RULES AND SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE USE: CASE STUDIES OF SMALL-

RULES AND SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE USE: CASE STUDIES OF SMALL-
RULES AND SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE USE: CASE STUDIES OF SMALLSCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
by
Ana Cinti
_____________________
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
SCHOOL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
WITH A MAJOR IN NATURAL RESOURCES
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
2010
2
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation
prepared by Ana Cinti entitled:
Rules and Sustainable Resource Use: Case Studies of Small-scale Fisheries in the
Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
________________________________________________ Date: July 9, 2010
Dr. William W. Shaw
________________________________________________ Date: July 9, 2010
Dr. Edella Schlager
________________________________________________ Date: July 9, 2010
Dr. Thomas E. Sheridan
________________________________________________ Date: July 9, 2010
Dr. Richard Cudney-Bueno
________________________________________________ Date:
Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s
submission of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and
recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
________________________________________________ Date: July 9, 2010
Dissertation Director: Dr. William W. Shaw
3
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an
advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library
to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided
that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended
quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by
the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her
judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other
instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNED: Ana Cinti
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank to the people who contributed in many ways to the accomplishment of this
dissertation. Bill, I am very thankful to you for your wise advice, your generosity and hospitality
(yours and Darcy’s), and for having given me the opportunity to continue growing professionally
and personally in such enriching environment. Richard, I wish to thank you and your family very
much for your hospitality, support, advice and for the opportunity to be part of a great project. I
have learned enormously from this experience. Edella Schlager and Tom Sheridan, thank you
very much for your invaluable advice, support, and encouragement. I feel privileged for having
had you both as part of my committee.
Deseo agradecer muy especialmente a los pescadores, permisionarios, autoridades y otros
miembros de las comunidades bajo estudio, que amablemente participaron de esta investigación.
En especial deseo agradecer a los pescadores artesanales de Bahía de Kino y Bahía de los
Ángeles y a sus familias, por su paciencia y buena disposición, y por su generosidad y
hospitalidad. Agradezco especialmente el apoyo del personal de SAGARPA y SEMARNAT en
Ensenada, al personal de CONANP en Bahía de los Ángeles, y al personal de SAGARPA en
Bahía de Kino.
Deseo agradecer muy especialmente a Jorge Torre y Luis Bourillón (de COBI) por su apoyo y
retroalimentación y por las porras constantes! A Marcia Moreno-Báez y Jennie Duberstein, por
ofrecerme siempre su ayuda y por toda la ayuda y el cariño que nos han dado durante estos 5
años. A Tad Pfister (y familia) por tu apoyo constante y tu amistad de fierro! Gracias Tad! Al
equipo de trabajo de COBI, PRONATURA, Niparajá y CEDO, por su colaboración durante la
realización de este trabajo: Mario Rojo, Cesar Moreno, Andrea Sáenz, René Loaiza, Sergio Pérez,
Esteban Torreblanca y familia, Gustavo Danemann, Peggy y Rick Turk Boyer, Iván Martínez,
Alexis Rife, Amy Hudson y Constanza Santa Ana. A Xavier Basurto por su retroalimentación
durante las primeras fases de este proyecto.
I also wish to thank Cheryl Cradock, Anne Hartley, Shri, Andy and Katy Honaman, and Mike
Renning for their valuable help throughout this process, and to Isaac Kaplan for his support and
understanding during the final phases of this dissertation.
I am greatly thankful to the Wallace Research Foundation and the Packard Foundation for the
financial support provided throughout these years.
A los amigos de aquí (además de los ya nombrados) y de más al sur por su ayuda logística y/o
emocional durante esta larga travesía, en especial: Gaby y Leo, Martín y Paula, Adrián, Lili y
familia; Cora y familia, Karla Pelz, Sonya Stecker, Alberto Macías y familia, Camilo y Paula;
Francina, Salvador, Vale e Isi; Alyssa y Dennis, Beté, Kai y Eva; Samia, Matías y Dieguito;
James Collins, Yamillet Carrillo, Jesús, Susie Quashu, Carlos Mbandong Eyenga, Mari Sans,
Wilma Zufelt, Lobo Orensanz, Ana Parma, Inés Elías, Marta y José Ascorti, Naty Ríos y familia,
Fer Menchi, Wolfgang Stotz, Mané Cisterna y flia, Feña, Iván y cabritos; Cachito Hernández, Ale
Mercado, Kari Reynoso, Laura Anderson, Andy Rodríguez y Valeria Martínez.
Deseo agradecer muy especialmente a Alba y Jorge Moreno, por habernos cuidado y mimado
como si fuéramos sus hijos.
Gracias Gaspar, por estar y aguantar, por tu amor y tu humor, por cocinar, lavar…etc!
Gracias Nau, por hacer de nuestras vidas una fiesta.
Finalmente pero MUY especialmente deseo agradecer de todo corazón a mis padres, Carlos y
Ana María, a los papas de Gaspar, Marta y Guillermo, y al resto de nuestras familias (sobrinos,
hermanos, primos, tíos, cuñados), por el amor y el apoyo incondicional que siempre nos han
dado, no vemos la hora de estar allá con ustedes!
5
DEDICATION
A mi madre, por tu paciencia infinita. Espero que podamos recuperar con creces el
tiempo perdido.
A Teresita Capdevila, por haberme enseñado inglés desinteresadamente sabiendo (ella)
que algún día me abriría puertas.
A Silvina Soria, por tu fortaleza como mujer y mamá.
A Nahuel.
Corderito mío,
suavidad callada:
mi pecho es tu gruta
de musgo afelpada.
Carnecita blanca,
tajada de luna:
lo he olvidado todo
por hacerme cuna.
Me olvidé del mundo
y de mí no siento
más que el pecho vivo
con que te sustento.
Y sé de mí sólo
que en mí te recuestas.
Tu fiesta, hijo mío,
apagó las fiestas.
“Corderito”, Gabriela Mistral.
6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ 8
ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................ 9
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 11
The problem and its global context ........................................................................... 11
The State of the World’s Fisheries: Where do Small-scale Fisheries Stand? .......... 11
Small-scale fisheries as common-pool resources (CPRs): The role of institutions in
fisheries performance................................................................................................ 13
Rules on paper vs. rules in use.................................................................................. 15
This Dissertation ......................................................................................................... 16
Explanation of the dissertation format ..................................................................... 18
PRESENT STUDY ........................................................................................................... 22
The Study Area ........................................................................................................... 22
Small-scale Fisheries in the Gulf of California ........................................................ 22
Small-scale Fisheries in Bahía de Kino, Northern Gulf of California ..................... 24
Small-scale Fisheries in Bahía de los Ángeles, Northern Gulf of California........... 25
Legal Framework for Fisheries in Mexico (applicable to BK and BA fisheries) ..... 26
Social and Fisheries Impact of Formal Fisheries Policies in Bahía de Kino and
Management Implications Beyond this Case Study ................................................ 30
Assessing Fishers’ Knowledge and Attitudes on Fisheries Policies in Bahía de
Kino to Improve Fisheries Management .................................................................. 32
Comparative Institutional Analysis of Small-scale Fisheries Performance in Bahía
de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino .............................................................................. 34
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 39
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
APPENDIX A: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FORMAL FISHERIES
POLICIES: SOCIAL DISPARITIES AND RESOURCE OVERUSE IN A MAJOR
FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO ...................... 44
APPENDIX B: INSIGHTS FROM THE USERS TO IMPROVE FISHERIES
PERFORMANCE: FISHERS’ KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES ON FISHERIES
POLICIES IN BAHÍA DE KINO, GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO ...................... 91
APPENDIX C: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES
PERFORMANCE IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO, FROM AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR
COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT ................................................................... 137
APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR PANGA CAPTAINS - BAHÍA DE
KINO............................................................................................................................... 198
APPENDIX E: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR KEY INFORMANTS - INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF FORMALIZED GROUPS AND LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS BAHÍA DE KINO........................................................................................................... 208
APPENDIX F: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR PANGA CAPTAINS - BAHÍA DE LOS
ÁNGELES ...................................................................................................................... 217
APPENDIX G: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR KEY INFORMANTS - INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF FORMALIZED GROUPS AND LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS BAHÍA DE LOS ÁNGELES .......................................................................................... 225
APPENDIX H: HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL ..................................................... 232
8
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Map of the study area within the Northern Gulf of California (NGC). The NGC
is the area extending north of Punta San Francisquito in Baja California and north of
Bahía de Kino in Sonora. The thick gray line on the Sonoran coastline indicates the
geographic jurisdiction of fishing permits for diving products in Bahía de Kino,
extending from Puerto Libertad to Estero Tastiota. Square markers indicate the main
towns or cities. Hermosillo is the capital city of Sonora. Cartographic design: Marcia
Moreno-Báez and Erika Koltenuk. ................................................................................... 37
Figure 2. Federal agencies involved in fisheries regulation in Mexico and their main
attributes as they relate to fisheries management. ............................................................ 38
9
ABSTRACT
Understanding how institutions affect or shape fisheries performance is an
important part of providing practical insights for the development of management
strategies that promote sustainable fishing. In the Gulf of California there is widespread
evidence of declines in fish stocks upon which small-scale fisheries depend and these
declines are largely attributed to policy failures. Using methods commonly used in social
sciences, I investigated the formal and informal rules regulating resource use by smallscale fishers from two fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California (NGC),
Bahía de Kino and Bahía de los Ángeles, Mexico, and their effects on fisheries
sustainability.
Some of the main results are summarized below:
a) The percentage of fishers holding fishing rights and actually using them to report and
commercialize catch was quite small in both communities (fishing rights are usually
in the hands of absentee operators).
b) Current policies and policy changes do not reach the fishers in a direct and formalized
way in any of these communities, and these policies are shaped with no participation
of local fishers.
c) Current policy tools show poor performance in practice and have been ineffective (at
the moment) in promoting sustainable fishing practices by fishery stakeholders.
Neither community has been able to manage their resources sustainably.
10
Results also suggest some potentials that could lead to more sustainable fishing
practices in both communities:
d) The presence of informal rights (fishers’ sense of ownership) over the fishing grounds
in the surroundings of their home communities. Generally, local fishers do not
conform to or enforce the individual boundaries of the fishing rights they hold (or
work under), but they do care about and defend an area that they perceive as
belonging to their community as a whole, particularly when there are “outsiders”
coming in.
e) The presence of strong support from the fishers for implementing improved
regulatory measures for local fisheries.
Specific recommendations for each case study are provided with the aim of
enhancing rules legitimacy and improving management outcomes.
11
INTRODUCTION
The problem and its global context
The State of the World’s Fisheries: Where do Small-scale Fisheries Stand?
The current status and trends of global fisheries has been a subject of intense
debate over the years. Nonetheless, it is now well recognized that the majority of the
world’s fish stocks are intensively exploited and that the impact of fisheries (and other
human activities) on marine ecosystems has been profound (Hilborn et al. 2003; Norse
and Crowder 2005; FAO 2009; Worm et al. 2009). While many of the world’s major
fisheries continue to produce substantial yield, a number have been severely overfished,
and many more stocks appear to be heading toward depletion (Hilborn et al. 2003). The
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that 19% of stocks
were overexploited and 9% depleted or recovering from depletion in 2007 (FAO 2009).
More recent estimations (based on a sample dominated by valuable industrial fisheries
with some form of management in developed countries)1 suggest that marine ecosystems
are currently subjected to a range of exploitation rates, resulting in a mosaic of stable,
declining, collapsed, and rebuilding fish stocks and ecosystems (Worm et al. 2009).
These authors also assert that despite the long history of overexploitation in most
fisheries, management actions have achieved measurable reductions in exploitation rates
1
Information on other fisheries like small-scale or recreational fisheries is scarcer, less accessible, and
more difficult to interpret than industrial or large-scale fisheries’ data (Berkes et al. 2001; Worm et al.
2009).
12
in some regions, suggesting that there is room for recovery if the right mechanisms (for
each context) are in place.
Although there is no universal definition of small-scale fishery (SSF), SSFs
generally involve small boats and catches, and mechanized and manual fishing gears
(Panayotou 1982; Berkes et al. 2001). SSFs around the globe are socially and
economically very important (Berkes et al. 2001; FAO 2009). However, due to the high
level of informality, complexity and heterogeneity of this fishing sector, estimating its
magnitude is highly challenging and estimates vary greatly. Berkes et al. (2001)
suggested that SSFs worldwide comprise over 50 million fishers of a total of 51 million
considering large and small-scale fisheries. More recent estimations suggest that this
fishing sector comprises 12 million fishers compared with 0.5 million in industrialized
fisheries (Pauly 2006). Even with these large differences, the relative importance of SSFs
compared with large-scale fisheries remains noticeably high. The great majority of these
fishers reside in developing countries, which produce a significant amount of the world’s
harvests2 (Berkes et al. 2001; Pauly 2006).
Worldwide, the management of SSFs is quite challenging both biologically and
socially (McGoodwin 1990; Berkes et al. 2001; Hilborn et al. 2005; Orensanz et al. 2005;
St. Martin et al. 2007). SSFs usually involve a large number of boats, highly diverse
species and fishing gears, and occur in relatively small, usually isolated communities,
that land their catch in multiple spots along the coasts (Mahon 1997; Berkes et al. 2001;
2
According to Berkes et al. 2001, these fisheries produce 20-30 million tons per year, compared to 15-40
million tons by large-scale fleets. The best global estimate is thought to be about 21 million tons in 2000
(Pauly 2006).
13
McGoodwin 2002). Under these circumstances fishery information is hard to get and
regulations are difficult to enforce when implemented in a top down manner (Orensanz et
al. 2005; Grafton et al. 2006). Because of these characteristics, the conventional
approach3 to fisheries management involving single species stock assessment, top-down
administration and external enforcement, has rarely worked for managing SSFs (Mahon
1997; Berkes et al. 2001; Worm et al. 2009). Furthermore, when these fisheries are
managed at all, the tendency has been to keep access to these fisheries open, with limited
controls over who may exploit the resources (Berkes et al. 2001).
Small-scale fisheries as common-pool resources (CPRs): The role of institutions in
fisheries performance
Institutions4 (like policies or locally developed rules) are widely regarded as key
factors influencing the uses of natural resources by humans, whether it involves overuse
or sustainable management (Ostrom 1990; National Research Council 2002). People
work within a set of ecological, social, and institutional constraints to consider the costs
and benefits of various behaviors and act according to perceived incentives (Ostrom
1990; Rudd 2004). Institutions are particularly important in common-pool resources
(CPRs) (such as a forest or a fishing ground), which are resources from which excluding
users is difficult (the exclusion problem), and one person’s harvest of the resource makes
this resource unavailable to others (the subtractability problem) (Ostrom et al. 1994).
3
This approach was developed for large-scale (or industrial) fisheries from the Northern Hemisphere and
used elsewhere.
4
We refer to ‘institutions’ as the rules, norms and strategies adopted by individuals to organize their social
interactions and resource extraction (Ostrom 1990).
14
In fisheries, controlling who accesses a fishing ground and how the resource is
harvested by those entering the fishery are critical aspects for limiting exploitation to
sustainable levels (Hilborn et al. 2003; Grafton et al. 2006). Open-access to fisheries has
had disastrous social and ecological consequences worldwide. Hardin’s model of the
“tragedy of the commons” explains how the divergence between individual and collective
rationality may cause overexploitation of resources open to all (Hardin 1968). Under
freedom of fishing, the fish that is left in the water may be caught by others, and so there
is no incentive to conserve. However, although Hardin’s model is a coherent explanation
for overexploitation in open access situations, his predictions of a guaranteed tragedy
whenever resources are held in common have been widely refuted by empirical evidence
(Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; Smith and Berkes 1991). Studies conducted by social
scientists over the last quarter of last century have revealed a surprising amount and
variety of organizational arrangements previously ignored (e.g., informal property rights,
self-governed examples), where the “tragedy” was not observed (Cordell 1984; Ruddle
and Akimichi 1984; Ostrom et al. 1994; Ruddle 2007). These findings opened new
alternatives for the -de novo- management of SSFs, involving more participatory
approaches (community-based management, co-management), the use of property or use
rights and other incentive-based management practices (also called rights-based tools5) to
encourage rule compliance and self-enforcement, and an increased attention on factors
affecting human behavior.
5
Approaches that tend to eliminate ‘the race for fish’ and provide incentives for fishery stakeholders to
participate in management decisions and increase compliance with regulations (e.g., territorial use-rights in
fisheries or TURFs, marine tenure systems, use-rights to a certain gear or to an amount of a resource
granted to individuals, groups of individuals or communities) (Christy 1982; Hilborn 2005; Grafton et al.
2006).
15
Today, fisheries management failures are thought to be largely the product of
institutional failures, the sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements
used to manage fisheries which are directly linked to incentives (FAO 2002; Hilborn et
al. 2005; Grafton et al. 2008). The existence of inappropriate incentives for sustainable
management has been identified as one of the six6 major causes for unsustainable
fisheries around the world (FAO 2002). Understanding how institutions affect or shape
individual incentives and fisheries performance is therefore an important part of
providing practical insights for the development of management strategies that promote
sustainable fishing.
Rules on paper vs. rules in use
Rules and regulations are seldom implemented and used exactly the way they are
stated. These rules may consist of externally established rules (often formalized rules,
like policies or regulations) and rules developed by the users of resources (often informal
arrangements or agreements). The rules and practices that are actually used in field
settings are called working rules or rules in use and they may or may not closely resemble
the formal laws expressed in legislation (Ostrom et al. 1994). Sometimes, rules in use
may differ considerably -or even contradict- the existing formal rules. Because rules in
use are not easily observable, fisheries managers and analysts may believe that formal
rules and rules in use are always the same, and/or that there are no other rules in place
other than formal rules (Ostrom 1992; Ensminger 1996). If managers assume that users
6
Together with high demand for limited resources, poverty and lack of alternatives, complexity and
inadequate knowledge, lack of governance, and interactions of the fishery sector with other sectors and the
environment.
16
automatically learn, comprehend, and make use of the government rules in place,
management strategies may be based on administrative assumptions (rules on paper)
rather than on what is really happening in the field.
Unfortunately, studies of rules in use and of how the fishers respond to rules and
regulations are seldom addressed in studies of fishing communities (Grafton et al. 2006),
leaving us without an understanding of how policies are performing on-the ground and
how their implementation could be improved. This is usually the case in SSFs where
rules in use (locally developed and government rules) to control access and resource use
are virtually unknown to authorities, even though many of the processes governing the
sustainability of SSFs take place at the local level (Christy 1982; Orensanz 2001).
This Dissertation
The goal of this dissertation is to understand the formal and informal mechanisms
regulating resource use by small-scale fishers from two fishing communities in the
Northern Gulf of California (NGC), Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino, Mexico,
and their effect on fisheries sustainability. By comparing the institutional performance of
these case studies this dissertation aims to improve our understanding of how formal
policy tools and local arrangements interact in different settings and under what
circumstances they are effective in influencing stakeholders’ behavior.
In the Gulf of California, there is widespread evidence of declines in fish stocks
upon which small-scale fisheries depend (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998; Sala et
al. 2004; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2005; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2006; Danemann and Ezcurra
17
2007; Cisneros-Mata 2010). Despite the existence of formal policies and regulations
intended to sustain fishery production, these declining stocks are largely attributed to
policy failures (Alcalá 2003; Greenberg 2006; Cisneros-Mata 2010).
This dissertation is aimed to provide information to better fit current government
policies to local circumstances with the goal of enhancing their legitimacy and improving
management outcomes. Results from this study may also be used as a preliminary
baseline in the development of ‘regional fishery ordinance plans’ and ‘species-specific
management plans’ for the study area, as required by the recently enacted fisheries act in
Mexico, the “Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables”.
The specific goals of this dissertation are as follows:
1. To assess the on-the-ground performance of existing government rules for
fisheries management in Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino.
2. To assess fishers’ knowledge and attitudes on fisheries policies in these
fishing communities, and their suggestions on how these policies could be
improved.
3. To assess the presence of locally developed rules or arrangements to
regulate fishing behavior in these fishing communities, and their
interaction (compatibility) with existing government rules.
4. To contrast the institutional performance (of government and local rules)
of these communities’ SSFs and the factors (institutional and non-
18
institutional) potentially contributing to the outcomes observed in each
case.
5. Based on the knowledge generated, to recommend how this knowledge
can inform fisheries management to improve the condition of SSFs in the
region.
Explanation of the dissertation format
The results of this dissertation are presented as three separate appended
manuscripts (Appendices A, B, and C). The manuscripts present in-depth details of
specific research questions addressed, methodology, results, and discussion. Various
colleagues appear as co-authors based on our collaboration through the development of
this research. However, the research design, analysis, writing, and the majority of the data
collected for this research are entirely my own and the dissertation as a whole represents
my original and independent work. In addition to these research articles, Appendices D-G
contain copies of the survey instruments used for this research, which could be useful for
anyone studying institutional aspects of small-scale fisheries in the Gulf of California,
Mexico. Appendix H contains approval paperwork for the UA Human Subjects
Protection Program.
APPENDIX A: “The Unintended Consequences of Formal Fisheries Policies: Social
Disparities and Resource Overuse in a Major Fishing Community in the Gulf of
California, Mexico” is an article published in Marine Policy in March 2010, Volume 34,
19
pages 328–339. This study investigates the local social and fisheries impact of formal
fisheries policies in Bahía de Kino, and addresses the question of whether the formal
institutional structure of Mexican fishing regulations is effective in promoting responsible
behavior by small-scale fishery stakeholders. I wrote this article in collaboration with
William W. Shaw (my dissertation director) and Richard Cudney-Bueno (UC Santa Cruz
and Packard Foundation), who are part of the PANGAS Project, which supported my
dissertation research. They provided important feedback during the design and
development phases of this research and in the preparation of the manuscript. Mario Rojo
(from COBI), also a co-author of this study, facilitated my field work and assisted with
data collection.
APPENDIX B: “Insights from the Users to Improve Fisheries Performance: Fishers’
Knowledge and Attitudes on Fisheries Policies in Bahía de Kino, Gulf of California,
Mexico” is an article published in Marine Policy in November 2010, Volume 34, issue 6,
pages 1322–1334. This study investigates the interpretation and level of support of
government regulations in Bahía de Kino, and includes information on fishers’ awareness
of current policies, fishers’ attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation,
and fishers’ suggestions on how their fisheries should be managed. I wrote this article in
collaboration with William W. Shaw (my dissertation director) who provided significant
feedback throughout the development of this research and in revisions of the manuscript.
Jorge Torre (from COBI), also co-author of this article, collaborated with information and
in revisions of the manuscript.
20
APPENDIX C: “A Comparative Analysis of Small-scale Fisheries Performance in the
Gulf of California, Mexico, from an Institutional Perspective: Opportunities and
Challenges for Community-based Management” prepared for publication in the
International Journal of the Commons. This study compares the institutional performance
of two case studies of small-scale fisheries in the Gulf of California (GC), Bahía de los
Ángeles and Bahía de Kino. It aims to improve our understanding of how formal policy
tools and local arrangements interact in different settings and under what circumstances
they are effective in influencing stakeholders’ behavior. This study also examines the role
of factors (institutional, non-institutional, fishers’ attitudes and perceptions) that may
potentially influence the capacity of these communities for fisheries improvement in the
mid- to short-term. It also examines how these factors may potentially affect the degree
to which local stakeholders could take an active role in resource management. I wrote
this manuscript in collaboration with Marcia Moreno-Báez (recently graduated at the
School of Natural Resources and the Environment and member of the PANGAS project),
who provided fishing zone data and assisted with cartographic design and incorporation
of official information into GIS. Esteban Torreblanca-Ramírez (from PRONATURA) is
also co-authoring this manuscript. Esteban facilitated my field work in Bahía de los
Ángeles and assisted with data collection.
APPENDIX D: Survey instrument for panga captains - Bahía de Kino.
APPENDIX E: Survey instrument for key informants - Internal organization of
formalized groups and local arrangements - Bahía de Kino.
21
APPENDIX F: Survey instrument for panga captains - Bahía de los Ángeles.
APPENDIX G: Survey instrument for key informants - Internal organization of
formalized groups and local arrangements - Bahía de los Ángeles.
APPENDIX H: Human Subjects Approval.
22
PRESENT STUDY
The methods, results, and conclusions of this study are presented in the papers
appended to this dissertation. The following is a summary of the most important findings
in this document.
The Study Area
Small-scale Fisheries in the Gulf of California
The Gulf of California (GC) in Mexico (Figure 1) is an area characterized by
exceptionally high rates of primary productivity (Zeitzschel 1969; Alvarez-Borrego and
Lara-Lara 1991) and biodiversity levels (Brusca et al. 2004), as well as high economic
and social significance (Carvajal et al. 2004; Cisneros-Mata 2010). Fishing (large and
small-scale) is a predominant economic activity throughout the GC. It is estimated that
there are approximately 50,000 fishers and 25,000 boats operating in small-scale (or
artisanal) fisheries in the GC, and about 10,000 fishers and 1,300 boats operating in in
large-scale (or industrial) fisheries (Cisneros-Mata 2010). The region is a major
contributor to the national fisheries sector, producing approximately 50% of the landings7
and 70% of the value of national fisheries in Mexico (Carvajal et al. 2004).
7
Nonetheless, about 60% of these landings (as of 2002) correspond to small pelagics (mainly sardines and
jumbo squid), most of which is harvested by large-scale fleets (37 industrial vessels for sardine and 1,000
small boats or pangas for jumbo squid). These fisheries combined employ a relatively small number of
people and contribute with only about 10% of the total value of GC landings to the national fishery
production (Cisneros-Mata 2010).
23
SSFs are very important in the Northern Gulf of California (NGC)8 (Figure 1).
Recent studies revealed that small-scale fishing takes place in most of the coastline of the
NGC (89%) and surrounding islands, from shore to over 100 meter depth (Moreno-Báez
et al. 2010). The exact number of small-scale boats working in the NGC (and in the entire
GC) is hard to determine given the vastness and complexity of the territory, and the
dynamism of this type of fleet. The number of boats commonly increases and decreases,
and distributes over space, in response to variations in resource abundance and other
factors like market demand and cost-benefit calculations (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer
1998; Moreno et al. 2005b; Danemann and Ezcurra 2007; Cudney-Bueno and Basurto
2009; Cinti et al. 2010; Cisneros-Mata 2010; Moreno-Báez et al. 2010). Estimations
made in 2005 at the scale of the NGC suggest between 1,600 and 3,000 active9 boats
depending on the season (project PANGAS 2006, unpublished data), each with a team of
two or three fishers. These boats, locally called “pangas”, target over 70 main species and
more than 100 species total, including crustaceans, mollusks, fishes, echinoderms, and
more recently coelenterates (PANGAS 2008). Pangas are typically fiberglass boats, 8-9
meters long, equipped with 55-115 hp outboard motors, and gross tonnage of about 1
metric ton. Small-scale fishers use a diversity of fishing gears, being the most common
gillnets (for fish and crustaceans), longlines (fishes), traps (crustaceans and fishes), and
8
Based on observations of fish species distribution patterns, the Gulf of California has been divided in
three main areas (north, mid and south) (Walker 1960). The Northern Gulf of California is defined as the
area extending north of an imaginary line from San Francisquito in Baja California and Bahía de Kino in
Sonora.
9
These are the boats that were actively fishing at the time the survey was conducted, regardless of their
legal status. Note that both, counts of active pangas in a given season and official registries may not reflect
the reality because of the dynamism of these artisanal fleets and the presence of outdated official
information.
24
diving (crustaceans, mollusks, echinoderms, fishes) (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer
1998).
Small-scale Fisheries in Bahía de Kino, Northern Gulf of California
Bahía de Kino (BK) is a rural fishing community of about 5,000 inhabitants
(INEGI 2005) located in the State of Sonora (Figure 1). This village is only 100 Km from
Hermosillo (the state capital)10, which is the primary destination of local marine
resources prior to redistribution to regional, national and international markets.
Approximately 800 fishers and 200 active pangas are involved in SSFs in this
community (Moreno et al. 2005b). A total of 66 species are harvested by these smallscale fishers, of which 35 are regarded as the primary targets of fishing trips (Project
PANGAS, unpublished). The main fishing gears used by the fishers of BK are gillnets,
traps (for crab and fish), and commercial diving. Approximately 80 pangas are dedicated
to gillnet fishing, which primarily targets small sharks (Mustelus spp.), rays (Dasyatis
dipterura, Myliobatis californica), and related species (Guitar Fish, Rhinobatus spp.;
Angel Shark, Squatina californica); sierra (Scomberomorus spp.), flounder (families
Paralichthidae and Pleuronectidae), and shrimp (Litopenaeus spp.). About 20 of these
pangas switch to fish swimming crab (Callinectes bellicosus) with traps at the onset of
this fishing season and return to gillnets afterwards. Other 30 pangas are dedicated
exclusively to the harvest of swimming crab with traps more regularly throughout the
year. In addition, another 80 pangas are active in commercial diving. Divers mainly
harvest pen shells (mostly Atrina tuberculosa, and occasionally Atrina Maura and Pinna
10
With 640,000 inhabitants (INEGI 2005).
25
rugosa), octopus (Octopus spp.), and fishes [mainly groupers (Mycteroperca rosacea and
M. jordani) and snappers (Hoplopagrus guentherii and Lutjanus novemfasciatus)]. Sea
cucumber (Isostichopus fuscus) is also an important diving fishery, though clandestine
because no authorization to harvest this species has been granted in the area (Cinti et al.
2010). Smaller quantities of lobsters (Panulirus spp.), rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer),
several species of clams (Megapitaria squalida, Dosinia spp., and others) and snails
(Hexaplex nigritus, Strombus galeatus, and others) are also harvested11. In AugustSeptember, these divers and other fishers in town temporarily abandon their main fishing
activity and join the shrimp small-scale fishery. About 150 pangas of the 200 active
pangas in BK participate in the shrimp fishing season. Also, some pangas from BK work
using other fishing gears for short periods of time in addition to their main fishing
activity, like traps for fish (<10 pangas) (Meza et al. 2008), longline (<5 pangas during a
couple of months per year), and hand lining (project PANGAS 2006, unpublished).
Small-scale Fisheries in Bahía de los Ángeles, Northern Gulf of California
Bahía de los Ángeles (BA) is a very small and isolated community of 527
inhabitants (INEGI 2005), situated in the state of Baja California (Figure 1) over 500 Km
from the nearest major city12 where marine resources can be marketed and redistributed
to other regional, national and international markets (US and Asia).
11
Some of these products are harvested in small amounts because they are overfished and consequently
scarce, even though they get a high price in the market (e.g., lobster, rock scallops, some species of clams).
Other species are harvested only in small quantities because they get a very low price in the market (some
species of snails and clams).
12
At 555 Km from Ensenada (~260,000 inhabitants), 650 Km from Tijuana (~1.29 million inhabitants), and
800 Km from Mexicali (the state capital) (~900 thousand inhabitants), all next to the United States (US)
border.
26
SSFs in BA consist of about 70 fishers and 37 pangas (Avendaño et al. 2009) and
make use of three main fishing gears: 1) gillnet fishing, which primarily targets flounder
(Paralichthys californicus) and species13 associated to this fishery; and shark species
(mainly Mustelus spp. and Galeorhinus spp.; 2) trap fishing, which mainly targets
octopus (Octopus bimaculatus and O. hubbsorum) and fish species (mainly sand basses
Paralabrax auroguttatus and P. maculatofasciatus and species14 associated to these
fisheries); and 3) commercial diving, which targets octopus (O. bimaculatus and O.
hubbsorum), sea cucumber (Istiotichopus fuscus and I. inornata), and several species of
clams (e.g., Megapitaria squalida, Argopecten ventricosus) (Danemann and Ezcurra
2007; Valdez Ornelas and Torreblanca 2008; Torreblanca et al. 2009).
Legal Framework for Fisheries in Mexico (applicable to BK and BA fisheries)
Fisheries regulation in Mexico is shared by two federal agencies, SAGARPA15,
the Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture, and SEMARNAT16, the Secretary of the
Environment and Natural Resources (Figure 2). SAGARPA, via CONAPESCA17, its
National Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission, is the primary agency in charge of
fisheries regulation, issuing licenses in the form of fishing permits (referred as
CONAPESCA’s permits hereafter), authorizations or concessions (Figure 2).
CONAPESCA is also in charge of enforcing regulations related to fishery resources that
fall under SAGARPA’s jurisdiction.
13
Angel shark Squatina californica, Guitarfish Rhinobatos productus; Rays Dasyastis
Brevis, Gymnura marmorata, and Myliobatis californica.
14
Whitefish Caulolatilus princeps and Mexican hogfish Bodianus diplotaenia.
15
Stands for “Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación”.
16
Stands for “Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales”.
17
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”.
27
On the other hand, SEMARNAT, via DGVS18, its General Division of Wildlife,
regulates the use of species listed “under special protection”19 and, in the case of benthic
resources listed in this category (e.g., sea cucumber and rock scallop), may authorize
their harvest through a species-specific permit20 (referred to as SEMARNAT’s permit
hereafter) (Figure 2). SEMARNAT is also in charge of the establishment and
management of marine protected areas (MPAs) throughout Mexico via CONANP21, the
National Commission of Natural Protected Areas. PROFEPA22, the Federal Agency for
the Protection of the Environment, is SEMARNAT’s enforcement body (Figure 2). The
Navy is also empowered to provide enforcement support to both CONAPESCA and
PROFEPA if needed.
In the Gulf of California, and throughout Mexico, CONAPESCA’s fishing
permits are the most widely used management tool23 to grant access to marine resources.
Fishing permits may be granted to any corporate entity [e.g., formalized groups like
cooperatives or SPRs24] or individual for four years or less (2-5 years in the new law),
and they are renewable upon compliance with regulations. The permit specifies the
18
Stands for “División General de Vida Silvestre”.
Species included in the norm NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and subsequent modifications.
20
Called “Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo para la Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de
Vida Silvestre” (Federal Polygons for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Wildlife).
21
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas”.
22
Stands for “Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente”.
23
To date, fishing concessions have only been granted for a few benthic resources of high commercial
value (e.g., abalone, lobster) on the west coast of Baja California Peninsula and the Caribbean Sea
(Bourillón-Moreno 2002). In the GC only a few SEMARNAT’s permits have been issued for the harvest of
sea cucumber, rock scallop, and ornamental fish used for the aquarium market.
24
An SPR (Society of Rural Production) is a type of formal organization commonly used in Mexico for any
type of rural industries, services and productive activities, including fisheries.
19
28
particular species (e.g., octopus permit, lobster permit) or group of species25 to be
harvested, within a broadly specified region (Bourillón-Moreno 2002). Generally, access
to the species (or group of species) within that area is not exclusive, since several permits
for the same species and area may be granted to different permit holders. Nonetheless, as
we will describe later, variations in the way this tool is implemented may occur between
states.
Each fishing permit specifies the number of boats26 that are permitted for use to
harvest the species authorized in the permit, together with technical specifications of the
fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear). A boat that belongs to a permit
holder can be registered in more than one permit. That is, the same boat can be entitled to
fish several species, depending on the amount of permits registered to a specific boat.
Permit holders are the only ones who can legally land and declare the catch at
CONAPESCA’s regional offices (Bourillón-Moreno 2002). Permit holders are also the
only ones who can provide legal invoices (or “facturas”) for the product extracted
directly from sea27. These invoices certify legal ownership of the harvest, and are
necessary to sell and transport the catch to regional or international markets. Note that
permit holders are only allowed to harvest and sell resources that have been caught using
the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear) registered in their permits. The
use of one’s permit to buy and sell catch caught by fishing equipments not registered in
25
Some permits are issued for several species under a generic category, e.g. the escama (fish with scales)
permit allows fishing about 200 species of fish, or the ‘shark permit’ which includes several species of
elasmobranchs.
26
Referred as ‘número de espacios’.
27
Buyers without a fishing permit are allowed to buy product from permit holders or from other buyers
without a fishing permit and resell it. They have to carry on with them a document that certifies the legal
possession of the catch and specifies the fishing permit under which the product in question was harvested.
29
the permit is locally called ‘amparo’ (‘sheltering’ catch from illegal sources) and is
prohibited by law.
SEMARNAT’s permits (as well as CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions) may
provide exclusive use-rights over one or more species within a specified polygon,
following the guidelines of a management plan, for which a quota must be authorized
(this permit does not specify a number of authorized boats as is the case of
CONAPESCA’s permits). Note that this tool provides exclusive access to the species but
not to the polygon since other fishers may access the area to harvest other species28. This
permit may be granted to any formalized group or individual for one year and it is
renewable upon compliance with regulations.
MPAs have been also used as tools in the GC for conservation and fisheries
management purposes. In the region, the most common type of MPA used is the
Biosphere Reserve29, for which zones with different degrees of protection must be
delimited (typically one or more core zones with higher levels of protection and a buffer
zone with lower level of protection). According to the law30, preferred access to MPAs
for the conduct of commercial activities should be provided to members of the
communities inhabiting the area at the moment the MPA is established, following the
guidelines of its management plan. Also, the law31 encourages participation of municipal
and state governments, and members of the community, in decision-making concerning
the use and management of MPAs.
28
Unless the harvest of all commercial species within that area is granted to the same permit holder.
Biosphere reserves must be established in regions of high ecological value to the country.
30
‘Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente’ (LGEEPA), www.semarnat.gob.mx,
and its bylaws concerning MPAs. See Art. 48 and 64 BIS-1, LGEEPA.
31
Art. 67, LGEEPA.
29
30
Social and Fisheries Impact of Formal Fisheries Policies in Bahía de Kino and
Management Implications Beyond this Case Study
This paper illustrates the effect of institutions on social interactions and harvesting
behavior in an important commercial diving fishery of the Gulf of California. Although
only one fishing community was the focus of this study, this particular case provides
lessons that go beyond its boundaries, illustrating the potential impacts of some of the
most widely used fishery management tools throughout Mexico.
We conducted research in Bahía de Kino from April to August 2007, focusing on
the small-scale fisheries sector of commercial divers. We gathered information on the
local performance of formal and informal rules regulating access and use through
participant observation, examination of secondary sources, and semi-structured and
structured interviews (including open and closed-ended questions).
We found that generally marine resources targeted by commercial divers in Bahía
de Kino are captured by fishers who do not own a fishing permit and do not belong (as
members), to any cooperative holding permits. In reality, most permit holders are the
buyers of the product. Also, most of the local corporate permit holders (principally
cooperatives) that were active in 2007 function in practice as individual permit holders
(locally referred as ‘permisionarios’). Cooperatives are usually constituted by a mixture
of family members, others not related to the fishing activity, and a few fishers that were
requested to sign at the time the cooperatives were formed. However, in practice, these
‘cooperatives’ are seldom ‘cooperatively managed’.
31
We argue that existing requirements to access fishing permits create an
institutional environment in which people who are not necessarily closely attached to the
fishing activity and/or community decide to enter the fishery for business purposes.
Often, full time fishers do not have the means, the capacity, and/or the time to fulfill the
requirements and successfully navigate through the bureaucracy in order to access a
fishing permit. This sets a standard that is too high for direct users (fishers) to become
formally involved in the fishery. In addition, because several boats can be registered as
part of a fishing permit, it is common that people requesting fishing permits do so for
several boats, creating the need for additional people to operate these boats.
As a result, the system tends to promote the disconnection of right holders from
the resource and intensify rent-seeking interests. Resources and markets tend to be
monopolized in a few hands, and an informal system of production is created. This
informal labor system is practically invisible to the federal government, resulting in the
exclusion of most fishers (usually more closely attached to the resources and with the
most at stake if resources are overfished) from management decisions concerning the
fishery. This social structure creates the wrong incentives for effective fisheries
management. Because permit holders are the only ones who can provide legal invoices
for the product extracted directly from sea, they are constantly tempted to shelter marine
resources from boats not registered in their permits. Furthermore, if fishers do not possess
a legal right to fish, they will also not have incentives to pursue the common good or to
limit fishing, even if perceiving that resources are increasingly scarce.
32
We argue that the design of the permit (licensing) system, the most widely used
tool to regulate access to marine resources throughout Mexico, provides the wrong
incentives for sustainable management. It is suggested that granting secure rights to
resources to those actively involved in the fishery is a necessary step for promoting
sustainable fishing practices.
Assessing Fishers’ Knowledge and Attitudes on Fisheries Policies in Bahía de Kino
to Improve Fisheries Management
Studies of what the resource users know about and how they perceive the formal
policies that regulate their activity are useful tools to assess the effectiveness of rules
designed to manage natural resources to ensure sustainable harvests.
We studied the interpretation and level of support of government regulations in
Bahía de Kino, Sonora. Research was conducted in Bahía de Kino from April to August
2007, focusing on the small-scale fisheries sector of commercial divers. We gathered
information on knowledge and attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries
regulation through structured interviews (including open and closed-ended questions),
informal talks and participant observation.
The results presented in this article reinforce and complement the information
presented in the first article by Cinti et al. (2010), from the perspective of resource-users,
suggesting that:
a) There exists an unequal distribution of fishing rights. None of our interviewees
had fishing permits in their names (as individual permit holders) and only 18% were
33
members of cooperatives holding fishing permits. Nonetheless, these cooperatives did not
commercialize their harvests through their cooperatives, which means that they are also
highly dependent on external buyers or other permit holders to sell their product. In
addition, obtaining a more even distribution of fishing permits, granting them to the users
of resources (not to absentee operators), was a major suggestion by local fishers.
b) Current policies and policy changes do not reach the fishers in a direct and
formalized way, and they are shaped with no participation of local fishers. Permit holders
are the only ones legally involved in the fishery, and consequently, the only ones
informed about regulatory measures, policy changes, or government benefits available to
them. The result is that fishers, operating under permits held by others; do not have
thorough knowledge about existing rules.
c) The existing system for monitoring and enforcing current rules is inefficient as
reflected by fishers’ willingness to reinforce vigilance and improve authorities’ response
to illegal fishing.
d) There exists the need to implement additional regulatory measures on most of
the species targeted by local divers because of a generalized state of overfishing.
Our results provide further evidence supporting the need for formally recognizing
these small-scale fishers as key stakeholders in local fisheries, and for working
cooperatively towards the design of management strategies and regulations that provide
better stimulus for resource stewardship and discourage overfishing. Very importantly,
this study suggests that there is strong support from resource users for implementing
regulatory measures for local fisheries.
34
The information presented in this study could be used as a preliminary baseline to
inform and guide the development of species-specific management plans for the area, as
required by the recently enacted fisheries act in Mexico, the “Ley General de Pesca y
Acuacultura Sustentables” (see www.sagarpa.gob.mx).
Comparative Institutional Analysis of Small-scale Fisheries Performance in Bahía
de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino
Understanding how institutions affect or shape fisheries performance is an
important part of providing practical insights for the development of management
strategies that promote sustainable fishing (Ostrom 1990; Hilborn et al. 2005; Grafton et
al. 2008).
This paper analyses the institutional performance of two case studies of smallscale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, with the aim of improving our
understanding of how formal policy tools and local arrangements interact in different
settings and under what circumstances they are effective in influencing stakeholders’
behavior.
The on-the-ground performance of existing formal policy tools and the presence
and performance of local arrangements to regulate access and resource use was assessed
through examination of secondary sources, semi-structured and structured interviews
(including open and closed-ended questions), informal talks and participant observation.
Fishers’ attitudes and perceptions were assessed using a combination of open-ended
questions and a set of statements in a 5-point Likert scale. We relied on available
35
literature for information on additional factors which may help explain the outcomes
observed in each case.
Our results suggest that the formal policy tools in place in either community have
been ineffective (at the moment) in promoting sustainable fishing practices by fishery
stakeholders. Even though these communities use different management tools (to some
extent), neither community has significantly modified traditional fishing practices in
response to over exploited resources. The geographic jurisdictions of individual permits
(of formalized groups or individuals) are generally ignored and individual fishers fish
where it is more convenient to them, following seasonal and spatial changes in resource
abundance of different species, and driven by market demand, weather conditions, and
distance constraints, among others. Informal rights (fishers’ sense of ownership) seem to
play a more important role than formal regulations in fishers’ decisions about where to
fish, at least within community limits. In BA, and also in BK to a lesser extent, there is a
tendency to willingly share the fishing grounds among all members in the community (as
if use-rights or permits would have been granted to the community as a whole), and to
protect these fishing grounds from outsiders.
We argue that communal property or use-rights might potentially offer a viable
alternative to help protect local fishing grounds from unwanted visitors, and incentivize
local fishers to organize themselves to implement and self-enforce more legitimate
management measures. In Mexico, granting communal property or use-rights over
marine areas is only reserved for indigenous groups. Nonetheless, administrative tools
available in Mexico’s fishery and environmental laws could be used to provide higher
36
exclusivity of access to the community within the limits of their fishing grounds, and help
prevent intrusions from outside.
We also found that fishers’ attitudes and perceptions about the problems affecting
their fisheries were quite similar between the two fishing communities, suggesting the
need for formally recognizing the fishers as key stakeholders in local fisheries, and for
working cooperatively towards the design of management strategies that provide better
stimulus for resource stewardship and discourage overfishing. Remarkably, this study
suggests that there is strong support from resource users for implementing regulatory
measures for local fisheries in both communities.
We argue that local arrangements and initiatives, if recognized and supported,
may provide the basis for the development of locally supported management strategies.
This would in turn lead to a higher likelihood of compliance and a higher potential for
managing these resources sustainably in both communities.
37
Figure 1. Map of the study area within the Northern Gulf of California (NGC). The NGC
is the area extending north of Punta San Francisquito in Baja California and north of
Bahía de Kino in Sonora. The thick gray line on the Sonoran coastline indicates the
geographic jurisdiction of fishing permits for diving products in Bahía de Kino,
extending from Puerto Libertad to Estero Tastiota. Square markers indicate the main
towns or cities. Hermosillo is the capital city of Sonora. Cartographic design: Marcia
Moreno-Báez and Erika Koltenuk.
38
SAGARPA
Primary agency in charge of fisheries
regulation, via its National Fisheries
Commission (CONAPESCA)
CONAPESCA
Participates in
fisheries regulation
and enforcement
In Bahía de Kino
A local Enforcement
Committee supports
CONAPESCA’s efforts
SEMARNAT
Regulates the use of species listed under
‘special protection’
CONANP
Regulates the establishment and
management of marine
protected areas
INAPESCA
Provides management
recommendations and
fishery indicators
PROFEPA
Enforces SEMARNAT’s
regulations
The Navy provides support
for enforcement to both
agencies
Figure 2. Federal agencies involved in fisheries regulation in Mexico and their main
attributes as they relate to fisheries management.
39
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44
APPENDIX A: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FORMAL FISHERIES
POLICIES: SOCIAL DISPARITIES AND RESOURCE OVERUSE IN A MAJOR
FISHING COMMUNITY IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
PUBLISHED IN MARINE POLICY, Volume 34 (2010) 328–339.
A. Cinti1,*, W. Shaw1, R. Cudney-Bueno1, 2, and M. Rojo3
1
The University of Arizona, School of Natural Resources, Biological Sciences East 325,
Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.
2
Institute of Marine Sciences, Long Marine Laboratories, University of California Santa
Cruz, 100 Schaffer Road, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, USA.
3
Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C., Blvd. Agua Marina #297, entre Jaiba y Tiburón,
Colonia Delicias, Guaymas, Sonora, 85420, México.
*Corresponding author: Ana Cinti, The University of Arizona, School of Natural
Resources, Biological Sciences East 325, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. Email address:
[email protected] Tel. +1 520 621 5568/626 5607, Fax. 520 621 8801.
Keywords
Small-scale fishery; institution; policy; cross-scale interaction; incentive; Gulf of
California.
45
The Unintended Consequences of Formal Fisheries Policies: Social Disparities and
Resource Overuse in a Major Fishing Community in the Gulf of California, Mexico
A. Cinti, W. Shaw, R. Cudney-Bueno, and M. Rojo
Abstract
This study investigates the local social and fisheries impact of formal fisheries
policies in Bahía de Kino, one of the most important fishing villages in terms of
extraction of benthic resources in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. The paper
focuses on cross-scale institutional interactions, describing how existing formal policies
are functioning on the ground, how these policies interact with local arrangements, and
how this interaction may affect the incentives of different actors towards sustainable
fisheries. Besides providing lessons on how the performance of a local fishery could be
improved, this paper addresses the question of whether the formal institutional structure
of Mexican fishing regulations is effective in promoting responsible behavior by smallscale fishery stakeholders. It is argued that the design of the most widely used
management tool to regulate access to marine resources throughout Mexico -the permit
(licensing) system- provides the wrong incentives for sustainable-use. Granting secure
rights to resources to those actively involved in the fishery is a necessary step for
promoting sustainable fishing practices.
46
1. Introduction
Institutions32 are widely regarded as important factors influencing the outcome of
natural resources use by humans, whether it involves overuse or sustainable management
[1, 2]. Given a set of ecological, social and institutional constraints, people consider the
costs and benefits of various behaviors and act according to their perceived incentives [2,
3]. Institutions are particularly important in common-pool resources (CPRs), resources
from which excluding users is difficult (the exclusion problem), and one person’s harvest
of the resource makes this resource unavailable to others (the subtractability problem)
[4].
In fisheries, controlling who accesses a fishing ground and how the resource is
harvested by those entering the fishery are critical for limiting exploitation to sustainable
levels. Open-access to fisheries has had disastrous social and ecological consequences
worldwide, even when resource-use rules were in place. On the other hand, decades of
observation of traditional and de novo management practices have shown us that
sustainability is achievable when the right mechanisms for controlling access and use,
and for providing incentives for fishery stakeholders to pursue sustainable outcomes, are
in place [4-11]. Whether developed by users themselves, by governments or other
agencies, or a mix of both, some of the elements present in successful management
institutions include granting of secure rights to resource users, stakeholder’s meaningful
participation in the full range of management (planning, science, legislation, and
32
We refer to ‘institutions’ as the rules, norms and strategies adopted by individuals to organize their social
interactions and resource extraction [2].
47
implementation), government recognition and consideration of locally developed
institutions and initiatives, and government support for management [5, 11, 12].
However, rules and regulations are seldom implemented and used exactly the way
they are stated. The rules and practices that are actually used in field settings are called
working rules or rules-in-use and they may or may not closely resemble the formal laws
expressed in legislation, administrative regulation [4], or local formal agreements.
Sometimes, rules in use may differ considerably -or even contradict- the existing formal
rules. Rules-in-use are also different from laws or formal rules in that they are not easily
observable [13]. This may lead to erroneous assumptions by analysts and managers who
may believe that formal rules and rules-in-use are always the same, and/or that there are
no other rules in place than formal rules [13, 14]. If managers assume that users
automatically learn, comprehend, and make use of the government rules in place,
management strategies may be based on administrative assumptions rather than on what
is really happening in the field [2, 14]. Unfortunately, this issue is seldom addressed in
studies of fishing communities, leaving us without an understanding of how government
rules are functioning on the ground, and therefore how their implementation could be
improved.
This paper presents the results of a study designed to describe the local social and
fisheries impacts of formal fisheries policies in Bahía de Kino, one of the most important
fishing villages in terms of extraction of benthic resources33 in the Northern Gulf of
33
Benthic species spend most of their life cycle in association with the sea bottom (i.e., mollusks,
crustaceans). In Bahía de Kino, they are harvested primarily by commercial divers.
48
California (NGC), Mexico (Fig. 1) [15]. The Gulf of California (GC) is a region
internationally known for its biological richness [16]. It is Mexico’s chief supplier of
fishery resources for national and international markets, and provides food and labor
opportunities to thousands of people at a local level [17]. Fishing activities (large and
small-scale) in the GC generate over 50,000 jobs, produce about 50% of the national
fishery production, and involve around 26,000 fishing boats of which about 90% are
small-scale boats34 locally called ‘pangas’ [18].
Besides providing lessons on how the performance of a local fishery could be
improved, this paper addresses the question of whether the formal institutional structure
of Mexican fishing regulations is effective in promoting responsible behavior by smallscale fishery stakeholders. A number of studies of governance of marine resources by
fishing communities have been developed in the Gulf of California [16, 19-23]. However,
none has specifically addressed the on-the-ground performance of the main management
tools for fisheries regulation and their consequences for fisheries sustainability. This
study argues that the design of the permit (licensing) system, the most widely used tool to
regulate access to marine resources throughout Mexico, provides the wrong incentives for
sustainable management. It is suggested that granting secure rights to resources to those
actively involved in the fishery is a necessary step for promoting sustainable fishing
practices.
34
Usually fiberglass boats less than 10m long, equipped with outboard motors.
49
2. Methods
The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) [24] was used to
help frame this research and identify relevant variables to explore. In this framework,
three basic categories of variables are thought to influence the patterns of interaction
among individuals in any given setting: 1. the rules used by participants to order their
social interactions (i.e., local and government rules-in-use); 2. attributes of the
biophysical world (i.e. resource characteristics); and 3. attributes of the community (i.e.
socio-cultural attributes) [24] (Fig. 2).
Research in Bahía de Kino (Fig. 1) was conducted from April to August 2007,
focusing on the small-scale fisheries sector of commercial divers. Information on the
local performance of formal and informal rules regulating access and use was gathered
through participant observation, examination of secondary sources, and semi-structured
and structured interviews (including open and closed-ended questions) [25, 26]. The first
phase of the research was devoted to getting used to the setting, building trust and having
informal and semi-structured talks with fishers, participating in a few fishing trips (n=4)
and recording observations at the beach. During the final phase of the research, a
structured interview was designed based on what was learned in previous months.
The structured interview was applied to fishers belonging to the major groups of
divers in town that were active in 2007 (6 groups). Even though the selection of
interviewees was not random due to lack of updated information on these groups’
members, whenever possible the number of interviews was distributed among groups
more or less in proportion to an estimate of the number of boats working for each group
50
at the time interviews were performed. A total of 45 interviews were conducted (about
19% of the fishers believed to be directly involved in this activity)35. Eighty nine percent
of interviewees were panga captains (in charge of the boat)(n=40), of which 33 were also
divers and the rest (n=7) were captains and divers’ assistants (the person who assists the
divers on board). One or two crew members from 40 pangas were interviewed, out of
approximately 80 active pangas involved in commercial diving in town (COBI36,
unpublished).
In addition to interviewing fishers, interviews were performed with a local
authority and a local leader of the permit holders’ sector to obtain information about
issues of access to fishery resources within local fishing grounds. Secondary data were
reviewed, including bylaws of cooperatives, official statistics on catch for the main target
species of commercial divers, and additional catch and effort data collected through a
voluntary logbook program implemented by an interdisciplinary project on small-scale
fisheries called PANGAS, taking place in the Northern Gulf of California
(http://pangas.arizona.edu).
3. Bahía de Kino’s Fisheries: Social and Resource Characteristics
Bahía de Kino is a rural coastal community of about 5,000 inhabitants [27]
situated in the state of Sonora, Mexico, where fishing is the most important human
activity [28]. About 800 fishers and 200 active pangas are locally involved in small-scale
35
The exact number of fishers involved in this activity is actually unknown. An estimation was used based
on the number of pangas dedicated to commercial diving in town and the number of people generally
involved in any diving trip (n=3), accounting for 240 people. However, because small-scale fishing is
highly dynamic, actual number of fishers actively participating in fishing activities can vary greatly.
36
A local NGO, Comunidad y Biodiversidad (COBI), www.cobi.org.mx.
51
fisheries (COBI, unpublished). A total of 66 species are harvested by these small-scale
fishers, of which 35 are regarded as the primary targets of fishing trips (project PANGAS
2007, unpublished). Species extracted are an important source of marine products at the
local and regional level. A number of these species are also internationally
commercialized [15, 29].
About 80 pangas are currently active in commercial diving in Bahía de Kino
(COBI, unpublished), harvesting pen shells (mostly Atrina tuberculosa, and occasionally
Atrina Maura and Pinna rugosa), octopus (Octopus spp.), lobsters (Panulirus inflatus),
and fishes [mainly groupers (Mycteroperca rosacea and M. jordani) and snappers
(Hoplopagrus guentherii and Lutjanus novemfasciatus)]. Sea cucumber (Isostichopus
fuscus) is also an important diving fishery, though clandestine because no authorization
to harvest this species has been granted in the area. Pangas are 8-9 meters long, equipped
with 55-115 hp outboard motors. To breathe underwater, divers use a ‘hookah’, which is
fabricated locally using a modified paint sprayer as the air compressor, connected to a
modified beer keg as the reserve air tank [30]. One or two 100 m hoses are attached to
this tank with air regulators at the end. The diving crew may include the operator or
‘popero’ (who operates the boat), one or two divers, and a divers’ assistant (who controls
the air supply for the divers). However, ‘poperos’ usually act as divers’ assistants too, to
increase the economic efficiency of the fishing trip (earnings are divided among less
people). One of these crew members is also the person in charge of the boat or captain,
52
who is responsible for its maintenance and for responding to the owner37 in case anything
may happen to it. Fishers working in commercial diving may at times also work in other
fishing activities, using gillnets (for fish and shrimp) or traps (for swimming crabs,
Callinectes spp.). Nonetheless, based on fishers’ declarations, diving is the primary
source of income for 93% of the fishers interviewed and fishing (of any kind) is the only
source of income for 71% of interviewees.
The state of fishery resources is not being evaluated by the federal government for
any target species of commercial diving in Bahía de Kino. The only information available
is landings statistics, and sometimes independent studies conducted by NGOs or other
non-governmental institutions. Official historical landings in Bahía de Kino indicate a
marked decrease in catches of pen shells from 1992 to 1998 (from 168 to 3 metric tons),
with a tendency to a slight increase in recent years (Fig. 3). A slight increase in landing
trends is also evidenced for leopard grouper and octopus in the last few years, though
octopus catch has been quite variable over time (Fig. 3). Table 1 shows the average,
maximum and minimum catch for octopus, lobster, pen shell and leopard grouper
between 1992 and 2008. Nonetheless, official statistics should be interpreted with caution
and may only be useful to show trends. Illegal fishing is likely high because of
unreported catch, catch captured outside local port’s jurisdiction that is declared as if it
was captured inside (i.e. in another state’s jurisdiction), and misidentification of species,
among other factors. In Sonora, estimations by the Navy in 2006 suggested that half of
37
Usually when a crew member owns the fishing equipment, he or she is the person in charge. Otherwise,
the captain is appointed by an owner external to the crew.
53
the small-scale boats fishing in state waters were illegal (4,000 boats officially registered
and about 8,000 actually fishing) (newspaper El Imparcial, August 2006).
For one of the species of interest, Moreno et al. [31] provided the first reliable
estimation on the condition of pen shell populations in the fishing grounds of Bahía de
Kino. These authors found densities of less than 5 individuals per 300 m2 in most fishing
grounds, suggesting severe overfishing. Also, additional catch and effort data collected
through a logbook program indicates lower average annual catch per unit effort (CPUE)
for the 2007 pen shell fishing season in an important fishing ground for Bahía de Kino’s
divers (1.1kg of adductor muscle/hour diving38) compared with neighboring fishing
grounds [2kg of adductor muscle/hour diving39 inside the Infiernillo Channel (Fig. 1);
and 7.3kg/hour diving40 in a fishing bed in the southern state of Sinaloa] (project
PANGAS, logbook program, http://pangas.arizona.edu).
4. The Formal Institutional Setting for Fisheries in Mexico and Bahía de Kino
Fisheries administration in Mexico has been traditionally centralized [32].
Nonetheless, a new fisheries Law was enacted in October of 2007, the ‘Ley General de
Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables’, introducing decentralization41 as one of its primary
goals (see www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx). Hereafter, the formal institutional setting in
place at the time this study was conducted (before the new law was enacted) will be
38
Based on two logbooks. Fishing site: Cerro Prieto.
Based on one logbook.
40
Based on one logbook. Fishing site: Teacapán, Sinaloa.
41
This law establishes that states and municipalities will have participation in decision making through the
creation of State Fisheries Laws and State Fisheries and Aquaculture Councils.
39
54
described. In addition, the changes as they appear in the new law, when there was any,
will be also described.
Fisheries regulation in Mexico is shared by two federal agencies, the Secretary of
Fisheries and Agriculture (SAGARPA), and the Secretary of the Environment and
Natural Resources (SEMARNAT) (Fig. 4). SAGARPA, via its National Fisheries
Commission (CONAPESCA), is the primary agency in charge of fisheries regulation,
issuing licenses in the form of fishing permits, authorizations or concessions (Fig. 4).
CONAPESCA is also in charge of enforcing regulations related to fishery resources that
fall under SAGARPA’s jurisdiction. SEMARNAT, on the other hand, regulates the use
of species listed ‘under special protection’42 and, in the case of benthic resources listed in
this category (i.e. sea cucumber, rock scallop Spondylus spp.) may authorize their harvest
through a species-specific permit43 that grants exclusive use rights within a specified
polygon following the guidelines of a management plan. SEMARNAT is also in charge
of the establishment and management of marine protected areas throughout Mexico via
the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP). PROFEPA, the
Federal Agency for the Protection of the Environment, is SEMARNAT’s enforcement
body (Fig. 4). The Navy is also entitled to provide enforcement support to both
CONAPESCA and PROFEPA if needed.
42
Species included in the norm NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and subsequent modifications.
Called ‘Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo para la Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de
Vida Silvestre’ (Federal Polygons for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Wildlife). This tool and
CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions provide exclusive use-rights over one species within a specified area.
This implies that other fishers may access the same area to harvest other species.
43
55
Throughout Mexico, fishing permits (granted by CONAPESCA) are the most
widely used management tool to regulate access to marine resources. To date, fishing
concessions have been granted only for a few benthic resources of high commercial value
(i.e., abalone, lobster) on the west coast of Baja California Peninsula and the Caribbean
Sea [20].
Fishing permits may be granted to any corporate entity (typically a cooperative) or
individual for 4 years or less (2-5 years in the new law), and they are renewable upon
compliance with regulations. The core requirements to access fishing permits include (a)
presenting personal documentation, (b) specifying the species, fishing area, landing port,
and duration of the right to be solicited, (c) specifying and certifying technical
information of boat(s), motor(s) and fishing gear(s) as registered in the Secretariat of
Communication and Transportation, (d) certifying the legal possession of boat(s),
motor(s) and fishing gear(s), (e) certifying the legal constitution and membership of
corporate entities, (f) certifying inscription at the Federal Taxpayers’ Registry
(Secretariat of Economy), and (g) paying the required fees44.
The permit specifies the particular species (i.e., octopus permit, lobster permit) or
group of species45 to be harvested within a broadly specified region [20]. Each fishing
permit specifies the number of boats (referred as ‘número de espacios’) that are permitted
for use to harvest the species authorized in the permit, together with technical
44
The processing fee for a fishing permit was about US$50 in 2008 (Ley Federal de Derechos, Art 191A,
inciso IIa), but the actual cost of the permit varies according to the species (i.e. permits for abalone, lobster
or species included in the category ‘almejas’ (clams) range between US$150 and 400 each, SAGARPA’s
personnel, personal communication).
45
Some permits are issued for several species under a generic category, i.e. the escama (fish with scales)
permit allows fishing about 200 species of fish, or the shark permit which includes several species of
elasmobranchs.
56
specifications of the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear). Even though
the number of permits to be issued per species or group of species is not formally fixed
(as in limited entry systems), the tendency has been to restrict or put on hold the
allocation of new permits in most small-scale fisheries in the GC because of stock decline
or lack of information on the status of populations. However, there is no restriction on the
number of permits each corporate entity or individual can hold, besides the cited
restrictions on the allocation of new permits. Also, a boat that belongs to a permit holder
can be registered in more than one permit. That is, the same boat can be entitled to fish
several species, depending on the amount of permits registered to a specific boat.
When this study was conducted, fishing permits were transferable from person to
person with authorities’ supervision (under the new law, an existing permit has to be first
rescinded by its holder or removed46, and authorities decide who to allocate it to).
Fishing permits provide a number of benefits to their holders. Permit holders are
the only ones who can legally land the catch and declare it at a Regional Office of
CONAPESCA [20]. They are also the only ones who can provide legal invoices (or
‘facturas’) for the catch. These invoices certify legal ownership of the harvest, and are
necessary to sell and transport the catch to regional or international markets. Note that
permit holders are only allowed to harvest and sell resources that have been caught using
the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear) registered in their permits. Since
permit holders are the only ones who can issue legal invoices necessary to commercialize
46
A permit can be removed if the holder does not comply with regulations, i.e. if he or she does not initiate
fishing activities when expected, suspends fishing for over 90 days without justified cause, or does not
provide the required information.
57
the catch, they might be tempted to buy and sell resources caught with boats other than
the ones registered in the permits. This practice is locally called ‘amparo’ (sheltering
catch from other sources using one’s permit) and is prohibited by law. Nevertheless, as it
will be later shown, it is widely practiced.
Table 2 shows the permit holders that have declared catch in 2007 (active permits)
for each of the four main target species of commercial divers at the regional office of
CONAPESCA in Bahía de Kino, together with the number of boats allowed to operate
per permit and species, and the spatial jurisdiction of each permit (see Fig. 1 for
geographical reference). Note that the total number of permits (19) exceeds the total
number of permit holders (12) since one person or corporate entity can hold several
permits. Also, since the same boat may be entitled to fish several species depending on
the number of permits allotted to each boat, the total number of boats allowed to operate
(50) does not match the sum of subtotals for the four species analyzed (97). In addition,
the spatial jurisdiction of permits for the same and different species tend to overlap with
one another.
On the other hand, specific regulations for resource use are defined within
‘Normas Oficiales Mexicanas’ (norms) published in the Federal Registry. Closures
(temporal or permanent) and gear or size restrictions are the most common management
measures in the existing norms. Generally there are no quota limits. In addition to fishery
norms, the National Institute of Fisheries (INAPESCA), the scientific ‘backbone’ of
CONAPESCA, develops the ‘Carta Nacional Pesquera’ (CNP) (National Fisheries
Chart), which summarizes the status, management recommendations and indicators for
58
all Mexican fishery resources. Table 3 shows the norms that apply to the target species of
commercial divers in Bahía de Kino (also applicable to the entire Gulf of California and
other regions within Mexico) and the main recommendations as they appear in the CNP
for the same species. Note that there is an absence of legally binding norms and
knowledge of these species’ population status for most of these species.
It should also be noted that the use of marine protected areas has only recently
been implemented in the Bahía de Kino region. Isla San Pedro Mártir is an important
fishing destination, especially for commercial divers, and in 2002, a large area
surrounding this island was designated as a Biosphere Reserve [16]. Even though the area
involved constitutes a small portion of local divers’ fishing grounds, this is a new
fisheries management strategy for this region and studies are currently underway to
monitor its effectiveness in promoting sustainable populations of marine organisms
targeted by small-scale fishers [16].
These regulations (access and resource-use rules) are enforced by the federal
agencies cited above (Fig. 4). In Bahía de Kino, two officials from CONAPESCA are in
charge of monitoring and enforcing regulations concerning fishing permits and resourceuse norms under CONAPESCA’s jurisdiction. The area they oversee spans over 200 km
of coastline (from Puerto Libertad to Estero Tastiota; Fig. 1), and inspections are usually
performed by land. There is no permanent presence of PROFEPA (in charge of enforcing
regulations concerning MPAs and species under special protection) in town. However
PROFEPA’s officials may arrive upon demand by members of the community, the Navy,
or CONAPESCA’s officials. The navy provides support for enforcement to both agencies
59
at sea, when solicited. Resources and personnel are often in short supply, and officials are
frequently unable to cover the entire area in a timely and effective manner. Also,
CONAPESCA’s available resources and control efforts are often invested on species
subject to official norms and with the most economic importance to the federal
government like shrimp. Since CONAPESCA’s officials are federal agents, from time to
time they are required to provide support to other communities where additional help is
needed, leaving local fishing grounds without enforcement. CONAPESCA’s efforts are
supported locally by a committee comprised of local permit holders, the ‘Comité de
Inspección y Vigilancia de Bahía de Kino’ or CIV (Local Enforcement Committee). Its
goal is to provide support to help prevent illegal fishing in any fishery taking place in
local fishing grounds (Fig. 4). However, as it will be later discussed, the performance of
this committee is rather controversial.
5. De facto Institutional Setting in Bahía de Kino
In the following section, a description on how the formal institutions described
above perform in practice in Bahía de Kino will be provided, particularly concerning the
performance of the permit system and local cooperatives as it relates to issues of access
control and enforcement.
5.1. Buyers as Right Holders and Fishers with no Rights
Generally, in Bahía de Kino marine resources targeted by commercial divers are
captured by fishers who do not own a fishing permit and do not belong (as members), to
any cooperative holding permits. These fishers are locally called ‘pescadores libres’ or
60
independent fishers and they are the labor force of the permit holders (individual or
corporate). They possess the fishing expertise and experience, and gain legal access to
resources by entering into a working relationship with the holder of a permit. In this
study, 82% of respondents were independent fishers, none was an individual permit
holder, and 18% were members of cooperatives holding fishing permits. In reality, most
permit holders are the buyers of the product. It should also be noted that most47 of the
local corporate permit holders (principally cooperatives) that were active in 2007 (Table
2) function in practice as individual permit holders (locally referred as ‘permisionarios’).
Cooperatives are usually constituted by a mixture of family members, others not related
to the fishing activity, and a few fishers that were requested to sign at the time the
cooperatives were formed. However, in practice, these ‘cooperatives’ are seldom
‘cooperatively managed’. Generally, only one person administers the business and
concentrates most of the power.
The disparate social structure of local diving fisheries is somehow reinforced by
existing requirements to obtain fishing permits and the socio-economic context in which
these fisheries take place. Generally, the people who directly harvest marine resources in
the Gulf of California, as is generally the case worldwide, have low educational and
economic backgrounds, with few or no chances to access alternative, highly remunerated,
and less risky, jobs. It is estimated that only 25% of the population in the state of Sonora
47
The only exception at the time this study was conducted was a cooperative entirely integrated and
managed by fishers (not buyers). However, they had major administrative problems. We interviewed 5 out
of 12 members from this group.
61
between 15 and 13048 years of age has reached an educational level higher than the third
year of middle school [27]. Obtaining fishing permits requires possession and
certification of ownership of fishing equipments and conducting exhaustive and time
consuming paperwork, requisites that are difficult to accomplish by fulltime fishers who
often lack the time, the capacity, or the means to compete with people who are more
prepared, influential, and economically well positioned. There is also the issue of people
needing to bribe officials to obtain permits (or to avoid being punished for not having
permits), as has been pointed out in previous works [33]. In addition, since there are no
restrictions on the number of boats that can be registered as users of a fishing permit, it is
common that people requesting fishing permits do so for several boats. Given this,
individual permit holders or corporate permit holders whose members are not fishers,
necessarily have to ‘hire’ fishers (without contract and social provisions such as pension
or insurance) to put their equipments to work. Permit holders tend to distance themselves
physically from the fishing activity and become businessmen.
Although the formal system does not allow ownership of fishing equipments
(boat, motor, and fishing gear), by others than permit holders, 24% of interviewees
declared that they own the fishing equipment with which they worked, 47% said it was
permit holder’s ownership, and 29% were in the process of buying equipment from
permit holders. This practice, where permit holders encourage fishers to buy their own
equipment with their help, is becoming increasingly common as a way for permit holders
to get rid of equipment maintenance responsibilities. The fishing equipment is bought by
48
The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI) (National Institute of Statistics and
Geography) uses 130 years of age as the highest age value in statistical reports.
62
the permit holder, and the fisher starts paying for the equipment with each fishing trip,
using the portion of the earnings that is retained by the boat owner for equipment repairs
(1/4 of net earnings if three crew members went fishing). This practice tends to increase
fishers’ dependency on permit holders because as long as the fisher is in debt with the
permit holder, the fisher is obliged to sell the product to the permit holder at the price he
chooses. This process of fishers buying equipment from permit holders who also buy the
fishing products may take years to complete. Once fishers own the equipment, they could
choose to sell their product to other buyers. However, since these fishers do not hold
fishing permits associated with their boat, this action would still be illegal unless they
secure a fishing permit under their name.
Regardless of who owns the fishing equipment, permit holders almost always
provide in advance the funds to cover the costs of the fishing trips (for gas, food, ice).
This also obliges fishers to sell the product to the permit holder that provides these funds.
Ninety one percent of interviewees rely on permit holders or independent buyers (with no
fishing permits) to cover the cost of fishing trips, while only 9% cover these costs on
their own. These fishers also rely on permit holders or independent buyers to loan them
funds for other personal expenditures. Although at times a personal and respectful bond
is formed between both parties, fishers are usually in debt to these permit holders.
5.2. De facto Open-access in the Presence of Regulatory Tools
5.2.1. Fishing Permits are Used to Launder Illegal Harvest
63
As suggested by our observations in the field and previous works [15, 20] the onthe-ground performance of current fisheries tools has been clearly ineffective in Bahía de
Kino. Implementation and enforcement of current rules is also difficult in practice given
the characteristics of the fleet and the coastal environment. Illegal practices as defined in
legislation are known to be locally widespread. These practices may include (a) using
one’s permits to sell resources caught with fishing equipments other than the ones
registered in the permits, known locally as ‘amparar’ or to shelter illegal catch, (b) buying
or selling invoices49 (‘facturas’) to legitimize the commercialization of products caught
without a permit, (c) not complying with the species that each boat is allowed to capture,
(d) unreported catch by permit holders or illegal fishing by people not holding any
permission to fish in the area, (e) the use of fishing equipments not owned by the permit
holder (i.e. usually the boat’s name as registered in the permit is painted over the original
one), and (f) the use of altered invoices to shelter catch harvested during closures.
One of the most widely prevalent illegal practices throughout the region is
sheltering illegal catch under someone else’s permit or ‘amparo’ (point (a) above) [15,
20]. This practice is relatively easy to perform and hard to detect in part because there are
no quota limits associated with permits. Since permit holders are the only ones who can
provide legal invoices for the product extracted directly from sea50, they are generally
perceived in the community as buyers simply because that is what they generally do, they
buy product from people willing to sell their catch to them, and ‘legitimize’ this catch
49
Usually in exchange for a monetary compensation per kg of product sheltered in each invoice.
Buyers without a fishing permit are allowed to buy product from permit holders, or from other buyers
without a fishing permit, and resell it. However, they have to carry on with them a document that certifies
the legal possession of the catch, which specifies the fishing permit under which the product in question
was harvested.
50
64
under their permits. To illustrate this, the average annual catch of pen shells (the species
for which there was the most data) per boat declared in 2007 by permit holder (official
data) was compared with the average annual catch per boat using logbook data for the
same year (Table 2). Five logbooks were used, 2 from Bahía de Kino’s fishers (fishing
grounds surrounding Bahía de Kino) and 3 from Punta Chueca’s fishers (fishing grounds
inside the Infiernillo Channel) (Fig. 1). Punta Chueca was included because often the
catch from the Infiernillo Channel is sold to permit holders or independent buyers from
Bahía de Kino and declared (at least part of it) at the local office of CONAPESCA.
Results show that one corporate permit holder (#4) has apparently fished (and declared)
as much as 8 times more pen shells per authorized boat than the average annual catch per
boat as estimated from logbooks (Table 2). This excess catch might potentially come
from boats not registered in his permits or from outside the jurisdiction of Bahía de
Kino’s or Punta Chueca’s fishing grounds. Although declaring a high amount of catch
implies that permit holders would have to pay more taxes, the amount they get by selling
so much product would counteract this cost.
5.2.2. Invasions of pangas in other Communities’ Jurisdictions: What Role for Right
Holders and Fishers?
Illegal access to other permit holders’ jurisdictions is also common in the Gulf of
California and triggers disputes between stakeholders from different fishing communities.
In Bahía de Kino, access to local fishing grounds by outsider pangas is a major source of
internal conflict, involving local fishers (independent or in cooperatives), permit holders
and authorities. The ‘invasión de pangas de fuera’ (invasion of outsider pangas), as local
65
fishers refer to it, takes place almost every year during the fishing season of the most
valuable and/or abundant resources in Bahía de Kino’s fishing grounds. These pangas
usually arrive from fishing communities within the state, south of Bahía de Kino (i.e.
Guaymas, Fig. 1), and from southern states (mainly Sinaloa and Nayarit). Most of the
invasions take place during the fishing season for fish species (mostly Sierra,
Scomberomorus spp.; rays and sharks) and shrimp (blue shrimp, Litopenaeus stylirostris).
However, outsider pangas may also invade local territory during the fishing seasons for
benthic species like pen shell, lobster, and octopus. The number of outsider pangas
arriving to town varies. The last intrusion involved about 150 pangas from Sinaloa
(Sierra fishing season 2007; source: newspaper El Imparcial; March 10, 2007).
According to local fishers this number may escalate to about 500 pangas during the
shrimp season (as of last invasion in 2006).
In Bahía de Kino, local fishers and some permit holders react to these intrusions
organizing protests (locally referred to as ‘grillas’) at the Regional Office of
CONAPESCA or blocking the main and only paved road to town with their pangas. It
should be noted that people not directly depending on the affected fisheries (villagers in
general, friends and family members of fishers and permit holders) frequently participate
in these ‘grillas’, fearing that outsider fishers may settle and begin working in other
resources too. Outsiders would be competing with local fishers of any kind, thus
threatening everyone’s livelihoods.
Some local permit holders are involved in these intrusions, bringing the outsider
pangas to work for them with the understanding that they sell their product only to them.
66
This arrangement can offer the newcomers ‘legal’ protection under the fishing permits of
local permit holders. However, if these pangas arrive from outside, they are not the same
pangas registered in local permit holders’ permits. Even if the outsider pangas would
bring a permit that allows them to fish in the area of Bahía de Kino (which is the case of
many escama (fish with scales) permits), these fishers usually sell the product to local
permit holders and not to the owner of the permit they are bringing with them.
These intrusions can also generate conflicts between permit holders. While some
permit holders may participate in bringing in outsider pangas to work for them, other
permit holders see invasions as a threat to their own business and may join local fishers in
protest. Permit holders compete for fishing products and for fishers willing to sell these
products to them.
Access conflicts are mediated by CONAPESCA’s officials and a local committee
integrated by local permit holders, ‘Comité de Inspección y Vigilancia de Bahía de Kino’
or CIV (Local Enforcement Committee). This committee was formed in 2004 to provide
support to local authorities in preventing intrusions of outsider pangas and reducing
illegal fishing. Its members are to provide support for surveillance activities, supplying
gas, vehicles and/or pangas for officials to make the rounds, and informing authorities
about illegal activities when detected. However, this committee is in some way
controversial since it is integrated by the only legal actors in the fishery, local permit
holders, some of whom are locally known to participate in promoting the intrusion of
outsider pangas in town. In addition, because independent fishers are not allowed to
participate in this committee, its actions are generally perceived as illegitimate by these
67
fishers. This reduces the transparency of the process and makes fishers believe that access
conflicts are ‘negotiated’ between permit holders and authorities, decreasing the
credibility of local authorities as law enforcers.
Access conflicts are certainly not limited to Bahía de Kino [34]. Bahía de Kino’s
fishers also move to other communities to harvest resources when these are scarce or less
convenient in local fishing grounds. Local divers usually move south of Bahía de Kino
(Guaymas in Sonora, Nayarit, and Sinaloa), or west, crossing the gulf to fish in islands
and along the coast of the Baja California Peninsula. One of these movements took place
in the summer of 2007 (while this study was taking place), when divers from Bahía de
Kino moved to Guaymas (Sonora) and other southern states (Sinaloa and Nayarit) to
harvest pen shells after large beds of this species were found (productions of 80150kg/panga/day, compared to 15-20 kg/panga/day in Bahía de Kino’s fishing grounds;
summer 2007).
In contrast to movements of pangas promoted by permit holders, Bahía de Kino’s
fishers tend to tolerate the movement of individual fishers (without pangas) between
fishing communities. Local fishers are in general willing to accept people from outside
the community if these fishers work with local pangas. Likewise, local fishers have more
chances to be accepted in other communities (i.e. in Guaymas) if they move without their
panga and work in a panga from the village they are visiting. In these movements, divers
are allowed to carry their fishing gear (compressor, hose, diving suit) and crew with
them. They have to prearrange this movement with fishers or permit holders from the
village they are heading to and use the pangas and fishing permits (when they exist) of
68
the locals. This informal agreement matches the formal legislation concerning access
rights as granted by fishing permits (people can move from panga to panga, but pangas
must be used within a jurisdiction as specified in the permits).
However, these tacit arrangements are often relaxed if fishers have family bonds
or close friendship with people in other villages, in which case they are allowed to take
their pangas with them. Furthermore, regardless of fishers’ discontent, movements of
pangas to other communities’ jurisdictions with no previous arrangements with locals are
frequent in the Gulf of California region, particularly due to the absence of strong official
control.
6. Is Sustainability Achievable under Current Institutions?
To a large extent, the informal world of independent fishers is not visible to the
federal government which only recognizes permit holders as the sole legal actors in the
fishery. Independent fishers are perceived as illegal actors by authorities and even by
permit holders themselves (who depend on fishers’ labor to make their living). This lack
of recognition of the people who actually perform fishing activities results in exclusion of
these fishers from formal decision-making processes concerning their fisheries. These
fishers are also unable to access government benefits. In addition, since the permit
holders who have access to regulatory agencies have little direct involvement with the
harvested resources, a great deal of fishers’ knowledge useful for management never
reaches government agencies. Furthermore, the co-existence of unrecognized fishers and
69
permit holders that are often powerful businessmen, gives way to the development of
incentives that discourage responsible fishing practices.
As a result, Bahía de Kino’s situation resembles a de facto open-access.
Interviewees expressed almost unanimously that, in spite of perceiving that local
resources are severely overfished, they believe that anything left unexploited will be
captured by others and this inevitably leads to overharvest. Also, because species that can
be legally extracted have already become scarcer and are found at farther distances than
before, banned resources (mainly sea cucumber) that command a high black market price
are often harvested in conjunction with legal species to help the costs of fishing trips51.
7. Discussion
This paper illustrates the effect of institutions on social interactions and harvesting
behavior in an important commercial diving fishery of the Gulf of California. Although
only one fishing community was the focus of this study, this particular case provides
lessons that go beyond its boundaries, illustrating the potential impacts of some of the
most widely used fishery management tools throughout Mexico. However, this does not
imply that the outcomes observed in Bahía de Kino’s commercial diving fishery are
representative of the condition of small-scale fisheries throughout the Gulf of California
or anywhere else in Mexico.
51
About 30 kg of dried sea cucumber (obtained from about 150 kg of fresh, eviscerated, sea cucumber) sold
at about US$10/kg as of summer 2007 are needed to afford the cost of one fishing trip for one panga
involving 3-4 days of camping (local diver, personal communication).
70
Existing requirements to access fishing permits create an institutional
environment in which people who are not necessarily closely attached to the fishing
activity and/or community decide to enter the fishery for business purposes. Often, full
time fishers do not have the means, the capacity, and/or the time to fulfill the
requirements and successfully navigate through the bureaucracy in order to access a
fishing permit. This sets a standard that is too high for direct users (fishers) to become
formally involved in the fishery. Even if direct users get to access fishing permits, since
there are no requirements forcing them to continue fishing, they tend to become
intermediaries as a matter of convenience because to do so is more profitable and less
risky than fishing. This has been the case of some of current buyers (also right holders) in
Bahía de Kino who were previously fishers. In addition, because several boats can be
registered as part of a fishing permit, it is common that people requesting fishing permits
do so for several boats, creating the need for additional people to operate these boats.
As a result, the system tends to promote the disconnection of right holders from
the resource and intensify rent-seeking interests. Resources and markets tend to be
monopolized in a few hands, and an informal system of production is created. This
informal labor system is practically invisible to the federal government, resulting in the
exclusion of most fishers (usually more closely attached to the resources and with the
most at stake if resources are overfished) from management decisions concerning the
fishery. This social structure creates the wrong incentives for effective fisheries
management. With permit holders as intermediaries, they have little incentives to
encourage fishers to catch less since the more they can sell the more they would earn.
71
Because permit holders are the only ones who can provide legal invoices for the product
extracted directly from sea, they are constantly tempted to shelter marine resources from
boats not registered in their permits. This is somehow facilitated by the absence of
additional restrictions associated to the permit system. The regulatory system for fisheries
in Mexico is meant to limit access to the fishery by controlling the number of fishing
permits to be issued. However, fishing effort or catch is not generally limited52 and
permit holders are allowed to harvest as much as they can handle using the pangas
authorized in their permits. Under these conditions, while controlling the legal possession
of fishing permits could be substantially improved with greater support from the
government, verifying that the catch declared and processed by permit holders was
harvested using only the authorized equipments is nearly impossible. While the number
of fishing permits is what any administration intuitively would try to reduce to overcome
resource depletion, this alone will not ensure that fishing effort and catches will be in fact
reduced. Just by focusing on controlling the legal possession of fishing permits will not
result in sustainable harvests. Furthermore, if fishers do not possess a legal right to fish,
they will also not have incentives to pursue the common good or to limit fishing, even if
perceiving that resources are increasingly scarce.
Independent fishers have the option to associate themselves into cooperatives or
other forms of associations and thereby share the costs of access to fishing permits.
However, this path is difficult to pursue by fishers alone without external economic and
52
Unless the species is under a fishing concession or SEMARNAT’s permit, for which a quota and
management plan must be approved; or subject to a norm that limits the fishing effort or the type of gear to
be used. These cases are uncommon in most commercial fisheries in the Gulf of California, except for
species of high revenue to the nation.
72
administrative support. Furthermore, the experience with fishing cooperatives in several
places in the Gulf of California, like the ones from Bahía de Kino, has been generally
disappointing (for a historical perspective on the cooperative system see [35, 36]). In a
study conducted in 2005 in 17 fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California
most fishers (63%) stated a preference for working as part of a group or cooperative
rather than working as an independent fisher (34%) [37]. However, the most common
incentive for fishers to access cooperatives was accessing fishing permits, reaffirming the
point that obtaining permits as independent fishers is a difficult task. Nonetheless, this
incentive is generally too weak to foster cooperation or collective action, not to mention
sustainable harvests. Generally, fishing permits granted to individuals or cooperatives
allow access to a large territory, not exclusive to one permit holder (there are overlapping
jurisdictions). Since this territory is large and is shared with numerous fishers belonging
to different fishing groups and even communities, there is little incentive for responsible
use and little possibilities to exercise control. In a large territory with an indeterminate
number of users, fishers do not have the need or the incentive to work collectively, craft
their own rules, or comply with externally established rules.
The existence of inappropriate incentives for sustainable management has been
identified as one of the six53 major causes for unsustainable fisheries around the world
[5]. Fisheries failures are believed to be largely the product of institutional failures [38],
the sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage
53
Together with high demand for limited resources, poverty and lack of alternatives, complexity and
inadequate knowledge, lack of governance, and interactions of the fishery sector with other sectors and the
environment.
73
fisheries which are directly linked to incentives [2, 7, 39-41]. Unfortunately, the case
illustrated in this study presents many of the major characteristics associated with poor
institutional performance worldwide [5]; like lack of incentives to comply with
regulations; inefficient enforcement; lack of well defined rights; no incentives for
cooperative behavior; poor involvement of major stakeholders in the elaboration of
management instruments, decision making and implementation; and insufficient financial
and human resources as well as information for proper management.
In this context, the need for a careful reexamination of current policies is
suggested, particularly concerning the permit system and its potential consequences not
only for Bahía de Kino but elsewhere in Mexico. In reexamining the system, considering
alternative management approaches that tend to eliminate ‘the race for fish’ and provide
incentives for fishery stakeholders to participate in management decisions and increase
compliance with regulations is recommended [42, 43]. These approaches entail vesting
exclusive use or property rights on the users of resources [2, 42-44] and may include
rights to shares of fisheries in terms of areas (i.e., territorial use-rights in fisheries or
TURFs54, marine protected areas55 or MPAs), effort units (i.e., allowing the use of certain
types of fishing gear) or catch [i.e., individual transferable or non-transferable quotas
(ITQs or IQs)], granted to individuals, groups of individuals or communities [5, 8].
However, we should be cautious that right-based approaches might also be subject to
incentives’ distortion if, for example, the rights’ system tends to exacerbate wealth
54
This right may involve the use of the surface, the bottom, or the entire water column [43].
Marine Protected Area (MPA) is often used as an umbrella term covering a wide range of marine areas
with some level of restriction to protect living, non-living, cultural, and/or historic resources. The
permissions given within an MPA often depend on the objectives.
55
74
inequality and social division as has been the case in a number of ITQ systems (absentee
quota owners, and contract harvesters with significantly less benefits than quota owners)
[45-47]. Granting secure rights to resources to those actively involved in the fishery
seems to be a necessary step for promoting sustainable-use.
In the fisheries addressed, the sedentary life-history characteristics of
invertebrates and the nature of the fishing process56 calls for management measures that
explicitly acknowledge spatial structure [8, 48]. These may include reproductive refugia
and MPAs57 (not only restricted to no-take zones) specifically designed to enhance
fisheries (considering density-dependent and larvae advection-retention processes),
territorial property or use rights (traditional tenure systems, TURFs); rotation of fishing
areas, among others.
Tools like the ones described above are available in Mexican legislation including
species-specific use-rights within an area (CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions or
SEMARNAT’s permits), fishery refugia, and MPAs. In the Northern Gulf of California,
the few cases where granting exclusive access to a controllable marine territory have
been attempted, either formally or informally, have shown promising results as to be
considered for wider implementation [16, 19, 20, 23]. Chile has experience with this sort
of systems on a larger scale, showing that granting TURFs to formalized groups of
fishers does promote sustainable harvests within TURFs [49]. This, together with the
56
In spatially structured fisheries, time series of catch, effort, and composition of the catch are rarely
available, and even if they are, they may be dangerously misleading because of the interaction between the
spatial pattern of a stock and fishers’ behavior (i.e., abundance tends to drop faster than CPUE as the stock
is depleted)[47].
57
Refugia and MPAs are recommended for fisheries that combine complex spatial structure, little available
information, and enforcement difficulties [47].
75
need to perform collective activities such as monitoring studies and surveillance, and the
fact that the benefits to be derived from these resources are held, and are required to be
sold, by the group; have successfully encouraged collective action and implementation of
sanctions58 (Parma et al., in preparation). However, if enforceable restrictions to fishing
outside TURFs are not applied as well, fishing effort is often displaced to less restricted
areas (open access areas in the case of Chile), generating a patchy environment that may
impact the sustainability of the fishery in question and other fisheries as well [49]. A
similar effect is expected to occur with MPAs implementation, especially with highly
restrictive ones, if realistic measures to regulate fishing and enforce regulations outside
MPAs are not in place [50].
With this in mind, our main recommendations to encourage sustainable use and
conservation in Bahía de Kino include granting secure rights to resources to those
actively involved in the fishery, as part of a broader-higher level institutional framework.
Given the situation in Bahía de Kino’s fishing grounds, it is suggested that an
institutional tool that may provide exclusive access to the community within the limits of
their fishing grounds, could serve as a protective umbrella to help avoid intrusions from
outside. At the same time, providing secure individual or collective rights to local fishers
for specific fisheries within these limits may provide additional incentives to avoid
internal competition for resources among local groups or individuals. This set of
measures may encourage and facilitate participation of fishery stakeholders in
management decisions and implementation of measures to protect not only fishery but
58
Fines for infractions are discounted from the benefits each member is entitled to receive.
76
ecosystem values. Furthermore, the regulation of activities other than commercial fishing
(i.e. aquaculture, sport fishing, land activities affecting marine environments) could be
also facilitated by a broader institutional perspective, following the principles of coastal
zoning or integrated coastal management [51].
This type of institutional umbrella could be locally approached using tools
available in Mexico’s fishery and environmental laws. For example, through
implementation of: 1) ‘regional fishery ordinance plans’ as incorporated into the new
fishery law59, for which the area to be incorporated into the plan, lists of users, the
species subject to use, and the species-specific management plans available for this
species must be provided; 2) MPAs covering the fishing grounds of the community
and/or ‘ecological ordinance plans’ for land and/or marine environments, according to
environmental legislation60; 3) or a combination of 1) and 2). Both laws state that
preferred access to fishing rights61 (permits, concessions) and MPAs62 should be provided
to local people in the area to be managed or protected, and encourage participation63 of
municipal and state governments, and members of the community, in decision making.
However, if tools typically associated to environmental protection (like MPAs) are to be
used as a protective umbrella, defining and formalizing access rights should be one of the
first and most critical steps, to engage and empower local people to manage and defend
their resources [16, 34, 51].
59
‘Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables’ (LGPAS), www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx.
‘Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente’ (LGEEPA), www.semarnat.gob.mx.
61
Art. 43, LGPAS.
62
Art. 48 and 64 BIS-1, LGEEPA.
63
Art. 13 and 14, LGPAS. Art. 67, LGEEPA.
60
77
In addition, independent fishers should be formally recognized as active and
essential members of the fishing sector and provided with individual or collective fishing
rights. In this process, independent fishers are likely to be challenged by existing permit
holders who may want to continue being in control of extraction and commercialization.
Fishers will need to be supported to acquire the means and develop the necessary skills to
successfully commercialize their own product, and incentives should be established for
existent permit holders who are following the law and act responsibly with fishers they
employ.
In any case, whatever measures are to be considered for implementation, they
should be carefully evaluated for each particular context (no one solution fits all
situations) and, critically, with active stakeholders’ participation, especially of fishers. A
more supportive role for the government should be also encouraged, for which additional
human and financial resources will be needed for researchers, managers and enforcers to
be able to improve their response to fisheries issues. Also, fisheries authorities should
take advantage and support fishers’ efforts to regulate use or restrict access of outsiders to
local fishing grounds [34].
More importantly, the informal labor system that hides behind the visible face of
existing permit holders should be acknowledged by the federal government and steps
taken to formalize it and prevent it from continuing. Unless these fishers are formally
recognized and given a secure right to enjoy the benefits from their activity, they are
unlikely to contribute to enhance the health of coastal fisheries and ecosystems.
78
8. Acknowledgements
This study was made possible by contributions from the Wallace Research Foundation,
and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation through a grant to the PANGAS Project.
We would like to express our gratitude to the fishers and other key informants who
participated in this research; to the personnel from the regional office of CONAPESCA
in Bahía de Kino for their kind attention and collaboration with information; to Cesar
Moreno, Jorge Torre , and Luis Bourillón from COBI for their support and guidance
during fieldwork, and helpful comments to this manuscript; to Edella Schlager for her
valuable guidance during this research and helpful feedback on previous versions of the
manuscript; to Marcia Moreno-Baez and Erika Koltenuk for developing Fig. 1; to Tad
Pfister and Jennie Duberstein for insightful discussions on the region’s fisheries issues; to
one anonymous reviewer; and to Isaac Kaplan for sharing interesting literature for
discussion. A. Cinti would like to thank Gaspar Soria for his constant support. This paper
represents the views of the authors and not necessarily those of their institutions and
funders. This is a scientific contribution of the PANGAS Project,
www.pangas.arizona.edu.
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Fig. 1. Map of the study area within the northern Gulf of California (NGC). The NGC is
the area extending north of Punta San Francisquito in Baja California and north of Bahía
de Kino in Sonora. The thick gray line on the Sonoran coastline indicates the geographic
jurisdiction of fishing permits for diving products in Bahía de Kino, extending from
Puerto Libertad to Estero Tastiota. Square markers indicate the main towns or cities.
Hermosillo is the capital city of Sonora. Cartographic design: Marcia Moreno-Báez and
Erika Koltenuk.
84
Attributes of
Physical World
Action Arena
Attributes of
Community
Action
Situations
Patterns
of interactions
Actors
Outcomes
Rules-in-use
Evaluative
Criteria
Fig. 2. A framework for Institutional Analysis [4].
85
Octopus
180
Lobster
160
Pen shell
Leopard grouper
Metric tons
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
Year
Fig. 3. Unpublished official landings (MT) for octopus, lobster, pen shell and leopard
grouper declared at the regional office of CONAPESCA in Bahía de Kino. Weight of
entire individuals for all species but pen shells (adductor muscle weight) is reported.
Markers indicate where there is data. Lines do not imply real data. Courtesy: Personnel of
the Regional Office of CONAPESCA in Bahía de Kino.
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
0
86
SAGARPA
Primary agency in charge of fisheries
regulation, via its National Fisheries
Commission (CONAPESCA)
CONAPESCA
Participates in
fisheries regulation
and enforcement
In Bahía de Kino
A local Enforcement
Committee supports
CONAPESCA’s efforts
SEMARNAT
Regulates the use of species listed under
‘special protection’
CONANP
Regulates the establishment and
management of marine
protected areas
INAPESCA
Provides management
recommendations and
fishery indicators
PROFEPA
Enforces SEMARNAT’s
regulations
The Navy provides support
for enforcement to both
agencies
Fig. 4. Federal agencies involved in fisheries regulation in Mexico and their main
attributes as they relate to fisheries management.
87
Table 1: Average, maximum and minimum catch (MT) for octopus, lobster, pen shell and
leopard grouper between 1992 and 2008.
Species
Octopus
Octopus spp.
Pen shell
Atrina spp.
Lobster
Panulirus inflatus
Leopard grouper
Mycteroperca rosacea
Average annual
catch (MT) (1992 –
2008)
Maximum annual
catch (MT) (1992 2008)
Minimum annual
catch (MT) (1992 2008)
72.9
145.9
30.3
40.0
168.4
3.4
8.6
14.9
1.5
24.2
58.2
3.5
Weight of entire individuals for all species but pen shells (adductor muscle weight) is reported. Source:
regional office of CONAPESCA in Bahía de Kino.
88
Table 2: Permit holders that showed catch declarations in 2007 (active permits) at the regional office of CONAPESCA in
Bahía de Kino for four main target species of commercial divers, and features of each fishing permit.
Species
Octopus
Subtotal
Pen shell
Subtotal
Lobster
Subtotal
Escama
permita
Subtotal
Total
Fishing
permits
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
4
19
Permit
holders
Geographic jurisdiction
CPH 1
CPH 2
CPH 3
IPH 1
IPH 2
IPH 3
IPH 4
El Sahuímaro - Las Cuevitas
El Colorado - Puerto Libertad
El Colorado - Puerto Libertad
El Sahuímaro - San Esteban
Bahía de Kino - Las Cuevitas
El Choyudo - Puerto Libertad
El Colorado - Puerto Libertad
CPH 2
CPH 4
CPH 5
IPH 1
IPH 5
El Colorado - Puerto Libertad
Estero Santa Cruz
Puerto Libertad - Tastiota
El Sahuímaro - San Esteban
Cerro Prieto - El Colorado
CPH 1
IPH 3
IPH 6
El Sahuímaro - Las Cuevitas
El Choyudo - Puerto Libertad
Segundo Cerro Prieto
CPH 1
CPH 3
IPH 1
IPH 2
El Sahuímaro - Las Cuevitas
El Colorado - Puerto Libertad
El Sahuímaro - San Esteban
Bahía de Kino - Las Cuevitas
Number of
authorized
boats
Declared catch
07 (MT)
5
12
8
3
2
2
6
38
12
4
3
7
5
31
5
2
3
10
5
8
3
2
18
4.1
5.4
1.3
6.5
7.9
2.6
0.3
28.1
2.0
9.0
4.6
8.2
6.8
30.6
4.4
0.5
1.5
6.4
14.8
1.1
0.4
10.9
27.2
Average annual catch
per boat (declared
catch/number of
authorized boats)(MT)
0.8
0.4
0.2
2.2
3.9
1.3
0.1
Average annual
catch per boat
(logbooks)(MT)
Ratio average annual
catch per boat
(declared/logbooks)
-
-
0.2
2.3
1.5
1.2
1.4
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.28
0.6
8.0
5.5
4.2
4.9
0.9
0.2
0.5
-
-
3.0
0.1
0.1
5.4
-
-
12
Weight of entire individuals (eviscerated) for all species but pen shells (adductor muscle weight) is reported. Logbook data is used for comparison with
official landings. The average annual catch per boat estimated from logbooks was 0.28 MT, for which 5 logbooks were used. CPH: corporate permit
holder (i.e. a fishing cooperative or other form of association); IPH: individual permit holder. aOnly includes escama permits that were used for leopard
grouper caught through diving.
89
Table 3: Management recommendations as they appear in the National Fisheries Chart for the main target species of
commercial divers in Bahía de Kino and fishery norms regulating the harvest of these species.
Species
Sea cucumber
Isostichopus fuscus
Rock scallop
Spondylus calcifer
Lobster
Panulirus inflatus
Groupers,
Mycteroperca spp. &
Snappers,
Hoplopagrus
guentherii.
Pen shell
Atrina spp.
CNP management recommendations
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. There are no
recommendations for Sonoran sea cucumber populations. SEMARNAT
may authorize use. No authorization for exploitation has been granted in
Sonora.
Lumped with other 15 species under the category ‘almejas’ (clams).
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. There are no
recommendations for Sonoran rock scallop populations. SEMARNAT
may authorize use. Only one authorization has been granted in Sonora,
though not in Bahía de Kino.
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. A gradual increase in fishing
effort may be allowed if supported by technical studies. Recommends
assessing the resource in Sonora and other states, and regularizing the use
of commercial diving. This fishing gear is used in the Gulf of California,
even though it is prohibited for lobster.
Lumped with other 200 species under the category ‘peces marinos de
escama’ (marine fishes with scales). Commercial diving does not appear
in the list of fishing gear used to capture these species. Population status
in Sonora, undetermined. General recommendations include not
increasing fishing effort in any of the species within the category, and
modifying current categorization to allow administration by groups of
related species (smaller groups).
Lumped with other 15 species under the category ‘almejas’ (clams).
Recommends not increasing fishing effort in Sonora and other states, and
implementing the use of quotas in Sonora and Sinaloa.
Existing regulations by species
NOM-059-ECOL-1994
- Enforced by PROFEPA and the Navy
- Permanent closure throughout México
NOM-059-ECOL-1994 (see above)
NOM-006-PESC-1993
- Enforced by CONAPESCA and the Navy
- Applies to Federal jurisdiction of Gulf of
México and the Caribbean Sea, Pacific
Ocean including Gulf of California (GC)
- Gear restrictions: traps, unless other gear is
authorized by SAGARPA
- Size restrictions: 82.5 mm (cephalothorax
length)
- No breeding females
- Land entire specimen to enable control
- Temporary closure (GC): July 1st to October
30th
None
None
90
Black murex snail
Hexaplex nigritus
Octopus
Octopus spp.
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. Recommends assessing the
resource in Sonora every 2 years. General recommendations include not
increasing fishing effort in any of the states where it is fished, and
implementing reproductive closures.
Under a general category ‘pulpo’ (octopus) including identified and
unidentified species captured in Mexico. Population status in Sonora,
undetermined. Recommends taking measures in Sonora if catches are
lower than 100 MT. General recommendations for all octopus species
include not increasing fishing effort, and reinforcing biological and
fisheries studies to better regulate these fisheries.
None
None
91
APPENDIX B: INSIGHTS FROM THE USERS TO IMPROVE FISHERIES
PERFORMANCE: FISHERS’ KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES ON FISHERIES
POLICIES IN BAHÍA DE KINO, GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
PUBLISHED IN MARINE POLICY, Volume 34 (2010), 1322–1334.
A. Cintia,*, W. Shawa, J. Torreb
a
School of Natural Resources and the Environment, The University of Arizona,
Biological Sciences East 325, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA. [email protected]
b
Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C., Blvd. Agua Marina #297, entre Jaiba y Tiburón,
Colonia Delicias, Guaymas, Sonora 85420, México. [email protected]
* Corresponding author, [email protected] School of Natural Resources and the
Environment, The University of Arizona, Biological Sciences East 325, Tucson, AZ
85721, USA. Phone number: +1 520-621-7255 (main office); +1 520-621-8801 (fax).
Keywords
Small-scale fisheries, institutions, policy, fishers’ attitudes, fisheries management,
incentives, Gulf of California.
92
Insights from the Users to Improve Fisheries Performance: Fishers’ Knowledge and
Attitudes on Fisheries Policies in Bahía de Kino, Gulf of California, Mexico
A. Cinti, W. Shaw, J. Torre
Abstract
This study investigated the interpretation and level of support of government
regulations in Bahía de Kino, Sonora, one of the most important fishing communities in
terms of diving extraction of benthic resources in the Northern Gulf of California.
Research was conducted from April to August 2007, focusing on the small-scale fisheries
sector of commercial divers. Information on fishers’ awareness of current policies,
fishers’ attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation, and fishers’
suggestions on how their fisheries should be managed, was gathered through structured
interviews (including open and closed-ended questions), informal talks and participant
observation. Results provide further evidence supporting the need for formally
recognizing the fishers as key stakeholders in local fisheries, and for working
cooperatively towards the design of management strategies and regulations that provide
better stimulus for resource stewardship and discourage overfishing. Very importantly,
this study suggests that there is strong support from resource users for implementing
regulatory measures for local fisheries. Results could be used as a preliminary baseline to
initiate the discussion among fishery stakeholders towards the development of speciesspecific management plans for the area, as required by the recently enacted fisheries act
in Mexico, the “Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables”.
93
1. Introduction
Effective management of fisheries relies not only on the development of rules that
are appropriate for the biophysical and social characteristics of the fisheries in question,
but also on the understanding and internalization of these rules by resource users [1-3].
Rules that are understood and deemed legitimate and functional by fishery stakeholders
have the potential to lead towards robust and effective management of fishery resources.
Often, however, local practices do not resemble the formal laws expressed in
legislation [4]. If managers assume that users automatically learn, comprehend, and
make use of the government rules in place, the development of management strategies
may be based on administrative assumptions rather than on what is really happening in
the field [3]. Cross-scale interactions and coordination (between governmental and local
domains) are critical to make sure that the formal rights and rules are compatible with
local practices and circumstances so that negative externalities are avoided [1, 5].
As a means to begin addressing how well governmental rules are suited to local
circumstances within fishing communities of the Northern Gulf of California64 (NGC)
(Figure 1), Mexico, the interpretation and level of support of government regulations was
studied in Bahía de Kino, Sonora. Bahía de Kino is one of the most important fishing
villages in terms of diving extraction of benthic resources65 in the NGC (Figure 1) [7].
The Gulf of California (GC) is a region characterized by its biological richness and socio64
Based on observations of fish species’ distribution patterns, the Gulf of California has been divided in
three main areas (north, mid, and south) [6]. The Northern Gulf of California has been defined as the area
extending north of an imaginary line from San Francisquito in Baja California and Bahía de Kino (Figure
1).
65
Benthic species spend most of their life cycle in association with the sea bottom (e.g., mollusks,
crustaceans).
94
economic significance [8]. Fishing (large and small scale) is a predominant economic
activity throughout the GC, comprising approximately 50,000 fishers and 25,000 boats
operating in small-scale (or artisanal) fisheries, and other 10,000 fishers and 1,300 boats
operating in large-scale (or industrial) fisheries [9]. The region produces approximately
50% of the landings and 70% of the value of national fisheries in Mexico [8].
However, in spite of the importance of small-scale fisheries (SSFs) in the region,
these fisheries have received little attention from the federal government in comparison to
large-scale fisheries (like shrimp and small-pelagic species) [10, 11]. This is likely
because SSFs use many widely dispersed small boats that are not easy to monitor and
because their economic contributions are similarly dispersed and difficult to assess. Also,
despite the existence of formal regulatory tools, access to small-scale fisheries has been
nearly open in practice [10]. Largely due to state subsidies and policies encouraging
migration from different parts of Mexico [11], the GC has seen a significant increase in
fishing pressure over the last few decades and a downtrend in total production in many
primary target species [9, 10, 12, 13]. In addition, fishing communities are thought to be
largely uninvolved in the development of management policies (at least formal resource
management rules), and the extent of compliance with formal regulations is unclear.
A previous publication by Cinti et al. [14] described the social and fisheries
impacts of fisheries policies in Bahía de Kino, and discussed whether the formal
institutional structure of Mexican fishing regulations is effective in promoting
conservation behavior by small-scale fishery stakeholders. These authors suggest that
current rules set the standard too high for direct users (the people who go fishing) to
95
access fishing rights, promote the disconnection of right holders (usually absentee
operators) from the resource, and intensify rent-seeking interests. This incentivizes
overfishing and exacerbates social inequalities.
The present article presents additional information collected during the same
research period and using the same methodology, on fishers’ awareness of current
policies, fishers’ attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation, and fishers’
suggestions on how their fisheries should be managed. Results provide further evidence
supporting the need for formally recognizing these small-scale fishers as key stakeholders
in local fisheries, and for working cooperatively towards the design of management
strategies and regulations that provide better stimulus for resource stewardship and
discourage overfishing. Very importantly, this study suggests that there is strong support
from resource users for implementing regulatory measures for local fisheries. This
finding, together with other information provided by the fishers could be used as a
preliminary baseline to inform and guide the development of species-specific
management plans for the area, as required by the recently enacted fisheries act in
Mexico,
the
“Ley
General
de
Pesca
y
Acuacultura
Sustentables”
(see
www.sagarpa.gob.mx). This type of assessment where fishers’ perspectives on
management issues are gathered can be useful to improve fisheries performance,
particularly in settings where participatory mechanisms are not yet in place.
96
2. Background Information
2.1. Bahía de Kino’s Diving Fisheries: Social and Resource Characteristics
Bahía de Kino is a rural coastal community of approximately 5,000 inhabitants
[15] situated in the state of Sonora (Figure 1). Fishing is the most important economic
activity [7]. About 800 fishers and 200 active boats (locally called “pangas”) are involved
in small-scale fisheries in this community [7]. A total of 66 species are harvested by these
small-scale fishers, of which 35 are regarded as the primary targets of fishing trips
(Project PANGAS, unpublished). Species extracted are an important source of marine
products at the local and regional level. A number of these species are also internationally
commercialized [7, 16].
[Figure 1 about here]
About 80 pangas were active in commercial diving in Bahía de Kino at the time
this study was conducted (2007). Divers mainly harvest pen shells (mostly Atrina
tuberculosa, and occasionally Atrina maura, Atrina oldroydii, and Pinna rugosa),
octopus (Octopus spp.), and fishes [mainly groupers (Mycteroperca rosacea and M.
jordani) and snappers (Hoplopagrus guentherii and Lutjanus novemfasciatus)]. Sea
cucumber (Isostichopus fuscus) is also an important diving fishery, though clandestine
because no authorization to harvest this species has been granted in the area [14]. Smaller
quantities of lobsters (Panulirus spp.), rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer), several species
of clams (Megapitaria squalida, Dosinia spp., and others) and snails (Hexaplex nigritus, Strombus
galeatus, and others) are also harvested. Pangas are 8-9 meters long, equipped with 55115 hp outboard motors. To breathe underwater, divers use a “hookah” which is
97
fabricated locally using a modified paint sprayer as the air compressor connected to a
modified beer keg as the reserve air tank [17]. One or two 100 m hoses are attached to
this tank with air regulators at the end. The diving crew may include the operator or
“popero” (who operates the boat), one or two divers, and a divers’ assistant (who controls
the air supply for the divers). Poperos usually act as divers’ assistants too, to increase the
economic efficiency of the fishing trip (earnings are divided among less people). One of
these crew members is also in charge of the boat or captain, who is responsible for its
maintenance and for responding to the owner66 in case anything happens to it. Captains
are generally the most experienced and knowledgeable fishers and those who tend to
make the decisions about fishing [7]. Fishers working in commercial diving may at times
also work in other fishing activities, using gillnets (for fish and shrimp) or traps (for
swimming crabs, Callinectes bellicosus). However, they are strongly dependent on
fishing to make a living. Fishing is the only source of income for 71% of interviewees
[14], and diving (of the set of fishing activities they develop) is the primary source of
income for 93% of interviewees.
Information on fisheries performance for any species targeted by commercial
diving in Bahía de Kino is scant. The only official fishery information available are
landings statistics, which should be interpreted with caution given that illegal fishing is
likely high because of unreported catch, catch captured outside local port’s jurisdiction
that is declared as if it was captured inside (e.g., in another administrative jurisdiction),
and misidentification of species, among other factors (see [14] for historical landings of
66
Usually when a crew member owns the fishing equipment, he or she is the person in charge. Otherwise,
the captain is appointed by an owner external to the crew.
98
main target species). The first reliable estimation of the condition of one of the main local
diving fisheries, the pen shell fishery, was provided by Moreno et al. [18]. These authors
concluded that the species was severely overfished.
2.2. Legal Framework
Fisheries administration in Mexico has traditionally been centralized [10].
Nonetheless, a recently enacted fisheries act (October of 2007), the “Ley General de
Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables”, introduced decentralization67 as one of its primary
goals (see www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx). Some of the relevant elements of this new
law68 will be described. However, data for this study were collected in 2007 and
therefore this study will focus on the formal institutional setting in place at that time
(before the new law was enacted).
Fisheries regulation in Mexico is shared by two federal agencies, SAGARPA69,
the Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture, and SEMARNAT70, the Secretary of the
Environment and Natural Resources. SAGARPA, via CONAPESCA71, its National
Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission, is the primary agency in charge of fisheries
regulation, issuing licenses in the form of fishing permits, authorizations or concessions.
CONAPESCA is also in charge of enforcing regulations related to fishery resources that
67
This law establishes that States and Municipalities will have participation in decision making through the
creation of State Fisheries Laws and State Fisheries and Aquaculture Councils.
68
Note that the bylaw that would make this new law operational is still under revision (as of March 2010),
which means that the prior bylaw (correspondent with the old fisheries law enacted in 1992) is still in use.
69
Stands for “Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación”.
70
Stands for “Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales”.
71
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”.
99
fall under SAGARPA’s jurisdiction. INAPESCA72, the National Institute of Fisheries, is
the scientific “backbone” of CONAPESCA.
On the other hand, SEMARNAT, via DGVS73, its General Division of Wildlife,
regulates the use of species listed “under special protection”74 and, in the case of benthic
resources listed in this category (e.g., sea cucumber and rock scallop), may authorize
their harvest through a species-specific permit75. SEMARNAT is also in charge of the
establishment and management of marine protected areas (MPAs) throughout Mexico via
CONANP76, the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas. INE77 , the National
Institute of Ecology, generates scientific and technical information about the environment
to provide support for decision making to SEMARNAT. PROFEPA78, the Federal
Agency for the Protection of the Environment, is SEMARNAT’s enforcement body. The
Navy is also empowered to provide enforcement support to both CONAPESCA and
PROFEPA if needed.
Throughout Mexico, fishing permits (granted by CONAPESCA) are the most
widely used management tool to grant access to marine resources. Fishing permits may
be granted to any corporate entity (typically a cooperative) or individual for four years or
less (2-5 years in the new law), and they are renewable upon compliance with
72
Stands for “Instituto Nacional de la Pesca”.
Stands for “División General de Vida Silvestre”.
74
Species included in the norm NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and subsequent modifications.
75
Called “Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo para la Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de
Vida Silvestre” (Federal Polygons for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Wildlife). This tool and
CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions provide exclusive use-rights over one or more species within a
specified area.
76
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas”.
77
Stands for “Instituto Nacional de Ecología”.
78
Stands for “Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente”.
73
100
regulations. The core requirements to access fishing permits include: (a) presenting
personal documentation, (b) specifying the species, fishing area, landing port, and
duration of the right being solicited, (c) specifying and certifying technical information
about boat(s), motor(s) and fishing gear(s) as registered in the Secretariat of
Communication and Transportation, (d) certifying the legal possession of boat(s),
motor(s) and fishing gear(s), (e) certifying the legal constitution and membership of
corporate entities, (f) certifying inscription at the Federal Taxpayers’ Registry (Ministry
of Economy), and (g) paying the required fees79.
The permit specifies the particular species (e.g., octopus permit, lobster permit) or
group of species80 to be harvested within a broadly specified region [19]. In Bahía de
Kino, the spatial jurisdiction of fishing permits for species targeted by commercial divers
overlap one another (see Figure 1 for general jurisdiction of fishing permits). Each
fishing permit specifies the number of boats (referred as “número de espacios”) that are
permitted for use to harvest the species authorized in the permit, together with technical
specifications of the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear). Also, a boat
that belongs to a permit holder can be registered in more than one permit. That is, the
same boat can be entitled to fish several species, depending on the amount of permits
registered to a specific boat.
79
The processing fee for a fishing permit was about US$50 in 2008 (“Ley Federal de Derechos”, Art 191A,
inciso IIa), but the actual cost of the permit varies according to the species (e.g., permits for abalone,
lobster or species included in the category “almejas” (clams) range between US$150 and 400 each,
SAGARPA’s personnel, personal communication).
80
Some permits are issued for several species under a generic category, e.g., the “escama” (fish with
scales) permit allows fishing about 200 species of fish, or the shark permit which includes several species
of elasmobranchs.
101
Fishing permits provide a number of benefits to their holders. Permit holders are
the only ones who can legally land the catch and declare it at a Regional Office of
CONAPESCA [19]. Permit holders are also the only ones who can provide legal invoices
(or “facturas”) for the product extracted directly from sea81. These invoices certify legal
ownership of the harvest, and are necessary to sell and transport the catch to regional or
international markets. Note that permit holders are only allowed to harvest and sell
resources that have been caught using the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing
gear) registered in their permits.
Mexico’s laws also provide a mechanism for applying for fishing concessions
(i.e., exclusive fishing rights over a species within an area)82 and these concessions have
the same requisites as for accessing fishing permits, plus detailed technical and economic
information to assess the economic viability of the intended activity. Unlike fishing
permits, concessions require the authorization of a quota of the resource being harvested.
To date, no fishing concession has been granted in the Bahía de Kino area, or in the
NGC.
Specific regulations for resource use are defined within “Normas Oficiales
Mexicanas” (norms) published in the Federal Registry. Closures (temporal or permanent)
and gear or size restrictions are the most common management measures in the existing
norms. Generally there are no quota limits. In addition to fishery norms, INAPESCA
81
Buyers without a fishing permit are allowed to buy product from permit holders, or from other buyers
without a fishing permit and resell it. However, they have to carry on with them a document that certifies
the legal possession of the catch, which specifies the fishing permit under which the product in question
was harvested [14].
82
For example the abalone and lobster fisheries in the Pacific coast of the Baja California Peninsula.
102
develops the National Fisheries Chart or “Carta Nacional Pesquera” (CNP). This chart
summarizes the status, management recommendations, and indicators for all Mexican
fishery resources. These recommendations become legally binding under the new
fisheries law. Table 1 shows the norms that apply to the target species of commercial
divers in Bahía de Kino (also applicable to the entire GC and other regions within
Mexico) and the main recommendations as they appear in the CNP for each species. Note
that for most species, there is an absence of norms and knowledge on these species’
population status [14].
[Table 1 about here]
The use of marine protected areas has only recently been implemented in the
Bahía de Kino region. Isla San Pedro Mártir is an important fishing destination,
especially for commercial divers, and in 2002, a large area surrounding this island was
designated as a Biosphere Reserve [20]. Even though the area involved constitutes a
small portion of local divers’ fishing grounds, this is a new fisheries management strategy
for this region and studies are currently underway to monitor its effectiveness in
promoting sustainable populations of marine organisms targeted by small-scale fishers
[20].
These regulations (access and resource-use rules) are enforced by the federal
agencies cited above. In Bahía de Kino, only two officials from CONAPESCA are in
charge of monitoring and enforcing regulations concerning fishing permits and resourceuse norms under CONAPESCA’s jurisdiction. The area under their responsibility spans
over 200 km of coastline (from Puerto Libertad to Estero Tastiota; Figure 1), and
103
inspections are usually performed by land. There are approximately 350 boats operating
in this area, in addition to boats from other communities that arrive in varying numbers
depending on the season (see Cinti et al. [14]). There is no permanent presence of
PROFEPA (in charge of enforcing regulations concerning MPAs and species under
special protection) in town. However PROFEPA’s officials may arrive upon demand by
members of the community, the Navy, CONANP or CONAPESCA’s officials. The navy
provides support for enforcement to both agencies at sea when solicited. The navy is the
only agency that is allowed to carry guns. Resources and personnel are often in short
supply, and officials are frequently unable to cover the entire area in a timely and
effective manner [14]. Insufficiency of inter-institutional agreements and coordination
among the different agencies involved is also a major impediment to achieve effective
enforcement in the area.
In Bahía de Kino, most permit holders are in reality the buyers of the fishing
product (absentee permit holders). Marine resources targeted by commercial divers are
generally captured by fishers who do not own a fishing permit and do not belong (as
members), to any cooperative holding permits [7, 14]. These fishers are locally called
“pescadores libres” or independent fishers and they are the labor force of the permit
holders (individual or corporate). They possess the fishing expertise and experience, and
gain legal access to resources by entering into a working relationship with the holder of a
permit (by working in his pangas under his permits). Ironically, because most of these
fishers do not own fishing permits in their name (or in the name of a cooperative of
104
which they are members) they are not legally registered in the fishery and consequently,
they are considered illegal participants.
The relationship between permit holders and their workers is complex. These
fishers are highly dependent on permit holders economically, which is often detrimental
to them but also beneficial (permit holders serve as banker, lending money in case of
illness, emergencies, basic needs). On the other hand, permit holders frequently benefit
from this relationship but they also bear substantial risks by lending to people who have
limited financial assets.
Of the sample taken by Cinti et al. [14] (which is the same sample used in this
study), 82% of respondents were independent fishers, none was an individual permit
holder, and 18% were members of cooperatives holding fishing permits.
3. Methods
Research in Bahía de Kino (Figure 1) was conducted from April to August 2007,
focusing on the small-scale fisheries sector of commercial divers. Information on
knowledge and attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation was gathered
through structured interviews (including open and closed-ended questions), informal talks
and participant observation. The first phase of the research was devoted to getting used to
the setting, building trust and having informal talks with fishers, participating in a few
fishing trips (n=4), and recording observations at the beach. During the final phase of the
research, a structured interview was designed based on what was learned in previous
months.
105
Among additional topics published in Cinti et al. [14], the structured interview
assessed fishers’ knowledge of regulatory tools and procedures such as: 1. the Fisheries
Act (enacted in 1992 and in use until late 2007) and its bylaws, 2. resource-use norms by
species establishing how a given species may or may not be caught (closures, size
restrictions, etc.), 3. procedures to request fishing permits and territorial rights (i.e.,
concessions), 4. penalties for infractions, and 5. anticipated changes in Mexican policies
concerning fisheries, specifically about the new fisheries act (enacted in late 2007).
Fishers’ attitudes concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation were investigated
using a combination of open-ended questions and a set of statements in a 5-point Likert
scale. Open-ended questions allowed the fishers to express their opinions more freely
about what was currently missing in terms of fisheries regulation in Bahía de Kino. The
Likert-scale statements allowed for quantification of predetermined topics including
fishers’ attitudes toward access and resource-use regulations, fishers’ perceptions of
performance of local authorities concerning enforcement of regulations; and fishers’
willingness to join cooperatives, the most common form of formal organization in the
region. Additional questions on fishers’ associative and labor preferences complemented
this latter topic.
The structured interview was applied to fishers belonging to the major groups of
divers in town that were active in 2007 (six groups). Even though the selection of
interviewees was not random due to the lack of updated information on these groups’
members, whenever possible the number of interviews was distributed among groups
more or less in proportion to an estimate of the number of boats working for each group
106
at the time interviews were performed. A total of 45 interviews were conducted with 1-2
crew members from 40 pangas, out of approximately 80 active pangas involved in
commercial diving in town. Eighty nine percent of interviewees were panga captains
(n=40), of which 33 were also divers and the rest (n=7) were captains and divers’
assistants (the persons who assist the divers on board).
Differences in responses to the Likert-scale statements among fishers were
explored by contrasting the responses to each statement using non-parametric statistics
(Mann-Whitney U test). The responses of fishers having two different modes of fishing
operation, and also different reputations concerning compliance with fishery regulations,
were compared. The first group, that was named the “island group”, consisted of fishers
primarily operating in oceanic islands (Isla Tiburón, I. San Pedro Mártir, I. San Esteban,
I. Ángel de la Guarda, and islands of the Archipiélago de San Lorenzo) (Figure 1). The
main target species for this group are rocky reef species such as lobster, octopus, fishes,
and occasionally pen shells (sand-mud species). This group has the reputation of being
less respectful of regulations than the second group. The second group, which was named
the “bay group”, consisted of fishers whose main target species are pen shells and
octopus, and occasionally lobsters and fishes, in the surroundings areas of Bahía de Kino
and Isla Tiburón (Figure 1). In the case of sea cucumber, there is no legal harvest on the
Sonoran coast83. However, it is generally acknowledged that this species is widely
harvested and although it cannot be known for sure which of these groups is most active
in the clandestine harvest of sea cucumber, the island group is believed to be the one that
83
A few authorizations to harvest sea cucumber have been granted by SEMARNAT in the states of Baja
California, and Baja California Sur.
107
harvests this species the most. Each of these two groups consists of several distinct
subgroups primarily defined by who they work for (who they sell their product to) [14].
4. Results
4.1. Fishers’ Knowledge of Fisheries Policies
In general, respondents were unaware that a Fisheries Act, a bylaw of this Act,
and species-specific norms as such existed. However, they were generally aware of
important things contained in these legal instruments such as which species are allowed
to be captured (contained in resource-use norms), and that fishing permits are required for
fishing (contained in the Fisheries Act and its bylaw).
In terms of resource-use regulations, most of respondents were aware of the
permanent closure on sea cucumber fishing (NOM-059-ECOL-1994, SEMARNAT,
Table 1), the temporal closure on lobster fishing (NOM-006-PESC-1993, SAGARPA,
Table 1), and the lack of regulations for octopus, pen shells, fishes (groupers & snappers)
and black murex snail. However, additional restrictions on lobster fishing concerning
allowed size and fishing gear (Table 1) are generally ignored by respondents, as well as
the permanent closure implemented on rock scallop fishing (NOM-059-ECOL-1994,
SEMARNAT, Table 1).
With regards to the requirements to access fishing permits, even though 90% of
respondents have never tried to request a fishing permit on their own, about 70% were
aware of at least one or two main requirements for permits. Ownership and certification
of ownership of fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear) were the most
108
commonly mentioned. In general, respondents perceived that accessing fishing permits
was unreachable because of their high cost84, the need to own several fishing equipments
(they believed they could not access a permit having only one panga), and the notion that
authorities would grant fishing permits only to formalized groups (e.g., cooperatives), not
to individuals. Surprisingly, most of the fishers believed that they needed to own at least
three fishing equipments to access a fishing permit. Interestingly, the law does not
restrict the number of fishing equipments that can be registered in a permit. In addition, a
number of respondents expressed that they did not need to request fishing permits on
their own since they have always worked for permit holders (under the permits of
corporate or individual permit holders), or because authorities were simply not enforcing
the fishing permit requirement.
Eighty seven percent of respondents were aware that a group of fishers was
allowed to request a territory at sea for management purposes. When asked about the
name under which they would formally request this territory, about half of these fishers
recalled a “concession”, about 10% a “reserve”, and 40% could not remember.
Nonetheless, most of these fishers were unaware or had a very limited knowledge about
how to request this territory, and they generally perceived the process as very difficult,
with too many requirements to fulfill.
84
For the GC, the tendency has been to restrict or put on hold the allocation of new permits in the majority
of benthic small-scale fisheries (except for new fisheries like the geoduck or panopea clam (Panopea spp.)
fishery for which exploratory permits (permisos de fomento) have been recently granted in the NGC). One
way in which an individual or corporate entity may obtain a permit is by transferring permits that are no
longer in used by their holders. Though profiting with permits’ transference is prohibited, in practice the
interested party usually has to pay an extra amount than the actual cost of the permit (a bribe) to the owner
of the permit and the officials that do the paperwork.
109
In general, respondents were well aware of the penalties they would suffer if
caught in illegal fishing activities. This indicates that they are generally aware of which
species are allowed to be fished and when, even if they ignore the existence of formal
instruments containing these rules (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas). Respondents usually
perceived that Sonoran fisheries authorities are less strict in the application of fisheries
regulations compared with authorities in states of the Baja California Peninsula. This is a
region often visited by fishers from Bahía de Kino, and even permit holders from that
region hire divers from Bahía Kino [14, 21].
With regards to any recent changes in Mexican policies concerning fisheries,
100% of respondents were unaware that changes in fisheries legislation were underway.
This is not surprising considering that most of them did not know that a fisheries act even
existed. The only change in legal requirements that respondents have noticed in recent
times concerns an increase in enforcement activities by local authorities within the last
year or year and a half.
4.2. Fishers’ Attitudes toward Fisheries Regulation
4.2.1. What is Missing in Bahía de Kino in Terms of Fishery Regulation? (Open-ended
question)
The most frequent issues and suggestions expressed by respondents concerning
regulatory aspects involved: 1. controlling the entrance of outsider pangas into local
fishing grounds (27% of respondents) (see Cinti et al. [14] for a description of local
access issues), 2. more respect for regulations (22% of respondents), 3. more support
from local authorities particularly in applying and enforcing current regulations (22% of
110
respondents), and 4. a more even distribution of fishing permits, granting them to real
fishers, not to absentee operators (22% of respondents) (Figure 2).
[Figure 2 about here]
On the other hand, only 5 of 45 respondents (11%) claimed that fewer restrictions
on fishing should be imposed (Figure 2), arguing that important fishing grounds have
been closed85 to fishing through the establishment of protected areas (n=3 specifically
regarding the Reserva de la Biósfera (Biosphere Reserve) Isla San Pedro Mártir, and the
Parque Nacional (National Park) Archipiélago de San Lorenzo on the coast of Baja
California, Figure 1); or that restrictions are too radical for some species which should be
opened for fishing (n=2, both concerning sea cucumber fishing).
4.2.2. Fishers’ Attitudes toward Access Regulation (Likert-scale)
Forty percent of respondents agreed with the idea that fishing permits were a
useful tool to limit access to local fishing grounds, while 56% evaluated it negatively
(Figure 3). In addition, 60% of respondents agreed with the idea that the movement of
divers among fishing villages (e.g., divers from Bahía de Kino to Guaymas and vice
versa) is a way in which fishers help each other and 35% did not (Figure 3).
Interestingly, a number of these fishers observed that if these divers were to arrive
bringing their pangas with them, their reaction would be different. In general, local
fishers are reluctant to accept the arrival of new pangas to fish in local fishing grounds
85
Interestingly, the no-take areas within these MPAs do not comprise the entire MPAs. Two point six
percent of the Isla San Pedro Mártir Biosphere Reserve and 15% of the National Park Archipiélago de San
Lorenzo are completely closed to fishing. In addition, enforcement is almost absent, particularly in the
second case.
111
[14]. When fishers were asked to evaluate whether they agreed that only people from
Bahía de Kino should be allowed to dive in local fishing grounds, this statement also
received a high level of support (64%)(Figure 3). Overall, there is a tendency to support
the protection of local fishing grounds from outsiders, especially if this movement
implies increasing the number of pangas fishing in the area. Interestingly, the fishers
from Bahía de Kino are known throughout the GC for being highly migrant, entering
other port’s jurisdictions without permission [14, 22].
[Figure 3 about here]
4.2.3. Fishers’ Attitudes toward Resource-use Regulation (Likert-scale)
Statements assessing fishers’ attitudes toward resource-use regulation for each
target species86 were worded in a negative form in order to diminish the probability of
influencing fishers’ responses towards a pro-conservationist view: “The species does not
need formal regulation to conserve the species, it recovers alone when its natural fishing
season is over and the fishers start targeting other species”. Results are presented in
inverse order to simplify their interpretation (Figure 4). When fishers expressed that any
of these species needed formal regulation, fishers’ suggestions on how the species should
be regulated were recorded (Table 2).
Overall, fishers’ attitudes toward resource-use regulation and their suggestions on
how the species should be regulated indicate that, in general: 1. respondents perceive that
local resources are quite scarce with most showing signs of overuse, and 2. respondents
86
A predetermined list of target species was used and it was only asked about the species on the list. The
list was based on previous knowledge of the area.
112
tend to support the idea that most of their target species need some form of formal
regulation to conserve the species. In general, fishers’ suggestions on how their primary
target species should be regulated emphasize implementing temporal closures more than
any other measure, either on species without regulation (e.g., pen shells) or species with
existing legal protection (e.g., sea cucumber) (Table 2). Interestingly, the use of quotas
was seldom mentioned.
[Table 2 about here]
In general, respondents strongly support the need for formal regulation of the
harvest of sea cucumber (87%), lobsters (89%), and pen shells (78%) (Figure 4). The
main suggestions on how sea cucumber should be regulated include implementing a
temporal closure (and issuing permits) rather than the permanent closure already in place
(see Table 2 for suggested dates). For lobster, the main suggestions involve increasing
enforcement of current temporal closure, prohibitions on harvests of small size
individuals and breeding females, and the ban on nocturnal diving87. For pen shells, most
fishers suggest implementing a temporal closure (see Table 2 for suggested dates), and
enforcing requirements for legal possession of fishing permits.
[Figure 4 about here]
87
In the GC, nocturnal diving with commercial purposes is only prohibited in areas of traditional use by
indigenous groups (like the Seri Indians), according to the management plan of the “Islas del Golfo de
California” protected area (area of reserve and refuge for migratory birds and wild fauna), and in some
other protected areas like the Bahia de Loreto National Marine Park and Isla San Pedro Mártir Biosphere
Reserve. Nonetheless, respondents tend to believe that nocturnal diving with commercial purposes is
prohibited everywhere.
113
In the case of rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer), although this species is not a
primary target species due to its comparative scarcity and low demand, the majority of
respondents support the need for regulation in order for this species to recover (58% of
support vs. 35% do not support) (Figure 4). According to the fishers, this species is
accessible for fishing all year round and consequently more vulnerable to overuse (Table
2). Rock scallops are often harvested as a byproduct during the harvest of more profitable
species (because of price or high abundance) like octopus, sea cucumber, or rocky fishes,
since they are found in rocky or near rocky habitats. Rock scallops are in fact protected
by SEMARNAT (NOM-059-ECOL-1994, Table 1), though respondents were generally
unaware of the existence of this regulation.
On the other hand, in the case of fish species targeted by local divers (groupers
and snappers) responses were divided (52% support vs. 48% do not support the need to
regulate the species) (Figure 4). Respondents not supporting the need for regulation
explained that these species show seasonal variations in behavior, approaching shallower
waters during cold water months, and moving deeper and becoming more active during
warm water months. Even though respondents did not mention that this behavior might
be related to reproduction, a migratory behavior like this has been observed in the leopard
grouper (one of the main species of fish they harvest) when they aggregate to mate. The
species migrate to specific sites disappearing from places where they are commonly seen,
from April through June [23]. According to the fishers, this movement would make fish
species inaccessible for fishing (through diving) for a period of time and consequently
less vulnerable to overuse.
114
In contrast, respondents supporting the need for regulation of fish species would
like to see an increase in enforcement of nocturnal diving (see footnote 24), especially
near islands, and the establishment of size restrictions together with more enforcement, to
reduce the harvest of small-size individuals (Table 2).
For octopus and black murex snail (Hexaplex nigritus) the majority of
respondents do not support the need for regulation (66% for octopus, and 76% for black
murex) (Figure 4). Most of these fishers justify their opinions on regulations for these
species explaining that these species are seasonal in their accessibility, only available for
fishing in coastal waters during summer and inaccessible the rest of the year. In addition,
the black murex snail is rarely extracted in Bahía de Kino because of their scarcity, low
demand, and low price. Nonetheless, respondents also agree that both species are caught
during reproduction and are likely to be affected (Table 2).
4.2.4. Fishers’ Perceptions of Performance of Local Authorities (Likert-scale)
Responses were divided when fishers were asked if they agree that “without the
support of local authorities, they would not currently have any products to fish in Bahía
de Kino” (44% agreed vs. 47% do not agree) (Figure 5). In other words, about half of
respondents agreed that local authorities have had an important role in preventing the
depletion of fishery resources in Bahía de Kino, while the other half do not support this
idea. Nonetheless, 80% of respondents agreed that in order to improve the situation of
local fisheries, the implementation and enforcement of current regulations by local
authorities was needed.
115
[Figure 5 about here]
4.2.5. Fishers’ Willingness to Join Cooperatives (Likert-scale)
Sixty seven percent of respondents agree that working independently is preferable
to working as a member of a cooperative (Figure 6). On the other hand, 86% believe that
the main motivation for joining a cooperative today is having access to fishing permits
(Figure 6). In addition to the Likert-scale statements, the preferences of fishers and the
reasons for their preferences were assessed through additional questions as part of the
same interview. These results indicate that 40% of respondents would prefer working as
a member of a group or cooperative because it would allow them to access benefits and
support that would be hard to obtain as independent fishers. These benefits included
access to support and increased (positive) attention from the government, access to
equipment owned by the cooperative (boats, motors, and fishing gear), the possibility of
buying one’s own equipment through credit or loans, access to fishing permits,
advantages in selling one’s product (legal receipts, better prices), and social benefits such
as health insurance. However, the benefits most frequently mentioned were improved
access to fishing permits and fishing equipments. This result reaffirms the point that
obtaining a fishing permit as independent fishers is a difficult task.
[Figure 6 about here]
In terms of incentives to join cooperatives it is clear that in general, respondents
look for material benefits that are difficult to obtain as independent fishers, rather than
other type of support given by the collective nature of a cooperative. Also, when
116
expressing their reasons for preferring to work as a cooperative member, many
respondents answered in a conditional way commenting that if the cooperative functions
properly, they would prefer the cooperative option. Local experiences with cooperatives
have not been generally successful [14], and this insecurity is reflected in fishers’
answers.
On the other hand, 53% of respondents preferred to work independently (not as a
member of a group or cooperative). The reasons include having had bad experiences with
cooperatives, such as poor administration and organization, unequal contributions of
members to the cooperative and internal conflicts between members. Other reasons for
preference for working as independent fishers included freedom on the job, and higher
earnings than as member of cooperatives due to the possibility of getting a better price
when selling one’s product, and avoiding paying cooperative dues. Obtaining higher
earnings was the most common answer from respondents who stated a preference for
working independently.
In addition, the preferences of respondents with regards to the alternative ways in
which they can legally access fishing and sell their catch were assessed: 1) with fishing
permits of their own (individual permits), 2) as a member of a cooperative that holds
fishing permits, 3) working under the permits of individual permit holders (locally called
“permisionarios”), or 4) working under the permits of a cooperative (not as member of
the cooperative). Interviewees were told to assume that any of the offered options was
equally feasible in practice. Interestingly, 73% of respondents would prefer working with
fishing permits of their own (individual permits), only 20% would prefer working as a
117
member of a cooperative that holds fishing permits; and no one would prefer working
under the permits of individual permit holders or “permisionarios”. Ironically, this is the
most common way for fishers to access fishing permits and legal authority to sell
products in Bahía de Kino [14].
4.2.6. Attitudinal Differences Among Groups of Fishers (Likert-scale)
Convincing evidence of differences exist between the island and bay group
concerning attitudes toward resource-use regulation for fish species (p<0.01), perception
of performance of local authorities (p<0.01) and perception of the need for reinforcing
implementation and enforcement of current rules by local authorities (p<0.01) (Table 3).
[Table 3 about here]
Respondents of the bay group tend to show a more negative perception of how
local authorities have performed and are more supportive of an increase in enforcement
of current regulations, than respondents of the island group, who tend to be more cautious
about those topics. Differences in perceptions might be explained by the fact that the
primary target species of the bay group (octopus and pen shells) are not subject to any
formal regulation (Table 1), while the main species targeted by the island group are
subject to official restrictions (norms regulating lobster and sea cucumber harvesting)
(Table 1). Respondents whose target species are already regulated may fear or be less
likely to accept an increase in enforcement. Nonetheless, in spite of these differences, it
should be noted that respondents of both groups tend to support the need for some kind of
formal regulation for the majority of the species they harvest (including sea cucumber).
118
5. Discussion
Studies of what the resource users know about and how they perceive the formal
policies that regulate their activity are useful tools to assess the effectiveness of rules
designed to manage natural resources to ensure sustainable harvests. These kinds of
studies can help policy-makers design regulations that incorporate appropriate
biophysical and social characteristics of the setting, so that people’s responses to these
policies –and hopefully fisheries performances- are improved.
Cinti et al. [14] described the local social and fisheries impact of formal fisheries
policies in Bahía de Kino, and discussed whether the formal institutional structure of
Mexican fishing regulations is effective in promoting responsible behavior by small-scale
fishers. These authors described a system aimed to regulate access to the fishery (the
permit system) that sets the standard too high for many real fishers to access fishing
permits, tends to promote the disconnection of permit holders (usually absentee
operators) from the resource, and intensify rent-seeking interests. Resources and markets
tend to be concentrated in a few hands (permit holders’ hands), and an informal system88
of production is created (the fishers that operate the boats and do not own fishing rights).
This informal labor system is practically invisible to the federal government, resulting in
the exclusion of most fishers (usually more closely attached to the resources and with the
most at stake if resources are overfished) from management decisions concerning the
fishery. This social structure creates the wrong incentives for effective fisheries
88
The informality of this fishing sector is such that most fishermen do not even have national identification
credentials (locally referred as “Credencial de Elector”) that would allow them to vote.
119
management, incentivizing illegal fishing rather than discouraging it. In addition, the
authors highlight their observation that overuse is also promoted by the absence of legally
binding norms to regulate resource uses in most of the species targeted by local divers,
the lack of knowledge on these species’ population status, and an insufficient system for
enforcement and control.
This article reinforces and complements the results presented by Cinti et al. [14],
from the perspective of resource-users, suggesting that:
a) There exists an unequal distribution of fishing rights. None of our interviewees
had fishing permits in their names (as individual permit holders) and only 18% were
members of cooperatives holding fishing permits. Nonetheless, these cooperatives did not
commercialize their harvests through their cooperatives, which means that they are also
highly dependent on external buyers or other permit holders to sell their product. In
addition, obtaining a more even distribution of fishing permits, granting them to the users
of resources (not to absentee operators), was a major suggestion by local fishers.
b) Current policies and policy changes do not reach the fishers in a direct and
formalized way, and they are shaped with no participation of local fishers. Permit holders
are the only ones legally involved in the fishery, and consequently, the only ones
informed about regulatory measures, policy changes, or government benefits available to
them. The result is that fishers, operating under permits held by others; do not have
thorough knowledge about existing rules.
120
c) The existing system for monitoring and enforcing current rules is inefficient as
reflected by fishers’ willingness to reinforce vigilance and improve authorities’ response
to illegal fishing.
d) There exists the need to implement additional regulatory measures on most of
the species targeted by local divers because of a generalized state of overfishing.
e) There is a strong willingness of resource users to improve the condition of local
fisheries through implementation of regulatory measures.
Even when local fishers have no formal rights to resources, weak organization,
limited power, limited access to information, and insufficient institutional support, their
attitudes and demands show that potential for implementation of improved fishing
regulations exists. This is particularly important since it may provide the basis for the
development of locally supported management strategies, with a higher likelihood of
compliance and a higher potential for managing these resources sustainably.
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that regardless of the strong support by local
fishers towards increased enforcement of existing regulations and implementation of new
ones, most of these fishers are working informally and hence, not complying with legal
requirements in some aspect or another. Thus, it is suggested that before any significant
change is made in how regulations are implemented and enforced, local fishers should be
approached in a non-threatening way and opportunities for them to regularize their
activity should be provided.
The new fisheries act adds to the pre-existing list of management tools the
possibility of developing species-specific management plans, and “Regional Fishery
121
Ordinance Plans” (“Programas de Ordenamiento Pesquero”). Each of these plans must
define the area to be incorporated into the plan, provide a list of users, the species subject
to use, and the species-specific management plans available for the species of concern.
As initially suggested by Cinti et al. [14], an institutional tool like this could be used in
Bahía de Kino to grant exclusive access to the community (or to a group of neighboring
communities) within the limits of their fishing grounds, and serve as a protective
umbrella to help avoid intrusions from outside. Also, providing exclusive use or property
rights on the users of resources (individually or collectively) for specific fisheries (and controllable- areas) within these limits may provide additional incentives to avoid
internal competition for resources among local groups or individuals. These could be
approached through the use of rights-based mechanisms89 already available in Mexican
legislation (i.e., CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions or SEMARNAT’s species-specific
permits that provide exclusive use-rights over one or more species within a specified
area; MPAs that may grant exclusivity of access to certain groups or communities) or
through exploring others that may have proved promising in other places under similar
circumstances. Our results could be used as a preliminary baseline to initiate the
discussion among fishery stakeholders from the diving sector of Bahía de Kino towards
implementation of improved fishing regulations.
89
Approaches that tend to eliminate ‘the race for fish’ and provide incentives for fishery stakeholders to
participate in management decisions and increase compliance with regulations (e.g., territorial use-rights in
fisheries or TURFs, marine tenure systems, use-rights to a certain gear or to an amount of a resource
granted to individuals, groups of individuals or communities)(see [2] and [24]).
122
This does not mean to imply that the permit system has to be necessarily
eliminated, but instead elements of its design modified (to reduce the chances of
achieving unfavorable outcomes) and combined with rights-based mechanisms. Some of
these modifications (which may be useful for the permit system beyond Bahía de Kino)
might include: (a) ease the requirements for accessing fishing permits so that resource
users are able to successfully request them; (b) give preference to resource users in the
allocation of permits that are made available; (c) limit the number of boats each permit
holder could register into the fishery. This would make room for others to access fishing
rights and discourage concentration of resources in a few permit holders; (d) limit the
number of permits each permit holder could hold (to avoid concentration). Nonetheless, it
is advisable that permits are kept multi-specific (or that each permit holder be allowed to
accumulate a number of permits for different species), to allow for diversification to
better cope with resource fluctuations; (e) revoke permits that are badly used or not in use
by their holders so that they can be reallocated to people with long history into the
fishery; (f) be more strict in the application of the rules to revoke permits so that permit
holders have more incentives to comply with rules, and permit holders that fail to comply
make room for others to access these permits; (g) significantly improve control measures
to increase the chances of detecting violations such as the concealing of illegal catch
under current permits, particularly in processing plants considering that one of the main
reasons for local fishers to harvest illegal products is the existence of buyers willing to
buy them; and (h) provide incentives for rule compliance through combining the permit
system with rights-based tools and more inclusive management approaches.
123
6. Acknowledgments
This study was made possible by contributions from the Wallace Research
Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation through a grant to the
PANGAS Project. We would like to express our gratitude to the fishers who participated
in this research; to Cesar Moreno and Mario Rojo from COBI, and Amy Hudson Weaver
from Niparajá, for their support and guidance during fieldwork; to Edella Schlager and
Richard Cudney-Bueno for their valuable guidance during this research, to Marcia
Moreno-Baez for developing Fig. 1, and to an anonymous reviewer. A. Cinti would like
to thank Jennie Duberstein and Marcia Moreno-Báez for their cheerful companion and
support in the hell of the summer in Bahía de Kino, and to Gaspar Soria for his support
during this research. All procedures were performed in compliance with relevant laws
and institutional guidelines and the appropriate institutional committee have approved
them. Informed consent was obtained for experimentation with human subjects. This
paper represents the views of the authors and not necessarily those of their institutions
and funders. This is a scientific contribution of the PANGAS Project,
www.pangas.arizona.edu.
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126
Figure 1: Map of the study area within the Northern Gulf of California (NGC). The thick
gray line on the Sonoran coastline indicates the general geographic jurisdiction of fishing
permits for most diving products in Bahía de Kino, extending from Puerto Libertad to
Estero Tastiota. The MPAs present in the area are indicated as follows: Reserva de la
Biósfera (Biosphere Reserve) Bahía de los Angeles y Salsipuedes (RB. BACBS); Parque
Nacional (National Park) Archipiélago de San Lorenzo (PN. ASL); Reserva de la
Biósfera (Biosphere Reserve) Isla San Pedro Mártir (RB. ISPM). Square markers indicate
the main towns or cities. Hermosillo is the capital city of Sonora. Cartographic design:
Marcia Moreno-Báez and Erika Koltenuk.
127
Expel outsider pangas
Grant permits to the fishers
More respect of regulations
More support from authorities (law enforcement)
Less restrictions on fishing
Less corruption by authorities
Apply specific regulations
Grant more permits
Support for alternative activities to fishing
Nothing
Others
0
5
10
15
20
% of respondents
25
Figure 2: Fishers’ responses to question: What is currently missing in terms of fishery
regulation in Bahía de Kino? One person may have provided multiple answers.
30
128
100
90
80
70
56
60
%
50
64
60
40
40
36
35
40
30
20
31
2
13
33
10
0
42
20
7
4
agree &
strongly
agree
neither
22
20
4
disagree &
strongly
disagree
agree &
strongly
agree
neither
29
22
4
disagree &
strongly
disagree
agree &
strongly
agree
neither
disagree &
strongly
disagree
Fishing permits have been useful for The movement of divers among fishing Only people from B. Kino should be
controlling the number of people fishing villages is a way in which fishers help
able to dive in B. Kino's fishimg
in B. Kino
each other
grounds
Figure 3: Fishers’ attitudes toward access limitation. n=45. The numbers in bold above
each bar indicate the total percentage of responses for each category or combination of
categories (i.e., agree and strongly agree) with the stippled bar for the “agree” or
“disagree” responses and the plain bars for the “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree”
responses for each statement.
129
“The species needs formal regulation to conserve the species, it does not recover alone when its
natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species”
100
90
89
87
78
80
76
66
70
60
49
58
58
38
52
48
% 50
35
40
11
10
0
31
24
20
38
2
40
31
7
4
11
22
33
16
2
4
26
23
7
59
44
26
31
30
20
35
17
2
14
22
9
2
10
17
agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree agree & neither disagree
&
strongly
&
strongly
&
strongly
&
strongly
&
strongly
&
strongly
&
strongly
strongly
strongly agree
strongly agree
strongly agree
strongly agree
strongly agree
strongly agree
agree
disagree
disagree
disagree
disagree
disagree
disagree
disagree
Sea cucumber
Lobster
Pen shell
Rock scallop*
Fish species*
Octopus
Black murex snail*
Figure 4: Fishers’ attitudes toward resource-use regulation by species. n=45, except for species with asterisks: rock scallop
(n=43), black murex (n=29), and fish species (n=42). The numbers in bold above each bar indicate the total percentage of
responses for each category or combination of categories (i.e., agree and strongly agree) with the stippled bar for the “agree” or
“disagree” responses and the plain bars for the “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree” responses for each statement.
130
100
90
80
80
70
60
% 50
44
40
30
31
47
27
20
10
47
33
13
9
agree &
strongly agree
neither
0
20
disagree &
strongly
disagree
Without the support of local authorities, we
would not currently have any product to fish in
B. Kino
agree &
strongly agree
13
7
neither
disagree &
strongly
disagree
In B. Kino we need local authorities to
implement and enforce current laws
Figure 5: Fishers’ attitudes toward authorities’ performance. n=45. The numbers in bold
above each bar indicate the total percentage of responses for each category or
combination of categories (i.e., agree and strongly agree) with the stippled bar for the
“agree” or “disagree” responses and the plain bars for the “strongly agree” or “strongly
disagree” responses for each statement.
131
100
86
90
80
70
67
60
% 50
62
36
40
30
20
15
31
10
18
0
agree &
strongly agree
neither
13
2
disagree &
strongly
disagree
Today it is more convenient to be an
independent fisherman versus joining a
cooperative
11
24
2
agree &
strongly agree
neither
7
4
disagree &
strongly
disagree
Today the principal reason for joining a
cooperative it to have access to fishing permits
Figure 6: Fishers’ willingness to join cooperatives. n=45. The numbers in bold above
each bar indicate the total percentage of responses for each category or combination of
categories (i.e., agree and strongly agree) with the stippled bar for the “agree” or
“disagree” responses and the plain bars for the “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree”
responses for each statement.
132
Table 1: Management recommendations as they appear in the National Fisheries Chart (Carta Nacional Pesquera or CNP) for
the main target species of commercial divers in Bahía de Kino, and fishery norms regulating the harvest of these species.
Species
Sea cucumber
Isostichopus fuscus
Existing regulations by species
NOM-059-ECOL-1994
- Enforced by PROFEPA and the Navy
- Permanent closure throughout México
Rock scallop
Spondylus calcifer
NOM-059-ECOL-1994 (see above)
Lobster
Panulirus spp.
NOM-006-PESC-1993
- Enforced by CONAPESCA and the Navy
- Applies to Federal jurisdiction of Gulf of
México and the Caribbean Sea, Pacific Ocean
including Gulf of California (GC)
- Gear restrictions: traps, unless other gear is
authorized by SAGARPA
- Size restrictions: 82.5 mm (cephalothorax
length)
- No breeding females
- Land entire specimen to enable control
- Temporary closure (GC): July 1st to October
30th
Groupers,
Mycteroperca spp.(a) &
Snappers, Hoplopagrus
guentherii.
Pen shell
Atrina spp. & Pinna
rugosa
Black murex snail
Hexaplex nigritus
None
None
None
CNP management recommendations
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. There are no recommendations for
Sonoran sea cucumber populations. SEMARNAT may authorize use. No
authorization for exploitation has been granted in Sonora.
Lumped with other 15 species under the category “almejas” (clams). Population
status in Sonora, undetermined. There are no recommendations for Sonoran rock
scallop populations. SEMARNAT may authorize use. Only one authorization has
been granted in Sonora, though not in Bahía de Kino.
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. A gradual increase in fishing effort
may be allowed if supported by technical studies. Recommends assessing the
resource in Sonora and other states, and regularizing the use of commercial
diving. This fishing gear is widely used in the GC, even though it is prohibited for
lobster.
Lumped with other 200 species under the category “peces marinos de escama”
(marine fishes with scales). Commercial diving does not appear in the list of
fishing gear used to capture these species. Population status in Sonora,
undetermined. General recommendations include not increasing fishing effort in
any of the species within the category, and modifying current categorization to
allow administration by groups of related species (smaller groups).
Lumped with other 15 species under the category “almejas” (clams).
Recommends not increasing fishing effort in Sonora and other states, and
implementing the use of quotas in Sonora and Sinaloa.
Population status in Sonora, undetermined. Recommends assessing the resource in
Sonora every 2 years. General recommendations include not increasing fishing
effort in any of the states where it is fished, and implementing reproductive
closures.
133
Under a general category “pulpo” (octopus) including identified and unidentified
species captured in Mexico. Population status in Sonora, undetermined.
Octopus
Recommends taking measures in Sonora if catches are lower than 100 MT.
Octopus spp.
None
General recommendations for all octopus species include not increasing fishing
effort, and reinforcing biological and fisheries studies to better regulate these
fisheries.
(a) Mycteroperca jordani, Mycteroperca prionura, and Mycteroperca rosacea are enlisted as endangered, near threatened and vulnerable, respectively,
in the IUCN red list of threatened species.
134
Table 2: Fishers’ suggestions on how the species should be managed.
Species
Sea cucumber Isostichopus fuscus
Rock scallop Spondylus calcifer
Lobster
Panulirus spp.
Fishes
Groupers, Mycteroperca spp. &
Snappers, Hoplopagrus guentherii.
Pen shell
Atrina spp.
Black murex snail
Hexaplex nigritus
Fishers’ suggestions on how the species should be managed
─ Need urgent attention. Overexploited (very scarce, very small sizes left).
─ Closure is not respected, extracted all year round.
─ Fishers suggest temporal closure during reproduction with strict enforcement (and provide permits to regularize fishing),
rather than a useless permanent closure. Or close it permanently, but substantially enhancing enforcement.
─ Suggested time for temporal closure: summer time (~May-August) based on fisher’s observations of reproductive
season.
─ Fishers also suggest controlling the buyers. Reinforce control in processing plants.
─ Overexploited (very scarce)
─ Infrequently fished due to scarcity, low demand and low price. It is fished as secondary species during octopus fishing
season.
─ Apply temporal closure in the summer (when they believe it reproduces) or ban it for several years.
─ Fishers believe that it takes longer to recover than other species (low growth).
─ Need urgent attention. Overexploited (very scarce, very small sizes left).
─ Closure is not respected, extracted all year round.
─ More enforcement is needed to avoid extraction during closure.
─ Control nocturnal divinga, limit extraction of breeding females and small size individuals.
─ Fishers consider that current closure dates are wrong. Lobsters start reproducing in late May-early June. Closure should
start one month earlier (including June).
─ Fishers agreeing with the need for regulation generally claim for controlling nocturnal divinga, and increasing vigilance
in islands.
─ According to the fishers, the fish approach shallower waters during cold water months, and move deeper and become
more active during warm water months. This makes harder their capture using harpoon.
─ A temporal closure should be established when the water gets cold (~two months, probably in November-December).
─ Impose size restrictions. Small sizes are not respected.
─ Most of the fishers suggest temporal closure during reproduction in summer (from May-June-until August-September).
─ Enforcement could be facilitated since most fishers stop fishing it naturally in the summer because extraction is no
longer convenient (muscle turns very thin), though some local and foreign fishers still fish it.
─ Fishers also suggest controlling legal possession of fishing permits (and the number of boats allowed per permit).
─ Some fishers suggested setting a quota since today everyone fish in the same fishing sites until it is over.
─ It is infrequently worked in Bahía de Kino because of scarcity, low demand and low price.
─ Most of the fishers agreed that it may recover alone since it is seasonal (only accessible during the summer when it
aggregates to mate and inaccessible (buried) the rest of the time). Yet, they also agree that it is caught while it
reproduces.
─ Only 10% of the fishers said that it would need regulation (temporal ban during the summer or permanent closure for
135
several years until it recovers).
─ Most of the fishers agreed that it may recover alone since it is a seasonal resource (only accessible in coastal areas during
summer and inaccessible for fishing the rest of the time). Yet, they also agree that it is caught while it reproduces.
─ ~ 30% of the fishers believed that even if it is seasonal, it may need regulation since it is overexploited and it is caught
Octopus
during reproduction. These fishers suggest:
Octopus spp.
1. Temporal closure during last months of natural fishing season (July and August) when it have laid their eggs for
incubation.
2. Give preference for extraction to local fishers.
3. Establish a quota.
(a) In the GC, nocturnal diving with commercial purposes is only prohibited in areas of traditional use by indigenous groups, according to the management plan
of the “Islas del Golfo de California” protected area (area of reserve and refuge for migratory birds and wild fauna), and in some other protected areas like the
Bahia de Loreto National Marine Park. Nonetheless, even though it is widely practiced, respondents tend to believe that nocturnal diving is prohibited
everywhere.
136
Table 3: Results of Mann-Whitney U tests between fishers of the island and bay group per statement. Values between brackets
indicate the number of respondents. *Significant differences at p<0.05.
Statements
Fishers’ Attitudes toward Access Regulation
(1) Fishing permits have been useful for controlling the number of people fishing in Bahía de Kino
(2) The movement of divers among fishing villages (e.g., divers from Bahía de Kino to Guaymas and
vice versa) is a way in which fishers help each other
(3) Only people from Bahía de Kino should be able to dive in the area of Bahía de Kino
Fishers’ Attitudes toward Resource-use Regulation
(4) Pen shells do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, they recover alone when its
natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(5) Sea cucumber do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, it recover alone when its
natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(6) Octopus do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, it recover alone when its natural
fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(7) Lobsters do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, they recover alone when its
natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(8) Rock scallops do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, they recover alone when its
natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(9) The black murex snail do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, it recover alone
when its natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
(10) Fish species targeted by divers do not need for formal regulation to conserve the species, they
recover alone when its natural fishing season is over and the fishers start targeting other species
Fishers’ Perceptions of Performance of Local Authorities
(11) Without the support of local authorities, we would not currently have any product to fish in Bahía
de Kino
(12) In Bahía de Kino we need local authorities to implement and enforce current laws
Fishers’ Willingness to Join Cooperatives
(13) Today it is more convenient to be an independent fisherman versus joining a cooperative
(14) Today the principal reason for joining a cooperative it to have access to fishing permits
Mean rank
Island group Bay group
25.4 (27)
19.4 (18)
P value
0.114
25.2 (27)
20.9 (27)
19.7 (18)
26.2 (18)
0.150
0.154
24.9 (27)
20.2 (18)
0.212
25.3 (27)
19.5 (18)
0.109
25.7 (27)
18.9 (18)
0.069
23.5 (27)
22.3 (18)
0.742
24.0 (26)
19.0 (17)
0.180
16.6 (14)
13.5 (15)
0.269
28.0 (25)
11.9 (17)
0.000*
27.2 (27)
18.8 (27)
16.7 (18)
29.3 (18)
0.007*
0.005*
24.1 (27)
24.4 (27)
21.4 (18)
20.9 (18)
0.491
0.301
137
APPENDIX C: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES
PERFORMANCE IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO, FROM AN
INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR
COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGEMENT
TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE COMMONS
Ana Cinti1, Marcia Moreno-Báez1, Esteban Torreblanca-Ramírez 2
1
The University of Arizona, School of Natural Resources, Biological Sciences East 325,
Tucson, AZ 85721, USA.
2
Pronatura Noroeste, A.C., Calle Décima No 60 (esq. Ryerson), Zona Centro, Ensenada,
Baja California, 22800, México.
Keywords
Gulf of California, institutions, small-scale fisheries, incentives, policy, local rules,
fishers’ attitudes.
138
A Comparative Analysis of Small-scale Fisheries Performance in the Gulf of
California, Mexico, from an Institutional Perspective: Opportunities and Challenges
for Community-based Management
Ana Cinti, Marcia Moreno-Báez, Esteban Torreblanca-Ramírez
Abstract
Understanding how institutions affect or shape fisheries performance is an
important part of providing practical insights for the development of more effective
management strategies. This paper analyses the institutional performance of two case
studies of small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico, with the aim
of understanding how formal policy tools and local arrangements interact in different
settings and under what circumstances they are effective in influencing stakeholders’
behavior. Results suggest that existing policy tools have been ineffective in promoting
sustainable fishing practices by fishery stakeholders in both communities. The
geographic jurisdiction of individual permits is generally ignored and individual fishers
fish where it is more convenient to them, following seasonal and spatial changes in
resource abundance. There is a tendency to willingly share local fishing grounds among
community members (as if use-rights would have been granted to the community as a
whole), and to protect them from outsiders. In addition, available permits are being used
to cover the product that is harvested by most of the fishers in these communities,
regardless of whether individual fishers are legitimate permit holders. We argue that
communal property or use-rights might potentially offer viable alternatives to increase
protection from outsiders, and incentivize local fishers to craft, implement and self-
139
enforce more legitimate measures. Tools available in Mexico’s fishery and environmental
laws could provide higher exclusivity of access to these communities. Importantly, there
was strong support from resource users (fishers) for implementing regulatory measures
for local fisheries in both communities. Increased attention should be given to local
arrangements and initiatives to develop locally supported regulations.
1. Introduction
Fisheries management failures are thought to be largely the product of
institutional (or policy) failures, the sum of the legal, social, economic, and political
arrangements used to manage fisheries (Ostrom 1990; Hilborn et al. 2005; Grafton et al.
2008). Fishers and other stakeholders work within a set of ecological, social, and
institutional constraints to consider the costs and benefits of various behaviors and act
according to perceived incentives. Understanding how institutions affect or shape
fisheries performance is therefore an important part of providing practical insights for the
development of management strategies that promote sustainable fishing.
The Gulf of California (GC) (Figure 1), in Mexico, is a region characterized by its
biological richness and socio-economic significance. The region is a major contributor to
the national fisheries sector, producing approximately 50% of the landings90 and 70% of
the value of national fisheries in Mexico (Carvajal et al. 2004). Recent estimations
90
Nonetheless, about 60% of these landings (as of 2002) correspond to small pelagics (mainly sardines)
and jumbo squid, most of which is harvested by large-scale fleets (37 industrial vessels for sardine and
1,000 small boats or pangas for jumbo squid). These fisheries combined employ a relatively small number
of people and contribute with only 12% of the total value of GC landings to the national fishery production
(Cisneros-Mata 2010).
140
suggest that there are approximately 50,000 fishers and 25,000 boats (or pangas)91
operating in small-scale (or artisanal) fisheries in the GC, and another 10,000 fishers and
1,300 boats in large-scale (or industrial) fisheries (Cisneros-Mata 2010).
In spite of the existence of formal fisheries policies intended to regulate fishing
practices, access to most small-scale fisheries (SSFs) in the GC –and generally in
Mexico- has been practically open (at least to Mexican citizens) (Alcalá 2003; World
Wildlife Fund 2005a,b). Fueled by state subsidies and policies that encouraged migration
from different parts of Mexico (Alcalá 2003; Greenberg 2006), the GC has seen a drastic
increase in fishing effort over the last decades and a downtrend in production of many of
the over 70 species targeted by SSFs (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998; Sala et al.
2004; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2006; PANGAS 2008). It is estimated that 85% of the Gulf
fisheries are either at their maximum harvesting capacity or overexploited (CisnerosMata 2010).
SSFs in the GC are affected by a number of institutional weaknesses commonly
associated with poor institutional performance worldwide (FAO 2002). These include
poor enforcement capabilities, no well defined rights; poor involvement of major
stakeholders in the elaboration of policies and regulations, decision making and
implementation; and insufficient financial and human resources, and information for
proper management (Bourillón-Moreno 2002; Alcalá 2003; Carvajal et al. 2004;
Danemann and Ezcurra 2007; Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Cinti et al. 2010a).
91
Typically fiberglass boats 8-9 meters long, equipped with 55-115 hp outboard motors.
141
In this institutional context and in a region where external (governmental)
management and enforcement capabilities will likely never be adequate, optimizing
implementation and performance of current policies and encouraging local stakeholders
to take responsibility in resource management, becomes critical. Several authors have
suggested that one solution to problems like these involves devolving or sharing
management responsibilities with fishery stakeholders to provide incentives for better
management of fishery resources (Pinkerton 1989; Berkes 1994, Pomeroy and Williams
1994, Jentoft and McCay 1995). Local involvement in management decisions may also
help remove burden from government institutions. Also, limited governmental resources
could be differentially allocated to fishing communities that are most in need and are less
likely to cope by themselves with internal or external threats. In this context, it is
important to assess how current policies are performing on-the-ground and the presence
of factors or circumstances that may potentially favor a more active role of local
stakeholders in resource management.
This paper analyses the institutional performance of two case studies of smallscale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California (NGC)92, with the aim of improving our
understanding of how formal policy tools and local arrangements interact in different
settings and under what circumstances they are effective in influencing stakeholders’
behavior. We provide insights from two case studies situated in different states, Bahía de
Kino in Sonora and Bahía de Los Angeles in Baja California. Comparatively, these
92
The GC has been divided in three main areas (north, mid and south) based on observations of fish
species distribution patterns (Walker 1960). The NGC is the area extending north of an imaginary line from
San Francisquito in Baja California and Bahía de Kino in Sonora (Figure 1).
142
communities show similar limitations in the on-the ground performance of the formal
policy tools used to manage fisheries, and similarly poor fisheries performance (in terms
of sustainability). However, they show noticeable differences in demography, geography,
level of fishers’ organization within their communities that may result in different
potentials for fisheries improvement in the mid- to short- term and for successful
devolvement of management authority to the local level.
We describe: 1) the non-institutional attributes of Bahía de los Ángeles (BA) and
Bahía de Kino’s (BK) fisheries (demographic, geographic, and fishery characteristics), 2)
the institutional attributes (formal and informal), and 3) fishers’ perceptions concerning
fisheries policies and management issues. Since the institutional component of BK has
been described in detail in two prior publications (Cinti et al. 2010a; Cinti et al. 2010b),
we will emphasize the most important differences and similarities among the case studies
and refer the reader to those publications for further detail.
2. Methods
We used the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD)(Ostrom
1999) to guide this research and identify relevant variables to explore. Three basic
categories of variables are thought to influence the patterns of interaction among
individuals in any given setting: 1. the rules used by participants (e.g., local arrangements
and government rules); 2. attributes of the biophysical world (e.g., resource
characteristics); and 3. attributes of the community (e.g., socio-cultural attributes)
143
(Ostrom 1999). In this study we collected information on these three components using
primary and secondary sources of information.
The on-the-ground performance of existing formal policy tools and the presence
and performance of local arrangements to regulate access and resource use was assessed
through examination of secondary sources, semi-structured and structured interviews
(including open and closed-ended questions), informal talks and participant observation.
We relied on available literature for information on additional factors which may help
explain the outcomes observed in each case.
Secondary sources included documents and information such as laws and bylaws
concerning fisheries (fishery and environmental laws), bylaws of formalized groups (e.g.,
fishing cooperatives), and official information (fishing permits issued, norms by species,
decrees, official statistics).
The semi-structured interviews with key fishers were aimed at collecting
information about the internal organization of formalized groups and the presence of
fishery-related local arrangements in both communities. In addition, we conducted semistructured interviews with key informants from the federal agencies involved in fisheries
and environmental protection, to get insights about the local implementation of tools and
regulations, enforcement and access issues.
The structured interviews assessed fishers’ occupational aspects (fishing activity,
primary target species, sources of income, etc.), association to formalized groups, how
they accessed fishing targets and how they commercialized their products (whose permits
and fishing equipment they used for fishing and selling products), and their attitudes and
144
perceptions about different aspects of fisheries regulations. Fishers’ attitudes and
perceptions were assessed using a combination of open-ended questions and a set of
statements in a 5-point Likert scale. Open-ended questions allowed the fishers to express
their opinions more freely about what was currently missing in terms of fisheries
regulation in BA and BK. The Likert-scale statements allowed for quantification of
predetermined topics including fishers’ attitudes toward access and resource-use
regulations, fishers’ perceptions of performance of local authorities concerning
enforcement of regulations; and fishers’ willingness to join formalized groups.
We conducted research in BK from April to August 2007, focusing on the smallscale fisheries sector of commercial divers. We focused on this sector because this is one
of the most important communities in terms of extraction of benthic resources in the
NGC. We conducted seven semi- structured interviews, five with key fishers focused on
internal organization of formalized groups (typically fishing cooperatives) and the
presence of fishery-related local arrangements in the community. Two additional
interviews focused on the local implementation and enforcement of regulations and were
conducted with a local governmental authority93 and a local leader of the permit holders’
sector.
In BK, the structured interview was applied to fishers belonging to the major
groups of divers in town that were active in 2007 (six groups), covering the topics
described in previous paragraphs. Because of the high number of fishing groups in BK,
we added a set of questions about fishery-related local arrangements that was not used in
93
From CONAPESCA (the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission) (the role and full name of
governmental agencies are described later on).
145
the BLA interviews. Even though the selection of interviewees was not random due to the
lack of updated information on these groups’ members, whenever possible the number of
interviews was distributed among groups more or less in proportion to an estimate of the
number of boats working for each group at the time interviews were performed. In BK, a
total of 45 structured interviews were conducted with 1-2 crew members from 40 pangas,
out of approximately 80 active pangas involved in commercial diving in town (resulting
in information from ~50% of active pangas at the time). Eighty-nine percent of
interviewees were panga captains (n=40). The captain is the person in charge of the boat
and is generally the most experienced and knowledgeable fisher and the one who tends to
make the decisions about fishing (Moreno et al. 2005).
We conducted research in BA from mid November to early December 2008,
focusing on the entire small-scale fisheries sector (diving, gillnet and trap fishing). This
was possible given the small size of this community that allowed us to extend the study to
include other fishing sectors in addition to diving. We conducted eight semi-structured
interviews total. Five of these interviews were conducted with key fishers and focused on
internal organization of formalized groups (typically Sociedades de Producción Rural or
SPRs94) and fishery related local arrangements in the community. Three interviews
targeted officials representing governmental fisheries and environment agencies95 and
these interviews focused on local implementation of regulations, enforcement, and access
94
An SPR (Society of Rural Production) is a type of formal organization commonly used in Mexico for any
type of rural industries, services and productive activities, including fisheries.
95
One from each of these agencies: 1) CONAPESCA (the National Fisheries and Aquaculture
Commission), 2) SEMARNAT (the Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture), and 3) CONANP (the National
Commission of Natural Protected Areas) (the role and full names of governmental agencies are described
later on).
146
issues. The structured interviews were conducted with 30 panga captains out of 37 active
pangas dedicated to small-scale fishing in this town (Avendaño et al. 2009), on the same
topics as for BK (except for the section on local arrangements). This resulted in
information from ~80% of active pangas at the time. In addition, we conducted seven
unstructured interviews with key informants aimed to explore the link between the
presence of communal land tenure and the emergence of a strong sense of use-rights over
local fishing grounds as perceived by community members
3. Non-institutional attributes of Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino’s
fisheries
The main non-institutional attributes of these communities’ fisheries are
summarized in Table 1.
3.1. Demographic, geographic, and fishery characteristics
Bahía de los Angeles (BA) and Bahía de Kino (BK) are both rural communities
situated by the coast of the Gulf of California (GC), Mexico (Figure 1). They differ
significantly in size and isolation from major urban centers. BA is a very small and
isolated community of 527 inhabitants (INEGI 2005), situated in the state of Baja
California over 500 Km from the nearest major city96 where marine resources can be
marketed and redistributed to other regional, national and international markets (US and
Asia). In contrast, BK is a much larger community of about 5,000 inhabitants (INEGI
2005) located in the State of Sonora. BK is only 100 Km from Hermosillo (the state
96
At 555 Km from Ensenada (~260,000 inhabitants), 650 Km from Tijuana (~1.29 million inhabitants), and
800 Km from Mexicali (the state capital) (~900 thousand inhabitants), all next to the United States (US)
border.
147
capital)97, which is the primary destination of local marine resources prior to
redistribution to regional, national and international markets.
Historically, commercial extraction of marine resources began and boomed more
or less simultaneously in both communities. In the surroundings of BA, mining was the
main economic activity during mid twentieth century, but the importance of marine
resources exploitation started to increase steadily beginning in the late 1930’s98
(Danemann and Ezcurra 2007). In BK, the first registries of permanent human (modern)
settlements were fishers in rudimentary fishing camps in the 1920’s, and fishing activities
started to increase dramatically in the 1930’s and 1940’s (Bahre and Bourillón 2002;
Fernández 2003; Moreno et al. 2005b). The growth in fisheries was largely due to an
increasing demand for the marine resources for national and international consumption
like the totoaba99 (Totoaba macdonaldi), shark species100, and sea turtles101 (mainly black
and green turtles Chelonia spp.) (Bahre and Bourillón 2002; Fernández 2003; Danemann
and Ezcurra 2007). Both communities harvested these species.
Also, the development rate and population growth of these communities was quite
different, as evidenced by current population sizes. Because of its remote location, BA
was less subject to rapid influxes of new settlers. Thus, relatives of the families that first
97
With 640,000 inhabitants (INEGI 2005).
Earnings from mining fluctuated widely and by the 1950’s the local economy shifted to sea turtle
exploitation (Danemann and Ezcurra 2007).
99
The totoaba is a fish endemic to the Gulf of California. From about 1910-mid 1920’s the gas bladder of
the female totoaba was the only part of the animal that was traded to Asian markets and the rest of the fish
was usually discarded. Large amounts of totoaba flesh started to be exported to US markets around mid
1920’s (Bahre and Bourillon 2002).
100
Commercial fishing for shark developed in late 1930’s for shark liver (a major source of vitamin A),
shark skin, and shark fins (Bahre and Bourillon 2002).
101
Sea turtle fishing increased during the 1950’s, as turtle flesh became popular in Mexico as well as in the
United States (Fernandez 2003). By the 1990’s, sea turtle populations had declined dramatically and the
species were protected and the legal fishery eliminated.
98
148
settled permanently in the area comprise most of the population today (Danemann and
Ezcurra 2007). In contrast, BK has received several immigration pulses of people
displaced from other economic activities (mainly agriculture) from different parts of
Mexico as well as fishers from within Sonora and southern states (Fernandez 2003,
Moreno et al. 2005). Consequently, BK shows a more heterogeneous population than BA.
The higher growth rate experienced by BK and other communities in the Sonoran coast
of the GC was fueled by a series of governmental policies that stimulated migrations to
the coast (all over Mexico) during economic hardships (Alcalá 2003; Greenberg 2006),
and technological innovations like irrigation systems and roads102 that facilitated the
proliferation of human settlements and extensive agricultural fields near the coasts
(Fernández 2003; Moreno et al. 2005b). BA was comparatively less affected by these
influences due to its isolated location. Nonetheless, today both communities are growing
rapidly, as are other villages and cities in the GC region (Bahre and Bourillón 2002;
Danemann and Ezcurra 2007).
Today, most of the economic activities occurring in both communities depend
upon marine and coastal resources. However, the size of the SSF fleet and the number of
fishers and species involved are substantially smaller in BA compared with BK. SSFs in
BA consist of about 70 fishers and 37 boats (Locally called ‘pangas’) (Avendaño et al.
2009) and make use of three main fishing gears: 1) gillnet fishing, which primarily
targets flounder (Paralichthys californicus) and species103 associated to this fishery; and
102
The road that connects Bahía de Kino with the state capital (Hermosillo) was built in 1953 (Fernandez
2003).
103
Angel shark Squatina californica, Guitarfish Rhinobatos productus; Rays Dasyastis
Brevis, Gymnura marmorata, and Myliobatis californica.
149
shark species (mainly Mustelus spp. and Galeorhinus spp.; 2) trap fishing, which mainly
targets octopus (Octopus bimaculatus and O. hubbsorum) and fish species (mainly sand
basses Paralabrax auroguttatus and P. maculatofasciatus and species104 associated to
these fisheries); and 3) commercial diving, which targets octopus (O. bimaculatus and O.
hubbsorum), sea cucumber (Istiotichopus fuscus and I. inornata), and several species of
clams (e.g., Megapitaria squalida, Argopecten ventricosus) (Danemann and Ezcurra
2007; Valdez Ornelas and Torreblanca 2008; Torreblanca et al. 2009). Fishers’
dependency on fishing is high, with 60% of respondents with no alternative occupation
other than fishing. Additionally, about half of respondents with alternative occupations
other than fishing, have fishing as their primary source of income.
In contrast, in BK approximately 800 fishers and 200 active pangas are involved
in SSFs in this community (Moreno et al. 2005b). A total of 66 species are harvested by
these small-scale fishers, of which 35 are regarded as the primary targets of fishing trips
(Project PANGAS, unpublished). About 80 pangas were active in commercial diving in
BK at the time this study was conducted (2007). Divers mainly harvest pen shells (mostly
Atrina tuberculosa, and occasionally Atrina maura, A. oldroydii and Pinna rugosa),
octopus (Octopus spp.), and fishes [mainly groupers (Mycteroperca rosacea and M.
jordani) and snappers (Hoplopagrus guentherii and Lutjanus novemfasciatus)]. Sea
cucumber (Isostichopus fuscus) is also an important diving fishery, though clandestine
because no authorization to harvest this species has been granted in the area (Cinti et al.
2010a). In contrast, the sea cucumber fishery is legal in BA. Smaller quantities of lobsters
104
Whitefish Caulolatilus princeps and Mexican hogfish Bodianus diplotaenia.
150
(Panulirus spp.), rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer), several species of clams (Megapitaria
squalida, Dosinia spp., and others) and snails (Hexaplex nigritus, Strombus galeatus, and
others) are also harvested105. BK fishers are also highly dependent on fishing to make a
living, with fishing being the only source of income for 71% of interviewees and
commercial diving being the primary source of income for 93% of interviewees (Cinti et
al. 2010a).
3.2. Condition of fishery resources
The Midriff Islands Region, where these two communities are situated, is one of
the most productive regions in the GC. Due to topographic and oceanographic features
that generate strong currents and water mixing, this region shows the highest surface
temperature, nutrients, and CO2 of the GC (Álvarez-Borrego 2007). This results in
exceptionally high levels of primary productivity and biological diversity (Zeitzschel
1969; Alvarez-Borrego and Lara-Lara 1991; Brusca et al. 2004).
Nonetheless, even in this highly productive environment, although the two
communities have many demographic and geophysical differences, many of the primary
fisheries in both communities (e.g., totoaba, sharks, and sea turtles) have experienced
similar boom and bust cycles throughout their history. Over the last few decades, the state
of fishery resources has followed similar tendencies in both communities as is the case of
other regions in the GC. Top predator fisheries (sharks, Gulf Coney Epinephelus
acanthistius, groupers E. itajara and Mycteroperca spp.) have been replaced with
105
Some products are harvested in small amounts because they are overfished and consequently scarce
even though they get a high price in the market (e.g., lobster, rock scallops, some species of clams). Other
species are harvested in small quantities because they get a very low price in the market (some species of
snails and clams).
151
fisheries harvesting species in lower trophic levels (herbivores), smaller in size and with
lower market prices (Sala et al. 2004; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2005; Valdez et al. 2007). In
addition, important declines in production have been observed in many current target
species in both communities. In BA, recent assessments conducted in 2007 through
analysis of biometric measures and/or fishing effort suggest that populations of main
target species appear to be deteriorating, showing signs of severe decline in some cases
[e.g., sea cucumber, sharks (particularly Galeorhinus spp.), sand bass, and flounder]
(Valdez and Torreblanca 2008). In BK, the primary target species of commercial divers
(as well as other species harvested in the community) are thought to be overexploited
(Moreno et al. 2005a; Moreno et al. 2005b; Cinti et al. 2010a, Cinti et al. 2010b).
However, this assertion is mainly based on fishers’ perceptions of resource abundance
since information on fisheries conditions is either unavailable or unreliable (see section
4.2.2.1. for a description of the problems with official statistics in both communities).
Perhaps, a useful qualitative indicator of resource condition in each community’s
fishing grounds might be how far the fishers move in search for resources that are no
longer readily available close to their home communities. It has been documented that
three decades ago BK’s fishers did not need to travel long distances to find profitable
catches, and used to fish for the day in the surrounding areas of BK (Fernández 2003;
Moreno et al. 2005b). The high immigration rate and increasing demand for marine
resources over the years resulted in increasing fishing pressure, and consequently
decreasing resource abundance (Moreno et al. 2005b). Nowadays, BK fishers
(particularly the divers) are known throughout the GC for being highly migrant, using
152
areas as far as Isla de Ángel de la Guarda and the coast of the Baja California Peninsula
(Fernández 2003; Moreno et al. 2005b; Moreno-Báez et al. in press) (Figure 1) and states
south of Sonora (Sinaloa or Nayarit) (Cinti et al. 2010a).
In contrast, BA fishers still find it profitable to fish in the surrounding areas of BA
and generally do not move further (Danemann et al. 2007) (Figure 1). Nonetheless, as
mentioned earlier this does not necessarily imply that local fishing grounds are in good
shape. An important observation is that even though BA is difficult to access by land,
accessing BA’s fishing grounds by sea is relatively easy (Valdez and Torreblanca 2008).
While the minimum distance (straight line distance by sea) between the Sonoran coast
and BA is only 87 Km, the closest fishing communities on the Baja California peninsula
are at 250 Km (San Felipe to the north) and 300 Km (Santa Rosalía, in Baja California
Sur, to the south) from BA (straight line distances by sea). This may explain why BA’s
fishing grounds are more frequently visited by small-scale fishers from Sonora
(particularly from Guaymas, Bahía de Kino, Puerto Libertad and Puerto Peñasco) and the
Pacific side of the Baja California peninsula (e.g., Guerrero Negro) (Danemann and
Ezcurra 2007)106. These communities are highly populated and may represent a real
threat to the marine resources of BA, together with other fleets’ impacts (large-scale and
sport fishing).
106
Nonetheless, sport fishers from San Felipe and Santa Rosalía are frequent visitor of the islands
surrounding BA (Danemann and Ezcurra 2007).
153
4. Institutional attributes of Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino’s fisheries
The main institutional attributes of these communities’ fisheries are summarized
in Table 1.
4.1. Legal framework for fisheries in Mexico (applicable to both fishing communities)
Fisheries regulation in Mexico is shared by two federal agencies, SAGARPA107,
the Secretary of Fisheries and Agriculture, and SEMARNAT108, the Secretary of the
Environment and Natural Resources. SAGARPA, via CONAPESCA109, its National
Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission, is the primary agency in charge of fisheries
regulation, issuing licenses in the form of fishing permits (referred as CONAPESCA’s
permits hereafter), authorizations or concessions. CONAPESCA is also in charge of
enforcing regulations related to fishery resources that fall under SAGARPA’s
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, SEMARNAT, via DGVS110, its General Division of Wildlife,
regulates the use of species listed “under special protection”111 and, in the case of benthic
resources listed in this category (e.g., sea cucumber and rock scallop), may authorize
their harvest through a species-specific permit112 (referred to as SEMARNAT’s permit
hereafter). SEMARNAT is also in charge of the establishment and management of
marine protected areas (MPAs) throughout Mexico via CONANP113, the National
107
Stands for “Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación”.
Stands for “Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales”.
109
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Acuacultura y Pesca”.
110
Stands for “División General de Vida Silvestre”.
111
Species included in the norm NOM-059-ECOL-1994 and subsequent modifications.
112
Called “Predios Federales Sujetos a Manejo para la Conservación y Aprovechamiento Sustentable de
Vida Silvestre” (Federal Polygons for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Wildlife).
113
Stands for “Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas”.
108
154
Commission of Natural Protected Areas. PROFEPA114, the Federal Agency for the
Protection of the Environment, is SEMARNAT’s enforcement body. The Navy is also
empowered to provide enforcement support to both CONAPESCA and PROFEPA if
needed.
In the Gulf of California, and throughout Mexico, CONAPESCA’s fishing
permits are the most widely used management tool115 to grant access to marine resources.
Fishing permits may be granted to any corporate entity [e.g., formalized groups like
cooperatives or SPRs (see footnote number 4)] or individual for four years or less (2-5
years in the new law), and they are renewable upon compliance with regulations. The
permit specifies the particular species (e.g., octopus permit, lobster permit) or group of
species116 to be harvested, within a broadly specified region (Bourillón-Moreno 2002).
Generally, access to the species (or group of species) within that area is not exclusive,
since several permits for the same species and area may be granted to different permit
holders. Nonetheless, as we will describe later, variations in the way this tool is
implemented may occur between states.
Each fishing permit specifies the number of boats117 that are permitted for use to
harvest the species authorized in the permit, together with technical specifications of the
fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear). A boat that belongs to a permit
114
Stands for “Procuraduría Federal de Protección al Ambiente”.
To date, fishing concessions have only been granted for a few benthic resources of high commercial
value (e.g., abalone, lobster) on the west coast of Baja California Peninsula and the Caribbean Sea
(Bourillón-Moreno 2002). In the GC only a few SEMARNAT’s permits have been issued for the harvest of
sea cucumber, rock scallop, and ornamental fish used for the aquarium market.
116
Some permits are issued for several species under a generic category, e.g. the escama (fish with scales)
permit allows fishing about 200 species of fish, or the ‘shark permit’ which includes several species of
elasmobranchs.
117
Referred as ‘número de espacios’.
115
155
holder can be registered in more than one permit. That is, the same boat can be entitled to
fish several species, depending on the amount of permits registered to a specific boat.
Permit holders are the only ones who can legally land and declare the catch at
CONAPESCA’s regional offices (Bourillón-Moreno 2002). Permit holders are also the
only ones who can provide legal invoices (or “facturas”) for the product extracted
directly from sea118. These invoices certify legal ownership of the harvest, and are
necessary to sell and transport the catch to regional or international markets. Note that
permit holders are only allowed to harvest and sell resources that have been caught using
the fishing equipment(s) (boat, motor and fishing gear) registered in their permits. The
use of one’s permit to buy and sell catch caught by fishing equipments not registered in
the permit is locally called ‘amparo’ (‘sheltering’ catch from illegal sources) and is
prohibited by law.
SEMARNAT’s permits (as well as CONAPESCA’s fishing concessions) may
provide exclusive use-rights over one or more species within a specified polygon,
following the guidelines of a management plan, for which a quota must be authorized
(this permit does not specify a number of authorized boats as is the case of
CONAPESCA’s permits). Note that this tool provides exclusive access to the species but
not to the polygon since other fishers may access the area to harvest other species119. This
permit may be granted to any formalized group or individual for one year and it is
renewable upon compliance with regulations.
118
Buyers without a fishing permit are allowed to buy product from permit holders or from other buyers
without a fishing permit and resell it. They have to carry on with them a document that certifies the legal
possession of the catch and specifies the fishing permit under which the product in question was harvested.
119
Unless the harvest of all commercial species within that area is granted to the same permit holder.
156
MPAs have been also used as tools in the GC for conservation and fisheries
management purposes. In the region, the most common type of MPA used is the
Biosphere Reserve120, for which zones with different degrees of protection must be
delimited (typically one or more core zones with higher level of protection and a buffer
zone with lower level of protection). According to the law121, preferred access to MPAs
for the conduct of commercial activities should be provided to members of the
communities inhabiting the area at the moment the MPA is established, following the
guidelines of its management plan. Also, the law122 encourages participation of municipal
and state governments, and members of the community, in decision-making concerning
the use and management of MPAs.
4.2. Formal institutional setting in Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino’s fisheries
and its performance on-the-ground
4.2.1. Presence of fisheries authorities
Even though the presence of fisheries authorities is quite different in each
community (absent in BA and permanent in BK), the outcomes in terms of enforcement
are similar —very little enforcement in either community.
In BA, there is no permanent presence of governmental agencies in charge of
fisheries regulation or enforcement (CONAPESCA or PROFEPA). This represents a
major impediment for local inhabitants to fulfill administrative paperwork (they have to
travel ~550 Km) and for these agencies to provide adequate support for monitoring and
120
Biosphere reserves must be established in regions of high ecological value to the country.
‘Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente’ (LGEEPA), www.semarnat.gob.mx,
and its bylaws concerning MPAs. See Art. 48 and 64 BIS-1, LGEEPA.
122
Art. 67, LGEEPA.
121
157
enforcement. Information collected through interviewing suggests that PROFEPA (in
charge of enforcing MPAs rules and SEMARNAT’s permits) may have visited the
community only twice in 2008. In addition, it was common to hear that information
regarding CONAPESCA’s rounds (to enforce fisheries rules) is often available to the
community in advance to this agency’s visit, and local people behave differently (e.g., do
not go out fishing) while they are visiting. CONANP, in charge of administering local
MPAs, is the only agency with permanent presence in BA, but monitoring and enforcing
fisheries’ rules is not its role. CONANP could only inform the corresponding agencies
when illegal activities are detected. Due to logistical constraints, by the time these
agencies arrive (when they do) any evidence of illegal behavior has already vanished.
In BK, on the other hand, even though there is permanent presence of fisheries
authorities (only CONAPESCA), their enforcement capacity is also limited because
resources and personnel are often scarce and inter-institutional agreements and
coordination among the different agencies involved (CONAPESCA, PROFEPA and the
navy) is often lacking (Moreno et al. 2005b; Cinti et al. 2010b).
4.2.2. Management tools
The most common management tool used for the harvest of fish and invertebrate
species in BA and BK are CONAPESCA’s fishing permits. In addition, a few of
SEMARNAT’s permits have been granted in BA (none in BK) for the harvest of sea
cucumber, and both communities have biosphere reserves within the limits of their
fishing grounds.
158
4.2.2.1. CONAPESCA’s permits
Table 2 shows the permit holders with permission to operate in BK in 2007 (for
four main target species of commercial diving only123) (Cinti et al. 2010a) and in BA in
2008 (for all fishing sectors) (Source: Subdelegación de Pesca de SAGARPA, Ensenada),
and number of boats allowed to operate per permit and species. Note that each permit
holder may hold several permits (one for each species) and the same boat may be entitled
to fish several species (the boats of a permit holder that are registered under different
species are usually the same).
[Table 2 about here]
There are important differences but also similarities in the way this tool and the
requirements associated to this tool are implemented and their performance in practice in
both communities.
One of the similarities shared by these two fishing communities is that fishery
statistics associated with permits are poor indicators of local fishery production. This is in
part because fishing takes place in areas outside of these communities’ jurisdictions (in
another port’s jurisdiction) and these harvests are declared as if they were harvested
within port jursidictions (among other reasons)124. Nonetheless, this takes place through
different paths in each community.
In BA, there are permit holders with authorization to fish in the BA area who do
not operate (nor reside) in the community. These permit holders use their permits to
123
Permits for species targeted by other fishing sectors in BK are not shown.
Other factors may include unreported catch, species that are declared under other species names or
under generic categories, lack of records of changes in fishing effort or in technological innovations over
time.
124
159
shelter catch captured outside BA’s jurisdiction (Danemann et al. 2007). Of the 19 permit
holders authorized to fish locally in 2008, only 8 (5 individual permit holders and 3
Sociedades de Producción Rural or SPRs) resided or were based (in the case of SPRs) in
the community, totaling 37 pangas with authorization to operate in the area. The rest (9
individual permit holders and 3 SPRs) were based in major cities within the state of Baja
California (e.g., Ensenada, Tijuana, Guerrero Negro), totaling 30 pangas with
authorization to operate in the area. Locally based permit holders operate almost
exclusively in BA, commercializing most of the fishing products captured by local
fishers. In contrast, permit holders based outside BA are generally dedicated to
commercializing fishing products that they buy and/or extract in places others than BA
(usually localities within the state from the Gulf and the Pacific side of the peninsula).
These permit holders use their fishing permits to shelter catch harvested outside BA
jurisdiction, or simply make profit by selling their invoices (“facturas”) to “legitimize”
the commercialization of products caught without a permit.
In BK, on the contrary, even though most permit holders working in commercial
diving operate (and reside) in the community, it is common that these permit holders
commercialize (and declare at least in part) product harvested in other communities’
jurisdictions (e.g., in BA’s fishing grounds) primarily because of the highly mobile nature
of local fishers (Cinti et al. 2010a).
Another similarity between communities involving permits is that the number of
pangas authorized to each permit holder is rarely respected and permit holders generally
buy product (and shelter it using their permits) from any local fishermen willing to sell
160
(e.g., a permit holder with a permit for octopus may buy octopus from any panga
harvesting octopus in town). Although illegal, this practice is widely prevalent
throughout the GC region (Bourillón-Moreno 2002; Cinti et al. 2010a). In both cases,
available permits are not effective in limiting the amount of product that is being
harvested since they are being used to launder the product that is harvested by most of the
fishers in these communities.
Nonetheless, in BA locally based permit holders and local fishers do appear to
comply with regulations in terms of the species they are allowed to capture. This is not
the case in BK. Note that the primary targeted species in BA (for all fishing gears) are
species for which local permit holders have permits (octopus, sea cucumber and fish
species), which does not seem to be the case of BK where, for example, sea cucumber or
shrimp are major unauthorized125 fisheries. Lobster fishing is another good example of a
species for which no permit has been issued for BA and it is not a target species of BA
fishers. However, BK divers cross the GC to harvest lobsters inside BA’s fishing grounds
and shelter these catch using BK’s lobster permits. Also, the need to have a fishing
permit (the fishers themselves or someone else in the community to whom they could sell
their product to) to legally harvest species was a recurrent complaint among BA fishers,
more than in BK (see section 5.1). At least in some aspects there seems to be a stronger
“culture of legality” in BA compared to BK. Interestingly, BA fishers’ tendency to
operate legally occurs in spite of the fact that there is an almost total absence of
enforcement authorities.
125
In 2008, a few shrimp permits (for about 10-20 pangas total) were up-to-date in BK, though about 200
pangas fish the species every year.
161
Another difference between communities is how fishing permits are allocated by
authorities. In the state of Baja California (which includes the BA region), permits for
individual benthic species (e.g., octopus permits) are granted to different permit holders
without spatial overlap, while in BK these permits generally overlap (see Cinti et al.
2010a). Although fisheries laws are common to both states (they are federal laws), there
are variations in the way each state’s authorities interpret and implement this legislation.
In Baja California, avoiding granting fishing permits for benthic species that overlap
geographically whenever possible is a strategy to avoid conflicts between permit holders
that may arise from the common use of the same area (SAGARPA’s personnel, Pers.
Comm.).
At least in theory, CONAPESCA’s permits for benthic species as implemented in
BC are similar to fishing concessions or SEMARNAT’s permits in that they all provide
exclusive access to a species within an area, though they do not prevent other fishers
from entering the area to fish other species. Nonetheless, insights from interviews suggest
that each permit holder’s individual boundaries are not taken into account and local
fishers (and permit holders) fish wherever they can find resources. This is part of an
unwritten agreement among local residents stating that as long as you belong to the
community (i.e., perceived as local resident), you are allowed to fish anywhere within the
limits of BA fishing grounds. Individual boundaries start to matter when there are
outsiders coming in. The affected permit holders generally do not complain about this
because they (and the fishers that sell their product to them) also fish inside other permit
holders’ polygons. Furthermore, they report that many times these polygons are not even
162
suitable for finding the species that was granted. Similarly, in BK permits’ jurisdictions
are generally not taken into consideration and local fishers fish where it is convenient to
them, within or beyond their jurisdictions (Cinti et al. 2010a).
Finally, in BA locally based permit holders (not the ones that operate outside BA)
generally participate in fishing trips (with some exceptions) and are generally perceived
by local fishers as legitimate members of the community (also with some exceptions). In
BK instead, permit holders are usually absentee operators, commonly perceived by the
fishers as a totally separate group that acts –almost always- against fishers’ interests.
4.2.2.2. SEMARNAT’s permits
Figure 2 shows the polygons and volumes (quotas) that were authorized to each
BA permit holder (with SEMARNAT’s permits) from late 2007-late 2008 for the harvest
of sea cucumber. The performance of SEMARNAT’s permits as a management tool is
similar to CONAPESCA’s permits in that polygons are not generally taken into account
and sea cucumber is fished wherever it can be found in harvestable amounts. These
permits may also be easily used to shelter sea cucumber captured far from BA fishing
areas or fished by others than the people authorized in the permits.
4.2.2.3. Biosphere reserves
In BA, the ‘Reserva de la Biósfera (biosphere reserve) Canal de Ballenas y
Salsipuedes’ (RB. CBSS), was formally established in June 2007. This presidential
decree occurred after a long process that was initiated in 1999 and involved the
participation of members and social organizations of the community, federal and state
agencies, and others (researchers, NGOs, etc) with interest in the area (SEMARNAT
163
2005). The reserve comprises about 385,000 hectares and has the dual purpose of
preserving ecological values and enhancing fishery productivity. Importantly, its decree
specifically states that preferred access to commercial activities inside the reserve must
be granted to members of the community adjacent to the reserve. Also, the reserve
extends over the full range of local fishers’ fishing grounds (Figure 1), which is
uncommon in the GC.
However, given the recent implementation of the reserve, in late 2008 (when this
study was taking place) there were still no restrictions to fishing in place, besides a
number of core (non-extractive) zones126 that are relatively small (~200 hectares total)
and do not affect important fishing zones (Figure 2). The management plan of the reserve
was still being developed at that time. This plan, when developed and adopted is expected
to set regulations for fishing and other commercial activities within the reserve. This is
consistent with insights from interviews that suggest that fishing activities still continue
to be as they were before the implementation of the reserve, with fishing taking place
where it is convenient to the users, mainly guided by factors like resource abundance
(when and where they can find resources), the market, climate conditions, and distance
constraints.
Similarly, the Reserva de la Biósfera Isla San Pedro Mártir (RB. ISPM) was
established in 2002 in the surrounding of the San Pedro Mártir island (Figure 1), with the
same purpose and following a participatory process as the BA reserve (Cudney-Bueno et
al. 2009). The island is an important fishing destination for BK fishers (mainly
126
Estero San Rafael, Estero La Mona, Ensenada Los Choros, Campo Polilla, Estero de Las Caguamas
(East and West) (Figure 2).
164
commercial divers but also trap fishers) [16], but unlike the BA reserve, it comprises a
small fraction of local divers’ fishing grounds. This reserve was not the focus of our
study, but recent studies suggest that although enforcement and compliance with rules are
still inadequate, a reduction in the number of boats fishing inside the core zone (covering
2.6% of the reserve surface) (Figure 2) has been observed over the years (Meza et al.
2008). In addition, a monitoring program of the reserve’s species and habitats has been
recently implemented, which involves the participation of knowledgeable BK
commercial divers who are highly respected and connected with others in the community.
This program shows promise to create stewardship and to further incorporate the users in
the administration of the reserve.
4.2.3. Fishers’ possession of fishing rights and control of means of production
Comparatively, a larger amount of BA fishers hold fishing rights, own the fishing
equipment in which they work, and self-support the cost of fishing trips.
4.2.3.1. Possession of fishing rights
In BA 47% of respondents were independent fishers (without fishing permits in
their name), 13% were individual permit holders, and 40% were members of two
formalized groups holding permits (SPRs). However, one of these groups owns a fishing
permit for a species that they rarely harvest and commercializes their main target species
(for which they do not own a permit) through permits held by other permit holders in
town. Consequently, 63% of respondents (not 47%) depend on external permit holders or
independent buyers (without fishing permits) to legally sell their catch.
165
In BK, in contrast, 82% of respondents were independent fishers, none was an
individual permit holder, and 18% were members of formalized groups holding permits.
However, none of these groups commercialized their product on their own, meaning that
100% of respondents were dependent on external permit holders or independent buyers to
commercialize their catch.
4.2.3.2. Ownership of fishing equipment
In BA, 60% of respondents declared that they own the fishing equipment with
which they worked, compared with only 24% in BK. In BK, another 29% of respondents
were in the process of buying the equipment from permit holders. This practice, where
permit holders encourage fishers to buy their own equipment with permit holders’ help, is
becoming increasingly common in BK as a way for permit holders to get rid of
equipment maintenance responsibilities. It also tends to increase fishers’ dependency on
permit holders because as long as the fisher is in debt127 to the permit holder, the fisher is
obliged to sell the product to the permit holder and the permit holder sets the price he
chooses (Cinti et al. 2010a).
4.2.3.3. Self-support of fishing trip expenses
Borrowing money in advance to cover the costs of the fishing trips (for gas, food,
ice) obliges the fishers to sell the product to the permit holder who provides these funds.
In BA only 20% of respondents rely on permit holders (who buy their product) to cover
these costs, and 77% cover them on their own or rely on the group to which they are
127
The equipment is bought by the permit holder, and the fisher starts paying for the equipment with each
fishing trip, using the portion of the earnings that is retained by the boat owner for equipment repairs.
166
members to cover them. In BK, 91% percent of respondents rely on permit holders or
independent buyers to cover the cost of fishing trips, while only 9% cover these costs on
their own.
4.2.4. Fishers’ formal organization
In BA, the three formalized groups holding fishing permits at the time this study
was taking place (SPRs) were constituted almost entirely by fishers (as members) and
most showed cooperative behavior (members meet more or less regularly, make
monetary contributions to the group, and have developed some rules to work
collectively). Only one of these groups functioned as an individual permit holder with a
couple of members in control of the group (absentee operators) and the remaining
members working as independent fishers (providing the fishing product and not having
additional compensations for being members of the group).
In BK, in contrast, most of formalized groups holding fishing permits (principally
cooperatives) function in practice as individual permit holders (Moreno et al. 2005b;
Cinti et al. 2010a). They are usually constituted by a mixture of family members, others
not related to the fishing activity, and a few fishers that were requested to sign at the time
the cooperatives were formed. These organizations are seldom cooperatively managed.
The few cooperatives holding fishing permits for commercial diving products whose
members were all fishers (2 at the time the study was underway) had major
administrative problems and did not work cooperatively either.
167
4.3. Informal institutional setting in Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía de Kino’ fisheries
4.3.1. Perception of fishing grounds’ boundaries: the role of land tenure and permits’
jurisdictions
In BA, the presence of a coastal ejido128 (a system of communal use-rights over
the land) has apparently had an important role in how local residents perceive their rights
over the marine territory adjacent to the ejido land, as if the land rights have been
extended to include the sea.
The ejido Tierra y Libertad129 was founded in 1970, consisting of 415,804 ha and
62 members (Vargas et al. 2007) (Figure 1). It was a “fishing ejido” since its foundation,
with most of their members dedicated to fishery-related activities and a small percentage
to cattle ranching. Today, it consists of about 90 members, with 90% of ejidatarios
dedicated to fishery-related activities and/or tourism and only 10% to ranching (F. Smith
Pers. Comm.).
Interviews suggest that this informal “sense of ownership” over the sea among
BA residents and the defense of this territory, started to emerge when the ejido and a
specific group in close association with the ejido, the “Sociedad Cooperativa de
Producción Pesquera Ejidal Canal de Ballenas” or SCPPECB (a fishing cooperative),
were formed. The SCPPECB was the first formalized fishing organization in BA and
was funded in 1970, following the foundation of the ejido. Apparently, one of the
128
The ejido system is a system of land reform based on agricultural communal land created by
constitutional reform in 1917 (Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution) (Jones 1996). Ejidos consist of a
defined governing body (or comisariado), land parcels (or parcelas) and members (or ejidatarios), thus
creating an agrarian community or town (or ejido). Ejidal land is communally held, but individuals have
long-term use rights to particular parcels that they cultivate (or simply own) individually (Brown 2004).
129
Short form of “Ejido Ganadero, Turístico y Pétreo Tierra y Libertad”.
168
primary reasons for its foundation was the need to acquire fishing permits to legally
harvest sea turtle (highly demanded at that time), which were only to be granted to
formalized groups (I. Verdugo, Pers. Comm.). Originally the cooperative consisted of
about 60 members (most ejidatarios) and 15-20 small-scale boats, which targeted sharks,
sea turtle130 (locally called caguama or cahuama), clams, and fish species (like groupers)
(Figure 3 shows a historical invoice of this cooperative for the delivery of sea turtle by a
local fishermen).
When ejidos were established in the area, adjacent ejidos started to claim the
fishing grounds within their limits as theirs, and these limits were generally respected
without the need of external intervention (F. Smith Pers. Comm.). The relationship
between neighboring ejidos and communities (e.g., between ejidos “Tierra y Libertad”
and “Confederación Campesina”) (Figure 1) has always been relatively good and
crossing each others limits was generally accepted provided that only members of these
communities were involved. Nonetheless, it was not until recently (5-10 years ago) that
BA residents started to enforce these limits more vigorously, upon the arrival of pangas
from distant communities from Sonora (from Bahía de Kino, Puerto Libertad, Guaymas),
and the pacific side of the Baja California peninsula more recently (from Guerrero
Negro) (Figure 1). Unlike the arrival of pangas from adjacent communities, boats from
more distant communities are considered an intrusion by BA residents, which motivates
the demand for support to fisheries authorities (often without satisfactory response),
130
During the 1960’s, BA was the main producer of sea turtle of Mexico (Caldwell 1963), and the
SCPPECB was the only group allowed to legally harvest and commercialize them in town. The permit
granted to this group allowed them the harvest of 60-100 turtles per month.
169
including formal requests by the ejido leader (comisariado) to expel the outsiders. Local
residents generally resent not only the intrusion of pangas but also the arrival of outsider
fishers that may have the opportunity to work as crew members in local pangas.
Interestingly, the boundaries of the biosphere reserve established in 2007 in BA
coincided almost perfectly with the boundaries of the ejido, since local fishers operate
within these limits and the reserve was intended to include the full range of local fishing
grounds (Figure 1). Considering this and the fact that the decree creating the reserve
mandates that preferred access to fishing (and other commercial activities) within the
reserve must be granted to those residing next to the reserve; it could be argued that the
reserve somehow “formalized” pre-existing informal rights over local fishing grounds.
However, for this to be effective BA fishers must still be granted legal rights to fish in the
area by fisheries authorities (CONAPESCA) in the form of permits or concessions (to
individuals or formalized groups), even when the reserve is administered by a different
agency (SEMARNAT through CONANP).
In BK, although local residents do not have a history of ownership of the land
adjacent to their fishing grounds, they also tend to resent (and reject) the intrusion131 of
pangas from other fishing communities to fish locally. However, unlike BA they are
generally willing to accept people from outside the community if these fishers work as
crew members in local pangas (Cinti et al. 2010a). Likewise, local divers have more
131
Access to local fishing grounds by outsider pangas (from southern Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit) is a major
source of internal conflict, involving local fishers, permit holders, authorities, and other community
members (for a description of these conflicts see Cinti et al. 2010).
170
chances to be accepted in other communities (at least within Sonora) (e.g., in Guaymas)
if they move without their panga and work as crew members in local pangas.
Interestingly, while BK divers perceive as their own territory the area within the
general jurisdiction of all fishing permits granted in the community for the species they
target (Figure 1), whether or not they individually hold a fishing permit, in BA local
fishers tend to perceive as their own territory the area within ejido borders. That is, they
do not seem to take much into consideration the geographic jurisdiction of the fishing
permits held by them or by others in the community. Note that for example fish species’
permits generally include a wider area than the delineated by the ejido (e.g., some are
valid for the entire GC), and benthic species permits generally include small sectors
granted within ejido borders. Overall it seems that neither BK nor BA fishers conform to
or enforce the individual boundaries of the permits they hold (or work under), but they do
care about and defend132 an area that they perceive as belonging to their community as a
whole, particularly when there are “outsiders” coming in (though who is considered an
outsider varies between them).
5. Fishers’ attitudes toward fisheries regulation in Bahía de los Ángeles and Bahía
de Kino fisheries
In spite of the many differences between these two communities, fishers’ attitudes
concerning different aspects of fisheries regulation were quite similar (Table 3).
132
In BK, fishers (and other residents) react organizing protests to authorities or blocking the main and only
paved road to town with their pangas. In BA, the whole community organizes to expel outsiders, generally
without authorities’ intervention. The isolation of BA makes it relatively easy for local residents to try
simple strategies like agreeing not to sell or provide drinking water to “intruders” to deter them from
staying longer in the community.
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5.1. What is missing in (BK or BA) in terms of fishery regulation to improve the
condition of fishery resources? (open-ended question)
Granting fishing permits to local fishers and increasing support from fisheries
authorities (in enforcement and local presence) were two common concerns frequently
mentioned by BA and BK fishers (Table 3 shows the 4 most frequently mentioned
categories for each case). For BA, these two categories showed the highest percentages of
response (57% and 43% of respondents, respectively). Easing the requirements and
paperwork for local fishers to access fishing permits and regulating resource-use (e.g.,
implementing temporal closures, mesh size, quotas) were additional main concerns of BA
fishers (~20% of respondents each). In BK, the four most mentioned categories obtained
similar percentages of response (between 22 and 27%). Controlling the entrance of
outsider pangas and increasing respect of regulations were additional main concerns of
BK fishers.
5.2. Perception of performance of fisheries authorities (Likert-scale)
Both communities showed relatively high percentages of respondents (>50%)
disagreeing with the idea that fisheries authorities have had an important role in
preventing the depletion of fishery resources, and this percentage was higher in BA (77%
in BA vs. 50% in BK, Table 3). Also, over 80% of respondents in both communities
agreed that in order to improve the situation of local fisheries, implementation and
enforcement of regulations by local authorities was needed.
172
5.3. Attitudes towards access and resource-use regulations (Likert-scale)
Both communities showed a large percentage of respondents (>60%) agreeing
that only people from their own community should be allowed to fish in local fishing
grounds. However, this percentage was considerably higher in BA (87% in BA vs. 64%
in BK, Table 3). Generally, there is a tendency to support the protection of local fishing
grounds from outsiders, especially if outside encroachment involves not just fishers but
pangas from outside the community.
In both cases, fishers’ attitudes toward resource-use regulations suggest that most
respondents tend to support the idea that most of their target species need some form of
formal regulation to conserve the species (Table 3). However, respondents generally
perceive that species with seasonal accessibility (e.g., species that migrate or that are not
accessible for fishing all year round) are not so vulnerable to overfishing and thus would
not need much formal protection compared to species that are available for harvest year
round (see percentages by species in Table 3).
5.4. Usefulness of fishing licenses to limit access (Likert-scale)
Fisher’s perception of the usefulness of fishing permits to limit access to their
fishing grounds were similar for both communities, with about half of respondents
agreeing with the idea that fishing permits were a useful tool to limit access to local
fishing grounds (50% in BA vs. 40% in BK) and the other half evaluating this tool
negatively (47% in BA vs. 60 in BK) (Table 3).
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5.5. Usefulness of the biosphere reserve (only for BA)
In BA we asked the fishers if the nearby reserve had benefitted them and how, if it
had been detrimental to them and how, and whether or not, if given a choice, they would
support the existence of a reserve. Around 70% of respondents said that the reserve was
neither beneficial nor detrimental to them (Table 3). This lack of strong feelings on the
topic may simply reflect the fact that the reserve was created recently and there has been
little time to evaluate it. In BA, if given a choice, 47% of respondents would support the
establishment of a reserve (Table 3). Taking care of resources was one of the main
reasons for this response, but for this to be effective respondents commented that
enforcement should be increased. Another 30% of respondents would decide not to have
a reserve because they fear it would bring additional restrictions on fishing (they already
complain about current restrictions to land and camp on islands). Finally, another 10%
said it would not make any difference to them if there is or there is not a reserve in place.
5.6. Fishers’ incentives to join formalized groups
About half of respondents from both communities would prefer working as a
member of a formalized group, mainly because it would allow them improved access to
fishing permits and governmental benefits (Table 3). The other half would prefer working
independently (not as a member of a group or cooperative) because of the difficulties of
working as part of a group (disagreements, conflicts); and greater independence for
working and selling one’s product that leads to higher earnings.
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6. Discussion
By comparing the institutional performance of two case studies of small-scale
fisheries in the Gulf of California (GC), this paper aims to improve our understanding of
how formal policy tools and local arrangements interact in different settings and under
what circumstances they are effective in influencing stakeholders’ behavior. This paper
also examines the presence of factors (institutional, non-institutional, fisher’s attitudes
and perceptions) that may influence the capacity of these communities for fisheries
improvement in the mid- to short- term and for local stakeholders to take a more active
role in resource management.
Our findings suggest that neither Bahía de los Angeles (BA) nor Bahía de Kino’s
(BK) fishery stakeholders have been able to manage their resources sustainably.
Regardless of these communities’ differences particularly in terms of isolation from
major roads and cities (and markets) and in the number of fishers and boats, fishery
resources are clearly over exploited in both communities, and this occurs in one of the
most productive regions in the GC. Although many factors may be acting to produce this
outcome, we argue that the open access nature of both communities is probably the most
important factor. This open access results from a variety of factors including the lack of
enforceable restrictions (formal or informal) on the number of people who access the
fishery (the exclusion problem) and on the amount of resources that the people entering
the fishery are able to harvest (the subtractability problem) (Berkes et al. 1989; Ostrom
1990). These problems (exclusion and subtractability) are characteristic of the
175
exploitation of common-pool resources and are at the roots of overfishing (Ostrom 1990;
National Research Council 2002; Hilborn et al. 2003).
In BK, the existence of open access is less surprising because this village is easy
to access by road and by sea, there is high demand for marine products (for local,
regional, and international markets) and there are many local buyers ready to receive
these products and transport them quickly to distribution centers either directly or through
intermediaries. Also, the amount of people (local and from other villages) participating in
small-scale fisheries is high and difficult to limit. And finally, the likely impact of other
fishing sectors (industrial and sport fishing) on marine resources in this region is also
high. The larger scale and complexity of BK small-scale fisheries may explain why local
efforts to limit access and sustainably manage resources in BK have had little success.
Unexpectedly, in a highly isolated environment (at least by road) and with a much
smaller number of fishers and boats in the community, BA’s fishers have not been able to
manage their resources sustainably either. Homogeneity of resource users (e.g., people
with similar interests) and a small number of users, both attributes of BA, are
characteristics believed to facilitate the emergence of collective action for sustainable use
of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1990; National Research Council 2002). However,
the impact of a smaller number of users may be small or large depending on the size of
the resource base that they exploit. Also, given the same resource base, a smaller number
of users may overexploit these resources if they comparatively harvest a larger amount
per fishing unit (boat or individual) than a larger number of users. This is a reminder that
176
both exclusion and subtractability aspects must be considered in understanding fishing
(and other CPRs’) dynamics.
In the case studies analyzed, even though the extent of each community’s fishing
grounds (in resource abundance) is unknown (and nearly impossible to determine), the
total areas fished by each community’s fishers differ significantly, with about 4,300 and
700 squared kilometers in BK and BA, respectively (Duberstein 2009). Although we
cannot know for certain, these differences in fishing ground sizes may suggest that the
local impact over the resource base of a smaller fleet like the BA fleet can still be
significant when the size of the area that they exploit is relatively small. In both
communities, the likely impact of small-scale fishers from outside communities plus the
sport and industrial fleets should also be considered because they can and often do access
these fishing grounds by sea.
In addition, our results clearly suggest that the formal policy tools in place in
either community have been ineffective (at the moment) in promoting sustainable fishing
practices by fishery stakeholders. Even though these communities differ in a number of
ways, neither community has had notable success in developing sustainable fisheries
systems. The geographic jurisdiction of individual permits (of formalized groups or
individuals) is generally ignored and individual fishers fish wherever it is more
convenient to them.
In both communities, informal rights (fishers’ sense of ownership) seem to play a
more important role than formal regulations in influencing fishers’ decisions about where
to fish. In BA, regardless of the existence of geographically specific fishing permits (for
177
benthic species), as long as you belong to the community (i.e., perceived as local
resident), local fishers do not object if you fish anywhere within ejido limits. In BK,
individual permits’ jurisdictions overlap geographically and access of fishing grounds is
generally open and unconstrained for local fishers. However, community-defined fishing
zones do seem to matter when there are outsiders encroaching into these areas. This
resentment of outsiders exists even though “Kineños” (as locally called) themselves are
known throughout the GC for being highly migrant and for not respecting other
communities’ jurisdictional (formal) or informal limits (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto
2009; Cinti et al. 2010a).
In addition, restrictions on the number of pangas allowed to operate per fishing
permit are not respected in either community. Permits are not effective in limiting the
amount of product that is being harvested since permits are frequently used to register the
products that are harvested outside permitted areas and using fishing equipments not
registered in these permits.
This raises the question of whether the most commonly used tool in the Region
(CONAPESCA’s permits) is the most appropriate. Even if enforcement is substantially
increased- and if available alternative tools with higher spatial definition and exclusivity
(like SEMARNAT’s polygons and fishing concessions) were implemented, there is still
some question whether fishing behavior of the fishers in these communities would
actually change.
However, these results also suggest some potentials that could lead to more
sustainable fishing practice in both communities. There is a tendency to willingly share
178
the fishing grounds among all members in the community (as if use-rights or permits had
been granted to the community as a whole), and to protect these fishing grounds from
outsiders. In this context, communal property or use-rights might be viable strategies to
increase protection of local fishing grounds from unwanted visitors, and incentivize local
fishers to craft, implement and self-enforce more legitimate management measures.
The case of the Seri indigenous community of Punta Chueca, situated right next to
BK to the north (Figure 1), is unique in the region as an example of communal133
property-rights over the marine area comprised of the Canal del Infiernillo (or Infiernillo
Channel) (Figure 1). Formalization of these property rights by the Federal government
helped strengthen preexisting informal rights of the Seri tribe over the area and
encouraged the emergence of locally-crafted rules to control access by outsiders and to
internally restrict use, which have been essential for the sustainability of Seri fisheries
(Bourillón-Moreno 2002; Basurto 2005; Basurto 2006). Governmental recognition and
support is key in efforts to promote and sustain local-level management systems and/or to
develop new ones (Christy 1982; Schlager et al. 1994; Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; Ribot
et al. 2006).
However, in Mexico, granting property rights over marine areas is reserved for
indigenous groups (like the Seri), and conceding communal rights (of property or use) is
not a possibility within Mexican legislation. In spite of this, there are administrative tools
available in Mexico’s fishery and environmental laws that could be used to provide a
133
These property rights were formally granted to a fishing cooperative within the Seri community.
However, in practice these rights are actually considered (by the Seris, and Mexican authorities and
citizens) as belonging to the Seri community.
179
higher level of exclusivity to these communities within the limits of their fishing grounds.
For example, through implementation of: 1) ‘regional fishery ordinance plans’ as
incorporated into the new fishery law134; 2) MPAs covering the fishing grounds of the
community and/or ‘ecological ordinance plans’ for land and/or marine environments,
according to environmental legislation135; 3) fishing concessions granted to formalized
groups (e.g., cooperatives or SPRs), although for it to act as a communal right, all or most
of the members of the community should be part of the group receiving the right); 4) or
combinations of those.
BA is an example of the second alternative. The existence of informal communal
rights over the marine area demarcated by the ejido and their geographic overlap with an
institutional framework recognized by the Mexican government (the biosphere reserve),
makes BA an excellent candidate for strengthening resource stewardship through
formalization of preexisting rights. Nonetheless, for this to be effective, given that the
reserve is administered by environmental authorities (SEMARNAT via CONANP) and
fishery resources are under the jurisdiction of fisheries authorities (SAGARPA through
CONAPESCA), fishing rights must be granted by CONAPESCA136 (in the form of
permits or concessions) to the fishers participating in local fisheries (for the area and
species within the reserve). Only then will the clause of the reserve’s decree stating that
134
‘Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables’ (LGPAS), www.conapesca.sagarpa.gob.mx. For
ordinance plans, the area to be incorporated into the plan, lists of users, the species subject to use, and the
species-specific management plans available for this species must be defined.
135
‘Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente’ (LGEEPA), www.semarnat.gob.mx.
136
Unless the species in question is listed as under special protection in which case SEMARNAT through
the General Division of Wildlife is the agency in charge. Of the species targeted by these communities’
fishers, only sea cucumber is protected in BA, and sea cucumber and rock scallop in BK (for commercial
diving).
180
preferred access to commercial activities inside the reserve should be granted to members
of the community adjacent to the reserve be made effective (at least for fishing activities).
The reserve’s council and management plan could be used as a forum for communal
discussion, conflict resolution and decision making, and for setting management
measures which could be communally accepted and enforced137. However, for the fishers
to be able to participate in this council and in the development of the reserve’s
management plan, they have to be formally recognized as fishers through granting them
fishing rights. Efforts should be coordinated among the agencies to formalize preexisting
informal rights of local residents to the marine area in question and for the joint
management of the area so that the existing social capital is used in favor of the
management of the area.
This study suggests that the extension of ejido jurisdiction into marine areas may
incentivize collective conservation behavior. On the other hand, the current trend toward
subdivision and privatization of many coastal ejidos may make such collective behavior
unlikely. Most of the land surrounding BA is under the ejido system, but the rate of
exchange of this community-owned property regime into multiple “small” privately
owned properties has increased significantly since 2001 (Vargas et al. 2007), with the
purpose of establishing large scale urban, touristic and residential developments.
Formalization of fishing rights (and other activities) in the hands of local residents,
together with the development of the reserve’s management plan and ecological
137
For example, setting quotas, rotation of areas, reproductive refugia, temporal closures, gear restrictions.
181
ordinance plans138 for land and/or marine environments may be crucial to safeguard
against potentially harmful developments.
In BK, on the other hand, implementation of regional fishery ordinance plans or
‘planes regionales de ordenamiento pesquero’ (alternative number 1 above) is now being
considered by authorities as an alternative management framework for the area (J. Torre
from COBI139, personnal communication). Although for BA the transition to increasing
exclusivity of access for local residents might be easier than for BK due to the
characteristics highlighted above and the higher level of fishers’ formalization140, fishery
ordinance plans might also constitute a viable alternative to achieve that goal in BK (see
previous works by Cinti et al. for additional recommendations).
Regardless of these communities’ differences, both communities show potential
for fisheries improvement. Fishers’ perceptions about the problems affecting their
fisheries were quite similar between them, suggesting the need for formally recognizing
the fishers as key stakeholders in local fisheries, and for working cooperatively towards
the design of management strategies that provide better stimulus for resource stewardship
and discourage overfishing. Remarkably, this study suggests that there is strong support
from resource users for implementing regulatory measures for local fisheries in both
communities. Local arrangements and initiatives, if recognized and supported, may
provide the basis for the development of locally supported management strategies, with a
138
‘Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y la Protección al Ambiente’ (LGEEPA), www.semarnat.gob.mx.
NGO Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C.
140
BA shows a larger amount of fishers holding fishing rights (though still low), belonging as member to
formalized groups with cooperative behavior, and having control over the means of production, than BK.
An NGO (Pronatura Noroeste) with long history in the community (the same which supported the
implementation of the reserve) have had a key role in helping the fishers fulfill the requirements to
formalize groups and to request fishing rights to authorities.
139
182
higher likelihood of compliance and a higher potential for managing these resources
sustainably.
7. Conclusions
This study suggests the presence of a number of factors that present challenges to
the development of sustainable fisheries in the region:
a) There exists an unequal distribution of fishing rights. The percentage of fishers
holding fishing rights and actually using them to report and commercialize catch was
quite small in both communities. Also, granting fishing rights to the users of
resources (not to absentee operators) was a major suggestion by local fishers in both
communities.
b) Current policies and policy changes do not reach the fishers in a direct and formalized
way, and they are shaped with no participation of local fishers.
c) Current policy tools show poor performance in practice and have been ineffective (at
the moment) in promoting sustainable fishing practices by fishery stakeholders
(neither community has been able to manage their resources sustainably).
d) Enforcement of regulations by fisheries authorities is insufficient as reflected by
fishers’ willingness to reinforce vigilance and improve authorities’ responses to
violations, particularly to the arrival of outsiders to fish locally.
In spite of the factors above, this study also revealed some aspects of these fishing
communities that could lead to more sustainable fishing practices in both communities:
183
e) The presence of informal rights (fishers’ sense of ownership) over the fishing grounds
in the surroundings of their home communities. Generally, local fishers do not
conform to or enforce the individual boundaries of the permits they hold (or work
under), but they do care about and defend an area that they perceive as belonging to
their community as a whole, particularly when there are “outsiders” coming in.
f) The presence of strong support from resource users for implementing regulatory
measures for local fisheries.
Increased attention should be provided to local arrangements and initiatives that,
if formally recognized and supported, may provide the basis for the development of
improved and locally supported regulations.
8. Acknowledgments
This study was made possible by contributions from the Wallace Research
Foundation and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation through a grant to the
PANGAS Project. We would like to express our gratitude to the fishers, permit holders,
and other community members who kindly participated in this research; to the personnel
of CONAPESCA in Bahía de Kino (Sonora), the personnel of CONAPESCA and
SEMARNAT in Ensenada (Baja California), and the personnel of CONANP in Bahía de
los Angeles (Baja California), for collaborating with information; to Cesar Moreno and
Mario Rojo from COBI, and Amy Hudson Weaver from Niparajá, for their support and
guidance during fieldwork in Bahía de Kino; to Gustavo Danemann from Pronatura for
his support during fieldwork in Bahía de los Ángeles; to William Shaw, Edella Schlager
184
and Richard Cudney-Bueno for their invaluable guidance during this research. A. Cinti
would like to thank Gaspar Soria for encouraging me to do what I like. Informed consent
was obtained for experimentation with human subjects. This paper represents the views
of the authors and not necessarily those of their institutions and funders. This is a
scientific contribution of the PANGAS Project, www.pangas.arizona.edu.
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190
Figure 1: Map of the study area within the northern Gulf of California (NGC). The thick
gray line on the Sonoran coastline indicates the geographic jurisdiction of fishing permits
for diving products in Bahía de Kino (BK), extending from Puerto Libertad to Estero
Tastiota. The MPAs present in the area are indicated as follows: Reserva de la Biósfera
(Biosphere Reserve) Bahía de los Ángeles y Salsipuedes (RB. BACBS); Parque Nacional
(National Park) Archipiélago de San Lorenzo (PN. ASL); Reserva de la Biósfera Isla San
Pedro Mártir (RB. ISPM). Square markers indicate the main towns or cities. Hermosillo
is the capital city of Sonora. The fishing zones of BK’s divers are shown in red and the
fishing zones of Bahía de los Ángeles fishers (all fishing sectors included) are shown in
yellow.
191
Figure 2: Location and volume (Kg) of each fishing permit granted by SEMARNAT for
the harvest of sea cucumber in the Bahía de los Ángeles (BA) area from late 2007 to late
2008. PH: Permit Holder. RB. BACBS: Reserva de la Biósfera (Biosphere Reserve)
Bahía de los Ángeles y Salsipuedes. The general location of this reserve’s core zones are
indicated with circles (Estero San Rafael, Estero La Mona, Ensenada Los Choros, Campo
Polilla, and Estero Las Caguamas). PN. ASL: Parque Nacional (National Park)
Archipiélago de San Lorenzo. RB. ISPM: Reserva de la Biósfera Isla San Pedro Mártir.
The exact location of this reserve’s core zone is indicated (rectangular area next to the
island).
192
Figure 3: Historical invoice of the “Sociedad Cooperativa de Producción Pesquera Ejidal
Canal de Ballenas” or SCPPECB for the delivery of 44 Kg of sea turtle or cahuama by a
local fisherman (Source: Juan Romero Amador, fishermen and ex-member of the
cooperative).
193
Table 1. Summary of non-institutional and institutional attributes of Bahía de los Ángeles (BA) and Bahía de Kino’s (BK)
small-scale fisheries. Only the diving sector was evaluated in BK (data from 2007) and all fishing sectors in BA (data from
2008). Percentages are relative to each sample.
Non-institutional attributes
BA
BK
Population
~500 inhabitants
~5,000 inhabitants
Distance from major cities
Large. >500 km through one-way,
Small. ~100 through highway.
unimproved road.
Accessibility from sea
Moderate
High
Main resources/fisheries
Gillnets: flounder, sharks.
Diving: pen shells, octopus, fishes, sea cucumber, lobster,
Traps: octopus, fishes.
clams.
Diving: octopus, sea cucumber.
Trap and gillnet fishing are also important fisheries, though
only diving was included in this study.
Resource productivity
High
High
Condition of fishery resources Overfished
Overfished
Number of small-scale fishers ~70 fishers and 37 boats total (all species). ~800 fishers and 200 boats total (all species).
and boats
~80 boats in commercial diving.
Fishers’ dependency on fishing High. 60% of respondents with no
High. 71% of respondents with no occupation other than
(% relative to the sample)
occupation other than fishing.
fishing.
About half of respondents with alternative Commercial diving is primary source of income for 93% of
occupation have fishing as primary source respondents (of the set of fishing activities they develop).
of income.
Institutional attributes
Presence of governmental
No permanent presence of fisheries
Permanent presence of fisheries authorities (only
agencies
authorities (CONAPESCA or PROFEPA). CONAPESCA).
Permanent presence of CONANP (in
No permanent presence of CONANP.
charge of MPAs administration).
Fisheries management tools
Fishing licenses (CONAPESCA’s and
Fishing licenses (only CONAPESCA’s)
SEMARNAT’s).
Biosphere reserve covering a very small portion of local
Biosphere reserve covering the full range
divers’ fishing grounds.
of local fishing grounds.
194
Performance of management
tools
Fishers’ possession of fishing
rights (% relative to the
sample)
Ownership of fishing
equipment (% relative to the
sample)
Self-support of fishing trip
expenses (% relative to the
sample)
Fishers’ formal organization
Informal rights over local
fishing grounds (perception of
fishing grounds’ boundaries)
Poor
Poor
63% of respondents depend on other
permit holders or independent buyers to
legally sell their catch.
60% of respondents own the fishing
equipment.
100% of respondents depend on other permit holders or
independent buyers to legally sell their catch.
20% of respondents rely on permit holders
to afford these costs.
77% afford them on their own.
Most formal organizations holding fishing
permits generally constituted by fishers
and showing cooperative behavior.
Informal “sense of ownership” over
fishing grounds within the ejido limits.
Strong defense of this territory.
Rejection of outsider boats and fishers.
24% of respondents own the fishing equipment.
29% were in the process of buying equipment from permit
holders.
91% rely on permit holders or independent buyers (with no
fishing permits) to afford these costs.
9% of respondents afford them on their own.
Most formal organizations holding fishing permits rarely
constituted by fishers and not showing cooperative
behavior.
Informal “sense of ownership” over fishing grounds within
the jurisdictional limits of fishing permits granted in the
community.
Strong defense of this territory.
Rejection of outsider boats.
Acceptance of outsider fishers if they work as crew
members in local boats.
195
Table 2. Permit holders (CONAPESCA’s) with permission to operate in Bahía de Kino
(BK) in 2007 (for four main target species of commercial diving only) and in Bahía de
los Ángeles (BA) in 2008 (for all fishing sectors), and number of boats allowed to operate
per permit and species.
Species
Permit
Pen
Giant Escama
Shark
holders Octopus shell Lobster Geoduck squid permit1 Mullet permit2
CPH 1
5
5
5
CPH 2
12
12
CPH 3
8
8
CPH 4
4
BK
CPH 5
3
IPH 1
3
7
3
IPH 2
2
2
IPH 3
2
2
IPH 4
6
IPH 5
5
IPH 6
3
38
31
10
18
Total
CPH1
2
CPH2
5
6
6
3
CPH3
3
3
CPH4
3
3
CPH5
4
CPH6
7
IPH1
3
IPH2
3
3
2
IPH3
2
2
2
IPH4
1
BA
IPH5
1
IPH6
2
6
2
IPH7
5
5
IPH8
2
2
IPH9
2
1
IPH10
5
5
IPH11
4
IPH12
Ns
IPH13
1
IPH14
7
Total
44
3
7
32
17
10
CPH: corporate permit holder (mainly cooperatives in BK and SPRs in BA); IPH: individual permit holder.
Ns: not specified. 1The “escama” (fish with scales) permit allows fishing about 200 species of fish. In BK
there were 30 escama permits but only 4 were used for commercial diving species (the ones showed here). 2
The shark permit allows fishing several species of elasmobranchs including rays, sharks and related species.
196
Table 3: Fishers’ knowledge of regulations and fishers’ attitudes toward fisheries regulation in Bahía de los Ángeles (BA) and
Bahía de Kino’s (BK) small-scale fisheries. Percentages are percentages of respondents relative to each sample.
BA
BK
Fishers’ knowledge of Respondents unaware of the existence of formal
Respondents unaware of the existence of formal
regulations
instruments (laws and norms), but generally aware instruments (laws and norms), but generally aware
of important things contained in these legal
of important things contained in these legal
instruments.
instruments.
Fishers’ awareness of
100% unaware that fisheries legislation had been
100% unaware that changes in fisheries legislation
recent changes in
recently modified.
were underway (In mid 2007).
legislation
What is missing in
• Grant fishing permits to local fishers (57%).
• Grant fishing permits to local fishers (22%).
terms of fishery
• Increase support from authorities (in
• Increase support from authorities (in
regulation?
enforcement and local presence) (43%).
implementation and enforcement of current
regulations) (22%).
• Ease/fasten paperwork for locals to access
permits (20%).
• Control entrance of outsider pangas into local
fishing grounds (27%).
• Regulate resource-use (temporal closures, mesh
size, quotas) (23%).
• More respect of regulations (22%).
Fishers’ perception of
• 50% agreed with the idea that fishing permits
• 40% agreed with the idea that fishing permits
usefulness of fishing
were a useful tool to limit access to local fishing
were a useful tool to limit access to local fishing
licenses to limit access
grounds.
grounds.
• 47% disagreed with the statement.
• 60% disagreed with the statement.
Fishers’ perception of
• 23% agreed that fisheries authorities
• 50% agreed that fisheries authorities
performance of
(CONAPESCA and PROFEPA) have had an
(CONAPESCA) have had an important role in
fisheries authorities
important role in preventing the depletion of
preventing the depletion of fishery resources in
fishery resources in BA, while 77% disagreed
Bahía de Kino, while 50% disagreed with the
with the statement.
statement.
• 87% agreed that in order to improve the situation • 80% agreed that in order to improve the situation
of local fisheries, implementation and
of local fisheries, implementation and
enforcement of regulations by local authorities
enforcement of regulations by local authorities
was needed.
was needed.
197
Fishers’ attitude
toward access
regulation
Fishers’ attitude
toward resource-use
regulations
• 87% agreed that only people from BA should be
allowed to fish in local fishing grounds.
• 64% agreed that only people from Bahía de Kino
should be allowed to dive in local fishing
grounds
• Strong support (>70%) for the need for formal
• Strong support (>70%) for the need for formal
regulation of the harvest of species like sea
regulation of the harvest of species accessible for
cucumber (100%), octopus (70%), and sand bass
fishing all year round like sea cucumber (87%),
(72%).
lobsters (89%), and pen shells (78%).
• Intermediate support (~50%) for flounder.
• Low support for species showing seasonal
accessibility like fishes (groupers & snappers)
• Low support for highly migratory species
and octopus.
(sharks and related species).
Fishers’ incentives to
• 47% would prefer working as a member of a
• 40% would prefer working as a member of a
join formalized groups
formalized group because it would allow them
formalized group because it would allow them
improved access to fishing permits and
improved access to fishing permits and
governmental benefits.
governmental benefits.
• 53% would prefer working independently
• 53% would prefer working independently
because of the difficulties of working as part of a
because of the difficulties of working as part of a
group and greater independence for working and
group and greater independence for working and
selling one’s product that leads to higher
selling one’s product that leads to higher
earnings.
earnings.
Usefulness of the
• 71% of respondents said the reserve has not
biosphere reserve (only
benefitted nor being detrimental to them.
for BA)
If given again the choice of establishing a reserve
in BA:
• 47% of respondents would again decide to have
a reserve to take care of fishing products.
• 30% of respondents would decide not to have a
reserve because they fear it would bring
additional restrictions on fishing.
• 10% said it does not make any difference to
them if there is or there is not a reserve.
198
APPENDIX D: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR PANGA CAPTAINS - BAHÍA DE
KINO
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Entrevista sobre Conocimiento y Percepción sobre Reglas Gubernamentales
Asegurarse de entregar una copia con la explicación del proyecto antes de comenzar y
explicar verbalmente su contenido
Entrevistador: ________________
Código de entrevista: ______
Fecha: _____________
Duración de entrevista: ____
Lugar: _____________
1. INFORMACIÓN GENERAL DEL ENTREVISTADO
1.1 ¿Cuántos años tiene? ___________
1.2 ¿Dónde nació? (lugar/estado)__________________________________________
1.3 ¿Dónde vive actualmente? ____________________________________________
1.4 ¿Cuánto tiempo tiene viviendo aquí? # años______________________________
2. TRABAJO
2.1 ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva pescando en pangas en la región? # años________________
2.2 ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva dedicándose al buceo en la región? # años ______________
2.3 Es usted:
01 Buzo
02 Popero
03 Matador
PANGA_______________________
2.4 ¿En el tiempo que lleva trabajando en buceo, se ha dedicado mayormente a
eso…..ej: a ser buzo?
01 Si
02 No (hacer pregunta 2.4.1)
2.4.1 ¿A qué se ha dedicado más?_______________________________
2.5 ¿A lo largo de un año, a qué especies se dedica más (NO SOLO DE BUCEO)?:
199
Especies principales
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
01 Buceo
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
02 Chin
Arte de pesca
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
03 Trampa Otras_____________
Solo si usa otros artes de pesca además de buceo
2.6 ¿Diría usted que el buceo es su actividad principal en pesca de pangas?
01 Si (saltar a 2.7) 02 No (hacer 2.6.1)
2.6.1 Cuál? ________________________________________________
2.7 ¿Tiene algún otro trabajo además de la pesca de pangas?
01 Si (hacer 2.7.1 y 2.7.2)
02 No (saltar a sección 3)
2.7.1 ¿Cuál/es?______________________________________________
2.7.2 ¿Diría usted que vive más de la pesca que de su/s otro/s trabajo/s?
01 Sí
02 No
3. ORGANIZACIÓN
3.1 ¿Es socio de algún grupo (Ej: unión de buzos) o cooperativa relacionada con la
pesca?
01 Sí (hacer 3.1.1 a 3.1.6) 02 No (saltar a 3.2) 03 No sé
3.1.1 ¿Cuál/es?______________________________________________
3.1.2 ¿Cuánto tiempo tiene como socio en este grupo? # años_________
3.1.3 ¿Ocupa algún puesto? 01 Sí (Puesto_________________) 02 No
3.1.4 ¿Por qué ingresó al grupo o cooperativa?
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
200
3.1.5 ¿Para usted fue bueno haber ingresado a ese grupo o cooperativa?
01 Sí
02 No 03 No sé
3.1.5a ¿Por qué?________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
3.1.6 Si pudiera cambiar algo del grupo al que pertenece, ¿Qué
cambiaría?
____________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
3.2 ¿Por qué no es socio de un grupo o cooperativa relacionada con la pesca?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
3.3 Alguna vez ha sido socios de alguna cooperativa? Cuál?_____________________
3.4 ¿En términos generales, cómo preferiría trabajar más (leer opciones)?
01 Como socio de un grupo o una cooperativa
02 Sin estar asociado a ningún grupo o cooperativa
03 No sé
3.5 ¿Por qué prefiere eso?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
4. ACCESO A LA PESCA: Ahora le voy a preguntar un poco más sobre cómo
trabaja…
4.1 ¿Cuentas con un permiso propio?
01 Sí
02 No
4.2 ¿Alguna vez has intentado sacar un permiso a tu nombre?
01 Sí (hacer 4.2.2)
02 No (hacer 4.2.1 y saltar a 4.3)
4.2.1 ¿Por qué no lo has intentado?______________________________
201
4.2.2 ¿Por qué no has logrado tenerlo? ___________________________
4.3 ¿A quién le entregas tu producto?___________________# años entregándole:___
4.4 ¿Trabajas bajo el permiso de algún permisionario o cooperativa___; o solo le
entregas tu producto a un comprador__?
01 Sí 02 No
4.4.1 ¿Qué cooperativa o permisionario? ____________________
4.5 ¿Cuánto tiempo llevas trabajando así?___________________________________
4.6 ¿Quién te habilita para los gastos de las salidas de pesca?____________________
4.7 ¿La panga y el motor con el que trabajas habitualmente son tuyos, de quien te
habilita...otro?
Panga _________________________________
Motor_________________________________
4.8 ¿Qué arreglo tienes con el permisionario o cooperativa que te ampara con sus
permisos (qué tienes que dar a cambio)?
_____________________________________________________________________
4.9 ¿Y con quien te habilita?______________________________________________
4.10 ¿Cambian esos arreglos si eres dueño de la embarcación?___________________
4.11 Si pudiera Ud. decidir cómo trabajar, cómo preferiría trabajar más (elegir una
sola opción):
01 Como socio de una cooperativa que tenga permisos
02 Con un permiso a su nombre
03 Amparado por un permisionario
04 Amparado por una cooperativa, sin ser socio
05 Otra_______________________________________________
4.12 ¿Por qué preferiría eso?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
202
5. REGULACIONES
5.1 Está al tanto de las regulaciones o normativas para la pesca que realizas?
01 Si 02 No
¿Cuáles conoces?:
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
¿Dice algo esa reg.
¿Me nombraría alguna cosa que diga
sobre cómo usted
esa regulación sobre cómo usted
debiera realizar su debiera realizar su pesca? Lo que usted
pesca?
recuerde…
5.2) Una Ley de
5.2.1)
5.2.1a)
01 Si hay (pasar a
Pesca
01 Si (pasar a
5.2.1)
5.2.1a)
02 No hay
02 No
03 No sabe
03 No sé
5.3.1a)
5.3.1)
01 Si hay (pasar a
01 Si (pasar a
5.3) Un
5.3.1)
5.3.1a)
Reglamento de 02 No hay
02 No
la Ley de Pesca
03 No sabe
03 No sé
01 Si hay (pasar a 5.4.1) Pedir que comente qué dicen esas normas (por especie de buceo
5.4) Normas que 5.4.1)
de las que él trabaja)
digan cómo
02 No hay
deben pescarse
las especies de 03 No sabe
buceo (sobre
vedas, tallas
mínimas…).
¿Conoce que
haya?
5.5 ¿Una persona sin ser pescador puede solicitar un permiso de pesca?
01 Sí
02 No
03 No sé
5.6 ¿Para solicitar un permiso, qué tendría que hacer uno (requisitos)?
___No sé
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
5.7 ¿Un grupo de pescadores podría solicitar una zona en el mar para que solo ellos
pudieran explotarla?
203
01 Sí
02 No 03 No sé
5.8 ¿Qué tendrían que hacer para solicitarla (requisitos)?
___ No sé
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
5.9 ¿Si lo sorprenden los inspectores de PESCA o PROFEPA con algún producto sin
tener permiso para su captura, cómo es el castigo?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
5.10 ¿Conoce que haya habido algún cambio en la legislación pesquera últimamente?
01 Sí supe (hacer 5.10.1)
02 No supe
5.10.1 ¿Qué me puede contar de esos cambios?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Percepción sobre reglas gubernamentales
5.11 ¿Desde su opinión, qué está faltando en Kino en tema de regulación pesquera
para que mejore la situación de la pesca?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
5.12 Para cada una de las ideas siguientes preguntar al entrevistado si esta De acuerdo o En
desacuerdo con lo que expresa cada idea. Una vez que haya respondido si está o no de
acuerdo, volver a preguntar si esta muy de acuerdo (ó en desacuerdo), solo de acuerdo (o en
desacuerdo) o solo un poco de acuerdo (o en desacuerdo).
5.12.1 Acceso a la pesca
a) Los permisos de pesca han servido para controlar la cantidad de personas que
pescan en Kino
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) Hoy en día sin permiso la gente igual trabaja
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
204
c) El movimiento de buzos de una comunidad a otra (ej: buzos de kino a guaymas y
viceversa) es una forma de echarse la mano entre pescadores
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
d) Solo la gente que vive en Kino debería poder bucear en el área de Kino
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
5.12.2 Cooperativas/organizaciones
a) Hoy en día conviene más trabajar independiente (por su cuenta) que asociarse en
cooperativas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) Hoy en día la gente busca asociarse en cooperativas más que nada para acceder a
un permiso y poder trabajar
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
5.12.3 Medidas especificas (normas, vedas, tallas)
a) El callo de hacha no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el
futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) El pepino no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el futuro, se
recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
c) El pulpo no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el futuro, se
recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
d) La langosta no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el futuro,
se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
e) El callo de escarlopa no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en
el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
f) El caracol chino no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el
futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
g) El pescado de primera (garropa, pargos) no necesita de ninguna regulación para
que siga habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
especie
callo de hacha
pepino
¿Qué regulación propone?
Descripción (época/talla/detalles)
205
pulpo
langosta
callo de escarlopa
caracol chino
pescado
5.12.4 Rol de autoridades (inspección y vigilancia)
a) Gracias al apoyo de los de Pesca todavía tenemos producto que pescar en Kino
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) Para que mejore la situación de la pesca en Kino lo que hace falta es que los de
Pesca hagan respetar las reglas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
6. DECISIONES SOBRE PESCA
6.1 Cuando se prepara para salir a pescar en un día cualquiera….
6.1.1 De qué depende que vaya a un lugar y no a otro? (Pregunta abierta y luego
ofrecer opciones incluyendo la que él haya dado si no fue considerada y que seleccione
las dos más importantes)
1°__________
__________________________________________________________________
2°__________
__________________________________________________________________
6.1.2 De qué depende vayas a un producto y no vayas a otro? (Idem anterior)
__________________________________________________________________
1°__________
__________________________________________________________________
2°__________
6.1.3 De qué depende que traiga poquita o mucha cantidad de producto? (Idem
anterior)
__________________________________________________________________
1°__________
2°__________
__________________________________________________________________
En tarjetas:
01. De cuestiones naturales (el estado del tiempo, las mareas, corrientes…)
206
02. De cuestiones de comercialización (que haya comprador, precios
convenientes…)
03. De algo (regulación o normativa) que exijan las autoridades (de Pesca,
Profepa o Marina)
04. De que haya producto, que sea la temporada
05. De la capacidad de la panga y el motor
06. Otras que el entrevistado haya mencionado espontáneamente
7. REGLAS LOCALES EN USO (reglas que ellos mismos hayan generado)
7.1 En su grupo (__) o entre compañeros de panga (__), han hecho algún acuerdo
entre ustedes para cuidar un producto, ej: dejar de trabajar una zona por un tiempo,
dejar descansar un producto por un tiempo, o tener algún cuidado especial al
pescarlo…ej: no destruir las cuevas de los pulpos al pescarlo, o no sacar producto
menor de una talla, o cosas como esas…?
01 Sí (hacer 7.2 a 7.3) 02 No (saltar a 7.4) 03 No sé
7.2 ¿En qué consisten/consistían esos acuerdos (FECHA si fue en el pasado, recursos,
zonas, épocas del año, tallas, cantidades)?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
______________________________reglas escritas (E)__ reglas no escritas (NE)__
7.3 ¿Están vigentes esos acuerdos?
No sé
01 Sí (saltar a 7.4) 02 No (hacer 7.3.1)
03
7.3.1 ¿Por qué?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
7.4 ¿Y han hecho algún acuerdo o intento de limitar la cantidad de pangas de buceo
pescando en la Bahía?
01 Sí
02 No 03 No sé
207
7.5 ¿Quienes participaron de esos acuerdos o intentos?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
7.6 ¿Dieron resultado esos intentos? 01 Sí (fin) 02 No (hacer 7.6.1)
03 No sé
7.6.1 ¿Por qué?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
Muchas gracias por su valiosa colaboración!
Notas:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
208
APPENDIX E: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR KEY INFORMANTS - INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF FORMALIZED GROUPS AND LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS BAHÍA DE KINO
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Entrevista sobre Organización Interna y Reglas Locales
Asegurarse de entregar una copia con la explicación del proyecto antes de comenzar y
explicar verbalmente su contenido
Entrevistador: ____________
Fecha: _____________
Lugar: _____________
Grupo u organización: _____________
Código de entrevista: _________
Duración de entrevista: __________
REGLAMENTOS
1. ¿En su grupo tienen algún reglamento escrito o acta de reunión donde hayan
acordado reglas para trabajar en conjunto? (Solicitar acceso a estos reglamentos).
1. Si 0. No
2. ¿Además -o en lugar- de un reglamento escrito, tienen reglas o acuerdos que no
estén escritos en ninguna parte pero que igual los usen para trabajar en el grupo?
1. Si 0. No
3. ¿Me puede contar sobre estos acuerdos (escritos y no escritos)?
ACCESO AL GRUPO
4. ¿Qué condiciones o requisitos debe cumplir alguien que desee ingresar como
socio?
209
5. ¿Los hijos u otros familiares de los socios tienen mayores posibilidades de
ingresar como socios al grupo que alguien que no lo es?
1. Si 0. No
Para la Unión de Buzos:
6. ¿Qué condiciones o requisitos debe cumplir alguien que desee inscribirse en la
lista interna de la agrupación?
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
7. ¿Qué condiciones o requisitos debe cumplir alguien para trabajar amparado por
los permisos del grupo?
DECISIONES
8. ¿Cómo toman la decisión de dejar o no entrar como socio a una persona? (En
junta? ¿Con el voto de la mayoría de los socios?)?
9. ¿Cuándo tienen que tomar decisiones sobre OTROS temas, lo hacen de la misma
manera? 1. Si 0. No (¿Cómo?)
Para la Unión de Buzos:
10. ¿La decisión de dejar ingresar a una persona como miembro del listado interno de
la agrupación la toman de la misma manera?
1. Si 0. No (¿Cómo?)
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
11. ¿La decisión de permitir que alguien trabaje amparado por un permiso del grupo
la toman de la misma manera?
1. Si 0. No (¿Cómo?)
POSICIONES Y FUNCIONES
12. ¿Los socios de la agrupación pueden ocupar distintos cargos o funciones dentro
del grupo?
1. Si (¿Cuáles?) 0. No
210
13. ¿Han formado comités para dividir las tareas en el grupo?
1. Si (¿Cuáles?) 0. No
14. ¿Cómo llega uno a tener esos cargos o a integrar esos comités?
15. ¿Cuáles son los derechos y obligaciones de las personas que están en esos cargos
o comités? ¿Qué pueden hacer y que no deben hacer?
Para la Unión de Buzos:
16. ¿Las personas que están en el listado interno pueden ocupar los mismos cargos o
comités dentro del grupo?
1. Si 0. No
INFORMACIÓN
17. ¿Se da a conocer algún tipo de información al grupo?
17.1 ¿Qué tipo de información se da a conocer?
1. Si 0. No
17.2 ¿Cómo se da a conocer esa información (en reuniones, cada cuánto tiempo)?
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
18. ¿A los pescadores libres amparados por los permisos del grupo se les da a conocer
algún tipo de información?
1. Si
0. No
23.1. ¿La misma que a los socios?
1. Si
0. No (¿Cuál?)
CONVIVENCIA
19. Tienen reglas que digan cómo debe comportarse un socio:
19.1. ¿En las juntas u otras reuniones del grupo?
1. Si (¿Cuáles?) 0. No
211
19.2. ¿En el lugar de trabajo (dónde desembarcan, guardan, refaccionan sus
pangas)?
1. Si (¿Cuáles?) 0. No
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
20. ¿Estas reglas también aplican para quienes están amparados por los permisos del
grupo pero no son socios?
1. Si 0. No
PESCA
21. Existe alguna regla o acuerdo entre ustedes para NO pescar:
21.1 ¿En una zona en particular?
1. Si 0. No
21.1.1 ¿Cuáles zonas?
21.1.2 ¿Para qué recursos?
21.1.3 ¿Por qué crearon esos acuerdos?
21.2. ¿Un producto en particular?
21.2.1. ¿Cuáles?
1. Si 0. No
21.2.2. ¿Por qué crearon esos acuerdos?
21.3. ¿Con un arte de pesca en especial?
21.3.1. ¿Cuáles artes?
1. Si 0. No
212
21.3.2. ¿Para qué recursos?
21.3.3. ¿Por qué crearon esos acuerdos?
21.4. ¿En alguna época del año en particular?
21.4.1. ¿Cuáles épocas?
1. Si 0. No
21.4.2. ¿Para la pesca de qué recursos?
21.4.3. ¿Por qué crearon esos acuerdos?
21.5. ¿Una cantidad en particular?
21.5.1. ¿Qué cantidades?
1. Si 0. No
21.5.2. ¿De qué recursos?
21.5.3. ¿Por qué crearon esos acuerdos?
Derechos de uso
22. ¿El pertenecer o trabajar amparado por este grupo le da derecho exclusivo a
pescar un producto en particular o una cantidad en particular de algún producto, al
que otros que están fuera del grupo no tienen acceso?
1. Si 0. No
22.1. Especificar los términos de derecho:
213
22.2. ¿Es una regla del gobierno (permiso de pesca o concesión) o un
acuerdo local?
22.3. Especificar recursos, zonas y/o cantidades incluidas en el derecho
22.4. Especificar cómo se asignan los derechos entre los miembros del
grupo (también si se trata de permisos de pesca, cómo se reparten su uso)
ACTIVIDADES QUE REQUIERAN AUTORIZACIÓN DE OTROS EN EL
GRUPO
23. ¿Hay alguna actividad que requiera el visto bueno de otros pescadores del grupo
para que un pescador la pueda realizar? (Por ejemplo, que alguien pueda salir a
pescar solo si otros pescadores del grupo lo acompañan)
1. Si 0. No
23.1. ¿Cuál?
23.2. ¿Por qué la/s implementaron?
APORTES Y REPARTICIÓN DE BENEFICIOS
24. ¿Los socios tienen que aportar dinero u otro tipo de ayuda al grupo? 1. Si 0. No
24.1. ¿Qué aportes tienen qué hacer?
24.2. ¿Por qué motivo/s?
25. ¿Cuando reparten las ganancias/utilidades del grupo, todos los socios reciben la
misma parte?
1. Si 0. No (¿Quienes reciben menos y por qué?)
214
26. ¿Cómo es la repartición de las ganancias entre los tripulantes de la panga?
26.1. ¿Cambia la repartición según el producto que agarren?
1. Si 0. No
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
27. ¿Quienes están amparados por los permisos del grupo tienen que hacer los
mismos aportes al grupo que un socio?
1. Si 0. No (¿Cuáles?)
28. ¿Tienen alguna participación en la repartición de utilidades?
28.1. ¿Cómo es su participación?
1. Si 0. No
SANCIONES
29. ¿Han pensado en sanciones para quienes no siguen las reglas establecidas por el
1. Si (¿Cuáles?) 0. No
grupo?
29.1. ¿Sancionan a quien no asiste a las reuniones?
29.1.1. ¿Cómo?
1. Si 0. No
29.2. ¿Sancionan a quien no hace los aportes correspondientes al grupo?
1.Si 0.No
29.2.1. ¿Cómo?
29.3. ¿Sancionan a quien trae algún recurso o pesca en alguna zona no permitida
por el grupo?
1. Si 0. No
29.3.1. ¿Cómo?
30. ¿Son graduales las sanciones?
1. Si (Especificar) 0. No
215
31. ¿Cuál es la sanción más fuerte que has visto aplicar en el grupo?
31.1. ¿Por qué motivo?
Para grupos que amparan con sus permisos a pescadores libres (no socios):
32. ¿Estas sanciones aplican también para los que trabajan amparados por el grupo?
1. Si 0. No
MONITOREO DE REGLAS
33. ¿Cómo se organizan para vigilar que los socios -o quienes están amparados- sigan
las reglas establecidas por el grupo?
REGLAS LOCALES EN LA COMUNIDAD (pasadas y presentes):
34. ¿Hay en la actualidad, o alguna vez hubo, esfuerzos para limitar el acceso a pescar
las principales especies de buceo que se trabajan en Bahía de Kino? Cuénteme
acerca de eso.
35. ¿Quién tiene o tenía derecho a pescar y quienes no?
216
36. ¿Qué recursos incluía el acuerdo o esfuerzo?
37. ¿Esos esfuerzos surgieron por la iniciativa de pescadores de la comunidad o fue
algún grupo externo o autoridad el que los inició?
38. ¿Llegaron a ponerse en práctica esos esfuerzos?
38.1 ¿Por qué?
1. Si 0. No
39. ¿Hay alguna documentación escrita donde se cuente sobre esos esfuerzos, o
son/fueron parte de un acuerdo informal entre la gente que lo inició?
1. Si (conseguir?) 0. No
217
APPENDIX F: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR PANGA CAPTAINS - BAHÍA DE LOS
ÁNGELES
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Entrevista sobre Conocimiento y Percepción sobre Reglas Gubernamentales
Asegurarse de entregar una copia con la explicación del proyecto antes de comenzar y
explicar verbalmente su contenido
Entrevistador: ________________
Fecha: _____________
Lugar de entrevista: _____________
Código de entrevista: ______
Duración de entrevista:_____
1. INFORMACIÓN GENERAL DEL ENTREVISTADO
1.1. ¿Cuántos años tiene?
1.2. ¿Dónde nació? (lugar/estado)
1.3. ¿Dónde vive actualmente?
1.4. ¿Cuánto tiempo tiene viviendo aquí? # años
2. TRABAJO
2.1. ¿Cuánto tiempo lleva dedicándose a la pesca en la región? # años
Es usted:
01 Buzo [(buzo ( ), popero ( ), asistente de buzo ( )]
02 Pescador comercial
03 Pescador deportivo
2.2. ¿Cuál de estas actividades le genera mayores beneficios económicos?
01 Buceo
02 Pescador comercial
03 Pescador deportivo
2.3. ¿Cuáles son los productos que mas trabaja comercialmente? Nota: Indicar arte de
pesca especifico entre paréntesis, ej. Pulpo - Buceo (trampa)
218
Productos
Arte de pesca
01 Buceo (
) 02 Pesca comercial (
)
01 Buceo (
) 02 Pesca comercial (
)
01 Buceo (
) 02 Pesca comercial (
)
01 Buceo (
) 02 Pesca comercial (
)
01 Buceo (
) 02 Pesca comercial (
)
2.4. ¿Tiene algún otro trabajo además de la pesca (además de buceo/pesca comercial
o deportiva)?
01 Si 02 No
2.4.1. ¿Cuál/es?
2.5. ¿Diría usted que vive más de la pesca (en general) que de su/s otro/s trabajo/s?
01 Sí
02 No
01 Sí
02 No
3. ORGANIZACIÓN
3.1. ¿Es socio de alguna organización relacionada con la pesca?
3.1.1. ¿Cuál?
3.2. ¿Por qué decidió formar parte de esta organización?
3.3. ¿Por qué no es socio de alguna organización relacionada con la pesca?
3.4. ¿En términos generales, cómo preferiría trabajar más (si no existiera restricción
respecto a permisos)?
01 Como socio de un grupo o una cooperativa
02 Sin estar asociado a ningún grupo o cooperativa
03 No sabe/no contesta
219
3.4.1. ¿Por qué prefiere eso?
4. ACCESO A LA PESCA: Ahora le voy a preguntar un poco más sobre cómo
trabaja…
4.1. ¿Cuenta con un permiso a su nombre?
01 Sí (especie, # pangas y arte autorizados)
02 No
4.2. ¿Trabajas bajo el permiso de algún permisionario o cooperativa ( ); o solo le
entregas tu producto a un comprador ( )?
4.2.1. ¿Bajo el permiso de quien trabajas (describir especies)?
4.3. ¿A quién le entregas (vendes) tu producto (preguntar por especie)?
4.4. ¿Quién te habilita los gastos de las salidas de pesca?
4.5. ¿Eres dueño de la panga ( ) y el equipo ( ) con el que trabajas habitualmente?
(consultar si la está pagando aun)
01 Sí
02 No (dueño:___________________)
4.6. ¿Tienes algún compromiso con quien te facilita sus permisos o con quien te
habilita? ¿Cuál?
4.7. ¿Si pudieras escoger libremente como trabajar, cómo preferirías trabajar mas
(elegir una sola opción)?:
01 Como socio de una cooperativa (u otro grupo formal) que tenga permisos
02 Con un permiso a su nombre
03 Amparado por un permisionario
220
04 Amparado por una cooperativa (u otro grupo), sin ser socio
05 Otra
4.7.1. ¿Por qué preferirías eso?
5. REGULACIONES
5.1. ¿Conoces que exista una Ley de pesca en México? Que sabes de ella?
5.2. ¿Conoces que existan normas que digan como cada especie debiera pescarse
(sobre vedas, etc)? Preguntar para las especies que indicó.
5.3. ¿Para solicitar un permiso de pesca, qué tendría que hacer uno?
5.4. ¿Sabe si un grupo de pescadores podría solicitar a las autoridades una zona en el
mar para que solo ellos pudieran trabajarla? ¿Cómo tendría que hacer para solicitar
esa zona?
5.5. ¿Conoce que haya habido algún cambio en las legislación pesquera últimamente?
(has oído hablar de una nueva ley de pesca?)
01 Sí 02 No
221
5.6. ¿Se permite pescar en cualquier parte de BLA? ¿Dónde si y donde no?
5.7. ¿Sabes si esta zona es una reserva o área protegida? ¿Conoces las zonas núcleo,
cuáles son?
5.8. ¿La gente de BLA tiene preferencia por sobre gente de fuera para pescar en la
reserva? Las leyes dicen algo acerca de eso?
5.9. ¿Si lo sorprenden los inspectores de PESCA o PROFEPA locales con algún
producto sin tener permiso para su captura, cómo suele ser el castigo?
Percepción sobre reglas gubernamentales
5.10. ¿Desde su opinión, qué está faltando en BLA en tema de regulación pesquera
para que mejore la situación de la pesca?
5.11. Explicar al entrevistado la dinámica de estas preguntas. Usar escala con caritas para
esta sección.
5.11.1. Acceso a la pesca
a) Los permisos de pesca han servido para limitar/controlar la cantidad de personas
que pescan en BLA
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) Solo la comunidad de BLA debiera poder pescar en la reserva de BLA
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
c) Solo la comunidad del Barril debiera poder pescar en San Lorenzo
222
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
d) Solo ambas comunidades (BLA y el Barril) debieran poder pescar en la Reserva y
San Lorenzo (Reserva y San Lorenzo para ambas comunidades)
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
e) No importa de donde sea la persona, lo que importa es que tenga permiso para
pescar en la región
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
5.11.2. Medidas específicas (normas, vedas, tallas)
a) El pepino no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga habiendo en el futuro, se
recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) El/la___________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
c) El/la___________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
d) El/la___________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
e) El/la___________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
f) El /la__________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
g) El /la__________________ no necesita de ninguna regulación para que siga
habiendo en el futuro, se recupera solo al cambiar las temporadas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
Producto
pepino
¿Cómo debiera regularse/cuidarse?
Especificaciones
223
5.11.3. Rol de autoridades (inspección y vigilancia)
a) Gracias al apoyo de las autoridades de Pesca y Profepa todavía tenemos producto
que pescar en BLA
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
b) Gracias al apoyo de las autoridades de CONANP todavía tenemos producto que
pescar en BLA
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
c) Para que mejore la situación de la pesca en BLA lo que hace falta es que las
autoridades hagan respetar las reglas
Muy en desacuerdo__ en desacuerdo__ ni uno ni otro__ de acuerdo__ muy de acuerdo__
Percepción sobre la reserva (Sabes que hay una reserva en la bahía desde
2007…)
5.12. ¿Te ha beneficiado en algo la reserva? ¿En qué?
5.13. ¿Te ha perjudicado en algo la reserva? ¿En qué?
5.14. ¿Si regresáramos el tiempo atrás y pudieras escoger tener o no tener reserva,
qué preferirías?:
01 Tener reserva
02 No tener reserva
03 ns/nc
5.14.1. ¿Por qué?
Nota: Si el tiempo lo permite preguntar por límites de ejidos y zonas de pesca, y
conflictos de acceso en la comunidad.
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Muchas gracias por su valiosa colaboración!
Notas:
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APPENDIX G: SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR KEY INFORMANTS - INTERNAL
ORGANIZATION OF FORMALIZED GROUPS AND LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS BAHÍA DE LOS ÁNGELES
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Entrevista sobre Organización Interna y Reglas Locales
Asegurarse de entregar una copia con la explicación del proyecto antes de comenzar y
explicar verbalmente su contenido
Entrevistador: ______________
Fecha: _____________
Lugar de entrevista: _____________
Grupo: _____________
Código de entrevista: _________
Duración de entrevista: ________
# socios:
Cuénteme como se formo la sociedad, ¿Por qué la formaron?
1. ACCESO AL GRUPO
1.1. ¿Cualquier persona podría ingresar a la organización? ¿Qué condiciones debiera
tener una persona para ser socio de la organización (indagar características
personales, laborales, parentesco, aportes en dinero o trabajo)?
2. DECISIONES
2.1. ¿Cómo toman la decisión de dejar o no dejar entrar a una persona?
226
2.2. Cuando tienen que tomar otras decisiones, ¿las toman de la misma manera?
3. POSICIONES Y FUNCIONES
3.1. ¿Qué beneficios obtienen los socios al estar en la organización?
3.2. ¿Qué obligaciones tienen los socios? ¿Qué deben y no deben hacer?
3.3. ¿Los socios de la agrupación pueden ocupar distintos cargos o funciones dentro
del grupo?
¿Cuáles?
3.4. ¿Cómo llega uno a tener esos cargos?
3.5. ¿Han formado comités o comisiones de trabajo para dividir las tareas en el
grupo? ¿Cuáles? (describir funciones).
3.6. ¿Cómo llega uno a integrar esos comités?
227
4. INFORMACIÓN
4.1. ¿Qué tipo de información se da a conocer a los socios?
4.2. ¿Cómo se da a conocer esa información (en reuniones, cada cuánto tiempo)?
4.3. ¿Cuántas reuniones han tenido en el último año (2008)?
5. CONVIVENCIA
5.1. ¿Tienen reglas que digan cómo debe comportarse un socio (qué no debe hacer)
durante las juntas, en el lugar de trabajo? Describir.
6. PESCA (ACUERDOS INTERNOS Y REGLAS LOCALES)
Derechos de pesca:
6.1. ¿El pertenecer o trabajar para este grupo le da derecho a pescar un producto en
particular?
6.2. Número de permisos (permisos de la sociedad y/o individuales):
6.3. Especies autorizadas:
6.4. Zonas autorizadas para cada especie:
228
6.5. ¿Teóricamente, esas son zonas de uso exclusivo para ustedes para esas especies?
6.6. # espacios (pangas):
6.7. ¿Son las mismas pangas para las distintas especies?
Reglas de uso:
6.8. ¿Se han puesto de acuerdo (en su grupo o en la comunidad) para trabajar un
producto de una manera en particular, por ejemplo: Dejar descansar un producto por
un tiempo, cuidar una zona, dejar de usar (o modificar) un arte de pesca que sea muy
dañino para un producto, sacar de un determinado tamaño, o limitar la cantidad?
Describir (productos, zonas, épocas del año, otras medidas).
6.9. ¿Se han puesto de acuerdo para limitar/controlar el acceso de gente a los campos
pesqueros de la región? Describir.
6.10. ¿Qué resultados han tenido esos esfuerzos?
229
7. APORTES Y REPARTICIÓN DE BENEFICIOS
7.1. ¿Cómo se reparten los beneficios en el grupo? ¿Todos los miembros de la
organización reciben la misma cantidad de dinero? Describir arreglos.
7.2. ¿Hay aportes anuales/mensuales/diarios que los socios deben hacer al grupo?
Describir.
7.3. ¿Se descuenta una parte del producto entregado por cada socio para la agrupación
(ej. tantos pesos por kilo de producto entregado quedan para la agrupación)?
7.4. ¿En qué se utilizan estos fondos?
7.5. ¿Cómo es la repartición de las ganancias entre los tripulantes de la panga?
¿Varía según el producto, según la actividad (buzo, popero, ayudante), según sea
dueño de equipo?
8. SANCIONES
8.1. ¿De qué manera sancionan a quienes no sigan los acuerdos creados por el grupo?
230
8.2. ¿Sancionan a quienes no asisten a las reuniones? ¿Cómo?
8.3. ¿Sancionan a quien no hace los aportes al grupo (ej. A quien vende el producto
por fuera de la cooperativa)? ¿Cómo?
8.4. ¿Las sanciones son mas fuertes cuanto mas grave es la falta? Describir.
8.5. ¿Cuál es el castigo más fuerte que le hayan aplicado a alguien en el grupo? ¿Por
qué motivo?
8.6. ¿Alguna vez han echado a alguien del grupo? ¿Por qué motivo?
No-socios
8.7. ¿Además de los socios, hay personas que trabajen para el grupo sin ser socios (ej.
Personas amparadas por los permisos del grupo)? ¿Cuántos trabajan así?
8.8. ¿Estas personas se ubican en las pangas de la sociedad o aportan sus propias
pangas?
231
8.9. ¿Hay pangas de socios o no-socios que estén dadas en comodato a la sociedad
(Cuántas)? ¿Cuál es el compromiso que adquiere el dueño de panga mediante el
comodato?
8.10. ¿Las personas que trabajen para el grupo sin ser socios tienen obligaciones
diferentes que un socio normal? ¿Qué deben dar a cambio y qué beneficios reciben al
trabajar para el grupo?
9. REGLAS ESCRITAS
NO OLVIDAR solicitar acceso a reglamento escrito, minutas de reuniones, y
registros de asistencia.
232
APPENDIX H: HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL
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