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Classification of Less Lethal Device
Technologies
Doug Baines
Biokinetics and Associates Ltd.
Prepared By:
Biokinetics and Associates Ltd.
2470 Don Reid Drive
Ottawa, ON K1H 1E1
Contractor's Document Number: R11-20
Contract Project Manager: Benoit Anctil, 613-736-0384 ext.223
PWGSC Contract Number: W7701-061933/001/QLC (A.T. 46 PO 04134NG)
CSA: Daniel Bourget, Defence Scientist, 418-844-4000 ext.4228
The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the
contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.
Defence R&D Canada – Valcartier
Contract Report
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
March 2012
Principal Author
Original signed by Doug Baines
Doug Baines
Supervisor - Laboratories
Approved by
Original signed by Daniel Bourget
Daniel Bourget
Defence Scientist
Approved for release by
Original signed by Dr. Dennis Nandlall
Dr. Dennis Nandlall
Head, Weapons Effects and Protection Section
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2012
© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale,
2012
Abstract ……..
Biokinetics was tasked by DRDC Valcartier as part of the CEWSI (Conductive Energy Weapon
Strategic Initiative) to define a classification schema based on available information that can be
used as part of an approval process to ensure that technologies to be approved are assessed using
proper regulations and test protocols. This was achieved by conducting a review of source
material that came from previous DRDC contracts, NATO and TTCP panel reports, as well as the
internet. Results indicate that despite much research and discussion about device effectiveness,
evaluation methodologies, and studies of human effects; there are not any product standards for
less-lethal devices.
If occupational exposure standards exist for the particular agent being used, as they do for many
types of noise, radiation and chemicals, then these standards should be followed when possible.
However, such standards are highly conservative with large safety factors and therefore might not
induce the desired response. In general, injury thresholds seem to be known for many of the
major body regions and their related organs and systems. Combining this knowledge with device
effectiveness and risk assessment methodology to create product performance and safety
standards for less-lethal devices seems stalled in the research stage.
Résumé ….....
Biokinetics a été chargé par RDDC Valcartier dans le cadre du CEWSI (conducteur Initiative
arme stratégique de l'énergie) pour définir un schéma de classification de base sur les
informations disponibles qui peuvent être utilisés dans le cadre d'un processus d'approbation afin
de s'assurer que les technologies soient approuvés sont évalués à l'aide des règlements appropriés
et protocoles d'essai. Ceci a été réalisé en procédant à une révision du matériel source qui venait
de précédents contrats de RDDC, l'OTAN et les rapports des groupes TTCP, ainsi que l'internet.
Les résultats indiquent que, malgré beaucoup de recherches et de discussions sur l'efficacité de
dispositif, les méthodes d'évaluation, et études sur les effets de l'homme; il n'ya pas de normes de
produits pour moins létales appareils.
Si les normes d'exposition professionnelle existent pour l'agent particulier qui est utilisé, comme
ils le font pour de nombreux types de bruit, les rayonnements et les produits chimiques, alors ces
normes doivent être suivies lorsque cela est possible. Toutefois, ces normes sont très
conservatrices avec des facteurs de sécurité importants et donc peut-être pas induire la réponse
souhaitée. En général, les seuils de blessures semblent être connus pour la plupart des régions du
corps les grands et de leurs organes et des systèmes connexes. La combinaison de ces
connaissances avec la méthodologie de l'efficacité périphérique et la création de la performance
du produit et les normes de sécurité pour les moins meurtrières dispositifs semble au point mort
dans le stade de la recherche.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
i
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ii
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
Executive summary
Classification of Less Lethal Device Technologies:
Doug Baines; DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127; Defence R&D Canada – Valcartier;
March 2012.
Introduction or background: Biokinetics was tasked by DRDC Valcartier as part of the CEWSI
(Conductive Energy Weapon Strategic Initiative) to define a classification schema based on
available information that can be used as part of an approval process to ensure that technologies
to be approved are assessed using proper regulations and test protocols. From the list of
technologies identified in the NATO Non-Lethal Weapon Technology Taxonomy the following
list of in-service technologies and devices has been identified:
•
Kinetic less-lethal devices (e.g. impact munitions of various calibers and launch
platforms)
•
Acoustic devices (e.g. hailing device, and underwater hailing devices)
•
Laser devices (e.g. green laser interdiction system, and dazzlers)
•
Chemical devices (e.g. pepper spray)
•
Electrical devices (e.g. Taser)
•
Multi-sensory devices (e.g. flash bangs)
These technologies and devices where identified based on their counter-personnel capabilities and
their status within the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program as current
non-lethal weapons. Current non-lethal weapons are fielded and in use. Human effects
assessments have been conducted to identify the technology’s anticipated physiological responses
and risk of significant injury to the subject, bystander, and operator. However, access to this data
is limited to pepper spray and Taser devices.
Source material came from previous DRDC contracts, NATO and TTCP panel reports, as well as
various internet sources such as; the U.S. Defense Technology Information Center (DTIC), and
the U.S. Department of Defense Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (JNLWP).
Results: Some occupational exposure standards exist for particular agents being used; as for
many types of noise, radiation and chemicals, and these standards should be followed when
possible. However, such standards are highly conservative with large safety factors and therefore
might not induce the desired response. Other agents and technologies are without guidance on
safe limits.
Significance: The possible human effects of less-lethal devices range from medical, to group
psychology and from the acute to the long-term. The human effects issues concerning less-lethal
devices are not unlike those related to therapeutic drugs; there are desired effects, there are
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
iii
undesired effects, and there is a useful region in between the two extremes. These effects can be
characterized by plotting the probability of a response versus some measure of the less-lethal
device strength, the so called dose-response curve.
In general, injury thresholds seem to be known for many of the major body regions and their
related organs and systems. However, despite the human effects data collected so far, defining the
threshold between no-response, the desired response, and injury is not as well defined.
Combining this knowledge with device effectiveness and risk assessment methodology to create
product performance and safety standards for less-lethal devices seems to be stalled in the
research stage. In the absence of industry regulations and standards strong product claims can be
made without evidence or references.
Future plans: Identifying all of the intended and unintended effects both acute and chronic for
both the user and the subject is required not only for the technology class but in some cases for
the particular devices within that class.
iv
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
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DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
v
Table of contents
Abstract …….. ................................................................................................................................. i
Résumé …..... ................................................................................................................................... i
Executive summary ........................................................................................................................ iii
Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ vi
List of figures ............................................................................................................................... viii
List of tables ................................................................................................................................... ix
1
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1
2
Kinetic Devices ......................................................................................................................... 4
2.1
Blunt Force Effects ........................................................................................................ 4
1.1.1
Definition ........................................................................................................ 4
1.1.2
Device Description .......................................................................................... 4
1.1.3
Effects of Concern........................................................................................... 4
1.1.4
Safe Exposure Limits ...................................................................................... 5
1.1.5
Standards ......................................................................................................... 5
1.1.6
Associated Technologies and Device Characteristics ..................................... 6
3
Acoustic Devices .................................................................................................................... 10
3.1
Aural Effects................................................................................................................ 10
1.1.7
Definition ...................................................................................................... 10
1.1.8
Device Description ........................................................................................ 10
1.1.9
Effects of Concern......................................................................................... 10
1.1.10 Safe Exposure Limits .................................................................................... 10
1.1.11 Standards ....................................................................................................... 11
1.1.12 Associated Technologies and Device Characteristics ................................... 11
4
Optical Devices ....................................................................................................................... 13
4.1
Ocular Effects .............................................................................................................. 13
1.1.13 Definition ...................................................................................................... 13
1.1.14 Device Description ........................................................................................ 13
1.1.15 Effects of Concern......................................................................................... 13
1.1.16 Safe Exposure Limits .................................................................................... 13
1.1.17 Standards ....................................................................................................... 15
1.1.18 Associated Technologies and Device Characteristics ................................... 16
5
Chemical Devices ................................................................................................................... 17
5.1
Toxic Effects ............................................................................................................... 17
1.1.19 Definition ...................................................................................................... 17
1.1.20 Device Description ........................................................................................ 17
1.1.21 Aerosol Subject Restraints (ASR’s) .............................................................. 17
1.1.22 Safe Exposure Limits .................................................................................... 20
vi
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
Data Gaps and Research Needs..................................................................... 22
Standards ....................................................................................................... 23
Associated Technologies and Weapon Characteristics ................................. 25
6
Electrical Devices ................................................................................................................... 27
6.1
Electrical Muscle Stimulation (EMS) Effects ............................................................. 27
4.1.4
Definition ...................................................................................................... 27
4.1.5
Device Description ........................................................................................ 27
4.1.6
Delivery Modes ............................................................................................. 27
4.1.7
Effects of Concern......................................................................................... 28
4.1.8
Safe Exposure Limits .................................................................................... 30
4.1.9
Data Gaps and Research Needs..................................................................... 31
4.1.10 Standards ....................................................................................................... 32
4.1.11 Associated Technologies and Device Characteristics ................................... 33
7
Multi-sensory Devices ............................................................................................................ 34
7.1
Combined Effects ........................................................................................................ 34
4.1.12 Definition ...................................................................................................... 34
4.1.13 Device Description ........................................................................................ 34
4.1.14 Effects of Concern......................................................................................... 34
4.1.15 Safe Exposure Limits .................................................................................... 34
4.1.16 Standards ....................................................................................................... 35
4.1.17 Associated Technologies and Device Characteristics ................................... 35
8
Technical Evaluations ............................................................................................................. 37
9
Risk Characterization Framework .......................................................................................... 39
9.1
Hazard Effects Identification ....................................................................................... 39
Dose-Response ............................................................................................................ 39
9.2
9.3
Exposure Assessment .................................................................................................. 40
9.4
Risk Characterization .................................................................................................. 40
9.5
Standards Framework .................................................................................................. 41
10 Taxonomy (Counter Personnel) .............................................................................................. 43
11 Conclusions............................................................................................................................. 45
References 46
Distribution list ............................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
vii
List of figures
Figure 1 Relationship Between VF Threshold in Pigs and Body Weight ..................................... 31
Figure 2 Advanced Total Body Model ......................................................................................... 38
Figure 3 Less-lethal Weapon Operating Envelope ....................................................................... 40
Figure 4 Conceptual Framework for Effectiveness and Risk Characterization............................ 41
Figure 5 LLD Standards Framework ............................................................................................ 42
viii
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
List of tables
Table 1 NATO Non-Lethal Taxonomy ........................................................................................... 2
Table 2 Technical Expertise .......................................................................................................... 37
Table 3 Taxonomy (Counter Personnel) ....................................................................................... 43
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
ix
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x
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
1
Introduction
Less lethal devices are designed to fill the gap between the shout and shoot responses, however
they bring with them some new challenges to the law enforcement acquisition community and
program managers who are tasked with characterizing the effects and effectiveness of less-lethal
devices on their subjects. Currently there is no policy or guidance and they must rely on their own
discretion. The purpose of this report is to identify the less-lethal technologies and devices
currently available in the public domain and to identify criteria and protocols to test against. A
less-lethal device taxonomy that will facilitate an approval process for law enforcement and
corrections is desired, such that technologies to be approved are assessed using proper regulations
and test protocols to determine whether or not the device meets the law enforcement definition of
less-lethal (to be determined) and presents low risks of short and long term injuries to the civilian
population. Excluded from this report are considerations given to legal assessments, and
operational policies and procedures.
The current NATO Non-lethal Weapon (NLW) Technology Taxonomy categorizes possible
NLW technology types and was developed by the NATO SAS-035 study which is based on the
US Joint NLW directorate Taxonomy (Table 1). Specific NLW systems that use these and other
technologies must comply with treaty and legal obligations.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
1
Tablee 1 NATO Non
n-Lethal Taxo
onomy
The following
f
listt of less-lethaal devices was identified for review iin this reportt based on thhe
devicee’s counter-personnel capaabilities and its
i status withhin the U.S. D
Department off Defense Joinnt
Non-L
Lethal Weapo
ons Program as current non-lethal
n
weeapons. Curreent non-lethaal weapons arre
fieldeed and in use.. Human effects assessmen
nts have beenn conducted tto identify the technologyy’s
anticipated physiological respo
onses and risk
k of significaant injury to the subject, bbystander, annd
operator. Howeverr, access to these assessmen
nts is limited to pepper sprray and Taserr devices.
2
•
Kinetic leess-lethal dev
vices (e.g. impact
i
muniitions of varrious caliberrs and launcch
platforms)
•
d
(e.g. hailing
h
devicee, and underw
water hailing ddevices)
Acoustic devices
•
Laser deviices (e.g. greeen laser interd
diction system
m, and dazzlerrs)
•
Chemical devices
d
(e.g. pepper
p
spray))
D
DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
•
Electrical devices (e.g. Taser)
•
Multi-sensory devices (e.g. Flash Bangs)
Counter-materiel less-lethal weapons, and those still in development are outside the scope of this
report.
By reviewing the device characteristics, as well as the intended and unintended effects of these
devices, this report attempts to summarize the effects of concern and to identify test procedures
that can be used to evaluate the performance and safety of these devices.
Some occupational exposure standards exist for a particular agent being used, as for many types
of noise, radiation and chemicals, and these standards should be followed when possible.
However, such standards are highly conservative with large safety factors and therefore might not
induce the desired response. Other agents and technologies are without guidance on safe limits.
The possible human effects of less-lethal devices range from medical, to group psychology and
from the acute to the long-term. The human issues concerning less-lethal devices are not unlike
those related to therapeutic drugs; there are desired effects and there are undesired effects and
there is a useful region in between the two extremes. These effects can be characterized by
plotting the probability of a response versus some measure of the less-lethal device strength, the
so called dose-response curve.
In general, injury thresholds seem to be known for many of the major body regions and their
related organs and systems. However, despite the human effects data collected so far, defining the
threshold between no-response, the desired response, and injury is not as well defined.
Combining this knowledge with device effectiveness and risk assessment methodology to create
product performance and safety standards for less-lethal devices seems to be stalled in the
research stage. In the absence of industry regulations and standards strong product claims can be
made without evidence or references.
A classification scheme based on the NATO taxonomy with consideration given to the various
effects of exposure to less-lethal devices is proposed. This will allow for the inclusion of new
technologies as they become available. Since many of the major body regions and their related
organs and systems have known injury thresholds this will help to identify proper test methods.
This is in keeping with existing approaches to trauma prediction that include survivabilitylethality-vulnerability (SVL) models to assess the interaction of conventional threats such as
projectiles and fragments. The critical elements include models of the threat and delivery to the
subject, their interaction with the anatomy and physiology, and injury outcome assessments based
upon available injury criteria. Less-lethal devices include some unique threats not currently found
in these models, but building upon and using these existing evaluation tools seems a natural
evolution.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
3
2
Kinetic Devices
2.1
Blunt Force Effects
1.1.1 Definition
Blunt trauma comprises any injury that is sustained from blunt force caused by impact, injury, or
physical attack; the latter usually being referred to as blunt force trauma. Motor vehicle accidents
are the most common cause of blunt trauma but other mishaps from falls, blows or crush injuries
from blunt objects are also possible causes. The term blunt trauma may encompass concussions,
abrasions, bruising, ruptures, lacerations, and bone fractures. Blunt force trauma differs from
penetrating trauma, in which a projectile enters the body, although both have the ability to cause
pain and internal injury [1].
1.1.2 Device Description
Projectile, Blunt Impact and other Kinetic Devices: Devices intended to impart kinetic energy
and cause temporary physical pain, resulting in deterrence, distraction, incapacitation, and a
reduced motivation. Also, hollow projectiles can be filled with chemicals, dyes, or other
substances that are released upon impact. Depending on energy, range, ricochet, bounce, location
of impact, and the sensitivity of the individual, such devices can result in undesired injuries such
as severe bruising, broken bones, contusion, concussion, eye damage, and are potentially lethal
[2].
1.1.3 Effects of Concern
Many surveys, Post Mortem Human Subject (PMHS) studies, animal studies and incident reports
have been published to assess the type and severity of injuries that occurred as consequence of
Kinetic Energy Non-Lethal Weapons (KENLW) projectile impact. In summary, the following
injuries can be expected[3]:
• At the site of impact: abrasion, contusion, laceration and penetration of the projectile, or part
of it
• Away from the site of impact: bone fracture, crushing of organs, hemorrhages.
Depending on the projectile impact location and the energy at which it hits the target, a large
range of consequence can occur, including death. The following non exhaustive list of injuries
from either penetration or blunt impact of KENLW has been reported[3]:
• Head and face impacts: skull and facial bone fracture can occur with possible brain
hematomas
• Eye impacts: globe rupture and corneal abrasion and laceration
• Thoracic impacts: rib fracture, heart concussion and contusion and lung contusion
• Abdominal impacts: rupture and laceration of abdominal internal organs
4
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
• Upper and lower extremities impacts: open or closed fractures of long bones
In the references mentioned above, head impact is pointed out as the most frequent cause of death
and serious injuries followed by the thoracic region which suggests that the impact location is a
primary factor in the outcome of KENLW use. Manufacturers’ literature and impact munitions
training programs typically advise officers to direct their aim towards extremities and larger
muscle areas and away from others (e.g., head, neck, spine, liver and kidney areas) based on the
assumption that more serious injuries are more likely to occur when subjects are struck in critical
areas. It is therefore essential to train soldiers and police officers effectively and to provide them
with accurate KENLW devices to reach the desired effects on the target[3].
1.1.4 Safe Exposure Limits
There are no formal exposure limits for kinetic energy less-lethal weapons (KELLW), although
there is research to suggest that blunt trauma injury thresholds are known for the various
anatomical regions.
1.1.5 Standards
Although no formal NIJ KELLW standard currently exists for the evaluation of less-lethal
munitions, Wayne State University (WSU) has developed an internal test methodology to assess
the injury potential of these munitions. Three factors (for kinetic energy munitions) are
considered: accuracy, thoracic blunt trauma, and penetrating trauma [4]. NATO LCG-9 (Land
Capability Group-9) on NLW have stood up a working group of experts in March 2010 with the
goal of standardizing test methods for the assessment on injuries caused by blunt impact NLW.
The group of expert has divided the work as follows: head/face impacts, thoracic impacts,
abdominal impacts, penetration assessment and accuracy. The different test methods available
within NATO countries are analysed and injury criteria’s are proposed. At the time of writing
this report the first version of the standard concerning penetration assessment is planned for
September 2012.
Accuracy and Precision Assessments
The accuracy of a projectile is assessed at various ranges [up to 100 m] based on operational
firing distances. A circle of precision is used to determine how tightly a ten shot grouping can be
made at various distances. KENLW projectile are relatively unstable. Therefore, in flight
attitude of the projectile has to be determined using high-speed video analysis.
Penetration Assessments
The risk of penetrating trauma caused by KENLW is important and has been reported frequently.
One factor to consider is the amount of energy generated by the munition. In addition, it is
important to determine the energy per unit area or E/a (J/cm^2) value to assess penetration
capability. This value takes into account the mass, velocity, and the cross-sectional area of the
projectile. Simply reporting energy is insufficient for comparison of different samples and
projectiles. Penetration assessment is done by the evaluation of penetration in a surrogate
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
5
composed of 20% ballistic gelaatin, foam, an
nd natural chaamois. This teesting is typiccally done at a
range that represen
nts the worst case or miniimum suggestted range. A
Accuracy of thhe projectile is
criticaal for this testting due to thee surface areaa restrictions oof the penetraation surrogatte.
Blunt Trauma Assessment
A
s
r
of blunt trauma to thee thorax has been assesseed by using aan empiricallyy based injurry
The risk
criteriion called thee viscous critterion (VC). This
T criterionn has used exxtensively for motor vehicle
occup
pants to predict the severity
y of injury. The
T VC is callculated basedd on the amount of thoracic
compression and the velocity
y at which this
t
compresssion occurs.. The amounnt of thoracic
compression was defined
d
as thee displacemen
nt of the chesst in relationsship to the spiine normalizeed
by thee initial thickn
ness of the th
horax. VC hass been validatted as a usefuul tool in deteermining injurry
severiity related to blunt ballisttic impacts to
o the thorax. Blunt traum
ma assessmentt of less-lethhal
munittions is condu
ucted at Way
yne State Un
niversity withh the 3-RBID
D ballistic imppact surrogatte.
This testing
t
is also
o typically don
ne at a range that representts the worst ccase, or minim
mum suggesteed
range. Accuracy of the projeectile is again critical foor this testinng due to thee surface areea
restricctions of the 3-RBID.
3
Biok
kinetics and Associates
A
haave developedd a Blunt Trauuma Torso Riig
(BTTR) with a larrger surface area
a
that may
y be a useful tool once a test methodoology has beeen
adoptted.
Head and face su
urrogate devicces exists to evaluate thee risk of skuull fracture ((Ballistic Loaad
Sensin
ng Headform
m – BLSH – from Biokin
netics) and thhe risk of faacial bone fraacture and eyye
injuriees (FOCUS head,
h
USAA
ARL). A test method to assess skull fr
fracture was ddetermines foor
behind armour blu
unt trauma (BA
ABT) behind
d ballistic helm
mets under C
CSA Z613. The test methood
can bee adapted to KENLW,
K
but as of now, no
o test methoddology has been adopted.
1.1.6
6 Associated Technologies an
nd Device C
Characteristics
12-ga
auge munitions
The 12-Gauge Mun
nitions are deesigned to den
ny individualss access into//out of an, moove individuaals
throug
gh an area, and suppress individuals.
i
This
T
technoloogy has the potential to suupport multiple
missio
ons including
g: force protecction, checkpo
oints, patrols//convoys, andd crowd contrrol.
6
D
DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
Thesee munitions are shotgun rounds thatt are designeed to deliveer blunt trauuma effects tto
indiviiduals. Multiiple Servicess currently employ
e
thesee rounds. Diifferent typess of 12-gaugge
munittions are available such as stingball rou
unds, fin stabiilized rounds,, and sock rouunds [5], to liist
a few.
40 mm Munition
ns
The 40
4 mm Muniitions are deesigned to deny
d
individuuals access iinto/out of aan area, movve
indiviiduals through
h an area, and
d suppress ind
dividuals. Thiis technologyy has the potenntial to suppoort
multip
ple missions including:
i
forrce protection
n, access contr
trol points, paatrols, and croowd control.
Amon
ngst other, thee M203 grenade launcher can deliver bblunt trauma effects to inddividuals usinng
these rounds. Mu
ultiple Servicces currently employ theese rounds. D
Different typpes of 40 mm
m
munittions are avaiilable such ass sponge roun
nds, foam ruubber baton roounds, and crrowd dispersal
cartrid
dges [5].
66 mm Light Vehicle Obscu
urant Smok
ke Systems and Vehicle Launched
d LessLetha
al Grenades
s
The 66
6 mm Light Vehicle
V
Obsccurant Smoke System and V
Vehicle Launnched Less-Leethal Grenadees
are deesigned to den
ny individuals access into//out of an areaa, move indivviduals througgh an area, annd
supprress individuaals.
DRDC
C Valcartier CR
R 2012-127
7
This technology
t
haas the potentiial to support multiple misssions includiing: force prootection, crow
wd
contro
ol, offensive and
a defensivee operations.
The Light
L
Vehiclee Obscurant Smoke
S
System
m and Vehiccle Launched Less-Lethal Grenades is a
remottely fired lau
uncher that diischarges a 4 grenade sinngle salvo. Thhe grenades are capable oof
deliveering smoke, flash bang eff
ffects, Riot-Co
ontrol Agent m
munitions annd blunt traum
ma[5].
FN-303 Less-Letthal Launch
hing System
m
The FN-303
F
Less Lethal
L
Launcching System is designed tto deny indivviduals accesss into/out of aan
area, move indiviiduals throug
gh an area, and
a
suppresss individuals. This technnology has thhe
potential to suppo
ort multiple missions
m
inclluding: force protection, ddetainee operations, crow
wd
contro
ol, defensive and offensivee operations.
The FN-303
F
is a compressed--air powered
d launcher deesigned to fiire Less-Lethhal projectilees.
Projecctiles includee a training/b
blunt impactt, marking (w
washable-pinkk, permanennt-yellow), annd
Oleorresin Capsicum
m liquid[5].
Modu
ular Crowd Control Mu
unitions
8
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The Modular
M
Crow
wd Control Munition
M
is deesigned to denny individualls access into/out of an areea
and suppress
s
individuals. Thiis technology
y has the ppotential to support multiple missionns
wd control.
includ
ding: entry co
ontrol points, defensive acttions, and crow
The Modular
M
Crow
wd Control Munition
M
is thee same dimennsion as a Claaymore Mine and is capable
of blu
unt trauma im
mpact. The explosive
e
mun
nition sends 600 rubber bballs out at hhigh speeds tto
supprress subjects[5
5].
Sting
gball Grenade
The Stingball Grenade is dessigned to deeny individuuals access innto/out of aan area, movve
indiviiduals through
h an area, and
d suppress ind
dividuals. Thiis technologyy has the potenntial to suppoort
multip
ple missions including:
i
forrce protection
n, clear roomss, and crowd ccontrol.
The Stingball
S
Gren
nade is hand thrown or caan be fired oout of a 12-gaauge launch ccup for furtheer
range. The cartridg
ge consists off a fuse, a sep
parating fuse bbody, a blackk powder sepaaration chargge,
a presssed black po
owder delay, a bursting charge
c
of flassh powder, aand rubber peellets. When it
explodes the rubbeer pellets hit th
he subject with blunt forcee.
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3
3.1
Acoustic Devices
Aural Effects
1.1.7 Definition
There are two basic types of Noise Induced Hearing Loss (NIHL); acoustic trauma from acute
exposure, and gradually developing through chronic exposure. Acoustic trauma is injury to the
hearing mechanisms in the inner ear (cochlear damage) due to very loud noise (excessive sound
pressure). Gradually developing NIHL refers to permanent cochlear damage from repeated
exposure to loud sounds over a period of time[6].
1.1.8 Device Description
Devices intended to utilize acoustic energy to induce human effects through the sense of hearing
or through the direct impact of pressure waves on other parts of the human body. A large variety
of acoustic devices have been proposed for less-lethal applications. Most are of uncertain
effectiveness and many could damage hearing[2]. We have focused here on audible acoustic
devices currently available to law enforcement and corrections.
1.1.9 Effects of Concern
Noise induced permanent hearing loss.
1.1.10 Safe Exposure Limits
For the purpose of this discussion there are two main categories of individuals to consider;
operators and subjects.
Operators may be exposed to noise produced by these devices on repeated occasions and their
exposure should fall within well-established occupational exposure limits defined by the
Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS). Occupational exposure limits
(OELs) for noise are typically given as the maximum duration of exposure permitted for various
noise levels. They are often displayed in exposure-duration tables. The OELs depend on two key
factors that are used to prepare exposure-duration tables: the criterion level and the exchange
rate[7]. The criterion level, often abbreviated as Lc, is the steady noise level permitted for a full
eight-hour work shift. This is 90 dB(A) in most jurisdictions, but in some jurisdictions it is 85
dB(A). The exception is in the Canadian federal noise regulations where the criterion level is 87
dB(A). As the sound level increases above the criterion level, Lc, the allowed exposure time must
be decreased. The allowed maximum exposure time is calculated by using an exchange rate, also
called a "dose-trading relation" or "trading ratio." The exchange rate is the amount by which the
permitted sound level may increase if the exposure time is halved[7].
Occupational exposure limits for subjects of acoustic effects is inappropriate, given that subjects
will likely only receive a single exposure and there are no recognized safety limits for these
10
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
subjeccts[8]. Howev
ver, the Direcctorate of Forcce Health Prootection Canaadian Forces H
Health
Servicces Group Heeadquarters haas developed Occupationaal Health Recoommendationns Regarding
the Saafe Use of thee LRAD-1000
0X in Maritim
me Operationss which recom
mmends expoosure limits foor
singlee exposure to continuous high
h
intensity sound based on existing hhuman researcch.
1.1.1
11 Standard
ds
Curreently there aree no industry standards
s
for less-lethal accoustic devicees.
MIL-STD-1474D standard
s
estab
blishes acoustical noise lim
mits and presccribes testing requirementss
and measurement
m
techniques
t
for determining
g conformancce to the noisee limits speciffied therein.
This standard
s
was established fo
or the military
y environmennt (including ssingle exposuure high levell
low duration
d
noises like blast) and
a is the resu
ult of long term
rm, still continnuing research on the
subjecct. Although not perfect, this
t standard can
c be used too assess the eeffects of expoosure to
acousstic devices. LRAD
L
Corpo
oration’s prod
duct specificattion sheets indicate that theeir products
meet MIL-STD-14
M
474D
1.1.1
12 Associated Technologies an
nd Device C
Characteristics
Acou
ustic Hailing
g Devices
Acousstic Hailing Devices
D
(like the LRAD for
f example) are designedd to deny indiividuals accesss
into/o
out of an areaa, move individuals throug
gh an area, annd suppress inndividuals. This technologgy
has th
he potential to
o support multiple missions including: fforce protectioon, checkpoinnts, patrols annd
convo
oys, and crow
wd control.
Acousstic Hailing Devices pro
ovide scalablle, directionaal warning ttones or inteelligible voicce
comm
mands beyond
d 500 meters. They can be
b vehicle, veessel and groound mounted [5]. At higgh
powerr, the sound pressure
p
level (SPL) can bee damaging foor targets at sshort range.
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Enha
anced Unde
erwater Loudhailer
The Enhanced
E
Und
derwater Loudhailer is dessigned to denyy access into//out of an areea and suppresss
underrwater swimm
mers and diveers. This techn
nology has thhe potential too support muultiple missionns
includ
ding: force prrotection, and port security
y.
The Enhanced
E
Un
nderwater Loudhailer is a man-portablle, easy-to-opperate unit ccomprised of a
contro
ol unit and a 75-foot transsducer cable. The unit trannsmits intelliggible commannds capable oof
audito
ory impairment up to 2 hou
urs with a battery source, to a distance of 457 meterrs and depth oof
40 meeters [5].
12
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4
4.1
Optical Devices
Ocular Effects
1.1.13 Definition
Optical radiation refers to those parts of the electromagnetic spectrum broadly divided into three
spectral bands; ultraviolet (UV), visible (VIS), and and infrared (IR). UV and IR are further
subdivided into various spectral bands. Laser radiation predominantly causes injury via thermal
effects. Even moderately powered lasers can cause injury to the eye. High power lasers can also
burn the skin. Some lasers are so powerful that even the diffuse reflection from a surface can be
hazardous to the eye. Non-Coherent optical radiation (sources other than laser) can also damage
the eye.
1.1.14 Device Description
Electromagnetic – Visible and Invisible Light and Lasers: Most less-lethal technology concepts
utilizing light are intended to temporarily disrupt vision. Vision disruption can occur by glare
from direct exposure to the light source, glare from reflections from the light source or from
flashblindness occurring after exposure. These effects are stronger in low background
illumination environment like at night or in low light conditions principally because of the
dilatation of the pupils under those circumstances.
1.1.15 Effects of Concern
The eye and skin are the organs most susceptible to damage by laser radiation[9]. The primary
effect of concern for the eye is caused by irradiation of the retina by high level of light energy.
For skin the effect is related to burns caused by the thermal load generated by the light source.
The type of effect, injury thresholds, and damage mechanisms vary significantly with wavelength,
intensity, duration, and the frequency of its impact [9]. Secondary effects due to visual
impairment are also of concern[2].
1.1.16 Safe Exposure Limits
Lasers
Laser safe exposure limits exists to minimize the risk of laser accidents, especially those
involving eye injuries.
Moderate and high-power lasers are potentially hazardous because they can burn the retina of the
eye, or even the skin. To control the risk of injury, various specifications, for example ANSI
Z136 in the US and IEC 60825 internationally, define "classes" of laser depending on their power
and wavelength. These regulations also prescribe required safety measures, such as labelling
lasers with specific warnings, and wearing laser safety goggles when operating lasers.
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13
The Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) and the Nominal Ocular Hazard Distance (NOHD)
are the most important parameters of laser safety. The MPE is the highest power or energy
density (in irradiance - W/cm2 - or radiance exposure - J/cm2 -) of a light source that is considered
safe i.e. that has a negligible probability for creating damage. It is usually about 10% of the dose
that has a 50% chance of creating damage[8] under worst-case conditions. The MPE is measured
at the cornea of the human eye or at the skin, for a given wavelength and exposure time.
The evaluation of these parameters requires a detailed knowledge of the standards and of the
various techniques which are necessary to measure them. The experimental values of irradiance
must be compared with the MPE parameters obtained by safety standards. When the values of
irradiance exceed the MPE parameters then the NOHD values must to be calculated.
A calculation of the MPE for ocular exposure takes into account the various ways light can act
upon the eye. For example, deep-ultraviolet light causes accumulating damage, even at very low
powers. Infrared light with a wavelength longer than about 1400 nm is absorbed by the
transparent parts of the eye before it reaches the retina, which means that the MPE for these
wavelengths is higher than for visible light. In addition to the wavelength and exposure time, the
MPE takes into account the spatial distribution of the light (from a laser or otherwise). Collimated
laser beams of visible and near-infrared light are especially dangerous at relatively low powers
because the lens focuses the light onto a tiny spot on the retina. Light sources with a smaller
degree of spatial coherence than a well-collimated laser beam, such as high-power LEDs, lead to
a distribution of the light over a larger area on the retina. For such sources, the MPE is higher
than for collimated laser beams. In the MPE calculation, the worst-case scenario is assumed, in
which the eye lens focuses the light into the smallest possible spot size on the retina for the
particular wavelength and the pupil is fully open. Although the MPE is specified as power or
energy per unit surface, it is based on the power or energy that can pass through a fully open pupil
(0.39 cm2) for visible and near-infrared wavelengths. This is relevant for laser beams that have a
cross-section smaller than 0.39 cm2. The IEC-60825-1 and ANSI Z136.1[10] standards include
methods of calculating MPEs[11].
The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program in the United States has identified an eye safe irradiance
of 100 ȝW/cm2 as causing enough glare to temporarily and effectively obscure a persons field of
vision.
Non-coherent Optical Radiation
The optical properties of lasers are special and differ significantly from those of conventional,
broad-band optical sources, and so the exposure limits for broad-band optical sources necessarily
differ from those applicable to lasers. In addition, laser guidelines incorporate assumptions of
exposure that may not apply to conventional optical sources. Most lasers emit radiation over one
or more extremely narrow wavelength bands, and no detailed knowledge of the spectral output is
required for purposes of hazard evaluation. By contrast, evaluation of the potential hazards of
broadband conventional light sources requires spectraradiometric data to apply several different
photobiological action spectra, as well as knowledge of the exposure geometry. The action
spectra may apply to different ocular structures and the biological effects are not additive.
Adverse health effects of exposure to intense light sources are theoretically possible across the
entire optical spectrum, but the risk of retinal injury due to radiation in the visible and nearinfrared is of particular concern. Exposure lintits vary enormously across the optical spectrum
14
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
because of variations in biological effects and the different structures of the eye that are
potentially at risk [12].
Guidelines on exposure limits for non-coherent visible and infrared radiation have been put
forward by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection [12], and are
currently being updated[13]
1.1.17 Standards
There are currently no industry standards for less-lethal optical devices in particular. However,
industry standards do exist for laser safety, one of which is the American National Standard for
Safe Use of Lasers (ANSI Z136.1)[10]. This standard provides recommendations for the safe use
of lasers and laser systems that operate at wavelengths between 180 nm and 1 mm.
Manufacturers measured laser safety in terms of MPE and NOHD as defined by the ANSI Z136.1
standard for laser safety, and provide a recommended safe stand-off distance.
No product standards for exposure to optical radiation have been proposed. But because there are
differences between broad-band incoherent optical sources and monochromatic laser sources, and
between the worst-case conditions for the two, and because a number of simplifying assumptions
were used to derive laser exposure limits, it is necessary to recommend different exposure limits
that are more realistic for incoherent sources[12].
The following standards and guidelines might offer a way forward and offer insight into the
proper safety assessments of less-lethal devices utilizing optical radiation:
1. ANSI Z136.1[10]
2. International Commission on Non-ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNRP) [9] [12] [13]
3. Directive 2006/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2006 on the
minimum health and safety requirements regarding the exposure of workers to risks arising
from physical agents (artificial optical radiation) (19th individual Directive within the
meaning of Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) [14].
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15
1.1.1
18 Associated Technologies an
nd Device C
Characteristics
Gree
en Laser Inte
erdiction Sy
ystem
The Green
G
Laser In
nterdiction Sy
ystem (GLIS)) is designed to deny indivviduals accesss into/out of aan
area, move indiviiduals throug
gh an area, and
a
suppresss individuals. This technnology has thhe
potential to supp
port multiple missions in
ncluding: foorce protectioon, checkpoiints, maritim
me
ports//security zon
nes, entry co
ontrol pointss, and deny,, move, andd suppress iindividuals oon
foot/o
operating vesssel.
The GLIS
G
is a riflle-mounted/haand-held laseer that allowss interdiction of potential hostile actionns
throug
gh less-lethal effects and
d is interchaangeable betw
ween host w
weapon platfoorms. It is aan
effecttive less-lethaal means to inform
i
(warn
n) civilians thhat are approoaching milittary operationns
with visible effects from 0-30
00 m. This ocular
o
impaiirment devicee is handheld, but can bbe
moun
nted on a rifle or crew serveed weapon[5]]. These devicces are comm
monly referredd to as dazzlers
and arre available from
f
numerou
us manufactu
ures with varioous models ooffering continnuous wave oor
pulsed
d mode.
The colour
c
green was
w chosen due
d to the facct that the hum
uman eye is fo
four times moore sensitive tto
green light than to red light duriing the day, and
a 363 timess more sensitivve to green att night.
Othe
er Optical de
evices
Laser devices where identified
d based on their
t
counterr-personnel caapabilities annd their statuus
within
n the U.S. Deepartment of Defense
D
Jointt Non-Lethal Weapons Proogram as currrent non-lethal
weapo
ons. Current non-lethal weapons
w
are fielded
f
and inn use. Humaan effects assessments havve
been conducted to
o identify th
he technology
y’s anticipateed physiologiical responsees and risk oof
signifficant injury to the subjeect, bystanderr, and operattor. Other opptical devices operating iin
variou
us wavelengths, although available, aree beyond thee scope of thiis report due to the lack oof
data.
16
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5
5.1
Chemical Devices
Toxic Effects
1.1.19 Definition
Toxicity is the ability of a substance to produce an unwanted effect when the chemical has
reached a sufficient concentration at a certain site in the body. The more toxic a material is, the
smaller the amount required for harmful effects to occur . The toxicity of a chemical is generally
measured by experiments on animals. It is measured in terms of the amounts of material
necessary to cause death in 50% of the test animals. These values are called LD50 (lethal dose) or
LC50 (lethal concentration), and are usually given in weight of material per kg of body weight or
airborne concentration of material per set time period respectively[9].
1.1.20 Device Description
Chemicals for Anti-Personnel Applications: Pharmaceuticals, irritants, and lubricants, have been
proposed for a variety of anti-personnel applications. Possibilities for undesired human effects are
significant and depend on the amount of exposure (dose) to the agent, its means of entry into the
body (e.g., skin for liquids, respiratory for gasses), and access to sensitive organs (e.g., the eye).
While some of these compounds are used by domestic police, their use by multinational forces
and in warfare is limited by laws and treaties[2].
The predominant agents used in law enforcement and corrections are normally referred to as Riot
Control Agents (RCAs) – despite the fact that they have much broader tactical application for law
enforcement than crowd management and riot control. Internationally, RCAs are defined as:
Any chemical not listed in a Schedule [lists of chemicals prohibited under the Chemical Weapons
Convention] which can produce rapidly humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects
which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure[15].
RCA’s fall into one or more of the following five technology categories: Malodorant Agents,
Irritant Agents, Smoke, Marking Agents, and Calmative Agents.
A physiological classification of materials identifies toxic materials based on their biologic
action, as follows: irritants, asphyxiants, narcotics or anaesthetics, systemic poisons, carcinogens,
mutagens, teratogens, and sensitizers[16].
1.1.21 Aerosol Subject Restraints (ASR’s)
Delivery Modes
There are three primary delivery modes; stream, cone spray (large aerosol droplets), fogger (small
aerosol droplets).
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17
Effects of Concern
The intended effects of OC/PAVA sprays are irritation and incapacitation. Ocular irritation is the
primary effect, followed by respiratory and skin irritation. The stream and cone sprays are
expected to cause blepharospasm if the spray reaches the eyes. For these devices, pressure injury
to the eyes may pose a significant risk of severe eye damage. Aspiration of inert liquid for the
stream or cone spray device investigated was not a concern based on estimates of the volume of
liquid entering the mouth, but data gaps prevent elimination of concern for this effect. The risk of
flammability relates to the potential for ignition of solvents or propellants by a flame or a
spark[17].
For the fogger device, induction of intended respiratory effects would be expected within a
minute or less. Very sensitive asthmatics may develop bronchoconstriction at exposures less than
those that cause the intended effect in healthy individuals. These sensitive asthmatics are likely to
also have lower thresholds for the intended effect than healthy individuals, but quantitative
information on these relative thresholds was not available. There is also very wide variability in
the response among asthmatics. Healthy individuals may be at some risk for bronchoconstriction,
but the dose that causes bronchoconstriction in healthy individuals is not well defined. There may
be a risk of effects on the deep lung for the fogger, and this risk will increase with foggers that
have low levels of solids, but the data are not sufficient to translate this potential into a
probability of an effect[17].
The Biobehavioral Systems Branch (AFRL/RHDJ) conducted a Human Effectiveness and Risk
Characterization (HERC) for oleoresin capsicum (OC) and pelargonic acid vanillylamide (PAVA
or nonivamide) hand-held devices. The active ingredients in these devices are collectively termed
capsaicinoids, and act by peripheral sensory irritation. OC and PAVA sprays are a diverse set of
more than 300 commercially available products. Because the HERC team was not able to identify
sufficient information on any one product to allow the development of a product-specific
assessment of risk and effectiveness, the HERC instead evaluated three illustrative devices (a
stream spray, cone spray, and fogger) that are believed to generally represent the range of devices
commercially available[17].
The HERC presented a characterization of the likelihood of intended and unintended effects from
the use of these devices. Overall, the results indicate that the use of the devices as intended would
generally be effective in inducing the desired effect of peripheral sensory irritation without
presenting a significant risk of unintended severe effects. Although likely to be uncommon,
severe unintended effects might occur. In some cases, key data gaps and uncertainties preclude
the evaluation of effectiveness and risk. These overall conclusions regarding effectiveness and
risk are consistent with; the current experience with OC and PAVA devices in the field, limited
empirical data (primarily on the related chemical, capsaicin, as well as some data on PAVA), as
well as human effects or safety assessments developed by others[17].
Seven effects (two potentially intended and five unintended) were of sufficient concern and had
adequate data to include in a quantitative dose-response assessment[17].
•
18
Intended – eye irritation, and respiratory irritation
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
•
Unintended – pressure injury to the eye, bronchospasm, pulmonary effects, aspiration,
impact from canister and flammability. All unintended effects are potentially severe.
The spray is intended to cause a burning sensation in the eyes, nose and mouth. Contact with OC
particles incapacitates subjects by causing an almost immediate burning of the skin, and a
burning, tearing and swelling< of the eyes. This exposure to the OC can cause severe
blepharospasm (twitching or spasmodic contraction) of the eyes and even involuntary closing of
the eyes When the agent is inhaled, the respiratory tract is inflamed, resulting in a swelling of the
mucous membranes lining the breathing passages, and temporarily restricting breathing to short,
shallow breaths. Inhalation causes coughing and shortness of breath. This, in turn, causes a
gagging reflex and gasping for breath. This has been reported to be a response to
bronchoconstriction, a constriction of the airway. Repeated exposure can cause tachyphylaxis, a
decreasing response following consecutive administration. Furthermore, if a significant amount of
the aerosolized product reaches the pulmonary or alveolar region, where air exchange takes place,
it may greatly interfere with essential respiration. This is a primary concern for aerosols
generating a mist or a fog where the aerodynamic particle size is much smaller, thus potentially
allowing an excess amount of active ingredient to travel to the alveolar region[18].
The HERC report concluded that their analyses suggest that, despite significant data gaps in
exposure and toxicity, devices that spray liquids containing OC and PAVA are generally effective
devices, achieving a significant degree of compliance that appear to have a limited potential for
moderate to severe unintended effects. This conclusion is consistent with several other recent
evaluations of OC or PAVA. However, there are significant and important uncertainties in the
effects assessment, particularly regarding dose-response for respiratory effects of small-dropletsize aerosols and the estimates of inhalation exposure and physical impact of droplets on the eye.
The potential for occurrence of the various effects evaluated in this HERC can be summarized as
follows:
•
Eye effectiveness – expected for both the cone and stream, as long as the spray reaches
the eyes; not effective for the fogger.
•
Pressure injury to the eye – not a concern for the fogger; streams or cone sprays that
produce droplets (greater than 26 m/s) may pose a significant risk of severe eye damage.
•
Respiratory effectiveness – expected within 1 minute or less for the fogger.
•
Bronchoconstriction in sensitive asthmatics - not expected for the stream or cone sprays;
may occur within 1 minute or less for both fogger scenarios, but the fraction of the
population where this effect will occur is not known, due to considerable variability
among asthmatics.
•
Bronchoconstriction in healthy individuals – not expected for the cone spray or stream;
there may be some risk for bronchoconstriction in healthy individuals from foggers, but
the dose that causes bronchoconstriction in healthy individuals is not well defined.
•
Pulmonary effects – not expected for the cone spray or stream; there may be a risk of
pulmonary effects for fogger and this risk will increase with foggers that have low levels
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
19
of solids, but the data are not sufficient to translate this potential into a probability of an
effect.
•
Aspiration of liquid – not a concern for the fogger; not a risk based on aspiration of inert
liquid for the stream or cone spray device investigated in this study. However, the lack of
data on the actual amount used and the frequency of use at a distance of less than a meter
prevent the elimination of concern for this effect.
•
The risk of flammability depends on the solvent mixture. The available data suggest that
the 50% ethanol, 50% water mixture used in the hypothetical three devices assessed in
this report have the potential for being ignited under certain circumstances.
1.1.22 Safe Exposure Limits
In order for a substance to affect health, it must contact the body or be absorbed into the body.
When assessing the potential health effects from working with a particular substance it is
necessary to understand the difference between "toxicity" and "hazard".
Toxicity is the ability of a substance to produce an unwanted effect when the chemical has
reached a sufficient concentration at a certain site in the body. The more toxic a material is, the
smaller the amount of it necessary to be absorbed before harmful effects are caused.
Hazard is the probability that this concentration in the body will occur. Toxicity is an inherent
property of the material. A material may be very toxic, but not hazardous, if it is handled properly
and is not absorbed into the body. On the other hand, a material may have a very low toxicity, but
be very hazardous[16].
There are three primary routes of entry into the body; ingestion, skin or eye absorption, and
inhalation. Once a toxic substance has contacted the body it may have either acute (immediate) or
chronic (long-term) effects. Exposures are also classified as acute (single event) or chronic (some
frequency over a period of time).
Manufacturers provide Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) with their products. The MSDS lists
the hazardous ingredients in the product along with any exposure limits, counter measures and
other safety information. In Canada the program known as the Workplace Hazardous Materials
Information System (WHMIS) establishes the requirements for Material Safety Data Sheets
(MSDSs) in workplaces and is administered federally by Health Canada under the Hazardous
Products Act, Part II, and the Controlled Products Regulations. WHMIS and MSDS requirements
are also enforced by provincial Ministries or Departments of Labors Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS). CAS Registry Numbers are unique numerical identifiers assigned by the "Chemical
Abstracts Service" to every chemical described in the open scientific literature (currently
including those described from at least 1957 through the present). The Registry maintained by
CAS is an authoritative collection of disclosed chemical substance information, including;
hazards, risk codes, and safety descriptions.
20
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
Oleoresin Capsiicum (OC)
v
in hum
mans have beeen estimated at 0.5-5.0 g//kg. Acute deermal exposurre
Acutee oral LD50 values
can cause skin irriitation, but no
o exposure liimits have beeen found. Acute inhalatioon exposure tto
capsaicin temporarily causes bronchoconstr
b
riction, coughhing, nausea,, and incoorddination in thhe
upperr body in hum
mans[19], but no
n industry exposure limitts have been ddefined.
Permiissible Expossure Limits (PEL)
(
as deffined by the United Statees Departmennt of Labourr’s
Occup
pational Safeety and Healtth Administraation (OSHA
A) have not bbeen establishhed for workeer
safety
y. First Defen
nse conducted
d a study wherre the one miinute acute innhalation LC550 values in raats
was estimated
e
to be
b greater th
han 5.76 mg/L
L using a Firrst Defense O
OC product ((no mortalitiees
occurred). It was determined
d
th
hat the possib
bility of geneerating an aerrosol concentration of 5.776
mg/L in an outd
door applicattion is almo
ost unachievvable, and thhe ability too sustain thhat
conceentration for a one-minute continuous ex
xposure woulld be difficultt to produce[220].
No efffective dose for this less--lethal devicee has been deefined. Althoough, anecdottal informatioon
suggeests that it is generally acccepted by law
w enforcemennt and correcctions trainingg professionaals
that the use of Aeerosol Subjecct Restraints (ASR’s) witth a Scovillee Value exceeding 200,0000
would
d be unsuitablle for normal duty use[21].
Chloroacetophe
enone (CN)
Chlorroacetophenon
ne is the onlly riot contro
ol/tear agent listed on thee United Staates Center foor
Diseaase Control (C
CDC) websitee. CN is the active
a
ingrediient of Mace®
®, it is a riot control or teaar
agent, used by the military and
d law enforcem
ment. It is allso available to the generaal public in thhe
U.S. The
T United States considerrs CN and itss mixtures to bbe obsolete fo
for military deeployment. CN
N
has a sharp, irritatiing odor and like OC it may
m be dissolvved in a solveent and is avaailable in manny
deliveery systems.
The CDC
C
has ideentified occup
pation expossure limits (O
OEL) for thiis chemical, as defined bby
NIOS
SH (National Institute
I
for Occupational
O
Safety and H
Health), OSHA
A (Occupatioonal Safety annd
Health
h Administrration), and ACGIH (A
American Coonference off Governmenntal Industrial
Hygieenists), as folllows:
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1
NIOSH recommended exposure limit (REL): time weighted average (TWA): 0.3 mg/m3
(0.05 ppm)
2
OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL): TWA 0.3 mg/m3 (0.05 ppm)
3
ACGIH threshold limit value (TLV): 0.32 mg/m3 (0.05 ppm)
4
NIOSH immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH): 15 mg/m3.
4.1.1 Data Gaps and Research Needs
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
The HERC report identified the following research needs related to developing a complete
assessment as well as data gaps that do not relate to key research needs. While filling these latter
data gaps may be of interest, it is highly unlikely that filling these data gaps would affect the
results of the HERC[17].
22
•
Comparative dose-response data for PAVA, capsaicin, and dihydrocapsaicin for key
endpoints.
•
Definition of effectiveness for small-droplet-size aerosols.
•
Systematic statistically rigorous reporting system to measure effectiveness and adverse
effects.
•
Identification of a predictive dose metric for pressure injuries to the eye that applies to
water droplets emitted from a variety of devices.
•
Improved deposited dose estimates for the respiratory tract.
•
Dose-response information for laryngospasm.
•
Improved understanding of the relationship between the dose-response for
bronchoconstriction in asthmatics and the dose-response for effectiveness in normal
subjects and asthmatics.
•
Information on the impact on effectiveness in individuals under the influence of drug or
alcohol.
•
Effects of repeated exposure, particularly on the respiratory tract.
•
Improved estimate of the threshold for pulmonary effects, based on reliable doseresponse data.
•
Development of a self-contained pulse oxymeter that could be used on restrained people
and under conditions of fogger exposure to monitor for adverse bronchoconstriction.
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•
Dose-response information on neurodevelopmental effects.
•
Quantitative information on tachyphylaxis (reduced response after repeated exposure).
•
Quantitative information on the impact of temperature and humidity on both the doseresponse of capsaicinoids, and on exposure from OC and PAVA devices.
•
Additional studies on the behavior and transport of droplets formed by OC devices.
•
Data on the actual amounts of spray used to incapacitate individuals and the specific
products used.
•
Information on the composition of specific products.
•
A survey of effectiveness for the different types of devices, including reporting of the
conditions of use, which will allow for the determination of the influence of these
conditions.
•
A monitoring study of the distribution and persistence of aerosols following the use of
foggers.
•
Information on the potential for capsaicinoids to cause increased intraocular pressure and
increased blood pressure in humans. This data could be obtained in controlled exposure
studies. If such studies are conducted, it would also be of interest to collect data on
hematology, clinical chemistry, and neuropsychological endpoints.
•
Information on thresholds for ocular effects of solvents.
•
Estimate of an SE 2 effect threshold for pulmonary effects of liquid aspiration.
•
Toxicology studies: In vitro skin penetration; repeated inhalation exposure (up to
subchronic) studies; developmental toxicology studies in two species (including
monitoring of neurobehavioral and neuropathological endpoints); a two-generation
reproduction study.
4.1.2 Standards
Less-lethal product standards could not be found for this specific group of products and only one
test and measurement standard was found governing the capsaicinoid content. Industry standards
concerned with efficacy and safety of these products are also notably missing.
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
To date there does not appear to be any industry standards for testing and evaluating the safety
and effectiveness of OC sprays on humans. In Canada and the United States Capsaicin is
regulated as a pesticide for use against animals.
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23
The capsaicinoid content in a given solution is the determining factor of how hot a product will
be, not the percentage of OC, or Scoville Heat Units (SHU’s)[22]. The Major Capsaicinoid (MC)
concentration quantification uses high-performance liquid chromatography (HPLC) using one of
two methods; the America Spice Trade Association (ASTA) method 21.3, Pungency of
Capsicums and their Oleoresins (HPLC method), which is virtually identical to AOAC 995.03
(The Association of Official Analytical Chemists).
In pepper sprays, the OC is combined with other products that hold the OC in solution and a
propellant to discharge the solution. The area of concern in pepper sprays is to find the level that
causes the desired effect, without risking permanent damage. It has been reported that increased
levels of capsaicin can cause nerve damage, and possibly death of pain fibers. A concern most
often overlooked is determining what these other products are. This concern is valid, considering
that the other ingredients make up the majority (90-95%) of the product mixture. Often time,
these mixtures are flammable, or contain ingredients that are listed as poisons, toxic, or cancercausing[22].
In addition to the content analysis, label claim, and flammability analysis, another important
parameter of concern is the aerosol particle size. Particle size is generally considered the critical
factor that determines the region of deposition within the respiratory tract and is crucial to
minimizing the possibility of undesirable and even harmful effects from an exposure to pepper
spray[18].
However, some manufacturers[23] have adopted quality and operational standards from other
industries and applied them to their products. These systems and component tests include quality
control tests such as;
•
Operation test
•
Temperature cycle test
•
One year time leakage test
•
Discharge duration test
•
Operating weight test
•
Pressure vessel test
•
Intermittent discharge test
•
Gasket dependability test
•
High temperature exposure test
•
Hydrostatic pressure test
Applicable U.S. Federal Regulations include:
24
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•
29 CFR 19
910 Occupatio
onal safety an
nd health stanndards
•
16 CFR 15
500.41 Test fo
or skin irritan
nt
•
16 CFR 1500.45 Tesst method for
fo determiniing flammabbility of conntents of sellfpressurized
d canisters
•
AOAC 995
5.03 Oleoresiin Capsicum assay
a
•
16 CFR 15
500.130 Labeling of self-prressurized can
anisters
•
16 CFR 15
500.42 Test fo
or eye irritantt
•
16 CFR 15
500.3 Acute in
nhalation toxicity study
4.1.3
3 Associated Technologies an
nd Weapon
n Characteristics
Irritant Agents
hrymators thaat cause trannsient discom
mfort and eyye
Thesee agents are inflammatorries and lach
closurre. They requ
uire an extrem
mely high conccentration to bbe lethal and a very low cooncentration tto
be efffective, so they have a hig
gh safety ratiio. Their maj or purpose iss to cause paain, burning, oor
discom
mfort on expo
osed mucous membranes and
a skin. Theese effects occcur within a ffew seconds oof
expossure, but rarelly persist morre than tens off minutes afteer exposure haas ended[15]..
Theree are variious Agentts used, such
s
as: Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), Orthho
Chlorrobenzalmalon
nonitrile (CS
S), Chloroacettophenone (C
CN), and Dipphenylarenam
mine (DM). A
All
can bee delivered ass a fog, stream
m, foams/gelss, or in powdeered form. Thhey are typicaally mixed inn a
solution and use some
s
kind of
o propellant/carrier such as nitrogen or an encapssulated kinettic
round
d. Oleoresin Capsicum (OC), and Ortho
O
Chlorobbenzalmalonoonitrile (CS)) have largelly
replacced the otherr chemicals as
a these agen
nts disperse quicker and have a morre rapid onseet.
Oleorresin Capsicum
m (OC) is reg
garded as imm
mediately efffective and saafer than otheer forms of teaar
gas orr mace, such as
a CN and CS
S[24].
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Oleoresin Capsicum (OC)
The Oleoresin Capsicum Dispensers (OC spray also known as pepper spray) are designed to deny
individuals access into/out of an area, move individuals through an area, and suppress individuals.
This technology has the potential to support multiple missions including: force protection, assist
in clearing spaces, entry control points, and crowd control. The Oleoresin Capsicum Dispensers
are hand held dispensers providing variable range, single stream or area fog RCA against single
or multiple subjects with irritant effects. Uses include crowd control and detainee operations.
Multiple Services currently employ these devices[5].
26
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6
6.1
Electrical Devices
Electrical Muscle Stimulation (EMS) Effects
4.1.4 Definition
Electrical muscle stimulation (EMS), also known as neuromuscular electrical stimulation
(NMES) or electromyostimulation, is the elicitation of muscle contraction using electric impulses.
The impulses are generated by a device and delivered through electrodes on the skin in direct
proximity to the muscles to be stimulated. The impulses mimic the action potential coming from
the central nervous system, causing the muscles to contract. In the United States, EMS devices
used in the medical field are regulated by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
4.1.5 Device Description
The less-lethal industry has coined a term used to distinguish devices using EMS technology for
less-lethal applications, such as; Electrical Stimulation Devices (ESD), but other synonyms exist
(such as Conducted Energy Device, Electronic Control Device, Electromuscular Incapacitation
Device, Electromuscular Disruption Device). These are devices that produce and deliver a lesslethal electrical shock to a subject, resulting in pain, involuntary muscle contraction, and
incapacitation, depending on the device and its application. The shock can be produced by pulsed
or direct electric current, affecting the target muscle signal paths and disturbing the body’s
nervous system. Conceivable undesired effects could include effects on the heart and interference
with medical implants that utilize electricity, such as cardiac pacemakers. Electrical burns at the
area of contact are possible[2].
This family of devices relies on extremely low electrical current to achieve compliance from
targeted subjects. There are two effects of interest; pain and muscle tetany. The first is pain
induced by electrical shock. This pain can produce compliance of a subject or sufficient
distraction to enable an officer to disengage or use hand control techniques. As with any pain
compliance tool, it is less effective against disturbed persons or those under the influence of
alcohol or drugs. The second effect of interest is extreme (but temporary) muscle tetany –
involuntary muscle convulsion. At the high frequencies (pulse repetition rates) of most of these
devices (nominally 16-19 pulses per second), the muscle contractions appear as one smooth
contraction. Unlike the “pain” effect, this muscle tetany appears to be universal across the human
population in its effect. There are differences in how well particular devices achieve this
tetany[15].
4.1.6 Delivery Modes
There are two delivery modes: tethered and drive-stun. The tethered systems fire two tethered
darts that carry the electricity from the device to the subject individual. In drive-stun application,
the EMD device is placed directly against the skin of the subject. In addition to differences among
these devices in the physical delivery technique for the electrical charge, the electrical waveform
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
27
of each also differs, and so can the intended and unintended effects. For these reasons,
comparison of effects data across weapons systems is complex.
4.1.7 Effects of Concern
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), in partnership with the Joint Non-lethal Weapons
Directorate (JNLWD), conducts research to assist Non-lethal Weapon (NLW) Program Managers
across the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) in assessing effectiveness and risks of NLWs. This
information is used to develop dose-response curves for the particular systems under review,
identify data gaps and determine additional research requirements, and provide this information to
those within the DoD who make policy and acquisition decisions. The Human Effects Center of
Excellence (HECOE), located in the AFRL, conducts and coordinates the majority of human
effectiveness testing for the JNLWD[25].
In this role, the HECOE coordinated a Human Effectiveness and Risk Characterization (HERC)
report for Electromuscular Incapacitation (EMI) devices. Using available data, probability
estimates as well as data gaps and uncertainties were characterized for intended and potential
unintended effects of these types of devices. The risk characterization included two EMI devices
manufactured by TASER International, the M26 and X26 TASERs®. Overall, the results support
the conclusion that the M26 and X26 TASERs are generally effective for their intended use.
These findings were used in the decision process of the Armed Services to procure Taser™
devices. The Canadian Police Research Centre review of conducted energy devices[26] also
concluded that CEDs are effective law enforcement tools that are safe in the vast majority of
cases.
Five effects of sufficient concern were identified in the HERC report and had adequate data to
include in the quantitative dose response assessment[25]:
•
Intended Effects (electrical) – Electromuscular incapacitation (EMI)
•
Unintended Effects (dart related) – Ocular injury
•
Unintended Effects (electrical) – Seizure, and ventricular fibrillation
•
Other Effects – Fall injuries (lacerations, fracture, chipped teeth, concussion, etc.)
The HERC report did identify the possibility of several unintended effects, albeit with estimated
low probabilities of occurrence, as follows;
28
•
Unintended effects (dart related) – Blunt trauma, skin penetration, ocular injury, skin
burns, blood vessel injury, and testicle injury.
•
Unintended effects (electrical) – Discomfort, changes in blood pressure or heart rate,
peripheral nerve injury, mechanical muscle injury, bone fracture, spontaneous abortion,
acute respiratory impairment and failure, rhabdomyolysis,
seizures, ventricular
fibrillation, and cancer.
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•
Other effects – Fall related injuries, laser related eye injury, noise related injury,
interaction with other NLW, and flammability/explosions. The last two are considered
secondary effects and were not evaluated.
•
Drive stun effects – Testicular torsion
Several data gaps were identified in the data evaluation. These gaps include the biological basis
for TASER effects, appropriate dosimetry, and the impact of environmental and scenariodependent variables on the induction of effects. Available laboratory data are too limited to
adequately quantify all possible risks of ventricular fibrillation or seizures, particularly in
susceptible populations. Limitations in the exposure and incidence data for some infrequent
events, and the need to rely on a database of case reports compiled by manufacturers, was also
noted. A research plan to begin further exploring these issues was developed and provided to the
JNLWD. The JNLWP, as part of its research, development, test and engineering efforts, is
supporting continued research into EMI to enable development of several technologies that may
utilize this effect. Research includes epidemiological studies of medical outcomes from stun
device use, investigating underlying mechanisms of action, modeling and measurements of
current path in subjects, and understanding the health effects of EMI as a function of duration of
exposure[25].
A separate health effects study was conducted at AFRL that focused on the physiological effects
of EMI that would be used in other types of NLW. This study was looking at the effects of EMI
use in different environments and configurations than the Taser™ device. This study’s purpose
was to evaluate changes in blood chemistry in swine after repeated exposures to EMI. Analyses
of pig cardiac troponins T and I (as potential biomarkers of cardiac muscle damage) were
performed by a commercial laboratory. It is unknown whether these preliminary data will be
relevant, in terms of application to future clinical decisions regarding humans exposed to either
EMI or TASERs. A paper detailing the study and the results is in final preparation for submission
to a peer-reviewed journal. Until the article is accepted and published, additional details on the
study will not be provided[25].
The Canadian Policy Research Centre also conducted a review of conducted energy devices[26]
which focused on three areas; the medical safety of CED’s, along with policy consideration, and
analysis of the medical condition excited delirium. Only the TASER M26 & X26 were reviewed.
The primary conclusions regarding the medical safety of CED’s are as follows;
•
Definitive research or evidence does not exist that implicates a causal relationship
between the use of CEDs and death.
•
Existing studies indicate that the risk of cardiac harm to subjects from a CED is very low.
•
Excited Delirium (ED), although not a universally recognized medical condition, is
gaining increasing acceptance as a main contributor to deaths proximal to CED use.
•
The issue related to multiple CED applications and its impact on respiration, pH levels,
and other associated physical effects, offers a plausible theory on the possible connection
between deaths, CED use, and people exhibiting the symptoms of ED.
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29
4.1.8 Safe Exposure Limits
Electromuscular Incapacitation (EMI) Injury
The available data on Electromuscular Incapacitation (EMI) used in the HERC report were from
human experience, animal studies, as well as comparison to biological let-go thresholds. These
data all suggest that when an electrical circuit is completed, muscle contraction will occur. Based
on these data, TASER output is assumed to exceed the muscle contraction threshold in all cases
where a circuit is established. Whether an induced EMD is fully or partially effective in
controlling the exposed subject, however, depends on the location and distribution of the current
path. The impact of dart placement on effectiveness is estimated based on observations from
experienced users of the TASER and was integrated with hit probabilities in the risk
characterization step of the analysis[25].
Ocular Injury
No dose-response data are available to calculate the probability of eye effects of different
severities. Thus, any strike to the eye is considered a moderate to severe unintended effect. The
risk characterization approach for ocular injury is a direct function of the probability of an eye
strike from firing the device[25].
Seizures
Induction of seizures has not been tested experimentally for the M26 or X26 TASERs, although
the TASER output is in the range of experimental seizure thresholds. A sensitivity analysis
approach provides an upper bound estimate of seizure risk. Using this approach, any head strike
that established a current path in the region of the brain is assumed to be sufficient to induce a
seizure (i.e., exceed the seizure threshold). The hit probabilities for dart impacts in the head are
used as the basis for the risk characterization of this effect[25].
Ventricular Fibrillation (VF)
A key effect of concern for which dose-response data are available is ventricular fibrillation (VF).
Experimentally determined VF thresholds in pigs for differing TASER outputs are plotted against
body weight. The resulting curve is extrapolated for use in assessing human dose-response with
the use of uncertainty factors for experimental animal to human extrapolation and human
variability. This analysis suggests that healthy adults and larger children would not be at
significant risk of VF following exposure to the X26 TASER under normal operating conditions.
However, due to assumptions made in selecting uncertainty factors and the absence of specific
threshold information in young children, the elderly, individuals with underlying heart conditions,
or individuals with concurrent drug use, it is not known whether there are highly sensitive
individuals that could experience VF under normal EMI exposure conditions. The data are also
limited with regard to extrapolating the results to the M26 TASER or future EMI waveforms, or
for assessing the impact of different temporal patterns of exposure[25].
30
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Figure 1 Relationsh
hip Between VF
V Threshold in Pigs and B
Body Weight
Fall Injuries
Publisshed data on
n fall injuriess rates are lim
mited. Howeever, TASER
R Internationaal field reporrts
suggeest that four moderately
m
seevere fall injuries have occcurred in appproximately 1600 or morre
deployments that resulted
r
in a complete EM
MD. These daata are consisstent with exppert judgmennts
from TASER userss in the law enforcement
e
community.
c
B
Based on the data and exppert judgmentts,
an injury rate of 1 in 500 (0.2%)) fall events is used for thee risk characteerization[25]..
4.1.9
9 Data Gaps and Res
search Needs
Severral areas requ
uire further evaluation
e
or data collectiion before a conclusion ccan be reacheed
regard
ding potentiaal effects or risks. Suggeestions to adddress key un
uncertainties aand data gapps
includ
de[25]:
•
Develop a statisticallly rigorous database oof field inccidence expoosures (target
demograph
hics, TASER Internationall database)
•
Develop a common mettric for prediccting physioloogical effects of exposure
•
or EMI waveeforms (total ppulse charge,, body currennt,
Determinee the parameteer of merit fo
net charge, charge in po
ositive phase)
•
ompare existinng and future EMI wavefoorms
Develop a dosimetry tecchnique to co
•
d for ventricu
ular fibrillationn/asystole
Determinee the threshold
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331
•
Determine the threshold for seizures
•
Determine the effect of scale (body size, mass, age, dart location/contact) on EMI
response
•
Develop a dose response for EMI intended effects (varying pulse amplitude, pulse
duration, pulse form, inter-pulse interval)
•
Determine the effect of drugs (e.g., ethanol, cocaine, phencyclidine) on the dose response
to EMI
•
Determine the effect of existing morbidity (e.g., cardiac arrhythmias, epilepsy) on the
dose response to EMI
•
Determine the effect of increasing the duration of stimulation
•
Determine the effect of EMI on respiration
•
Develop 3D impedance modeling
•
Determine the impact of TASER stimuli on pregnancy & reproduction
•
Examine applicability for novel applications such as remote or sensoractivated non-manin-the-loop devices.
The CPRC report[26] also highlighted the fact that:
•
A lack of scientifically tested, independently verified, and globally accepted CED safety
parameters is problematic due to the reliance on manufacturer claim and leaves agencies
ill-equipped to respond quickly to beneficial advances in technology.
•
There is a lack of scientific information on death proximal to restraint.
•
There is great interest in the physiological response to excited delirium.
4.1.10 Standards
Industry standards that identify the control parameters and thresholds for evaluating each effect of
concern have yet to be developed. Currently the only testing protocols found are designed to
ensure that the device is operating within approved operating parameters as defined by the
manufacturer. An example would be the Canadian Police Research Centre’s report on the testing
of conducted energy weapons[27].
Standards from other industries might offer a way forward, such as those governing medical
equipment, specifically nerve and muscle stimulators. The Canadian Standards association
standard CAN/CSA-C22.2 No. 601.2.10-92 [28], which is essentially a copy of IEC 601.2.10-92,
provides limitations on the output parameters for equipment intended for therapeutic applications
32
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
of nev
ver and muscle stimulatio
on. However, such standaards might be highly connservative witth
large safety factorss and thereforre might not in
nduce the dessired responsee.
4.1.1
11 Associated Technologies an
nd Device C
Characteristics
TASE
ER®
The X26
X TASER®
® is designed to disable an individuaal. This technnology has thhe potential tto
suppo
ort multiple missions
m
includ
ding: force prrotection, andd crowd contrrol.
The X26
X TASER®
® is an electro
o-muscular in
ncapacitation device that uuses a nitrogeen air cartridgge
propu
ulsion system
m to launch tw
wo probes tetthered to an electrically ccharged cartriidge. Effectivve
range is 0-35 feet, depending on
n cartridge typ
pe, penetratess up to two innches of clothhing[5]
The X26
X device has
h been high
hlight here baased on its ccounter-personnnel capabiliities and statuus
within
n the U.S. Deepartment of Defense
D
Jointt Non-Lethal Weapons Proogram as currrent non-lethal
weapo
ons. Current non-lethal weapons
w
are fielded
f
and inn use. Humaan effects assessments havve
been conducted to
o identify th
he technology
y’s anticipateed physiologiical responsees and risk oof
signifficant injury to
t the subject, bystander, and operatorr. Concieveabbly the other Taser devicees
(M26, XREP, etc.)) would also be
b suitable.
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7
Multi-sensory Devices
7.1
Combined Effects
4.1.12 Definition
Combined effects include multi-sensory devices that affect more than one sensory modality
simultaneously. There is an expectation that the effects will be at least additive and perhaps
synergistic. Sensory overload is a possibility, leading to confusion and indecisiveness[2].
4.1.13 Device Description
Combined effect devices would include items such as: flash bang grenades (acoustic and optical
diversionary device), multi-sensory distraction devices that contain a combination of payloads,
and thermobaric compounds[2]. These are also referred to as Noise Flash Diversionary Devices
(NFDDs). However, combined effects can include any combination of effects resulting from
specific targeted sensory modalities, delivery, and exposure modes (e.g. blunt impact with
chemical, blunt impact with electrical). All basic intended and unintended effects should be
assessed.
4.1.14 Effects of Concern
The explosive force of these devices can cause major injuries if the device detonates in close
proximity to a person. In addition to the explosive charge, which through its pressure wave may
rupture tympanic membranes and possibly produce other primary blast injuries at distances closer
than five feet, distraction devices contain powdered magnesium or aluminium, which burn
brightly at high temperature and represent a significant ignition and burn injury hazard[29].
•
Intended effects – temporarily impair hearing and vision
•
Unintended effects – burns, soft tissue injuries, bony fractures, bleeding, pulmonary
contusions, and GI tract injuries.
•
Secondary injuries – falls and secondary projectiles propelled by blast.
4.1.15 Safe Exposure Limits
For NFDDs exposure limits are required for the following[30]:
34
•
Illuminance and radiant flux (Flash) – Peak level (LUX) and total light energy (Joules) at
varied ranges.
•
Acoustic Sound (Noise) – Blast overpressure in air (bar), and peak sound (decibels).
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
•
Functionall delay (from pulled safety
y pin to first liight)
•
Functionall Duration (bu
urn time)
•
Fragmentaation due to fu
unction
•
Collateral effects (fire start,
s
propulsive movementt, disruption oof vicinity)
4.1.1
16 Standard
ds
Produ
uct performan
nce standardss have not been
b
establishhed. However some manuufactures havve
adoptted industry sttandards relatted to safe fun
nctioning.
Occup
pational safetty and health standards for noise and flaash might be aapplicable, ass defined in thhe
previo
ous sections covering
c
Auraal and Ocularr effects. A suubject matter expert mightt be required tto
determ
mine the applicability of vaarious guideliines and standdards.
4.1.1
17 Associated Technologies an
nd Device C
Characteristics
M-84
4 Flash Bang
g Grenade
The M-84
M
Flash Bang
B
Grenadee is designed to deny indivviduals accesss into/out of an area, movve
indiviiduals through
h an area, and
d suppress ind
dividuals. Thiis technologyy has the potenntial to suppoort
multip
ple missions including: fo
orce protectio
on, checkpoinnts, and assistt in clearing spaces, crow
wd
contro
ol, and entry control
c
pointss.
The M-84
M
Flash Bang
B
Grenadee is a hand th
hrown flash bbang that deliivers a brightt flash (optical
effectt) and loud bang
b
(acousticc effect) agaiinst single orr multiple subbjects. Uses include crow
wd
contro
ol and room clearing.
c
Multtiple Servicess currently em
mploy this muunition[5].
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NICO
O BTV-1 Flas
sh Bang Grrenade
The NICO
N
BTV-1 Flash Bang Grenade
G
is deesigned to denny individualls access into//out of an areea,
move individuals through
t
an arrea, and suppress individuuals. This techhnology has tthe potential tto
suppo
ort multiple missions
m
inclluding: forcee protection, assist in cleearing spacess, checkpointts,
crowd
d control, and
d entry control points.
The NICO
N
BTV-1
1 Flash Bang Grenade is a hand throw
wn interim replacement foor the MK-1441
Flash Bang Grenad
de based on an
a urgent needs statement.. Improvemennts prevent seerious injury tto
person
nnel in the event
e
of prem
mature deton
nation of the grenade, proovide 3-5 secconds of flassh
blindn
ness, a lower pressure to reduce
r
blast injury
i
risk, annd hand-safe capability with metal boddy
and to
op and bottom
m venting. Mu
ultiple Servicees currently eemploy this deevice[5].
36
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DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
8
Technical Evaluations
The study of human effects of less-lethal devices is interdisciplinary, requiring expertise in the
specific technology, the metrics and dosimetry of the energy utilized, and the relevant effects. The
following table summarize the expertise needed to conduct a technical evaluation[2].
Table 2 Technical Expertise
Level of
Organization
Areas of Study
Possible Devices and
Effects
Pressing Issues
Cells
Toxicology, Cancer,
Pathology
Chemicals used could
be carcinogenic;
lasers might damage
retinal cells
Long-term health
effects
Organs
Pathology, Anatomy
Blunt impact devices
could damage organs;
RF devices could burn
skin
Damage to organs of
sight or hearing;
crippling body
damage
Whole Organism
Physiology, Medicine
CEW’s can
incapacitate the whole
person; likewise some
gases
Damage to CNS
function.
Individual behavior,
motivation
Psychology
Behaviour may be
modified to avoid
unpleasantness, pain,
or threat thereof
What is meant by
incapacitation
Crowd Behaviour
Psychology
Devices may cause
complex responses in
crowds, from
resignation and
compliance to fear
and panic
Predictive models for
crowd response
Population Response
Sociology, Politics
Groups may develop
incorrect beliefs about
less-lethal devices and
Risk communication
regarding safety,
value, and ethics of
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
37
acceptaance could be
threatenned
devices
A claassification sccheme based on the NATO
O taxonomy with consideeration given to the variouus
effectts (both intend
ded and non--intended) of exposure to lless-lethal devvices is propoosed. This wiill
allow for the inclu
usion of new technologies as they becoome availablee. Since manny of the majoor
body regions and their
t
related organs
o
and sy
ystems have kknown injuryy thresholds thhis will help tto
identiify proper tesst methods. This
T
is in keeping with exxisting approoaches to trauuma predictioon
that include
i
survivability-lethality-vulnerab
bility (SVL) models to assess the interaction oof
conveentional threaats such as prrojectiles and
d fragments. T
The critical eelements incllude models oof
the th
hreat and delivery to the subject, theirr interaction with the anaatomy and phhysiology, annd
injury
y outcome asssessments bassed upon avaiilable injury ccriteria. Less--lethal devices include som
me
uniqu
ue threats not currently fou
und in these models, but building upoon and using these existinng
evaluaation tools seeems a naturaal evolution. Defence R&
&D Canada V
Valcartier havve such modeels
and ex
xpansion to th
hreats other th
han ballistic penetration
p
annd blast is posssible.
The United
U
States Joint Non-Leethal Weapon
ns Program hhas an advancced total bodyy model that is
used to characterize and assesss less-lethal systems. Priimary less-letthal human eeffects modeels
includ
de the Advan
nced Total Bo
ody Model (ATBM) for bblunt impactt injury assesssment and thhe
Optical Effects Model for broaadband opticaal effects anaalysis. Less-leethal human effects modeels
are developed
d
fro
om dose-response data geenerated by experimentattion. Their H
Human Effeccts
Modeeling Analysiss Program is a collection of
o detailed moodels that proovide predictioons for a rangge
of hu
uman effects and permits a standardizzed and centtralized approoach for lesss-lethal devicce
human effects asseessment.
Fiigure 2 Adva
anced Total B
Body Model
38
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DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
9
Risk Characterization Framework
The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) Human Effects Center of Excellence
(HECOE) developed a Human Effectiveness and Risk Characterization (HERC) framework to
evaluate non-lethal weapons. The objective is to assist decision and policy makers in determining
the technical feasibility, likely effectiveness, safe operational use, and policy acceptability of
NLW’s.
The method considers the risk of unintended effects to the targets, users, and bystanders, as well
as weapon effectiveness, uncertainties, and limits of human effects models. This process is
consistent with the National Academies of Sciences and the Society for Risk Analysis
recommendations and standards. The risk characterization framework utilizes the four steps of
hazard (effects) identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization initially developed for the evaluation of chemical substances. The term “dose” is
used in a generic sense to convey a quantitative measure of the substances or forces released by a
non-lethal weapon. The HERC reports are organised according to these four steps. Three
workshops consisting of subject matter experts and risk assessment experts are typically held as
part of the process. The first is a data sharing workshop that identifies all possible sources of
relevant data and determines insufficiencies in effectively evaluating the NLW. The second is a
peer consultation workshop that outlines potential data gaps, identifies additional sources of data,
and provides feedback on preliminary strategies for completing dose-response and exposure
assessments. The third workshop is an independent external review panel that submits comments
and recommendations that are incorporated into the final HERC document.
The HECOE is also the central repository of human effects data and maintains extensive
references for the full gamut of technologies used in NLW developments. However, public access
to this data seems limited.
9.1
Hazard Effects Identification
The first phase in the HERC framework is to identify all possible effects of the weapon, both
intended and unintended. The next step is to combine all the unintended effects in a way that
allows easy comparison with the intended effects. One approach is to combine all of the effects of
equal severity for a combined effect. Another approach would be to select a single critical effect
to establish a benchmark to compare with other levels of exposure (dose). The quantitative data
on the combined effects, or the critical effect, helps to develop the dose-response curves.
9.2
Dose-Response
The second phase of the HERC framework refers to the process of evaluating information on the
magnitude or intensity of the dose required to produce the physiological effect or behavioral
response desired.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
39
Figure 3 Less-lethal
L
Weeapon Operatting Envelopee
9.3
Expos
sure Asse
essment
The goal
g
of this th
hird phase is to
t define the interaction beetween the teechnology or device and thhe
user, the subject, and
a bystanderrs. This phase specifies thhe informatioon necessary tto characterizze
the in
ntended and unintended
u
efffects using the dose metriccs and the ressponse inform
mation from thhe
previo
ous phases. This
T phase begins with thee specific devvices includedd in the assesssment and thhe
use off the devices. The use is defined
d
in terrms of one orr more conceepts of emplooyment (COE
E).
The COE
C
defines the
t following elements in the
t use of a nnon-lethal weaapon; the natuure of the useer,
the co
onditions under which the NLW
N
is used
d, the subject iindividuals, aand the tacticaal goals for thhe
use.
9.4
Risk Character
C
rization
In thiis phase the probability
p
of
o occurrence is determineed for variouus intended aand unintendeed
effectts. Once this is complete a Monte Caarlo model iss used to estiimate the freequency of thhe
occurrence of inteended and un
nintended eff
ffects. Probabbilistic and ppoint estimatee methods arre
suggeested as two examples
e
of riisk characterization metriccs.
40
D
DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
Figure 4 Conceptua
al Frameworkk for Effectiveeness and Rissk Characterizzation
9.5
Standards Fram
mework
Whilee there is mu
uch discussio
on about lesss-lethal reseaarch, field reeports, policyy, and traininng
issuess; there seem
ms to be little in the way of
o product peerformance aand safety staandards for innservicce items. How
wever, in add
dition the JN
NLWD HERC
C assessmentts, the Nationnal Institute oof
Justicce (NIJ) is working
w
on a less-lethal devices
d
standdards framew
work for less--lethal produuct
perforrmance and saafety standard
ds (Figure 5 LLD Standarrds Frameworrk).
DRDC
C Valcartier CR
R 2012-127
441
Figure 5 LLD
D Standards F
Framework
42
D
DRDC Valcartiier CR 2012-1227
10
Taxonomy (Counter Personnel)
A classification scheme based on the NATO taxonomy with consideration given to the various
effects of exposure to less-lethal devices is proposed. This will allow for the inclusion of new
technologies as they become available. A summary of the standards, or lack thereof, has also been
included to help identify gaps to be filled and to assists with the approval process.
Product standards, as previously discussed, would consist of performance requirements for the
device manufacturers to follow. Test and measurement standards would focus on the critical
performance aspects required for product certification and evaluation. Safety standards are meant
to address permissible exposure limits for health and safety.
In the absence of product safety and performance standards it would be prudent to insist that
whenever a canister or a projectile is launched, or debris are expected when deploying a NLW,
blunt impact and penetration tests have to be performed.
Table 3 Taxonomy (Counter Personnel)
Technology
Electromagnetic
Class
Electromuscular
Effects of Concern
Intended Effects
(electrical) –
Electromuscular
incapacitation (EMI)
Standards
Product
None
Test
None
Safety
None
Intended Effects
(Ocular) - distract
Product
None
Unintended (Ocular) Eye and skin damage
due to laser radiation
Test
•
ANSI Z136.1 Safe use of lasers
Safety
•
Occupational safety and health
standards
Intended – eye, and
respiratory irritation
Product
Unintended – pressure
injury to the eye,
bronchospasm,
pulmonary effects,
Test
Unintended Effects (dart
related) – Ocular injury
Unintended Effects
(electrical) – Seizure,
and ventricular
fibrillation
Optical
Chemical
Irritants/Riot
Control
Agents
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
None
•
•
16 CFR 1500.41 Test for skin
irritant,
16 CFR 1500.45 Test method for
determining flammability of
contents of self-pressurized
canisters,
43
aspiration, and
flammability
•
•
•
•
•
Safety
Acoustic
Directed
Energy
Intended – Pain
Product
None
Unintended - Noise
induced hearing loss
Test
None
Safety
•
•
•
•
Mechanical
Kinetic
Impact
Munitions
Intended – Pain
Unintended – Head and
face impacts: Skull and
facial fractures and
brain hematomas
Product
None
Test
None
Safety
None
Product
None
Test
None
Safety
None
AOAC 995.03 Oleoresin
Capsicum assay,
16 CFR 1500.130 Labeling of
self-pressurized canisters,
16 CFR 1500.42 Test for eye
irritant,
16 CFR 1500.3 Acute inhalation
toxicity study
29 CFR 1910 Occupational safety
and health standards
MIL-STD-1474D Noise Limits,
Occupational Health and Safety
Administration (OSHA),
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH),
Canadian Centre for Occupational
Health and Safety (CCOHS)
Thoracic; rib fracture,
heart concussion and
contusion and lung
contusion
Combined
(MultiSensory)
44
For multi-sensory
effects, all basic
intended and
unintended effects
should be assessed.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
11
Conclusions
While there is much emphasis on policy and procedure, and much discussion about human effects
there are not any less-lethal product specific performance and safety standards for industry to
follow.
Some occupational exposure standards exist for a particular agent being used, as for many types
of noise, radiation and chemicals, and these standards should be followed when possible.
However, such standards are highly conservative with large safety factors and therefore might not
induce the desired response. Other agents and technologies are without guidance on safe limits.
Some device manufacturers have adopted component and system tests, as well as technical
standards, regulations, and guidelines from other industries and application. The implementation
of these is at the discretion of the manufacturer and is not consistent throughout the industry,
creating an environment of buyer beware. In the absence of industry regulations and standards
strong product claims can be made without evidence or references.
In general, injury thresholds seem to be known for many of the major body regions and their
related organs and systems. However, despite the human effects data collected so far, defining the
threshold between no-response, the desired response, and injury is not well defined. Combining
this knowledge with device effectiveness and risk assessment methodology to create product
performance and safety standards for less-lethal devices seems to be stalled in the research stage.
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
45
References
[1]
Shewchenko, N., Fournier, E., and Wonnacott, M., V/L Model Development, Part 1
Injury Assessment, Biokinetics and Associates Ltd. 2010.
[2]
NATO, The Human Effects of Non-Lethal Technologies, NATO 2006.
[3]
Daniel Bourget, B. A., Test methods to Evaluate Terminal Effects of Kinetic Energy
Non-Lethal Weapon Systems, IRCOBI, 2011.
[4]
Sherman, D., KE testing, N. Shewchenko, Ed.: Wayne State University, 2011.
[5]
Defense, U. S. D. o., U.S. Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Program, 201109-23, 2011.
[6]
Wikipedia, Noise Induced Hearing Loss, 2011.
[7]
(CCOHS), C. C. f. O. H. a. S., Noise - Occupational Exposure Limits in Canada, 2011.
[8]
Headquarters, D. o. F. H. P. C. F. H. S. G., Occupational Health Recommendations
Regarding the Safe Use of the LRAD-1000X in Maritime Opertions, DND, 2009.
[9]
Protection, I. C. o. N.-I. R., Guidelines on Limits of Exposure to Laser Radiation of
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[10]
Institute, A. N. S., American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers: ANSI, 2007.
[11]
Wikipedia, Laser Safety, 2011.
[12]
Protection, I. C. o. N.-I. R., Guidelines on Limits of Exposure to Broad-band Incoherent
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[13]
Protection, I. C. o. N.-I. R., Draft Guidelines on Limits of Exposure to Incoherent Visible
and Infrared Radiation (0.38 to 3 um), International Commission on Non-Ionizing
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[14]
Union, O. J. o. t. E., On the Minimum Health and Safety Requirements Regarding the
Exposure of Workers to Risks Arising From Physical Agents (Artificial Optical
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89/391/EEC), Official Journal of the European Union, vol. Directive 2006/25/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, 2006.
[15]
Center, T. W. a. P. S. T., A Guidebook for Less-Lethal Devices, in A Guidebook for LessLethal Devices, R. A. O. Edward L. Hughes, Ed. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University, 2010, pp. 4-12.
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Safety, U. o. T. E. H. a., Health Effects of Toxic Chemicals, 2011.
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Lynne Haber, P. N., Andrew Maier, Paul Price, Eugene Olajos, Larry Bickford, Maureen
McConnell, B. Jon Klauenberg, Human Effectiveness and Risk Characterization of
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) and Pelargonic Acid Vanillylamide PAVA or NONIVAMIDE)
Hand-held Devices, Toxicology Excellence for Risk Assessment (TERA), LINEA Inc.,
U.s. Army, Edgewood Chemical & Biological Center (ECBC), Air Force Research
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[18]
David K. DuBay, R. E. R., Aerodynamic Particle Size Analysis of First Defense Pepper
Spray, in Defense Technology / Federal Laboratories Specification Manual, 2003.
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Center, N. P. I., Capsaicin Technical Fact Sheet, 2011.
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David K. DuBay, R. E. R., Health Risk Analysis of First Defense Pepper Spray Using an
Acute Whole-Body Inhalation Exposure, in Defense Technology / Federal Laboratories
Specification Manual, 2003.
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Products, R. P., Pure Capsaicin is 16 Million Scoville Heat Units, 2011.
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DuBay, D. K., Oleoresin Capsicum and Pepper Sprays, Defense Technology / Federal
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Nance, B., SABRE General Protocol for Performance Tests, 2011.
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DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
47
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48
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)
1.
ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document.
Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a
contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.)
2.
UNCLASSIFIED
(NON-CONTROLLED GOODS)
DMC A
REVIEW: GCEC JUNE 2010
Biokinetics and Associates Ltd.
2470 Don Reid Drive
Ottawa, ON K1H 1E1
3.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
(Overall security classification of the document
including special warning terms if applicable.)
TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U)
in parentheses after the title.)
Classification of Less Lethal Device Technologies:
4.
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Baines, D.
5.
DATE OF PUBLICATION
(Month and year of publication of document.)
March 2012
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6b. NO. OF REFS
(Total containing information,
(Total cited in document.)
including Annexes, Appendices,
etc.)
65
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e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)
Contract Report
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Defence R&D Canada – Valcartier
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Quebec (Quebec)
G3J 1X5 Canada
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research
and development project or grant number under which the document
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assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)
R11-20
DRDC Valcartier CR 2012-127
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)
Unlimited
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here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)
Biokinetics was tasked by DRDC Valcartier as part of the CEWSI (Conductive Energy
Weapon Strategic Initiative) to define a classification schema based on available information
that can be used as part of an approval process to ensure that technologies to be approved
are assessed using proper regulations and test protocols. This was achieved by conducting
a review of source material that came from previous DRDC contracts, NATO and TTCP
panel reports, as well as the internet. Results indicate that despite much research and
discussion about device effectiveness, evaluation methodologies, and studies of human
effects; there are not any product standards for less-lethal devices.
If occupational exposure standards exist for the particular agent being used, as they do for
many types of noise, radiation and chemicals, then these standards should be followed
when possible. However, such standards are highly conservative with large safety factors
and therefore might not induce the desired response. In general, injury thresholds seem to
be known for many of the major body regions and their related organs and systems.
Combining this knowledge with device effectiveness and risk assessment methodology to
create product performance and safety standards for less-lethal devices seems stalled in the
research stage.
14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be
helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model
designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a
published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select
indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)
less-lethal devices, test methods, classification schema
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