User manual | THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE

THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE
CONSERVATION OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
By
Jennifer Nell Duberstein
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the
SCHOOL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In Partial Fulfillment for the Requirements
For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
WITH A MAJOR IN RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCE STUDIES
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
2009
2
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
As members of the Dissertation Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation
prepared by Jennifer N. Duberstein
entitled The Shape of the Commons: Social Networks and the Conservation of Small-scale
Fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: November 18, 2009
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: November 18, 2009
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: November 18, 2009
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: November 18, 2009
_______________________________________________________________________
Date: November 18, 2009
Dr. William W. Shaw
Dr. H. Randy Gimblett
Dr. Jeffrey J. Sallaz
Dr. Edella Schlager
Dr. Jorge Torre
Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate’s submission
of the final copies of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that
it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement.
________________________________________________ Date: November 18, 2009
Dissertation Director: Dr. William W. Shaw
3
STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an
advanced degree at the University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library
to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided
that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended
quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by
the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her
judgment the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other
instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNED: Jennifer Nell Duberstein
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are so many people who have helped me over the years that I have been
working on this dissertation. First, I thank my advisor, Bill Shaw, whose support and
guidance from the day he accepted me as his student have helped keep me grounded,
mostly on track, and optimistic and excited about my work. I thank the other members of
my committee for their support, encouragement, and feedback: Randy Gimblett, Miller
McPherson, Jeff Sallaz, Edella Schlager, and Jorge Torre. I particularly wish to express
my gratitude to Jorge Torre for his unending encouragement and support for my field
work, his confidence in my abilities, and his invaluable input and suggestions for
improving my work throughout this long process. Thank you to the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation, COBI, and The Nature Conservancy for supporting me financially
as I undertook this ambitious project. I am grateful to Cesar Moreno, Mario Rojo, Nabor
Encinas, and Esteban Torreblanca-Ramirez for important assistance with field work and
patience in answering all of my many questions. Thanks to Gustavo Danemman for
supporting my work in Bahía de los Ángeles. I thank Amy Hudson Weaver for invaluable
conversations about small-scale fisheries in Bahía de Kino and the Gulf, as well as for
guidance in designing my interviews. Thank you to the CEDO staff, in particular Peggy
Turk-Boyer, Sergio Perez-Valencia, and Rene Loaiza Villanueva, who have taught me
much about fisheries conservation in the region. My gratitude to the Prescott College
Center for Cultural and Ecological Studies in Bahía de Kino for field support. Thank you
to Robert Mesta and everyone involved with the Sonoran Joint Venture for allowing me
the flexibility to undertake this PhD while still continuing to work. My thanks to Mitch
McClaren for his support and encouragement—from helping to make sure that I was
accepted into this program to filling in at the last minute for my comprehensive oral
exams, I would not be here without your support. I thank my fellow UA Pangueros: Ana
Cinti, Marcia Moreno-Báez, Gaspar Soria, Alejandro Castillo, and Adrian Munguia
Vega. I have learned so much from working with you over these past few years—it has
truly been a pleasure. Special thanks to Ana Cinti and Marcia Moreno-Báez, whose
friendship and support have helped me through all of the detours of this long journey. I
thank Tad Pfister for introducing me to the Gulf of California nearly ten years ago and
am so grateful for the support, advice, inspiration, and encouragement you have given
me. Thank you to Richard Cudney-Bueno for pushing me to become involved in the
PANGAS project and convincing me that even though it did not involve birds, I should
still join the team—thank you for providing me with this opportunity. Thank you to my
family—Mom, Susan, John, Matt, Chris, Nina, Freddy, and Ben—for your love and
support. Very special thank you to my cabinmates at Phinished.org: I truly, truly would
not be here without you, my dear phriends. Thank you for your encouragement, throbby
hearts, and for believing in me and helping me believe in myself at my very lowest
points. I trust. Finally, thank you to Juan Caicedo, my partner on this long journey, for
your love, support, confidence, patience, and encouragement. I look forward to the next
chapter.
5
DEDICATION
For my father, Allen Duberstein
1942-2005
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................................................8
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................10
ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................12
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................14
The problem in its global context ...............................................................................14
Common-pool natural resources ...................................................................................14
The state of the word’s small-scale fisheries: conservation and management .............15
Marine Protected Areas as a fisheries management tool..............................................16
Social networks and CPR management and governance ..............................................17
This Dissertation ..........................................................................................................18
Explanation of the dissertation format ..........................................................................19
PRESENT STUDY...........................................................................................................22
The Study Area ..............................................................................................................22
A brief history of commercial small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico .......................................................................................................23
Formal institutional arrangements .......................................................................24
Federal Agencies ......................................................................................................24
Formal laws, rules, and regulations .........................................................................26
Fishing permits and concessions ..............................................................................27
Rules behind the establishment and management of Marine Protected Areas in
Mexico .......................................................................................................................28
7
Informal institutional arrangements .....................................................................29
Rapid Appraisal .............................................................................................................31
Social connectivity of small-scale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico .......................................................................................................33
Combining social and spatial networks of small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf
of California, Mexico ...................................................................................................36
Marine Protected Areas, social networks, and the emergence of collaboration for
small-scale fisheries .....................................................................................................38
Implications for the sustainable management of small-scale fisheries ...................39
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................43
APPENDIX A. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN FISHERIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO..................................................................................................50
APPENDIX B. USING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS FOR
MANAGEMENT OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO..................................................................................................88
APPENDIX C. THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS,
SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND THE CONSERVATION OF SMALL-SCALE
FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO ....................141
APPENDIX D: MARINE SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE GULF OF
CALIFORNIA WORKSHOP: PRELIMINARY RESULTS ..........................................205
APPENDIX E. FISHER, PERMIT HOLDER, AND BUYER INTERVIEW ................208
APPENDIX F: NGO AND GOVERNMENT AGENCY INTERVIEW ........................215
APPENDIX G: HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL. .....................................................217
8
LIST OF FIGURES
APPENDIX A. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN FISHERIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Figure 1. Study area and sub-regions, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico................76
Figure 2. Locations of respondents’ kinship ties with other fishers living in the states
of the Gulf of California and other states throughout Mexico. .....................................78
Figure 3. Kinship ties of small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf of California by subregion (n=376, missing=64). (NE=Northeast, SE=Southeast, NW=Northwest,
SW=Southwest, GULF=Gulf of California states outside of the study region,
OTHER=other states outside of the Gulf of California, UNKNOWN = unable to
determine specific location.) .........................................................................................79
Figure 4. Small-scale fisher kinship ties connecting communities and key players in
the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.......................................................................81
APPENDIX B. USING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS FOR
MANAGEMENT OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Figure 1. Map of the study area in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .............118
Figure 2. Network of communities connected by fishing zones, Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico. Black nodes are communities with access to major roads and ice;
gray nodes do not have access. A line between two nodes means the communities have
a fishing zone in common (thicker lines represent greater amounts of convergence).
Node size in Figure 2a represents maximum distance traveled to reach fishing zones
(km) and in Figure 2b represents total fishing area (km2) ...........................................129
Figure 3. First level community groupings based on overall fishing zone convergence
(all fishing methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .......................................131
Figure 4. Second level community groupings based on overall fishing zone
convergence (all fishing methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ..................132
Figure 5. Third level community groupings based on overall fishing zone convergence
(all fishing methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .......................................133
9
LIST OF FIGURES – Continued
Figure 6. Community groupings based on overall MPA use convergence (all fishing
methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. Dotted arrows indicate use of MPAs.
The different groups separate communities based on equivalent use of MPAs as
fishing zones ................................................................................................................134
APPENDIX C. THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS,
SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND THE CONSERVATION OF SMALL-SCALE
FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Figure 1. Organization of small-scale fisheries management in Mexico ....................186
Figure 2. Map of the study area within the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (NG).
The NG is the area extending north of Punta San Francisquito in Baja California north
of Bahía de Kino in Sonora. The dark gray polygons delineate SPMI and BLABR, as
well as the San Lorenzo Marine Park. Cartographic design: Marcia Moreno-Baez ...187
Figure 3. Brokerage analysis diagram for the information sharing network in SPMI.
Nodes are sized based on overall brokerage score. Dotted red lines denote the different
user groups ..................................................................................................................195
Figure 4. Brokerage analysis diagram for information sharing network in BLABR.
Nodes are sized based on overall brokerage score. Red dotted lines denote different
user groups ..................................................................................................................196
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LIST OF TABLES
INTRODUCTION
Table 1. Overview of RA interviews, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ................42
APPENDIX A. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN FISHERIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Table 1. Matrix of kinship ties connecting small-scale fishing communities in the
Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ............................................................................77
Table 2. Freeman’s degree centrality measures for community kinship ties of smallscale fishers in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (n=376, missing=64) ...........80
APPENDIX B. COMBINING SOCIAL AND SPATIAL NETWORKS OF SMALLSCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO Table
Table 1. Representative species for each fishing method, Northern Gulf of California,
Mexico .........................................................................................................................119
Table 2. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for all
fishing methods, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ...............................................120
Table 3. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for
diving, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ..............................................................121
Table 4. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for
gillnets, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .............................................................122
Table 5. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for
longlines, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ..........................................................123
Table 6. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for
traps, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .................................................................124
Table 7. Matrix of community use of Marine Protected Areas by small-scale fishers in
the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.....................................................................125
Table 8. Fishing zone attributes, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ......................126
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LIST OF TABLES – Continued
Table 9. Geographic attributes, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico ........................127
Table 10. Multivariate regression results of effects of geographic attributes on distance
to and size of fishing zones, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico .............................128
Table 11. Correlation of geographic distance between communities and fishing zone
convergence (QAP correlation analysis, 5000 permutations) .....................................130
APPENDIX C. THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS,
SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND THE CONSERVATION OF SMALL-SCALE
FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Table 1. Federal Marine Protected Areas in the Northern Gulf of California.............188
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of fisher-only networks ...............................................189
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of overall networks (fishers, permit holders, buyers,
NGOs, agencies, and universities/researchers) ...........................................................189
Table 4. Comparison of institutional attributes for SPMI and BLABR, Northern Gulf
of California, Mexico ..................................................................................................190
Table 5. Abridged brokerage analysis results, information sharing network for SPMI
Biosphere Reserve .......................................................................................................193
Table 6. Abridged brokerage analysis results, information sharing network for BLA
Biosphere Reserve .......................................................................................................194
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ABSTRACT
One of the biggest questions surrounding common-pool natural resources (CPRs)
lies in understanding the circumstances which increase the likelihood of sustainable use
and those that lead to resource degradation. Small-scale fisheries are an example of a
CPR that has proven difficult to manage sustainably. I use social network analysis
methods to examine the social connectivity of small-scale fishing communities and the
association of network structures with collaborative behavior of small-scale fisheries in
the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
I found considerable connectivity of communities via kinship ties of small-scale
fishers, both within the region and to other areas in Mexico. Fisher kinship relationships
are important mechanisms for information transfer. Identifying communities in the
network that are most likely to share information with other communities allows
managers to develop more effective and efficient education, outreach, and enforcement
efforts.
Communities are also connected by their use of the same fishing zones and
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). My results provide suggestions for dividing
communities based on common use of fishing areas and MPAs. This may help fishers
and managers to develop, implement, and enforce boundary rules that will facilitate
regional management of small-scale fisheries. My results provided mixed evidence for
the role of social structure in impacting positive outcomes for fisher’ ability to
collaborate and organize. A wide range of factors affect the emergence of institutions for
CPR management. Similarly, finding a common network structure that can accurately
13
predict sustainable use of CPRs is unlikely. Knowing how people are connected and the
ways in which information about CPR resources moves through (or is hindered from
moving through) a network can improve manager’s ability to develop more effective
strategies and actions. Adding social networks into the CPR management toolbox
provides a mechanism by which those working in management and conservation can
incorporate social structure into management activities.
An understanding of the social networks that connect communities and the
potential pathways for information transfer, combined with a system of enforceable rules
and policies and effective outreach methods and materials, may help managers and
resource users more effectively and sustainably manage CPRs in the long term.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem in its global context
Common-pool natural resources
Common-pool natural resources (CPRs) are those for which access is difficult
limit and use by one person decreases the value of the resource for use by others (Ostrom
et al. 1999; Feeny et al. 1990). The challenge of sustainable use and management of
CPRs has been the subject of many studies. Traditional solutions to these challenges are
privatization of the resource or government control (Hardin 1968). In practice, however,
there exist a wide range of possibilities, ranging from community-based, bottom-up
efforts to co-management to top-down government control (Alcala 1998; Pomeroy and
Berkes 1997; Jentoft and McCay 1995). This diversity of management situations has led
to a variety of outcomes for common-pool resource situations, from overuse and
degradation of resources to long-term sustainability (Ostrom 1990).
One of the biggest questions surrounding CPRs lies in understanding the
circumstances which increase the likelihood of sustainable use and those that tend to lead
to resource degradation. CPR theorists have offered a number of different factors that are
associated with the emergence and sustainability of successful institutions for
management of CPR systems. Numerous case studies and broad-scale surveys have been
conducted in an effort to better understand the reasons behind success and failure of
different efforts (see Ostrom 1990). One common theme runs through the majority of
these studies: the emergence of institutions for the their successful management is
15
dependent on the complex physical, biological, and social characteristics of the situation
in which the resource and users exist (McCay 2002; Ostrom 1990).
The state of the world’s small-scale fisheries: conservation and management
Small-scale fisheries are an example of a CPR that has had a range of outcomes.
Although there are some examples of sustainable management (Acheson 1997),
throughout the world, fisheries resources are in a state of decline (Botsford et al. 1997).
Increased fishing effort, the use of more efficient equipment, and a variety of other
complicating factors, such as habitat loss and degradation, and global climate change, are
facilitating these declines (Roessig et al. 2004; Turner et al. 1999; McGoodwin 1990).
Although there are examples of long-term sustainable management of fisheries resources
(Acheson 1997), the more common tendency is a continued declining trend in resource
health (Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2005; Sala et al. 2004).
Worldwide, small-scale fishers make up over 90% of the world’s fishers and
produce nearly half the world’s fish catch designated for human consumption (Iudicello
et al. 1999; McGoodwin 1990). At the level of the individual, small-scale fishers may not
have much impact when compared to large-scale, industrial fishing, but when taken
together, this group has a great deal of impact on marine resources.
For CPRs such as small-scale fisheries, determining who should have access to
resources is one of the most challenging management issues, particularly in the absence
of rules or adequate enforcement. Access rights for CPRs can be placed in a general
category of boundary rules (Ostrom and Crawford 2005). These may include things such
16
as limiting access based on residency, use of technology (such as allowing only certain
types of fishing gear within a specified area), possession of a permit, or membership in a
group. Past research has shown that CPRs for which users are able to clearly define
boundaries and develop mechanisms for excluding ‘outsiders’ have a much greater
chance of being sustainably used (Basurto 2005; Ostrom et al. 1994).
Marine Protected Areas as a fisheries management tool
One special case of boundary rules and an increasingly popular tool for protecting
biodiversity and marine resources is the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs)
(Allison et al. 1998). MPAs are zones that are set aside as reserves to protect sensitive
ecosystems, as well as to provide economic and social benefits to users of the area (Alder
et al. 2002; Badalamenti et al. 2000). Managers have looked to MPAs as a way to
complement more traditional fisheries management techniques (Agardy 2000), and the
use of MPAs as a conservation strategy is becoming more widely used throughout the
world.
MPAs may close an area to fishing and extractive activity entirely. They may also
use a zoning system that includes a no-take core zone, inside of which fishing and
extractive activities are prohibited, as well as buffer zones and other areas where certain
actions or activities are permitted. MPAs can come from the federal or state level, as in
the case of Biosphere Reserves and National Marine Parks. They can also be designated
locally and informally, as when a group of fishers decides to let certain areas rest from
17
extraction pressure or of their own accord limits extraction activities in some way in
certain areas.
Social networks and CPR management and governance
Social network analysis focuses on the study of patterns of structures of social
relations (Breiger 2004) and is a useful tool for understanding connectivity and
communication among CPR users. While networks and the concept of social connectivity
are often mentioned as being important to the sustainable management of CPRs (Dietz et
al. 2003; Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2000), the incorporation of social networks into CPR
management has only recently begun to receive formal attention (Ramírez-Sánchez and
Pinkerton 2009; Carlsson and Sandström 2008; Ernstson et al. 2008; Prell et al. 2008;
Prell et al. 2007; Bodin et al. 2006; Grafton 2005).
Examining social networks allows us to study how micro-patterns of interactions
between actors affect large-scale patterns of interactions, which then feed back into the
small group (Granovetter 1973). In a CPR context, social network methods provide new
tools for examining many of the characteristics described in Ostrom’s design principles
and attributes of users. Understanding social networks can help shed light on the
association of local patterns of social connectivity with the collaborative arrangements
that lead to positive outcomes for CPR systems. This information, in turn, can be used to
make recommendations for incorporating knowledge about social networks into the
implementation effective conservation and management strategies and policies for CPRs.
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This Dissertation
This dissertation uses the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico as a case study to
address the topics and issues outlined above. Despite a growing number of conservation
efforts in the Northern Gulf of California (Carvajal-Moreno et al. 2004), the growth of
coastal human populations and marine resource use has created conflict between fisheries
management and marine conservation (Enríquez-Andrade et al. 2005; Páez-Osuna et al.
1999). I use social network analysis methods to examine social connectivity at different
scales in the Northern Gulf of California, from the connectivity of communities via
kinship ties and convergence of fishing zones to a detailed network analysis of users of
two Marine Protected Areas. I then make recommendations for how knowledge of social
networks can be used to support the sustainable use and management of small-scale
fisheries in the region.
The specific goals of this dissertation are as follows:
1. To provide an overview of the social networks of small-scale fisheries in the
Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
2. To examine the affiliation of social networks and the capacity for organization
and collaboration among small-scale fishers and those working in fisheries
management and conservation in Marine Protected Areas in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico (focusing on the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve
and the Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere
Reserve).
19
3. Based on the findings above, interpret how knowledge about social networks and
capacity for organization and collaboration can assist natural resource managers
in designing and implementing effective conservation and management policies
for common pool natural resources.
Explanation of the dissertation format
The results of this dissertation are presented as the separate appended manuscripts
(Appendices A, B, and C). The manuscripts present in-depth details of specific research
questions addressed, methodology, results, discussion, and conclusions. Various
colleagues appear as co-authors based on our collaboration through the development of
my research. However, the research design, analysis, writing, and the majority of the data
collected for this research are entirely my own and the dissertation as a whole represents
my original and independent research. In addition to these research articles, Appendices
D-G contain information that could be useful for anyone studying social aspects of
small-scale fisheries and marine resources in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico,
copies of the survey tools used for the research described in Appendix C, and approval
paperwork for the UA Human Subjects Protection Program.
APPENDIX A. Understanding Social Connectivity in Fisheries: Implications for
Management in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. This paper addresses the role of
kinship ties between small-scale fishers in connecting communities in the Northern Gulf
of California and discusses implications for management of fisheries resources. I wrote
20
this paper in collaboration with Richard Cudney-Bueno (UC Santa Cruz and Packard
Foundation), Jorge Torre (COBI), William W. Shaw (my dissertation director), and Tad
A. Pfister (University of Arizona), all of whom are part of the PANGAS Project, which
supported my dissertation research. They were instrumental in helping to design the
survey tool and in providing input and feedback through the development of the
manuscript.
APPENDIX B. Using social networks and spatial analysis for small-scale fisheries in
the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. This paper examines the ways in which smallscale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California are connected through their
use of fishing zones, particularly within Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). It discusses the
benefits to combining social networks with spatial information and discusses implications
for regional management of small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California. I
wrote this paper in collaboration with Marcia Moreno-Báez, a fellow student in the
School of Natural Resources and the Environment at the UA, who conducted the
geospatial analysis of fishing zone data. Other authors on this paper are Sergio PerezValencia (CEDO) and Mario Rojo (COBI), who were key in conducting interviews to
gather fishing zone information.
APPENDIX C. The shape of the commons: Marine Protected Areas, social networks,
and the conservation of small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
This paper uses an in-depth case study of social networks of users and managers of two
21
Marine Protected Areas (San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve and Bahía de los
Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve) to examine the
association of social structure with propensity for organization and collaboration among
fishers and those working in fisheries conservation and management. I wrote this paper in
collaboration with Cesar Moreno (COBI) and Esteban Torreblanca-Ramirez (Pronatura
Noroeste) who facilitated my field work and assisted with interview design and data
collection.
APPENDIX D. Social connectivity in the Gulf of California, Mexico: learning from a
structural perspective. This is a summary report from a workshop that I co-organized
with Jorge Torre (COBI) and Xavier Basurto (Duke University). The goal of the
workshop was to bring together experts on marine conservation, sustainable fisheries
management, common-pool resources, and social networks to discuss social connectivity
with respect to these themes in the Gulf of California. The workshop took place over the
course of three days in August 2009. A final report for this workshop will outline ways to
expand the recommendations of the workshop into a large scale social network study of
small-scale fisheries in the Gulf of California region.
APPENDIX E. Fisher, Permit Holder, and Buyer Interview Questions.
APPENDIX F. NGO and Government Agency Interview Questions.
APPENDIX G. Human Subjects Approval.
22
PRESENT STUDY
Detailed methods, results, and conclusions of this study are presented in the
papers appended to this dissertation. The following is a summary of the most important
findings in this document.
The study area
The Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (herein referred to as the NG) comprises
the area between mainland Mexico and Baja California, beginning at the mouth of the
Colorado River, just south of the international boundary with the United States, and
continuing south to Bahía de Kino and Punta San Francisquito in Sonora and Baja
California, respectively (Thomson et al. 2000). It includes over 3,000 km of coastline and
58,000 km2 of marine habitat used by seventeen principal fishing communities (MorenoBaez et al. 2009). The region is characterized not only by its high biodiversity and
conservation importance but also by its extreme climate, remoteness, and a relatively
sparse population (Brusca et al. 2005; INEGI 2005; Turner and Brown 1994). It is
recognized as a conservation site of hemispheric importance (Aguilar Ibarra et al. 2005)
and is one of the most productive marine ecosystems in the world (Brusca et al. 2005;
Hyun 2005). This study focuses on small-scale fishers in the NG, a group characterized
by its use of small, outboard motor boats (locally called pangas), versatility in fishing
gear and methods, a relatively low investment in equipment, and an ability to target
multiple species (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998).
23
A brief history of commercial small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico
Commercial small-scale fishing in the NG began in the 1920s, when Mexican
fishers from southern states began to migrate to northwest Sonora and establish
permanent settlements in the region in communities that included Puerto Peñasco, El
Golfo de Santa Clara, and San Felipe (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). This
followed the Mexican Revolution and Mexican President Lázaro Cardenas’ promotion of
fishing cooperatives (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). Since that time and in the last thirtyfive years in particular, Mexican fisheries have seen significant increases in size and
operations (Heffernan 1981), particularly with regards to the small-scale fishing fleet.
Initially, totoaba (Totoaba macdonaldi), a large, endemic croaker that spawns in
the Colorado River delta, was one of the principal species being fished (for export to
Asian markets). The other important fishery in the region at this time was shark,
harvested for fins and its liver oil which was used for the production of vitamin A
(Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). In the 1950s shark liver demand decreased
drastically due to the availability of synthetic alternatives. At the same time, the shrimp
fishery began to thrive in the NG, helped by formal government programs in the late
1940s and 1950s (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). From 1970-1976 Mexican
President Echeverria’s administration promoted government policies that expanded the
small-scale fishing sector and the development of cooperatives (Basurto 2006; Aguilar
Ibarra et al. 2000; Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). The NG benefited, at least in
the short term, from some of this attention and several seafood warehouses were
24
constructed in Punta Chueca and Desemboque Seri (in between Bahía de Kino and Puerto
Peñasco), which provided jobs, boats, and fishing gear to local fishers (Basurto 2006).
The 1970s also saw a broad influx of people from inland Mexico to the NG to work in the
shrimp fishery (Aguilar Ibarra et al. 2000; Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). By the
late 1980s PROPEMEX had halted it operations in the region due to a combination of
internal business problems and overfishing and by the early 1990s the shrimp fishery
crashed, causing small-scale fishers to diversify their catch in search of alternative
income sources.
Since the 1980s, more efficient and affordable equipment, including bigger,
fiberglass boats (as opposed to wood), more powerful motors, and nylon nets (as opposed
to cotton) has allowed small-scale fishers to exploit resources previously not available to
them. One of the defining characteristics of small-scale fishing is adaptability, and as
certain fisheries have been depleted, efforts have shifted to accommodate the exploitation
of new species (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Weaver et al. 2003). This flexibility has
permitted small-scale fishing to continue in the NG (and throughout the world) even
when fishing for a particular species is no longer profitable.
Formal institutional arrangements
Federal agencies
Tracing the formal agencies in charge of regulating small-scale fisheries and
Marine Protected Areas in Mexico is a somewhat complex process. Management of
marine resources is split between two main government agencies: The Secretariat of
25
Agriculture, Ranching, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food (Secretaría de
Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación or SAGARPA) and the
Secretariat of the Environment and Natural Resources (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y
Recursos Naturales or SEMARNAT). In general, SAGARPA and its subsidiaries are
responsible for the commercial side of fishing while SEMARNAT and its subsidiaries
deal with the non-commercial aspects, such as management of protected areas and
endangered species. Mexico’s Federal Environmental Protection Agency (Procuraduría
Federal de Protección del Medio Ambiente, or PROFEPA) is under SEMARNAT and is
responsible for enforcement of federal laws and regulations (enforcement assistance is
also provided by the Mexican Navy at times).
Under SAGARPA and SEMARNAT are a number of other government groups
that deal with different aspects of resource management. The National Fisheries Institute
(Instituto Nacional de la Pesca, or INP), which is in charge of research permits,
assessment of marine resource health, and evaluation of fishing gear and the National
Fisheries Commission (Comisión Nacional de la Pesca y Acuacultura, or
CONAPESCA), which is responsible for granting commercial fishing permits and
concessions are under the jurisdiction of SAGARPA. INP also has several Regional
Centers for Fisheries Investigation (Centro Regional de Investigación Pesquera, or
CRIP) in the NG, which conduct the on-the-ground data collection that the INP uses to
make management decisions. The National Natural Protected Areas Commission
(Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas, or CONANP), which manages
Natural Protected Areas (including Marine Protected Areas) and the General Division of
26
Wildlife (División General de Vida Silvestre, or DGVS), which deals with wildlife
permits and management for listed species, are under the jurisdiction of SEMARNAT, as
is the National Ecology Institute (Instituto Nacional de Ecología, or INE), which
conducts scientific research to support environmental policy and decision making for
sustainable development and ecological planning (INE also manages the vaquita refuge
in the Upper Gulf). It is not difficult to imagine the barriers and challenges to effective
coordination, communication, and information and data sharing between all of these
distinct groups.
Formal laws, rules, and regulations
The main law governing fisheries in Mexico is the Federal Fisheries Law (Ley
Federal de Pesca), which provides general guidelines about fisheries regulation. The
Fisheries Regulation (Reglamento de la Ley Federal de Pesca) stems from the Federal
Fisheries Law and deals with more specific aspects of fisheries management (FAO 2003).
The Fisheries Regulation is also easier to amend than the Federal Fisheries Law and
allows for greater adaptability to changes in natural resources.
The Mexican Official Standards (Normas Oficiales Mexicanas, or NOMs) deal
with some of the more dynamic aspects of fisheries management, such as mesh size for
nets, types of fishing gear used, and spatial and temporal restrictions on harvest (FAO
2003). CONAPESCA is ultimately responsible for making decisions about NOMs,
although there is an element of public participation in any proposed changes to existing
NOMs or in the creation of new NOMs. Small-scale fishers in the NG exploit a number
27
of species that are regulated by NOMs, including shrimp, lobster, abalone, octopus, and
scallop.
The National Fisheries Chart (Carta Nacional de Pesca, or CNP) is a
management tool created by the INP and most recently updated in 2006. The CNP
defines levels of fishing effort for species by area and gives guidelines, strategies, and
targets for conservation, protection, restoration, and management of the habitats (FAO
2003).
Fishing permits and concessions
In order to fish commercially in the Northern Gulf of California, give a receipt to
a buyer, and sell one’s product officially, fishers must have a permit from CONAPESCA.
During President Echeverría’s promotion of cooperatives and fisheries, permits were only
accessible to small-scale fishers through cooperatives. Changes in the Federal Fisheries
Law have altered this and permits can now be granted to cooperatives, individuals, or
businesses. Each permit has a certain number of “spaces” for boats, and must include
things like the boat name, size, and motor size. A permit holder can give a copy of his
permit to a fisher, who can then fish under that permit (in place of the permit holder) as
long as he is using the boat listed on the permit. Within 72 hours of catch permit holders
are required to declare their capture with the CONAPESCA office. Permits must be
renewed every two years.
Concessions are a special class of permits given to individuals, groups, or
businesses that grant exclusive access to a particular species in a particular location. The
28
application requirements for a concession are more stringent than those for a regular
permit and the applicant must prepare a comprehensive management plan for the species
in the proposed concession area and submit it to CONAPESCA for approval. The
management plan must also include a monitoring component, and the concessionaire
must submit regular reports to CONAPESCA so that the health of the resource can be
monitored.
Rules behind the establishment and management of Marine Protected Areas in Mexico
The first step in the creation of a federal Marine Protected Area is the creation of
a justification study (estudio previo justificativo) that provides detailed information to
justify the creation of the protected area (Székely et al. 2005). This study includes
physical, biological, cultural, and social characteristics, as well as proposed management
recommendations. Notice of the availability of the draft study must be published by
SEMARNAT in the Federal Register (Diario Oficial de la Federación) for a 30-60 day
comment period. SEMARNAT/CONANP takes these comments into account and makes
adjustments to the justification study accordingly. Once the study has been accepted, the
MPA must be officially established by Presidential decree. The process is labor and time
intensive and can take years; the establishment of the Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de
Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve, for example, took six years and an equal
number of drafts plans before it was accepted by the public and officially decreed
(CONANP 2005).
29
Although the establishment of an MPA is an important step towards the
sustainable use of natural resources, the official decree is only the first step. In order for
these ‘paper’ reserves to function on the ground, adequate human and financial resources
must be allocated for management, monitoring, and enforcement. Many MPAs in Mexico
suffer growing pains during this transition and management and enforcement efforts, in
particular, tend to be insufficient. CONANP is the government agency responsible for
developing and implementing a management plan for MPAs, including community
education and outreach, supporting enforcement activities, and implementing and
supporting monitoring efforts. The activities which are allowed or prohibited within
MPAs differ depending on the way in which the area was formed. Some MPAs in
Mexico are completely closed to extractive activities, while others are working to include
multiple use practices in certain areas of the reserve (i.e., commercial fishing, sport
fishing, tourism, etc.). All fisheries rules and regulations apply within marine MPAs, and
CONANP can further dictate in the management plan permitted and prohibited activities.
Informal institutional arrangements
The formal process for obtaining and fishing under a permit is described above,
but the reality is oftentimes very different. Theoretically only the boats listed on a permit
are allowed to fish under it. In reality, the process is much more fluid and boats that are
officially listed on a permit are often not ones that are actually going out to fish. A
number of informal, illegal, and under-the-table institutions have arisen that allow fishers
30
to get around the permit requirement. It is very common for the boat listed on the permit
to differ from the actual boat being used to fish. When fishers purchase new boats, they
often just paint them the same colors and with the same name as the old boat so as to not
have to go through the permitting process again (since only the original boat or boats
listed on the permit is technically allowed to fish under that permit).
Although in theory one must be a cooperative member to fish under a
cooperative’s permit, independent fishers can pay a fee to a cooperative to be temporarily
endorsed. Cooperatives benefit from this illegal process in one of several ways: first, they
can charge independent fishers a flat fee that goes toward paying for the permit renewal.
Second, independent fishers might be allowed to fish under a cooperative’s permit by
agreeing to sell their entire catch to the cooperative, which then benefits when selling the
catch to a buyer. Third, an independent fisher might pay the cooperative a pre-arranged
amount for every kilogram of product they harvest in exchange for facilitating the
endorsement. These practice gives cooperatives power over the livelihoods of
independent fishers, as well as allows them to take advantage of the formal rule structure.
Independent fishers who choose to fish without forming some sort of alliance or
agreement with a cooperative or permit holder risk fines and other penalties by selling
their catch without a permit, although the lack of enforcement in the region means that
there are many fishers in the NG who are willing to take this risk.
Past research in the region has also identified some different ways in which
fishers have created their own legal, informal institutions to manage use of their marine
resources. Basurto’s (2005) study of the Seri Indians found a series of different informal
31
institutions that allowed them to limit outside access to the pen shell scallop (callo de
hacha) fishery in the Canal de Infiernillo just north of Bahía de Kino, Sonora. CudneyBueno and Basurto (2009) show that divers in Puerto Peñasco, with support from
regional non-profit conservation organizations and academic institutions, were able to
coordinate among themselves to establish no-take zones and monitoring efforts for rock
scallop (Spondylus calcifer) and black murex snail (Hexaplex nigritus).
Although individuals are now able to apply for permits, cooperatives are still
favored recipients and because of this, many fishers have formed their own
“cooperatives.” Because of this, there is an overabundance of cooperatives in the NG.
Many cooperatives today exist largely only on paper in order to obtain permits, subsidies,
and loans from the government. Each member tends to have his own equipment and uses
cooperative membership only to legally commercialize the product, or alternately,
individual permit holders use the guise of a cooperative to run what is essentially a
private business venture. Other than the name, there is little “cooperative” about the
process.
Rapid Appraisal
Data for the first two manuscripts come from a Rapid Appraisal (RA) of the state
of small-scale fisheries that was conducted by the PANGAS Project in 2005-2006,
focusing on seventeen fishing communities and camps in the region. During the RA, a
team, including the author, conducted 376 structured interviews with a stratified random
sample of small-scale fishing captains in these communities. The interview was designed
32
to capture broad-scale information about the social aspects and the spatio-temporal
distribution of small-scale fishing activities in the region. It included a combination of
closed and open-ended questions about demographics, fishing experience and activities,
and kinship networks.
In order to select respondents, we worked with CONAPESCA officials and Port
Captains to create a complete list of all registered pangas in each community and
identified their captains. We targeted panga captains as our sampling unit because they
were generally the most experienced and knowledgeable fishers and tend to make
decisions about where and when to fish. Communities in the RA varied in size, with total
numbers of resident fishers ranging from two to 460 (PANGAS Project, unpublished
data). Maintaining accurate records of fishers and boats is challenging because numbers
vary throughout the year due to a constant migration both between communities in the
study area and to and from areas elsewhere in Mexico, but altogether we estimate
somewhere between 1000 and 1600 total resident fishers in the NG (Table 1).
Once we created the complete list of pangas/captains, we used stratified random
sampling as established by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) (Bernard 1995: 77-78) to calculate
a sample size that ensured a 90% probability sample with at least a 10% confidence
interval for each fishing community. The formula we used to calculate sample size
included a correction for taking samples from small populations 1. For communities with
1
Sample size formula: χ2NP(1-P)/C2(N-1)+ χ2P(1-P), where χ2 is the chi-squared value for 1 degree of
freedom at some desired probability level; N is the population size (which gets more important as N gets
smaller); P is the population parameter of a variable; and C is the confidence interval. For this study, χ2 is
33
ten or fewer pangas, we endeavored to interview all captains. In some communities there
was a very small subset of fishers who practiced a different fishing art. In these cases, if
the second fishing art was not represented in the sample, we also interviewed the small
subset of captains in order to ensure that the RA was as representative as possible of all
fishing methods used in the community. Ultimately, we interviewed from 13% to 100%
of the captains in each community for an overall sample size of 26% of the total
population in the NG (Table 1).
Social connectivity of small-scale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico
Studying the flow of information among fishers and between fishers and those in
fisheries management via social networks aids in determining how and why fishers make
the decisions they do about the use of fisheries resources (Crona and Bodin 2006) and
therefore in carving out management approaches that are more appropriate for the
existing decision making process. More generally, communication has been shown to
affect the degree to which common-pool resources are used sustainably (Ostrom 2005:
64-65; Dietz et al. 2003; McCay 2002; Ostrom et al. 2002). In particular, kinship ties
have been identified as a mechanism for information transfer and the adoption of rules
that can mitigate issues hindering sustainable use of common-pool resources, such as
small-scale fisheries (Schlager 2002).
2.706 (1 degree of freedom with 90% probability; N is the number of registered pangas in each
community; P is conservatively set at .5, and C is .10, for a 10% confidence interval (Bernard 1995).
34
This study provides the first view of kinship ties of small-scale fishers in the NG,
adding much needed information for the development and communication of regional
management recommendations. For instance, given a limited amount of financial and
human resources, mangers could capitalize on existing kinship ties within and between
communities in the NG to more effectively disseminate information throughout the
region by targeting communities that are well-connected. Similarly, communities outside
of the NG may nevertheless be key for the dissemination of information due to their
strong ties to fishers in the NG. In cases where fishers share information with each other
that is detrimental to management efforts, understanding the flow of information among
small-scale fishers can also help managers to develop more effective enforcement and
management strategies.
My results show that there is considerable linkage of small-scale fishers via
kinship ties not only within and between communities in the NG, but also in states
throughout the Gulf of California and elsewhere in the country. These linkages provide
pathways for the transfer of information within and between communities (Schlager
2002; Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2000) in ways that both support and hinder management
efforts. For example, fishers use these kinship networks to discuss good fishing areas, to
facilitate temporary migration to other communities for work, to gain access to resources
such as permits and subsidies or to share information about beneficial programs (Cinti et
al. 2010), or to share information about new technologies (Bavinck 1996).
35
The study of connectivity among sub-regions of the study area provides insights
into the movement of fishers in the NG. Knowing the areas from which fishers are
coming and the areas to which they are moving could help managers choose areas on
which to most effectively focus outreach efforts. Keeping track of trends in movement
patterns of fishers can also be an important tool for helping to anticipate regions of the
NG that will face pressure from population growth and increased fishing effort.
Managing access rights to resources is an ongoing challenge for those working in
management of small-scale fisheries. While the diverse kinship ties linking communities
throughout the region could potentially be used to diffuse information about management
activities, it seems that fishers tend to use these networks more to share information about
things such as good fishing zones and impending enforcement activities. Identifying key
players may prove to be just the first step; within that set of key players it may be
necessary to conduct outreach efforts about the importance and value of different
management activities and promote sharing of that information. Understanding what
types of information move through different communication networks and why certain
types of information but not others are shared will help both managers and resource users
better manage fisheries resources.
36
Combining social and spatial networks of small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico
One of the challenges in managing CPRs lies in delineating appropriate
boundaries and determining who should have access to what. When flows of CPRs are
mobile and boundaries are difficult to distinguish, management faces special challenges.
Combining social network analysis with spatial data and analysis methods provides
useful way to examine patterns of CPR use that may extend beyond traditional physical
and social boundary definitions. Incorporating spatial information improves social
network analysis of small-scale fisheries by providing a multi-dimensional view of how
fishers and fishing communities interact in physical space. For example, one way in
which small-scale fishers are connected is through their use of fishing zones. By knowing
where fishers are working and where they live, we can create a network that shows how
different communities are connected through their use of fishing zones. Managers can
then incorporate this information into strategies for sustainable use of small-scale
fisheries resources.
I found that convergence of fishing zones between communities is generally
divided along geographic lines: communities that are closer together generally have more
points of convergence of fishing zones. These patterns of use offer considerations and
guidance to managers for organizing regionalization of small-scale fisheries in the NG
and make suggestions for ways to group communities together for management purposes,
based on convergence of fishing zones or use of Marine Protected Areas.
37
I also found that both total area of fishing zones and maximum distance traveled
to fishing zones were positively correlated with whether or not communities had highway
access and commercial ice production facilities. Increased development in the region may
allow previously isolated communities to increase their fishing ranges. This, in turn,
increases the potential for conflict with other communities (as potential convergence of
fishing zones increases with expansion of fishing zone size) (Gillis and Peterman 1998).
It may also mean greater impact on marine resources, as fishers are able to travel farther
to work and have improved access to markets and other important resources (Laurance et
al. 2006; Wilkie et al. 2000; Kurien 1978).
Fishing communities in the NG may extend beyond the standard boundaries of
towns and fishing camps. Understanding which communities are fishing in different areas
may help fishers, as well as those working in management and conservation, to better
develop, implement, and enforce boundary rules. By expanding the definition of
‘community’ to include not just physical town boundaries but CPR users with a common
interest, we can improve our understanding of how management strategies and decisions
will influence or impact the true community of CPR users (St. Martin et al. 2007;
Agrawal and Gibson 1999). Without enforceable boundaries that are understood and
respected by resource users, the sustainable management of CPRs is highly unlikely.
When coupled with other information such as biological data (i.e., data about landings or
catch composition as reported by fishers), the combination of network analysis and
spatial information can offer guidance for determining units for regional fisheries
38
management and may help to create a system of boundaries rules that are respected by
resource users and ultimately support sustainable use of fisheries resources.
Marine Protected Areas, social networks, and the emergence of collaboration for
small-scale fisheries
The management of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in Mexico has proved to be
a complex and challenging proposition (Fraga and Jesus 2008). It has been posited that
certain structural characteristics of a social network can support or hinder collaborative
behavior. In order to examine the connections between social networks and the ability of
fishers to work collaboratively, I conducted an in-depth social network analysis of users
of two different Marine Protected Areas in the region: the San Pedro Mártir Biosphere
Reserve (SPMI) and the Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes
Biosphere Reserve (BLABR), focusing on networks of information sharing and advice
about small-scale fishing. I also collected information about the ways in which fishers
organized to work and access resources and used this information to develop a measure
of each community’s capacity for organization and collaboration.
My results provide mixed evidence for the role of social structure in impacting
positive outcomes for fishers’ ability to work together to organize. While the on-theground results point toward increased collaboration in BLABR, we found that some of
the structural characteristics that might be associated with collaborative action (i.e., some
measures of network density and centralization, as well as certain brokerage tendencies)
39
were higher for SPMI. For other measures, our hypothesis that Bahía de los Ángeles
would show a greater propensity for organization is supported.
In this study we suspect that combination of factors is responsible for the
observed outcomes, including the salience of the resource to users and the distance of the
community of users to the resource. While social structure is important to consider, it is
equally important to consider other features of the situation. Even when many of the
structural characteristics of a network point towards the likelihood of collaboration, these
other features may ultimately have a greater impact.
Implications for the sustainable management of small-scale fisheries
The incorporation of social networks into natural resource management is a
relatively recent phenomenon that shows great promise for contributing to the sustainable
use of common-pool natural resources. Understanding social networks can help shed light
on the association of local patterns of social connectivity with the development of
institutional arrangements that lead to positive outcomes for CPR systems. This
information, in turn, can be used to develop effective conservation and management
strategies and policies for CPRs. Are certain types of social structures found more
frequently in successful (or unsuccessful) CPR management situations? How does
information flow between users of a resource or between users and managers of the
resource? How can managers use this knowledge to be most efficient in their use of
limited human and financial resources for outreach and enforcement efforts? Who are
the key stakeholders to involve in management and enforcement efforts and decisions,
40
and are they all being included in an effective way? Social network analysis can help us
to answer these questions. By understanding how users of CPR systems are connected
and the ways in which they communicate and interact, we can develop a more complete
picture of the ecosystem and improve management efforts.
In Mexico, recent changes in federal fisheries law calls for the development of
regional fishery management plans, which will likely involve new temporal and
geographic restrictions on fishing activities. Using social network analysis to help
identify similar communities based on their use of fishing zones can help in determining
geographic boundaries for management units. Ultimately the results of a network analysis
might be used to contribute to the design of new natural protected areas and no-take
zones and in assigning permits, concessions, and other use rights for small-scale fisheries
in the NG.
In my research I hypothesize that a combination of factors is responsible for the
observed outcomes, and it is important to consider the entire context of the CPR situation.
In addition to the structural features described in this research, considering attributes of
the resource itself, including its salience to the community, the formal rules governing the
resource, and whether or not these rules are being enforced are all important parts of the
equation. The use of social network methods, however, can help provide a deeper
understanding of the situation and plays an important role in helping to design more
effective management strategies for small-scale fisheries.
A wide range of factors affect the emergence of institutions for CPR management
and there is no single recipe for success (Ostrom 2007). Similarly, finding a common
41
network structure or pattern of structures that are associated with collaboration for the
sustainable use of CPRs across the board is unlikely (Bodin and Crona 2009). Although
we can point to network patterns that tend to be present in situations where users have
been able to successfully organize to manage CPRs, the presence of these structural
features in and of themselves is likely not enough to ensure success or failure.
Nevertheless, an understanding of the social networks that connect communities and
individuals and the potential pathways for information transfer, combined with a system
of enforceable rules and policies and effective outreach methods and materials, may help
managers and resource users more effectively and sustainably manage marine resources
in the long term.
42
Table 1. Overview of RA interviews, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Community
# interviews
# pangas
% interviewed
Bahía de los Ángeles
20
29
68.97%
Bahía de Kino
48
200
24.00%
Desemboque de Caborca
20
28
71.43%
Desemboque Seri
15
20
75.00%
El Barril
5
12
41.67%
El Golfo de Santa Clara
61
460
13.26%
Las Ánimas Norte
2
2
100.00%
Los Dorados de Villa
1
1
100.00%
Punta Chueca
21
49
42.86%
Punta Jagüey
2
11
18.18%
Puerto Libertad
40
95
42.11%
Puerto Lobos
16
20
80.00%
Puerto Peñasco
46
153
30.07%
San Felipe
45
325
13.85%
San Jorge
16
21
76.19%
San Luis Gonzaga
8
7
114.29%
Santo Tomás
10
11
90.91%
TOTAL
376
1444
26.04%
43
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50
APPENDIX A. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN FISHERIES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
SUBMITTED TO ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY
By Jennifer N. Dubersteina, Richard Cudney-Buenob,c, Jorge Torred, William W. Shawa,
and Tad A. Pfistera
a
School of Natural Resources, University of Arizona, Biological Sciences East Room
325, Tucson, Arizona, 85721 USA.
b
Institute of Marine Sciences, Long Marine Laboratories, University of California Santa
Cruz, 100 Schaffer Road, Santa Cruz, CA 95060, USA
c
Conservation and Science Program, The David and Lucile Packard Foundation, 300
Second Street, Los Altos, CA 94022
d
Comunidad y Biodiversidad, A.C., Blvd. Agua Marina #297, entre Jaiba y Tiburón,
Colonia Delicias, Guaymas, Sonora 85420, Mexico
Key words: social network analysis, common-pool resources, small-scale fisheries, Gulf
of California, sustainable management, kinship networks
51
Understanding Social Connectivity in Fisheries: Implications for Management in
the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
Jennifer N. Duberstein, Richard Cudney-Bueno, Jorge Torre, William W. Shaw, and Tad
A. Pfister
ABSTRACT
The sustainable management of common pool natural resources (CPRs) has
challenged resource managers and users alike for many years. Small-scale fisheries are an
example of CPRs that have often proven difficult to manage sustainably. The role of
social networks is one aspect of CPRs and fisheries management that is only recently
beginning to receive formal attention. Communication has been shown to be an important
piece of understanding sustainable use of CPRs. Kinship ties, in particular, have been
identified as an important mechanism for information transfer pertaining to the
sustainable use of CPRs. We use social network analysis to examine how kinship ties
connect small-scale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. We
calculated degree centrality to identify the communities in the network that were the most
highly connected via kinship ties. We then performed a key player analysis, identifying
six key communities to target for information dissemination. Degree centrality results
may be useful for understanding diversity, while the key player analysis provides
suggestions for the best way to allocate resources to ensure optimal information
dissemination. Social networks methods for identifying key players can assist managers
and resource users in determining the most efficient and effective ways to direct their
52
limited resources by harnessing existing communication networks, although fishers may
also use these networks to share information that is detrimental to management and
enforcement efforts. An understanding of the social networks that connect communities
and the potential pathways for information transfer, combined with a system of
enforceable rules and policies and effective outreach methods and materials, may help
managers and resource users more effectively and sustainably manage CPRs in the long
term.
Key words: social network analysis, common-pool resources, small-scale fisheries, Gulf
of California, sustainable management, kinship networks
INTRODUCTION
The sustainable management of common pool resources (CPRs) has challenged
resource managers and users alike for many years. Common pool resources are those for
which access is difficult to limit and use by one person decreases the value of the
resource for others (Dietz et al. 2002; Salafsky et al. 2002; Berkes et al. 2001). As such,
outcomes in the use of CPRs largely depend on human behavior, which is often
determined by community and social relations (Berkes et al. 2001) such as rules, norms,
and strategies governing the use of CPRs (Ostrom 1999).
Fisheries are an example of CPRs that have proven difficult to manage
sustainably. Part of the difficulty in managing fisheries is due to the lack of
53
understanding of the spatial scales at which they operate, whether they are spatial scales
related to biological connectivity of the species harvested (i.e., larval dispersal or adult
movement) or the social linkages between communities harvesting fishery resources.
Indeed, studies of biological connectivity have shown the importance of protecting
corridors or semi-contiguous patches of important habitat in order to protect marine
resources (Cowen et al. 2006; Botsford et al. 2001).
Just as addressing biological connectivity can improve fisheries management,
understanding how fishing communities are connected socially can lead to the design of
more robust management policies and programs. Studying the flow of information among
fishers and between fishers and those in fisheries management via social networks aids in
determining how and why fishers make the decisions they do about the use of fisheries
resources (Crona and Bodin 2006) and therefore in carving out management approaches
that are more appropriate for the existing decision making process. More generally,
communication has been shown to affect the degree to which CPRs are used sustainably
(Ostrom 2005; Dietz et al. 2003; McCay 2002; Ostrom et al. 2002). In particular, kinship
ties have been identified as a mechanism for information transfer and the adoption of
rules that can mitigate issues hindering sustainable use of common-pool resources, such
as small-scale fisheries (Schlager 2002).
An examination of the ways in which CPR users are connected via kinship
networks can provide insights into the ways in which information moves through a
network of users and managers. Social network analysis, which focuses on the study of
54
patterns of structures of social relations (Breiger 2004), is a useful tool for understanding
connectivity and communication among fishers. Nevertheless, while networks and social
connectivity are often mentioned as being important to the sustainable management of
CPRs (Dietz et al. 2003; Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2000), the incorporation of social
networks into CPR management has only recently begun to receive formal attention
(Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton 2009; Carlsson and Sandström 2008; Ernstson et al.
2008; Prell et al. 2008; Prell et al. 2007; Bodin et al. 2006; Crona and Bodin 2006).
Here we provide a case study of how social network analysis can be used to
inform management of small-scale fisheries operating within large, regional seascapes
used by multiple communities. We use social networks methods to examine small-scale
fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (herein referred to as NG), a region
that is an important provider of fishery resources for Mexico (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009).
This study examines the ways that kinship ties connect communities at a regional level
and discusses the potential of these ties for facilitating information transfer, in ways that
may either support or hinder management and enforcement efforts.
From a regional perspective, our study provides the first view of kinship ties of
small-scale fishers in the NG, adding much needed information for the development and
communication of regional management recommendations. For instance, given a limited
amount of financial and human resources, mangers could capitalize on existing kinship
ties within and between communities in the NG to more effectively disseminate
information throughout the region by targeting communities that are well-connected.
55
Similarly, communities outside of the NG may nevertheless be key for the dissemination
of information due to their strong ties to fishers in the NG. In cases where fishers share
information with each other that is detrimental to management efforts, understanding the
flow of information among small-scale fishers can also help managers to develop more
effective enforcement and management strategies.
Our study provides the first approach of which we are aware for using an
understanding of information flow through multiple communities to assist in management
and conservation of fisheries at regional scales. In the following sections we give a brief
description of the NG and its fisheries and a description of the methodological and
analytical approaches used in this study. We then discuss our results in the context of the
application of social network analysis for fisheries management in the NG and
management of CPRs.
The study area: the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
The NG comprises the area between mainland Mexico and Baja California,
beginning at the mouth of the Colorado River, just south of the international boundary
with the United States, and continuing south to Bahía de Kino and El Barril in Sonora
and Baja California, respectively (Thomson et al. 2000)(Figure 1). It includes over 3,000
km of coastline and 58,000 km2 of marine habitat used by seventeen principal fishing
communities (Moreno-Baez et al. In press). The region is characterized not only by its
56
high biodiversity and conservation importance but also by its extreme climate,
remoteness, and a relatively sparse population (Brusca et al. 2005; INEGI 2005; Turner
and Brown 1994). It is recognized as a conservation site of hemispheric importance
(Aguilar Ibarra et al. 2005) and is one of the most productive marine ecosystems in the
world (Brusca et al. 2005; Hyun 2005). It has also been the subject of numerous regional,
national, and international conservation efforts (Aburto Oropeza and López Sagástegui
2006; Ulloa et al. 2006; Weaver et al. 2003).
Small-scale commercial fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
There are three fishing sectors in the NG: industrial (principally shrimp trawling
and sardine purse seine fishing), sport, and small-scale fishing. This study focuses on
small-scale fishers, a group characterized by its use of small (20-26’) outboard motor (55115 hp) boats (locally called pangas), versatility in fishing gear and methods, a relatively
low investment in equipment, and an ability to target multiple species (Cudney-Bueno
and Turk-Boyer 1998). As in the rest of the world, small-scale fishing plays an important
role in the NG. Some communities, like Bahía de Kino, still have economies that rely
heavily on small-scale fishing. Others, like Puerto Peñasco, have other significant
industries, such as tourism, although fishing remains a mainstay of the economy. There
are indigenous fishing communities, such as Punta Chueca and Desemboque de los Seris,
as well as temporal fishing camps, such as Punta Jagüey. Between 1600 and 3000 pangas
currently operate in the NG depending on the time of year (PANGAS Project,
unpublished data), each with a team of two or three fishers. Collectively, the fleet targets
57
over seventy species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans, and echinoderms on a regular basis
(Moreno Rivera et al. 2007; Cudney-Bueno 2000).
Social networks and small-scale fisheries in the NG
Small-scale fishers and those working in fisheries management in the NG are
connected in a variety of different ways, ranging from who they work with to where and
how they fish. For example, a panga has a team of fishers who tend to work as part of a
cooperative or in connection with a permit holder or buyer (Cinti et al. 2009). One
important connection for fishers in the region is kinship. Few of the small-scale fishers in
the NG were born in the communities in which they now live and work. Instead, many
emigrated to the region, first during the heyday of the totoaba fishery in the 1930s and
1940s (Bahre and Bourillon 2002; Bahre et al. 2000) and later in the 1970s and beyond to
take advantage of the small-scale fishing boom (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). Many
came from inland communities where they worked as ranchers, farmers, or miners, while
others were fishers from coastal communities to the south. Once they reached the NG,
some settled in one community while others moved between different communities in the
region. Because of this pattern, fishers in the NG have kinship ties to other communities
in the region, as well as elsewhere in Mexico and their movements have created networks
of communication within and between communities.
In the NG kinship, ties improve access to resources such as permits, subsidies,
financial assistance, and other government programs and are also used to facilitate
58
movement of fishers between communities in the region (Cinti et al. 2010). They also
provide an important mechanism for the transfer of information important for
management, such as location of good fishing zones (Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton
2009), poaching events, and imminent enforcement activities (PANGAS Project,
unpublished data). Understanding how fishers share information about all of these topics
has important implications, both in ways that may positively and negatively impact
management and sustainability of fisheries resources; however, these ties have never
been formally analyzed or studied.
METHODS
From December 2005 through August 2006 we undertook a Rapid Appraisal
(RA) of the state of small scale fisheries in the NG (PANGAS Project,
http://pangas.arizona.edu), focusing on seventeen fishing communities and camps in the
region (Figure 1). These varied in size, with resident fishers ranging from two to
approximately 460 (PANGAS Project, unpublished data). Maintaining accurate records
of fishers and boats is challenging because numbers vary throughout the year due to a
constant migration both between communities in the study area and to and from areas
elsewhere in Mexico (Cinti et al. 2010), but altogether we estimate somewhere between
1000 and 1600 total resident fishers in the NG.
59
Structured interviews
We conducted 376 structured interviews with small-scale fishers in the seventeen
communities throughout the NG. In order to select respondents, we developed a list of
active pangas for each community and identified their captains (for more details see
Moreno-Báez et al. in press). We targeted panga captains as our sampling unit because
they were generally the most experienced and knowledgeable fishers and tend to make
decisions about where and when to fish. We then used stratified random sampling as
established by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) (see Bernard 1995: 77-78) to calculate a
sample size that ensured a 90% probability sample with a 10% confidence interval for
each fishing community (for communities with ten or fewer pangas, we endeavored to
interview all captains). In some communities there was a very small subset of fishers who
practiced a different fishing art. In these cases, if the second fishing art was not
represented in the sample, we also interviewed the small subset of captains in order to
ensure that the RA was as representative as possible of all fishing methods used in the
community. Ultimately, we interviewed from 13-100% of the captains in each
community for an overall sample size of 26% of the total population of small-scale
fishing captains in the NG.
The RA interview included a combination of closed and open-ended questions
about demographics, fishing experience and activities, and kinship networks. To learn
about networks we asked respondents whether they had family members who worked in
small-scale fishing and, if so, where those family members lived. We defined ‘kinship’
60
relations as parent, sibling, aunt/uncle, cousin, grandparent, niece/nephew, in-law, or
compadre (similar to a godparent and considered to be part of the family).
For analysis, we divided the NG into four sub-regions: northeast, southeast,
northwest, and southwest (Figure 1). We used UCINET 6.0 and KeyPlayer 2 software to
analyze the social networks of respondents (Borgatti 2006; Borgatti et al. 2002). We use
communities as the unit of analysis, although we also discuss kinship connections
between study sub-regions. Social networks comprise nodes and ties. In this study, the
nodes are the communities in the NG and the ties represent kinship connections between
communities. We examined the connectivity of communities in the study by calculating
degree centrality and conducting a key player analysis.
Analysis
In order to study the ways in which communities in the NG are connected by
kinship ties between small-scale fishers, we used social network analysis methods. Social
networks comprise nodes (the network members, which in this study are the seventeen
communities in the study area) and ties, or the relations that connect network members.
In this study, two communities were connected if a fisher in one community had a family
member that lives in another community. The following sections describe in more detail
the specific analysis methods that we used to examine these kinship networks of smallscale fishers in the NG.
61
Determining kinship linkages between communities
Degree centrality is a measure of network activity that counts the number of ties
between each node in a network. The most central actors have the most ties to other
actors in the network. Degree centrality can be useful as a measure of capacity for
exchange and the most central actors in a network tend to be recognized as sources of
information (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In the case of kinship networks in the NG,
communities with the highest degree centrality (i.e., the most central network members)
have ties to the greatest number of other communities, thus giving them a greater
capacity for information exchange.
We used UCINET 6.0 to calculate degree centrality of each community in the
network. To do this we created a symmetric, dichotomous community by community
matrix of kinship ties (Table 1) 2. Because we conducted a different number of interviews
in each community, we normalized centrality scores in order to allow us to compare
networks of different sizes (Wasserman and Faust 1994). We did not collect social
network data from the single interview in the community of Los Dorados de Villa, so we
dropped this community from analyses.
2
Since kinship ties are by definition symmetric, we used UCINET to symmetrize the community by
community matrix (if someone in community A mentioned a family member in community B, community
B, by definition, also had a family member in community A, even if we did not interview that person).
62
Identifying key players for information transfer
Degree centrality provided us with a basic measure of the number of ties
connecting communities, but in order understand the potential for influence of each
community on others, taking into account the entire network structure, we used the
KeyPlayer 2 program to conduct an analysis of kinship ties between communities. Key
players are network members that are connected to the most other distinct nodes in a nonredundant way; that is, key players are connected to nodes to which other key players
tend not to be connected. A key player analysis is used for identifying well-connected
nodes that, due to their network positions, are likely to influence other network members
(Borgatti 2006). From a fisheries management perspective, this information can be
important for either understanding which communities are important hubs for information
transfer, both in ways that support or undermine management efforts.
To use KeyPlayer, told the program how many nodes should be included in the
final set (through a trial and error process, we chose six, the minimum number required to
reach 100% of this network). The program then used a combinatorial optimization
algorithm to find the best combination(s) (Borgatti 2006). In this study, we wanted to
know the optimal number of communities to target to effectively disseminate information
via direct kinship ties. A direct tie is one where two nodes do not need to go through a
third party to communicate but are instead linked directly to each other. In our study a
community had a direct tie to another community if the respondent had a family member
in the second community. For this analysis we used the same community by community
63
matrix that we created for the degree centrality analysis (Table 1). We then used the
KeyPlayer 2 combinatorial optimization algorithm to choose a set of communities that
were not only well-connected but who also had ties that were not duplicated by another
key player. This final group of six communities comprised our key player set.
RESULTS
Kinship ties in the Northern Gulf: an overview
Kinship ties between small-scale fishers in the NG connected fishers within and
between communities in the study area and the four sub-regions. They also connected
communities in the study area to communities and states located elsewhere in Mexico. In
order to incorporate these ties into our analyses, we lumped some communities into more
general categories. GULF represents communities located in one of the states bordering
the Gulf of California (Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, or Nayarit)
but outside of the communities included in Rapid Appraisal. OTHER is a category for
other states in Mexico (Jalisco, Guerrero, Chiapas, and Tamaulipas), and UNKNOWN
represents communities for which interviewers only recorded the name but not a more
precise location (many communities in the region share the same name and the
information recorded was not sufficient to definitively determine a location) (Figure 2).
The majority of respondents had family members who were also small-scale
fishers (82%; n=309), although some had family members who worked in industrial
64
fishing (20%; n=76) and sport fishing (12%; n=46). Of fishers with family members who
were also fishers, 41% reported sharing information about small-scale fishing with them,
including the location of good fishing zones. Respondents in all four study sub-regions
reported the greatest number of kinship ties with small-scale fishers from their own
communities. After intra-community ties, respondents reported the greatest number of
ties with others who lived in the same sub-region (Figure 3).
After intra-region ties, fishers in all four sub-regions reported the highest number
of kinship ties with communities in the GULF category. In particular, the community of
Guaymas, Sonora was mentioned by respondents in all four sub-regions. It was the most
frequently mentioned community, accounting for 30% of ties with the GULF category
across all four sub-regions. Respondents mentioned eight communities in the state of
Sinaloa, as well as just the state itself. When we lumped all of these responses into the
general category of ‘Sinaloa,’ the state accounts for an additional 24% of ties with the
GULF category and was mentioned by respondents in three of the four sub-regions.
Determining kinship linkages between communities
Puerto Libertad, Puerto Peñasco, and Bahía de Kino emerged as the most central
communities when using degree centrality as a measure (eight, eight, and five ties to
other communities in the study, respectively (normalized centrality of 53.333, 53.333,
and 33.333) (Table 2). Punta Jagüey and El Barril had degree centralities of zero,
65
meaning that, based on the Rapid Appraisal they were not connected to any other
communities in the region via kinship ties.
Identifying key players for information transfer
In order to reach 100% of the communities in the study area via direct kinship
ties, six communities must be included in the key player set (Figure 4) 3. Initially key
players are the communities with the greatest degree centrality: Puerto Peñasco and
Puerto Libertad are included in both sets. After that, however, the two measures diverge,
with the key player set including extremely non-central actors, such as Punta Jagüey and
El Barril. In order to reach 100% of the network, these two disconnected communities
must be included in the key player set because there is no other way to reach them. Other
central communities, like Bahía Kino, are not included in the key player set because its
ties are made redundant by the ties of other key players.
3
Combining expert knowledge of the region allowed us to select key players more accurately, beyond the
results of the KeyPlayer 2 program. The analysis yielded two sets of potential key players, identical except
for one community: one set included Bahía de los Ángeles (BLA) while the other included Las Ánimas
Norte (LAN). Because we knew that fishers in the camp of LAN generally lived in BLA when they were
not camping, we were able to select BLA as a more appropriate key player. Thus, incorporating expert
knowledge with the results of the analysis proved to be an important part of selecting appropriate key
players.
66
DISCUSSION
Kinship networks and community linkages
Our results show that there is considerable linkage of small-scale fishers via
kinship ties not only within and between communities in the NG, but also in states
throughout the Gulf of California and elsewhere in the country. These linkages provide
pathways for the transfer of information within and between communities (Schlager
2002; Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2000) when fishers activate these kinship networks to
discuss good fishing areas, to facilitate temporary migration to other communities for
work, to gain access to resources such as permits and subsidies or to share information
about beneficial programs (Cinti et al. 2010), or to share information about new
technologies (Bavinck 1996).
Those working in fisheries management and conservation may be able to target
network key players to facilitate the transfer of information that supports management
and conservation efforts, such as opportunities, programs, changes in rules, or new
technologies (e.g., Coleman et al. 1957). In this scenario, managers share information
with fishers in key player communities, who then share the information with family
members in other communities. Since inadequate funds and lack of personnel often
hinder even the best conservation and management efforts, social network methods for
identifying key players can assist managers and resource users to determine the most
efficient and effective ways to direct their limited resources by harnessing existing
communication networks to their best advantage.
67
Some communities showed a much greater diversity of kinship ties than did
others (and hence a higher degree centrality). To a certain extent, this might be explained
by the size of the community. That is, one would expect a community like Puerto
Libertad, with 95 active pangas to have more diverse ties to other communities than a
small fishing camp, such as El Barril, which had no external kinship ties and only ten
active pangas. This turns out to be somewhat the case: the community of Puerto Libertad
had kinship ties to eight other communities, versus zero for El Barril. On the other hand,
the community of Bahía de Kino, with 200 active pangas had ties to only five other
communities in the region, so size is not the only factor at play in determining the
number of kinship ties between communities in the NG.
Movement between communities
The information that fishers share with family members may support management
activities, such as passing on details about government programs that benefit fishers or
discussing new management activities and actions. However, fishers also share
information with family members that does not necessarily support management efforts
and can, in fact, hinder them. One of the most common examples of this lies in the ways
in which fishers use kinship ties to access fisheries resources in other communities.
Many fishers in the NG emigrated from other areas in the Gulf of California or
elsewhere in Mexico, resulting in a widespread network of kinship ties (63% of fishers in
the RA (n=235) moved to the NG from other areas). These ties help provide fishers
68
access to fisheries resources which would otherwise be unavailable to them or difficult to
access. For example, several years ago the diving cooperative in Puerto Peñasco
voluntarily designated marine reserves for rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer) and
conducted their own monitoring program to determine the effectiveness of these efforts
(Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). While these reserves initially lead to an increase in the
health of the scallop population, news of this success spread rapidly. Divers from outside
the community moved into the area and, with disregard for local management efforts,
harvested within and outside of the reserves and prompted further rule-breaking by local
fishers (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). The diverse kinship ties between the community of
Puerto Peñasco and other communities in the NG may have contributed to the speed with
which information about the scallop beds was spread.
Although fishers from outside (those who come from other communities to fish
local resources for a few weeks or even months, but do not make their permanent home
in the community) are generally viewed as a threat to local fishers and provide challenges
to fisheries management, certain mechanisms have been developed to allow outsiders to
access local resources (Cinti et al. 2010; Basurto 2005). Indeed, many fishers in the
region regularly spend time working in communities other than their own during different
times of the year. For example, during our time in the field we observed a two week
temporary emigration of divers from Bahía de Kino south to Guaymas to take advantage
of a large pen shell scallop bed that had been found. Kinship ties helped provide access,
as fishers with family in Guaymas worked with those individuals to take advantage of the
69
opportunities (Cinti et al. 2010). By working with a local family member, the outsider is
able to learn about the opportunity, gain a degree of insider status during his time in the
community, and also have access to accommodations, food, and a supportive family
environment. In these cases, the kinship networks that connect communities allow fishers
to exploit resources more quickly and with increased pressure on the resource as fishers
from a number of different communities arrive at a location to work with family
members.
Implications for management and outreach efforts
When fishers share information with family members about things that benefit
sustainable use and management, such as details about new technology or management
programs, the results of the key player analysis can help managers determine the best
way to allocate limited human and financial resources to ensure optimal information
dissemination (Borgatti 2006). If managers can focus on communities that are the most
likely to share information with other communities, they can be more efficient and
effective in their effort. In addition to supporting information dissemination, identifying
key players could be an important part of making sure the appropriate people are
involved in co-management efforts. In Mexico, recent changes in federal fisheries law
calls for the development of regional fishery management plans (DOF 2007). These
management plans will likely involve new temporal and geographic restrictions on
fishing activities. The results of this key player analysis could be useful in developing
70
strategies for disseminating this information and communicating the rational for new
regulations and their potential benefits to fishers.
As we have also discussed, however, not all information shared by fishers with
family members supports management and conservation efforts. Nonetheless, managers
can also use knowledge about how this information moves among resource users to help
identify the mechanisms by which fishers share information about things like good
fishing zones, poaching events, and enforcement activities. If managers understand the
patterns of information flow between fishers and communities, they can consider new
strategies for monitoring and enforcement activities that do not require an element of
surprise, as many traditional enforcement activities do.
Although the ability to move from one community to another to take advantage of
resources may be beneficial to the specific fishers involved, a constant movement of
fishers in and out of a community may hinder the development of social capital, trust, and
a system of shared norms for resource use, all of which have been shown to be important
to the sustainable management of natural resources (Ostrom 2005; Agrawal 2002; Curran
2002). Communities with high degree centrality might indicate higher levels of inmigration. Since fishers in the region appear to use kinship ties to gain information about
and access to resources in other communities (Cinti et al. 2010), it is possible that degree
centrality could be used to identify communities which are more likely to face challenges,
conflict, and pressure brought on from an influx of outside fishers. Looking at degree
centrality may provide a way to anticipate or address issues before major problems begin
to manifest themselves.
71
The study of connectivity among sub-regions of the study area also provides
insights into the movement of fishers in the NG. Knowing the areas from which fishers
are coming and the areas to which they are moving could help managers choose areas on
which to most effectively focus outreach efforts. The ties between fishers in the northeast
and southeast region of the study area may indicate a migration of fishers from the south
to the northern portion of the NG. Also interesting is the connection between the
northwest and southeast region. In conversations with fishers in Bahía de Kino we
learned about new work opportunities in a geoduck (Panopea spp.) fishery in San Felipe
that have drawn fishers from Bahía de Kino, which may help explain this pattern of ties.
Keeping track of trends like this can be an important tool for helping to anticipate
regions of the NG that will face pressure from population growth and increased fishing
effort. Although they are not in the NG, various communities in the state of Sinaloa and
the city of Guaymas appear to be tightly connected to the NG via fisher kinship ties. It is
reasonable to consider the importance of conducting outreach to fishers in these two areas
as a means for supporting sustainable management of resources in the NG.
Directions for future research
This study provides an important first step in understanding the role of kinship
networks for the transfer of information among small-scale fishers in the NG. The next
steps will involve improving our understanding of the types of information that are
shared via kinship ties, testing ways in which managers may be able to tap these existing
networks to encourage the transfer of information that is beneficial to sustainability of
72
fisheries resources, and exploring the other relations that are important for information
transfer, such as friendship (Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton 2009).
As certain resources become depleted in the Gulf of California, small-scale fishers
shift their efforts to target others. Research has shown that fishers throughout the Gulf of
California are capturing smaller individuals and many fisheries have shifted from higherlevel predators such as groupers to lower trophic level species, such as wrasses (Sagarin
et al. 2008; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2006; Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2005a; Sáenz-Arroyo et al.
2005b; Sala et al. 2004). As the resources being fished change, so, too, may fishers’
social networks. Both kinship ties themselves as well as the utility of these ties for
accessing information and resources may change depending on the availability of
fisheries resources (Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton 2009). When a fishery becomes
commercially unviable, the social networks that link fishers may also become unviable or
may shift, losing local knowledge and social capital in addition to the resources
themselves. An interesting future study might combine an examination of resource use
and health with communication networks.
The data collected during the RA provide a regional-level overview of kinship
networks are not a completely accurate representation of all kinship ties in the region. For
instance, we detected no kinship ties between the communities of Punta Chueca and
Bahía de Kino although past experience in the two communities shows that they do exist
(X. Basurto pers. comm.) In an area as large as the NG, it was necessary to select only a
sample of fishers from each community to interview. Although the stratified random
73
sampling that we conducted provided a useful method for examining the state of smallscale fisheries at a regional scale, it may not have been the most effective method for
sampling kinship networks. Stratifying fishers not only by community but also by other
relevant factors could provide more accurate results for future studies.
CONCLUSIONS
Past research has demonstrated the importance of taking into account social and
political factors affecting marine ecosystems, in addition to the biophysical ones (Dietz et
al. 2002; Schlager 2002). Considering social networks in the context of management of
small-scale fisheries can be a useful tool for the sustainable management of commonpool natural resources (Prell et al. 2008; Bodin et al. 2006; Crona and Bodin 2006). Both
users and managers can harness the power of existing networks to their best advantage.
Examining kinship networks provides one example of how information
potentially moves between small-scale fishing communities in large regional seascapes
such as the NG. In addition to kinship, future studies might consider including other
network types, such as friendship and co-work. In large networks collecting complete
network data is nearly impossible, so it is important to select a sampling method that will
gather representative data about the social network.
Managing access rights to resources is an ongoing challenge for those working in
management of small-scale fisheries. While the diverse kinship ties linking communities
74
throughout the region could potentially be used to diffuse information about management
activities, it seems that fishers tend to use these networks more to share information about
things such as good fishing zones and impending enforcement activities. Identifying key
players may prove to be just the first step; within that set of key players it may be
necessary to conduct outreach efforts about the importance and value of different
management activities and promote sharing of that information. Understanding what
types of information move through different communication networks and why certain
types of information but not others are shared will help both managers and resource users
better manage fisheries resources.
The flow of information among fishers and between fishers and resource
managers is an important part of understanding how and why fishers make decisions
about how and where to fish. Understanding this will help users and managers create
more effective systems for the sustainable use of fisheries resources. An understanding of
the social networks that connect communities and the potential pathways for information
transfer, combined with a system of enforceable rules and policies and effective outreach
methods and materials, may help managers and resource users more effectively and
sustainably manage common-pool resources in the long term.
75
Acknowledgements
This research was made possible by contributions from the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation and the Wallace Research Foundation through the PANGAS Project.
We would like to express our gratitude to the many fishers who participated in this
research; to Marcia Moreno-Báez for the development of Figures 1 and 4 and for her
input on previous drafts of this paper; and to Ana Cinti and Martin Rivera Soldevilla
(University of Arizona), Olegario Morales, Rene Loaiza Villanueva, Sergio Perez
Valencia, and Peggy Turk-Boyer (CEDO), and Cesar Moreno and Mario Rojo (COBI)
for insightful discussions about the region’s fisheries and many hours conducting
interviews and entering data. J.N. Duberstein would especially like to thank Juan Caicedo
for perceptive feedback and support throughout the development of this paper. This paper
represents the views of the authors and not necessarily those of their institutions and
funders. This is a scientific contribution of the PANGAS project,
http://pangas.arizona.edu.
76
Figure 1. Study area and sub-regions, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. Cartographic design: Marcia
Moreno-Báez.
Table 1. Matrix of kinship ties connecting small-scale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BDA BKI DDC DDS EBA GSC LAN PCH PJA PLI PLO PPE SFE SJO SLG STO
BDA
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
BKI
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
DDC
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
DDS
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
LAN
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PCH
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PLI
1
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
PLO
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
PPE
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
SFE
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1
0
SJO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
SLG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
STO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
77
78
Figure 2. Locations of respondents’ kinship ties with other fishers living in the states of the Gulf of
California and other states throughout Mexico.
79
140
120
100
# kinship ties
NE
80
SE
NW
60
SW
GULF
40
OTHER
UNKNOWN
20
0
NE
SE
NW
SW
Study Sub-region
Figure 3. Kinship ties of small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf of California by sub-region (n=376,
missing=64). (NE=Northeast, SE=Southeast, NW=Northwest, SW=Southwest, GULF=Gulf of California
states outside of the study region, OTHER=other states outside of the Gulf of California, UNKNOWN =
unable to determine specific location.)
80
Table 2. Freeman’s degree centrality measures for community kinship ties of small-scale fishers in the
Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (n=376, missing=64).
Community
Puerto Peñasco
Puerto Libertad
Bahía de Kino
Golfo de Santa Clara
Desemboque de Caborca
San Felipe
Bahía de Los Ángeles
Puerto Lobos
San Luis Gonzaga
Desemboque de los Seris
San Jorge
Puncha Chueca
Santo Tomás
Las Ánimas Norte
Punta Jagüey
El Barril
Degree
8.000
8.000
5.000
4.000
4.000
4.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
2.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
Normalized Degree
53.3333
53.3333
33.3333
26.6667
26.6667
26.6667
26.6667
20.0000
13.3333
13.3333
6.6667
6.6667
6.6667
6.6667
0.000
0.000
Mean=3.000; SD=2.424; Normalized Mean=20.000; Normalized Standard Deviation=16.159
81
Figure 4. Kinship networks and key players connecting small-scale fishing communities in the Northern
Gulf of California, Mexico. Cartographic design: Marcia Moreno-Báez.
82
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APPENDIX B. USING SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SPATIAL ANALYSIS FOR
MANAGEMENT OF SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Jennifer N. Dubersteina, Marcia Moreno-Baeza, Sergio Perez-Valenciab, and Mario Rojoc
a
School of Natural Resources, University of Arizona, Biological Sciences East Room
325, Tucson, Arizona, 85721 USA.
b
Centro Intercultural de Estudios de Desiertos y Océanos. Apartado Postal #53.
Puerto Peñasco, Sonora, Mexico.
c
Comunidad y Biodiversidad, A.C., Blvd. Agua Marina #297, entre Jaiba y Tiburón,
Colonia Delicias, Guaymas, Sonora 85420, Mexico
Key words: small-scale fisheries, social network analysis, social and spatial networks,
GIS, regional management, common-pool resources
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Using social networks and spatial analysis for management of small-scale fisheries
in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
Jennifer N. Duberstein, Marcia Moreno-Báez, Sergio Perez-Valencia, and Mario Rojo
ABSTRACT
One of the challenges in managing common-pool natural resources (CPRs) lies in
delineating appropriate boundaries and determining who should have access to what.
When flows of CPRs are mobile and boundaries are difficult to distinguish, such as for
many small-scale fisheries, management faces special challenges. Combining social
network analysis with spatial data and analysis methods provides useful way to examine
patterns of CPR use that may extend beyond traditional physical and social boundary
definitions. In this paper we combine spatial and social network analysis to show how
small-scale fishing communities in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (NG) are
connected by their use of fishing zones and Marine Protected Areas. We found that
convergence of fishing zones between communities is generally divided along geographic
lines: communities that are closer together generally have more points of convergence of
fishing zones. We also found that both total area of fishing zones and maximum distance
traveled to fishing zones were positively correlated with whether or not communities had
highway access and access to ice, pointing to the potential impact of development on
marine resource exploitation through increased fishing effort. Fishing communities in the
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NG may extend beyond the standard boundaries of towns and fishing camps.
Understanding which communities are fishing in different areas may help fishers, as well
as those working in management and conservation, to better develop, implement, and
enforce boundary rules. By expanding the definition of ‘community’ to include not just
physical town boundaries but CPR users with a common interest, we can improve our
understanding of how management strategies and decisions will influence or impact the
true community of CPR users. Without enforceable boundaries that are understood and
respected by resource users, the sustainable management of CPRs is highly unlikely.
When coupled with other information such as biological data (i.e., data about landings or
catch composition as reported by fishers), the combination of network analysis and
spatial information can offer guidance for determining units for regional fisheries
management and may help to create a system of boundaries rules that are respected by
resource users and ultimately support sustainable use of fisheries resources.
Key words: small-scale fisheries, social network analysis, social and spatial networks,
GIS, regional management, common-pool resources
INTRODUCTION
Common-pool natural resources (CPRs) are those for which access is difficult to
limit and use by one person decreases the value of the resource for others (Ostrom et al.
1999; Feeny et al. 1990). Examples of CPRs pastures (Ostrom 1990), irrigation systems
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(Schlager et al. 1994), and small-scale fisheries (Basurto 2005). One of the challenges in
managing CPRs lies in delineating appropriate boundaries and determining who should
have access to what. Having clearly defined boundaries is an important first step in
facilitating long-enduring CPR systems (Ostrom 1990). While in some situations it is
reasonably straightforward to define the physical boundaries of CPRs, in other cases
delineating boundaries can be more complicated. When CPRs are highly fluid (i.e., air,
water), mobile, or migratory (i.e., most fish populations) and boundaries are difficult to
distinguish, such for migratory fish populations, management faces special challenges,
including difficulty in gaining an accurate understanding of the health of the resource,
difficulty ensuring that users will directly benefit from their actions to improve or
manage the resource, and difficulty controlling the behavior of other resource users
(Schlager et al. 1994).
Boundaries of CPRs include both the physical limits of the resource as well as the
boundaries of the group that uses the resource. Access rights for CPRs can be placed in a
general category of boundary rules (Ostrom and Crawford 2005). These may include
things such as limiting access based on residency, use of technology (such as allowing
only certain types of fishing gear within a specified area), possession of a permit, or
membership in a group. They may also include spatially-based management measures
such as the creation of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs), inside of which certain activities
are limited or prohibited. Past research has shown that CPRs for which users are able to
clearly define boundaries and develop mechanisms for excluding ‘outsiders’ have a much
greater chance of being sustainably used (Basurto 2005; Ostrom et al. 1994).
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Small-scale fisheries are an example of a CPR for which establishing boundaries
can be difficult. Because geographic boundaries of marine ecosystems are large and
difficult to clearly define, these expansive areas are often subdivided into smaller units
for management purposes, based on things such as existing political and administrative
boundaries or resource users’ involvement in management activities (Gislason et al.
2000). While political boundaries, such as state lines, may be convenient mechanisms for
designating management units, they can fail to adequately capture the true population of
resource users, as community and ecosystem boundaries rarely coincide exactly (Degnbol
et al. 2006). For this reason, management schemes that use only these artificial
boundaries may find that they have created a system of that is not recognized or respected
by resource users, particularly in cases where resources are migratory in nature, such as
many small-scale fisheries (Blaikie 2006).
Social networks, CPRs, and spatial analysis
Social network analysis addresses the patterns of structures of relations among
actors (Breiger 2004). Networks and the idea of social connectivity are often mentioned
as being important to the sustainable management of CPRs (Dietz et al. 2003; Mazzucato
and Niemeijer 2000). Despite this, examinations of social networks have only recently
begun to be incorporated into the CPR literature (Bodin and Crona 2009; Carlsson and
Sandström 2008; Bodin et al. 2006). Studies of social networks have been used to
demonstrate the facilitation or hindrance of collective action for CPR management
(Ernstson et al. 2008; Crona and Bodin 2006), to determine who should be involved in
93
co-management efforts (Prell et al. 2009), and in the promotion of trust and cooperation
leading to sustainable CPR management (Grafton 2005), among a growing list of other
issues.
Social networks may be contained in geographic space, such as kinship networks
of users of particular natural protected areas (Gillingham 2001) or networks of equipment
sharing among residents of a geographic region (Faust et al. 2000). Social networks can
also be impacted and even created by geographic features in the environment. For
example, Faust et al. (2000) show the impact of rivers and bridges on the likelihood of a
tie between communities in Thailand. The presence of roads, bridges, ice production, and
improved transportation have all been shown to improve resource users’ ability to exploit
natural resources and transport these resources to a market (Laurance et al. 2006; Wilkie
et al. 2000; Rubinoff 1999; Chomitz and Gray 1996; Kurien 1978). If resource users are
connected by their use of a particular area or resource, the development of geographic
infrastructure, such as roads which allow improved access to resources that would
otherwise be inaccessible, can directly impact the social network of resource users.
Combining social networks and spatial information for small-scale fisheries
When combined with spatial information, social network analysis is a useful way
to help determine boundaries and thus access rights by examining the ways that resource
users are connected through their use of natural resources or particular areas. Spatial
information helps to improve the analysis and visualization of social networks and places
connections in their proper geographic context. Particularly for natural resource
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applications, seeing social connectivity in the context of the resources themselves shows
how geographic features impact the likelihood of a relation or connection between
resource users. This can aid those working in management and conservation to better
understand the interplay between social and geographic features of the system.
The merging of spatial information with social network analysis of small-scale
fisheries provides a multi-dimensional view of how fishers and fishing communities
interact in physical space. Communities that are located closer together are more likely to
share certain resources and therefore be connected through common resource use (Faust
et al. 2000). By knowing where fishers are working and where they live, it is possible to
create a social network that shows how different communities are connected through their
use of fishing zones. Managers and resource users can then use this information to
develop strategies for developing and managing boundaries and access rights that more
accurately reflect the on-the-ground situation and which therefore may ultimately be
more likely to be respected by users. This, in turn, helps support the sustainable use of
small-scale fisheries resources.
Study Area
This research focuses on small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf of California,
Mexico (herein referred to as the NG)(Figure 1), a group characterized by its use of 7-8
m fiberglass outboard motor boats (locally called pangas), its versatility in fishing gear
and methods, a relatively low investment in equipment, and an ability to target multiple
species (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). Small-scale fisheries are an example of
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use of a CPR that has had a wide range of outcomes, from long-term sustainable
management (Acheson 1997) to a continued declining trend in resource health (Sala et al.
2004).
In Mexico, small-scale fishers capture 31% of the national harvest of marine
resources, but account for 76% of the total economic value of fisheries resources (Aburto
Oropeza et al. 2009). The NG is no exception, where small-scale fishers play an
important role in the economy of the region (Carvajal-Moreno et al. 2004). It is estimated
that between 1600 and 3000 pangas currently operate in the NG depending on the time of
year, targeting over seventy species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans, and echinoderms on a
regular basis (Moreno Rivera et al. 2007; Cudney-Bueno 2000).
In the NG, some boundary rules come from the federal level. For instance, all
fishers are technically required to have a permit to be able to fish in the region.
Enforcement of this rule, however, is sporadic and many fishers continue to work
illegally (Cinti et al. 2010). Permits may limit fishers to working in a particular
geographic region, but these delimitations are generally quite large and are rarely
enforced 4. Legislation exists that can grant communities that are located adjacent to
certain classes of MPAs exclusive resource rights or preferential access to resources
(DOF 2008), although in the NG enforcement of this rule has also been difficult to
implement. In other cases, local groups of fishers have obtained concessions to extract
species in specific areas (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). Although some of these
4
The geographic range designated on fishing permits in the NG varies greatly and generally follows
political boundaries, such as state or county lines.
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efforts have had some measure of success, the development and enforcement of boundary
rules in the NG continues to challenge managers and fishers alike.
In this paper we combine social network and spatial analyses to show how smallscale fishing communities in the NG are connected through their use of fishing zones and
Marine Protected Areas (MPAs). We then examine how different geographic features,
such as roads, population size, distance to nearest large population center, or access to
industrial ice production, may influence choice of fishing zone and thus impact the social
network. Next, we test different ways to group communities together for management
purposes, based on similar use patterns of fishing zones or MPAs. Finally, we discuss
how these analyses can help inform management and the long-term conservation of
fisheries resources.
METHODS
Rapid Appraisal of Small-scale Fisheries: interviews and participatory mapping
From December 2005 through July 2006 we conducted a rapid appraisal (RA)
(Beebe 1995) of small-scale fisheries in seventeen communities throughout the NG to
capture broad-scale information about the social aspects and the spatio-temporal
distribution of small-scale fishing activities (Figure 1). We conducted 376 semistructured interviews with randomly-selected captains of fishing boats and asked
respondents to identify up to three of their principal target species (for details on
sampling design, see Moreno-Baez et al. 2009). We then asked respondents to mark
spatial and temporal distribution of their fishing activities for these species on printed
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maps at six different scales ranging from 1:800,000 to 1:15,000, depending on the region.
Because the exact locations of good fishing areas are the intellectual property of the
fishers, the maps we used to gather data in the RA were intentionally of a relatively large
scale. This allowed us to protect the precise location of each respondent’s fishing zones
while still giving us a general idea of where the fishing activity was occurring. We also
gathered information about what gear was used to harvest the species in question. The
specific (translated) questions from the RA that are used in the analyses in this paper are
as follows:
“Of all of [the species you capture], which are the main target species? (Species
for which you organize fishing trips specifically to capture)”
“Can you indicate in which three zones you fish (this species) most frequently?
(Color with red.)”
“Can you indicate on the map in what other zones you fish this species? (Color
with yellow and note the names on the map).”
“Of these, in what three zones do you fish the least? (Circle the zones on the
map).”
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Spatial Analysis
We used data from the Rapid Appraisal to construct a geographic information
system (GIS) of fishing zones for the NG that included geographic features such as
fishing zone convergence, distance between communities, maximum and median distance
to fishing zones, presence of major roads, distance to nearest major population center,
and availability of commercial ice production. In the following sections we describe our
methods.
Fishing zone convergence
We used ArcGIS 9.3 to standardize, digitize, georeference, and integrate
information from the RA interviews and generated a total of 769 layers, which we
integrated into a GIS to create a generalization of fishing zones for the NG. In developing
the GIS of fishing zones, we included associated attributes, such as community of origin
of the respondent, target species, and main fishing gear used for the species harvested.
We used these attributes to develop finer scale maps of fishing zone convergence based
on the four major fishing gear types in the region: diving, gill nets, traps, and long lines.
We selected representative species for each of these gear types (Table 1), which allowed
us to create four sub-matrices, one for each of the four major fishing gear types in the
region (Tables 2-5). We also used the polygons representing the total fishing area for
each community to calculate maximum and median distances traveled to fishing zones
(Euclidean distance).
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To develop a map of fishing zone convergence by community for all fishing gear
types, we joined together all fishing zones mentioned by respondents in the same
community to create one overall fishing zone of the entire area used by each community.
We then calculated the number of areas of convergence of these overall fishing zones by
community. We used this information to develop a community-by-community matrix,
whose values represented the number of areas of convergence in community fishing
zones. We also used attribute information in the GIS to separate out the overall fishing
zones by fishing method to create overall fishing zones by community based on the four
principal fishing methods. We then created community-by-community matrices that
showed convergence in fishing zones for each type of fishing gear.
In order to see how these fishing zones fell within MPAs, we then incorporated a
layer demarcating MPAs within the study region (CONANP 2009): The Upper Gulf of
California and Colorado River Delta Biosphere Reserve (hereafter called the Upper Gulf
Biosphere Reserve), the Vaquita Marine Refuge (which is partially encompassed in the
Upper Gulf Biosphere Reserve), the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve, the
Bahia de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve, and the
San Lorenzo Archipelago Marine Park. We overlaid this information with the fishing
zone data from the interviews and used this to create a matrix of communities that were
connected by their use of MPAs.
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Geographic attributes
There are a number of geographic attributes that might affect choice of fishing
zone. One of the most important factors impacting choice is distance from home port,
with fishers showing a preference for areas closer to home (Cabrera and Defeo 2001;
Caddy and Carocci 1999; Hilborn and Walters 1987). Because of this preference,
communities that are located closer together are more likely share fishing zones, so the
first thing we tested was the impact the effect of geographic proximity of communities in
the NG on choice of fishing zone. In order to do this, we calculated the geographic
proximity of communities in the NG by two measures: linear and true distance. Linear
distance was a straight-line measure between two communities. We used ArcGIS 9.3
(ESRI 2009) and Hawth’s Tools (Beyer 2004) to calculate this. In order to generate a
more meaningful measure of distance between communities by boat from the perspective
of a small-scale fisher in his panga, we used ArcGIS 9.3 to conduct a cost-distance
analysis to generate the closest path between communities by sea considering the islands
as the cost surface. We then generated a Cost Path which calculates the least-cost path
from a source to a destination, created a vector line between communities, and used the
ArcGIS Calculate Geometry tool to determine the true distance between communities via
panga.
We also included major roads and the presence of commercial ice production in
our model as possible explanatory factors for choice of fishing zone (Rubinoff 1999). To
do this, we used knowledge of the region to determine whether communities had
commercial ice production capabilities and found that the ones that did were the same
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communities that had a major road leading to them (DCW 1985). We used this
information to create a geographic influence variable to indicate whether or not a
community had the combination of a major road and ice production (‘1’ if a community
had both and ‘0’ if it had neither). Finally, we included total population size (INEGI
2005), number of pangas in a community (PANGAS Project, unpublished data), and
distance to the nearest large city (>250,000 inhabitants). All of these measures served as
independent variables for multivariate regression analyses to examine the impact of
geographic factors on fishing zone choice, both in terms of distance traveled to reach
fishing zones and overall size.
Social network analysis of spatial networks
We UCINET 6.235 (Borgatti et al. 2002) to analyze the fishing zone network of
communities in the NG, first by using the QAP correlation function to examine the
correlation of distance between communities and fishing zone convergence and then by
using the CONCOR function to look at structural equivalence of communities. Details of
each of these procedures are described in greater detail below.
Impact of geographic distance on fishing zone convergence
We conducted a QAP correlation analysis to determine how closely correlated
fishing zone convergence was with geographic proximity of communities, based on the
two different measures of distance (linear and true). We analyzed correlations at both a
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general level that included all fishing gear types and by each of the four principal fishing
gear types.
Using similarities in fishing zone and MPA convergence to group communities
CONCOR is a UCINET function that divides network members based on their
structural equivalence. In this study, two communities are structurally equivalent if they
exhibited the same patterns of use of fishing zones, both in general and within MPAs. To
use CONCOR, one tells the program to sub-divide the network into a pre-determined
number of groups based on their structural equivalence. We set the program to divide the
network up into three partitions because, through a trial and error process, this gave us
the highest R2 value. To more easily visualize the different components we then overlaid
each of these three levels of partitioning on a map of the region that showed fishing
zones.
RESULTS
Fishing zone convergence
Communities varied in the amount of fishing zone convergence, both in terms of
the number of communities with which they converged and in the number of points of
convergence between each community pair (Table 2). No community was isolated in its
fishing zone use, and totals of inter-community convergence ranged from a high of
eleven (Puerto Libertad) to a low of three (Punta Chueca, El Barril, Los Dorados de Villa,
San Jorge, Desemboque de los Seris, and Puerto Lobos).
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When examined based on fishing method, inter-community fishing zone
convergence showed different patterns, since not all communities used all fishing
methods. Convergence for diving ranged from a high of nine (Bahía de Kino) to a low of
two (Bahía de los Ángeles, El Barril, Puerto Lobos, and Puerto Peñasco) (Table 3). For
gillnets the community of Puerto Libertad had the most points of convergence with other
communities (nine), while the lowest number (two) was demonstrated by El Barril and
San Jorge (Table 4). Longlines were used by the fewest number of communities, and
inter-community fishing zone convergence ranged from a high of four (Desemboque de
Caborca) to a low of one (Santo Tomas, which overlapped with Desemboque de Caborca)
(Table 5). Finally, inter-community convergence of fishing zones for traps ranged from a
high of four (Santo Tomas) to a low of one (Desemboque de Caborca)(Table 6).
Fishing zone convergence by Marine Protected Area
No single community demonstrated sole use of any of the MPAs in the study
region (Table 7). The Bahía de los Ángeles Reserve has the most diverse user group (six
different communities). The Upper Gulf Biosphere Reserve and the Vaquita Marine
Refuge were used by the same communities, and they, as well as the San Lorenzo Marine
Park were used by five communities. The San Pedro Mártir Biosphere Reserve is used by
just two communities (and principally by just one: Bahía de Kino). Out of the five MPAs
in the region, the highest number of MPAs used by a community was three (Bahía de
Kino and El Barril).
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Impact of geographic attributes on fishing zone choice
Tables 8 and 9 show the fishing zone and geographic attributes, respectively.
Multivariate regression analysis showed that both total area of fishing zones and
maximum distance traveled to fishing zones were positively correlated with the
geographic influence of highway access and access to ice. Population size, number of
pangas, and distance to nearest large city did not have a significant effect on size of or
distance traveled to fishing zone (Table 10). Communities that have major roads coming
in to them and regular access to ice had significantly larger fishing zones (p=0.004) and
traveled greater maximum distances to reach those zones (p=0.023).
We used Netdraw 2.089 (Borgatti 2002) to show these results visually. Figure 2a
demonstrates that those communities with access to ice and major road access travel
greater maximum distances to reach fishing grounds (San Felipe, Golfo de Santa Clara,
Puerto Peñasco, Puerto Libertad, and Bahía de Kino). If we re-size the nodes to represent
total fishing area, we also see the same communities have larger overall fishing zones
(Figure 2b).
Impact of geographic distance on fishing zone convergence
There was a significant negative correlation of distance between communities and
convergence of fishing zones for both the linear and true measures of distance (Table 11).
This means that the shorter the distance between communities (when traveling by boat or
using direct line measures), the more convergence there will be of fishing zones. When
examining QAP correlations by fishing gear type, results are similar (Table 11). There is
105
a significant negative correlation between both measures of distance and fishing zone
convergence for diving, longlines, and traps. The exception is for gillnets, where no
measure of distance between communities was significantly correlated with fishing zone
convergence.
Using similarities in fishing zone and MPA convergence to group communities
The CONCOR analysis of the fishing zone convergence matrix (for all fishing
methods) divided communities into two to eight subgroups based on their similar use of
fishing zones. Communities placed in the same groups tended to have the same patterns
of fishing zone convergence. We set UCINET to divide communities up at three levels,
each with an increasing level of detail. At the first level, communities were divided along
a clear north-south boundary, with everything below Puerto Lobos and San Luis Gonzaga
in one group and everything else in the other group (Figure 3). The second level split
divided communities up at a finer scale. Again, we find that things are generally divided
up geographically in a clear southeast, northeast, northwest, southwest pattern (Figure 4).
The third split created eight distinct groups and singles out three communities (Bahia de
Kino, Puerto Peñasco, and El Barril), whose patterns of fishing zone use were distinct
enough to warrant this separation (Figure 5).
The results of the CONCOR analysis for the MPA by community network
showed a somewhat different division (Figure 6). In this analysis, structurally equivalent
communities tended to fish in the same MPAs. The region was split into three main
groups: those that did not fish in MPAs (red: Puerto Lobos, Punta Chueca, Punta Jagüey,
106
San Jorge, and Los Dorados de Villa), those that fished in the southern portion of the
region (light and dark blue: Bahía de Kino, Bahía de los Ángeles, Puerto Libertad, El
Barril, and Las Ánimas Norte), and those that fished in the northern portion of the region
(purple: Golfo de Santa Clara, San Felipe, Puerto Peñasco, and Desemboque de Caborca).
The southern portion can further be divided into communities that fished in the San Pedro
Mártir MPA (light blue: Bahía de Kino and El Barril) and those that fished only in Bahía
de los Ángeles and San Lorenzo MPAs (dark blue: Bahía de los Ángeles, Las Ánimas
Norte, and Puerto Libertad). Fishers from the community of San Luis Gonzaga (green)
were a special case and act as a link between the two main groups by working in MPAs
from both the northern and southern portions of the study region.
DISCUSSION
Combining GISs and spatial analysis with social network analysis methods
provides an innovative way to group communities in the NG based on patterns of fishing
activity. This blend of methods may more accurately define a community of users and
lead to development of boundary rules that best reflect the realities in the field, thus
increase opportunities for sustainable use. It gives us a more complete understanding of
the relationships between communities at a regional level and provides guidance for
developing fisheries management strategies.
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The role of geographic distance
The significant relation of geographic distance between communities in the NG
and the likelihood that fishers will use the same fishing zones supports the findings of
past research, which shows communities that are closer together tend to share certain
types of resources (Faust et al. 2000). Fishing grounds that are closer to the home port are
preferred by fishers because they are less expensive to reach and tend to involve less of a
safety risk because fishers do not need to travel as far to reach them (Branch et al. 2006;
Cabrera and Defeo 2001; Pet-Soede et al. 2001; Caddy and Carocci 1999; Sampson 1992;
Hilborn and Walters 1987; Allen and McGlade 1986). In addition, some fishers prefer to
spend time fishing versus traveling to fishing grounds and thus select areas closer to the
home port (Salas and Gaertner 2004). For these reasons, communities that are located
closer together are more likely to fish in the same areas, which is confirmed by our
results from the NG.
The exception to this is gillnet fishing, where there was no significant correlation
between gillnet fishing zone overlap and either measure of distance between
communities. One possible explanation for this lies in the species being targeted. Many
of the species caught with gillnets are migratory, schooling fish that are not tied to
specific fishing grounds, unlike the species targeted by divers and trap fishers, and to a
lesser extent, longliners, which have more specific habitat requirements (Table 1). This
makes the range for gillnets in the NG quite expansive when compared to the other three
fishing gear types (PANGAS Project, unpublished data, http://pangas.arizona.edu). For
fishing methods that require habitats with very specific locations, such as traps for crabs
108
in estuaries, or which target benthic species, such as diving for scallops or clams, the
amount of fishing zone convergence is much more likely to be related to distance
between communities since there is a limited amount of available habitat and fishers
prefer to work close to home (see discussion above). For gillnets, which are used over a
wider, less regular area, there are more potential fishing zones and so distance between
communities becomes less of a predictor for fishing zone convergence. This may be an
indication that the species targeted by gillnet fishers are more likely to face open access
issues, versus fishing methods that are more closely tied to specific habitats or distinct
areas, since it is more difficult to establish clear boundaries.
Implications for regional fisheries management
One strategy that is currently being considered in the NG is the regional
management of small-scale fisheries resources (Valdez-Ornelas et al. 2009). A practical
use of the combination of social networks and spatial analysis methods in the NG lies in
its contribution to the development of these regional management efforts that take into
account the social, biological, and spatial dimensions of small-scale fisheries.
The results of the CONCOR analysis offer considerations and guidance to
managers for organizing regionalization of small-scale fisheries in the NG. Prior research
has shown that CPRs are more likely to be managed sustainably when the user group
lives in close proximity to the resource (Agrawal 2002). By this measure, small-scale
fishing communities located closest to the various fishing grounds should be granted
priority for access rights. At all levels (Figures 3-5), the CONCOR results generally
109
provide support for this sort of regionalization, since communities that are located closer
together tend to have the same patterns of fishing zone use. Incorporating these results
into the decision making process for regional management strategies may ultimately
support more sustainable use of marine resources.
Beyond distance: other factors impacting fishers’ decisions
Although past studies have shown a preference of fishers to work in areas close to
their home ports (Pet-Soede et al. 2001; Hilborn and Walters 1987), and in the NG
geographic distance between communities appears to be an important indicator of fishing
zone use, in many instances fishers do still choose to travel to distant fishing zones
(Cabrera and Defeo 2001). In the NG we found that fishers from certain communities
may work fishing grounds distant from their home ports (e.g., Bahía de Kino and Puerto
Libertad). In order to understand these seemingly anomalous patterns of resource use and
improve recommendations for regional management strategies, we must move beyond
geographic proximity.
Considering factors in addition to geographic proximity can improve our
understanding of what affects fishing zone choice and therefore can help those working
in management better delineate administrative units for small-scale fisheries. One of the
features that we considered was accessibility of the community by major road and regular
access to ice (recall that the results of these two measures were identical—communities
with major road access were the same communities that had ice production capabilities).
Better roads make it possible for other improvements, such as electricity allows ice
110
production. They also make travel to major cities easier, thus providing access to more
varied market possibilities and improving fishers’ ability to purchase major equipment,
such as boats, motors, and other necessary fishing gear and supplies (Rubinoff 1999;
Kurien 1978).
Access to ice is an important factor affecting a fisher’s decision about what and
where to fish. Fishers are limited in how far they can go to fish by their ability to keep the
catch from spoiling. Without ice, multi-day trips or even full day trips become
challenging or even impossible. If traveling to distant fishing zones is limited by access
to ice, we would expect communities that do not have this access to make use of fishing
grounds located close to their home community. Bahía de los Ángeles, for example, does
not currently have a means of industrial ice production in the community and the nearest
ice must be brought in by truck from Guerrero Negro or Ensenada, three to seven hours
away, and requires having a mechanism for transporting the ice and keeping it frozen. In
Bahía de Kino, on the other hand, ice is readily available from a number of ice plants
located in the community. Considering the availability of ice and average distance
traveled to fishing grounds supports this assertion. We find that fishers from Bahía de
Kino travel nearly twice as far on average to reach fishing grounds than do fishers from
Bahía de los Ángeles, as we would predict based on access to the necessary resources.
Similarly, the total fishing zone of Bahía de Kino is more than twice as large as the zone
for Bahía de los Ángeles.
Fishers from Bahía de Kino, in fact, travel farther to reach fishing grounds than
fishers from any other community in the NG. Although part of this pattern may be
111
attributable to overfishing in areas close to the home port (see Caddy and Carocci 1999
for a discussion of "friction of distance" and "Gaussian Effort Allocation" models, which
consider how preference for fishing zones close to the home port impacts resource
availability), the fact that Bahía de Kino is close to the major export market (the Sonoran
capital of Hermosillo), has major roads, and the availability of ice also helps explain why
Bahía de Kino fishers are able to travel greater distances and spend multiple days in the
field.
In the case of the NG, some of the convergence of fishing zones comes about due
to the fact that certain communities travel great distances to reach fishing grounds, while
others work much closer to home. Knowing that two communities share a fishing zone is
important, but knowing that they share the fishing zone because fishers in one of the
communities travel to the other community to work is exceedingly important information
to have when designing and implementing management actions. For example, Bahia de
Kino and Bahia de los Ángeles have 41 regions of convergence in their fishing zones, but
this is because fishers from Bahía de Kino travel across the Gulf to work around the
islands in Bahía de los Ángeles. Only by considering the distance traveled in conjunction
with the number of regions of convergence are we able to more completely understand
this relationship. Adding the ice and road access feature helps to further understand why
this pattern exists and can help us anticipate future patterns of use. The amalgamation of
spatial information and social network analysis allows us to better understand nuances of
social structure that might otherwise go unnoticed.
112
The impacts of development on small-scale fisheries
The impacts of development on natural resources have been demonstrated
elsewhere (Laurance et al. 2006; Wilkie et al. 2000). As development in the NG
continues, more communities will have access to electricity, ice, and other resources that
will make it possible for them to expand their fishing zones and thus increase their impact
on marine resources. The Mar de Cortés program, previously known as the escalera
nautical, is a government-sponsored effort aimed at developing the Gulf of California as
a tourist destination through improved access and development. It includes plans for the
development of new highways which would provide improved access to communities
throughout the region, a number of new or improved airports, and other infrastructure
development (Pesenti and Dean 2003). Today the program is stalled, but a new highway
was constructed in the northeastern part of the study region after most of the data for this
study were collected in 2005-2006. This provides previously isolated fishing
communities with new access to resources that may allow them to increase the size of
their fishing zones. This, in turn, increases the potential for conflict with other
communities (as potential convergence of fishing zones increases with expansion of
fishing zone size) (Gillis and Peterman 1998). It may also mean greater impact on marine
resources, as fishers are able to travel farther to work and have improved access to
markets and other important resources (Laurance et al. 2006; Wilkie et al. 2000; Kurien
1978).
113
Implications for Marine Protected Area management
Results of the CONCOR analysis of convergence of fishing zones within MPAs
also provide guidance for management and enforcement activities for those areas. In
order to implement effective management of MPAs, managers must know who is using
the resource. This information is important in designing targeted education and outreach
campaigns and in helping to determine which communities should be the focus of efforts,
as well as in potentially determining who should be granted access rights. By looking at
the CONCOR results, we see that an effective management strategy for the Bahía de los
Ángeles and Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve or the San Lorenzo
Marine Park may include outreach efforts to fishers in communities on the Sonoran coast
in addition to the communities that are adjacent to the reserves in Baja California. The
community of San Luis Gonzaga is something of an outlier and falls in a very interesting
position. Fishers from this community make use of MPAs in both the northern and
southern part of the study region and for this reason the CONCOR analysis singles it out
as its own sub-group (Figure 5). Although fishers from San Luis Gonzaga only work in
two MPAs, the management concerns in the two areas may vary greatly. Determining
how to best design outreach efforts in San Luis Gonzaga that address appropriate issues
in both MPAs but do not overwhelm fishers with confusing or even conflicting
information is likely to be a somewhat complex undertaking.
114
Defining boundaries for regional management of fisheries resources
Fishing communities in the NG may extend beyond the standard boundaries of
towns and fishing camps. Understanding which communities are fishing in different areas
may help fishers, as well as those working in management and conservation, to better
develop, implement, and enforce boundary rules. By expanding the definition of
‘community’ to include not just physical town boundaries but CPR users with a common
interest (such as fishing zone convergence or joint use of MPAs), we can improve our
understanding of how management strategies and decisions will influence or impact the
true community of CPR users (St. Martin et al. 2007; Agrawal and Gibson 1999).
Without enforceable boundaries that are understood and respected by resource users, the
sustainable management of CPRs is highly unlikely.
Considering these patterns of use are important when designing any sort of
regional management scheme. The combination of network analysis with spatial
information allows us to better comprehend patterns of fishing zone convergence and
may help managers determine appropriate divisions of communities for management
purposes. When coupled with other information such as biological data (i.e., data about
landings or catch composition as reported by fishers (Aburto Oropeza et al. 2009;
Valdez-Ornelas et al. 2009), the results of the more detailed divisions of the CONCOR
analysis (Figures 4 and 5, particularly) can offer guidance for determining units for
regional fisheries management and may help to create a system of boundaries rules that
are respected by resource users and ultimately support sustainable use of fisheries
resources.
115
Directions for future research
Where target species are found is often strongly tied to the availability of habitat,
whether it be rocky reefs, sandy bottoms, near-shore, or pelagic. Currently wide-scale,
reliable data that show the distribution of different marine habitat types in the NG are
lacking, although we can draw conclusions based on where fishers are extracting
different species. As these spatial data become available, overlaying them with a map of
fishing zones will be a valuable way to further dissect the patterns behind different
communities’ choices of fishing zone.
Another feature we did not incorporate into this analysis was the impact of
resource availability on fishing zone size or distance traveled to reach fishing zones. As
populations of species targeted by small-scale fishers in the NG decline throughout the
region (Sala et al. 2004), fishers must travel greater distances to access resources (Caddy
2000). The declining trend in most fish populations in the NG likely has an important
impact on determining fishing zone and should be incorporated into future studies.
CONCLUSIONS
Combining social networks and spatial analysis methods provides both
descriptive and analytical benefits to the management of CPRs. At the simplest level,
spatial data can be used to construct social networks, as was demonstrated in this paper:
fishers are connected by their use of geographic space. Without the tools afforded us by
spatial analysis methods, we would be unable to develop an accurate map of fishers’ use
of different areas. By adding social network methods to the analysis, we gain a deeper
116
understanding of the ways in which CPR users are connected and can design more
effective management strategies.
Being able to incorporate other spatial data, such as location of major roads, puts
the study into its larger context and allows us to consider how these seemingly external
features might affect the structure of a social network. Including more directly related
geographic features, such as distance between communities and distance to fishing
grounds, improves the explanatory power of the network analysis.
Viewing social connections in the context of the geographic space in which they
exist makes it easier to visualize and understand the relations. For natural resource
management applications, maps and GISs are already an integral part of planning and
implementation processes that help managers consider the impacts of proposed activities
on fisheries resources. Developing methods for incorporating social networks and spatial
data into the system allows for the creation of a more complete model and thus the
potential for making more informed management decisions that could lead to the
sustainable use of common-pool natural resources.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was made possible by contributions from the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation and the Wallace Research Foundation through the PANGAS Project.
We would like to express our gratitude to the many fishers who participated in this
research; to Richard Cudney-Bueno, Jorge Torre, Peggy Turk Boyer, William W. Shaw,
and Edella Schlager for helpful comments to earlier versions of this paper; and to Ana
117
Cinti, Martin Rivera Soldevilla, Olegario Morales, Rene Loaiza Villanueva, Sergio Perez
Valencia, and Cesar Moreno for insightful discussions about the region’s fisheries and
many hours conducting interviews and entering data. This paper represents the views of
the authors and not necessarily those of their institutions and funders. This is a scientific
contribution of the PANGAS project, http://pangas.arizona.edu.
118
Figure 1. Map of the study area in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
119
Table 1. Representative species for each fishing method, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Fishing
Species
Common Name (English)
Common Name
method
(Spanish)
Atrina tuberculosa
tuberculate pen shell
callo de riñon
Diving
Dosinia ponderosa
giant dosinia
Hexaplex (Muricanthus)
nigritus
Phyllonotus erythrostoma
black murex
almeja blanca
gigante
caracol chino negro
pink murex
caracol chino rosa
Parastichopus fuscus
sea cucumber
pepino de mar
Octopus bimaculatus
two spotted octopus
pulpo dos manchas
Panulirus inflatus
blue spiny lobster
langosta azul
Pinna rugosa
rugose pen shell
callo de hacha
Spondylus calcifer
rock scallop
callo de escarlopa
Gymnura marmorata
butterfly ray
raya mariposa
Litopenaeus stylirostris
blue shrimp
camaron azul
Mustelus californicus
gray smoothhound
cazon mamon
Mustelus lunulatus
sicklefin smoothhound
tiburon tripa
Mustelus spp.
smoothhound
tiburon tripa
Myliobatis californicus
bat ray
manta tecolote
Myliobatis longirostris
longnose eagle ray
manta gavilan
Rhizoprionodon longurio
pacific sharpnose shark
tiburon birocha
Rhinobatus productus
shovelnose guitarfish
guitarra, payaso
Scomberomorus sierra
pacific sierra
sierra de manchas
Scomberomorus spp.
mackerel
sierra
Micropogonias megalops
gulf croaker
chano
Dasyatis dipterura
diamond stingray
manta arenera
Cynoscion orthonopterus
Gulf curvina
curvina golfina
Cynoscion parvipinnis
curvina
curvina
Epinephelus acanthistius
Gulf coney
baqueta
Longline
Paralabrax auroguttatus
goldspotted sand bass
cabrilla extranjera
Traps
Callinectes bellicosus
warrior swimcrab
jaiba verde
Gillnets
Table 2. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for all fishing methods, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BKI
BLA
DDC
DDS
EBA
GSC
LAN
LDV
PCH
PJA
PLI
PLO
PPE
SFE
SJO
SLG
STO
BKI
0
41
0
38
21
0
38
0
33
0
56
0
0
0
0
0
0
BLA
41
0
0
0
1
0
41
0
0
0
26
0
0
0
0
1
0
DDC
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
6
0
3
17
21
9
0
0
0
12
DDS
38
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
0
31
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
21
1
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
20
26
0
20
0
LAN
38
41
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
0
LDV
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
PCH
33
0
0
19
0
0
0
0
0
0
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
4
0
3
0
4
PLI
56
26
17
31
0
0
18
0
17
0
0
23
4
1
0
6
1
PLO
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
23
0
5
0
0
0
0
PPE
0
0
9
0
0
20
0
0
0
4
4
5
0
18
7
12
4
SFE
0
0
0
0
0
26
0
0
0
0
1
0
18
0
0
30
0
SJO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
7
0
0
0
4
SLG
0
1
0
0
0
20
0
0
0
0
6
0
12
30
0
0
0
STO
0
0
12
0
0
0
0
7
0
4
1
0
4
0
4
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
120
Table 3. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for diving, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BKI BLA DDC DDS EBA GSC LAN LDV PCH PJA PLI PLO PPE SFE SJO SLG STO
BKI
0
13
0
17
4
0
9
0
12
0 23
0
0
0
0
0
0
BLA
13
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DDC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DDS
17
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0 24
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
4
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LAN
9
7
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LDV
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PCH
12
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PLI
23
0
0
24
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
7
3
0
0
0
0
PLO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
3
0
0
0
0
PPE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
SFE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SJO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SLG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
STO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
121
Table 4. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for gillnets, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BKI BLA DDC DDS EBA GSC LAN LDV PCH PJA PLI PLO PPE SFE SJO SLG STO
BKI
0
27
0
32
10
0
23
0
26
0 43
0
0
0
0
0
0
BLA
27
0
0
0
0
0
22
0
0
0 15
0
0
0
0
1
0
DDC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
8
5
0
2
0
0
DDS
32
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0 31
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
10
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
18 26
0
21
0
LAN
23
22
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
0 16
0
0
0
0
0
0
LDV
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PCH
26
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0 19
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PLI
43
15
9
31
0
0
16
0
19
0
0
9
0
1
0
4
0
PLO
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
1
0
0
0
0
PPE
0
0
5
0
0
18
0
0
0
0
0
1
0 16
6
13
0
SFE
0
0
0
0
0
26
0
0
0
0
1
0
16
0
0
29
0
SJO
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
SLG
0
1
0
0
0
21
0
0
0
0
4
0
13 29
0
0
0
STO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
122
Table 5. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for longlines, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BKI BLA DDC DDS EBA GSC LAN LDV PCH PJA PLI PLO PPE SFE SJO SLG STO
BKI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
BLA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DDC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
9
7
0
0
0
3
DDS
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LAN
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LDV
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PCH
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PLI
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
PLO
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
PPE
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
SFE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
2
0
SJO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SLG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
STO
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
123
Table 6. Matrix of number of areas of fishing zone convergence by community for traps, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
BKI BLA DDC DDS EBA GSC LAN LDV PCH PJA PLI PLO PPE SFE SJO SLG STO
BKI
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
BLA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DDC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
DDS
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
EBA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
GSC
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LAN
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
LDV
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PCH
8
0
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PJA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
5
0
3
PLI
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PLO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
PPE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
0
11
0
4
SFE
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
SJO
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
11
0
0
0
8
SLG
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
STO
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
8
0
0
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo
de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca; LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto
Lobos; PPE=Puerto Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
124
125
Table 7. Matrix of community use of Marine Protected Areas by small-scale fishers in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico.
Upper Gulf/Vaquita
Bahía de los
San Lorenzo
Isla San
TOTAL
Ángeles
Pedro Mártir
X
X
2
BLA
X
X
X
3
BKI
X
1
DDC
0
DDS
X
X
X
3
EBA
X
1
GSC
X
X
2
LAN
0
LDV
0
PCH
0
PJA
X
X
2
PLI
0
PLO
X
1
PPE
X
1
SFE
0
SJO
X
X
2
SLG
0
STO
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de
los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca;
LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto Lobos; PPE=Puerto
Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
126
Table 8. Fishing zone attributes, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Community
Median Distance
to fishing zone
(km)
62.97
Total Fishing Zone Area
(km2)
BKI
Maximum distance
to fishing zone
(km)
207.13
BLA
98.61
38.84
715.31
DDC
125.43
46.74
4841.57
DDS
94.71
26.70
493.66
EBA
76.95
32.97
1700.56
GSC
108.06
53.71
6924.88
LAN
94.05
34.36
198.90
LDV
17.74
9.31
38.74
PCH
43.39
24.80
159.95
PJA
20.71
12.92
95.86
PLI
177.05
72.73
12145.84
PLO
93.83
21.44
626.55
PPE
145.14
64.76
8360.01
SFE
162.23
44.31
4214.84
SJO
51.02
23.53
724.05
SLG
180.98
81.84
3191.49
STO
60.96
24.99
171.05
4315.51
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de
los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca;
LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto Lobos; PPE=Puerto
Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
127
Table 9. Geographic attributes, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Community
Population
size
# pangas
Geographic
Influence
Distance to Nearest City (km)
(>250,000 residents)
BKI
4990
200
1
110.874
BLA
527
29
0
539.045
DDC
441
55
0
396.638
DDS
253
20
0
207.366
EBA
86
13
0
799.7
GSC
3186
450
1
178.338
LAN
2
2
0
605.327
LDV
3
2
0
448.802
PCH
405
49
0
144.536
PJA
3
16
0
431.572
PLI
2823
100
1
259.026
PLO
90
22
0
362.703
PPE
44647
67
1
323.885
SFE
14831
291
1
392.59
SJO
3
60
0
357.305
SLG
3
10
0
496.397
STO
0
16
0
437.978
BKI=Bahía de Kino; BLA= Bahía de los Ángeles; DDC=Desemboque de Caborca; DDS= Desemboque de
los Seris; EBA= El Barril; GSC= El Golfo de Santa Clara; LAN= Las Ánimas Norte; PCH= Punta Chueca;
LDV=Los Dorados de Villa; PJA=Punta Jagüey; PLI=Puerto Libertad; PLO=Puerto Lobos; PPE=Puerto
Peñasco; SFE=San Felipe; SJO=San Jorge; SLG=San Luis Gonzaga; STO=Santo Tomás
128
Table 10. Multivariate regression results of effects of geographic attributes on distance to and size of
fishing zones, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Independent
Variable
Distance to nearest
large city (km)
Population
# pangas
Geographic
influence
Intercept
R2
Model 1: Maximum
Distance to Fishing
Zone (km)
0.03
(0.08)
-0.00
(0.00)
-0.19
(0.17)
141.28*
(54.26)
71.96
(36.43)
0.51
Note: standard errors are in parentheses
*p<.05 **p<.005
Model 2: Median
Distance to Fishing Zone
(km)
0.02
(0.03)
0.00
(0.00)
-0.06
(0.07)
46.49
(21.74)
26.26
(14.60)
0.44
Model 3: Total
Fishing Area (km2)
1.09
(3.65)
-0.05
(0.07)
-10.99
(7.98)
9117.70**
(2590.64)
881.05
(1739.32)
0.71
129
Figure 2. Network of communities connected by fishing zones, Northern Gulf of California, Mexico. Black
nodes are communities with access to major roads and ice; gray nodes do not have access. A line between
two nodes means the communities have a fishing zone in common (thicker lines represent greater amounts
of convergence). Node size in Figure 2a represents maximum distance traveled to reach fishing zones (km)
and in Figure 2b represents total fishing area (km2).
130
Table 11. Correlation of geographic distance between communities and fishing zone convergence (QAP
correlation analysis, 5000 permutations).
Fishing zone convergence for all methods:
Pearson
Obs
p-value
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Correlation
Value
-0.385**
0.000
-0.002
0.098
-0.352
0.297
Linear distance
-0.327**
0.001
0.000
0.098
-0.362
0.302
True distance
Diving fishing zone convergence:
-0.242*
0.013
Linear distance
-0.181*
0.047
True distance
-0.002
-0.002
0.105
0.106
-0.335
-0.346
0.320
0.307
Long lining fishing zone convergence:
-0.239*
0.007
Linear distance
-0.243*
0.007
True distance
-0.003
-0.003
0.095
0.095
-0.302
-0.306
0.325
0.311
Trap fishing zone convergence:
-0.348** 0.000
Linear distance
-0.339** 0.000
True distance
-0.002
-0.002
0.093
0.093
-0.326
-0.303
0.259
0.282
0.002
0.002
0.098
0.099
-0.330
-0.323
0.307
0.303
Gill net fishing zone convergence:
-0.036
0.343
Linear distance
-0.029
0.370
True distance
*p<.05; **p<.005
131
Figure 3. First level community groupings based on overall fishing zone convergence (all fishing
methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
132
Figure 4. Second level community groupings based on overall fishing zone convergence (all fishing
methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
133
Figure 5. Third level community groupings based on overall fishing zone convergence (all fishing
methods), Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
134
Figure 6. Community groupings based on overall MPA use convergence (all fishing methods), Northern
Gulf of California, Mexico. Dotted arrows indicate use of MPAs. The different groups separate
communities based on equivalent use of MPAs as fishing zones.
Group A: Punta Chueca, Desemboque Seri, Puerto Lobos, Los Dorados de Villa, Santo Tomas, Punta
Jagüey, San Jorge
Group B: Desemboque de Caborca, Puerto Peñasco, Golfo de Santa Clara, San Felipe
Group C: Puerto Libertad, Bahía de los Ángeles, Las Ánimas Norte
Group D: Bahía de Kino, El Barril
Group E: San Luis Gonzaga
135
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141
APPENDIX C. THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONS: MARINE PROTECTED AREAS,
SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND THE CONSERVATION OF SMALL-SCALE
FISHERIES IN THE NORTHERN GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO
Jennifer N. Dubersteina, Cesar Morenob, and Esteban Torreblanca-Ramírez c
a
School of Natural Resources, University of Arizona, Biological Sciences East Room
325, Tucson, Arizona, 85721 USA.
b
Comunidad y Biodiversidad, A.C., Blvd. Agua Marina #297, entre Jaiba y Tiburón,
Colonia Delicias, Guaymas, Sonora 85420, Mexico
c
Pronatura Noroeste, A.C., Calle Décimo No 60 (esq. Ryerson), Zona Centro, Ensenada,
Baja California, 22800, Mexico
Key words: common-pool resources, social networks, marine protected areas, natural
resource management, brokerage
142
The shape of the commons: marine protected areas, social networks, and the
conservation of small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
Jennifer N. Duberstein, Cesar Moreno, and Esteban Torreblanca-Ramírez
ABSTRACT
One of the biggest questions surrounding common-pool natural resources (CPRs)
lies in understanding the circumstances which increase the likelihood of sustainable use
and those that tend to lead to resource degradation. The incorporation of social network
analysis methods into CPR management has only begun to receive formal attention.
Small-scale fisheries are an example of a CPR that has had a wide range of outcomes,
from long-term sustainable management to a declining trend in resource health. One
mechanism for management of marine resources is the creation of Marine Protected
Areas. We use social network analysis methods to examine the association of network
structures with collaborative behavior of small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of
California, Mexico by comparing in-depth case studies of users of two Marine Protected
Areas in the region (the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve—SPMI and the
Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve—BLABR).
We collected detailed social network data about information sharing and advice networks
between fishers and those working in fisheries management. We created basic descriptive
statistics on network density, tie strength, degree centrality, and centralization. We also
143
conducted a brokerage analysis of the information sharing network. We found that the
network of BLABR in general showed a greater propensity for organization collaborative
behavior. Our results provide mixed evidence for the role of social structure in impacting
positive outcomes for fishers’ ability to work together to organize. While the on-theground results point toward increased collaboration in BLABR, we found that some of
the structural characteristics that might be associated with collaborative action (i.e., some
measures of density and centralization, as well as certain brokerage tendencies) were
higher for SPMI. For other measures, our hypothesis that Bahía de los Ángeles would
show a greater propensity for organization is supported. A wide range of factors affect
the emergence of institutions for CPR management and there is no single recipe for
success. Similarly, finding a common network structure that can accurately predict
sustainable use of CPRs is unlikely. Although we can point to factors that tend to be
present in situations where users have been able to successfully organize to manage
CPRs, the presence of these structural features is likely not enough to ensure success or
failure. We suspect that combination of factors is responsible for the observed outcomes,
including the salience of the resource to users and the distance of the community of users
to the resource. While social structure is important to consider, it is equally important to
consider other features of the situation.
Key words: common-pool resources, social networks, marine protected areas, natural
resource management, brokerage
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INTRODUCTION
Common-pool natural resources (CPRs) are those for which access is difficult
limit and use by one person decreases the value of the resource for use by others (Ostrom
et al. 1999; Feeny et al. 1990). The challenge of sustainable use and management of
CPRs has been the subject of many studies. Traditional solutions to these challenges are
privatization of the resource or government control (Hardin 1968). In practice, however,
there exist a wide range of possibilities, ranging from community-based, bottom-up
efforts to co-management to top-down government control (Alcala 1998; Pomeroy and
Berkes 1997; Jentoft and McCay 1995). This diversity of management situations has led
to a variety of outcomes for common-pool resource situations, from overuse and
degradation of resources to long-term sustainability (Ostrom 1990).
One of the biggest questions surrounding CPRs lies in understanding the
circumstances which increase the likelihood of sustainable use and those that tend to lead
to resource degradation. CPR theorists have offered a number of different factors that are
associated with the emergence and sustainability of institutions for CPR systems and a
greater propensity for organization and collaboration. Numerous case studies and broadscale surveys of CPR institutions have been conducted in an effort to better understand
the reasons behind success and failure of different efforts (see Ostrom et al. 1994). Based
on an in-depth review of the CPR literature, Ostrom (1990) developed a series of design
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principles that tend to be present in long-enduring CPR institutions 5. She also developed
a series of attributes of both the resource system and resource appropriators that are
positively associated with the emergence of collective action in CPR situations 6 (Ostrom
2005, 2000). These resource and appropriator attribute lists describe characteristics that
make it feasible for the development of the long-enduring institutions for CPR
governance that tend to have the characteristics described in the design principles.
Social networks and CPRs
Social network analysis focuses on the study of patterns of structures of social
relations (Breiger 2004) and is a useful tool for understanding connectivity and
communication among CPR users (Duberstein et al. In review). While networks and the
concept of social connectivity are frequently mentioned as being important to the
sustainable management of CPRs (Dietz et al. 2003; Mazzucato and Niemeijer 2000), the
incorporation of social network analysis methods into CPR management has only begun
to receive formal attention in the last several years (see Bodin and Crona 2009; Prell et al.
5
These principles include clearly defined resource boundaries, proportional equivalence between benefits
and costs, collective choice arrangements for rule making, graduated sanction for breaking rules, conflict
resolution mechanisms, and monitoring (Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom 1990).
6
Resource attributes include the possibility for feasible improvement, the availability of reliable indicators
of resource condition, predictability in flow of resource units, and a reasonable spatial extent of the
resource in terms of developing accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal
microenvironments. Resource user attributes include salience of the resource to the user, a common
understanding of the operation of the resource system, a low discount rate, trust and reciprocity, autonomy
with regards to developing access and harvest rules, and prior organizational experience and local
leadership (Ostrom 2005).
146
2009; Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton 2009; Carlsson and Sandström 2008; Ernstson et
al. 2008; Bodin et al. 2006; Crona and Bodin 2006; Grafton 2005).
Examining social networks allows us to study how micro-patterns of interactions
between actors affect large-scale patterns of interactions, which then feed back into the
small group (Granovetter 1973). In a CPR context, social network analysis methods
provide new tools for examining some of the characteristics described in Ostrom’s and
attributes of users, such as trust and reciprocity and a common understanding of the
operation of the resource system. Understanding social networks can help shed light on
the association of local patterns of social connectivity with the development of
institutional arrangements that lead to positive outcomes for CPR systems. This
information, in turn, can be used to make recommendations for effective conservation
and management strategies and policies for CPRs.
Are certain types of social structures found more frequently in successful (or
unsuccessful) CPR management situations? How does information flow between users of
a resource or between users and managers of the resource? How can managers use this
knowledge to be most efficient in their use of limited human and financial resources for
outreach and enforcement efforts? Who are the key stakeholders to involve in
management and enforcement efforts and decisions, and are they all being included in an
effective way? Social network analysis can help us to answer these questions. By
understanding how users of CPR systems are connected and the ways in which they
communicate and interact, we can develop a more complete picture of the ecosystem and
improve management efforts.
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Small-scale Fisheries as CPRs
Small-scale fisheries are an example of a CPR that has had a wide range of
outcomes, from long-term sustainable management (Acheson 1997) to a continued
declining trend in resource health (Sáenz-Arroyo et al. 2005; Sala et al. 2004). Smallscale fishers are a group that has a great deal of impact on marine resources. Worldwide,
they make up over 90% of the world’s fishers and produce nearly half the world’s catch
designated for human consumption (Iudicello et al. 1999; McGoodwin 1990).
For years fisheries managers have tried to devise ways to best manage marine
resources. Many of these efforts focus on just the biological aspect of the problem,
creating models that work well on paper but do not transfer well to real world situations
(Dietz et al. 2002; Schlager 2002). In order to achieve successful management of marine
resources, however, it is necessary to take into account not only the biological and
physical factors affecting the resource, but also the social, economic, and political factors
(McCay 2002; McCay and Jentoft 1998; Schlager et al. 1994; Ostrom 1990).
The standard approach to fisheries management has been to manage for maximum
sustainable yield (MSY); that is, to manage stocks of commercial value above a predetermined target levels. Models of MSY, however, do not take into account many of the
complicating factors affecting marine resources, which results in inaccurate target
population levels. Today, the utility of this management strategy has been challenged at
many levels (Pauly et al. 2002; Pomeroy 1995). Uncertainty in population models and the
impacts of extraction activities on resource health, a wide variety of external factors
affecting marine resources, and social and political pressure to increase fishing activity,
148
make the MSY model in and of itself an unlikely candidate for the long-term sustainable
management of marine resources (Pauly et al. 2002). As fisheries resources decline
around the world, managers have looked to develop new models and methods for
managing resource health that incorporate sound biophysical information, but also
integrate the complex socio-political factors affecting fisheries resources.
Although fisheries are generally viewed as a common-pool, open-access resource,
in many instances it is still possible develop rules that grant fishing rights to groups or
individuals for particular fishing zones or species (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Acheson
and Brewer 2003; Schlager and Ostrom 1992). This has proven to be an effective way to
manage CPRs. Indeed, fishers who consider certain fish stocks or fishing grounds their
own property may develop their own institutions to govern fishing activities and
conservation and management efforts (Basurto 2005; Dietz et al. 2003; McGoodwin
1990). But for CPRs such as small-scale fisheries, determining who should have access to
resources is one of the most challenging management issues, particularly in the absence
of rules or adequate enforcement.
Marine Protected Areas as a fisheries management tool
One increasingly popular tool for protecting biodiversity and marine resources is
the establishment of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) (Allison et al. 1998). MPAs are
zones that are set aside as reserves to protect sensitive ecosystems, as well as to provide
economic and social benefits to users of the area (Alder et al. 2002; Badalamenti et al.
2000). Managers have looked to MPAs as a way to complement more traditional fisheries
149
management techniques (Agardy 2000), and the use of MPAs as a conservation strategy
is becoming more widely used throughout the world.
MPAs may close an area to fishing and extractive activity entirely. They may also
use a zoning system that includes a no-take core zone, inside of which fishing and
extractive activities are prohibited, as well as buffer zones and other areas where certain
actions or activities are permitted. MPAs can come from the federal or state level, as in
the case of Biosphere Reserves and National Marine Parks. They can also be designated
locally and informally, as when a group of fishers decides to let certain areas rest from
extraction pressure or of their own accord limits extraction activities in some way in
certain areas.
The use of MPAs as an effective fisheries conservation and management tool has
a number of challenges. One of the most important is in selecting the appropriate size and
location of the MPA (Agardy and Wilkinson 2003). If they are chosen appropriately,
MPAs can help protect the most sensitive and vulnerable species and habitats, maintain
genetic diversity, and act as a sort of insurance policy for non-protected areas (Roberts et
al. 2005). Adequately addressing social and economic concerns of MPA users is another
issue for mangers (Blount and Pitchon 2007), as is enforcement of boundaries of MPAs,
particularly for larger areas or areas that are located distant from human habitation. In
these cases, having the involvement and support of resource users is a critical link in the
success chain (Blount and Pitchon 2007).
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Small-scale fisheries in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico
In Mexico, as in the rest of the world, small-scale fisheries are an important part
of the economy: they represent 31% of the national total catch by tons, but account for
76% of the total economic value of fisheries resources (Aburto Oropeza et al. 2009). The
Gulf of California, located in northwest Mexico provides a disproportionately large
amount of fisheries resources for the country. Approximately half of the national total
fisheries catch and 70% of the national total value comes from the Gulf 7, while it only
encompasses 10% of the total Mexican fishing territory (Aburto Oropeza et al. 2009;
Carvajal-Moreno et al. 2004).
Governance of fisheries resources in Mexico falls under the jurisdiction of a
number of different agencies 8, each of whom has different responsibilities (Figure 1)
7
8
These numbers include both large- and small-scale fisheries.
Management of marine resources is split between two main government agencies: The Secretariat of
Agriculture, Ranching, Rural Development, Fisheries, and Food (Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería,
Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación or SAGARPA) and the Secretariat of the Environment and Natural
Resources (Secretaría del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales or SEMARNAT). SAGARPA and its
subsidiaries are generally responsible for the commercial side of fishing while SEMARNAT and its
subsidiaries deal with the non-commercial aspects, such as management of protected areas and endangered
species. Mexico’s Federal Environmental Protection Agency (Procuraduría Federal de Protección del
Medio Ambiente, or PROFEPA) is under SEMARNAT and is responsible for enforcement of federal laws
and regulations (enforcement assistance is also provided by the Mexican Navy at times). Under SAGARPA
and SEMARNAT are a number of other government groups that deal with different aspects of resource
management. The National Fisheries Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Pesca, or INP), which is in charge
of research permits, assessment of marine resource health, and evaluation of fishing gear and the National
Fisheries Commission (Comisión Nacional de la Pesca y Acuacultura, or CONAPESCA), which is
responsible for granting commercial fishing permits and concessions are under the jurisdiction of
SAGARPA. The Regional Centers for Fisheries Investigation (Centro Regional de Investigación Pesquera,
or CRIP) conduct on-the-ground data collection that the INP uses to make management decisions. The
National Natural Protected Areas Commission (Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas, or
CONANP), which manages Natural Protected Areas (including Marine Protected Areas) and the General
Division of Wildlife (División General de Vida Silvestre, or DGVS), which deals with wildlife permits and
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(Cinti et al. 2010), from enforcement and inspection to permitting to management of
natural resources and endangered species. In order to achieve effective management,
coordination, communication, and information and data sharing between these different
agencies is critical. They ways in which these agencies, as well as others involved in use
and management of marine resources are connected can have an impact on collaborative
efforts for marine resource management.
In this paper, we examine small-scale fishers in the Midriff island region of the
Northern Gulf of California (herein referred to as the NG) (Figure 2), a group that is
characterized by its use of small, outboard motor boats, its versatility in fishing gear and
methods, a relatively low investment in equipment, and an ability to target multiple
species (Cudney-Bueno and Turk-Boyer 1998). An estimated 1600 to 3000 commercial
small-scale fishing boats currently operate in the NG depending on the time of year,
targeting over seventy species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans, and echinoderms on a
regular basis (Moreno Rivera et al. 2007; Cudney-Bueno 2000).
Despite a growing number of conservation efforts in the NG (Carvajal-Moreno et
al. 2004), the growth of coastal human populations and marine resource use has created
conflict between fisheries management and marine conservation (Enríquez-Andrade et al.
management for listed species, are under the jurisdiction of SEMARNAT. Both CONAPESCA and
PROFEPA are at times supported by the Mexican Navy. In addition, the Port Captain is responsible for port
management and safety, including registration of boats, coordinating rescues, and informing fishers and
others about inclement weather.
152
2005; Páez-Osuna et al. 1999). One means for trying to find a balance has been the
creation of MPAs.
In Mexico many MPAs are designed to conserve natural resources, but to do so in
such a way that benefits users of those resources (e.g., commercial and sport fishers,
tourists)(Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009; Bezaury-Creel 2005). Federally-designated MPAs in
Mexico currently fall into one of four categories: Sanctuaries, National Parks, Biosphere
Reserves, or Areas of Protection of Flora and Fauna (Bezaury-Creel 2005; Bahre and
Bourillon 2002). The NG has three Biosphere Reserves, one National Park, and a special
marine refuge for the protection of the vaquita (Phocoena sinus), a highly endangered
porpoise that is endemic to the upper Gulf of California (Table 1). Although the entire
region is part of the Islas del Golfo de California Área de Protección de Flora y Fauna
(Gulf of California Islands Flora and Fauna Protection Area) and there are other islands
with special protected status in the NG (e.g., Isla Tiburon, Isla Rasa), these include only
the terrestrial habitat and not any of the surrounding marine area. In addition to the
federally designated MPAs in the NG, there are also examples of community-based
efforts at protecting certain areas. Cudney-Bueno (2009) shows that divers in Puerto
Peñasco, with support from regional non-profit conservation organizations and academic
institutions, were able to coordinate among themselves with mixed success to establish
temporary no-take zones and monitoring efforts for rock scallop (Spondylus calcifer) and
black murex snail (Hexaplex nigritus).
MPAs in the NG have met with mixed success in finding a balance between
sustainable use and conservation (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009; Cudney-Bueno et al.
153
2009). Generally speaking, most MPAs in the region suffer from a lack of sufficient
funds, lack of human resources, and lack of training and resources for existing staff.
These deficiencies create challenges for monitoring and enforcement, education and
outreach, and community involvement in management efforts (Fraga and Jesus 2008). It
is an constant contest for MPA staff to adequately manage the resources under their
jurisdiction with the resources available to them.
Fisheries resources in the NG represent a valuable and productive resource with
the potential for sustainable management. Unfortunately, current patterns of resource use
do not appear to be sustainable in the long term. Although significant areas of important
marine habitat have been granted protected status, management and enforcement of these
areas is an ongoing challenge. Here we provide two case studies of how social network
analysis can be used to inform management of small-scale fisheries operating within
MPAs. We use social network analysis methods to examine small-scale fisheries in the
NG by comparing in-depth case studies of social networks of users of two Marine
Protected Areas in the NG (the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve and the Bahía
de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve). We then discuss
how local social structure is associated with the development of successful organization
for the management of small-scale fisheries and marine protected areas.
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Area Descriptions
Bahía de Kino, Sonora and the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve
San Pedro Mártir Island is the most geographically isolated island in the Gulf of
California, located approximately 60 km from both the states of Sonora and Baja
California. It is a relatively small island (2.9 km2) characterized by steeply rising, guanocovered cliffs. It has a long boulder beach and two cobble bars where small boats can
land, but the sheer cliffs make human access to the rest of the island difficult (Tershy et
al. 1992)(Figure 2).
The island and its surrounding waters are biologically rich and provide habitat for
63 species of plants and animals that are under a category of special protection
(CONANP 2008). The marine habitat surrounding San Pedro Mártir Island is also
extremely diverse. Marine resources near the island include species of interest to
recreational divers and snorkelers, sport fishers, and commercial small-scale fishers. For
this last group, San Pedro Mártir Island has always been thought of as a sort of
emergency fund or savings account and is considered to be a place where fishers could go
if the catch is poor at fishing sites closer to shore (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009).
The remoteness of the island has in many ways made the island into something of
a de-facto marine reserve (Tershy et al. 1992). The distance of the island from the
mainland requires a reasonable investment of gas and a forecast of clear weather. For
small-scale fishers, the cost involved in a trip to San Pedro Mártir Island generally
induces them camp on the island for several nights. This, in turn, requires an extra
investment in ice to keep their catch from spoiling, as well as food and other camping
155
gear. For these reasons, fishers must consider the benefits to such a trip before making
the decision to work at San Pedro Mártir Island.
The combination of island’s biological importance and pressures from human
activity led to the decree of the San Pedro Mártir Island Biosphere Reserve (SPMI) in
2002 after two years of lobbying by the Sonoran State Offices of the Gulf of California
Islands Area of Protection of Flora and Fauna and two conservation organizations (DOF
2002). SPMI’s total area is 302 km2, which includes 2.9 km2 of terrestrial habitat on the
island and adjacent islets. The marine portion of the reserve is divided up into a 8.2 km2
no-take zone where fishing activity is prohibited and a 290.6 km2 buffer zone, inside of
which certain activities, including some types of fishing, are permitted (DOF 2002). In
addition, the island has also received a number of other special designations: it is a
Priority Marine Region in Mexico (Meza et al. 2009), a Wetland of International
Importance (Ramsar 2009), a Priority Conservation Site in the Baja to Bering Initiative
(Morgan et al. 2005), a UNESCO World Heritage Site (UNESCO 2009), part of the
UNESCO Man and the Environment program (UNESCO 2007), and is an Important Bird
Area in Mexico (Arizmendi and Marquez Valdelamar 2000).
The town of Bahía de Kino, on the central Sonoran coast is the third largest
fishing community in the NG in terms of numbers of fishers (PANGAS Project
unpublished data). Today, more than 50% of the population of Bahía de Kino depends on
fishing directly (CONANP 2007). It is located about 120 km west of the state capital of
Hermosillo. Approximately 50% of the commercial small-scale fishers that use the
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SPMI’s resources come from Bahía de Kino and the island is also an increasingly popular
destination for American sport fishers from the community (Meza et al. 2009)
Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salispuedes Biosphere Reserve, Baja
California
Bahía de los Ángeles is a remote community of approximately 500 inhabitants
(INEGI 2005) on the Gulf of California side of the Baja California peninsula (Figure 2).
It is located approximately 500 km and nearly 7 hour driving from the state capital of
Ensenada. Small-scale fishing is the most important economic activity in the community
(CONANP 2005). Approximately twenty percent of community members work as
fishers, and many others are either family members of fishers or are involved in sport
fishing or marine tourism activities.
The waters surrounding Isla Angel de la Guarda and the Baja Peninsula are an
area of high biodiversity and species richness (CONANP 2005). This area is important
for whales, dolphins, California sea lions, sea turtles, and numerous species of birds. It is
also a diverse area for fish, including many species of commercial value, as well as whale
sharks, which have been an important draw for ecotourism. The Mexican National
Commission for Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO) has designated the
area of the reserve as a Priority Region for Conservation in Mexico and as a Priority Area
for Bird Conservation (CONANP 2005) and Pronatura Noroeste has called the region one
of the three most important marine areas for conservation of biodiversity in the Baja
Peninsula and the Gulf of California (Enríquez-Andrade and Danemann 1998). The area
157
also incorporates a Ramsar Wetland of International Importance: the Corredor Costero La
Asamblea-San Francisquito (Ramsar 2009) and the region shares many of the same
distinctions as SPMI (it is an Area for the Protection of Birds in Mexico, a UNESCO
World Heritage Site, and part of the UNESCO Man and the Biosphere Program). The
remoteness of Bahía de los Ángeles has also contributed to its conservation value.
Because the region is difficult to access by road, development and associated pressures
have been much slower to reach the area than communities like Bahía de Kino or Puerto
Peñasco on the Sonoran mainland.
For these reasons, among others, in June 2007 the Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales
de Ballenas y Salsipuedes Biosphere Reserve (BLABR) was officially declared (DOF
2007) after more than seven years of planning efforts by a number of different partners,
including the Mexican National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) and
Pronatura Noroeste, a regional NGO. BLABR is expansive and covers a total area of
3836 km2, nearly all of which is marine habitat 9. Unlike SPMI, the only nuclear zone in
BLABR is a small wetland located in the bay in front of the community of Bahía de los
Ángeles. The rest of the vast area of the reserve has been categorized as a buffer zone for
sustainable use of natural resources (CONANP 2005).
9
The Reserve also protects the terrestrial portion of the 23 islands and islets that fall within its boundaries.
158
Methods
In 2007-2008 we spent a total of five months living in Bahía de Kino and one
month in Bahía de los Ángeles. In each community we collected detailed social network
data from users and managers of SPMI and BLABR. We also collected information about
the ways in which fishers organize themselves to work and their involvement in a number
of different activities related to small-scale fishing and marine resources.
We worked closely with two regional non-profit conservation organizations that
had long histories of working with small-scale fishers in Bahía de Kino and Bahía de los
Ángeles and which led the effort to designate the two biosphere reserve marine protected
areas (Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C. (COBI) for SPMI and Pronatura Noroeste A.C.
(Pronatura) for BLABR). With the knowledge of COBI and Pronatura staff, we created
two user lists, one for each MPA. These lists included all fishers, permit holders, and
buyers who were known to work at SPMI or BLABR or who were known to buy product
that was captured at SPMI or BLABR. It also included government agencies and NGOs
who were involved in management and conservation activities and academic institutions
and investigators engaged in research in the MPAs. In order to make sure the user lists
were as complete as possible we met with three key informants in each community prior
to beginning interviews to verify the validity of the list. Based on recommendations from
these key informants, we removed names that should not have been included and added
names that were missing. This final list comprised our study population for each
community.
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Structured Interviews
In order to obtain detailed social network data and an understanding of the ways
in which fishers worked and organized themselves, we conducted a series of structured
interviews with users of the two MPAs. We developed two separate interviews: one for
fishers, buyers, and permit holders and another for government agencies, NGOs, and
universities/researchers.
Fisher, buyer, and permit holder interviews focused on gathering information
about the respondent’s membership in groups, organization for work activities (who they
worked for and with), permits, equipment ownership, and participation in fisheriesrelated activities at SPMI and BLABR. We also asked for details about how the
respondent was connected to other members of the network. We provided respondents
with a list of all members of the network and asked them to indicate their connection with
each member of the list for three different relationships, all based on small-scale
fisheries. The specific (translated) questions are as follows:
1) Are you a member of a cooperative? Which one?
2) Do you have a fishing permit?
a. In whose name is the fishing permit that you use?
3) Who owns the equipment that you use to fish?
4) Who pays for your fishing outing costs?
5) To whom do you sell your catch?
6) Are you currently or have you even been a member of some other group or
160
fishers’ union?
7) Of the people in your community, is there anyone that you think could serve as a
representative for small-scale fishers?
8) Have you ever participated in meetings, programs, or courses about small-scale
fisheries (for example, about management, monitoring, or conservation?)
9) Have you ever participated in research or monitoring projects in the Reserve?
10) Have you ever received support from the government (e.g., stipend, motor, boat,
gasoline subsidy)?
11) Have you ever participated in monitoring and enforcement activities?
12) Do you share information with other people about small-scale fishing? For
example, about good fishing areas, prices, changes in rules and regulations? How
frequently?
13) When you have a problem related to small-scale fishing, do you ask someone for
advice? How frequently?
14) Do others come to you to ask for advice when they have a problem related to
small-scale fishing? How frequently?
The agency/NGO interview gathered more general information about the fisheries
management and conservation meeting, projects, and programs of that organization (that
dealt with the Reserves), including fisher participation. We used the user list for the MPA
to ask how the agency or organization was connected to others in the network. The
questions for agency/NGO respondents were worded in a slightly different way than for
161
the fishers, but gathered information for the same relations (i.e., question 1 below is
equivalent to question 12 above; question 2 below is equivalent to question 13 above, and
question 3 below is equivalent to question 14 above).
1) Do you share information with others about small-scale fishing, conservation and
management (including enforcement activities) in the Biosphere Reserve? How
frequently?
2) Do you seek information from others about small-scale fishing, conservation and
management (including enforcement activities) in the Biosphere Reserve? How
frequently?
3) Do others come to you for advice when they have a question or problem related to
small-scale fishing, conservation, or management (including enforcement
activities) in the reserve? How frequently?
For both interviews, we gave respondents the opportunity to name others who they
felt were an important part of their network, although they did not appear on the provided
user list. If others were named, in addition to the network information described above
we collected basic demographic information about the new person, including where they
lived, how long they had lived there, where they were born, and how and for whom they
worked (if they were fishers).
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Analysis
We used UCINET 6.235 (Borgatti et al. 2002) to create basic descriptive statistics
on network density, tie strength, degree centrality, and centralization. Density is a
measure of the actual ties observed compared with the maximum number of possible ties.
Mean tie strength is a measure of the average strength of the relation (how frequently
network members spoke). Degree centrality describes the patterns of connections
observed in a network and is a measure of the number of times each respondent was
named by others. Network centralization is a measure of the variance degree centrality
among network members (networks where one or just a few members are hubs of
information are highly centralized, versus a network with more disperse connectivity).
We calculated these measures for a fisher-only network as well as the complete network
of users for each MPA.
Brokerage
We used Netminer 3.0 (Cyram 2002) to conduct a brokerage analysis of the
information sharing network of users of the two MPAs. Brokerage is a method for
examining the position of nodes in a network with respect to other nodes, based on a predefined partitioning attribute. In this study, we partitioned nodes into different functional
groups based on how network members worked: fisher, permit holder, buyer, government
agency, NGO, university/researcher, or other 10. This analysis allowed us to better
10
Other included funding organizations and advisory boards and committees for management and
enforcement in the MPA.
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understand each member’s role in creating bonding or bridging ties in the network.
Bonding ties occur between members of the same sub-group (i.e., between two fishers),
while bridging ties connect two distinct sub-groups (i.e., fishers and government
agencies). The brokerage analysis examines the role of each node in making connections
within and between partitions and assigns points based on five categories: coordinator,
gatekeeper, representative, consultant, or liaison 11. In general, the greater the brokerage
score of a network member, the more important the role that person plays in the network
in terms of facilitating the flow of information or resources.
RESULTS
We conducted a total of 175 structured interviews with users of SPMI in BKI
(n=83) and users of BLABR in BLA (n=92).
11
Coordinator: If node ‘A’ receives a link from node ‘B’ in the same partition and sends a link to node
‘C’ in the same partition, node ‘A’ receives one Coordinator point. Example: fisherfisherfisher.
Gatekeeper: If node ‘A’ receives a link from node ‘B’ in a different partition and sends a link to node ‘C’
in the same partition, node ‘A’ receives one Gatekeeper point. Example: NGOfisherisher.
Representative: If node ‘A’ receives a link from node ‘B’ in the same partition and sends a link to node
‘C’ in a different partition, node ‘A’ receives one Representative point. Example: fisherfisherNGO.
Consultant: if node ‘A’ receives a link from node ‘B’ in a different partition and sends a link to node ‘C’
in the same partition as node ‘B’, node ‘A’ receives one Consultant point. Example: fisherNGOfisher.
Liaison: if node ‘A’ receives a link from node ‘B’ in a different partition and sends a link to node ‘C’ in
another different partition, node ‘A’ receives one Liaison point. Example: fisherNGOGovernment
Agency.
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Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics on network density, tie strength, degree centrality, and
centralization allow comparisons among the information sharing, advice giving, and
advice requesting relations. Table 2 presents a comparison of statistics on these network
features for commercial fisher-only networks, while Table 3 shows the same information
for complete networks.
Density
Although the numbers differ somewhat depending on whether we consider the
fisher-only network or the complete network, the patterns are similar. The information
sharing relation had the highest density for both MPAs. Network members in both
communities shared information with each other for frequently than they asked for or
received advice (higher mean tie strength for information sharing).
Compared to SPMI, densities are slightly higher in BLABR for the information
sharing relation for both the fisher-only and complete networks. Continuing this
comparison, density for both BLABR advice relations are lower for the BLABR fisheronly network, while for the BLABR complete network they are lower for advice giving
and slightly higher for advice receiving. Mean tie strength was higher for both the fisheronly and complete BLABR information sharing networks compared to SPMI, but lower
for both advice relations, across both the fisher-only and complete networks.
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Centrality and centralization
We report degree centrality based on measures of in-degree (the number of times
each respondent was named by another network member). For both SPMI and BLABR,
the mean degree centrality for information sharing for both the fisher-only and complete
networks was much higher than either of the advice relations, meaning that fishers tend to
share information about small-scale fishing at a much higher rate than they give or
request advice. Also for both MPAs, the mean degree centrality for the complete network
for advice giving and receiving is higher than the fisher-only network, meaning that
advice tends to come from sources outside of the network of fishers (Tables 2 and 3).
For the fisher-only network, BLABR shows greater centralization than SPMI for
the advice receiving relation, but lower centralization for the information sharing and
advice giving relations. For the complete network, BLABR shows lower centralization
across all three relations when compared to SPMI (Tables 2 and 3).
Institutional Analysis
SPMI and BLABR have many similarities in terms of the ways in which fishers
work and organize themselves, but they also have some important differences. In terms of
the presence of government agencies, CONAPESCA and the Port Captain both have a
regular presence in Bahía de Kino (SPMI), while neither have a presence in Bahia de los
Ángeles (BLABR). CONANP, on the other hand, has a strong presence in Bahia de los
Ángeles and at the time of this study had a much weaker presence in Bahía de Kino.
PROFEPA does not have a regular presence in either community, but each community
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has the regular presence and support of a regional NGO (COBI in the case of SPMI and
Pronatura in the case of BLABR). Neither NGO currently has a local office, although
both have had them in the past. In Bahía de los Ángeles Pronatura has developed a
community center for environmental education activities, but there is no regular staff at
the center. Staff from both NGOs travels to the respective communities regularly. One
difference is that COBI has hired local residents as employees (all three of the staff
members that regularly work with fishers in Bahía de Kino are originally from that
community and still have family that live there). Pronatura staff members that work in
Bahia de los Ángeles are not local (Table 4).
“Salience” is a term used to describe the importance of an issue to respondents in
social research. The salience of marine resources within the MPAs is high for fishers at
Bahia de los Ángeles and lower for Bahía de Kino. BLABR is located directly in front of
the community of Bahía de los Ángeles and encompasses the fishing zones of the
community entirely, versus SPMI, which is only used by a subset of fishers from Bahía
de Kino and is located distant from the community (Table 4).
Users of both MPAs generally fish where, what, and when they like. Although the
permits in Bahía de los Ángeles do specify fishing zones, fishers have a tacit agreement
that allows locals to have the benefit of essentially open access to the MPA, while
territories are defended from outsiders (fishers from other communities)(Cinti 2009).
Some permit holders from BLABR have also developed agreements with fishers from
outside who temporarily work under the permits of the local permit holder, thus gaining
access to the area. For SPMI the territories delineated by permits are very general (Cinti
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et al. 2010) and Bahía de Kino fishers do not appear to have developed any sort of
informal territorial use rights (Table 4).
Neither MPA has effective enforcement or inspection activities. In SPMI,
respondents commented that fishing activities are often illegal and include fishing in the
no-take zone of the reserve. Even when activities occur in the buffer zone, where fishing
is legal, it often involves the capture of protected or out-of-season species which are
generally captured using illegal methods. In BLABR fishing activity is generally legal.
There are, however, fishers in both communities that work without permits or under
permits on which their boat is not listed (Table 4).
Both communities of users have relatively similar proportions of fishers that work
as cooperative members and those that work independently. The biggest difference is in
the way that cooperatives work. In Bahía de los Ángeles there are two cooperatives that
truly function cooperatively. In Bahía de Kino, on the other hand, all cooperatives are
either run by permit holders or are groups of fishers who work independently under the
guise of a cooperative. The only exceptions are a long-time cooperative whose permits
are expired and whose members work for individual permit holders, and a newer
cooperative that, at the time of this research, was having administrative problems and
difficulty in maintaining member participation and obtaining permits. Virtually no fishers
in either community own their permits. Instead, individual permit holders are generally
permit holders who do not fish themselves, but essentially run a business whereby other
fishers work under his permit (Table 4) (Cinti et al. 2010).
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Ownership of equipment and dependence on permit holders to cover the expenses
of fishing outings differed greatly between the users of the two MPAs. In Bahía de los
Ángeles more than half of the fishers own their own boats and fishing gear (60%) and
nearly 80% covered their own expenses for fishing trips. In contrast, in Bahía de Kino
less than 25% of fishers owned their own boats and gear and nearly 90% relied on permit
holders and buyers to finance the costs of fishing trips (Table 4).
Participation in meetings about small-scale fisheries, monitoring activities in the
MPAs, and enforcement and inspection activities is relatively similar between the two
communities, but fishers in Bahia de los Ángeles had much greater success at accessing
government programs for receiving subsidies, stipends, and fishing equipment (43% of
fishers in Bahia de los Ángeles had received support from the government versus 19% of
fishers in Bahía de Kino) (Table 4).
In Bahía de los Ángeles more than half of respondents named someone in the
community that they felt could represent his interests as a fisher, and one permit holder
received 27% of the votes. By contrast, in Bahía de Kino only 37% of respondents
thought there was someone trustworthy enough to represent them, and the most popular
choice only received 13% of the votes.
Brokerage Analysis
We conducted a brokerage analysis of the information sharing network in order to
understand the importance of different network players in facilitating the exchange of
information about small-scale fishing in the study area. Tables 5 and 6 provide a
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summary of these results for SPMI and BLABR, respectively. Numbers in the tables
represent rankings rather than raw scores, for purposes of comparison. Figures 3 and 4
provide diagrams of the connections between different functional groups for each MPA.
Although the numbers differ somewhat between the two MPAs, the general
pattern is quite similar, both in terms of overall rankings and rankings for the five
different categories. Regional NGOs play top brokerage roles for both SPMI and
BLABR. Government agencies play a role, to different degrees. Some permit holders,
although not all, are important brokers in both networks, and some fishers are important
in different ways (Tables 5 and 6, Figures 3 and 4).
NGOs
For both communities the regional NGOs were the top-ranked overall network
broker. Their most important role is as a consultant. This means that they facilitate
information transfer between members of a different functional group, such as between
two fishers who otherwise would not be in communication with each other. This is
followed by their importance as a liaison (facilitating information exchange between two
different functional groups) and gatekeeper (getting information from a different
functional group and sharing it with other NGOs).
Permit Holders and Fishers
Permit holders play a brokerage role in networks of both MPAs, particularly as
liaisons (likely between fishers and government agencies or fishers and NGOs) and
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consultants (likely between fishers). For fishers, the most important brokerage role for
both MPAs is as a coordinator, facilitating information transfer between themselves and
other fishers. This is followed by acting as gatekeepers and representatives between other
fishers and network members in other functional groups, such as NGOs or government
agencies.
Monitoring Teams
In each MPA the lead regional NGO has been working with a group of fishers to
monitor the health of populations of different commercial species found within the
Reserve. For SPMI, COBI, in collaboration with CONANP, has developed a team of
local divers from Bahía de Kino who conduct ongoing sub-tidal monitoring efforts at
SPMI. Six of the nine team members are in the top fifteen overall spots in the brokerage
analysis. Six out of the nine are also in the top fifteen spots as coordinators among
fishers, five of nine are in the top fifteen as both gatekeepers and representatives between
other groups and fishers, one of nine is in the top fifteen consultants, and two of nine are
in the top fifteen liaisons between two non-fisher groups (Table 5, Figure 3).
In Bahía de los Ángeles Pronatura has also developed team of local divers to
undertake octopus and sea cucumber monitoring within BLABR. Three of nine
monitoring team members are in the top fifteen overall spots in the brokerage analysis.
Four of nine occupy the top fifteen spots as coordinators among fishers, one of nine is in
the top fifteen gatekeepers, four of nine are in the top fifteen representatives (including
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the top spot in the network), and one of nine is in the top fifteen for both consultants and
liaisons (Table 6, Figure 4).
Government Agencies
CONANP, the government agency in charge of MPA management, plays the
second most important brokerage role in the network in both communities, following the
same pattern as the NGOs’ role (consultant, liaison, gatekeeper). For SPMI,
CONAPESCA plays a moderate brokerage role in the network, particularly as a liaison
and as a gatekeeper, while for BLABR CONAPESCA’s role in the network is far less
pronounced (its most important role is as a gatekeeper, followed by liaison, but its overall
brokerage score is 40th, compared with 18th for SPMI (Tables 5 and 6). The Port Captain,
who is responsible for managing the fleet of registered boats, ranks 15th overall for SPMI
(principally as a liaison). For BLABR we were unable to interview the Port Captain, but
based on how he was named by other respondents 12, he does not play an important
brokerage role in the network.
DISCUSSION
Lack of communication and disconnect between resource users and managers
have both been discussed as limiting factors for collaborative management of MPAs in
Mexico (Fraga and Jesus 2008). Social network analysis provides a mechanism for
12
Mentions of the BLABR Port Captain made up .005% of all network ties.
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formally examining the pathways of communication between users and those working in
management and conservation. This, in turn, can help identify the most appropriate
network members to include in management efforts, appropriate areas for outreach and
education activities. It can also provide insights into the sorts of social structures that can
help facilitate collaboration.
While neither fishers in Bahía de Kino nor Bahía de los Ángeles can be said to
have successfully organized to develop institutions for sustainable use of marine
resources within SPMI and BLABR, there are certain tendencies in BLABR that point
towards better organization and capacity for collaborative behavior. Greater autonomy
both in terms of ownership of boats and fishing gear and ability to finance their own
fishing trips, the development of unofficial mechanisms for defending territories from
outside fishers, the presence of two cooperatively-functioning cooperatives, and a greater
level of trust (as evidenced by the belief that there are community members who could
serve as a representative for fishers) all suggest that the BLABR network has a greater
degree of collaborative behavior than the SPMI network. By contrast, in Bahía de Kino
fishers are highly reliant on permit holders for financing and equipment, have not
developed any informal mechanisms for defending their fishing zone, have lower
confidence that someone in the community could serve as their representative, and all but
one cooperative in the community are essentially businesses run by individual permit
holders (it should be noted that there are examples of this in Bahia de los Ángeles, as
well).
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All of this points towards Bahia de los Ángeles fishers’ greater ability to organize
themselves and work together in a way that is mutually beneficial to cooperative
members. The results of our network analysis provide somewhat mixed evidence for the
role of social structure in this outcome. In the following paragraphs we examine the
structural characteristics of the social networks of users of the two MPAs and provide
insights into how some of these characteristics may be associated with the presence or
absence of collaboration and organization.
Descriptive statistics
Density
Previous studies have shown that increased density of network ties can increase
the likelihood for collaboration and collective action (Bodin and Crona 2009). It can also
improve the possibility for exposure to new ideas and information (Janssen et al. 2006;
Reagans and McEvily 2003). In the case of the information sharing relation for the fisheronly networks for SPMI and BLABR, network densities are very similar, although they
are slightly higher in BLABR. Density is also higher for BLABR when considering the
information sharing relation for the complete network. For the advice giving relation, the
density is higher at SPMI (for both the fisher-only and the complete network), although
the numbers are very similar, and BLABR has a slightly higher density for advice
receiving compared to SPMI.
Comparing these measures between the two MPAs may help to explain why in
Bahía de los Ángeles there are more examples of successful organization of fisher
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cooperatives while in Bahía de Kino most fishers work for permit holders. The increased
density of the information sharing network of BLABR may facilitate collaboration and
collective action among fishers. The fact that SPMI has a higher density for both advice
relationships but does not show collaborative behavior may help highlight the importance
of information sharing.
Mean tie strength gives us a measure of how frequently network members share
information with each other. Sharing information between network members more
frequently can help contribute to a shared understanding of the resource system, which
has been shown to be important to collective action (Ostrom 2005). BLABR’s higher
mean tie strength score for the information sharing may add further evidence of the
importance of this relation for facilitating collaborative behavior.
Centrality and Centralization
Examining the mean degree of the different networks allows us to better
understand the types of information discussed by fishers. The higher mean degree for
information sharing in both the fisher-only and complete networks for both MPAs means
that fishers share information about small-scale fisheries with more people than they give
advice to or seek out for advice. The higher mean degree for both advice relations for the
complete network (compared with the fisher-only network) suggests that non-fisher
members of the network (e.g., NGOs, government agencies, or universities/researchers)
are important for advice relations.
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Centralization is another way in which networks of the two MPAs differ. It has
been suggested that higher degrees of centralization may support initial collective action
in resource governance (Bodin and Crona 2009; Sandström 2008). Highly centralized
networks, however, may be less than optimal for the long-term sustainability of collective
action, since few network members have most of the power (Bodin and Crona 2009). The
SPMI network’s higher centralization for all relations across both networks (with the
exception of the fisher-only advice receiving relation) may hinder collaboration by
concentrating relations around a few key people. This increased centralization may
decrease the inclination of fishers to work together cooperatively. The greater
centralization of the BLABR advice receiving relation in the fisher-only network
suggests that key fishers may be important and reliable sources for advice in that
network, which may, in turn, facilitate a shared understanding of the resource.
While resource users in Bahia de los Ángeles have not clearly demonstrated an
ability to engage in collective action with regard to management and use of marine
resources, they do show a greater propensity for working cooperatively and collaborating.
Higher network density and tie strength for the information sharing relation for both the
fisher-only and complete networks, combined with lower centralization for most other
relations, may help to explain this.
The role of brokerage on fishers’ organization
The results of the brokerage analysis provide conflicting insights into why fishers
at BLABR may have had greater success in organizing. In general, network members
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with high brokerage scores occupy important positions and can serve as bridges or
barriers to the transfer of information and resources within a network. These bridging ties
and bonding ties of brokers have a central function in the management of natural
resources (Ramírez-Sánchez and Pinkerton 2009; Bodin et al. 2006).
NGOs
Regional NGOs can play an important role in facilitating conservation and
management activities for CPRs. They bring human and financial resources, expertise,
prior experience in organizing, and a number of other factors that are essential in the
long-term sustainable management of CPRs (Ostrom 2005). They are also important in
the implementation of fisheries conservation and management efforts for both SPMI and
BLABR. The high brokerage scores for the NGOs in both MPAs highlight the important
role that these organizations play, particularly in creating bridging ties to bring together
different diverse groups for fisheries management and facilitating the transfer of
information between others, particularly fishers and management agencies.
Permit Holders and Fishers
Permit holders play an important brokerage role between fishers and those
working in fisheries management. Many of the government agencies target permit
holders for meetings and programs and rely on the permit holders to share that
information with fishers. Because of this, permit holders hold a position of power
between fishers and managers. In the BLABR network, the most important role of permit
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holders was as a consultant, while for the SPMI network it was as a liaison. A reasonable
interpretation of these results would be to say that in Bahía de los Ángeles the permit
holders facilitate information transfer between fishers, while in Bahía de Kino they more
often span the hole between NGOS or government agencies and fishers. The improved
information sharing between fishers facilitated by permit holders (as we see in BLABR)
may provide benefits to successful organization and collaboration.
Monitoring Team
NGOs in both Bahía de Kino and Bahía de los Ángeles involve a team of divers in
monitoring efforts for the two MPAs. The brokerage role of these divers can serve an
important function to the NGOs, particularly their roles as gatekeepers and
representatives. Both of these relationships are important to groups working on
conservation and management, who may not be able to directly communicate with every
network member but instead can rely on key fishers to most efficiently gather and
disseminate information about a variety of themes. By selecting fishers who have high
coordinator scores (that is, who share information with many other fishers) to participate
in monitoring efforts, NGOs are able to help build a stronger network of information
transfer (fishers who score high as coordinators, when involved in efforts with NGOs or
government agencies, will subsequently serve as gatekeepers and representatives for
other fishers). In this way, NGOs may be able to substantively influence network
structure and consequently facilitate information transfer about MPA use and
management.
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For SPMI we can generally say that the divers COBI has involved in monitoring
work are well-connected in the community of fishers in Bahía de Kino and serve as
important links for information transfer within and between network partitions. The high
coordinator scores of the members of the monitoring team are good indicators that the
NGO has chosen team members who have the potential to share information with other
fishers (that is, they have many bonding ties). Fishers’ roles as representatives
demonstrate that the monitoring team members have the potential to serve as conduits of
information from fishers to other network groups, such as NGOs or agencies. Similarly,
their role as gatekeepers may help disseminate information from NGOs and agencies to
other fishers. Both of these last two relationships highlight the important bridging ties of
these fisher-brokers.
The divers involved in BLABR monitoring efforts are somewhat less important as
brokers when compared with the SPMI team. Across all brokerage measures, including
the overall score, BLABR monitoring team members played a less important role in the
network, meaning that they are not as important in terms of forging connections between
fishers and others involved in fisheries management and conservation. Other fishers in
the community who are not involved in monitoring efforts have higher brokerage roles.
This is the opposite of what we might expect if the bridging and bonding ties represented
by the coordinator, gatekeeper, and representative roles of fishers involved in
conservation activities are important in facilitating cooperation and organization. For the
case of Bahía de los Ángeles other factors may be important to consider, as discussed
below.
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Government Agencies
Another marked difference between the two communities is the level of local
involvement and activity of government agencies. In Bahía de Kino, CONAPESCA has a
local office. Staff is responsible for receiving reports from permit holders about their
catch (who are required to submit information within 72 hours of capture). The office is
also responsible for disseminating information about rules and regulations, such as dates
for opening and closing seasons for different species. Because of the catch reporting
requirements, permit holders are in fairly regular communication with the local
CONAPESCA office. Individual fishers are also in communication with CONAPESCA,
but to a lesser degree than the permit holders.
CONANP’s role in Bahía de Kino has been increasing slowly, but at the time this
study was conducted they did not have a strong, regular presence in the community13.
While CONANP has a local visitor’s center in Bahía de Kino, it is located in New Kino 14
and local fishers do not tend to visit. There are two part-time local employees (both are
area residents and one is a former fisher), but neither has job responsibilities that require
them to specifically conduct outreach for the Reserve (one is the receptionist at the
visitor’s center and the other conducts human use surveys and supports other monitoring
13
Since the completion of this study, CONANP and RARE have implemented a PRIDE Campaign in Bahía
de Kino, focusing on the conservation of SPMI. CONANP has hired a campaign manager that lives in the
community of Bahía de Kino and is responsible for a wide range of education and outreach activities
related to the MPA. In addition, they have also hired a person who is responsible for sustainable
productivity projects and the organization and collaboration with other government agencies for
enforcement and sustainable fisheries activities, such as the development of fisheries management plans.
14
Bahía de Kino is divided into Old Kino, where the fishers and other local residents live, and New Kino,
which is principally made up of vacation homes and trailer parks for American sport fishers.
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activities at SPMI). It is interesting to note that much of CONANP’s role as a gatekeeper
and consultant was due to the connections of the employee who is a former fisher and
still has many connections with fishers in the community, and likely not due to education
and outreach efforts of Reserve staff.
The Port Captain is a special case of a government agency. In Kino there is a local
office and permit holders and fishers have reasonably regular contact with the Port
Captain. He is in charge of making sure boats are correctly registered, shares details
about weather and safety, offers training on security and survival on the water, and is a
member of the advisory board for the Reserve. He is particularly connected to the permit
holders but also has a reasonable amount of connection with fishers, including three of
the members of the NGO monitoring team. Despite this, he is not particularly involved in
conservation and management efforts for MPAs, although his location in the network
puts him in a potential position of power.
The situation in Bahía de los Ángeles with respect to the role of government
agencies is the opposite of Kino. There is no CONAPESCA office in the community and
the agency has virtually no local presence, which explains why its brokerage role is so
much lower than for the SPMI network. CONANP, on the other hand, has a local office
with a large staff that includes people from the local community (three previously or
continue to work as small-scale fishers). Their efforts in the community include
education and outreach about the reserve and the local staff play important roles in these
efforts. The increased involvement of CONANP likely supports collaborative efforts in
Bahía de los Ángeles.
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The Port Captain in charge of Bahía de los Ángeles is located in Ensenada and,
with the exception of special trips by fishers to Ensenada to deal with paperwork for boat
registration, plays a very small role in the day to day activities of fishers. It is not
surprising that he does not rank high in the brokerage analysis, as opposed to the role of
the Port Captain in the SPMI network.
PROFEPA does not have a local office or a regular presence in either community
and both MPAs have problems with enforcement of formal rules. The lack of good
connections among fisheries management and enforcement agencies in both communities
helps explain some of these issues. In Bahía de los Ángeles, particularly, the lack
presence of CONAPESCA and PROFEPA was remarked upon by most fisher and permit
holder respondents. During our interviews in Bahía de los Ángeles fishers mentioned that
when inspectors from PROFEPA or CONAPESCA were going to come to Bahía de los
Ángeles, word of the impending inspection arrived in the community prior to the
inspectors, allowing fishers who are undertaking illegal practices or fishing without
permits to temporarily stop and thus avoid negative consequences. No one was able (or
willing) to discuss how the information arrived in the community, but once it was there it
rapidly spread by word of mouth and fisher were able to adjust their activity accordingly.
The increased density of the information sharing relation in BLABR, particularly for the
complete network, may facilitate the transfer of this sort of information (although not
necessarily supportive of conservation behavior) and support other collaborative efforts.
At SPMI CONANP, with the support of several NGOs, is facilitating planning
efforts for coordinated enforcement in the MPA that would bring together CONANP,
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CONAPESCA, PROFEPA, and the Mexican navy. PROFEPA’s role in the brokerage
network for SPMI is through its connection to other government agencies and NGOs and
not because it is actively engaging with fishers and permit holders in Bahía de Kino.
Network members, such as PROFEPA, who are not particularly well-connected may
benefit by engaging with well-connected groups, such as COBI or CONANP. Using
network analysis to identify these bridging network members is a good way to ensure the
most effective involvement of groups who are currently not particularly embedded in the
network of the MPA but whose involvement is critical to the long-term success of
management efforts.
One interesting difference between the two communities is the greater amount of
government support received by fishers from BLABR (43% have received some sort of
government support, versus just 19% in SPMI). In both communities CONANP
facilitates PROCODES (Programa de Conservación para el Desarrollo Sostenible), a
small grants program for rural communities located within or nearby natural protected
areas. The funding goes to support projects that promote economic diversification and
conservation of natural resources, including training, development of new methods for
fisheries, ecotourism training and promotion, and monitoring. Both MPAs also have a
temporary employment program, where local residents are hired for short-term work
(generally cleaning up trash on the islands). In addition to these programs, though,
BLABR fishers tended to have received subsidies for boats, motors, and fishing
equipment from the state, whereas very few SPMI fishers had ever received this sort of
support. This suggests that fishers from BLABR may be better able to organize to take
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advantage of these opportunities, which also exist in Sonora. It may also point to better
connections between fishers and those in charge of the support programs for BLABR,
giving fishers improved access to these sorts of programs 15.
CONCLUSIONS
Our results provide mixed evidence for the role of social structure in impacting
positive outcomes for fishers’ ability to work together to organize. While the on-theground results point toward increased collaboration in BLABR, we found that some of
the structural characteristics that might be associated with collaborative action (i.e., some
measures of density and centralization, as well as certain brokerage tendencies) were
higher for SPMI. For other measures, our hypothesis that Bahía de los Ángeles would
show a greater propensity for organization is supported.
The illegal nature of much of the activity at SPMI made studying the network of
users challenging. Fishers generally did not even admit to working there, so it was nearly
impossible to ask direct questions about the ways that they worked or organized
themselves. Spending an extended period time at the island conducting participant
observation may help provide a clearer understanding of the activities of fishers, which
may be more organized, although illegal, than currently understood.
15
The small size of the community of Bahía de los Ángeles (population ~ 500) makes it fairly
straightforward to get information out to all fishers. Most households have a marine band radio (instead of
a telephone) and this is the most common mode of communication. When information about a government
program becomes available, it is generally announced on the radio and quickly filters through the
community. In contrast, the community of Bahía de Kino is much larger (population ~5000) and it is more
challenging to get information to all fishers.
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A wide range of factors affect the emergence of institutions for CPR management
and there is no single recipe for success (Ostrom 2007). Similarly, finding a common
network structure that can accurately predict sustainable use of CPRs is unlikely (Bodin
and Crona 2009). Although we can point to factors that tend to be present in situations
where users have been able to successfully organize to manage CPRs, the presence of
these structural features is likely not enough to ensure success or failure. In this study we
suspect that combination of factors is responsible for the observed outcomes, including
the salience of the resource to users and the distance of the community of users to the
resource. While social structure is important to consider, it is equally important to
consider other features of the situation. Even when many of the structural characteristics
of a network point towards the likelihood of collaboration, these other features may
ultimately have a greater impact.
Knowing how people are connected and the ways in which information about
CPR resources moves through (or is hindered from moving through) a network can
improve managers’ ability to develop more effective strategies and actions. Adding social
networks into the CPR management toolbox provides a mechanism by which those
working in management and conservation can incorporate social structure into their
management strategies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was made possible by contributions from the David and Lucile
Packard Foundation through the PANGAS Project and from The Nature Conservancy.
185
We would like to express our gratitude to the many fishers and fisheries managers from
Bahía de Kino and Bahía de los Ángeles who participated in this research; to Richard
Cudney-Bueno, Jorge Torre, and William W. Shaw for valuable guidance in research
design and implementation, as well as for their important feedback on previous versions
of this manuscript; to Gustavo Danemann for helping to facilitate field work in Bahía de
los Ángeles; to Mario Rojo and Nabor Encinas for assistance with field work in Bahía de
Kino; to Juan Caicedo for invaluable assistance with field work in both communities and
helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript; and to Ana Cinti, Marcia
Moreno-Baez, and Tad Pfister for insightful discussions on the region’s fisheries issues
and research design. This paper represents the views of the authors and not necessarily
those of their institutions and funders. This is a scientific contribution of the PANGAS
project, http://pangas.arizona.edu.
186
Figure 1. Organization of commercial small-scale fisheries management in Mexico.
187
Figure 2. Map of the study area within the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico (NG). The NG is the area
extending north of Punta San Francisquito in Baja California north of Bahía de Kino in Sonora. The dark
gray polygons delineate SPMI and BLABR, as well as the San Lorenzo Archipelago Marine Park.
Cartographic design: Marcia Moreno-Báez.
188
Table 1. Federal Marine Protected Areas in the Northern Gulf of California, Mexico.
Year Established
MPA Name
Reserva de la Biosfera Alto Golfo de California y delta del Río Colorado
1993
Reserva de la Biosfera Isla San Pedro Mártir
2002
Parque Nacional Marino Archipiélago de San Lorenzo
2005
Refugio para la Protección de la Vaquita Marina
2005
Reserva de la Biosfera Zona Marina Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de
2007
Ballenas y de Salsipuedes
189
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of fisher-only networks.
Information
Advice Giving
SPMI
BLABR
SPMI
BLABR
0.104
0.109
0.005
0.001
Density
0.386
0.444
0.136
0.005
Mean tie strength
Degree
min-max
0-31
0-64
0-17
0-7
std. dev.
7.484
6.321
0.761
0.355
mean
9.959
9.244
0.515
0.116
centralization
0.221
0.164
0.026
0.022
Advice Receiving
SPMI
BLABR
0.005
0.003
0.018
0.004
0-12
0.705
0.474
0.027
0-5
0.584
0.233
0.033
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of overall networks (fishers, permit holders, buyers, NGOs, agencies, and
universities/researchers).
Information
Advice Giving
Advice Receiving
SPMI
BLABR
SPMI
BLABR
SPMI
BLABR
0.054
0.078
0.005
0.003
0.005
0.006
Density
0.183
0.291
0.011
0.007
0.015
0.012
Mean tie strength
Degree
min-max
0-53
0-50
0-5
0-4
0-23
0-15
std. dev.
9.224
10.342
1.092
0.872
2.141
1.984
mean
9.117
12.406
0.813
0.463
0.912
0.988
centralization
0.260
0.238
0.249
0.022
0.131
0.089
190
Table 4. Comparison of institutional attributes for SPMI and BLABR, Northern Gulf of California,
Mexico.
Institutional
SPMI
BLABR
attributes
Presence of
• Local CONAPESCA
• No permanent (or regular)
government
office.
presence of fisheries authorities
agencies
(CONAPESCA or PROFEPA).
• No permanent (or regular)
• CONANP has local office with
presence of PROFEPA.
large staff.
• Minimal regular presence
• Port Captain is located in
of CONANP (Casa del
Ensenada and has minimal
Mar)
involvement with the
• Port Captain has local
community.
office and regular
communication with
permit holders and buyers.
Role of
No local office currently; one local
No local office currently; no local staff
regional
staff member and two other
members.
NGO
Guaymas staff who are from Bahía
de Kino.
Salience of
• Low: SPMI covers only a
• High: BLABR covers the full
Biosphere
small range of local fishing
range of local fishing grounds.
Reserve to
grounds for BKI fishers.
• Reserve is located close to the
users
• Reserve is located distant
community.
from the community.
• The management plan is being
• Management plan and
developed. Currently fishing
inspection/enforcement
activity continues as it did prior to
plan are currently being
the designation of the Reserve
finalized. At the moment
fishing activities continue
as before the designation of
the Reserve
Enforcement
Low
Low
(formal rules)
Legality of
Activities of fishers tend to be
Activities of fishers generally follow
fishing
illegal and include the capture of
existing laws and regulations. Some
activity in the
protected or out-of-season species
fishers work without permits and there is
Reserve
for sale on black market, the use of
a degree of fluidity in terms of accurate
illegal fishing methods, or fishing
match of pangas with permits.
within the no-take zone of the
reserve. There is a degree of
fluidity in terms of accurate match
of pangas with permits.
Territories/
The fishing behavior resembles
Generally, fishers work without
Fishing rules
open-access. Fishers work where it
restrictions. A tacit agreement exists
is convenient, without restrictions.
among locals to allow local fishers to fish
No formal territories are defended.
wherever they want, regardless of the
territories listed on permits. When outside
fishers arrive, local fishers defend their
territories and have developed
mechanisms to allow entry.
191
Participation
in groups
Cooperative
membership
# of
cooperatives
holding
permits
Ownership of
fishing
permits
Presence and
performance
of fishers’
organizations
(functional
cooperatives)
% fishers’
ownership of
fishing
equipment
% fishers
relying on
external
sources to
cover cost of
fishing trips
Participation
in meetings
16
39% of fishers had participated in
other groups.
• 33% of fishers are members of a
cooperative
• 67% are independent fishers
1 (permits are expired and fishers all
work under the permits of other
permit holders)
• 1% of fishers have permits in
their names.
• All other individually-held
permits are held by people that
act as permisionarios.
• One cooperative has its own
permits, but they are expired.
Local corporate permit
holders function in
practice as individual
permit holders.
Cooperatives are seldom
“cooperatively managed”.
Generally, only one
person administers the
business and concentrates
most of the power.
• The only cooperative
entirely managed by
fishers at the time of this
study. had major
administrative problems.
• 46% own their boats and gear
• 55% work with boats and gear
owned by permit holders (of
these 30% are working to
purchase the boat/gear).
• 87% rely on permit holders or
independent buyers (with no
fishing permits) to cover the cost
of fishing trips.
• 13% cover these costs on their
own.
80% of fishers have participated.
•
35% of fishers had participated in other
groups.
• 31% of fishers are members of a
cooperative
• 69% are independent fishers 16
2
• No permits held by individual fishers.
• The only individually-held permits are
held by people that act as
permisionarios.
• Two cooperatives have their own
permits but may work under the permits
of others, depending on the target
species
• Two local cooperatives function
more or less cooperatively. They
are constituted entirely by
fishers.
• One cooperative functions in
practice as an individual permit
holder with one or two people
administering the business.
• 60% own their boats and gear.
• 40% work with boats and gear owned
by permit holders.
• 37% rely on permit holders (who buy
their product) to cover the cost of
fishing trips.
• 63% cover these costs on their own or
rely on their own organization to afford
these costs.
70% of fishers have participated.
Independent fishers are those that are not official members of a cooperative. They may work under the
permits of a cooperative, for a permisionario or buyer who has a permit, or may fish illegally, with no
permit.
192
Participation
in monitoring
projects
Received
government
support
Participation
in
enforcement
and
inspection
activities
Fisher
representation
61% have participated.
69% have participated.
19% have received.
43% have received.
25% have participated.
24% have participated.
37% thought that there was
someone in the community who
could serve as a representative for
fishers (no single person received
more than 13% of the vote).
52% thought that there was someone in the
community who could serve as a
representative for fishers (one person
received 27% of the votes).
193
Table 5. Abridged brokerage analysis results, information sharing network for SPMI Biosphere Reserve.
Network
Overall Coordinator Gatekeeper Representative Consultant Liaison
Member
Rank
1
56
1
1
1
1
COBI (NGO)
2
64
2
5
2
2
CONANP
3
1
9
10
35
23
Fisher 1*
4
9
16
2
33
12
Fisher 2*
5
72
39
12
3
3
Permit Holder 1
6
11
33
3
23
25
Fisher 3*
7
2
14
49
30
47
Fisher 4
8
8
4
11
36
13
Fisher 5*
9
6
5
25
18
31
Fisher 6*
10
7
24
7
34
29
Fisher 7
11
3
29
14
37
26
Fisher 8
12
15
8
6
24
19
Fisher 9*
13
4
17
32
47
38
Fisher 10
14
19
7
8
15
18
Fisher 11
15
73
23
13
4
5
Port Captain
16
62
10
20
5
8
Permit Holder 2
17
5
66
60
63
66
Fisher 12
18
68
6
40
8
6
CONAPESCA
19
69
13
52
7
4
Prescott College
20
32
31
4
13
16
Fisher 13
21
17
15
18
26
28
Fisher 14
22
21
11
17
14
22
Fisher 15*
27
74
40
33
6
7
RARE (NGO)
35
61
22
27
9
9
Permit Holder 3
45
33
36
54
59
42
Fisher 36*
51
39
51
45
54
59
Fisher 42*
64
75
60
67
10
10
Permit Holder 4
65
70
61
59
12
11
Permit Holder 5
67
66
25
65
67
21
PROFEPA
71
76
62
56
21
15
GECI (NGO)
77
77
77
77
77
43
WWF (NGO)
*Member of sub-tidal monitoring team for SPMI.
194
Table 6. Abridged brokerage analysis results, information sharing network for BLA Biosphere Reserve.
Network
Overall Coordinator Gatekeeper Representative Consultant Liaison
Member
Rank
1
53
2
2
1
1
PRONATURA
(NGO)
2
51
1
3
3
2
CONANP
3
1
30
5
25
36
Fisher 1†
4
2
3
7
7
13
Fisher 2
5
55
24
25
2
4
Permit Holder 1
6
3
7
11
16
14
Fisher 3
7
5
6
14
10
18
Fisher 4
8
8
4
10
8
8
Fisher 5
9
57
51
21
4
3
Permit Holder 2
10
4
8
37
23
34
Fisher 6
11
6
5
45
47
48
Fisher 7*
12
7
10
17
18
21
Fisher 8
13
15
23
1
14
9
Fisher 9*
14
9
12
8
9
15
Fisher 10
15
58
52
58
5
5
Researcher 1
16
17
9
4
11
7
Fisher 11
17
11
13
9
26
12
Permit Holder 3
18
10
21
18
19
22
Fisher 12*
19
13
16
16
12
26
Fisher 13
20
56
46
57
6
6
Permit Holder 4
21
14
41
20
30
38
Fisher 14
22
25
22
6
15
10
Fisher 15
25
18
17
24
21
28
Fisher 18
26
21
20
19
29
17
Fisher 19*†
29
20
42
26
31
30
Fisher 22†
30
24
48
13
28
37
Fisher 23*†
32
35
34
12
27
16
Fisher 25*†
35
28
25
34
38
32
Fisher 28*†
40
49
14
33
37
11
CONAPESCA
58
59
58
31
35
41
Museum (NGO)
60
60
60
53
55
55
Aquatic
Adventures
(NGO)
*Member of octopus monitoring team for BLABR.
†Member of sea cucumber monitoring team for BLABR.
195
Figure 3. Brokerage analysis diagram for the information sharing network in SPMI. Nodes are sized based
on overall brokerage score. Dotted red lines denote the different user groups.
196
Figure 4. Brokerage analysis diagram for information sharing network in BLABR. Nodes are sized based
on overall brokerage score. Red dotted lines denote different user groups.
197
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205
APPENDIX D. MARINE SOCIAL CONNECTIVITY IN THE GULF OF
CALIFORNIA WORKSHOP PRELIMINARY RESULTS
The following is an internal preliminary report of outcomes and ideas generated as part of
the Marine Social Connectivity in the Gulf of California Workshop, held in Tucson, AZ
on 18-20 August 2009. This will serve to share some of the key points of discussion and
ideas for future needs, research ideas, and management implications of conducting social
networks research in the Gulf of California region.
Rational for the study of social networks in the Gulf of California:
The problems that exist in the Gulf of California are created by human-social interaction
and generally not by physical processes initiated outside of humanity. In order to solve
these problems we need to describe and understand the patterns of human interact that led
to the problems and figure out how to change those interactions in a way that would
mitigate the problem in some way.
•
Things to consider while designing networks research:
o Research question: clearly define a research question(s) to be answered
(question framing is key).
o Nodes/actors: who/what are the relevant actors (units of analysis)?
o Links/ties (what networks are of interest?)
o Attributes: what other information do we need to collect about the actors
and/or relationships?
o Boundary: where do you draw the line when deciding who is ‘in’ the
network?
o Method for generating network data: how will we collect data?
o Complementary studies: what else has already been done? What data
already exist that could potentially be used to look at networks?
Over the course of the workshop we discussed a wide variety of topics that had potential
to be answered through social networks research. Some of these questions would require
the collection of in-depth data, while we may be able to answer others with existing data.
We discussed things from both a larger, Gulf-wide perspective as well as at the
community level. A number of themes emerged throughout the course of the discussion.
Of particular interest were questions that could be used to help guide and improve
management and conservation efforts in the region.
•
•
•
Does understanding social networks in and between communities help design
management strategies/design effective zoning?
How are networks at a local scale connected to networks at a more regional level?
Key players: who to involve in management, who truly represents fishers/groups?
206
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
What network structures facilitate successful management or certain outcomes in
which we might be interested (e.g., sustainability, equity, efficiency, etc.)
How flexible and evolving are networks? How can we study the change of
networks over time?
How do different policies impact different parts of the network/different network
actors?
Can we use networks to drive regionalization within the GOC? Can networks be a
tool to lead us towards better understanding the regionalization of fisheries in the
GOC?
How can we study the evolution of the resilience of networks in relation with the
degradation of natural resources
Can we create/observe networks of people based on issues that mobilize/interest
them? Group people by their interest in different issues.
Who are the actors that sit ‘between’ issues or actors of interest, acting as a
bridge? (“Issue Brokers”)? Do they cross scales?
Are NGOs/agencies enabling or blocking processes? What role are
NGOs/agencies playing that the government should really be playing?
Does the scale of the social network match the scale at which resources are being
managed and adequately cover the regional network of priority conservation
areas?
How can SNA be used to complement conservation planning methods to
prioritize and schedule effective resource management and conservation actions?
Can we identify gaps in the bigger picture of conservation in the entire GOC?
How are sites connected by NGOs/researchers that work in multiple sites?
The preceding list is by no means exhaustive but includes the principle themes discussed
over the course of the workshop.
Next Steps:
• Step 1: Synthesize what is known
o Determine who is not at the table who should be involved.
o Create wiki to keep the group in touch (can also be medium for sharing
information)
o Create database of different social studies in the region (what exists, where
are the gaps in knowledge?)
o Who is working where? What are their interests? How can people doing
work in the region help facilitate communication and data collection?
o Prepare concept paper (based on final report for this workshop)
• Step 2: Conduct pilot studies (that have value of their own but also help inform
the regional study); generate data on contacts, collaboration, and other levels of
governance. Possible areas of interest:
o Current research on San Pedro Mártir Island and Bahia de los Angeles
207
•
o Agua Verde Corridor
o Loreto
o Upper Gulf of California
o Puerto Peñasco
o Bahia de Kino/Punta Chueca
Step 3: Consider utility/feasibility conducting regional study (Gulf-wide); connect all
social studies to biological/ecological studies wherever possible.
208
APPENDIX E. FISHER, PERMIT HOLDER, AND BUYER INTERVIEW
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Encuesta Sobre Redes Sociales de la Pesca de Pangas
Comunidad donde se realiza la entrevista ______________________________________
Nombre del entrevistador: __________________________________________________
Hora a la que empieza la entrevista (formato 24 hr) _____________________________
Fecha (mes/día/año; seis números ej. 08/28/08) ________________________________
Código de entrevista (comunidad, # entrevista, iniciales, fecha) ____________________
(Ejemplo: BKI01JC112208= Bahía de Kino; entrevista #1;
entrevistador: Juan Caicedo; Noviembre 22, 2008)
SECCIÓN I: INFORMACIÓN GENERAL SOBRE USTED Y SU TRABAJO
Me gustaría empezar con algunos datos generales sobre usted.
1.0
¿Cuántos años tienes? _________________________
1.1
¿Dónde naciste? (lugar/estado) ________________________________________
1.2
¿Dónde vives actualmente?____________________________________________
1.3
¿Cuánto tiempo tienes viviendo aquí? ___________________________________
1.4
¿Trabajas o trabajabas en la región de la Reserva de Bahía de Los Ángeles?
01 Sí 02 No 98 DNA
1.4.1 ¿Cuánto tiempo llevas pescando en pangas en la región de la Reserva de
Bahía de Los Ángeles? ________
1.4.2 ¿Con qué frecuencia sales para pescar en la Reserva de Bahía de Los
Ángeles?
01 Una vez o más veces en la semana
02
Una o dos veces al mes
03
04
Una vez al año o menos
Aproximadamente seis veces al año
209
1.5
¿En la región de la Reserva de Bahía de Los Ángeles, qué arte(s) de pesca
practicas?
1.6
a.
Buceo: especies
b.
Trampas: especies
c.
Piola: especies
d.
Cimbra: especies
¿Eres socio de una cooperativa?
01 Sí
00 No (en caso de respuesta
negativa, pasar a pregunta 1.7)
1.7
¿Cuál es el nombre de tu cooperativa?
1.7.1 ¿Cuánto tiempo tienes como socio en esta cooperativa?
1.7.2 ¿Ocupas algún puesto dentro de la cooperativa?
1.8
¿Tienes un permiso de pesca? 01 Sí 02 No (en caso de respuesta negativa,
pasar a pregunta 1.7.2)
1.8.1 ¿A nombre de quién está el permiso que usas para pescar; en tu nombre?
1.8.2
1.9
¿Para cuál(es) especies?
¿En qué panga trabajas?
1.9.1
Normalmente, ¿con quién trabajas en la panga?
1.9 ¿La panga, motor, y equipo de pesca que usas son tuyos o de otra persona?
1.9.1
Panga:
1.9.2
Motor:
1.9.3
Equipo de pesca:
1.10
¿Quién te habilita para los gastos de las salidas de pesca?
1.11
¿A quién le entregas tu producto? (puede ser más de una
persona/grupo)(persona/grupo, comunidad/estado)
1.12
01 Sí
¿Actualmente eres o has sido socio de algún otro grupo o unión de pescadores?
00 No
1.12.1 ¿Cuál?
1.12.2 ¿Cuánto tiempo tienes como socio?
1.12.3 ¿Ocupas algún puesto dentro del grupo?
210
1.13
00 No (en caso
¿Te acoplas con alguien cuando sales para pescar? 01 Sí
de respuesta negativa, pasar a pregunta 1.14)
1.13.1 ¿Con quién?
Nombre de panga
Nombre de capitán* y tripulantes
Arte de
pesca
1
2
3
4
5
6
1.14
¿De esas personas o de otras en Bahía de Los Ángeles, hay alguna que tu sientes
que podría representar tus intereses como pescador? Alguien que sabes que
comparta tus intereses?
SECCIÓN II: PREGUNTAS SOBRE LA COLABORACIÓN
Ahora te voy a hacer unas preguntas sobre tu participación en proyectos o programas relacionados con la
pesca ribereña (de pangas) en la región.
2.0
¿Has participado en algún reunión/programa/curso de capacitación sobre la pesca
(por ejemplo, sobre manejo, monitoreo, conservación)?
01 Sí
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, pasar a pregunta 2.1)
00 No
211
2.1
2.0.1
¿De qué se trató?
2.0.2
¿Quién le dio la capacitación?
2.0.3
¿Cuándo fue?
¿Has participado en proyectos de investigación o monitoreo? Por ejemplo, has
llevado biólogos, estudiantes, etc.
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso
de respuesta negativa, pasar a la pregunta 2.2)
2.1.1
¿En cuáles/con quienes?
2.1.2
¿Qué hizo usted en este proyecto?
2.1.3
¿Por cuánto tiempo has participado en este proyecto/con esa
persona/grupo?
2.2
¿Has recibido alguna ayuda o apoyo del gobierno (beca, motor, panga, subsidio de
gasolina, etc.) 01 Sí
00 No 98 DNA
(en caso de respuesta negativa,
pasar a pregunta 2.3)
2.3
2.2.1
¿Qué apoyo recibió?
2.2.2
¿Quién le dio ese apoyo?
2.2.3
¿Cómo se enteró que estaban dando ese apoyo?
¿Has participado en actividades de inspección y vigilancia?
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, pasar a la
Sección III)
2.3.1
¿Con qué grupo o comité?
2.3.2
¿Por cuánto tiempo has participado en estas actividades?
2.3.3
¿Cómo has participado?
212
SECCIÓN III: FUENTES DE INFORMACIÓN
Las próximas preguntas son para conocer de donde obtienes información sobre lo que está pasando
con la pesca ribereña (de pangas) en el área de la Reserva de Bahía de Los Ángeles. Te voy a
preguntar sobre varios medios de comunicación que a lo mejor consultas para obtener información
(por ejemplo: sobre áreas buenas de pesca, precios, vigilancia, cambios en las exigencias de la
autoridad (PESCA, PROFEPA), etc.) Por favor indica si son importantes para ti.
3.0
a. Periódico
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
b. Radio
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
c. Televisión
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
d. Internet
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
i. ¿Cuáles sitios? ¿Para qué visitas?
e. Boletines
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
f. Cartelones
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
g. Volantes
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
h. Reuniones
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
i. De otras personas 01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
j. Otro
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA
SECCIÓN IV: PREGUNTAS SOBRE COMPARTIR INFORMACIÓN
Las siguientes preguntas son sobre la gente con la que usted platica sobre la pesca ribereña (de
pangas) en la región de la Reserva de Bahía de Los Ángeles o alrededor. Pueden ser de tu
cooperativa o no, de tu comunidad, o de otras comunidades en la región. Esas personas pueden ser
otros pescadores o pueden ser gente que trabajan para el gobierno, ONGs, universidades, etc. Por
favor, piénselo tranquilamente y dé tantos nombres como quiera para cada pregunta.
4.0
¿Compartes información con otros personas sobre la pesca ribereña)--por
ejemplo, sobre áreas buenas de pesca, precios, vigilancia, cambios en las
exigencias de la autoridad, etc.?
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, pasar a pregunta
5.0; en el caso que sí, usa Apéndice A; usa hojas adicionales para obtener
detalles sobre cada pescador que no está mencionado en el Apéndice A.)
213
4.1
¿Otra gente comparten información contigo sobre la pesca ribereña (de pangas)-por ejemplo, sobre áreas buenas de pesca, precios, vigilancia, cambios en las
exigencias de la autoridad, etc.?
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, pasar a la
Sección V; en el caso que sí, usa Apéndice A; usa hojas adicionales para obtener
detalles sobre cada pescador que no está mencionado en el Apéndice A.)
SECCIÓN V: CONSEJO
Ahora quiero preguntarte sobre quien te aconseja cuando tienes un problema o una pregunta sobre
cosas legales relacionado con la pesca ribereña, y también quién pide consejo a ti con sus
problemas/preguntas. Por ejemplo, lo que puedes y no puedes pescar (vedas, vigilancia, cambios en
las exigencias de la autoridad, etc.) Puede ser gente de tu cooperativa o no, de tu comunidad, o de
otras comunidades en la región. Esas personas pueden ser otros pescadores o pueden ser gente
que trabajan para el gobierno, ONGs, universidades, etc.
5.0
¿Cuándo tienes un problema relacionado con la pesca, pides consejo a alguien?
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, pasar a pregunta
5.1; en el caso que sí, usa Apéndice A; usa hojas adicionales para obtener
detalles sobre cada pescador que no está mencionado en el Apéndice A.)
5.1
¿Otros personas vienen a pedirte consejo cuando tienen algún problema
relacionado con la pesca?
01 Sí
00 No
98 DNA (en caso de respuesta negativa, termina con la
encuesta; en el caso que sí, en el caso que sí, usa Apéndice A; usa hojas
adicionales para obtener detalles sobre cada pescador que no está mencionado
en el Apéndice A.)
SECCIÓN VI: CONFIANZA (pone las respuestas en el Apéndice A)
6.0
¿Le pedirías prestado la panga, el motor, o el equipo (compresor, otro equipo,
etc.) a esa persona?
6.1
¿Le prestarías a él tu panga, motor, o equipo (si tuvieras equipo propio, crees que
se lo prestarías?)
214
6.2
¿Le pedirías un préstamo de dinero a esta persona?
6.3
¿Le prestarías dinero a esta persona?
Hora a la que termina la entrevista (formato 24 hrs) ______________
215
APPENDIX F. NGO AND GOVERNMENT AGENCY INTERVIEW
Proyecto PANGAS
Conectando Gente y Ciencia por la Salud de Nuestra Pesca
Encuesta Sobre Redes Sociales de las ONGs y Agencias Trabajando en el
Manejo/Conservación de la RBBLA
Nombre del entrevistador:
Hora a la que empieza la entrevista (formato 24 hr)
Fecha (mes/día/año; seis números ej. 08/28/08)
Código de entrevista (comunidad, # entrevista, iniciales, fecha)
1. ¿Cuáles proyectos/programas está implementando en la Reserva de la Biósfera
Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes (o la comunidad de
Bahía de los Ángeles, sobre la Reserva) su organización?
a. ¿Cuál es el proyecto/programa (nombre, metas)
b. ¿Por cuánto tiempo ha existido este proyecto/programa(s)?
c. ¿Quién está involucrado en el proyecto/programa(s)?
i. Pescadores
ii. Otros grupos/organizaciones
d. ¿Cómo están involucradas? (¿Cual es su papel?)
e. Si ofrece reuniones o talleres, ¿a quién invita a participar?
i. ¿Cómo decides a quién vas a invitar?
ii. ¿Cómo les convocas y cómo les contacta para informar del evento?
2. ¿Su organización/agencia tiene una oficina local en Bahía de los Ángeles?
SI
NO
a. ¿Quién trabaja en la oficina en Bahía de los Ángeles?
3. ¿Su organización/agencia tiene personal que visitan la comunidad de Bahía de los
Ángeles regularmente? SI
NO
216
a. ¿Quiénes?
b. ¿Qué es su papel? ¿Con que frecuencia visita a Bahía de los Ángeles?
4. ¿Compartes información con otras personas sobre la pesca ribereña, conservación
y el manejo (incluyendo la vigilancia) de la Reserva de la Biósfera Bahía de los
Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes?
SI
NO
5. ¿Solicita información a alguien sobre la pesca ribereña, el manejo o la
conservación (incluyendo la vigilancia) de la Reserva de la Biósfera Bahía de los
Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes?
SI
NO
6. Otra gente le pide consejos a usted, cuándo tienen una pregunta/problema sobre
la pesca ribereña, la conservación o el manejo (incluyendo la vigilancia) de la
Reserva de la Biósfera Bahía de los Ángeles y Canales de Ballenas y Salsipuedes?
SI
NO
Usar el padrón de usuarios para tomar datos en detalle sobre preguntas 4, 5 y 6.
7. ¿Hay alguien que no sea en la lista pero que sientes que es un parte importante de
tu red?
a. Notar nombre(s)/grupo(s), relación(es) y frecuencia(s) de comunicación.
Si son individuos, notar donde trabajan y su papel.
Hora a la que termina la entrevista (formato 24 hrs)
217
APPENDIX G. HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL
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