THE ARMY BULLETIN Canada’s Professional Journal on Army Issues

Published Quarterly
Major Vic Sattler, CD
LE BULLETIN
THE CHALLENGES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION OPERATIONS
Major A.R. Jayne, CD
MANOEUVRE WARFARE DOCTRINE FOR URBAN OPERATIONS
DE L ARMÉE DE TERRE
Vol. 5, N o 1, Printemps 2002
Major Gary Campbell, CD
GETTING THERE WAS THE CHALLENGE! THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION OF 1870
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
THE OPERATION ABACUS PLANNING PROCESS: A STUDY
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
FACING THE THREAT: THE FUTURE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT AND THE NEED FOR GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE
A Comparative Study of Military Ethics in Operations Other Than War
Catherine Sheridan-Demers
FIGHTING THE GOOD FIGHT:
/ Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2002
Major Cliff Trollope, CD
MANOEUVRE WARFARE AND MISSION COMMAND
IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: A Practical Application
Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.
Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990 - 1991
MISSED OPPORTUNITY: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian
ISSN 1712-9745
Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 2002
Canada’s Professional Journal on Army Issues
Le journal professionnel de l’Armée de terre du Canada
Vol. 5, No 1, Printemps 2002
UNE OCCASION RATÉE :
L’opération BROADSWORD, la 4e Brigade méchanisée du Canada et la guerre de golfe, 1990-1991
par Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.
GUERRE DE MANŒUVRE ET COMMANDEMENT DE MISSION
DANS LES OPÉRATIONS DE PAIX : Une application pratique
par le major Cliff Trollope, CD
MENER LE BON COMBAT :
Une étude comparative de l’éthique militaire au cours des opérations hors guerre
par Catherine Sheridan-Demers
AFFRONTER LA MENACE :
Environnement de sécurité futur et besoins en défense aérienne basée au sol
par le lieutenant-colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
LE PROCESSUS DE PLANIFICATION DE L’OPÉRATION ABACUS : UNE ÉTUDE
par le major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, B.A.
LE DÉFI ÉTAIT DE S’Y RENDRE!
L’EXPÉDITION DE LA RIVIÈRE ROUGE DE 1870
par le major Gary Campbell, CD
BULLETIN
LA DOCTRINE DE LA GUERRE DE MANŒUVRE
POUR LES OPÉRATIONS EN ZONE URBAINE
par le major A.R. Jayne, CD
LES DÉFIS DES OPÉRATIONS MILITAIRES DURANT
LES OPÉRATIONS D’AIDE HUMANITAIRE
THE ARMY
par le major Vic Sattler, CD
Publication trimestrielle
Publication Agreement No. 1882732
Le Bulletin de doctrine et d’instruction de l’Armée de terre
ISSN 1480-9826
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Le journal professionnel de l’Armée de terre du Canada
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Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
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Canada’s Professional Journal on Army Issues
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THE ARMY DOCTRINE AND TRAINING BULLETIN
Convention de publication no 1882732
ISSN 1480-9826
Table of Contents
GUEST EDITORIAL – INFANTRY IN THE FUTURE CANADIAN ARMY:
A RIDDLE WRAPPED IN A MYSTERY INSIDE AN ENIGMA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
FROM THE MANAGING EDITOR: HAPPY ANNIVERSARY! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF ARMY TRAINING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
FROM THE DIRECTORATE OF LAND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
WARFIGHTING: THE WAY AHEAD FOR THE
CANADIAN LAND FORCE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Brigadier General Glenn A. Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
MISSED OPPORTUNITY: OPERATION BROADSWORD, 4 CANADIAN
MECHANIZED BRIGADE AND THE GULF WAR, 1990 - 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.
MANOEUVRE WARFARE AND MISSION COMMAND
IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: A PRACTICAL APPLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
Major Cliff Trollope, CD
FIGHTING THE GOOD FIGHT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
MILITARY ETHICS IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38
Catherine Sheridan-Demers
FACING THE THREAT: THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
AND THE NEED FOR GROUND-BASED AIR DEFENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
THE OPERATION ABACUS PLANNING PROCESS: A STUDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
GETTING THERE WAS THE CHALLENGE! THE RED RIVER EXPEDITION OF 1870 . . . . .58
Major Gary Campbell, CD
MANOEUVRE WARFARE DOCTRINE FOR URBAN OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Major A.R. Jayne, CD
Table of Contents
THE CHALLENGES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
Major Vic Sattler, CD
BOOK REVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
THE STAND-UP TABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
i
Part of Our Heritage
Two Hundred Years Ago…
B
etween 1793 and 1802, the British Empire was at war with the Revolutionary France. The presence of French warships in
the North Atlantic and tensions with the United States, led to the creation of several regular colonial units to bolster the
British garrison in Canada. The Queen’s Rangers, raised in 1791, were joined by the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, the Royal
Nova Scotia Regiment, the King’s New Brunswick Regiment, the Island of Saint John Volunteers and the Royal Canadian
Volunteers Regiment. An armistice signed in 1802 brought the disbandment of these little known units in the summer and fall
of 1802. In less than a year, the British Empire and Napoleonic France would be at war, leading to the creation of a series of
new regiments in British North America.
Francois Mailhot,
Captain of the 2nd
Battalion, Royal
Canadian Volunteers,
circa 1797. The Royal
Canadian Volunteers
was a two-battalion
A corporal of the
regiment raised for the
Island of Saint John
A private of the
Volunteers.
An officer of the
North America. It was
King’s New Brunswick
Authorized to have
Queen’s Rangers. This
the first regiment to
Regiment, 1793 – 1794.
200 men in two
regiment was
embody French and
The regiment was
companies, this unit
authorized in 1791 for
English Canadians for
stationed mainly in
was renamed as His
service in Upper
regular service.
Fredericton, with
Majesty’s Prince
Canada. It served
(Courtesy Musée
detachments at
Edward Island
mainly at York
du Québec)
Saint John and at
Fencibles in 1800.
(Toronto) and
Saint Andrews.
(Courtesy Prince
Fort St. Joseph.
(Courtesy Osprey
Edward Island
(Courtesy Toronto
Military, Men at
Museum and Heritage
Historical Board)
Arms No. 319).
Foundation)
Part of Our Heritage
defence of British
ii
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The Chief of the Land Staff
is pleased to announce
The 2002 Army Symposium:
The Intellectual Challenges of Future Warfare
21 May 2002, 0830 hrs – 1630 hrs
At Korea Hall (Courcelles Block), Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario
Speakers will include:
Colonel Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., USAF
Author of numerous articles on future warfare in Parameters and other American Journals
and a frequent speaker to the United States School of Advanced Military Studies and the
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth
Colonel Howie Marsh, CD
Former Director Land Staff Technical Programme, currently Special Advisor to the Chief of
the Land Staff and frequent commentator on Army issues
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Leonhard, US Army
Author of “The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle” and “The
Principles of War in the Information Age.” Professor of Military Science, West Virginia
University
Dr. Sean Maloney
Author of “War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951 – 1993” and
“Operation Kinetic: Canadians in Kosovo, 1999 – 2000” (forthcoming). Professor of History at
The Royal Military College of Canada
A selection of fine military books will also be available for purchase.
The Symposium is sponsored by The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin.
Army Symposium
For further information, please contact
Major John R. Grodzinski
Managing Editor
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Phone (613) 541-5010, ext 4874
Fax (613) 541-4478
E-mail: grodzinski.jr@forces.ca
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
1
Guest Editorial
Infantry in the Future Canadian Army: A Riddle
Wrapped in a Mystery inside an Enigma?
by Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
I
Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
n our history, Canada has had an
infantr y army. Although it may
remain so into the foreseeable
future, this is certainly not written
in stone. The Chief of the Land Staff’s
intent is to build an army that is
strategically relevant, expeditionary by
nature, and capable of deploying a
credible combat capability across a
broad range of coalition operations. As
the army struggles to build these
future requirements within a tightly
constrained fiscal envelope, there is no
question that the infantry battalion and
the entire infantry trade structure must,
and will, come under the microscope.
As we all struggle through this difficult
restructuring exercise, there has been
very little public debate on the place or
role of the infantry in that future,
particularly among the infantry
community itself.
Instead, within the Infantry Corps,
there has been some debate, at times
acrimonious, about what core infantry
skills are, and how they should be
nurtured and protected. It has also
become clear that, given the size of the
Army, we will not be able to afford the
grab bag of infantry approaches
effected by many of our allies (light,
In the purely Canadian context,
increased technology and the adoption
of successively more effective armoured
personnel carriers (Bren Gun Carrier;
Kangaroo; M113; armoured vehicle,
There is an accusation that the infantry
battalion is actually a mini battle group.
general purpose [AVGP]; and now the
LAV III) have drawn a line between
traditional
light
infantry
and
mechanized infantry. Special operating
forces, including parachute-delivered
light infantry, which are present in most
Western armies, remain an emotive
subject in the wake of Somalia and the
disbanding of the Canadian Airborne
Regiment. As well, the need to operate
across virtually all types of terrain also
factors strongly in the infantry debate
and drives the Corps to stay current in
winter warfare, mountain operations,
and urban operations. Finally, there is
the fact that the infantry corps is viewed
as being fractured along geographic
and regimental lines, more than the
other three combat arms.
There has been very little public debate on
the place or role of the infantry.
mountain, parachute, ranger, marine,
air assault, motorized, armoured
infantry, mechanized). Instead, to be
relevant and to meet the future
requirements, we must truly be a generalpurpose infantry and maintain the
equipment and skills to perform a broad
range of combat and other missions.
2
The raison d’être of the infantry is
“to close with and destroy the enemy”
and remains at the heart of what armies
are expected to do today and into the
future. This responsibility, to take and
These issues are important, but, at
the same time, we must not lose sight of
the fact that Canada produces superb
infantrymen, the equal, and often the
envy, of any in the world. Therefore, in
our drive to rationalize and reorganize,
we must ensure we do not break the
system.
hold ground, is coupled with a growing
range of complex and challenging
peace support missions and domestic
operations. There is also a growing
realization and acceptance that many of
our most likely, and most difficult,
operations will be conducted on
complex terrain.
There is also little argument that
the rifle company remains the core of
the infantry and the primary means of
carrying out the infantry mission.
Within the company are the vehicles,
capabilities, and technologies that
permit the infantry to carry out its
mission. At issue is how much of this
surrounding capability needs to be
integral to the infantry battalion, and
how much could and should be
grouped from external sources, as
required.
In the current search for balance,
there is an accusation that the infantry
battalion is actually a mini battle group,
lacking only tanks to go into
battle. Although there is a significant
difference between an infantry
battalion and a battle group, the
organization of the battalion is not an
accident. The current structure of the
infantry battalion grew out of the need
to conduct close combat on complex
terrain, in situations where everyone
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
3
Guest Editorial - Infantry in the Future Canadian Army
had to be an infantryman first and a History is replete with examples where brutal combat scenario. Surprisingly,
specialist second. All the capabilities in an entire combat support company was perhaps, these same vehicles provide a
the battalion were man portable and forced to dismount and fight in close superb capability in PSO, offering
focussed on the need to close with and and complex terrain, either as infantry mobility, force protection, rapid
reaction, and a credible enforcement
destroy the enemy. Integral combat or employing their sub speciality.
capability. Even in certain types of
support grew out of necessity.
The importance of combat support complex terrain (urban, for example),
Reconnaissance, for example, is a core
component for every combat arm, and is also imbedded in the current infantry there is still significant utility offered by
no unit can be without an integral recce military occupation classification the LAV III. However, in most View 1
capability. In the infantry battalion, (MOC) structure. By trade progression, scenarios, separating infantrymen from
these vehicles results in a
they are the elite; elite
dramatic decrease in
in the sense of being
There is limited room and
effectiveness, since with
the best at surviving
the vehicle comes prowhile dismounted on
scope for armoured vehicles in
tection (NBC and indirect
the
battlefield
in
urban or mountain operations.
fire), mobility, logistics
extreme conditions,
support, ammunition refinding the enemy,
surveillance
capabilities,
move
from
rifle supply,
navigating, patrolling, observing, infantrymen
sniping, and leading rifle companies or companies to combat support, as they communications, and a variety of heavy
combat teams to the attack position. gain confidence in their infantry skills support weapons. Hence, regardless of
With the advent of tanks and armoured and are ready to take on advanced how it is crewed (and there may be
vehicles came the requirement for anti- infantry tasks. Under the current options), I believe the APC must be
armour protection; again, however, infantry trade structure, NCOs gain imbedded in any future infantry
the emphasis was on dismounted part of their legitimacy as leaders battalion structure.
operations. The anti-armour platoon through their advanced combat
Unfortunately, many of the
had to, and still must be prepared to, support qualifications. Thus, combat
today
represents
nine technical advances integral to these
abandon the heavier vehicle-mounted support
or towed systems and either convert companies of the best trained, most vehicles cannot be dismounted. Thus,
them to the dismounted role or use experienced, and most versatile our concentration on vehicle-based
lighter man portable systems. The infantry in the Army. The existence of mechanization and technological
platoon is formed and equipped as these infantry companies is also one of upgrades has resulted in a situation
infantry, enabling them to perform the primary reasons the infantry has where, in complex terrain, the infantry
primary infantry duties when required. been able to sustain the burdens of is blown almost back to the Second
They use their weapons, not just for peace support operations (PSO), NCO World War. There is limited room and
anti-armour, but also in supporting taskings, and domestic operations. scope for armoured vehicles in urban
roles (bunker busting, destruction of Finally, the vehicle heavy components or mountain operations; their mobility
weapons positions) and to complement of combat support (mortars, pioneers, is significantly reduced and their
and reinforce the recce platoon by and anti-armour) also permitted vulnerability dramatically increased,
providing a flank protection force in a internal ship-to-shore rotations that requiring dismounted infantry provariety of circumstances. Assault allowed soldiers to heal when hurt and tection. In these scenarios, much of the
pioneers breached the wire, crossed the served to prevent burnout against the technological advantage disappears,
obstacles, and then went through the extreme physical activity demanded in and the infantry is again dependent on
rucksacks and man portable and
breach or over the bridge alone, or with the rifle company.
integral infantry capabilities. A combat
the leading company, as infantrymen
To say that mechanization has team in urban operations, for example,
carrying the satchel charges. In the
defence, they helped dig in the affected the infantry is an under- may well be composed of an infantry
company and battalion headquarters, statement. Advances in technology have company supported by an APC platoon,
put up minor obstacles (wire and imposed a tremendous training burden a troop of tanks, and a dismounted
protective minefields), and formed part on the infantry. At the same time, engineer troop. In mountainous
of the battalion commander’s infantry armoured personnel carriers (APCs) terrain, there may be no vehicle
reserve. More recently, they have been have provided incredible capabilities, support, with indirect fire and aviation
responsible for rapid individual including surveillance, firepower, as the only supporting arms.
decontamination
in
a
nuclear, mobility, and sustainability. Conceived
Thus, we are caught in a dichotomy
biological, and chemical (NBC) during the Second World War, but not
environment. Mortar platoon was the widely used until the Cold War, the and the need to strike a balance to
same, equipped with light, man- successive generations of APCs, ensure that the infantry can fight and
portable, indirect fire systems to culminating in the LAV III, permit the win across the spectrum of tasks. Given
provide final protective fire against infantry heavy combat team or battle the Future Security Environment, the
infantry, plus provide illumination and group to defeat an overwhelming, Future Army Capability Requirement
smoke to cover friendly movement. mechanized enemy in a short and and the decreasing risk of a rapid
equipment suite to another in order to
deploy. It has the added advantage of
ensuring that at least one-third of the
Corps is focussed on light or
dismounted operations. It also offers
the ability to assemble a light battalion
for specific missions (national evacuation
operations, special operating forces), as
required. However, under the Land
Force Reserve Restructure, I would also
add a fourth reserve rifle company
tasking to the mix, as follows:
•
Over the hills and far away. Despite technological advance, there is still a need
for difficult dismounted work in a variety of difficult environments. (Photo by
Cpl Lou Penney, 3 PPCLI Battallion Group)
Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
deployment to View 1 mid to high-end
operations, perhaps infantry combat
support has become far too vehicle
dependent. At the same time, there is a
continuing need to maintain our
medium-weight combat capability and
to achieve the required balance
between dismounted and mounted
infantry capabilities. This situation is
compounded by our need to create
sufficient similar units in our small
force to facilitate training and permit
sustained deployments across a wide
variety of operational scenarios. What
are our options? Some ideas follow.
The rifle companies are torn
between light and mechanized roles,
but I still believe it is possible to achieve
balance. Even to mechanized infantry,
the vehicle is primarily a taxi and an
armoury. Whether the rifle section is
riding in an M113, AVGP, BV206 or LAV
III, their real job does not begin until
the ramp goes down. This is not meant
to downplay the role of the Zulu
vehicles and crew. From the AVGP
forward, the Zulu vehicle has had an
integral role to play in the infantry
fight, a role that has increased
exponentially with the capabilities of
the vehicle. However, mounted combat
team attacks actually form only a small
part of the training year for an infantry
battalion. Section commanders and
platoon commanders are grown and
trained in patrolling exercises,
dismounted quick attack scenarios, and
by training on a variety of terrain
(mountain, urban, forest, winter,
helicopter insertion). At the same time,
I do acknowledge that there is still a
4
heavy training bill and a great deal of
effort spent on the mechanized aspect
of infantry to ensure that we get the
best out of the tools that transport,
support, and sustain the infantry in the
close fight. To provide the necessary
balance in a rule-of-three army, I
recommend an organization of two
LAV companies and one light company
with some assigned battalion Centres of
Excellence (CoE) to ensure a broad
range of skills are developed across the
entire Corps.
•
A Company: mounted in LAV III
with an integral echelon (capable
of dismounting its headquarters,
Eryx/AGL [automatic grenade
launcher]/84/MMGs [medium
machine-gun]). Battalion CoE
for ALEA (assistance to law
enforcement agencies), non lethal
weapons, and winter warfare.
•
B Company: mounted in LAV III
with an integral echelon (capable
of dismounting its headquarters,
Eryx/AGL/84/MMGs). Battalion
CoE for PSO and NBC operations.
•
C Company: dismounted with
some light patrol vehicles (LPVs)
and light over snow vehicles
(LOSVs). Battalion CoE for complex
terrain (urban and mountain)
and air-mobile. Equipped with
Eryx/AGL/84/MMGs.
This structure would ensure we
have enough similar units for sustained
overseas deployment, without the need
to continually convert units from one
D Company (reserve tasking):
dismounted with some LPVs and
LOSVs. Equipped with Eryx/
AGL/84/MMGs. Concentration
on PSO and complex terrain.
This would permit excellent
co-operative training between
regular and reserve infantry and
would provide the basis for
continual reserve augmentation
to overseas operations.
These three (or four) companies
and the battalion headquarters are the
core of the infantry battalion. However,
this does not yet adequately address the
combat support issue. First, we must
look at combat support company
headquarters. This headquarters has
always been the jack-of-all-trades.
During PSO, in addition to its primary
role of commanding the support
platoons, it commands many of the
external attachments (armour, electronic
warfare, air defence, engineers,
national rear link, etc.). This
headquarters also performs the roles of
civil military operations centre,
coordinates the battalion’s civil military
co-operation, and, more recently, has
taken on an increasing role in
coordinating the battalion level ISTAR
(intelligence, surveillance, target
acquisition, and reconnaissance) battle.
In domestic operations, it is the basis of
a fourth rifle company or has given the
battalion the capability of establishing a
second joint headquarters, when
required. In garrison, it coordinates the
centralized training of the support
platoons, provides essential personnel
for taskings, and provides the training
of the battalion (safety staff). In
essence, this company is the command
support element that enables the
battalion to function effectively, and it
must remain.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
loss is unfortunate and adversely affects
the infantry in a wide range of current
and future terrain. Perhaps it is time to
centralize (and even reduce) our heavy
anti-armour weapons at the brigade
level, as another step towards the
eventual adoption of a medium
multiple-effect vehicle. However, this
does not mean that the infantry should
get out of the dedicated anti-armour
game. The infantry requirement is for a
multi-task capable, man-portable or
ATV-carried system, such as Javelin,
Milan, AT 4, or some other future
system (preferably, fire and forget at
ranges out to 2500 metres). These
weapons have application across the
entire spectrum of operations (less
perhaps
for
certain
domestic
operations) and are far easier to deploy
than vehicle-mounted anti-armour
systems, from both a political and
operational perspective. At issue is
whether or not these capabilities should
be imbedded in each company or
centralized under battalion control.
The answer is in fact both. The
personnel and equipment need to be
centralized for training and to permit
the commanding officer to weigh his
anti-armour capability in certain
circumstances. As well, if properly
equipped (ATV, thermal-defeating
blankets, surveillance and dismounted
sensor suites, target designation, etc.),
this platoon could still perform its force
protection (flank security) role for the
battalion across a broad range of
missions. However, I would also expect
that in many circumstances, particularly
in complex terrain, the detachments
would be decentralized to rifle
companies. Whether imbedded or
stand-alone, the infantry must retain a
robust, medium range, anti-armour
capability that can be dismounted and
used in complex terrain. In View 1
high-end scenarios, this integral
capability
would
have
to
be
supplemented by existing, or future,
longer range anti-armour or multipleeffect weapons (brigade anti-armour
company perhaps).
Pioneers. Equipping the infantry
pioneer platoon with the same vehicles
as an engineer troop has detracted
dramatically from their traditional role
and created a sense of duplication in
the army structure. What do pioneers
need to be able to do? First, pioneers
need to perform dismounted infantry
gap crossing in all terrain (mountain,
water, urban canyons, foot lanes
through wire and minefields), provide
individual decontamination expertise
and capability for the battalion,
conduct wire and obstacle assault
breaches,
and
construct
field
protection for company and battalion
headquarters. Yes, there is still
duplication with some dismounted
Signals. The success of the infantry
battalion is only possible with a
functioning command and control
system. The signals platoon, composed
of both hard signals trades and
infantrymen, has always met this
challenge and will continue to do so
even as we proceed farther down the
road of digitization. However, it is
critical to remember that this platoon
must retain a dismounted capability
and that our C2 technologies must
cater to this eventuality, without
significantly degrading the command
and control capabilities.
Anti-Ar mour. By virtue of its
equipment, this platoon has lost the
capability for dismounted action. This
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Landing craft, helicopters, aircraft, vehicles or by foot. There is more than one
way to get there. (Courtesy DND)
5
Guest Editorial - Infantry in the Future Canadian Army
Reconnaissance.
Since
the
acquisition of the Coyote, successive war
games and exercises have demonstrated,
time and again, that it is not a close recce
vehicle and does not meet the infantry
requirement across the full spectrum of
terrain and missions. There is a need to
refocus infantry recce on dismounted
operations and/or provide them with a
stealth vehicle capability. Experiments
with all terrain vehicles (ATVs), in 1
Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group,
demonstrated there are vehicles available
today that can provide an incredible
capability across a broad range of
complex terrain and that support both
the close recce and sniper capabilities.
Properly equipped (night vision
equipment, PLGR [precise, lightweight
global positioning system receiver],
TCCCS [tactical command, control, and
communications system], dismounted
surveillance and sensor suites, target
designation capability), we can retain
many of the technological advantages,
without making infantry recce terrain
dependent. However, in addition to this
essential dismounted or light capability,
an infantry battalion or battle group does
require a wide area surveillance or
observation capability, like that provided
by the Coyote, in at least troop size, over
a broad range of medium combat, PSO,
and domestic operations missions. But,
although it is clear that this capability
could be integral to the battalion, it is not
essential it be owned or operated by
infantry. Hence, this capability could be
an external add-on from the armoured
regiment.
Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
engineer roles; however, all complex
operations have proven there are never
enough engineers to do all the work
required. Eliminating pioneer platoons
from the battalion and passing the
pioneer role to the engineers, without a
transfer
of
personnel,
merely
compounds the problem for one of the
most operationally tasked MOCs in the
army. In so doing, the available infantry
would be reduced by the equivalent of
nearly three companies across the army.
I contend there is an enduring
pioneer requirement in the army and
that many battle groups deploying
overseas need this capability (at least
early in the life of a mission and during
most View 1 scenarios). Therefore, in
accordance with Canadian doctrine
that dictates a requirement for five
units to maintain a single unit
indefinitely out of the country, I
recommend a minimum of five pioneer
platoons be retained in the army in
order to have enough to keep one
platoon indefinitely overseas on PSO
and three to support the MCF(main
contingency force) in an emergency.
Given that this number still requires a
necessary reduction, where should this
capability reside? First, there is no
question that engineer and pioneer
training in the army should be
centralized within the Combat Training
Centre (CTC). Second, with the
reduced number of platoons, pioneers
will become a brigade resource and
should be resident in the combat
engineer regiment. It is also a reality
that combat engineers are highly
sought after on the civilian market, and
maintaining their numbers is always
difficult. By passing them the pioneer
task, we must be sure that we are not
just increasing their staffing problems
ensure at least a latent emergency
capability for pioneer tasks within
the battle group. This latent
capability would result from the
cross posting of infantry between
rifle companies and pioneers
(engineer regiments), throughout
their careers. It must also be
recognized that this change does
represent a considerable loss of
force protection within the infantry
battalion (NBC decontamination,
bunker building, and mine
awareness) and, consequently,
increases risk.
Mortars. The issue of indirect
fire is the most complex of all.
Every battle group requires a fire
support
coordination
centre
(FSCC) and the ability to plan for
and control fire on the ground. To
date, the traditional artillery
battery structure has not been
sufficient to guarantee the full
We’ve done this before. For the first time
range of support (primarily a lack
since the end of the Korean War,
of forward observation officers
Canadians relieve Americans in a combat
[FOOs] and command posts).
zone. (Photo by Sgt David Snashall,
However, this lack is clearly a
DGPA/J5PA Combat Camera)
personnel and organizational issue
that could be solved by increasing the say that there are not additional
number of FOO parties and the size of requirements. The inclusion of
the artillery FSCC that come to a battle lightweight 40-millimetre AGLs at the
group headquarters. The reality is that company level would go a long way
with longer ranges and better target towards eliminating the need for
designation, indirect fire can be indirect fire mortars at the company and
delivered accurately by a wide range of battalion levels. This weapon offers an
systems. As well, restrictions on the use exponential jump in capability across a
of any indirect fire system that lacks a broad range of missions, particularly in
precision capability are increasing, complex terrain. Hence, with heavy
particularly in View 2 Operations. Plus, heart and fond memories, I recommend
in the future, multiple-effect vehicles are the elimination of mortar platoons from
likely to cover part of the gap normally the infantry battalion. Whether this
filled by indirect fire. Hence, the need capability should be eliminated
for integral indirect fire in the infantry is completely from the army order of battle
waning. Direct fire weapons (for is an issue that is under detailed study. I
example, the M203 offer the thought that perhaps the
grenade launcher), complete elimination of this capability
The infantry battalion is still
perform part of the now, coupled with the centralization of
not capable of fighting alone.
role currently filled our heavy anti-armour weapons, could
by the 60-millimetre be another springboard towards rapidly
and deleting a capability due to mortar, and this system is particularly adopting a terminally-guided multiplepersonnel shortages. I believe that useful in complex terrain. Smoke effect capability.
giving this task to combat engineers dischargers and better smoke grenades
In the end, what does an infantry
along with the necessary infantrymen to also fill at least part of the covering role
do their job should eliminate this that used to be filled by the 60- battalion do, and what does it look like?
concern. Therefore, given their tasks millimetre and 81-millimetre mortar. The infantry role remains to close with
and likely employment, I believe the Night vision equipment has reduced the and destroy the enemy. Each battalion
majority of these platoons should dependence on illumination provided must maintain enough of a generalremain as infantry. This would also by indirect fire weapons. That is not to purpose capability to perform this role
6
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
•
•
•
A mechanized battalion
headquarters with a dismounted
capability (perhaps step-up
should be the basis of a
dismounted headquarters).
Three or four rifle companies, as
described earlier.
Combat support company
headquarters: battalion CoE for
command support, ISTAR, range
and training safety, simulation,
and civil military co-operation.
•
Signals Platoon: battle group
headquarters C2, crypto,
frequency management, CoE for
communications training and
operations, radio repair.
•
Intelligence Section: intelligence,
information operations, ISTAR,
public affairs, and unit history.
•
•
Recce Platoon: Command Post;
Platoon Commander; four recce
sections each of three or four
ATVs; sniper section mounted on
ATVs; CQ with a support vehicle
and an ATV carrier; equipment
to include unattended ground
sensor and surveillance system,
target designation system, NBC
recce capability; battalion CoE
for dismounted recce,
marksmanship (sniping), and
surveillance.
Anti-Armour Platoon: Command
Post; four sections each of two
detachments; mounted on ATVs
and armed with 2500-metre man
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
portable AT [anti-tank] system
and unattended ground sensor
and surveillance system; roles dismounted AT capability, flank
protection; battalion CoE for
dismounted AT operations.
With this proposed structure, the
infantry battalion is still not capable of
fighting alone, and in addition to these
integral close fighting capabilities, the
battalion group or battle group will still
require a significant range of external
capabilities, in a mix that will depend
upon the assigned mission.
For View 2 operations, an infantry
battalion requires the following
augmentation:
•
FSCC, BC and FOO parties
(coupled with assigned indirect
fire assets);
•
troop to squadron of Coyote
surveillance vehicles;
•
mounted or dismounted
engineer troop, pioneer platoon,
and support troop heavy
equipment assets, as required;
•
ISTAR assets (national
intelligence link, UAVs
[unmanned aerial vehicles],
target acquisition, human
intelligence, electronic warfare,
and special operations forces);
•
aviation support;
•
man-portable or vehiclemounted TACP [tactical air
control party] (situation
dependent); and
•
national command and control
systems (rear link, area communications, and satellite access).
In most View 1 scenarios, an
infantry battalion requires all the
resources necessary to conduct View 2,
plus the following:
•
tanks (troop through to squadron,
depending upon the mission);
•
vehicle mounted and/or man
portable air defence;
•
mounted long range anti-armour
capability; and
•
additional indirect fire assets.
In discussing this model and
seeking input from a variety of sources,
I have already been inundated with
questions and arguments concerning
the training and employment of such
an organization. I do not have all the
answers, and some of these issues would
have to be addressed in time. However,
I will comment on three issues:
The Army Training and Operational Framework (ATOF) and the
Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre
(CMTC). This proposed structure
definitely meets the ATOF rotation and
high readiness requirements and
makes highly versatile units available to
meet a broad range of missions. It will
also meet the CMTC requirement as
long as there is some flexibility in how
the CMTC is set up. At the moment,
the CMTC will be fighting the View 1
mechanized battle on the West German
plains (a function of terrain). I
acknowledge that this may, and must,
change over time. Therefore, the
mechanized component will consist of
a battle group with two LAV companies
and a tank squadron (whatever
number of tanks that turns out to be);
thus, the rule-of-three mechanized
requirement will be met. The battle
group will include combat support, a
light company, an administration
company, as well as additional external
assets assigned. The CMTC offers a
variety of training venues for light
infantry (just like the American
National Training Center and the Joint
Readiness Training Center). They can
be used with aviation to cross obstacles
(another reason to get 1 Wing involved
in the CMTC), do blocking tasks,
conduct AT tasks, conduct patrolling,
fight in built-up areas, defend a
location, perform rear area security
tasks, etc. The only limit to the
employment of the light company will
be imagination. In other scenarios,
the battle group trained may be on
light scales, like the Immediate
Reaction Force (Land). I do not
believe a variety of unit structures
will be any impediment to CMTC
training.
7
Guest Editorial - Infantry in the Future Canadian Army
across a broad spectrum of operations,
extending from medium weight combat
through to domestic operations. The
core components of the infantry
battalion must be capable of operating
dismounted or partially mechanized in
complex terrain, as well as fighting
against a mounted mechanized threat.
Battalions must all be organized and
equipped alike and be capable of
rotating through assigned missions
under the Army Training and
Operational Framework plan. Finally,
there must be an effective and
sustainable MOC structure. To do this, I
recommend the following organization:
Future Infantr y MOC Structure.
I believe that the current structure is
both supportable and will meet our
future requirements. The infantry
system of progression is a reasonable
balance of experience and training and
offers sufficient career paths to
challenge every member of the Corps.
Brigadier-General Glenn Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
•
Soldiers come from the area
training centres as dismounted
infantry. They should go directly
into the dismounted company
for at least one year to round out
their infantry skills and to get
some of the basic QL4 courses
(Machine Gun, Communications,
Driver Wheel, Eryx, AGL, and
Winter Warfare). The
dismounted company should also
have the highest staffing priority
in the battalion. Where this
proves impossible, due to high
numbers of new soldiers, the
remaining new soldiers could go
into the two LAV companies as
infantry section members and
take the same range of basic
courses.
•
Senior privates and corporals
should move to combat support
platoons or to LAV companies
to start specialist MOC training
(dismounted recce, sniper,
dismounted AT, driver LAV,
pioneer, LAV gunner). It is
at this point that some will be
cross-posted to combat engineer
regiments to fill pioneer
platoons. This point of their
career also marks the beginning
of real exposure to many of the
technological capabilities
resident within the infantry.
They also start gaining
leadership experience, acting as
section third in command,
detachment commanders,
section second in command
leading to the Junior Leader
Course/Infantry Section
Commander’s Course.
•
Master corporals are the first
official level of leadership. They
act as section second in command
or detachment commanders and
need to attend the Small Arms
Instructors Course. The best can
8
also start being selected for
advanced courses (dismounted
recce, anti-armour, sniper, LAV
crew commander, pioneer, or
communications).
•
Sergeants are section
commanders and should have an
advanced sub-speciality
(dismounted recce, anti-armour,
LAV crew commander, sniper,
pioneer, or communications).
•
Warrant officers are employed
as rifle platoon warrant officers,
operations warrant officers,
specialist platoon warrant
officers, or as company
quartermaster sergeants (CQMS).
•
There are also specialist skills
that must be retained within the
battalion in sufficient numbers
to ensure operational missions
can be met. These skills include
mountain operations instructor,
urban operations instructor,
winter warfare instructor, and
rappel master.
that every LAV in the army must be
crewed by the Armoured Corps. This is
not a simple leap of logic and requires
far more intellectual debate to
determine how some of these ideas will
actually improve both our combat
capability and our ability to train,
while generating efficient and
cohesive combat units.
In the future, we cannot predict
where we might have to fight, and we
must avoid trying to oversimplify the
world. Because of rapid advances in
technology, combat is becoming more
intense and more complex. Across the
entire world, there is a higher need for
versatile and multi-skilled personnel.
Armies are not any different. We need
to spend time resolving how we can
deliver training and new capabilities to
our soldiers throughout their careers,
rather than trying to use specialization
as a means of resolving training issues
and saving training dollars. We must
avoid letting technology force us into
compartmentalizing our soldiers and
capabilities to the point that we can no
longer form independent and
cohesive units, capable of carrying out
their assigned tasks. Our soldiers today
are intelligent and adaptable. They
can absorb new ideas and new
technologies and are capable of
performing well, across a broad range
of complex situations. The army needs
units that work.
Centralized training versus
centralized employment. I have long
recognized that there are efficiencies
to be had in the army training system
by centralizing certain types of army
training. There is no requirement for
both the CF School of Military
Engineering and the Infantry School
To make the infantry and the entire
to teach engineering. We need one
school staffed by both engineers and Army more effective, it is also clear that
infantry soldiers. There is no need for we must spend more research and
two indirect fire schools (artillery development effort to provide techand infantry).
There is no
We must avoid letting technology
need for two
force us into compartmentalizing
recce schools
(infantry and
our soldiers and capabilities.
armoured),
although there
is a need for the CTC recce school to nologies applicable to both mounted
teach mounted recce, dismounted and dismounted operations. Conversely,
recce, and specialist recce. The list we must ensure vehicle-mounted
could go on. However, support for technologies can be dismounted or
centralized
schools
does
not adapted for dismounted use. To meet
automatically equal support for the Future Security Environment, there
centralized employment. The fact that is also a requirement to ensure that
the Armoured School is undoubtedly new technologies are developed or
the best place to teach crew gunnery purchased specifically to improve our
and crew command does not capabilities in complex terrain. To do
automatically translate into the fact this, we must break our fixation and
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
preference
for
armoured-vehiclemounted technology. Areas for study
include robotic sensors, small UAVs,
attended and unattended ground
surveillance and sensing, portable
target designation, thermal imaging,
threat warning, communications, and
communications relay.
The infantry, as a corps, has a real
role in the future. At the same time, I
know that there are others out there
with different, and equally valid,
arguments for both infantry and army
restructuring. For example, I have
heard arguments from some that, in
the future, the Infantry and Armour
Corps should be combined. Given the
infantry requirement to operate on
complex terrain, I have severe
reservations about this construct, but
would welcome some concrete
proposals on this issue that we can
then debate. I hope that this article
provides food for thought and
generates some discussion. So, let the
debate begin…
ENDNOTE
1. With grateful acknowledgement to Sir
Winston Churchill. Managing Editor.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
The first Coyote reconnaissance vehicle from Lord
Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) (LdSH[RC])
drives off the ramp of a U.S. Air Force C-17
Globemaster at Kandahar on 3 Feburary 2002. The
LdSH(RC) Reconnaissance Squadron is part of the 3rd
Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
Battalion Group, which is in Afghanistan on Operation
“Apollo.” (DGPA/J5PA Combat Camera photo by Capt
Dale MacEachern)
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
9
Guest Editorial - Infantry in the Future Canadian Army
Brigadier-General Nordick enrolled in the Canadian Forces in 1973. He attended Royal Roads Military College in
Victoria and graduated from The Royal Military College of Canada in 1977 with a baccalaureate in English. His service
included various appointments with the 1st and 3rd Battalions, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, Headquarters
4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and National Defence Headquarters. He also served briefly as a staff officer in
Headquarters Canadian Forces Middle East, Manama, Bahrain during the Gulf War. He is a graduate of the US Army War
College. Brigadier-General Nordick has served two tours in Cyprus and with the United Nations Protection Force in
Croatia, where he commanded the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battalion Group. He was
awarded the Meritorious Service Cross for his outstanding leadership during this deployment. Between 1999 and 2001,
Brigadier-General Nordick commanded 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. He is currently the Deputy
Commander, Land Force Doctrine and Training System and the Commandant of the Canadian Land Force Command
and Staff College.
From the Managing Editor
Happy Anniversary!
by Major John R. Grodzinski, CD
T
his year marks the fifth
year of publication of The
Army Doctrine and Training
Bulletin.
Judging
from
comments from the field, the “ADTB,”
as some call it, is providing a useful
professional tool for the Army. The
Bulletin has achieved the mandate of
providing a mechanism for professional
discussion and debate. The debate has
gone far beyond our pages and into unit
lines, messes and other places. While
the title of this journal is a mouthful and
often said incorrectly—it’s “Training”
not “Tactics”! —the ADTB is clearly part
of our professional culture.
Major John R. Grodzinski, CD
This anniversary provides an
opportunity to briefly outline the
origins of The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin and how it has
evolved.
Since the 1850s, the Army has
published a number of professional
publications, of varying quality. These
include, The Canadian Volunteer
Review, The Canadian Army Journal,
The Junior Officer Journal, and the
Canadian Army Doctrine Bulletin. The
best of these was the original Canadian
Defence Quarterly, published from 1923
to 1939. The end of the Canadian
Army Doctrine Bulletin in 1993 left the
Army without a professional journal,
while several commercial publications
simply did not meet Army needs.
Through the late 1990s, the need
for a new journal received considerable
debate, but the actual impetus did not
occur until 1996 when the newly
created Directorate of Army Doctrine
(DAD) was assigned the task of
developing a professional army journal.
Institutionally, the Army leadership was
divided over the utility of a professional
journal, but the work went on. Your
humble Managing Editor entered the
picture in early 1998. As a staff officer at
10
DAD, I became responsible for further
developing the concept and taking
that through to publication.
One hurdle at the time was the
fear that serving personnel would use
the “Canadian Army Journal” (as was
the working title) to vent their
frustrations. This lack of faith by some
in the professional conduct of our
personnel was surprising. These
concerns have proven false, and no
submission to the Bulletin has ever
been of this nature. Potential authors
voiced worry that their published
opinions might bring repercussions by
career action. These concerns were
countered with promises that it would
not, and there is no evidence that it
ever has.
The relationship between the
Bulletin and existing publications was
then developed. These publications
included the corps and branch
journals and the yet to be launched
Canadian Forces journal, which
eventually became Canadian Militar y
Journal. It was important that these
publications complement and not copy
each
other.
Excellent
working
relationships exist with all these
journals.
By 16 April 1998, the concept was
complete and was ready for approval.
This came from Lieutenant General
Bill Leach, then Chief of the Land Staff,
who approved the scope, content and
format of The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin. He clearly saw its
importance in exchanging ideas and
held a very dark view of those who
might take institutional sanctions
against authors. The Bulletin was for
ideas and debate—the more, the better.
Given the legal status of the
Canadian Forces, “Canadian Army”
could not appear in the title and use of
The Army Doctrine and Training
Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, August 1998.
A true collector’s Item.
the word “journal”, which was used for
another publication, might create
confusion. It was finally decided to use
the title The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin, with the sub-title
“Canada’s Professional Journal on
Army Issues” being slipped in later by a
party not to be named here.
The editorial policy was clearly
established. The fundamental rule
remains that, while the editorial staff
may make minor changes to a
submission for grammatical or like
reasons, it will never undertake the
revision of any submission. If major
structural or other flaws are discovered,
the author will be notified and asked to
undertake any revisions.
Another early principle was that
each issue of the Bulletin would include
articles on various subjects and not on a
“single topic.” It was felt that single
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
As the title was the result of
compromise and suggests content, it
must be understood that the scope of
The Army Doctrine and Training
Bulletin was never limited to doctrinal
and training matters. It includes
subjects such as leadership, technology,
history, ethics or any other topic of
professional interest to the Army.
Once armed with approval to
publish, articles had to be collected. In
order to get the publication off the
ground, articles were commissioned for
the first two issues. Since then, most of
the articles have come from the
initiative of our readership or unit
professional development programmes.
The scope of The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin has been extended to
sponsoring book launches and hosting
the annual Army Symposium in Kingston,
Ontario (see elsewhere in this issue for
details of the next one in May 2002).
While the cover design and layout
have evolved over the last five years, the
Bulletin’s importance has always rested
on its content. The directorate updates,
guest editorials, articles, stand-up table
commentaries, tactical problems, book
reviews and other features are what
count. Articles have dealt with
operational deployments, historical
events and technological issues. Noncommissioned members have played an
important role, and it mystifies me that
they are quite comfortable discussing
operational and strategic issues in our
pages, while senior officers are not. Predeployment issues, the development of
the post-Second World War Army and
doctrinal pitfalls have also been
presented. The future of the Armour
Corps has also caught particular
interest. From the many articles dealing
with armour, it is clear that the word
“tank” is indeed a four-letter word.
The last five years have seen some
interesting concepts and ideas put
forward. Many of the articles have been
used as background reading for
working groups, strategic planning
sessions, courses and at Army Council.
Best of all, they have provided our
soldiers with a professional journal to
share and debate ideas. The future only
looks brighter.
The Managing Editor extends thanks to
the many editors, proofreaders, layout
designers and most especially to the
contributors to The Army Doctrine
and Training Bulletin for making this
a great professional journal.
From the Managing Editor - Happy Anniversary!
theme issues would result in the
Bulletin driving discussion instead of
the readership doing so. Furthermore,
reading six to eight articles on the same
subject is not exciting for everyone.
Certain special features have focussed
on special issues. Readers may recall the
telephone book like Volume 2, No. 2,
which had a feature on the combined
arms team on top of the regular
selection of articles.
We regret to announce that the winners of The Army
Doctrine and Training Bulletin Warfighting Essay Contest
cannot be announced in this issue as other demands have
delayed judging. The winners will be announced in the
Summer 2002 issue of the Bulletin.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
11
From the Directorate of Army Training
THE ARMY TRAINING COUNCIL –
3-4 NOVEMBER 2001
T
From the Directorate of Army Training
he second annual Land
Force Doctrine and Training
System
(LFDTS)
Army
Training Council (ATC) was
held in Kingston, 3-4 November 2001.
The conference was a great success
with excellent presentations, frank
discussions and clear paths charted for
many Army training issues. The
conference was chaired by MajorGeneral Arp, Commander LFDTS, and
attended by senior leaders from across
the Army. Deputy Commander LFDTS,
Brigadier-General Nordick, area or
deputy area commanders of each area,
brigade commanders from both the
Regular and Reserve brigades, the
Commander Combat Training Centre,
and the Land Force Command
Inspector were in attendance to name a
few of the 118 attendees. There was also
good representation from noncommissioned members with many
command, area and brigade CWOs
as well as many area training centre and
school commandants and their RSMs.
The topics covered at the ATC
ranged from an update on the new
professional development models
for officers and non-commissioned
members to an overview of the
challenges resulting from the transfer of
responsibility for certain military
occupation classifications from the
Canadian Forces Recruiting, Education
and Training System to the Army. The
ATC also saw the first presentations of
the new B-GL 300-008/FP-001 Training
Canada’s Army by Comd LFDTS to the
area commanders or their deputies.
The presentations from the ATC are
available on the DIN at: http://lfdts.army.
mil.ca/web_temp/DAT/Army%20Training
%20Council%20Presentations/
The record of decisions is available at:
http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/web_temp/
DAT/Army%20Training%20Council%
20Record%20of%20Decisions/
12
In conclusion, the second annual
ATC was a most worthwhile endeavour.
It saw the meeting of not only the
majority of the Army senior leadership
but also the senior trainers from across
the Army. It will continue as an annual
event, and ideas for improvement are
always welcome.
R E C E N T LY R E V I S E D D AT L A N D
FORCE COMMAND ORDERS
(LFCO)
O
ver the last year, the Directorate of
Army Training (DAT) has embarked on an ambitious rewrite of two
out-of-date Land Force Command
Orders (LFCOs). The two LFCOs in
question are LFCO 24-8 Individual
Training and Education Policies and
Procedures and LFCO 24-20 Training
Equivalencies and Qualification Reinstatement Policy and Procedures.
LFCO 24-8 INDIVIDUAL
T R A I N I N G A N D E D U C AT I O N
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
T
he policies and procedures
outlined in LFCO 24-8 have their
roots in the Canadian Forces Individual
Training and Education System
(CFITES). The aim of CF individual
training and education (IT&E) is to
provide the necessary training and
education at the right time and in the
most efficient and effective manner to
ensure that the required qualified
personnel are ready and able to
satisfy operational requirements and
departmental objectives and goals. The
CFITES governs the training and
education for all Regular and Reserve
CF members and guides the
development and management of all
IT&E activities and its key concepts of
performance oriented training, systems
approach, and optimum efficiency. The
CFITES is a management system
composed of a quality control system
and a quantity control process. Each
of these components incorporates
resource management mechanisms.
CFITES is referred to in the Army
as the IT&E component of the Army
Systems Approach to Training (ASAT).
Containing the same quality control
components as CFITES—analysis,
design, development, conduct, evaluation,
and validation—the objective of ASAT is
to aid in the preparation of Army
personnel for operations. ASAT is used
to plan and conduct all Army IT&E, and
it supports the development of
standards by which the Army unifies the
approach to training for operations.
ASAT is used to describe the operations
of war in terms of training objectives for
both individuals and groups, and it
provides clear criteria such as time and
accuracy standards by which to measure
success.
The aim of LFCO 24-8 is to set forth
the policies and procedures for the quality
and quantity control of individual training
within the Land Force. The order
specifies the quality and quantity control
mechanisms for all Army individual
training and education. More specifically,
it provides the following:
•
a description of the quality
control process of the IT&E
component of ASAT;
•
a description of the control
documents that support IT&E;
•
a description of the responsibilities of key organizations tasked
with IT&E;
•
the policy on liaison between:
•
the Land Force Doctrine and
Training System (LFDTS);
•
the Combat Training Centre
(CTC);
•
area headquarters;
•
area training centres; and
•
centres of excellence (CoE);
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
•
the policy on liaison with
Canadian Forces Recruiting and
Education System (CFRETS)/
Canadian Forces Support
Training Group (CFSTG) and its
schools;
a description and function of the
Army Professional Development
Senior Review Board (Army PD
SRB);
•
a description and function of the
Army Individual Training and
Education Working Group (Army
IT&E WG);
•
a description and function of the
Army Individual Training
Conference (AITC);
•
the role/function of the
Command Chief Standards
Officer (CCSO) including visit
procedures and a visit reporting
format;
•
the Army progress review
procedures;
•
the validation process;
•
document management control; and
•
the quantity control process.
LFCO 24-20 TRAINING
E Q U I VA L E N C I E S A N D
QUALIFICATION REINSTATEMENT
POLICY AND PROCEDURES
T
he second LFCO recently rewritten
by DAT staff was LCFO 24-20
Training Equivalencies and Qualification
Reinstatement Policy and Procedures.
LFCO 24-20 is applicable to all candidates for enrolment, occupation
transfer (OT) or CF component transfer
(CT). LFCO 245-20 also applies to
personnel already serving who have or
are acquiring relevant civilian training
and experience or who have previous
Canadian or foreign military service.
The aim of LFCO 24-20 is to
provide the authority, policies, and
procedures for granting equivalencies
and reinstating qualifications within the
Army. The LFCO provides direction on
the following issues:
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
•
equivalencies;
•
qualification reinstatement;
•
reinstatement requirements;
•
staffing procedures; and
•
driver qualifications.
Many candidates for enrolment,
OT or CT have civilian and military
qualifications and experience that are
related to their new military career or
occupation. Additionally, personnel
already serving continue to acquire new
qualifications and experience outside
the CF. Consequently, personnel are
often more qualified than expected for
their MOC, rank, and seniority. In fact,
they may already possess the necessary
skills and knowledge required for more
advanced employment and career
progression. There is a requirement to
recognize and take full advantage of
the enhanced potential of these
individuals. Higher than expected skill
and knowledge levels must be identified
and assessed with respect to their
applicability and validity towards the
granting of formal CF qualifications. The
two processes to do this are the granting
of equivalencies and the reinstatement
of CF qualifications.
An equivalency is defined as the
granting of a CF qualification in
recognition of the applicability and
validity of civilian, foreign military,
Cadet Corps and Cadet Instructor
Cadre qualifications and experience.
Equivalencies are granted when it is
assessed that civilian qualifications and
experience or foreign military training
are acceptable as alternatives to CF
training. The reinstatement of qualifications recognizes that a previously held
CF qualification is still valid. Both these
processes aim at providing an incentive
for trained personnel to join the CF,
recognizing self-improvement, and
eliminating unnecessary training.
The responsibility for equivalencies
and reinstatement of CF qualifications
is derived from the Individual Training
and Education Managing Authority
(IT&E MA) responsibility tables found
in NDHQ Instruction ADM (Per) 4/94.
The CF Military Equivalencies Program
(CFMEP) (DAOD 5031-1) provides CFwide direction and delegates the authority
over to awarding of equivalencies to the
IT&E MAs.
In summary, the Chief of Land
Staff (CLS) is responsible for Army
qualifications, while the CF Recruiting,
Education and Training System
(CFRETS) is responsible for combat
support (CS) and combat service
support (CSS) qualifications. The Navy,
Air Force, Health Services, and Provost
Marshall have also been assigned MA
responsibility for their respective areas
of responsibility. CFRETS has delegated
authority to the CF Support Training
Group (CFSTG).
The CLS has delegated the IT&E
MA responsibility to DAT, which is the
only agency authorized to grant
equivalencies for Army qualifications.
As the Army IT&E MA, DAT is
responsible for developing, promulgating, and maintaining the policies
and procedures on equivalencies and
reinstatement for CF qualifications
assigned to the Army. A listing of all
active Army qualifications can be found
on the DAT DWAN site located at:
http:// lfdts.army.mil.ca/dat/qual.asp
A major focus of the new LFCO is the
policy change with respect to the authorities to grant reinstatement of a previously held CF qualification. Reinstatement is the recognition that the
individual is still considered qualified to
perform the related duties associated
with a given qualification. Within the
Army, the authority to reinstate CF
qualifications is now as follows:
•
if the break in service is less than
three years, LFAHQs have the
authority to reinstate Army and
Army CSS qualifications. Authority
for the reinstatement of all other
qualifications rests with the
appropriate MA;
•
if the break in service is between
three and five years, LFAHQs also
have the authority to reinstate
primary combat function (PCF)
and leadership qualifications.
Authority for the reinstatement
of all other qualifications rests
with the appropriate MA;
13
From the Directorate of Army Training
•
•
if the break in service is between five
and ten years, the authority for the
reinstatement of all qualifications
rests with the appropriate MA; and
•
if the break in service is ten years
or more, no Army qualifications
will be reinstated. Nevertheless,
the file may be sent to CFRG,
which may reinstate CF QL2.
All requests for equivalencies and
the reinstatement of qualifications are to
be forwarded through the chain of
command to LFDTS/DAT, CFSTG/G3
Trg Pol or other appropriate MA using
Annex A of the LFCO. Documentary
proof of the qualifications or experience
for which the equivalencies/reinstatement are being sought must be
included with the application. The unit
CO should forward the application
through the chain of command to the
area HQ for consideration. If the area
HQ does not have granting authority,
the request will then be forwarded to
DAT or the appropriate MA.
Questions or comments regarding
either LFCO are welcome and can be
forwarded through the chain of
command to DAT 6, LieutenantColonel Thomson, at the Land Force
Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS)
Headquarters in Kingston, telephone
(613) 541-5010 local
LFCO 24-8 and 24-20 were signed
off and approved for distribution by
the Director of Army Training on 11
October 01. In the near future, the
LFCOs will be placed on the CLS DWAN
site at: http://army.dwan.dnd.ca/lfco/
24-08.htm
In the mean time, both LFCOs can
be downloaded from the DAT DWAN
site at: http://lfdts.army.mil.ca/DAT/
draft_lfco.asp
From the Directorate of Army Training
Soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battalion
Group arrive at Kandahar Airport, 3 February
2002. The 3 PPCLI Battalion Group is serving in
Afghanistan on Operation “Apollo,” Canada's
military contribution to the international
campaign against terrorism. (DGPA/J5PA Combat
Camera photo by Capt Dale MacEachern)
14
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
From the Directorate of Land
Strategic Concepts
T
he Future Army Development
Plan of 08 March 1999
highlighted the need for wargaming experimentation to
validate future army concepts. June of
2001 saw the first of these experiments.
While much work remains to be done to
analyze all of the findings, and even as a
detailed report on the conduct of the
experiment is being completed for issue
in the near future, some early
conclusions of interest to a wider
audience merit publication now. The
aim of this report is to disseminate to
the Army at large the insights gained
from the Director Land Strategic
Concepts (DLSC) Experiment 01. It
must be understood that it is still early
in the experimentation process and
these insights remain to be tested under
other conditions.
With Army Council approval, it was
determined that this first experiment
should look at operations in a general
war scenario in the open, expanded
battlespace, circa 2020, and should
compare and contrast two different sets
of capabilities. The year 2020 fits within
the DLSC mandate of examining issues
in the 11 to 25 year time frame. The
Future Security Environment (August
1999) and Future Army Capability
Requirements (January 2001), coupled
with the recent combat function audit
on indirect fire, provided much of the
background information.
Two experimental forces, EXFORs A
and B, were examined. EXFOR A
represented an evolutionary development
of the Army, while EXFOR B represented
the acquisition of capabilities sufficiently
advanced to facilitate a different concept
of operations. In essence, the
evolutionary EXFOR A model would
continue the current trend of using
firepower to support manoeuvre. The
EXFOR B model, which featured
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
enhanced, extended-range capabilities
coupled with a corresponding reduction
in manoeuvre elements, demanded that
manoeuvre support firepower.
The experiment was conducted in
a seminar format of action, reaction,
counter-reaction, and discussion. To
assist in the war-game deliberations, the
work of the Army Experimentation
Centre in developing appropriate
simulation was used.
The results derived from this
experiment represent but one small
piece of a larger future force
structuring process. Over the next year,
DLSC will be conducting a similar
experiment to explore high-end View 2
operations in the urban environment.
Taken together, this series of experiments—which will later include an
examination of domestic operations—
will provide the background for
developing a model for the future Army.
BACKGROUND
I
n order to increase the cogency of
the findings, every effort was made to
use validated data from previous
experiments and analyses. Of particular
value was the recent combat function
audit on indirect fire assets.
A second source of import was the
baseline data on weapons capabilities
provided by the Army Experimentation
Centre. This data was especially
important for those capabilities for
which research and development are
only just beginning. For example, one
of the EXFOR vehicles was a multimission effects vehicle (MMEV) armed
with a high-energy missile (HeMi)
postulated to reach speeds of mach 7
within 400 meters. Modelling was done
using the current air-defence anti-tank
system (ADATS), which is slower and
bigger than the HeMi; however, the
ability of the ADATS to kill T80 tanks at
5 km provided a minimal baseline from
which results during the experiment
could be projected.
Additional background information
was drawn from related experiments
conducted by the US and Australian
armies. Data from those experiments
was consolidated to form a baseline
picture representing the situational
awareness (SA) that might be enjoyed
and how it might be degraded over time.
As well, data from these experiments was
used as a start point to set the kill ratios
and to determine the general effects of
extended-range capabilities.
O BJECTIVES OF THE EXPERIMENT
T
he objective of the experiment was to
compare and contrast the capabilities
of two different forces operating in an
expanded battlespace. The focus was on
answering two major questions: what are
the significant multipliers, and what are
the major vulnerabilities? Utilizing two
different force structures allowed a
broader examination of both capabilities
and vulnerabilities. The following list of
subordinate questions was developed to
address selected aspects of each of the
operational functions:
Sense
•
How should information for the
force be managed, co-ordinated,
and distributed?
•
Will Sense capabilities be able to
provide the assurance of targeting
needed to exploit extremely
long-range weapons?
Command
•
What degree of confidence is
required by (or acceptable to) a
force commander to identify and
automatically attack mobile high
payoff targets?
15
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
P R E FA C E
•
•
•
What is the most appropriate
command structure within and
between headquarters to satisfy the
time restrictions posed by attacking
mobile high payoff targets?
•
Will mission sufficiency create a
mobility problem?
•
What is the best method for the
care and evacuation of casualties?
What are the potential command
support functions that could be
satisfied through a reachback
capability at battle group (BG)
/EXFOR level?
EXERCISE HYPOTHESES
How will a network-centric
capability affect mission command?
Act
•
How much integral firepower
does the force need, and can the
force receive timely and effective
supporting fire through reachback?
•
What are the possible implications
of automatic sensor-shooter links
and the implications for target
acquisition, target assessment,
munitions selection, and morality?
•
Do EXFOR A and B have the correct
balance of firepower and manoeuvre
resources to support their respective
concepts of operation (CONOPS)?
In other words, does EXFOR A have
the firepower to support manoeuvre
and EXFOR B the ability to
manoeuvre to support firepower?
T
o be effective in the 2020 expanded
battlespace, the Army will require new
capabilities, which are defined as a combination of doctrine, structure, and systems.
The experiment was designed to
explore both new capabilities and what
balance of capabilities would best
enable the Army to fight and win
in open terrain in an expanded
battlespace. The central hypothesis was
that to be successful, EXFOR would
have to achieve operational shock
through manoeuvre, firepower, and
offensive information operations
against the enemy in depth. This would
include conducting high tempo,
simultaneous, tactical manoeuvres of
limited duration with the ability to
rapidly aggregate effects from dispersed
assets. Inthis regard, the following
additional hypotheses were explored:
•
burst engagements plus dispersion
enhance force survivability;
•
improvements to sense and
extended-range assets facilitate
a decrease in close-range forces;
•
improvements to lethality allow
close-range forces to defeat
much larger enemy forces;
•
extended-range forces gain in
exploiting burst engagement
tactics, dispersion, precision,
and lethality overmatch; and
•
sense facilitates precision that in
turn allows formations to engage
and destroy enemy forces well above
the currently accepted ratios of 3:1.
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
Shield
•
Does the increased lethality and
mobility of EXFOR compensate
for traditional passive protection?
In other words, will it be possible
to achieve the protection afforded
by a 70-ton vehicle in a 20-ton
package?
area of operations allocated to EXFOR A
and B was comparable to that which
would currently be allocated to a division
or higher formation (150 X 200 km). The
size of the area of operations (AO) and
the disadvantageous correlation of forces
dictated that manoeuvre and firepower
had to be carefully co-ordinated to
achieve the ability to shape and defeat the
enemy while retaining the combat
capability for exploitation.
Both EXFOR A and B faced two
divisions of RED forces. Both had four
motor rifle regiments (MRRs) in the first
tactical echelon oriented on immediate
objectives and two MRRs and two tank
regiments in the second tactical echelon
focussed on the subsequent objectives.
RED possessed the full suite of modern
conventional capabilities, being particularly strong in armoured forces and indirect fire assets. RED’s attack helicopters
were of high quality but limited in
numbers. The correlation of forces lay
significantly in RED’s favour, with an
advantage of 7:1 and 10:1 in manoeuvre
against EXFOR A and B respectively and
7:1 in firepower. The initiative for the
initial attack lay with RED.
Although numerically superior, RED
was constrained by the relative backwardness of its intelligence, surveillance,
and target acquisition (ISTAR) system,
which resulted in significant vulnerabilities, the most significant of which
were its comparatively deficient SA and
command and control systems. This
resulted in vulnerability to BLUE
reconnaissance and attack aviation
capabilities. RED was also unable to fix
and engage BLUE forces in close battle,
where RED’s superior numbers would
have been advantageous.
B L U E ( E X F O R ) F o rc e s
•
•
What redundancy and protection
does EXFOR require for its
information systems?
To what degree will EXFOR rely
on deception for protection?
CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT
Sustain
Scenario and RED CONOPS
•
T
The two EXFORs were structured to
provide capabilities across the five operational functions. Both EXFORs were relative in size to a current brigade group with
a strength of about 5000 personnel. A summary of each operational function follows.
EXFOR A - Act
16
Will it be possible to configure
a force for mission sufficiency,
thus negating a regular/linear
resupply system?
he scenario involved fighting a
conventional battle in open terrain,
but within a greatly expanded battlespace
and with an unfavourable force ratio. The
The Act capabilities assigned to
EXFOR A comprised tube artillery, mortars, armed aviation, offensive oper-
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
EXFOR B - Act
The primary difference between
EXFOR A and B was the addition to
EXFOR B of improved extended-range
assets. To supplement tube artillery
and mortars, EXFOR B was given
artillery rocket systems and attack
aviation.
The rocket system was based on
the US Army high mobility artillery
rocket system (HIMARS); however, the
range was extended to 100 km—a
realistic expectation for 2020. The
armed, ERSTA equipped Griffon
helicopters were upgraded to the US
Army RAH-66 Comanche. The stealth
profile of the Comanche (radar
cross section 1/30th of an Apache)
combined with the ability to acquire,
process, and hand-off up to 200 targets
gave EXFOR B a considerable extended-range capability.
The BG indirect fire assets were
allocated from EXFOR. The main
combat power of the BG was contained
within the multi-mission effects vehicle
(MMEV) and close effects vehicle
(CEV) sub-units. The MMEV sub-unit
consisted of three sub-sub units of
MMEV and one sub-sub unit equipped
with a ground-mounted missile based
on Hellfire capabilities. The CEV subunit consisted of three sub-sub units.
The MMEV represented the evolution
of the current direct fire capability of
the tank, and the CEV represented the
evolution of the light armoured vehicle
(LAV) III. The CEV represented a
conventional evolution of the LAV III
manned by a crew of three and carrying
a section of six soldiers. Each CEV was
armed with a 25 mm cannon and a
general purpose machine-gun (GPMG).
Two vehicles per sub-sub unit were
equipped with an Mk 19 automatic
grenade launcher, and one vehicle per
sub-sub unit was equipped with a very
short-range air defence (VSHORAD)
pod of four missiles.
The Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle
The MMEV was slightly more
revolutionary in capability. In consultation with the research and
development community, the vehicle
was modelled on the capabilities
inherent in the FAV project. Armament
consisted of a 105 mm electro-thermalchemical gun with a basic load of 40
rounds and a pod mounted missile system
for both anti-tank and VSHORAD tasks.
FAV B a t t l e G ro u p s
High Energy Missile (HeMi)
Close combat assets were organized into BGs, each of which contained capabilities across the five
operational functions. In order to
better explore the trade-off between
close- and extended-range assets and
their relationship to manoeuvre,
EXFOR A was allocated three BGs and
EXFOR B two.
The MMEV missile was based on the
current ADATS missile but with improvements projected to occur in the
next 10 or so years. It is expected that
such a missile will be approximately one
meter in length, weigh 20 kg, and reach
a speed of mach 7 within 400 m of
launch. Given the speed of the missile, it
is expected that it will be a laser beam
rider.
C O M M O N C A PA B I L I T I E S
In order to keep the number of
variables to a manageable level,
capabilities within the individual BGs and
across the other operational functions
were identical for EXFOR A and B.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
C o m m a n d — E ff e c t s
C o o rd i n a t i o n C e l l ( E C C )
Command support was organized on
the basis of a command support battalion
relying heavily on technology with
knowledge as the driving feature. The
routine collection, analysis and synthesis
of data was considered to be automated.
The headquarters of both EXFOR A
and B comprised two “effects coordination” cells that provided redundancy and the capability to split
planning and execution between the
two cells.
One of the more important projected capabilities was centralized
control of weapon effects embodied in
the concept of an ECC linking sensors
and effects providers. In order to do
this effectively, the ECC requires
visibility over all potential sensors
and attack resources, including
joint assets, in order to maximize
responsiveness.
The ECC was capable of establishing, altering, and terminating direct
sensor-to-effects links. Connectivity
permitted a reduction in the layers of
fire support and fire direction nodes.
These functions and organizations were
consolidated into fewer and more
capable ECCs, which were located at
those levels that could plan, coordinate,
prioritize, de-conflict, and execute the
fire support plan.
Sense
In order to make effective use of
the capabilities inherent within each
EXFOR, it was necessary to make some
projections about the sensing systems
that will be available circa 2015. In
particular, it is expected that the
sensing system will be an integrated
one, enabling commanders at all levels
to access information from a wide
variety of sources at the strategic to
tactical levels. This capability was given
to both EXFOR A and B. Degradation
of this capability was not exercised.
The Sense features common to
both EXFOR A and B included sensor
links and computer systems immune to
interruption and destruction. The
sensor mix provided 24/7 coverage
and, through connectivity with resources
from higher levels, facilitated longrange target identification and
engagement. The common operating
picture (COP) was well developed out
to a distance of 120 km.
17
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
ations capability, and three future
armoured vehicle (FAV) battle groups.
For modelling purposes, the tube
artillery was based on 155 mm with
precision-guided munitions (PGM) and
a range of 40 km. The mortars were
based on a 120 mm calibre mortar with
PGM and a range of 15 km. Aviation
resources were modelled on the Griffon
helicopter with an electro-optical,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition (ERSTA) suite and a
weapons load of 8-16 Hellfire missiles
with a range of 8 km and 38 laser guided
CRV 7 rockets with a range of 7km.
Shield
There were no structural differences in the Shield capabilities assigned
to EXFOR A and B. Field engineer, air
defence, and NBCD capabilities were
available at both the EXFOR and BG
level. Engineers were able to provide
both mobility and counter-mobility
support; however, this aspect was not
fully explored in this particular
experiment. Regarding air defence,
EXFOR established an umbrella to
counter low to medium threats, and the
BGs handled very low-level threats with
the VSHORAD missile on the MMEV.
Sustain
Sustain capabilities for both
EXFOR A and B were based on a
modular approach wherein sub and subsub unit capabilities were added or
deleted depending on the mission
analysis. Replenishment was provided
through a distribution-based system
emphasizing precision. Sufficient integral
support was provided to enable the
completion of a range of potential
missions with resupply on an emergency
basis only. The medical support system
concentrated on stabilization and
evacuation. The size of the AO, in most
cases, dictated the need for a dedicated
air evacuation capability.
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
BLUE Concepts of Operations
The operating concepts for both
EXFOR A and B were based on a
cyclical process of shaping, defeating,
and then exploiting. The way in which
this was achieved differed based on the
availability of extended-range assets. In
addition, the entire cycle was examined
using a construct based on the
operational functions of Command,
Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain.
EXFOR A CONOPS
T
he concept of operations for
EXFOR A was based on the tactics
of “Find-Fix-Strike.” Find was based on
the integration of higher and integral
sense assets. Of note was the ability of
the sense systems to identify enemy
actions well beyond the ability of
EXFOR A to take action with integral
Act resources. Using this high degree of
18
SA, the enemy was fixed using mediumrange assets and, where possible, the
extended-range assets from coalition.
The enemy was then defeated using
traditional close combat tactics, which
were executed only after significantly
reducing the enemy’s combat power.
Where possible, EXFOR A shaped the
battle, thus forcing the enemy to break
out and allowing EXFOR A to use the
advantage of defensive power. EXFOR A
sought security through dispersion. The
manoeuvre elements were dispersed
throughout the battlespace down to subsub unit level with a high level of SA.
Each sub-unit contained the integral
capabilities, both direct fire and
VSHORAD, to facilitate the creation of
a protective envelope within which any
threats could be destroyed by integral
firepower. Indirect assets were dispersed
as well with the ability to mass effects
provided through the ECC.
EXFOR B CONOPS
T
he extended-range assets of EXFOR
B allowed it to employ a concept of
operations best described as “Find-KillFinish.” As with EXFOR A, the Find
function was accomplished through the
integration of both higher and integral
sense assets. A high degree of SA was
achieved with a common operating
picture at all levels. The advantage of
EXFOR B lay in its ability to use
extended-range assets, specifically the
Commanche helicopter and rocket
systems, to kill at distance.
In the initial stages of the battle, the
manoeuvre elements were used to
provide security for the extended-range
assets. Security was further enhanced
through the physical dispersion of assets
and the use of the ECC to mass effects.
EXFOR B used its long-range assets to
set favourable conditions for the close
battle, which could best be described as
“mopping up.” In fact, the 1st tactical
echelon motor rifle regiment was so
decimated through extended-range fire
that it was defeated without engaging in
a close battle at all.
JUDGEMENTS AND INSIGHTS
A
s many analytical and assessment
tools as possible were used in order
to determine the greatest possible
breadth of insights and judgements.
The tools ranged from the mathematically based operational research
analysis to collective, subjective insights
based on professional opinion. The
insights and judgements from this
experiment must be combined with
other scenarios in order to draw valid
conclusions about desired force
development. The computer modelling
was based on using existing, or about to
be fielded, capabilities with a margin of
capability added for what might occur
in the next few years.
EXFOR B was particularly successful in degrading RED’s capability
during the break in battle. Extendedrange capabilities were used to attack
RED reserves in their assembly area
once the border was breached. Most
importantly, extended-range assets
allowed EXFOR B to shape the
conditions under which the close battle
was eventually fought. This ability to
shape essentially deprived RED of the
ability to close with and decisively
engage EXFOR B, with a concomitant
reduction in BLUE casualties.
The experiment modelled a high
level of SA which, when coupled with
extended-range assets, gave EXFOR B
considerable latitude in both the
composition and timing of establishing
a reserve. This same SA facilitated
dispersion down to the sub-sub unit
level for manoeuvre forces and down to
individual systems for indirect assets.
This dispersion enhanced security and
survivability through negating counterfire while still allowing the massing of
effects through the ECC. Although the
multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS)
were initially dispersed individually, it
was determined through exercise play
that resupply would be more effective if
they were sited in pairs. Siting in pairs
allowed the reload vehicles to establish
a fairly good rate of turnaround.
The battlespace in which EXFOR A
and B operated was far different
from the current norm, in particular,
in terms of physical size and concentration of enemy forces. It was
subjectively assessed that this dispersion
could create feelings of isolation that
could impact on cohesion, morale, and
trust. As the battlespace increases in size,
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Sense assets were essential to realize
the potential of the extended-range
capabilities. High resolution was
required, and it was considered that
given the complexity of the battlespace
and targeting issues, it was essential that
formation-level resources have the
capability to integrate with higher levels.
It was further considered that the
reliance on Sense creates a critical
vulnerability. The system must be
protected and must have built in
redundancies. The vulnerability to
deception must be carefully assessed
and guarded against. The ability of
EXFOR to “act” like a current division is
based on the effective use of all its
capabilities, and any significant
degradation of the sensing capability
would cause a reassessment of the task.
EXFOR A and B contained different
ratios of manoeuvre-to-firepower capabilities, with EXFOR A having one
additional manoeuvre BG and EXFOR B
have significantly more lethal extendedrange assets. This difference became
pronounced when the mission changed
and EXFOR was given an exploitation
task. EXFOR A suffered far more
casualties than B and required some
reconstitution, whereas the combat
power of EXFOR B was essentially intact.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
At the same time, during discussion
about engaging in tasks with a high
manpower requirement, it was clear
that EXFOR B would lack flexibility.
The balance between firepower and
manoeuvre must be carefully considered
in force structure and must take into
account the requirements of more than
any one mission setting.
The experiment provided ample
evidence of the need to integrate the
capabilities inherent in each of the five
operational functions. The vulnerabilities
of EXFOR—in particular, information—
demand that the Shield function be
given a high priority. The proliferation
of sensing systems throughout the
world gave rise to discussion about
whether or not deception is still possible.
It is clear that given the proliferation of
information, the advantage will lie with
the force that can process and act on
this information in a timely fashion.
Direct shooter to sensor links and
autonomous burst engagements are two
possibilities in this regard.
Sustainment issues were considered
during the exercise, and controls were
placed on missile availability. A “mission
sufficiency” approach meant a larger
“tail” than normal; however, the tradeoff was a reduction in the requirement
for secure lines of communication.
During the experiment, it was
determined that this approach would
work for the majority of supplies;
however, the provision of artillery
ammunition became problematic due to
the quantities involved. Resupply based
on “battle rhythm” was more achievable
than was “mission sufficiency.” This fact
dictated the establishment of temporary
resupply corridors on an as-required
basis. The experiment did show that the
use of precision munitions can reduce
the quantity of munitions expended and
thus reduce the resupply problem.
For example, EXFOR B only expended
1000 missiles.
Medical support to a fast moving
formation in an expanded battlespace
was discussed. Although casualties were
relatively low (approx 100 per day
for a total of 400/450 total), it was
clear that the effort in the future must
be on stabilization and evacuation.
The distances and possible lack of
secure lines of communication will
likely dictate dedicated air evacuation
resources.
QUESTIONS NOT ANSWERED
A
lthough the experiment provided the
opportunity to examine issues related
to operations in an open, expanded
battlespace, there were a number of issues
that could not be examined due to
experimental limitations.
As the experimentation process
matures, it is intended to examine these
issues in both open and restricted
terrain. The mobility support issue is
of particular importance given the
projection of being a wheeled force.
R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
A
lthough further analysis is
required, this experiment clearly
showed the value of extended-range
assets in an open, expanded battlespace.
The HIMARS was very effective and, in
combination with mortars and tube
artillery, greatly increased the lethality
of indirect fire. It is a system well worth
further investigation.
The integration of Sense systems
was considered essential for EXFOR
success, and the ISTAR project should
be pursued as part of this requirement.
In view of the obvious need for synergy
and a systems approach, an integrated,
digitized command system is essential
to facilitate the required connectivity.
Armed helicopters provided both
EXFORs with a considerable capability.
The Comanche was particularly effective; nevertheless, the Griffon helicopter
equipped with ERSTA, CRV 7 rockets,
and Hellfire missiles provided a
formidable capability.
The experiment results serve to
endorse the current alignment of 1
Wing and S&T force development. An
evolutionary process is recommended,
moving from ERSTA through armed
ERSTA Griffon to a dedicated armed
reconnaissance helicopter.
Notwithstanding the proliferation
of Sense systems, deception is still
considered to be an important factor,
19
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
training and education must prepare all
ranks to use this dispersion to advantage.
It was further opined that the size of
the AO, combined with the lack of
friendly forces on the flanks, would
place additional stress on the command
support system as well as on the
commander. SA and a common
operating picture would help to alleviate
this situation; however, it was the opinion
of the exercise participants that some
degradation in SA was to be expected.
While functional, this high level of
awareness presented the opportunity for
directive command, the impact of which
requires further examination. The size of
the AO and the enemy forces created
the need for synergy of effort both
within the formation and with external
sources. Battlespace management was
problematic and relied very much on the
maintenance of a common operating
picture and understanding of the
commander’s intent at each level of
command.
and work needs to be done in this area
to determine what is possible, in
particular, in the electronic cloaking of
forces.
Although EXFOR B was a formidable force at extended range, the
close battle was still necessary. As well,
there are tasks for which dismounted
soldiers are required. A balance of
manoeuvre and firepower assets is
essential.
Future areas for S&T involvement
are many and varied but must include
continued work with the US Army on
their FCS, the alignment of ISTAR to
meet operational requirements, and
continued research into lethality and
communications, including information
security.
CONCLUSION
T
he experiment provided valuable
insights into the use of extendedrange indirect fire assets in open
terrain. The expanded battlespace
presents complex problems that can
only be dealt with by balancing
capabilities, in particular, manoeuvre
and firepower. The results derived from
this experiment represent but one small
piece of a larger future force structuring
process. In the near future, DLSC will
be conducting a similar experiment to
explore operations in the urban
environment. This will be followed by
an examination of domestic operations.
Taken together, this series of experiments will provide the background
for developing a model for future Army
force development.
PA RT I C I PA N T S
From the Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
WHITE CELL
Col M Ward
LCol M Cessford
Mr. RL Roy
Mr. FW Cameron
Ms. Z Bouayed
Dr. S Robertson
Maj BJ Chapman
Cpl L Steele
DLSC
DLSC
OR Team
OR Team
OR Team
Strat Analyst
LFDTS AEC
DLSC Clerk
RED CELL
LCol R ap Probert
LCol W Schultz
Maj JAYR Boissonault
DLSC
CFLO(W)
DGOR
EXFOR A
LCol GD Burt
LtCol D Fraser
Maj RS McLeish
Maj S Davidson
Maj MP Gagne
Capt RW Dupuis
Maj KS McKay
DLSC
Australian LO
DAD
427 Tac Hel Sqn
DLR
DLR
DAD
20
EXFOR B
LCol AG Morrow
LTC SE Murray
LCol A Welsh
Maj P Duff
Maj PJ Fleury
Maj K Whale
Maj MB Johnstone
DLSC
US TRADOC LO
UKSTANREP/DLFR
DAD
DLSP
1 Wing
DAD
ADVISORS
Dr. K Ackles
Maj LM Espenant
Dr. J Beaulieu
Mr. DH Saint
Mr. DL Smith
Mr. P Fournier
Ms. A De Montigny
Ms. C McCann
DLSC/Science Advisor
DAVPM
Contractor
ADM (S&T)
ADM (S&T)
DREV
DREV
DCIEM
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Warfighting
The Way Ahead for the Canadian Land Force
Command and Staff College
by Brigadier General Glenn A. Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
It is important to understand that
the CLFCSC does not just teach regular
army captains and majors. The College
is also responsible for the Militia
Officers Staff Course (MOSC) for
Reserve captains, the Militia Command
and Staff Course (MCSC) for Reserve
majors and the Commanding Officers
Course (COC) for incumbent Regular
Force commanding officers. In
addition, under the auspices of the
Military Assistance Training Programme
(MTAP), a residency course for selected
foreign officers is offered once a year
before their attendance on the
Command and Staff Course.
As a basis, consider recent events
that lead to changes in the Command
and Staff Course. In 1996, the army
approved a two-course model for
CLFCSC. Army staff training comprised
37 weeks divided between the Land
Force Staff Course (LFSC) and the
Land Force Command and Staff Course
(LFCSC). Although a credible teaching
model, this change did not meet army
requirements. The courses could not
meet the expected officer throughput
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
and were found to fall short of the new
army Officer General Specification
(OGS). Therefore, in 2000 a hybrid
course called the Transition Command
and Staff College course (TCSC) was
created and mandated to run 10 serials
in order to ensure some 400 officers
awaiting training were staff qualified.
However, the TCSC was never designed
as an end state. It was a measured step
towards building a new course structure
that would better meet the new OGS.
The College recently launched
work on this new structure that will
result in a new course entitled the Army
Operations Course (AOC). This AOC
will replace the current Transitional
Command and Staff Course (TCSC)
and the pilot course will commence in
May 2003. What should the army expect
from this new course?
First, the technical details. The CF
has adopted a four-stage model for
Officer Professional Development.
Development Period 1 (DP1) corresponds
to basic training as an officer cadet. DP2
represents the time period spent as a
lieutenant and captain. DP3 starts with
promotion to major, ends with
promotion to colonel and incorporates
operational-level army and joint training.
Finally, DP4 covers colonels and general
officers. The AOC is intended for army
officers early in DP2, and the formal
parts of the course will be open to
selected captains with three years or
more in rank. In accordance with the
revised OGS, it is intended that all army
officers should receive this course.
Initially CLFCSC will run three
AOCs per year, with a total throughput
of 216 students, which includes 18 air
force and 12 MTAP officers. With the
existing infrastructure (residence space
and staff), the College will only be able
to meet 80 percent of the total annual
army demand. However, in the future, it
is possible the College could expand by
one syndicate per course or/and offer a
complete non-residency package for
some officers. Given that not all officers
or MOCs follow the same career paths,
not every captain will attend at the
three-year point and the course will
remain open to captains and selected
majors regardless of years of service.
This will provide maximum career
flexibility. The AOC is a key element in
development of the army officer and
will be a prerequisite for attendance on
DP3 courses at the CFC in Toronto.
Although not completely developed
or approved, it is expected the AOC will
be delivered in four separate parts that
will be a hybrid of individual, distance
and residential studies:
Part 1 will be a Guided Individual
Study self-paced package, and includes
several of the new Officer Professional
Military Education (OPME) system
courses. In addition to completion of
selected OPME courses, officers will be
expected to complete certain web-based,
self-paced modules of study. These
modules will culminate with computerbased testing. Successful completion of
each will be mandatory for eligibility for
AOC selection. Although geared for newly
promoted captains, army officers can start
this part of the courses at any time after
completing DP1 Basic Training. It is
estimated that the three OPME courses
would take half a year and the army topics
a similar period. This part will take, more
or less, a year to complete.
Part 2. On completion of Part 1 and
being loaded by your career manager for
Part 2 of the AOC, officers will follow a
structured Distributed Learning Course
of seven weeks in the home garrison
location. This package will be delivered
using the current Royal Military College
of Canada hosted Web Course Tools
(Web CT) and will eventually migrate to
21
Warfighting: The Way Ahead for the CLFCSC
T
he Canadian Land Force
Command and Staff College
(CLFCSC) is and remains an
institution focussed on warfighting, with the mission of developing
in army officers the ability to perform
command and staff functions in war.
Our vision contains two powerful
elements. First, to provide the Army
with an institution that will embody and
project its ethos and professional
attributes and, second, to provide a
centre of study, thought and doctrinal
development that will ensure the
intellectual and professional vibrancy of
the Army. This College has a proud 62year history. It is a flexible, innovative
and professional institution that can
change and adapt and can help the
army move to the future.
the new Defence Learning Network
(DLN). This section of the AOC will
also be web-based and will introduce
officers to a variety of innovative and
modern educational techniques such
as computer- based learning, virtual
syndicate discussions, and video-conferencing. Evaluation will be a combination of computer-based testing,
informal written email submissions,
formal written products, participation in
on-line discussions, and subjective
evaluation of individual participation in
syndicate or other activities. There will be
a confirmation threshold exam to
confirm an officer is ready to proceed to
Part 3 of the course. Part 2 will take place
over 7 weeks.
Brigadier General Glenn A. Nordick, OMM, MSC, CD
Part 3. This will be an 11-week
residency at CLFCSC. This section of the
course will be a combination of Tactical
Exercises Without Troops, ComputerAssisted Exercises (battle-group, brigade
and divisional level), Self Study,
Syndicate Discussions, College Lectures,
Guest Lectures, Peace Support and
Domestic Operations Seminars, a Field
Trip, and a number of written products
including Formal Estimates and papers
demonstrating Critical Thought. This is
obviously the most important part of the
course and provides ample opportunity
for subjective evaluation of the command
and staff potential of army officers.
Part 4. The final tutorial will be a
second self-paced study package that
must be completed before officers
attend the Canadian Forces Command
and Staff College in Toronto. It includes
the remaining OPME exams and several
independent computer-based study
modules. It will cover 16 weeks of OPME
and 7 weeks of self-study
There will also be a number of
tactical and doctrinal changes to the
College curriculum that will occur at
the same time the AOC is introduced:
• Currently the CLFCSC is using 4
(CA) Canadian Division as its primary
teaching vehicle. This formation, the last
vestige of Corp 86 and Corp 96 doctrine,
is a heavy division, numbering 34,168
personnel, with 2772 major vehicle and
weapons systems. 4 (CA) Division is
arguably the largest such formation in
the world, and does not exist in any
22
Canadian army mobilisation planning,
nor is it representative of recent or
historical Canadian divisional structures.
With the AOC, the College will adopt a
US- or UK-led division-sized task force
construct as the primary teaching
vehicle. The Field Standard Operation
Procedures used will be those Canada
has approved in the NATO and America,
Britain, Canada, Australia (ABCA) fora.
This will also allow us to realistically
explore doctrine, equipment and tactics
not found in the CF but which do exist in
virtually all coalition operations. Imbedded in this Task Force will be the
Canadian Major Contingency Force
(MCF) Brigade Group, structured as approved in our operational planning. For
accurate portrayal of the National
Command and Control, a National
Command Element (NCE) will be introduced into all exercises to teach officers
to deal simultaneously with national and
coalition chains of command. This
structure will be an excellent and realistic
training vehicle, but will still allow the
College and the army to maintain
expertise in the design and operation of
higher Formation level Headquarters.
• The MCF Brigade, the MCF vanguard battalion, and the Immediate
Reaction Force (Land) (IRF[L])
battalion structure will be used to teach
and study brigade and battle group
doctrine and tactics. In accordance with
current Canadian doctrine, we will
employ the rule of three versus the rule
of four in all organizations. This will
improve realism in the Estimates, the
Operational Planning Process, and in
College exercises. In addition, we will
only employ existing equipment in any
unit organization table. These army
officers will learn the art of warfighting
in a realistically constrained environment. This not to say that the College is
not prepared to experiment with new
doctrine, tactics and equipment, but
such experimentation will be done in a
controlled manner. Certainly, the
College would also willingly introduce
and use any national mobilisation
structures, as these are approved.
• The College has introduced Deep
Operations into the TCSC and this will
continue in the AOC. The planning
and understanding of Deep Operations
is critical to shaping the battlefield and
taking full advantage of our air
superiority and information dominance.
This is also key to the full implementation of Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
(ISTAR) concept, another area of
critical interest to the army. Current
and future College exercises will also be
conducted jointly (air - land), as no
divisional or task force operation can be
conducted solely from a land perspective. This will be done by maintaining
close association with 1 Wing and 1
Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) to
ensure that air operations are properly
represented at the College. The College
will continue to request teaching and
technical support from our US Allies to
properly teach and exercise Deep Operations and the use of attack helicopters.
• In addition to the traditional Division
Support Group (DISGP) construct, we
will introduce other realistic logistic
features into the course including Close
Support Battalions, General Support
Battalions, National Support Elements,
Joint Support Groups, Host Nation
Logistics, civilian contractor support, and
coalition logistics agreements. This will
ensure that army officers become
familiar with the range of logistics
support options that exist in actual
operations. This construct should also
greatly assist with the development of
army and national logistics doctrine,
tactics and procedures.
• CLFCSC has an important role to
play in the digitisation of the army.
Although it is expected that all army
officers will be familiar with Tactical
Command, Control and Communications Systems (TCCCS) during phase
training and their first unit deployments,
the AOC will likely mark their first
encounter with Land Force Command
and Control Information System
(LFC2IS). In order to permit realism in
training, the College will be required to
both teach and use a simulated version of
LFC2IS in all brigade-level and above
exercises. Computer-based training on
the Athene Tactical Software (ATS) and
Situational Awareness Software (SAS)
will take place during both Parts 1 (Self
Study) and 2 (DL), culminating in full
use of LFC2IS during Part 3 (Residency).
It is expected this digital environment
will be in place for the first AOC.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
• The College is also taking a close look
at the enemy (opposing force - OPFOR)
organization. With the assistance of the
Directorate of Army Doctrine (DAD) and
the Army Simulation Centre (ASC), we
will introduce a more flexible, realistic
opponent into the curriculum. This
OPFOR will include View 2 and
asymmetric options that will permit
students to study a variety of opponents.
Of course, close coordination will be
required between the College, DAD and
the ASC to achieve this result.
To promote greater unity and
cohesion in the army and across the CF,
CLFCSC also intends to leverage centres
of expertise, rather than maintain
College-unique methods and structures.
Some examples follow:
• DAD will be responsible for the Staff
Officer’s Handbook and all organizational structures used by CLFCSC;
• The CF Leadership Institute, in
conjunction with the CLS responsible
agency, will be used to write and
maintain the leadership doctrine to be
taught at the College;
• RMC will be asked to write and
maintain any history packages taught by
the College.
• We will remain closely linked to the new
Defence Learning Network (DLN) and,
in fact, because of the maturity of the
TCSC on the existing RMC hosted Web
CT system the AOC will be one of the trial
courses to be delivered over the new DLN.
We are committed to being innovative and
flexible in how we deliver our training;
• The CF Management School (CFMS)
will be asked to write and maintain a
package on “Chairing a Meeting.” As well
negotiation has begun for the CFMS
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
to write and maintain an army business
planning package;
• After the initial package is written, the
Land Force Technical School (LFTS)
will be asked to maintain the science
and technical package used by CLFCSC;
• As approved by DAD and the Combat
Development Board, NATO and ABCA
manuals will be used for all nonCanadian Doctrine and SOPs;
• The ASC will write and run all
Computer-Assisted Exercises used by the
College, which has already reduced
significantly the external- tasking load
required for College exercises. This will
also ensure commonality between formation-level CST exercises across the army.
We are also exploring options that could
see a regular brigade head– quarters
introduced into College exercises for
training purposes;
• Closer ties are being established
between CLFCSC, DAD and the
Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts
(DLSC). The College regularly runs
excellent Formation level exercises that
can be used to validate or modify
existing Canadian Doctrine. We will
conduct a trial this year where TCSC 05
students will be tasked to man formation
headquarters in support of DLSC Army
Future Experiment Number 2 (Exercise
Urban Challenge). The College will also
re-institute processes to ensure that the
brainpower and experience resident in
the College Directing Staff is harnessed
to help update army doctrine;
• The AOC will be harmonised with
the Militia Command and Staff Course
(MCSC). In fact, many of the Distributed Learning techniques already
featured in the MCSC are being used by
the TCSC and will be refined for the
AOC. This provides the platform that
may eventually result in a complete
Distributed Learning AOC that could
be made available to some officers. This
approach will also closely harmonise the
Regular and Reserve courses;
• Close contact will be maintained by the
College with the CFCSC to ensure there
is a seamless transition from the AOC to
the operational-level joint structures
taught in Toronto;
• We intend to make our instructional
tools available to the army at large,
through our website. This should
provide a range of tools to assist unit
commanding officers and formation
commanders run their unit professional
development programmes, refresher
training, and even operational preparations. On occasion, the College has also
been able to help the army with
mentoring and with support to major
army experiments or exercises. This type
of support will continue; and
• CLFCSC is also responsible for
managing equivalencies to the AOC.
The Directorate of Army Training
(DAT) and the Deputy Commandant
have devised a workable system that
permits the College to evaluate foreign
courses for content using the existing
Course Performance and Education
Objectives. We have used our major
course exercise (Final Drive) as an
evaluation tool, to permit the College
to validate an officer’s abilities.
Following a review that there are
significant equivalencies in content,
officers seeking equivalency are loaded
on Final Drive in command and staff
appointments, alongside their CLFCSC
peers. This has proven very successful
and will continue in future.
As you can see this is a vibrant and
viable institution. Our product is the
next generation of army leaders and
staff officers and we are here to serve
the army in any way that we can. I am
personally very excited about the
prospects for the AOC, the future of
army professional development, and
the way ahead for the College. At the
same time, I acknowledge that there are
many good ideas across the army that
may help shape how this institution
should operate in the 21st Century.
Your ideas and comments are always
welcome and should be forwarded to
the Deputy Commandant, LieutenantColonel Dennis Hartnett or myself.
For more information, visit the CLFSC
website at: http://armyapp.dnd.ca/
clfcsc-cceftc/main.asp
23
Warfighting: The Way Ahead for the CLFCSC
• Today, the primary exercise vehicle
used by the College is a battlefield
remarkably similar to that found on the
West German Plain. In future we will
introduce a range of operations into our
major exercises to include complex
terrain (urban and mountain), asymmetric
attack, and transition operations (Peace
Support to Warfighting, and Post
Conflict Operations) in order to better
prepare army officers for the future; and
Missed Opportunity
Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade and the Gulf War, 1990-1991
by Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.
M
Sean Maloney, Ph.D.
issed Opportunity was
written in the summer of
1993 as 4 Canadian
Mechanized Brigade was
closing down in Lahr, Germany.
Originally intended as an appendix to
War Without Battles: Canada’s NATO
Brigade in Germany 1951-1993, it was
subsequently deleted. I published it two
years later in Canadian Militar y
Histor y. At the time and over the years,
there was a lot of internal speculation
as to the dimensions of the planned
operation and the reasons for its
cancellation. Since its original
publication, I have developed more
information, which has not seriously
altered my original discussion of the
events of 1990.
I wrote Missed Opportunity for a
number of reasons. First, it was part of
4 Brigade’s historical experience. My
other concern at the time was that we
learn from the series of errors and
misperceptions that combined to prevent
Canada from participating effectively
in an operation designed to stand up to
blatant aggression, stabilize a vital
region that affects Canada’s economy,
and prevent a dangerous totalitarian
state from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. In those days, the J-Staff
was an embr yonic and arguably
temporar y phenomenon designed to get
us through two simultaneous crises: the
Gulf and Oka. There was no lessons
learned cell at the time. There were even
those who thought Op BROADSWORD
should just disappear down the
Orwellian memor y hole since it was
embarrassing. My belief then, as it is
now, is that there were valuable lessons
to be learned from the BROADSWORD
experience and, as a historian, it was
my job to ensure that those lessons are
passed on. We are now entering a new
era of histor y, with a new global crisis.
Have our staffing procedures improved
24
since 1990? Has the interface between
the elected civilian leadership, senior
bureaucrats, and the senior uniformed
leadership improved? Do we have the
strategic lift at hand? Will Canada
participate effectively in this new
campaign or will Canada sit back and
let others do the job once again?
The decision not to deploy 4
Canadian Mechanized Brigade1 (CMB)
to participate in the Gulf War may
eventually be of interest to students of
Canadian defence policy. The current
lack of available material on this subject
will no doubt attenuate such efforts. The
purpose of this article is to provide a
brief and very tentative discussion of
relevant factors contributing to the
decision not to go. In essence, the
following should be considered a “toe in
the water” rather than a
“headlong dive.”
On 2 August 1990, Iraq
overran and occupied its
smaller neighbour Kuwait.
This act not only threatened
the delicate balance of power
in the Middle East but also
posed a direct threat to the
economic well-being of the
Western world, of which
Canada was a part. If Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states
were invaded in turn by Iraq,
the flow of Persian Gulf oil
would be shut off, adversely
affecting other parts of
the world. Additionally, the
morally
repugnant
and
brutal occupation of Kuwait,
coupled with the seizure
of Western embassies and
citizens (including Canadians),
were indications that Saddam
Hussein could not be
negotiated with. The United
Nations, with unprecedented
haste, passed Resolutions 660 and 661
demanding that Iraq vacate Kuwait
immediately or face imposition of
economic sanctions.
In the wake of the conflict, a
great deal of criticism was leveled at
the apparent inability of Canada’s
Army to deploy and sustain a brigadesized force in a regional conflict.
Much of this criticism arose from
inter-service disputes and defence
budgetary matters. Such criticism
could well be ignored except that the
alleged inability of Canada’s Army to
conduct such a deployment was used
by some to call into question the
viability of Canada's land force
commitment to NATO's Central
Region since 1951. Such an analogy
between a regional conflict and
What about combat troops? Lieutenant-General
Kent Foster, Commander of Force Mobile
Command, inspecting members of Service
Battalion in the Persian Gulf, February 1991.
(Courtesy CFPU)
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Associate Minister of National Defence Mary Collins visiting C Company, 1st
Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment at “Canada Dry 1” at Quatar, 1991. (Courtesy CFPU)
Canada's land force commitment to
NATO's Central Region thus deserves
examination.
Responding to the UN's request for
forces to enforce the economic
sanctions, Prime Minister Mulroney
announced the deployment of a
Canadian naval task group to the
Persian Gulf on 10 August. Operation
FRICTION
had
started.
Other
commands within the Canadian Forces
were anticipating further action on the
part of the Canadian Government and
used their initiative to prepare a
number of contingency plans in case
the senior military leadership had to
provide options to the political
leadership. By 13 August, seven
contingency plans were proposed even
though no detailed staff work on them
had been done. In order of priority
these plans included:
1.
2.
3.
4
5.
6.
7.
evacuation of Canadian nationals
from the Gulf region;
the deployment of CF-18s to Turkey;
resupply and sustainment of the
Op FRICTION task group;
replace vessels involved in Op
FRICTION;
in-theatre airlift support to panArab forces;
logistical support to multi-national
forces in the Gulf region; and
the deployment of ground
combat forces.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
As the Canadian naval task group
departed on 24 August for its “Persian
Excursion,” the first U.S. prepositioning ships from Diego Garcia
disgorged enough equipment for two
U.S. Marine Corps divisions. By 25
August, the UN passed Resolution 665,
which permitted the use of military
force to back up the economic
sanctions against Iraq.
The Americans had already
committed a marine division, an
airborne division, an airmobile division,
and a mechanized division to Saudi
Arabia for Operation DESERT
SHIELD. In addition to this, the United
Kingdom
announced
Operation
GRANBY on 14 September, which
deployed the 7th Armoured Brigade
from the British Army of the Rhine
(BAOR). At the same time, France
implemented Operation DAGUET,
which deposited the 6th Light
Armoured Division into the desert
sands of Saudi Arabia. The British
wanted to bring in an entire threebrigade division to Saudi Arabia but
could only provide 7th Armoured
Brigade initially, followed by 4th
Armoured Brigade on 22 November.
Sometime around 14 September,
Canadian officers at higher-level NATO
headquarters were informally contacted
by British officers from BAOR. Could
Canada provide a brigade under British
control to form a Commonwealth
Division along the same lines as the
Korea conflict in 1951?
Around this time, Canadian Forces
Europe had prepared a contingency plan
to deploy a CF-18 squadron and an Army
protection unit to an undesignated
This was a tempting request. It was,
location in the Persian Gulf. This was a however, fraught with problems. The
logical contingency to the planners who political dimensions went well beyond
felt that the ships would require air cover command and control on the
and the aircraft would
require protection from
The last Canadian option
hostile ground forces. This
contingency was quickly
was to deploy ground
adopted by the Government
troops to Saudi Arabia.
and Operation SCIMITAR
was announced on 14
September. The first CF-18s from CFB battlefield. Some Canadian officers
Baden left on 6 October for their base in believed that the British wanted “more
Qatar, which had been secured by "M" flags” on the battlefield to balance out
Company 3rd Battalion, The Royal American influence. In the British
Canadian Regiment (3 RCR), from mind, a Commonwealth partner might
Baden-Soellingen.
be easier to influence than, say, the
French. This would be important in the
The Air Force planners had to be post-war resolution of the conflict. In
convinced to take a security company Canada, however, there were the issues
with them. Later on, “C” Company, 1er of national pride and the old colonial
bataillon Royal 22e Régiment (1R22eR) relationship. For this and other reasons,
took over as Security Company for the the British proposal was put on hold.
25
Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War
Op SCIMITAR bases Canada Dry 1 and
Canada Dry 2. The in-theatre security
threat was rated as high. Saddam
Hussein publicly announced that
terrorist groups sympathetic to Iraq
would wreak havoc within those nations
arrayed against him.
Canadian military staff planners at
all levels knew that force would
ultimately be needed to evict Iraqi
forces from Kuwait. They also knew
WORD. The Chief of the Defence Staff
(CDS), General de Chastelain, ordered a
staff check with the aim of analyzing the
factors influencing the deployment and
Canadian troops had not been in combat since
from the list of planning priorities
generated in August that the last
Canadian option was to deploy ground
troops to Saudi Arabia. Canadian
initiative operated at new heights.
Force Mobile Command Headquarters
(FMC HQ), with input from 1st
Canadian Division, conducted a quick
staff check on 26 October on the
feasibility of providing a brigade-sized
formation to Saudi Arabia. The
assumptions in this staff check formed
the basis for what would eventually be
called Operation BROADSWORD.
Sean Maloney, Ph.D.
FMC HQ determined that any
Canadian formation sent to Saudi Arabia
would have to fight in a high-intensity
battlefield environment, a battlefield that
would probably include the use of
chemical and biological weapons. The
headquarters also assumed that
Canadian units in Europe could be
released by SACEUR for operations.
Furthermore, the planners knew that
such a formation would have to work
within the framework of a higher
formation like an allied division or corps.
More importantly, any Canadian
contribution less than a brigade group
was unacceptable for “visibility reasons.”
employment of a viable brigade group to
support UN coalition action against Iraq.
This CDS staff check was prepared by
13 November and added more detail to
the FMC HQ staff check. The CDS check
assumed that a Middle East deployment
would receive first priority over existing
Army operations and that resources could
be drawn from anywhere. Again, it was
assumed that the force would be
integrated into a higher formation
(division or corps). Most importantly, the
CDS check assumed that the force would
be based on 4 CMB after augmentation
with Operation PENDANT (the unit was
re-titled for this operation) adding a third
infantry battalion with armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) and a fourth
tank squadron. 4 CMB also had to have
enough supplies for 30 days of
operations, and it had to have time to
acclimatize. The CDS check further
assumed that 2 PPCLI would be the third
infantry battalion.
The timings for the deployment of
4 CMB to Saudi Arabia in the CDS staff
check assumed that it would take seven
days to produce the plan, 45 days to
assemble the force, 55 days to move
the force, and 35 days to train and
acclimatize the force in theatre.
Some
general
shortfalls needed to
be made up, however.
Korea.
The long-standing
problems in Canada's
logistics and medical structures—
problems that had been identified in
the 1970s—had not been corrected
even though major attempts at overhaul
had taken place in the mid-1980s. The
other critical area was combat
sustainment. The problems inherent in
reinforcing 4 CMB in Germany had
never been solved either, though
attempts had been made to improve the
state of Canada's reserve forces. If
Canada wanted to sustain a brigade
group in theatre for a period longer
than six months, reserve forces would
have to be employed, and there was no
job protection legislation to guarantee
Militia soldiers their livelihood once
they returned from the Gulf.
While the CDS staff check was
undergoing review, External Affairs
Minister Joe Clark met with his
American counterpart, James Baker, in
Bermuda on 13 November. The effect
of this meeting on the CDS tasking
instruction for 14 November is unclear,
but the media speculated that the
Americans sounded out Clark on
After surveying the existing
formations in the Canadian Army, FMC
HQ logically determined that the
formation best suited for operations in
the Middle East was 4 CMB. It was at
75% of war establishment strength,
while the other brigades in Canada
ranged from 70% to 45% of their
establishments. Only 4 CMB had main
battle tanks. Notably, the FMC planners
did not think that enough lift could be
acquired to move a brigade group to
Saudi Arabia immediately; they did
estimate that it would take 8 to 10 weeks
to fully deploy the formation.
These assumptions were critical in
the creation of the more detailed contingency plan Operation BROADS-
26
In 1991, army troops in Germany included 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and
Headquarters 1 Canadian Division Forward. (Courtesy CFPU)
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Over the next fifteen days, the
Division and FMC HQ planning staffs in
Lahr, Kingston, and St Hubert laboured
to produce a concrete concept that
would keep the Canadian Government's options open. As a result, the
BROADSWORD plan was an amalgamation of several elements that
included a concept of operation, a risk
assessment, a movement estimate and a
casualty estimate.
The concept of operations for
BROADSWORD, as in the earlier
estimates, postulated that 4 CMB would
operate as part of an allied division
within the framework of an allied corps.
The threat environment in which 4
CMB would be operating was a heavily
armoured one, with the enemy in
prepared defensive positions in the
desert. Iraqi chemical capability was as
diverse as it was prolific: known enemy
chemical weapons included mustard
equipment that it possessed in
Germany. Leopard 1s and M-113s
advancing in the open desert were
vulnerable to direct fire from long
range. The planners reasoned that 4
CMB could, however, participate as the
reserve formation within an armoured
division. Once the other armoured
brigades bypassed strong points and
took on the enemy's armoured reserve,
4 CMB could be used to assault
As to tactical employment, 4 CMB
was incapable of participating in an
advance to contact based on the
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
The organization of 4 CMB for a
Middle East deployment was not radically
different from having 4 CMB augmented
in Europe by Operation PENDANT (a
reinforcement plan). 4 CMB would have
a four-squadron tank regiment (8th
Casualty estimates, which were driven by
extremely pessimistic threat assessments
emanating from American sources…
bypassed Iraqi units. If the situation
worsened, and allied forces were forced
onto the defensive, 4 CMB was already
attuned and equipped for defensive
operations in an armoured-heavy
environment. Other 4 CMB missions
could include flank or screen
operations on a flank, or corps rear
area security.
With regards to assigning 4 CMB to
a division or corps, there were a number
of possibilities. 4 CMB could go as part of
the multi-national Gulf Cooperation
Council Corps. This option was rejected
immediately. The choice then came
down to placing 4 CMB under the British
division or under a U.S. division
operating within a U.S. Corps. As noted
earlier, a bias had developed against
placing 4 CMB under British command.
This emotional bias was, however, backed
up with undeniable facts. 4 CMB had not
operated with the British since 1970 but
had operated with the Americans, with
The real problem was that the Canadian Army
was still playing catch up from the 1970s.
blistering agents, phosgene choking
agents, as well as Sarin and Tabun nerve
agents. The Iraqis were also credited
with producing BZ, a psychochemical
similar to LSD. Finally, the enemy had
combat experience from the long IranIraq war; Canadian troops had not been
in combat since Korea.
the Canada-U.S. integrated logistics
system. As a result, placing 4 CMB with
the British armoured division was no
longer an option.
all of their faults, since 1971. When the
list of advantages and disadvantages was
compiled, the situation favoured placing
4 CMB with VII(US) Corps, preferably
with 1st (US) Armored Division.
Interoperability issues, including liaison
officers, training, and equipment
compatibility no longer existed between
the British and the Canadians.
Standardization did exist in the form of
the usual NATO agreements, but Britain
no longer had anything comparable with
Canadian Hussars [Princess Louise’s])
plus a recce squadron, while the infantry
battalions (3 RCR, 2 PPCLI, 1 R22eR)
would be augmented to include three
four-company battalion structures. 444
Tactical Helicopter Squadron was having
problems with the aging Kiowas and
wanted to create a composite squadron
with Kiowas and Twin Huey light
transports. The other arms and services
required little modification, at least
initially. Some planners called for the
deployment of a complete Canadian
Support Group and a Canadian Medical
Group. This would have increased the
number of troops in theatre from the
7,000 to 9,000 originally envisioned to
12,000.
Once the planning process was
underway, units were solicited to
provide materiel and organizational
improvements that they deemed
necessary for a Middle East deployment. Planners at the several headquarters involved in BROADSWORD also
added changes and suggestions. An
attitude developed in many places
simultaneously, which can best be
described as the “We can't go without
________” syndrome. This was an
understandable phenomenon since
some equipment programmes that had
been put off in 1989 could now be
implemented. Some (but not all) of
these organizational “grafts” included
the deployment of the new ADATS (air
defence antitank system) anti-aircraft
system, an artillery target acquisition
battery, an entire intelligence company,
a forward replacement holding unit, all
of 2 (Electronic Warfare) Squadron, a
decontamination unit, an evacuation
27
Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War
sending land forces to Saudi Arabia.
Whatever the impact, 1st Canadian
Division Headquarters was tasked to
prepare a plan to deploy a mechanized
brigade group to Saudi Arabia, and this
plan was to be called Operation
BROADSWORD. For all intents and
purposes, this tasking instruction used
the same assumptions as the CDS staff
check. It should be noted here that no
decision was made by the Canadian
Government in November 1990 to
deploy ground forces to Saudi Arabia;
this was a military contingency plan in
case the Canadian Government was
asked to do so and committed itself to
such a course of action.
company, and a 400-bed field hospital.
Personal equipment necessary for
fighting in desert environment was
required as well as improved NBCD
detection and protective gear. This
latter requirement was not a problem,
since Canada led NATO in the
development of NBCD protective
equipment. Other larger pieces of
equipment would, however, delay the
deployment and increase costs if the
decision was made to obtain them.
It would be easy to call this
situation “gold plating” and to blame
inter-arm rivalry. The real problem was
that the Canadian Army was still playing
catch up from the 1970s deficiencies
and the heightened expectations of the
1980s. Many of these materiel
improvements had been identified by 4
CMB back in 1985, but had not been
solved by1990.
Sean Maloney, Ph.D.
The movement estimate for
BROADSWORD was not encouraging.
There was no sealift capability organic
to the Canadian Forces. This fact forced
the logistics planners to look to
commercial shipping. Unfortunately,
the Americans had already hired much
of Canada's commercial sea and airlift
to support their own deployment
operations. Even the United Kingdom
was chartering Eastern Bloc shipping to
move the balance of their division to
Saudi Arabia! The use of the large RollOn/Roll-Off (RO/RO) ferries from
Newfoundland was contemplated, but
this was not feasible for political
reasons. Moving manpower was less of a
problem; agreements between the
Canadian Government and commercial
air carriers in Canada ensured Canada's
ability to move troops and some light
equipment. The apparent lack of heavy
lift would probably have imposed
a significant time delay on the
deployment of 4 CMB if BROADSWORD
was authorized and implemented.
Another
problem
that
the
BROADSWORD planners had to deal
with was conflicting casualty estimates,
which were driven by extremely
pessimistic threat assessments emanating
from American sources. Medical
specialists involved in BROADSWORD
planning calculated that, given 30 days
of combat, the entire brigade group
28
would need replacement. They
estimated that, out of a 9000 pers force,
there would be 1,971 killed and 7,434
wounded. Other BROADSWORD
planners developed a smaller estimate
in which 3,000 killed and wounded pers
would need replacement after thirty
days. Another DND agency put the
rates at 1,000 killed and 3,472
wounded. It appears as if these
estimates were based on the Iran-Iraq
War, which was a First World War
attrition-type of conflict. They also
failed to take into account the fact that
the allied coalition being formed was in
every way a far superior military
machine than what Iraq could muster
in terms of overwhelming air support,
initiative, and manoeuvreability.
By 20 November the window on
deployment was closing fast. On 29
November, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 678, which set a 15
January 1991 deadline for Saddam
Hussein to move his forces out of Kuwait.
When asked on 7 December 1990 about
the feasibility of BROADSWORD in light
of this development, 1st Canadian
Division planners replied, "there are no
show stoppers per se but one issue, the
composition and availability of battle
casualties replacement could impose
limitations on the employment of
4 CMB(G) plus."
BROADSWORD hung on the wall
for the next month. On 12 January 1991,
an anonymous military source recently
returned from Germany leaked
significant aspects of BROADSWORD to
the media, including the size, composition, and the possibility that the
brigade might come under British
the event the Government wished to
select a ground force option. It was not
designed to circumvent the democratic
process. Naturally, parliamentary critics
of the Government's handling of the
Gulf situation pounced on the issue
without having the facts and roundly
criticized the government. By 14 January,
Minister of National Defence Bill
McKnight told the media that the
Government had no intention of
sending a brigade to the Gulf. Two days
later, the air assault started, and the land
portion of the campaign was completed
by 28 February.
It is easy to say that 4 CMB was not
needed in Saudi Arabia, that it could
not have arrived in time to do anything,
and that it was not sustainable.
Comments such as this can only be
made in retrospect, however, since we
only know now how short the war would
actually be. At the time, many planners
believed that the ground war would last
several weeks to many months. There
was no indication that it would last
only100 hours. If it had been a longer
war, Canadian land forces would have
been a valuable contribution.
Why was Operation BROADSWORD
not implemented? The answer to this
question is multi-faceted, and the reasons
are found at many levels. It is unclear at
this point which level of command made
the decision not to go. There are four
possibilities. The first is that the
politicians wanted to go with ground
troops but were convinced by the highest
military level that BROADSWORD was
not a feasible undertaking. The second
possibility is that the politicians did not
want to go and told the military no.
The Americans unofficially offered
enough M-60A3s, M-2s, and M-109A2s.
command. The source was motivated by
a belief that BROADSWORD planning
was being done behind the backs of the
Canadian people under instructions of
the Mulroney Government, and that the
Canadian people were not being given a
say in the deployment of troops overseas.
The source was mistaken in his
assertions. BROADSWORD planning was
anticipatory on the part of the military in
There could have been a combination of
these possibilities, whereby the political
level did not want to go and the highest
military level did not encourage them to
implement BROADSWORD. Fourthly,
the highest military level might not have
passed on or recommended to the
political level the existence and advanced
nature of BROADSWORD beyond the
list of options created in August.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
1.
BROADSWORD was not logistically feasible. We could not get
enough lift in time, and existing
lift was dominated by the
Americans.
2.
If we had gotten to Saudi Arabia,
our equipment (particularly
tanks) was not capable of
matching Iraqi equipment on
the battlefield. There was simply
not enough equipment.
3.
BROADSWORD was not sustainable from a personnel and equipment battle casualty replacement
point of view.
4.
There was not enough time to
get to the theatre, train, and
acclimatize before the ground
war started.
5.
The Canadian people would not
have supported the ground war
or we didn't need to deploy
ground forces.
6.
BROADSWORD was a fundamentally flawed concept because
it was based on a mechanized
brigade group.
7.
BROADSWORD would have cost
too much.
8.
BROADSWORD demonstrates
that the NATO Central Region
commitment was not workable
either.
The lift, deployment time and
equipment questions can be discussed
together. The assumption that 4 CMB
would be operating with VII (US) Corps
(and probably with 1st (US) Armored
Division) was based on the close
relationship 4 CMB had developed with
the Americans since 1971. 4 CMB
already had liaison officers with VII (US)
Corps and 1st (US) Armored Division—
two of them, Major K.D. Mohr and
Lieutenant-Colonel N.H. Connally were
invited to go and were given permission
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
to do so, with Major Mohr seeing action
with 1st (US) Armored Division—and
the Americans respected Canadian
capabilities on the battlefield. The U.S.
did sound out Canada on the ground
forces issue while they were deciding if
and when to send VII (US) Corps. If
Canada had decided to go at that time or
even late in November, arrangements
would have been made to deploy 4 CMB
to Saudi Arabia using the ILOC
agreement. The Americans constantly
pushed for “more flags” and, if Canada
seriously demonstrated it was interested,
American support would have been
there. In terms of time, the British were
able to deploy their 4th Armoured
Brigade (similar in composition to 4
CMB) from BAOR making the decision
on 22 November with the first units
arriving on 10 December. The
Americans had a constant flow of forces
throughout the period.
There is no doubt that some of
Canada's equipment was in poor shape
not only for the Gulf but for Germany as
well. The Leopards were showing their
age, particularly when one compares
their protection and firepower to the
T-72. In terms of interoperability, some
equipment could receive spare parts
through the U.S. system since an M-113 is
an M-113, an M-109 is an M-109, and a
C-7 is similar to an M-16A2. Other nonstandard equipment like the Leopard,
the Iltis, and the MLVW (medium
logistic vehicle wheeled) would have
posed logistical problems. The solution
here was to acquire equipment from the
Americans. In fact, the Americans
unofficially offered enough M-60A3s,
M-2s, and M-109A2s to equip and sustain
a Canadian brigade group in the same
have been relatively easy to deploy
Canadian troops and small equipment by
air. It takes less than two weeks to retrain
on a new tank, and this retraining would
have been done concurrently in the
operational desert environment.
There have been arguments made
that too many bells and whistles were
added to the existing brigade structure,
that this drove up the cost of
deployment, and that the refitting
increased the deployment time. This
argument does have some merit, but
there were numerous cases where
BROADSWORD planners “just said
no.” On the other hand, if 4 CMB were
operating as part of VII (US) Corps,
why did it need its own decontamination capability, target acquisition
battery, an electronic warfare squadron,
its own field hospital, and the brand
new ADATS? Could these resources
have been provided by division or
corps? Exercises in Germany demonstrated time and again that 4 CMB was
capable of assimilating non-Canadian
units into its organization and planning
structure or utilizing support provided
by a higher headquarters. Canada had a
free ride with these resources in Germany
since the 1970s. Why change now?
The sustainability question is important, for it shows a weakness that has
existed in the Canadian Army since the
Diefenbaker Government decided that
sustainability forces were no longer
required. The degradation of the Militia
in the early 1960s was so profound that
attempts to remedy the problem still
baffle defence planners today in 1994.
The four-brigade group army concept
such as it existed in 1953 was designed to
The sustainability question is important,
for it shows a weakness that has existed
in the Army since the Diefenbaker
Government decided that sustainability forces
were no longer required.
way the Americans helped some of the
gulf Cooperation Council countries (the
M-60A3 offer was apparently changed to
M-1 Abrams tanks later). These vehicles
were already in theatre, and it would
fight two wars—one in Germany and
one in Korea—with sustainability
coming from the two Militia division
equivalents. The decrease in Army
strength in 1970 ensured that there were
29
Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War
Some were not convinced of
BROADSWORD's feasibility. Let us
briefly explore some reasons why
BROADSWORD was not considered to
be a viable operation:
Soldiers of The Royal Canadian
Regiment guarding Iraqi prisoners of
war at al-Qaysumah, 2 March 1991.
(Courtesy CFPU)
Sean Maloney, Ph.D.
four partially manned brigade groups.
The events in 1990 show that the wisdom
of this decrease in strength was more
than flawed. The Oka Crisis in 1990
occupied an entire brigade group
(Canada even had to approach SACEUR
to explain why half of 1st Canadian
Division was tied up in an internal
security situation), and this stretched
Army resources thin. Since the Militia
was untrained and unequipped for the
internal security missions, regular forces
had to be used and flexibility was lost.
The political problems with calling
out the Militia to sustain BROADSWORD
were insurmountable. No job protection
legislation existed. Problems with neglected training and a lack of equipment
meant that Militia personnel would have
to undergo a significant period of
training before they were ready to fight in
a Middle East environment. Despite the
limited steps taken in the late 1980s to
correct this (e.g., the Total Force
concept), the Militia's ability to provide
battle casualty replacements was an
unknown factor in BROADSWORD
planning. The politicians feared an
Opposition backlash and thus would
probably not have supported such
measures early on in the deployment.
The most open-ended argument
made against BROADSWORD was the
belief by some that the Canadian
30
people would not have supported such
a deployment and would have become
disillusioned when it started to take
casualties. The Canadian public was
overwhelmingly in favour of military
operations within the context of the
UN resolutions. There was only a
minuscule peace movement consisting
of a few students. Naturally, the media
made this movement out to be more
than it was and the Opposition parties
played this for all it was worth to
embarrass the Mulroney government as
much as possible. If the Prime Minister
chose to deploy ground forces to Saudi
Arabia, he would have done so after
explaining the reasons for his decision.
These reasons would probably have
focused on the need to limit existing
aggression and deter future aggression
and the need to provide economic
stability in the West. The spectre of
Saddam Hussein developing nuclear
weapons only increased the reasons for
DESERT STORM. Canadians are a
practical people who have fought wars
for lesser reasons in the past.
Suggesting that a Canadian brigade
group was not needed in such a conflict
is an extension of the argument against
having a Canadian brigade group in
Europe. Canada cannot afford to be
isolationist in the world community and
must act in difficult situations. The loss
of prestige is not an easy thing to
measure, but the deployment of low
risk forces like two combat ships and a
squadron of fighters to protect them
certainly made Canada look cautious
and minimalist. The ridiculous political
debate over how defensive the
FRICTION and SCIMITAR forces were
supposed to be was laughable. The
deployment of a Canadian field
hospital to Saudi Arabia and medical
personnel to U.S. ships was less
laughable, particularly to the casualties
that they treated, but Canada, perhaps,
could have done more in other areas.
As to the financing of a Saudi
Arabia deployment, it is conceivable
that many of Canada's out of pocket
costs would have eventually been
funded by Saudi Arabia and the
Japanese. Participating in a war of
liberation not only carries with it a
sense of moral satisfaction but also
provides business opportunities for the
inevitable reconstruction effort, as
discussed by the British commander,
General Sir Peter De La Billiere in his
book Storm Command.
Was a mechanized brigade group
the only option for a Canadian Army
deployment to the Gulf? A number of
officers have questioned this basic
assumption in the BROADSWORD
planning process, and they have a valid
point. There were other options. How
many of them saw light of day in highlevel planning discussions is unknown.
The CDS believed that only an
independent brigade group-sized
commitment would be a viable one for
political purposes within a coalition.
One possible option was a light infantry
brigade group of three infantry
battalions operating with, say, the 101st
(US) Airborne Division (Airmobile) or
the 82nd (US) Airborne Division. Units
from the Special Service Force based in
Canada had good working relationships
with these formations. Such a brigade
group could have been delivered by air
in a timely manner.
If the viability of a Canadian
mechanized brigade group operating in
the Middle East is in question, one should
examine the forces deployed by the
British and the French. The British 4th
Armoured Brigade was deployed in less
than a month from its bases in Northern
Germany. It consisted of an armoured
regiment, two mechanized infantry
battalions, and an artillery regiment. In
other words, it was almost identical to
4 CMB in Germany but with better
equipment. Its performance in the Gulf
War, though overshadowed by 7th
Brigade, was particularly effective in
reducing bypassed Iraqi strong points.
The French 66 DBL (6th Light
Armoured Division) had three mechanized infantry battalions mounted in
VAB (front armoured vehicle) wheeled
APCs, three armoured regiments (one
tank and two heavy armoured car), an
artillery regiment, and two attack
helicopter regiments with 60 anti-tank
helicopters. This formation was unsuited to a frontal assault role against
the enemy's main defensive positions.
As a result, it was relegated to the very
important role of flank guard on the
left flank of the main effort. 6e DBL
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Unlike the British and French
forces, a Canadian mechanized brigade
deploying to the Gulf would not have
been sustainable over a long period
without a radical change in Canadian
mobilization policy. This dictated that
the operational employment of the
brigade in the Gulf would have to be
considered carefully. These employment
options were considered by a planning
cell in Ottawa and this cell concluded
that a brigade based on the existing
European commitment could have
fulfilled a number of roles in the
Coalition plan: flank guard/ screening,
counter-penetration, and blocking.
These employment options were based
on the assumption that the brigade
would not be sustainable for a long
period, the same assumption that had
been used in Central Region planning
for twenty years. However, these
employment options as developed by this
planning cell do not appear to have
been disseminated widely, and there is
little discussion of them in the
BROADSWORD plan.
Though many shortcomings (specifically equipment and lift) would
have been overcome if the effort and
initiative had been made in November,
the casualty estimates and the sustainability problem gave the higherlevel military and political leadership
cold feet. One BROADSWORD planner
thought that this was the primary
reason for not deploying to the Gulf:
I honestly believe the reason that it
got handicapped or turned off was
that people realized there would be
casualties. There was DEATH involved!
It was pretty easy to continue to sit
offshore, embargo shipping, fly some
airplanes, come back to a relatively
secure environment.... The government
could see that we were talking 30
casualties a day, half of them being deaths.
That was startling to the politicians...
Another planner had a similar
point of view:
We may have been too pessimistic. The
casualty estimates were up there and
the shopping lists too big. That was the
straw that broke the camel's back. When
all was accumulated, with the highrisk assessment and a long shopping
list, the thing became intolerable and
it was cancelled. I wonder what would
have happened if we had gone with a
less grandiose shopping list.... The Chief
[of the Defence Staff ultimately] did
not recommend it to the political level.
The operational commanders for
BROADSWORD certainly believed
that the plan was a good one and that
it was capable of being executed.
Many logisticians also believed that
the movement problem could have
been overcome and that the equipment could have been acquired
quickly. What was lacking was the will
to do these things.
brigade commitment was not a viable
one? (At least one Canadian Admiral has
made this assertion). Many wellinformed people believe that the answer
is no. To redeploy a brigade group to an
entirely new and unfamiliar theatre of
operations against a new enemy cannot
be compared to having a brigade in
theatre with intimate knowledge of the
ground, its allies, and its enemy. There is
no doubt that the sustainment and
logistical problems were significant and
would have posed problems in NATO's
Central Region. This ignores the fact that
Canadian planners knew what the
problems were and were not given the
guidance and political support necessary
to fix them prior to 1985. The Canadian
soldier's ability to improvise and make
things happen should never be
underestimated. A NATO war would
have been more important than a Gulf
deployment, and the entire national
effort would have been directed to
supporting the Central Region.
In sum, Operation BROADSWORD
represents possibly one of the biggest
“what if's” in Canadian military history.
It was not only a missed opportunity.
BROADSWORD also highlighted some
of the structural weaknesses that have
existed in the Canadian Army since
1970 and should provide guidance for
future defence policy makers and
military planners.
The most important question here
is, does the failure to execute
BROADSWORD prove that the NATO
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Dr. Sean Maloney received his BA and MA from the University of New Brunswick and his Ph.D. from Temple
University in Philadelphia. His military service included duty with the 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise’s) as a
troop officer and an appointment as the official historian to 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. His writing and
research focuses on Canadian national security policy. Dr. Maloney’s publications include War Without Battles: Canada’s
NATO Brigade in Germany, 1951 – 1993 (1997), numerous articles, and the forthcoming book Learning to Love the
Bomb: Canada’s Cold War Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1951 – 1968. He is currently the Social Sciences Humanities
Research Council of Canada Post-Doctoral Fellow at The Royal Military College of Canada, where he also teaches in the
War Studies Department. Dr. Maloney is the Academic Advisor to The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin and
regularly contributes articles and commentaries.
ENDNOTE
1. With the realignment of Canada’s NATO ground contribution to the central front, the two brigades assigned to 1st Canadian Division changed
their titles from brigade groups to brigades.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
31
Missed Opportunity: Operation BROADSWORD, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade and the Gulf War
did not sit out the war; it operated in
an aggressive fashion within the limits
of its capabilities.
Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission
Command in Peace Support Operations
A Practical Application
By Major Cliff Trollope, CD
INTRODUCTION
Major Cliff Trollope, CD
S
a way of thinking more than anything
else and therefore it should be applied
and permeate everything we do in
garrison, on training, in headquarters,
during peace support operations and
when at war. The basics of manoeuvre
warfare can be applied every day and
used to solve every problem that
professional soldiers face in our day-today work. When a concerted effort is
made to apply our doctrine, most will
find that implementing manoeuvre
warfare and mission command is not an
overly complex endeavor. In this paper
I will demonstrate, using practical
examples from Operation Palladium,
Roto 7, that by applying the tools of
manoeuvre warfare the stage is set for
mission command to thrive. Manoeuvre
warfare fundamentals can then be used,
mand were applied should be a prescription for similar peace support
operations. It is not an exercise in selfgrandeur. The aim is simply to give
practical examples of how our doctrine
can be applied, how it does not have
to be overly complex and the huge
benefits that can be reaped, when the
manoeuvrist approach is used. The
intent is to show that applying the tools
of manoeuvre warfare allows the entire
process to move from the theoretical to
the real world.
ince the Canadian Army adopted
the doctrine of manoeuvre
warfare, and the accompanying
command philosophy of mission
command, there has been a great deal of
debate surrounding its implementation.
There has been a plethora of articles
written on the subject and many
questions regarding what we are doing
on a daily basis, and if we are actually
implementing our doctrine. Most would
agree that the manoeuvrist approach is
P R O B L E M : T H E N AT U R E O F
the best way to conduct operations. With
P E A C E S U P P O RT O P E R AT I O N S
this approach comes the imperative of
mission command. It is not my intent to
eace support operations, by their
explain the value of tempo, attacking
very nature, can be extremely
centres of gravity or disrupting the
complex endeavors that come with their
enemy etc., as this has been proven many
own built-in friction. There
times. The problem we, in
are many different issues and
the Canadian Army, seem
dynamics at play that force
to be having is getting
One of the most attractive
commanders and soldiers to
past the theory, buzzwords
aspects of manoeuvre warfare is
consider factors well outside
and fictitious or historical
of conventional warfighting.
examples and onto the
that it applies equally across the
Sub-units in isolated Areas
actual application. It is one
full spectrum of conflict.
of Operations (AORs) are
thing to recite the various
forced to plan and think at
fundamentals, tenets, and
the operational, and even
tools of the manoeuvrist
approach and mission command and as fundamentals should, to guide the strategic, levels. The problem is
quite another to actually use it on a daily conduct of operations and to assist in exacerbated by the fact that peace
planning and decision making. The tools support missions are long in duration
basis.
of manoeuvre warfare referred to are: and success cannot be achieved by
One of the most attractive aspects of mission analysis, commander’s intent, conducting a series of unrelated actions.
manoeuvre warfare is that it applies selection and maintenance of the aim, The decision/action cycle is continuous
equally across the full spectrum of main effort, and unity of effort.1 Each of and every action must contribute to the
conflict. Peace support operations these will be dealt with in more detail overall mission. To complicate the issue
further, the essentials of such things as
demand mission command and the later.
attacking a centre of gravity, mission
manoeuvrist approach is really the only
For purposes of illustration, the focus, sound and rapid decisionviable option commanders have to deal
with the complexities and pace of these author’s personal experience as a rifle making, and unity of effort still apply in
missions. Perhaps some of our slow company commander in Drvar, Bosnia peace support operations as they do in
progress regarding the implementation during Operation Palladium, Roto 7 war. Cohesion, both our own and that of
of our doctrine is due to the fact that will be utilized. This is definitely not to the forces/people bent on obstructing
commanders, at all levels, have not fully imply that everything done on that tour the peace process, is still the key. The
embraced manoeuvre warfare or exper- was perfect or that the manner in which problem is multi-faceted. How should
imented with its use. It is, as we all know, manoeuvre warfare and mission com- we go about the operation? How do we
32
P
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
apply and focus our military resources
on a daily basis? How does the commander sift through the complexities of
the situation, ensure a rapid decision/
action cycle and, most importantly,
clearly articulate his intent to his
subordinates? The answer is found in
applying the tools of manoeuvre warfare
that in turn allow mission command to
successfully be exercised.
THE SOLUTION: TOOLS OF
M A N O E U V R E WA R FA R E A N D
MISSION COMMAND
(achieve the mission) at hand.
However, like all tools, they are
of no use if they sit in a box and
are not used. Now it is time to
get to work and give examples of
how the tools can be used to
solve “the problem” which in
this case is a peace support
operation. However, before we
do that, each tool needs to be
looked at briefly from a sub-unit
commander’s perspective to
emphasize how they support
each other and set the
conditions for mission command.
nderstanding fully that manoeuvre
warfare is a way of thinking and not
a set-piece process, there still has to be
some procedures or actions that can be
undertaken that foster the manoeuvrist
approach and allow mission command
to flourish. If our doctrine has one
failing it is that there is not enough
emphasis placed on the application of
manoeuvre warfare. There is much
written on the fundamentals of the
manoeuvrist approach and mission
command but very little on what can be
done to get the process going. The best
start point for practical application is
with the tools of manoeuvre warfare.
The tools are as follows:
Mission Analysis. Mission
analysis is the start point for
every plan and action that takes
place and, one could argue, the A Bison armoured vehicle belonging to the 3rd
most important tool. It is the Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light
start of the decision action cycle. Infantry Battalion Group (3PPCLI BG), patrols
It is spoken of often and taught, the village of Ramici, September 2001.
along with the estimate process, (Courtesy CFPU)
in our various schools. However, it is my Commander’s Intent. Proper mission
experience that junior officers and analysis cannot occur unless the
NCOs do not fully understand what it commander clearly articulates his
means. Perhaps some of the confusion is purpose (intent), method (concept of
related to the actual term mission operations to include main effort) and
analysis. Maybe task analysis would be a end state. Every plan, order, directive or
better term. My job was made much instruction must be structured in this
easier by the fact that the first thing I do manner. The problem with commander’s
in the development of junior officers is intent is often not with the intent itself
to teach them mission analysis. It does but how it, and his concept of operations,
• Mission Analysis
not need to be a complex procedure is articulated to his subordinates. The
• Commander’s Intent
that follows a strict format. It is merely a more complex the task or mission the
•
Selection and Maintenance
logical thought process that ties into and more difficult it is.
of the Aim (Mission Focus)2
overlaps with the estimate, and arrives at
• Main Effort
plans and actions that need to take Selection and Maintenance of the
• Unity of Effort
place. You can never go wrong by “so Aim. Also a principle of war, selection
Personal experience reveals that whating” an issue until you get to a and maintenance of the aim really
these five aspects of manoeuvre warfare concrete action. It is the foundation of means staying focused on the mission.
are aptly called tools as they are pro- applying the manoeuvrist approach and The aim should be evident in the
cedures, or concepts, that commanders the only process that, when done at all mission statement as well as in the
at all levels can use. They are mutually levels, will allow decentralized command commander’s intent. It may seem like a
supporting, do not have to be sequential, and ensure sound, rapid decision motherhood statement but, as I will
can be used on a continuous basis, and making. Mission-type orders, that stress explain later, it is essential on long
complex missions and in peace support
operations to stay focused on what
really matters. Without a clear and
If our doctrine has one failing it is that
directed focus, mission analysis is
there is not enough emphasis placed on
difficult and becomes less effective.
Subordinates cannot be continually
the application of manoeuvre warfare
asking themselves why they are doing
specific tasks. The “why” of an
by using one tool you are setting the the commander’s intent, concept of operation can never be in doubt.
stage or building the framework for the operations, main effort and end state
others to be put into action. They should will only be effective if subordinate Main Effort. Even with clear articube considered as instruments that are commanders can conduct effective lation of the commander’s intent and
concept of operations, subordinates still
used to solve or fix the military problem mission analysis.3
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
33
Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission Command in Peace Support Operations: A Practical Application
U
need to know the one element of the
operation that is the most important.
Designating a main effort, and making
it clear why the main effort is what it is,
pushes mission command to the next
level. Through their own mission
analysis, subordinate commanders will
use their initiative to find ways to
support the main effort.
Unity of Effort. Unity of effort is as
much a byproduct of using the other
tools as it is a tool itself. By maintaining
mission focus, clear articulation of
commander’s intent and main effort,
and continuous mission analysis, unity
of effort will logically follow on. As a
tool, it is almost always used to measure
the effectiveness of the other tools. If
there is no unity of effort, it is most
likely a result of the other tools not
being applied properly.
Major Cliff Trollope, CD
Mission Command. Mission command
is based on trust and trust is a topic that
we should not even need to discuss.
If a commander does not trust his
subordinates, he needs to either
replace them or find a new profession
himself. Our junior officers and NCOs
are top-notch people and worthy of our
complete trust. The issue at hand is
setting the conditions that allow them
to operate independently, use their
initiative, and make sound and timely
decisions. They need to know why
they are tasked to do certain things.
Applying the tools of manoeuvre
warfare sets these conditions.
The Bosnia-Herzegovina theatre of
operations. (Courtesy DND)
34
P R A C T I C A L A P P L I C AT I O N O N A
P E A C E S U P P O RT O P E R AT I O N
T
result was continuous mission analysis
and reassessing the way we were
conducting day-to-day operations.
Mission analysis was needed both at the
macro level (i.e. looking at the entire
operation and related issues) and with
specific aspects of the mission (i.e.
humanitarian assistance operations and
psychological operations or “Psy Ops”)
as well as with daily patrols. There are
hroughout the tour, mission
analysis as a tool received a great
deal of use. I should stress that by
mission analysis I do not simply mean
the process one goes through to arrive
at a mission statement. It is much more
than that. Where mission analysis ends
and the estimate begins is not
clear nor does it matter. The
The commander’s intent
key word is analysis. A logical
study of available information
is vitally important.
and assigned tasks and simply
“so what?” each element until a
deduction is made and action can be two key points to be drawn from this as
taken. Considering the complexities of they relate to peace support operations
the situation we were faced with in Bosnia, and mission analysis. The first relates to
that last question one asks at the end of
mission analysis was a powerful tool.
the mission analysis process: Has the
As was mentioned previously, peace situation changed? When it has, mission
support operations can be very complex. analysis is required. For Roto 7, I needed
The logical and thorough process that is to conduct three large-scale looks at the
mission analysis makes it the perfect tool. overall mission. The end result of each
It was found to be useful to start mission was the initial intent and concept of
analysis as early as possible. The detailed operations, a mid-tour situation report
information that I received on the and adjustments and the end of tour
tactical recce, combined with a study of handover. These were not scheduled
the AORs history and any other events but rather times when it became
information available, allowed me to clear that the mission had evolved and
have my mission analysis completed prior things had occurred on the ground that
to the confirmatory exercise. I under- forced us to look at the big picture.
stood the intents of the Commander of
The second key point relates to
Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Commander Multi-National Division (South- mission analysis being done at all levels.
West) (MND[SW]), as well as what my The two hours I spent teaching platoon
battle group commander expected of me commanders the basics of mission
and my company. I also had a good analysis, and having them in turn
understanding of the current mission teaching section commanders, paid huge
and the key issues and factors at play. As dividends. I found that all of my
complex as the situation was, by taking subordinate commanders would analyze
the time to conduct a detailed mission each task to see how it fit into the overall
analysis, my understanding of what mission. As a result, they would either
needed to be done was enhanced. question the effectiveness of what they
However, my understanding of the were doing or more often ask me for
situation was nearly useless unless I could clarification of the “why”. As soon as our
find a way to articulate the complexities patrol reports appeared to be drying up
of the mission and my intent to my or getting stale we knew it was time to resubordinates. This is a separate issue that look at what we were directing the troops
I will deal with when discussing the other to do. The company second in
tools. The main point here is to gather as command, the Operations Mastermuch information from as many sources Corporal, or the patrol commanders
as early as possible and start with mission themselves often brought this fact to my
attention and was a result of them
analysis.
conducting mission analysis. This in turn
What became abundantly clear drove me to look at specific aspects of the
from the tactical recce and throughout mission, conduct mission analysis and
the tour was that the situation on the issue an operations directive (with my
ground was evolving very fast. The intent, concept of operations and main
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Commander’s Intent is a tool that
takes mission analysis and starts to
transform it into actions taken to fulfill
the mission. An extremely effective
mission analysis loses its value if the
commander cannot successfully link it to
his intent. The commander’s intent is
vitally important as not only does it drive
his subordinate’s mission analysis but it
also is what allows mission
command to flourish. While
deployed in Bosnia, I discovered
two very important aspects with
respect to commander’s intent.
The first was that if I clearly
expressed my intent, in absolutely
everything the company did, the
officers, NCOs and soldiers found
ways to get results that exceeded
what I thought was possible every
time. In order for this to happen,
commander’s intent had to be
obvious in all aspects of the
operation.
My
subordinate
commanders seemed to thrive on
this, especially the NCOs. The
important thing was giving the
direction (intent) and some
guidelines (concept of operations).
Then, with the “how” left largely up
to them, they could get on with
things and I would move to the
next task. With some of the more
complex tasks, I expressed this in
writing as well as verbally; however,
the most effective means appeared
to be when I gathered all section
commanders and attachments and
expressed my intent verbally with
the aid of a flip chart. We used this
for operational tasks, visits, the
leave plan, and the sports program.
Everything had an intent and I
became convinced that if an activity
had not unfolded as I had
envisioned, it was not the fault of
the troops but rather mine for not
clearly articulating my intent. The
second aspect of the commander’s
intent, and the more difficult, was
finding ways to clearly articulate it
so that my troops understood what
I was thinking.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
For complex and on-going peace
support operations, I found that merely
stating my intent was often not enough.
It worked for various tasks throughout
the tour, but for the mission itself,
it was not enough. By showing the
overall operation diagrammatically, the
complexities of the situation could be
explained with one page or chart. This
diagram, which I called the concept of
operations, but really in essence was the
intent tied in with the mission and
concept of operations, was an extremely
useful tool. It allowed me to take the big
picture and draw it down to what the
soldiers did on a day-to-day basis.4
Our mission was clear. A Company
will ensure a secure a stable environment in order to facilitate the full
implementation of the General Framework
Agreement for Peace/Dayton Accords
(GFAP). This was all well and good, but
it did not help the troops understand
what needed to be done apart from the
fact that we needed to keep the
situation secure and stable. My intent
was as follows: To conduct a focused,
well-coordinated and unpredictable
patrol program that will gain and
maintain information dominance in the
AOR. Information dominance will
allow us to pre-empt or disrupt any
Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission Command in Peace Support Operations: A Practical Application
effort) that would refocus the patrols and
my subordinate commanders. They
would then take this operations directive,
conduct their own mission analysis and
the entire operation would continue to
progress.
35
Major Cliff Trollope, CD
elements striving to obstruct the peace
process thereby ensuring a secure and
stable environment. This statement was
useful in that it emphasized the importance of the patrols and information
gathering; however, it still was not
enough to get the process going. It was
the concept of operations diagram that
wrapped everything together.
that the patrols were properly focused.
The key was that every single thing we
did had to go towards supporting a
secure and stable environment. The
main effort was the information
operations line of operations as it was
the one that most influenced the other
lines and the overall mission. If we did
the little things right on a daily basis,
not only would we have information
dominance, but also all three legs of the
tripod would be strong and the secure
and stable environment maintained. If
one leg became too weak, the tripod
would topple and the secure and stable
environment would fall.
and main effort that tied to the overall
mission of maintaining a secure and stable
environment and gave my subordinates
the direction they needed.
Selection and Maintenance of the
Aim or mission focus acted as both the
glue that held the operation together
and the tool to assess if an activity was
worth doing. Everything had to somehow
In general terms, the concept of
relate to maintaining a secure and stable
operations was based on three mutually
environment and the operation itself. If
supporting lines of operations that were
we found ourselves being pulled in a
to be viewed as three legs to a tripod.
different direction the question asked
These lines of operations, or legs of the
was, “How does this relate to maintaining
tripod, all supported the mission, a
a secure and stable environment?” If it
secure and stable environment. More
did not, we did not do it. This was also
specifically, the diagram worked as
This diagram was the one way that I useful in fighting mission creep.
follows. At the top is what I identified as could articulate my intent and the overall Maintaining an operational focus was not
the centre of gravity at the time in our mission to my subordinates. A company- difficult but had to be re-enforced by
AOR and that was a lack of effective level operations order for the mission commanders at all levels on a continuous
governance. The single factor that was was not required as long as my basis. It was the essence of the command
most holding back the peace process subordinates understood the diagram climate. We were in Bosnia to conduct a
was the fact that there were no and how the mission was meant to peace support operation and everything
organizations or structures in place that unfold. We would revisit this diagram we did had to support this. The food, the
could lead Bosnia to the point where many times throughout the mission to leave plan, how visits were handled, and
international assistance was no longer check our progress. It was also an how we conducted day-to-day business
required. The main task for getting to effective tool to explain to the soldiers were all related to the mission. Once this
this centre of gravity fell largely to the the big picture “why” of the operation. It seed was planted, the troops ran with it.
other international agencies entrusted linked our day-to-day activities to the The standard response in the company
to implement the civil aspects of the overall situation. I knew my subordinate when one was asked what he or she was
Dayton Accords, and the
doing at any particular
local population themselves.
time was, “Conducting
The most important aspect
However they could not do
peace support operations
of main effort was ensuring
their jobs and the process
in the Former Republic of
could not move forward
Yugoslavia.” When asked
that one was designated and
unless there was a secure and
to elaborate the company
clearly understood.
stable environment, and that
mission statement was
was our mission. Now we had
quoted. Although these
to take our military resources and apply commanders understood my intent early statements were made in jest they did go
them in such a way as to ensure a secure in the mission when they began to a long way in keeping the company
and stable environment. Maintaining a question me on various aspects of the focused on what was truly important.
secure and stable environment itself diagram. The first such question was With specific tasks there were obviously
was not a simple task given the various related to humanitarian assistance more specific aims but the key was that
elements and issues at play. This is operations and how they were linked to a operations prevailed and everything
where we look at the bottom of the secure and stable environment. This was related back to the mission.
diagram to the patrols as the building a trigger to me to flush out that aspect of
block. On any given day the patrols the mission with an operations directive.
Main Effort for the entire operation
were given tasks that fit into the three All this entailed was my doing a mission remained the information line of
lines of operations. The small blocks analysis related to that specific element operations. However, on a daily or weekly
along the lines of operations were of the operation and issuing a one or two basis the main effort shifted as required.
simply things that we did. They were page directive that gave my subordinates The most important aspect of main effort
not sequential and all were mutually the guidance they needed. Throughout was ensuring that one was designated
supporting. For example, something the tour, I issued six operations directives and clearly understood. This may seem
that we did on the information dealing with everything from human- like a motherhood statement but I
operations line supported the other itarian assistance operations, civil disorder found it to be a very powerful tool.
international agencies and so on. It was and cooperation and confidence build- Subordinates liked knowing what was the
then by conducting a series of 24-hour ing measures. Essentially these directives most important aspect and why. Once
rotations, that began with a morning were mission-type orders that had an aim/ this was understood not only would those
operations conference, that we ensured mission, intent, concept of operations tasked launch with focus, but others
36
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Unity of Effort on a peace support
operation, regardless of complexity, is
not overly difficult to achieve. One of the
most important things is to ensure that
everyone working in the AOR,
regardless of command relationship, is
working to support your mission. What
was highly successful for us was to
include all attachments in every
operations conference. This ensured
that they understood what the issues of
the day were and gave them the
opportunity to find ways to contribute to
the mission. The other key aspect to
ensure unity of effort was simply
applying the other tools. If everyone is
situationally aware, understands the
intent and main effort and can conduct
mission analysis, then unity of effort will
be inevitable. In our particular case,
the Civil-Military Cooperation liaison
officers, with their contact with the local
population, made great contributions by
simply directing their efforts to support my
intent and mission. Many were small
actions, like organizing a Halloween party
for local Bosnian-Croat children at a time
when the operation needed us to build
better relations with that portion of the
population. I did not direct them to do
this. They simply pounced on an
opportunity that arose during the course
of their duties and in the end we reaped
huge benefits from this one small
initiative.
Finally, it was by applying the tools
of manoeuvre warfare that allowed
mission command to be exercised. It was
really quite simple. Our junior officers
and our NCOs fully embraced mission
command and the tools of manoeuvre
set the conditions for them to succeed.
The start point was their being
comfortable and relatively proficient
with mission analysis. If I then clearly
articulated my intent and main effort
and ensured that the aim was
maintained, they would then be in a
position to not only make the right
decisions but also to find the best “how”
to meet my “why”. When all of these
elements came together and were reenforced on a daily basis, unity of effort
logically followed. The end result was
that the company virtually ran itself.
Without having to worry about every
detail and coordinating every activity, my
time was free to focus on the important
issues. The essential thing for me as the
commander was to get my mission
analysis as close to right as possible, and
to clearly articulate my intent and main
effort. After that, my subordinates filled
in the cracks and produced outstanding
results on a daily basis.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Major Cliff Trollope holds a BA is History from The
Royal Military College of Canada and is a graduate of the
Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College
(CLFCSC). Since gaining his commission in 1988 he has
served exclusively in infantry units or infantry related
positions. Major Trollope served as a junior officer with 1st
Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
(PPCLI) and accompanied that unit on United Nation duty
in Cyprus. From 1991 to 1995 he was employed at The
Infantry School in Gagetown and has spent the last six years
with 2 PPCLI. While serving with 2 PPCLI, he has twice
deployed to Bosnia; once as company second in command
with the first SFOR deployment into the area in 1997, and on
the second, as a company commander on Operation Palladium,
Roto 7. He is presently a company commander in 2 PPCLI in
Winnipeg, Manitoba.
ENDNOTES
1. The tools of manoeuvre warfare are from the works of Lieutenant
Colonel (ret’d) C.S. Oliviero. They are the synthesis of many works and
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
CONCLUSION
O
ur struggle to implement the
manoeuvrist
approach
and
mission command has to end. We, as an
army, must get past the theory and start
to apply our doctrine in all we do, on
operations and in garrison. The best way
to do this is by using the tools of
manoeuvre warfare. Regardless of task,
if commanders maintain the aim, clearly
articulate intent, concept of operations
and main effort, then subordinates will
know the “why”. If we train our
subordinate commanders in mission
analysis and demand it from them, they
will arrive at the proper “how”. When
these things are combined, unity of
effort is not only inevitable but also
synergistic. With this done, the stage is
set for mission command, mission type
orders, and use of the fundamentals of
manoeuvre warfare as they apply to any
given situation. The application of the
tools is especially effective when dealing
with peace support operations. In the
end, most will find that not only is it
relatively easy but it is also the most
effective and efficient way to do
anything in the Army.
have been presented, amongst other places, to students at the Canadian
Land Force Command and Staff College in Kingston, Ontario. The
author first came in contact with the tools as a student at CLFCSC in
1997.
2. The term “mission focus” as it relates to selection and maintenance
of the aim is the author’s doing. The intent is to emphasize what this
particular tool of manoeuvre warfare meant to the author and his subunit.
3. William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Boulder CO, 1985, p.
15. Although mentioned in many publications and manuals, Lind’s
description of mission-type orders gives a very clear explanation.
4. The idea to show the mission in a diagram was initiated based on the
experience of using a “campaign plan” during my first SFOR deployment
in Drvar in 1997. Major (now Lieutenant-Colonel) Ian Hope, had
designed a campaign diagram that suited the mission at the time and it
was highly effective. Following my initial mission analysis, I started out
with a similar intent using B-GL-300-001/FP-000 as a guide. However, I
got considerably bogged down when it was clear that the mission had
evolved so much, had a different centre of gravity, and was no longer as
linear in fashion. It was following a discussion with Major Hope, who was
at the time a SAMs student at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College in Fort Levanworth, Kansas, that the idea of a tripod emerged.
Major Hope’s advice was not to be concerned if the mission was no
longer linear and to think in three dimensions for the model. It was with
this information that I devised the tripod. I was later to learn while giving
briefings in Bosnia that the three-legged stool is a concept or method of
explanation used at the U.S. Army War College.
37
Manoeuvre Warfare and Mission Command in Peace Support Operations: A Practical Application
within the company group would come
up with ways to help. As a commander
this made my job extremely easy.
Fighting the Good Fight
A Comparative Study of Military Ethics in
Operations other than War
by Catherine Sheridan-Demers
It is curious that physical courage
should be so common in the world and
moral courage so rare.
— Mark Twain (1835 - 1910)
M
ilitary culture and form
are vastly distinct from
society at large. The
profession of arms, which
by definition is the controlled application of violence, sets military
professionals—officers and soldiers
alike—apart from the bulk of society visà-vis terms of professional responsibility.
The military professionals’ stock and
trade is often human life spent at the
cost of furthering government policy—
whether in defence of state, international security or humanity. Military
professionals are trained and purportedly prepared to deal with the
dissimilar situations that range along
the spectrum of conflict and to cope
with the attendant ethical dilemmas
inherent in those situations. Traditional
“warfighting” constitutes only a slender
portion of the spectrum of conflict. The
majority of operations along the
Catherine Sheridan-Demers
Military culture and
form are vastly distinct
from society at large.
spectrum are categorized as operations
other than war (OOTW), which encompass a diverse collection of functions,
including disaster relief, search and
rescue, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.1
It is interesting to note that,
although the majority of operations
along the spectrum of conflict are those
other than war, the ethics of such
situations remain a murky realm for the
38
majority of military professionals. In officer execute his or her duty within the
traditional warfighting the situation is often blurred and incomplete ethical
clear—military professionals are given framework that military organizations
an un-ambivalent enemy,
which they will engage and
The military professional
defeat at the behest of their
superiors and ultimately the
must regularly deal
governing powers of the state.
with the “grey areas” of
In this uncomplicated “black
and white” situation, military
the spectrum of conflict.
professionals confront few
ethical dilemmas in the
prosecution of a war for the further- have provided for such situations? The
ance of the state or for the good of answer can only be, with a great deal of
humanity as a whole. The enemy is personal fortitude and a reliance on
typically demonized, and military military ethical values.
professionals enjoy the support of their
Historically, the reliance on these
society and the belief—founded or
not—that the cause of the state is just ethical values has led to situations of
conflict within the chain of command.
and therefore justified.
These grey areas of operations often
If there are few ethical dilemmas in find a soldier far from home, isolated,
what a recent article in the Canadian without a clear enemy to fight, and in
Military Journal described as “appropriate the midst of a complex situation that
circumstances” (the examples given were can evolve abruptly, unpredictably, and
a trench at Passchendale or on the gun violently. Add to this situation the strain
deck of a ship of the line at Trafalgar), of communications between those
perhaps we should heed the terse advice within the theatre of operations and
of John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, those without. One often finds inwho charge, “Look around. No theatre commanders in conflict with
good old-fashioned war is in those out of theatre. The majority of
sight.”2 The clear cut areas of responsibility, both militarily and
conflict are few and far between, ethically, is placed upon the in-theatre
the military professional must commanding officer, who must make
regularly deal with the “grey effective and ethical decisions. With the
areas” of the spectrum of increasing public demand for transconflict, which constitute the parency, intolerance of unethical acts,
majority of military operations. firm international policy of personal
If there is no overarching ethical accountability, and the commanders’
framework in place apropos OOTW, own humanity and sense of duty, such
then what is to guide the professional responsibilities can be devastating to
soldier? Realistically, considering the the only human military professional.
diversity of OOTW, it is impractical that a
The tale of General Charles
single ethical framework could be
developed to deal with all possible Gordon, an officer of imperial Britain
situations. But the question still remains, who blatantly rejected his orders to
what guides the military professional abandon the city of Khartoum in 1884,
through the labyrinth of these OOTW? and the account of Lieutenant-General
How will the professional soldier or Romeo Dallaire, who turned in disgust
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The death of Gordon at Khartoum on
26 January 1885. The Nile Expeditionary
Force, which included Canadian
Voyageurs, arrived to late to save him.
(Courtesy Canadian War Museum)
from an order to withdraw his
international peacekeeping force from
Rwanda in 1994, chronicle the
disparate experiences of dissimilar
commanders. Interesting parallels can
be drawn, however, between Gordon
and Dallaire. Even though Gordon and
Dallaire came from two different eras,
they were the products of similar yet
diverse military cultures that were both
rooted in British military tradition, and
they were both captive of their own
personalities and temperaments. The
underlying principles of their respective missions were diametrically
opposed, yet both men navigated the
more precarious grey areas within the
spectrum of conflict and demonstrated
how military ethics grounded in
personal morals and convictions could
and did mold the eventual outcome of
their situations.3
In 1885, General Charles Gordon
was a well-known maverick of the British
army, darling of the public and a Royal
Engineer famed for his contribution in
China during the Taiping Rebellion.
The pinnacle of Gordon’s career was
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Gordon had retired and was residing
in England in 1883 when word of
rebellious forces led by Muhammad
Ahmed, known as the Mahdi, reached
England. The Mahdi was believed by
Islamic people to be the “Expected
One”—a forerunner to the end of the
world and a prophet of Allah. Militarily,
the Mahdi enjoyed considerable success,
and, ironically, Gordon at first supported
the rebellion, seeing it as God guiding
the Sudanese to their freedom. Soon
though, events began to sweep out of the
grasp of British power, as British and
Egyptian forces were destroyed wholesale
by the Mahdi and his followers and
power increased exponentially with each
victory.6
For the British
government the only
feasible course of action
was the evacuation of
the Sudan. The government had no wish
to further involve the
British Empire in this
tumultuous region, and
wanted only to forestall additional military
involvement and subsequent entanglements.
The British public, however, was of a different
mind, and the press
began to clamour for
British intervention.
British pride had
suffered at the hands of
the Mahdi, Dervishes
were overrunning the colony of a
British protectorate, and, therefore,
something had to be done. The British
government decided upon a compromise to avoid further embarrassment
or entanglement. The Sudan would be
evacuated, but Gordon would be sent to
supervise the evacuation and lend an
appropriate air of British control to the
circumstances.7
Gordon was to survey the situation
and decide the best course to evacuate
the Sudan. It was falsely believed that
Gordon had extensive knowledge of the
Sudan; he was, in fact, viewed by the
British government and public as the
expert on the Sudan. In truth, Gordon
spoke virtually no Arabic and his actual
knowledge of the Sudan was very limited
and dated. Furthermore, his orders were
extremely vague and allowed liberal
interpretation of what specifically were to
be Gordon’s duties. Before Gordon had
even left for the Sudan, he had already
decided that the whole situation had
been blow out of proportion by panic
artists and believed that the evacuation
would be a simple logistical matter.8
Many questions have been raised as
to why Gordon transformed a mission to
evacuate the Sudan into an all-out
defence of Khartoum. A few clues may
be found in the thoughts and character
of Gordon himself. As Valentine Baker,
a British general in the Egyptian service,
noted, “As soon as I heard Gordon was
going to the Sudan, I knew there would
Brigadier-General Romeo Dallaire, Commander of the
United Nations mission in Rwanda (left) and an
Argentinian officer speaking with a rebel brigade
commander, Rwanda, August 1994. (Courtesy CFPU)
39
Fighting the Good Fight: A Comparative Study of Military Ethics in Operations other than War
spent as the governor of the Sudan.
During his time as Governor, Gordon
worked diligently to eliminate the slave
trade, bolster the economy, establish
communications and develop a niche
for the Sudan in international relations.4
Gordon’s relationship with the Sudanese
people was somewhat ambivalent as
Gordon often viewed the Sudanese as
children who needed to be watched
over, and even displayed some doubt as
to whether the Sudanese would not be
better off as well-cared for slaves rather
than left to their own devices.
Nonetheless, Gordon’s concern for the
well-being of the Sudanese was genuine,
and the people, like the country itself,
held a special place in Gordon’s
affections.5
be a fight.” Baker’s observation seems to
be corroborated by Gordon himself,
who held that “There is no earthly
success except in war when you beat
your enemy.” Such sentiments, perhaps,
indicate a dangerous mind-set with
which to approach the situation in the
Sudan, especially considering Gordon’s
emotional ties with the African country.9
Catherine Sheridan-Demers
Upon his arrival in Khartoum,
Gordon did manage to evacuate some
2300 civilians, mostly women and
children. But there remained an Egyptian
garrison of 6000 men, countless
Egyptian government officials, and a
handful of European citizens, whom he
had no realistic means of evacuating.
Although it was possible for him to slip
away and avoid facing the oncoming
onslaught of the Mahdi, Gordon was
unwilling to abandon these people
to their fate.10 Although Gordon’s
enthusiasm for battle surely contributed
to his decision to stay, his ethics were the
deciding factor in his decision that
he must defend Khartoum. Gordon
believed that the Mahdi would simply
slaughter the Egyptian and European
occupants of the city. He thus
demanded that a relief force be sent
from Britain and began to fortify
Khartoum against attack. It is clear from
Gordon’s journal entries that he
believed that his continued presence
was vital to the defence of Khartoum: if
he were to leave, it was certain that there
would never be a relief force expedition
to Khartoum and he could not hope to
save eight to ten thousand lives.11
Thus did Gordon face his ethical
dilemma: sent to simply advise on the
best means that could be employed in
the evacuation of the Sudan and
Khartoum, and after extricating those
few he was able to evacuate, he realized
that thousands would not escape the
onrush of the Mahdi unless he did
more than his orders allowed. The
situation on the ground was much
different from what the British
politicians had envisioned. Gordon
risked and would ultimately loose his
life striving to provide protection for
the Egyptian and European citizens
stranded in Khartoum. Gordon could
have easily removed himself from the
path of the Mahdi, but his professional
military ethics prevented him from
40
Tutsi Militiamen celebrate their victory over Hutus. (Courtesy Esprit de Corps)
doing so. Britain’s reluctance to send
the forces he was desperately calling for
cost him his life: the relief force arrived
two days after the fall of Khartoum and
Gordon’s death. Gordon followed his
ethics and paid for that decision with
his life.
Another man intimately familiar
with being placed in such a tenuous
situation is General Romeo Dallaire.
Dallaire was sent to Rwanda on what
was to be a simple peacekeeping
mission to implement a ceasefire
agreement and oversee the installment
of a coalition government in 1994.
Dallaire and his staff, however, were
unaware that the ceasefire was little
more than a guise. Among many other
reports and indicators, in mid April
1993, Mr. Nidiaye, a Special Rapporteur
of the UN, observed first hand in
Rwanda the questionable viability of the
ceasefire, as countless human rights
violations and massacres continued to
target the Tutsi population. Nidiaye
identified a serious risk of genocide and
was ignored by the principal powers of
the Security Council, who received his
report with little interest.12 By this time
the powers of the Security Council had
received word through their own
intelligence reports that there was
indeed serious trouble brewing.
Unfortunately, Africa, and more
specifically the poor state of Rwanda,
was of little or no strategic interest to
the powers, and the information was
ignored. Dallaire arrived in Rwanda on
the 22nd of October 1993, uninformed
of this disturbing information and
believing that the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)
was to be a simple mission.13
After a short time in Rwanda,
however, it became clear that there were
undercurrents that had been overlooked
in the establishment of the mission.
Tensions steadily rose, and the development of the coalition government was
stalled, as sporadic violence began to
increase in frequency and worsen in degree.
Dallaire received reliable information
from an informant, a high level member
within the Rwandan Interhamwe (“those
who attack together”), that the mass murder
of the Tutsis was being planned.14
Through this informant, Dallaire was able
to accurately establish the location of
several significant weapons caches that
were to be distributed only a short time
before the massacres were to commence.
Dallaire contacted UN headquarters
(UNHQ) in New York and requested
permission to activate a knockout force in
order to seize the weapons caches and
prevent their use. He was denied
permission. Dallaire later contacted
UNHQ to ask for permission to halt
the inflammatory broadcasts that were
inciting the Hutus to massacre the Tutsis.
Again he was denied. There were many
opportunities to halt the violence that
was so obviously building, but UNHQ,
specifically the Security Council, was
reluctant to take the necessary steps. This
reluctance was to cost the lives of
hundreds of thousands of innocent
civilians.15
As with Gordon in Khartoum,
Dallaire helplessly watched the situation
deteriorate around him as UNHQ did
nothing. On April 6th the mounting
tension erupted when the plane
carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and
Burundi was shot down while preparing
to land at the Kigali airport. Almost
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
and Dallaire was there a century later in
1994 as an international peacekeeper
helping to maintain order in a
postcolonial society, the similarities of
these two seemingly unlike situations
are striking. In both cases, the
circumstances of the situations into
which the generals were to enter were
not fully understood. Both Gordon and
Dallaire left their native soil with the
thought that their missions were to be
relatively uncomplicated.
Upon arriving in theatre, both
generals realized that the situation was
much different from the picture that
had been presented back home. In
both cases, as the generals began to
report back to their respective headquarters, both bodies of political
authority resisted the conclusion that
the actual situation was different from
what had been expected and demanded
that the generals fulfill their mission as
given. This inflexibility of policy and
mind can be said to be responsible for
a large part of these unfortunate
situations.
censured for their roles in Africa, both
were eventually considered heroes not
just within their own military
organizations but also within society,
proving that, in following the dictates of
their ethics and their humanity, they
did the only possible thing.
Both generals were faced with the
mass slaughter of innocent civilians, both
were cognizant of the danger prior to the
commencement of serious violence, both
tried to warn their superiors of the
impending peril and risk to civilian life,
and both were ignored. As the interests of
the political parties involved did not allow
for sending additional forces to Africa, it
was expediently decided that the military
commanders were merely exaggerating:
Gordon simply was not trying hard
enough to evacuate Khartoum, and
Dallaire had misjudged completely, or
was greatly overestimating, the risk of
violence in Rwanda.
After the initialization of hostilities,
when both men were ordered out of the
At the outset of the violence, Dallaire
area because the situation was deemed
had fashioned a plan that entailed the use
too dangerous, both refused in order to
of an estimated five thousand additional
The unwillingness of the collective protect the lives of the people under
troops to quickly stop the violence, but the
UN was not willing to listen to Dallaire. political unit to trust the military their care. Whether struggling to protect
Dallaire revised his plan and requested establishments’ commanders in theatre ten thousand people as in the case of
that the mission be modified to a Chapter is both unwise and amateurish. Yet the Gordon or over thirty thousand as in the
case of Dallaire, the
VII. Once again the
message from the
UN rejected his plan,
commanders was the
refusing to give any real
same—we will not
consideration to the
Hegel was right when he said that
stand by and simply
possibility of bringing
watch these people
an end to a genocide
we learn from history that man can
die. Their military
that would result in the
never learn anything from history.
ethical values were
deaths of some 800,000
at odds with those of
Rwandans. By July 4th
the political decision
the Rwandan Patriotic
makers, who were
Front (RPF) rebel army,
fighting against the government for the military establishment is not free of more concerned with avoiding embarTutsi people, had made its way across blame in either case. In war, the old rassment and the level of involvement
Rwanda and declared a unilateral adage that “the best plan never survives and expense attendant with remaining
ceasefire, bringing a bloody end to the the first cavalry charge” is implicitly in Africa. If the military professionals’
understood; yet, the military com- stock and trade is human life to be spent
genocide.18
munity seems incapable of applying this in the furtherance of state policy, so too
George Bernard Shaw once dryly knowledge to those grey areas of then does the professional of arms hold
commented that, “Hegel was right conflict, just as it seems incapable of sacred the value of life and observes
when he said that we learn from history trusting its own senior officers to make diligently the inherent obligation to
that man can never learn anything from judgement calls in situ. In the cases of protect it from needless expenditure.
history.”19 The comparison of Gordon Gordon and Dallaire, the responsibility Neither Gordon nor Dallaire was willing
and Dallaire’s command experiences of balancing political calculation and to allow innocent people to die for lack
lends credence to Shaw’s comment. the ethical values espoused by the of political interest. Both generals
Even though Gordon was in Africa in military community fell to the desperately called for reinforcements,
1885 for Britain on a mission that was shoulders of military commanders. both developed plans through which
spiced with strong imperial undertones Although both men have been countless lives could have been saved,
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
41
Fighting the Good Fight: A Comparative Study of Military Ethics in Operations other than War
immediately the “brutal Presidential
Guard and the paramilitary Interhamwe
establish(ed) road blocks throughout
Kigali”16 leaving General Dallaire in
little doubt that the massacres the
Interhamwe informant had warned of,
were about to begin. After the loss of the
Belgian and Bangladeshi contingents,
Dallaire defied UNHQ and, following
his own ethics, refused to withdraw the
remainder of his force and completely
abandon the Tutsis to their grim fate.
Dallaire found himself in the middle of
the most incredibly brutal and swift
genocide of the 20th century with only
450 lightly armed peacekeeping troops.
In the following three months of
relentless slaughter, Dallaire sought to
protect as many people as possible with
his small peacekeeping force and
succeeded in saving the lives of over
thirty thousand people. This was no
trivial feat considering the formidable
obstacles facing the small peacekeeping
team.17
situation, and it raises frightening
questions concerning the ethical values
of those high-level officials who guide
military and governmental policy and
action. Gordon and Dallaire are
examples of two men who “fought the
good fight,” only to find that, in the end,
Although Gordon would not have
they had been abandoned. There was no
recognized the term “human security,”
longer a continuous unit—from the
both Dallaire and Gordon fought to
political body, to the military high-level
protect humanity, without thought to
leadership, to the comrace or nationality. The price
mander in theatre—to
that these men paid was
carry out the collective
staggering. Gordon was killed.
Though honour is black and white, will of society. There was
Dallaire suffers from postonly one man, forsaken
traumatic stress disorder. One
policy is generally grey.
by the political authority,
paid with his life; the other with
alone, facing a situation
his mental health. General
of unprecedented conDallaire himself recognized the
haunting reflection of his own dilemma that the disparity between military and sequence. This lone individual had to
in that of Gordon’s as he said, “I felt the political objectives is a perpetual hurdle decide whether to retreat as his superiors
ghost of Gordon of Khartoum watching that the military establishment must wished, or to risk his own life and those
over me. Dying in Rwanda without a sign surmount? Failure to do so comes at a of his men to save innocent people. One
or a sight of relief was a reality we faced high cost to commanders in theatre who man was forced into the vacuum left by a
possess the ethical values that are so political community that did not want to
on a daily basis.” 20
esteemed in our military culture. The know or help, and this single being had
One thing is decidedly clear: these situations of Gordon and Dallaire starkly to find the courage to make a decision
outcomes could have been prevented. If portray the ethical dilemmas of these where higher authorities would not.
the commanders in theatre had been foggy grey areas of OOTW, and show
listened to, if high command had been how with alarming ease - then and now—
more flexible, if the reinforcements that the military professional finds himself
were requested had been sent—the list of dislocated from an unfeeling command
failings on the part of the military and faced with making decisions that will
community is daunting; those of the affect the lives of thousands. Very little
can ever prepare a commander for this
political establishment abhorrent.
and both were forced to struggle on
alone as reinforcements were withheld.
Tragically, though honour is black and
white, policy is generally grey,
particularly in OOTW.
In the final analysis, these men
delved willingly into the grey areas on
that spectrum of conflict, confident of
the support of the political bodies
involved. In the end, their situations
dictated that they would ignore and
countermand orders because their
military ethics were at odds with the
political focus of their superiors. How
have we come so far, yet failed to realize
Catherine Sheridan-Demers
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Catherine Sheridan-Demers is currently a civilian
student at the Royal Military College of Canada, completing
her final year of a bachelor in Honours History. Ms.
Sheridan-Demers has focussed her studies on Civil-Military
Co-operation (CIMIC). In addition to her academic
workload she has successfully participated in formal training
in CIMIC at both the NATO school in Germany, and the
Pearson Peacekeeping Center in Canada. Catherine's
undergraduate thesis subject is CIMIC within peacebuilding
in modern peace support operations, and her career goals
are to pursue a career in the CIMIC field.
ENDNOTES
1. Captain Donald Neil, “Military Ethics and the Military Corporation,”
Canadian Military Journal, Vol 1, No. 1, 2000, pp. 27 - 38.
2. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. “A New Epoch And Spectrum Of Conflict.”
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR880/MR880.ch1.html,
February 18, 2001;Neil, pp. 27 - 38.
3. Carol Off, “Do the Right Thing! General Romeo Dallaire in the
1990’s,” in Warrior Chiefs eds. Lieutenant -Colonel Bernd Horn and
Stephen Harris, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001, p. 336; Charles C.
42
Trench, The Road to Khartoum : The Life of General Charles Gordon, New
York: Dorset Press, 1987, p. 83.
4. Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopaedia 2000, “Gordon, Charles George.”
http://Encarta.msn.com/find/concise.asp?ti=F9000, February 8, 2001.
5. Trench, p. 83.
6. Ibid., pp. 190 - 193.
7. Gordon Brook-Shepherd, Between Two Flags, London: Willmer
Brothers Limited, 1972, p. 65.
8. Trench, p. 6.
9. Ibid., p. 240.
10. Ibid., p. 198.
11. Ibid., p. 247.
12. “Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United
Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” 15 December 1999,
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/Rwanda_report.html, 29 September 2001.
13. Carol Off, The Lion, The Fox, and the Eagle: A Story of Generals and
Justice in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, Canada: Random House, 2000, p. 26.
14. Off, The Lion, the Fox, and the Eagle, p. 42.
15. Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, “Command experiences in
Rwanda,” Presentation paper; Lieutenant-General Romeo Dallaire, “The
Theatre Commander in Conflict Resolution,” in Generalship and the Art of
the Admiral eds. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris, St. Catherines: Vanwell
Publishing Limited, 2001, pp. 261 - 270.
16. Off, “Do the Right Thing!”, p. 336.
17. Ibid., pp. 338 - 339.
18. Ibid., pp. 335 - 345.
19. George Bernard Shaw (1856 - 1950).
20. Off, The Lion, the Fox, and the Eagle, p. 66.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Facing the Threat
The Future Security Environment and the Need
for Ground-Based Air Defence
I
n a letter dated April 2000, from
the Chief of the Defence Staff
(CDS) to the Minister of National
Defence (MND), General Maurice
Baril wrote:
The financial situation facing the
Department is well known to you.
Even with the funding provided by
the recent budget, not all our
current capabilities can be considered affordable. Our staff have
recently assessed the affordability of
the ADATS missile-based air defence
system. A summary of the results of
that study are [sic] provided in the
attached Briefing Note.1
The attached briefing note was
clear: ADATS (air defence anti-tank
system) had to go because the Army
operating budget would be short about
$100 million a year and not having the
ADATS would go a long way to help
alleviate the problem.2 From now on,
the Skyguard/35 millimetre gun
combination and the Javelin would be
used for ground-based air defence in
the Canadian Forces. However, the
Army’s real intent was to do away with
the Skyguard/35 millimetre gun system
as well and then reduce the Javelin
contingent down to 93 Regular Force
personnel only. In another army
restructure option, even this tiny group
went missing.3 Thus, while the CDS was
advising the MND not to worry about
the ADATS capability, because a
significant air defence expertise would
remain, the army had other plans.
The decisions being made by the
Army staff with regard to air defence
also had considerable foreign policy
ramifications, tying the hands of
the government if a deployment was
ordered to a theatre of conflict with a
serious air threat. Even Major-General
Jeffries, the Assistant Chief of the Land
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Staff at the time, had to admit that
participation in any future mission
would depend on a specific air threat
analysis and if the situation proved
unacceptable, might “well prompt a
decision not to deploy Canadian
troops.”4 Most important in this matter
was the lack of any genuine study of
what might constitute a future air
threat. Certainly the air defence experts
in the field were not given any
opportunity to contribute. Instead, lack
of funds and little to no support for air
defence within the Land Staff Headquarters led the Army, in 2000, to make
the very same decision taken in 1959—
the eventual elimination of a combat
capability. Of course, the question has
always remained for those outside the
air defence community: Why have an
air defence capability at all when much
of our current force development
planning was, and continues to be,
predicated on being part of a coalition
led by the United States (undoubtedly
the case in a war-fighting scenario)?
Wouldn’t they guarantee our protection
from air attack?
Colonel (retired)
Sean Henry certainly
had something to say
on this subject. In a
letter to the Ottawa
Citizen on 10 December
1999, he attacked what
he called a “mantra”
then making the rounds
of National Defence
Headquarters.5 This
“mantra,” he explained,
was based on the theory
that if one had not
used a piece of military
equipment on operations
in the last ten years,
then one really did not
need it. As all of
Canada’s air defence
assets fell into this category, the mantra
he described helped clarify why systems
like ADATS were likely viewed as
unnecessary by the Army at large.6
More important, though, was Colonel
Henry’s incisive comment that military
resources are like insurance policies
whose payouts are not required every
day but can come in handy when
needed.7 But is a SHORAD (shortrange air defence) insurance policy
really necessary today and in the
future? To determine the answer to this
question, we must delve into the past,
present, and future.
The decision in 1986 to acquire
new ground-based air defence weapons
was made in order to defend the air
bases at Baden-Soellingen and Lahr,
4th Canadian Mechanized Brigade
Group in Germany, and the Canadian
Air Sea Transportable Brigade that
would deploy to Norway in an
emergency. The threat at the time was
considered to be from fast, low-flying
fighter aircraft using electronic warfare
that would attack both airfields (at
The ADATS missile system is made in Canada. It has a
search radar with a range of 25 km and uses a passive
infrared system for target tracking. There are eight onboard missiles. Missile range is 10 km. The system is
effective against all types of targets, including cruise
missiles. (DND photo)
43
Facing the Threat: The Future Security Environment and the Need for Ground-Based Air Defence
by Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
In essence, this
passage ultimately
tells any potential
opponent of the
United States and
its allies to invest
their defence dollars in anything
but fighter aircraft
and helicopters.
Instead, defence
dollars would be
better invested in
non-traditional
airpower means,
The Skyguard and 35 mm gun. The Skyguard has a search
as significant numradar range of 25 km and uses a tracking radar to carry out
engagements. Each Skyguard is normally connected to two bers of UAVs and
35 mm guns (which can be up to 500 m away) that are CMs can be obremotely controlled from within the Skyguard itself. The tained today for
guns fire 1,100 rounds per minute and can be used against the price of one
single aircraft. Such
all types of aircraft plus cruise missiles. (DND Photo)
a package would
also come without
the added costs of
Baden-Soellingen and Lahr). For the
brigades, the threat was considered to training, maintenance, and infrabe from aircraft, supplemented by structure inherent with a traditional air
attack helicopters, armed with long- force. So, what will the threat look like
range anti-armour weapons. However, between now and 2020? To begin this disas the first ADATS were appearing in cussion, it is worthwhile looking at what
Germany, a United States’ American might be called the traditional threats
Division air defence study had already of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
determined that the threat from fixed
A well-employed fixed wing aircraft
wing fighters was no longer the main
risk for ground forces. Instead, the is a remarkable force multiplier that can
analysis determined that unmanned strike terror, as we saw during the Gulf
aerial vehicles (UAVs), helicopters, and War, into an army on the move, no
cruise missiles (CMs) now posed the matter what direction it happens to be
going in. Modern fighters can carry
greatest danger.8
out air interdiction, strategic attack,
More recently, Lieutenant-General close air support, reconnaissance, and
John Costello, then Chief of the United electronic warfare while employing a
States Army’s Space and Missile Defense wide variety of munitions in all-weather
Command, indicated that the threat conditions. Aircraft technology has also
of cheap, conventional CMs hitting improved with better aerodynamics,
American troops was high on the list of power plants, and on-board passive and
the Army’s 21st century problems.9 active jamming systems. Survivability has
Indeed, according to the United States’ also been enhanced with the use of low
Fiscal Year 99 Air and Missile Defense observable materials, creating very small
Master Plan:
The evolving threat will take on new,
stressing characteristics in the 21st
century. Adversaries will closely
observe emerging U.S. capabilities
in an effort to identify and exploit
weaknesses using asymmetric approaches. An asymmetric approach
seeks to negate U.S. capabilities by
simple counters and avoids a direct
match with U.S. strengths.10
44
In the year 2054, the entire defence
budget will purchase just one
tactical aircraft. This aircraft will
have to be shared by the air force,
and navy, three and a half days per
week, except for the leap year, when
it will be made available to the
Marines for the extra day.11
The above quote, at first glance, is
quite comical. However, it becomes less
so when one considers one F-22 fighter,
with weapons and support needs, is
expected to cost $50 million each (all
amounts Canadian). For countries like
Canada, the cost is simply out of reach.
Even the 1998 announcement that the
present fleet of CF-18s would receive a
$1.2 billion upgrade was tempered by
the fact that this money would be spread
over a decade, and only 80 fighters
would be affected. As Dr. Paul Mitchell
noted in a paper delivered at the
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies,
Spring 1999 seminar: “If funds are hard
to find to simply keep existing aircraft
flying, how much harder will it be to
fund the procurement of future classes
of fighter aircraft?”12 Further evidence
of future fighter costs is also available
from the United Kingdom, which plans
on acquiring 150 joint strike fighter
(JSF) aircraft between 2012-2015. So far,
to replace Harrier GR7s and Navy Sea
Harriers, the British government has
committed $4.2 billion toward the JSF
development, but the total bill will likely
be $15.4 billion.13 If we were to replace
the planned fleet of 80 CF-18s with 80
JSFs, one can imagine the cost.
Consequently, how will countries
like Canada and, more importantly,
potential adversaries afford a modern
fixed-wing air force by 2020? The clearcut answer is that we, and they, will not.
That is not to say that some countries will
not try and cling to what passes as a
A well-employed fixed wing aircraft
is a remarkable force multiplier.
radar cross- sections that make newer
aircraft virtually invisible to air defence
radar. However, such technological
improvements come at a cost—a point
already well understood in the early
1970s, when Norman Augustine, CEO
of Martin Marietta, predicted:
traditional air force, as there are still
plenty of aircraft to be had. But should
we really expect a serious fixed-wing
threat against Canadians in a NATO or
United States led coalition on par with
that envisioned during the LLAD (lowlevel air defence) project? The answer
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
thing operating below 500 metres
above ground level. Also, there is a
distinct possibility that without
overlapping AWACS aided by a longrange ground-based air defence radar
With regard to helicopters, the coverage, a short-range lookdown
situation is somewhat different. Many capability will not be available. Finally,
countries have them, but it is attack AWACS aircraft are very vulnerable and
helicopters that pose the greatest threat prime targets for attack. Thus they are
deployed well back from the
forward edge of the battle
that pose the greatest threat to
area, increasing the likelihood that very low-level
a challenge for air defenders.
targets will get through.17
Attack helicopters
ground forces and
to settle for second-class or second-hand
airplanes and weaponry. They will be no
match in the air (if they even get in the
air) against the United States. But this
viewpoint should not come as a surprise,
as it is the view held by NATO itself:
For future operations, when any
NATO alliance is involved, we can
assume friendly air superiority. This
implies that fixed-wing aircraft are no
longer considered to be the primary
threat to SHORAD. The future threat
to SHORAD will consist of the
following: the attack helicopter—
utilizing covered approaches and popup or hull down attacks; UAVs; Cruise
Missiles; and Fixed Wing ‘Leakers’.14
Also, anyone contemplating a war
against the United States or NATO in
which they intend to fly fixed-wing
fighters would be better studying their
history first. For example, the hell
German fighter pilots faced in October
1944, is best told by General Hugo
Herrmann who described in his book
Eagle’s Wings how he and his
companions would spend their time in
late October evenings:
… in front of a tiled stove or an
open fire drinking Tokay, bitching,
swearing, telling stories, exchanging
views, in an attempt to discover if there
was anything we could reasonably
hope to do, even though the means at
our disposal were insufficient. It was
complete nonsense to throw highly
decorated, experienced, mature
fighter leaders in with a bunch of
brave beginners and send them into
the jaws of 1,000 escort fighters ready
to consume all and sundry, irrespective
of rank and training.15
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
No doubt, in more recent times,
General Herrmann could easily have
been describing Argentine, Iraqi, or
Yugoslavian pilots.
to ground forces and a challenge for air
defenders. However, new attack
helicopters are also very costly, and the
trend has been to retrofit all manner of
helicopters with modular weapon upgrades and sensor packages. Such helicopters, taking full advantage of terrain,
electro-optic sensors, and improved fire
control systems are a significant threat.
What makes a helicopter target
such a challenge, is its ability to fly at
very low altitudes, thus avoiding
detection by airborne and long-range
ground sensors. Even in the most
advantageous terrain for a defender,
the mean unmask range for a
helicopter flying at 100 metres above
ground level is about 15 kilometres. In
rolling terrain, this can drop to 11
kilometres and in rough terrain, down
to 4 kilometres.16 A helicopter operating at tree-top level reduces the
unmask range to 1 kilometre. Surprise
is key, and without air defence protection, ground troops can be hit with
cannon or unguided/guided missiles
before they know what is
happening. It is against
helicopters that SHORAD
protection remains relevant.
There is some misconception that an elevated
sensor, such as an AWACS
(airborne warning and
control system) platform,
will solve the terrainmasking problem. While
elevating a sensor will
provide an increase in
radar coverage, ground
clutter often prevents an
AWACS, or any elevated
sensor, from seeing any-
Of course, it will still require the
potential enemy to be somewhat
organized to get several helicopters in
the air at once, and all working
together, be they armed helicopters or
a close approximation thereof. Only a
few countries can boast of an effectual
armed helicopter fleet, as the logistics
of simply showing up anywhere on time
and organized are tremendous. And
then one needs something to fire.
Fortunately, anyone with really
effective armed helicopters is mostly an
ally of ours with effective means to get
more than a handful of helicopters in
the air at anytime. Therefore, like the
fixed wing threat, by 2020, we should
expect the helicopter threat to be
nothing more than a general nuisance,
easily dealt with by the full combination of air defence means at our
disposal, including SHORAD. And,
certainly, if we are able to deal with
some of the non-traditional air threats,
tackling fixed-wing “leakers” and
helicopters should be comparatively
easy.
While the Javelin system is effective against
helicopters and some UAVs in daylight and fair
weather conditions, it is not at all effective against
the growing CM threat.
45
Facing the Threat: The Future Security Environment and the Need for Ground-Based Air Defence
to this question is no. The fixed-wing
air threat will steadily fade away by 2020
simply because new top-of-the-line
fighters will be unaffordable for most, if
not all, countries. Only the United
States and a few European nations will
maintain the desire and resolve to pay
for fighters. Anyone else that insists on
having their own fighter force will have
guns to blast the UAVs out
of the air. In the end
though, the question of
how valuable a UAV really is
to one’s operations is not
based on type, size, or
payloads, but on whether
one is able to control their
use and provide real-time
intelligence to the commander.
Today, we should expect
UAVs to continue to use
daylight television or infrared cameras to provide
intelligence. The trend will
also be toward UAVs
equipped with laser designators, providing immediate targeting
of assets by smart munitions. Others will
be linked directly to indirect fire assets
and provide information so that
surface-to-surface artillery or rockets
can engage targets. UAVs are also
becoming smaller all the time, and
scientists expect that a new generation
of micro air vehicles (MAVs), no bigger
than a hand or even a paperclip, will
replace UAVs in the post 2020 period.18
Certainly, UAVs will continue to
proliferate, and while their use may
not, in the foreseeable future, present a
sophisticated threat, it only seems
reasonable that we have an inherent
capability to know when an enemy is
using such a platform to gather
intelligence on us. Indeed, it is often
amusing to see some Canadian officers
expound upon the importance of
having our own ISTAR (intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
Already in service with Israel, the Harpy UCAV hovers
over the battlefield looking for enemy radar
transmissions. When it finds one, ground controllers
activate the UCAV’s homing capability, and Harpy
becomes an on-site anti-radiation missile.
With regard to the non-traditional
threats, UAVs have in fact been around
for about three decades, and hence a
good deal is known about them. Today,
they are steadily gaining in prominence
and capability. It was the Israeli Air Force
who first used UAVs in combat, forming a
single squadron in 1971. This squadron
was key in the spoofing and follow-on
destruction of Syrian air defences in
Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, in 1982.
American Navy and Marine Corps units
have used the Pioneer UAV in combat
since 1991, and UAVs certainly came into
prominence during the 1999 NATO
military campaign in Kosovo. The United
States’ Predator UAV became the first
UAV to designate a target for laser-guided
bombs launched from an A-10 groundattack aircraft, while German and French
CL-289 UAVs with British Phoenix UAVs
conducted target-acquisition and battledamage assessment missions. In all, 20 to
30 UAVs were shot down by the Yugoslav
air defences.
Generally, UAVs come in two types:
drones, characterized by having preprogrammed flight paths, and remotely
piloted vehicles, controlled by a
ground-based operator. Depending
upon configuration, range, and payload, they can all provide valuable
intelligence to their owner. Also, low
radar cross-section and the generally
small size of tactical UAVs make them
difficult to detect and engage. But not
impossible, as demonstrated by the
Yugoslav military, which became adept at
using helicopters to fly alongside UAVs.
They used door-mounted machine
46
reconnaissance) capability with nary a
consideration given to the enemy, who
likely have their own ISTAR plan.
Today, and in the years to come, we
are entering into a world that will be
dominated by UCAV (unmanned combat
air vehicle) development, which, in the
United States, has been centered on the
dangerous job of suppression of enemy
air defence(s) (SEAD) and knocking out
battlefield computers. Much of the work
has been centred on fitting UCAVs with
directed energy weapons, like highpowered microwave emitters designed to
erase computer memory. Within the
Pentagon, the debate is whether UCAVs
should remain passive in nature,
gathering intelligence and using directed
energy weapons or take on a more
traditional role of attacking targets with
conventional munitions, such as antiradiation missiles.19 UCAVs could hover
over an area for long periods, ready to
respond to threats almost immediately.
Mobile SCUD launchers or air defence
weapons could be detected by satellite
and then attacked. More importantly, if
the UCAV was shot down, no pilot would
be lost in the process—an important
factor for any military as human casualties
are always a predicament, no matter how
much resolve a government has in waging
a war. Either way, the intent of the United
States, according to Aviation Week and
Space Technology, is “a substantial shift to
unmanned air and ground vehicles by
2010-20.”20
Having discussed UAVs and
UCAVs, we have to now realize that
most, if not all, of the technological
As this picture shows, CMs are not exactly small. The latest American CM, still
under development at this time, is the JASSM (Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off
Missile). A stealthy CM, it is 4.26 metres long with a 432-kilogram penetrating
warhead.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
If NATO is still in the process of
sorting itself out, what will we likely
encounter in the future? Generally, we
should expect a less sophisticated
enemy using much less advanced UAVs,
but with similar aims to our own. It
would not be out of the ordinary to
expect enemy UAVs over air and sea
ports or major logistics bases gathering
information for air strikes or other
more clandestine attacks. Would a
limited, real-time intelligence gathering
capability provide an enemy with
information on our troop concentrations and headquarters?
Certainly, UAVs can be used in any
type of conflict, and their use will
proliferate. China, Finland, Japan,
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
Taiwan, and Russia (which operated its
Pchela, or Bumblebee, UAV over
Chechnya) all have independent,
advanced UAV programs. In operations,
any side or group having built or
purchased UAVs could easily go about
the business of gathering information
without the knowledge of a warfighting or peacekeeping force—if
that force lacks the means to control
the airspace. In any conflict, a UAV
would allow an adversary one of only a
few means to accurately deliver longrange artillery or missile fire on a
target and then carry out battle damage
assessment.
Of course, the argument has been
made above that synchronizing everything to produce effective results is
no easy task, even for NATO. Also,
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
our existing Canadian
SHORAD systems are,
in general, quite
capable of dealing with
threat UAVs below
20,000 feet, now and
in the future. Our
coalition partners would
take care of any highflying strategic UAV
assets. No doubt, our
SHORAD radar would
likely detect highflying UAVs, but could
not attack them due to
missile and projectile
British gunners
range limitations. But
conflict.
let us be clear: not
having any SHORAD
capability would leave Canadian ground
forces without any means to control the
airspace above them or coordinate the
surrounding airspace with adjacent
formations. When all is considered,
UAVs are not and will not be the
most dangerous threat to make an
appearance in the very near future.
Instead, we would be better to spend
our time considering the arrival of
numerous fast, lethal, and accurate
CMs.
Like UAVs, CMs are not at all new
to the battlefield. The concept of a CM
was first suggested prior to 1914, and by
1918, the United States Navy had
developed the Sperry Aerial Torpedo,
an N-9 biplane with gyroscopic
guidance and a 70-mile range.21 In
England, as early as 1921, trials took
place on a CM that culminated in the
development of a small monoplane
with a 300-mile range and a 112kilogram warhead. Twelve monoplanes
were eventually built, “four of which
were tested with live warheads—
ironically in what is now Iraq.”22
In late 1944, Hitler tried to re-stage
the Blitz on London. Now, “revenge
and terror were to be the order of the
day and the weapons used were dubbed
the V1 and V2[SH2].”23 The V1 was a true
CM, while the V2 was more a ballistic
missile. In either case, the “V” stood
for Vergeltungswaffen or “vengeance
weapons.”24 Between 12 June and 5
September 1944, 6,725 V1s were
launched against England, although
3,463 were destroyed by anti-aircraft
prepare a Phoenix during the Kosovo
gunfire, fighters, and barrage balloons
before they could reach their intended
targets.25 By the end of September,
8,564 V1s had been fired at London, 53
at Southampton, and another 21 at
continental cities such as Paris,
Brussels, and Liège.26 In the first two
weeks of the V1 Blitz, the casualty rates
were as high as the original Blitz as the
V1s often struck by day when the streets
were filled. In total 5,475 people were
killed in London alone.
In all, about 60 percent of the
casualties attributed to the V1 occurred
in the first six weeks of the campaign.
After that, the anti-aircraft defences
were improved, notably with the
addition of new radar-directed antiaircraft guns firing proximity-fused
shells. However, the V1 campaign was
successful, as noted in a 1944 British Air
Ministry report, which remarked that
defending against the V1 cost about £48
million. Over 130,000 homes were
destroyed, more than 750,000 others
damaged, and in excess of one million
people evacuated. It is thought that
each V1 cost £150 to produce, or £2,500
at today’s prices.27
Another example of the effectiveness that a “flying bomb” can have when
conventional air attack is just not
possible given overwhelming numerical
or technological odds also originated
during World War II. During the Leyte
Gulf naval battles, which occurred in
October 1944, Japanese air power was
out-gunned and out-classed. Without
adequate air cover, Japanese carriers
47
Facing the Threat: The Future Security Environment and the Need for Ground-Based Air Defence
developments mentioned are only
available to a few countries, most of
whom happen to be our allies. It takes
an inordinate amount of effort and
coordination, even for NATO, to sort
out how to handle UAVs, disseminate
the intelligence gathered, and react
accordingly. If NATO is viewed as the
pre-eminent military alliance (the
fellows with their stuff together, so to
speak) how difficult must it be for
other, less advanced militaries to utilize
UAV technology effectively? Doctrine,
concept of operations, command and
control, and the distribution of imagery
were the biggest lessons to emerge from
the Kosovo conflict with regard to
UAVs.
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford, CD
and ships were vulnerable to air attack. exercise was from the Commander of the thinks for one moment that one’s own
Between January and October 1944, the 1st Air Force, Major General Larry conventional air force will not get off the
Japanese Navy alone had lost 5,209 Arnold, who said, “the probability of a ground in a major air battle, then a
pilots, or 42 percent of the total cruise missile attack against the United Tomahawk-like CM is the answer to one’s
number available.28 Drastic tactics were States is greater than the probability of prayers. Also, CMs are not as obtrusive or
as inaccurate as the present generation
needed. As a result, Admiral Takijiro ballistic missile attack.”32
of SCUD missiles, so
Ohnishi, in the lead up
one might actually
to the Leyte Gulf, proget to deploy them
posed to his staff that the
Air defence cannot and should not be
and fire a few with
only way to defeat the
taken for granted any longer.
devastating results.
American fleet carriers
As
most
NATO
was “by crash-diving on
nations (less Canada)
the carrier flight decks
with Zero fighters carrying 250 kilogram
There are differing views as to do not have the means to detect and
bombs.”29 His words were to translate when the CM threat will actually shoot down CMs, the results could very
into kamikaze fighter groups—suicide materialize. So far, CM proliferation in well indeed exceed expectations. In
fighters—the Japanese version of smaller military powers has been essence, there would be no more rogue
limited to British and French sales to missiles landing in the empty deserts of
Vergeltungswaffen.
the United Arab Emirates and Russian Saudi Arabia or in empty lots in Israel.
The Japanese were successful. offers of CMs to India. According to However, since the Gulf War, CM
While kamikaze missions did not Aviation Week and Space Technology, technology has not made a grand
change the course of the war, they did “land attack cruise missile proliferation appearance amongst what are regarded
accomplish a good deal. In one has been remarkably slow compared to as rogue states. How long this will last
example, on 25 October 1944, nine ballistic missile proliferation.”33 On the cannot be predicted too easily, but there
planes attacked two American Naval other hand, Global Trends 2015, a is little doubt that defending against CMs
Task Forces. By the time the strike was recent American report, summed up between now and 2020 will likely be one
of the more difficult tasks for air
over, the Japanese had sunk one escort the situation quite differently:
defenders.
carrier, badly damaged another, and
left others needing extensive repairs.30
Theater-range ballistic and cruise
Today we can look upon our
The strike was not enough to prevent missiles proliferation will continue.
the final outcome of the Pacific War, Most proliferation will involve systems a present ground-based air defence
but it was enough to give Japanese generation or two behind state of the systems as the first example of a
senior officers pause for thought about art, but they will be substantially new “focused revolution” of a particular
how they might continue to use their capabilities for the states that acquire capability as described in The Future
own revenge weapons to better effect in them. Such missiles will be capable of Security Environment. We have in place
delivering WMD or conventional a system capable of dealing with any
the months ahead.31
payloads inter-regionally against fixed threat, both traditional and nonGenerally, the possibilities that targets. Major air and seaports, logistics traditional. But what we really need in
revenge weapons can offer an enemy bases and facilities, troop concentrations, the Canadian Forces (the Army and Air
have not been overlooked. Around the and fixed communications nodes Force, in particular) is a full
appreciation that an air threat does
world, many countries such as Iran, Iraq, increasingly will be at risk.
actually exist and this threat to our
Libya, North Korea, and Syria continue
Further to this, Robert Wall, in operations will continue to grow. As a
to put significant effort into fielding both
ballistic and CMs. Within the North Aviation Week and Space Technology, result, air defence cannot and should
American Aerospace Defense Command added that today, enemy ballistic not be taken for granted any longer.
(NORAD), responsibility for defeating missiles and cruise missiles are However, if anything at all, we need the
CM attacks falls to the 1st Air Force, an “supplanting surface-to-air missile confidence that our leadership will
Air National Guard unit. In June 2001, systems as the targets U.S. Air Force never agree to cut any type of
the 1st Air Force deployed on the coast planners would strike first during the equipment as a cost saving measure
before the full implications of such a
of Florida in an exercise designed to opening phases of a conflict.”34
decision are fully understood.
demonstrate their capability to shoot
down incoming CMs. The exercise was a
In general terms, both Aviation
success, although no live missiles were Week and Space Technology and Global
fired. Instead, radar lock-on of incoming Trends 2015 have it right. CM
“threat” Raytheon MQM-107 drones and proliferation has been slow. However, the
BD5-J UAVs was used to indicate a kill. sight of the United States Navy’s
The army’s participation was limited to a Tomahawk CMs flying over downtown
National Guard Avenger (Stinger) Baghdad, seemingly immune to any
Battery. Perhaps one of the most countermeasures, was awe-inspiring
interesting observations about the during the Gulf War. Certainly, if one
48
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
ENDNOTES
Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Kilford was born in
England and immigrated to Canada in his youth.
Following graduation from high school, he joined the
Regular Force. After training as a radio technician, he
served with the 8th Canadian Hussars in Petawawa,
Ontario. In 1981, Lieutenant-Colonel Kilford applied for
officer training and was accepted as an artillery officer.
He has served with the 3rd Regiment Royal Canadian
Horse Artillery, 128th Airfield Air Defence Battery (in
Germany), the Air Defence Artillery School, Land Force
Command Headquarters, 18th Air Defence Regiment,
and Land Force Central Area Headquarters. LieutenantColonel Kilford was commanding officer of the 4th Air
Defence Regiment in Moncton, New Brunswick until
August 2001, when he became a member of the National
Securities Staff at the Canadian Forces College in
Toronto. He is a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces
Command and Staff College. In October 1992, he
successfully completed a Bachelor of Arts Degree from
the University of Manitoba. He is currently completing a
Masters Degree in the War Studies Program. LieutenantColonel Kilford’s first book, Lethbridge at War, was
published in 1996 and in 2000 he won first prize in the
Royal Canadian Artillery’s Colonel Geoffrey Brooks
Memorial Essay Competition. He is currently Senior
Staff Officer 1 National Security Studies in the
Department of National Security Studies at the Canadian
Forces College in Toronto, Ontario.
L I S T O F A B B R E V I AT I O N S
ADATS (air defence anti-tank system)
AWACS (airborne warning and control system)
CM (cruise missile)
ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition,
and reconnaissance)
JSF (joint strike fighter)
LLAD (low level air defence)
MAV (micro air vehicle)
SEAD (suppression of enemy air defence(s))
SHORAD (short-range air defence)
UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle)
UCAV (unmanned combat air vehicle)
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
1. Department of National Defence, Future of the ADATS Capability. A
copy of this draft letter, in the author's possession, is dated April 2000. It
was prepared for the CDS and the Deputy MND (Jim Judd). Whether it
was sent or not is unknown.
2. Ibid.
3. Department of National Defence, Designing the Army of Tomorrow,
3000-8 (DLSP), 11 February 2000, Annex A and B.
4. Department of National Defence, Future Security Environment and
Ground-Based AD Protection
1000-1-1 (DLSP), 26 April 2000. This letter was signed by the ACLS in
response to a threat analysis paper produced by Major Ken Hynes, the
Canadian Forces Liaison Officer in Fort Bliss, Texas, p. 2.
5. Colonel Henry’s letter was in response to an article written by David
Pugliese, Ottawa Citizen, 2 December 1999.
6. Javelin was used during the Gulf War to give our naval contingent an
added layer of air defence.
7.
Colonel (retired) Sean Henry, “Insurance Policies”. Ottawa Citizen,
Letters, 10 December 1999, A17.
8. Major J.C.Y.F. Lafortune, “Air Defence in the Mid 1990s,” The Gunner
Bulletin, No. 23, 1995 p. 11.
9. James Asker, “Washington Outlook,” Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 18 October 1999, p. 25.
10. Department of the Army, HQ United States Army Air Defence
Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas, Approval of the FY 99 Air and Missiles
Defense Master Plan.
11. Dr. Paul Mitchell, Editor: David Rudd, The Revolution in Military
Affairs and the Canadian Air Force, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic
Studies – Air Power at the Turn of the Millennium, 1999, p. 39.
12. Ibid., p. 32.
13. John D. Morrocco, “U.K. Antes Up $2.8 Billion for JSF,” Aviation
Week and Space Technology, 22 January 2001, p. 33.
14. NATO Army Armaments Group Land Group 5 on Army Air
Defence, SHORAD Systems Airspace Control Measures Associated with War and
Operations other than War, Document AC/225(LG/5) D/11, 7 May 1999, p. 3.
15. John Ellis, One Day in a Very Long War – Wednesday 25th October 1944,
London: Jonathan Cape, 1998, p. 210.
16. Dr. John Anderson, “Shorad Systems in Extended Air Defence,” Air
Defence Readings 2000, September 2000. Unmasking data is from the Cost
and Operational Analysis carried out for the American DIVAD air
defence program in 1981.
17. Ibid., p. 8.
18. Jim Wilson, “Micro Warfare,” Popular Mechanics, February 2001, p. 63.
19. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “UAV Weapons Focus of
Debate,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 September 2000, p. 29.
20. Ibid., p. 29.
21. Centre for Defence and International Studies, Lancaster University,
Cruise Missiles: A Brief History p. 1 [book online], http://www.cdiss.org/
cmhist.htm"
22. Ibid., p. 1.
23. Ellis, p. 219.
24. Ellis, p. 219.
25. Philip Ziegler, London at War, Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada,
1995, p. 287.
26. Ellis, p. 223.
27. Centre for Defence and International Studies, Lancaster University, p. 3.
28. Ellis, p. 382.
29. Ibid., p. 384.
30. Ibid., p. 391.
31. In all, the kamikaze pilots sunk or severely damaged 300 ships and
caused 15,000 casualties.
32. Times Colonist (Victoria) “Anti-cruise missile system performs
flawlessly in test,” 7 June 2001, p. F7.
33. Steven Zaloga, “Missile Markets: Uneven Recovery,” Aviation Week
and Space Technology, Vol. 15, January 2001, p. 183.
34. Robert Wall, “USAF Updates Plans for Future Air Wars,” Aviation
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 29, January 2001, p. 61.
49
Facing the Truth - The Future Security Envoronment and the Need for Ground Based Air Defence
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
The Operation Abacus Planning
Process: A Study
by Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
The purpose of the Op ABACUS
contingency plan was to prepare the
Department of National Defence
(DND) and the Canadian Forces
(CF) should it had been called upon
to assist federal, provincial and
territorial authorities in mitigating
the impact of Year 2000 problems on
essential services, while continuing
to fulfil its essential national and
international tasks.1
W
e now know that the
millenium rollover was
very peaceful, and the
Y2K bug was no cause for
fear. But that was not the case at the
beginning of 1998. In fact, even up to
the very last minute, nobody could
predict with precision what the arrival of
the year 2000 would bring. Therefore,
confronted with a situation where the
arrival of the year 2000 could be a risk
for Canada, the federal government
asked the CF in 1998 to be ready should
the year 2000 become something other
“The most important characteristic of
this threat is unpredictability. Unlike a
traditional threat, the year 2000 or Y2K,
had no established doctrine or tactics
against which one could train. Even
worse, history did not provide a guide
since there have been no previous
manifestations of this type of phenomenon.”2 Despite being different,
COP ABACUS involved the potential
use of military forces and was therefore
a traditional military operation. To
prepare for it, the CF had no reason
to change the planning process
methodology it was already using for
planning more conventional military
operations.
For Operation ABACUS, four
distinct levels of command were
involved.3 There was a military strategic
level at NDHQ in Ottawa. Two
operational levels were created: the first
had a national focus and was based
on the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters in Kingston, Ontario, known as
Unlike a traditional threat, the year
2000 … had no established doctrine or
tactics against which one could train.
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
than a time for celebration. The CF
response became known as Contingency
Operations Plan (COP) ABACUS.
The aim of this article is to study the
planning and preparation process taken
by the CF to prepare for COP ABACUS.
It will look at how the planning process
was done at the strategic and
operational level. In other words, how
did the CF develop a contingency
operation plan like ABACUS?
THE PLANNING PROCESS
F
rom the beginning, it quickly
became apparent that the CF were
facing an entirely new type of challenge.
50
Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ),
while the second had a provincial focus
and was composed of the four Land
Force Area Headquarters with the
addition of CF Northern Area. Finally,
the tactical level was organized at the
brigade headquarters (both Regular and
Reserve) across Canada. All levels were
involved in detailed planning in order to
meet the deadline of 31 December 1999.
B AT T L E P R O C E D U R E
B
attle procedure is defined as “the
entire military process by which a
commander receives his orders, makes
his reconnaissance and plan, issues his
orders, prepares and deploys his troops
and executes his mission.”4 It is a
process that can be used at all levels of
command (from tactical to strategic)
and across the entire spectrum
of operations (from war-fighting to
operations other than war and normal
routine activities). Battle procedure is a
fully integrated process that occurs
simultaneously at all levels of the chain
of command and in joint and combined
settings. The process is composed of
four stages: Direction, Consideration,
Decision, and Execution.
Direction. During this stage, a unit
or formation receives a mission or
task. An initial analysis of the
requirements is done in order to
determine the time by which a
decision must be made (the
decision point) and the priorities
for staff work (staff planning
guidance).
Consideration. Before a decision is
made, it is necessary to consider all
the factors that could influence the
mission and determine possible
options (courses of action). The
larger the unit or formation
involved, the more complex the
problem becomes. Therefore, this
stage could involve the participation
of a large number of personnel and
is usually further broken down into
additional steps.
Decision. This stage includes the
completion of the work done during
the consideration stage. The commander makes a decision to adopt a
particular course of action and
develops an expression of his intent
and broad concept of operations.
The decision is then translated into
orders and disseminated.
Execution. Although a decision has
been made, battle procedure is not
complete until troops have been
committed, and the mission achieved. 5
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
To further understand how battle
procedure works, it is necessary to
realize that the process varies depending on the level of command
involved. At the tactical level, with small
units, the process is normally referred
to as a drill and can be carried out by a
commander alone since the time for
planning is relatively short. The process
is a series of steps that ensures the
stages of direction, consideration, and
decision are done to come up with a
workable plan. With larger size units or
formations, mainly at the operational
level (division), the planning is far
more complex, and the effort of a large
staff is required. The process is not
referred to as a drill anymore, but as the
operation planning process (OPP). The
OPP can also be referred to sometimes
as the Force Employment Planning
Process (FEPP). The OPP is defined as
“the process by which a Commander,
assisted by his staff, carries out the
analysis of a given situation, decides on
a plan of action, issues orders to his
subordinates, controls the execution of
his plan and prepares for further
contingencies and actions.”6 The OPP
is simply a collective estimate of the
situation that synchronizes the efforts
of the staff. It is a logical sequence of
collective reasoning leading to the best
solution within the available planning
time.
The OPP occurs within the first
three stages of battle procedure:
Direction, Consideration, and Decision.
It has been organized into a series of six
steps in order to facilitate its execution:
Step 1. Receipt of tasks
Step 2. Orientation
Step 3. Development of courses of action
Step 4. Decision
Step 5. Plan Development
Step 6. Plan Review
To better illustrate how the process
works, let us take the planning done in
preparation of the strategic level COP
as an example. The JTFHQ7 began its
OPP with the reception of a warning
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
order from the CDS on 17 August
1998.8 That warning order was Step 1,
Receipt of tasks. From there, a planning
guide was sent on 26 August 1998 to all
JTFHQ members.9 The guide was
Step 2, Orientation. Step 3 took place
between 26 August 1998 and 21
September 1998.10 It involved an
information brief, on 02 September
1998, in order to coordinate and better
refine the development of courses of
action. Step 4 was on 21 September
1998, when a decision brief was
presented to the Deputy Chief of the
Defence Staff.11 From the different
possible options, a course of action was
chosen. Step 5, the preparation of the
strategic level COP draft 1, was done by
23 September 1998.12 The last step,
Plan Review, involved presentation of
the draft COP to a national seminar on
29 and 30 September 1998. Following
this, comments were received from the
different elements of the CF involved in
the operation. The draft COP was
reviewed in the last two weeks of October,
and the first version of the Strategic COP
was issued on 13 November 1998. This
was not, however, the end of the review. A
series of week-long exercises took place
in 1999.13In addition, a series of seminars
and conferences with the task forces
and/or NDHQ also provided feedback
on the COP. Before the final version of
the Strategic COP 201/99 was published
on 22 November 1999, at least two more
draft versions had been prepared.14 This
is only one of many examples of the
planning sequence that took place at
different levels and in different areas of
Canada in preparation for the COP
ABACUS. The dates and the details may
change, but the process remains the
same.
The overall planning sequence was
led at the strategic level, followed
closely by the national operational
level. Both had their first version of
their COP produced by the end of
1998. The regional level initial COP
versions were finalized in the first
quarter of 1999. This planning phase
was then followed by an exercise and
validation phase, from March to
September 1999. From the lessons
learned from these exercises, each
individual COP, at all levels, was
reviewed and modified. The final
versions of the COPs were done in
November 1999, the same time as the
forces completed their readiness
preparation. The forces were then
ready to meet the challenges of the Y2K
bug with the planning, training, and
pre-deployment completed.
For the planning of COP ABACUS,
the OPP was the planning tool most
used by the organizations involved. The
planning for COP ABACUS was a
complex issue, but it demonstrated that
the battle procedure, in general, and
the OPP, in particular, were flexible
tools for the military to prepare for any
type of contingency and operation. The
planning process was the method used.
Let us now examine what resulted from
that method at the strategic and
national operational level.
T H E S T R AT E G I C L E V E L C O N C E P T
AND PLANNING
F
or the CF, planning at the strategic
level focussed on the employment
of the country’s military resources “to
achieve political objectives which are
critical to the national interest.”15 With
Operation ABACUS, the political
objectives of the Canadian government
were “to continue to provide programs
and services vital to the health, safety,
security and economic well-being of
Canadians, with minimum disruption as
the century turned.”16 From these
objectives, it was the responsibility at the
strategic level to establish “national
military aims, provide direction, craft
strategy, allocate national resources,
and impose conditions and limitations
on the military actions to be undertaken.”17
Although some work was done
prior to August 1998, it was during that
month that the preparation for
meeting the potential problems that
the arrival of 2000 could cause was
launched in earnest. The preparation
began during August when the Prime
Minister of Canada sent a letter to
four federal ministers assigning responsibilities for contingency preparations.18
The Minister of National Defence was
the lead minister, responsible for
facilitating and coordinating the
development of national contingency
plans with particular focus on Canada’s
critical infrastructure.
51
The Operation Abacus Planning Process: A Study
COP ABACUS planning involved
the first three stages of the battle
procedure. Since the deployment of
troops never materialized, the execution stage was never implemented.
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
To meet the challenge imposed by
the Y2K bug, DND was confronted on
three dimensions attached with the
arrival of the year 2000.19 First, the CF
had to maintain its support to essential
national and international tasks.
Although it was impossible for the CF to
cease all operations in order to
concentrate only on the Y2K bug issue,
it was possible to reduce routine
operations. Second, DND had to make
sure that its equipment would not be
affected by the Y2K bug itself. The CF
could not afford to become part of the
problem. Being affected by the Y2K bug
would have seriously limited the ability
of the CF to provide support, and would
have affected its credibility. That
dimension was known as business
continuity planning (BCP) and involved a significant amount of effort to
prepare the CF for the arrival of the
year 2000. Finally, the last dimension
was the potential for the CF to receive a
large number of requests for assistance
by civil authorities to help mitigate the
effect of the Y2K bug.
To prepare for its mandate of being
ready, DND launched two major
initiatives: one proactive and one
reactive. First, the National Contingency
Planning Group (NCPG) was created.
Despite being the lead federal agency in
developing contingency planning, DND
could not work in isolation. The NCPG
was there to coordinate all national
efforts at the federal ministerial and
departmental levels. This was a proactive
initiative. The second initiative, which
was reactive, was for the CF to start their
planning procedures for Operation
ABACUS in order to be ready to respond
to requests from civil authorities. As
stated, the planning process was
launched in August 1998, when NDHQ
sent a warning order on August 17th to
the CF. The warning order provided the
information required for the subordinate formations to start their own
planning process. In addition, further
guidance was given on August 31st when
a document called Strategic Direction to
the Department of National Defence
and the Canadian Forces – Operation
ABACUS was published.20
Operation ABACUS was conducted
in five phases, which are standard
practices for all operations: Warning,
52
Preparation, Deployment, Employment
and Redeployment. These phases were
the same for all levels of command.
Phase 1 – Warning. This phase took
place in July and August 1998. It was
launched by the preparation of the
CDS Warning Order that was sent
throughout the CF. Subsequent to
this, each level of command
prepared their own warning order
for their subordinates’ formations
or units.
Phase 2 – Preparation. This phase
was done during the period August
1998 to November 1999. It is during
this phase that the planning for
Operation ABACUS took place. The
plan that was developed had to be
supported by the requisite training
plans, logistics preparations, intelligence databases preparation,
command and control structures,
and public affairs programs in order
to reach the required degree of
operational readiness across the CF.
At the conclusion of this phase, each
element and formation of the CF
had to declare their respective
troops and equipment operationally
ready to the CDS.
Phase 3 – Deployment. This phase
was done from 30 November 1999 to
31 December 1999. Upon receipt of
the DCDS Implementation Order,
transfer of command authority
occurred, placing the task forces, Air
Component Headquarters, and
other
designated
units
and
personnel under the operational
command of the JTFHQ. It involved,
among other things, the deployment
of the JTFHQ to Ottawa. At the end
of this phase, the Joint Task Force
Commander, Major-General Jeffery,
declared his force operationally
ready to the CDS.
Phase 4 – Employment. This phase
was to be executed on order if a
request from civil authorities was
received. The intent was for the
conduct of operations to be
decentralized in nature, using
established regional procedures and
doctrine pertinent to dealing with
civil emergencies; most emergency
situations were to be dealt with at
the lowest possible level. The main
concern was the rapid collection
and analysis of situational information to develop a panCanadian picture of Y2K. With this
information, the CF would have
been in a good position to establish
priorities of support.
Phase 5 – Redeployment. This phase
was also to be executed on order. If
it would have determined that some
forces were no longer required, the
CDS was the authority to order the
redeployment of those forces. In a
similar fashion, the CDS was also the
final authority for the JTFHQ to
stand down. That decision was to be
taken when the requirement for a
national operational level command
and control structure was no longer
required; as it turned out, it was the
only decision required by the CDS.21
From the start of the planning
process, the CF worked under a series of
assumptions. The following summarizes
some of the key factors considered:
The CF expected disruptions to
occur and their support to be
needed. But as the threat remained
vague and fluid, the CF had to deal
with the unpredictability of the
contingency plan. A large amount of
flexibility had to be integrated into
their ability to respond.
It was also made very clear that the CF
were not there to replace the civil
authorities, but would assist when the
latter had exhausted their ability to
mitigate a problem. Provincial and
territorial authorities would retain
the lead responsibilities in responding to problematic situations.
The CF were there to support.
All CF resources would be made
available for employment for
Operation ABACUS, except for
those supporting essential national
and international missions and
tasks. In addition to the full-time
military personnel, it was expected
that 50 percent of reservists would
be available for employment.
Therefore, a total of about 35,000
military personnel were expected to
be available.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Based on these assumptions, it was
determined that the centre of gravity
for the success of Operation ABACUS,
at the strategic level, was maintenance
of “the public confidence in the
government’s ability to manage and
provide leadership in dealing with the
Y2000 problem.”23 In this regard, the
CF were expected to play a key role:
It has been proven in the recent past
that the most potent set of
capabilities that the CF bring to a
domestic crisis is the inherent ability
to command, control, plan and
react efficiently and coherently in
difficult situations. If the general
public knows what is happening, if
government at all levels know how to
handle the situation, and if
government can relay timely and
accurate information to the public,
then public confidence in government at all levels and public
composure will be fostered and
maintained throughout the crisis.24
The strategic mission statement for
the operation was that “[t]he CF/DND
will be prepared to assist federal and
provincial authorities in mitigating the
impact of the Year 2000 problem on
essential services, while continuing to
fulfill essential national and international defense tasks.”25 Finally, the
end state for Operation ABACUS
would be reached “when the civil
authorities are capable of providing
essential services, setting the conditions for a return to the normal CF
posture.”26
The course of action chosen was
for the CF to adopt a poised
deployment.27 The intent was for the
deployment posture to strike a prudent
balance between the risks associated
with appearing to over-react to the
problem and wasting CF resources, and
the risks associated with appearing to
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
be too little prepared for the operation.
A poised deployment meant that the
command, control, and communications facilities (NDHQ, JTFHQ, and
the areas’ headquarters) were fully
ready and pre-deployed. (This involved
mainly the JTFHQ, which moved from
Kingston to Ottawa.) The remainder of
the forces available (including the
reservists) would remain located in
their normal geographic locations and
be on call, ready to be deployed only if
required. Finally, logistics preparations
took place to ensure requisite
quantities of sustainment stocks, critical
stores, personal equipment and infrastructure were available. Sustainment
planning was based on the deployment
of Operation ABACUS command,
control, and communications for 100
days, mobile forces (up to 9,600
personnel) for 30 days, and static forces
(up to 16,000 personnel) for 30 days.
To support that course of action,
the CF adopted a modified command
and control structure.28 At the national
level, the DCDS was responsible for
coordinating all strategic and national
aspects of the operation. It was
responsible for maintaining the
interface between the CF and the
NCPG, the federal government, and
the other government agencies (i.e.,
RCMP, CSIS, and CSE). A JTFHQ based
on the 1st Canadian Division Headquarters was established to command
all CF elements deployed in support of
Operation ABACUS. At the regional
Planning done at the strategic level
determined the global approach that
the CF would adopt to prepare for the
arrival of the Year 2000. The strategic
level looked at the Y2K bug in relation
to everything else that the CF has to do.
From that perspective, it then set the
objectives and concept of operations as
well as the limitations under which the
CF would operate.
T H E O P E R AT I O N A L L E V E L
CONCEPT AND PLANNING
The challenge for the JTFHQ was
to take the concept of operations and
the plan developed at the strategic level
and translate them into an operational
plan that covered the entire territory of
Canada. JTFHQ also needed to detail
how the forces available were to be
used. Planning at the JTFHQ involved
deciding when, where, and under what
conditions military forces would be
employed to meet the problems caused
by the Y2K bug. It was also at the
JTFHQ level that the issue of training in
preparation for Operation ABACUS
was planned, coordinated, and
supervised.
The operational level was the
bridge between the decision taken at
NDHQ and the operations undertaken
at the area level. From the work done at
the JTFHQ, the area headquarters
would in turn develop their own
plan adapted to their regional
particularities. The JTFHQ did not
The course of action chosen was for the
CF to adopt a poised deployment.
level, the command structure was
composed of the four existing Land
Force areas with the addition of the
Northern Area. Finally, 1st Canadian
Air Division was to provide an air
coordination capability to the JTFHQ
to be responsible for the employment
of air force assets assigned in support of
the COP. This decision was required
given the extensive nature of the
operation in terms of planning,
training, and potential deployment
requirements.
work in isolation, and their planning
mirrored closely what was done at the
strategic level. In fact, the JTFHQ
planning cycle was only one step
behind NDHQ. For example, the
JTFHQ COP Version 1 was published
on 27 November 1998, only two weeks
after the Strategic COP. The final
version of the JTFHQ COP was
published on 12 November 1999, after
three draft versions had been done.
The review that the JTFHQ COP
underwent was similar to the one done
53
The Operation Abacus Planning Process: A Study
Due toY2K’s global impact, supplies
and services from outside Canada
may not have been available.
Canadian suppliers may also have
experienced supply difficulties or
have treated the CF requests with
reduced priority. National capability
to assist may have been limited to
supplies on hand.22
for the strategic level. In fact, it was
impossible to review one plan without
having repercussions on the work done
by the other levels of command.
JTFHQ worked with the same
assumptions and constraints as did
NDHQ and had to maintain consistency with the strategic concept. The
difference was the focus applied to the
planning. The JTFHQ concentrated on
how the forces would be actually
employed to mitigate Y2K effects. This
is what is reflected in the JTFHQ
mission statement: “On order, against
the threat of Y2K problems, JTF
ABACUS will provide assistance
throughout CANADA to the civil
authorities in order to maintain services
and infrastructure that are essential to
life and public order.”29
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
The JTFHQ Commander’s intent,
as describe in the final version of the
COP, was to capitalize on the CF
command organization, with its formal
chain of command that spans the entire
nation, to collect and analyze countrywide information in order to build one
common picture of the situation.30
From this picture, a unified response
could be developed to provide support
where it was deemed to be most
necessary. It was also expected that,
naturally, other agencies were likely to
turn to the CF to provide them with
unbiased information on the situation.
To support this intent, there was
a requirement for three areas of
responsibilities:
Situational Awareness. First, there
was need for the rapid development
and maintenance of an up-to-date
and accurate level of situational
awareness of the national threat
picture. This was assessed as a key
element of the national operational
plan.
Allocation of Resources. From the
national common picture, allocation of military resources would
take place to mitigate the impact of
Y2K. It could have been necessary to
reallocate personnel and material
among task force areas to react to
the developing national situation,
concentrating forces where they
would actually be required. In the
54
event of widespread national
difficulties, a main effort would be
identified based on regional
situation reports and consultations
with the Government of Canada.
This main effort would be designed
to concentrate resources to achieve
the greatest overall national impact.
Information Operations. The final
aspect involved the requirement to
communicate continuously, at all
levels and to wide audiences, the
knowledge of Y2K related incidents,
and the authorities’ intentions to
deal with them. The aim was to
inform both the public and the
appropriate civilian agencies of the
extent of Y2K problems. This
communication would help maintain public confidence in the ability
of authorities to deal with Y2K
difficulties.31
From this intent, it was determined
that the centre of gravity at the national
operational level was as follows:
… the successful implementation
and maintenance of the JTF
Command, Control, Communications
and Intelligence (C3I) plan,
ensuring unity of command and
furnishing a degree of JTF wide
situational awareness that will
provide commanders and staffs at all
levels with real time, relevant and
fused operational data.32
To maintain situational awareness,
a classified network, establishing a link
between the different headquarters
located across Canada, was developed
and deployed.33 The system, called the
National Infrastructure Database
(NIDB), was essentially a shared
computer program that provided a
national view of the situation in
Canada. As soon as it was available, data
was to be entered and kept up-to-date
by every member of the network (i.e.,
NDHQ, JTFHQ, and the areas’ headquarters). The information needed to
be entered only once, as the database
was regularly updated for everyone else
(up to every four to six hours, as
required). This system, which was
developed only in support of ABACUS,
was created and deployed with the
support of a civilian, contracted
company, CGI. It provided a common,
accurate, and detailed account of the
impact caused by the Y2K bug.
The CF have a limited number of
military resources available. These
resources were dispersed across Canada
and varied from regular fully equipped
units to reserve static organizations.
Also involved was the entire military
infrastructure located throughout the
country, from bases to militia armory.
To facilitate their employment, JTFHQ
divided personnel and resources under
its command into four groups, as
follows:
Specialists. Units or individuals
primarily involved in activities
that match their normal military
tasks (e.g., C3I, flight operations,
engineering, military police, security,
medical, stores control and distribution, and transport). These
resources, used in conjunction with
the permanent CF infrastructure,
were to provide Task Force
Headquarters with the ability to
deploy, command, administer, and
maintain general-purpose forces in
tasks within their areas.
Category A. General-purpose units
with organic sustainment capability,
capable of being deployed and
operating throughout Canada.
(These were the Regular Forces
infantry, armored and artillery
battalions.)
Category B. General-purpose units
without organic sustainment, capable of being deployed for short
periods within the immediate
vicinity of their base location. (These
were the Reserve Forces units.)
Residual. Personnel and resources
resident in Canada but not allocated
to the operational or tactical
conduct of Operation ABACUS.
They were deemed to be a residual
capability. They could be tasked by
the CDS to Operation ABACUS at
any stage, if additional resources
were available. (These were the
military staff of the CF training
facilities, recruiting centres, base
personnel,
and
other
static
organizations.)34
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
55
The Operation Abacus Planning Process: A Study
local Category B units, without the
operational level of the JTFHQ that
To provide local area flexibility
requirement for higher-level endorsethe planning, preparation, and cowhile maintaining a national reserve
ment. However, any movement of the
ordination of the training took place.
capacity, JTFHQ developed specific
Category A unit across provincial
The training needed to balance the
employment guidelines.35 Before
boundaries was to be coordinated
requirements to conduct strategic and
looking at the details of those
through the chain-of-command.
operational level, collective and
guidelines, it is important to
Employment of any other Category A
individual training with the need to
understand a few aspects attached with
battalion within an area would require
continue, as much as possible, the
the CF involvement in domestic
approval from higher authority. Each
normal CF training cycle focussed on
operations.
Essentially,
domestic
area’s headquarters (not including
the general purpose combat capability.
operations can be divided into two
Task Force Northern Area) were
To accomplish this balance, a series of
categories: humanitarian assistance and
required to maintain the remainder
week long Command Post Exercises
assistance to law enforcement agencies
of Category A units prepared to
(CPX) were planned and conducted
(ALEA). The first category is defined as
deploy for extended periods, outside
to train the command, control, and
any action taken to save lives, prevent
of their own areas. These forces were
communications aspects of the
human suffering, or mitigate property
designated as either operational or
operation. The training phase took
damage.36 It implies that the CF
strategic reserves and were to be held
place between March and September
could provide support ranging from
at designated notices to move (NTM).
1999. The first exercise involved only
equipment (e.g., tent, camp, cots) to
the JTFHQ in March.
facilities (armories) to
Two more exercises,
troops being deployed
involving the JTFHQ
on the ground. An
Preparation for Operation ABACUS
and the five regional
important feature of
task force headthis type of support
also implied that it was vital for
quarters, took place
is that the troops
a comprehensive training plan
in June and Sepdeployed are unarmed.
tember. The first subPrime examples of this
to be developed.
sequent exercise was
type of operation are
called Vigilance 2000
the Winnipeg floods of
and focussed on train1996 and the Ice Storm
Changes to NTM, for operational and
ing at the regional level to respond to
of 1998. The second category, ALEA,
strategic reserve units, remained at
Y2K simulated problems. The second
requires the deployment of armed
the discretion of the JTFHQ comwas called ABACUS 2000 and focussed
troops in support of a crisis involving
mander. JTFHQ had the authority to
this time on the JTFHQ decisionviolence or potential use of violence.
employ three Category A battalions as
making process. In addition, each
This type of deployment implies very
its operational reserve: one Category
regional headquarters had their own
specific rules of engagement, and the
A battalion each for Task Force
exercises in order to validate their COP
decision to provide troops has to be
Western Area, Task Force Central
and practice their own internal
authorized by the Minister of Defence
Area, and Task Force Quebec Area.
methods of operation.
in agreement with the Canadian
The remaining Category A units
government. This type of deployment is
across the country were designated as
The training focussed on practicing
a federal responsibility and must be
strategic reserve and were to be
information flow, the decision-making
done in response to a provincial
released by the CDS, only for
process (approval of requests for
request for support. In other words, the
employment. Included was the
support), situational awareness, public
Canadian government cannot deploy
provision of a Category A company
affairs, and responses to requests for
armed soldiers on its own without a
size unit for use, if required, in Task
support (force generation). The
valid reason. A prime example of this
Force Northern Area.
scenario depicted hypothetical situations
situation is the Oka crisis of 1990. For
that were designed to simulate potential
Operation ABACUS, the employment
The JTFHQ COP37 also allocated a Y2K problems with the aim of practicing
guidelines for ALEA were that only
Category A units could be deployed. maritime component (MC) under a a wide range of options for the CF.
The decision to do so rested at the maritime component commander (MCC)
For the troops available, the normal
strategic level and was not delegated to to Task Force Atlantic Area and Task
Force Western Area. NDHQ were training associated with a general-purpose
JTF or regional headquarters.
prepared to allocate a similar combat capability continued. To meet
For humanitarian assistance, the organization to Task Force Quebec some specific requirements presented by
Area, if required, at any time.
Operation ABACUS, however, it was
guidelines were as follows:
necessary to add some items to the
The preparation for Operation training plan. For example, the troop that
Each area’s headquarters were deleABACUS also implied that it was vital could be engaged in ALEA had to be
gated the authority to employ one
for a comprehensive training plan to be informed of the rules of engagement
Category A battalion (not including
developed. It was at the national aspects attached with providing such a
Task Force Northern Area) and its
The planning done at that level was
similar to what was done at the JTFHQ,
but instead of having a national focus,
the planning was concentrated on the
specific aspects of the region, under
the control of each region’s
headquarters.
COP ABACUS provided an entirely
new environment for the CF. Never
before had such an elusive and unknown
enemy been faced. Up until the very last
minute, nobody could predict what
One of the provisions to support a
would happen with the millenium
poised deployment of the CF was the
rollover. By using its existing structure,
move of the JTFHQ, from Kingston to
the CF adopted a command and control
Ottawa, for the millennium rollover.
posture based on NDHQ in Ottawa as
The headquarters’ new location was the C O N C L U S I O N
the Strategic level looking out for the
Federal Study Centre, south of Ottawa.
The reasons for the move were the
OP ABACUS was the CF con- overall CF and the relationship with the
establishment of unity of command and
tingency plan, prepared in response other departments of the Canadian
the concentration of resources in to potential Y2K problems. A careful government. The operational level was
a centralized location. With this level of planning and preparation was based on the headquarters of the 1st
approach, if the Y2K bug affected done in case Y2K turned out to be the Canadian Division, with responsibility
communications, close proximity of the cause of major infrastructure failures or for the employment of CF resources
across Canada and the four
JTFHQ to the centre of
land force area headquarters
decision-making in Ottawa
Up until the very last minute,
with CF Northern Area, as the
would help mitigate the
regional focus. By the end
impact caused by the loss of
nobody could predict what
of 1999, the CF had
connectivity. The JTFHQ first
would happen with the
its command and control
deployed to Ottawa in March
structures in place, ready, and
1999, for Exercise JOINT
millenium rollover.
manned. The troops and
START II. The exercise was an
units were on stand by, each
opportunity for the JTFHQ,
by itself, for a shake out of its other related incidents. COP ABACUS one remaining in its geographic area,
organization and procedures. This led was the CF response to the request of the ready to be employed, if required.
to two other deployments to Ottawa in Canadian government to be ready to
COP ABACUS was a balanced
support of CF-wide exercises, Exercise mitigate Y2K-related problems, if
response between doing too much
VIGILANCE 2000 and Exercise required.
(thereby giving the impression of overABACUS 2000. The final move of the
JTFHQ to Ottawa took place in
Since the millenium rollover was reacting and appearing to waste
December 1999, in preparation for the peaceful, with no significant incidents, resources and effort) and doing too
arrival of the year 2000. The JTFHQ was support from the CF was not required. little (and appearing to be negligent).
manned and ready to take action when Nevertheless, COP ABACUS was the The CF were asked to be ready, and be
the new millennium arrived.
largest domestic operation done by the ready was what the CF did.
CF. From mid-1998 to January 2000,
Following the national oper- every member of the CF was involved, at
ational level, the next level of com- one point or another, in preparation
mand was Regional Headquarters. for COP ABACUS.
support. This type of training was done
mainly in the fall of 1999, in the final
stages of preparation for COP ABACUS.
C
Major Daniel Villeneuve, CD, BA
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Major Daniel Villeneuve is a graduate of the Collège
militaire royal de Saint-Jean from 1986. He has been
serving as an intelligence officer for the last 12 years. His
tour of duty includes different intelligence staff positions
in NDHQ and QG SQFT [Land Force Quebec Area HQ].
He also served in Western Sahara, Bosnia, Haiti, and
Kosovo. He has served as G2 Land Force Atlantic Area
Headquarters since 1999.
L I S T O F A B B R E V I AT I O N S
ALEA (Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies)
BCP (Business Continuity Planning)
C3 I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
56
COP (Contingency Operations Plan)
CPX (Command Post Exercises)
CSE (Communications Security Establishment)
FEPP (Force Employment Planning Process)
JTFHQ (Joint Task Force Headquarters)
MC (Maritime Component)
MCC (Maritime Component Commander)
NCPG (National Contingency Planning Group)
NIDB (National Infrastructure Database)
NTM (Notices to Move)
OPP (Operation Planning Process)
OPRED (Operationally Ready)
RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police)
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
1. Canadian Forces Public Affairs Backgrounder on OP ABACUS
[source online], available from the DND intranet at http://
dgpadgap.mil.ca/DGPA/mail/products_index_e.htm. The verb tense
was modified to the past.
2. DND, COP 201/99 - OP ABACUS FINAL VERSION, 22 November
1999, p. 3. [publication online], accessed November 1999, available from
the DND intranet at http://jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
3. DND, NDHQ, OP Abacus Warning Order, DM/CDS 001 dated
171530Z, August 1998, [publication online], accessed August 1998,
available from the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca / registry.
4. DND, B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Land Force, Volume 3, - Command. Ch. 6,
Army Lessons Learned Information Warehouse, version 10 [CD Rom].
5. Ibid. The description of the four stages is a summary of the
information provided in Chapter 6. The battle procedure can be a very
complex situation and, for the intent of this study, I chose to summarize
the stages in order to retain only the essential information.
6. Ibid., Ch. 6.
7. Although the strategic level rested with National Defence
Headquarters in Ottawa, the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division
in Kingston, known as the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) was
deeply involved in supporting the planning done at the strategic level.
8. DND, NDHQ, OP Abacus Warning Order.
9. DND, JTFHQ, Strategic COP 01 - OP ABACUS, 1st Canadian Division
Headquarters Writing Plan/Directive, Memorandum 3120-10 (J7 Mar), 26
Aug 1998, [memorandum online], accessed August 1998, available from
the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
10. Ibid.
11. This is based on the JTFHQ Strategic Planning, Decision Briefing for
DCDS, 21 September 1998, [memorandum online], accessed September
1998, available from the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.
abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
12. DND, JTFHQ, OP ABACUS JTFHQ COP 01 Writing Plan,
Memorandum 3120-10 (J7 Land 2), 29 October 1998, [memorandum
online], accessed October 1998, available from the DND intranet at
http//jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
13. DND, JTFHQ, Brief OP Abacus, Force Preparation and Readiness
Training, 25 August 1998, Slide 28 of 84, [brief online], accessed August
1998, available from the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.
dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
14. DND, NDHQ, Operation Abacus, COP 201/99, Final Version, 22
November 1999, [document online], accessed November 1998, available
from the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
15. DND, Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee, Ottawa: DGPA, 1998, p. 79.
16. DND, NDHQ, OP Abacus Warning Order.
17. DND, Canada’s Army: We Stand on Guard for Thee, p. 79.
18. Briefing on National Contingency Planning Group (NCPG) given by
Major General Forand to a seminar held in Kingston in January 1999. An
electronic copy of the briefing is archived on the LFAA HQ server.
19. Ibid.
20. DND, NDHQ, Strategic Direction to the Department of National Defense
and the Canadian Forces Operation ABACUS, 31 August 1998, [document
online], accessed August 1998, available from the DND intranet at
http//jtfhq.abacus. dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
21. DND, JTFHQ, Operation Abacus, COP 201/99. Final Version,
22 November 1999. This information is a summary of the description of
each phase found on pp. 9-12. [document online], accessed November
1999, available from the DND intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.
dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. DND, NDHQ, Operation Abacus, COP 201/99. Final Version.
25. DND, NDHQ, Strategic Direction to the Department of National Defense
and the Canadian Forces Operation ABACUS, p. 3.
26. Ibid.
27. DND, NDHQ, Operation Abacus. COP 201/99. Final Version, pp. 7-9.
28. DND, NDHQ, Strategic Direction to the Department of National Defense
and the Canadian Forces Operation ABACUS, p. 4.
29. DND, NDHQ, COP 01, HQ JTF Abacus, 12 November 1999 p. 3,
[document online], accessed November 1999, available from the DND
intranet at http//jtfhq.abacus.dwan.dnd.ca/registry.
30. Ibid., p. 4.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 5.
33. This information is taken from the author’s personal experience
with the project.
34. DND, NDHQ, COP 01, HQ JTF Abacus, p. 5.
35. Ibid., p. 6.
36. This definition is taken from a briefing presented by LFAA HQ during
a seminar given on the Use of Force. 1-2 September 1999. Slide 6 of 48. An
electronic copy of the briefing is archived on the LFAA HQ server.
37. Ibid., p. 7/25.
The Operation Abacus Planning Process: A Study
ENDNOTES
A member of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry (3 PPCLI) Battalion
Group familiarizes himself with Kandahar
Airport, where he will be based during his tour
in Afghanistan. (DGPA/J5PA Combat Camera
photo by Sgt David Snashall)
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
57
Getting There Was the Challenge!
The Red River Expedition of 1870
by Major Gary Campbell, CD
he year 1870 would be full
of challenges for the one
hundred and fourteen officers
and men of the Commissariat
Department, Commissariat Staff Corps,
Purveyors Department, Military Store
Department, and Barrack Department
who were stationed in Canada.1 The first
challenge was their reorganization under
the Royal Warrants of 1869. The officers
were formed into the Control
Department while the other ranks were
formed into the first Army Service Corps
(ASC). The officers would perform
Supply, Transport and Pay functions
while the men were grouped into
Transport and Supply Companies.2 The
second challenge was the redeployment
of all the British Forces from Canada with
the exception of the Imperial Garrison at
Halifax, Nova Scotia. The withdrawal was
to be completed before the end of the
shipping season in October. There was a
great deal of work to be done to
accomplish this. Stores and equipment
had to be returned to Britain or disposed
of locally. The workload would be
immense.3
from 11 April to 3 June 1870.4
Supporting this force would be the third
challenge for the Control Department
and the Army Service Corps.
To further add to their burden, the
Fenians were threatening to invade
Canada from the United States. The
Fenians were an organization of Irish
immigrants who dreamed of capturing
parts of Canada and using this as a
bargaining tool to free Ireland from
British rule. They had many Irish
veterans of the American Civil War in
their ranks. The Fenian’s previous
invasions in 1866 had failed and by the
spring of 1870, they were ready to try
again. There was an invasion scare in
April and then two small invasions of
the Province of Quebec, south of
Montreal, took place in May 1870. The
Canadian Militia, reinforced by the
British Regulars, was called out to
defend the Canadian border from
Windsor, Ontario to the Eastern
Townships of Quebec during the period
The Red River area, centered on
Winnipeg and Fort Garry, was the major
centre of population in Rupert’s Land.
The inhabitants were the descendents
of Scottish and English settlers, native
Indians and Métis, who were the
offspring of unions between the French
fur traders and the Indian women.
While the British settlers generally
welcomed the coming of the Canadian
government, the Indians and Métis
were distrustful of the change. They
had received no assurances that they
would be able to retain their French
language, their Roman Catholic
religion, and their land rights. These
fears were reinforced as Canadian
surveyors laid their survey chains
without regard to existing property
boundaries. The result of this was a
rebellion, which led to the formation of
Major Gary Campbell
T
58
The fourth challenge was the
suppression of the rebellion that had
occurred in the Red River district of
present day Manitoba. A vast area,
consisting of Western Canada, the
NorthWest Territories, and the northern
parts of Ontario and Quebec, had been
under the control of the Hudson’s Bay
Company (HBC) since it received its
Charter in 1670. There was concern that
this tract of land, known as Rupert’s
Land, could fall under American
domination as Americans continued to
follow their policy of “Manifest Destiny”
and expanded westwards. The solution
was to promote British settlement of the
West, which could best be done under
Canadian sponsorship. Thus the
Canadian government, with the support
of the British government, agreed to
purchase Rupert’s Land from the HBC
for £300,000. The transfer was to take
effect on 19 November 1869.5
Bring in the Canadian. Assistant Controller Matthew Bell Irvine was a
Canadian brought from London and
made responsible for moving the
force from Thunder Bay to Fort Garry.
the Provisional Government of Red
River, under Louis Riel. Significantly,
one of Riel’s deputies was William
O’Donoghue, an Irish Fenian. The
rebellion could have ended peacefully
when the Métis sent a delegation to
Ottawa to negotiate for their rights.
This led to the passage of the Manitoba
Act on 12 May 1870, which granted
them most of their demands.
Unfortunately, the heavy-handed way in
which Riel dealt with the loyal British
elements within the Red River
settlement led to the “judicial” murder
of Thomas Scott, a native of Ontario.
The resulting uproar in Ontario sealed
the political need for a military
expedition to put down the rebellion
and firmly establish the legitimate
control of the Canadian government.6
A period of interesting “horse
trading” ensued. The Canadian
government wanted Britain to send a
force of Regular troops while the
British, who were trying to withdraw the
troops from Canada, did not want to
commit them, as they feared they could
be delayed in the West and forced to
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
winter over. Cost sharing was also a
hotly debated issue, with the British and
the Canadians finally agreeing to a 1:3
split. A compromise on the force
composition was reached, by which
Britain would prove the nucleus of the
expedition with support from the
Canadian Militia. The British troops
had to be back in Central Canada
before the shipping season closed in
late October. The Canadian Militia
would remain in the Red River as a
garrison after the campaign was
successfully concluded.7 The force
finally agreed to consisted of:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Royal Artillery – 20 personnel with
four 7-pounder bronze mountain guns
Royal Engineers – 20
1st Battalion 60th Rifles – 377
Army Service Corps – 12
Army Medical Corps – 8
1st Battalion Ontario Rifles – 378
1st Battalion Quebec Rifles – 378
Staff – 21
Total – 1214 All Ranks 8
Speed was critical, as this had to be
a quick campaign. Selecting a route
was the first priority. Civilians travelled
to the Red River by rail, through the
United States, and then north by road
from St. Paul, Minnesota. This was not
a suitable route for a military
expedition. The other traditional route
had been used by the 6th
(Warwickshire) Regiment in 1846 and
by the Royal Canadian Rifle Regiment
in 1857. This was to go by ship into
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Spring 2002
Hudson’s Bay and then south by boat
along the Hayes River, across Lake
Winnipeg and then up the Red River to
Fort Garry. This route was not
acceptable because of the late break-up
of the ice in the Bay. The route selected
was the old fur trading one that
followed a series of lakes and rivers
westward from Fort William (Thunder
Bay) on Lake Superior to Lake
Winnipeg. It would be a hard route, as
many portages around rapids and
waterfalls would be necessary, but it was
the best one available.9
The Control Department was first
officially advised on 5 April that they
would be required to support this
expedition. Colonel Garnet Wolseley
was given command of the expedition
on the same day. A period of intense
planning followed as decisions about
rations, stores and equipment had to be
made and tenders for their provision
made. This process was completed by
the end of April. Lieutenant-Colonel
Martindale, the Acting DeputyController in Canada, coordinated this
part of the expedition. He drew upon
Control Department officers and the
As the route was so critical to the
success of the expedition, a description of it is in order. From the assembly
base in Toronto, the force would go by
rail to Collingwood where they would
board steamships for
the 544 mile journey
to Thunder Bay where
Speed was critical, as this had
they would form a
to be a quick campaign.
camp at a location
named Prince Albert’s
Landing. The critical
part of the voyage was the passage of Army Service Corps men stationed in
the American canal and locks at Sault Ontario and Quebec to do this. Deputy
Ste. Marie. It was not known if the Commissary Wilkinson was placed in
Americans would allow vessels carrying charge of the control arrangements at
“war-like” stores to pass through the Toronto. The men and stores began
canal. From Prince Albert’s Landing, arriving there during the second week
they would carry the stores, equipment of May. The sub-charge of the Control
and boats 48 miles overland to Lake Department between Thunder Bay and
Shebandowan. From there, they would Fort Garry was assigned to Assistant
row, sail, pole and portage 532 miles Controller Matthew Bell Irvine, a
over a series of lakes and rivers to Fort Canadian born officer who had been
Garry.10 Then they would deal with brought out from London especially for
this purpose. Irvine had previously
Riel and his rebellion!
59
Getting There Was the Challenge! The Red River Expedition of 1870
Alternate service delivery is not new. The American canal at Sault Ste. Marie
showing the rented steamer Chicora passing through the canal.
Plans were made to defend against
the ever-present threat of Fenian
interference with the expedition. A
temporary garrison of four companies
of the 1st Ontario Rifles was placed at
Sault Ste. Marie until the expedition
had passed through. A redoubt was
built at Prince Arthur’s Landing, which
was garrisoned throughout the
expedition by a company of the 1st
Quebec Rifles and a detachment of
Royal Artillery with two guns. A
company of the 1st Ontario Rifles was
temporarily garrisoned at Fort Francis,
which was also established as an
advance depot.11 In addition, at least
one Canadian gunboat patrolled Lake
Huron to guard against any Fenian
incursions.12 As the expedition moved
farther westwards, there was increased
concern that Riel would stir up the
local Indians against the force. Colonel
Wolseley made great efforts to gain and
keep the good will of these tribes.13
served in Canada and he was familiar
with its people and geography. He had
ten Control officers plus the ASC (Army
Service Corps) and AHC (Army
Hospital Corps) detachments under his
command.14 The ASC contingent
mustered in Montreal on 10 May and
reported to Toronto on the 11th.15
Some preparatory work had begun
as early as January. Mr. S.J. Dawson,
of the Canadian Public Works
Department, had built a portion of a
road across the 48 miles between
The expedition did
not have a good start.
Major Gary Campbell
Thunder Bay and Lake Shebandowan
the previous year. He was directed to try
to have the road open before the start
of the navigation season in early May. In
addition, he appears to have let
contracts for the construction of the
140 light boats that the expedition
would need regardless of which route
was chosen. He was also responsible for
the purchase of the wagons that would
be used to carry the stores and
equipment over the Dawson Road, and
the hiring of the teamsters, road
workmen and voyageurs—some 800
men in total.16 The steamers Chicora
and Algoma were chartered for the
season and it was intended that they
would run between Collingwood and
Thunder Bay on a regular schedule.17
Meanwhile, the troops were
training in Toronto and the stores were
arriving daily. The rations would consist
of biscuit, salt pork, sugar, tea, beans,
preserved potatoes and pepper that
would be augmented with fresh bread,
vegetables and beef when available.
Because the rations and other supplies
would have to be man-packed over
many portages and receive hard use,
every effort was made to have them
packaged in small, sturdy containers
that could be easily carried. This was not
entirely successful and the barrels of salt
pork, for example, required constant recoopering and re-brining. Minimal
quantities of camp stores were taken in
order to reduce the bulk and weight
that had to be carried. The planning was
quite exact and before leaving Toronto,
60
all stores and equipment were marked
with an “X” (to be left at Prince Arthur’s
Landing), a “Y” (to be left at Fort
Francis), or a “Z” (to be taken to Fort
Garry).18
Six Aldershot pattern field ovens
were taken on the expedition and seven
of the ASC men were bakers. Three of
the ovens were used at Prince Albert’s
Landing and two along the Dawson
Road, with the sixth one being carried
to Fort Francis. A very high quality of
bread was produced which was a
pleasant change for the troops
from the usual biscuit.19 Smalltented hospitals were established
at Prince Albert’s Landing and at
Fort Francis. As it turned out, the
health of the men was excellent
and there were no serious injuries. The
Control Officers performed the
paymaster duties.20 The HBC was
contracted to provide the mail, using
Indian couriers.21 With the logistics
arrangements completed and the
troops trained, the expedition was
ready to depart by late May. As with
most good planning, concurrent
activity had occurred, and the civilian
element of the force was already
underway as soon as the ice had cleared
and the Great Lakes were open for
navigation.
The expedition
did not have a good
start.
Wrangling
over whether the
military or civil
authorities should
charter the ships
resulted in a week’s
delay.22 The first
ship to sail was the
Algoma, which left
Collingwood on 3
May. She carried a
mixed load of stores
plus voyageurs and
workmen.
She
dropped off a work
crew to improve the
portage road at
Sault Ste. Marie,
passed through the
American
locks
without difficulty,
and arrived safely
at Thunder Bay.
The Chicora sailed on 7 May with a load
of boats, stores and more voyageurs and
workmen. The anticipated problems
with the American authorities arose
when they denied the Chicora the use
of the canal at Sault Ste. Marie. There
were many reasons for the American
position. One problem was the proFenian sympathies amongst some
politicians and officials. It was also an
opportunity for the Americans to bring
diplomatic pressure to bear on Britain.
The negotiations for the compensation
that Britain would pay the United States
for the losses caused by the British-built
Confederate commerce raiders during
the Civil War, were reaching a critical
stage.23 It did not help that the Chicora
had been a Confederate blockade
runner during the war. Fortunately, this
eventuality had been considered. The
Chicora’s cargo was unloaded on the
Canadian side, moved over the threemile portage road and reloaded on the
Algoma, which had been directed to
remain in Lake Superior.
A small Land Transport Corps was
formed that used civilian teamsters and
wagons under the direction of Captain
Nagle, a Control Department Transport
Officer. Other Control Department
officers and ASC men oversaw the
The Canada General Service Medal, obverse and reverse.
After petition by veterans of the Fenian Raids and the Red
River Expedition, this medal was awarded to those who
took part in the events of 1866 and 1870. A total of 17,635
medals were awarded with three different bars indicating
service. The rarest bar was “Red River 1870”.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
movement of the stores and accounted
for them. A considerable quantity of
stores was lost during the portaging due
to exposure to weather, rough handling
and weak packaging. This procedure of
off-loading and re-loading the ships
would continue for the duration of the
deployment. By 21 May, the American
authorities had relaxed their position
and ships were allowed through the
canal as long as they were not carrying
troops or military stores.24 The hiring
of five more ships, including an
American owned one, alleviated the
potential delay that this extra work
could have caused. A “propeller”
steamship, the Shickluna, was chartered
to tow the schooners Pandora and
Orion with loads of boats from Lake
Ontario to Thunder Bay.25 As they
passed through the locks at Sault Ste.
Marie, they picked up an escort of a
company of the 1st Ontario Rifles.
The advance guard of the
expedition began departing Toronto
on 21 May and arrived at Prince
Arthur’s Landing on 25 May. The last
part of the force did not arrive until 27
June. A large camp for the troops and a
depot for the stores were quickly
established. Due to the depth of water,
the ships had to anchor a fair distance
offshore. They were off-loaded using a
scow named Tiger Lilly, which was
under the command of Commissary
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Spring 2002
Mellish. The scow was moved to and
from the ships by means of a tow rope
or, when they were too far out, a small
steam launch was used. The next step
was to move the men, stores, equipment
and boats over the 48 miles to Lake
Shebandowan. The plan was to use the
Dawson Road. A Land Transport Corps
of 110 civilians with 150 horses, 36
oxen, 50 wagons and 30 carts was
formed for this purpose. They would be
under the direction on the Control
Department Transport Officers. Interestingly, 65 horses from “K” Battery, 4th
Brigade, Royal Artillery (RA) were
seconded to this task as the battery was
under orders to return to England and
no longer needed their animals.26
The expedition’s difficulties continued. Just prior to their arrival, a large
forest fire had swept through the area
and destroyed some road culverts as
well as a quantity of timber intended for
bridge construction. There were the
normal swarms of black flies and
mosquitoes with which they had to
contend! Then it began to rain and
continued to do so for most of the time
the force was moving over the Dawson
Road. Instead of being completed, only
the first 28 miles of the road, up to the
Matawan Bridge, was open to wagons.
The next nine miles, to the
Oskondagee, was passable only by oxcarts and the remaining eleven miles
As June progressed, the force made
slow progress westwards. More wagons
with drivers were brought in from
Ontario to augment the Land
Transport Corps. The Dawson road was
extended and improved. The Control
Department established depots at the
various transfer points along the road
in order to regulate and account for the
movement of stores and equipment.
The troops were spread out all along
61
Getting There Was the Challenge! The Red River Expedition of 1870
The Route of the Red River Expedition in 1870.
had not been started. A
serious difference of
opinion arose between
Mr. Dawson, the senior
Canadian Government
official in the area, and
Colonel Wolseley, about
how to proceed. Dawson
wanted to concentrate
his civilian workforce,
augmented by soldiers of
the 1/60th, on road
construction. Wolseley
wanted to explore other
options as well.27 While
this was happening, boats,
stores and equipment
began moving over the
road up to the Matawan
Bridge. It was difficult
work due to the soft
roadbed. Despite the
corduroying, the horses
often worked in mud up
to their bellies and they began to break
down under the strain.28 Wolseley was
aware that the Kaministikwia River ran
west from Prince Albert’s Landing to
the Kaministikwia Bridge (mile 22 on
the road) where it met with the
Matawan River. He conceived of the
idea of relieving the burden on the
land transport by trying to force boats
up this river network as far as the
Matawan Bridge. He was told that it
could not be done and that the attempt
would cause unnecessary damage to the
lightly built boats. Not to be dissuaded,
he assigned the task to Captain Young
of the 1/60th and he succeeded!
Subsequent efforts showed that the
boats could be moved even farther up
the Matawan. In its final form, the water
and land routes met at the Oskondagee
River (mile 38) where everything had to
be moved by ox-cart to Ward’s Landing
and then by water for three miles to
M’Neill’s Bay on Lake Shebandowan.29
Major Gary Campbell
the road and “much care and trouble
were necessary to keep them well and
fully supplied”.30 Colonel Wolseley was
appreciative of these efforts as he is
quoted by Huyshe as saying “I have
never before been with any force in the
field so well fed as this one has been up
to the present time”.31 A special
relationship seems to have developed
between Colonel Wolseley and Assistant
Controller Irvine during this time. The
first notice of this was on 6/7 June
when Colonel Wolseley had Irvine
accompany him on an inspection of the
damage that another forest fire had
caused at the western end of the road.
Irvine became a trusted advisor and
stayed close to Colonel Wolseley
throughout the expedition.32 Meanwhile, the force was arriving at M’Neill’s
Bay. Wolseley’s criterion for beginning
the next stage of the trip was the
stockpiling of 60 days of provisions
there. This was achieved on 16 July
when the first group left by boat.
Deputy Commissary
Meyer was the Control
Officer there and he
was responsible for
superintending the
shipment of stores, the
loading of boats, and
the issuing of rations
and stores.33
The force was
organized into 21
brigades numbered
from “A” to “X”, less Tracking and poling up the Kaministikwia River.
“J”, “U” and “W”.
There were usually six boats in a was to be the Control Officer at Fort
brigade, each with a crew of 10-12 Francis, had the ASC and AHC men in
soldiers of all ranks, plus 12 voyageurs his boat along with the tents for the field
and a pilot. Each boat carried each hospital, the field oven, and the medical
man’s personal kit, 60 days of comforts and stores. They formed part of
provisions, an arms chest containing “G” brigade and departed M’Neill’s Bay
the Snider short rifles they had been on 19 July.36 Once the troops had
issued, cooking utensils, blankets, and departed M’Neill’s Bay, the remaining
waterproof sheets. All told, each boat voyageurs were employed in moving a
carried a load of over 7,000 pounds. reserve stock of provisions to Fort
With each brigade was a Francis. Because they were under less
carpenter’s toolbox for time pressure, they moved a small steam
making repairs en route to launch onto Lake Shebandowan to tow
the boats. There was also a the boats across it and used ox-carts at
“gig” for the staff and three some of the portages to carry the stores.37
birch-bark canoes. On a
The work they had done along the
typical day, reveille sounded
at 3 a.m. and they started Dawson Road had put the soldiers in
soon afterwards. The stop good shape for the portaging. The drill
for breakfast was at 8 a.m. at each portage was fairly routine. The
with the one for dinner at 1 brigade would land and off-load the
p.m. About one hour boats. The lead brigade would cut out
before dusk, they stopped the portage road, if it had not already
for supper and made camp.34 been done, and lay rollers for the boats
to go over. They would then move the
The 1/60th took the stores and equipment across the
lead, followed by the two portage.38 The idea of carrying the
militia battalions with the barrels and crates on a pole between two
boats of the other units men was soon abandoned in favour of
interspersed amongst them. the Indian “tumpline.” This strap went
The first leg of the route around the forehead and supported the
would be across Lake weight of the load on the shoulders.
Shebandowan, over the The normal load was about 200 pounds
watershed at Height of although many carried more. Captain
Land portage, and then Redvers Buller “always took at least 200
down a series of lakes and pounds and sometimes 300 pounds at a
rivers to Fort Francis, trip.”39 One voyageur could carry up to
All Sir Garnet. Colonel Garnet Joseph Wolseley,
208 miles away. Colonel 530 pounds in a single load! Once this
commander of the expedition. Admiration for
had been done, the boats would be
Wolseley was so great that he inspired popular Wolseley, with Assistant
manhandled, using only ropes and
Controller
Irvine,
Wolseley’s
culture. At the time, if things were going well, it was
“All Sir Garnet”. He also inspired Sir Arthur personal servant, and eight sheer muscle power, up the steep slopes,
Sullivan’s famous ditty “I am the Very Model of a voyageurs ranged along the over rocks and any other obstacles to
Modern Major General” and the character Major route in a canoe, often in the end of the portage. All told, there
General Stanley from “the Pirates of Pensance.” the lead blazing the way.35 were more than 42 portages to be made
(Courtesy National Archives of Canada)
Commissary Mellish, who before they reached Fort Garry.40
62
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
was deployed on each bank of the river.
They camped that night in the rain and
advanced on Fort Garry on the 24th.45
Riel and his cohorts were aware of the
approaching troops but were not
certain of their location. Their entry
into Fort Garry caught Riel by surprise.
He quickly fled with his associates,
leaving their breakfast behind on the
table to be claimed by some officers of
the 1/60th, including Capt Buller.46
Colonel Wolseley quickly consolidated his control of the settlement.
Lieutenant-Governor Archibald arrived
on 2 September to assume civilian
control of the area. The two militia
battalions remained until 1874 as a
garrison to ensure the peace until the
newly formed North West Mounted
Police replaced them. The regular
troops began their return to Central
Canada on 29 August with the last ones
leaving on 3 September. Colonel
Wolseley left on 10 September and by
18 October all of the force was safely
back in Central Canada.47 The weather
on the return trip was good and the
mosquitoes and blackflies had
disappeared. Capt Buller’s company
pioneered the “Snow Road” from Fort
Garry to Lake of the Woods. They used
carts to traverse the prairie and then
switched to pack horses to cross the
Albert’s Landing had to be returned to
Central Canada.50 All of this was
completed in good order.
The Red River Expedition is a largely
forgotten campaign. It occurred in a
remote area, with a small force, when the
attention of Europe was on the FrancoPrussian War of 1870. Yet this campaign
firmly secured Rupert’s Land for Canada
and blocked any possible American
expansion into the area. The recently
formed Control Department and the
Army Service Corps ably supported the
expedition. To quote Irvine’s official
report, “I believe the Control system has
proved itself on this occasion to be a
sound one; the Officers of the old
Departments worked together under one
head with the greatest unanimity, and
undoubtedly there was much saving of
time and trouble throughout in there
being one Department instead of
several”.51 This could well be said to have
been the first operational test of an
organizational concept that eventually
developed into the logistics services of
the British and Commonwealth armies,
including Canada’s.
The expedition left Fort Francis on
10 August. Their route would take
Colonel Wolseley was certainly
them 280 miles across the Lake of the
influenced by this campaign. His
Woods, down the Winnipeg River to
experiences with the Canadian
Fort Alexander, then across the tip of
voyageurs led him to ask for a
Lake Winnipeg and up the Red River to
detachment of them to
Fort Garry. More portages
assist him during the
awaited them along the
Gordon Relief Expedition
Winnipeg River and in places
of 1884/5.52 Assistant
they could run the boats
The Red River Expedition is a
through the rapids. When
Controller Irvine, who was
Colonel Wolseley arrived at
awarded the Companion
largely forgotten campaign.
Fort Alexander, all of the
of St. Michael and St.
1/60th plus the gunners and
George (C.M.G.) for his
engineers were already there
services, became a member
waiting for him.44 Conscious of the remaining 33 miles of swamp. At the of the “Garnet Ring” and was Wolseley’s
coming fall, and of the need for a quick lake, they met the company of the 1st chief Control Officer during the
conclusion of the campaign, he set out Ontario Rifles, which had formed the Ashantee Campaign of 1873.53 As a
on 21 August for Fort Garry, which was garrison at Fort Francis. They veteran of the Crimea and the China
only 80 miles away. After an overnight exchanged packhorses for boats and War of 1860, Wolseley was certainly
stop, the flotilla of 50 boats started up each group continued on their way. cognizant of the importance of a well
the Red River in battle order. Capt Assistant Controller Irvine also functioning logistics system, as he was
Butler and Assistant Controller Irvine, returned via this road.48 The troops well aware of the consequences of
in Colonel Wolseley’s canoe, took the were met by baggage wagons at having one that did not work
lead and had orders to report anything M’Neill’s Bay, as the road had been properly!54
unusual or suspicious. The rest of the completed, greatly easing their passage
boats were drawn up in two lines to Prince Albert’s Landing and
behind them, with a mountain gun onwards.49 The control work continued
mounted in the first boat of each during the redeployment. They had to
column.
On
the
23rd,
they dispose of the reserve stocks at Fort
appropriated some horses and an Francis—most were sold to the HBC.
advanced guard of Mounted Infantry The stores and ammunition at Prince
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63
Getting There Was the Challenge! The Red River Expedition of 1870
Colonel Wolseley arrived at Fort
Francis early on 4 August. He planned
to give his force a short rest and do any
necessary reorganization before they
began the final leg of their journey.
They could stock up on fresh bread
from the ASC oven and perhaps obtain
a few vegetables from the HBC post. It
also allowed Colonel Wolseley to hold a
“palaver” with the local Indians in
order to ensure their co-operation.41
He also met with Captain W.F. Butler
who Wolseley had sent to the Red River
settlement on an intelligence mission.
Butler was quite bold in his scouting
and had actually spoken with Riel.
Colonel Wolseley welcomed the
information as it allowed him to
complete his campaign plan.42 There
was some discussion about using the
partially completed “Snow Road”,
which ran across the NorthWest Angle
from Lake of the Woods to Fort Garry.
Colonel Wolseley had had quite
enough of unproven roads and he
elected to continue with the water
route.43
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Major W.E. (Gary) Campbell holds a BA in History
from the University of Western Ontario and is studying
part time towards a Master’s of Arts in War Studies through
The Royal Military College of Canada. He has served as a
transportation officer in each of the environmental
commands and has had tours in the U.S.A. and the U.K.
His interest in Lines of Communications issues derives
from his service with both the Canada/U.S. ILOC and the
U.S./UK Lines of Communications Arrangement. Major
Campbell is presently serving as AITS (CSS) at the Combat
Training Centre Headquarters in Gagetown, New
Brunswick. A version of this article, entitled “With the
Military Train in Canada”, appeared in the 1997 Review of
the Royal Logistics Corps and was subsequently awarded the
annual prize for best historical entry.
ENDNOTES
Major Gary Campbell
1. WO 73, Distribution of the Army, Horse Guards: 1 May 1870. pp. 54, 61
and 64; Hart’s Army List for 1870.
2. Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Massé, MC, The Predecessors of the Royal Army
Service Corps, Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1948, pp. 57 to 62.
3. Assistant Controller M.B. Irvine, CMG, Report of the Red River
Expedition of 1870, London: Harrison and Sons, 1871, p. 2.
4. Edited by John Thyen, Canada General Service Medal Roll 1866 – 1870,
Winnipeg: Bunker to Bunker Books, 1998, pp. ii to v.
5. George F.G. Stanley, Toil & Trouble, Military Expeditions to the Red
River, Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1989, p. 48.
6. Stanley, pp. 64 and 65; Joseph H. Lehman, All Sir Garnet: A Life of
Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley, London: Jonathan Cope, 1964, p. 34.
7. Stanley, p. 65.
8. Irvine, p. 3.
9. Stanley, p. 65; Lehman, p. 136.
10. Samuel J. Dawson, Report of the Red River Expedition, Ottawa, Times
Printing and Publishing Company, 1871, pp. 7 to 11.
11. Capt. G.L. Huyshe, The Red River Expedition, London: MacMillan &
Co., 1871, p. 33; Charles Rathbone Law, A Memoir of Lieutenant-General Sir
Garnet Wolseley, Volume 2, London: Richard Bently and Son, 1878, p. 23;
Lehman, p. 149.
12. Graham H. Neale and Ross W. Irwin, The Medal Roll of the Red River
Campaign of 1870 in Canada, Toronto: The Charlton Press, 1982, pp. 27
and 35.
13. Irvine, Standing Orders.
14. Irvine, pp. 1 and 2.
15. Anonymous. Red River Expedition No.1. As provided from the RLC
Archives by Dr. Anthony Morton. p. 1.
16. Dawson, p. 7.
17. Ibid., p 11.
18. Irvine, pp. 4, 5 and 12.
19. Huyshe, p. 92.
20. Irvine, p. 11.
21. Ibid., p. 9.
22. Lehman, p. 140.
23. Dawson, pp. 11 to 14. The Treaty of Washington, which finally
settled the reparations question, was signed in 1871.
24. Irvine, p. 4.
25. Huyshe, p. 44.
26. Law, p. 15.
27. Dawson, p. 17.
28. Law, p. 31.
29. Ibid. p. 20.
30. Irvine, p. 10.
31. Huyshe, pp. 92 and 93.
32. Stanley, p. 114.
33. Huyshe, p. 97.
34. Stanley, p. 133; Irvine, Standing Orders.
35. Lehman, p. 140.
36. Huyshe, p. 259; Law, pp. 37 and 38.
37. Dawson, p. 26.
38. Stanley, p. 136.
39. Ibid, p. 163.
40. Irvine, p. 10.
41. Stanley, p. 150.
42. Ibid, p. 151.
43. Ibid, p. 150.
44. Ibid, p. 165.
45. Huyshe, p. 189.
46. Stanley, p. 11.
47. Law, p. 73.
48. Huyshe, p. 201.
49. Dawson, pp. 33 and 34.
50. Irvine, pp. 8 and 10.
51. Ibid, p. 11.
52. Stanley, p. 252.
53. Matthew Bell Irvine was born in Quebec City in 1832, served with
the British Commissariat in a variety of locations and retired to Quebec
City with the honourary rank of Commissary General (Major General
equivalent) in 1881. His link to the Garnet Ring continued and he was
instrumental in organizing the Nile Voyageurs in the late summer of
1884. He died in 1893. In addition to the Companion of St. Michael and
St. George (C.M.G.), he was made a Companion of the Bath (CB) for his
services during the Ashantee Campaign. Many of his personal papers,
including his Journal of the Red River Expedition, are in the National
Archives of Canada in Ottawa.
54. The dreadful state of the British logistics services at the start of the
Crimean War resulted in a massive overhaul of these services. It also
started a programme of improvement and reorganization that continued
until the 1890s. The Second China War of 1860 was not well supported
logistically. Wolseley served in both these campaigns and suffered the
effects of poor support.
64
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Manoeuvre Warfare Doctrine for
Urban Operations
by Major A.R. Jayne, CD
required. The tenets of manoeuvre
warfare will then be presented and
applied to the urban battlespace to
derive new doctrine.
sequences: “Military actions in some
cities, such as Hong Kong, New York,
Frankfurt, Seoul and Singapore, would
endanger the very economic stability
of the nation—and the planet. Consequently, the operational commander will
probably be constrained by various
political dictates, limitations and rules
of engagement.”5 Canada will be
obligated to commit forces to these
conflicts to protect its interests.
Therefore, we must be prepared to
conduct operations against an enemy
that has decided to conduct operations
centred in and around large urban
areas.6
The Future Security Environment
he projection of the future of recognizes that globalization continues
warfare provided above by to accelerate and has integrated
Ralph Peters supports a Canada into the world community to
growing realization that such an extent that global concerns will
current trends will change the security become Canadian concerns more
environment that has driven Canadian rapidly than ever before.3 Population
policy and doctrine over the past few pressure, mismanagement, over-condecades. As a result, the Canadian Army, sumption, the uncontrolled growth of
specifically the Directorate of Land cities, environmental deterioration and
Strategic Concepts, has published a climatic changes are leading to the
report on the future security depletion of food production capenvironment,2 which serves as the ability, potable water and natural
Advances in technology are also
foundation for the identification, resources, which will widen the gap increasing the likelihood of urban
development, and refinement of the between the “have” and the “have not” warfare. The advances in precision
capabilities and doctrine needed by the countries, which, in turn, could weapons and surveillance that favour
future Army. Fighting
Western military forces
effectively in an urban
will threaten operational
battlespace is one of the
and tactical manoeuvre
Fighting effectively in an urban
critical capabilities that
of potential enemies in
battlespace is one of the critical
must be developed
open terrain. Opponents
within the Canadian
who wish to capitalize
capabilities that must be developed.
Army to meet the
on political situations
demands of the future
and restrictive rules
security environment. Our current threaten Western interests.4 Population of engagement and mitigate the
tactical doctrine is based on Second migration and urbanization are leading technology available to Western forces
World War experience and does not to more and bigger cities, which will will likely find cities appealing. This will
adequately address the exigencies of the impose great burdens on national be increasingly likely if they know the
urban battlespace or the principles of infrastructures, especially in developing terrain better than their opponents and
manoeuvre warfare currently practised nations. If demographers and political can gain the support of the urban
by the Canadian Army. The aim of this strategists are correct, many, if not most resources and populations.7
article is to argue that the application of of the conflicts of the future will be
the tenets of manoeuvre warfare to the conducted in or around large urban
The projection that conflicts will
conduct of urban operations is possible. areas. Cities and their outlying urban most likely be fought in and around
sprawls will increasingly be the political, urban centres is not useful to the
In order to achieve the aim of this economic, social, and cultural centres examination of doctrine without an
article, new doctrine for the future of gravity of the world. In future analysis of how an enemy could use
urban battlespace, based on the tenets conflicts, the control of large urban such terrain to fight. Western alliances
of manoeuvre warfare, will be areas will be critical to the successful could possibly be challenged regionally
proposed. To adequately set the stage, it attainment of strategic, operational, by China, India, or by one or more
is necessary to first define the battle- and tactical objectives. The operational major competitors, but the most likely
space within the future security and strategic goals of opponents who threat is from asymmetric attacks by
environment and then compare the choose to fight in urban areas will mean state and non-state powers.8 Future
current tactical doctrine against it to that military operations in those urban opponents will likely employ asymdemonstrate why a new doctrine is centres may have far-reaching con- metric attacks in an attempt to succeed
T
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
65
Manoeuvre Warfare for Urban Operations
[The] future of warfare lies in the streets,
sewers, high-rise buildings, industrial
parks, and the sprawl of houses, shacks,
and shelters that form the broken cities of
our world.1
against
stronger,
technologically
superior Western allies. This form of
attack avoids strengths and exploits
mander would be given the authority to
lay siege to the city and starve out the
enemy due to consideration for the
Current tactical doctrine is inadequate
to guide future commanders.
vulnerabilities. It may include exploiting the fears and beliefs of a
population, undermining political
support for a government or its actions,
exploiting Western sensitivity to
casualties, or attempting to disrupt
complex economies. Such attacks
can take the form of terrorism,
psychological operations, misinformation,
the use of weapons of mass destruction,
and information systems disruption or
destruction.9
Major A.R. Jayne
Given the nature of the projected
future security environment and the
likely threats to Canadian interests,
current tactical doctrine is inadequate
to guide future commanders. Current
doctrine does not sufficiently address
operations in a large urban environment with possible political limitations
and constraints against an opponent
who is technologically inferior but who
enjoys the relative protection of
complex terrain and the ability to affect
the international balance of power.
Current Land Force tactical doctrine
states that the attack on a built-up area
may be conducted as any other: the
built-up area is first “isolated”; the
attacker then advances to the perimeter
of the area and seizes a foothold, thus
achieving a “break-in”; then the enemy
is cleared during the “fighting through”
stage of the operation.10
Although the isolation of a city can
doctrinally mean the securing of
positions outside the area to support
the point of entry and the conduct of
raids to disrupt and capture key
positions, this term generally refers to
the encirclement and cut-off of all
approaches to the city.11 The rapid
growth of modern cities compounds
the difficulty of this task, and one can
imagine the difficulty of and the size of
force involved in isolating a city such as
Toronto. Shanghai and its surrounding
areas, for example, contains over 125
million people and covers 2,383 square
miles.12 If it were possible to isolate
such a city, it is unlikely that a com-
66
civilian populace. Thus, the freedom of
action of the enemy, who desires to
achieve his aims within the city itself,
would not have been affected.
The conduct of the break-in
consists of an advance to the perimeter
of the area and the seizure of a
foothold. This stage of the operation is
normally accompanied by artillery fire
to suppress enemy fire and observation
of the approaching troops. The
political limitations on collateral
damage and civilian casualties will likely
make this practice unacceptable in
future urban conflicts. As well, it is
unlikely that the enemy would have
sufficient force to defend the entire
perimeter of the city; therefore, breakin would not be necessary. During the
first Chechen War, the Russians were
allowed to penetrate deep into Grozny
before the Chechen opposition
attacked and destroyed them.13
The traditional approach to urban
combat will not serve to achieve
political or strategic victory for Western
forces in the future security environment. Cities will undoubtedly be the
centres of gravity for enemy forces, but
the restraints necessitated by economic,
social, cultural, and political considerations and the likely forces
available will require a new method of
defeating the enemy. This new method
can be found in the application of the
tenets of manoeuvre warfare.
Manoeuvre warfare focuses on the
enemy’s centre of gravity, the source of
his freedom of action, and his physical
strength or will to fight and determines
how best to attack, neutralize, or
destroy these factors. The emphasis is
on the defeat of the enemy rather than
attempting to hold or take ground for
its own sake. In attempting to defeat the
enemy, a commander seeks to apply his
strength against the enemy’s vulnerabilities. Inevitably, manoeuvre
warfare will include elements of
movement, application of firepower,
and positional defence in order to find,
fix, and strike the enemy on the moral
and physical planes. Finally, operations
based on manoeuvre warfare will most
likely be joint in nature and practically
all will be combined.16
The traditional approach to
fighting through the urban area is to
conduct a systematic sweep of the city.
In order to set the stage for the
This method consumes inordinately presentation of new tactical doctrine,
high quantities of manpower, time, and a number of premises should be
logistical support.14 It is unlikely that a articulated. Any friendly force (most
Western force would
be able to conduct this
type of warfare due to
sensitivity to casualties.
The enemy could engage in a wide variety
of asymmetric methods
to slow the tempo of
operations, cause large
numbers of friendly
casualties and attempt
(through various means
including terrorism)
to break the will of the
Western people to
continue the fight.15
In the ensuing long,
costly battle, the Urbanization may make operations in cities more likely
enemy would only in the future. Concern over the growth of the “urban
need to avoid defeat battlespace” is not new and was examined by NATO in
rather than achieve the 1970s and1980s. Is it that we must hold cities to
fight in the countryside or vice versa?
success.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Find
X
MORAL PLANE
Fix
Strike
X
X
X
X
X
X
* May include combat operations that involve fixing and striking the enemy on the physical plane.
likely a coalition) involved in such
future urban combat would likely have
the capabilities of at least a division.
This division would also be functioning
within a corps and hence have access to
a full range of capabilities such
as psychological and information
operations. The enemy would likely be
an armed force that has some
technological equivalency with Western
powers but could not hope to achieve
its aims in conventional warfare in open
terrain against Western coalition forces.
Such an enemy would likely have
decided, therefore, to pursue its
objectives by fighting in the cities where
it enjoys a detailed knowledge of the
terrain and some public support. In
order to protect Western interests in
the region, the friendly forces would
have to defeat the enemy without
creating corollary problems such as
mass civilian casualties, massive infrastructure damage, and a hardening
of the political opinion against the
coalition forces and powers. The
friendly forces would also have to
simultaneously protect themselves
against attack by the enemy and incur
“acceptable” levels of casualties.
In order to be successful in the
situation that has been presented, the
coalition force will have to employ
doctrine different from what currently
exists. It is proposed that this doctrine,
firmly based in manoeuvre warfare
theory, will involve four equally
important and concurrent activities to
achieve success: winning the information
battle, securing the environment, shaping
the environment, and exploiting the
environment. These activities must not
be confused with the widely known
Find-Fix-Strike cycle; they are categories
of concurrent, complimentary operations
that each contains an element or
elements of the Find-Fix-Strike cycle
that intersect to allow the defeat of the
enemy. The prosecution of the
information battle provides the basis of
the other three categories and allows
the commander to find the enemy on
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
the moral and physical planes. The
other three categories involve fixing
and striking on both the moral and
physical planes as well as finding on the
physical plane. The following matrix
succinctly groups the operations
inherent to each category and should
provide focus for the detailed
explanation of each.
city block-by-block. The use of
communications, signal and human
intelligence sources, psychological
operations, civil-military cooperation,
and public affairs will be crucial to
success. If the commander can gain
detailed information of the enemy, he
can then decide how best to defeat
the enemy. Technology will play a
role in winning the information battle.
The extensive communications infrastructure in a modern city will allow the
enemy various means of communicating
including local telephones, cell phones,
the Internet, and radio. The commander does not necessarily have to
deny these means of communication to
the enemy if he can exploit them for his
own purposes. The commander must
also conduct defensive information
operations to shield his forces,
intentions, and capabilities from the
enemy. Such operations will be
especially important in an environment
where all or part of the population
supports the enemy.
Winning the information battle will
be key to achieving success in an urban
environment.17 Not only will it be
necessary to have detailed information
on the city but, perhaps more critically,
information on the enemy will be
required. In order to define the
enemy’s centres of gravity, his sources
of freedom of action, and his will and
cohesion, extensive use of all facets of
The information battle will be
information operations will be
required. A commander will have to fought throughout the operation
understand why the enemy has chosen within the urban environment. It will
to fight in the city and what he hopes to serve as the underlying catalyst that
accomplish. Much like any coalition enables the commander to define
force, the enemy will unlikely be able to the enemy intentions, strengths,
control all portions of the city weaknesses, and centres of gravity. The
simultaneously. The
enemy will have to
A commander will have to
focus his centre of
gravity and be forced
understand why the enemy has
to choose targets that
chosen to fight in the city.
further his aims and
enable him to achieve
his goals. These targets may be designed identification of nodes allows the
to control economically or politically commander to find the enemy on the
important areas, or they may be moral plane and determines the overall
focussed on control of the civilian intentions and aims of the enemy. The
populace. These targets are referred to identification of nodes may also allow
as “nodes” and can be defined as areas the commander to find the enemy on
within the city that hold tactical, the physical plane. This is especially
operational, or strategic value to either true if the enemy has been in the city
the enemy or coalition forces who for a sufficient period of time to occupy
control them.18 It is possible that a and control nodes within the city.
node, such as public opinion or
As the information battle is being
political support, may relate to the
moral plane and have no physical fought, the commander will start to
gain information that will enable him to
location per se.
start the process of securing the
The identification of nodes within environment. Securing the environment
the city will allow the commander to is designed to deprive the enemy of his
focus the activities of the force to defeat freedom of action and wrest the
the enemy without clearing the entire initiative from him. As has been stated,
67
Manoeuvre Warfare for Urban Operations
Winning the Information Battle
Securing the Environment *
Shaping the Environment
Exploiting the Environment
PHYSICAL PLANE
Find
Fix
Strike
X
Major A.R. Jayne
neither the coalition force nor the
enemy can hope to control the entire
city. Therefore, the commander must
focus on controlling those nodes that
are important to the enemy and to his
forces. It is important to note that the
nodes important to the friendly forces
and the enemy may or may not overlap.
In order to achieve success, the
commander must focus on the effects
to be achieved rather than the terrain.19
If the enemy intends to install himself
as the de facto government of the area,
the presidential palace may prove to be
a critical node that would help the
enemy solidify his claim to power.
Denying that area to the enemy will
then limit some of the options open to
him. It is important to realize here that
the enemy may or may not already
control this node, and combat
operations may be necessary to take it,
but it is the node itself that holds the
importance, not the physical forces of
the enemy. As the commander
recognizes and gains control of the key
nodes within the city, the enemy will be
faced with fewer and fewer options that
will enable him to achieve his aims. The
overall effect is that the enemy will be
fixed on the moral plane. This is very
important in the overall concept of
manoeuvre warfare in the urban
environment. The freedom of physical
manoeuvre that is available to the
enemy will not have been appreciably
degraded at this time, but the
commander has been successful in
wresting initiative from the enemy.
Securing the environment may also
include the use of wider ranging
techniques to fix the enemy on
the moral plane. For example, if the
enemy is intent on exploiting the
Traditional methods of finding the enemy
with reconnaissance assets and aerial and
space surveillance will not be sufficient.
civilian populace, the protection and
provision for that populace could
become a critical factor in the battle.
The maintenance of the supply and
infrastructure necessary to sustain the
civilian population, coupled with
protection and an aggressive public
affairs campaign, would limit the
enemy’s ability to impact the
population and thereby achieve his
aims.20 In this example, it can easily be
seen how securing the environment
would require the effective conduct
of information operations. As the
presence of the coalition force
started to nullify the efforts of the
enemy and public opinion turns in
favour of the coalition, the ability to use
the population as a source of
information would increase. While the
coalition force could not observe the
entire city at once, the civilian populace
could accurately and quickly provide
information on the enemy that would
be useful to the force commander.
New technologies and methodologies, such as UAVs, may aid urban combat.
68
As is readily apparent, it is not
possible to determine exactly when and
where the force commander would
have to act to secure the environment.
As manoeuvre warfare theory states, we
must focus on the enemy. No two cities
or situations would be exactly the same;
therefore, it is impossible to list the
nodes or methods that will always be
effective in fixing the enemy on the
moral plane. It is, however, possible to
recognize the merit of denying the
enemy the nodes and opportunities
that are essential to achieving his
goals. As this is accomplished, the
environment will become more secure.
The enemy will have fewer and fewer
options available and the initiative will
pass to the friendly forces.
As the initiative passes to the force
commander, he can now start to shape
the environment to his advantage. The
enemy is struggling to maintain the
upper hand in the information battle
and has been, or is in the process of
being, fixed on the moral plane through
the loss of nodes critical to achieving his
goals. Shaping the environment is
intended to create an environment
where the commander has greater
control over the city as a whole and can
start to find the enemy on the physical
plane. This process must start from the
outset of the battle with psychological
operations, civil-military cooperation,
public affairs, and intelligence and
counter-intelligence operations, but
these are initially focussed on winning
the information battle. Once the enemy
has been fixed on the moral plane and
the force commander has secured the
environment, it is now possible to use
these tools to shape the environment to
his advantage. The intent is to physically
find the enemy. Traditional methods of
finding the enemy with reconnaissance
assets and aerial and space surveillance
will not be sufficient to determine the
exact locations and centres of gravity of
the enemy. However, if the enemy has
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The force commander has now
created the conditions whereby he can
use the environment to find the enemy.
He controls the critical nodes that the
enemy requires to achieve his aims and
has secured the environment while
winning the information battle. Aggressive use of psychological operations,
civil-military cooperation, and public
affairs has continued to weaken the
enemies’ resolve and swing public
support in favour of the coalition. The
enemy still retains the ability to
physically move within the city but not
without fear of being located. It is within
this context that shaping the environment includes striking the enemy on the
moral plane. Faced with deteriorating
public support, the enemy must act or
admit defeat, and, in doing so, he either
moves to ground chosen by the force
commander or reveals his location and
intentions, which can subsequently be
exploited. This situation, coupled with
offensive information operations, will
assist in defeating the will and cohesion
of the enemy.
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Once again, exploiting the
environment can be conducted
concurrently with the other steps of this
proposed urban doctrine. Commanders
must seize every opportunity to fix and
strike the enemy. These opportunities
may require widely varied responses
such as a ground attack against an
enemy safe haven, the precision
bombing of a certain building, or
harassment by sniper fire. In any event,
these operations will have the net effect
of disrupting the enemy, attacking his
physical strength and cohesion, and
contributing to the defeat of his will to
continue the fight.
The doctrine proposed above does
not attempt to provide a specific
checklist for the prosecution of a battle
in an urban environment or to define the
technology, training, or tactics required
to successfully prosecute such a battle.
The doctrine is formulated to provide
overall guidance to a commander within
a set of general principles that will allow
him to make sense of the complex
terrain and the possible threat in order
to achieve victory. The defeat of an
enemy in an urban environment has
been described as similar to the modern
treatment of cancer. The doctor must
analyze the body to determine which
system or systems the cancer is trying to
infect. Once this is known, he can use
drugs to protect the unaffected systems
and precision laser surgery to eradicate
the cancerous cells from the body.
Overall, the doctor tries to defeat the
cancer while preserving the body and
mind of the patient.21
The future security environment
and the emerging threats to Western
interests present a problem to
commanders of the future that the
current doctrine for fighting in the
urban environment is not capable of
addressing. The current doctrine does
not consider the limitations that are
likely to be placed on Western forces or
embody the tenets of manoeuvre
warfare. This article has proposed a new
doctrine that is based on the tenets of
manoeuvre warfare and is specifically
designed for the urban environment.
This doctrine is based on the activities of
winning the information battle and
securing, shaping, and exploiting the
environment. These activities can and
will
happen
concurrently
and
compliment each other. Winning the
information battle will provide the
catalyst for all the other steps to take
place. Seizing key nodes within the city to
secure the environment will fix the
enemy on the moral plane and wrest the
initiative from him. Operations designed
to shape the environment will turn the
urban terrain to the advantage of the
commander, and the enemy will be
forced to admit defeat or try to regain
the initiative. With this achieved, the
commander will be in a position to fix
and strike the enemy vulnerabilities by
exploiting the environment. The end
state will be the eradication of the cancer
that may threaten the cities of tomorrow.
69
Manoeuvre Warfare for Urban Operations
The force commander may now take
direct actions against
the enemy’s vulnerabilities to ensure his
defeat on the physical
plane. This is accomplished through exploiting the urban
environment. It is here
that the force commander can employ
the elements of manoeuvre, application of
firepower, and positional
defence to fix and
strike the enemy.
Whether the enemy is
trying to regain control
of a critical node,
consolidating his forSpecial lightweight vehicles with ascent systems may ces in a specific area of
be required for urban areas.
the city, or trying to
maintain an effective
lost the initiative and is fixed on the logistical chain, the force commander is
moral plane, he will have to take in a position to choose when and where
measures to try to regain the initiative to disrupt or defeat the enemy. The
and achieve his goals. The force force commander must protect the
commander can use this knowledge to nodes that he has secured and be
anticipate how and where the enemy is willing and prepared to act decisively
likely to act and position assets to and counter-attack when the enemy
attempts to regain them.
confirm or deny his intelligence.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Major Andrew Jayne is a graduate of the Royal
Military College of Canada with a B.Eng. (Civil). He has
held various appointments in Canadian and British field
and armoured engineer units and in Headquarters
1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group. Major Jayne also
served with the 1st Battalion Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry Battlegroup in Croatia in 1994 and with a
British engineer squadron with Implementation Force
(IFOR) in 1996. He is currently the Officer Commanding
18 Administrative Squadron, 1 Combat Engineer
Regiment in Edmonton, Alberta. This article was written
while the then Captain Jayne was a student at the
Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College in
November 2000.
3. Ibid, p. 10.
4. Ibid, p. 11.
5. Lester Grau and Jacob Kibb, “Urban Combat: Confronting the
Specter,” Military Review, Jul-Aug 99.
6. Robert F.Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, “Urban Warfare and the Urban
Warfighter of 2025,” Parameters (Summer 99), pp. 74-86.
7. Ibid.
8. Directorate – Land Strategic Concepts, “The Future Security
Environment,” Report No. 99-2, Aug 99, p. 13.
9. Ibid, p. 13.
10. B-GL-300-002/FP-000 Land Force Tactical Doctrine, pp. 8-21.
11. Ibid, pp. 8-21.
12. Grau and Kibb.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Hahn II and Jezior.
16. B-GL-300-003/FP-000 Command, Jul 96, p. 3-3.
17. Hahn II and Jezior.
18. Ibid.
19. LCol C.G. Magee, Directorate Army Doctrine 4, Briefing to CLFCSC
Students, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, 23 Oct 00.
20. Grau and Kipp.
21. Magee.
ENDNOTES
1. Ralph Peters, “Our Soldiers, Their Cities,” Parameters (Spring 1996), p. 43.
2. Directorate – Land Strategic Concepts, “The Future Security
Environment,” Report No. 99-2, Aug 99, p. i.
The Canadian Rangers
T
he Canadian Rangers are reservists who provide a
military presence in remote, isolated and coast
communities of Canada. Established in 1947, the
Canadian Rangers are responsible for protecting
Canadian sovereignty by reporting unusual activities or
sightings, collecting local data of significance and
conducting surveillance or sovereignty patrols as
required.
There are currently 3,500 Canadian Rangers
located in 144 communities across Canada. They are
organized into five Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups
(CRPG), numbered one through five, under the
command of Canadian Forces Northern Area and
the four Land Force Areas.
Planning exercise activity with Army personnel.
Major A.R. Jayne
Two Canadian Rangers with Her Excellency the Right
Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, following an investiture
ceremony in Ottawa where 17 Canadian Rangers from
across Canada were awarded the Ranger Bar to the
Special Service Medal.
70
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The Challenges of Military Operations
in Humanitarian Action Operations
by Major Vic Sattler, CD
Major-General W.I. Nash,
Commanding General
1 Armoured Division,
Task Force EAGLE, 1996
INTRODUCTION
only impartiality makes it possible to
help all victims without discrimination.
Using weapons to force one’s way to
deliver aid is a military measure.
Humanitarian actions conducted by the
military are political decisions. They
necessitate identifying victims and
belligerents. The post-Cold War world
has challenged not only military forces
but also United Nations (UN) agencies
and numerous non-governmental
agencies (NGOs). The challenge for all
is to know what one is expected to do in
a coordinated effort. The military
challenge is to work, within capabilities,
to accomplish all the traditional as well
as the non-traditional tasks in the right
balance.
the strategic level. Are our own mission
statements ambiguous? Do they have no
tangible objectives? Where is the
middle ground from which the military
can continue to aid a society that needs
to be reconstructed during and after
hostilities have ceased? What are the
tangible objectives that could indicate
mission success so that an exit strategy
is even conceivable?
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE BIPOLAR
SYSTEM OF THE COLD WAR
T
he end of the Cold War witnessed
n recent humanitarian actions,1
the end of understanding the
military forces have been deployed
world in terms of a simple, bipolar
to theatres of operation to
geopolitical framework. This has
simultaneously keep the peace,
particularly affected the developing
take military action, and help the
The aim of this article is to countries, even in the very heart of
humanitarian organizations. Northern examine, using the example of Bosnia- Europe. “Endowed with obsolete
Iraq (1991), Somalia (1993), Goma and Herzegovina, the mandate challenges political systems and economies too
Zaire (1994), Rwanda (1994), and the faced by, and the finite capabilities of, weak to accommodate their sudden
former Republic of Yugoslavia (1993-95) military forces involved in complex change, the countries of Eastern Europe
are examples of such theatres.
had to start the difficult path
These complex humanitarian
towards the Western model.
The principal concern is the
emergencies have seen the
Some perhaps more fragile
military with a blurred, if not at
than others, such as
ease with which the soldier
times confused, role between
Yugoslavia,
disintegrated
can become involved in
traditional and non-traditional
into violence” (translation).3
military tasks. Striking the
The state and its institutions
humanitarian assistance.
balance between the two is not
became weaker as they
necessarily easy. In fact, the
dedicated resources to
division is often blurred by the humanitarian actions. Identified here- dealing with the conflict. The state
operations orders themselves. The under are some strategic coordination could no longer ensure the safety and
implementation
of
the
Dayton issues that create grey areas among the dignity of its people. Thus the local
Agreement has created some interesting mandates of various organizations and population fled the indignities and
military challenges in terms of strategic agencies of the international com- atrocities to find safety, food, and
mandated support for humanitarian munity (IC). Mission objectives will be shelter. A humanitarian emergency was
emergencies. At the tactical level, the suggested that enable measurement of created.
principal concern is the ease with which mission success and thus make an exit
the soldier can become involved in strategy realizable.
It was the atrocities and the refusal
humanitarian assistance. “The military,
to recognize people as human beings
although it can render invaluable
What were the conditions that led that forced the IC to take humanitarian
humanitarian services (i.e., civil to the digression from conducting action. The Geneva Convention of 1949
engineering, logistics) can not by purely military mandates? What are the and the two Additional Protocols of
definition and by its very nature problems associated with performing 1977 outline what is accepted as
transform itself into a humanitarian both military and humanitarian International Humanitarian Law.
enterprise” (translation).2 A basic actions? The blurring of traditional and Intervention came in the form of
principle of humanitarian action is that non-traditional military roles starts at military troops, UN agencies, and
I
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
71
The Challenges of Military Operations in Humanitarian Action Operations
…We learned that when you use a land
combat power in the peacekeeping or
peace building role, you can’t achieve an
end state of long term peace—of stability
and prosperity in the area. In general, a
military element can only bring about an
absence of war.
numerous NGOs that forced humanitarian action, monitored procedures,
and established institutions with a view
to re-establishing humanitarian law and
creating a secure, stable environment.
Unfortunately, such intervention merely
exacerbated the situation:
But rather than taking the political
measures needed to stop the
atrocities … the IC rushed to
provide humanitarian aid. Instead
of trying to put an end to the war,
States sent in troops and volunteers
to protect and assist the victims … In
pursuing this policy, the IC never
stopped vaunting the virtues of
humanitarian activity to mask its
political impotence … Political
circles thus set about lavishing
care and assistance, not only
creating unhealthy and spendthrift
humanitarian competition but
also prolonging the conflict”
(translation).4
military parlance, only once you know
the commander’s intent can you then
make your own plan.
Many of the NGOs have little
experience in theatres where physical
security is an issue (ICRC is the
exception). Most of the NGOs
previously focused on natural disastertype, short-term relief emergencies.
Hence, their internal administrative
issues and campaign plans required
deliberation not previously done.
Interoperability in a complex humanitarian emergency is in its infancy for
many of these organizations.
Intervention in a conflict on humanitarian
grounds solves nothing.
Coordinated and clearly defined
strategic mandates are necessary before
sending in organizations to deal with
complex humanitarian emergencies.
Coordination is built incrementally
on experience and practice. Unfortunately, all IC organizations have
the inherent problem of transient
leadership and minimal corporate
knowledge. This problem alone is one
of the leading causes of success in
complex humanitarian actions being
incremental at best. Strategic shortsightedness stems from six-month
missions. Nevertheless, shared and
integrated objectives are the products of
necessity in a region that views politics,
security, and assistance as inextricably
linked. At the tactical level, mission
statements and operational plans are
essential to differentiate respective
tasks. If that is not done, when
military troops support humanitarian
organizations, the respective roles of the
organizations become blurred in their
conduct as well as in the perception of
the belligerents and victims. Conversely,
“stove piped” solutions, where the
organizations work autonomously, are
inefficient, even dysfunctional, and have
previously seen catastrophic results in
Rwanda and Somalia.
resolution is achieved when one side
wins through political resolution or
armed conflict. Militarily, what happened in Bosnia was the war was stopped
mid-stride. This stoppage denied victory
to the winners and allowed the losers to
escape the rationalizaton that they were
defeated. Politically, a comprehensive
housecleaning was not done except to
The Dayton Accords is a comprehensive settlement. The strategy is
defined in the articles. While the
parlance of the agreement is in
universal statements, the detail of the
execution of the tasks is found in the
respective organizations’ operational
plans. It is through continual coordination at every level that the
intervention plan is executed.
In addition to tasks of physical
security, military forces in this situation
were faced with numerous nontraditional tasks in support of noncombat objectives. The traditional
bipolar conflict, the “winner and
losers,” had been replaced with
numerous actors, only one of which was
the military, who would conduct
humanitarian interventions.
From a military perspective, intervention in a conflict on humanitarian
grounds solves nothing. There has never
been a victor in the latest of conflicts
that have rocked the Balkans
for centuries. Intervention is not
synonymous with resolution. Classic
Major Vic Sattler, CD
note who the belligerents were at the
highest levels. Institutional corruption
remains a problem even today.
Economically, there was no Marshall
Plan or economic reconstruction; there
was only humanitarian aid. In Bosnia,
two entities and three ethnicities (which
are, in fact, further splintered into
numerous political factions within
ethnicities, each of which is also seeking
resolution) remain that still have not
had a resolution to their disputes.
Instead, what happened was intervention on humanitarian grounds. The
last armed conflict in Bosnia was in 1995.
To this day, Stabilization Force (SFOR)
cannot disengage itself for fear of
hostilities resuming. This is echoed
today, even in the most stable areas, by
locals who admit that war would resume
in a very short time without SFOR.
72
S T R AT E G Y A N D C O O R D I N AT I O N
CHALLENGES
“T
he absence of comprehensive
strategies for dealing with
complex humanitarian emergencies is
one reason that the international
response to them has been so troubled
and so often frustrated.”5 The problem
of strategy starts with the large number
of independent actors: the military,
UN agencies, NGOs, International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
and donor aid agencies. Each of these
actors has its own agenda and each
controls a piece of the strategic pie.
Individually, each has created its own
mandate and operational plan.
However, a coordinated strategy needs
careful deliberation and execution.
Anyone in the group can undermine a
coordinated strategy simply by stopping
or even slowing operations. Worse yet,
anyone can force endless compromise
resulting in a plan of the lowest
common denominator rather than
addressing the real issues. There is a
requirement of all organizations to
surrender some autonomy in order to
rationalize the planning and conduct
the work in complex emergencies. In
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
NATO was dispatched to BosniaHerzegovina to ensure, by military
means if necessary, that the guns
remain silent, while humanitarian
matters were delegated to the
competent organizations: the return
of refugees and displaced persons to
the UNHCR [United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees], the
release of detainees and the tracing
of missing persons to the ICRC.
[Only] when the mandate of each
agency is clearly defined according
to its specific functions does the IC
gain in efficiency (translation).6
However, the tasks assigned by the
Dayton Accords were unconventional
for military forces. In fact, in some cases
(as in “Assist the UNHCR”[7]) they
were specifically humanitarian tasks.
The military force must know what the
diplomat, the humanitarian relief
worker, and the developmental
economist do in addition to its own
role. It is through knowing what others
do and what you specifically don’t have
to do that you can plan, operationally
coordinate, and ultimately solve central
problems in the most efficient and
economical manner.
THE PROBLEM EMERGES: BLURRED
MISSIONS FOR THE MILITARY
T
here are some inherent problems
with doing military and humanitarian actions at the same time.
Humanitarian action, by definition, is
impartial for all those who require it.
Take, for example, the humanitarian
aid convoys (impartial) that are
protected by armed military (partial).
The military force participation will use
force to deliver the aid. When military
forces are sent to theatres of operation,
they remain a political tool to achieve a
political end regardless of the best of
intentions. Hence, military forces are
not neutral. They use aid to reward
compliance of belligerents and victims
as part of an operational plan. Even the
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
UN adopts resolutions of a political they prevent excessive loss of life, and
nature. The UN designates belligerents they ensure military security of the area.
and victims, makes policies, sends The military can quickly assess situations
military troops (through the Security and coordinate efforts to address
Council), and sends aid organizations. requirements. While the military is
Once a judgement is
made as to whom the
There are some inherent
belligerents are, improblems with doing military
partiality is lost. One
cannot be a judge, take
and humanitarian actions
sides, and then claim to
at the same time.
be neutral. The confusion of roles between
military and humanitarian actions adept at such activities, every effort must
occurs when the military conducts non- be made to facilitate UN, NGOs, and
traditional military tasks. The fact is local involvement at the earliest
nobody is neutral in the delivery of moment. A balance must be struck, and
humanitarian aid: “some NGOs have there is a middle ground from which
abandoned any pretence of absolute the military can aid societies that need
neutrality in favour of the principle of to be reconstructed during and after
independence.”8
hostilities. The fact is military resources
are finite. There is always the danger
The military mission must under- that they become inextricably involved
stand the strategic mandates if it is to in, and ultimately over stretched
understand how its operation will affect between, military and humanitarian
the overall IC’s coordinated plan and tasks, thus detracting from the
avoid unintentional consequences. The traditional tasks of the military mission.
military mission is only one small It is the military commander who is
portion of the strategic response. If we faced with balancing threats to life and
understand what we are all supposed to security with the requirement for
do—that is, understand the strategic humanitarian aid.
intent—then can we draw boundaries
The conduct of military forces and
and define our tasks in the chaos of a
complex humanitarian intervention. humanitarian agencies can profoundly
Only then can we begin to do our job. It influence the power of local governis when “foreign ministries engage in ment. It is critical that the local
politics, armies carry out orders of population does not become depenpoliticians with military means, and dent on military intervention. The local
humanitarian agencies were left to get population must try to meet the IC’s
on with their work that a welcomed efforts half way. There is nothing more
situation of complimentarity exists, as is important in humanitarian action than
moreover reflected in the Peace to challenge the local population to
Agreements” (translation).9 While solve their own problems. Local
everything must be coordinated, there is institutions and government must take
a point where each organization needs the lead from aid agencies and the
to get on with its own tasks. Alone, a military at the earliest opportunity.
military mission statement may not They must not be allowed to abrogate
include humanitarian relief initiatives, their responsibilities to/for their
political negotiations, or developmental people. Sometimes, a robust and
interventions. Hence, it is possible to callous indifference must be shown by
have military mission success but lose the intervening military if dependency
is to be overcome early on. Unless the
the strategic humanitarian campaign.
situation is so desperate that further
loss of life will occur without substantial
B A L A N C I N G F I N I T E M I L I TA RY
military intervention, a balance must be
RESOURCES
struck between callous indifference and
ilitary forces are particularly adept military intervention to encourage selfat providing early coordination of help. At the earliest opportunity, once
humanitarian activities. They are a the situation is under control, the
stabilizing influence on the population, military leadership should withdraw
M
73
The Challenges of Military Operations in Humanitarian Action Operations
Having established that there must
be a strategy and all the actors must
understand their own role, it is also
essential to understand what everyone
else does in this complex emergency
response system, from the strategic to
the tactical level:
from intervention to a monitoring
capacity. It is up to commanders at all
levels to identify this fine balance
between too little or too much military
intervention. Particularly, as the belligerents become compliant and the
victims harder to find, the operational
requirement to monitor their activities
also falls off.
When traditional military operations slow, the non-traditional support
to civil agencies and the local
population picks up. There are always
inherent risks in providing tasks for
under-utilized soldiers. Soldiers may be
used for humanitarian tasks only if it is
in support of the mission or the higher
commander’s desired end state. The
level at which military resources may be
used for non-military tasks is a risk that
the commander takes. The key to
mission success is not to create
dependencies but self-sustainable
solutions. The IC must support and
empower local government to regain its
authority and legitimacy.
S E T T I N G S T R AT E G I C G O A L S :
JUDGING MISSION SUCCESS
Major Vic Sattler, CD
I
t is from the strategic mandates that
one can identify what the mission
objectives are. The objectives should
allow for periodic evaluation so that
resources can be re-allocated as
necessary to meet those objectives.
Without realizable mission objectives,
there is no means by which to judge
success or failure of the mission and
ultimately arrive at an achievable exit
strategy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
United States set a fixed deadline to
determine when the mission would be
over. While a deadline is an option to
consider when deciding how long one
will be committed to a mission, it
undermines the very reason for which
the intervention took place: it does not
address current condition of the
humanitarian emergency. As previously
mentioned, traditional conflicts only
end when there is either a military
victory or a negotiated settlement
between all parties. In humanitarian
actions, there may be no resolution.
Hence, there is the need for realizable,
intermediate goals that lead to the
strategic objectives. They permit, if
nothing else, a phased measure on
74
The presence of Canadian soldiers in Mitrovica, Kosovo, in February 2000, allowed
the local children to feel safe enough to come out and play. (Courtesy CFPU)
paper that allows organizations to review
missions and re-allocate resources with a
view to being a more efficient part of the
coordinated strategy.
Each complex humanitarian action
is unique. However, it may be possible
to identify some general principles that
can guide the development of a
strategic design. The start state is likely
always the same: it is setting the
preconditions for displaced persons,
refugees and evacuees (DPREs) to
return to their home communities with
a view to returning society to some
degree of normalcy and self-sufficiency.
When military forces are tasked with
creating these conditions, the initial
planned involvement is usually one of
simple security and monitoring. In the
case of humanitarian intervention
operations, the military requirements
quickly broaden to supporting the UN
agencies and NGOs. The distribution of
food and water, local security (police),
information centres, medical cover, and
re-establishment of local government
all require organization and resources.
Each is intertwined with the next.
These functions are not military in
nature but do require the security and
logistic support that military forces are
well suited to accommodate early on in
the mission. These functions are also
tangible objectives that are inextricably
linked to the overall strategy of the
mission. To that end, they suggest a list
of measurable objectives that have the
return of society to some degree of
normalcy as an end state. The following
list contains suggested objectives of a
humanitarian intervention:
•
Restoration of Physical Security –
All subsequent objectives are
dependent on this first one.
When a local population can
live without fear of violence,
administrative harassment, or
unjust laws and belligerents are
no longer a threat to conflict,
then can there be a return to
normalcy for society. True
physical security is realized
when the local institutions are
capable of maintaining such a
state without the intervention
of foreign forces.
•
Restoration of the Rule of Law –
This is perhaps the most difficult
objective. Neither the military nor
NGOs really have the skill sets to
re-establish the rule of law. It is
usually the UNHCR that leads the
IC with this challenge. While local
police forces may become more
professional through international
police task-force-type organizations
to guide them, without a judiciary
that enforces the laws of the
land, the best local police are for
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
•
•
•
Resettlement – DPREs should be
resettled to their own homes at the
earliest opportunity. In some cases,
when DPREs have been displaced
for long periods, they have no will
to return to their former homes.
The choice to stay should not interfere with the return of other DPREs.
The aim is to restore community
life and economic self-sufficiency.
DPREs will not return home
unless they believe that their
physical security is assured.
Restoration of Markets and
Economy – Since humanitarian
interventions seem to take place
in countries where agriculture is
the largest market, only when the
local population can bring their
produce to market does the
economy become embryonic.
Trade creates jobs. Jobs create
stability. Stability lends to social
order. There is a huge danger
here with regard to relief
agencies. Humanitarian relief
agencies can profoundly alter the
economics of a distressed society
•
Restoration of Basic Medical
Facilities – There is a requirement
to have basic medical care that
can provide minimum coverage
of a society. Even in societies where
there is an absence of government,
there is very basic care. When Western
agencies act in humanitarian interventions, the basic level of care helps
to reduce mortality rates by providing inoculations. The ICRC is
instrumental in returning DPREs to
communities that have access to clean
water, thus reducing risk of epidemics for the rest of the population.
Food Security – Food security is
achieved by having a secure source
of affordable food to sustain life.
In rural areas, this means planting
crops and reconstituting animal
herds. In urban areas, it means sufficient economic activity for people
to live.
CONCLUSION
M
ilitary forces, UN agencies, and
NGOs will continue to co-operate
in humanitarian actions. The instability
that characterizes these complex emergencies will not change:
The countries of the former
Yugoslavia have not yet risen to this
challenge. The authorities now in
power are all relics of the old Tito
system of State-run, centralized
economies and single-party government. Profound political and
economic reforms are needed to
prepare these new States to take their
place among European nations. Peace
will only endure with the building and
proper functioning of democratic
State institutions which take into
account the cultural identities and
political entities that emerged from
the conflict (translation).10
Only the IC and SFOR working
together have the ability to mould
Bosnia-Herzegovina into a stable,
prosperous, and secure nation.
Presented above are components of
the start state and subsequent coordination difficulties that face military
forces when conducting non-traditional
tasks with unfamiliar partners and
different mandates trying to work within
the same overarching strategic mandate.
Commanders need to be aware of the
capabilities of their units and accept the
risk of doing humanitarian aid balanced
against their traditional military role.
Lastly, suggested above are realizable strategic objectives that permit
one to set and measure success of a
generic humanitarian action and
rationalize the mission. Identification
of success or failure permits one to
determine where the effort of a mission
rests. Only once measurable objectives
are met is an exit strategy possible.
The success of occupation can only be
judged fifty years from now. If the
Germans (Bosnians) at that time have a
stable, prosperous democracy, then we
shall have succeeded.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
June 1945
Soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry
Battalion Group help an elderly woman out of a truck at Grako Ljani, Croatia,
October 1992. The refugees were brought to their village to retrieve some
personal effects left behind due to the war. (Courtesy CFPU)
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
75
The Challenges of Military Operations in Humanitarian Action Operations
when they introduce computers,
vehicles, food aid, and pharmaceuticals. Every precaution must
be taken to not upset the balance.
The old market system—vice the
Western, technological introductions—
is often the quickest means to reestablish an economy.
not. Restoration of the rule of law
is a component of the restoration
of physical security of a society.
While UN agencies can support
the rule of law, a sustainable
system of maintaining law and
order, overcoming institutional
corruption, can ultimately come
only from within.
ENDNOTES
ABOUT THE AUTHOR…
Major C. Victor Sattler enrolled in the Canadian Forces
in 1988 and completed infantry officer classification
training in 1990. He has served with Princess Patricia’s
Canadian Light Infantry in Calgary and Winnipeg and on
exchange with both battalions of The Royal Green Jackets in
Dover, England and Dhekalia, Cyprus. He has served in a
number of staff positions including Infantry Doctrine at
Land Force Command Headquarters in St. Hubert and at
the Directorate of Army Training and the Canadian Land
Force Command and Staff College in Kingston. Major
Sattler’s operational duty includes a tour with the United
Nations forces in Cyprus and deployment throughout
Europe as part of the UK’s Infantry commitment to Allied
Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) and NATO
Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Major Sattler is a
political science graduate of Queen’s University at Kingston,
The Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College, and
The Combined Arms Tactics Course at Warminster, UK. He
is currently serving as an Arms Control Inspector at J3 Arms
Control Verification in Ottawa.
1.
“Humanitarian action” is a term that refers to the forcible
intervention in domestic affairs of another state by a variety of means. It
can include a whole range of actions, from mild diplomatic protests to
sanctions to military invasion to occupation, occurring over an
indeterminate period of time. These are interventions short of war. The
aim of humanitarian action is to provide conflict victims with a measure
of protection, to bring them aid and to initiate a dialogue with the
belligerents, to institute rehabilitative projects that have a stabilizing
influence on communities, and to bring order back to people’s lives.
Such an aim is based on a simple realization that people’s lives must
return to normal before long-term stability can be achieved.
2. Christophe Girod and Angelo Gnaedinger, “Le politique, le
militaire, l’humanitaire: un difficile mariage à trois,” Dernière Guerre
balkanique? Ex-Yugoslavie: témoignages, analyses, perspectives (Paris and
Montréal: L’Harmattan, 1996), p. 157.
3. Girod and Gnaedinger, pp. 139-140.
4. Girod and Gnaedinger, p. 144.
5. Andres S. Natsios, US Foreign Policy and the Four Horseman of the
Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies, Westport, Ct:
Praeger, 1997, p. 60.
6. Girod and Gnaedinger, p. 159.
7. Dayton Peace Agreement, Article VI, Deployment of IFOR,
paragraphs two and three refer.
8. Natsios, p. 56.
9. Girod and Gnaedinger, p. 159.
10. Girod and Gnaedinger, p. 162.
Major Vic Sattler, CD
Coyotes of the LdSH(RC) Recce Squadron vehicles
at the Kandahar Airport, after arriving there on
3 February 2002. DGPA/J5PA Combat Camera photo
by Capt Dale MacEachern
76
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
BOOK REV I EWS
Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada’s
Airborne Experience 1942 – 1995
Reviewed by Major J.J. Parkinson, CD
period 1946-1948, the Mobile Striking
Force and Defence of Canada Force
1948-1967, The Canadian Airborne
Regiment 1968-1995, and the recreation of decentralized parachute
companies after the disbandment of
The Canadian Airborne Regiment in
1995. At the back of the book is a list of
abbreviations that will be valuable to
most readers, whether they are military
or civilian. The index is quite comprehensive and more than adequate for
anyone wishing to use the book for
research purposes.
When I saw this book, I thought,
“Uh-oh, this looks like a ‘how badly the
Airborne was treated and how nasty
everyone was to us’ book”. The cover of
the book is unimaginative, and the title
seems to have macho, Hollywood
overtones. The foreword by MajorGeneral Pitts, although well written,
appears somewhat self-serving, just
another member of the airborne
community supporting one of their
own. The preface by Colonel Kenward,
however, is excellent, and sets the real
tone for the book. This is followed by
the acknowledgements, and then
listings of the Regimental Commanders, Commanding Officers and
Colonels of the Regiment for The
Canadian Airborne Regiment.
The introduction suggests the book
will be a scholarly examination of the
Canadian airborne experience rather
than some form of popularized history.
Lieutenant-Colonel Horn clearly outlines his central thesis that Canadian
airborne capability has had a bumpy
ride due to a lack of strategic vision
regarding airborne forces. As there was,
and is, no strategic direction, how then
can there be any Army, or operational,
direction regarding either the requirement for, or the role of, airborne
forces? Horn also raises the issue of
elitism, although this is the focus of the
book. I suspect this is to address the
issue of The Canadian Airborne
Regiment as an elite unit, something
many perceived it to be. The notes at
the end of the introduction are quite
extensive, a number of quotes having
more than one source. This is the
standard for notes throughout the
book, lots of them, well documented,
and most often from primary sources.
The book is chronologically arranged
into five periods: the establishment of a
parachute capability during the Second
World War, the immediate postwar
Although the book is about
Canada’s airborne experience, in
reality Bastard Sons goes much deeper
than this, maintaining that Canadian
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Bastard Sons: An Examination of
Canada’s Airborne Experience 1942 –
1995, by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd
Horn.
(St.
Catherines,
Vanwell
Publishing Limited, 2001. 288 pages).
military strategy failed to protect
Canadian sovereignty. Towards the end
of Chapter Two, Lieutenant-Colonel
Horn sets the stage for this argument to
be developed further when he quotes
defence analyst R.J. Sutherland:
“Canada must not become through
military weakness or otherwise a direct
threat to American security. If this were
to happen, Canada’s right to existence
as an independent nation would be
placed in jeopardy.” LieutenantColonel Horn then goes on to clearly
illustrate that on three separate
occasions, the issue of airborne
capability came to the forefront of
Canadian strategic military thinking
when there was a perceived threat to
Canadian sovereignty from the United
States. On all three occasions, the
77
Book Reviews
I
t was with some caution that I
approached Bastard Sons. I
remember well the disbandment
of The Canadian Airborne
Regiment. At the time, I was shocked
and angered at the sudden announcement of the Regiment’s disbandment,
which, in my view, represented a
betrayal of the highest order. Upon
limited consideration, I changed my
mind. I was vindictively glad that The
Canadian Airborne Regiment had been
punished for the problems it had
brought upon the Army. However, with
greater reflection, I realized that the
Army’s problems were those of its own
making, and that the disbandment of
The Canadian Airborne Regiment was a
reflection of those problems, not a
solution to them.
Book Reviews
Canadian government reacted to
events, rather than develop a strategic
plan. Changes in strategy lasted as long
as the perceived threat; once the threat
was gone, attention quickly wandered
elsewhere. Nor does LieutenantColonel Horn credit the Army with any
better planning or foresight than the
government that controlled it.
praise about the Regiment and its
conduct from a number of important
individuals, including Jonathan T. Howe,
the Special Representative to the U.N.
Secretary-General; Lieutenant-General
R.B. Johnston, American UNITAF
commander; Robert Oakley, the Special
Envoy to Somalia, and Minister of State
for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall.
The most fascinating part of the
book, from an army perspective, is
Chapter Four, “The Winds of Change”.
Many of the issues and the problems
identified in this chapter, covering the
period of 1964 to 1968, are the very
same issues and problems facing the
Army today. The Minister’s intent then
to “restructure the military into a global
and very mobile force that could meet
the widest range of potential
requirements in the fastest possible
time” sounds very similar to the Army’s
rationale for a medium-weight force
today. Then, as now, this concept of
rapid deployment did not really exist.
To that effect, Lieutenant-Colonel Horn
quotes the Commander of Force Mobile
Command, Lieutenant-General Allard:
“We knew that the deployment of an
infantry brigade overseas could take
several weeks and even then only if it
were already completely equipped and
had received at least one month’s
thorough training.” Has anything really
changed? Nor were some of the systemic
problems any different. LieutenantColonel Horn does an excellent job
showing how direction from a general
officer, who was essentially the
Commander of the Army, was ignored—
a problem that exists today.
Despite all of the book’s strengths
there are a number of problems. At
times, the author’s writing style can be a
little difficult to follow, more so at the
beginning of the book as he jumps
around chronologically to consider
some relevant point from an earlier
period. In part, this is an editing
problem, and there are others such as
the four missing notes for Chapter
Eight. In addition, on three separate
occasions, Lieutenant-Colonel Horn
states that the government would rather
spend money on social programs than
on the military, yet he neither develops
this point to substantiate it, nor does he
footnote it, to credit the argument
elsewhere. Is this in fact true? Or is it
just another “urban legend?” This
weakens what would be an otherwise
balanced academic work. In addition,
throughout the Canadian airborne
experience, the size and organization of
airborne forces has varied considerably,
thus a comparison of airborne organizations and establishments from 1942
to the present would have been a nice
addition to provide some context.
The most emotionally powerful part
of the book is Chapter Eight, “On the
Edge of the Abyss,” dealing with The
Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia.
The Regiment’s commitment to Operation Deliverance and the results of its
deployment are very well described.
Lieutenant-Colonel Horn presents the
information in a very balanced manner, in
sufficient detail relative to the length and
scope of the book. He faces the problems
with The Canadian Airborne Regiment in
Somalia directly. More importantly, he
presents a very well supported case that
The Canadian Airborne Regiment’s
conduct of the mission in Somalia was
highly successful. He documents high
78
In the conclusion, LieutenantColonel Horn provides a direct
explanation for the title, and provides a
strong case for the maintenance of an
airborne capability. He also addresses
the issue of Canadian airborne forces as
an elite, stating that the 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion, the Special Air
Service Company and The Canadian
Airborne Regiment (from its inception
until about 1977) could all be
considered elite units. Where the
conclusion falls short is with respect to
an analytical consideration of future
Canadian airborne capability. Although
this may be understandable considering the emotion still surrounding
the issue and the fact that this is
a historically-based study, this does
not make its omission any less
disappointing.
But the biggest and most unforgivable problem with the book is the
treatment, or its lack, of the operational
experience of the 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion and the Canadian
component of the First Special Service
Force. Lieutenant-Colonel Horn covers
this experience in less than a single
page. This is a serious shortcoming for
a book that is supposed to be
examining airborne experience. Two
whole chapters, 33 pages including
notes, address the period 1935 to 1945;
yet, the operational experience, the
only Canadian operational airborne
experience in wartime, is dealt with
in a single page. This should have
warranted a chapter of it’s own. Perhaps
there is a valid reason for not including
it, but at least let the reader know why
something so obvious is not included.
In the end though, the good far
outweighs the bad, and Bastard Sons is an
excellent book. Lieutenant-Colonel Horn
has clearly illustrated the lack of strategic
thought concerning the creation and
maintenance of Canada’s airborne
capability. He also does an excellent job
dealing with the most painful period of
the Canadian airborne experience, the
disbandment of The Canadian Airborne
Regiment. The author does not address
this as an issue of whether there should
be an airborne regiment, but as a matter
of how the strategic decision was made
and continues to be made. This book is
significant for its sound academic
treatment of a failure in Canadian
military strategy. From an Army
perspective, it clearly illustrates where we
have come from, as a modern military
institution, and that we still have a way to
go towards achieving institutional
maturity. This book is a must-read for
anyone interested in modern Canadian
military history and should be a part of
every professional soldier’s literary
collection.
Major J.J. Parkinson, CD, is the G1,
Land Force Doctrine and Training
System, an occasional parachutist, and
is working towards a Master of Arts in
Militar y Studies from the American
Militar y University.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Canada at War and Peace, II:
A Millenium of Military Heritage
Reviewed by Major Jim Godefroy, CD
C
The jacket suggests that the books
constitute a valuable research tool,
given their “chronological organization
and A-Z index” and their coverage of
the political, social, and military aspects
of the conflicts in which Canada has
participated. I kept this claim in mind as
I read through them and must confess
that I came away less than convinced.
As a general criticism, I noted that
the article length and style are aimed
more at the curious than the serious
student of military history, and few
primary sources are cited. Many
passages seem to mimic the style of
popular historians like Pierre Berton,
and it appears that Taylor’s aim is to
popularize Canadian military exploits.
In this he certainly succeeds. Unfortunately, given the unsophisticated
nature of the analysis offered in many of
the pieces, the overall effect of the
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
Canada at War and Peace, II: A Millenium of Military Heritage. Scott Taylor,
Editor. Two Volumes. (Ottawa, Esprit de Corps Books, 1999, 2000).
books is diminished by a lack of depth
and balance and by the inevitable gaps
and omissions that have occurred.
While I have a broad general interest in
Canadian military history and an
academic background in the subject, I
consider myself a layman and decided
that the best way to gauge the general
quality and accuracy of the articles was
to cast scrutiny on those sections that
held a more specialist interest for me. As
a collector of campaign medals awarded
to Canadians, I was drawn to one article,
written by L.H. Packard, dealing with
medals awarded to Canadian servicemen. I found that this article confused
awards for specific military actions
(denoted by clasps to the medal) with
medals generally. Two of the three
awards mentioned are misnamed and
erroneous information is provided
about the method of qualification for
the Saskatchewan clasp to the North
West Canada Medal, which was awarded
for service in the North West Rebellion
of 1885. These errors involve facts that
are easily checked in standard
secondary sources and cast doubt on the
general quality of editing. Further on, in
the section dealing with Canadian
participation in the Boer War (another
personal interest), I noted that no
mention is made of the large Canadian
contingent sent to the South African
Constabulary or the second most bloody
Canadian battle of the war, fought 31
March 1902 at Boschbult on the Harts
River. In fact, Canadian participation in
the war beyond the return of our initial
contingents is ignored. Similar omissions
and errors dog much of the text and
lead me to dispute the claim that these
volumes could be used as a valuable
research tool.
As I read on, I remarked that
Canada’s entry into the First World War
received a flippant one-page treatment
from Norman Shannon, who repeated
tired stereotypes about Minister of
Militia and Defence Sam Hughes,
dismissed the utility of the Ross rifle
using an awkward turn of phrase, and
ended his piece with a cryptic reference
to German experiments with gas in the
Ypres sector. A reader with some
knowledge of the Canadian experience
in the First World War will understand
79
Book Reviews
anada at War and Peace, II:
A Millenium of Militar y
Heritage is a two-volume
collection of short articles,
each two to three pages in length, which
cover the history of conflict in Canada
and Canadian military activity from the
arrival of the Vikings and aboriginal
tribal conflict to present-day events.
Published by Esprit de Corps books,
Editor-in-Chief Scott Taylor took on a
very ambitious project in his attempt to
chronicle the entire military history of
what is now Canada, and the two
volumes, at just under 1000 pages, took
some time to plow through. No less than
44 separate contributors are listed in the
frontispiece of each volume, and, as can
be imagined, with such a wide variety of
authors, the result is of varied quality.
The books’ content is a combination of
articles reprinted from Esprit de Corps
Magazine and purpose-written material.
Both volumes are illustrated profusely
with both familiar photographs and
original art produced by Scott and
Katherine Taylor. Several colour
sections are included.
the hidden meaning in all of these coy
remarks, but the uninformed reader
who is leaning on this “valuable
research tool” will be lost and unable to
grasp much of what Mr. Shannon is
getting at until they read other articles
and put some of the pieces of the puzzle
together.
Book Reviews
The First World War, from a
Canadian perspective, is generally well
covered, with articles or mention
accorded to most of the major Canadian
actions of the war. This section is
marred by a recurring theme espoused
by Mr. Shannon, which sees an
unnecessary and populist lauding of
Canadian fighting effectiveness in the
face of incompetent British generalship.
Criticism of British generals’ performance
during the First World War is nothing
new. The performance of Field Marshall
Haig and his staff has been critically
examined for over 80 years, and
excellent books by Denis Winter, John
Keegan, and others have explained
their decisions, failures, and successes in
a balanced way. The regrettable manner
in which this theme is presented here—
as a simple fact requiring no
explanation—makes it seem trite,
oversimplified and hard to swallow, and
detracts from the otherwise generally
factual accounts of the great Canadian
achievements during the war. On the
bright side, and contrasting Mr.
Shannon’s style, are several well-written
pieces by Mike McNorgan on the
exploits of the Canadian Cavalry
Brigade and articles by Colonel Strome
Galloway such as his well-written
account of the Canadian entry into
Mons at the end of the war. These pieces
suggest that Taylor’s format is not
necessarily flawed but that editing, tone,
and bias might be the main detractors.
The second volume begins with a
short section on the inter-war years
before devoting its bulk (over 200
pages) to a series of articles dealing with
the Second World War. Subscribers to
Esprit de Corps will be disappointed
with this volume, as almost all of the
Second World War section consists of
80
articles reprinted from that magazine,
and a simple troll through back issues
could have found them what they were
after. The Second World War pieces are
a combination of unit, action, and
incident exposés, personal accounts and
biographies. Like the First World War
section, coverage of major Canadian
activities is generally good, but shallow,
and often tinged with recriminations
about a lack of allied recognition
for Canadian accomplishments. This
plaintive theme grows tiring very
quickly, and while it might strike a
chord with some, it will generally tend
to distract the reader.
A somewhat odd piece by George
Orsyk deals with the Canadian Forces
and the rise of the Parti Québécois.
Orsyk argues that “many Quebecois
have viewed the military as a paramilitary force the Federal Government
keeps in readiness and reserve for a
troublesome colony called Quebec.” He
goes on to explain CF deployments
during the 1970 October Crisis, but
subsequently questions various CF
decisions in 1976 and 1977, including
the large number of CF personnel
placed in support of the Montreal
Olympics and the move of the Canadian
Airborne Regiment from Edmonton to
Petawawa, leading the reader to
conclude that they were somehow
motivated by fears of separatism. With
no primary source references beyond
public press announcements and no
attribution of the source of various
quotes, Orsyk paints a shadowy picture
that smacks of conspiracy theories and
casts the government and CF leadership
in a questionable light.
I must confess that, given the
reputation of the Editor-in-Chief, I
expected the section dealing with
Canada’s recent military exploits to be
somewhat biased against the “brass.” I
was not disappointed in this regard. The
section dealing with Canada’s military
involvement in the Balkans sees several
familiar mantra repeated, including
allegations that the Department of
National Defence has systematically
covered up shooting incidents,
downplayed or hushed up Canadian
combat, and tried to keep the public in
the dark. The “brass,” the Public Affairs
and Judge Advocate General folks,
senior civil servants, and their political
masters are tagged as the ethicallychallenged architects of this grand web
of deception, and the reader is led to
believe that a pervasive culture of
secrecy and cover-up drives this agenda.
There is little consideration of possibly
less sinister reasons for some of the
failings of the CF such as downsizing,
under-trained personnel, bureaucratic
politics, or simple individual human
error. While there is little doubt that
there is some truth to much of what is
printed here, facts that do not support
the secrecy culture thesis are ignored
and the overall result is an unbalanced
account.
Would I recommend these books to
the reader? Regrettably, I cannot. While
Taylor’s effort in bringing all of this
material together is admirable, there is
little that is new here and too much that
is subjective, flawed, missing, or
misleading. The odd article might offer
some new or obscure information, but
the lack of footnotes or sources makes
their content suspect. For the
determined reader who insists on onestop shopping, other general Canadian
military histories, such as Desmond
Morton’s A Militar y Histor y of Canada,
are a better choice. While this genre will
always be plagued by inevitable
omissions, the latter book provides a
more balanced and factual overview of
our military heritage than Taylor’s work
and is an easier read.
Major Jim Godefroy, CD, is currently
ser ving at the Directorate of Army
Training in Kingston.
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in
the German Army, 1920-1939
Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, CD
The mythology around Blitzkrieg is
a case in point. It has long been held
that Blitzkrieg was the result of the
efforts of a select few—most notably
Guiderian and von Mainstein, guided by
the works of Liddell Hart. These
mavericks, the myth suggests, took tank
and aeroplane technology and leveraged
it to produce maximum effect, thus
creating a doctrine that was unbeatable
in its time. The myth also refers to the
fierce struggle between these officers
and those of the intransigent General
Staff who refused to accept their ideas—
a struggle that was only resolved when
Hitler himself sanctioned Blitzkrieg, and
the Wehrmacht was thereby transformed
into a war-winning machine.
The value of Citino’s work lies in his
dispelling this particular myth, which in
turn discredits all like it. In The Path to
Blitzkrieg - Doctrine and Training in the
German Army, 1920-1939, Citino argues
convincingly that German battlefield
success was not the result of any
particular new tactical method, technology or weapon but of institutional
excellence that came about through
sustained effort for a period of decades.
Path to Blitzkrieg fills a gap in the
historical research of the German Army
from 1920 to 1939. Much has been
written on the role of the Reichswehr in
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
the Weimar Republic and the role of
the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany, and
there are excellent biographies of the
key commanders of this period. There
are also good studies on the
development of the tank and aircraft.
But there is no single work that
discusses the developments in training
and doctrine that became the
foundation of Second World War
German fighting excellence.
While Citino’s scope stretches from
1920 to 1939, the weight of his work
rests in the era of von Seeckt, 1920 to
1926. He persuasively contends that the
roots of Blitzkrieg lie in this early
period, in von Seeckt's doctrine of
Bewegungskrieg or “war of movement.”
The Versailles Treaty had limited
Germany to a posture of strategic
defence and prohibited tank and
combat plane production. Yet, despite
this limitation, von Seeckt was able to
instil in his small professional army a
preference for tactical offensive
operations using mobility provided by
motorization and supported by aircraft
and a continued emphasis of combined
arms doctrine and small unit leadership
and initiative.
Citino covers the genesis of von
Seeckt's Bewegungskrieg from the
tactics and doctrine of the 1914
German Army, through the First World
War, to its articulation in the 1921 Field
Service Regulations - Combined Arms
Leadership in Battle. But because this
doctrine manual was "frozen in 1921,"
Citino uses other source material to
examine subsequent years, most
remarkably the yearly "Observations of
the Chief of the Army Command."
From these sources, as well as reports of
military attaches and contemporary
military writings, Citino assesses the
influence von Seeckt exerted on the
Reichswher. He informs us that every
officer received copies of the
“Observations,” which became the rules
The Path to Blitzkrieg – Doctrine and
Training in the German Army, 1920-1939,
by Robert M. Citino (Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).
that guided the work of the subsequent
year. Von Seeckt's mark was also evident
in the weekly Militar Wochenblatt,
which published tactical exercises by
the Army Training Section. These works
document the establishment of a sound
doctrinal foundation for methods and
tactics that were essential to German
successes in the Second World War.
Citino also provides insight on the
conduct of all types of training. He
dedicates a chapter to describing the
various tactical schools of the German
Army, their scope, and their curriculae.
He gives detailed descriptions of war
games and paper tactical exercises.
Nevertheless, his greatest attention is
given to how field training exercises
were conducted, their scope, length,
and results. Here the reader gets a good
glimpse at training methodology of the
German Army, its use of umpires and
controlling staffs, the participation of
81
Book Reviews
C
asual students of history and
many military professionals
search for lights that illuminate the path toward
military excellence. They rummage
through history seeking examples of
panacea tactics or technologies that have
created decisive military advantage.
They are susceptible to mythologies of
military history; especially those wherein
some “revolution in military affairs” has
allowed an army to perform a rapid
metamorphosis after the acquisition of a
particular new capability that creates
overwhelming benefit to the force.
commanders and visitors, and the
means by which observations were
transformed into doctrinal changes.
Change and progression are a part
of this history. The reader senses
institutional learning that was built
incrementally year to year, allowing for
the expansion and re-armament of the
German Army after 1933 without loss of
competency. The sound doctrine
established by von Seeckt led training,
which, in turn, informed doctrine,
which again drove training in constant
cycles of learning that steadily
increased the German Army’s ability to
fight as combined arms organizations
in highly mobile offensive operations.
Citino concludes by describing
Case Yellow (the offensives against the
Low Countries and France in May
1940) as an example of effectiveness of
"doctrine" applied. The tactical
brilliance of the German Army in North
West Europe in 1940 was the
accumulative result of activities from
1920 to 1939 - when severe restrictions
on manpower and material did not stop
the German Army from being forwardthinking, innovative, and experimental.
Citino makes excellent use of
unpublished sources. These include
American military intelligence reports
from 1919 to 1941, records of the
German High Command, the papers of
Generals von Seeckt and Groener,
records of the German Foreign Office,
as well as secondary studies - which
include all of the seminal works on
this period. His footnoting instils
confidence and informs. There is great
detail, which is of value to the serious
historian of that period, but which also
serves to fully substantiate his
argument.
Citino’s Path to Blitzkreig is an
excellent companion to Harold
Winton’s To Change an Army and
to Doughty’s Seeds of Disaster,
which describe British and French
developments in doctrine and tactics in
the same period. The greatest value of
Path to Blitzkreig, however, lies in its
destruction of Blitzkrieg myths.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hope is a staff
officer with the Directorate of Land
Strategic Concepts (DLSC) in Kingston,
Ontario and a knowledgeable student of
militar y theor y and histor y.
Book Reviews
When new doctrine was introduced
in 1933—Truppenfuhrung—it was
really only an evolution of the doctrine
of the early 1920s. And this doctrine
survived the largest change in the
German Army in the entire period—
the establishment of the Panzer
Division in 1935-36. Citino attacks
Guiderian’s assertion about a long,
hard fight with Beck for the
establishment of Panzer divisions. Beck
became Chief of the Truppenamt in
1933; in 1935 three Panzer divisions
were fielded. This hardly suggests a
struggle. While the divisions themselves
were new, Panzer tactics, doctrine, and
training were not. A long-sustained
emphasis on combined arms warfare
and offensive action accommodated
these new formations.
82
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The Stand-Up Table
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
A Commentary on The Canadian Army Reading List: A Guide to Professional Reading
About the Author…
Donald E. Graves is a militar y historian specializing in operational and tactical
warfare. He is the author or editor of several critically-acclaimed books, including
Fighting for Canada: Seven Battles, 1758-1945, and is currently Managing
Director of Ensign Heritage Group, a commercial firm that provides consulting
services relating to militar y histor y to Canadian and American government
departments (including the Department of National Defence), museums and film
companies. He lives near Ottawa, Ontario.
5BBS – (FIVE BASIC BOOKS FOR SOLDIERS)
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War
T
he Canadian Army recently
published The Canadian
Army Reading List: A Guide to
Professional
Reading,
a
publication that is intended for all
ranks. In the foreword we are assured
that, among “the many challenges
confronting soldiers are the complex
warfighting, technological and social
changes of our times” and that “more
than ever we require a … thorough
understanding of a myriad of
interrelated subjects, such as doctrine,
training,
international
relations,
history and other topics to complete
our duties.” This may be true but,
personally, I question whether this
emphasis (which we hear everyday) on
the complexities of the modern world
is a wise thing when considering the
profession of arms. I have a little
experience in military history,
particularly operational and tactical
military history and, in the last decade
have, more and more, tried to reduce
things to their utmost simplicity lest I
be overwhelmed by yet another wave of
experts armed with “cutting-edge” and
radical new technologies that will
change the universe. In fact, so
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
resistant have I become to the almost
unceasing ranting about the complexities of the modern military
profession that I have gone quite in the
opposite direction and derived a
philosophy of warfare—that most
terrible of human endeavours—
founded on Clausewitz's assertion that:
“Fighting is the central military act; all
other activities merely support it.” It is
my belief that the “central military act”
is an exercise in hot- and cold-blooded
killing, and the soldier's task is to do
that awful job as efficiently as possible
with the minimum of casualties—
anything that works toward that end is
a good thing; anything that works
against that end is a bad thing. This
may be a simplistic belief, but it works
for me.
With this rudimentary philosophy,
it will come as no surprise that when
I perused the more than 100 titles
contained in The Canadian Army
Reading List, I was puzzled by many of
the choices. It is my feeling that too
many books on this list are concerned
with matters so arcane, peripheral,
transitory or academic that I doubt very
much whether an intelligent soldier
who wishes to learn more about his or
her profession would find much use for
them, other than as rather expensive
beer coasters.
“Fighting is the central military act;
all other activities merely support it”
(Clausewitz). Are we digressing from
that?
Since I am basically stupid, I like
to keep things as simple as possible
lest I get confused. For this reason, I
think that this reading list (which
appears to be the work of many hands
or committees) should be drastically
reduced. I therefore decided to
compile a list of the five books that I
feel every soldier should read at some
time during his or her professional
career. I call them the 5BBS (Five
Basic Books for Soldiers) following an
example set by the Royal Canadian
Air Force nearly half a century ago:
when faced with lengthy and
contradictory advice by numerous
experts on the best way to improve
the physical fitness of aircrew, the
RCAF instituted five simple exercises
(known as 5BX), which, along with
running, constitute an effective
training regimen that can be followed
by anyone, anywhere.
Here, in order of importance, is my
personal list of 5BBS, which I feel are
essential reading for every soldier:
83
The Stand-Up Table
The knowledge required does not
look remarkable…
1.
Clausewitz, On War (Princeton
University Press, Princeton,
1984). All soldiers must read this
book at some time. It is not an
easy task, but it has been made
much lighter by the appearance
of this excellent English language
edition edited by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, which contains a
70-page “Guide to Reading On
War” that is worth the price of
admission and a masterful summary
of the most important analysis of
warfare to appear in print.
leadership by an officer who has
much to say on the subject and
who says it with considerable
wisdom and not a little humour.
Of course my list is subjective,
and what works for me may well not
work for others. I am sure that others
have their own chosen 5BBS, and I
would welcome the opportunity to
learn about them. The main thing is
that, soldiers being busy people, I feel
there must be some attempt to
simplify their professional reading
not complicate it.
Training for War: The Reasons Why
Lieutenant-Colonel L. Fortin writes…
2.
3.
Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford
University Press, London, 1963).
The Chinese classic and a succinct
appraisal of the nature of warfare
notable for its emphasis on the
interplay of morale, diplomacy
and plain old trickery. The
edition I prefer is this one
translated by Samuel B. Griffith.
Farley Mowat, The Regiment
(McClelland and Stewart, Toronto,
1955, and many subsequent
editions). A fine piece of narrative
history that verges on being
literary, this is the story of a
Canadian infantry battalion
during the Second World War
and an excellent portrayal of
how a well-led military unit will
perform.
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
So far, so good, but at this point
things became difficult as there were
many alternate choices. After some
cogitation, I selected the following
titles as numbers 4 and 5—although I
have to admit that my decision is not
cast in stone.
4.
5.
84
Richard Holmes, Acts of War
(Macmillan, New York, 1985). The
work of a member of the faculty
of the Royal Military Academy at
Sandhurst and a senior officer of
the British Territorial Army, this
investigation of the nature of warfare is grounded on solid historical
research, as opposed to flights of
psychological or social science
fantasy.
Field Marshal A.P. Wavell, Generals
and Generalship (Macmillan, Toronto,
1940). An analysis of the art of
IN THE ARMY…
M
ost of the ways things are
done in the army have a
good reason for being
done exactly that way.
However, for many of us, these reasons
are misunderstood or simply just not
known. Yet it is important to know these
things, they are part of our culture. This
culture is unique and unforgiving
because we expect our soldiers to
operate without flinching under conditions totally abnormal for a human
being; namely to put themselves squarely
in the path of a projectile intended to kill
them. Even worse, we tell them the time
and the place that they shall put their
lives at stake. Remember that to be
efficient, soldiers must have confidence
in their leaders, their training and their
equipment. Everything must be undertaken to build and to sustain this
confidence. It is therefore not only
worthwhile but also essential to explain
the wisdom of these procedures. But first
of all, this wisdom has to be understood.
Isn’t training supposed to prepare us for
fighting? Let’s look at some examples.
The 13 km Forced March. The
present practice is to warn the platoon
or troop a few days before and, if time
permits, to get ready by marching in
formation in the days leading up to the
actual forced march. On the day of the
march, the commander explains the
route and insists that everybody must
finish within 2 hours and 26 minutes in
order to succeed and they’re off. The
routes out and back are run at the best
pace for the majority of the platoon or
troop. The usual result is that
participants are strung out over a
kilometre at the finish line. The fastest
will have completed the test in 90
minutes while the stragglers will arrive
just in time to meet the deadline. Many
of these last minute stragglers do not
have their weapons or equipment and
are therefore not combat effective.
Yet, this particular physical evaluation was chosen because it constitutes
a classical military deployment and
offers both a physical fitness evaluation
and also an evaluation of combat
effectiveness at the point of arrival. It is
in the best interests of platoon and
troop commanders to meet the
objectives of the mission and they must
therefore respond to the task as they
have been taught. First of all, the finish
line must be seen as the tactical line of
departure for a mission. Commanders
must do a map recce and establish
timed reference points that will ensure
they arrive at the finish within and
certainly no later than the assigned
time. What is the point in arriving at the
line of departure an hour early when we
know for a fact that lines of departure
are targets of choice? Lines of
departure may be chosen for being out
of range or observation for enemy
direct fire but the enemy is just as smart
as we are and will have defensive fire
tasks planned for the same reasons that
we do. Another principle must be
respected. Since the finish line is in fact
line of departure, we have to be as fresh
and as ready as possible with all our
firepower and obviously all participants.
Stack the odds in our favour!
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Inspections also have a purpose.
Who has not questioned the purpose of
rolling the socks individually and
placing them in the left corner of the
top drawer? This requirement and
many others similar in nature really
don’t seem to serve a particular
purpose but in fact serve to develop
personal discipline and uniformity.
Failure to acquire these particular
attributes can lead to far greater
consequences than a simple “bad chit”.
For instance when soldiers provide first
aid to the injured on the battlefield,
they don’t use their own field dressing;
they take the field dressing on the
webbing of the casualty. They have to be
able to find it without wasting time to
increase the casualty’s chance of
survival. A place for everything and
everything in its place.
Similarly, why iron the shirts before
putting them away in the closet? It is
really quite simple. Personal equipment
must always be in perfect working order
and immediately available. Ultimately,
our lives depend on it; this approach
must be part of every aspect of our daily
routine. One final example, why are the
parts of the personal weapon laid out
on the bed in such a precise manner for
inspection? Note that the layout must
be exactly the same as in the field.
These and similar practices, repeated
over and over again in varying
circumstances, become instinctive to
the point of being a second nature.
They are particularly useful when we
have to strip, clean and reassemble our
weapon in the dark so that it works
when it has to.
Physical fitness training has
always been a hot topic. Who hasn’t
been in a conversation where we
boasted our physical prowess as recruits
while today’s soldiers, the so-called
Nintendo generation, are soft and
generally in poor physical condition? I
believe we have forgotten a lot about
our first days in the Army. The
instructors on our qualification levels 2
and 3 courses are master-corporals and
Volume 5, No. 1
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Spring 2002
sergeants who have an average 8 to 12
years of experience. Not only have they
been around but also they have had the
opportunity to explore and learn to
extend their limits. Furthermore, at the
average age of 30, they are at their
prime in terms of strength and physical
stamina. For comparison, just look at
world level athletes in the strength and
stamina sports. They achieve their best
performances in their thirties after
years and years of training. Be aware of
the evidence and provide better
training to our soldiers, namely
progressive and interesting training
that allows them to develop strength
and stamina without hurting themselves. Showing them how much better
we are is humiliating and counterproductive. They will respect us more
for our leadership skills than for our
physical prowess.
instructor but also a lack of respect for
the students. It is impossible for most
people to be attentive in class for
extended periods of time just as it is
impossible for the Coyote observation
systems operator to be attentive for
extended periods of time. Instructors
who are always cutting short the student
breaks are shooting themselves in the
foot. The students just stop paying
attention after a certain period of time,
which cancels out the time and effort
the instructors put into their
preparation.
A little mental effort on your part
will allow you to apply this perspective
to all the other aspects of our training,
such as basic drill. I encourage you to
show purpose in your approach to
training and to look for the tactical link;
in a word, to look for the reason we do
things in a certain way.
Breaks are an essential part of the
learning process both in class and
elsewhere. Who hasn’t been frustrated
by having their breaks continuously
being cut short or even ignored
altogether. This indicates not only a
lack of preparation on the part of the
Comments on “Manstein’s Counterstroke 1943” by Major Kooistra and other
articles in The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 3.
Lieutenant Vincent J. Curtis of The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of
Canada (Princess Louise’s) writes…
T
he articles by Major S.
Kooistra and Professor Rob
Citino1 certainly present a
contrast in outlook. Professor Citino, writing about the
intellectual culture of the interwar
German army, says that nothing could
be further from the German mentality
than making a fetish out of a word or
phrase and that “no hard and fast rules”
was the rule of the German staff. Citino
comments that General Hans von
Seeckt warned about using catch
phrases and buzzwords. In his analysis
of the Battle of Kharkov, which was
fought by Field Marshal von Manstein,
a product of that interwar German
army, Major Kooistra expounds at
length on the fundamentals of
manoeuvre warfare, a list of rules,
catch-phrases, and buzzwords that
Manstein’s victory is said to illustrate.
For all its detail, I do not believe
that Major Kooistra’s analysis of
Manstein’s victory is correct. Errors
arise partly because Major Kooistra fails
to consider a crucial element of the
German success—the disparity in warfighting skill between the Russians
and the Germans—and because the
so-called fundamentals on which
the analysis is based are themselves
vague and contradictory.
Kooistra asserts that the “focus on
the enemy” fundamental of manoeuvre
warfare is illustrated, first, in violation
by the attacking Russian armies
separating from each other to attack
85
The Stand-Up Table
Ultimately, why undermine these
principles by unnecessarily going for
speed and risking exhaustion to
personnel who will then be of no
further utility to the mission.
different objectives and, second, by
Manstein’s withdrawal of forces to
concentrate for a counterattack. Jomini
would describe what the Russian armies
did as a divergent attack, and a surprise
withdrawal of forces followed by a
counterattack against an unbalanced
enemy advance is a tactic as old as the
hills. There is nothing here that is
specific to manoeuvre warfare, for the
tactics used and mistakes made predate
the conception of manoeuvre warfare.
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
Kooistra contrasts the command
styles of the two armies: the Russian
being an orders-tactics style and the
German being mission-tactics style.
Certainly, the flexibility of the German
style of command was critical to
Manstein’s success and served the
Germans better than the Russian’s style
served them. However, manoeuvre warfare recognizes two styles of command:
behfelstaktik and auftragstaktik. The
orders-tactics style of a generic force is
every bit as effective at creating
manoeuvre warfare at the operational
level as mission-tactics are. Also, it was
a Russian—Tukhachevsky—who conceived the beginnings of manoeuvre
warfare in the 1930s. The Russians in
1943 may not have been very good at it,
but the doctrine was there nevertheless.
Hence, the fact that one side followed a
manoeuvre warfare style of command
and the other didn’t was not a decisive
reason for Manstein’s success. Both sides
followed styles of command recognized
as conducive to manoeuvre warfare, but
the Germans were better at their style
than the Russians were at theirs.
Kooistra also alleges that the
Russians were defeated because they
did not focus on main effort. The
Russians outnumbered the Germans by
five to one, and they certainly had
enough force to capture Zaporozhye,
which was the focus of their main
effort. One could argue, however, that
they focused too much on their main
effort to the neglect of their flanks. It
was Manstein’s attack against the flank
of the advance on Zaporozhye that
caused the Russian attack to collapse
and resulted in the recapture of
Kharkov. Manstein’s counterattack was
the first large-scale, non-frontal
German counterattack of the war
(Stalingrad was choked off, and the
86
relieving attacks by the Germans were
all frontal against a covering army on
defence). The counterstroke against
Kharkov, on the other hand, was the
first time the Russians, advancing
rapidly and confident of victory, faced a
determined German flank attack. The
Russians were surprised, and they had
little or no command experience to
deal with the unexpected threat. Even
though they outnumbered the Germans
five to one, the Russians collapsed and
were routed. The problem was not that
the Russians failed to focus on their
main effort; it was that, at that stage of
the war, they were a relatively unskilled
force facing a highly skilled enemy.
Both sides in the battle attempted
to apply their strength against their
opponent’s weakness. The Russians
enjoyed a large disparity in numbers
and in materiel, they had the initiative,
and they had the victory at Stalingrad
behind them. They were not, however,
skillful at military command at that
stage of the war. The Germans, on the
other hand, were very skillful war
fighters, especially when Hitler let his
generals fight their battles. This was the
difference that permitted the Germans
to fight the Russians effectively even at
odds of five to one. F.W. von Mellenthin
believes that the Russian numerical and
materiel superiority could have been
overcome by the superior German skill
in handling armies and fighting battles
had Hitler not interfered with the
conduct of the war in Russia. This belief
does not reflect a preference for this or
that doctrine; rather, it reflects the
differences between the Germans and
Russians in sheer skill, in training, in
education, and in quality of leadership
at all levels. These differences are
the crucial factor, which Manstein
mentions in his own memoirs as being
decisive at Kharkov. In reference to the
withdrawal over the Dnieper, Manstein
comments, “Only commanders and
formations staff who felt superior to
their counterparts on the other side,
only troops who had no feeling of being
beaten….” This confidence was why the
Germans were able to act more quickly
than the Russians could react and why
they would and could take risks. In
other words, the Germans could act
boldly and decisively and take
advantage of tactical opportunities.
German General Staff officers were
trained to take risks and possessed the
confidence that they could retrieve any
situation. Stalin executed his General
Staff in purges in the late 1930s.
Manstein’s victory at Kharkov
cannot be illustrative of the list of
fundamentals of manoeuvre warfare.
Both sides manoeuvred at the Battle of
Kharkov—the Russians to seize a key
rail junction; the Germans to
challenge the moral courage and
military skill of the Russian leadership.
Manoeuvre per se is not illustrative of
manoeuvre warfare, and manoeuvrists
themselves have not yet said whether
the essence of manoeuvre warfare lies
in intent or in effect. Manstein’s
victory is illustrative of how great a
factor institutional skill can be in
winning battles, not of the superiority
of this or that doctrine or this or that
command style. It could be said
with equal truth that Manstein’s
counterstroke illustrated these principles
of war: maintenance of the aim,
offensive action, surprise, flexibility,
co-ordination, and administration.
Manstein himself called what he
did “mobile operations,” and it is
evident from his memoirs that he
considered himself a product of the
German General Staff in the great
tradition of Moltke and Schlieffen. The
chief strategist behind Guderian’s
thrust in France never proposed that he
was inventing anything new; he applied
what he learned from the great
Prussian-German teachers of the past.
His was the example of the German way
of war as applied at that time, over that
terrain, against those enemies, and with
that technology. Manoeuvrists, therefore, have a difficult time establishing
that a new doctrine came into being
during the Second World War, except
perhaps on the Russian side.
I believe Major Kooistra is handicapped in his analysis because he
draws his illustrations using the list of
so-called fundamentals of manoeuvre
warfare. There is nothing fundamental
about that list: it was originally
proposed to highlight the differences
between manoeuvre warfare doctrine
and the doctrine that was developed as
a result of the Canadian experience of
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
sophical first principles so that the doctrine
flows logically and understandably from
them when the operational problems
of war are considered. That doctrinal work
might become the first step towards
codifying a Canadian way of war and
begin to address the excellent critiques
of Roman Jarymowycz and Christopher
Ankersen.2
Flirting with Special Forces: Canada’s Special Air Service Stor y
Major (ret’d) Roy Thomas, MSC, CD writes…
T
he part that military tradition
plays in improving personal
combat performances is hard
to measure. However, if there
is any possible value in the role of
heritage and lineage, Canadians should
consider Canada’s own Special Air
Service (SAS) story as talk swirls about
expanding Joint Task Force Two (JTF 2),
the Canadian Forces’ present antiterrorist unit. The JTF 2 had its origins in
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) anti-terrorist response unit—
definitely a non-military lineage—
restricted primarily to domestic service in
Canada. Almost forgotten is the fact that
Canada, like Australia, New Zealand, and
many other countries, did have an SAS
unit. SAS was a Second World War cover
name for a highly successful, unorthodox
unit that operated in North Africa
against that unorthodox German
general, Erwin Rommel. Over 400 Axis
aircraft were destroyed in the African
theatre by the SAS. This was a higher
total of kills than was achieved by the
Royal Air Force in aerial combat in the
skies overhead, by Commonwealth antiaircraft units on the ground, or by the
Royal Navy at sea. In short, the men with
parachute wings not pilot’s wings, were
the most successful at depriving Rommel
of his much needed air support from the
Luftwaffe. This was great value for the
resources expended. Ironically, in the
North African campaign, the SAS was
delivered into action by vehicles of the
Long Range Desert Group and not by
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
aircraft. As an aside, it should be noted
that these were initially Canadian made
trucks, although they were later replaced
by American jeeps made familiar to old
TV buffs on “Rat Patrol.”
The SAS, which at war’s end was
larger than a brigade, was conceived by
an officer recovering from parachuting
injuries. David Stirling, knowing that a
mere subaltern would not manage to see
the Commander in Chief Middle East,
had to resort to an SAS approach to
expose his ideas to Sir Claude
Auchinleck. Stirling left his crutches outside the wire surrounding Auchinleck’s
headquarters and thus was able to
confront his Deputy Commander in
Chief before security staff knew of his
intrusion. The SAS heresy was sold in the
subsequent interviews. Stirling deliberately
rejected the basis of the standard infantry
battalion—a section of eight to ten men
lead by a non-commissioned officer—for
an organization based on modules or subunits of four soldiers. The SAS concept
did not call for a leader to emerge in this
group. Rather, each soldier was trained to
a high level of expertise in all SAS skills
while having one individual area of
special skill. In an operation, each
individual exercised his own judgment.
The risk that military discipline would
break down was recognized.
The SAS was one example of a
whole range of small highly effective
specialized units created, particularly by
ENDNOTES
1. Major S. Kooistra, “Manstein’s Counterstroke 1943” and Professor Rob Citino, “‘Die
Gedanken sind frei’: The Intellectual Culture of
the Interwar German Army.” Both appear in
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4,
No. 3, Fall 2001.
2. See Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret’d) Roman
Johann Jarymowycz, “On Doctrine—A Brief
Comment” and Christopher Ankersen, “‘Too Many
Houseboats’: Why the Canadian Army Doesn’t ‘do’
Change Well,” both in The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 2001.
the British, during the Second World
War. The Sea Reconnaissance Unit, the
idea of a Canadian, Sub-Lieutenant
Wright, is another such example.
Canadians served in many of these
organizations, so it was to a veteran of
one of them that the Canadian Army
turned in 1946 when forming the
Canadian SAS company.
Captain Lionel Guy d’Artois was
the first and only Officer Commanding
of the Canadian SAS Company. During
the war, he served with the British
Special Operations Executive (SOE),
whose mandate was to encourage
resistance in Fascist occupied Europe
and Asia by sending agents to assist in
organizing and training locals in
sabotage. Captain d’Artois started his
Second World War experience in the
Royal 22e Régiment and deployed with
it to England. He returned to North
America to join the Canadian-American
Special Service Force and participated
in the Kiska operation in the Aleutians.
In the autumn of 1943, he was recruited
and trained for the SOE. In the spring
1944 he parachuted into France, where
he helped create and equip two
Resistance battalions. Within his area of
operations, any German soldier or
vehicle could expect attack. D’Artois’
role was recognized for his efforts by
the award of a Distinguished Service
Order.
The first members of d’Artois’
Canadian SAS began arriving at the
Canadian Joint Air Training Centre in
Rivers, Manitoba in the spring of 1947.
The SAS Company was under command
of the Centre for Administration,
Discipline, Rationing and Quartering
87
The Stand-Up Table
the Second World War; it is not,
therefore, comprised of philosophical
first principles that are fundamental to a
philosophy of warfighting. The next
generation of Canadian war fighters will
not be schooled in the old way of
fighting; they will thus have nothing
against which to compare when they are
told to focus on the enemy not the
ground and to focus on the main effort.
Canadian Forces doctrine writers need to
rethink and recast the list of manoeuvre
warfare fundamentals as a set of philo-
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
but was under the operational control
of Army Headquarters in Ottawa. The
role of the Canadian SAS Company was
never clearly enunciated. The actual
role as understood by members of the
unit seemed to be undertaking “Otto
Skorzeny” 1 1 type German special
forces’ tasks more akin to SOE
operations than those of the SAS. In
common with the British SAS model
and indeed all specialist units, physical
fitness was stressed. All were parachutists and the original members were
also trained to pack their own parachutes. Airportability training was given
to all. Demolition training similar to
that provided the maquis or French
Resistance was undertaken. Spanish was
studied. D’Artois was said to have made
the training highly imaginative and
creative, perhaps due to the number of
war veterans in the company. Like the
present SAS, there was a strong
emphasis on personal initiative and
self-reliance. These attributes were
necessary.
The Canadian SAS Company
initially consisted of four officers, one
sergeant, two corporals, four lancecorporals, and sixty privates that were
eventually organized into a conventional structure of platoons and
sections. This organization was a
departure from Stirling’s principles and
British
SAS
practice,
probably
reflecting the background of the first
and only Canadian SAS commander.
The unit also reflected existing
regimental politics. The three platoons
were drawn and organized from the
three existing Regular Force infantry
regiments—the
Royal
Canadian
Regiment, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry, and the Royal 22e
Régiment. Late in 1948 a “services”
platoon was added. This SAS company
had limited contact with the rest of the
Canadian Army. Except for parachute
demonstrations, most activity seems to
have been restricted to the Rivers
region. This was logical as Rivers was
the base with the airlift resources, and
movement was constrained due to low
budget levels.
Operationally, the SAS Company
was only deployed once, in the Spring
of 1948, when it formed the basis of the
Joint Training Centre’s contingent
88
fighting floods in the lower mainland of
British Columbia. Captain d’Artois later
earned a George Medal when he and
three other members of the SAS
Company were involved in the rescue of
an Anglican missionary in the High
Arctic in the fall of 1947. The Canadian
SAS Company was disbanded in
September 1949. Former SAS Company
members formed the nucleus of
instructors and trained parachutists
within their parent Regiments for
conversation of battalions to an
airborne role as Mobile Strike Force
units. Stirling’s organizational “module
of four” never gained acceptance within
the Canadian SAS company and did not
appear in any renditions of specialist
elements under The Canadian Airborne Regiment. Perhaps the pathfinders and the recce platoon could
claim many aspects in common. The
JTF2 does not have Stirling’s module
among its antecedents. Today the
British SAS still maintain Stirling’s basic
principles dictated perhaps by bitter
experience in a quarter century of
special operations in Ireland as well as
more conventional operations in Asia,
the near East, and even in the Western
Hemisphere.
The Canadian SAS story indicates
that lineage did have a large part to play
in how our own so-called SAS Company
was trained and even organized.
If Canada is really serious about
expanding JTF 2 into something more
akin to the SAS, then perhaps British
expertise must be sought to help with
spending the money wisely. Serving SAS
experts may be busy at this time.
However, a retired SAS member such as
Sir Michael Rose, who commanded SAS
units at the squadron and regimental
level, in addition to his more publicized
service as Commander of the United
Nations Protection Force in Bosnia,
would be an ideal advisor for
developing a successor to the Canadian
SAS Company.
Lineage does mean something in
units. If we want an SAS unit, then SAS
precedents and not those of some other
organization should provide the heritage.
ENDNOTE
1. Otto Skorzeny (1908 – 1975) earned the
accolade “the most dangerous man in Europe”
after the operations he led in Italy, the Ardennes
and Hungary. By 1943, the Chief of Germany’s
Special Troops. His most famous operation was
the “rescue” of Benito Mussolini from Gran
Sasso, Italy, on 12 September 1944, using 100
glider-borne SS troopers. (Managing Editor).
Leadership and the Future
Sergeant Jim Hill of the 56 Field Regiment RCA and Manager of Old Fort Erie,
Fort Erie, Ontario – National Historic Site writes…
A
fter reading many articles
in The Army Doctrine and
Training Bulletin that were
filled with “modern dichotomies” and “21st century paradigms” and
after speaking with technophile extraordinaire Sergeant Arthur Majoor, I would
ask your readers to consider the past. Now
that we are in the 21st century, the
command and leadership structure of the
Forces must step out of the middle ages.
The two-tier rank structure we presently have
is, in fact, medieval in its origins.
In the large, professional armies of
the Roman Empire there was a single
chain of command. A soldier who
joined the Roman Legion as a private
could rise to the equivalent modern
rank of colonel if he was the smartest,
most experienced, and toughest
member of his unit. This system died
out immediately following the Roman
period and was only revived by military
reformers studying Roman tactics and
strategies in the 17th century. These
reformers realized they needed large,
professional, national armies that
possessed a uniformed standard of
dress, weapons, training, and tactics.
Such troops could be deployed in
combined arms formations for long
periods. During the Middle Ages, large
standing armies were not considered
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The most common reason given
over the last 400 years for maintaining
an officer class was the complete lack of
education and literacy in the lower-class
rank and file. Another important factor
in maintaining a separate corps of
leadership was the belief that the
officer class would place the mission or
big picture ahead of everything else,
while the common ranks would be too
concerned about casualties. As is always
the case, the army had to reflect the
society it came from. The land-based
wealth and political control of the
Middle Ages carried on well into the
20th century. To be an officer, your
family had to own land. The officer
class also made the messy task of
fighting wars an acceptable career for
the third or fourth sons of a
respectable, wealthy, land-holding
family. The two-tier system of
leadership is still considered a tradition
with romantic, chivalrous imagery
stretching back over 14 centuries and
virtually all armed forces in the world
continue to use this system.
Romantic traditions aside, it does
not require a great deal of research to
recognize the changes in society that
have taken place in the last half of the
20th century. The military has been
told to get in line with modern
thinking, but it could be argued that
the military has always been more
culturally diverse than Canadian
society. This diversity may not be
present in the officers’ mess but the
rank and file has always included
(particularly in war time) contingents
of women, first nations, visible
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
minorities, and new immigrants, all of
whom were denied opportunities in
modern Canadian society. The present
rank structure is a model of a centuries
old European class structure.
The notion that soldiers could not,
and for their own sake, should not try
to understand the big picture has
always been ludicrous. Soldiers were
told throughout the First World War
that they could not understand the
complex, modern management and
staff work that went into the planning
of operations that lead to the deaths of
thousands. How could it be possible
that sacrificing soldiers is in the interest
of the military, the government or the
people of Canada? Almost a century
later, we have a “Shoot to Live” manual
instead of the old “Shoot to Kill”
manual for dealing with an enemy, but
officer candidates are often asked how
they would handle giving orders that
they knew would lead to the deaths of
their soldiers. We cannot mention
killing the enemy, but we can discuss
the sacrifice of our own troops as if
losing personnel were a foregone
conclusion or some sort of tradition.
Regardless of the rank and command
structure, soldiers that have a clear
picture of the plan routinely outperform troops left in the dark and can,
in turn, avoid taking casualties.
The present command structure
ignores the many examples of soldiers
moving from the ranks to command
large formations or operate complex
equipment, once again, particularly
during wartime. At least eight of
Napoleon Bonaparte’s marshals started
their careers as privates. As experienced
combat soldiers, they could truly lead by
example when their gentrified opponents simply could not. During the
Second World War, the Royal Air Force
and Royal Canadian Air Force employed sergeants as pilots. When these
sergeants began shooting down large
numbers of enemy aircraft, they were
offered commissions; when they refused
to take those commissions, they were
threatened with dismissal. This was an
interesting punishment considering
that non-commissioned members were
traditionally jailed, flogged or shot for
disobeying an order, while only officers
were dismissed from the service.
As improvements in transportation,
communications, firepower, and technology in general come on line, the
tasks of commanders accelerate but so
does their ability to respond and with
far more options at their fingertips. The
debate over formal education in the
officer ranks continues to rage while
many reserve units are filled with
university and college graduates serving
in the ranks. The Bulletin has proven
that formal education and a grasp of
the big picture are no longer the
exclusive domain of the officer corps.
The Warrior Individual Battle Task
Standards have made it all too clear
that the physical fitness and skill at arms
standard of a soldier have little to do
with rank or trade.
Today, the most repeated excuse
for having a 25-year-old officer
command a 35-year-old NCO or
warrant officer is the example that the
experienced soldier fights the battle
while the officer co-ordinates the
actions of his sub-unit with the actions
of other sub-units and passes on the
orders of higher levels of command.
This example simply relegates the
junior officer to the position of platoon
signaller relaying information to the
NCO fighting the battle. If this example
holds true, why does a section
commander, detachment commander
or crew commander not have a junior
officer to co-ordinate the actions of
their sub-unit with other sub-units?
What about the modern soldier as
diplomat, aid worker, politician, local
magistrate, day care worker, sanitation
engineer, astronaut, professor, florist?
Enough said! The military has
reinvented itself into virtual oblivion.
One does not have to look at the
Roman Empire, the Napoleonic Wars
or the Second World War to find
examples of a more streamlined
command structure. I have recently
been on exercises where, due to a lack
of trained and skilled officers, the
command post of an artillery battery
had no officers. A regular force warrant
officer used a militia sergeant,
technician, signaller, and driver in his
command post. Even the safety officer
was a reserve sergeant. In that
command post, the warrant officer was
the best trained, most experienced, and
89
The Stand-Up Table
necessary, and royalty relied on
mercenaries that usually consisted of
local forces raised for short periods of
time. These medieval forces were
deployed in immobile blocks of
troops—a block of archers, a block of
pikemen, a block of heavy cavalry, and a
block of civilian operated cannons—
which were invariably armed with the
same weapons. The armies of the 1600s
revived old Roman methods, combined
them with firearms and artillery, and
established the structure we still use
today. However, the reformers did not
revert back to the Roman single chain
of command, and we have not done so
to this day.
most physically fit soldier on the team.
At the observation post end, the
increased use of laser range finders had
the technicians doing more and more
of the shooting. This produced two
results: a number of lieutenants and
captains were not given an opportunity
to learn or practice artillery skills and . . .
the artillery fire came down more quickly
and with a higher degree of accuracy. In
this example, the most experienced and
technically skilled soldiers made the
decisions, commanded the troops, and
could truly lead the unit into battle.
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
Most unsettling of all is that some of
the principles of leadership cannot and
do not apply in a two-tiered command
system. How can a junior officer lead by
example when he has always received
higher pay, better accommodations,
better food, education incentives,
different standards of training, greater
rewards, and less punishment than his
subordinates? The junior officer does
not take an active role in the training of
soldiers. In fact, much of the junior
officer’s training is conducted by NCOs.
How can the officer know and promote
the welfare of his soldiers when he does
not live, work, and take courses with the
soldiers he will be around for short
periods of time until the next posting,
promotion, tasking within the unit, or
university course becomes available? Are
the principles of leadership intended for
all levels of command?
One chain of command, one
recruiting standard, and one training
system will make for a less expensive
and more effective military. Eliminate
the ranks of master warrant officer,
chief warrant officer, lieutenant, and
captain where the greatest overlap
exists and, as Sergeant Majoor
suggested in his Summer 2000 article,1
take the cream of the crop and stream
them into leadership and staff officer
training. If you have a university degree
and are looking for a job that will pay
off student loans and help you pick up
your master’s degree until something
more meaningful and higher paying
comes along, the military should not be
an option for you. If you would like to
be a career corporal because you can’t
find any other civilian work, the
military should not be an option for
you. One system of dedicated military
90
personnel can produce a more efficient
fighting machine and give the flexibility
of command necessary to take on the
multiple roles expected of the CF today.
We want politicians to spend more
money on defence, and we want young
people to join the military. However,
the military is viewed as non-essential
and backward. Since September 11, a
number of polls and articles have
indicated Canadians respect their
military, but virtually every other
government concern still ranks higher
in importance when compared to
defence. This is not surprising when we
parade down the streets of this nation
armed with bows, arrows, pikes and the
officers still carry swords. I am not
referring to our weaponry itself
(although some would argue our
equipment is fit for museums). I am
talking about the command structure
we put on parade, which was built
around those antiquated weapons over
a dozen centuries ago during a period
of history that is not known for its
enlightened thinking. If we want better
equipment and better recruits, we need
a system that will draw excellent
personnel and make the modern
weaponry most effective.
On the high tech, high-speed
battlefield of the 21st century, will
soldiers continue to look to the platoon
warrant for confirmation when the
platoon commander gives an order
from the wrong page of his aide
memoire? No, the leader of the unit will
give the order, and it will be responded
to immediately because the leader will
be the best soldier in her platoon.
ENDNOTE
1. Sergeant Arthur Majoor, “Changing
Structures for Tomorrow’s Leaders”, The Army
Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 2,
Summer 2000, p. 26-30.
Commentar y on The Canadian Army Reading List: A Guide to
Professional Reading, Version 1, 2001 (Released with The Army
Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 4).
Jason S. Ridler of the Royal Militar y College of Canada writes…
The Canadian Army Reading List vs.
Robert A Heinlein: A Polemic
T
he release of The Canadian
Army Reading List from the
Army Publishing Office this
September is an encouraging
step to provide the Land Forces with a
primer on a number of works that
address, investigate, and evaluate many
related military issues for the Army of
today and tomorrow. Applause is given
for the final section that rounds off the
topics of import: fiction. The literary
and martial merit of reading
Remarque’s All’s Quiet on the Western
Front or Crane’s The Red Badge of
Courage seems self-evident given that
they concern wars that have actually
occurred and, in the former case, the
book was written by a veteran.
But one book sits in the list that
may raise some hackles: Robert A.
Heinlein’s Starship Troopers. A tale set
in the future, Starship Troopers revolves
around the exploits of a soldier of the
Mobile Infantry (M.I.), a group of oneman tanks engaged in a desperate war
against a hive-minded (think communists in bug suits) alien race that is
bent on the annihilation of earth. It is
kill or be killed in a desperate war. Part
recruitment drive, part military extrapolation of highly sophisticated proportions, Troopers has (as The Canadian
Army Reading List mentions) been a
staple of military colleges for years. It is
often regarded as Heinlein’s best early
work, winning the 1960 Hugo award for
best novel. Then why can’t the work
stand on its own? The blurb following
the entry states that Heinlein’s novel is
“The first true military science fiction
book. It is more than just science fiction,
though, as it discusses politics, military
organization and training theory.”1 The
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
The blurb could have been put this
way: Heinlein’s work is more than just
science fiction because it deals with
politics, military organization and training
theory, all of which are essentially lacking
in the young genre, making Heinlein rise
above the rest.2 Even the most casual
reader of science fiction would know this
statement to be untrue. It is rare to find
more political novels than Zamyatin’s We
(1924), Huxley’s Brave New World (1932)
or Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty Four (1949).
And for those who think these futuristic
dystopias—with advanced biological,
chemical, and communications technologies—are not science fiction proper,
then what of more acknowledged leaders
in the field? Walter M. Miller’s A Canticle
for Leibowitz (1960) is a stunning
evaluation of human nature, cold war
politics, and the doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction. Philip K. Dick’s The
Man in the High Castle (1962) provides the
first “Hitler Wins” scenario by an admitted
science fiction writer and details the
existence of an America divided between
the Axis victors that parallels and
manipulates the actual division of
Germany after the Second World War.
Heinlein himself was probably the most
politically didactic sci-fi writer in history.
The rugged librertarian-frontiersman
heroes of his novels almost always fight an
intrusive government that demands all
that it surveys be put under its control. It
would be hard to assert, even with this
small sampling, that sci-fi has not made
politics one of its many targets of
discussion.
So are military issues. There is a
whole subset of military sci-fi whose
audience shares an interest in stories
with a heavy emphasis on realistic,
extrapolated, future combat, tactical to
strategic. The works of Korean War
veteran Jerry Pournelle (touted by some
as Heinlein’s successor) have long been
the standard for those interested in the
military side of sci-fi, including
organization and training. He also
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
wrote one non-fiction text, The Strategy
of Technology (1970), which, like
Heinlein’s fiction, was used in US war
colleges. But the military sci-fi novel that
has garnered the most respect and
attention since Heinlein’s Starship
Troopers is Joe Haldeman’s The Forever
War (1974). Haldeman studied physics
and astronomy before serving for three
years in Vietnam as a combat engineer.
He wrote the novel as a series of short
stories dealing with his experience in
the war (including a deadly injury that
earned him a Purple Heart) and his
interests in science and politics. The
Forever War is often seen as the
antithesis to Heinlein’s military novel,
largely due to the cynical nature of the
narrative. It is an earnest and
compelling picture of one man’s
military experience through the devices
of sci-fi. So, here are two veterans using
the modes and conventions of sci-fi
to investigate the interaction of men
in combat. Clearly, sci-fi and military
matters are not anathema to each
other.
That Starship Troopers was the first
“true” military science fiction book is
debatable thanks to the subjective word
in quotations. In English, at least, sci-fi
could claim Sir George Chesney’s Battle
of Dorking (1871) as the starting point
of military sci-fi. Chesney’s work
investigates the technological and
military advancements made by the
Germans during the Franco/Prussian
war and then postulates the possible
future invasion threat to Britain. It may
be more accurate to argue that
Heinlein’s novel was the first “modern”
military science fiction book, which, in
any case, was likely his intent.
writers, and he used it to describe his
own literary mode. Judge the genre by
its diamonds, not its coal.
It is encouraging to see that any
science fiction made its way onto a
“must read” list for our nation’s army. I
hope the next one will cover the same
breadth and, hopefully, feel no
compulsion to apologize for any of its
professional choices.3
Managing Editor’s Note: Readers
unfamiliar with Mr. Ridler may appreciate
this short introduction. Jason S. Ridler is a
graduate of the Royal Military College of
Canada’s War Studies MA program and is
currently employed as an Instructor for the
Officer’s Professional Military Education
courses in Canada. His historical
publications include “Near Disaster: Hong
Kong, Korea, and the Lessons of History”
(available at the CDAI website) and
“Intervention in the State of Confusion:
Third Party Intervention and the Birth of
the Latvian Nation.” Praxis: The
Occasional Papers of the Royal Military
College of Canada (Publication in 2002).
Mr. Ridler has also lectured on the merits of
fantastical literature for the Queen’s
Institute for Life Long Learning, and his
fiction has been published by the C.S. Lewis
Society for Southern California’s Literary
Publication The Lamp Post.
ENDNOTES
The apologetic statements regarding
Starship Troopers no doubt reflect the
more general perception of sci-fi in
general as a poor man’s genre, a ghetto
literature, something spawned out of
the pulp industry with no more merit to
engage the intellect than an Avengers
comic book. There is some truth in this
perception. But the same could be said
of most popular art forms. A wise man
once noted that “ninety percent of
everything is crap; people, things, and
ideas. But that last ten percent is to die
for.” The quote is attributed to
Theodore Sturgeon, one of sci-fi’s great
1. The Canadian Army Reading List, Kingston,
Ontario: Army Publishing Office, Land Forces
Doctrine and Training System, September 2001,
p. 30.
2. While the origins of Science Fiction are
still debated, the most accepted date of origin is
the publishing of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein
in 1818. See Brian Aldiss, The Billion Year Spree:
The True History of Science Fiction, New York:
Schicken Books: 1974.
3. For those with an interest on the vast
impact and range of science fiction, see John
Clute and Peter Nicholis, The Encyclopedia of
Science Fiction, London: Orbit, 1999, and
Thomas M. Disch, The Dreams our Stuff is Made
of: How Science Fiction Conquered the World, New
York: Touchstone Books, 2000.
91
The Stand-Up Table
author of the blurb is almost apologizing
or, perhaps, defending the selection of
the text not because of its military
content but because of its label--science
fiction. But the need to defend a
selection rather than let its merits sell
itself are both distressing and, in this
particular, misleading.
What Would Worthy Think? Observations on the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps
Captain Steve Giberson, an armour officer employed at G3 Training 3 Area
Support Group in Gagetown, New Brunswick, writes...
How Far Can You Throw a Black Beret?
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
The cliché has now officially been
flogged to death about living in
interesting or challenging times. The
Royal Canadian Armour Corps is of
course no exception. Over the past few
years, the closing comments of any
briefing on the state of affairs of the
Army in general, and the Armour Corps
in particular, is that the burden of
success lies with the ability of junior
leadership to effectively meet the
challenges presented by the 21st
century. As a “pre-Kingston” captain, I
consider myself a member of that
group. As a professional, I have some
concerns with what appears to be the
current disposition of the state of my
chosen profession.
The Corps has recently gone
through the pains of who should
maintain the centre of excellence for
vehicle gunnery. All this under the
premise of control of 25 mm cannons;
but, of course, the fight became allinclusive in the search of standardization. I do not want to appear to be
antagonistic towards the “keep it soldier
simple” school of thought; however, I
must admit that I find it ironic that,
after the better part of a century of
conducting mounted warfare, the
Amour Corps managed to surrender
SOPs for turret operations to the
Infantry practically within hours of the
announcement of the LAV III
procurement. Nothing highlights this
better than the dissection of the fire
order process.
It is not my intention to revisit old
battles and “armchair general” them
with the all-powerful weapon of
hindsight. However, it must be pointed
out that the clinical dissection of fire
orders in a classroom is a long way from
the flurry of activity that comes from
engaging a target on the move. The
discussion quickly evolved into
seemingly never-ending bickering over
infantry or armour drills on machine
92
guns and, of course, the discussions on
whether 25 mm cannon qualified as
simply a big machine gun or if it should
be treated as a tank gun with respect to
the engagement process. The command “SABOT, BATTLE, TANK” may
make logical sense in the sterile
environment of a writing board, but I
would suggest that BATTLE, SABOT,
TANK achieves a more effective
psychological impact on the gunner. It
immediately clues him or her into the
fact that the crew is in grave danger and
they should destroy the large enemy
object that fills the viewer of the
Integrated Fire Control System (IFCS)
when the turret stops traversing.
Using “BATTLE” as a pro-word not
only goes beyond its value of range
indication but also initiates the thought
process and the reflexes of the tank
crew, like the word “EJECT” does to a
flight crew. If the pilot said “get out,” it
would mean the same thing, but would
not necessarily achieve the desired
effect in the required time. With the
healthy respect the Infantry Corps has
for history, I assume that they might
appreciate the idea that maybe the
people who have been conducting
turreted operations in the wars of the
20th century had a reason for how they
engaged targets (even if they forgot
exactly what those reasons were when
asked to vocalize them in a classroom).
As for logic, I find it hard to rationalize
why the Armour Corps changed its 105
mm drills because the Infantry Corps
has more 25 mm than us.
Now we have reached the point
where the Land Force has been given
the blueprint for the 21st century. It is
that of a mechanized (or at least
motorized) force that currently does
not include the tank as we know it
beyond 2015. The challenges of
technology are affecting all corps of the
Land Force. However, the unique
challenge to the Armour Corps is that
an effective Leopard replacement has
not been identified. The other corps all
have identified equipment (admittedly,
all primarily based on the LAV III) to
form the basis of Canada’s approach to
land warfare in the new millennium.
Smart soldiers will figure out how to use
that equipment effectively despite the
best efforts of all the writing boards. On
the other hand, the Armour Corps does
not yet have a technology identified for
it crews to complain about and then get
on with the business of figuring out how
to manoeuvre it in such a manner
to cause termination with extreme
prejudice. I would submit that the single
largest reason for this is the Corps itself.
Speaking as someone who walked
into the recruiting centre and asked to
be a Dragoon, I am convinced our
corps’ single largest downfall is that it
does not behave as one. I must say that,
as one who has followed the whole
debate on whether or not we should
shelve the regimental system and as a
potential leader of the soldiers who will
fight the next major engagement, I do
not care if there is a regimental system
or not. If my epaulette says RCD or 2
RCAC in 2015, it will not affect my
personal professionalism or my
commitment to the nation’s defence. I
will not care less for, nor expect less of,
soldiers of 2 RCAC than I would of
Dragoons. I will state that, as a
professional soldier, I am embarrassed
that a corps as small as ours cannot
present a single viewpoint to the
Commander of the Army on what we
should be doing. If the regiments are
the children and the hat badges are our
“toys,” we should be able to all play the
same game together in the backyard. If
not, can you really blame the parents
for thinking about taking the toys away?
I love being a Dragoon, and I
identify myself as a professional in the
light of what that means. However, if
being a member of that regiment
means that Canada would have less of a
defence, I would be the first to remove
the hat badge. I do not believe that we
have to destroy the regimental system
to achieve an Armour Corps; I do
believe that we must achieve an Armour
Corps. This, of course, is truly what is at
the heart of the majority of frustrations
for our family of “blackhats.”
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Technology. There is such a thing
as too light to fight. 120 mm is the
world standard for tank gunnery. Air
transportable is attractive, but what’s
the hurry if you are not strong enough
to decimate the enemy (we can’t even
go toe to toe). Kosovo proved that even
tanks have a role to play in peace
keeping. Tanks and nothing else, not
even attack helicopters, provide the
true dominating force of last resort.
There remains no such thing as all
weather flying. Tanks are the army
equivalent of the aircraft carrier. Their
presence on the battlefield lets the “bad
guys” know that we really believe in
what were doing and that we are
committed to do it.
Tactical Intent. Armour is the
combat arm of Decision, not the combat
arm of Information. It is simply a side
effect of our training that mounted
reconnaissance is a skill easily adapted to
by crews (a skill I support keeping inside
the Corps). However, a reconnaissance
corps is not an armour corps. The only
point of gathering information on the
enemy is to close with and destroy that
enemy. I challenge any professional to
argue that there is a better, more reliable
single weapon system for causing
destruction and havoc than the tank.
Anybody ever wonder why so much
effort goes into anti-armour assets?
Vision of the Future. Regiments
have to move past their hat badges and
decide how to aggressively defend this
nation as a single body. Hopefully, we
are mature enough to achieve this and
maintain the proud history of our units
properly displayed on our uniforms. If
we are not strong enough to act as a
Volume 5, No. 1
◆
Spring 2002
corps with our respective insignia,
perhaps we have already failed, and we
should just turn the Army over to the
Infantry Corps. As for Reg/Res Force
issues, the professionals need to decide
what the Corps will look like and how it
will achieve its mission. The hobbyists
need to get in line and support the
vision. I checked the records, there
hasn’t been a CANFORGEN published
making the Corps a democracy.
With the Corps in apparent
disarray and the Army moving forward
without us, the infantry school has
become the de facto centre of
excellence for mounted warfare. The
rest of the Army walks past the Armour
School to train their soldiers in
mounted operations on the LAV III. A
whole generation of young leaders are
being introduced to the mounted army
of the 21st century at the infantry
school as we cling precariously to the
tank trainer that is the C2 dutifully
issuing fire orders the infantry has
taught us.
As a footnote, I would ask why we
have to give up our black berets and
yellow stripe in our mess kit when we
are promoted to colonel? Pilots do not
give up their wings. Imagine if a
paratrooper was told to take off his
wings so he could properly represent
the entire Land Force Command or the
Canadian Forces? The black beret is to
the crewman what wings are to the
pilots and paratroopers. Just how far
can you throw a black beret?
Apparently, at least the length of bldg J7 in Gagetown.
Commentary on “Tank: The Canadian Army’s Four-Letter Word” by Major Lee J.
Hammond, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 4, Winter 2001.
Second Lieutenant Wade Peters of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantr y writes…
I
have to agree with Major
Hammond that the tank is still
very relevant in today’s army and
will remain so for the foreseeable
future. The LAV Low Profile Turret
(LPT), which is being considered as the
armoured combat vehicle (ACV), simply
does not have the protection or the
punch to be an effective combat vehicle.
It is vulnerable to infantry hand-held
anti-armour weapons such as the RPG,
which are found throughout the Third
World. Modern tanks, such as the
Leclerc and Challenger 2, have
explosive reactive armour (ERA) and
Chobham armour, which protect them
from hand-held anti-armour weapons.1
The main problem, as was stated in
Major Hammond’s article, is the ACV
lacks the firepower to deal with
modern tanks. The 105 mm gun does
not have the punch of the 120 mm
gun. The addition of a through the
barrel missile (TBM) may give the ACV
the ability to deal with tanks. The
problem here is that only a handful of
TBMs (usually 3-5) are carried in an
armoured fighting vehicle (AFV), and
TBMs usually take up more space in the
ammo compartment than regular
rounds. More TBMs could be carried,
but at the expense of having fewer
rounds available to an AFV crew.
The best solution would be to buy
new tanks of some sort. Major
Hammond gives a couple of options,
both of which would be satisfactory.
Either purchase surplus tanks like M-1s
or Leopard 2s from other armies or
buy a new tank like the French Leclerc.
The Leclerc may be the best option
because of its autoloader, which
reduces the crew needed from four to
three.2 With the Army struggling to
find and retain personnel, the
reduction of the crew from four to
three would free up more personnel for
vehicle crews or other duties.
It seems like the Army is destined,
due to political reasons, to have an
ACV in its armoured regiments.
Brigade groups in the near future will
either have a mix of tank and ACV
93
The Stand-Up Table
It has been my observation that
there are three areas of debate that are
working to destroy the Corps’ concept.
The first is technology: heavy armour
versus air-transportable. The second is
tactical intent on the battlefield:
armour versus recce. The final area of
debate is competing visions of the
future: regular/reserve and regimental
rivalries. The following proposals are
my personal thoughts. They are
intended to trigger a reactionary
process from my superiors, peers and
subordinates alike. We have to get it
right, right now.
squadrons in their armoured regiments
or the armoured regiments will be
completely composed of ACV squadrons.
Because the LAV ACVs are produced by
General Motors of Canada, there are
major political and economical reasons
to choose it as the ACV for the Army. As
well, the Army uses LAV armoured
personnel carriers (APCs) already, and
it makes sense to have an ACV based on
the same vehicle. However, there is
another alternative for an ACV.
The choice for the ACV should be
the Swedish Hagglunds Vehicle CV
90120 Light Tank. This tracked vehicle is
currently under development in Sweden
and should be available soon. The CV
90120 is based on the CV 90 Infantry
Fighting Vehicle that is currently being
used in the Swedish Army.3
The CV and LPT are roughly the
same size. Both have the same kind
of armour protection: frontal protection against 30 mm armour piercing;
all around protection from 12.7 mm
armour piercing. The CV has tracks
and weighs 25,000kg; the wheeled
LPT weighs less at around 19,000kg. 5
However, the CV is light enough to
fill the ACV role. The main advantage
of the CV 90120 is that its 120 mm
gun has the firepower that the LPT
lacks.
While it is important that we keep
tanks in the Army, it seems that an ACV
will be an inevitable part of the
armoured corps. The LPT looks like it
is the Army’s choice for the ACV role
because of its compatibility with the
LAVs the Army already has in service
and because it is made in Canada. The
problem with the LPT is that its 105
mm main gun does not have the ability
to deal with many modern tanks unless
it uses a TBM. Therefore, if the Army
decides to stick to the ACV concept, the
Army’s choice should be the CV 90120,
not the LAV LPT.
ENDNOTES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2000-2001.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Commentary, Opinion and Rebuttal
I think the CV 90120 is a better
choice as the ACV than the LPT because
of its firepower. The CV has a 120 mm
50 calibre smoothbore compact tank
gun capable of firing sabots and highexplosive antitank (HEAT) rounds. The
120 mm has the capability to knock out
tanks like the T-80, whereas the LPT
cannot perform this function without a
TBM. The CV has a semi-automatic
loader, with a full automatic loading
system being developed. The CV, like
the LPT, has a crew of three. Four troops
or additional 120 mm ammunition can
be carried in the rear of the CV. In
addition, the CV 90120 has a 7.62 mm
coax machine gun and can carry 50
rounds of 120 mm ammunition.4
94
The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin
Recipients of
the Victoria Cross and the George Cross
Recipients of the Victoria Cross and the George Cross with Governor-General Roland Michener
following a dinner in their honour at Government House, Ottawa, 16 June 1967
Since its institution in 1856, 1,351 awards of the Victoria Crosses have been made, including three bars, or
second awards made. Ninety-four awards went to Canadians or are associated with Canada. The George
Cross was created in 1940 and 10 have been awarded to Canadians.
Of them, E.A. “Smoky” Smith is the sole surviving Canadian Victoria Cross recipient.
Front Row, left to right
Frederick Harvey, Raphael Zengel, the Hon. George R. Pearkes, Governor-General Michener,
Paul Triquet, E.A. “Smoky” Smith, B. Handley Geary.
Rear Row, left to right
Awards
Ernest Frost, D.V. Currie, John Mahony, Norman Mitchell, F.A. Tilston,
A.D. Ross, Thomas Dineson, the Rev. John Foote, J.M. Patton.
Messrs Frost, Ross and Patton are George Cross winners; the remainder are Victoria Cross recipients.
Volume 5, No. 1
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Spring 2002
95
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