Wildlife conservation in Zambia and the Landsafe Customary Commons

Wildlife conservation in Zambia and the Landsafe Customary Commons
Wildlife conservation in Zambia and the Landsafe
Customary Commons
by
I. P. A. Manning
Thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy (Wildlife Management)
The Centre for Wildlife Management
Faculty of Natural & Agricultural Sciences
University of Pretoria
Pretoria
Supervisor: Professor Wouter van Hoven
February 2011
© University of Pretoria
3
Declaration:
I, Ian Patrick Alexander Manning, declare that the dissertation which I hereby submit for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Wildlife Management) at the University of Pretoria, is my
own work and has not previously been submitted by me for a degree at this or any other
tertiary institution.
SIGNATURE: _______________________________
DATE: _____________________________________
5
From the standpoint of a higher socio-economic formation, the private property of particular
individuals in the earth will appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men.
Even an entire society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not owners
of the earth, they are simply its possessors, its beneficiaries, and have to bequeath it in an improved
state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias (good heads of the household).
Karl Marx – Capital
If Africa is to take her rightful place among the continents, we shall have to proceed on different lines
and evolve a policy which will not force her institutions into an alien European mould, but which will
preserve her unity with her own past, conserve what is precious in her past, and build her future
progress and civilisation on specifically African foundations.
J.C. Smuts - Africa And Some World Problems
6
Wildlife Conservation in Zambia and the Landsafe
Customary Commons
by
I. P. A. Manning
Supervisor: Professor Wouter van Hoven
The Centre for Wildlife Management
Faculty of Natural & Agricultural Sciences
University of Pretoria
Doctor of Philosophy (Wildlife Management)
_________________________________________________________
ABSTRACT
This dissertation both proposes and records the ongoing implementation of a ‘Landsafe’ integrated
conservation and development model for the customary commons of Zambia.
In Volume I, a geographical historical perspective of the country is presented which concentrates on
wildlife conservation and rural people. The changes wrought successively on indigenous peoples by
invading native Africans of the Bantu linguistic group, then in turn on them by Europeans in the form
of Charter Companies and later by Imperial Protectorate rule, and finally, by self-rule, is explored. The
country’s evolution from Western colonialism and embedded liberalism, to exploitative neoliberalism
and the concurrent emergence of the traditional patrimonial system - one modernised by its meeting
with European capitalism, is the backdrop and basis for the construction of Landsafe and its current
implementation in two chiefdoms.
Volume II presents the Landsafe ICDP model. This is based on the formation of chiefdom statutory
trusts, with trustees elected by villagers of the customary commons; and the signing of comanagement agreements with government departments in respect of wildlife, Game Management
Areas, and protected forest land, forests, fisheries and water. The local District Councils would be
signatory to such agreements, and the chiefs and their headmen would vest selected customary land in
these trusts. These vested lands are then protected, allowing for controlled exploitation by investors such that they do not impinge unnecessarily on traditional rights or on the re-establishment of
traditional guardians of nature. Land may not, under any circumstances, be alienated from customary
control. A log frame programme analysis procedure is adopted and a suggested formalisation
methodology and procedures for implementing Landsafe included. Finally, the socio-ecology of the
first project area in the Luangwa Valley is detailed, followed by a description of the implementation of
the Landsafe programme; including a critical analysis comparing Landsafe theory to practice.
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Declaration……………………………………………………………………………………………..... 5
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 7
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………………………... 9
Project location – Map…………………………………………………………………………………... 18
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………….... 19
Dedication……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 21
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
VOLUME I: WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN ZAMBIA
CHAPTER 1: Zambia before self-government in 1964……………………………………............... 27
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 28
1
Wild Country……………………………………………………………………………………... 29
2
Pre-colonial History………………………………………………………………………………. 29
3
Bantu Colonialism………………………………………………………………………………... 30
3.1 Early Bantu invaders, the Portuguese and the Arabs
3.2 Nineteenth century invaders
3.3 Bantu culture and custom
3.3.1
Survival strategies
3.3.2
Witchcraft
3.3.3
Customary law
3.4 The slave and ivory trade
4
European Colonialism……………………………………………………………………………..36
4.1 Explorers, missionaries, hunters, traders and miners
4.1.1
The pioneer concessionaires in the east of the territory
4.2 Charter companies
4.2.1
History
i)
The North Charterland Exploration Company
ii)
The British South Africa Chartered Company
4.2.2
Impacts on people
4.2.3
Blackbirding
4.3 British Imperial Protectorate
4.3.1
Indirect Rule
4.3.2
Provincial Administration
4.3.3
The Federation
4.4 Winds of change and Bandung
5
The Environment and its Legal Framework……………………………………………………… 44
5.1 Land tenure and population
5.2 Landuse and technical support
5.3 Wildlife conservation
6
The Economy……………………………………………………………………………………... 49
7
References………………………………………………………………………………………… 51
9
CHAPTER 2: Self-Government and wildlife conservation…………………………………………. 53
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………............... 54
1
Zambia and the Game Department (1964-1974)…………………………………………………. 56
1.1 Politics and wildlife conservation
1.2 Transitional and Natural Resource Development Fund
1.3 The Luangwa Valley Conservation and Development Project and Game cropping
2
National Parks and Wildlife Service (1975-1999)………………………………………............... 59
2.1 Introduction
2.2 ADMADE: Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
2.3 LIRDP: Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
2.4 Restructuring the administration of wildlife and National Parks (1992-2001)
3
Zambia Wildlife Authority (1999- 2009)………………………………………………………… 67
3.1 Game Management Areas and The Lands Act of 1995
3.2 Community Resource Boards
3.3 SLAMU: South Luangwa Management Unit
3.3.1 Quotas
3.3.2 Elephant poaching
3.3.3 Illegal acts
3.3.4 Human rights abuses
3.4 NRCF: The Natural Resources Consultative Forum
3.5 CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
3.5.1 Ivory trade
3.5.2 Bushmeat trade
3.5.3 Ranching
3.5.4 Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed
at Illegal Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora
4
Partnerships in Conservation Development………………………………………………………. 83
4.1 National Parks and public-private partnerships
4.1.1 Kasanka
4.1.2 North Luangwa
4.1.3 Liuwa
4.1.4 Luambe
4.1.5 South Luangwa
4.1.6 Lower Zambezi
4.1.7 West Lunga
4.1.8 The Kafue Flats and its protected areas
5
National Park Concession Tourism Agreements (CTAs)…………………………………………. 88
5.1 Mosi oa Tunya
5.2 Kafue and Luangwa
5.3 Sioma Ngwezi
6
Aid Projects……………………………………………………………………………………….. 90
6.1 CONASA: Community Based Natural Resource Management and Sustainable
Agriculture (2001 – 2005)
6.2 COMACO: Community Markets for Conservation
6.3 SEED: Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification
6.4 REMNPAS: Reclassification and Effective Management of the National
Protected Areas System
7
National and Local Organisations………………………………………………………................ 96
7.1 WECSZ: The Wildlife and Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia
7.2 PHAZ: The Professional Hunters Association of Zambia
7.3 SHOAZ: The Safari Hunter Operators Association of Zambia
7.4 WPAZ: The Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia
8
ZAWA Performance……………………………………………………………………................ 97
9
ZAWA Incorporated……………………………………………………………………................ 99
10
9.1
9.2
10
11
Live animal translocation
Game meat
References……………………………………………………………………………………….. 102
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………. 106
Appendix 1: Précis of five evaluations of ADMADE carried out between1992
and 1998 (Clarke 2000).
Appendix 2: Principal conclusions from a review of Kasanka (Pope, 2006).
Appendix 3: CITES 15th CoP
CHAPTER 3: Safari Hunting and wildlife-based tourism…………………………………………..115
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 116
Part I: Safari hunting…………………………………………………………………………………117
1
Hunting Concessions……………………………………………………………………………... 117
1.1 The first 25 concessions: 2003 – 2012
1.1.1
Hunting Concession Agreements (HCAs)
1.2 The next 13 concessions: 2005 – 2010
1.3 Proposed protected area hunting concessions
2
Quotas, Species Status and Mbeza Safaris……………………………………………………….. 120
2.1 2003
2.2 2004
2.3 2005
2.4 2006
2.5 2007
2.5.1 Quota utilisation
2.5.2 Licencing
2.6 Summary of Zambia’s safari quotas: 2003 – 2007
3
Concession ‘Nationalisations’……………………………………………………………………. 126
3.1 African Experience Safaris
3.2 Leopard Ridge Safaris
3.3 Sable Transport
3.4 Mbeza Safaris
3.5 NAMAC v ZAWA
4
Country Safari Hunting Report 2008……………………………………………………………... 130
4.1 Legal
4.2 Conservation
4.3 Customary community partners
4.4 Safari hunting operators
4.5 Changes to the Hunting Concession Agreement
Part II: Game ranching……………………………………………………………………………….. 133
Part III: Non-consumptive tourism…………………………………………………………………… 134
5
References………………………………………………………………………………………… 137
6
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………...139
Appendix 1: The 25 concessions (2003-2007)
Appendix 2: The next 13 hunting concessions as awarded
Appendix 3: Synthesis of the Draft National Policy of May 2003 on Private
Wildlife Estates and Other Novel Uses of Wildlife
CHAPTER 4: The Framework for Conservation and Rural Development……………………….. 145
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 146
1
Economics, Population and Investment…………………………………………………………... 149
1.1 Economics
1.2 Population
1.3
Investing and doing business in Zambia
1.4
Investment protection
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1.5
Foreign aid
The International and Regional Framework for Conservation…………………………………… 159
2.1 The World Conservation Strategy
2.2 UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Copenhagen Consensus
2.3 SADC: Southern African Development Community
2.4 NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
2.5 The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
2.6 WSSD: World Summit on Sustainable Development
2.7 Convention on Biological Diversity
2.8 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNIDO)
3
Zambia’s Natural Resources Framework affecting Customary Communities and
Wildlife Conservation…………………………………………………………………………….. 163
3.1 Current state of the customary commons
3.1.1 Introduction
3.1.2 Strategies for customary community ownership
3.1.3 The customary authority
3.1.4 Customary land
4
Legal and institutional framework for natural resources……………………………………….. 172
4.1
Introduction
4.2 Policy and legislative formulation process
4.2.1 Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) of 1990
4.2.2 Tourism and Hospitality Bill
4.2.3 The Forestry Act No. 39 of 1973
4.2.4 The Fisheries Act of 2007
4.2.5 The Water Act No. 34 of 1948
4.2.6 National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP)
4.2.7 National Conservation Strategy (NCS) 1985
4.2.8 National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) 1994
4.2.9 National Policy on Environment (2005)
4.2.10 Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) - Fifth National Development Plan,
2006 – 2010
4.2.11 Zambia National Action Plan (NAP) for Combating Desertification (2002)
4.2.12 Climate change
4.2.13 Forest and carbon protection
4.2.14 Genetic resources
4.2.15 Malaria
5
Government Policy and Chiefdoms………………………………………………………………. 188
5.1 Public-private partnerships (PPP)
5.2 Decentralisation
5.3 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Bill
5.4 Freedom of Information Bill
5.5 Bio-safety Act
5.6 National Constitution Conference (NCC)
5.7 Local Government Acts
6
Parastatals (Quangos), Chiefdoms and Investors………………………………………………….191
6.1 Zambia Development Agency
6.2 Zambia Business Forum
6.3 Anti-Corruption Commission
6.4 Commission for Investigations
6.5 Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission
6.6 Drug Enforcement Commission
7
Government, Chiefdoms and Investors……………………………………………………………194
7.1 Legislation Supporting Primary Stakeholders
7.1.1 The Co-operative Act
2
12
7.1.2 Societies Act
7.1.3 Lands (perpetual succession) Act
7.1.4 The Companies Act (limited by guarantee)
8
International community, chiefdoms and investors………………………………………………. 195
9
Zambian NGOs, chiefdoms and investors………………………………………………………... 196
9.1 The Zambia Land Alliance
9.2 Transparency International Zambia
9.3 The Human Rights Commission
10
References………………………………………………………………………………………… 198
11
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………...202
Appendix 1: Corruption in Ministries affecting customary residents
CHAPTER 5: Integrated Conservation and Development Partnerships in Zambia…………….. 209
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 210
1
Regional integrated community-based conservation and development………………………… 212
1.1 Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
1.2 Namibia (Appendix 1)
1.3 Malawi
1.4 Botswana
1.5 Tanzania
2
Zambia………………………………………………………………………………………….. 215
2.1 Customary Areas Investor Partnerships
2.1.1 Nyawa Community Trust
2.1.2 Luembe Conservancy Trust
2.1.3 Royal Empowerment Foundation
2.1.4 Itumbi-Kaingu Community Trust
2.1.5 West Lunga Trust
2.1.6 Mwanachingwala Conservation Trust
2.1.7 Nyakolwe Trust
2.1.8 Shinganda-Lumba Conservancy
2.1.9 Royal Luembe Trust
2.1.10 Nyakaulu Mwape Community Trust
2.1.11 Sioma Falls PPP
2.1.12 Nyalugwe Conservation Trust
3
International Donor Funding………………………………………………………………………222
3.1 The Kabuwebulwe Trust
3.2 Mpumba Conservancy Trust
3.3 Chikuni Community Partnership Park
3.4 Chiawa Community Partnership Park
3.5 Kazungula Heartland Trusts
3.5.1 Mukuni Trust
3.5.2 Sekutu Development Trust
3.5.3 Siluwe Trust
3.5.4 Other Trusts
3.6 Joint Forest Management Areas (JFMAs)
4
Mafunta CBNRM Project………………………………………………………………………..227
5
Transfrontier Conservation Areas………………………………………………………………. 227
5.1 Kazangula and Zambezi Heartlands
5.2 Malawi/Zambia TFCA
5.3 Kaza (Kavango – Zambezi TFCA)
References………………………………………………………………………………………. 229
6
7
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………… 232
Appendix 1: The CBNRM policy and legislation for Namibia
Appendix 2:
Objectives of the Luembe Conservancy Trust Limited
13
VOLUME II: THE LANDSAFE COMMONS DEVELOPMENT MODEL
CHAPTER 6: The Landsafe Model……………………………………………………………………239
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 240
1
The evolution of Landsafe……………………………………………………………………… 241
1.1 The Chipuna investment model for chiefdoms
1.2 The Chipuna partners
2
Landsafe………………………………………………………………………………………… 242
2.1 The focused objectives
2.2 The expected general outcomes
2.3 The expected benefits
2.4 The expected constraints
2.5 Outputs and activities to implement Landsafe
3
Towards Investor/Chiefdom Trusts equitable financial solutions……………………………… 245
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Landsafe Land lease
3.3 Comparative lease cost in Zambia
3.3.1
Agricultural land
3.3.2
Concession Tourism Agreements
3.3.3
Hunting Concession Agreements
4
The formalisation and implementation of Landsafe……………………………………………. 249
4.1 Statutory institutional structures for natural resource management
4.2 Facilitation
4.3 The land
4.4 Wildlife
4.5 Game Management Areas
4.6 National Parks
4.7 Local forests and forest on customary land
4.8 National Forests
4.9 Fisheries
4.10 Water
4.11 Chiefdom landuser rights (usufruct)
4.12 Business development
4.13 Appointment of chiefdom advisory committee
5
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………… 259
6
References………………………………………………………………………………………. 261
7
Appendices……………………………………………………………………………………… 262
Appendix 1: Introduction for chiefs to Chipuna conservancy development for
customary and protected land in Zambia
Appendix 2: Chipuna main partners
Appendix 3: The Chipuna roadmap
CHAPTER 7: The Three-rifts Landsafe Project Area………………………………………………. 269
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 270
Part I: : Environment and Natural Resources……………………………………………………... 271
1
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….. 271
2
The Environmental Framework…………………………………………………………………... 271
2.1 Physiography and climate
2.2 Geology and soils
2.3 Three-rifts rivers
2.3.1
Lunsemfwa
2.3.2
Lukusashi
2.3.3
Luangwa
2.4 Vegetation
14
2.4.1
Soil associations
2.4.2
Physiographic associations
2.5 Agriculture
2.6 Wildlife and hunting
3
Key Environmental Issues………………………………………………………………………... 274
3.1 Fire
3.2 Tsetse fly
3.3 Animal predation on villagers
3.4 Human predation on wildlife
3.5 HIV/Aids
3.6 Mining and hydro-electric generation
Part II: Luembe……………………………………………………………………………………….. 279
4
Location…………………………………………………………………………………………... 279
4.1 Luembe Open Area (Luangwa east bank)
4.2 GMA section (Luangwa west bank)
4.3 West Mvuvye National Forest
5
The Ambo Tribe…………………………………………………………………………………...280
5.1 Location
5.2 History
5.3 The Luembe chiefdom
5.4 Land tenure
5.5 Customary land alienations
5.5.1
Introduction
5.5.2
Mbizi ranch
5.5.3
Nyamadzi ranch
6
Kazumba Open Area Section……………………………………………………………………... 284
7
Protected Areas…………………………………………………………………………………… 284
7.1
Luembe section: West Mvuvye National forest
7.2
West Petauke GMA
8
Key Legal Issues………………………………………………………………………………….. 285
8.1
Luembe CRB
9
The State of Luembe……………………………………………………………………………… 286
Part III: Nyalugwe…………………………………………………………………………………….. 287
10
The Chiefdom…………………………………………………………………………………….. 287
11
Customary Land Alienations……………………………………………………………………... 287
12
Key Legal Issues………………………………………………………………………………….. 288
12.1 Nyalugwe CRB
12.2 Nyalugwe Conservation Trust
13
The State of Nyalugwe…………………………………………………………………………….289
13.1 Education
13.2 Agriculture
13.3 Health
13.4 Wildlife
13.5 Forestry
13.6 Justice
13.7 Extension services
13.8 Credit availability
Part IV: State of the Three-rifts and GRZ services…………………………………………………. 290
14
Office of the President – Eastern Province……………………………………………………….. 290
15
Health……………………………………………………………………………………………... 291
16
Agricultural and Cooperatives……………………………………………………………………. 291
17
References………………………………………………………………………………………… 292
18
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………...294
15
Appendix 1: Common game species and hunting quotas for 2007 in the West Petauke GMA
and the Nyamadzi
CHAPTER 8: Implementing Landsafe in Luembe and Nyalugwe Chiefdoms……………………. 297
Plate 1: Three-rifts Landsafe Project Area………………………………………………………………. 297
Acronyms………………………………………………………………………………………………... 298
1
The objectives……………………………………………………………………………………. 299
2
Respective responsibilities of partners…………………………………………………………….299
3
Stakeholders involved in Project…………………………………………………………………. 300
3.1
Primary stakeholders
3.2
Secondary stakeholders
3.3
Key stakeholders
4
The expected general outcomes…………………………………………………………………... 300
5
The expected benefits……………………………………………………………………………... 301
6
Ongoing and achieved general outputs…………………………………………………………… 301
7
Proposed Landsafe outputs for the chiefdoms……………………………………………………. 303
8
Natural resources protection……………………………………………………………………… 305
9
Agriculture………………………………………………………………………………………... 305
10
Hunting Safaris…………………………………………………………………………………….305
Part I: Luembe Chiefdom…………………………………………………………………………… 306
11
Background……………………………………………………………………………………….. 306
12
Present Outputs…………………………………………………………………………………… 307
13
Projected Investment Outputs…………………………………………………………………….. 307
14 Constraints to progress……………………………………………………………………………. 307
Part II: Nyalugwe Chiefdom………………………………………………………………………….. 308
15
Background……………………………………………………………………………………….. 308
16
Expected Outcomes………………………………………………………………………………. 308
17
Planned Outputs and Activities to Achieve Outcomes…………………………………………… 308
18
Constraints to progress…………………………………………………………………………….309
Part III: Conservancy expansion: the Central African Transfrontier…………………………….. 309
19
Background……………………………………………………………………………………….. 309
20
Expected Outcomes………………………………………………………………………………. 310
Part IV: Critical analysis comparing Landsafe theory to practice…………………………………. 310
21
References………………………………………………………………………………………… 313
22
Appendices………………………………………………………………………………………...314
Appendix 1: Nyalugwe hunting block quotas, fees and potential earnings
Appendix 2: Landsafe Njinga reports
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………………………………..317
1
Common-Property Trusts (The Chiefdoms)………………………………………………………. 319
2
The Zambia Permanent Fund……………………………………………………………………… 319
16
ADDENDA……………………………………………………………………………………………… 321
Addendum 1: Landsafe formalisation documents………………………………………………………..322
Form 1:
MOU: Establishment of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy
Form 2:
Landuser rights cession: customary authority to chiefdom society
Form 3:
Petition to the Minister of Lands
Form 4:
Community application for a CRB to the Zambia Wildlife Authority
Form 5:
MOU: wildlife co-management agreement between a Chiefdom
Landsafe Trust and a Community Resource Board
Form 6:
Community Resource Board game quota application to ZAWA
Form 7:
Game quota cession by CRB to a Trust
Form 8:
Application for registration of a Community Game Ranch by a Chiefdom
Form 9:
Conservancy land-use planning template
Form 10:
Game Management Area co-management agreement between a chiefdom Trust and a
Community Resource Board
Form 11:
Application for the co-management of an adjoining National Park by a CRB to
ZAWA
Form 12:
MOU for a Joint Management Agreement for chiefdom forests
Form 13:
MOU for a Joint Management Agreement for gazetted forest
Form 14:
MOU for a Joint Management Agreement with the Fisheries Department
Form 15:
Community application for a Fisheries Management Committee
Form 16:
MOU for a co-management agreement with the Department of Water Affairs
Form 17:
Chiefdom landuser rights assignment under Lands (perpetual succession) Act
Form 18:
Chiefdom landuser cession to Trust Company (limited by guarantee)
Form 19:
Project proposal template
17
Google Map showing the area of the Landsafe Conservancy Project
18
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am massively indebted to my family: to my wife, partner and friend in all things, Cathlin, in
particular for her unwavering courage in the face of threats by the state; to my son, Brendan who
struggled on with us and who was unjustly deported; to my eldest son, Hamish, for his very generous
support and management of our project’s hunting operation; and to our daughter Bronwen for coming
to our assistance in the eye of an administrative storm.
Rolf Shenton (and Penroy Morris early on) made Zambia for a time a vibrant place for debate and
inquiry as to the way forward for the villagers and wildlife of Zambia; and Judy Carr and Martha
Potgieter have kindly stood in the breech for us during our enforced absence from the country. Also,
we are exceedingly fortunate to have found in Japher Mbewe, a son of the Luembe people, an
outstanding individual prepared to carry on bravely with the Landsafe campaign.
There are others who gave their support: Roy Clark (Kalaki) and Sarah Longwe, Wynter Kabimba,
and Ali Shenton, Margaret Whitehead and Claire Mateke- with whom I joined in the battle for the
Mosi oa Tunya National Park - and Allistair Gellately who has remained our friend through thick and
thin. In addition, I thank my friend and former Game Department colleague, Peter de Vere Moss, for
his advice to our Zambian team. And I am grateful that Chief Nyalugwe was finally prevailed upon by
Brendan to take up a constructive role in guiding his people forward with Landsafe, and also that
Francis Kalunga Njobvu, the sitting Senior Chief Luembe, initially supported the first Landsafe
project.
To our partner, Khalid Al Tajir, I can only marvel at his good faith in giving financial backing to what
he must surely have thought were merely quixotic dreams. That we persevere has much to do with his
tenacity and forbearance, as well as the critical support that Nicola Jones gives us. Without Khalid
none of this would have been possible.
I am also extremely grateful to the late Professor Emeritus Donald Dodds, and his wife Pearl, for their
long friendship and guidance, and for encouraging my move long ago from Luangwa to Acadia
University in Nova Scotia - from whence all the best things in my life have come. Also I remember
with great fondness the late Lydia MacMillan – mother of Cathlin, who welcomed me far from home
during two ‘study tours’ and made possible the writing-up of my work on sitatunga.
I am greatly indebted to Professor Wouter van Hoven for agreeing to take in to his cellar of academia
an old partly corked wine; and to his wife, Suzanne, for encouragement on the map front; and to Liset
for her kindly welcome to the University of Pretoria’s Centre for Wildlife Management. And I thank
the American academics: Professor Delwin Benson, for his insightful critique of this dissertation; and
Professor Stuart Marks - whom I have known from the time he began his seminal study in the
Luangwa in the 1960s - for some very wise, generous and trenchant advice and comment. And finally,
I must thank our editor at Gamefields Press, Debbie Coetzee, for attending to the minutiae of the
dissertation itself.
19
For Cathlin, Hamish, Brendan and Bronwen.
21
INTRODUCTION
At the start of this Zambian project seven years ago the author still held patently Eurocentric views
regarding the previously named Northern Rhodesia, and Zambia: that the country was a Western-style
state within the Western club of nations requiring assistance and effort to safeguard its institutions and
to further its modernisation. In such a country, wildlife would be conserved, the poor enfranchised and
safeguarded, and democratic freedoms assured. Later on in the project, the author gained an insight
into the neoliberal effects of restructuring, foreign aid, and of the control exerted by the West over the
political and economic realms, and of their impact on the elite and on the urban and rural poor. These
were, after all, the same forces that had destroyed the embedded liberalism of the post-war years in the
West, replacing it with the cult of individualism and the withdrawal of the state from social provision.
And added to this, anti-globalist forces now increasingly object to excessive corporate greed and its
negative externalities. Harvey analysed the forces at work within capitalism, noting how prone it is to
crisis, calling for remedial social action by setting out ‘some loosely agreed-upon common objectives’.
These objectives resonate with African communal culture and with Landsafe:
These might include respect for nature, radical egalitarianism in social relations,
institutional arrangements based in some sense of common interests, democratic
administrative procedures (as opposed to the monetised shams that now exist), labour
processes organised by the direct producers, daily life as the free exploration of new
kinds of social revelations and living arrangements, mental conceptions that focus on
self-realisation in service to others and technological and organizational innovations
orientated to the pursuit of the common good rather than to supporting militarised
power and corporate greed. These could be the co-revolutionary points around which
social action could converge and rotate.1
An Africanist called for something similar - for an autochthonous model for Africa’s development:
It would be found, rather, in devolving executive power to a multiplicity of locally
representative bodies. It would be found in re-establishing ‘vital inner links’ within the
fabric of society. Democratic participation would have to be ‘mass participation’ And
‘mass participation, patiently evolved and applied, would be able to produce its own
version of a strong state: the kind of state, in other words, that would be able to
promote and protect civil society.2
These, in essence, are objectives and views of the way forward that are in harmony with African
culture, certainly with the people of the chiefdom commons. Yet, it is questionable that the reform of
capitalism and any neoliberal reversal would make much difference to Zambia. The author’s
experience gained during the Landsafe project reveals that Zambia is not a Western state in waiting, or
a state wishing to modernise - as Europeans would wish. It is, in fact, a country of many ‘nations’ run
by ‘Big Men’ and their networks of ‘clients’, a country occupied by people who - perhaps because
they did not experience the Industrial or Mesopotamian revolutions - have little interest in Western
notions of development. What motivates Zambians is social wealth – and the material wealth to assure
that status’s continuance, for they are a deeply communal culture, who do not act at the individual
level as do Westerners. While the institutions and the administrative capacity to run a modern state
appear to be in place, the reality is that they barely function, except as harvesting centres – as the
Auditor-General’s reports continually confirm. It is patrimonialism that ‘runs’ the country, a
bewildering set of major and minor corruptions, of highly integrated social networks required to make
it function, all of it inimical to Eurocentric modernisation:
1
2
Harvey, D., 2010. The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism, Oxford University Press, USA, p. 231.
Davidson, B. 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the curse of the nation-state. Times Books, New York,
p. 294.
23
…what all African states share is a generalised system of patrimonialism and an acute
degree of apparent disorder, as evidenced by a high level of governmental and
administrative inefficiency, a lack of institutionalisation, a general disregard for the
rules of the formal political and economic sectors, and a universal resort to
personal(ised) and vertical solutions to societal problems.3
This statement describes Zambia, with a patrimonial system that impacts negatively on people (thus
not surprising that Zambia’s 2010 standing on the Human Development Index places it fourth from
last in the world, with Liberia, Congo Republic and finally, Zimbabwe, following behind it by only a
few points). This is the reality that this partly polemical Eurocentric history contained in Volume I
hints at. But does this belated conclusion mean that the author’s efforts so far – as laid out in Volume
II –will not deliver any improvement to villager livelihoods or to wildlife? Upon review, the author
concludes that by providing the statutory institutional shape for the chiefdoms of Zambia, and by the
attempts to implement it in two chiefdoms, some minor accretion of modernisation will - and already
has, occurred. But it needs to be taken up by other chiefdoms, without being a mere fleeting addition
to the patrimonial food chain, and without becoming a curse, rather than a blessing.
3
Chabal, Patrick. & Daloz, Jean-Pascal. 1999. Africa Works: disorder as political instrument. James Currey,
Oxford, p. xix.
24
VOLUME I: WILDLIFE CONSERVATION IN ZAMBIA
25
CHAPTER ONE:
ZAMBIA BEFORE SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 1964
27
ACRONYMS
BSA Company
CAZEC
CHA
DC
DO
GMA
GDP
HQ
KNP
mtDNA
NA
NCE Company
NGO
NW
PA
PC
UN
WWI
WWII
British South Africa Chartered Company
Central African and Zoutpansberg Exploration Company
Controlled Hunting Area
District Commissioner
District Officer
Game Management Area
Gross Domestic Product
Headquarters
Kafue National Park
Mitochondrial DNA
Native Authority
North Charterland Exploration Company
Non-Governmental Organisation
North-Western Rhodesia
Provincial Administration
Provincial Commissioner
United Nations
World War I
World War II
28
1
WILD COUNTRY
The territory encompassing the watersheds of the Congo and Zambezi is geologically ancient, noted
for its Great Tanganyika Plateau of deciduous miombo forest, its lakes and wetlands, and the fertile
valley troughs and vistas of undulating Kalahari sands. It is one of the best-watered parts of Africa
with sixteen ecosystems contained within four biomes and with a wealth of minerals and natural
resources, though its soils are generally leached and infertile. It lies at an altitude of between 2,164
and 3,500 metres, presenting a generally equitable climate of the ‘savannah’ type with three seasons:
cool-dry (April-August), hot-dry (August-November) and warm-wet (November-April) - its ecology
being determined by the long dry season and the single wet season.. The rainfall is highest in the
northern parts of the territory, which reveal, in the presence of remnants of mushitu tropical moistforest, evidence that the present Congo moist-forest had at one time extended much further east.
Such a rich ecological environment - particularly associated with the hippo, crocodile and fish-filled
perennial rivers and wetlands - produced the Elysian Fields in which vast herds of lechwe, buffalo,
eland, wildebeest and tsessebe, together with other species of antelope, were coursed by the great
African predators. And elephant and black rhino were ubiquitous.
2
PRE-COLONIAL HISTORY
Excavations at the Mumbwa and Natchikufa caves revealed the existence of two types of aborigines:
bushmanoid, of the Wilton culture; and pygmoid, of the Natchikufan culture. The latter emanated from
the Equatorial region to the west, people of considerable cultural divergence (Clarke 1950, pp. 42-52).
Bushmanoid remnants - probably resembling the black and physically robust bushmen, the Hukwe,
who still live in the region between the Mashi and Zambezi Rivers in Western Province (Barotseland)
- bear some resemblance in appearance and survival strategy to the Hadzabe bushmen of present day
Tanzania, another aboriginal remnant (Brelsford 1956, p.18).
The pygmoid group is represented by the Twa people, whose genetic inheritance is still found to a
marked degree in the peoples of the Lukanga, Kafue and Bangweulu wetlands – in the latter centred
on the island of Mboyolubambe - though in that area, by the time of the First World War (WWI), they
were not universally short, having already fused with the Unga and other tribes (Hughes 1933). What
singles them out is the Twa geometric tradition of rock art and the now defunct Butwa secret society
(Smith 2000, p.87). In the Luangwa Valley, the aborigines were known as the Akafula, being skilled
iron workers and fearsome fighters. The Nsenga knew them as baKatanga, a largely solitary people
who hunted elephant with spears and who were without bow and arrow (Lane Poole 1938, p.37). They
were slowly assimilated, killed, or driven off elsewhere by the Bantu colonists.
Recent genetic evidence making use of mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) – as well fossil evidence - has
allowed us to trace the movement of humans around the earth, suggesting that a group of modern
humans migrated successfully out of Africa some 80,000 years ago (Oppenheimer 2003, p.31). In
addition, the fact that Africans have a much larger mtDNA sequence divergence than non-Africans,
suggests that they accumulated the most mtDNA mutations, and therefore the greatest diversity,
supporting the argument for a human African origin (Stoneking 2006, p.21). Thus it would appear that
modern Africans, Europeans, Asians and Australians i.e. Homo sapiens, evolved from a Hukwe/Twa
type, who had in turn possibly evolved from Homo erectus.
29
3
BANTU COLONIALISM
3.1
Early Bantu invaders, the Portuguese and Arabs
It is likely that the immigration into the territory by Africans belonging to the Bantu linguistic group
began in a trickle, greatly expanding in the mid eighteenth-century, a process that continues to this
day.
By A.D. 500 a group distinguished by their use of ‘stamped ware’ pots had moved from the north of
Lake Nyasa and down the Shire River and up the Zambezi Valley - a matriarchal people, these were
the likely ancestors of the Tonga. During the fourteenth and fifteenth-centuries a group known as the
Maravi settled the Luangwa Valley and Eastern Plateau, while the Kaonde moved into the north-west
of the country, displacing the Lenje. In the early sixteenth-century the Portuguese gained an
ascendancy over Islam in the Indian Ocean, having already in the early fifteenth-century captured the
ports of Mombasa, Kilwa and Sofala. From here they made forays into the interior in search of gold
and ivory. In the process they introduced a wide array of new agricultural plants: pepper, wheat,
tobacco sweet potatoes, manioc (cassava), haricot beans, lentils, onions, guavas, paw-paws, small
bananas, and later, maize. Their first invasion - one leading to a settlement - was in the Zambezi
Valley at Zumbo (the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambezi Rivers), established by the Goan,
Perreira. In 1570, a horde of cannibal invaders known as the Zimba arrived at Tete on the Zambezi,
laying waste the country. In 1585, they retreated towards Kilwa, which they sacked, eating most of
their prisoners; finally being defeated by an alliance of Arabs, Africans and Portuguese. In the same
century, more invaders arrived, the present people known as the Lozi entering along the Zambezi from
the north and spreading out onto the plains allied with the upper Zambezi, usurping the land settled by
the Subiya, Mashi and Shanjo aboriginals. Sometime in the seventeenth-century, the Luba Kingdom,
fuelled by commerce from the west and the possession of many firearms, sought new lands to settle by
moving into the present day Northern Province. These migrations culminated with the arrival of the
Bemba in about 1740, who then forced the Bisa, Lungu and Mambwe nations to give way, the latter
two in particular spending the next 170 years escaping their depredations. While all these movements
were taking place, the Portuguese, Lacerda, led an expedition in 1798 from Tete to Chief Kazembe’s
country near the Luapula River. The first crossing of Africa in these parts was completed by two
Portuguese speaking Africans, Baptista and Jose, a journey which took them nine years for they had
been long detained by Chief Kazembe on the Luapula River. In 1827, the Portuguese established a
small garrison to protect their Kazembe slave and ivory route in the Lundazi district of the Luangwa
Valley, but by 1831, the last Portuguese expedition into the territory left Tete for the north under
Monteiro and Gamitto (Gann 1964, pp.13-18).
3.2
Nineteenth century invaders
The nineteenth-century saw a reversal of the generally southward migration of Bantu Africans. In
1835, the patriarchal cattle-owning Ngoni crossed the Zambezi from present day Swaziland, then split
up into various groups, some of them settling under Chief Mpeseni in the eastern part of the territory,
displacing the Nyanja people and soon laying waste the area far and wide in their search for tribal
converts and grain (Baxter 1954, pp.46-52).
A further remarkable movement north took place when a nation known as the Kololo, under their
chief, Sebitwane, moved north with large herds of cattle, crossing the Zambezi in about 1840. They
dallied briefly in the Tonga country, until they were forced westward by the Matabele into the Barotse
country. On the death of Sebitwane in 1851, the Kololo fortunes declined and in 1864 they were
defeated by the Barotse chief, Sepopa, and the Barotse Kingdom, now firmly established, expanded its
area of influence by raids for cattle and slaves, much as the Ngoni had done (Gann 1964, p.21).
30
3.3
Bantu culture and custom
The Bantu invaders of the territory were predominantly hoe agriculturists of a late iron-age culture,
with a few tribes - notably in the tsetse fly free areas - such as the Tonga, Ila, Bisa, Lozi and Ngoni,
being pastoralists, depending on hunter-gathering and fishing in the generally well watered territory.
Canoes were dugouts, loin coverings were made from bark cloth and antelope skin – with some
spinning and weaving of kidney cloth - and hoe, spear and axe heads being smelted by themselves
(Gluckman 1956, pp.1-27). The Ila men, however, went completely naked up until WWI (Holub &
Johns 1975, p.116). Paradoxically, this external view concealed the existence of a reasonably well
developed native African model of community self-government, and the existence of well developed
political institutions among the Bemba, Ngoni and the Barotse, the latter characterised by an elaborate
central political authority that is still intact today. It was simply assumed by Europeans, as in the rest
of Africa, that there were no nations or nation-states in Africa’s pre-colonial history (Davidson 1996,
p.51). Yet there is evidence that by the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century the Batoka Plateau
supported populations of considerable density and prosperity, suggesting the existence of a ‘nation’
that was relatively advanced (Vickery 1986, p.13).
Although Bantu societies all have a rich set of kinships and clans, they vary considerably according to
custom. The Tonga, when first studied at the time of their disintegration at the hands of the raiding
Matabele, had no system of chieftainship, living in small hamlets of kinsmen related in many lines.
Here the important kinship groups were those related by maternal descent, there being twelve
matrilineal clans, some of which were linked as ‘joking partners’, signifying a close and privileged
relationship. The clan system is the sine qua non of Bantu life itself. Chirapula Stephenson,
clambering up the Muchinga Escarpment, described it thus:
But, of course, they would only help members of their own clan, or family, or surname
– the last is, perhaps, the nearest equivalent according to our lights. In other words,
these people would regard all Smiths in the world, all Browns, all Robinsons, as of the
same descent: all Smiths are relations, all Browns are relations, but no Smith is any
kind of relative to a Brown – certainly not! Natives of the same surname have, among
themselves, particular rights and privileges: they will do for their “brothers” what they
would do for themselves. But the strangers from another ‘surname’ is, as the scriptures
say, “not with us,” and therefore “against us” – and is treated accordingly (Stephenson
1937, p.49).
3.3.1 Survival strategies
The principles upon which Bantu tribal life is based, showing a remarkable similarity over a wide
area, were wrought in the fires of isolation and environmental vicissitude. Three principles have long
governed their existence (Culwick 1943, p.11):
(i)
The idea of the intimate relation of the natural and supernatural worlds with the
consequent interplay of religious and secular functions - the immanence of the
supernatural.
(ii) The conception of tribal and clan unity in both worlds, and the social and moral
philosophy built on that foundation.
(iii) The complicated and interlocking organisation of economic reciprocity which
regulates the rights and duties of individuals in the various groups, often
overlapping, some permanent, others temporary, to which they belong.
African’s wealth is measured therefore in the extent of social networks - ‘rights-in-persons remain a
respectable and rational way to invest and display wealth’ (Gordon 2006, p.23) - the normal capitalist
accretion model exhibited by Westerners, whereby individuals advance their interests and wealth in
isolation, being largely absent. And the relationship of Bantu Africans with the land and the
31
biodiversity is far from being strictly utilitarian. Prior to colonisation in particular, nature and man
formed an inviolable relationship where religion, custom and the dream world formed a unity.
Elaborate rituals governed man’s relationship with nature, something carried out by appointed
guardians having authority and tenure rights over particular areas such as lagoons and rivers where
fish were plentiful, or by guilds who held the rights to hunt elephant. In the moist tropical forest areas
of Africa where small sedentary populations exist, the land, forest and its wildlife is still ‘owned’ by
lineages and distinct families, and is inherited, evidence of the age-old existence of a positive political
economy and the organisation of common-pool resources that avoid excessive consumption by its
participants (Manning 1990), (Manning 1991). With colonisation, particularly under Indirect Rule,
‘the commons’ was created under appointed chiefs and headmen who had previously not held the
positions of guardians of nature.
This led to the marginalisation of an ecological ideology that had integrated discourses
about society with those about nature. The new chiefly bureaucracy and colonial
government separated people and nature; nature became an object acted on by people,
rather than an integral part of societal forces (Gordon 2006, p. 83)
While the aboriginal people were hunter-gatherers having a negligible impact on the land or its
wildlife, the successive waves of Bantu invaders introduced twenty-one systems of land usage into the
country, though mostly of the type developed in dry to moist forest (Winterbottom 1945, p.39). Five
staple crops were grown out of more than 100 varieties, of which four are cereals (maize, sorghum,
millet and bulrush millet) and one root crop (cassava). Essentially, with the exception of some
examples of more permanent agriculture based on livestock, these were traditional systems, or
modified traditional systems. What these systems have in common is that they are adaptations and
survival strategies of small groups of people of a low population density in response to soils of
generally low carrying capacity notable for being highly leached and acidic, and the need to survive an
extended annual dry season of seven months. The type of survival strategy in place, is based on
hunter-gathering and a number of shifting cultivation strategies of the chitemene (fitemene, plural)
type where trees are lopped, whole or in part, and then burnt, the crop seeds planted in the ash. This
divergence of systems also governs the carrying capacity of people. With the coming of the British
under the British South Africa Chartered Company (BSA Company) rule, notions of forest
conservation and the management of land which had emerged under the King’s Law of Magna Carta
in 1215 as a result of the more static and settled history of the British, were introduced. These
conflicted with similar systems in place, notably again among the Barotse.
Among the people of the Great Tanganyika Plateau who required extensive areas of miombo forest in
which to carry out chitemene, any population increase and a more sedentary existence had negative
effects both on the environment and the people. Reports of the extremely wasteful de-forestation that
took place among the Bemba after their slaving had been brought under control points to this change,
their young men taking great pride in cutting down trees, the area far exceeding that which was
planted, particularly in the southern chitemene system where some twenty times the amount of land
required annually for crops was cut down (Gluckman 1945b, p.57).
The agricultural methods of these first colonists were highly developed adaptations to the environment
from which they had come, most of which were successfully applied initially; but others, as in the
Bangweulu Chipya areas, with greater population pressures, less successfully. In addition, the sudden
imposition of the plough and other more modern methods were often not successful, as the culture of
people with long-honed survival strategies does not easily absorb sudden change. Moreover, where the
movement of people was restricted due to the imposition of Native Reserves (as a result of the
alienation of land), as occurred with the North Charterland Exploration Company (NCE Company),
European commercial farming settlement in present day Eastern Province (Winterbottom 1945, p.38),
and along the railway lines relevant to these, ecological degeneration and some desertification
followed. However, the statement by Leroy Vail (Musambachime, cited in Chipungu 1992, p.9) that
‘the daily realities of colonial control, labour migrancy, village consolidation interacted with the
32
natural disasters of the 1890’s to precipitate an ecological collapse’ is highly unlikely, instead a low
ecological equilibrium was likely reached (Bell, in Anderson & Grove 1989, p.83). In part because of
this, able-bodied men were drawn off to the mines, leading to labour shortages and other significantly
adverse effects on the fabric of village community life.
The assumption of power by people with an advanced civilisation in a land locked in the late iron-age,
yet with well developed political systems and adapted as they were to the environment, would bring
with it mixed results. Early in the 1900s the killing of wildlife was banned, though in 1905 the BSA
Company reluctantly allowed duiker to be hunted. In 1906/7 at the end of the growing season,
chitemene and mitanda4 were banned in some areas, as were the use of game pits – this undoubtedly
caused great hardship, although given the number of company officials it is highly unlikely that it was
enforced to any great degree. Also, all villages of less than twenty huts were instructed to amalgamate
– all mitanda now being banned - and the new villages were encouraged to be re-positioned on good
soils. In the first year harvests appeared excellent and there were few breaches of the new chitemene
regulations. However, in the Mpika district a famine occurred due to a locust plague, the salt industry
ceased production because of the lack of food, and smallpox took a heavy toll. However, one benefit
was the fixing of all boundaries between the various chiefs - a source of constant tension and
squabbles. In 1908, three chiefs in the Mpika district travelled to Fort Jameson to complain to the
Administrator of the BSA Company concerning the abolition of chitemene. Three years later, after the
chiefs’ complaints could no longer be ignored, the ban was lifted. These early years, after the great joy
of the successes against the slave trade – even though they often masked the foreign invasion intent of
resource extraction - must have been extremely difficult times for the villagers.5
3.3.2 Witchcraft
A witchdoctor (ng’anga) is a medium through which an African fights against and seeks protection
from witchcraft – a malign craft practiced by the muloshi (sorcerers), who bewitch others. The latter
casts a pall of terror over Africa, constantly requiring individuals – be they chiefs, politicians or
ordinary people - to seek the protection of a medium and to have them bolster their powers against
their effects. The witchdoctor is also the diviner carrying out such essential tasks as finding out which
ancestor is re-incarnated in their newborn child. Yet the Witchcraft Suppression Ordinance of
Northern Rhodesia stated that, ‘Any person practicing as a witch-doctor shall be guilty, etc’ (Melland
& Young 1937, p.127).
As it is unlikely that any native Africans existed in those times who felt that they could not be
bewitched, this ordinance – based on considerable ignorance and misunderstanding - would have had
the effect of driving witchcraft underground, making it subversive and secretive, an unhealthy
development in the psyche of a people already under the yoke of a foreign culture.
A magistrate for 26 years under the BSA Company stated,
The natives believe in witchcraft. We do not; and so we deny it. And while we legislate
against the pretence of witchcraft, that is actually a part of the various ordinances that
is hardly ever invoked, since one cannot find a man guilty of pretending to do such a
thing when he believes he has done it. In such cases we generally have to frame an
alternative indictment under the Vagrancy Act of 1824 – to use a law which was never
made for such cases - but the sections of the ordinances under which penal action is
taken are almost invariably those that penalise accusations of witchcraft, divination for
witchcraft, and action taken against an alleged witch: that is to say, ordinances are used
against those who are trying to protect either themselves or others. That is what seems
so unjust to the natives.
4
5
Guard huts built in the rains amidst the crops in order to chase off wildlife garden raiders.
Mpika District Notebook Vol. 1, p.9.
33
…a witch in African society is someone who ceases to be a person - the latter defined
as a muntu (a person) - residing within the Peace of the Chief. He could therefore, in
times past, be killed without affecting anyone; a belief not accommodated by Western
adopted mores and customs (Melland & Young 1937, p.128).
3.3.3 Customary law
As with English common law, Bantu customary law is unwritten, evolving over time in accordance
with the pressures and adaptations of people to their environmental and cultural circumstances.
African justice at its heart is based on offences against life, property and the wellbeing of others, as
between neighbours and clansfolk. The primary concern of any group, any clan, is its increase,
therefore the first demand of justice is equilibrium, the continuing necessity of the quid pro quo
(Melland & Young 1937). Failing ‘give and take’, discontent is inevitable, and any action outside of
this, crime. This does not include the removal of sorcerers who threaten group equanimity. The reestablishment of friendly relations between estranged groups is the sine qua non of traditional African
life, a process facilitated by the witchdoctor, for as African justice has no regard for the individual, the
families of the wronged and the perpetrator of wrong-doing both have a vital interest in the
reinstatement of social equilibrium. This notion is totally rejected by Western statutory law; and by the
same token it rejects the actions of such nineteenth-century tribal despots as Tchaka, Mpeseni and
Chitimakulu, their place taken by the political despots Mugabe, Mobutu and their ilk, all of whom
transgress the natural law that ensures social cohesion and the building of a nation-state.
Customary law became a compendium of tribal laws and customs enforceable in native courts that
were established early in BSA Company times. It differs from English law on matters of property which descends to heirs according to local custom, or in the making of a will – for which there is no
provision. After Company rule had ended and the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia declared in 1924,
the Northern Rhodesia Native Courts Ordinance of the 1920s restored powers to chiefs lost under BSA
Company rule but also ‘conferred on them a jurisdiction in some matters of customary law which they
had not enjoyed before the British occupation’ (Stefaniszyn & Apthorpe 1964, p.vi).
In Northern Rhodesia, the English court could review a decision of the native court or hear an appeal
from a native court. These mostly dealt with issues relating to marriage or tenure and inheritance of
property. Customary law could not be enforced when the court was dealing with land that was under a
form of title such as freehold or leasehold. The Colonial courts did not interfere where land was used
and occupied according to the provisions of that law. And this natural law was not enforced among
those who no longer lived a traditional life.
Customary law came into force in a dispute between a native and a foreigner, and was generally
enforceable unless it had little to do with natural justice or if it was inconsistent with statute law; or if
it was inapplicable to the particular circumstances of the case. Unfortunately, the volte-face that had
occurred in the administration in the transition from direct to Indirect Rule, was not mirrored in that of
the law i.e. of the transition from customary to statutory law.
3.4
The slave and ivory trade
The slave trade, with serfdom endemic in Africa, was commercialised between the fifteenth and
sixteenth-centuries, first by the Portuguese who shipped slaves – this known as the Atlantic Trade - to
the ‘New World’ plantations. In 1807, Britain banned the trade, though perversely, she only ended the
trade in her West Indian possessions in 1833 (Gann 1954, pp.28-51). In the nineteenth-century the
trade was operated by Muslims. In the north, east and west of the territory Muslims operated from the
East African Coast collecting slaves from their agents such as the Bemba, Lunda, Bisa, Yao and
Chikunda, and taking them to Zanzibar, Pemba, Kilwa, Turkey, Persia and Arabia, the three East
African Arab settlements having been established in the tenth-century.
34
In Barotseland – now called Western Province - domestic serfdom, as well as slavery, was a feature of
life. Lewanika, the Paramount Chief, raided into the Ila and Batoka country, as well as present day
Angola. Slaves were also obtained from vassal tribes who paid them over as tribute. In 1898, the
coming of the BSA Company gradually brought this slave export under control. But it was the
imposition of the hut tax in 1903 that discouraged citizen slavery, as the tax had to be paid to the
administration by all able bodied men, placing a burden on slave owners such as the Lozi who
considered labour demeaning (Gelfand 1961, p.75). In order to compensate Lewanika for the loss of
income from slavery, the administration agreed to pay him 10% of all hut tax received. Lewanika’s
proclamation of 1906 banning slavery, freed some 30,000 serfs on condition they paid £2 each in
compensation to their owners (Clay 1968, p.171). However, domestic slavery continued until 1913 at
least. In the rest of what first became North-Western Rhodesia (the areas outside of Lewanika’s
influence), the export trade continued with the Mambari traders from Angola the most prominent there being a lively trade in guns and cloth for slaves, wild rubber and ivory.
In North-Eastern Rhodesia the Arab slave trade had a firm grip on the area lying between the Luapula
and Lake Nyasa, and beyond it into the Katanga. They had controlled the area since their invasion of
the Mweru district in 1865 and their attacks on the Watawa people. In 1873 the Sultan of Zanzibar
banned the slave trade, but this made little difference. In 1881 the Stevenson Road was constructed
between the northern part of Lake Nyasa and the southern part of Lake Tanganyika, greatly speeding
up the anti-slavery campaign. In 1883, Abdullah-bin-Suliman (who had helped Livingstone) and Tipu
Tib invaded the country in earnest, setting up a series of armed encampments (Tembes). When the
emissary of the BSA Company, Alfred Sharpe, returned to Chief Nsama two years after a previous
visit in 1892, he found that the chief had been murdered by the Arabs and their Bemba allies and the
villagers taken off into slavery. Sharpe later questioned any action in a region where financial returns
would be difficult to achieve, suggesting it be left to the Arabs and their unpleasant ways. However,
he did conclude that there were funds available to administer the area, and that they had a duty to do
so (Boeder 1981, p.43).6
The importance of the anti-slavery campaign was that it disguised the imperial intentions of Britain. In
1885, the first expedition of the BSA Company’s newly appointed head of the region, Major Forbes,
began to attack the Arab caravans and to aggressively place administrative outposts with Native
Collectors in situ around the region. Of importance in these early days was the African Lakes
Corporation set up at Abercorn in 1892, which established trading stores, keeping the officials and
their troops supplied. From 1896 the Native Collectors began a serious campaign against the Arab
slavers, one caravan intercepted leaving Bemba country having fifty-seven women and children and
150 pounds of ivory. Another caravan yielded thirty-five slaves and 1,000 pounds of ivory. The
Company focused on bringing the powerful Bemba chiefs Mwamba and Mporokoso - the main agents
of the trade in those parts – to heel, and putting the Arabs out of business (Gelfand 1961, p.90). The
BSA Company then took over the Arab and Swahili vacated land. There now was imposed upon the
people a growing stream of BSA Company officials and miners – and later, European settlers along
the line of rail and on the Nyasaland border - direct rule now being imposed. With the slavers and their
comprador chiefs defeated, dispossession was complete; and as in Asante on the Gold Coast,
anywhere that wealth could be extracted by commercial means fell within the scope of European
companies, mostly British (Davidson 1996, p.71)
It has been said that the Bemba were forced by the poor land that they inhabited and the presence of
tsetse flies to raid other tribes for cattle and grain (Meebelo 1971, p.5). This may have been a
contributory factor, but a number of tribes who practiced chitemene in the leached soils of the Great
Tanganyika Plateau did not pillage other tribes for slaves, grain and whatever else could be plundered.
The Bemba, like the Ngoni, sought to retain their ascendancy in the area by obtaining recruits, many
of which they sold. The general animosity of both these tribes towards Europeans may have been
6
Note that the area remains totally neglected and undeveloped 117 years later.
35
brought on by the fact that they foresaw that Christians would not long tolerate the slavery, and that
the missionaries would not supply them with guns and gunpowder.
The actual death rate resulting from slave raiding was enormous. Inn the last decade of the nineteenthcentury the Matabele raids on the Batoka plateau laid waste the land, one such raid on a Tonga village
in 1883 - which yielded but a few young girls - resulting in the torture and slaughter of everyone (Clay
1968, p.82). Another observer estimated that one caravan of fifty-five captured women had involved
the destruction of at least ten villages, each having a population of between one and two hundred
people. F.S. Arnot, the missionary, reported seeing forty men killed in order to abduct the same
number of women and children (Arnot 1914, p.97). In the last twenty years of the nineteenth-century,
the slave trade laid waste the country until the Charter companies were able to eradicate the
commercial trade. Apart from the BSA Company, the African Lakes Company around Lake Nyasa which was made up of missionaries and traders -undertook a campaign against the slavers, at one time
employing Frederick Lugard - later Lord Lugard of Indirect Rule fame - to head the action. However,
without the force to effect the Arabs’ defeat, they had to sue for peace with them in 1888. Later, in
return for important concessions, Cecil Rhodes – through his bankers, Rothschild - gave financial
undertakings to the Imperial Government, who as a result then formed the British Central African
Protectorate.
The slave trade greatly intensified from the 1870s, in part a domino effect and compensation for the
lack of ivory, which in turn, made the predated people welcome the coming of the European as their
protector. However this was not the case with the Ngoni and the Bemba. With the defeat of Chief
Mpeseni of the Ngoni in 1898, the slave trade ended in the Luangwa Valley, though the Ngoni were
still to send out impis in search of converts until shortly before the Great War.
4
EUROPEAN COLONIALISM
For the last 2,000 years, as a result of long settled and stable conditions, north-west European societies
gradually threw off their hunter-gatherer survival strategies, embracing modern notions of time and
modes of behaviour which accentuated forward planning, technological innovation, education and
problem solving. This led to the production of Magna Carta in England in 1215 - the basis in the
English speaking world of common law and of early notions of human rights and responsibilities, and
also of environmental conservation efforts, the latter more fully developed in a forest conservation
charter of 1217. It also eventually led to the Industrial Revolution. However, from the Stone Age until
about 1800, any technical innovation and increase in living standards was rapidly reversed by
population increase, with the average standard of living worse than that of Stone Age man – ‘a life of
boring drudgery, poor diet and unhygienic living conditions’ (Clark 2007, p.1). Life expectancy then
was the same as it is now for Zambia and Zimbabwe: thirty to thirty-five years. Since the Industrial
Revolution in the European world - which led to Pax Britannica and the emergence of the major
powers, Britain and France - and the Neolithic Revolution of Mesopotamia in the Asiatic world,
greatly improved living standards occurred, though not necessarily improved levels of happiness.
Also, the expectancy that living standards would rise the world over have been dashed, suggesting that
if the conditions which led to these revolutions are absent or conspicuously different, modernisation –
in a Western sense – will be a long running affair.
4.1
Explorers, missionaries, hunters, traders and miners
The death of David Livingstone in 1873 near the Lulimala River in south-east Bangweulu evoked
great sadness among those who followed his exploits; but the tale which then unfolded of the transport
of his mummified remains by his two stalwarts, Susi and Chuma, truly struck an emotional chord,
lending impetus to missionary incursions, and, inevitably, to commerce and colonisation (Arnot 1914,
p.121).
36
In 1849, the first European to enter Barotse country was the Portuguese explorer, Silva Porto, who
spent the next sixty years travelling and trading for rubber, ivory and slaves. In 1884, he helped the
Plymouth Brethren missionary, Arnot, on his journey away from Lewanika - Arnot had been refused
permission by Lewanika to travel to the tribes further up the Zambezi, with the latter stating, ‘These
people were the dogs of the Barotse, and missionaries would not be allowed to visit them.’; and thence
to take himself off to the Garanganze (Katanga) - whom ‘God had told him to serve’ - being accepted
by the tyrannical chief of that region, Mushidi (Arnot 1914, p.21). There he persevered, treated with
considerable disdain by Mushidi, living in abject conditions and making no converts. Two of his early
recruits, Dan Crawford and Dr Walter Fisher, who moved on to Lake Mweru and Mwinilunga area
respectively, left a more lasting impression, the Fisher progeny still active in Zambia over a century
later.
The trader, George Westbeech, who had arrived in 1871 at Pandamatenga on the Zambezi, became a
highly trusted trader with strong links to Lewanika, obtaining permission for Arnot to carry out his
missionary work. In 1882, Francois Coillard of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society arrived from
the Hlotse River area of present day Lesotho and was later invited by Lewanika to set up a mission
station. Coillard became an important advisor to the traditional leader of a nation later given
protectorate status by Britain.
In the north of the country the first missionaries to arrive were from Livingstone’s London Missionary
Society. In 1891, they were followed by the White Fathers who in 1895 built Kayambi Mission in the
Bemba country. In 1899, they opened Chilonga Mission near Mpika, and in 1903, Chirui in
Bangweulu. In 1904 they started work at Kamwiri in the Luangwa Valley. Their missionary work was
closely bound up with the BSA Company (Gelfand 1961, p.64). However, the pioneer missionaries in
the eastern area were the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa, who established a mission at
Magwero in 1899 and at Madzimoyo in 1903.
4.1.1 The pioneer concessionaires in the East of the territory
In the country lying close to the British Central African Protectorate (in the present day Eastern
Province of Zambia) two men, working without the backing of major financial institutions, signed
treaties and obtained concessions from local chiefs and headmen. One of them, Harrison Clark, later
called the uncrowned King of Northern Rhodesia, was active from 1887 to the turn of the century,
controlling much of the area north of the Zambezi and up to the mid-Luangwa, and to the Hook of the
Kafue (Stephenson 1937, p.23). He maintained his own army of Nsenga tribesmen who kept the
Chikunda and Ngoni at bay. Later he was made a chief of the Ila (Brelsford 1965, pp.19-29). Clarke
built his headquarters in 1895 at the confluence of the Lunsemfwa and Lukusashi, naming it Algoa
after the Portuguese name for his home town of Port Elizabeth in South Africa. As famous a name as
Livingstone or Fort Jameson at that point, it was listed in the The Times Atlas of 1922. Clark made
numbers of treaties with chiefs that were as comprehensive as any signed up by Rhodes’ emissaries.
They included mineral rights, establishing farms, collecting corn as tax, dealing with Arab ivory
caravans as he saw fit, suppressing slavery, constructing railways, tramways, telegraphs and the
building of towns and villages (Brelsford 1965, pp.22-23). One of the chiefdoms he signed up,
Mburuma, is still in existence on the lower Luangwa.
Another pathfinder with considerable impact was Carl Wiese, who established himself at the same
time as Clark, but in Mpeseni’s country lying to the west of Clark’s eastern plateau concessions,
though he makes no mention of Clark in his book Expedicao Portugueza a M’Pensene (1889) (Wiese
& Langworthy 1983). Wiese had obtained the concessions from 1885 when he had first journeyed
there to obtain ivory from his base in Mozambique. In 1890 he began to seek and obtain concessions.
In May 1895 he met up with H.H. Johnston who had arrived to take up his position as Consul-General
of the British Central African Protectorate and Administrator of the BSA Company. The latter was
dismayed to find that Wiese had already signed up many of the chiefs and headmen. In 1892, Wiese’s
37
concessions in the British sphere were placed in the Central African and Zoutpansberg Exploration
Company (CAZEC), for which he received shares (Wiese & Langworthy 1983, p.13)
The BSA Company, by then settled in current Malawi, wished to extend its domain to Lake
Tanganyika, and would not tolerate individuals signing treaties with chiefs. In order to resolve the
dilemma, they gave Harrison Clark – or Changa Changa, as he was called - financial compensation
for his concessions (Stephenson 1937, p.24). Wiese, on the other hand, agreed in 1895 to the reorganisation of CAZEC, the company in which he had a major shareholding, as the North Charterland
Exploration Company (NCE Company) – this new company then being recognised as the legal owner
of the concessions.
4.2
Charter companies
4.2.1 History
i)
The North Charterland Exploration Company
With the breakdown in negotiations between CAZEC and the BSA Company in 1893 for the sale of
the concessions, Johnson pursued the dubious claims to the territory by the BSA Company. However,
negotiations continued in London and finally it was agreed that the Wiese concessions would be
surrendered to the BSA Company, in return for which a new company would be formed - the NCE
Company – which would receive a grant (Wiese & Langworthy 1983, p.24). The NCE Company
received a 10,000 sq. mile concession along the Mozambique border, including the land between the
Luangwa and present day Chipata, this including Mpeseni’s country and Luembe, Mwape and that of
a few other chiefs. Here they received ordinary mineral rights and the land, but no monopoly of trade.
The rights of natives were to be protected but not defined. In 1896, Wiese joined the NCE Company
expedition to the Ngoni - in essence an aggressive search for financial returns - later calling for British
help on the basis of his reports that there was a threatened rising against the NCE Company. This was
an unfortunate development as it led to the Ngoni war and to settler incursions and land alienations
(Wiese and Langworthy 1983, p.20).
The BSA Company who had fought Wiese’s claims through their Commissioner, Johnson, had artfully
manipulated the process in order to deliver up the mining rights that Mpeseni had long refused to sign
over to both the British and Portuguese, but which he had given to the person he trusted, Wiese. When
these concessions suddenly appeared in the unwelcome form of the BSA Company, it was most likely
devastating to Mpeseni.
By 1897, Mpeseni was unwell and had lost control of the warring and raiding elements amongst his
people; n’dunas did as they pleased, taking slaves and killing people on their raids. The Ngoni clearly
wished to rid themselves of the Europeans who had concessions. Rumours abounded, worsening an
already tense situation. One such rumour was that the Ngoni had killed two NCE Company officials;
this later proving to be false. At that point, any reason would have been sufficient to advance upon
them, for clearly the Ngoni were viewed by the successive administrators of the BSA Company,
Johnston, Sharpe and Colonel William Manning, as standing in the way of the advancement of BSA
Company interests (Wiese & Langworthy 1983, p.41). When the NCE Company thoughtlessly
established their HQ, Fort Young, at Loangweni - six miles from Mpeseni’s court - the Ngoni bridled,
smarting at the loss of land and at the sudden influx of Europeans; confrontation was thus inevitable
(Gelfand 1961, p.91).
On 19 January 1898, the Ngoni were defeated in a brief battle by troops sent by Colonel Manning
from British Central Africa (Wiese left the employment of the NCE at this time), and thousands of
head of their cattle confiscated, capping a series of shameful acts by the BSA Company. The Ngoni
defeat was to change their way of life. Now they would have to concentrate on cultivation and nurture
their diminished herds. But many went to work on the mines.
38
On 17 July 1902, the Manager of the NCE Company wrote to the administrator of North-East
Rhodesia, confirming that the BSA Company had taken over the NCE Company.
ii) The British South Africa Chartered Company
In North-Eastern Rhodesia development was slow, there being only 129 Europeans in the territory in
1899, a number of them itinerant hunters and traders. The Administrator, Robert Codrington, stated
that the African living in that region was now a free man as he paid no taxes and was free to move
where he wished. In 1900, a High Court was created in Fort Jameson and a district administrative
system implemented. In a few years Indian – mainly Hindu - traders started arriving, soon to play an
important part in opening trading stores in far-flung places.
The Great War saw a massive recruitment of village men as porters (Tenga Tenga), and as free-lance
scouts (Ruga Ruga). When the campaign intensified in southern Tanganyika against Von Lettow
Vorbeck’s well lead forces, the need for food was overwhelming. The presence of tsetse fly made the
use of animal transport impossible, and the Great North Road – a mere hoe track - could not yet take
much motorised transport (Model T Fords), and not at all in the rains. The development of the Luapula
River route solved the supply problem with stores brought from the railhead at Ndola and across the
Congo pedicle to Kaunda on the Luapula River where as many as 2,000 canoes transported the goods
– including tons of black lechwe meat collected from native hunters under David Ross and Mickey
Norton - through the Bangweulu swamps and up the Chambeshi to the Lukulu River, thence up to
within about twenty-five miles of Kasama. The former Native Collector, J.E. Hughes, who had left the
BSA Company to live in the swamps and organise hunting safaris and the collection of otter skins,
organised the canoe men (Hughes 1933, p.86). The war caused a massive shortage of food in the
country, with many of the villagers having to resort to the most basic of food gathering. Privation was
considerable, understandable when one considers that 36,897 able-bodied men had been recruited
away from their villages. In all, 312,910 men were employed for war work during the campaign. In
addition to these, many thousands were contracted to traders to carry their goods to all ends of the
territory. Mortality was high. After the German surrender, the carriers returned to their villagers in an
emaciated state due to the onerous war conditions, lack of food, dysentery and typhoid. Of the 1,485
carriers sent from the Petauke sub-district, sixty-three deaths were reported. The Allied effort,
particularly in East Africa, had been delivered with the help of the villagers, but at great cost (Gelfand
1961, p.274).
4.2.2 Impacts on people
The imposition of British colonial rule in Central Africa in the late nineteenth-century, mainly through
the BSA Company, a company granted a royal charter in 1889 (just after the assumption of the
Imperial Protectorate over Nyasaland), was brought about by Cecil John Rhodes. This occurred at a
time when there was an indigenous population of some 340,000 people in the territory, resulting in the
creation of two separately administered territories named North-Eastern Rhodesia and North-Western
Rhodesia (which later coalesced in 1911 into Northern Rhodesia – administered by the BSA
Company).
Given a people with no notion of buying or selling land, the arrival of Europeans bearing documents
which resulted in land being given over under English contract law showed a lack of understanding of
native African land tenure, and was amoral in many respects. On the other hand some chiefs and
headmen would do anything for trade goods and firearms – as evidenced by the slave trade – there
being very little sense of duty by them to safeguard their community of subjects. On the other hand,
some chiefs firmly resisted their lands being taken over by settlers after WWI, as with the Tonga of
the Batoka Plateau, particularly Chief Mwanachingwala (Vickery 1986, p.127).
39
The first recorded alienation of land to a European occurred in 1824, when the mid-Luangwa Chief
Mwase of the Bisa sold land for an ivory trading post to the Governor of Sena, Colonel Barbosa. This
post was called Marambo but was abandoned after two years. Under Company rule, the alienation of
land to European farmers after 1898 and the emergence of Native Reserves greatly affected African
settlement and land use along the line of rail and around Fort Jameson. The NCE Company and the
BSA Company had the right to sell land.
In North-Western Rhodesia, the administrator, Coryndon, gave out land on an ad hoc basis; the first
was to H.F. Walker and his sons; given 12,000 acres. By the late 1920s about one-tenth of the Batoka
Plateau had been alienated to white settlement, a highly fertile tenth. As a former BSA Company
official recorded, ‘These natives are complaining that restrictions on the sale of their crops to
Europeans, legislation for enforcing their continuance of big villages, and the like, are thwarting their
natural aspirations and tending towards stagnation and repression (Melland & Young 1937, p.38). In
1904, the East Luangwa Land Commission considered the impacts on Africans, the Mpeseni Reserve
near Fort Jameson being demarcated and defined and the area south-west of the boma (district
headquarters) reserved for the sole use of Africans. In 1924 a Native Reserve Commission was
appointed to investigate matters, and later in 1928 nine reserves were set aside in perpetuity for the
sole use of Africans by the Northern Rhodesian Crown Lands and Native Reserves Order in Council.
This order reduced by a third the 10,000 sq. mile NCE Company estate, to which the Company
objected in the courts. But the House of Lords ruled against the Company. The Provincial
Administration and the BSA Company then began moving Africans into the retrieved area. By 1931,
only a thousand or so people remained outside the Reserves and large areas of Petauke district became
deserted, wildlife increased and with it the tsetse fly - carrier of the cattle disease, Nagana, and the
human disease, sleeping sickness. The impact of this re-distribution of people lead ten years later to
overcrowding and land degradation; and inevitably to attempts once more to resettle people. Again
Africans had their land taken away, though this was done voluntarily. In 1928, the tobacco industry
around Fort Jameson was all but destroyed by the tobacco blight, the United Tobacco Company
closing down. The North Charterland Company could afford to keep employing their managers but the
private planters went out of business (Tapson 1957, p.138).
In North-Western Rhodesia, shortly before it joined with North-Eastern Rhodesia to become Northern
Rhodesia, the Administrator, realising that the company could only be developed with an influx of
settlers, urged that grants of land be made, but on the condition that the interests of the African would
be protected. He was encouraged by the Fort Jameson scheme where farmers could obtain land for
three to five years, provided they took occupation, and where they had the option of purchase after a
certain period. In 1908, there were sixty-eight farms in North-Western, but only thirty of them were
genuine farmers producing maize, potatoes and finger-millet. After amalgamation, with about 1,000
settlers in the country, they naturally started to voice their opinions and wished to have a say in the
administration. A number of them favoured joining up with the new Union of South Africa whose
policies the administration found abhorrent. This was to drive the process forward to self-government
until the running of the country was handed over to the Colonial Office in 1924. Wallace was the first
administrator and was paid by the BSA Company, but his appointment had first to be approved by the
Secretary of State. European farmers, alarmed at the prevalence of cattle disease and the lack of
controls, called for firmer action. In 1918, an Advisory Council drawn from the settlers was elected;
with this Council being vociferous on the issues of labour being diverted to Southern Rhodesia and the
way land was being handled. In 1921, the Europeans numbered 3,634, the Africans of the territory,
983,539 (Gelfand 1961, p.139).
4.2.3 Blackbirding
In place of the slave trader came the recruiter of labour for the mines of the Witwatersrand, Southern
Rhodesia and later, the Copperbelt and the Congo, village men being recruited from the early 1900s.
Recruitment for the mines in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia were lent considerable impetus by
40
the imposition of the hut tax in 1901 in North-Eastern Rhodesia and in 1904 in North-Western
Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia as a whole was seen as a source of labour for the developing south.
In North-Western Rhodesia, many Tonga villagers refused to pay the hut tax on the grounds that they
had no money. An official, Colin Harding, went to one troublesome area with a maxim gun and eighty
policemen and burned as many as 970 huts; though barbaric instances such as these were rare. Harding
was subsequently dismissed from Company service (Vickery 1986, p.75). In 1920 the Hut tax was
doubled, resulting in the Administration raising their wages, this soon followed throughout the
country. Despite the negative impact, the villager had since before WWI been free to come out of his
stockaded village and move about in search of work, something he had not been able to do under
slavery. However, the impact of all of this on village life with many of its men employed elsewhere,
would continue the state of dissolution that the slave trade and the invasion of resource harvesters had
brought about.
After serving out their contracts mineworkers returned with trophies of the modern age, including
venereal and other diseases. One of the main routes south from the east of the territory was through
Feira on the Zambezi. In 1902, the count of men walking to and from Southern Rhodesia amounted to
6,981 going south, and 4,308 going north – these were Africans of Nyasaland, North-Eastern Rhodesia
and Portuguese territory (Gelfand 1961, p.88). In 1904, because of the high mortality rate of those
walking, Nyasaland banned the recruitment of labour within its borders; and in 1907 NW brought in
regulations controlling recruitment. In 1907, the Southern Rhodesia Administration took on
responsibility for all recruitment north of the Zambezi, and in that year recruited 4,743 men and 7,009
in 1908. The high death rate of the people in the mines was cause for great concern: in the years 1907
and 1908 the death rates from scurvy, dysentery and pneumonia were some 40 per 1,000. Added to
this at the time were outbreaks of sleeping sickness, which brought about bans on recruitment from
certain areas. The men were frequently transported in trains without proper latrine facilities, and
worked without adequate rest - this also added greatly to the abysmal mortality rate. After WWI
reform was introduced through the lobbying of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society,
probably the first NGOs to be active in the territory. But the effects of the mines through the invasion
of hundreds of prostitutes from the villages certainly added to the weakening of community structure.
However, these effects were insignificant when compared to the effects of the slave trade.
4.3
British Imperial protectorate
4.3.1 Indirect Rule
In 1924, in addition to the Nyasaland Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia was taken over by the Colonial
office as a Protectorate. The British administration continued ruling directly as they had done in BSA
Company times, with the chiefs and headmen acting more as administrative assistants. By 1932, Lord
Lugard’s Indirect Rule was introduced whereby a network of traditional rulers was imposed and rule
conducted through them. The acquisition of the territory took place in the Victorian era, a time
notorious for a rather rigid parental manner, as well as loyalty to principle, something now eroded
over time (Bowman 2006, p.4). This manifested itself in a certain attitude: that the ways of the native
African were inferior to that of the British; and that the African should be moulded into a British way
of behaving, disregarding African culture, the result of thousands of years of survival. The danger of
this was that spontaneous adaptation by the African was extremely difficult, with the Africans being
constantly harried to conform. Melland, who had served as a BSA Company magistrate and official
for 26 years, wrote strongly from experience that Indirect Rule required to be reformed so that
Africans could produce an autochthonous civilisation, ‘which will prove a notable contribution to
world civilisation’ (Melland & Young 1937, p.21).
As Melland pointed out, one of the principle criticisms of Indirect Rule was that it would not contain
those educated Africans wishing to break free from what they now regarded as a primitive past. This
immediately raised the spectre of dual development: on the one hand a materialist and more self-
41
centred one based on the Western ballot box and on European ways and thought; the other, that of
autocratic rule by chiefs – in many cases enthroned by the BSA Company - where the emphasis was
on a perennially fixed culture of equitability and harmony, a culture of the group rather than of the
individual.
But Melland suggested a third possibility: ‘The rule of the aristocracy (in its original sense) which can
be built on to the old tribal council, and yet admit into such councils plebeian educated natives who
have demonstrated their worth’ (Melland & Young 1937, p.30).
Melland also makes the point that, implicit in the Indirect Rule of British colonial effort, be it as a
crown colony or as a protectorate, was the question of Christianity, which disregarded native religion
and belief, the latter the result of the evolutionary time warp and not something to be lightly
dismissed. Africans were required to become self-regarding individualists, when in fact natural
selection had moulded them into part of an harmonious whole, however primitive their life and culture
might have appeared to Victorians or Edwardians. Africans did question the fact that while missionary
effort was zealous in seeking to convert them, most of the Europeans farming, mining, administering
or trading with them at the time, were clearly not practicing Christians.
The reaction of the chiefs to Indirect Rule was interesting. They had not been consulted on the issue,
the notion having been transplanted from Lord Lugard’s implementation of it in Nigeria. In the period
of BSA Company rule until the 1930s they had become used to direct rule, had appreciated the
impartiality of the white man, a major factor amongst people so riven by clans and the imperatives of
economic reciprocity. Melland wrote that, ‘they did not relish the change, in many cases because they
had lost the habit of ruling, and still more because they did not regain the right to rule in accordance
with custom, but were forced to rule on lines laid down by their white overlords, to administer to
justice and to punish on those lines’ (Frank Melland & Young 1937, p.39). And there were those like
Sir Stewart Gore-Brown who, seeing the damage being wrought, called for the creation of a
partnership with the African, a relationship of equals rather than an imposed will, and imposed rule
(Melland & Young, 1937, pp.65-75).7
Until the exploitation of copper, the territory did not satisfy those in the BSA Company who wished to
see great profits. Until 1924, the BSA Company never declared a dividend, and it was only in
Protectorate days that huge royalties for the Company were produced (Vickery 1986, pp. 40-41).
4.3.2 Provincial Administration
In 1926, Native Authorities (NAs), based on chiefdoms, were established and shortly thereafter Native
Courts and Treasuries, the country being split into provinces and then into districts run by Provincial
Commissioners (PCs) – and under them - District Commissioners (DCs), and in turn, District Officers
(DOs), and served by kapasos, or messengers. Income for the NAs came from government grants and
from licences and other fees. District officials therefore held meetings with the chiefs, local officers
responsible for agriculture and health, as well as with prominent local people, following basic
development plans which increased in complexity as time wore on. The operations of the NAs were
therefore highly collaborative with the officials visiting each of the villages a few times a year to
assess development and to advise on a host of issues.
4.3.3 The Federation
Despite strong African opposition, the British Parliament in 1953 passed an Act providing for a
Federal Constitution for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federal Government
controlled the main economic and military functions, but not the police. All matters affecting Africans
– their education, agriculture and rural development - were parcelled off, a clearly segregationist
7
Colonel Gore-Browne’s maiden speech to the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, November 1935.
42
approach. And the Queen could disallow any law of the Federal Legislature assented to by the
Governor-General within twelve months of its having been passed.
The Constitution was complicated, both Europeans and Africans vying for greater powers. One major
development through an Order in Council was the recognition of the Barotseland Protectorate in 1953,
but only as a part of Northern Rhodesia. By 1951 there were 37,000 Europeans in Northern Rhodesia,
with their increasing political power being matched by the rapid growth of the African’s political
consciousness and the growing realisation that their powers were in the ascendant (Gann 1964, p.441).
At the end of 1963, the Federation was dissolved.
4.4
Winds of change and Bandung
The Afro-Asian Conference held at Bandung in Indonesia in April of 1955, where four independent
African and twenty-three Asian independent states gathered, set in motion de-colonisation. Their
central belief was that they formed the nucleus of millions of the world’s population and that they
should mobilise a third world ‘of free, pacific, non-aligned, purged of capitalist and Stalinist vice,
radiant with public virtue, today saving itself by its exertions, tomorrow the world by its example’
(Johnson 1983, p. 477). The Suez crisis of 1956-7 confirmed that Britain had lost the will to rule. The
blockade of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser and the dithering of the Eden Government was in
marked contrast to the resolute action of Israel. But Nasser and the Bandung generation had won, with
the support of the UN. Thus for the Empire, weakened by WWII and irresolution over Suez, and with
the new concept of ‘world opinion’ now clearly supportive of the colonised and the ‘protected’;
change was not far off. A British White Paper in 1948 had recognised this, stating that British colonial
policy was to guide colonial territories to responsible self-government, clearly something that was not
done. In the general election of 1959, the decision was taken to withdraw from Africa; the ‘Winds of
Change’ speech by Prime Minister MacMillan in Cape Town in 1960 merely making it public.
In Northern Rhodesia, where the Provincial Administration had fought against an increasingly vocal
and powerful settler group and the siren call of apartheid down south, whilst continuing to rule
through the chiefs as part and parcel of the Native Authorities, they were suddenly faced with the
inevitability of withdrawal. The question however was to whom they should hand power. The NAs
were still embryonic and required administrative and accounting skills, then in short supply,
particularly where clan and traditional leadership interests required an independent person or group to
steer the ship through the muddy cultural waters. But they were not to make the decision; that was a
matter for the Colonial Office who now looked around for the group normally in receipt of political
power, professional politicians, candidates suitable for African nation-statist leadership, who despite
their rather inflated freedom-fighter credentials would be the interlocuteurs valuables, for they still
clearly accepted the primacy of British interests (Davidson 1996, p.172). To them were handed the
keys of State House. As great as was the betrayal of the chiefs and NAs, many of whom supported the
new order called politician, so – on the face of it - was the betrayal of settlers who had been recruited
to support Pax Britannica and the building of a modern society. However, it was also the
intransigence of the European population who refused to compromise on the sharing of power with
Africans, rejecting British proposals under the 1962 constitution, which forced the hand of the
Government (Sampson 2006, p.19). And what was lost also was the opportunity to go to nationhood
based on the African participatory model extolled by such visionaries as F.H. Melland, rather than the
now bankrupt neoliberal model with its army of consultants, ‘other nations’ representatives and the
perennial plunderers in search of cheap natural resources.
43
5
THE ENVIRONMENT AND ITS LEGAL FRAMEWORK
5.1
Land tenure and population
Africa, the cradle of man, has witnessed the full evolution of land use patterns from hunter gathering,
to shifting cultivation and cattle management, to chemical farming. This change, depending on rainfall
and soil fertility, on population pressures, peace and stability and economic conditions has brought
increased pressure on customary tenure and on the culture of communal welfare.
5.2
Land use and technical support
The BSA Company essentially gained land rights over the whole territory except for Barotseland. It
could therefore bring in white settlers and insist that native Africans living in situ move. In order to
compensate for this, The Northern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1911 stated that native Africans
would be assured sufficient land and water sources for their needs. In 1923, the Passfield
Memorandum stated the situation in more unambivalent terms, ‘that the interests of the African
natives must be Paramount, and that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant
races conflict, the former should prevail’ (Gann 1964, p.242). This led to the establishment of Native
Reserves in 1928-29.
By the mid-thirties, the land was divided into three categories: 71 million acres of African Reserve –
made up of Barotseland - and 34 million acres of Native Reserve. The land alienated to two Europeans
companies totalled 5.5 million acres, leaving another 3 million acres of commercial farms. The
balance of 105 million acres was taken up by 11 million acres of protected areas, with 94 million acres
being unallocated. The Pim Commission recommended these be converted into Native Trust Land,
this subsequently legislated for in 1947. Therefore, just prior to attaining self-government, the territory
comprised the following: Crown Land (5.6%) held by Europeans; Native Reserves (18.9%);
Barotseland (16%); and Native Trust Land (59.5%). According to an Order in Council, the Governor
administered Native Trust Land for the sole benefit of native Africans. Non-Africans could only have
access to these areas if they were part of a township development or public utilities.
The agricultural policy of Northern Rhodesia ensured that European farmers and the ‘improved’
African farmer, i.e. the commercial farmer along the line of rail, had preferential treatment. But, in so
far as the production of maize was concerned, this had no great effect on Africans due to expanding
internal markets and changes in the control scheme.
The Department of Agriculture, backed as it was by two fine research institutions - the Central
Agricultural Research Station at Mount Makulu and the Veterinary Research Centre at Mazabuka ensured a full range of technical support. In addition, two outstanding ecologists, C.G. Trapnell and
W. Hall, pioneered the ecology of native agriculture. In socio-anthropology, the Rhodes-Livingstone
Institute provided the peerless knowledge and understanding necessary of the different tribes and
nations speaking some seventy-five languages and involved in complex survival strategies.
5.3
Wildlife conservation
The slave export trade, allied with the ivory trade, and paid for in firearms and calico, saw elephant
numbers by 1870 reduced to such an extent in the Zambezi and Luangwa Valley that one of the
Zambezi musungu8 traders, Texeira de Sousa, who ran a stable of some three hundred or so elephant
hunters north of the Zambezi, had great difficulty in finding bulls carrying heavy ivory. In 1885, it was
reported that ‘elephant populations had decreased surprisingly over the last two years in that triangle
between the lower Chobe and the western part of the central Zambezi’ (Holub & Johns 1975, p.272).
8
At the time describing those of mixed race i.e. Native Africans and European, but now used to describe white
people.
44
However, this was not surprising given the great elephant drives that took place in the 1870s by the
Barotse Paramount Chief Sipopa, with elephant being driven by a few thousand men into the angle
between the Zambezi and the Chobe. On one occasion ninety elephant were slaughtered. Sipopa’s
successor, Lewanika, continued these drives on elephant and antelope (MacKenzie 1997, p.71). From
1871 the hunter and trader George Westbeech formed a close commercial relationship with Sipopa
and Lewanika, employing many elephant hunters in the region. In 1882, Lewanika gave Westbeech
his own exclusive hunting concession in the Machili Valley. In the years 1871 – 1888, Westbeech
exported between ten and fifteen tons of ivory each year, the equivalent of 460 to 690 elephant
annually (MacKenzie 1997, pp. 123-124).
In the country of the Bemba and their vassal tribes, elephant were greatly reduced by 1879, the
explorer, Joseph Thomson reporting that there were few left between Lake Tanganyika and the East
Coast (Meebelo 1971, p.6). Alfred Sharpe – who had once been a commercial ivory hunter - only shot
two elephant on his long journey back to Blantyre from Katanga in 1890 (Boeder 1981, p.34). But the
slaughter in Africa - supplying only the London market - was estimated to be in the order of 47,000
animals annually between the years 1850 to 1890 (Melland, 1938, p.13). As elephant populations
recovered, they were again killed in the legitimate defence of life and property in the territory in the
years 1917 to 1921 - native hunters armed by the BSA Company and supplied the necessary
ammunition, killing 3,992 elephant (Melland 1938, p.88). This commercial exploitation of elephant by
Africans, Europeans and Arabs –which reappeared a hundred years later - brushed aside native
African laws of conservation, directly threatening their stability. Among the Bemba,
…finding one bee’s nest is good fortune, because honey is a blessing, finding two is
better still, but persisting in your search for bees’ nests that are never plentiful and
finding three – that is the work of witchcraft: it is the influence of greed, for which the
powers of Evil will find a way to punish you (Davidson 1996, p.85).
Within tribal groupings prior to BSA Company rule, the hunting of elephant, eland, rhino and hippo
was severely restricted to a certain class of fundi9 or hunter. Among the Bemba the sect, society or
guild which controlled the hunting of elephant was held in great esteem, being known as Uwanga wa
Nsofu with its own secret nomenclature, initiation ceremony and body marks, and with its own elders,
the waChiwinda, to whom application had to be made to join. With any slaying of an elephant, one of
the tusks was immediately given to the chief, the left hand tusk, the chimbo, being a symbol of the
lordship of the country. The tail was normally given to the fundi. Hughes, the Native Collector at
Nabwalya in 1902, reported on the use of members of this guild by the Arabs in their search for ivory
(Hughes 1933, p.223). One of the first acts of the BSA Company when it assumed control – having
had these rights signed over by some chiefs, but not all - was to claim the right to all ‘ground’ tusks
i.e. the tusk lying on the ground, at an elephant’s death. This symbol of ownership, of the right to rule,
was now accepted as being held by the BSA Company. These guilds died with Indirect Rule and the
appointment of chiefs and the creation of the chiefdom commons. The extermination of the black
rhino and the onslaught on elephant populations was driven by the same sort of anarchic forces as
operated during the slavery holocaust, where money and the power it brought was deemed greater than
any notion of kinship. Any hope for the emergence of an indigenous conservation movement from the
hunting guilds was therefore stalled, as foreseen by Melland (1938, p.90).
In 1892 the Rinderpest epidemic reached the territory from the Horn of Africa, crossing the Zambezi
in 1896. Buffalo were nearly exterminated, and kudu, eland and other cloven-hoofed species severely
affected, and also zebra. Barotseland was spared; the people brought new wealth from cattle in place
of ivory.
In 1896, regulations for the control of hunting and the establishment of game reserves was produced
by the British Central African Protectorate – the former Nyassaland and future Nyasaland. By 1899,
9
Now used to describe anyone thought to be a genuine expert at anything.
45
Alfred Sharpe, the Commissioner and Consul-General of the BSA Company, was alarmed at the
desecration of the great herds of game in the Mweru region and feared for the extinction of the
elephant. He thus declared the Mweru Marsh as a Game Reserve (gazetted in 1900), the first in the
territory, and one of the earliest in Africa. In 1901, in order to protect villagers from large predators,
the Administrator of North-Eastern Rhodesia reduced the size of the Mweru Marsh Game Reserve by
excluding the villages on the eastern boundary (MacKenzie 1997, p.234).
In 1900, the North-Eastern Rhodesia Order in Council for the International Convention for the
Preservation of Wild Animals, Bird and Fish in Africa was issued, and regulations for the preservation
of game introduced. These were the Game Laws of North-Eastern Rhodesia, issued, printed and
distributed in Fort Jameson, and revised two years later. Killing animals with snares, traps and pit-falls
was banned, and other restrictions were placed on the species allowed to be hunted. In 1902 an export
duty was placed on ivory, and later, the acting Administrator stated that control was necessary as
hippo numbers were dwindling as they were being shot for their teeth. He also decried the fact that in
one week an African hunter killed thirty rhino for their horns (Astle 1999, p.15). In 1903, the
restriction on the hunting of a number of animals was withdrawn because of the increase in wildlife
and the resultant damage to African crops. In 1904, under Section 4 of the Game Regulations of 1902,
a second Game Reserve was proclaimed (for the protection of Thorneycroft’s giraffe); this was the
Luangwa Game Reserve near old Petauke - the Sasare mine on its border, also known as the
Lusangazi Game Reserve (later cancelled in 1913). In the years 1912-1925, non-residents of the
Luangwa were banned from hunting there.
With the change brought about by the imposition of the hut tax and the demand for labour for the
mines, villagers had a large proportion of their adult males drawn away. This necessitated a
reorganisation of the villagers’ survival strategies. The more elderly lineage members now recruited
younger males as hunters with the responsibility for protecting crops and supplying meat. The younger
males, in turn, grasped the opportunity as their control of meat supplies would enable them to compete
later for the position of lineage head over their contemporaries who had gone off to the mines. The
ownership of a gun or rifle became a matter of considerable importance. Among the Bisa of the
Luangwa, there were four groups of hunters, being differentiated by the charms they used and the
manner in which they had been legitimised. The ‘dangerous shades’ of elephant, lion and eland
required specialised rituals to be observed, particularly - if the hunter and his kin was not to descend
into madness (Marks 1984, p.88).
Soon after the formation of the Protectorate, and managed by the Provincial Administration, the
Northern Rhodesia, Ordinance No. 19 of 1925 was promulgated, a game ordinance which
consolidated the laws of North-Eastern and North-Western Rhodesia. Native game licences were
issued allowing a villager to hunt in his traditional area, limits only being introduced in 1931. The bag
was extremely generous and given that the territory in 1926 was estimated to have 1,099 breechloading rifles, 1,763 shotguns and 25,619 muzzle-loaders among a population of about one million
people, the impact on wildlife would have been considerable. However, increasing game populations
also raided village gardens (Astle 1999, p.25). As the main concern of the PA was the welfare of the
villagers, they began to contract experienced hunters to deal with marauding animals elephant. These
included E.C. Mills, a notable professional white hunter and member of the East African Professional
Hunters Association; Henry Rangeley, H.L. Hall (who farmed in the Petauke district), Charlie Ross
and D.G. Lancaster; with most of them later appointed as civil-service elephant control officers.
In 1929, R.W.G. Hingston - the first wildlife consultant to the territory – was appointed by the Society
for the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire. He recommended the establishment of what was
to be called the South Central African National Park, a suggestion which was rejected, but which
would have incorporated much of the Luangwa and the present day Kasungu area in Malawi. This was
finally accomplished some seventy-seven years later by the formation of the Malawi/Zambia
Transfrontier Conservation Area, linking the Kasungu, Nyika and Lukusuzi National Parks.
46
The 1931 ordinance amendment registered the following Game Reserves: Victoria Falls, Kafue Gorge,
Mweru Marsh, Kafue and David Livingstone Memorial – wardens being provided within the PA,
although Pitman in his report of 1934 did not mention Victoria Falls (Pitman 1934, p.36). Pitman
came to Northern Rhodesia in 1931, and in his report of 1934 he laid the foundation for the future
Game and Tsetse Control Department of 1942, or the “Game Department” as it became known. His
report remarked on the massive decrease of wildlife – with the exception of buffalo and elephant - due
to hunting by villagers with muzzle-loaders, and the inadequate Game Ordinance and state of Game
Reserves, some of whom contained villages. He recommended establishing organised elephant control
operations to protect villagers (immediately effected), the establishment of a Game Department, that
the co-operation of the NAs be sought, that people be removed from Game Reserves, that much of the
Luangwa should be made a Game Reserve (on 27 May 1938, Luangwa Valley Game Reserve southern
section was gazetted), and that the present Kafue Reserve become a National Park.
The report emphasised game control. In 1935, 4,600 elephant were shot on control in order to alleviate
the sufferings of the villagers - plus 573 killed on licence (MacKenzie 1997, p.253). Moreover, he
urged that the Native Authorities be given increased powers in order to effect wildlife’s protection,
something of a contradictory statement. The Secretary for Native Affairs had commented that the
interests of the native community were the first consideration. However, the shortages of money and
WWII meant that the implementation of his recommendations were much delayed. Out of this came
two categories of land, Game Reserve and Controlled Area, to be administered by the NA and for
which they would receive an income from hunting. Vaughan-Jones, the author of a 1938 report laying
out the architecture of a future department, warned of the corruption amongst chiefs, but thought that
the NA could in time manage wildlife and the areas under them for the benefit of the villagers - ‘The
optimum scope of a Game Department, as has become apparent in the light of modern thought, is the
whole relationship of wild life to human progress, not merely the preservation of game for sportsmen
to hunt and the shooting of superfluous elephant’ (Vaughan-Jones 1938, p.vi, para 82). In 1941, he
was appointed the Officer-in-Charge of the Game Control Department, a revised Game Ordinance
being proclaimed in the same year.
In 1942, the Department of Game and Tsetse Control was formed within the PA and Vaughan-Jones
appointed Director. In future the proclamation of any Game Reserve would have to have the
agreement of the NA as these were formed on Native Trust Land. However, the responsibility given to
the NA for the control of wildlife outside of the reserves, with them receiving substantial fees from
non-resident hunters, was not a success, and wildlife populations continued to decrease - as they
would under any open-access regime. This led to a conflict between the Game Department (prowildlife) and the PA (pro-people). In 1945, the Kunda Controlled Hunting Area (CHA) and the
Munyamadzi CHA was declared, with responsibility for protection of wildlife given to the chiefs. In
1946, hunters were encouraged to hunt in these CHAs, with native treasuries receiving income from
licences and permits. In 1947, the Petauke CHA was declared. In 1949, in the Kunda CHA, the Game
Department camp, Chipera, (on the orders of the DC Lundazi, Errol Button) was handed over to the
NA as a tourist lodge, with all income being retained by the NA.
In 1949/1950, the Government Controlled Hunting scheme was started in the Nsefu/Malama area of
Eastern Province, producing further income for the NA. This was the resumption of professional safari
hunting after WWII. By 1952, European hunters coming to hunt on their own account could not hunt
easily or at all given the plethora of CHAs: only 140 permits a year were being issued and each permit
was only valid for a fortnight in a particular area. But there was no check on native African licences or
on native hunting, and thus a massive trade existed in bushmeat - driven by the demand of the mines
and by the burgeoning urban populations. In 1954/55 a Fauna Conservation Ordinance was passed in
which the existing thirty-nine Controlled Hunting Areas were redefined as sixteen First Class Hunting
Areas and twenty-three Second Class Hunting areas, representing a one-third reduction in areas for
hunting.
47
In April 1950, the Governor proclaimed the Kafue National Park being ‘set aside’ within what was
Native Trust Land. The Order in Council defining Trust Land stated, ‘land set apart for the sole use
and benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of Northern Rhodesia…’ and further: ‘out of the profits or
rents accruing from any area of native trust land set aside as a forest or Game Reserve… there shall…
be paid first the expenditure necessarily incurred by the Government in connection with the said area,
whether by maintenance, development or otherwise, and the balance shall be paid into the (Native
Trust Land) Fund, or into the treasury of the native authority concerned, as the Governor shall direct’.
A consultant, Darling, commented that being Native Trust Land first and a National Park second
conflicted with the concept of National Parks as outlined by the 1933 International Convention.
Darling recommended that an amendment be tabled of the Order of Council, altering the boundaries of
Native Trust Land, or by invoking Section 5(1) (d) of the Order in Council which empowers the
Governor to ‘acquire native trust land for public purposes’ (Darling 1960, pp.128-129).
The Fauna Conservation Ordinance was approved in 1954, but only gazetted in 1957. Existing
controlled areas became First or Second Class Hunting Areas, and a category of private game area was
defined. There was considerable opposition in the Legislative Assembly to the new Game Ordinance,
with one member, R. Kidson, speaking out on behalf of the villagers who were suffering from wildlife
impacts - essentially for their protection - demanding that the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme
be abandoned.10 Some new African members said that NAs should be allowed to shoot out their
animals if they so wished. Vaughan-Jones’ riposte reminded members that CHAs were created at the
request of Native Authorities, and Government had assented, hoping that they would manage their
areas (Astle 1999, p.42).
The PA and the NAs were opposed to any tightening of preservationist regulations. And while the
Game Department now had the necessary powers to control African hunting, they conceded that
without the co-operation of the NAs, no progress would be made in slowing down the pace of
depletion. In 1958, Game Department staff were instructed to confine themselves in their duties to the
Kafue National Park (KNP), the Game Reserves, and the First and Second Class CHAs on Crown
land. In other areas, NAs would have full responsibility for game management. The retrenchment of
Game Department staff in 1958 as a result of a fall in copper prices, saw them hand over control of
most of the Second Class Hunting Areas to the NAs. These areas continued to deteriorate as the State
retained ownership of wildlife. In 1962, the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme was abolished
and their concessions awarded to a limited liability company, Luangwa safaris, whose Directors were
Peter Hankin and Norman Carr, the latter formerly in charge of the Government hunting scheme.
In 1966 Nsefu was declared a full Game Reserve. The National Parks and Wildlife Act was
promulgated in 1968, but only implemented in 1971. In this legislation, CHAs became Game
Management Areas (GMAs), and the Luangwa South Reserve was enlarged to include Nsefu Game
Reserve and Chifungwe Plain, and renamed the South Luangwa National Park. In 1972 the elephant
cropping scheme, begun eight years earlier in South Luangwa, was closed after the conservationist
turned preservationist, Sir Peter Scott, allegedly complained about it to President Kaunda.
By the early 1970s a broad-based protected area system was in place and nineteen National Parks had
been created from their Game Reserve predecessors. Many of these protected areas were supported by
the production of management plans and applied research. The power of the chiefs waned greatly from
the time of self-government, and the Natural Resources Act Cap 315 of 1962, and later, the Natural
Resources Act of 1970 - legislation which contained everything necessary to usher in development to
customary areas - was ignored and much of it later repealed by the Environmental Protection and
Pollution Control Act of 1990.
10
Father of Ron Kidson, founder Chairman of the Professional Hunters Association of Zambia.
48
6
THE ECONOMY
With the extension of British interest over the territory in 1891, it took another thirty years for the
basic infrastructure of railways, roads, towns, and the basic forms of Western technology and
civilisation to be imposed. By 1921, commercial mining had begun - the engine for the rapid growth
which was to follow over the next forty years, though clearly the 3,000 Europeans, 56 Indians and
approximately one million African natives in existence, stood together at the brink of development. At
the time, 82% of the Europeans lived in the capital, Livingstone, Lusaka (the capital from 1935) or
Broken Hill (Kabwe). The rest – with the exception of the tobacco farmers in the Fort Jameson area
(Chipata) – lived near the railway line whose construction through the territory reached Kabwe in
1906 and the Congo border in 1909. Of the Europeans, 1,000 farmed, with the great majority of
Africans subsisting in the time-honoured fashion, and the Indians being involved in trading. Only 133
Europeans worked in mining, mainly in the production of lead and zinc in Broken Hill. The 1924
export value of metals was £161,000 (only £7,000 from copper at Bwana Mkubwa), with agriculture
at £153,000 - constituting 70% of the total exports of £465,000 (Baldwin 1966, p.19).
But all of this was soon to change with a massive rise in demand for copper, the mobilisation of
investment capital in London and a recent advance in mining technology that allowed, through the
flotation method, the mining of ores high in sulphides. However, the key was the decision of the BSA
Company – which still held the mining rights - to award vast mining concessions to well capitalised
mining companies. By the end of the 1920s, copper was a major industry. The Copperbelt now
experienced a building boom. By 1930, seven major mines were in production. Allied with this
development, advances in the treatment of malaria allowed relatively large numbers of qualified
Europeans to live in the area. The health of Africans was also considerably improved (Gann 1964).
However, in 1931, with copper prices plummeting, Bwana Mkubwa closed down, and by 1932, with
the onset of the Great Depression fully evident, copper production was cut by international agreement
to 26.5% of world capacity (Gann 1964, p.251). Between 1931-1933 the white population dropped
from 13,846 to 11,278. Five difficult years followed, but by 1937 mining was once more in full swing,
Northern Rhodesia now becoming one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. In 1949,
the pound devalued and the price of copper increased 44% overnight, and with it production, reaching
379,000 tons in 1954. In 1959, further significant growth took place with minerals generally taking up
70% of GDP. From Federation days (1953-1962), these figures were no longer available, but no other
industry challenged the copper supremacy in what had become a very lopsided dualistic economy
(Baldwin 1966, p.36).
In 1947, the Government inaugurated a ten-year development plan, giving as their three main
objectives:11
i)
To give, on a modest scale, the bare essentials of social and economic services
which all sections of the community require.
ii) To encourage development of the natural and potential assets of the Territory but
at the same time to prevent ‘exploitation’ (used in its worst sense) of these assets.
iii) To assist the African population to develop itself under its Native Authority with
all possible speed. This is urgent because a higher standard of living must be
earned and cannot be awarded.
However, shortly after the start of the programme, under pressure from the legislature, the goal of
stimulating the rural non-monetary sector was diminished, with increased food production, roads and
European and African housing taking their place. The share devoted to African housing, education and
rural development fell from 31% to 17% by 1953, mirrored later by the Government in the years
11
Ten-Year Development Plan for Northern Rhodesia as approved by the Legislative Council on 11 February
1947, Northern Rhodesia. Government Printer, 1951. p.8.
49
1980-2000. Between 1945 and 1951, Britain extracted roughly 140 million sterling from their
colonies, investing about 40 million sterling under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts; this
under a Labour Government supposedly with the interests of the common man at heart (Davidson
1996, p.219).
From the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, development funds augmented those
being supplied by the Northern Rhodesia Government. Most of this was taken up by the modernisation
of the railway and the production of power from Kariba. Crucially, funding which had been intended
for the upliftment of the rural African went to strengthening the urban monetary sector (Baldwin 1966,
p.200). And where some effort was made to improve African food production, these were based on
European methods of agriculture as the condition for raising income. This was particularly applicable
to the Kafue Flats Pilot Polder Scheme begun in 1956, a massive and expensive failure, an augury of
the destruction of the Elysian Fields to come.
As both the Protectorate and Federation days came to an end, it was claimed that the economic reality
of the time was of an economy controlled by European interests where African farmers had been
excluded from access to the land along the line of rail – essential to supplying the mines with food –
with imposed produce marketing controls, seen as a deliberate policy to hinder their competitiveness
with commercial farmers; and in industry, that the might of the European controlled unions blocked
the attainment of any significant advances in labour skills by Africans (Baldwin 1966, p.216). This
conclusion did not take into account the massive social and cultural differences between Westerners
and native Africans. And as Peter Bauer wrote, ‘Poverty and prosperity are not usually matters of land.
Poverty or riches, and personal and social satisfaction depend on man, on his culture and on his
political arrangements. Understand that, and you understand the most important cause of wealth or
deprivation’.12
12
Bauer, Peter. Land and People, quoted in Zambia Institute for Public Policy Analysis, April-June 2009.
Lusaka.
50
7.
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Literature.
MELLAND, F. H. 1938. Elephants in Africa. Country Life Ltd, London.
METCALF. S. 2005. Landscape Conservation and Land Tenure in Zambia: Community Trusts in the
Kazungula Heartland. AWF working papers
OPPENHEIMER, S. 2003. Out of Africa's Eden: the peopling of the world, Jonathan Ball,
Johannesburg.
PITMAN, C. R. S. 1934. A report on a faunal survey of Northern Rhodesia with especial reference to
game, elephant control and National Parks, Government Printer, Lusaka.
SAMPSON, R. 2006. With Sword and Chain in Lusaka: A Londoner's Life in Zambia 1948-1972,
Trafford Publishing.
SMITH, BENJAMIN. 2000. Reading rock art and writing genetic history. In Soodyall, Himla, Ed.,
The Prehistory of Africa.
STAIRS, WILLIAM G. 1994. Victorian Explorer, Ed., Janina M. Kongzacki, Nimbus, Halifax,
STEPHANISZYN, B., APTHORPE, R. 1964. Social and ritual life of the Ambo of Northern
Rhodesia, Published for the International African Institute by the Oxford University Press.
STEPHENSON, J. E. 1937. Chirupula's tale: a bye-way in African history, Geoffrey Bles, London.
STONEKING, MARK. 2006. Genetic evidence for our recent African ancestry, in Soodyall, Himla,
Ed., The Prehistory of Africa. Jonathan Ball, Johannesburg.
TAPSON, W. H. 1957. Old Timer, H. Timmins, Cape Town.
VAUGHAN-JONES, T. G. C. 1938. Memorandum on policy concerning the foundation of a game
department and the conservation of fauna in Northern Rhodesia. Government Printers,
Livingstone.
VICKERY, K. P. 1986. Black and White in southern Zambia: the Tonga Plateau economy and British
imperialism, 1890-1939, Greenwood Pub Group.
WHITE, C. M. N. 1959, A Survey of African Land Tenure in Northern Rhodesia, in Journal of
African Administration, Vol. 11 No. 4, October, pp. 171-178.
WIESE, C. & LANGWORTHY, H.W. 1983. Expedition in east-central Africa, 1888-1891: a
report, Collings.
WINTERBOTTOM, J. M. 1945. The Ecology of Man and Plants in Northern Rhodesia, in Max
Gluckman and J.M. Winterbottom, eds., Human Problems in British Central Africa III,
Rhodes-Livingstone Journal.
52
CHAPTER 2:
SELF-GOVERNMENT AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
53
ACRONYMS
ACC
ADMADE
AG
AWF
BEE Act
BSA Company
Bushmeat
CBNRM
CBO
CEE Act
CEO
CHA
COMACO
CONASA
CRB
CTC
D-G
DNPW
EDF
EIA
ERPP
FAO
FINDECO
GEF
GMA
GRZ
HCA
HQ
INDECO
KNP
LIRDP
MD
MINDECO
MP
MSB
MTENR
NA
NBSAP
NGO
NORAD
NP
NPE
NPWS
NRCF
NRM
PA
PAYE
RAMSAR
REMNPAS
Anti-Corruption Commission
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
Auditor General
African Wildlife Foundation
Broad Based Black Empowerment Act of South Africa
British South Africa Chartered Company
Wild animals used in tropical and sub-tropical forests for food and for
non-food purposes, including medicinal use
Community Based Natural Resource Management
Community Based Organisation
Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of Zambia
Chief Executive Officer
Controlled Hunting Area
Community Markets for Conservation
Community Based Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Agriculture
Community Resource Board
Conservation Trading Centre
Director General ZAWA
Department of National Parks and Wildlife
European Development Fund
Environmental Investigation Agency
Emergency Resource Protection Project
Food and Agriculture Organisation
Finance and Development Corporation
Global Environment Facility
Game Management Area
Government of Zambia
Hunting Concession Agreement
Headquarters
Industrial Development Corporation
Kafue National Park
Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project
Managing Director
Mining Development Corporation
Member of Parliament
Mechanical Services Branch
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
Native Authority
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
Non-Governmental Organisation
Norwegian Agency for International Development
National Park
National Policy on the Environment
National Parks and Wildlife Service
Natural Resources Consultative Forum of Zambia
National Resource Management
Provincial Administration
Pay As You Earn
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
54
SCI
SEED
SLAMU
TBNRM
UN
UNDP
UNIP
US
USA
USAID
VAG
VMC
WB
WCRF
WCS
WWF
ZAWA
ZCC
ZCCM
ZIMCO
ZRA
Safari Club International
Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification
South Luangwa Management Unit
Tourism-based Natural Resource Management
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United National Independence Party
United States
United States of America
United States Aid
Village Action Group
Village Management Committee
World Bank
Wildlife Conservation Revolving Fund
Wildlife Conservation Society
World Wide Fund for Nature
Zambia Wildlife Authority
Zambia Competition Commission
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation
Zambia Revenue Authority
55
1
ZAMBIA AND THE GAME DEPARTMENT (1964 -1974)
1.1
Politics and wildlife conservation
The early post-European colonial protectorate period had seen the continuation of the colonial system
of protected area and biodiversity management. But after near total Zambianisation from 1974, this
became much neglected and corrupted, even though supported financially by an increasing array of
idealistic and ultimately naïve foreign donor support.
The new African hegemony under the founding president, Kenneth Kaunda, continued with the
European conservation system it had inherited despite the antipathy of the nationalists who felt that
their people had been denied access to wildlife and other resources enjoyed before being colonised by
the British, and that they should now be able to claim what was rightfully theirs. Kaunda was
avowedly pro-conservation, frequently visiting the Luangwa Warden’s own quarters on Mfuwe
Lagoon, the Mushroom, and spending days driving about in the company of a coterie of
conservationists such as Errol Button and Johnny Uys, though the suggestion that Kaunda was
converted to conservation by Uys et al, has been refuted elsewhere (Astle 1999). However, Kaunda’s
support for the controversial elephant cropping scheme in the Luangwa which operated between 19641972 (mounted on ecological grounds), appears to support his conservationist claims, as well as his
instructions to the Game Department to translocate black lechwe to an area where they had been
exterminated (Manning 1975).
In 1968, a new bill was passed conferring even greater powers on the Government of Zambia in their
mandate to manage wildlife and its habitat. By the end of 1971, when the bill was implemented, the
governing United National Independence Party (UNIP) passed a further eight statutory instruments
outlining new regulations governing hunting licences, trophies, protected animals and legal methods
of hunting. The system of Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs) were replaced by 32 Game Management
Areas (GMAs), and a motion was forwarded by the Minister in the National Assembly for the creation
of a further eighteen National Parks. One of these new National Parks, the new South Luangwa
National Park, contained Chifungwe Plain – taken from Chief Nabwalya and his Valley Bisa people and Nsefu Game Reserve, declared as a Government controlled Game Reserve in 1966 (Nsefu camp
having been taken over by Government in 1965).13
It has been suggested elsewhere that Zambia’s political institutions – and that of other African
countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya - create incentives for the ruling party to ignore the
electorates’ wishes for greater hunting In Zambia this was put down to the fact that Kaunda was proconservation, that electoral and party rules did not reward those parliamentarians who called for
greater wildlife benefits for their constituencies, that the rules punished members of UNIP for
opposing Kaunda and the Central Committee, and that by promulgating the National Parks and
Wildlife Act, GRZ would control the wildlife sector and be able to woo chiefs and others with game
licences (specifically the Minister who to this day has within the Ministerial remit a number of special
licences that may be issued to those bringing the greatest benefit) (Gibson 1995, chap.2, p.2). This was
African patrimonialism at work, with rule by patronage rather than law or ideology, and based upon
relationships of loyalty and dependence with a blurred distinction between private and public interests
(Bond 2006).
However, its roots really lie at a deeper level than this, imbedded as it is in the traditional African
culture of kinships and interlocking clans whose members must conform to an intricate set of give and
take relationships and economic reciprocity forged over thousands of years. Clearly they have survival
value; rigid ideology and laws do not, and relativism truly holds sway. In this there is no notion of a
world outside, no notion of a nation state let alone ideology or law or honour, which are what modern
states are founded upon (Bowman 2006). And there are few principles outside of the clan.
13
Kafue NP was the only extant National Park at the time.
56
The legitimacy of the African political elites, such as it is, derives from their ability to
nourish the clientele on which their power rests. It is therefore imperative for them to
exploit governmental resources for patrimonial purposes (Chabal & Daloz 1999, p.15).
In the 1968 bill, authority over wildlife was vested in the President and generally centralised power
over wildlife and National Parks strengthened. Little thought was given to empowering rural
communities or chiefs at the time as the Game Department was in a building phase, although in later
Protectorate days the Provincial Administration’s (PAs) main conservation mandate had been to
protect villagers from wildlife depredations and to rule indirectly through the chiefs. At the time this
was understandable, given the existence of a highly competent Game Department with a vibrant
research division based on a model which had been copied by a number of countries in the British
sphere of influence; and funds were in plentiful supply given the high price of copper at the time,
unlike ten years earlier in 1958 when copper prices plummeted and the Game Department was shorn
of a large number of staff. But in the 1968 bill, penalties for poaching were increased as a resurgent
hunting safari industry began to exploit increasing game populations.
The only opposition to the 1968 bill came from Harry Nkumbula, leader of the opposition party, the
African National Congress, who railed against the amount of land being placed under the protective
blanket. As his party’s stronghold lay in Southern Province he was particularly critical of the massive
Kafue National Park, not realising that the Park had originally been given over to protected status from
its Trust Land status by the communities living there - not alienated to State Land - and with the
agreement that after the costs for running the area were covered, that they would receive financial
benefits (Darling 1960, p.128). This agreement, as with all the other National Parks and protected
forests, has not been honoured.
The Wildlife Act No 65 of 1970 had reversed the powers placed in the civil service head of the Game
Department, the Director, and placed them under the sanction of the Minister. It was at this time that
members of the Central Committee- such as Grey Zulu - arrived occasionally in the Luangwa
accompanied by a fleet of Government vehicles and assistants to kill what they could load up and
remove.
The assertion that poaching had greatly increased in the early years of independence is probably true,
though no statistics exist to prove it either way. However, it is clear that at no time after the arrival of
the British South Africa Company (BSA Company), or the Imperial Government’s administration, had
poaching ever been under control. Moreover, the sheer population increase, the massive number of
firearms in circulation, the later liberation wars in Rhodesia and, most of all, the failure to decentralise
and devolve and address issues of wildlife ownership - wildlife supported on traditional land ‘owned’
by villagers - ensured that.
Just prior to 1973, Government ‘broke the contracts of numbers of long serving officers while
admitting their exemplary service, and filled the resulting vacancies with other expatriates thus
ensuring that experienced staff were not available to guide the newly qualified Zambian staff’ (Astle
1999, p.88). By 1974, the Zambianisation programme entered its final phase, with hundreds of
European civil servants told to leave - the Minister of State (Lands and Natural Resources) of the time,
Sefelino Mulenga, travelled to the Department of National Parks and Wildlife (DNPW) HQ at
Chilanga to address the staff, pointing at the white officers, and saying that the Zambians present
would be taking ‘the whites’ jobs, and that they should denounce any white racists. To his credit, the
Permanent Secretary apologised to the Director (Astle 1999, p.88). The Game Department was soon
cleared of its institutional memory and expertise. With the possible exception of one officer, all whites
were expatriates, though many were long time residents. Experienced whites were no longer hired,
though some since have thought that ‘white Zambians no longer saw the wildlife department as an
appropriate employment option’ (Manspeizer 2004, p.25).
57
In 1974 and 1975, Kaunda still directed matters in a conservation direction. In 1974, he issued an
instruction to the Game Department for the black lechwe antelope to be re-established in the Nashinga
Swamps and Bwela Flats area near Chinsali, the site of the Lubwa Mission where he had grown up
(his father was the pastor). Airforce transport planes were despatched to the Chikuni airstrip of the
Black Lechwe Project in south-east Bangweulu to carry the animals caught by airboat to Chinsali
(Manning 1976). Ironically, the project, which had three phases: research on the lechwe’s ecology and
distribution (Grimsdell & Bell 1975), its protection, followed by the development of a utilisation
scheme once populations had risen to a certain level for the sole benefit of the local communities of
Unga and Twa swamp inhabitants, never occurred. Early in 1976, as the head of the project, the author
was forced to leave the country due to one of the strictures of the Watershed Speech of June, 1975 that
stated that no Government employee could leave the service and enter into private business. Despite
having increased the population from 17,000 to 39,000 between 1971 and 1975, the project simply
ceased, never to be resumed, other than a desultory attempt by a multi-national conservation NGO, the
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), of whose activities, like the Black Lechwe Project - which only
completed one other study, on sitatunga (Manning 1983) - there is now no trace. No follow up was
ever made of what happened to the 120 or so lechwe translocated to the Nashinga, although they all
appear to have disappeared (Chief Chibesakunda 2009, personal communication, 17 November.).
The Watershed Speech of 30 June – 3 July 1975 made Kaunda’s revolutionary intentions absolutely
clear to non-Zambians: he wished to defeat capitalism and place the UNIP Party at the centre of
Zambian life. In short order the private hospitals were closed and the membership told to use
government hospitals, the Mechanical Services Branch (MSB) was taken over by the army, freehold
land was abolished, estate agents were closed down - land now only having the value of its
infrastructural development. Emigration of Europeans and Hindu Indians from 1974 became a flood
and the economic destruction of a country - which had been one of the most successful and promising
in the world - had begun.
1.2
Transitional and Natural Resource Development Fund
In the Luangwa in the early 1960s development funds were used to establish international tourism
facilities, 72% of Game Department revenue being so allocated. Nsefu and Luambe camps –
established expressly to provide revenue for the Native Authorities – were handed over to the Game
Department, joining their stable of non-catering camps: Lion, Big Lagoon, Chilongozi and Lusangazi.
In 1966, the 32 bed lodge, Mfuwe was opened in the Park but from 1971 the decision was made to
place all infrastructure outside the Park, this immediately broken by Kaunda’s orders to build his
presidential lodge, Chichele, within. Since then the practice has continued. From 1970 the decision
was made to create a series of game viewing loops that could be used by tourists during the rains, thus
encouraging the build-up of a mass of tourist operators all concentrated in a small area. From 1964, a
landuse planning approach was adopted by the Department, followed by aerial surveys, fire and
mammal research (Astle 1999, pp.57-67). This approach has long since been discontinued.
1.3
The Luangwa Valley Conservation and Development Project and Game cropping
In the Luangwa, in order to provide funds for the Native Authorities (NAs), a pilot cropping scheme
was initiated by the Game Department in 1962 under the Lundazi-Chewa Native Authority. In 1963
the scheme expanded into the Luambe Game Reserve. In 1964, operations moved to the South
Luangwa Game Reserve, with little profit resulting. In 1965, the cropping of elephant, buffalo, hippo
and impala began, being served by an abattoir complete with refrigeration. In October 1966, the Food
and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) under the Luangwa Valley Conservation and
Development Project began a landuse survey of the Luangwa. In 1966 and 1967 dart guns and the
drug, Scolene, were used to remove entire elephant family groups, with buffalo and hippo shot in the
day by rifle (Manning 1995). In 1968 the use of dart guns was discontinued. In the same year, the
FAO team recommended the removal of several thousand elephant (Dodds et al. 1968). However, the
cropping ceased in 1972 having accounted for 1,408 Elephant, 1,643 hippo and 212 buffalo, and an
58
unrecorded number of impala (Astle 1999, p.101). In 1973, after conducting elephant aerial surveys
with high confidence limits, attempts were made to once again continue the project, it being
recommended that a two-step reduction of 5,000 elephant should take place (Naylor et al. 1973).
However, the cropping did not resume and the project closed down, its place taken by poachers.
The cropping scheme had provided very little benefit to local people, the meat being frozen and sent to
the Copperbelt - one five ton load of ivory going missing on its way to Lusaka (J Botha 1966, personal
communication). Another project, hastily conceived, had ended. And the original reason for the
cropping in the Park - ecological, not socio-mercantile - to reduce elephant numbers because of major
changes to the floristic diversity, forgotten.
From the standpoint of the elephants and their range, this illegal removal was probably
not terribly detrimental: but the specific animals chosen would probably not have been
the same ones taken under controlled removal. The prime bulls, reflecting elements of
the best genetic stock were harvested most heavily by the poachers (Gilbert & Dodds.
1987, p.272).
2
NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (1975 - 1999)
2.1
Introduction
Between 1973 and 1993, under a new and completely Africanised administration, almost the entire
population of rhino of some 20,000 or so were killed for their horns, and the elephant population in the
South Luangwa National Park and its environs reduced from 31,000 to 7,000. This has been put down
to inadequate wildlife conservation policies inherited from the colonial era (Gibson & Marks. 1995).
However, the onset of poaching had begun in Kenya with a ban on safari hunting in 1972 (all hunting
in 1977), orchestrated by the wife of President Kenyatta, Mama Ngina, who was involved in the ivory
trade. To this was added the Africanisation of the East and Southern African Game Departments, the
increase in oil prices, a drop in the gold price, and the onset of neoliberalisation and reckless cadre
Africanisation. However, it was the removal of the British administrators and the inevitable collapse
of governance that allowed for the emergence of a patrimonial elite from the Native Authorities,
unhindered by traditional systems that had once guarded nature – these destroyed by colonialism.
Between 1994 and 2002, at a time when millions of dollars were being invested by donors in
conservation, protection and community empowerment, possibly 123.5 tons of ivory – the likely
contents of nineteen containers, representing some 14,589 elephant, was – according to the Malawi
Anti-Corruption Bureau – allegedly smuggled from the Luangwa via Malawi and Durban to
Singapore14. At the same time, the last population of rhino living in the Chendeni Hills within a few
miles of the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) field HQ
– some 14 in number - were exterminated (R Time 1989, personal communication), despite assurances
to the author of their safety by the senior advisor to the ADMADE programme (D Lewis 1989,
personal communication) at his Nyamaluma HQ, (Manning 1989a).
A number of Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) attempted to stem the tide. From 1979, the
NGO, Save the Rhino Trust made vain attempts and safari companies came forward with funds. In
return for concessionary benefits, Circuit Holdings (a subsidiary of the Zambia Consolidated Copper
Mines (ZCCM)), through a personal relationship of their Managing Director, M. Freed, with Kaunda,
obtained concessions around Lake Tanganyika - some of them seized from others and handed over to
Circuit, with Kaunda ordering that they take on some of the mandate of the National Parks and
Wildlife Service (NPWS) such as anti-poaching work. Kaunda even had the boundaries of the Sumbu
14
Samuel Ngosi. 2006. Address to International Ivory Enforcement Workshop. Environmental Investigation
Agency (EIA), Lusaka.
59
National Park de-gazetted to accommodate Circuit. In 1981 Kaunda deployed large numbers of
military into the Luangwa to stem the elephant and rhino poaching, without success. From 1983
Kaunda allowed hunting companies to retain 50% of their foreign exchange, opening the doors to
patronage - corrupt businessmen with little interest in conservation obtaining concessions in return
for other concessions and bribes (Gibson 1995). Unknowingly, Kaunda had lost the bedrock of
wisdom and experience of those who had advised him in the 1960s and early 1970s, replaced by
crackpots, opportunists and carpetbaggers.
That Kaunda, superficially at least, was trying to do something about the killing fields, is not in doubt;
but having embarked on his grandiose and tragically misguided indigenous socialisation plan, part of
which was perversely to do exactly what the colonials had done – but with a quarter of the existing
population - to order village regrouping, he clearly could not turn the clock back and welcome a new
wave of conservation minded immigrants into the country, the only way modern economies grow. But
crucially, despite his philosophy of Humanism that sought to re-impose the egalitarian pre-colonial
life of economic reciprocity, he refused to see that it was the empowerment of the chiefs and their
communities, joined as they once were under the promising Native Authorities and the Parish
Councils, where the way forward lay. He believed in a highly centralised control mode with himself in
charge serving his narrow constituency of Central Committee Members and Cabinet Ministers,
whereas the reverse was required. But this he had learnt from his colonial masters, who having
followed Lugard’s model of Indirect Rule through the chiefs, when the time came to withdraw from
Empire, looked for a few professional politicians to receive the cudgels of power, but not the chiefs.
This was a massive and callow act of expediency by the British Government on the people whom their
admirable Provincial Administration - of no more than 250 men - had served so well for a mere 40
years as a protectorate within Pax Britannica.
Kaunda made numerous attempts to provide more draconian punishments in the Wildlife Act of 1971
by way of amendments. In 1982 the Minister put forward the required amendment to the National
Assembly (National Parks and Wildlife Amendment bill of 1982). Backbenchers opposed the
amendment believing it to impinge on the rights of their constituents, but the front bench, reliant on
Kaunda patronage, supported it. The bill was withdrawn, re-appeared a few months later with the
prison sentences removed for poaching rhino and elephant. This omission coincided with the eye of
the killing field’s tornado (Gibson 1995).
In 1983, with conservationists complaining about the dire situation, two new major strategies emerged
from the seminal Lupande Development Workshop held in September 1983, a last-gasp move of
desperation to halt the slide into depletion anarchy. The first, ADMADE (Administrative Management
Design for Game Management Areas), was funded by United States Aid (USAID) and engineered by
one of their citizens, Dale Lewis and the then current leadership of the NPWS who were the first
native African wildlife management graduates. The second, the Luangwa Integrated Resource
Development Project (LIRDP), was punted by conservationists with the backing of Kaunda and
funded by the Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD). Ostensibly both
programmes had customary communities as their main beneficiaries, and the stemming of the elephant
and rhino poaching as the main thrust, in particular in the Luangwa where they believed the future
model for conservation should be implemented. LIRDP was to be an independent group having total
development control of the area, a mini-government in fact, essentially usurping the NPWS mandate.
ADMADE with Lewis and the NPWS hierarchy as its champions protested at this saying that what
was required was not a mini-government, but a programme within the NPWS.
Most of the nineteen National Parks, thirty-five Game Management Areas (GMAs) and numerous
national forests have since 1975 been under only rudimentary protection and management, much as
they had been during the early years of the Protectorate period, though with considerably smaller
numbers of people. However, now some Parks and forests are already settled by people, parts of some
Parks have been alienated to developers and tourism concessions expanded without due process and
before the necessary environmental assessment work was completed (Mosi oa Tunya National Park).
60
Part of at least one National Forest (West Mvuvye No. 54) was sold off on a 99 year (renewable)
leasehold illegally with the assistance of corrupt elements within the District Council, Ministry of
Lands and the Forestry Department, and conveyanced by a Lusaka lawyer.
There are a number of reasons for this sorry state of affairs. Government has for too long avoided
implementing provisions in the law for awarding customary communities harvesting rights to forests
and wildlife and to devolve powers to them under structures that will ensure that the plunder of the
customary commons is avoided, and to ensure that they have the necessary investment and support
which will allow them to improve their living standards and halt the increasing degradation of an
environment which should be the engine for their development. Since 1975, there has been a near total
failure of GRZ to provide the funds and managerial expertise necessary for biodiversity conservation
and for the upliftment of the rural poor, their prime consideration being to use the jobs available as
part of the patronage and clientelism system, development altruism being almost wholly absent.
2.2
ADMADE: Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
The ADMADE programme had its genesis in the Lupande Research Project (1979-1984), which then
led to the Lupande Development workshop in 1983, which in turn gave birth to the two major
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) interventions in Zambia, LIRDP and
ADMADE. The latter ran for the last twelve years of the NPWS (1987 – 1999), being funded by
USAID, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-US), and with aid and technical assistance from the
Wildlife Conservation Society of America (WCS-USA). CBNRM has been defined by Stiener &
Rihoy (cited by Clarke 2000, p.5) as ‘for a community to manage its resource base sustainably it must
receive direct benefits arising from its use. These benefits must exceed the perceived costs of
managing the resource and must be secure over time’. This definition excludes the essential element
for providing benefits over time: ownership. Lyons (2000, p.39) conceded that ADMADE had many
of the ingredients for a successful CBNRM project ‘that a strong wildlife legislation had been adopted
by the government and that …a legal framework which does not grant ownership yet empowers rural
communities with access and management rights’ was in place. However, such access and
management rights have been almost totally absent in Zambia.
Lewis, the main originator of ADMADE proposed an ‘African model’ for wildlife conservation based
on the following four hypotheses (cited by Marks 2008, P.107):
i)
ADMADE employees would show greater dedication to conservation than other
NPWS employees.
ii) The costs of law enforcement would decline as local and more Afro-centric
institutions took over the management of wildlife, allowing for enhanced wildlife
productivity.
iii) The ADMADE wildlife authorities would build trust and respect among rural
residents.
iv) The restoration of ‘traditional African wildlife values’ would take place as
wildlife recovered ‘its place’ within the lives of rural residents.
It is revealing that ADMADE followed a set of hypotheses that did not mention ownership as being
the absolutely essential pre-requisite for the sustained development of wildlife land. This is the
Achilles’ heel of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), also known as
CBNRM, or CBWM (Community based Wildlife Management).
Avoiding the recruitment of powerful politicians, particularly Kaunda (a strategy adopted by LIRDP),
the NPWS/ADMADE embarked on a programme to increase revenues and staffing levels. For this
they would need a Trojan horse; so, persuading their Ministry to create a hunting concession in the
Lupande GMA – a prime hunting area, which they would lease out for a good return, they had
partially succeeded on the first count. Here they made use of their Wildlife Revolving Fund, set up
61
originally in January 1983 as a mechanism to fund their operations. There were unanswered questions
regarding the financial accounting and management of the Revolving Fund, with certain senior
members being involved in high-handed corruption. In America, before the start of the European
Development Fund project to re-organize the NPWS (see section 2.4), two senior members of the
NPWS attended the Safari Club International (SCI) Hunting Convention and attempted to extract a
massive bribe from two Texans and a senior member of the world hunting fraternity for a concession
in the Luano Valley, having earlier agreed verbally to award them the concession. The Texans then
cancelled their proposed investment (D Lindsay 2009, personal communication). No full and
satisfactory audit of the Revolving Fund was ever presented to the Ministry of Finance, with most of
the money being trousered. This system of harvesting by the present equivalent of NPWS, a statutory
body, the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), is now firmly entrenched.
ADMADE then started a cropping programme, making cheap meat available and reportedly giving the
local community 40% of the income. This bought the necessary grassroots political support for
ADMADE, soon to be the NPWS national programme of CBNRM, the term usually used when
government and donors jointly establish a project with the intention of improving the lives of villagers
from wildlife derived income. ADMADE now established similar projects in other GMAs, creating a
structure not unlike that implemented by the colonial administration’s system of Parishes, a system
ADMADE imposed on the people of the GMAs (Kawayawaya 2003). A Wildlife Management
Authority was established in each area, the District Governor acting as chairman, the District
Secretary as vice-chairman, and members comprising the Member of Parliament (MP), the local
officer in charge of ZAWA, the chief and the ward chairman - not dissimilar to the Native Authority
of old, only the Native Authority had all the natural resource departments of Government represented,
not just that responsible for wildlife. The managing director of the local safari company also sat on the
Authority. In the GMA associated chiefdoms, Sub-Authorities were set up and chaired by the chief,
with headmen, teachers and a representative of the District Council in place. This structure was
ingrained in the Wildlife Act of 1998 as Community Resource Boards (CRBs), although no statutory
instruments regulating their operations were produced by 2009. In practice the hierarchy of the NPWS
ran ADMADE as a private fiefdom, with the Authority and the Sub-Authorities having little power,
but having responsibility for game protection, rather as in the present situation, and with the same poor
sharing and very lax and corrupt payment system. Clearly ADMADE in time subsumed NPWS and
metamorphosed into the present ZAWA and their CRB proxies, with all their defects intact.
In 1988, WWF provided funding for six GMAs out of the thirty-two then in existence.15 This was
followed by a US$3 million grant by USAID. This money and support from another major donor
started to bring in support from the Government, although ADMADE, run by NPWS officers, was in
fact the NPWS Trojan horse. The Government agreed to absorb its hirelings into the civil service and
to transfer 50% of the income from hunting safaris to the Revolving Fund under the NPWS control.
ADMADE now had nine GMAs under their control. Given that hunting safaris were now the most
important source of funds, USAID, doubtless mindful of the powerful American domestic hunting
lobby received some sort of undertaking that hunting safaris would continue into the foreseeable
future (Gibson 1999, chap.4, p.20.).
The concentration in the 1990s by the pretentiously named Nyamaluma Institute for Community
Based Natural Resource Management – ADMADE’s HQ - on the collection of data and arcane
monitoring procedures, funded as it was by USAID, took on CIA like proportions, fully revealed in
200 pages of a Master’s thesis, a bewildering detail of forms and data sheets requiring to be filled out
by the barely literate, and numerous courses and standards to be attended and attained (Lyons 2000).
Today there is little left of this, although the South Luangwa Management Unit of ZAWA (SLAMU)
still attempts to have professional hunters fill out, in bewildering detail, the state of their hunt – while
they are in company with a client.
15
At the time Kaunda was punting LIRDP, and the Norwegians were about to fund them.
62
The Trojan horse, in the guise of a project, ushered in by the NPWS, Lewis and USAID had easily
captured something they would ordinarily not have been able to obtain: international protection,
compliance with the mechanics of a new operating institution, and protection as a result of its own
Government’s reluctance to obstruct a large donor partner. There was also the matter of the
considerable patronage arsenal of special licences given to the Minister of Tourism. In 1999, as one
example, the Minister issued 233 animals from fifteen species in just three GMAs free-and-gratis to
those whom he wished to favour, at a loss of $141,400 to the three CRBs (Clarke 2000, p.50).
Both NORAD and USAID had not considered carefully what they were setting in motion. The law of
unintended consequences is to be seen today in its natural progeny, ZAWA, which has inherited a
scientifically bogus quota system, a corrupt field operation involved in the bushmeat and ivory
business, the late or non-payment of Village Scouts, the failure to provide even a modicum of resource
protection for the hunting and game tourism industry who provide the only earned income, the
complete absence of any successful collaborative wildlife management scheme because of their
resistance to decentralisation, and, more seriously, through their active undermining of many
investment initiatives. This was particularly true up to the end of the Saiwana era – the DirectorGeneral of ZAWA until 9 October 2009 - when he was removed by the Board. However the final
evaluation of ADMADE in 2000 by an American consultancy group using the services of a former
Director of the NPWS in the early 1970’s, were, apart from reservations about what had been done for
women, fulsome in its praise for what it considered to be the successes of the project and for USAID’s
role as the provider of the funds (Clarke 2000).
Clarke also concluded that the Project had:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
Shown that CBNRM is a workable system for wildlife management in at least
some GMAs, and may be applicable to others.
Shown that safari hunting is a profitable use of wildlife in GMAs, the revenue
from which can be used to improve household living standards.
Defined the criteria needed to create sustainability of ADMADE programs.
Established CBNRM programs that are probably self-sustaining in some
Luangwa Valley GMAs where ADMADE is active.
Shown that ADMADE can produce local employment opportunities and raise
incomes.
Set up monitoring programs that may demonstrate a positive link between living
standards and optimal sustained wildlife yields.
Influenced Government wildlife policy resulting in CBNRM provisions being
included in the new Zambia Wildlife Act.
Begun testing the linkage between wildlife management and food security.
However, Clarke admitted that Astle’s criticism of community-based programmes is valid: that they
are nothing more than special pleading by biologists on behalf of animals. He also observed that
ADMADE’s strong assertion that anti-poaching is ineffective in conserving animals is contradicted by
their massive effort and expense in the training and deployment of 600 Village Scouts. The fact that
the Singapore ivory bust suggests that 18 similar consignments of ivory had come out of the Luangwa
in the eight years before 2002 coinciding with ADMADE’s reign, reveals the massive corruption of
the system, with those responsible yet to be prosecuted (Wasser et al. 2007). He also commented that
the programme started as a wildlife management exercise and ended up as one of food security. This is
confirmed by Lewis’s move from his HQ at Nyamaluma to Lundazi where he is now running
COMACO, a food security/wildlife conservation quid pro quo project programme, still supported by
WCS-US. At community level, COMACO establishes Conservation Trading Centres (CTC) that strive
to provide stable prices and a guaranteed market for agricultural produce for farmers based on
conservation farming techniques and a local landuse plan (DSI 2008, p.48).
63
Experience of the current state of GMAs and the author’s efforts over the last seven years to invest in
a GMA and two Open Areas does not support many of Clarke’s overly optimistic conclusions. And
the customary communities in some of the GMAs where ADMADE had spent eleven years working
are rather bemused at ADMADE’s disappearance and metamorphosis into COMACO.
While ADMADE was consuming large amounts of money and time and generally raising once more
the expectations of people living on their survival wits, a burgeoning game ranching industry in
Zambia based on leasehold land was arising. This industry is based purely on individual ownership
and the responsibility which comes with it, proving a far more potent force than the donor/government
instigated projects that pretend to advance the cause of communities, yet which do not address the
absolute fact that the reason why all the supposed CBNRM projects have failed is that they deal only
with benefits and not ownership; and that the benefits – solely monetary – amounted to no more than
17.5% of total revenue in GMAs, the rest going to Treasury and the NPWS (Matenga 2002).
At the end of ADMADE’s life – for all such projects not based on customary community institutions
are not sustainable - they were reputed to be working in twenty-nine GMAs, twenty-one of them being
given out as hunting concessions, eight being leased to companies for rehabilitation over a fifteen year
period. But in actual fact they supported eleven GMAs and thirteen hunting blocks involving ten
CRBs (Clarke 2000, p.8).16 The Wildlife Management Areas proved unworkable, the Sub-units being
viable but the chairmanship by chiefs creating dissatisfaction amongst its members. The answer they
believed was money, it being agreed that the chiefs would be paid 5% of the income received by
CRBs from the hunting concessions in their areas. Some of the dissatisfaction and constructive
criticism found expression in the Wildlife Act of 1998. In 1999, the CRBs were set up and ‘elections’
held. ADMADE was soon to become ZAWA, the former then re-inventing itself as COMACO,
attempting now to prove the hypothesis that food security in rural areas will bring with it the
conservation of wildlife, clearly signalling that the emphasis on anti-poaching by ADMADE had
failed (Rodary 2009), (Gibson & Marks 1995).
The recommendations of the final consultancy attained clarity by saying that in the future customary
communities should have rights of ownership over wildlife managed by the CRBs, with ZAWA as the
regulatory body being responsible for National Parks and safari hunting, and making available highly
professional technical services (Clarke 2000, p.61).
Zambia is fortunate in having the benefit of a remarkable research programme carried out since 1966
in Chief Nabwalya’s country (the Munyamadzi Corridor of the Luangwa Valley). One of its latest
reports includes an assessment of eighteen years of a community-based wildlife programme (including
the ADMADE programme), one carrying considerable weight (Marks 2008). Marks has pointed out
that ADMADE had assumed that villagers ‘would readily trade their access (both as endowments and
entitlements) to wildlife for community revenues from safari licences to foreigners’. He has shown
that wildlife numbers began to decline substantially in the Nabwalya Chiefdom from 1993, the year
ADMADE came to the area.17 This he ascribed to the toll taken by wildlife scouts from the operation
of an official ‘culling station’ from 1991, the killing of game for rations and from ‘assumed privilege’
of one sort or another. To this was added the low morale of ZAWA staff and the failure of crops due
to drought and elephant depredations (Marks 2008, p.49). He further pointed out that prior to
ADMADE the chiefdom was not an open-access area, for few local men had the means and
knowledge necessary to hunt commercially. When ADMADE was ushered in emphasising wildlife
protection at the expense of community development, villagers subsisting on wildlife were
criminalised, greatly impacting on them, particularly in times of drought and famine. For GRZ wildlife
had become a commodity for generating revenues:
16
Clarke presents a précis of five evaluations of ADMADE carried out between 1992 and 1998 by consultants
(Appendix 1).
17
Twenty years after the author and Phillip Nel had discovered there one of the earliest commercially poached
rhino of the infamous killing fields of the 1970’s and 1980’s.
64
shifting the local patronage system from meat, protection and support to money and
employment – a process requiring major transformations in social and cultural
organisation…other changes – a growing population, a shift from corporate (lineage)
identities to endemic individualism, recurrent drought-induced famines and resource
scarcities – are regional phenomena. How this symmetry of new changes and regional
factors will alter valley life and livelihoods in the future remains open-ended (Marks
2008, p. 89).
It is the criminal human rights abuses visited upon villagers by NPWS and ZAWA personnel which
took place in Nabwalya during the ADMADE and post ADMADE regime, which entirely consigns to
the dustbin of history the rationale of outside intervention and force in the guise of CBNRM. In
Nabwalya Central the survey of households in 2006 showed that the percentage of arrests, 38%
(174/460), among respondents was even higher in some village clusters (Marks 2008, P.95). In 2006,
in a summing up of ADMADE, the report on Nabwalya found that there was little to support Lewis’
earlier hypothesis. Indeed, rather than rural residents benefiting from their natural resources,
ADMADE had ushered in ‘sustainable use conservation’ with legal access to wildlife only assured
through wealth and privilege (Marks 2008, P.109).
A graphic account of human rights abuses and the torture of suspected poachers in the Zambezi Valley
during the tenure of ADMADE, particularly by the ZEBRA section of the Zambian Paramilitary,
acting in consort with NPWS/ADMADE, the Zambia Police, and white Honorary Rangers, is
recounted by a mission-educated villager converted to commercial poaching because of the effects of
illiteracy, poverty, hunger and cultural degeneration, a man who later became a dedicated
conservationist (Kawayawaya 2003).
In the Sichifula-Mulobezi GMAs, villagers who were found poaching were moved by ADMADE presumably with the cooperation of the chiefs - to areas with no animals,
When it is known that a certain person hunts animals illegally and is setting a bad
example to the local community, that person is sentenced by the chief as being unable
to live peacefully with wildlife and is ordered to live where there are no animals and to
take up some other occupation (Lewis et al. 1990).
This totalitarian forced removal, one redolent of apartheid, goes completely against the Constitution
and the rights of members of the customary commons.18
On the Kafue Flats where ADMADE was implemented for eleven years from 1986, it was clear that
little had been achieved, given the financial support of WWF and income from hunting. Crucially,
Government did not initiate resource-sharing initiatives over wildlife and fisheries, and no consultative
process with local people was ever undertaken by ADMADE (Chabwela & Haller 2008, p.19).
2.3
LIRDP: Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project
As a result of the Lupande workshop and a consultancy carried out by an NPWS member and a
Norwegian, LIRDP resulted and a mini-government established over the heads of the NPWS and the
local Kunda people. This was placed under the National Commission for Development Planning. The
two consultants, Larsen and Lungu, delivered the project by way of a private audience with Kaunda
who enthusiastically agreed to become the project’s Chairman, particularly as his wife’s people came
from Jumbe in the heart of Kundaland, and his one son was involved there in politics for the sole
Zambian political party. Lungu became its first co-director, joined by Richard Bell, formerly of the
Black Lechwe Project. They ran the project from 1987 until Kaunda was defeated in the 1991
elections.
18
See Chapter 5 for details of the forced removal and rape of villagers in Sichifula GMA.
65
The NPWS and LIRDP were clearly at loggerheads as the removal of the National Park and Lupande
from their control was a serious attack on the mandate of the NPWS, and clear evidence that Kaunda
had little faith in the ability of the NPWS to do something about the killing of black rhino and
elephant. The Ministry responsible clearly supported Kaunda, believing that the NPWS were
incapable of carrying out their mandate. In 1987, the then Permanent Secretary, Harry Chabwela, a
former Chief Research Officer of the Department, requested the assistance of WWF International in
saving the black rhino from extinction. The author was then recruited by WWF to head up the
programme, and seconded to the NPWS. However, the NPWS hierarchy were not in sympathy with
their former colleague, Chabwela, because of his allegiance to LIRDP, rather than to ADMADE.
Although the author answered to the NPWS it was with LIRDP that negotiations were opened, the
plan being to create a fenced sanctuary within the South Luangwa National Park and to translocate all
the rhino that could be found in the Luangwa into the sanctuary. Bell and Lungu refused permission
for this. Later, the ADMADE supremo, Lewis, told the author that he would not allow the Chendeni
Hills rhino population - which lay near his HQ (the Nyamaluma Institute for CBNRM) - to be
translocated into the National Park as they were ‘perfectly safe’ (D Lewis 1989, personal
communication).
In 1989, Lewis had written that ADMADE’s policy was shown to be ‘the best of all possible solutions
to be shown’ with regard to elephant and rhino anti-poaching success in the Lower Lupande Unit –
which included the Chendeni Hills population - near his headquarters, with not one rhino being killed
between 1986 -1988 (Lewis 1989 also citing Lewis & Chanda 1988). The rhino project was thus
ground up between the two projects, and Chabwela, despite being the senior civil servant, was
powerless to command either LIRDP or ADMADE to do his bidding. A short while later the project
was closed. Two years later the Chendeni Hills population had been exterminated, and the rhino, but
for a few isolated individuals elsewhere in Zambia, essentially extinct (Manning 1989). Subsequently
Lewis reiterated his claim that no rhino were killed for three years where an ADMADE project
existed: ‘Furthermore, a resident population of black rhino suffered not a single instance of poaching
during this period despite adequate numbers to attract illegal hunters’ (Lewis et al 1990). The claim
that Bell and Lungu, while making unsuccessful attempts to carry out the work of a mini-government,
had been successful with an effective law-enforcement campaign and had secured the protection of the
elephant in the project area rings hollow given the evidence of the massive ivory export from the
Luangwa that occurred from the time they left to 2004 – something which continues to the present day
(Dalal-Clayton & Child 2003, p. XXIV). In 1992 LIRDP was placed under the NPWS and in 1999, it
became the South Luangwa Management Unit (SLAMU), the NPWS metamorphosing in January
2000 into the statutory body, the Zambia Wildlife Authority.
In 1992, a consultancy on the restructuring of NPWS was rightly concerned about the absence of fiscal
devolution, the sine qua non for any meaningful upliftment of the disenfranchised and the wildlife
which is their cultural, spiritual and physical support:
Government should now take the bold but essential step of allocating the rights to use
and/or benefit from wildlife in a given area outside National Parks to these people with
established usufruct in the area. These people should then be viewed as shareholders of
the resource and, as with any shareholders, should be entitled to the dividends from the
proper management of their shared assets. This necessitates a second major policy
decision – the decision to pay people in cash for their wildlife in the same way that
they would be paid for in any other produce (Dalal-Clayton & Child 2003, p.81).19
19
These recommendations were embodied in the Policy for Wildlife in Zambia, approved by Cabinet on 25th
August 1993.
66
And despite much of the 1993 policy finding its way into the Wildlife Act of 1998, little has been
done to decentralise power or to encourage in any way fiscal devolution, both seen as a threat to
ZAWA’s income base and their control of the wildlife income and patronage, legal and illegal.
In 1998, a report concluded that ‘the research suggests that LIRDP has generally failed to achieve its
conservation and development objectives and that the program has achieved few community benefits‘
(Wainwright & Wehrmeyer 1998).
2.4
Restructuring the administration of wildlife and National Parks (1992-2001)
From 1992 to 2001, as a result of donor concern, a succession of consultants were brought in to
improve the state of wildlife conservation in Zambia; in particular, support came from an EDF funded
project which sought to transform the NPWS - which had been subsumed by a viral donor funded
project - into a statutory body which would be self-funding. The NPWS/ADMADE hierarchy were
resentful of this decision, informing potential consultants to the project in the recruitment phase that
candidate project leaders should be ‘fresh’ i.e. should know little of Zambia, and certainly should not
be former employees of the NPWS or its previous equivalent (A Mwenya 1996, personal
communication). Inevitably, the experienced consultants from Zimbabwe and Botswana were not
made welcome, and the master plan they produced, ignored. From 1998 – 2001 a firm of accountants
tried to establish ZAWA, their work delayed until 1999 until such time as the first ZAWA Board was
appointed. Essentially, NPWS/ADMADE became ZAWA, this despite ADMADE’s fundamental
failure by involving itself with the ‘soft’ option (benefits), rather than the ‘thorny’ and political issue
of ownership and devolution – a major cause of the further destruction of the customary commons.
The year 2001 ushered in further deterioration in the management of the Zambian wildlife estate due
in part to the suspension by President Chiluba of hunting safari leases and the subsequent loss of much
of the ZAWA income (US$2 million in 2001; US$2.7 million in 2002), the delay in the appointment
of a Board of Directors and Director-General for the newly fledged ZAWA, and the refusal of donors
to provide funding in the absence of these appointments. Foreign exchange earnings, tax income,
employment and associated benefits for ZAWA workers and income for CRBs who were responsible
for appointing law enforcement officers under the Wildlife Act of 1998, were adversely affected. This
encouraged the onslaught on wildlife by opportunistic bushmeat traders reacting to the considerable
traditional game meat demands of burgeoning urban populations, encouraged by the absence, or by the
active support of striking ZAWA and CRB Scouts (Manning 2001). In addition, the scientific capacity
of ZAWA was already severely impaired, with most of the management plans, scientific reports and
relevant files produced in the previous years stolen, not returned by borrowers, or thrown away. An
inspection of the government archives in 2003 revealed that few files had been deposited there after
1974 - though unconfirmed reports say they are being kept elsewhere - and nothing in the ZAWA
library. Moreover, where valuable research information is available, such as at Ngoma, the HQ for the
Kafue National Park, researchers there were in total ignorance of it until a visit by former Game
Department biologists.
3
ZAMBIA WILDLIFE AUTHORITY (1999 - 2009)
The Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) is a statutory body, i.e. a parastatal, confirmed by the
Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998 Part II: 4. (1), subsuming the former NPWS which had been empowered
under the Wildlife Act No.10 of 1991. However, it contradicts the prescriptions of the more senior
Lands Act of 1995.
This Act mandates the Zambia Wildlife Authority and its Board, with the assistance of its proxy
Community Resource Boards, to carry out the following:
67
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
In partnership with local communities, to share the responsibilities of
management in GMAs.
To encourage general development in National Parks and GMAs, including the
development of facilities in accordance with management plans.
To enhance the economic and social well-being of local communities in GMAs.
To prepare and implement management plans for National Parks and GMAs, in
consultation with local communities.
In partnership with communities, to grant hunting concessions to hunting
outfitters and photographic tour operators in GMAs.
To assist and advise the Community Resource Boards (CRBs).
To pay out money to a CRB, from licence and concessions fees obtained, and
according to regulations issued by the Minister.
To delegate any of its functions to the CRB.
The Policy for National Parks and Wildlife in Zambia adopted in 1998 recognises that customary
communities are the best custodians of wildlife and the natural resources. However, it is a policy, like
a lot of other legislation and policy, which is scantily adhered to.
3.1
Game Management Areas and The Lands Act of 1995
The Lands Act Chapter 184 of the Laws of Zambia of 1995 vests all land in the President and provides
for the recognition and continuation of customary tenure, and it provides – under section (8) 3 - the
‘right to use and occupation of land under customary tenure’. The President cannot alienate customary
land unless it is with the Chief’s consent, and then only after consulting affected bodies or persons,
and, in the case of Game Management Areas (GMAs), ZAWA. GMAs were created in 1971 under the
National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968 as a planning framework for integrated community and
biodiversity development, and not as another distinct category of protected state land. They are in fact
customary land and therefore legally under customary control, supported by the primary legislation of
the Lands Act of 1995.
Customary authorities - made up of Chiefs and their headmen, may ascribe usufruct rights, i.e. the
‘right to use and occupation’ of land, to an individual. Land rights obtained by residence is the most
prevalent form within customary tenure where an individual obtains land from a headmen, who,
together with other headmen, do so in consultation with a chief. Once acquired, land ownership is
recognised by the community, but should the individual leave, the land reverts after a reasonable
period once more to the community – under the control of the headmen and their chief. No person
owns the land in the statutory sense (i.e. as freehold land) – though the customary authority use and
allocate its usufruct. The chief does not extract taxes or surpluses from individuals or headmen, and
every person produces their own food, the society therefore being generally egalitarian.
3.2
Community Resource Boards
Community Resource Boards (CRBs) - elected to represent local communities along geographic
boundaries contiguous to a chiefdom in a GMA or a particular chiefdom with common interest in the
wildlife - are provided for in Part III of the Wildlife Act. As allowed under the Wildlife Act of 1998:
Part 3: (7), the elected CRB is empowered to promote and develop an integrated approach to the
management of human and natural resources in a GMA or an Open Area, with the power to:
i)
Negotiate, in conjunction with the Authority, co-management agreements with
hunting outfitters and photographic tour operators;
ii) Manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction, within quotas specified by the
Authority;
iii) Appoint Village Scouts to exercise and perform the duties of a wildlife police
officer under the supervision of ZAWA;
68
iv) In consultation with the Authority, develop and implement management plans
which reconcile the various uses of land in areas falling under the board’s
jurisdiction;
v) Perform such other functions as the Authority or Director-General as may direct
or delegate to it;
vi) Prepare and implement management plans in customary areas.
The CRB functions are summarised below:
PURPOSE
•
•
To create CRBs
in a Chiefdom or
community in
GMA and Open
Areas.
To promote and
develop
integrated natural
resource and
human
management in
the Chiefdom.
REQUIREMENTS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
ZAWA will register
a CRB.
Community to elect 7
to 10 representatives
to the CRB.
One representative of
District Council.
One representative of
Chief.
Chief to be Patron.
Management plans to
be prepared in
accordance with
regulations.
ZAWA to approve
donations to CRB.
Minister to approve
donations from
outside Zambia.
Books of accounts to
be open to
inspection.
POWERS
•
•
•
•
•
CRB may invite
persons to attend
board meetings, but
not to vote.
To negotiate, with
ZAWA, comanagement
agreements with
hunting operators.
Manage wildlife
within quotas set by
ZAWA.
Appoint Village
Scouts to carry out
duties under
supervision of
Wildlife Police
Officer.
Develop and
implement, with
ZAWA landuse
management plans.
RESPONSIBILITIES
•
•
•
•
To develop
management plans.
To keep minutes of
meetings.
To establish a
development fund.
To maintain
accounts.
CRBs are a civil society wing of ZAWA (i.e. a proxy), supposedly serving and assisting ZAWA to
protect wildlife and to assist community development, yet ‘without any legal personality of their own’
(W Kabimba 2009, personal communication). Although they list as one of their main functions the
promotion and development of integrated natural resource management, they have no powers over
resources other than wildlife. They represent the customary community in a GMA where a hunting
lease is in force, as well as in the Open Area. A share of income derived from hunting safaris is
supposed to be paid by ZAWA to the CRB, to be used in a prescribed manner under the control of
ZAWA, but in practice little is available for the benefit of GMA residents, it being used principally to
pay Village Scouts, with the CRB officers acting as unpaid volunteers. And the chief in his own area
is relegated – without his sanction - to the non-executive position of Patron, posing a threat to
traditional life and the chiefly powers and forcing many chiefs to override what should be a
democratically run Community Based Organisation (CBO), but also allowing, for the first time, a
glimpse of the liberating intrusions of a more democratic dispensation. However, CRBs in practice do
what the chief and ZAWA tells them to do - even if corrupt – and are removed should they stand up
against them, as has been shown in the removal of the elected Luembe CRB in Nyimba District who
would not support the chief or ZAWA for the removal from Mbeza Safaris of their hunting concession
in the West Petauke GMA.
And CRBs, mostly uneducated villagers unversed in the law and fearful of ‘Big Men’, ‘Big
Government’ and the chief’s witchcraft, rely on ZAWA for full support on financial accounting, the
compilation of management plans, the setting of game quotas, the protection of wildlife and the other
considerable number of unpaid duties and responsibilities, assistance which is rarely given. Despite an
offer to ZAWA to assist with the establishment of a national body to support CRBs in their essential
function under the law, this was ignored (Manning & Shenton 2004).
69
A continuing blight on the system is the failure of ZAWA to pay communities their full share of
income gleaned from hunting and land user rights. By May 2009, the Luembe and Nyalugwe CRB
Village Scouts and other employees, a total of 33 people, plus eleven former Village Scouts, were
owed salary arrears of K119,820,000 (c. $25,000), i.e. 44 people owed an average of 14 month’s
wages (Nkhoma 2009). The income from hunting concession fees and trophy fees is supposed to be
shared in the following ratio: ZAWA 50%; CRB 45%; Chief 5%; and the CRBs are supposed to spend
the funds in the following ratios: wildlife conservation (anti-poaching) 45%; community projects:
35%; administration: 20%, a highly academic model. For a time the amount supposed to be paid to
CRBs was summarily reduced by ZAWA.
The Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, in summoning ZAWA to account for deficiencies and
theft, revealed in the Auditor-General’s (AG) report on ZAWA in 2005 (2001-2005) that sixty-two
CRBs did not submit audited accounts or annual reports as is required under the Act: Part III section 5:
subsections (a), (b) and (c). In addition, taking four CRBs at random, it was clear that board members
had stolen money and had no assistance from ZAWA in managing funds, the Committee remarking on
the very poor and suspect financial control. The ZAWA Controlling officer in his submission said:
‘Given that the communities, through CRBs, were the custodians of wildlife, ZAWA would not like to
clamp down on them as this would endanger wildlife’. But he did reveal an important new
development: ZAWA would now submit quarterly financial returns on funds given to CRBs to the
Ministry, the CRBs now possibly being able to extract details of funds owed them, something they
manifestly failed to do at ZAWA. The Committee also made the following general comments:20
i)
CRBs need to be trained on how to account for public funds and there should be
corresponding progress in the agreed key result areas. It was however noted, that
there is a need to be firm in dealing with CRBs in respect of financial discipline.
ii) ZAWA needs to emphasise to traditional leaders that the patronage of CRBs was
placed on the traditional establishments as an institution. The direct involvement
of chiefs in the running of CRBs might result in avoidable queries.
iii) ZAWA is not financially able to adequately police wildlife sanctuaries on its own,
therefore, the concept of CRBs is filling the void.
iv) ZAWA should be encouraged to periodically re-evaluate the CRB initiative in
order to determine whether the objectives of ZAWA are being realised despite the
poor financial managements of CRBs.
v) The Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources should assist
ZAWA to meet its financial needs in order to operate effectively.
The Committee did not, however, probe deeply into the issue of ZAWA’s accounting itself, an
investigation long overdue; but they have correctly adjudged that the CRB initiative requires reevaluation. However, it is their ‘instruction’ that chiefs should involve themselves in the running of
CRBs - which runs counter to the Act where they are given explicitly non-executive positions as
Patrons, a source of great irritation and conflict.
Although the Director-General of ZAWA may empower a CRB as he sees fit, most CRBs have little
power or influence with ZAWA. Where CRBs – as in the case of the Luembe CRB - have made
applications for harvesting quotas as provided for in the Act, or for hunting safari quotas, they have
been ignored, though investors such as M’nyamadzi Game Ranch in Luembe, having obtained only a
14 year provisional leasehold title, were issued with a safari quota on its then unfenced land.
It is clear that the whole management by ZAWA of the CRB system is in need of review, the
lamentable accounting systems in place divulging huge discrepancies of money earned, paid and
received. In 2006, attempts were made to rectify matters with the removal of the ZAWA Commercial
20
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee 2006.
70
Director and the Director of Conservation, and meetings were held at a high level to urgently address
the re-building of ZAWA. Clearly, a forensic audit and appropriate subsequent action to prosecute and
discipline those responsible was necessary, however demands by the author for this in the press were
not heeded (Chirwa 2007).
By 2010 the debt of ZAWA to CRBs has yet to be cleared. Chief Chitingulu has complained of
ZAWA corruption, K50 million being owed to his CRB since 2007 for their share of hunting
(Habbuno 2009). And at a time when the private sector is being excoriated for not abiding by the
labour laws, ZAWA continues an entrenched system of staff recruitment introduced by ADMADE; a
system whereby classified employees are taken on as Village Scouts, without being subject to the
labour laws. The present system of Village Scouts employed by CRBs makes use of this ploy, paying
villagers without the necessary civil service required qualifications, paying them far less than civil
servants and without the need for pension or tax payments, or terminal benefits as is required under
the labour laws, something the private sector is not allowed to emulate (Gibson 1995, Chapter 4,
footnote 37).
3.3
SLAMU: South Luangwa Management Unit
The South Luangwa Area Management Unit (SLAMU) grew out of LIRDP. In January 1999, Zambia
signed an agreement with NORAD for assistance to allow SLAMU to retain all revenues from tourism
and safari hunting in the South Luangwa National Park and the Lupande GMA. The year 2009 marked
the 25th anniversary of NORAD aid to the South Luangwa National Park.
Some inkling of major management problems surfaced in July 2004. SLAMU/ZAWA entered into an
agreement with L and L Properties for cropping 600 hippo over a period of three years in the SLAMU
area of jurisdiction. From this ZAWA received K498,033,775 in 2005, but as of December 2006, only
K82, 391,000 had been remitted to SLAMU leaving a balance of K415,612,775 still owing. In
addition, both SLAMU and ZAWA Head office had been invoicing Chichele lodge in South Luangwa
National Park, the lodge invoicing ZAWA HQ instead of SLAMU - as a result, records at SLAMU
indicated that Chichele Lodge owed them a sum of K523,403,066 (US$67,202), whereas the statement
obtained from the lodge showed that the lodge was owing US$19,764 as of August 2006.21
The report of the Auditor-General in 2005 on parastatals places little confidence in the capabilities of
SLAMU. As one seasoned observer, (R Shenton 2007, personal communication) has noted:
At the other extreme is the NORAD/GRZ LIRDP/SLAMU where millions of dollars
have been thrown into the South Park and had created an overall negative impact on
local culture, ownership and created more problems in the long term than they have
solved. There are still no effective patrols in the park other than the private sector
organised ones, no alternative income interventions in the poaching communities on
the west bank (not that much in the east either if you take away the tourism industry)
and critically, no local ownership nor partnership structures. In fact there is more
hostility between locals and their tour operators, and ZAWA, than anywhere else in
Zambia.
Another writer’s experience is that SLAMU:
…is seen as heavily overstaffed, chronically inefficient and self-serving. It is divided
into a number of departments that charge each other at Norwegian rates, wholly out of
kilter with Zambian costs, haemorrhaging the organisation internally. Despite having
roughly five times the budget of North Luangwa, SLAMU achieves five times fewer
patrol days per scout per month. The road system relies on safari operators for
21
Auditor-General report on parastatals, 2005.
71
maintenance, and such is their frustration with the slowness of response to poaching
incidents that they have formed their own self-funded Rapid Action Teams. Against a
backdrop of economic hardship, food shortages and AIDS, government funding for
conservation comes under greater pressure. (Warburton-Lee 2003).
Without the support of the South Luangwa Conservation Society, very little active patrolling would
have occurred.
However, it is the author’s experience as an investor within the SLAMU area of jurisdiction, that there
is widespread incompetence, corruption and hostility to indigenous development - and to investors by the SLAMU management (i.e. the management in place until 9 October 2009 when the Saiwana
regime ended). It must be made clear that under the Zambian system of patronage and the highly
centralised political system, officers in the field merely slot into a corrupt system established from
1976, whereby the Minister controls the D-G, who in turn controls officers in the field, ensuring the
flow of benefits upwards.
3.3.1
Quotas
SLAMU showed that they had little understanding of the whole concept of quotas. While they held an
elaborate and expensive day of consultations with Mbeza Safaris and the Luembe and Nyalugwe
CRBs in 2005, the agreed quotas were subsequently changed to fit the requirements of the Hunting
Concession Agreements (HCA). In 2006 no consultation took place with Mbeza. The quotas therefore
still reflect ZAWA’s requirements that the West Petauke GMA remain a Prime hunting concession,
despite the author’s request – backed by the precautionary principle of the Biodiversity Convention (to
which Zambia is signatory) – for it to be downgraded.
3.3.2
Elephant poaching
During the 2005 to 2007 period in the West Petauke GMA, poaching of elephant was rampant - the
brother of the MP (Gray) in Nyimba being apprehended with large quantities of ivory (Manning
2007a) - and with clear evidence of an elephant poaching syndicate being run by the Nyimba SLAMU
office. Despite SLAMU officers being caught red-handed, no action was taken. While SLAMU did
occasionally send out anti-poaching patrols, they bore all the signs of being part of a criminal
poaching syndicate operation (Manning 2007b). When the author became too prominent in an anticorruption drive, both his community partners and the financial accounting and safari operation was
targeted by the Nyimba Offices of ZAWA/SLAMU by HQ itself, and by the Office of the President
(Manning 2007c) (Manning 2007d).
Given the onslaught on elephant and the lack of scientific data to support elephant sport hunting – all
of it conducted in the SLAMU area, stakeholders in Zambia opposed ZAWA’s issuing of elephant
hunting licences, but to no avail. In May 2005, ZAWA applied for a voluntary elephant quota of 40
tusks at a CITES Standing Committee meeting and then went ahead and issued elephant hunting
licences for the 2005 hunting season. On 10 January 2006, the Natural Resources Consultative Forum
(NRCF), a cross-sectoral forum for environment whose membership includes the hunting industry,
resolved that no elephant sport hunting should be conducted in Zambia in 2006 until such time as the
necessary scientific information was to hand. The minutes were widely circulated. An advisory note
and the minutes of the meeting were sent by the NRCF to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of
Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR), followed by a meeting between the NRCF
Chairman and the Minister. No reply to the advisory note has been received to this day.
On 28 October 2005, a six-ton consignment of ivory and precious stones was discovered in a container
in the port of Manila, the container allegedly originating in Lusaka (M Rice 2006, personal
communication, 6 February). The ivory was later stolen from the warehouse where it was housed. On
11 April 2006 at the ZAWA offices, an auction for 20 elephant for sport hunting was held and the
72
licences purchased by one bidder. These 20 elephant, according to the then D-G of ZAWA, Hapenga
Kabeta, in a statement to the Office of the Vice-President’s Disaster Management Unit, were elephant
that had been ‘identified’ as crop raiding bulls. In January 2007, a meeting was called by the Minister
MTENR and ZAWA of the hunting industry and some CRBs to resolve a number of conflicts and to
effect a truce between the industry and GRZ. Following this meeting, the D-G of ZAWA, Saiwana,
promised the author and another committee member of the Natural Resources Consultative Forum
(NRCF) that no elephant sport hunting would be allowed until wide consultations were held with
stakeholders. This promise was not kept.
3.3.3
Illegal acts
In 2008, the Nyimba SLAMU office, with the connivance of Senior Chief Luembe, removed the
elected Luembe CRB for not agreeing to the termination of the Mbeza Safaris concession. A man
posing as the Chairman of the Nyalugwe CRB from Nyalugwe was then collected and driven to
Lusaka where he was coerced by the D-G, Saiwana, into signing a concession termination document.
Later the West Petauke concession was removed from Mbeza. All efforts – as allowed under the
hunting agreement – for mediation were refused. Since then the two companies handed the concession
‘administratively’, have not hunted much (Chief Nyalugwe 2009, personal comm., November). A
default judgement from the High Court giving back the concession to Mbeza in July 2008 is yet to be
acted on.
In June 2009, the Ministry of Finance and National Planning reported the ZAWA D-G, Lewis Saiwana
and his management to the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) for investigations over the alleged
irregular awarding of a road construction contract in the SLAMU managed area of Mfuwe to
Tomorrow Investments. Complicit was the officer in charge of SLAMU at Mfuwe, Edwin Matokwoni,
who was chairman of the committee dealing with the road contract. This followed NORAD’s forensic
audit report on its funded road projects of serious irregularities allegedly committed by Saiwana and
his management. The audit recommended that ZAWA investigate the employment contract of
Saiwana and charge him with gross negligence for the loss incurred due to his acts resulting in a loss
of approximately K1.4 billion. The auditors recommended that ZAWA refund the Norwegian
Embassy (Silwamba 2009). Subsequently it is reported that Norway has suspended aid, subject to
Saiwana’s removal (Silwamba et al 2009). In October 2009, Saiwana was removed and offered a new
post by the President of Zambia, Rupiah Banda – presumably the first foreign-aid project mounted by
Zambia – establishing an organisation along the lines of ZAWA in the Gambia.
SLAMU management in the person of the Area Warden, Mushimbalume, failed to reply to
correspondence detailing the involvement of his officers in the elephant and bushmeat poaching ring.
No attempts to prosecute those responsible were made. 22
3.3.4
Human rights abuses
In October 2009 a villager was killed by a ZAWA Wildlife Police Officer (WPO) while on antipoaching patrol in the Luembe Chiefdom, the body later found by villagers who in retaliation burnt the
nearby ZAWA Kalanshya game camp to the ground. The police and paramilitary from Nyimba were
summoned, and together with officers from the Nyimba SLAMU office descended on the nearby
villagers, assaulting them – including woman and children – many of whom ran into the bush where
they remained in hiding for days. The GRZ forces widened their terror tactics to include villages far
from the game camp, the former Chairman of the Luembe CRB having to take to the bush with his
family and living there for a few days without food. He subsequently contracted malaria, fell into a
coma, and was saved by Gamefields staff taking him to hospital (A Lungu 2009, personal
communication, October). Sixteen villagers were incarcerated in the Nyimba jail where they spent a
number of weeks awaiting trial. An investigation by a Catholic task force revealed that villagers knew
22
Author’s letter to Area Warden SLAMU on 2 October 2007.
73
where the body was but were too terrified to tell the police (W Njobvu 2009, personal communication,
October). Later, when ZAWA attempted to re-build the camp, villagers tore the structures down.
Fourteen people were arrested and imprisoned in Nyimba; twelve being released within days for lack
of evidence. The two remaining were defended in court by a Catholic task force and acquitted (W
Njobvu, personal communication, 2010, March). In 2011, six villagers were given ten year sentences
for arson and imprisoned at Chipata jail. No prosecution of the ZAWA WPO has taken place. Local
villagers have refused to allow ZAWA to build another permanent camp.
3.4
Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF)
The first meeting of the NRCF on 24 March 2005 - a forum funded by DANIDA for a one-year pilot
phase, and a second three-year phase up to 2008 - was launched by its Chairman, the Permanent
Secretary, Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR).
NRCF was envisaged as a stakeholder organisation for the management of natural resources. It is
supposed to be member driven, and to promote the transfer of technical information within the sector.
Its deliverables are advisory notes on stakeholder issues and concerns, addressed to the MTENR
Permanent Secretary, its objective is to provide national policy goals on Zambia’s natural resources
and to provide an organisation able to deliver such an objective. However, the production of the
National Policy on Environment, the final draft of which was produced in May 2005, has already
provided the national policy goals – albeit, correctly, of a more holistic nature, including as it does
environment and natural resources, and has confirmed the need for a formal institutional mechanism to
structure natural resource and environmental issues, and to provide sustainability. What is therefore
now long overdue – given that the MTENR has accepted the NPE as official policy - is for the NRCF
to implement the NPE within a three-year renewable project format.
3.5
CITES: Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora
CITES was concluded on 3 March 1973 and entered into force after ratification by ten countries on 1
July 1975. The new Strategic Vision of the Conference of the Parties to CITES outlines the
Convention’s direction in the new millennium and takes into account, within the context of its
mandate, issues such as contributing to the MDGs relevant to CITES and contributing to the World
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) target of significantly reducing the rate of biodiversity
loss by 2010, and ensuring that international trade in wild fauna and flora is conducted at sustainable
levels.
3.5.1 Ivory trade
In 1991, the Zambian Parliament was told that …
‘The Forest Act No. 7 of 1999 provides for the implementation of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, the Convention in
Wetlands of International Importance, especially of water-fowl habitat, the Convention
on Biological Diversity and the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Lusaka
Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement directed at illegal trade in wild fauna and
flora’.23
The author had assisted ZAWA with appropriate legislation developed in the South African CITES
Implementation Project, as well as a manual on the MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephant)
programme. CITES is a contentious convention, running up against differing theories of economics
and the impacts of trade restrictions on the illegal harvesting of wildlife species, in particular – now
23
Statement by Minister of Legal Affairs: Daily Parliamentary Debates for the First Session of the Ninth
Assembly, Thursday, 5th December, 2002.
74
that native Zambian black rhino are extinct – elephant and hippo (ivory and bushmeat) and buffalo
(bushmeat) (Sugg & Kreuter 1994).
Since 2000, there have been four Conference of the Parties (CoP) meetings of CITES:
(I)
11th meeting of the Parties in Gigiri (Kenya), 10-20 April 2000;
(II)
12th meeting in Santiago (Chile), 3-15 November 2002;
At this meeting Zambia applied for permission to sell its stockpile of 17 tons of ivory. It also proposed
that its elephant be down-listed from Appendix I to Appendix II so that trade could be allowed. This
proposal was heavily defeated.
A CITES panel of experts had visited Zambia in late 2002 and reported that Zambia was failing to
report on seizures of elephant ivory as required under the Convention. They also reported that Zambia
had never officially communicated any information about seizures of elephant ivory or other
specimens to the Secretariat or to The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network (TRAFFIC) - although
TRAFFIC had sought information from Zambia - and consequently was not implementing the
recommendation in Resolution Conf. 10.10 (Rev.) that Parties should provide information on seizures
of ivory within 90 days of their occurrence. In addition, a copy of a report of an audit conducted by
Price Waterhouse in 1998, which the Panel expected to contain information about the stock of ivory
held at that time, was not made available.
In 1991, the National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) had nine tons of ivory. This was
deliberately destroyed (burnt) in 1992. Between then and 2002 it accumulated a further 17 tons of
ivory from natural mortality, problem animal control and other sources.
This equates to approximately 1.4 tonnes a year (N = 10 years). The average weight of
ivory (N = 1,700) being 4.23 kg per tusk, it can be assumed that ivory from about 200
elephant is being harvested each year. This equates to about 0.90 per cent of the overall
population (22,000), which is within the expected rate of increase of elephant
populations in the region (assumed to be 3 - 5 per cent per annum).24
The findings of the panel were that the overall population is not increasing (and could be decreasing)
suggesting an important illegal offtake that accounts for a substantial amount of the ivory that could in
theory be produced from an elephant population of this size, approximately 800 animals a year. Yet in
Zambia it was reported that from 1988 the Kafue National Park had a threefold increase in poaching,
while in the Luangwa poaching dropped by more than 90% between then and 1992, this being put
down to a huge investment in anti-poaching activities (Lyster 1992, p.42). This conclusion is highly
unlikely given the demise of the last pocket of rhino at about the same time, and in light of the
revelations brought about by the Singapore ivory bust.
CITES posed the following question:
Would the acceptance of the proposal be likely to have a positive or negative impact on
the conservation status of the elephant population and its environment in the affected
range State? The responses to most of the questions posed by the Conference of the
Parties are negative. Nonetheless, if the proposal were accepted, and if the stock of raw
ivory in Zambia were sold, the funds could be used to ensure a positive impact on the
24
Report of the Panel of Experts on the African Elephant on the review of the proposal submitted by Zambia to
transfer its national population of Loxodonta africanus from Appendix I to Appendix II . CoP 12, Doc 66,
Annex 4.
75
status of the species in Zambia. The Conference of the Parties will be able to judge this
when it is clear exactly how the funds would be spent.25
All experience since does not support the conclusion that it would be well spent.
In 2002, a consignment of 5.9 tons of ivory was intercepted in Singapore and traced to a shipper in
Lilongwe, Malawi. In April 2005, the Environmental Investigation Agency (UK) held an International
Ivory Enforcement Training Workshop in Lusaka funded by DFID and attended by the author. A
presentation on the Singapore ivory seizure was made, which included details of the DNA
investigations of the ivory and soil isotope analysis suggesting that the elephant came from two
savannah populations, one of them perhaps being the Luangwa, though they needed to be matched
with samples from there and elsewhere. At this same presentation, Samuel Ngosi, of the Malawian
Anti-Corruption Bureau, revealed, possibly for the first time, that his investigations had uncovered the
fact that a total of 19 shipments had been made between 1994 and 2002 by the same people in
Lilongwe, using the same methods and freight carriers, and sent to the same destination – a possible
total of 123.5 tons of ivory being shipped. The value of this was then in the order of US$185 million.
As reported in a National Geographic newsletter, Sam Wasser and his team at the University of
Washington sequenced DNA recovered from nearly 500 samples of dung collected from elephant in
23 African countries and then matched it with DNA from the seized ivory. When Wasser's team
compared 75 samples from the illegal shipment to their genetic map, they found that all the ivory
came from Zambia. Moreover, as the bulk of Zambia’s remaining elephant are to be found in the
Luangwa and its associated rift-valley systems, this does name the ivory’s source.26 Extrapolating
from the 2002 CITES report on Zambia, which found that the average ivory in the strong room was
4.23 kg; this would mean the tusks of 14,598 elephant might have been in those 19 containers.
The confiscated 2002 consignment was taken by the Lusaka Task Force to Kenya for assay and it is
alleged that the consignment’s whereabouts is unknown and the poachers yet to be apprehended
(Silwamba 2009). In May 2009 the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
(MTENR) wrote to the Lusaka Task Force requesting the return of the 2002 intercepted ivory, the
same newspaper report stating, ‘And well-placed sources have revealed that elephant might become
extinct in Zambia just like rhino if the government does not prosecute the syndicate involved in ivory
scams at Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) and other government agencies’, the same source at the
Ministry stating that the Singapore ivory had come from the theft of ZAWA’s own ivory cache’
(Silwamba et al 2009).
That Zambia is at the centre of the ivory trade is undeniable, an investigation team from the
Environmental Investigation Agency concluding:
…despite a ban on domestic sales, ivory is easily obtainable in large quantities. The
country has a thriving illegal domestic market and is also at the centre of the
international ivory trade, hosting some of the world’s most sophisticated traders and
networks – in some instances even using Red Cross and military vehicles to transport
illegal ivory.27
(III)
13th meeting in Bangkok (Thailand), 2-14 October 2004;
In April 2004, ZAWA announced that they were applying to CITES to downgrade elephant from
Appendix 1 to Appendix II in order to ‘control 20 animals’ which they considered to be crop raiders.
25
CITES CoP. 12, Doc. 66, Annex 4 – p. 6
URL:http://Susan Brown for National Geographic News. Corrected August 18 2006.
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060817-ivory-dna.html. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived
by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIEReDKM)
27
URL:http://www.eia-international.org/cgi/news/news.cgi?t=template&a=584&source=. Accessed: 2010-0321. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5oO5sHAVX).
26
76
The Conference of the Parties adopted an amendment to Resolution Conf. 8.3 (Recognition of the
benefits of trade in wildlife) to recognise that implementation of CITES-listing decisions should take
into account potential impacts on the livelihoods of the poor.
(IV) 14th meeting at The Hague (Netherlands) 3-15 June 2007
At this meeting the implementation of the Action plan for the control of trade in African elephant
ivory, adopted at CoP13 was mandated and adopted. Zambia reported that it was following the plan
and had established an office at the Lusaka International Airport. However this office later lay
unmanned and the Action Plan not implemented. Document CoP14 Inf. 61 was then presented on
behalf of Africa by Chad and Zambia. The new annotation authorised the trade in hunting trophies,
and allowed South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe to sell their ivory stockpile, but with no
further sale of ivory being allowed for nine years. This left Zambia and Tanzania free at future CoPs
to apply for downlisting and for the sale of their raw ivory stockpile.
In 2006, the South African National Biodiversity Institute hosted a workshop on CITES and
Livelihoods to identify practical measures that would contribute to the implementation of the new
provision of CITES Resolution Conf. 8.3 (Rev. CoP13). The workshop agreed on 14
recommendations that were presented at CoP14 and served as the basis for the adoption of Decisions
14.3 and 14.4. Decision 14.3 states that the Standing Committee shall, subject to the availability of
external funding, and requesting the assistance of organisations including the IUCN Species Survival
Commission, initiate and supervise a process to develop, by the 15th meeting of the Conference of the
Parties:
i)
ii)
Tools for voluntary use by the Parties for the rapid assessment at the national
level of the positive and negative impacts of implementing CITES listing
decisions on the livelihoods of the poor, in conformity with Resolution Conf. 8.3
(Rev. CoP13); and
Draft voluntary guidelines for Parties to address these impacts, particularly in
developing countries. The guidelines should, where possible, assist Parties to
develop local, national and regional initiatives that take account of the impacts of
implementing CITES listing decisions on the livelihoods of the poor.
At its 57th meeting (SC57, Geneva, July 2008), the Standing Committee agreed on the creation of a
Working Group on CITES and Livelihoods to assist in the implementation of Decision 14.3. 28
(V) 15th meeting at Doha (Qatar) 13-25 March 2010
In 2009, Zambia again made a proposal to the CITES Secretariat for its elephant population to be
down-listed from Appendix I to Appendix II (CoP15 Prop. 5) so as to allow it do the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Trade in elephant hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes;
Trade in live elephant;
Trade in raw elephant hides;
Trade in registered raw ivory with a single sale of 22 tons only to trading partners
designated by the Standing Committee (this to be allowed once the Secretariat has
verified the registered government-owned stocks).
The conditions applicable are that the proceeds of the trade must be used exclusively for elephant and
community conservation and for development programmes within or adjacent to the elephant range in
28
CoP15 Doc. 14 – p. 1.
77
Zambia; and, on a proposal from the Secretariat, the Standing Committee can cause this trade to cease
in the event of non-compliance. 29
Between 31 January and 5 February 2010, a four-man panel of experts selected by the Standing
Committee of CITES travelled to Zambia to assess its application for downlisting.30 The membership
of the panel consisted of the Chairman – also the Chief of the CITES Management Authority and
Conference Support, an Intelligence Officer of the Nairobi-based Lusaka Task Force, and two
consultants from Dar es Salaam and Harare respectively. The facilitator for the panel was the Head of
the CITES Management Authority at the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). The Panel reviewed the
ZAWA proposal – as well as the previous review of the application for down-listing made by Zambia
in 2002 and submitted to the 12th CoP. Only two conservation NGOs – both regionally based - were
invited to give information, the South Luangwa Conservation Society and Conservation Lower
Zambezi. A further two Zambian organisations consulted were the Professional Hunters Association
of Zambia and the Tourism Council of Zambia. In addition to these, the international NGOs, WorldWide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Wildlife Conservation Society (USA)(WCS), the Environmental
Investigation Agency (UK) and TRAFFIC provided further information. In addition a host of
government officials were interviewed. Only one Chief, Chiawa, and her Community Resource Board
were interviewed. No knowledgeable independent experts were consulted – particularly on the science
of the aerial population estimate and on the historical record, and the Natural Resources Consultative
Forum, expressly established by the Ministry of Tourism to deal with such issues in an open-handed
manner, was also not consulted (perhaps because the NRCF in its advisory note to the Minister of
Tourism, opposed the issue in 2005 of 20 elephant for sport hunting – its members drawn from civil
society, including the Professional Hunters Association of Zambia and the Safari Operators
Association of Zambia).
The panel accepted the information given to them by ZAWA and did not take into account reports of
the Auditor-General or of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee, nor of numerous reports
critical of the delivery of benefits to customary landholders and of the efficacy of Community Based
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Zambia. It also did not consult with the House of Chiefs
or organisations such as the Land Alliance or the Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia.
At the same time, the Environmental Investigation Agency did an undercover investigation,
confirming once more that Zambia has a thriving domestic ivory market with criminal syndicates
freely at work and with many of the ZAWA officials implicated in poaching, and those involved in
poaching and the ivory and meat trade in the past now occupying even more senior positions. 31 In
March 2009, 72 tusks and five rhino horns were intercepted on their way from Kafue to Lusaka. They
were being transported in three vehicles, two police officers being present. No prosecution has
resulted (EIA 2010).
In March 2010, the Secretariat endorsed its panel’s report, saying that the proposal demonstrated that
the elephant population did not meet the biological criteria for retention in Appendix I and that
appropriate and effective enforcement controls are in place in Zambia. While the Secretariat
recommended that the proposal be adopted, it also sounded a note of warning:
The adoption of the proposed annotation would mean that no trade in specimens of
elephant would be possible under the provisions relating to Appendix II except for
hunting trophies; the specified stock of raw ivory owned by the Government of Zambia
and derived from natural mortality and from problem animal control; live elephant of
Zambian origin to ‘appropriate and acceptable destinations’ and raw hides. 32
29
This proposal was submitted by the Republic of Zambia pursuant to Article XV of the Convention with
precautionary measures in accordance with Resolution Con 9.24 (Rev CoP 14).
30
Terms of reference of panel: CoP15 Doc.68 Annex 6.
31
See Chapter 2: (3).
32
CoP15Doc.68 Addendum.
78
In effect Zambia was making an application to down-list in order to make $3.5 million from the sale of
part of the current ivory stockpile, it being unlikely that it would ever trade in raw hides or export
many elephant. Furthermore, safari hunting did not need to down-list in order to receive an increased
elephant hunting quota and the necessary permission to export the trophies – a fact, given that only
60% of the 20 quota was shot, that casts doubts on the population estimate. However, Zambia did cite
as a reason for making the application the fact that it saw the primary risk to elephant in Zambia as
being elephant conflict with humans and not international trade issues, and that they would not tolerate
humans rising up against elephant as a result. However, much of the motivation for their actions, as
stated in their proposal, is their resentment at outside interference in their affairs.
A successful down-listing will therefore not bring the benefits ZAWA desires but will cause enmity
with other African nations, with conservationists – and perhaps tourists – who will view a sale of ivory
to China and Japan, two of the main dealers in illegal ivory, as reprehensible. As 27 prominent
elephant scientists and conservationists recently wrote:
We contend that no 'one-off" ivory sales should be approved, regardless of who is the
seller or buyer. Such sales split the appendix listing of a single species (which CITES
itself recommends against); introduce uncertainty of supply into the marketplace,
encouraging poaching; and stimulate conflict among people working for effective
elephant conservation. Ultimately, CITES will only meet its mandate to protect
wildlife if criteria that place science above politics are applied to all CITES trade
decisions. The implications reach far beyond trade species, potentially affecting
ecosystem health, climate, and even the spread of zoonotic disease (Wasser et al 2010).
And two of those authors further added:
We disagree with the recommendation of the Secretariat that the proposal should be
adopted. We also disagree that the biological criteria show that elephant in Zambia
should no longer be retained in Appendix I. Figures quoted by the Secretariat from
Game Warden Charles Pitman of 4,000 elephant for 1900, and 12,000 for the mid1930s, are likely to be significant underestimates from the pre-aerial census era. By
contrast, leading scientific authority Graeme Caughley estimated 350,000 for Zambia’s
elephant population in 1972, and the African Elephant Specialist Group estimated
160,000 in 1981. It is, therefore, highly probable that Zambia’s population has declined
by more than 50% over the last 75 years and thus meets the criterion for retention in
Appendix I. With the biological criteria in doubt and the currently increasing levels of
poaching (PIKE) and illicit markets, the Precautionary Principle should be invoked and
Zambia’s population should remain in Appendix I, which also means no trade of ivory
is permitted.33
In fact Pitman stated in his report (p. 63) that there were considerably more than 12,000 elephant, this
borne out by the fact that in 1935 in Northern Rhodesia, 4,600 were shot on crop protection and 573
killed on licence (MacKenzie 1997, p. 259).34 This figure of 5,173 –mostly bulls, is the number
actually killed, probably the same number again were wounded, at least half dying of their wounds.
Moreover, a figure of some 8,000 elephant possibly died from legal control operations – mostly bulls.
When this is added to the number poached, and the number of cows - given the skewed offtake since
circa. 1917, Pitman’s figure is a considerable underestimate.
33
Douglas-Hamilton, I. & Poole, J.
2010.URL:https://mail.google.com/mail/?shva=1#search/melissa+groo/12773b0793dc3b76. Accessed: 201003-25. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5oUPg7s9I).
34
'These figures were complied from data given in successive issues of JSPFE (The Journal of the Society for
the Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire); elephant kills are in JSPFE, xxxiii (1938), pp.44'.
79
Zambia’s application, the panel of experts report, the CITES Secretariat report and comments on them
are summarised in Appendix 3.
On 22 March 2010, at the 12th session of Committee 1, Zambia addressed the committee, thanking
NORAD for their assistance for wildlife conservation over 20 years but emphasising that their
application was motivated by their wish to reduce their dependence on donors. They also highlighted
increasing elephant-human conflicts and the fact that the paramilitary had been brought in on antipoaching exercises. Chieftainess Chiawa then addressed the committee stating that elephant were
seriously affecting villager livelihoods and that chiefs in Zambia were committed to wildlife
conservation having allocated considerable tracts of land to wildlife. Then, noting the comments from
the Panel of Experts, other Parties and the Secretariat, Zambia suggested amending the proposal in
accordance with Rule 22.2 of the Rules of Procedure, so that, after ‘for the exclusive purposes of
allowing:-‘, it would read: ‘a) trade in hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes; b) trade in live
animals to appropriate and acceptable destinations, as defined in Resolution Conf. 11.20; c) trade in
raw hides. All other specimens shall be deemed to be specimens of species included in Appendix I and
the trade in them shall be regulated accordingly’. Having made this amendment to their proposal,
Zambia admonished those circulating rumours that revenue from ivory sales would be used for
political purposes. Apart from the expected support of South Africa and Zimbabwe, Norway and the
United States expressed the bizarre view that Zambia had sufficient law enforcement and management
capacity to regulate any trade that would be allowed by adoption of their proposal, considered the
biological criteria for Appendix-II listing had been met, while Norway also considered Zambia's
proposal to be in line with precedent for transfer of elephant populations to Appendix II. Uganda noted
that the moratorium on proposals to allow trade in elephant ivory agreed at CoP14 did not apply to
Zambia's elephant population. They believed that Zambia was faced with the challenge of balancing
increasing numbers of elephant with consequent environmental degradation that had possible
implications for climate change. On behalf of the EU, Spain accepted that Zambia’s elephant met the
criteria for downlisting and that national management and conservation measures were adequate.
Ghana, Kenya, Mali and Rwanda, as members of the 23-member African Elephant Coalition, were
against the proposal, Kenya and Rwanda reminding the meeting that the moratorium had been
instituted to allow implementation of the African Elephant Action Plan and monitoring of the effect of
the one-off sales, and that Zambia had not consulted African elephant range states before submitting
their proposal. Ghana was sceptical about whether benefits from the trade in elephant would indeed
accrue to communities living alongside elephant. Zambia then requested a secret ballot. The result of
the vote was 55 in favour, 36 against with 40 abstentions. Accordingly, the amended proposal was
rejected. 35 On Thursday, 25 March, in plenary, Zambia moved to vote by secret ballot to re-open the
debate on the amended proposal. The debate was re-opened, with Uganda, Malawi, Japan and
Zimbabwe supporting the amended proposal; and Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra
Leone opposed. The CoP rejected the amended proposal, with 59 in favour, 47 against and 38
abstentions.
What CITES 15 CoP clearly reveals is that the elephant problem is a microcosm of the conservationpeople problem - in reality the CITES, donor, nation state, NGO consensus problem (on the necessity
for benefits to flow from elephant to villagers), versus their failure to address the agistment rights of
customary landowners – both historically and at present - in respect of elephant and other wildlife
which continue to impoverish the people living there, such that the customary landholders are 30%
poorer than people living without elephant. This thinking is even reflected in the tepid resolution
presented at the Doha meeting by the Standing Committee Working Group on CITES and
Livelihoods, a document entitled: Strategic Matters: CITES and Livelihoods. This resolution agreed
that the following principles be considered when Parties address livelihood issues, in particular with
regard to the empowerment of the poor: 36
35
36
CoP15 Com. I Rec. 12.
CoP15 Doc. 14 – pp. 4 – 5.
80
a)
Empowerment of the poor should be encouraged through measures that
include, as appropriate:
i)
Promoting transparency in the development and implementation of
policies regarding poverty and the use of natural resources;
ii)
Developing harvesters associations;
iii)
Developing trade associations with clear obligations for benefit
sharing; and
iv)
Recognising of resource tenure for indigenous and tribal communities
and the poor;
b)
Support for the implementation of CITES listings should be enhanced by
public awareness and education, including education of poor people, to ensure
that:
i)
The positive aspects of CITES and CITES-related legislation are
understood;
ii)
The need to take measures to conserve listed species, and the benefits,
particularly to poor people, that can accrue from doing so, are
appreciated; and
iii)
Poor communities support policies and activities designed to reduce
or eliminate illegal trade in specimens of CITES-listed species; and
c)
As implementation of some listings may have short-term negative impacts on
the poor, mitigation strategies may include:
i)
Developing interim aid packages to provide assistance to the
collectors and harvesters most severely affected by the
implementation of the CITES-listing decisions; and
ii)
Waiver of permit fees during the first six months of a listing so that
local harvesters and producers can internalise the transaction costs
generated by the implementation of the CITES-listing decisions;
d)
Regarding mitigation strategies for human-wildlife conflict:
i)
Recommends that mitigation strategies provide alternatives or
compensation schemes (e.g. payment for ecosystem services,
employment in eco-tourism or as game wardens; provision of tourist
or local hunting and collection permits; development of alternative
products);
e)
Regarding enabling policies:
i)
INVITES Parties to initiate or strengthen collaborative partnerships
between development and conservation agencies to enhance aid
effectiveness for wildlife conservation and eliminate duplication of
efforts (e.g. CITES authorities making cross-sectoral links to seek
assistance in mainstreaming wildlife trade policies into poverty
reduction strategies and wider development plans).
ii)
ENCOURAGES international financial institutions and cooperation
agencies to assist Parties in the development of multilateral and
bilateral measures, supportive policies and institutions at the regional,
national and local levels to address negative impacts of the
implementation of CITES listings on the livelihoods of the poor.
The closest this advice to the CoP came in addressing the real issue was in point a) iv) Recognising of
resource tenure for indigenous and tribal communities and the poor.
81
In effect, rather than the sovereignty of Zambia being brought into question by CITES, it is the
Government and CITES who fail to recognise the inalienable ownership rights of the chiefdoms to the
wildlife resources being supported by them at great cost, and that the National Parks in Zambia were
once customary land, only handed over to protected status by the chiefs on the proviso that they and
their people benefit from having done so. Given the horrendous assault on elephant in Africa as a
whole and in parts of Zambia such as Mukungule, Luembe, Nyalugwe and the Lower Zambezi, and of
the failure to curb the bushmeat and ivory trade, the only panacea is the building of the customary
commons and the enfranchisement of customary communities. However, as long as the CITES
Secretariat and NORAD, USAID and the EU support elephant-centred CBNRM benefit projects, the
elephant problem and the elephant impoverished will remain with us.
3.5.2 Bushmeat trade
Decision 11.166, adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its 11th meeting relating to the
establishment of the CITES Bushmeat Working Group, recognised that poaching and illicit trade in
bushmeat constitute the greatest threat to the survival of wildlife species in Africa, especially in
Central Africa; and that illicit trade in bushmeat increases poverty and the food deficit among rural
communities which use bushmeat as their main source of animal protein.
The Conference of the Parties to the Convention advised all relevant Parties to:37
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
prohibit the offtake of Appendix-I species for consumption as food, and to
encourage sustainable levels of offtake for species in Appendix II and III of the
Convention;
improve the domestic management of CITES-listed species harvested, traded and
consumed as bushmeat through a review and, if needed, strengthening of relevant
informative, legislative, in situ conservation, monitoring, enforcement and social
or economic incentive measures;
define clearly the administrative responsibilities of government agencies that may
be involved in, or can contribute to, the domestic regulation of trade in bushmeat
and the import, export, re-export and transit or transhipment of bushmeat;
clarify or establish property rights regarding CITES-listed species harvested,
traded and consumed as bushmeat and to involve local communities in the
monitoring of harvest, trade and consumption;
review and, if needed, revise logging and other natural resource concessions to
ensure that they contribute to the legal, non-detrimental harvesting of, trade in and
consumption of bushmeat;
encourage the adoption of codes of conduct by the timber, fishing and other
natural resource extraction industries, that discourage illegal or unsustainable
harvesting, consumption and trade in bushmeat; and
identify alternative sources of protein and take other measures to reduce the
demand for bushmeat and particularly the consumption of Appendix-I species.
At CoP15 on Monday, 22 March, in Committee II, the Secretariat presented a document on the Report
of the Central Africa Bushmeat Working Group (CoP15 Doc.61), announcing that no report had been
received from the working group and that Decisions 14.73 and 14.74 have been carried over.
3.5.3 Ranching
CITES regulates ranching and trade in ranched specimens of species transferred from Appendix I to
Appendix II, defining the term ‘ranching’ as the rearing in a controlled environment of specimens
taken from the wild. Also, regarding proposals to transfer populations from Appendix I to Appendix II
37
CITES Resolution Conf. 13.11 – 2.
82
for ranching purposes, a number of recommendations are made, as well as providing qualifying
criteria.
3.5.4 Lusaka Agreement on Co-operative Enforcement Operations Directed at Illegal Trade in
Wild Fauna and Flora
The Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), the Secretariat of the Lusaka Agreement, grew out of a
meeting of wildlife personnel from a number of countries in Lusaka in 1992 hosted by the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Zambian Government. In 2000 a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Task Force and the CITES Secretariat. There are
currently six members: Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Lesotho; with South Africa,
Ethiopia and Swaziland as signatories. One officer from each state is seconded to the Task Force. In
November 2008, The Task Force arrested 57 suspected dealers and confiscated about 1,000 kilograms
of powdered, carved and raw ivory products. Among those arrested were four Chinese nationals
attempting to smuggle ivory curios out of Kenya. This highly publicised event merely revealed the
scant success of LATF. In October 2008 it held its ninth governing council meeting in Uganda.
However, the Taskforce has had a negligible impact on poaching or the illegal ivory trade in Zambia,
as evidenced by the continuing Singapore ivory debacle.
4
PARTNERSHIPS IN CONSERVATION DEVELOPMENT
4.1
National Parks and public-private partnerships
More than 70% of the area of the National Parks has now been hived off into public-private
partnerships (PPPs) - this includes all of the flagship revenue earning Parks, with the main financial
beneficiary being ZAWA.
4.1.1 Kasanka
The original concept, elaboration, strategy, approach and technical evaluations for a PPP in respect of
the Kasanka was developed in 1984/85 by the author 38, David Lloyd, Peter Moss and Chief Chitambo.
Negotiations were successfully completed in 1988 for an agreement between the Kasanka Trust
Limited and National Parks and Wildlife Service (NPWS), the former agreeing to finance and manage
the park in partnership with NPWS (Moss 2008). On 28 May 2002, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was signed between the two parties and automatically renewed in 2007. The substance of the
MoU made it clear that the Trust’s Park Manager should report to the ZAWA Area Warden and
submit quarterly reports. The Trust agreed to pay ZAWA and the Kafinda Community Resource
Board (CRB) 10% and 5% respectively of its gross income from tourism within the Kasanka. Funds
given to the CRB was to be maintained in a bank account to which two members of the CRB, the Park
Manager and the Park Ranger were signatories, with the utilisation of the funds being in accordance
with the Zambia Wildlife Act. All accounts were to be made available to ZAWA on a quarterly basis.
The MoU also laid out the composition of the Kasanka National Park Management Committee
composed of the Director General (D-G) of ZAWA (Chairman), the ZAWA Director of Conservation,
the Park Manager (Secretary), the Area Warden, the Park Ranger, the District Council Secretary, the
Member of Parliament (MP), Chief Chitambo, one ward Chairman, the CRB Chairman and two Trust
officials. The Committee was to meet bi-annually and to approve plans and programmes for future
activities. The Trust was also given the mandate to ‘assist the local communities living within the
Kafinda GMA to embark on community development’.39 In 2005, Kasanka registered as a Trust under
the Companies Act (limited by guarantee), i.e. a non-profit organisation.
38
Former Officer-in-Charge/Biologist, Bangweulu Command: Kasanka, Lavushi Manda & Isangano National
Parks and attendant GMAs
39
MoU. 20 May 2002. Management of the Kasanka National Park: ZAWA and Kasanka Trust Limited, Zambia.
83
Until early 2009, no current management plan existed and the then (unqualified) manager operated an
air charter company from Kasanka, his wife running the park and organising anti-poaching. Funding
for park management and other activities has come from the EU, Conservation Foundation (Zambia),
Darwin Initiative, Beit Trust, Kasanka Trust (UK), Tusk Trust, Finnish Embassy, Holly Hill Trust,
German Development Service (DED), SRT (Zambia) and tourism. At that stage, a consultant reported
poor accounting and generally unprofessional management (Appendix 2). Another unfortunate aspect
of the Kasanka management was that they made plans to translocate black lechwe into the Park, and
had already had a hand in the translocation of a foreign strain of zebra onto the floodplains of the
south-east Bangweulu.
Apart from some limited CBNRM work, the Trust has rejected establishing a Landsafe Chiefdom
Trust in the Kafinda GMA and Open Area under Chief Chitambo, the traditional owners of the land
alienated from the Park. Relations between the Trust management and the chief are deplorable (J
Kapijimpanga, 2006 personal communication).40
4.1.2 North Luangwa
In 1986, on the grounds that it had been abandoned to poachers, the author made a PPP proposal to the
African Wildlife Leadership Foundation (AWF) to join with a consortium of Zambian businesses and
the NPWS for the management of the North Luangwa National Park (Manning 1986). This invitation
was declined by AWF. In the same year, a research couple, Mark and Delia Owens, began the North
Luangwa Conservation Project, having had the US Embassy in Lusaka obtain the necessary permits
and permissions for them from the NPWS. This project involved anti-poaching in the Park and a
variety of CBNRM type projects, mainly carried out in the Mukungule Chiefdom and GMA.
The Owens in the course of their work allegedly uncovered the workings of a wildlife crime syndicate
based in Mpika in the office of the area warden of the NPWS - with links to headquarter staff controlled in turn by the chief security official in the Office of the President (OP). This syndicate ran a
school of elephant and rhino poachers in the surrounding areas, but mainly in the North Park. In 1994,
this OP official visited the Owens in their Luangwa camp. Later they were warned by one their
employees that their lives were in danger (Owens & Owens 2006, p.162). At about the same time, the
North Luangwa Conservation Project (NLCP), along with other in-country NGOs, were asked to
renegotiate the status of their projects. At issue was the Zambian Government’s (GRZs) demand that
the NLCP turn over its fixed and moveable assets to GRZ, and that it agree to pass its operating funds
through a GRZ account so that they could be taxed at the rate of 33%. This issue was never resolved
(M Dykes 2009, personal communication).
In 1997, with the Owens’ on leave in the USA, their assets were seized, their staff placed under house
arrest - later freed on the intervention of USA and British Embassy personnel – and their field projects
and staff left permanently to their own devices (Owens & Owens 2006, p.178). Although free to return
- no cancellation of permits having been made or deportation orders issued - they did not do so, later
handing over the project to the Frankfurt Zoological Society who signed an agreement with the NPWS
in 1998, agreeing to conserve the wildlife resources and to generally develop the park. The reason the
Owens had not returned was that the Zambian police wished to question Mark Owens and his son in
connection with an investigation prompted by the murder of a poacher captured on an ABC television
documentary.41 This film lent considerable substance to the stories of the killing of poachers by the
scouts whom Owens commanded, and of other numerous human rights abuses against villagers. 42
40
A former Cabinet Minister, and relative of Paramount Chief Kopa of the Bisa
URL:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2010/03/a-shooting-in-zambia.html. Accessed: 201004-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5okl6b9mm).
42
URL:http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/04/05/100405fa_fact_. Accessed: 2010-04-04. (Archived by
WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5okk1eNwb).
41
84
In 2003, under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Rhino Programme,
five black rhino were translocated to the North Luangwa from the Kruger National Park and placed in
a fenced sanctuary. In 2006, a further ten were introduced.
4.1.3 Liuwa
The Liuwa Plain National Park has long been the personal fiefdom of the Paramount Chief of
Barotseland, the Litunga, with little being done there by Government until the first aerial census of its
wildlife was made in 1975 by the NPWS (Manning & Moss 1975). In 2003, whilst guidelines on PPPs
were being produced for ZAWA, it was made clear that no PPPs would be entered into by ZAWA
until such time as national policy on PPPs was provided, and that an application to establish a PPP for
the Lavushi Manda and Isangano National Parks would have to await this event (Manning 2003).
Despite this, a South African organisation, African Parks, were granted a concession over Sioma and
Liuwa National Parks.
In 2003, the United Party for National Development (UPND) MP for Livingstone, Sakwiba Sikota,
charged the Government of Zambia (GRZ) with corruption, complaining that the people of Liuwa and
Barotseland had not been consulted and that their heritage had been taken from them. He called for a
parliamentary inquiry, a request not heeded.43 Complicating the issue was the fact that the Liuwa had
been placed under the management of a limited liability company whose 30% shareholder was the
Litunga himself.
In 2004, n’dunas (headmen) living in the area surrounding the Liuwa (African Parks having given up
Sioma) came to Lusaka to voice their discontent at the ‘alienation’ of their park in which many of their
people and their cattle still lived. At two meetings with the author and others, they were encouraged to
form CRBs and Trusts and to then seek investors for development on the park periphery, an area
which should soon have increasing numbers of wildebeest and other wildlife as result of African Parks
activities. However, it was clear that ZAWA and the Minister of Tourism (Kalifungwa) – supported by
the Litunga - had effectively alienated the National Park to a company, the customary community’s
rights being side-lined.
4.1.4
Luambe
In December, 2003, an MoU was signed by ZAWA and an international NGO: Communities for
Conservation Society of Cologne (CCSC) in Germany, laying out a PPP arrangement for the
management of the Luambe National Park. Some Society members are also shareholders in a lodge
that serves the Park. No formal arrangements have been entered into with the adjoining Chitungulu
Chiefdom, with charitable gestures extended to the community on an ad hoc basis. Along with Nsefu,
this was one of the earliest pieces of customary land appropriated by Government as a Game Reserve,
agreed to by the customary community on the condition that they would benefit from its protected
status.
4.1.5 South Luangwa (see Chapter 3)
4.1.6 Lower Zambezi
In order to assist ZAWA in the preservation of the Park, Conservation Lower Zambezi (CLZ) was
registered under the Zambia Societies Act in 1995 by conservationists, safari tour operators and
stakeholders within the Lower Zambezi National Park (LZNP) and Chiawa GMA. In 1999, Danish aid
was elicited. CLZ is also involved with the development of the Chiawa Community Partnership Park
in the Chiawa GMA.
43
Reporter. 2003. Government is a Handmaid to Corruption-MP Sikota, The Post Newspaper, Lusaka, 5 August.
85
4.1.7 West Lunga
The West Lunga Trust, in association with the Kesho Trust (a registered Society and Canadian
charitable organisation in the province of British Columbia, also registered as an NGO in Tanzania),
have been involved in the conservation of this Park, in particular concentrating on the adjoining
Chibwika and Ntambu GMA communities. The Chibwika Development Foundation, a wholly
grassroots organisation has emerged from the process. As of early 2009, African Parks had signed an
MoU with ZAWA for its management.
4.1.8 The Kafue Flats and its protected areas
In 1905, with the building of the rail line from Kalomo to Broken Hill, the Kafue Flats was described
as the Elysian Fields, being covered with herds of game that had yet to be hunted by anything other
than the spears of the Ila people (Varian 1953, p.117). A hundred years later, despite the Flats being
embraced within 6,000 km2 of protected floodplain fringing 255 km of the Kafue River and containing
Blue Lagoon and Lochinvar National Parks and their attendant GMAs, the Flats are a socio-ecological
disaster.
Since 1972 with the construction of the Itezhi-tezhi dam at the upstream side of the Flats and the
Kafue Gorge dam downstream, both serving the Kafue Gorge Hydroelectric Power Project, the great
herds have gone, the cattle of the Ila and the Plateau Batoka decimated by disease and restrictions on
movement, Zambia’s most productive fishery destroyed, the waters and flood plains invaded by
pernicious and unpalatable plant species, and people impoverished. The proximate cause of this
disaster is the attenuated flood peaks, raised base flows, retarded drainage, reduction in floodplain
area, unseasonable fluctuations in water levels, and the lamentable natural resource management by
GRZ, and criminal neglect for 37 years by the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO) who
have deliberately ignored the environmental management regime required for the Itezhi-tezhi under
their water contract (Douthwaite 2007). As a result, the operation of the Kafue floodplain commons by
two-dozen chiefdoms comprising Ila cattle herders, Tonga agro-pastoralists and Twa fishermen has
been all but destroyed. Added to this the seizure of water and land resources by GRZ and large agrobusinesses such as the Nakambala Sugar Estates, as well as the removal of the land commons in the
form of two National Parks and the restrictions imposed on people by the GMAs, has greatly
exacerbated the problem. Moreover, ‘free-rider’ immigration into the area by people from other parts
of Zambia has further added to the burden of people once ancient members of the Kafue Flats
commons.
However, it is the failure of GRZ, with its neoliberal and highly centralised control agenda, avoiding
any devolution of powers to the existing chiefdoms over their land – in addition to the rather weak
usufruct rights and controlled-access regimes which rely on secure rights under the traditional system
and which cannot withstand major environmental perturbations and the invasion of their areas by
outsiders - which is the true cause of this ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). Reaction to all this
by conservationists, donors, GRZ and academia has been predictable: to call for interventions that deal
with the symptoms of the malaise, and not its cause, which is the eco-imperialism of both GRZ,
mining and agri-business over the rural poor. One such effort was the 1986 WWF Zambia Wetlands
Project, a CBNRM symptoms approach which parleyed a revolving fund in exchange for livelihoods
‘improvement’ and conservation projects. But the project collapsed when irreconcilable differences
emerged between the community and WWF. The Bangweulu WWF Wetlands Project met a similar
fate. One study, out of a host of recommendations, called for the involvement of:
...local communities wherever possible in both the planning and implementation
processes. Their participation and cooperation are critical in resolving land use
conflict. In fact, understanding the root cause of local people’s problems will help
implement water conservation and population strategies (Chabwela & Haller 2008).
86
This root cause is in actual fact the destruction of the controlled-access chiefdom commons; a political
problem and something most conservationists avoid tackling.
The Kafue Flats remains the main and visible exemplar of what is wrong with conservation and
governance in Zambia. Under the Ramsar Convention for Wetlands of International Importance, the
Kafue Flats and its two National Parks are one of eight designated Ramsar sites in Zambia. Moreover,
under the Zambia National Policy on Wetlands Conservation (2001), long awaiting ratification by
Cabinet, there is the intention to empower and conserve and devolve, but unfortunately there is little
action. There is supposed to be in existence a National Wetland Steering Committee and a National
Action Plan for the Management of Wetlands; and the WWF Wetlands Project, still in existence, has
reputedly entered into a partnership with ZESCO for the improved management of the flow regimes.
Also, ZAWA - having assumed the responsibility from the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ)
for Ramsar wetland sites - wrote a disarming report:
Notable changes however include reduction in the Kafue Lechwe (Kobus leche
kafuensis) to 38,000. The figure was previously fluctuating around 45,000. There is
also an encroachment of woody vegetation into the flats as seen from the latest aerial
survey and this could be a result of reduced flooding induced by dam operation.
Mimosa pigra has also surfaced in the Lochnivar National Park and has started to
spread but is still within manageable levels if interventions are implemented quickly
(Ramsar 2006).
Draft management plans have allegedly been produced for these parks.
i)
Blue Lagoon
Blue Lagoon was once a cattle ranch owned by Colonel Ronnie and Erica Critchley, later donated to
Government and declared a National Park in 1973. Since that time it has been neglected, either being
used by the Zambian army, or subject to failed PPP arrangements. From 2000, Real Africa Safaris
entered into an agreement with NPWS/ZAWA to manage the park. In December 2001, a further
agreement was signed to uphold the principles of sustainable tourism. By October 2007, Nyanja
Safaris were negotiating with ZAWA for its takeover. However, nothing has eventuated barring the
October of 2008 reports of a killing field of animal carcasses.
ii)
Lochinvar
The park was formerly the property of Len Vaughan, a former professional white hunter and first
game warden of the Kafue National Park (Manning 1995, p. 179). He had bought the property in a pub
in Nairobi in 1918 for use as a cattle ranch (L Vaughan 1983, personal communication), with the
property later purchased by the Government and turned into a National Park in 1972. In August 2001,
a tourism operator, Star of Africa, signed an MoU with ZAWA to rehabilitate infrastructure and to
develop tourism in the park. However they later withdrew. The mismanagement of the flooding
regime has created a permanent lagoon and thicket (Mimosa pigra) encroachment, displacing game
animals from the floodplain and beyond the park’s boundaries. The main house and lodge – formerly
known far and wide as the Regent’s Palace - and visited by train on weekends from as far afield as
Bulawayo, is now derelict. There are no facilities for tourists, other than an attempt to provide a
visitors’ centre and an imposing thatched entrance gate. Furthermore, a Chinese company, funded by
the World Bank, and seemingly oblivious to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) guidance or
supervision, is cutting down trees as they create wide roads in anticipation of future tourist invasions
(Staden 2009).
87
5
NATIONAL PARK CONCESSION TOURISM AGREEMENTS (CTAs)
ZAWA allocates lodge sites and concessions in National Parks as a result of a tender process.
Successful bidders are awarded a Tourism Concession Agreement (TCA), a commercial agreement
that lays out the rights and obligations of concessionaires. This TCA is conditional on an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) being approved by the Environmental Council of Zambia
(ECZ), a parastatal within the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR).
5.1
Mosi oa Tunya
That the TCA process is extremely corrupt, is revealed by an investigation of events in this National
Park, one enclosed in a World Heritage Site around the Victoria Falls. While ZAWA has direct control
of the park, the Natural Heritage Conservation Commission (NHCC) – which has no policy document
guiding its activities - is responsible for the preservation of what is a declared World Heritage Site
under the National Heritage Act Chapter 173 of the Laws of Zambia. During a hearing of the Public
Accounts Committee, a witness stated that:
…the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ) was consulted on developments to take
place because provisions of the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act
(EPPCA) required that projects, in areas such as game parks and national heritage sites,
underwent an EIA before any implementation was done. The land was usually
allocated by ZAWA and NHCC in consultation with the Ministry of Lands, depending
on whether the land in question was in a National Park or a heritage site. However,
ECZ was also consulted based on the requirements under EPPCA. ECZ then provided
a response in form of a decision letter, approving or rejecting the project proposal with
reasons. For example, the Commission had in the past entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) with ZAWA in an effort to stem conflicts between the two
institutions. For a time, there had been mutual understanding as the institutions
consulted each other regularly, especially with regard to development of heritage sites
and issuance of licences and permits in such areas. However, following a change of
management at ZAWA, they had refused to recognise the MoU, and the conflicts had
resurfaced. Hence, it often turned out that the Commission and its sister institutions
held conflicting positions about certain proposed developments and projects, when
they should in fact harmonise their positions and complement each other and promote
the much needed development of heritage sites. 44
He further stated that proposed development at the Victoria Falls World Heritage Site by Legacy
Holdings was one such situation. He explained that had the development been allowed to proceed as
initially proposed, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO)
would have withdrawn its recognition of the site as a World Heritage Site.
In July 2006, ZAWA signed a CTA agreement with Legacy Hotels and Resorts International for a 220
ha concession for 75 years. The developers planned to build an eighteen-hole golf course, two hotel
resorts, a club house and 350 chalets in the Mosi oa Tunya National Park lying on the edge of
Livingstone. On 29 July, the Vice-President – on behalf of President Mwanawasa – laid the foundation
stone, although no EIA had been approved yet. This proposed desecration of a UNESCO World
Heritage Site had effectively begun despite the project’s environmental impact assessment later being
rejected by the ECZ and the objections of the local ZAWA office, the NHCC and the Livingstone
branch of the Wildlife and Environment Conservation Society of Zambia (WECSZ) (Manning 2006a).
No application had been made to the Livingstone City Council, and no consultations of any kind
carried out with the National Heritage Commission or the Natural Resources Consultative Forum of
44
Report of the Committee on Energy, Environment and Tourism for the first session of the Tenth National
Assembly of Zambia appointed on 8 November 2006.
88
Zambia (NRCF - established by the MTENR to oversee natural resource and conservation concerns),
or with civil society in general. And, in flagrant disregard of international conventions, approval had
not been given by UNESCO for the scheme, threatening its World Heritage status and prospects for
the area’s conservation and economic development as a major world tourism destination.
Legacy, it appeared, had purchased a company with a 2.2 ha concessionary site on a five year lease.
This was expanded by the Acting Director-General of ZAWA (Gershom Chilakusha) on the advice of
the then Financial Director of ZAWA (Tom Mushinge, brother of the Legacy Financial Director) to a
220 ha concession for 75 years - essentially land alienation by another name. The sum of $9 million
dollars was allegedly paid for this by Legacy HQ in Johannesburg to ZAWA, an allegation denied by
the D-G of ZAWA.
Finally, on 15 December 2006, Lewis Saiwana, the Director-General of ZAWA, informed the
Chairman of the Livingstone Tourism Association, Nick Katenekwa, that the Tourism Lease
Agreement issued to Legacy Holdings Zambia Limited for 220 ha for 75 years in the Mosi oa Tunya
National Park had been cancelled. Legacy now reverted to their 2.2 ha for 5 year lease. Later the
Minister admitted that ZAWA had been wrong to issue the additional land (Chulu & Chirwa 2007).
However, calls for those responsible to be prosecuted were ignored, but Chilakusha and Mushinge
were later fired, like the former D-G, leaving with generous ‘golden handshakes‘(Chirwa 2007).
ZAWA then gave import permits – again before any EIA process was completed - to a group called
the African Lion and Environment Research Trust (ALERT) to import 19 lion for the establishment of
lion walking safaris in the Mosi oa Tunya National Park and in the Dambwa local forest reserve.
Antelope are being stocked in the Dambwa in order to teach lion how to kill; and once they are too
dangerous to be walked with tourists, they will be released into the wild.45
One of the concerns is the silence and lack of appropriate action by NGOs such as the African
Wildlife Foundation, and by the World Bank - the major loan and grant source for the area at the time
under the Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification (SEED) project - to the politically
inspired corruption that takes place. In fairness, NGOs are required to remain out of politics, certainly
a requirement of the Charity Commission in the United Kingdom. However, given the evidence of
corruption, they could withdraw their funds and support, as the Swedes did over the theft of their aid
money by the Health Department.
5.2
Kafue and Luangwa
These two flagship National Parks are currently being commercialised following the Kruger National
Park model. In the Kafue, ZAWA is brokering Commercial Tourism Concessions and Joint
Management Concessions. Tourism Concessions (TCs) are divided into Recreational TCs, consisting
of high-value investments such as hotels and lodges with capacities in excess of 40 beds each, and
Nature-Based TCs of various sizes. These will be operated through a Tourism Concession Agreement
(TCA) between the concessionaire and ZAWA. Joint Management Concessions (JMCs) covering
large areas of the park (between 1,823km2 and 6,778km2) will be awarded as Joint Management
Concession Agreements (JMCAs) between ZAWA and concessionaires. ZAWA states that
concessionaires will consist of partnerships that may include the private sector, NGOs and
Community-Based Organisations (CBOs). JMCAs are considered to be PPPs. The critical issue is the
length of the lease period, which, if taken up to 75 years is little different from leasehold alienation.
The mention of community-based organisations is unconvincing, as the original owners of the Trust
land on which Kafue now stands should have been the founding partners in the PPPs.
45
URL:http://lionscam.blogspot.com/2008/02/to-sunday-times-london.html. Accessed: 2010-04-07. (Archived
by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5ooFRF5TF)
89
The Luangwa is being similarly dealt with, though it appears land outside of the South Luangwa
National Park i.e. GMA, may have been given out as JMCAs.
5.3
Sioma Ngwezi
Six wildlife (block) concession sites ranging in size from 40,000 to 50,000 ha have been identified by
ZAWA within and adjacent to the National Park. Each concession will be allowed a sixteen two-bed
facility. The fact that ZAWA is effectively commandeering customary land through co-management
agreements, with itself acting as the main investor-partner, is clearly commercially driven and further
evidence of the nationalisation of nature.
6.
6.1
AID PROJECTS
CONASA: Community Based Natural Resource Management and Sustainable
Agriculture (2001 – 2005)
Under a cooperative agreement with USAID in Zambia to improve livelihood security and sustainable
resource management in the Bilili/Nkala, Sichifula and Mulobezi GMAs in Southern Province,
CONASA pursued the following programme:
i)
supporting rural livelihoods through agricultural production and small business
development,
ii) policy and advocacy, and
iii) Tourism based Natural Resource Management (TBNRM).
CONASA was implemented by CARE International, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) and
WCS (ADMADE) and funded by USAID Zambia, running for four years at a budget level of
approximately $1m a year.
A mid-term review conducted in the fourth year of operations noted the following results (Lyons
2004):
i)
The formation of CBOs - CRBs, VAGs (Village Area Groups), and VMCs (Village
Management Committees - in the project area, involving community mobilisation,
skills assessment, and training).
ii)
Several successful strategies to boost local food production.
iii) The formation and training of dozens of enterprise groups, with promising signs of
a viable model in a handful of them, had taken place.
iv) Numerous successful community mobilisation and sensitisation campaigns for
conservation, resulting in several examples of the voluntary surrendering of
firearms.
v)
The facilitation of numerous meetings involving ZAWA and CRBs to improve
community relations, increase skills in resource management, and implement safari
hunting concession agreements.
vi) Formation of local Natural Resource Management (NRM) plans and local by-laws
in four out of five CRBs, which are currently going through the process of legal
ratification through a provision in the Local Government Act.
vii) Numerous product development and marketing studies on non-timber forest
products.
viii) Training of livelihood skills for reformed poachers and the development of locallevel NRM plans.
ix) Training on the importance and content of natural resource policies.
90
x)
xi)
xii)
xiii)
xiv)
xv)
xvi)
xvii)
xviii)
xix)
A baseline report on the polices in the wildlife, forestry, water, and fisheries
sectors, and widespread dissemination and discussion of these analyses.
The establishment of the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF) in a
manner which was inclusive and eventually handed over to government.
Support for ZAWA’s reorientation to grassroots natural resource management
(NRM).
Formation of a regional CRB association.
Helping communities take advantage of opportunities to provide input into policy
formation by facilitating a community presentation to a parliamentary committee
on forestry, and input into the draft land policy review process.
Smoothing relations between ZAWA, communities, and safari operators through
meetings and forums.
Support for the development of enterprises with the potential to reach regional
markets.
Sensitisation and training in natural resource policy development of natural
resource by-laws and resource management plans formation and strengthening of
several Community Development Trusts in the Open Areas.
Collection of preliminary information on wildlife corridors and habitat.
Connectivity between Kafue NP and the Zambezi.
And concluded as follows:
Two months after it began operating, CONASA was informed by USAID that its total
budget had been reduced by $2 million, the project from five to four years and with
one less GMA, although the results framework and performance targets were not
adjusted. Consequently, what was already an ambitious and possibly unrealistic set of
goals for five years was compressed to four. CONASA had also stuck to its original
strategy even though significant changes in the project context had occurred. ‘On the
resource management side, a two-year ban on safari hunting, a lengthy restructuring of
ZAWA, a near total lack of law enforcement for over two years, and expansion of
settlements into core habitat has cast doubt on whether the most profitable form of
wildlife enterprise - safari hunting - will ever generate the levels of revenue it did as
recent as the 1990s.
Today there is little to see of CONASA’s efforts, other than a human rights disaster in Sichifula GMA
where people were forcibly moved from the area by ZAWA, and the Bilili Springs GMA which is
now the most heavily settled in the country as a result of agricultural settlement schemes. And the
depletion of wildlife is severe with only Mulobezi GMA escaping unscathed. WCS, rather than
carrying on with its programme of turning poachers into farmers, departed to Lundazi in Eastern
Province under the COMACO label, to start anew. And the NRCF was adopted by the Ministry of
Tourism, but has lapsed into a government sanctioned consultancy group rather than an advocacy
group as was intended. The Sekutu Trust was established under AWF, but no progress has been
reported, nor of any other attempts to strengthen and institutionalise the customary communities. It
may therefore be classed as another failure and let-down for GMA residents.
6.2
COMACO: Community Markets for Conservation
COMACO is essentially a continuation of a notable failure, ADMADE, and of the CONASA project,
which parlays agricultural input loans, guaranteed prices and market access as incentives to poachers and villagers in general - to enter into agriculture. It is a partnership between the CRB, District
Council and the funder, WCS. The model requires high finance with no guarantees of sustainability
once the project drivers have moved on. COMACO works in a number of chiefdoms merely as a
servicer and marketer of products. Its major failing is the absence of any attempt to create statutory
91
customary community structures, the sine qua non for socio-ecological sustainability. In June 2009,
the Norwegian Government agreed to give COMACO US$8 million for five years.
6.3
SEED: Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification.
The World Bank project ‘Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification’ is a US$29 million,
four-component project (Tourism and Protected Areas, Agribusiness Sector Development, Gemstones
Sector Development and Project Management), with the tourism component divided into two main
areas, tourism and protected area management. Within tourism there are three subcomponents:
i)
policy, regulatory and institutional support for Ministry of Tourism, Environment
and Natural Resources (MTENR) and its agencies;
ii) tourism investments and capacity building in the Livingstone area;
iii) infrastructure for Livingstone and institutional support for Livingstone City
Council.
The protected area sub-component covered biodiversity restoration in Mosi oa Tunya and Kafue
National Parks (KNP) and capacity building for ZAWA, a NORAD/World Bank financed component.
From August 2002, the KNP had benefited from the support from Norway through the project
Emergency Resource Protection Project (ERPP), whose purpose was to assist ZAWA to regain
management of the park and reverse the high levels of illegal hunting. In 2004, Norway and the World
Bank agreed to join forces to support ZAWA and the KNP through the present project under SEED. In
2006, the SEED project underwent a refocusing and the Mosi oa Tunya National Park Project was
dropped – this at a time when the park was under threat from the ZAWA/Legacy imbroglio - the funds
and focus shifting to the KNP. There the goal of the project was to see that critical habitat and species
were secured in the park and surrounding GMAs through improved management, infrastructure and
tourism development.
The review of the performance of the 2002 – 2007 Strategic Plan concluded as follows: the project did
not have a clearly defined leader, and this would not allow the Project to achieve its objectives; most
of the research carried out was of a poor standard; ZAWA’s performance was unsatisfactory; large
sums of money had been stolen; the lack of motivation at different levels was a major concern, being
detrimental to the success of the Project. Furthermore, they found that in the CBNRM component,
only two of the three objectives were addressed: the objective ‘to develop co-management agreements
with traditional fisher folk in the Park and its surrounding GMAs’ was ignored. In all, nine GMAs
were dealt with and the CRBs trained in basic GMA management skills. Also, landuse planning was
initiated in selected GMAs, but later discontinued due to a budget change (Booth et al 2007). The
project considered introducing sport hunting in the Park but this did not find favour. Booth et al
concluded that:
i)
In preparing the draft 2008 – 2012 Strategic Plan, ZAWA has not faced up to the
core issues that undermined the performance of the initial strategic plan. Nor has
it identified a reliable mechanism to resolve its financial situation, other than
prevailing on Government to write off this debt. Furthermore, contrary to the
assumptions made in the ZAWA Business Plan, it is doubtful that ZAWA would
be in a position to service its statutory financial obligations, and it would most
likely would incur debts of a similar magnitude over time. The key issue in
preparing the revised strategic plan is the absence of a thorough review of the
Wildlife Policy and subsequent amendments to the Wildlife Act. Currently
ZAWA is mandated to manage the entire wildlife sector, but does not have the
human and financial resources to achieve this. The 2008 – 2012 Strategic Plan
advocates an increase in staff and promotes Public-Private Sector Partnerships to
address this issue. What it fails to recognise is that there may not be the business
case to justify this assumption. In particular, the heavy reliance on the GMAs as
92
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
6.4
the primary source of income (through consumptive tourism) is being undermined
through the rapid advance of alternative land use options. ZAWA’s continued role
in attempting to manage these areas in the face of these challenges is therefore
probably unsustainable.
Without radical policy changes to effect the transfer of financial and management
responsibility for these areas to local communities, and the recognition by central
government that it has to play a role in meeting the cost of biodiversity
conservation in its protected areas, it is unlikely that ZAWA will achieve
financial self sustainability in the foreseeable future; particularly given the crash
in the clients-for-hunting market as a result of the economic meltdown.
In its current form, the KNP Project addresses the 2008 – 2012 Strategic Plan by
supporting its objective to develop cost effective Resource Protection
Programmes, improving the South Luangwa National Park infrastructure and
supporting initiatives to develop land use plans in the GMAs. It is not
contributing to any policy, legal or regulatory reforms which in the long term are
fundamental to the future sustainability of the Project.
The current approach of donor support to ZAWA is through stand-alone projects
such as SLAMU, Kasanka and KNP. In the case of SLAMU there has been
considerable investment over a long period of time to reach a point where it can
meet its recurrent costs. Under the current Project a similar scenario is envisaged
for KNP.
At issue is whether this approach is the most optimal, or whether donor support
should focus on a sector-wide programme designed to strengthen the overall
institutional capacity of ZAWA to effectively implement its mandate.
ZAWA is in a state of flux. It has not addressed the fundamental causes for its
lack of performance under the existing policy environment, and through its latest
Draft Strategic Plan, it is attempting to maintain the status quo (some might say
that it is actually reverting back to strategies that prevailed under the former
NPWS regime). It still has to resolve organisational and management issues that
were carried over from its transformation from a civil service structure to
corporate body. Above all, ZAWA has to develop internal revenue strategies that
would make it financially self-sustaining.
There is no clear answer to the future approach of donor support to ZAWA. The
environment for a sector-wide support programme is probably premature at this
stage. Government needs to take a pro-active role in defining future policy,
especially with respect to its Decentralisation Policy, that advocates the
empowerment of local communities to administer and manage natural resources.
A possible solution is to adopt a three-pronged approach in which donor support
focuses on policy reform at the central government level (this is to a large degree
should have been covered by the UNDP reclassification programme,
REMNPAS); institutional support to ZAWA and development support at the
project level aimed at creating a conducive environment for private sector
investment.
REMNPAS: Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected
Areas System
The project ‘Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas System’
(REMNPAS) is executed by the Ministry of Tourism (MTENR) through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resource Management, and ZAWA. The Global Environment Facility
(GEF), the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the GRZ jointly fund the project (UNDP 2004).
The project has three main areas of intervention: providing the regulatory, legal and institutional
framework for public-private partnerships; strengthening the institutions responsible for protected area
management, and implementing new protected area categories within these partnerships.
93
The original UNDP/GEF, 'Classification of Protected Areas' project, had its origin in 2000 when
UNDP and the Ministry decided that Zambia’s protected areas required re-classification. The
justification for this was presented in September 2000 to GEF as a concept proposal for a PDF Block
"B" grant ON the grounds that Zambia had demonstrated its commitment to conservation and had
backed this commitment with various legal instruments and policy frameworks and by the
establishment of the necessary institutions at the national and local levels - a statement made at a time
when such commitment was little in evidence, the National Parks and Wildlife Service having been
replaced by a statutory body, ZAWA. They also tried to justify the project by saying that conditions
had changed so much in and around protected areas that there needed to be a re-evaluation. And
belatedly, they mentioned that communities needed to be involved in the management and
conservation of biodiversity so as ensure sustainability of the new system. No empirical evidence was
put forward to justify the project.
GEF, the World Bank and the Nordic Development Fund were sent the concept note with a request for
£410K so that a full project proposal could be written. This was agreed to. The Plan recommended
nine implementation partners for the Reclassification of Protected Areas Project: the MTENR,
ZAWA, WWF, UNDP, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Natural Resources Consultative Forum, a
'Relevant Ministries Steering Committee', a Technical Advisory Group, a Project Consultation Group
(consultants) and private sector partners for two demonstration sites. Curiously, given they being used
to justify the project, the customary authority and the people were omitted.
The Government strategy at the onset of REMNPAS was as follows (UNDP 2004, p.7):
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
ZAWA will concentrate on the National Parks having high tourism potential
so that they may be conservation hubs.
A protected area re-classification exercise would be conducted.
GRZ will pass new legislation supporting the protected area estate which
emerges.
Two new categories of protected area would be advanced:
1) Community Conservation Areas which would maximise incentives for
conservation for communities by giving nearly full control over resources and
the revenue derived from these resources while preventing conversion to
agriculture or other land uses, and
2) allowing portions of National Parks to be zoned as safari hunting areas,
converting them from cost centres to profit centres for ZAWA and requiring a
change in their legal status.
A range of PPPs would be developed.
Strengthening core systems and institutional level capacities.
Although REMNPAS had removed the ZAWA safari-hunting scheme from the project (J Robinson
2007, personal communication) it will, given the pronouncements of Minister Namugala on the need
for ZAWA to operate as a mercantile quango, inevitably be reconsidered.
However, the development of so-called Community Customary Areas have seen the light of day in the
Chiawa demonstration site in the Zambezi Valley, where community representatives, ZAWA and
local tourism operators agreed to create a new PA category out of the eastern part of the GMA and to
raise the protection status, the land to remain under customary tenure and governed in a partnership
between the resident community, ZAWA and local tourism operators. But this new category of
protected area, placed on customary land, signals a future change of land tenure - effectively alienation
by another name, this being the experience of Chief Nsefu, Chief Kasempa, and other chiefs in 19491954. All of this was engineered by UNDP who used a secular planning group called Future Search to
usher in the scheme.
94
As Chieftainess Chiawa assisted in the distribution of the Landsafe (then Chipuna) model to the House
of Chiefs, a system of chiefdom trusts accepted by them and submitted to the 5th National
Development Plan workshop by James Matale, the House of Chiefs' spokesman, as Chiefdom Trusts,
declaring that, ‘We should be allowed to retain absolute title to our land while giving investors and
non-subjects renewable lease rights under various chiefdom trusts’. Thus UNDP/GEF completely
ignored an indigenous system developed over 58 years, and injected a foreign one with ZAWA still
holding the reins of power, ignoring REMNPAS’ own stated willingness to allow communities to have
one institutional structure for all natural resources that ‘they manage or are to manage’ (UNDP 2004,
p. 46).
UNDP had identified South-East Bangweulu as one of the demonstration sites, and were unaware of
the recommendations of the Black Lechwe Project (1969-1976), a project that had sought first to save
the black lechwe from extinction, and then to ensure that the local inhabitants would benefit from
them in the future. In this second demonstration site where UNDP and ZAWA proposed their new
system (ZAWA effectively bankrupt by 2008 but saved by a K23 billion bail-out from the Medium
Term Expenditure Framework for 2008-2010), they conjured up an agreement with six chiefs within
the black lechwe range, an area totally neglected by ZAWA and by the National Wetland Management
Committee, the latter supposed to be in place under the RAMSAR Convention. Again, UNDP
appeared unaware of some important facts: i.e., that this site was greatly expanded by RAMSAR in
1991 to include all the three National Parks of the Bangweulu and their attendant GMAs.
There never was a plan to gazette part of the Bangweulu into a National Park, as it would have
impacted on local people in their annual movement with the floods in search of fish and lechwe. What
was proposed by the original Black Lechwe Project team, Grimsdell and Bell, who carried out a
seminal ecological study of the area, was the gazetting of a Special GMA, with the second choice
being the establishment of a National Park within it.
One forthright comment was made concerning this (R Shenton 2007, personal communication):
The UNDP reclassification project exhibits all the classic mistakes of an aid program:
i)
Supporting an institution that does not follow its own agenda of partnership
building, and one that has made no effort to decentralise or manage its finances see Auditor-General's report of 2005 on parastatals, and;
ii) using foreign consultants (Future Search) who appear to have no experience in
rural Africa when there are at least three community ownership projects run by
locals, two of them supported by a sister institution, WWF (Mpumba and
Mazabuka) and;
iii) dreaming up a big plan without extensive involvement of the local stakeholders
and with no reference to relevant past studies or paying heed to existing
conventions. Bound to fail at a cost to future generations.
Recently, management of the REMNPAS project were persuaded by a group of businessmen to the
idea of creating a conservancy in the Luembe Open Area. These businessmen had bought a major
share of M’nyamadzi Game Ranch within the Open Area, and had conspired to alienate part of the
adjoining West Mvuvye National Forest, but having failed to do the same on the rest of it, sought to
take over the adjoining Luembe Open Area. But, on discovering that the Luembe Conservancy Trust
held 60-year land user rights, and the agreement of the self-same chief – and 153 of his headmen - to a
Community Game Ranch, REMNPAS declined to back them (Manning 2007e). Subsequently, Senior
Chief Luembe, has decided to pursue matters again with his Royal Luembe Trust, applications being
made by him to REMNPAS for the registration of a Community Game Ranch.
95
7
7.1
NATIONAL AND LOCAL ORGANISATIONS
WECSZ: The Wildlife & Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia
In 1951, the Northern Rhodesia Game Preservation and Hunting Association was formed by two
hunters from the Copperbelt, E. Page and V. Dunstan, in order to lobby Government over the paucity
of hunting permits issued (Astle 1999, p.67). It was later taken over and steered forward by nonhunters, Erica and Col. Ronnie Critchley of Blue Lagoon, thenceforth being called the Wildlife
Conservation Society with funding and support from Anglo American under the Chairmanship of
David Gleason. Among the Society’s notable achievements were the formation of the Chongololo
clubs for school children, the financing and other support to the Black Lechwe Project - in tandem
with the World Wildlife Fund – and encouragement to a fledgling game ranching industry (Manning
1989). It is now called the Wildlife and Environment Conservation Society, a fairly inactive society
that avoids confrontation with Government, with the notable exception of the Livingstone Branch and
the campaign against the illegal alienation and development of land in Mosi oa Tunya National Park.
7.2
PHAZ: The Professional Hunters Association of Zambia
PHAZ was first conceived at a meeting before Independence between Ron Kidson, Keith Rowse,
Norman Carr and Peter Hankin, and the Director of the Game Department, Bill Steele (R Kidson
2009, personal communication, October), and established in 1965. Its principle role has been to vet
future applicants for a professional hunters’ licence, and to generally try and regulate PH affairs so
that hunting and safari standards and ethics are maintained. A medical doctor in Choma, Ed Naylor,
succeeded Ron Kidson as Chairman in the early 1970s, followed by David Frost in the 1980s.
7.3
SHOAZ: The Safari Hunter Operators Association of Zambia
The general operating climate for hunting safari companies in Zambia is poor, with operators not
willing to unite into a progressive industry exhibiting the necessary leadership and vision able to deal
with the major industry issues:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
declining game stocks,
disenfranchised local communities and CRBs,
venal quotas,
flawed lease agreements, and
major threats such as the possibility of lion being placed on Appendix 1 of CITES
as a result of overshooting, poisoning and habitat/prey species loss; and
vi) the removal of concessions without a proper legal basis - a constant worry given
Zambia’s mercurial handling of concessions.
This is not improved by the fact that SHOAZ has only seventeen or so members who, in addition to
having shown little taste for dealing with the serious matters to hand, are further weakened by the lack
of the necessary ZAWA support, and the fact that individual operators prefer to negotiate directly with
those having the necessary powers. The industry thus remains unregulated and intrinsically corrupt.
The Association has shown no interest in pursuing a Landsafe agenda that offers long-term security of
tenure for operators.
7.4
WPAZ: The Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia
See Chapter 3: Part II
96
8
ZAWA PERFORMANCE
Two consultancy reports on ZAWA (Changa Management Services 2006) and the Auditor-General’s
report of 2005 on parastatals revealed a dysfunctional and corrupt organisation. In the first, it was
revealed that the ZAWA management database was inadequate for effective management and
monitoring of the organisation; that key elements such as human resources had no databases that could
be accessed immediately (outside the payroll list); that income and expenditure data was not in an
integrated format (i.e. all sources of revenue and all expenditures in one database); that there was no
summary of infrastructural information at Headquarters, and that wildlife population monitoring data
was held in separate files and not designed to allow time series monitoring. The consultant further
revealed serious financial and managerial failings, stating that (Pope 2006):
i)
Creditors represent 107% of ZAWA’s total turnover and nearly doubled over the
five-year period to US$6.4 million;
ii) Total income is approximately US$14 million of which only 42% is internally
generated (US$5.9 million), and 67% of that is still contributed from huntingrelated activities;
iii) Turnover is stated as US$5.9 million in 2005 (i.e. 112% of revenue income and
62% of all income), but the budgeted and actual expenditure is US$9.5 million
(i.e. published turnover is only 62% of all expenditure);
iv) Budget allocation and budget utilisation figures for HQ, regional offices and Area
Management Units (AMUs) are identical, probably indicating that operating cost
demands exceed budgeted resources to the extent that 100% of every budget line
is consumed. But it would also suggest that there is smoothing of budget
reconciliations so that each budget allocation can be reconciled to the last
Kwacha;
v) More disturbing is the budget allocation trend. Over the three years 2003 to 2005
the HQ budget increased by 46%, while the global Regional office and AMU
budgets (where the real work is done) decreased by 4% and 19%, respectively;
vi) A final observation is that ZAWA was only able to increase its total budget by
11% over the period in Kwacha terms (approximately 2.5% per annum) against a
national inflation rate of between 15% and 25%. In real terms the budget declined
by 0.3% over the period.
The second report, which assessed the current status of ZAWA’s strategic plan implementation (20012005), revealed considerable flaws. At the inaugural meeting at ZAWA HQ to launch the WB funded
assessment, attended by the NRCF (represented by the author), UNDP, NORAD, the World Bank,
ZAWA, the just quoted consultant, and the World Bank consultants, it was admitted by the senior
ZAWA officers present that they had barely looked at the plan, let alone followed its prescriptions. It
was agreed that the review of the plan would be carried out with the assistance of the NRCF as the
host for meetings attended by the private sector and Government, funded by UNDP. None of this
occurred, but two reports were produced, a draft and a final report.
The consultants to ZAWA, tasked to produce a strategic review, first produced a draft report that
contained some glaring omissions and errors.46 The report made clear that ZAWA expenditure was,
like the national Zambian budget, largely uncontrolled. Furthermore, whilst mandated to protect a very
large protected area estate, ZAWA had since 2001 spent a mere 7% - 18% of its total expenditure on
operations, i.e. biodiversity research and protection. The organisation had also not been able to meet
its statutory tax commitments, and 48% of income over the five-year period was from donor grants,
not 25% as reported. It was also unclear whether CRB incomes in the financial section were gross or
net, i.e. income after the CRBs had been paid - the consultants being unable to clarify the issue, but
saying at the time that it would be corrected in the final report. However, the final report carried the
46
I.P.A. Manning, letter to World Bank, Lusaka, 2006.
97
same errors, omitted any mention of the National Policy on the Environment (NPE), and contained
considerable padding and a poor understanding of the ZAWA areas of responsibility. A study of the
conclusions and changes made in the final report, with parts of the draft report table for comparison,
revealed that expenditure listed under establishment had been reduced, and operations increased. In
addition to this, the Auditor-General’s report of 2005 on ZAWA reported that:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
ZAWA collected revenue below the budgeted amounts during the period under
review.
ZAWA had net current liabilities of K2,699 million, K2,133 million and K12,687
million for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. ZAWA could clearly not
pay its liabilities when they fell due. The liquidity position worsened dramatically
in 2005.
ZAWA does not hold title to its buildings despite enjoying economic benefits
from the buildings, and had not taken stock of its properties since its
establishment in 1998.
ZAWA terminated the contract of the Director-General, who was paid an
irregular termination payment of K550,488,842.
Imprests totalling K368,346,544.08 were outstanding for more than ninety days
as of 31st December 2005.
Contrary to ZAWA regulations, which stipulated that salary advances must be
recovered within three months, amounts totalling K175,065,703 relating to salary
advances to 261 members of staff were outstanding for more than two years
without effecting recoveries.
Amounts totalling K1,300,233,627 (converted at K3500:$1, this equals $371,495)
was owed by nineteen operators who had since abandoned their projects and left
the country, or were wrongly classified; and could not be collected. Consequently,
ZAWA management applied to the Board to write off these debts.
In November 2006, the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee took submissions from ZAWA:
i)
The D-G had received K207 million from the People and Parks Foundation
without the permission of the Minister, this spent on upgrading his office and
other parts of the ZAWA HQ.
ii) Note was taken of the income/expenditure for the three year period but no
comment was made of the fact that the community share of income fell from
K20,878 million in 2003 to 3,345 million in 2004 and K4,315 million in 2005.
iii) The D-G was dismissed in December 2004 and was then illegally paid
K335,488,842 by the Financial Director. The D-G then claimed a further
K215,000,000 in allowances. This was referred to the Board who gave permission
for the amount to be paid in April 2006; again, illegally. The Committee censured
the Board and ZAWA and instructed them to recover the money.
iv) The amounts of K1,300,233,627 owed by nineteen operators and not collected
was written off.
Committee Observations and Recommendations:
i)
Your Committee observe that there was poor cooperation from ZAWA as these
responses could have been provided during the audit process. They, therefore,
urge the Controlling Officers to advise the Board and Management of ZAWA to
accord the audit process its due regard. Your Committee further observe that,
whilst the figures for the Hippo culling exercise may not have been accurately
reported, the action that ZAWA took was against the spirit in which the project
was developed. They, therefore, recommend that ZAWA should uphold the
agreement to sustain donor confidence. They further recommend that documents
98
relating to the payments to the South Luangwa Area Management Unit for the
Hippo culling exercise, and remittances of collections for Chichele Lodge should
be submitted to the Auditor-General for verification. The Controlling Officer
should report progress on the acquisition of title deeds for the South Luangwa
Area Management Unit property.
ii) Waterfront Lodge in the Mosi oa Tunya National Park had obtained title details
illegally. These were cancelled and a tourism lease entered into.
iii) In accordance with the Income Tax Act, every employer was required to remit
PAYE to the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA). During the period under review,
it was observed that ZAWA had not been remitting PAYE. As at 30th June 2006,
the outstanding PAYE stood at K19,656,327,267.
iv) It was also observed that the Authority had not remitted pension contributions for
its employees in amounts totalling K3,544,973,232 as at August 2006. The issue
was brought to the attention of the Board at its 4th meeting held on Friday, 16th
May, 2003 by the Finance Committee, though no action had been taken as at
October 2006. ‘Your Committee observe that, whilst ZAWA can propose to
write-off outstanding taxes or be considered for a tax waiver, this is not the case
with pension fund obligations’. 47
9
ZAWA INCORPORATED
Although endowed with a wealth of natural resources, Zambia, forty-five years after attaining selfgovernment, is under environmental siege. A number of factors contribute to a downward spiral of
land capability impairing the prospects for rural people’s upliftment, a situation reiterated in the
preamble to Zambia’s draft National Policy on Environment of 2005. These include the now rampant
abuse of the savannah by fire - a major contributor to global dimming - and the increasing brittleness
of the environment, lowering herbivore carrying capacity and leading progressively to desertification;
the depletion of wildlife due to poaching to supply the bushmeat and ivory trade; the second highest
deforestation rate in Africa brought about by shifting agriculture and the legal and illegal charcoal and
timber trade; and the overfishing and pollution of its rivers and lakes.
The conversion of the Government mandate for its wildlife and protected areas - and for the customary
communities living in GMAs - from a government department with a professional civil servant as
Permanent Secretary and advisor to a Minister, to a parastatal within a Ministry having a short-term
contracted appointee as Permanent Secretary, one instructed by the Minister in whom the powers of
patronage ultimately rest, would inevitably place income generation above custodial responsibility,
although this has over time been denied.48 The speech in March 2009 by the Minister of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources to Parliament makes it clear that ZAWA will now openly
function as a state-owned trading company:49
Further, ZAWA will this year start implementing a number of additional programmes
aimed at increasing its revenue base. These programmes include a live sale auctioning
of game; participation in the capture of animals for local and international game
ranching; venison business by curling50 of abundant species to supply game meat in
butcheries so that members of the public can have access to game meat; establish
47
Report of the public accounts committee on the report of the Auditor-General for 2005 on the accounts of
parastatal bodies for the first session of the tenth National Assembly appointed by the resolution of the House
on 10th November 2006.
48
Lisulo, Walusiku. 15 January, 2007. “We will no longer place wildlife conservation behind income
generation.” Statement of the Chairman of the Zambia Wildlife Authority Board to the Mulungushi Truce
Meeting called by Minister Pande of MTENR.
49
Minister’s speech to National Assembly, 17 March 2009, page 5 of 7.
50
Culling.
99
tourism block concessions in all National Parks and increase tourism sites, thereby,
inviting more investors; and the Lusaka National Park Project, where attractive key
species will be introduced for the purposes of creating among others activities,
photographic tours. The establishment of the Lusaka National Park has reached an
advanced stage.
The Minister appears to have ignored the advice of the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament:
As efforts to improve the financial performance and position of the Authority are being
made, your Committee further advise the Controlling Officer to ensure that the
fundamental reasons for creating ZAWA are observed, that is, wildlife protection and
conservation. This should not be compromised for mere monetary gain.51
As a state-owned trading company that has a monopoly over the awarding of hunting concessions
agreements, hunting permits, capture permits, tourism concession agreements and now a directly
controlled and operated business (i.e. game meat), it should therefore not be exempt from the
conditions laid out under the Competition and Fair Trade Act of 1994 which the Zambia Competition
Commission (ZCC) is mandated to uphold. 52 However the ZCC made a statement on 19th May 2009
announcing proposals to lift the exemption of state-owned companies from the application of the Act –
there to regulate monopolies and concentrations of economic power – although, as a recent article in a
Zambian newspaper stated: ‘There is nowhere in the Act where the exemption is conferred on stateowned companies’ (Kashita 2009). Clearly political pressure has been brought to bear on the ZCC so
as to remove any obstacles to ZAWA operating as an untrammelled business where patronage
opportunities will be considerable.
9.1
Live animal translocation
The last few years has seen the capture and translocation of animals with little regard for extant subspecies and varieties or of conservation principles in general. In The Post of 22 July 2008, ZAWA
advertised the sale of 150 buffalo from the Luangwa protected area estate, 100 crocodile from Kafue
NP, 240 impala from Lower Zambezi NP, 110 wildebeest and 20 tsessebe from Liuwa Plain NP, 50
zebra from Blue Lagoon NP, 20 hartebeest from Kafue NP, and 50 and 100 sable from Mushingashi
Game Ranch and the Stacey ranch (Mkushi) respectively. Neither African Parks in Liuwa, or Stacey,
had been informed of this, the latter obtaining a court injunction prohibiting the sale. Later, he and
ZAWA agreed to share the sable progeny and Stacey was then given ownership of the animals on his
ranch, the planned game auction being allowed to proceed. At the auction, buffalo sales were flaccid
until a ZAWA official stated that buffalo from the Luangwa are Foot and Mouth free, despite the fact
that the Luangwa is notorious for the disease.
After the auction, ZAWA issued export permits to South African and Namibian buyers for the 280
sable purchased, despite the fact that those countries will not allow for their import, raising the spectre
immediately of corruption and illegal exports. Zambian sable already exist in South Africa, having
been illegally smuggled out of the country in the past. This illegal trade continues with reports of sable
being smuggled out in a Dakota aircraft by a criminal gang.
In the late dry season of 2010 it is reported that more animals are being captured in the Kafue National
Park: 100 buffalo calves for African Parks, 50 sable for Peter Fisher, and an undisclosed number of
wildebeest and hippo, some of the latter tranquilised opposite the old Ntemwa camp in a prime tourist
area operated by Wilderness Safaris, one dying and another two, still drugged, being released back
into the river.
51
Report of the public accounts committee on the report of the Auditor-General for 2005 on the accounts of
parastatal bodies for the first session of the tenth National Assembly appointed by the resolution of the House
on 10th November 2006.
52
Competition and Fair Trade Act of 1994.
100
9.2
Game meat
ZAWA will have to act on the Ministerial speech by putting out to tender game cropping quotas in
National Parks and GMAs. These will be based on unscientific quotas, will cause considerable
disturbance and additional loss through wounding, spoilt carcass replacement, over shooting and other
corrupt processes, and will encourage ZAWA to avoid co-management agreements with customary
communities, both in customary areas – be they Open Area or GMA – and in National Parks. As
offtakes in game areas by the bushmeat trade are already unsustainable, this will further impact on
wildlife stocks. It will also allow illegally obtained game meat to be mixed with that of legal meat put
up for sale in butcheries.
101
10
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11
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Précis of five evaluations of ADMADE carried out between1992
and 1998 (Clarke 2000).
Appendix 2: Principal conclusions from a review of Kasanka (Pope, 2006).
Appendix 3: CITES 15th CoP uses of wildlife
106
Appendix 1: Précis of five evaluations of ADMADE carried out between 1992 and 1998 (cited in
Clarke 2000).
BENEFITS
NEGATIVES
• Meeting objectives to demonstrate that
wildlife can be a profitable form of land
use, and that benefits derived from
wildlife management can be distributed to
local people;
• Demonstrating progress towards
increasing the welfare of local
communities, increasing participation by
women and returning benefits from local
use of wildlife to communities;
• Increased local employment;
• Training and deployment of lawenforcement personnel, which resulted in
reduced illegal hunting;
• Successfully convincing local people of
the values of wildlife conservation;
(Alpert & DeGeorges 1992)
• Had not yet succeeded in establishing self-sustaining
wildlife management programmes;
• Had not yet succeeded in influencing national policies
governing rights of ownership over wild animals;
• Unlikely to demonstrate the ability of local communities to
manage wildlife unaided although it had shown that
communities could manage local development projects.
IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRED
• Wildlife monitoring and research capacity;
• Internal communications within the ADMADE program;
• Consistency of management and record keeping;
• Persuading officials and leaders to share authority with
lower levels;
• Financial accounting and increase revenues;
• Vehicle maintenance.
That adequate technical knowledge for natural • Lack of will on the part of GRZ to follow through existing
resource management, land use planning,
policies or to commit sufficient resources to the wildlife
community development and other relevant
sector;
issues existed, (ULG 1994).
• Insufficient attention by NPWS to address constraints to
the Project’s success;
•
Insufficient attention to management issues on the part of
USAID offices in Lusaka, Harare and Washington DC;
• Monitoring systems were not yet producing sufficient data
to determine whether or not natural resource management
or the lives of local people had been improved;
• The community development component had not got
started, and was beset with policy, management and
personality problems; there was minimal coordination
between the conservation and community development
components of the Project, which often competed for the
limited local resources being generated;
•
While the program is not mature, it has
achieved a degree of sustainability. Even
without further USAID funding, the
ADMADE program, or something like it,
would continue.
(Rosenthal & Sowers 1995)
Complete and accurate data were unavailable for the Wildlife
Conservation Revolving Fund (WCRF), making it impossible
to analyse availability or use of funds, and that little effort
seemed to be made by NPWS to address this problem.
• GRZs adoption of a wildlife policy has given needed
official support to the principal of community-based
management. But institutional changes were needed in
NPWS to give greater support to ADMADE;
• The concept of community-based natural resource
management is now seen to be workable in Zambia, and
the Zambian sport hunting industry has positive economic
benefits that can be passed on to local rural people;
• A new initiative is needed to assist local communities in
planning and conducting management programs for
conservation and development;
• Management of the WCRF had improved since the last
assessment;
• WWF-US had been unable to provide leadership and
coordination, and NPWS had allowed technical leadership to
be controlled at Nyamaluma. The Research and Training
107
BENEFITS
NEGATIVES
Centre at Nyamaluma was an asset but needed
strengthening, and its role in other fields clearly specified
to ensure its continued support of NPWS;
• Monitoring of wildlife and economic development still
needed improvement;
• The Technical Assistant needs to spend less time on
community development, and that more Zambians be
trained to carry out research and monitoring and how to
use the information derived from them;
• Village Scouts (who are trained at Nyamaluma) were
functioning well under trying conditions but needed
stronger leadership.
• Sound in conception, design and
• The report recommended that radical alternations were
implementation;
unnecessary but that efforts should be made to increase the
share of hunting revenues used to finance resource.
• An effective and cost-effective system of
wildlife conservation and
• No suggestions were made as to how much the increase
should be or how it might be achieved.
• Community development financially and
politically sustainable, wherever an area
had been ‘secured’.
(MANO 1998)
This report noted that improvements were
visible in WCRF’s financial management and
its operations were now transparent and
sufficient revenues were being generated
from hunting licences to achieve financial
self-sustainability.
(Ernst & Young 1998).
• Absence of accounting records in some GMAs to support
alleged expenditure of money received from WRCF;
• Absence of co-ordination and direction in and between
WRCF, NPWS and LIRDP;
• Duplication was leading to wasted resources.
• GMA residents allege that absence of a ceiling to special
licence issue results in lost revenue opportunities;
• Absence of communication between WRCF and GMAs
regarding accounting for funds and licence issue.
• The report noted that WCRF would become financial
managers within ZAWA when the latter was established,
and it identified three areas where continued need for
financial support would exist.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The College: the report recommended that USAID support
current activities but on a larger scale, and that
management courses be introduced for senior ZAWA
employees;
• Major capital investment in plant and vehicles and radios;
• Internal auditors be employed to review the work of
Bookkeepers trained at Nyamaluma and working at the
headquarters of the four proposed management units - the
four headquarters would, in turn, monitor their GMAs;
• Financial support would be needed to establish the four
offices but thereafter they would be sustained by revenue
from the GMAs.
108
Appendix 2: Principal conclusions from a review of Kasanka (Pope, 2006).
Data provided from Kasanka indicate that record keeping is not a strength in the private sector either.
In many cases data in replication format could only be provided readily for the last one or two years.
The National Park covers 420 km2, but the Trust also provides inputs to the surrounding areas,
including the Kafinda GMA (3,860 km2).
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
although the Kasanka Trust considers the PPP arrangement generally satisfactory,
they consider their working relationship with ZAWA to be less than satisfactory;
staffing levels have grown steadily over the period 1990 to 2005 to a total of 60
(excluding lodge staff) [representing 0.14 management staff/km2];
donor contribution has declined by 74% since 1995 to US$74,000, but income
from tourism activities has increased substantially to US$272,000 in 2005
[US$648/km2] (it should be noted that ZAWA does have any internally-generated
commercial tourism income but total non-consumptive income from tourism
operators is equivalent to some US$33/km2);
tourist numbers were not available for previous years but only 1,100 tourists
visited in 2005 [0.26 tourists/km2/year];
total income is in the region of US$325,000, but total expenditure US$234,000
[approximately US$190/km2 – assuming a 20% inputs to non-National Park areas.
A generally accepted value range for field management costs is US$50 - 150/km2.
ZAWA’s total field expenditure is equivalent to US$101/km2];
law enforcement data were only available for 2000 and 2005, but patrols declined
from 8 to 6 per month between those years, numbers of arrests declined by 46%
to 43 in 2005, but somewhat anomalously firearm recoveries increased by 175%
over the period to 14 and snare recoveries increased by 168% to 1,437 in 2005.
(Clearly patrols are better at collecting contraband (possibly because patrol days
have increased), but poachers are either carrying more contraband each, or they
have developed better techniques for evading capture);
infrastructure investments in roads have increased by 50km with a total
maintained distance of 250km [1.68km/km2];
wildlife research projects and surveys have been continued but at a limited level
(one or two projects);
Kasanka works with an increasing number of village groups and projects (10
village action groups, 5 women’s groups and 30 natural resource projects in
2005);
Wildlife numbers recorded from roadside counts show highly variable results that
have some correlation with annual rainfall. The averaged position for 9 species
(elephant, puku, warthog, bush pig, common duiker, bushbuck, waterbuck,
reedbuck, and hartebeest) indicates a 2% increase in numbers over the period
1999 to 2005 (which is low in comparison the common rates of natural increase
for wild, large mammal populations). Hartebeest numbers have declined in recent
years.
While the dataset is insufficient to draw firm conclusions there are more positive indicators than
negative ones, suggesting that the PPP arrangement is working and is sufficiently attractive to
encourage further investment by the Kasanka Trust. At the very least some data is available and there
are some positive management trends – outcomes that most of Zambia’s small National Parks cannot
match without the benefit of similar resource inputs’.
109
Appendix 3: CITES CoP15 proposals and comments
1.
LEGAL
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL
TO CITES
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
The Wildlife Act establishes
ZAWA whose ‘functions
include the establishment,
control and management of
Game Management Areas
(GMAs)’.
2. RISKS
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
COMMENTS
The CITES Panel and the CITES
Secretariat do not fully appreciate
the primacy of customary law and
the Lands Act over the Wildlife
Act in respect of the rights of
customary landholders. ZAWA
only has control of the wildlife on
customary land, i.e. that part of it
designated GMA.
COMMENTS
Primary risk to elephant in
Zambia is not international trade
but conflicts with humans
There is no clear relationship
between one-off sales and
poaching levels.
From Wasser et al 2010:
Does legal sale influence levels of
poaching across Africa?
Situations where humans rise
against the elephant as a result
cannot be tolerated
Disappearance of subpopulations cannot be ruled out
without meaningful investment.
Outside interference on
Zambia’s decisions are attacks
on national sovereignty and are
not welcome.
Lower Zambezi decline will
affect people currently
benefiting from hunting. Levels
of poaching need to be reduced.
That question could not be
resolved, partly because MIKE
(Monitoring Illegal Killing of
Elephant), created by CITES in
1997 to assess poaching rates on a
continental scale, is unable to
deliver data relevant to the
causality mandate.
Elephant populations support
human livelihoods through the
return of hunting revenues.
Survival of elephant ‘depends
on mitigation of elephant
conflicts and community
benefits and active community
involvement and participation in
dealing with these problems’.
110
3. PROTECTION MEASURES
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
CITES
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
2006-2007 reduction of poached
animals by 23% and elephant by
62%.
(These figures are not credible
given that between 1994 and
2002 there were 19 shipments of
ivory going through Lilongwe in
Malawi and bound or
Singapore which would have
meant about 1,750 elephant
were poached annually and
handled by one criminal gang –
most of it coming from the
Luangwa).
Anti-poaching sometimes
hampered by delays in salaries
for CRB scouts
(very long delays in some cases,
a major factor in converting
village scouts into agents of the
criminal gangs).
(The African Elephant Status
Report of 2007, compiled by the
African Elephant Specialist
Group, estimated that there
were 16,562 elephant in
Zambia)53
(The pro-hunting organisation,
The International Council for
Game and Wildlife
Conservation support Zambia’s
application for down-listing and
for an increase from 20 to 120
elephant for trophy hunting,
accepting the ZAWA estimate of
its population and its
undertaking that it would share
50% of income with local
communities; no evidence of
such actions being so far
recorded. 54 However, were
ZAWA to apply for 120
From Wasser et al (2010):
The petitioning countries are major
sources and conduits of Africa’s
illegal ivory:
These large seizures are indicative
of organised crime and suggest that
Tanzania and Zambia's abilities to
address these challenges are
considerably compromised.
Zambia and Tanzania are among
the largest sources of, and transit
countries for, Africa’s illegal ivory.
4. ELEPHANT POPULATION ESTIMATES
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
CITES
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
Estimate of 26,382 elephant
arrived at from aerial census
using stratified sampling
techniques.
COMMENTS
First countrywide survey (70%)
gave estimate of 26,382 (95%
CL)
In Bangweulu elephant only
seen in Kasanka.
(Inaccurate report as they range
throughout the south-east)
Elephant possibly moving into
Congo.
(They move constantly back and
forth hence calls from mid-30’s
for a transfrontier area)
Elephant surveys suggest a
minimum of 16,562 and
maximum of 29,229 so that no
clear overall population trend is
evident.
Carcass ratios were highest in
the Lower Zambezi suggesting a
declining population.
(This should include the GMAs
and Open Areas lying to the
south of the South Luangwa
National Park (Chisomo, West
53
COMMENTS
(The ZAWA report on the aerial
census is not on their website and
has not been reviewed and the
findings presented.)
Wasser et al 2010:
Transparent, scientific peer review
of census methods and results is
needed for verification.
The proportion of elephant
mortality attributed to illegal
killing (PIKE)—an index of
poaching threat - is rising in
Zambia, with record levels of 88%
in 2008. Monitoring data for
Zambia are deficient, with small
sample sizes limiting
interpretation.
MIKE, the system of verification,
is currently unable to meet its full
mandate, and an analysis
integrating data from both MIKE
and ETIS is lacking.
In the absence of data,
precautionary principles should be
URL:http://www.african-elephant.org/aed/aesr2007.html. Accessed: 2010-03-11. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5o93qBbpt)
54
URL:http://www.cic-wildlife.org/index.php?id=510. Accessed: 2010-03-13. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5oByZSD33)
111
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES
elephant hunting licences as
an Appendix I country, such
application would be allowed
by CITES)
5. SAFARI HUNTING
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES
1.
2.
3.
4.
Hunting will be based on a
scientifically based quota
system from a given
hunting block.
Quota too low to generate
funds for conservation and
CBNRM.
.5% offtake allowed.
Request an increase of
permits to 120 trophy
animals.
(If only 60% of 20 elephant on
quota a year are being shot and
with a decline in ivory weight
and length, this is illogical)
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
Petauke, Luano etc)
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
Hunting can still be permitted
under Appendix 1.
Trophy hunting regulated and
has minimum size of 15 kg per
tusk (33 pounder) and 150 cm
per tusk (5 foot).
Hunting results: 13 out of 118
tusks less than 33 lbs; and 22
out of 118 less than 5 ft. During
2005 – 2009, 60 shot out of 100
on quota.
Quota of 4 in Lower Zambezi;
16 in Lupande GMA.
Average tusk declined from
23.1 kg in 2005 to 19.6 kg in
2009.
(50 down to 43 pounders)
Accumulation of 112 trophy
tusks from other causes is large
increase in year 2000-2004 and
should be factored into quota
setting.
Declining trophy quality
suggests need for a
precautionary approach such as
gradual increase in trophy
hunting quota, accompanied by
close monitoring of trophy
quality.
112
COMMENTS
applied.
COMMENTS
15% by weight and 25% by length
of the offtake were illegal– and the
fact that only 60% of the 20 animal
quota was shot – suggests that the
alpha bull age class are in short
supply, the result of poaching and
control measures with alpha
raiding bulls being shot instead of
linked cow herds.
No mention is made of what ZAWA
did with the PHs and operators
who erred in bull trophy selection,
or what they will do in the future.
Original quota requested was
based on ‘20 known crop raiders’.
This suggests hunters have
difficulty in finding shootable bulls
even of such low standard. In
Lower Zambezi hunters shot known
alpha bulls near lodges A 33
pounder is not an elephant trophy
of acceptable standard. Setting the
standard at 65 pounds would
obviate the need for setting quotas
and would assure genetic health
The NRCF advised that no sport
hunting quotas should be issued
until quotas and acceptable
standards were in place; failing
which the precautionary principle
should be followed. The NRCFs
advice was ignored, and promises
made by the DG ZAWA to consult
widely, ignored.
6. ENHANCEMENT OF RURAL LIVELIHOODS
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
CITES
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
7.
All revenue will be used for
conservation (incl.
monitoring, research and
law enforcement) plus
development of
communities.
Economic returns required
for local people which will
be met by acceptance of
proposals
Well developed CBNRM in
Zambia.
African elephant is not a
global resource.
Prohibition of trade would
be detrimental to elephant.
Elephant should contribute
to the rural economy.
CITES should acknowledge
the effective conservation
measures in Zambia that
have led to the recovery of
the elephant.
Advisable to maintain
populations at low densities
as it may lead to
environment destruction
and may contribute to
global warming.
Elephant must yield
economic returns to
landholders.
A fund is already
operational in Zambia
where income from hunting
is shared on a 50/50 basis.
(No proof of this provided)
From 2005-2009 $6,171,126
disbursed to 56 CRBs. This is
40% of total hunting revenue
($15,429,920) and $21,653 to
each CRB.
Hunting revenues disbursed
quarterly upon receipt of reports
by from CRBs.
CRB Chiawa 2009 received
$50,400. CRB had statement
from ZAWA.
The CRB allocates 20% to
admin; 35% to comm. projects;
45% to wildlife management.
Panel believes that funds from
ivory sales and hunting ‘could
help to improve tolerance of
elephant by local communities,
reducing number shot on
control’.
Conservation disadvantage of
communities ‘came to regard
non-tolerance of elephant as
preferable because they were
regarded as a source of income.
Adoption of proposal would be
positive if funds channelled to
conservation and development
programmes.
COMMENTS
The CITES Panel has accepted
ZAWA reports at face value.
Numerous CRBs are owed money
for payment of village scouts, let
alone having funds for
development. This is corroborated
by the Parliamentary Public
Accounts Committee report to
Parliament 2006 and the AuditorGeneral’s report of 2005, as well
as the reports of a number of
CRBs
Insufficient funds to do this.
CBNRM is notable for its failure in
Zambia.
Panel fails to go beyond the
discredited ‘benefits’ issue.
SPECIES MANAGEMENT
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
CITES
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
•
•
•
COMMENTS
•
Protected areas are
managed to ensure minimal
disturbance and the
provision of security.
Secure the goodwill of
communities through
problem animal control.
In 2003 ZAWA formulated
an elephant management
policy.
•
113
Most National Parks – let
alone GMAs - receive no
management or protection.
Communities receive little
protection or compensation.
8.
HISTORY
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES
Elephant reduced by
‘disproportionate hunting’
during the colonial era, as well
as population increase and
agricultural activities.
Compounded by falling copper
prices and rising oil prices
forcing people to poach.
(This is the politically correct
and historically incorrect
answer)
9.
CITES SECRETARIAT
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
COMMENTS
Secretariat writes: at 1900
country had a small elephant
population estimated to be
12,000 by mid 1930’s; and then
‘increased steadily’ until mid
1970 followed by poaching.
Suggests population higher than
it was three generations ago
(1934).
There is no evidence of
‘disproportionate hunting during
the British Colonial period. The
elephant were reduced during the
pre-British period i.e. during the
Bantu colonial period preceding it.
(Selective reading of Pitman
report of 1934. In 1935 in
Northern Rhodesia, 4,600 were
shot to protect villages (plus
573 killed on licence) – a total
of 5,173; the same amount
again wounded and 60 -70% or
so dying later. Some 8, 000
elephant, all males would have
been shot, the sex-selection
policy since 1917. This would
suggest a very much larger
population ( source: The
Journal of the Society for the
Preservation of the Wild Fauna
of the Empire, xxxiii(1938),
pp.44).
De-colonisation, the closure of
safari hunting in Kenya, the
implementation of the Watershed
Speech of June 1975 and the
weakening of the power of the
chiefs, the destruction of the Native
Authorities and the removal of
Europeans from the Game
Department in Zambia, the
presence of a ready market in the
Chinese TAZARA workers, these
are the factors that led to the
killing fields.
Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) and contiguous populations across borders
ZAMBIA’S PROPOSAL TO
CITES EXPERTS PANEL
COMMENTS
CITES
REPORT ON ZAMBIA
Sub-populations contiguous
with populations in
neighbouring countries, hence
support for TFCAs.
Wasser et al 2010:
CITES decisions should be based
not only on national trends in
population size and illegal killing
but also on trends for subpopulations within ecological
aggregations (some of which span
national boundaries).
(Why were the ‘owners’ of these
sub-populations, i.e. the
adjoining countries, not
consulted about Zambia’s wish
to down-list? Note Congo
adjoining Sumbu and Kasanka
NPs; and Tete Province in
Mozambique, and Zimbabwe).
114
CHAPTER 3:
SAFARI HUNTING AND WILDLIFE BASED TOURISM
115
ACRONYMS
ADMADE
BSA Company
CBD
CBO
CCA
CEE Act
CITES
CRB
D-G
GDP
GEF
GMA
GRZ
HCA
HQ
IATA
ICS
JFMA
LR
MMD
MoU
MTENR
NAMAC
NGO
NORAD
NP
NPE
NPWS
NRCF
PH
PPP
PWE
REMNPAS
SEED
SHOAZ
SLAMU
TCA
TCZ
UNDP
WLPAZ
WPO
WWF
ZAWA
ZDA
ZNTB
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
British South Africa Chartered Company
Convention on Biological Diversity
Community-Based Organisation
Community Conservation Area
Citizen Economic Empowerment Act
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora
Community Resource Board
Director General ZAWA
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Fund
Game Management Area
Government of Zambia
Hunting Concession Agreement
Headquarters
International Air Transport Association
International Conservation Services
Joint Forest Management Agreement
Leopard Ridge
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Memorandum of Understanding
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
National Movement Against Corruption
Non-Governmental Organisation
Norwegian Agency for Development-Cooperation
National Park
National Policy on Environment
National Park and Wildlife Service
Natural Resources Consultative Forum
Professional Hunter
Public Private Partnership
Private Wildlife Estate
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification
Safari Hunting Operators Association of Zambia
South Luangwa Management Unit/ZAWA
Tourism Concession Agreement
Tourism Council of Zambia
United Nations Development Programme
Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia
Wildlife Police Officer
World Wildlife Fund for Nature
Zambia Wildlife Authority
Zambia Development Agency
Zambia National Tourism Board
116
PART I:
Safari hunting
Professional hunting, one of the oldest Zambian industries, started in the 1890’s when native African
hunters, often members of elite hunting guilds - the aChiwinda - guided the occasional explorer and
big-game hunters in pursuit of elephant and other game (Melland 1938), (Manning 2006a). Although
native Zambians rarely lead safaris as professional hunters, they still hunt on licence for themselves,
unlike in Kenya where both safari hunting and hunting by native Kenyans was banned in 1977
(Steinhart 2006, p.1).
From 1902, some hunters, mainly British settlers and ex-members of the British South Africa
Chartered Company (BSA Company), began hunting safari operations (Hughes 1933), (Lyell 1910),
(Manning 1995), (MacKenzie 1997, p.136). This continued between the wars. In 1949, the
Government Conducted Hunting Scheme was started by the Game Department in the Luangwa and as
part of the publicity drive a booklet was produced (Federal Tourist Office 1950). Norman Carr was
placed in charge and was joined by Bert Schultz, and later in 1950 by Barry Shenton and a contractor,
Peter Hankin, with 50% of net income accruing to the Native Authority. But, perhaps inevitably,
conservation gave way to protection and nationalisation, when, late in 1950, Nsefu became a special
Game Reserve, in 1954 a full Game Reserve, and in 1972 was joined with the South Luangwa Game
Reserve to form the present South Luangwa National Park. To this was added the Luambe Game
Reserve, also once part of the scheme. The significance of the two Luangwa-based operations
continues to be felt today as numerous efforts are made across Zambia and Africa to have wildlife
provide earnings for traditional communities. Unfortunately, shortly after they attained protected
status, benefits for the former residents ceased.
1
HUNTING CONCESSIONS
In 1962, the Government Controlled Hunting scheme run by the Game Department was closed and
then awarded to Luangwa Safaris under Peter Hankin and Norman Carr. Shortly after, Zambia Safaris
began operations, founded by Ron Kidson and Keith Rouse. After 1975, with the National Parks and
Wildlife Service (NPWS) now Zambianised, the patronage system came into force and a plethora of
companies were given concessions, a number of them to businessmen attracted by the opportunity to
obtain foreign exchange.
In 1991 they were reduced to twenty-one outfitters, the patronage system gaining impetus as a result
of the Chiluba MMD regime coming in to power. In the years 1992-1995, tenders for the first fouryear concessions were held, followed in 1995 for the 1996-2000 concessionary period. Corruption in
the 1995 tenders brought the industry to a standstill and affected Administrative Management Design
for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) and NPWS operations (Clarke 2000). In that year a safari
company was paid money in very irregular circumstances. It started with the refund of foreign
currency payments by a company from NPWS. The safari company later sued Government for nonpayment on account of some misinterpreted policy provision at the time for foreign currency
transactions. Though Government won the case, it later paid damages of US$2.32 million against the
court ruling. The amount appears in the Auditor-General’s report for 1995 as an expenditure loss
(Djokotoe & Chama 2007, p.68). To put this in perspective, in the period 2003-2005, those of the 29
safari company concessionaires holding one of the twelve Prime concessions paid $32,500 each for
them – other categories paying smaller fees - and licence fees paid per hunting safari were usually no
more than $10,000 per hunting client. A million dollars would therefore be the most that ZAWA could
expect to earn, a large slice going to the CRBs. Thus, in 1995, the amount of US$2.32 million in
damages represents more than ZAWA’s annual income from hunting, and a far greater percentage of
what the CRBs – acting on behalf of the villagers - could expect.
117
1.1
The first 25 concessions: 2003 – 2012 (Appendix 1)
In 2001, President Chiluba banned safari hunting. In 2002, the Minister cancelled the results of the
new concessions won by tender and awarded them to those he favoured, ‘administratively’. This led to
court injunctions by the illegally denied operators, with the actions of the Minister overthrown in
August 2003, one of these being the removal of the prime hunting concession, Nyampala, obtained by
Rashid Randera, and given back to Leopard Ridge Safaris from whom it had illegally been removed.
This event was to have repercussions a few years later with the former Nyampala concessionaire
embarking on a campaign to win it back.
In 2003 only 30% of the safari quota was utilised, this in part due to the fact that six Prime areas of the
twelve were not hunted due to the litigation – although ZAWA, reporting to the Public Accounts
Committee in November 2006, stated that no hunting had taken place until 2004 – given as the reason
for the reduced income based on their projections that 60% of the quota would be shot. The twentyfive concessions awarded by tender in January of 2003 resulted in some chiefs banning the issue of
District Game Licences in their areas.55 The twenty-five blocks (twelve Prime, seven Secondary and
six Understocked areas), were taken up by nineteen operators for ten years. Given that 50% of the topearning Prime areas were under court injunction for the season, and that little or no income was
expected from Understocked areas for five years, hunting income in 2003 had to rely on six Prime and
six Secondary areas i.e. 50% of the blocks awarded. Moreover, given the late date of the awards,
insufficient time was available to market hunts, placing enormous pressure on the operators, or on
those to whom they had sub-leased.
In 2005, ZAWA reported to Parliament again that there was a recovery in hunting quota utilisation and
that it was expected that revenue collection would improve, but that the appreciation of the kwacha
was the main contributor to the negative variance of K2,095 million registered.56
Two wetland areas, Kafue and Bangweulu, were classified as open access areas in which no particular
operator held concessionary rights; quite understandable given that they were the only areas in Zambia
where kafue and black lechwe were to be found.
In the Chiawa GMA, one part of which is a major tourism area with an array of lodge sites on the
Zambezi, and with Chieftainess Chiawa being a member of the ZAWA Board, ZAWA allowed
hunting - including the shooting of alpha bull elephant close to the lodges, animals of massive
sustained value to non-consumptive tourism.
1.1.1 Hunting Concession Agreements (HCAs)
ZAWA is authorised by the Wildlife Act of 1998 to grant hunting concessions on that part of
customary land designated as a Game Management Area, in agreement and in partnership with the
total number of villages, their residents and traditional rulers of the GMA (defined by ZAWA
collectively as Local Communities), or their authorised representative. It is a tripartite partnership
agreement between ZAWA, the community resident in the GMA and the safari operator, each
contributing certain services and resources. In practice the signature of the Community Resource
Board (CRB) Chairman - as the representative of the community - is obtained, and in the case of there
being more than one community, one CRBs assent is considered by ZAWA sufficient, even though the
proxy signature of other CRBs may not necessarily have been obtained.
The document laying out the Hunting Concession Agreement (HCA), which the industry signed under
some duress due to its highly contentious content and the pressure exerted by ZAWA (the Financial
55
56
Chiefs Chitingulu and Nabwalya et al. 16 July 2002. Letter to the Minister of Tourism and Natural Resources.
Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the report of the Auditor-General for 2005 on the accounts of
parastatal bodies for the first session of the Tenth National Assembly appointed by the resolution of the House
on 10th November 2006.
118
Controller, Tom Mushinge) to sign it immediately, has some 75 conditions and strictures, 70 of which
are in favour of ZAWA and six in favour of the safari operator. Some responsibility for law
enforcement – as a support to ZAWA and the Village Scouts - is awarded to the operator, in addition
to his pledges, although the Wildlife Act places this statutory responsibility squarely on ZAWA. This
highly inequitable document does not best serve the interests of the industry, the customary
community, wildlife, or ZAWA, the latter having near total control of the partnership through the
lease document and exhibiting an increasing penchant for the introduction of administrative diktats
and illegal charges, and with the operator having to carry out a vague requirement to assist ZAWA in
the protection of wildlife, a simply massive financial requirement were ZAWA to insist on the letter of
the law being enforced.
A serious omission from the agreement is a mechanism to reduce or increase the number of Classical
and Mini hunts based on obviously fluctuating wildlife populations. These populations should be
confirmed by either measurable scientific data, or should this be lacking, by the imposition of the
precautionary principle as provided for in the Biodiversity Convention – to which Zambia is signatory
- requiring a reduction of the ‘quota’, thus perhaps necessitating the downgrading of hunting
concessions categorised by ZAWA as Prime, Secondary, Understocked or Depleted. The HCA
agreement has proven to be of little worth, ZAWA rarely honouring what is laid out in the HCA for
settling disputes i.e. good faith negotiations, mediation and arbitration. CRBs who do not agree with
ZAWA (Luembe) are removed, safari concessions are removed summarily (Ed Smythe, Leopard
Ridge, Mbeza, etc.) for spurious reasons, and the conditions of the original HCA are not held to
despite changes in the state of the concession and populations of game species.
1.2
The next 13 concessions: 2005 – 2010 (Appendix 2)
Despite ZAWA receiving two proposals in 2003/2004: 1) for a public-private partnership (PPP) with
ZAWA for the management of depleted and unallocated GMAs that would involve local communities
as partners (Manning 2004), and 2) for a programme for the building of CRB capacity (Manning &
Shenton 2004); ZAWA declined any interest, and at the end of 2004 issued tenders for renewable
concessionary leases - eleven Secondary areas for five years and two Understocked areas on fifteen
year leases (see table below); these included the Kafue & Bangweulu wetlands, normally open access
areas to all operators. A very short time was given to bidders, so that the author’s attempt to bring in
the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as a partner to represent a 40% shareholding in concessions by
customary communities, could not be put together in time; a wonderful opportunity to empower
customary communities thus lost. The ramifications of this tender were as follows:
i)
Some existing concessions were subdivided and given the same quota in 2005 as
the original, larger concession.
ii) The Bangweulu and Kafue concessions became a species-specific monopoly
under single concessionaire companies controlled by the Indian community,
thought to be the result of the Nyampala concession being lost to Rashid Randera.
iii) Quotas were issued for animals that were either not available, or with numbers
that were inflated.
iv) No consultation was carried out with the private sector or local communities who,
under the Lands Act of 1995, and under customary law, are the de facto
landowners.
v) Customary community rights to harvest animals – enshrined in the Wildlife Act,
were ignored.
Had most of these areas been viable, they would have long been hunted and have contributed to the
economy and to the residents of GMAs. The removal of Bangweulu and the Kafue areas and their
awarding to single operators could not be justified; nor the awarding of Bangweulu to an existing
safari operator, in direct contravention of agreements entered into by the Department of National Parks
& Wildlife in 1972 with international and local donors, and with the conditions laid out in the tender
119
(Grimsdell & Bell 1975). It also created a monopoly; and no mechanism was put in place to give
villagers a shareholding, a massive opportunity lost for their empowerment and for the restitution of
ancient traditional rights over natural resources, and in the case of Bangweulu, to enfranchise the
remnants of an aboriginal people, the Twa. The irony is that Government had pushed for the
implementation of an Act that would allow the rapid indigenisation of existing businesses - the Citizen
Economic Empowerment Act (CEE Act) - yet denying customary residents a shareholding in an
enterprise being conducted on their land, tending to support the conclusion that the Act was intended
to enrich a small group of the politically connected elite (Manning 2007a).
It is accepted by those involved professionally with the conservation of the biodiversity that in order to
maintain ecological effectiveness, it is necessary to maintain game population densities and the
distribution of strongly interactive species above a certain threshold. It is also accepted that those
having the mandate to manage wildlife - together with all other stakeholders involved with wildlife be obligated to adhere to a doctrine of best conservation practices based on the best science (Soulé et
al. 2005). Hunting blocks should therefore be classified according to their wildlife threshold level.
However, the classification of hunting blocks into Prime, Secondary, Understocked and Depleted
areas is based solely on the number of Classical and Mini hunts which ZAWA consider able to be
conducted, based on a highly flawed quota system. There is no category describing an area able to
provide five or more Classical hunts but no Mini safaris (buffalo hunts), other than in the Kafue where
sable now take the place of buffalo as the main Mini-safari selling point. In the West Petauke GMA –
classified as Prime - buffalo populations cannot sustain the number of Mini hunts required. It is likely
that many of Zambia’s other hunting blocks, which have fallen below the critical threshold, cannot
cater for 21 day classical safaris and therefore require similar downgrading. In a Secondary area such
as Sichifula, now seriously depleted, wildlife numbers have dropped below the threshold necessary to
support even one classical safari, though in 2006, two 21 days safaris had been booked consecutively
and Professional hunters (PHs) started shooting animals on game ranches and then transporting them
in as lion bait. However, as predators are regularly poisoned there – a practice that appears to be on the
increase nationally - legal baiting is not often successful. The obvious conclusion is that the
categorisation criteria need drastic revision, or scrapping.
1.3
Proposed Protected Area Hunting Concessions
Under the Global Environment Fund (GEF)/ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
funded project currently underway: ‘The Reclassification and Effective Management of the National
Protected Area System for Zambia’ (REMNPAS), Government intended, over the medium term, to
pass new legislation to exploit wildlife by creating two new categories of protected areas:
i)
ii)
Community Conservation Areas (CCA) - under the near total control of local
communities for tourism development.
Safari Hunting Areas - managed by ZAWA for their own benefit, where safari
hunting will be allowed; to occur in part or all of protected areas, and requiring a
change in their legal status in order to do so.
Two CCAs are being established in Bangweulu and Chiawa, a move which appears to be a thinly
veiled attempt to expand ZAWA powers over GMAs. However, the original proposal to establish
Safari Hunting Areas under ZAWA, has been cancelled (J Robinson 2007, personal communication)
after considerable criticism.
2
QUOTAS, SPECIES STATUS AND MBEZA SAFARIS
ZAWA in its early years accepted that quotas may be defined as the number of animals which may be
utilised in a year without biologically destroying or reducing the wildlife population. In scientific
terms, sustainable offtake quotas should be based on scientific censuses having high confidence limits
120
in which a total population figure is arrived at, the mortality rates quantified, and a sustained yield
offtake set, i.e. a quota. However, other than in the Bangweulu and parts of the Kafue and Barotse
wetland systems, it is scientifically and economically not feasible to set scientific quotas in Zambia for
animals other than elephant; rather a ‘good farmer’ harvesting approach is required, based on a set of
agreed age and trophy standards, to be monitored at the end of each hunting season and then adjusted
for the next season; thus ZAWA quotas should correctly be termed allocations. This common-sense
approach to setting and monitoring offtakes is highlighted by a seminal paper on the trophy hunting of
lion, which confirms that quota size is irrelevant, provided only older males are shot (Whitman et al.
2004) – though lion hunting offtakes and management is a complicated issue. This holds true for all
species, but great care must be taken to avoid shooting animals showing a precocious development of
body size, horn or mane, as this will affect the evolutionary development of the species as a whole by
precluding the impregnation of females by these superior males. For instance, the excessive shooting
of young buffalo herd males with wide horns but soft bosses, as takes place in the Selous Game
Reserve and its environs will, over time, adversely affect the population as a whole.
2.1
2003
When hunting finally resumed in 2003, the offtake quotas provided by ZAWA in the first year of the
new ten-year leases were, according to them, influenced by a number of factors. This in addition to the
pre-2002 quotas; these were impacted by the feedback from resident and established citizen hunting
returns in 2002, but chiefly, by the needs of the lease agreement and the 2003 ZAWA financial budget
so as ‘…to ensure that numbers of species provided meet the minimum requirements for both classical
and mini safaris’, concessionaires being required to meet these on pain of the loss of a $50,000 surety
deposit, or the cancellation of their concessionary agreement. Although ZAWA admitted that wildlife
had decreased considerably due to poaching and that few GMAs had been censused, they gave a
contradictory justification for a quota increase of between 5 and 15% based on ‘the abundant state of
the species’ and also, on the assumption that:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
2.2
The hunting blocks were successfully allocated to bidding safari companies.
Logistics for law enforcement are made available.
Funds were secured for aerial counts and monitoring.
That as a result of the above animal populations will increase or stabilise (ZAWA
2003, p. 3).
2004
The 2004 ZAWA quota report stated that some hunting blocks had been subdivided and the quotas
increased as ‘each hunting block must meet the requirements in terms of the minimum number of
classical and mini safaris depending on its status’. It further stated that because all classical and mini
safaris require a buffalo, ‘This in practice entails that the minimum number of buffaloes for a prime
hunting block should be 12 and a secondary block, eight. Thus quotas have been prepared and
adjusted with this situation in mind’ (ZAWA 2004, p. 4). Clearly, quotas were therefore massaged to
meet the safari package requirements of Prime or Secondary areas in order for ZAWA to exact the
maximum income. In 2004, with all areas operating, 50% of the quota was utilised.
At the end of 2004, at the request of the Luembe Conservancy Trust, Gamefields Ltd purchased
Mbeza Safaris from its owners, the Mehta brothers. The HCA they had signed on 17 February 2003
had been co-signed by ZAWA and the Nyalugwe CRB, and not by the Luembe CRB. As Luembe was
far larger in area than Nyalugwe, holding the majority of the quota, this was an anomalous and
undemocratic decision by the Financial Director of ZAWA, T. Mushinge. To rectify matters,
Gamefields ensured that the Luembe CRB gave their blessing to the HCA - duly signing an
agreement, countersigned by the chief, on 22 December 2004 – to the effect that Mbeza Safaris could
legally operate in the chiefdom.
121
2.3
2005
The 2005 ZAWA quota report stated that further areas were subdivided, ZAWA admitting that overall
quotas were increased ‘to meet the requirements in terms of the minimum number of classical and
mini safaris’ (ZAWA 2005). This made clear that quotas were to a large extent a function of meeting
the lease requirements, and by extension, the meeting of ZAWA’s budgetary requirements.
The quotas were increased from 2003 – in West Petauke by 36% - despite the admission that in
Zambia game stocks of some species had been reduced drastically by poaching, particularly, the
buffalo of the lower Kafue. In addition, in the south Luano concession bordering on West Petauke and
sharing the same boundary, the Lunsemfwa River, a hippo quota was issued despite the fact that they
had been all but exterminated there.
Accompanied by the Luembe CRB Chairman of Natural Resources, the author conducted a 21 day
classical hunting safari over much of the Luembe part of West Petauke in July 2005, confirming that
the quotas bore little relation to game populations, in particular with regard to hippo and buffalo, both
keystone species in the operation of lion and leopard safaris and in the operation of buffalo Mini
safaris. The hippo population had only a few alpha males out of a population sample of 320 in the
stretch of the Luangwa spanning two game scout camps and were almost totally shot out in both the
Lunsemfwa and Lukushashi Rivers, evidence of the issuing of unrealistic quotas, overshooting by
local hunters and the operation of a hippo ivory and bushmeat poaching ring, as well as the issue by
ZAWA of hippo licences to trainee Wildlife Scouts for shooting practise. The buffalo population had
been severely reduced by the heavy infiltration of the bushmeat trade, as well as an obvious shortage
of adult bulls due to offtakes by citizen hunters and past hunting safari operations. Furthermore, little
anti-poaching effort by ZAWA and Village Scouts was in evidence, coupled with the operation of a
poaching ring by the same (Manning 2007b).57 In the Mlembo River area within the West Petauke
GMA, game carcasses were being poisoned so as to kill vultures for the Malawian muti trade, the
large predators being severely affected (B Phiri 205, personal communication, July).
Nationally, the quotas issued for the new hunting blocks given out in 2005 in many cases bore little
relation to the resource, most areas being given four lion. In Bangweulu, a quota of eighty black
lechwe is not unreasonable - given their duel lekking system (Manning 1974) - but a quota of fortyfive sitatunga when feedback from operators reveal very poor hunting success rates and where there is
clear evidence of over-use, is irresponsible (Manning 1983). In addition, there can be no grounds for
placing buffalo (eight) and reedbuck on quota, nor for issuing a quota of twenty oribi for safari
hunting and a further six made available for residents. Apart from those who hunt without licences,
resident hunters do not fill in their licences until it is absolutely necessary, greatly adding to the illegal
offtake. Having Wildlife Police Officers (WPOs) – a retrograde description - who accompany safari
hunting parties, is no deterrent, as they are easily bribed, followed by a situation where a licence to
kill is given.
In 2005, no figure for the utilisation of the national quota was published in the 2006 ZAWA quota
report, though it is likely not to have exceeded 60% overall, but probably near 100% of keystone
species were accounted for (though not lion), though there is no record of the age classes.
ZAWA was reported to have introduced performance bonds based on mandatory utilisation of 75% of
the quotas, though this was only implemented in the case of Mbeza Safaris (Simasiku et al 2008).
Three companies (of some twenty-eight to thirty-three in total for Zambia), had been adjudged by
ZAWA to have ‘underachieved’ for 2005 (T Mushinge 2006, personal communication, June) - this
term being used by the responsible ZAWA officers to describe the failure of operators to carry out the
requisite number of hunts for their particular area. It was therefore first thought that the small
percentage of ‘underachievers’, given the state of ‘quotas’ and the fact that many areas have wildlife
57
I.P.A. Manning. 30 January 2006. Letter to the Research Director, ZAWA HQ.
122
stocks below a critical threshold, could be explained by the failure of those operators to make use of a
loophole in ‘underachievement’ assessment: i.e. as long as an operator provides a Tourist’s Import
and/or Export Permit (The Firearms Act: Regulation 4 (2)) – a simple application requiring
submission of a client’s address, passport and firearm details, ZAWA will issue the mandatory NonResident Hunting Permit and bird licence (total cost of $250) which allows a client to hunt in a
specified hunting block and for a specified period; and as long as the ZAWA Form 14 trophy returns
are made to ZAWA showing that a few animals were shot, the safari would not be counted as an
‘underachievement’ – though it is doubtful that even this is necessary. However, one operator assured
the author that any attempt by ZAWA to exact ‘underachievement’ fines from them had simply been
ignored (Y Zumla 2006, personal communication). Legal council had also advised Mbeza that such a
fine was illegal. All attempts so far to recover this money has been in vain.
One of the problems that has added to the general insecurity of the hunting industry is the poor
security of tenure of hunting leases. As many GMAs have hunting as the only investment and
employment activity, it was important that action should be taken to improve the situation by making
use of the National Policy on Environment (NPE). The author therefore drew up a concept note and
sent this out to the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF), to ZAWA and other stakeholders
on 18 July 2006. The concept note elicited no interest from Government or the hunting industry itself.
A further instance of brazen harvesting officialdom was the insistence of ZAWA, supported by the
Immigration Department and the Professional Hunters Association, of charging Mbeza professional
hunters who held investment certificates and self-employed permits the non-resident professional
hunter licence fees of $6,000 each, instead of the $600 resident fee. ZAWA had for some time based
its professional hunters licence fee structure on two categories, ‘non-resident’ and ‘established
resident’, with the latter being defined by the Immigration and Deportation Act No. 25 of 1997, an Act
amended by Parliament on the 11th November 1997, and section 33 - which provided for such a
category, being repealed. It was clear that the use of this term was without legal standing and any
extraction of fees based on it therefore illegal. 58 ZAWA refused to recognise – even though so advised
by Immigration – that the resident directors and PHs were resident in Zambia. This position was
supported by the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA), who had issued the investment certificate to
Mbeza Safaris in the first place.
Towards the end of the 2005 hunting season, The Post newspaper quoted the then Director-General
(D-G) of ZAWA, Hapenga Kabeta, as saying that seven safari companies, including Mbeza Safaris,
had escaped criminal proceedings for overshooting their quotas. No proof of this allegation was ever
provided (Manning 2007c).
2.4
2006
The quotas for 2006 were issued as a result of quota meetings held by ZAWA and its partners in the
middle of the 2005 hunting season. In the case of the West Petauke block, the results of the workshop
held between the partners (CRBs and Mbeza) and ZAWA’s Norwegian Agency for DevelopmentCooperation’s (NORAD) funded South Luangwa Management Unit (SLAMU) – the latter with a poor
understanding of setting sustainable quotas - were not reproduced in the official quota issued to the
partners on 5 December 2005 - buffalo numbers being inflated by 50%, no mention being made of the
female hippo quota agreed to, nor of any other agreed changes. Contrary to agreements entered into at
the 2006 quota setting meeting held in 2005, the 2006 quotas included four buffalo for resident hunters
in the GMA, one later being poached by a Village Scout who was never prosecuted.
In 2006, no effort was made to institute a system designed to ensure sustainable offtakes, despite
numerous recommendations being made to ZAWA in workshops and meetings. In the Kafinda GMA,
58
I.P.A. Manning. 22 June 2005. Letter to the Director-General, Lewis Saiwana, The Zambia Wildlife
Authority, Chilanga.
123
classified as an Understocked area where little if anything under the lease should be shot, an area
surrounding the Kasanka National Park, a hunting quota of two sable and two buffalo were awarded to
an operator despite the fact that the Kasanka has no more than a dozen buffalo – some of the latter
translocated there by the Kasanka Trust - and despite the fact that there are very few sable in the area.
This offtake posed a considerable threat to the Kasanka and to the PPP established with ZAWA for the
management of the Park (D Lloyd 2007, personal communication), although ZAWA stated that
quotas for West Zambezi Lower and Kafinda had been reintroduced based on recommendations from
the field (ZAWA 2006). ZAWA later cancelled the quota for buffalo, but not for sable.
The 2006 report also stated that the lion quota was reduced due to concerns regarding the availability
of trophy animals: this again signalled ZAWA’s failure to understand that if the selection for six year
old plus lion was enforced - provided management was carried out at the pride level - quotas become
meaningless. ZAWA’s explanation that as a result of aerial surveys population levels of such species
as impala, buffalo, puku and warthog had remained stable, could not be taken seriously, being
contradicted by their statement in the same paragraph that ‘buffalo numbers have declined in some of
the GMAs…’. Very little supporting data was included in the report to substantiate any claims or
conclusions. The statement decreeing the minimum number of buffalo required for a Prime block
caused ZAWA in 2005 to ignore the joint request of Mbeza Safaris and the CRBs of Luembe and
Nyalugwe to lower buffalo quotas for 2006 in the West Petauke concession, and to dismiss Mbeza’s
decision to cut the number of its Classical safaris and all its Mini safaris due to the depletion of
wildlife stocks.
The terms of the 2003-2012 leases required – on forfeiture of a security bond of $50,000, that
operators generate gross revenues per client equal to the gross projected income as laid out in their
tender bid, and in the case of a Prime area, that they conduct a minimum of 5 Classical safaris
(lion/leopard/buffalo hunts) and seven Mini safaris (buffalo hunts).
The total theoretical, projected national gross trophy earnings for 2005 – based on the Mbeza
‘underachievement’ fine and extrapolated for Zambia’s concessions as a whole - is shown in the table
following:
TYPE OF SAFARI
Classical
Mini
UNIT RETURN
$8,435
$3,670
NUMBER OF HUNTS
96
144
TOTAL
809,760
528,480
$1,338,240
This amount is more than the $1.1 million earned from hunting in the same year, up from $700K in
2004.59 It was therefore clear, that were the industry as a whole to be treated similarly to Mbeza
Safaris, a large sum of money would be earned by ZAWA. However, although an increase in income
is highly desirable; such a move would have to be supported by a hunting industry that is scientifically
managed by a properly regulated organisation where every effort is made to encourage its viability.
2.5
2007
A quota meeting, in August of 2006, called by ZAWA for the 2007 season, invited a Mbeza company
director to attend whilst he was busy hunting with a client. It was also held without the Luembe CRB
Chairman being present. The resulting quotas were again inflated to fit the requirements of the area’s
classification as a Prime hunting area.
In terms of undertakings given by ZAWA, its Board and the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources (MTENR) to the general tripartite partnership meeting (operators, communities and
ZAWA) on 3 January 2007 at Mulungushi Hall, Lusaka - confirmed by the Chairman of the Board and
59
Director-General ZAWA. Feb 2, 2006. Statement to Xinhua via COMTEX.
124
the D-G at separate meetings with two steering committee members of the Natural Resources
Consultative Forum (NRCF) on 15 January - it was agreed that full consultative meetings would in
future take place between the tripartite partners and other stakeholders.
Shortly after the Mulungushi meeting, three members of the Safari Hunting Operators Association of
Zambia (SHOAZ) - who represent 50% of the safari hunting operators of Zambia – met with ZAWA
to discuss quotas and licencing, no CRB representatives being present. ZAWA had issued a statement
prior to this meeting proclaiming that in future 75% of the issued hunting quota would have to be paid
for in advance. Their position was not arrived at by any consultation with the stakeholders. The results
of the SHOAZ/ZAWA meeting revealed the contortions of logic to which ZAWA were prone when
scientific wildlife management collided with the illogical Hunting Concession Agreement (HCA),
created in order to extract maximum rentals. The main issues discussed were as follows:
2.5.1
Quota Utilisation
ZAWA was concerned that the majority of outfitters utilised under 50% of their quota, saying that as
operators had a hand in setting quotas, they should be able to take off a large part of it, something
justified by clause 7.1(i) of the lease agreement. While they accepted that their initial proposal of 75%
was not realistic they also rejected SHOAZ representatives’ suggestion of 40%, concluding that they
considered 60% to be a reasonable target to work towards.60
The meeting agreed that the underutilisation problem was due to unrealistic quotas being allocated to
some hunting blocks and that this should initially be attended to prior to a benchmark being set. To
achieve this ZAWA requested the representatives contact all outfitters and have them submit a
proposed quota based on a guaranteed utilisation of 60%. SHOAZ emphasised that while there was no
minimum quota utilisation requirement in the HCA lease agreements or the ZAWA Act, the Act was
in the process of being rewritten and would include a minimum quota utilisation clause. It was
therefore important, they stated, that the industry try and establish a realistic benchmark rather than to
have a figure imposed on them by new legislation.
It was clear from the minutes of this meeting that ZAWA had admitted that quotas were greatly
inflated and that many hunting concessions did not comply with the arbitrary classification given to
them, one laid out in the HCA and requiring certain fees and number of Classical and Mini hunts to be
conducted. It was also apparent that they had no clear understanding of the quota setting process
attempted by ZAWA field personnel, nor of the scientific rationale behind quotas, viewing them rather
as an allocation that the operators had somehow negotiated. In Mbeza Safaris’ case, quotas had been
agreed to in 2005 for 2006 (greatly reduced on the insistence of Mbeza), and then when they were
issued by ZAWA Headquarters (HQ), the agreed changes had been ignored. In addition, agreements
arrived at on resident hunters’ quotas were also not honoured; and in 2006 (for 2007), quotas were set
without an Mbeza representative or the CRB being present. The reason for the low utilisation of the
quota was solely due to the unrealistic quotas set and allowed by ZAWA, noticeably under the second
round of leases issued in 2005 which took in a lot of marginal areas. Quotas were inflated by ZAWA
in order to fit the number and type of hunt required in the tender, which in turn attracted a certain level
of financial commitment. Furthermore, apropos 7.1 (1) of the Hunting Agreement – the surety charge
apart, it was in fact being followed. ZAWA and SHOAZ appeared not to accept that if a real,
sustainable quota was to be arrived at, this could only be ascertained by a monitoring exercise of
trophy size/age classes at the season’s end, with adjustments then made to the quota.
60
Tanzania, which has a safari industry far greater than that of Zambia, at the time, adopted a 40% guaranteed
payment offtake on agreed quotas, with low concession fees of around $10,000.
125
2.5.2
Licencing
SHOAZ accepted ZAWA’s decision to revamp the licencing system, the most notable change being
that animals of a client’s choice - and within the quota - would be purchased by outfitters from ZAWA
prior to hunting; with a non-resident hunting licence for each animal bought and issued in the name of
the safari company and valid for the whole hunting season. Here ZAWA and SHOAZ had accepted a
major change to the licencing system without consultation with the stakeholders and without a
projection of the possible impact. An alarming decision was the purchase of animals prior to a hunt,
which would mean that young animals, or poor trophy animals, would be killed. The meeting clearly
contradicted the undertaking given by the ZAWA Board Chairman to the NRCF that income
generation would in future be subservient to conservation management and biological planning.
In 2007 no quota was issued to the West Petauke customary community whatsoever, in contrast to
other Prime areas. However, citizens and established residents of Zambia (i.e. Zambians not living in
the chiefdoms) were awarded 38 animals, including nine hippo.
2.6
Summary of Zambia’s Safari Quotas: 2003 - 2007
Total safari quota
Lion
Leopard
Buffalo
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
3360
112
108
240
4420
130
135
358
4350
122
123
321
4622
91
110
343
4539
99
117
341
From the table recording the total safari quotas and that of the keystone species that support Classical
and Mini hunts - the latter converted into a hunt with a sable taking the place of the buffalo - it can be
seen that quotas were considerably increased in 2004. It is the conservation status of lion, the prime
attraction for hunters, and the very basis of the hunting industry (and a major financial support to
ZAWA), which displays ZAWA’s dilemma, emphasised in their statement:
Unjustified uplifting of lion to Appendix I would have serious ramifications on the
Safari hunting industry in Zambia. As we all know, lion is an important component in
the classical safari and its removal would distort the classical package/bag. This would
present serious challenges and present areas of potential litigation by safari companies
with valid concession agreements and would eventually lead to loss of revenue to
ZAWA and the local communities (Kampamba & Chansa 2005).
3
CONCESSION ‘NATIONALISATIONS’
To confirm the inherent instability of the hunting industry and contempt for due process, some hunting
operators and concessionaires found their concessions removed by ZAWA.
3.1
African Experience Safaris (Lunga Busanga in the Northern Kafue – a Secondary area):
2006
On the sudden departure from Zambia of the owner of African Experience Safaris, Ed Smythe, as a
result, allegedly, of having threatened a worker with a firearm, a meeting was held in Kasempa on 4
May 2006 between ZAWA and some of its board members, CRB representatives in the Lunga
Busanga area, the local chief (Senior Chief Kasempa), a House of Chiefs representative and a
Kasempa District Council representative. 61 The purpose of the meeting was to re-allocate the
61
Minutes of the Consultative meeting on the re-allocation of Lunga-Busanga hunting block held at Kasempa
District Administrator’s Office on 4 May, 2006
126
concession ‘administratively’ rather than put it out to tender, the latter being the normal and accepted
procedure required to avoid any hint of corruption. Tom Mushinge, the Financial Director of ZAWA,
stated that in this case they would like the local community to decide on who would be chosen to take
up the concession, and that the CRB could not take on the hunting concession themselves – as they
had already applied to do. A ZAWA Board member (Sikongo) said that the concession had been
removed because Smythe had breached various hunting regulations, ‘such as failure to honour
community pledges, hunting without escort scouts, over shooting the quotas, no respect to traditional
authority, etc’, though no mention was made that the necessary procedures, as laid out in the lease
agreement, and put there to protect the tripartite partners, had been followed. Such charges are, under
the circumstances, not convincing; many safari companies suffering similar charges.
The Kasempa CRB put forward four companies that had expressed an interest in taking up the
concession: TEA-ECO Systems Limited; C.K. Scientific Group Zambia Limited; Mukata Zulu and
Associates and Royal Zambezi Wildlife Safaris. Senior Chief Kasempa objected to Royal Zambezi on
the grounds that Chieftainess Chiawa was a shareholder and he did not think it proper that a chief from
another area should take up a concession in his area. However, ZAWA stated that Royal Zambezi was
suitable, and supported by the District Council and the House of Chiefs representative, this motion
was adopted. They then called in the operator to negotiate on pledges and concession fees, a further
break from normal procedure, as in an ‘administrative’ re-allocation it would be expected that the
original lease agreement would be adhered to. Nevertheless, Royal Zambezi’s representative - not
known - proposed a concession fee of $24,000, the CRB representative countered with $25,000, and
this was agreed. The operator’s representative then pledged the sum of $10,000 to the CRB, to be paid
every season. This was accepted. Furthermore, the CRB requested that meat be issued, as did the
District Council, and this was accepted.
It is highly irregular to make a cash pledge to a CRB given that the purpose of pledges is to see that
the community benefit from hunting. It is likely that this payment was distributed between the
members of the CRB and the chief, with nothing going to the community whom they represent. One of
the reasons put forward for giving this concession to the Chieftainess Chiawa’s safari group - Royal
Zambezi Safaris - stems from their hunting operations in the Chiawa GMA where they have been
hunting up and around the game lodges. At the time, the Chieftainess was the acting Chairman of the
ZAWA Board.
3.2
Leopard Ridge Safaris: Nyampala: 2006
Leopard Ridge Safaris had their concession; Nyampala – the finest hunting block in Zambia –
removed. The brother of the major shareholder had his Professional Hunter’s licence withdrawn,
prompted by charges that they had been attracting animals with loud speakers and had overshot their
quotas. In the Nyalugwe chiefdom Open Area, where they also had a game ranch at the time, they had
been charged with feeding the community game meat mixed with hyena and lion meat. These latter
charges, without foundation, were also made by Chief Nyalugwe to ZAWA and the Office of the
President against the author and Dr Guy Scott, Secretary-General at the time of the main opposition
political party, The Patriotic Front, neither having ever entered the area.
ZAWA decided that the Nyampala hunting block, lying within the country of the Bisa chief,
Nabwalya, should be nationalised. Having got rid of its concessionaire, Leopard Ridge Safaris despite the High Court still having to decide on whether the expulsion was legal - ZAWA put it out to
tender, then, doubtless on the orders of the ZAWA Board, decided that they would run it themselves,
an advert for two professional hunters duly being placed in the local papers. No thought was given to
those who had paid $1,100 to tender. Reports circulated of the imminent nationalisation of other
hunting concessions (Manning 2007d).
Having had their rights to hunt in their Nyampala concession terminated, Leopard Ridge then applied
to the High Court for a stay of execution. This was refused, the judge directing them to go to
127
arbitration. Legal counsel advised Leopard Ridge and the community partners in the tripartite hunting
concession agreement (HCA), the Nabwalya CRB, that they could take action against ZAWA on the
grounds that as signatories they had not been consulted and that they stood to lose the income on
which their Village Scouts and development projects depended. The CRB applied to the High Court
for an injunction, which was granted. The safaris then recommenced. ZAWA then appealed to the
Supreme Court who upheld ZAWA’s appeal (Manning 2007e). At 4.00 am in the third week of
August, with clients in their Nyampala camp, Leopard Ridge were invaded by a ZAWA and
paramilitary force, served with the order, and advised to leave the area. In October, the company
returned to the Supreme Court who ruled that a hunting concession was analogous to a game licence
and could be removed by ZAWA whenever it chose to do so, a decision likely to deter future investors
from investing in the hunting industry.
3.3
Sable Transport (Sandwe – Secondary area; Chisomo – Understocked area)
The owner, Iqbal Alloo, had sub-leased the hunting concession to South African operators. His nearby
privately owned Nyakolwe Game Ranch, was also used for hunting. He had had his concessions
withdrawn on the charge of overshooting. He did not contest the ZAWA decision. The ZAWA
financial Director, T. Mushinge, stated that the Minister had decided to allocate the two concessions
‘administratively’, but had later changed his mind. Alloo resumed safaris.
3.4
Mbeza Safaris
In November 2004, Gamefields purchased Mbeza Safaris from the Mehta brothers after the latter
declined to join with the Luembe Conservancy Trust in the development of the area. In 2005, hunting
operations began.
In June, 2006, Mbeza were fined a US$43,560 ‘underachievement’ fine by ZAWA for allegedly not
having fulfilled their quota utilisation obligations in 2005, the only operator to be so treated. This fine
was levied on the day that the new D-G, Lewis Saiwana, took office. Mbeza – with a client arriving in
three days - were threatened with closure unless they paid. The ‘underachievement’ fine for failing to
conduct the full complement of hunts was calculated by ZAWA to be based on $8,435 for each of two
Classical hunts, and $3,670 for each of six Mini safaris. Legal action was taken by Mbeza Safaris;
with the matter still awaiting a High Court action.
On 28 March 2008, in defiance of the terms of the HCA, Mbeza’s concession was summarily removed
by ZAWA. Mbeza then instituted legal action against ZAWA, an action the latter did not defend in
the requisite time period. On 23 July 2008 Mbeza applied for a default judgement. By February
2011the High Court had failed to issue it.
3.5
NAMAC v ZAWA
Prompted by a question in Zambia’s National Assembly - and clearly not just politically motivated the Minister of MTENR requested that the National Movement Against Corruption (NAMAC) hold a
judicial review of ZAWA to inquire into the matter of the penalties applied to a number of companies
who had allegedly overshot their hunting safari quotas. This was supposedly a ruse to remove from
office certain corrupt ZAWA officers, and to remove concessions from safari operators whom they
deemed to have overshot quotas so that these could be made available to others, possibly ‘targeted
citizens’ as catered for under the new Citizens Economic Empowerment Act No 9 of 2006 (CEE Act).
On 22 August 2006, in the High Court, ZAWA was represented by its D-G, the latter agreeing to a
consent judgement with the NAMAC attorney, in which it was declared that ZAWA had not dealt
properly with those safari companies that had overshot their quotas in 2004, and that the matter should
now be rectified by them and referred to the Director of Prosecutions. These operators - in addition to
a few others - were the same seven safari operators who had been threatened with criminal charges in
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October 2005 by the D-G ZAWA for allegedly overshooting their quotas (Phiri 2005). One of these
companies was Mbeza Safaris, which had been charged with over-shooting one bushbuck in the 2004
season whilst under previous ownership when, in fact, Mbeza had shot one bushbuck less than the
quota for its West Petauke concession. ZAWA’s confusion was explained by their poor administrative
attempts to settle a dispute between the two chiefs in the concession by issuing quotas for each
chiefdom, this was illegal in terms of the Hunting Concession Agreement. Mbeza was informed that
the bushbuck would be taken off the following year’s quota. The seven miscreants were allegedly
given different penalties: 1) fines, 2) fines and having their PHs barred from hunting for three months
of the season, and 3) having their hunting concessions removed, though this was never carried out.
On 8 September 2006, Mbeza’s attorney received information from the Financial Director Mushinge
of ZAWA that the ZAWA D-G (Saiwana) - using the consent judgement - intended gaining the
Board’s approval for the removal of hunting concessions from a further six safari operators.
Furthermore, he had convened a ZAWA Board meeting for 12 September and had arranged a flying
visit on 14 September to the Nyalugwe CRB, a CRB which was the co-signatory with Mbeza Safaris
in an HCA. Thus the stage appeared set to remove Mbeza’s concession.
Deciding on pre-emptive action, on 11 September 2006 a writ of summons was obtained from the
Zambia High Court by Mbeza and Sofram Safaris Limited in an action against ZAWA and NAMAC.
This was delivered to the Director-General on the 12 September while he was attending the ZAWA
Board meeting. The plaintiffs’ statement of claim was notable for the following:
i)
ii)
That ZAWA only informed the Plaintiffs of the 2004 overshooting in 2005.
That the Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the court action which had led to a
consent judgement between ZAWA and NAMAC.
iii) That ZAWA and NAMAC should have known that such a consent judgement
would adversely affect the Plaintiffs’ exclusive hunting rights when in fact the
Plaintiffs were not party to the legal proceedings in question and had not been
accorded a fair hearing.
iv) That ZAWA ‘fraudulently or by mistake suppressed facts by consenting to the
judgement on issues which were fully within its Director-General’s knowledge
and which at trial would have been determined on the merits and hence the
court’s approval of the consent judgement’.
v) That ‘…it was an act of fraud or mistake for ZAWA not to give full disclosure to
the court of the circumstances leading to the alleged over hunting by the Plaintiffs
and the administrative action taken by ZAWA, which action was intra vires the
provisions of the Zambia Wildlife Act, No. 12 of 1998’.
vi) That NAMAC had no legal capacity to take out or commence the legal
proceedings under Cause No. 2006/HP/0596, or consent to any judgement.
The plaintiffs further claimed:
i)
A declaratory judgement to set aside the consent judgment by the defendants
granted on 22nd August 2006 as it would affect the plaintiffs on the grounds that
the same was obtained by fraud or mistake and, therefore the said judgement is
null and void at law.
ii) In the alternative, a declaratory judgement that NAMAC had no legal capacity to
take out the legal proceedings under cause no. 2006/HP/0596.
iii) An interim order of injunction.
iv) Costs.
v) Any other relief the court may deem just.
The companies alleged to be the subject of the possible removal of their concessions – in addition to
the three already so treated, were:
129
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
African Experience Safaris
Sable Transport & Safaris
Kwalada Safaris
Mushingashi Game ranch
Nsonga Safaris
Sofram
Leopard Ridge Safaris
Mbeza Safaris
Swanepoel & Scandrol Safaris
Lunga Busanga
Chisomo and Sandwe
Lower Lupande
Hunting quota removed
Bilili Nkala
Mwanya/Lumimba
Nyampala
West Petauke
West Mumbwa
NAMAC and ZAWA were defeated in the High Court. Their subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court
on 19th July 2007 was refused (Manning 2007e). Following the dismissal of the appeal, the Appellants
(NAMAC) had agreed that the consent judgment which was signed between ZAWA and NAMAC, be
set aside by consent of the parties. Legal council on behalf of the ‘safari four’ agreed to this proposal
as it did not in any way prejudice the safari four case. However, NAMAC raised a counterclaim
against the companies involved, with ZAWA as Defendants, with the intention of obtaining judgment
in similar terms as those contained in the consent judgment previously signed with ZAWA.
NAMAC evidently wished to obtain a decision to terminate the HCA of the four outfitters and their
reason for taking up the case in the first place (i.e. to remove the ZAWA Financial Director, T.
Mushinge), was pure subterfuge, Mushinge having been fired from ZAWA some time before. ZAWA
was in agreement with NAMAC’s decision. The action was later dropped by NAMAC.
4
COUNTRY SAFARI HUNTING REPORT 2008
At a meeting on 21 December 2007 between SHOAZ and ZAWA, SHOAZ was informed that the
ZAWA Board had laid down new policy for ZAWA to implement in the 2008 hunting season:
i)
Operators to make an advance, non-refundable payment for 100% of their issued
quota.
ii) These individual quotas to be mutually agreed between ZAWA and the Operators.
iii) Current laws and regulations to be amended so as to allow a client to shoot as
many species and animals as he wishes, at no additional charge.
iv) Time restrictions on hunts will no longer apply.
v) Operators may not enter their concession if payment is not made, though ZAWA
are prepared to accept tranche payments for the quota.
4.1
Legal
Such policy was not catered for in the HCA, and no good faith negotiations, mediation or arbitration –
as required in the agreement - had run its course. In 2007, payment by members of SHOAZ, and some
non-members, of 60% of the quota, was done in good faith. It was not legally bound into the HCA,
being a concession made by operators due to ZAWA’s parlous financial position. An organisation
motivated so highly by its financial needs was undoubtedly being driven to ever more desperate
measures, negating its mandate to see to the conservation of wildlife and protected areas, and to the
customary communities in the GMAs.
4.2
Conservation
Given that only some 43% of the 2006 quota was accounted for suggested that quotas continued to be
inflated. The fact that a keystone species such as lion had a similar offtake rate, at a time when a large
130
percentage of males taken appeared to be sub-adults, was indicative of the haphazard and poorly
managed and monitored quota system. To therefore require 100% payment for the lion quota would
ensure that young lion were killed and the lion population in Zambia placed under threat. This would
obviously also be the case for all other species, assuming that the general quota, and the lion quota for
2008 would be similar to that of 2007. Such policy could plainly not be defended on conservation
management grounds, a policy posing a direct threat to wildlife management and the tourism industry.
From a cursory examination of current lion research results to which Mbeza Safaris had contributed
skulls, it was clear that a preponderance of sub-adult males were being shot. A seminal contribution to
lion management in Zambia (having the objective of the long-term management of the species, as well
as to justify its retention on Appendix II CITES), concluded that lion populations were being
depressed by poaching of prey species and that certain GMAs needed to be rested. The study also
challenged the rigid classification of hunting areas and quota allocations that are unrelated to the
resource, recommending that success rates falling below 70% for two years should result in the
reduction of quotas. The study questioned the inequitable financial and administrative burdens placed
on operators. It also, for the first time in over 100 years of the safari hunting industry, made a lucid
presentation of the biology of lion harvesting, pointing out that lion harvesting should be carried out at
the level of the pride, not at the population level. The report also advised on the implementation of an
operator certification process and, significantly, pointed out that a major threat to the sustainability of
trophy hunting in GMAs was the failure to devolve adequate benefits to local communities, the lack of
which reduces incentives for rural people to conserve wildlife. It was stated that the primary linkage
needed to be between the outfitters and the communities, not between outfitters and ZAWA (Viljoen
2007).
The fact that ZAWA had repeatedly made offers to operators (first in January 2007) to renegotiate
quotas already agreed to with the community is evidence of a Board with no understanding of wildlife
management.
4.3
Customary community partners
As CRBs are mandated under the Wildlife Act to prepare management plans with ZAWA for their
area of jurisdiction, any changes that will affect wildlife populations and their management should
receive their inputs and assent. In addition, as they are supposed to receive 50% of the trophy fees, a
responsible CRB should not wish to benefit financially from increased earnings when there will be an
obvious and direct conservation cost. And the chiefs, who receive 5% of all income from hunting, and
who do hold rights to the land on which the wildlife is maintained, ask why they are not consulted.
4.4
Safari hunting operators
Any mandatory and increased charge levied without the agreement of the partners, in particular the
operators, is counterproductive. Most operators expend greatly in excess of the HCA pledges on the
community. Therefore asking an operator to pay an extra $50K or so per annum will have to be
compensated for elsewhere by a reduction in supports to the community, to anti-poaching and to the
CRBs. Given the rampant theft and misappropriation by CRBs of these funds already, increased CRB
income will not have the desired effect, it being far better for operators to be encouraged to increase
their community inputs. The Board should first have obtained details of operator expenditure on
community livelihoods and wildlife.
131
4.5
Changes to the Hunting Concession Agreements
The decision – as a quid pro quo, to allow a client to shoot as many animals as he wishes (within the
quota), and to hunt for as long as he wishes, completely nullifies the whole construction of Classical
and Mini safaris within the HCA – and the HCA agreement itself. The classification of hunting blocks
into Prime, Secondary, Understocked and Depleted areas was based solely on the number of Classical
and Mini hunts which ZAWA considered able to be conducted (based on a highly flawed quota
system). A serious omission from the HCA was a mechanism to reduce or increase the number of
Classical and Mini hunts based on obviously fluctuating wildlife populations. Changes such as these,
issued as policy by the Board, will serve to reduce a once vibrant industry to its knees and discourage
further investment at a time when the exchange rate mechanism, fuel costs, a weakening dollar,
unsympathetic labour laws, punitive taxes and the bushmeat trade already greatly weaken those
wanting to see some improvement of the livelihoods of the people living in the concessions, and to
wildlife conservation itself. 62
In early 2008, SHOAZ held talks with the ZAWA Board regarding the payments for the 2008 season.
The Board made the following points:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
The lease agreement is not cast in stone and can be amended at any time to suit
current conditions.
The Board is not in the least intimidated by the threat of legal action by operators.
The Board contended that as operators themselves identified the quota required at
their annual quota setting meetings, they should be able to utilise and pay for
100% of this quota.
The Board suggested that SHOAZ consider a proposal along the lines of the quota
being split into a 60%fixed quota and 40% optional quota.
The 60% financial quota would be paid in three instalments and the optional
quota paid for as and when used.
The current animal deposit would fall away.
The Board suggested removing the 50% surcharge on second animals.
The Board suggested removing the time and animals restriction currently in place
for mini safaris.
Outfitters could revisit their quotas if necessary.
Specialised and Understocked areas would be exempt from the above and would
negotiate separate arrangements with ZAWA.
The author’s response to the above was that at all times the procedure between the tripartite partners
should be followed as laid out in the HCA: 1) good faith negotiations, followed if necessary by 2)
mediation, and then 3) arbitration – the latter presumably under the auspices of the Arbitration
Commission. Should these fail, then it would be a matter for the courts. Unfortunately, these
procedures have not been followed by ZAWA in the past, nor at the time when the Board made its
pronouncements – with the then current court actions (Leopard Ridge v ZAWA) being prejudiced by a
proposed nationalisation of the Leopard Ridge concession, but later cancelled on advice of the
Ministry, the concession being handed back to Rashid Randera.
With regard to quotas, the Board clearly laboured under a misapprehension. Operators should not
identify the quota that they require. The operator may make submissions, which, together with the
inputs of the CRB and ZAWA, should be followed by ZAWA HQ. If the operator is to set a quota, i.e. a sustained yield quota - without it fulfilling reasonable scientific standards - then it should be
properly called an allocation. What is lacking is a monitoring system which will ensure that only the
older age classes are being taken. The allocation therefore becomes a guide only for the benefit of
62
I.P.A. Manning. 30 December 2007. E-mail submission re ZAWA Board policy to ZAWA re hunting safari
payments for the 2008 season.
132
ZAWA, who may from this deduce their income, and therefore their cash-flow. The Board appear to
be assuming powers they do not have, the issue not being about policy, but about management and
sound science.63
PART II:
Game ranching
Investment in the private game estate – begun some twenty-five years ago - has been disappointing. Its
benefits to communities are minimal on the 94% of Zambia denoted customary land, being more a
source of irritation and political resistance than advancement. In the light of political reality and the
need to avoid land alienations that do not encompass joint ventures, any increase in investment in the
land and biodiversity of areas under the Customary Authority require mechanisms and incentives for
joint-venture partnerships between investors, the chiefdom and District Councils, facilitated by the
good offices of responsible NGOs. These need increased support in legislation, as this is currently
weak.
Instruments supporting the expansion of the private wildlife estate, let alone its successful day-to-day
operations are imperfect, while the Customary Authorities, empowered as they are by the Lands Act
Chapter 184 of the Laws of Zambia of 1995 for statutory recognition for the continuation of its
‘ownership’ of land held under customary tenure, are hampered by the contradictory legislation
contained in the Wildlife Act of 1998. There remains an urgent requirement for national policy on
private wildlife estate and customary authority conservancy development in order that the private
wildlife estate may expand its activities, and the chiefdom’s be empowered to enter into dynamic joint
ventures for the benefit of the biodiversity and their beleaguered people.
In 2006, 47 game ranches were registered members of the Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia,
most of them being game-fenced leasehold land where the animals are owned; other ranches being
unfenced within Open Areas, with either 14 or 99 year title, where ZAWA issues game quotas for
hunting.
Attempts were made in 2003 by ZAWA to provide policy on private wildlife estates (PWEs) and other
novel uses of wildlife (Appendix 4). A project proposal was tendered by the author on behalf of the
Norman Carr Foundation to assist ZAWA in drawing up national policy that would stimulate the
interface between game ranchers on statutory land, and customary communities. No reply was
received to this offer. Later a workshop under the auspices of the NRCF was held, with senior ZAWA
management and their legal consultants present, and the policy scrutinised by representatives of the
WLPAZ and other stakeholders. Since that time, ZAWA and its legal consultants have not called
further meetings through the NRCF, and until recently had not involved the WLPAZ either. The
statutory instruments discussed at length at the time, have still not been signed off and gazetted.
Some of this deficiency is being attended to by the REMNPAS project which has put forward the
notion of Community Game Ranches, based on the same model negotiated in 2003 between the
author, Senior Chief Luembe, 153 headmen and the Nyimba District Council for the establishment of
a community game ranch in the Luembe Open Area under the custodianship of the Luembe Trust.
Such a mechanism only becomes necessary if a usufruct agreement is being entered into with an
investor who wishes to fence the area, a requirement if ownership of the wildlife is to be granted by
ZAWA.
ZAWA requires that game ranches established on alienated customary land (and elsewhere) fence
their land if they are to purchase and own the wildlife. Regulations controlling fencing fall under the
Agricultural Lands Act (Fifth Schedule of Fencing Ordinance Cap. 228 as amended by Ordinance No.
16 of 1960), and any fencing, in theory only, has to be approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. Some
63
I.P.A. Manning. 8 January 2008. E-mail submission to ZAWA Board on hunting safari payments policy.
133
ranchers, despite receiving investment certificates from the Zambia Development Agency, which were
issued on the condition that they fenced, were issued with hunting quotas by ZAWA even though they
had not fenced. One unfenced ranch of 10,500 ha, M’nyamadzi, in Luembe’s country, was issued
approximately half the lion quota of the adjoining West Petauke GMA (610,000 ha) - 2 lion, and a few
buffalo, hippo and crocodile, knowing that the latter two species could only be shot on the river, which
is part of the GMA. As the Luembe CRB wrote,
We must also question how it was that so many animals were given to M’nyamadzi
game ranching company without our knowledge. Their area is only 10,000 ha but they
were given 1 eland, 2 lion and so on, and our open area is depleted. Yet in the GMA –
about 4,000 km2, we are refused eland. There is something that is wrong here.64
Although ZAWA had told the Luembe CRB that from 2006 no hunting will be allowed on unfenced
ranches, this has not happened. Furthermore it is likely, once again, that the animals purchased by the
game ranch owners from ZAWA will not in any way benefit the villagers or the CRBs (Manning
2007g). Also, no guidelines or policy on game ranching is currently available for communities.
On 12 November 2009 the first Community Game Ranch in Zambia was officially sanctioned in
Zambia, the culmination of 18 months of work by Gamefields Ltd that had assisted the community of
the Nyalugwe Chiefdom in establishing a community trust into which land for a game ranch was
vested, and sanctioned by the Minister of Lands. ZAWA insisted on an ‘ecological survey’, followed
by a ‘social-scoping exercise’, holding out the promise of the issue of a game ranching certificate,
something that did not materialise.
PART III: Non-consumptive tourism
Tourism in Colonial days took the form of government self-catering camps in the Game Reserves and
National Parks, many of which fell into disuse from 1975, now replaced by private sector managed
lodges. Tourism today is concentrated around Livingstone (Victoria Falls), Mfuwe, the Kafue and
Zambezi portion of the Chiawa GMA with ZAWA now advancing on the ‘privatisation’ of the
protected area estate along the lines of the Kruger National Park model. In the GMAs (successor to the
Controlled Hunting Areas and run originally by the customary community), apart from hunting
concessions leased out by ZAWA, there is little non-consumptive tourism development and therefore
no benefit for the previously empowered.
The industry today is served by the private sector run Tourism Council of Zambia (TCZ), and the
parastatal, the Zambia National Tourism Board (ZNTB). Essentially, tourism is run – as it always has
been - by mainly small European managed outfits, carrying out their own marketing, ill-served by
ZAWA and the ZNTB (who recently had their boards dissolved (Sinyangwe 2009)); with legislation
which makes it very difficult for customary communities to become involved at the grass roots level,
and with GRZ having an erratic and confused support record for investment generally.
Donors and Government have concentrated their efforts in carrying out tourism in two National Parks
(abandoning Mosi oa Tunya), particularly the South Luangwa National Park, which has been funded
by the Norwegians for 25 years, and latterly the Kafue National Park, showing little signs of being
able to be managed by GRZ, or to involve the customary community in its management. ZAWA is
now advancing on the massive privatisation of nature as a concessionaire broker, obtaining rentals
wherever possible, with little prospect of managing the resource on which the industry will depend.
Zambia’s tourism is mainly wildlife based – apart from the Victoria Falls – and thus it must compete
with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. Other than being a peaceful country and
64
Senior Chief Luembe, Chairman of Luembe CRB, 9 November 2004. Letter to D-G of ZAWA.
134
generally friendly, it is expensive and corrupt, placing it well behind Namibia and Botswana in its
attractiveness to tourists. However, it has some of the last intact pieces of primary nature in Africa that
are well watered and with low populations of people. This is where its opportunity for appropriate
tourism development lies.
A World Bank report estimated that the travel and tourism economy contributes in total to nearly 4%
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and creates more than 55,000 jobs (3.7% of total employment).
Tourism demand from 2001 – 2006, it contends, has been continuously growing - international tourist
arrivals surged from about 400,000 in 1999 to more than 600,000 in 2008 - suggesting that Zambia
could attract more than 2 million tourists by 2015. But, Zambia represents only 4.3% of the safari
market share, the second worst performer in the region (World Bank 2006).
The Public Accounts Committee in Parliament identified some of the dysfunction affecting tourism.
The Government had issued a gazette number 332 in 1998 directing all operators in the Chiawa GMA
to pay land user fees. The fees were to be paid at the beginning of the year. However, as of December
2005, total amounts of K450,999,935 and US$128,857 (K440,175,512) were outstanding as land user
fees older than 120 days. As at June 2006, the fees had not been paid, nor had ZAWA invoiced the
operators for the year 2006. When the ZAWA Controlling Officer appeared before the Public
Accounts Committee in November of 2006, he stated that there was a conflict between ZAWA and the
operators as a result of ZAWA’s decision to allow hunting activities in the eastern part of the GMA
where the lodges are located. The operators had protested against the action by not paying the land
user fees. Discussions had then taken place between the two parties to draw up a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), following which the lodges owners agreed to pay the outstanding amounts. The
Controller hoped the MoU would be signed by August 2007. The ruling of the Committee was that
ZAWA was being lenient with the lodge owners, instructing the Controlling Officer to report progress
on the matter.65
The issue highlights a conflict both in the law and the matter of landuse. Chiawa is customary land,
such rights being held sacrosanct by customary law and by the Lands Act of 1995. However, the
Wildlife Act of 1998 confers rights over those parts of customary land classified as GMA that
supercede the rights of the customary authority, extracting rentals and issuing Tourism Concession
Agreements (TCAs) without consultation with the Customary Authority. This is done in addition to
their leasing out of GMAs as hunting concessions and their sale of hunting licences. The Wildlife Act
errs by not understanding that GMAs were only declared in 1971 as a land planning framework, and
not as a category of State land. This continues to give licence to ZAWA for rent seeking and control of
customary land development.
The Livingstone area, extended to Mosi oa Tunya, has benefited the most from tourism growth, yet the
town and the Park is neglected, increasingly crime ridden, polluted by trucking and with serious water
and power shortages. In nature-based tourism, the Livingstone area represents 39% of all beds and
45% of all bed nights with high levels of occupancy. It also has to deal with punitive corporate raids
on its public goods by corporations, despite it being part of a World Heritage Site. The second point
represents a serious challenge for Zambia’s tourism strategy: 60% of tourists spent less than four days
in Zambia, usually taken up with visits to the Victoria Falls and Mosi oa Tunya (World Bank 2006).
At a recent meeting in Livingstone, convened by the SEED Tourism Officer and attended by over 100
government officers and members of the tourism industry, a long catalogue of dysfunction was fed
into the proceedings. The Police spoke of their need for cash donations in order to give tourists
security, something already supplied by private operators in the form of a police station and police
accommodation, yet they stated they had not taken up their positions because they required bedding
and kitchenware. Mention was also made of the Zambian borders and the money extracted from
tourists for carbon taxes, toll fees, car insurance, ferry charges, District Council levies, each tax having
65
Report of the Public Accounts Committee on the report of the Auditor-General for 2005 on the accounts of
parastatal bodies for the first session of the Tenth National Assembly appointed by the resolution of the House
on 10 November 2006, p.24.
135
its own office with 2-3 staff members per office. In Botswana one tax office collected all revenues.66
The common constraints in developing tourism in Zambia remains an unskilled labour force and a
control-minded labour administration and legislation, poor infrastructural supports, burdensome
licencing bureaucracy, short land leases, the disregarding of concession agreements by the authorities,
the highest tax rates in the region, a Zambia Development Agency and a Department of Immigration
who do not serve the best interests or security of investors, a judicial system largely under political
control, and Zambianisation policies. However, one of the major constraints is the extended rainy
season and soils that make access and movement well nigh impossible over much of the game country.
The other major issue is the failure thus far of GRZ to devolve powers over natural resources to the
chiefdoms, and to knit customary communities into the fabric of protected area development and
appropriate exploitation.
66
The Livingstone Weekly, 14 June 2009
136
5.
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Design Project. USAID.
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to Northern Rhodesia’s Government-Conducted Big Game Hunting Safari Scheme,
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GRIMSDELL, J. J. R. & BELL, R. H.V. 1975. Ecology of the black lechwe in the Bangweulu Basin
of Zambia. Black Lechwe Research Project: final report. Animal Productivity Research
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HUGHES, J. E. 1933. Eighteen Years on Lake Bangweulu, The Field.
KAMPAMBA, G. & CHANSA, W. 2005. Field manual to lion study in National Parks, Game
Management Areas and Open Areas in Zambia. Zambia Wildlife Authority, Chilanga, Zambia
LYELL, D.D. 1910. Hunting Trips in Northern Rhodesia: With Accounts of Sport and Travel in
Nyasaland and Portuguese East Africa, and Also Notes on the Game Animals and Their
Distribution, H. Cox.
MACKENZIE, J. M. 1997. The Empire of Nature: hunting, conservation and British imperialism,
Manchester Univ Pr.
MANNING, IAN. 1995. With a Gun in Good Country, Trophy Room Books, Agoura, Cal.
MANNING, I. P. A. 1974. Dual lekking behaviour of the black lechwe antelope in south-east
Bangweulu. Typescript report to the National Parks and Wildlife Service, Zambia.
MANNING, I. P. A. 1983. Ecology of the sitatunga Tragelaphus spekei selousi in the Bangweulu
swamps, Zambia. M. Sc. thesis, Acadia University, Nova Scotia.
MANNING, I. P. A. 2004. Depleted GMAs Strategic Partnership Proposal to Zambia Wildlife
Authority, Lusaka, Zambia.
MANNING, I. P. A. & MOSS, P. DE VERE. 1975. Aerial census of black lechwe, Liuwa Plain
wildebeest and Busanga Plain red lechwe. Typescript report to the National Parks and Wildlife
Service, Zambia.
MANNING, I.P.A. & SHENTON, R. 2004. Proposal for the establishment of a national body to coordinate Community Resource Boards, Typescript report to ZAWA.
MANSPEIZER, YLYSSA. 2004. Considering Wildlife Conservation at the turn of the Millennium.
PhD dissertation, Binghampton University State University of New York
MELLAND, F. H. 1938. Elephant in Africa, Country life New York: C. Scribner's sons, London.
PHIRI, BRIGHTON. 2005. 7 Safari Firms Escape Prosecution – Kabeta. The Post Newspaper,
Lusaka, 28 November.
SIMASIKU, PHYLLIS., et al. (2008). The impact of wildlife management policies on communities
and conservation in Game Management Areas in Zambia’, Natural Resources Consultative
Forum of Zambia (NRCF), Lusaka.
SINYANGWE, CHIWOYU. 2009. ZNTB, ZAWA boards respond to dissolution. The Post
Newspaper, Lusaka, 14 June.
SOULÉ, M. E., ESTES, J. A., MILLER, B., HONNOLD, D. L. 2005. Strongly interacting species:
conservation policy, management, and ethics. BioScience, 55(2), 168-176.
STEINHART, E.I., 2006. Black poachers, white hunters: a social history of hunting in colonial Kenya,
James Currey Publishers.
VILJOEN, PETRI. (2007). Lions and lion hunting in Zambia. International Conservation Services
(ICS) report to Zambia Wildlife Authority.
WHITMAN, K., STARFIELD, A.M., QUADLING, H.S., PACKER, C. 2004. Sustainable trophy
hunting of Africa lions. Letters to Nature, Nature Publishing Group.
WORLD BANK. 2006. The Largely Untapped Potential of Tourism in Zambia. Draft report: Trade in
Services, World Bank/Lusaka
ZAWA. 2003. Report on off-take quotas for the Year 2003. ZAWA HQ, Zambia.
ZAWA. 2004. Report on off-take quotas for the year 2004. ZAWA HQ, Zambia.
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ZAWA. 2005. Report on off-take quotas for the Year 2005. ZAWA HQ, Zambia.
ZAWA. 2006. Report on offtake quotas for the year 2006, ZAWA HQ, Zambia.
Internet
Manning, I.P.A. 2006a. Chumamaboko first Zambian PH. 2011-03-10.
URL:http://zambiasafarihunting.blogspot.com/2007/03/chumamaboko-first-of-centralafrican.html. Accessed: 2011-03-10. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5x5o8qHV2)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007a. CITIZENS' ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT ACT. Zambia Gamefields
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Manning, I. P. A. 2007b. ZAMBIA WILDLIFE AUTHORITY OFFICERS IMPLICATED IN
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138
6.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
Appendix 3:
The 25 Concessions (2003-2007)
The next 13 hunting concessions as awarded
Synthesis of the draft national policy of May 2003 on private wildlife estates
and other novel uses of wildlife
139
Appendix 1: The 25 Concessions (2003-2007)
HUNTING AREA
CATEGORY NOTES
Kafue areas encircle the Kafue NP- except to the west,
being miombo woodland interspersed with dambos
(grassland drainage areas), high speciation, excellent sable
and roan, lion, leopard, kudu, duikers (blue and yellowback) and sitatunga, kafue lechwe on the flats to south, and
red lechwe in the north.
KAFUE AREAS
BILILI
Tiyovwane Safaris*
Chief Mukuni
S67
3080 sq km
Originally two hunting blocks: one retained (Bilili) by Chief
Mukuni; the other (Nkala) purchased by Nsonga Safaris.
Mukuni is a chief from the Livingstone area. Chief
Musungwa of Nkala GMA complains that ZAWA has been
issuing very high quotas and that the safaris have depleted
game required to support non-hunting tourism.68
BILILI NKALA
Nsonga Safaris
Chief Mukuni and South
African partners
MUMBWA WEST
Swanepoel & Scandrol
Safaris
P
3370 sq km
Was subdivided. They now hunt West Mumbwa.
SICHIFULA
Alfa Recreational Safaris
Gilson Kaweche.
S
3600 sq km
Once an excellent area but now heavily poached.
MULOBEZI
Steel Fabrications Ltd
P
3420 sq km
Reports suggest the area is being looked after and
improving.
KASONSO
Hunters & Guides Safaris
T. Mulonga
Gavin Hume
P
7780 sq km
A good area.
LUNGA BUSANGA
Royal Zambezi Wildlife
Safaris
Doug Reynolds
Chief Chiawa
S
2094 sq km
Concession removed from African Experience Safaris and
‘administratively’ awarded to Reynolds etc.
LUNGA LUSWISHI
Pro-Hunt Safaris
Barry & Richard Bell-Cross
S
11246 sq km
The poor parts of the concession were hived off by ZAWA
and awarded to other operators.
NAMWALA
Nsonga Safaris (also have
Bilili Nkala)
Chief Mukuni and South
Africans
U
1894 sq km
A poor area generally, though one now improving as a
result of the efforts of a lodge operator , Chief Kaingu and
the Itumbi- Kaingu Trust .
One of the great general-bag hunting grounds.
LUANGWA VALLEY
WEST PETAUKE
Mbeza Safaris
Khalid Al Tajir and Manning
family
67
68
P
4140 sq km
Purchased in December 2004 as part of a conservancy
development. Heavily poached. Quotas reduced to allow for
success but re-instated by ZAWA. In 2008 split and
awarded to Hunting Horizon (Nyalugwe) and Bimm’s
Travel (Luembe). Default judgement awaited since July
2008 to return it to Mbeza.
P = Prime; S = Secondary; U = Understocked
Frederick Mwansa. 21 July 2009. Chief Musungwa urges ban on safari hunting. The Post Newspaper, Lusaka.
140
HUNTING AREA
CATEGORY NOTES
LUAWATA
Luawata Conservation Ltd:
Tudor Jones
P
1284 sq km
An excellent non-profit conservation hunting area.
CHANJUZI
Muchinga Safaris
Johnny du Plooy
Roland Norton
P
Area was subdivided but owners retain both.
MWANYA LUMIMBA
SOFRAM SAFARIS
Fico Vidale
P
Area purchased from Sofram by Fico Vidale.
Removed from Leopard Ridge for no legal reason;
subsequently returned to owners as a result of community
obtaining an injunction. Then overturned in the Supreme
Court, and while LR were taking the matter to court against
ZAWA, was removed by ZAWA, then put out to tender,
then cancelled, then awarded to previous concessionaire,
Randera.
NYAMPALA
Nyampala Safaris
Rashid Randera
CHIFUNDA
Luangwa Crocodile Safaris
Keith/Ian Asherwood
P
UPPER LUPANDE
Mangomba Safaris
P
2336 sq km
LOWER LUPANDE
Kwalata Safaris
Peter Chipman, Gulam Patel
P
3262 sq km
SANDWE
Sable Transport & Safaris
Iqbal Alloo
S
Removed without due process, then given back. Sub-leased
to South Africans.
LUANO UPPER
Agro-Fuel Ltd
Sashi Patel
U
The Luano areas are considerably depleted but
concessionaires are actively protecting the wildlife, though
hunting quotas on hippo are a major concern.
LUANO LOWER
Agro-Fuel Ltd
Sashi Patel
S
Ditto.
WEST MUSULANGU
Wildcat safaris
Brian Heath
S
The area was subdivided, Wildcat Safaris retaining the
excellent section
RUFUNSA
Nyampala Safaris
Rashid Randera
U
3179 sq km
CHISOMO
Sable Transport & Safaris
Iqbal Alloo
U
CHIZERA
Luangwa Crocodile Safaris
Keith/Ian Asherwood
U
Removed without due process but later returned.
141
OTHER AREAS
CHIBWIKA NTAMBU
SOFRAM Safaris
Lilian Chilense
U
TONDWA
Muchinga Safaris
Johnny du Plooy, Roland
Norton
U
443 sq km
WEST ZAMBEZI
Hunting Horizon Safaris
S
Two elephant licences taken out – both in 2006 and 2007.
LOWER ZAMBEZI
Royal Zambezi Wildlife
Safaris
Doug Reynolds
Chief Chiawa
UPPER ZAMBEZI
Maningi Safaris
Appears to be inactive, though a dynamic trust, The West
Lunga Trust, is at work in the area.
U
142
Appendix 2: The next 13 hunting concessions as awarded
HUNTING AREA
CATEGORY NOTES
MUKUNGULE
Busanga Trails Ltd
Younis Patel
S
EAST MUSALANGU
Miyombo Safaris
S
LOWER EAST LUNGA
LUSHWISHI?
S
UPPER EAST LUNGA
LUSHWISHI?
S
MSORO LUPANDE
Mitchell Safaris
S
In 2007, the source of a dispute with Chief Msoro, Michell
and his PH, Ray Millican.69 The area is totally depleted and
should not be hunted.
BANGWEULU
Baobab Safaris
Rashid Randera (later
returned to open access
status)
SPECIALISE
D
A monopoly at first. Over concentration of hunting and
heavy poaching produces poor hunting for sitatunga –
although some 650 km2 of suitable habitats exists.70 Black
lechwe and Bangweulu tsessebe.
KAFUE FLATS NORTH
Eastern Safaris
Yousef Zumla
SPECIALISE
D
A monopoly. Kafue lechwe.
KAFUE FLATS SOUTH
Eastern Safaris
Yousef Zumla
SPECIALISE
D
A monopoly.
KAFINDA
Busanga Trails Ltd
Younis Patel
U
Apart from some sitatunga hunting, safaris should not be
allowed as it is heavily depleted, and what animals there are
come from the Kasanka and Lavushi Manda National Parks.
LUKWAKWA
‘Consortium’?
U
MUSELE-MATEBO
‘Consortium’?
U
69
A depleted area.
URL:http://zambiasafarihunting.blogspot.com/2007/12/zambia-hands-out-treatment-to-sheriff.html. Accessed:
2010-02-27. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nqyXnNTr)
143
Appendix 3:
Synthesis of the draft national policy of May 2003 on private wildlife estates and
other novel uses of wildlife
A.
ZAWA POLICY
•
The importance of PWEs is recognised in the war against rural poverty.
•
ZAWA will support PWE establishment, will provide animals for restocking at a fee.
•
ZAWA wish to enter into partnerships with PWEs, communities and private sector.
B.
PRIVATE ESTATE CLASSIFICATION
•
Game ranches: fenced, private, not greater than 5,000ha.
•
Communal – Private Conservancy: joint venture, fenced, not greater than 30,000ha.
•
Communal Wildlife Conservancy: community owned, fenced or not, not greater than
50,000ha.
C.
GUIDELINES FOR PWE APPLICATIONS
•
Application for a PWE to be made to ZAWA on the prescribed form.
•
Detailed business plans must be submitted.
•
Approval of a PWE will be given only after a feasibility study & inspection.
•
ZAWA will co-ordinate PWE development with other Ministries and stakeholders.
D.
PWE PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS
•
Restrictions on the placement of fences in relation to rivers.
•
Where existing properties are too close to rivers, and unable (after an ecological study) to
alter the boundary, ZAWA will not delegate ownership, but instead will award ‘user
rights’; and will set an off-take quota.
•
All PWEs must be fenced unless an environmental study suggests it is not in the
biodiversity interest.
•
ZAWA will ensure that PWEs have management plans that provide off-take restrictions
and quotas.
•
Professional hunters and capturers require to be registered with ZAWA.
•
Only a percentage of live capture are to be allowed for export.
•
No medium to large scale PWE will be allowed within 10 km of built-up area (i.e. a
town).
•
Export is prohibited in endemic species e.g. kafue & black lechwe.
•
Various restrictions are suggested on the import, care and release of species, most of them
following international regulations (CITES and International Air Transport Association
(IATA) etc).
E.
PWE CONDITIONS
•
Private operators to submit annual returns to ZAWA not later than 15 February of every
year.
•
Transfer of ownership to be with the approval of ZAWA, but only after a game inventory
is taken.
•
A change of land-use requires ZAWA’s approval.
•
CITES regulations to be followed.
F.
ZAWA DELEGATION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
•
Ecological studies & supervision of game capture may be delegated to an agent.
144
CHAPTER 4:
THE FRAMEWORK FOR CONSERVATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
145
ACRONYMS
ABC
ACC
ANC
BAA
BAZ
BBBE Act
CBD
CC
CDM
CEE Act
CEP
CITES
CMZ
CONASA
CoP
CPI
CRB
CSI
DANIDA
DDT
DFID
D-G
DHMT
DNA
ECZ
EIA
EMF
EPPCA
ESP
FD
FMA
FMC
FNDP
FODEP
FRA
FSC
GDP
GEF
GIS
GM
GMA
GMO
GRZ
H of C
HDI
HE
HIP
HIPC
HQ
HRC
HURID
Atmospheric Brown Cloud
Anti-Corruption Commission
African National Congress
Business Action for Africa
Bankers Association of Zambia
Broad Based Black Empowerment Act
Convention on Biological Diversity
Customary Community
Clean Development Mechanism
Citizens Economic Empowerment Act
Copperbelt Environmental Programme
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
Chamber of Mines of Zambia
Community-based Natural resource Management and Sustainable Agriculture
Conference of the Parties
Corruption Perception Index
Community Resource Board
Civil Society Index
Danish International Development Aid
Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
UK Department for International Development
Director General of ZAWA
District Health Management Team
Deoxyribonucleic Acid
Environmental Council of Zambia
Environmental Impact Assessment
Environmental Management Facility
Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act
Environmental Support Programme
Forestry Department
Fisheries Management Area
Fisheries Management Committees
Fifth National Development Plan
Foundation for Democratic Process
Food Reserve Agency
Forest Stewardship Council
Gross Domestic Product
Global Environment Facility
Global Information System
Genetically Modified
Game Management Area
Genetically Modified Organism
Government of Zambia
House of Chiefs
Human Development Index
His Excellency
Harmonisation in Practice
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Headquarters
Human Rights Commission
Institute of Human Rights, Intellectual Property and Development Trust
146
HWC
IDA
IMF
IPCC
ITN
IUCN
JASZ
JFM
MAP
MCA
MDG
MEWD
MIGA
MIKE
MMD
MoU
MP
MTENR
NAFTA
NAI
NAP
NAPA
NBSAP
NCC
NCS
NCSC
NDF
NDP
NEAP
NEPAD
NGO
NP
NPE
NPWS
NRCF
NWRMA
OAU
ODA
PFAP
PHAZ
PPIAF
PPP
PRGF
PRSP
PS
PSDP
R&D
REDD
SADC
SEAP
SERF
SHOAZ
SWOT
TCA
Human Wildlife Conflict
International Development Association
International Monetary Fund
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Insecticide Treated Net
World Conservation Union
Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia
Joint Forest Management
Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme
Multi-Criteria Analysis
Millennium Development Goal
Ministry of Energy and Water Development
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephant
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Memorandum of Understanding
Member of Parliament
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
North American Free Trade Agreement
New African Initiative
National Action Plan
National Adaptation Plan of Action
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
National Constitutional Conference
National Conservation Strategy
National Civil Society Consultative
Nordic Development Fund
National Development Plan
National Environmental Action Plan
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
Non-Governmental Organisation
National Park
National Policy on Environment
National Parks and Wildlife Services
Natural Resources Consultative Forum
National Water Resources Management Authority
Organisation of African Unity
Official Development Assistance
Provincial Forestry Action Programme
The Professional Hunters Association of Zambia
Public-private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
Public-Private Partnership
Poverty Reduction Growth Facility
Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
Permanent Secretary
Private Sector Development Programme
Research and Development
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
Southern African Development Community
Structural Economic Adjustment Programme
Strengthening of the Environmental Regulatory Framework
The Safari Hunter Operators Association of Zambia
Strength Weaknesses Opportunities and Threats
Tourism Concession Agreement
147
TCZ
TEALC
TEVETA
TIZ
TOR
TRAFFIC
UK
UN
UNCCD
UNCED
UNDP
UNEP
UNESCO
UNFCCC
UNIDO
US
WB
WCS
WDC
WECSZ
WHO
WPAZ
WRAP
WSPS
WSSD
WTO
WWII
ZAM
ZANIS
ZAWA
ZBF
ZCCM
ZCCM-IH
ZCSD
ZCSMBA
ZDA
ZECU
ZIBA
ZIBAC
ZIC
ZNFU
Tourism Council of Zambia
Tourism Enterprises and Licencing Committee
Technical Education and Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority
Transparency International Zambia
Terms of Reference
The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environment Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
United States
World Bank
Wildlife Conservation Society (USA)
Ward Development Committee
The Wildlife & Environmental Conservation Society of Zambia
World Health Organisation
The Wildlife Producers Association of Zambia
Water Resources Action Program
Water Sector Programme Support
World Summit on Sustainable Development
World Trade Organisation
World War Two
Zambia Association of Manufacturers
Zambia National Information Service
Zambia Wildlife Authority
Zambia Business Forum
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines
ZCCM-Investment Holdings plc
Zambia Council for Social Development
Zambia Chamber of Small and Medium Business Associations
Zambia Development Agency
ZCCM-IH Environmental Coordinating Unit
Zambia Indigenous Business Association
Zambia International Business Advisory Council
Zambia Investment Centre
Zambia National Farmers Union
148
1
ECONOMICS, POPULATION AND INVESTMENT
1.1
Economics
Four years after Zambia attained self-government, Kaunda - greatly influenced by Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania - moved in 1968 at the Mulungushi Economic Reforms Conference to nationalise the
economy.
The Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) was established with Andrew Sardanis as both
CEO and the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and large European-owned
corporations were told to hand over 51% of their equity, to be paid for out of declared dividends,
anticipating the future Broad Based Black Empowerment Act (BEE Act) of South Africa, and its
clone, the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act of Zambia (CEE Act). At the end of 1969, the
mining houses were informed by letter of Kaunda’s decision to take 51% of the mines, the latter
already paying 75% of their gross earnings in tax and royalties. This was to be repeated decades later
in South Africa, as a result of their wholly sympathetic part in the affirmative action industry, a front
for the African elite’s own self-enrichment (Mbeki 2009).
In rapid succession, Kaunda then created two more parastatal holding bodies: the Mining
Development Corporation (MINDECO), and the Finance and Development Corporation (FINDECO),
the latter being the vehicle to gain control of insurance companies and building societies. In 1971, the
three parastatals were combined into the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO), with
Sardanis as its CEO and Kaunda as Chairman. In 1972, Kaunda declared a one-party state, espousing
his philosophy of Humanism that called for a return to the African cultural roots of economic
reciprocity and the ‘low-poppy’ society. In 1973, Kaunda abrogated the management contracts entered
into with the mining houses, borrowed money from international banks, and bought them out (D
Gleason 2009, personal communication). Anglo-American received their payout gratefully, funds
which they used to establish themselves in the Bahamas.
By 1975 there were 147 parastatals in existence, 80% of them Government-run. The fact that Kaunda,
despite being a Humanist and re-distributive socialist, sought to harvest that which had been built by
European technology and verve and vest it into Afro-European conglomerates that in no way redistributed ownership or benefits to rural people, is both instructive and ironic. In June of 1975, the
economy already reeling from oil price increases and low copper prices, Kaunda unveiled a radical
programme of Zambianisation and pervasive state control in the cataclysmic ‘Watershed Speech’,
which effectively drained Zambia of its remaining critical mass of European skills, and consigned the
country to an isolated and donor-supported notional democracy, one serving only the elite. Clearly,
embedded liberalism, that political-economic organisation of the vibrant post-war period, was dead,
replaced by the neoliberalism that had swept through much of the world:
Embedded liberalism delivered high rates of economic growth in the advanced
capitalist countries during the 1950’s and 1960’s. In part this depended on the largesse
of the US in being prepared to run deficits with the rest of the world and to absorb any
excess product within its borders. This system conferred benefits such as expanding
export markets (most obviously for Japan but also unevenly across South America and
to some other countries of South-East Asia), but attempts to ‘export’ development to
much of the world largely stalled. For much of the third world, particularly Africa,
embedded liberalism remained a pipe dream. The subsequent drive towards
neoliberalisation after 1980 entailed little material change in their impoverished
condition….Fixed exchange rates were therefore abandoned in 1971. Gold could no
longer function as the metallic base of international money; exchange rates were
allowed to float, and attempts to control the float were soon abandoned. The embedded
liberalism that had delivered high rates of growth to at least the advanced capitalist
countries after 1945 was clearly exhausted. Some alternative was called for if the crisis
149
was to be overcome…….Even in the United States, a Congress controlled by the
Democratic Party legislated a huge wave of regulatory reform in the early 1970s,
governing everything from environmental protection to occupational safety and health,
civil rights, and consumer protection...The capitalist world stumbled towards
neoliberalisation as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments
that really only converged as the new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became
known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s….The uneven geographical
development of neoliberalism, its frequent partial and lop-sided application from one
state and social formation to another, testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal
solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and
existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of
neoliberalisation actually occurred….After the implementation of neoliberal policies in
the late 1970s, the share of national income of the top 1% of income earners in the US
soared, to reach 15% (very close to its pre-Second World War share) by the end of the
century. The top 0.1% of income earners in the US increased their share of the national
income from 2% in 1978 to over 6% by 1999, while the ratio of the median
compensation of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in
1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000 (Harvey 2005, pp. 11-16).
In 1983, Zambia, its external debt by 1980 already at US$3,244 million, entered into negotiations with
the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), leading to the imposition of a
Structural Economic Adjustment Programme (SEAP). In 1986-1987 the Government cancelled the
programme and began its own rescue package (‘Growth from Own Resources’). The Fourth National
Development Plan followed in 1988, as well as a resumption of its IMF relationship, so negating the
Plan. From 1989, Government (GRZ) began a New Economic Recovery Programme. Since 1989 there
have been trotted out an endless litany of plans and programmes, but as one writer observes:
From the end of WWII to 1974, Zambia saved and invested in excess of 30% of GDP.
Average per capita income grew at close to 4% per annum. This was one of the best
growth performances in the world. From 1975 to 1991, Zambia's savings rate collapsed
and the average investment rate, although inflated by foreign aid, external borrowing,
and the accumulation of arrears, fell below 20% of GDP. During this period, Zambia's
average per capita income declined by 2.5% per annum. For developing countries
which avoided disasters such as civil wars and coups, this was the worst performance
in the world (McPherson 1995).
In 1993, the debt crisis in countries such as Zambia led to the creation of the much vaunted Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative which imposed stringent conditions by the IMF on Zambia:
the privatisation of public utilities, removal of subsidies, deregulation of its markets and general trade
liberalisation, investment deregulation, retrenchment of civil servants, public sector wage cuts or
freezes, and reduced state intervention in the agricultural sector.
By any measure, these policies have been a massive failure: the textile manufacturing industry
declined from 140 textile manufacturing firms in 1991 to eight by 2002; the agricultural industry
regressed - partly due to the removal of subsidies; many companies collapsed, jobs were lost and
welfare programmes originally performed through a parastatal were not continued by private
companies; spending on the rural poor has since all but dried up; the trade deficit has increased; and
employment is still at the same level as it was under colonial rule. The core IMF and WB policies
agreed to by Zambia - trade liberalisation, agricultural liberalisation and privatisation - are clearly one
of the major causes of its woeful economic and social performance.
Ironically, all of the aforementioned occurred under the presidency of a former trade-unionist,
Frederick Chiluba, supposedly there to serve the masses and the national interest but who (along with
countless leaders of backward countries with the duty and expectation to introduce a new international
150
economic order) reversed allegiance, imposing ineffectual and extremely unpopular structural
adjustment programmes on their countries. In addition to the actual loans and programmes, the WB
and the IMF inveigled themselves into the chambers of policy decisions as a result of the debt crisis,
forcing GRZ and other governments to take on structural adjustment programmes. Where structural
adjustment was not agreed to, they had to give the IMF ‘policy undertakings’, under the threat of
losing international creditworthiness, inevitable without the IMF’s stamp of approval (Bond 2000).
Of concern is the way the WB forces its dubious agenda on individual Ministries, an agenda that
directly oppose the wishes of stakeholders and civil society. An example is the WB recommendation
to the Ministry of Lands that all customary land be placed under the Ministry of Lands, with the chiefs
relegated to land administrators.71 This recommendation was made without wide consultation, simply
agreed to by the Ministry of Lands and the World Bank and without the agreement of the chiefs or the
Land Alliance or the customary communities themselves. However, this has not yet been
implemented.
One of the factors in this major decline is the increasingly poor performance of workers and the
collapse of the apprenticeship schemes. Recent quantitative economic research reveals that modern
production technologies developed in the West are designed for labour forces that are disciplined,
conscientious and engaged, and where error rates are kept to a minimum. In poor countries little
attention is now paid to worker discipline and their training, explaining the dramatically lower
productivity of textile mill workers in these countries (Clark 2007, p.15).
In a recent report, 'A New Debt Crisis?' a warning is sounded that the significant decreases in income
and de-valueing of currencies taking place in 2009 will seriously damage developing countries' ability
to service and refinance their debts. In particular, they warn that Zambia could see its debts at twice
the level deemed sustainable by the WB and IMF.72
Since the time of Adam Smith, most economists have overwhelmingly held to a very rigid freemarket position. But there are an increasing number of dissenting voices:
In light of the apparent settled nature of economists’ judgement on the issue of trade
liberalisation, the profession has stopped thinking critically about the question and, as a
consequence, makes poor-quality arguments justifying their consensus. That is, this
consensus is now an institution that, like some other institutions, can best be described
as ‘centuries of tradition, unmarred by progress’ (Driskill 2007).
Major opposition to neoliberal free-market policies first took place in Mexico in 1994 as a result of the
disastrous effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the native Chiapas
people, with rural communities rising up against their government in what became known as the
Zapatista rebellion. The basis of much of this was the repeal of the rights peasants had long held to
their commons, the ejido, in order to allow agri-businesses to be established on their land. The legacy
of the Zapatistas reveal two inescapable facts: 1) power is not something to be concentrated at
government level, merely changing hands between political elites at every election, but something to
be devolved to community level, and 2) that it is foolish to expect government to hand down power of
its own volition, requiring communities to rise united and empower themselves (Kingsnorth 2004,
p.20). However it was at the first meeting of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle in
November 1999 that the phenomena of anti-globalisation (anti-neoliberalism) really emerged,
followed in 2000 by the demonstrations at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, a movement
protesting that the rich were getting richer and the poor, poorer.
71
12 April 2006, World Bank/Ministry of Lands presentation on an action plan to strengthen land administration
in Zambia, Oxfam HQ, Lusaka.
72
Campaigners warn of new Third World debt crisis, March 15, 2009, Christian Today.
URL:http://www.christiantoday.com/article/campaigners.warn.of.new.third.world.debt.crisis/22783.htm.
Accessed: 2010-04-06. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5omhNZgmr)
151
The evidence suggests that the past twenty years of IMF and WB interventions have exacerbated,
rather than ameliorated, Zambia's debt crisis. Ironically, in return for debt relief, Zambia is required to
do more of the same. As one report stated:
It is not acceptable that these institutions have effective control over policy-making in
countries like Zambia. Policies need to be developed which are genuinely home grown
alternatives that put the Zambian people, especially the poor, first (Situmbeko 2004).
Moreover (the misguided treatment by the Washington Consensus of Zambia’s economic condition
apart), particularly since the accession to power of the MMD Party - civil servants and society at large,
continue the unabated pillaging of government funds, as recorded in the annual reports of the AuditorGeneral, reports analysed by Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) for the period 1984-2004,
where the equivalent of approximately one year of national income is unaccounted for. Furthermore,
in a country where some 80% of its people scrape a living, with an average life expectancy at birth of
33-35 years, Government spent only 16.32% of total national expenditure on education, health,
agriculture, community development and social welfare – much of it stolen - with environment in
2006 having an estimated budget allocation within the Transitional National Development Plan of less
than 1% (Djokotoe & Chama 2007, p.67).
The actual amount of illicit funds exported to Western financial institutions from Africa is a crime of
simply massive proportions. From 1970, over a 39-year period, Africa lost US$854 billion in
cumulative capital flight – this excludes that moved illegally by the cross-border smuggling of the
informal sector. The illegal financial flows for Southern Africa – which includes Zambia – in the
1970’s was $5,894 million; 1980’s $20,581 million; 1990’s $31,447 million; 2000-2008 was $116,828
million – a total of $174,751 million. For Africa as a whole at the end of 2008, external debt was at
around $250 billion, leaving some US$600 billion for poverty alleviation and economic growth
accounted for between $9,770 - $5,880 million from 1970-2004, not accounting for the smuggling of
narcotics, ivory and gemstones (Kar & Cartwright-Smith 2010, p.10).
In 2006, problems of fuel supplies, the exchange rate mechanism - the dollar losing 30% of its value the inflation rate and the vagaries of the budget (not least the fact that oil reached and surpassed $100
a barrel), meant continued difficulties for the tourism industry and for agriculture in particular. Yet, in
2008, without consultation with the tourism industry, Government increased tourism visa fees by
100% and sought to have hunting safari operators pay in advance for 100% of the game quota (nonrefundable), despite the fact that quota offtakes since 2001 had not exceeded 45%.
The very recent and expectedly brief surge in mining brought about by high commodity prices has
once more allowed Zambia to misplace its development priorities, leading to considerable natural
resource exploitation with poor environmental safeguards in place and with a corrupt royalty
negotiation process that has lost the country a great deal of revenue. This renewed focus on mining has
only enriched the elite who benefit from mining royalties and other pay-offs, with rural people
excluded from the kleptocratic patronage system.
Inevitably, given recessionary fears, global commodity prices plummeted in September 2008, leading
to mine closures, massive retrenchment and the loss of income to Government, events redolent of the
precipitous collapse initiated by the formation of a one-party state in 1972 in what had been one of the
fastest growing economies in the world between 1920 and 1960, with a growth rate of 4% until 1974
(Baldwin 1966). At Independence Zambia had the same per capita income as the Asian Tiger nations;
now Hong Kong is seventy-five times richer, South Korea twenty-five times richer.
While there is a continued clamour for investment in agriculture, the reality is that the powerful lobby
for hybrid maize seed and nitrogenous fertilisers creates a continual state of crisis regarding seed and
fertiliser availability, maize collection, marketing and credit - the country paying lip service to
152
conservation agriculture, neglecting the use of age-old techniques using non-hybrid seeds. The 20082009 season has seen the most dramatic increase in prices in the country’s history, with compound
fertiliser prices increasing from K3.3 million per tonne to K8.8 million per tonne, and diesel prices
almost doubling from K4,860 per litre the previous year to K8,500 at the time of ploughing and
planting the maize crop (Katilungu 2009). The recent cataclysmic drop in commodity prices will likely
increase foreign debt and dependency on the IMF, further dampening the prospects for more equitable
income flows into rural areas. But it is the depletion of the non-renewable resources, and the
accompanying long-term pollution, which will continue to tax future generations. However, the recent
alliance of chiefs whose customary areas adjoin the Zambezi, condemning the mining companies for
polluting their country and delivering few benefits, is a spirited defence of the customary commons
which is likely to spread, to incorporate and add momentum to the movement for customary land
owners to reclaim their share of the renewable resources supported by it.
The WB has acknowledged that for every percentage point increase in a country’s extractive-resource
dependency, the potential GDP declines by 9% (as against the real GDP recorded). Significantly,
Zambia has the second highest combined resource dependence and the lowest accumulation of capital
of all countries in Africa (Bond 2006, p.78).
A major assessment of the state of environment and existing policy, legislation and conventions
carried out by the Policy Development Secretariat in 2005, confirmed that it has become widely
recognised that Zambia's wealth of natural and cultural resources are in danger of further widespread
depletion and degradation, sometimes irreversibly as in the case of misuse of some soils – this has not
changed since and is unlikely to do so unless those with the land assert their traditional rights.73
However, it is more difficult to deal with the ability of Government to hold two contradictory ideas
simultaneously. This may be gauged by two reports which appeared on the same day in the local
Lusaka free-press: 1) the IMF announced the immediate disbursement to Zambia of $160.1 million to
‘help the country cope with the global economic slowdown and financial crisis’; and 2) the IMF
having completed the first and second reviews of Zambia's economic performance under the threeyear Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement announced the authorities had adopted a
new public debt management policy and strategy to help ensure that the public debt remains
sustainable. ‘In this regard, caution will be needed in contracting new non-concessional external debt’
(Chulu 2009b). And addressing the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Cuba, Zambia's Foreign
Affairs Minister, Kabinga Pande lamented.
The process of globalisation and trade liberalisation in its current form has produced
uneven benefits among and within states. There is nothing more undignified and
humiliating than being in perpetual economic bondage and living in abject poverty.
Zambia believes that continued economic marginalisation has grave implications on
human rights (Moonze 2009).
The Bank of Zambia’s quarterly brief of 1 August 2009 states that during the second quarter of 2009,
international arrivals at the country’s four international airports was 88,066 passengers, lower than the
113,129 passengers recorded during the corresponding period in 2008. On the investment front
investment pledges totalled US$762.7 million in 2009, compared with the US$1,820.7 million
recorded during the same period in 2008. It was also reported that copper prices and production were
on the increase.74 However, as the year 2009 ran to a close, the closure of the Indeni Oil Refinery once
more plunged the country into crisis.
73
National Policy on Environment. May 2005. Ministry of Tourism, Environment & Natural Resources,
Zambia’, p. 6
74
Caleb Fundanga. M. July 2009. Second Quarter 2009 Media Briefing, The Bank of Zambia, Lusaka
153
1.2
Population
A fact not often mentioned in Zambia (and reported on even less), is that the depletion and
degradation of the environment is due to Zambia falling increasingly into the Malthusian Trap in
urban areas. Whilst people in the slums, in defiance of Malthus, actually do benefit from the critical
mass market found there, they represent a massive market for plundered rural natural resources. In the
last hundred years Zambia’s population of 12 million (10 million in 2000) has increased forty-fold,
with more than half of the population now urbanised, and with rural populations expected to supply
food, charcoal, bushmeat and timber for the town consumers. One report gives Zambia’s population as
increasing at a rate of 2.4%, with projections to 2010 and 2015 of 13.2 and 15.3 million respectively.75
The Central Statistics Office, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, provides the following details
for Zambia:
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Population (million)
11.8
12.1
12.5
12.9
13.2
Although Zambia introduced a National Population Policy in 1989, it was only in 2005, after
considerable vetting, that it was made official. Population issues were not, however, fed into the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2002-2004, nor into the Transitional National Development Plan
of 2002-2005; and the 5th National Development Plan (NDP) contains a weak attempt to deal with the
issues.
Zambia’s population density since self-government has gone from about 5/km2 to 13.5/km2 with
considerable variations across the country. The available labour force in 2010 is projected to be seven
million, indicating a rise of 15% over five years. By 2025, the labour force is projected to be at
approximately eleven million. In stark contrast, total formal employment in 2004 in Zambia was
estimated at 416,228 people, similar to figures issued at the time of self-government. The informal
sector – as is readily apparent when travelling around Zambia - is clearly the principal source of
employment and income for Zambians.
It was revealed in the 5th National Development Plan that the Government vision in the area of
population and development is ‘improved quality of life through the achievement of population trends
that are commensurate with Zambia’s socio-economic development’. It then lists the objectives as
being: the reduction of high levels of procreation, particularly amongst adolescents; the expansion and
maintenance of the nation’s population database; to promote the achievement of an even spatial
distribution - especially between urban and rural areas; and the improvement of the sexual and
reproductive health status of the population. The strategies they give for achieving these vague goals
are derisory:
i)
Establishing and developing mechanisms for coordination, collection, processing,
analysis, dissemination and utilisation of demographic and related information;
ii) Long-term and short-term training, re-training and retention of human resources
so as to ensure effective implementation of population and development
programmes;
iii) Promoting research on the inter-relationship between population, reproductive
health, gender, HIV and AIDS and various aspects of development;
iv) Providing long and short-term population and research related training in
population and development.
Programmes to be implemented:
75
Tens C. Kapoma, 3 – 7 April 2006, Thirty-ninth session of the Commission on Population and Development,
UN HQ, New York.
154
i)
Establishment of population and development sub-committees at provincial
district levels;
ii) Procurement of equipment;
iii) Production of tourism, migration and population registers, and education and vital
statistics reports;
iv) Census preparatory activities;
v) Census undertaking; and
vi) Establishment of a community database.
One Chief, Chitambo of Kafinda, has called for more children in his area, perhaps expecting hard
times - such is the ‘natural economy’ - and perhaps understanding more fully the workings of the
Malthusian model: knowing that the birth rate (being dictated by custom) increases with material
living standards, and also knowing that the death rate has dropped off in his country, for reasons
unknown. But he has had little experience with the fact that living standards in rural areas generally
decline as populations increase - a perilous situation in the Chipya woodland of low fertility, where
villagers are under pressure to grow maize with nitrogenous fertiliser and hybrid seed so as to feed the
clamouring urban masses. And those same masses now require his charcoal, his fish and what
bushmeat remains on the hoof.
1.3
Investing and doing business in Zambia (Manning 2007a)
A married couple involved in tourism in Livingstone wrote to the author:
We were investors in Zambia and, after hearing the then Minister of Home Affairs,
Shikapwasha, and the District Administrator of Livingstone say (on separate
occasions) in public meetings that they could ‘kick out investors any time’, we decided
to cut our ties and leave the country. There were other reasons too, e.g. the incessant
changing of Government rules and fees and the incompetent and often discriminatory
implementation of them. In a nutshell, investing in Zambia just wasn't worth it.
Another tourist operator described how his wife was jailed overnight in Livingstone for a minor
infraction of her immigration status. For the small to medium investor, without the means or mindset
to pay bribes to officials, Zambia is a minefield, acknowledged as such by the World Bank. In
particular, this applies to those who are involved with empowering customary communities (Manning
2007b). This does not apply to the Chinese who appear to avoid the Department of Immigration
altogether, and where they don’t, are given work permits (Manning 2007d).
A rating of doing business in Zambia by the WB compares Zambia with of 181 other nations:76
Doing Business
Starting a Business
Dealing with Construction Permits
Employing Workers
Firing costs
Registering Property
Getting Credit
Protecting Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading Across Borders
Enforcing Contracts
76
100
71
146
135
178
91
68
70
38
153
87
URL:http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=207. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived
by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIE5O6XS)
155
Closing a Business
80
The investor protection index of 5.3 suggests that there is fair protection77. However, once the political
and executive establishment have decided to rid themselves of a troublesome investor there is little
that can be done about it, national and international protective measures being of little help to those
without large financial resources. Moreover, the blurred boundaries between the executive and the
judiciary result in decisions not in favour of the alleged transgressor, with long delays being the order
of the day, justice therefore being denied. In addition, the alleged transgressor is constrained by the
judiciary from making public comments for fear of prejudicing the judicial proceedings; silence being
therefore enforced.
Apart from the employment of workers - a major limiting factor in doing business in Zambia - the
average score of 100 does confirm that the country is not friendly to investors, other than the Chinese.
Zambia is positioned at 135 out of 181 countries for worker employment. The Minimum Wages and
Conditions of Services Act ensures that students are not employed, and investors shun employing
older workers as terminal benefits for workers reaching 55 year of age ensure they must be paid three
months wages for every year of service - provided they have worked for ten years – an unaffordable
cost for most businesses, saved only by the low life expectancy of the average Zambian. In the case of
Mbeza Safaris Limited, in respect of a worker who had been employed for two years, a benefit of a
year’s wages had to be paid to the widow on his HIV/Aids-related death – much of this claimed by
predatory relatives under the traditional system. However, the law also has an impact on the worker:
the worker who moves to another employer, who goes into business, whose employer goes out of
business, may lose the entitlement. An additional impediment to progress is redundancy pay, which is
set at two months pay for every year of service – this compared to, for instance, the South African
standard of one week for every completed year of service. Taken together with the epidemic levels of
theft that businesses now suffer from workers – as does the civil service - Zambia presents a daunting
climate for investors.
The view of the business stakeholder group, The Zambia Business Forum (ZBF), is that ‘Zambia is for
the Zambians’ - as expressed by its Chairman at a meeting the author attended, and that the preeminent legislation guiding their work is the Citizens Economic Empowerment Act (CEE Act). The
recent commodity and financial crisis that has resulted in the closure of numerous mines, has elicited a
totally predatory response by District Councils and Government in seizing plant, vehicles and
equipment, as well as a call to cancel mining contracts and nationalise the mines.
The National Assembly debates also reveal disturbing levels of xenophobia and racism. A diatribe in
2006 by the Member of Parliament (MP) Shakafuswa in which he accused the Ministry of Tourism of
awarding hunting concessions on the basis of race (this while debating the report of the Committee on
Energy, Environment and Tourism), was greeted by the members with enthusiasm (Phiri 2006).78 The
MP failed to understand that although twenty-five concessions were awarded by tender in 2003,
citizens obtained seventeen areas, foreigners two and those of unknown origin, six. He asked for
concessions to be reserved for indigenous Zambians - although a number of concessions are held by
indigenous Zambians although not operated by them, these all being sub-leased to non-indigenous
fellow citizens, or residents. In the same debate a Deputy Minister (Chola) backed Shakafuswa’s
assertion that non-Zambians are stealing Zambia’s resources.79
77
The indexes vary between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating greater disclosure, greater liability of
directors, greater powers of shareholders to challenge the transaction, and better investor protection.
78
The Zambian Parliament: Debates, Thursday 16 March 2006, page 2 of 12.
79
I.P.A. Manning. 2006. Unpublished letter to the Editor, The Post Newspaper, Lusaka 22 March.
156
1.4
Investment protection
Zambia is a signatory to two major instruments meant to protect investors:
i)
The Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000, implements the model law on international
commercial arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law in 1985, as well as the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration
Clauses and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards
and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.80
ii)
The Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) signed by the Government of Zambia on October 7, 1986, and ratified on
June 6, 1988, designated the Ministry of Finance to be the authority with which
the Agency is to communicate. MIGA applies performance standards to manage
social and environmental risks and to enhance development opportunities in the
projects that it supports through the provision of guarantees against political risks.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Social and Environmental Assessment and Management System
Labour and Working Conditions
Pollution Prevention and Abatement
Community Health, Safety and Security
Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement
Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management
Indigenous Peoples
Cultural Heritage
Performance Standard 6 recognises that protecting and conserving biodiversity is fundamental to
sustainable development. In circumstances where a proposed project is located within a legally
protected area, the client must meet the following requirements:
i)
ii)
iii)
Act in a manner consistent with defined protected area management plans.
Consult protected area sponsors and managers, local communities, and other key
stakeholders on the proposed project.
Implement additional programs, as appropriate, to promote and enhance the
conservation aims of the protected area.
Performance Standard 7 recognises that Indigenous Peoples are often among the most
marginalised and vulnerable segments of the population. Their economic, social and legal
status often limits their capacity to defend their interests in, and rights to, lands and natural and
cultural resources, and may restrict their ability to participate in and benefit from development.
They are particularly vulnerable if their lands and resources are transformed, encroached upon
by outsiders, or significantly degraded. Their languages, cultures, religions, spiritual beliefs,
and institutions may also be under threat. These characteristics expose Indigenous Peoples to
different types of risks and severity of impacts, including loss of identity, culture, and natural
resource-based livelihoods, as well as exposure to impoverishment and disease.
…Private sector projects may create opportunities for Indigenous Peoples to participate
in, and benefit from project-related activities that may help them fulfil their aspiration
for economic and social development. In addition, this Performance Standard
recognises that Indigenous Peoples may play a role in sustainable development by
80
Statement by Minister of Legal Affairs: DAILY PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FOR THE FIRST
SESSION OF THE NINTH ASSEMBLY Thursday, 5th December, 2002.
157
promoting and managing activities and enterprises as partners in development.
Investments may be insured internationally by MIGA.81
However, the reality is that investors, most of them being small to medium do not rely on such august
conventions for their protection. The multi-national corporations rely on a closet relationship with the
elite and a battery of international lawyers using highly placed compradors, or become corporate
members of such organisations as the influential Commission for Africa’s, Business Action for Africa
(BAA), an organisation that falsely claimed in a report to the G8 meeting in Germany that it was
fighting corruption in Zambia.82
Furthermore, the Zambia International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC) – affiliated with the
Commonwealth Business Council – and in turn to the BAA, with its function to advise the Presidency
on investment, did not address the author’s complaint concerning the membership of the Chairman of
the CEE Commission on ZIBAC, the CEE Act being patently anti-investment.83 When, at its meeting
in Livingstone in 2005, the Chairman of the ZIBAC criticised the lack of progress of the Commission
since its previous meeting, President Mwanawasa of Zambia upbraided the Commission Chairman,
Lord Simon Cairns, for his temerity in levelling criticism.
Foreigners who invest in Zambia and commit any criminal act (except minor traffic offences), are
liable under Section 33 of the Penal Code Cap 87 of the Laws of Zambia to compulsory deportation
upon conviction.
1.5
Foreign Aid
Recently, a plethora of popular writings has been published on the efficacy and failings of Western aid
to Africa - this prompted in part by the high profile it has received through the involvement of various
celebrities in drawing attention to what are reported as pernicious famines and Africa’s poverty. The
politicians have followed this movement with a series of summits on poverty and African
development. Easterley (2008) puts forward two broad descriptions of the aid approach:
The predominant "transformational" approach (West saves Africa) to occasional
swings to a marginal" approach (West takes one small step at a time to help individual
Africans). Evaluation of "one step at a time" initiatives is generally easier than that of
transformational ones either through controlled experiments (although these have been
much oversold) or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to
actions. We see two themes emerge from the literature survey: (1) escalation. As each
successive Western transformational effort has yielded disappointing results, the
response has been to try an even more ambitious effort. (2) the cycle of ideas. Rather
than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas, we see a cycle in aid ideas in
many areas in Africa, with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later
after some lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience. Both
escalation and cyclicality of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to
be characteristic of the "transformational" approach. In contrast, the "marginal"
approach has had some successes in improving the well-being of individual Africans,
such as the dramatic fall in mortality. The ‘transformational approach’ is then the
classic top-down application of aid, which has been largely debunked, yet still has its
stubborn adherents promising ever larger sums of money, while the marginal, more
cautious and more easily monitored, through randomised evaluation, is a decentralised
approach that appears to be more successful.
81
URL:http://www.miga.org, accessed: 2010-02-27. Archived by WebCite®:
http://www.webcitation.org/5nqyobXmo.
82
Gamefields, the Landsafe originator and investor, was, at the time, the sole member in Zambia.
83
I.P.A. Manning. 23 March 2006. E-mail to Mohan Kahl, member of ZIBAC.
158
2
2.1
THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONSERVATION
The World Conservation Strategy
The World Conservation Union produced their vision for the integration of development with
conservation objectives and the participation of customary communities (IUCN 1980):
i)
To maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems (i.e.
atmosphere, soil and water cycles).
ii) To preserve genetic diversity (including preventing extinctions and preserving
representative biotic communities).
iii) To ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems.
Superficially, it appeared to provide an internationally acceptable framework for conservation and
human development. However, in reality it merely presented as a gold standard, a very narrow
conservationists’ view of what humans should aspire to, suggesting that society should transform and
mould itself into a rigid conservationist society which has a strategy of limitation of resource use and
human population increase so as to attain the World Conservation Strategy goals (Bell cited in
Anderson & Grove 1989, p.79). No mention is made of the social and political changes that are
necessary to achieve these goals, a fault lying at the heart of most conservation endeavours.
2.2
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Copenhagen Consensus
The first of the MDGs, agreed on in 2000, was to halve, between 1990 and 2015, both the proportion
of people whose income is less than $1 a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
Yet the neoliberal insistence on privatisation of water and electricity simply place a massive burden on
the urban poor, added to in rural areas by education, health and agricultural inputs (Bond 2006, p.138).
Hyperbole and the lack of real commitment have exposed the MDGs severe limitations. And, in the
light of its original objectives, the situation has deteriorated. As has been pointed out:
The Millennium Development Goals are broad outcome measures where it is very
difficult to attribute social outcomes to aid efforts, since the outcomes also depend on
many other things, including the important but often-overlooked incentives of local
public and private actors to make progress in the areas covered by the Goals. Hence,
the incentives for action created by international targets seem to be very weak indeed
(and even then the action seems to be more oriented toward increasing total aid dollars
rather than improving effectiveness of that spending to produce better outcomes)
(Easterley 2008, pp. 45-46).
Zambia’s National Policy on Environment (NPE), guided somewhat by the MDGs, views the
importance of socio-economic and environmental issues that affect ecosystems as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Protection of the Nation's current asset base.
Improvement and possible expansion of the asset base.
Introduction of cross-sectoral approaches for co-management with communities.
Development of mechanisms for re-investment and revenue sharing with the
poor.
v) Promotion of infrastructure and technology development without damaging the
environment.
vi) Identify and prioritise impoverished areas and develop compensatory mechanisms
and incentives for rehabilitation.
159
vii) Introduce effective environmental information, education and communication
nation-wide.84
More attainable goals, scientifically based, and extremely rigorous in their selection as a result of the
inputs of a panel of Nobel prize winners, is the Copenhagen Consensus 2008, which puts forward the
following as the most important areas on which to concentrate development and remedial action, of
which the first seven are extremely important in rural areas:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
2.3
Air Pollution
Diseases
Education
Global Warming
Malnutrition and Hunger
Sanitation and Water
Women and Development
Subsidies and Trade Barriers
Terrorism
Conflicts
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SADC was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on 1 April 1980 following the adoption of the Lusaka
Declaration. The Declaration and treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) was signed at the Summit of Heads of State or Government on 17 August 1992 in Windhoek,
Namibia. Member states of SADC are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC has proved to be a massive failure in dealing with the tyranny of
Mugabe, in allowing cheap goods to destroy manufacturing, in its failure to reduce intra-regional
tariffs, and in its use as a Trojan horse by mining interests in South Africa to ‘re-colonise’ the SADC
members (Bond 2000, p.234).
The SADC Biodiversity Support Programme, supposed to establish capacity and institutional
mechanisms for SADC members to collaborate by producing innovative financing mechanisms,
developing regional strategies and establishing national and regional expert groups, has thus far
achieved little.
2.4
NEPAD: New Partnership for Africa’s Development
In 2001, the African Union approved a merger between two African development initiatives:
Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and Omega Plan, now called the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The salient features as far as the development
of the customary commons is concerned, is fully supportive.
The failure of most NEPAD members to allow the African peer-review mechanism to report on them
has severely dented its reputation. Whatever doubts exist have been confirmed by the Zimbabwe
disgrace. In 2004, a meeting of Jubilee Africa members expressed their concerns that South Africa
was using NEPAD to further its sub-imperialist neoliberal role, serving the interests of trans-national
corporations. In Zambia, the Chiluba MMD Government merely brought in market rule at the expense
of the interests of the poor.
84
National Policy on Environment. 2005. Ministry of Tourism (MTENR), Zambia, p.14.
160
2.5
The African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
The African Union signed up most of its members to this convention in Maputo in 2003. The
convention has as its objectives the following:
i) To enhance environmental protection;
ii) To foster the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources; and
iii) To harmonise and coordinate policies in these fields with a view to achieving
ecologically rational, economically sound and socially acceptable development
policies and programmes.
This Convention is now rarely referred to, if ever mentioned.
2.6
WSSD: World Summit on Sustainable Development
The basis of the 1980 World Conservation Strategy document was sustainable development. Since
then the concept has been emboldened, notably at the World Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and the World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg in 2002, the concept extended to make explicit reference to justice, equity, and the
elimination of poverty.
The WSSD was held in Johannesburg from 24 August to 4 September 2002, carrying on from the Rio
de Janeiro Earth Summit in 1992, and before that from the World Commission on Environment and
Development (the Bruntland Commission) in 1987 which called for us to ‘fulfil the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. This was in
the hope of both placating the rich consumptive north - with its fears of unsustainable and
environmentally damaging survival strategies of southern subsistence peoples and their corrupt and
undemocratic leadership; and to mobilise the ‘haves’ – the North, into doing something about their
own pollution and the growing disparity between themselves and the poor South. The main theme of
the WSSD was to foster sustainable development through the triumvirate supports of economic
growth, social development and environmental protection.
A call for the alleviation of poverty was made by various African Ministers at the Nairobi meeting
held in October 2001 (African Preparatory Conference for the World Summit on Sustainable
Development), saying that they would not dwell on the failure to implement Agenda 21, nor wish to
renegotiate the outcomes, but that the WSSD ‘should result in a concrete programme of action with
time-bound measures and well-specified sources of funding to implement them’. It affirmed that it is
the New African Initiative (NAI) that should be the framework for sustainable development in Africa,
and that the eradication of poverty really means the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
The eradication of Northern import restrictions;
Debt reduction/cancellation;
A review of the conditionalities of the Bretton Woods Institutions;
The promotion of small to medium businesses;
Gaining access to energy resources;
Promotion of micro-finance;
Enhancing access to basic health services;
Sustainable rural development, agricultural development and food security;
Greater access to safe water and sanitation;
Reducing the vulnerability of people to natural disasters and environmental risks;
Access to and improved standards of education.
Under the heading human development, acknowledgement was given to the fact that Africa is
currently straining under the burden of communicable diseases that are disabling our economies,
161
ascribing the reasons to poor environmental conditions, or in the case of HIV/AIDS to a need to
incorporate the disease in poverty reduction/eradication, sustainable development and economic
growth strategies.
Taking as their cue the African Ministers’ exhortation to provide a concrete programme of action with
time-bound measures and well-specified sources of funding to implement them, a coalition of African
- mainly Southern African - environmental and biodiversity interests would be formed, tasked to
provide programmes which could contribute to sustainable development, i.e. the alleviation of
poverty. A menu of these projects, developed in a growing partnership with business, rural
communities and donors was presented at the WSSD.
However, the summation of the WSSD together with the hopes raised in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, was
of a massive failure to carry through with global environmental reform. Johannesburg merely
signalled a defeat and a long campaign ahead against neoliberalism and a sustainable future. The
actions of the host nation, South Africa, which had only just thrown off the yoke of apartheid, and to
whom the poor and marginalised looked for relief, sided with the Washington Consensus, privatizing
its water, much of the Kruger National Park, and doing nothing for the plight of the poor majority
(Bond 2000, p.294). With the US refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on
Biodiversity – the two main conventions emanating from Rio - and embarking on war against the
terrorism which had struck on September 11, 2001, it was clear that environmentalism was very low
on the priority list, something the global South – due to neoliberal globalisation – were caught in
worsening economic crises over which they had no control (Foster 2009, p.130).
2.7
Convention on biological diversity
The establishment and effective management of a global series of protected areas was a key element
of the 7th Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 2004.
However, such a policy is contradictory to an improvement in rural livelihoods, as the alteration of
land use from customary to protected status causes the foreclosure of future land use options, with
potentially significant economic opportunity costs. The 7th CBD CoP called for an assessment of the
economic and socio-cultural costs of protected areas (including the cost of livelihood opportunities
foregone), and policies to ensure that they are equitably compensated (Adams 2004). For Zambia this
remains the key for people who were essentially divested of their land under various pretexts.
The principle that the needs of local people should be systematically integrated into protected area
planning was agreed to at the third World Parks Congress in Bali in 1982. Yet by the 5th World Parks
Congress in September 2003, little had changed.
Zambia ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity on 28 May 1993, which makes Zambia
responsible for the conservation of biological biodiversity, the sustainable use of its components and
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources. It has
signed the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora (CITES), and
the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Convention). It has also ratified the
African Convention on Nature and Natural Resources (2003), an African Union initiative.
2.8
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNIDO)
UNIDO was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007. Although it was
clearly meant to protect the rights of particular people such as the bushmen or the pygmy - some of the
former perhaps still surviving in Barotse, in a modern context - Zambian Africans living a traditional
life under the authority of chiefs and headmen (as opposed to Zambians living in towns) should also
fall under the UN’s protection. In particular, the following resolutions are germane to the
circumstances of the people of the chiefdoms:
162
i)
Concern that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a result
of, inter alia, their colonisation and dispossession of their lands, territories and
resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to
development in accordance with their own needs and interests,
ii) Recognising the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of
indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social
structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies,
especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources,
iii) Recognising also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of indigenous
peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements with
States,
iv) Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organising themselves for
political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an
end all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,
v) Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them
and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,
vi) Recognising that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional
practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper
management of the environment.
3.
3.1
3.1.1
ZAMBIA’S NATURAL RESOURCES FRAMEWORK AFFECTING CUSTOMARY
COMMUNITIES AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
Current state of the customary commons
Introduction
In Zambia land is either state or customary land – the latter making up 94% of the land - where land
rights are obtained from a headman by residence in consultation with a chief. Once acquired, the land
is protected by the community and should the individual leave the land, it reverts once more to the
community under the control of the headmen and their chief. No person owns customary land in the
Western sense. And the chief usually does not extract taxes or surpluses from individuals or headmen,
every person producing their own food, the society therefore being generally egalitarian. Less
common is where land rights are held under the control of lineages. This defines a system where
access to agricultural land is exclusively reserved for the use of people able to trace their heritage from
a common ancestry. However, they may in some areas also sell land to people outside of the common
ancestry, i.e. outside a matrilineage or patrilineage (White 1959, pp. 171-178).
Europeans have since their first arrival in Central and Southern Africa embraced two major
misconceptions of the native African land tenure system, 1) belief that the system is communal, with
every tribesman having an equal right in every piece of the tribe’s land, and 2) believing that the chief
is the owner of the land, his subjects without rights in it and cultivating ‘at the caprice of their
overlord’, a belief which, with the arrival of Europeans seeking concessions, persuaded chiefs that
they stood to gain if they put themselves forward as the person controlling the land (Gluckman 1945,
p.1). The other misconception is to believe that the chiefdoms and the chiefs have always, in one form
or another, been in place, ignoring the evidence of the existence of ancient tenure rights to land,
lagoons, fisheries and wildlife. Today in Zambia some chiefs sell off land with the help of pliant local
authorities – though it is actually sold on leasehold, not freehold. On customary land the rights are
over the use of the land, rather than its ownership, i.e. usufruct. Moreover, chiefs should act as the
chairmen of their headmen in its allocation, headmen being chiefs in all but name. The chief does not
use the land for his own benefit and should not therefore sell it or allow others to use it without the
163
agreement of his people. His rights in turn are to demand allegiance from those to whom he allocates
land, to hold sway over all the land within his country, and to take over and allocate land - after a
reasonable period of time - not utilised. Customary land is therefore a mixture of usufruct on
residential and agricultural land, and controlled-access to the rest. State land defines private
(leasehold) land, protected land - the latter now rapidly being privatised in isolation of its original
traditional owners, and other land not classified as customary land. The customary commons is made
up agricultural and village land held under usufruct by residents owing allegiance to a particular
headman and chief, and the remaining part of chiefdoms to which all residents have access to
renewable resources not under the direct control of the Government of Zambia (GRZ) such as the
fishery, timber and wildlife. In addition to this competition with their own government, residents of
the customary commons must contend with outside plunderers in search of charcoal, fish, bushmeat,
timber and ivory, a state of affairs often described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’(Hardin 1968),
often used to justify interventions by outside forces, or greater centralised government control (Ostrom
1991a, p.182).
In addition to protected areas, one reviewer defined the regimes in Zambia as private property,
controlled open-access and regulated common-property regimes (Bwalya 2002). In fact what is
happening is that limited-access, common-property resources (i.e. customary lands), have been
converted to open-access resources. Bwalya cites others (Baland et al 1996) supporting his views that
the customary commons should be privatised, provided that there is full income compensation for
those who lose out if the traditional resource owners are made private resource owners, concluding his
review of Community Based Wildlife Management (CBWM) by saying:
It is therefore difficult for CBWM programs to demonstrate that biodiversity
conservation and sustainable rural development, the most inspired objectives of
CBWM, have been achieved in Southern Africa. The basic reason for this lack of clear
success partly lies in government’s failure to institute and provide secure property
rights to local communities, not only with respect to wildlife resources but also to
entire ecosystems in coexistence with wildlife resources.
The lack of leasehold or freehold rights being given as the reason for resource degradation is echoed
elsewhere by policy analysts who believe that common-property resources should be privatised if the
‘tragedy of the commons’ is to be avoided. It is the same thinking which led to the nationalisation of
much of the traditional natural resource ownership rights by a highly centralised government
oligarchy, followed by considerable resource depletion and poverty. Furthermore, the recent adoption
by the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) of the report by the Land and Environment
Committee lends no support against the forces of alienation as it recommends under the section for
customary land, section 330, that ‘Customary land shall not be alienated or otherwise used until the
approval of the chief and the local authority in whose area the land is situated has first been obtained
and as may be provided by, or under, and Act of Parliament…an approval (that) shall not be
unreasonably withheld’. This retrograde step would allow for the continuation of land alienations
allowed for under the Lands Act of 1995 by crooked or ignorant chiefs, the latter possibly unaware
that they are selling their people’s birthright. The continuing saga of some of the Nyendwa clan chiefs
of Nyimba District who continue alienating land without the approval of their headmen clearly
illustrate the present lack of protection afforded customary villagers.
Given the lack of ownership rights in respect of renewable natural resources resident ‘free-riders’ are
encouraged to join the irresponsible harvesting, encouraged by the natural human proclivity of time
preference, where people prefer to consume now, rather than later. The time preference rate measures
the strength of this preference, being the percentage by which the amount of consumption of a good
next year must by higher than consumption this year for people to be indifferent between consuming
now rather or later (Clark 2007). People of the present customary commons are essentially subsistence
and peasant forage-farmers with the typically high time preference rates of pre-industrial societies.
Encouraged by the absence of ownership rights, it is extremely common to find instances of behaviour
164
which show scant regard for future benefits: fruit trees being cut down for a handful of fruit; mosquito
nets and poison being used to kill all age classes of fish and other life. Clearly this is in part a function
of the destruction of the traditional systems in place to manage natural resources as a result of the near
total decline of the hunting guilds (aChiwinda) and other guardians of nature; followed by the
imposition under Indirect Rule of the chiefdom commons, but a commons with no ‘ownership’ of
nature and the weakening of the authority, incentives and controls necessary for maintaining the
customary commons. The theory is that coercion is required, or some other special device, to make
rational self-interested individuals act to achieve their common or group interest (Ostrom 1991, pp.6,
citing Olsen 1965, p.2). This is largely disproved in chiefdoms where the traditional authority does
curb some ‘free-rider’ activity but is simply overcome by the eco-imperialism of its own government,
by capitalist raiders, crime syndicates and, in some cases, venal chiefs operating within an open-access
regime. And again the NCC Committee on Land and Environment managed to ignore the whole
ownership issue of the natural resources being supported on customary land, opting rather to ‘provide
for the utilisation and management of a natural resource by a local authority in the area where the
natural resource is located’ (340 (a)). Were this to become law, District Councils would join the
plunder, invading the customary commons without hindrance. Moreover, quite how those having been
allowed access to natural resources would be able to adhere to the provisions in 341 (a) that ‘where the
right or concession is in respect of a renewable natural resources, the holder of the right or concession
shall replenish the natural resources that is exploited’, is not explained.
However, it is in Zambia’s fishing grounds that the existence and protection of the group interest is
seen. In the Mweru-Luapula fishery, where ‘resources were never ‘common property’ before
colonialism, complex tenure systems linked to clan groups governed the use of the lands, lakes and
lagoons (Gordon 2006, p. 4). These rights were largely sidelined by the colonial authority when a
chiefs’ commons was created as a result of the appointment of senior members of Paramount Chief
Kazembe’s family as chiefs. A dual control system then operated with the colonial appointed chiefs
and headmen placed in charge of people, but with the traditional guardians of the resources still in
control of nature. However, social networks based on entrepreneurial Big Men and their families and
evangelical Christian Churches had begun to challenge the authority of both colonial chiefs and
owners, and
State attempts to intervene in the economy and environment in the form of marketing
boards, nationalisations, closed fishing seasons, and restricted areas failed due to a lack
of capacity alongside the resilience of trader-fisher networks (Gordon 2006, p.169).
Since self-government, the Government, as the owner and manager of wildlife and other natural
resources, has manifestly failed to support the customary commons, its functions increasingly
privatised under quangos, embarking in a highly selective and opaque manner on unequal
‘partnerships’ with hunting safari operators and customary communities on customary land, with or
without the permission of the customary owners; awarding Tourism Concession Agreement (TCA)
leases to investors in National Parks - without benefit to the former owners of the land - for
increasingly longer leases at higher fees such that they all but resemble leasehold alienations; entering
dubious and illegal ‘partnerships’ with investors in national and local forests; and the start of large
scale alienations of land to the Chinese, Arabs and others for such agricultural schemes as jatropha
production with all its proven monocultural damage and damaging effects on food production.
The nationalisation of forests and the similar expropriation of 34 Game Management Areas (GMAs)
within the customary commons have merely created open-access regimes where limited commonproperty resources had previously existed. This is well documented in other parts of the world for
forests that were once communal forests, and for inshore-fisheries when national agencies presumed
that they had exclusive jurisdiction over all coastal waters (Ostrom 1991, p.23).
165
3.1.2 Strategies for customary community resource ownership
A seminal report suggests the following course of action for customary communities to follow when
seeking to regain natural resource ownership on their lands (HURID 2002, p.32).
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
In the area of policy and legislative formulation, Cabinet Office to be courted
and, in particular, an input made into the ongoing review of policy and legal
formulation processes by the Management Development Division under which
the Public Sector Capacity Building Project, inaugurated in October 2000, is
being managed. This will allow non-state actors to feature prominently in
policy and legislative formulation, especially during the initial stages.
Customary stakeholders need to understand the policy and legal formulation
procedures of Government so as to implement a tracking system for the
current state of policy, and legislation.
The Parliamentary Subcommittee entrusted with natural resources sectors
needs to be lobbied, and the Executive checked through the Action Taken
mechanism.
Friends of the stakeholders within government and beyond need to be
identified so that public opinion may be influenced. These should include
technocrats within Government line Ministries entrusted with the initiation of
policy and legislation, as well as co-operating partners of the State capable of
providing both financial and technical support necessary for effecting change
and new developments.
Small working groups need to be set up that will specialise in specific natural
resources so as to enhance effectiveness and efficiency and to build the
requisite expertise and contact with relevant authorities. Close contact should
be maintained with Cabinet Liaison Officers of line Ministries dealing with
natural resources, as well as with staff of the Policy and Analysis Coordination Division at Cabinet Office, and lawyers within the AttorneyGeneral’s Chambers, in particular, the Legislative Drafting Department.
Customary community stakeholders should facilitate the establishment of
community based resource boards or institutions so as to enhance the flow of
information between the local and the national level. They will require legal
persons as well as capacity building in understanding policy and legislative
measures in the natural resources sector. To assist this process, policies and
laws affecting the various community resource boards should be simplified
and translated into languages local communities can read and understand best.
3.1.3 The Customary Authority
The de facto customary control of Zambia covers 94% of the territory; the de jure control is total in
both the cultural and moral sense.
The Chiefs Act (1965) defines a chief as a person who is recognised by the President under the
provisions of the Act, the President being empowered to withdraw recognition of Chiefs, i.e.
withdrawing ‘subsidies’ set out under the Chiefs Act, as well as other entitlements such as subsidised
vehicle loans. The Zambian Constitution, amended in 1996, defines the institution of chief as ‘a
corporation sole with perpetual succession and with capacity to sue and be sued and to hold assets or
properties in trust for itself and the peoples concerned’. And the Local Government Act (1995) and the
Development and Registration of Villages Act (1971) provides the main institutional framework on
how chiefs are supposed to be integrated in development at the local level, the latter Act being an
instrument of one party rule in 1972, remaining unchanged to this day.
166
From their elevation – and in many cases, their creation - by the Provincial Administration within the
Native Authority under Indirect Rule, to their marginalisation by the Kaunda regime and the removal
of their administrative and business development role, chiefs and chiefdoms are now once more in the
ascendant. It is not surprising therefore that at a workshop in June 1997, the fifty attending chiefs
called for the House of Chiefs to be instituted as an Upper Legislative Chamber. Yet, in 2007, the
chief’s annual allowance was a derisory US$4.00 a day - little wonder that some of them found licence
under the Lands Act of 1995 to sell off land which they were supposed to guard in perpetuity for their
people. That they now have a House of Chiefs, and are courted by the politicians - the Movement for
Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) Government being elected by the rural vote – is indicative of their
increasingly elevated status. However, the MMD Government still appoints the clerk to the House,
and the House merely serves the bidding of the President, as the recent volte face over the removal and
re-appointment of Senior Chief Luembe of the Ambo people reveals.
Chiefs now hold sway over a largely sedentary people, the guardians of culture and religion, and a
bulwark against rent-seeking and the blatant profiteering of customary land and natural resources.
Increasingly, however, as in the Sichifula GMA, incursions of new unsanctioned settlers pose a threat
to the stability of chiefdoms. And some chiefs continue to act as partners in the illegal removal of
land, timber, game meat and ivory and other natural resources, much of this due to the lack of
supporting institutions able to negotiate some benefit from sustainable offtakes with Government.
To some ‘this continuation of the chieftaincy’s rule is an instance of undemocratic despotism’
(Negi 2008); to others, therein lies Africa’s salvation:
In the end really we will never achieve political or economic independence until we
develop a distinctly Zambian idea to solving our economic problems. We are
struggling to achieve local development because there’s no local idea of development
and no vision of what institutions can deliver a more harmonious route to getting
there.85
The local idea of development is the one currently in place: rule through chiefs and headmen, backed
by a local court and the traditions which seek equitable solutions to common problems, something
statutory courts find impossible to deliver.
3.1.4 Customary land
Customary land is made up of Open Areas and GMAs – the latter provided for in the Wildlife Act of
1998, although the misconception that GMAs are state land, and that all customary land is Open Area
land, is widely held (Mbewe 2007).
With the acquiescence of the local District Council, provisional title of 14 years can be awarded to
outsiders initially, expanded to a 99-year renewable lease period once cadastral surveys and other
requirements are completed. The latter is automatic and out of the hands of the chief, unless he were to
place a caveat to that effect, for, although a chief can agree to alienate land, the lessor is the
Commissioner of Lands who controls the lease and should receive ground rents from it, not the
customary authority of the community from whom it has been wrested (Metcalfe 2005).
In 1985, the Ministry of Lands issued Administrative, Circular No. 1, 1985 that set out the procedure
by which customary land could be alienated to a private person or body. In 1995, the Lands Act lent
this substance by providing for the recognition and continuation of customary tenure, and providing –
under (8) 3, for the ‘right to use and occupation of land under customary tenure’. However, should
85
URL:http://zambian-economist.blogspot.com/2007/08/cultural-approch-to-zambias-development.html.
Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIDkHSRI).
167
land be alienated, and bankruptcy be declared by the owners, the land reverts to the state and not back
to customary tenure.
The President, in whom all land is vested, cannot, according to the Lands Act, alienate customary land
unless it is with the Chief’s and the local authority’s consent, and only after consulting affected bodies
or persons, and – in the case of GMAs - the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). Article 16 of the
Constitution forbids the compulsory seizure of state land or acquiring it in the absence of the authority
of the law. This is laid out in the Lands (Compulsory Acquisition) Act of 1970 (Cap 189), which the
President uses to acquire alienated land for public interest. Customary law does not have the same
powers - the chief having to ask for it from the subject in question. In this respect, customary tenure
enjoys superiority relative to leasehold in protecting the rights of customary landholders.
Contrary to the Lands Act, and provided it is for agricultural development, the President can, under
Article 16 (2) (ii), take or acquire land from its owner or occupier, be it state or customary land:
But the next paragraph is even more categorical in emphasising the overarching
powers of the President on behalf of the State. In his bid to pursue the ends of a
comprehensive land policy, the President can dispossess any occupier or owner of
land, including the Chief, who enjoys rights in that land ‘and person claiming through
and under them’ of the rights in that piece of land. It is remarkable these extensive
provisions have not been used before by successive Presidents in customary areas.
Nevertheless, the policy theme behind the clause is that in the interests of the public,
the State should have higher hierarchy than the individual or even group of people as in
customary areas (Hansungule 2007).
Under the Land Acquisition Act of 1970 (Cap 189), the President may also compulsorily acquire land
if required for petroleum production. Indeed the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2008
under Part VI, section 41, requires written consent from a chief for petroleum mining activities in his
chiefdom, from the Forestry Department (FD) in protected forests, and from ZAWA in National Parks,
the licence holder being able to obtain a lease from the chief or the Ministry of Tourism, Environment
and Natural Resources (MTENR) should he so wish. But where the mining licencee causes damage he
is not required to compensate anyone for the removal of timber on protected forest land (Cap 199), nor
for damage to customary land (Cap 198), only on land alienated under the Lands Act of 1995. It is this
lack of compensation that causes some chiefs to call for the statutory alienation of their land to
leasehold, in their name. 86
Customary authorities made up of Chiefs and their headmen, may place the ‘right to use and
occupation’ of land held to an individual, but ideally – as is proposed here - to a statutory institution,
ideally a Trust Company under the Companies Act, for a period, therefore supplying the necessary
incentive for investment partnerships. For land to be alienated to non-citizens through leasehold,
application has to be made to establish an investment facility through the Zambia Development
Agency within the Ministry of Commerce, who may then issue an investment certificate making
possible the alienation.
The constant clamour for the release of customary commons for state development is not based on
audited figures available at the Ministry of Lands. Were they available, it would be seen that large
swathes of the country have been subsumed by GRZ. The ‘alienation’ of all or part of customary areas
– once Trusts lands - and their replacement by Game Reserves, then National Parks and GMAs, being
a good example.
The Fifth National Development Plan concentrates on the issue of attaining land, saying little about
customary land and the culturally grounded rights of its people. This shows clearly that Chiefs were
86
Reporter. 2007. Zambia: Chiefs Pursue Title Deeds, The Times of Zambia (Ndola), 4 October.
168
not listened to, an example being the failure to respond to the House of Chiefs’ request that their
decision to accept chiefdom trusts would allow their land to be protected, yet at the same time,
allowing investors to have security of tenure through the issuance of customary leases.
And then where is the value system? A Plan that is tailored to work in Zambia should
articulate Zambia’s values. The title deed which the Plan advocates proposes to fasttrack land delivery is good but it is still not the main value system to the majority of
people in Zambia. Most people still share land and therefore de-emphasises
individuality which is why there is relative security in the country. Even as they
develop and adopt new ideas and systems, a Plan should plan for people based on their
civilisation. You can’t impose alien ideas on people and expect to succeed. There is
serious need to contextualise the Plan so that it can reflect the society it is going to
operate. It must not only aim to attract money as the sole motive for the land reform.
More than that, to create, recreate and deepen the value system in land as in society
generally as the primary objective (Hansungule 2007).
The Land Alliance, a civil society organisation made up of a number of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs), weighed in with the following:87
In relation to the over ambitious aim to promote title deeds in rural areas, the policy
should consider leasing of land under customary tenure system directly without first
converting such land to the state land. Such lands must continue to be in the hands of
traditional rulers without the local communities losing their customary rights to the
leased land. Failure to do this could perpetuate whole selling of agricultural land by
speculators to the rich minority, as has been the experience in the last seven (7) years
under the 1995 Lands Act (Zambia Land Alliance 2003).
The Lands Policy has unfortunately been much delayed, in part because the Land Alliance lobbied the
government to adopt the Draft's current form but only to do so after making some amendments,
particularly in relation to customary land. The Ministry of Lands also said they wanted to wait for the
on-going constitution review process to be finalised before proceeding to adopt draft land policy so
that the policy does not contradict the former.
Of particular concern is the plight of women in general, and widows in particular, with land-grabbing
being a particularly pernicious custom in Zambia - and Africa as a whole - whereby on the death of
her husband, a woman is descended on by her husband’s family and other parasites, and divested of
land and chattels. Under the Intestate Succession Act of 1989, where a will has not been left, the
widow is entitled to receive 20% of the deceased’s estate, the children share 50%, his parents 20%,
and other relatives receive 10%. However this does not apply to customary land and the houses built
thereon. Rural women are also ill-served by contradiction in the Constitution whereby article 11
guarantees the equal status of women, yet article twenty-three permits discriminatory laws to exist in
the area of personal and customary law. And as a rule, rural women only have recourse to the Local
Court, where their lack of human rights are unenviably exposed. Clearly this is an issue which needs
to be addressed – given the failings in the law – by assisting in the provision of wills and in the
registration of customary held properties in the name of women, independent of their husbands.
87
Henry Machena. 18 May 2009. Land Alliance e-Mail to I.P.A. Manning.
169
i)
Open Area
Open Areas are that portion of customary area not designated GMA i.e. areas considered to have
highly depleted populations of animals within settled areas. They comprise 42% of Zambia. These are
the areas that are targeted for large-scale alienation, along with the national and local forests with
which they are associated.
ii)
Game Management Area
GMAs were created in 1971 under the National Parks and Wildlife Act of 1968 by statutory
instrument within a number of customary areas with significant wildlife populations as a planning
framework for integrated community and biodiversity development on customary land, and not as
another distinct category of protected state land. In 2008 there were thirty-six GMAs. The 1998 Act
states that the Minister in consultation with the local community and ZAWA may declare a GMA for
the ‘sustainable utilisation of wildlife and for the purposes of this Act.88 Although the Wildlife Act
No.12 of 1998 allows for co-management of GMAs between ZAWA and their proxy, the Community
Resources Board (CRB), and devolves authority to CRBs for wildlife management, in practice they
are currently viewed by ZAWA as state land under their control, a view supported by their importance
in providing them income from hunting leases. While this has served to hamper untrammelled
alienation, it also blocks development generally, a mixed blessing.
However, few management plans of any substance have been forthcoming for GMAs and National
Parks under ZAWA’s management, and little credible scientific work carried out to provide the basis
for sustainable offtakes of wildlife for hunting, cropping or capture. Attempts by the Luembe and
Nyalugwe CRB to even obtain the ZAWA template for wildlife management plans proved fruitless.
The Wildlife Act makes certain legal assumptions of the control of GMAs and customary land,
although contradicted by both customary and statutory law (the Lands Act of 1995) and by such
traditional practices under African law as contracts of agistment whereby owners of livestock are
obliged to pay rental for grazing rights (Derrett et al 1968). Furthermore, ZAWA has by dint of
statutory instruments attempted to further control customary people by laying out draconian
punishments for setting or not reporting fires. ZAWA as the ‘owner’ of wildlife pays no such rental,
rather extracting concession rentals and game trophy fees. Originally, 50% of concession and trophy
fees were paid to CRBs, but concession fees were later reduced by an ad hoc CRB committee to 20% in both cases 5% going to the chief. In late 2006, at a meeting held between CRBs and ZAWA, it was
agreed that the income would in future be shared equally.
The state of the biodiversity in the GMAs found on customary land ‘commons’ - in which hunting
concessions are placed, has seriously deteriorated under ZAWA. Fortunately though, a few hunting
concessions continue to hold their own generally, particularly of the strongly interactive keystone
wildlife species such as buffalo that are of immeasurable importance to the ecosystems on which a
myriad of other species are dependant, now reaching very low levels in some areas, resulting, with the
assistance of uncontrolled fires, in the increasing brittleness of rangelands and a deterioration in
carrying capacity (Savory & Butterfield 1999). Most seriously of all, the rural communities, although
still with access to a plentiful supply of land and adequate rainfall in much of the country, are denied
ownership or proper access to the benefits of the natural resources supported on their customary land,
are criminalised in their subsistence hunting and find their land sold off by unscrupulous chiefs,
district councils and corrupt officials in the Commissioner of Lands. They continue therefore to be
ensnared in poverty, their hopes for tourism revenues now diminishing with that of the wildlife.
The fact that customary residents of GMAs – and the attendant Open Areas - are 30% poorer than the
national average indicates that living in wildlife areas, rather than benefiting villagers from wildlife
88
Part V: (26) 1, The Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998.
170
resources, makes them considerably poorer than everyone else. In the case of women, 28% of GMA
households are female-headed, compared to 22% in non-GMAs, and female-headed households living
near National Parks, either in GMAs or in non-GMAs, on average enjoy 19% less per capita
consumption than male-headed households (Simasiku 2008, p.17). The reasons for this massive
discrepancy, supported by the author’s experience on the ground in Luembe, is (apart from the
presence of tsetse fly, due to animal depredations on villagers and their crops89) the depletion of
wildlife by criminal syndicates to feed the ivory and bushmeat trade, making it difficult for villagers
normally dependent on wildlife for their food to adapt to the change. And ZAWA anti-poaching scouts
- many of whom are involved with the crime syndicates, harass villagers, supported by the many
unpaid and ‘free-agent’ Village Scouts. In addition to the generally negative presence of ZAWA in the
customary areas, ZAWA in 2006 spent only 8% of its budget on GMAs, although they generate more
than 50% of ZAWA’s revenues and constitute more than 70% of the land under its stewardship.
ZAWA’s salaries and administration costs in 2006 took up almost 70% of total expenditure. The
conclusion here is that ZAWA is a factor in this poverty differential, urgently suggesting a
revolutionary socio-ecological change now required in GMAs if the customary community is to see
any improvement in its life prospects (yet without destroying native culture), and if the wildlife and
other natural resources are to be conserved so as to provide part of the sustainable solution.
An additional factor is that CRBs do not benefit the poor, with the rural elite capturing, by way of
travel allowances, accommodation and meetings most of the money received by CRBs from ZAWA
(Simasiku et al 2008, pp. 17-19). Moreover (as mentioned in Chapter 2), most CRBs remain unpaid,
the Nyalugwe and Luembe CRBs with 43 Village Scouts being owed 14 months salary on average,
with some not paid for more than three years. The Simasiku report summarised its findings as
follows:
This report paints and alarming picture of Zambia’s GMAs in terms of economical,
sociological and ecological benefits. Chapter 2 reveals that the commercial flow to
GMAs is probably decreasing. Chapter 3 illustrates that natural habitats and wildlife
are decreasing at an alarming rate in most GMAs. Chapter 4 shows that GMA
communities are 30% poorer than the average Zambian rural communities. Chapter 5
shows that 31 out of 36 GMAs fail to meet the requirements for minimum management
effectiveness.
This particular report on the impact of wildlife management policies on communities and conservation
in GMAs, was preceded in 2007 by a report on the real economic input of nature tourism in Zambia
(Hamilton et al 2007), and followed in May 2009 by a paper put out by the World Bank
Environmental Department ‘assessing household welfare and natural resource management around
National Parks in Zambia’ (Bandyopadhyay & Tembo 2009). The two latter authors are also coauthors of the 2007 and 2008 reports – yet failing to include them in their list of references – and
contradicting some of the results of the 2008 study. The 2008 study confirmed the 2007 study’s
findings that households were on the average better off in GMAs, but then concluded in a
contradictory manner that these benefits were captured by the elite residents and the CRB/VAG
members. The 2008 report found that GMA residents were 30% poorer than the national rural average.
The 2009 report began in ignorance of the facts concerning GMAs: stating that 1) GMAs are areas
where subsistence hunting is allowed (not true); 2) that landuse in GMAs submit to the provisions of
management plans (this being with rare exceptions, non-existent); 3) that the Wildlife Conservation
Revolving Fund was the financial facility being used to pay CRBs (this corrupted facility having
disappeared in the 1980s); and 4) referring to the wide latitude of CRBs spending their funds, when in
fact there is no official allowable latitude, as the percentages are stipulated that have to be spent on
89
In 2005, a total of 56 people were killed by wild animals with crocodile (34 victims), hippo (12), elephant (7),
lion (2) and hyena (1). NRCF, June 2008 p.21.
171
community development, administration and anti-poaching (the only latitude being in respect of
monies stolen or misappropriated).
The 2009 report further concluded that average household earnings in the 50:50 sampling of GMA and
non-GMA residents was K846, 000 per annum (about 50 cents a day); and that the Bangweulu and
Luangwa GMAs were appreciably better off than the Zambezi and Kafue GMAs. Why this should be
so when parks like Isangano and Lavushi Manda have been long denuded of their wildlife and with no
safari hunting or tourism taking place, when compared to the tourism and investment activity in Kafue
and Zambezi, is a mystery. They did find that GMAs and their institutions (CRBs/VAGs) do not
benefit the poor in the slightest, but then said that there were substantial gains associated with GMAs
and participation in the CRB/VAGS. Their conclusion that the gains are unevenly distributed, is well
known; but they made no suggestion of the measures required to improve matters.
iii)
Alienated Trust land (Protected Areas)
On 20 April 1950, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia proclaimed the Kafue National Park as the first
National Park in the country, being ‘set aside and not excised from it’ within what was Native Trust
Land. The Order in Council defining Trust Land stated, “land set apart for the sole use and benefit,
direct or indirect, of the natives of Northern Rhodesia…” and further: ‘out of the profits or rents
accruing from any area of native trust land set aside as a forest or Game Reserve… there shall… be
paid first the expenditure necessarily incurred by the Government in connection with the said area,
whether by maintenance, development or otherwise, and the balance shall be paid into the (Native
Trust Land) Fund, or into the treasury of the native authority concerned, as the Governor shall direct’
(Darling 1960, p. 128).
In 1954, parts of Nsefu and Luambe were put aside as Game Reserve at the request of the chiefs for
their people’s benefit. They were later converted to National Park status, the benefit element ignored.
Given the historical and moral imperatives, it is therefore necessary for the CRB in the customary area
adjoining a National Park to both take on responsibilities for the support of ZAWA in the protection of
the National Park as well as to derive benefits from it. For this to happen the CRB should sign a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ZAWA.
4
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NATURAL RESOURCES
4.1
Introduction
The Constitution of Zambia is the guide to policy and legislation: Article 50 awards responsibility for
policy formulation to Cabinet; Article 44(3)(b) allows the President to put forward laws for
consideration to Parliament; Article 62 vests legislative power in Parliament i.e. the President and the
National Assembly; and Part IX, Article 112(i) deals with natural resources: ‘...the State shall promote
sustenance, development and public awareness of the need to manage the land, air and water resources
in a balanced and suitable manner for the present and future generations’. The Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR) shares responsibility for natural resources along with
eleven other government ministries, backed by thirty-three sets of legislation and the notional twentyone international conventions to which it is signatory. The following are the sectors by Ministry
(HURID 2002):
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Fisheries: Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives;
Lands: Ministry of Lands;
Mineral resources: Ministry of Mines and Mineral Resources;
Water: Ministry of Energy and Water Development;
172
v)
Wildlife, forestry and environment: Ministry of Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources.
Legislation and the mechanisms of implementation available to rural people community for natural
resource management are largely absent. And to this must be added the fact that the country remains
essentially hostile to private sector investment in environmental and natural resource management,
particularly if it deals - as it must - with questions of resource ownership on customary lands and the
inequitable distribution of benefits. The prospects therefore for poverty reduction, the improvement of
livelihoods and sustainable development will remain illusory in the absence of fundamental change in
the urban/rural power nexus.
It is obvious therefore that procedures are designed to allow the executive near total control of the
policy and legislative process, ensuring that citizens have little say in the laws and policy which
govern them. In 2005, the Natural Resources Consultative Forum (NRCF) hosted a workshop to allow
ZAWA to receive stakeholders’ inputs to statutory instruments providing regulations on GMAs,
National Parks, hunting, game ranching and captive breeding, which they wished to be approved and
so be passed into law. In general, the draft regulations inflated ZAWA’s powers at the expense of the
stakeholders: noteworthy were the powers – backed by draconian punishments - assumed by ZAWA
in the GMA regulations over customary landowners dealing with bush fires, further highlighting the
contradictions of the Lands Act of 1995 and the Wildlife Act of 1998; the powers assumed by ZAWA
in the Game Ranching and Captive Breeding regulations – already unimaginatively conflated - of
withholding full ownership of wildlife on registered game ranches and of requiring that they pay
hunting licence fees for hunting these animals; and again in the GMA regulations, ZAWA being under
the impression that GMAs were state land.90 The legal consultants to ZAWA took full notes during the
workshop, yet subsequently no workshop reports were issued, nor a workshop held to sign the
regulations off, and by mid 2009 no regulations had been issued on these subjects.
4.2
Policy and legislative formulation process (after Mulonda 2003, p.5)
There are four stages in formulating policy: formulation, adoption, implementation, and
monitoring and evaluation. Unfortunately, there are severe systemic weaknesses in this
process:
i)
Article 50 of the Constitution empowers Cabinet to advise the President, to
formulate policy and to assign responsibility for policy to the executive, a highly
centralised process.
ii) Policy procedures are the function of an internal executive act, with no
requirement for consultation with non-Government stakeholders or civil society.
iii) Those who formulate and evaluate policy are all state operatives. This process
ensures that policy which is not in the public interest can be gerrymanded,
resulting in both flawed legal instruments and legislation, and legislation biased
against the disenfranchised, the poor and illiterate.
Some of the flaws are:
i)
ii)
90
There is virtually no information exchange between Government and the
governed, the procedures in place to arrive at statutory instruments, bills and the
passage of legislation are screened from public view, and may rapidly pass into
law unless newspapers happen to take an interest.
Once an issue or instrument has passed to Cabinet, it is regarded as top secret and
no public debate or scrutiny is possible, unless authorised. In addition,
Director-General, ZAWA (Hapenga Kabeta). 2005. Statement made at NRCF workshop, Lusaka.
173
consultation is restricted to line ministries, and scrutiny to the Legal Committee
of Cabinet.
iii) Article 44 (3) (b) of the Constitution gives the Executive, through the President,
power to initiate laws for consideration by the National Assembly. Legislation
formulation is therefore an executive act.
4.2.1 Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) of 1990
The Natural Resources Act Cap 315 of 1962 - now much diminished and known as the Environmental
Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) of 1990 - provided for community participation in the
conservation of natural resources through the establishment of a Natural Resources Board and a
Natural Resources Tribunal: their function, to provide for the preparation and implementation of
conservation plans in designated areas. Power was in turn devolved to the grass roots in the form of
Natural Resources Committees and Sub-Committees; in addition, conservation committees were
established in specific areas by petition to the board. Members of the community elected the
committee members, and the committee itself was a corporate body able to sue or be sued. Under this
Act, natural resources were defined as soils, water, vegetation and its products, and all animal life:
mammals, birds, reptiles, fish, insects and natural products derived from them. These committees
therefore existed to assist in the planning and management of all natural resources, directed by an
executive body - with what was essentially an ombudsman - to hear community grievances.
This Act was repealed and replaced by the Natural Resources Act of 1970, which, inter alia,
established a Natural Resources Advisory Board and Provincial and District Natural Resources
Committees drawn from GRZ and the private sector, but which could be dissolved by the Minister.
These were based on political boundaries and were supposed to provide conservation plans and their
oversight. In essence the two Acts performed much the same functions, but with the latter clearly
being under political control. Twenty years later, in 1990, the objectives and functions of the Act of
1970 was completely changed by the repeal of all parts of the Act except parts IV, V, and VI dealing
with conservation and management of natural resources, fire control and planning. The Act, now
transmogrified into the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act of 1990, is evidence of the
abandonment of any attempt at devolution and decentralisation.
Critics of the 1970 changes to the Natural Resources Act argue that the changes resulted in
compromising the independence and roles of community based organs. The character and composition
of these organs was changed. For example, public officers were brought in to work as an integral part
of committees, and all members were appointed by the Minister, in contrast with the 1962
arrangement where members of the community elected persons within their communities as members
of the committees. The functions of the committees changed to those of an administrative body
covering established political boundaries, supervising the use of natural resources (more regulatory),
and managed by the Minister and the Natural Resources Advisory Board as opposed to the former
arrangement where the community was engaged in the wise use of the natural resources. Any form of
development and management of natural resources came under direct Government control, unlike the
former arrangement. Furthermore, these committees were subject to dissolution by the Minister whilst
the benefits for resource use was not directly or easily identifiable to the community. The scenario
ushered in was therefore that of Government organs with community representation, as opposed to
community-based organs (Mulonda 2003, p.p. 25-29).
The Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act (EPPCA) of 1990, the principal
environmental legislation, is currently being reviewed in order to align it with the National Policy on
Environment, the latter now beginning to be absorbed into the policy and legislative process. It is
hoped that much of the legislation that supported community empowerment in the original Natural
Resources Act of 1962, will be included.
As has been pointed out previously, there has occurred
174
…the transfer of many regulatory functions from thematic legislations to the more
generic Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act. While this focuses
legislation, it weakens the field controls of line departments, and particularly
agriculture - on land use planning and management controls such as cultivation near
water courses, shifting cultivation, and other catalysts of deforestation, damage to
headwater catchments, river sedimentation and soil degradation (Pope 2006).
While the Policy produced in 1998 for the NPWS recognises local community participation in wildlife
conservation by the election of CRBs, they are merely arms of convenience for GRZ, being neither
supervised nor supported, with elections manipulated, largely unpaid. Moreover, where CRBs, such
as Luembe, do take up positions contrary to their ZAWA masters’ wishes, they are removed in
defiance of democratic principles. Furthermore, the National Forestry Policy of July 1999 which
encourages partnerships between State agencies, local communities and individuals, has yet to be
implemented. However the aforementioned policy did provide for the formation of the Environment
Council of Zambia (ECZ), which advises GRZ on the policies and projects needed to further the
sustained development of the natural resources. In 1994, The National Environmental Action Plan
(NEAP) was supposedly adopted, its objective to integrate environmental concerns into national
development planning.
4.2.2
Tourism and Hospitality Bill
The Tourism and Hospitality Act of 2007 came into operation on the issue of a statutory instrument. It
was clear after first sight of the Bill in September of 2007 that the Tourism Enterprises and Licencing
Committee (TEALC) should have a representative from the Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) so
as to balance a heavily politicised Immigration Department, plus two representatives from the private
sector, in addition to the Tourism Council of Zambia (TCZ). However, this is yet another highly
centralised committee, yet another quango, seeking to impose ‘central planning’ on the nation, in
defiance of the urgent need to decentralise. The inclusion of the term ‘empowerment’ means that the
CEE Act and the Commission will direct the way the TEALC conducts its business. The agenda is
political and will therefore not serve the interests of tourism development. The fact that some half a
dozen Tourism Concession Agreements (TCAs) in the Kafue NP are already held by native Zambians,
but who are not operating due to their lack of expertise and capital, shows that the problem does not
lie with a lack of empowerment - now so dear to the political heart - but with insufficient levels of
expertise, interest and investment capital.
Under section 14 - concerning the organisations that the Director should consult - it is notable that
conspicuously absent are the Zambia Business Forum (ZBF), the House of Chiefs (H of C) and
District Councils.
It is clear that this bill has not registered the concerns and inputs of stakeholders. While the TEALC
clearly has an empowerment agenda, there is little consideration for bringing in the poorer Zambians
into the tourism sector, and for the implementation of the Decentralisation Policy. Pages of
regulations, followed by details of the punishments to be meted out if the licencee does not comply,
will not result in a thriving tourism industry. The trend in Zambia is for the production of legislation in
support of newly created commissions, boards and committees – all quangos, and all under highly
centralised political control: the CEE Act, the NGO Bill, the Anti-Terrorism Bill, the Zambia
Development Agency Act; even business initiatives such as the Private Sector Development
Programme (PSDP), taken up by the Zambia Business Forum, are beholden to the CEE Act.
All this legislation, including the Immigration and Deportation Act, is there to control foreign
investors and non-Zambia residents, ensuring that they remain as investors, but held well within the
power of centralised control. And the Act, when taken with other developments, will simply siphon
175
off more money from the national purse, create ever more bureaucracy at a time when the Government
of Zambia becomes ever more dysfunctional, and so hinder investment.
4.2.3
Forestry Act No. 39 of 1973
The Act of 1973 remains in force until such time as a commencement order for the Forestry Act No. 7
of 1999 - which will establish the Zambia Forestry Commission, define its functions and provide for
the establishment of national forests, local forests and joint forestry management areas - is issued by
the Minister. Once in operation, this Act will provide for the participation of local communities,
traditional institutions, NGOs, and other stakeholders in sustainable forest management. Part V of Act
No. 7 of 1999 deals with joint forest management, allowing considerable devolution of powers to
customary communities over forests and local forests.
Under the proposed new act, as with wildlife, trees will be ‘owned’ by the republic’s president on
behalf of all Zambians, with powers of administration delegated to either chiefs or the Director of
Forestry. The 1973 Act mirrors the weaknesses in the legislation of other natural resource sectors,
being highly centralised, removing and disenfranchising customary communities who had previously
agreed to make the land available for conservation, and restricting customary authorities and District
Councils from receiving benefits from sustained forest conservation.
Since 2002, the Provincial Forestry Action Programme (PFAP II) has been supporting the Forestry
Department (FD) of the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources (MTENR), to pilot
Joint Forest Management (JFM) in seven districts in Zambia.
The legislative framework for Joint Forest Management activities in Zambia are the Forestry Policy of
1998, the Forests Act of 1999, and the local forests (Control and Management) Regulations, Statutory
Instrument No. 52 of 1999 - the programme stalled for years due to the lack of an adequate legal
framework to enable some aspects of JFM to be implemented. However, the failure to implement the
Forests Act of 1999, which provides the legal framework for JFM, is one of the principle causes of
customary communities not being able to benefit from forest resources. In particular, the issue of how
communities may be empowered to collect licence revenue on behalf of government, and how the
benefits arising from JFM can be shared between the government (FD) and the local communities is
untested. As the NRCF advisory note on JFM to the Minister (a note never acknowledged) advised in
2005, the Forests Act of 1999 ought to be brought into force through the passing of a commencement
order under the hand of the Minister of MTENR specifying an exact date of commencement. This
would then create the Forestry Commission in place of the Forestry Department; facilitate the transfer
of user, control and management rights to participating communities and stakeholders through joint
forestry management, and allow for the sharing of costs and benefits of forestry management with
participating stakeholders (NRCF 2005).
With current legislation unable to accommodate the implementation of joint forestry management, the
Local Forests (Control and Management) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 47 of 2006 was
gazetted in April of 2006 to accommodate their establishment.
As far as normal utilisation is concerned, the Director of Forestry can transfer the right of utilisation to
any individual or institution through a licence, four types being in operation:
i)
ii)
Production licences: - These are saw milling licences or pit sawing licences.
Concession Licence - This is a right given to harvest trees in a given area for a
specified period (usually five years), subject to the production of a forest
management plan. This licence is mostly used to produce timber for export..
iii) Conveyance Licence - This allows for the movement of forest produce (raw
timber, firewood and charcoal) from one area to another.
iv) Casual Licence - Allows the harvesting of rough forest produce for domestic use
176
and commercial use.
The critically important mechanism of timber certification has been introduced as a result of global
pressures. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
recognised that problems of poverty and food security were linked to deforestation and the
indebtedness of developing countries, resulting in the development of certification standards, which in
turn gave access to foreign markets. This gave birth to the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 1992
with the mandate to validate the claims of timber certifiers and with the goal of promoting sustainably
conserved forests. It is unlikely that many customary communities have been told of certification.
Also, Government might question it as a ploy by developed countries to control access to markets.
Donors, NGOs and the WB/IMF/WTO trinity naturally support pre-market economies obtaining an
FSC Certification (Forest Stewardship Council). FSC is an association of voting members registered
in Mexico with the aim of promoting environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and
economically viable management of the world’s forests. Membership is open to organisations and
individuals who are supporters of the FSC’s work, being assigned to one of three chambers:
i)
ii)
The Economic Chamber – those with a commercial interest.
The Environmental Chamber - non-profit, NGOs and individuals dedicated to
biodiversity and environmental conservation or studies, with a demonstrable
commitment to environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically
viable forest stewardship.
iii) The Social Chamber - for indigenous organisations and social movements and
individuals involved in such organisations that are active in the promotion of
environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial and economically viable forest
management.
The establishment of a forest management system is usually the first step before the certificate is
awarded, certification being still in its infancy. Zambian organisations have to rely on expensive
foreign-based certifiers. The tenure system is also seen as a severe constraint for companies who seek
security of tenure for their investment.
Making use of the Local Forests (Control and Management Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 47
of 2006, Forest Trusts under Joint Forestry Management (JFM) in Zambia may be registered as
Societies, and are bound to the Forestry Department through a memorandum of understanding (MoU).
But in theory development partners may apply to the Forestry Department (FD) to have National
Forest reserved for their use in a joint arrangement with the FD.
Trees on Customary Land and in Local Forests can freely be cleared, burned, or used for home
consumption or local use but not those in National Forests and National Parks. However, if a forest
product is to be used for commercial purposes, the State (through the Department of Forestry), has to
issue a licence. Thus, individuals or communities are only given use and management rights over
forests, but not ownership (Mbewe 2007).
In March, 2009 the Minister MTENR informed the National Assembly that the Forestry Policy of
1998 was under review; and that: ‘It is expected that the revised Forestry Policy will be in place
towards the end of the 2009. The revised Forestry Policy will inform the revision of the Forests Act
No. 27 of 1999 to strengthen its provisions including the restructuring of the Forestry Department’. 91
91
Minister’s speech to National Assembly, 17 March 2009, page 5 of 7.
177
4.2.4
The Fisheries Act of 2007
The Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws of Zambia of 1974 provided for fisheries management at a
departmental level, but did not incorporate community participation. Prior to that, it was administered
from 1941 by the Department of Game and Tsetse Control. The amended Fisheries Act of 2007 gives
powers to the Minister to declare Fisheries Management Areas (FMAs) through a statutory instrument
– in consultation with riparian communities, and subject to the provision of a fisheries management
plan, with special care for endemic fish. No fishing is allowed within an FMA without a licence. The
Minister appoints Fisheries Management Committees (FMCs) as co-management structures in FMAs,
with members comprising six villagers, one chief’s representative, one from the local authority, one
from an NGO operating in the FMA, one each from the fishing industry and aquaculture industry, plus
two other persons vetted by the Minister who also appoints the Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The
FMA may, in consultation with the Director, enter into co-management agreements with industrial
fishing companies, or with NGOs. The Committee is responsible for the production of the
management plan and the creation of a fund into which will be paid all licence money for the
economic and social well-being of the riparian community. The committee is required to prepare an
annual report and audited accounts to be submitted to the Minister. The Act also covers aquaculture,
requiring that ventures be licenced and operate under certain conditions. Government is required to
provide an Aquaculture Development Plan for Zambia.
The Act further provides for a Fisheries Department to co-ordinate the development of commercial
fishing, fishing control and the registration of fishermen and their boats.
4.2.5
The Water Act No. 34 of 1948
Water resources management in Zambia is governed by the Water Act, which makes provision for the
ownership, control and use of water. In terms of jurisdiction, the Act is not applicable to (a) the
Western Province; (b) the Zambezi River; (c) the Luapula River; and (d) that portion of the Luangwa
River that constitutes the boundary between Zambia and Mozambique.
The Water Act of 1948 (As amended by Nos. 5 and 39 of 1950, S.I. No. 55 of 1964 and No. 69 of
1965) vests ownership of all water in the President – no right of property in water existing – except for
domestic use. The Act provides for a Water Board and Registrar to whom applications must be made
if a public stream is to be diverted or stored. Water therefore remains an essential part of the
commons.
As admitted by the Minister of Finance in 2009, 42% of Zambians do not have access to potable
water, with the result that trachoma and cholera are the biggest disease killers of children after
malaria. The level of water related disease is worsened by the HIV/AIDS epidemic (official figure is
approx. 20%) with its associated infectious diseases, making interventions targeted towards poor
communities a high priority (Sievers 2006).
A donor support partnership on water resources management in Zambia identifies some major issues
affecting rural communities:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Lack of an integrated approach to water resources management.
Lack of decentralised and sustainable structures that are accessible and provide for the
participation of stakeholders/communities.
Lack of effective awareness programmes for all levels of water users/stakeholders
including policy makers and legislators.
Lack of involvement of traditional authorities in water resources management (customary
law).
178
Zambia is addressing this through institutional, legal and regulatory reform of the Water Resource
Management sub-sector, with the Water Resources Action Program (WRAP) under the auspices of the
Ministry of Energy and Water Development (MEWD) heading this process. WRAP has been
finalising the new draft of ‘The Water Resources Management Bill, 2004’, which proposes an
institutional framework for water resources management comprising:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
An autonomous National Water Resources Management Authority (NWRMA) to
replace the existing Water Board. The NWRMA will be responsible for all water
resources management functions except policy formulation and guidance as well
as issues relating to shared water sources (notably Zambezi River).
Catchment Councils (where feasible) substituting the present Provincial set-up for
water management.
Sub-Catchment Councils (where feasible) complementary to the District set-up.
Water User Associations, which should be formed on a demand driven basis.
A Water Resources Development Fund to make investments benefiting the poor
(e.g. dam/canal construction for small-scale irrigation schemes etc.) managed by
an autonomous board with NWRMA as secretariat.
A Department of Water Resources to substitute the present DWA and be
responsible for policy formulation and guidance as well as international rivers.
The Danida Water Sector Programme Support (WSPS) is specifically trying to link proposed
catchment/sub-catchment based institutions for water resources management to existing decentralised
local government institutions such as the local authorities.
4.2.6
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP)
In 1997 work began on the NBSAP Plan for the years 2000-2004. The plan acknowledged the need to
incorporate the best of indigenous traditional conservation practices. The following needs were
identified:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Conservation of ecosystems and protected areas.
Sustainable use and management of biological resources.
Equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of biodiversity.
Conservation of crop and livestock genetic diversity.
Provision of an appropriate legal and institutional framework and the required
human resources to deal with bio-safety.
Zambia’s vision is to have a progressive and enlightened nation where its people value and derive
sustenance and prosperity from the sustainable management and use of its biological resources. One of
the six goals of the NBSAP was to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits from the use of Zambia's
biological resources.
4.2.7
National Conservation Strategy (NCS) 1985
The NCS made proposals on policy, plans, organisation and the actions needed to integrate
conservation with development; in particular, it recognised that customary communities and the
private sector should be enjoined in the management of Zambia’s natural resources.
4.2.8
National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) 1994
The NEAP reiterated the need for local community and private sector participation in managing
Zambia’s natural resources by way of sustainable policies, incentives and guidelines in the
management and maintenance of ecosystems, ecological processes and the biological diversity of the
country. It also acknowledged that rural people, not the GRZ were the de facto managers of the natural
179
resources and that what was therefore needed were certain practical steps, including institutional and
policy reforms, a reduction of central government’s role in the management of natural resources, a
devolution of responsibilities over natural resource management to local authorities and communities,
and the privatisation of public enterprises involved in natural resource utilisation.
4.2.9
National Policy on Environment (2005)
The NPE recognises the requirements set out in the Constitution, its aim being to ensure sound
environmental management within a holistic framework of sustainable development in Zambia. It
emphasises the duty of any institution, government or non-governmental organisation, any community
group or people's organisation or any individual that uses or otherwise carries out activities that affect
the environment in any way, to exercise proper control to maintain the productivity and integrity of the
environment. Of all the plans, this is the most comprehensive and unifying. And were GRZ to follow
its prescriptions, the result could be a major positive change. Government finally announced the
launch of the NPE on 30 June 2009, having adopted it in 2007 (Chulu 2009c).
4.2.10 Zambia Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) - Fifth National Development Plan, 2006
- 2010
The IMF, having failed with Stabilisation and Adjustment, has now invoked central planning with the
Department of Planning and Economic Management within the Ministry of Finance and Planning
having the mandate to implement the FNDP. This Plan was launched in 2006. What is noteworthy is
that questions of land policy were not included in the main area of focus, the House of Chief’s
recommendations to the FNDP formulation falling on barren ground. The plans make the usual broad
set of objectives on the ushering in of development for all, though, as with all plans, GRZ is not
legally bound to carry them out (Hansungule 2007). The Plan endorses the African customary land
system. Furthermore, paragraph g) of the objectives: ‘the State shall promote sustainable development
and public awareness of the need to manage the land, air and water resources in a balanced and
suitable manner for the present and future generations, etc.’ clearly places an obligation on the
Government regarding sustainable development.
4.2.11 Zambia National Action Plan (NAP) for Combating Desertification (2002)
Zambia signed and ratified the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) on 15
October 1994 and 19 September 1996. The objectives of this programme is: 1) to reduce degradation
of land resources in affected areas; 2) to promote the sustainable use of the land resources for the well
being of the local communities; 3) to strengthen the capacity of all stakeholders so as to promote their
participation in the national action plan (NAP); 4) to introduce and improve assessments, planning and
monitoring systems for the effective management of the NAP process.
4.2.12 Climate change
Mubanga Kasakula, a small-scale farmer and leader of the Zambian Small Scale Farmers’ Forum, told
an international forum that in recent years in Zambia they have noticed a shift in the start of rainy
season:
..rains do not begin until December and stop by early March, and rain is interspersed
with dry spells; most crops grown are late maturing, like local varieties of maize and
sorghum; yields are going down due to lack of rain; and that this has brought about a
critical situation: in 2005, Zambia has a food deficit of 85,000 metric tonnes.
He then catalogued a list of negative impacts of this assumed climate change: reduced food supplies
and hunger, no money for school fees, increasing malnutrition, women and girls walking far to fetch
water. The amelioration measures which he suggested were to enhance the capacity of the Zambian
180
Meteorological Agency to give accurate, timely information, funding for small-scale irrigation
schemes that are affordable for poorer farmers, funding to develop early maturing and drought tolerant
crop varieties through farmer led research, encouraging the growing of drought resistant crops instead
of hybrid maize, and support for appropriate farming, not just more food aid. He further stated how
this support should be given:
i)
ii)
iii)
More resources and investment to agriculture sector and transparency in its
allocation.
Improved rural infrastructure relevant to poorer people, to enable income
generating activities (access to water and electricity).
Give space and capacity for farmers to engage in policy issues from local level to
international level. 92
The World Meteorological Organisation predicted that temperatures in Petauke district – the greater
area in which the Landsafe project falls - will increase by between 5°C and 10°C (9.0°F and 18.0°F).93
These predicted temperature increases were gleaned from the Hadley Centre, a Climate Research
Facility who chose the 'HadCM2' computer model from a variety of choices. But the only evidence for
a rise in temperature in the world has been in the last quarter of the twentieth-century, following a
slight cooling between 1940-1975. But the Hadley Centre now admit, at a time when CO2 emissions
are rising, that the climate models they used did not take adequate account of natural temperature
variability, yet still claimed that global warming will resume from 2009 (Lawson 2008). The science
of global warming or climate change is problematic, based as it is on highly sophisticated computer
models. Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide did increase substantially in the twentiethcentury, as it continues to do now, but CO2 is only one of the ‘greenhouse gases’, water vapour
making up most of the greenhouse gas and well nigh impossible for computer programmes to deal
with. The difficulty is to quantify the amount which man is producing, the so-called anthropogenic
effect, the amount that may be harmful should temperatures be increasing, and then to compute the
cost – if the prediction is correct, of amelioration. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), established by the United Nations (UN) in 1988, is supposed to settle this question by
synthesising the available information. But, as quoted by Lawson, the IPCC stated that, ‘Most of the
observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid 20th century is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations’ (Lawson 2008, p.13).
Zambians have accepted newspaper headlines warning of the dire effects of global warming, as
Europeans did in the 1970’s - urged on by flat-earth journalism - of the dire dangers of pollution,
species extinction, a looming ice-age, and before that of DDT, and more recently, of the Millennium
Bug (Booker & North 2007), (Davies 2008). Thus Zambians, like most people, appear prone to accept
information provided to them by journalists and politicians, groups notoriously subject to the
phenomenon of ‘group polarisation’ be it genetically-modified (GMO) maize in times of extreme food
scarcity – in itself trumpeted by aid agencies - or now, climate change (Sunstein 2009). Significantly,
a major work that contains 2,311 scientific references reveals the missing science in the global
warming debate (Plimer 2009).
However, it is apparent from the findings of the Copenhagen Consensus that statistically significant
anthropogenic climate change has been detected in every continent except Australia, with a probable
increase of between 2 and 5 degrees centigrade by the turn of the century (if there is no change in
carbon emissions) - this means that the matter must be taken seriously. But, as they point out, there are
decisions to be made on what action to take, but at vastly different levels of cost (Yohe 2008).
The Copenhagen Consensus have derived the following response options:
92
URL:http://The Global Warming 8 – GW8; http://www.practicalaction.org/?id=gw8. Accessed: 2010-02-04.
(Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIEbvfAc).
93
URL:http://www.climate-charts.com/Locations/z/ZA67673PETA00010.php. Accessed: 2010-02-04.
(Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIEfJCW0).
181
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Business as usual (the TAU reference case):
This provides a baseline scenario against which other policy options can be
assessed.
Mitigation only (annual) (the TAU Limited Mitigation case):
Economic instruments such as a carbon tax are used to reduce annual
emissions to the extent that the cost matches the Copenhagen Consensus
annual budget each year, with no Research and Development (R&D)
investment or proactive adaptation.
R&D plus mitigation (annual) (the ATP Limited Mitigation case):
Invest immediately in R&D to make carbon reduction and sequestration
technologies available to increase the effectiveness of mitigation in the longer
term.
Adaptation plus R&D plus mitigation (annual) (a portfolio approach):
A combination of case 3 above with measures designed to ameliorate various
health impacts related to other CC topics and respond to the likely
exacerbation of health hunger problems. This option illustrates the value of
simultaneously "fighting the disease" and "treating the symptoms".
What is known is that Zambia exports black carbon from biomass burning, which results in plumes of
atmospheric brown clouds (ABCs) containing sub-micron size particles, i.e. aerosols, as well as the
perennial dry season haze over Zambia. ABCs and the haze intercepts sunlight by absorbing and
reflecting it, leading to surface dimming. One researcher claims that Southern Africa is one of the five
global hotspot sources of green house gases.94 Another researcher found that anthropogenic sulphur
emissions have decreased (Stern 2006). It is very likely that the fires which burn continually in
Zambia from July to the onset of the rains in November do affect surface temperatures, and also affect
photosynthesis and plant productivity, the latter perhaps negated by the increase in carbon dioxide
levels. It is thus critical that Zambia places biomass burning and forestry protection at the top of its
agenda.
Zambia has signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and
also the Kyoto Protocol. In early 2009, the President of Zambia announced that the National
Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA), ‘Adapting and mitigating the impacts of climate change,
particularly on small scale farmers who are some of the hardest hit’, was being implemented, and that
‘in support, a national response strategy will be prepared to coordinate all the various efforts aimed at
addressing the impacts of climate change.’95
Using Multi-Criteria Analysis (MCA) to arrive at a list of urgent and immediate needs for adaptation,
Zambia has analysed agriculture and food security (Livestock, fisheries and crops), energy and water,
human health, natural resources and wildlife.
The Zambia programme advances the following adaptive measures and projects as being necessary:
i)
i)
Agriculture and food security
Adaptation of crops (cereals, legumes, root and tuber crops, and horticultural
crops) to climate change variability including promotion of early
maturing/drought resistance crops. Develop sustainable and appropriate
programmes for both crops and livestock in the face of climate change.
94
Global Dimming by Air Pollution and Global Warming by Greenhouse Gases: Global and Regional
Perspectives. V. Ramanathan Scripps Institution of Oceanography University of California at San Diego
Extended Abstract of the Plenary lecture presented at the 17th International Conference on Nucleation and
Atmospheric Aerosols, Galway, Ireland, August 13th-17th, 2007.
95
Speech to the Tenth National Assembly by His Excellency (HE) President of Zambia, 16 June 2009.
182
ii)
iii)
iv)
Promotion of irrigation and efficient use of water resources.
Water harvesting.
Use of technologies for fertility improvement and moisture storage (including
soil conservation measures).
Improving post-harvest storage and marketing of produce.
Strengthening of early warning systems and preparedness.
Development of dams and dip tanks and sustainable supply of feed to mitigate
the effects of droughts.
Promotion of Improved crop and livestock management practices.
Introduction of well-adapted livestock.
Boosting the Zambezi River Water System to increase delivery.
Application of GIS/remote sensing in mapping of drought and flood prone
areas.
Fish breeding to restock the lakes, rivers and dams.
Promotion of aquaculture.
Using species suitable for aquaculture in vulnerable areas.
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
xii)
xiii)
xiv)
ii)
Human health
i)
Crop diversification and fortified food supplementations for under-fives other
vulnerable groups.
Use of Insecticide Treated Nets (ITNs) to prevent malaria.
Water treatment for quality control (to prevent waterborne diseases).
ii)
iii)
iii)
Water and energy section
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Adaptation Measure.
Use of renewable energies.
Efficient use of charcoal and expanded use of ethanol stoves.
Inter-Basin Water Transfers.
Regional Integration of Electricity Infrastructure from Biomass Sources.
Wildlife and forestry96
iv)
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
xii)
96
Improved fire management in Game Reserves.
Construction of watering points e.g. boreholes for watering wildlife.
Breeding programme for selected species in National Park.
Translocation of animals.
Community based ranching in order to protect vulnerable species.
Culling to maintain sustainable animal populations.
Identifying and protecting migratory routes of wildlife.
Undertaking protective management measures to protect displaced wildlife
populations.
Developing small dams, and other storage facilities, to mitigate
droughts/flooding, to harvest water and to initiate community-based fish
farming and breeding.
Improved extension services to ensure sustainable land and forest
management.
Promotion of community forest management.
Forest fire management at the community level.
NAPA Zambia gives as the existing programmes under natural resources that are relevant to climate change:
the Integrated Land Use Management project under the Forestry Department, the Natural Resources
Management Component under the Environment and Natural Resources Management Department and the
SADC Biodiversity Support Programme.
183
xiii) Targeting afforestation and re-afforestation programmes to control siltation of
streams and rivers as well as to provide fuel wood to minimise encroachment
of the forests.
xiv) Promotion of community woodlots for the provision of fuel wood and as
sources of alternative cash income.
xv) Improving energy access and security, especially in rural areas (e.g., through
the Rural Electrification Agency, promotion of energy-efficient stoves).
xvi) Developing and implementing strategies for drought preparedness, flood
zoning and mitigation works.
xvii) Restocking of depleted game areas.
Giving an equal weighting to economic, environmental and social factors, the Ministry came
up with the following priorities for wildlife and forestry:
i)
Wildlife
i)
Early warning – establish weather stations and improving capacity to gather
climate-related information;
ii)
Baseline study to collect data to establish critical habitats;
iii) Provide water points in critical habitats;
iv) Dredge lagoons and streams for sand to increase volume of water in these
water bodies;
v)
For communities around the parks food security and alternative incomes are
important;
vi) Maintaining the available water infrastructure and provision of water for
communities to reduce Human Wildlife Conflict (HWC);
vii) Empowerment of women through access to microfinance to diversify earning
potential;
viii) Ensuring easier access to water and energy sources by drilling boreholes and
planting trees in woodlots; and
ix) Use of electricity provided through the rural electrification programme.
ii)
Forestry
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
Conservation farming;
Reforestation programmes;
Projects to promote natural regeneration of miombo woodlands;
Programs targeting participatory forest management of indigenous forests;
Program of beekeeping as a conservation strategy and most importantly
creating markets linkages for honey and other products;
Household woodlots for firewood; and
Fish farming initiatives to reduce pressure on fish stocks in Luangwa River.
NAPA lists the possible constraints to the implementation of NAPA as follows (MTENR
2007):
i)
The lack of financial resources and extreme poverty, coupled with an HIV/AIDS
pandemic and limited capacity.
ii) The lack of a clear and specific legal and policy framework for climate change
issues in the country. There is no legal framework or institution that has been
directed to ensure that climate change issues at various levels are properly
institutionalised in the planning process.
iii) The lack of public awareness activities on climate change and their potential
impact on the social-economics, livelihood, and the ecosystem.
184
iv) Inadequate human resources and skills at the community level where the impacts
of climate change are the greatest. This also follows coping strategies by the
communities, which, although useful, lack adaptive planning tools which are
needed to empower communities to deal with new threats and risks.
v) The lack of private sector involvement.
vi) A limited understanding of concrete or best practices activities of what constitutes
an adaptation to climate change;
vii) Monitoring and evaluation plans - including environmental impact assessments are weak and lack best standards and practices that consider climate change
implications and climate as a non-static element. Current deliberate efforts to
address the problem of climate change are more reactive than futuristic
The NAPA programme for Zambia lists the many adaptations required to combat climate change, as
well as the massive constraints mitigating against success, adaptations which would be listed in any
central planning wish list of a country adapted to begging – as it is in the inadequate 5th National
Development Plan – for an African nation’s development. Wholly absent is an appreciation of the
structural and institutional requirement needs, and of the massive potential of customary communities
as a catalyst and driver of development. And the prescriptions for wildlife are derisory. However,
specific projects within chiefdoms, which could be said to be an adaptation to climate change, would
receive the favourable attention of the donors. In the absence of a chiefdom statutory institution, one
backed by a landuse plan, this would merely be a waste of time and money.
As world leaders debated climate change and the course of action they would follow in December
2009, the Minister of Tourism and Environment (MTENR), Catherin Namugala, called for industrial
nations to cut their greenhouse emissions by 40% saying that this ‘should be sealed in a legal binding
document that will make them accountable’ (Chulu 2009d). In June 2009, Japan committed itself to
reducing its greenhouse gas levels by 8% by 2020. This would require Japan building nine new
nuclear power plants (increasing their use by a third), building more than a million new wind-turbines
and installing solar panels on nearly three million homes (Lomborg 2009, p. V1). This in itself is
already an unrealistic goal, and the fantastical 40%, were it to be seriously adopted, would destroy the
world’s economy.
4.2.13 Forest and carbon protection97
The fact that Three-rifts in Eastern Province (where Landsafe is currently being implemented) has
some of the finest miombo forest in the region, forest presently escaping the assault of charcoal
burners, the timber trade and chitemene (except in the riparian forest), and that global dimming from
unrestricted burning of the forest poses the greatest danger to this massive carbon sink, makes carbon
trading a possible option for both protecting the forest and its wildlife, and for generating income for
its people caught in a development time warp. The theoretical opportunity that exists would be to take
advantage of the situation where developed nations wishing to reduce carbon emissions have two
choices, 1) they can reduce emissions through more efficient operations or 2) they can ‘buy’ carbon
credits to meet reduction deficits. If choosing the latter, carbon credits can be purchased or they can
support Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects that reduce or prevent emissions in
developing countries.
The CDM will allow developed countries to invest in ‘carbon projects’ that reduce emissions in
developing countries as an alternative to more expensive emission reductions in their own countries.
Present sources of funding for this are available from Official Development Assistance (ODA)
funding, implemented through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and non-ODA private sector
97
Carbon sequestration: defined as the uptake from the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide (CO2) from the
atmosphere in growing biomass in afforestation and reforestation or the protection of existing carbon sinks by
sustainable forest management practices.
185
funding through the CDM. However, Zambia does not have the capacity to access these funds or
investments.
But Zambia has yet to domesticate the Kyoto Protocol, making investment under the CDM
problematic due to the considerable risks and cost of doing business in Zambia. It has been suggested
that a case be made for presenting climate change activities to GEF under its new strategic priority on
adaptation. Adaptation options, such as better water and natural resources management in rural areas
and improving agricultural productivity will reduce vulnerability to droughts, famine and loss of
income, put down to the effects of climate change (UNDP 2007). Zambia has now adopted this course.
A note of warning has been sounded that one should not confuse the carbon in trees and that of fossil
fuels and that trees supply only temporary storage of carbon, while that of fossil fuels is permanent
and requires man to unlock it. The charge is also made that the Kyoto protocol encourages the
establishment of temporary plantations in order to earn carbon credits and so increases the ecological
debt of the developed countries. This same report stresses that:
…real and lasting solutions to the forest crisis and the climate crisis lie in providing
incentives for forest-dependent communities and indigenous peoples to restore their
forests and practice sustainable forest management. Small-scale pilot projects are
already showing positive results, while large-scale carbon sink projects are attracting
criticism and protest.98
It also requires that government manage their electricity grid efficiently, for any major increase in
tariffs will increase charcoal production and forest depletion. The recent announcement by the Energy
Regulation Board that tariffs will be increased by 35% between 2009 and 2010; and a further 26%
between 2010 and 2011, is alarming (Nchito 2009).
The Indigenous Environmental Network at the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate
Change talks in Bangkok in October 2009, called for the rejection of the programme Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in Climate Treaty and predicted dire
consequences for Indigenous peoples, biodiversity and the climate alike if the new, post-2012 climate
treaty being debated there allows tradable carbon credits to be produced from projects such as the
REDD and the CDM. Moreover, at the same talks, Rising Tide North America, Carbon Trade Watch
and the Mobilisation for Climate Justice exhorted people to join global climate action to spread the
word about one of the biggest financial scams in history – carbon trading.99
In Zambia the official line on REDD is reported:
The REDD policy board has approved the budget allocation of US $4.49 million for
the Zambia national programme …and with the support of UNDP, FAO and UNEP,
the tourism ministry has produced a national programme document for the new UNREDD programme that would prepare Zambia to combat climate change through
financial initiatives to protect forest areas (Kapekele 2010).
4.2.14 Genetic resources
The Bonn Guidelines on access to genetic resources and benefit sharing arrangements and their
implementation adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at
its sixth meeting in April 2002, was reviewed in four African countries - Zambia being one of them.
The equitable sharing of benefits being of Paramount importance for rural people, the Zambia review
98
URL:http://www.fern.org/node/262 . Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5nICd5C86).
99
URL:http://IEN Online News: October 23, 2009, http://www.ienearth.org/. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived
by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIDAlqMV).
186
is vitally important (UNEP 2008). Clearly Three-rifts is a genetic treasure trove, the GMA being
particularly undisturbed.
4.2.15 Malaria
Prior to the discovery in 1898 that the mosquito transmitted malaria, the territory was deadly to
Europeans. Only later was it realised that Blackwater Fever was connected to malaria and could be
similarly treated. The Ambo nation of the Three-rifts, like other Bantu, were originally largely
resistant to malaria, though it is likely that child mortality was very high.
After WWII, aided in particular by the World Health Organisation (WHO) in 1955, a global
programme using DDT allegedly reduced mortality rates by 95% worldwide. In Zambia it was used in
townships and villages alike, being sprayed annually on the walls of huts and houses. DDT was
banned in the early 1970’s, causing it to fall into disuse (Carson 2002). This, coupled with the
improper use of malarial prophylactics in a population already resistant to malaria, greatly reduced the
efficacy of chloroquine. The recent widespread introduction of mosquito nets, most of them treated
with insecticide, and their subsequent use as fishing nets, has caused widespread but as yet
unquantified damage to the fisheries and other wildlife. No EIA of such a perturbation has ever been
published or called for by the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ). One of the chemicals used is
Fendona 100, which is highly dispersible in water and contains the hazardous ingredient Alphacypermethrin, for which there is no known antidote. The manufacturers, BASF, warn in its Priority
Identifier warning that it is to be kept out of reach of children; and in its Secondary Identifiers warning
that it:
i)
May be harmful if swallowed, inhaled or absorbed through the skin. May be an
irritant to individuals with sensitive skin. Skin contact may cause temporary skin
numbness (paraesthesia).
ii) May cause sensitisation by skin contact.
iii) May cause organ damage from repeated oral exposure at high doses.
iv) Very toxic to aquatic organisms, may cause long-term adverse effects in the
aquatic environment.
v) Toxic to terrestrial invertebrates.
Mosquito nets – or bed-nets as they are referred to in the USA – are frequently stitched together and
used to hoover out all age classes of fish. The increased incidence of attacks on people and on lion
crossing the river by crocodiles in the Three-rifts, and other such unusual incidents in rivers where it
was once safe to wade until recent times in the dry season, is evidence of massive overfishing
(Manning 2007e). The manufacturers have produced a pamphlet showing villagers how to deal with
the chemical.101
The United States and the Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria donated
$2.9 million to distribute more than 500,000 insecticide-treated mosquito nets in Zambia, saying that
they would greatly reduce the number of Zambians a year who die from malaria – their estimate being
50,000. This figure was not substantiated. The nets, enough for a tenth of the country's population,
would be handed out before November, the beginning of the malaria season (Dugger 2009).
Furthermore, other agencies also distributed nets, with the Red Cross of Canada claiming that the
‘leakage’ of nets was less than 10% (i.e. used for other purposes) (J Clarke, personal communication
2007, 6 November).
100
URL:http://www.rentokil.com.fj/images/pdf/Insecticide/Fendona.pdf. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by
WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIClYJDH)
101
URL:http://www.basfpublichealth.com/products/resource_files/Fendona_DIY_Africa_English.pdf. Accessed:
2010-02-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nICszTsO).
187
Bill and Melinda Gates were interviewed by the Financial Times and claimed that malaria was down
50-60% in Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia. But (as pointed out by William Easterley) they were
quoting ‘a dubious report’ by Dr. Arata Kochi, chief of malaria for the WHO, whose report was never
finalised by WHO, with its specific claims contradicted by WHO’s own September 2008 World
Malaria Report which stated that the effects of malaria control in Zambia were ‘less clear’.102 As there
is virtually no data on malaria cases available in Zambia, WHO merely took a guess, precipitating an
avalanche of nets – this damaging the fisheries and bringing added complications to the lives of rural
people.
5 GOVERNMENT POLICY AND CHIEFDOMS
5.1
Public-private partnerships (PPP)
The absence of PPP policy and a legal framework remains a major hindrance to the fostering of PPP
partnerships in protected and customary areas. At a seminar held in Lusaka in 2006, an action plan
was tabled to begin addressing the legal and regulatory obstacles to PPPs in Zambia. Since then GRZ
has developed policies, laws and regulations that define the scope of authority within the various
spheres of government to enter into PPP contracts; and designed an institutional framework to support
and streamline PPP implementation, which will be guided by a set of institutional development
principles.
Subsequently, a draft Cabinet Paper was prepared proposing specific actions that could be undertaken
by GRZ in order to establish such PPP frameworks. Following the completion of this assignment GRZ
is preparing detailed operating procedures and guidelines, illustrating the steps to be followed when
implementing a PPP project, processes for approval and model transaction documents.103
In November 2008, GRZ launched the national Public Private Partnership (PPP) policy under the
Ministry of Finance and National Planning where a PPP unit would be set up. The Public-Private
Partnership (PPP) Policy Bill is in the offing.
5.2
Decentralisation
The Decentralisation policy of 2002 has not been followed through with any vigour, in fact focus has
been on the opposite process of centralisation. It was recently announced that the Decentralisation
Implementation Plan will be adopted, forming the primary basis for financial and technical assistance
to Local Government.104
5.3
Non-Governmental Organisations Bill (Manning 2007f)
The NGOs Bill of 2007 has been sent back for re-drafting but has yet to be completed. Complaints
have been received from civil society organisations that GRZ does not respond to submissions, and
that subsequently a bill is presented once more to parliament without the necessary amendments, and
this then passed into law.
The present bill will require that NGOs register with the NGO Board and apply for a certificate to
operate. Should the certificate be cancelled an appeal can be made to the Minister, thence to the High
Court. The Act then declares that there shall be created a Zambia Congress of NGOs, and a Council of
NGOs answering to the Congress with a code of conduct published in the gazette. Any person found
102
URL:http://aidwatchers.com/2009/02/did-bill-and-melinda-gates-claim-malaria-victories-based-on-phonynumbers/. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nID27kwi).
103
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) Awareness Workshop. March 2006. Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility, PPIAF Program Management Unit. The World Bank, Washington.
104
Speech to the Tenth National Assembly by H.E. The President of Zambia on 16 January 2009.
188
to have provided incomplete information may be struck from the register for three years, and if a nonZambian, may be deported by the Minister.
The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) has urged the government and parliamentarians to
listen to concerns and appeals from majority stakeholders that the NGO bill in its current form gives
excessive discretionary powers to individuals rather than to an institution. It also remarked that any
process of legislating laws with a preconceived intention of targeting and stifling the operations of key
actors in democracy would be retrogressive and against the virtues of the hard-earned democracy and
the freedoms that must be cherished by all interest groups in the nation (Chakwe 2009a & 2009b). The
Zambia Council for Social Development (ZCSD) is implementing the Civil Society Index (CSI), an
analytical country report on the state of civil society organisations in Zambia, their weaknesses and
strengths, operating environment and the perceived impact they make to social change in the country.
5.4
Freedom of information Bill
The freedom of Information Bill of 2002 has yet to be enacted. Its objectives are to:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Establish the Public Information Commission and define its functions;
Provide for the right of access to information;
Set out the scope of public information under the control of public authorities;
Be made available to the public in order to facilitate more effective participation
in the good governance of Zambia;
v) Promote transparency and accountability of public officers; and
vi) Provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing.
A Cabinet Minister has said that delays in enacting the Freedom of Information bill are necessary to
ensure that GRZ officials are trained on how the legislation will work.105
5.5
Bio-Safety Act
The Bio-Safety Act is intended to control genetically modified organisms generally, and particularly
in the light of problems over GM food crops such as maize. Recently GRZ has allowed the Food
Reserve Agency (FRA) to import 100,000 metric tonnes of white non-GMO maize from within the
region (Chirwa 2009).
5.6
National Constitution Conference (NCC)
The National Constitutional Conference (NCC) was established under the NCC Act No. 19 of 2007.
According to Part II Clause 3 of the NCC Act, the NCC is a forum for the examination, debate and
adoption of proposals to alter the Constitution as contained in the Draft Constitution submitted by the
Mung’omba Constitutional Review Commission. The NCC began its work on 19 December 2007. Part
III Section 16 clause (3) gives the Conference powers to delegate its work through eleven committees
that shall debate and make recommendations on the provisions in the Mung’omba Draft Constitution.
The Committees are: General Constitutional Principle, Citizenship, Human Rights, Democratic
Governance, Executive, Legislative, Judicial, Local Government, Public Service, Public Finance and
Land and Environment Committees. Of particular importance to customary communities are the Local
Government, and Land and Environment Committees.
In September 2009, the Report of the Land and Environment Committee was adopted by the
Conference – said report unfortunately a reflection of a committee with little expertise in land and
environment. Hence, it confirmed the Lands Act of 1995 in the matter of customary land, allowing it
105
Commonwealth News and Information Service. 4 April 2008. ‘Zambia: Govt Seeks Help to Enact Freedom
of Information Laws’. London.
189
to be alienated with the approval of the chief and the District Council, ‘An approval under clause (be
3) shall not unreasonably withheld’.106 It also, under 336: (j) advised Parliament to enact legislation to
‘provide for security of tenure for customary land, which shall be issued by the chief’; though the
President may override this should he so wish in the case of setting aside agricultural land and land for
mining. An extraordinary recommendation was for the State to encourage carbon trading, seemingly
oblivious of its pitfalls and the vehement criticism from numerous quarters.
The NCC further adopted the committee’s recommendation: ‘…that Parliament shall enact legislation
to provide for the utilisation and management of natural resources by a District Council in the area
where the natural resource is located’ (340 (a)). Were this to be adopted by Parliament, District
Councils would likely plunder the chiefdoms.
5.7
Local Government Acts
District Councils are the lowest tier of government. Though established under the Local Government
Act, Councils perform most of their land administration functions under the Lands Act and the Town
and Country Planning Act. The Housing Act was introduced to augment the function of housing
delivery to poor communities within a council’s jurisdiction. Under this Act, land arrogated to
councils could be categorised as either Statutory or Improvement Areas according to purely political
considerations; Councillors declaring a given area i) Statutory, and thereby committing itself to
provide basic amenities and residents to receive council certificates of title to residents, or ii) an
Improvement Area, where holders of land are entitled to Land Record Cards, a form of title deed.
Problematically though: ‘But councils are extremely corrupt. Party officials outside councils allocate
land to residents without authority to do so. Individual councillors also allocate land outside councils.
Councils are ‘simply chaos when it comes to land administration’ (Hansungule 2007b).
Three Acts are crucial to the functioning of District Councils – rural councils of varying size situated
in customary areas – and, to some extent, chiefdoms: the Local Government Act No. 22 of 1995, the
Election Act of 1991 and the Registration and Development of Villages Act of 1971, the latter an
artefact of the moves towards a one-party state in December 1972.
Responsibility for administering the Acts lies with the Minister, and District Commissioners (political
contract appointees) provide a government presence at the district level to coordinate development.
Councils are corporate bodies with perpetual succession and powers subject to the provisions of the
Local Government Act. The larger councils are designated city councils. Urban councils are called
municipal councils and the smaller ones, rural-based, are called district councils. In February 2004,
Parliament voted to extend the tenure of office to five years in order to bring local government
elections in line with presidential and parliamentary elections. Each ward elects one member in a
democratic system that is universal throughout Zambian local government. Each council is made up of
all the members of parliament of the district and all the elected councillors in the district. In rural
councils, all the chiefs in the district appoint two representatives. Reporting and decision-making
operate through the committee system.
Below the council - established by the Registration and Development of Villages Act of 1971 - are
Ward Development Committees (WDCs) that are chaired by one of the ward councillors. Section 61
of the Act outlines up to 63 functions, most of them discretionary, that local councils are supposed to
perform: general administration, advertisements, agriculture, community development, public
amenities, education, public health, public order, sanitation, drainage, etc.
Under Section 45 of the Local Government Act, the Government must make grants to local
authorities, but this is rarely fulfilled; finance being provided on an ad hoc basis.
106
Report of the Land and Environment Committee of the September 2009. Part XIX: Land and Property: 330
(3 & 4), National Constitutional Conference.
190
According to Section 45(3), central government shall make specific grants to councils for:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
Water and sanitation.
Health services.
Fire services.
Road services.
Police services.
Primary education.
Agricultural services.
Education and health are the responsibility of central government and although there have been
attempts to decentralise these services, they are not part of the local government system. 107
6
PARASTATALS (QUANGOS), CHIEFDOMS AND INVESTORS
6.1
Zambia Development Agency
The Zambia Development Agency Act No. 11 of 2006 created the Zambia Development Agency, a
corporate body able to sue or be sued, its primary function to bolster the economy and attract
investment to Zambia, but also to deal with such controversial matters as privatisation. Overseeing its
operations is a sixteen-member board, its members drawn from the public and private sector. Under
Section 65. (1), an investor who invests a minimum of two hundred and fifty thousand United States
Dollars or the equivalent in convertible currency, and who employs a minimum of two hundred
persons is entitled to a self employment permit or resident permit; provided that such number of the
persons so employed by the investor as may be prescribed shall hold managerial and technical
positions. This amount was later changed by decree by the Minister of Home Affairs (Shikapwasha),
doubling the amount required per investor, without consultation with the ZDA or its parent Ministry,
Commerce.
Government responsibilities to foreign investors are poorly delineated, leaving the investor, should
anything go wrong, at the mercy of the Arbitration Act, a process anyhow avoided by a Government
Executive in which power remains highly centralised, where foreign investors are able to be deported
under emergency powers introduced to deal with a state of emergency under a previous regime. There
is thus a dire need for a special committee of the judiciary, set apart from the Executive, to deal with
matters affecting investors who are targeted by corrupted political elements (Manning 2007d). This
agency has proved that it will not defend its investors should they have immigration difficulties, with
the Ministry of Commerce being wholly subservient to the Ministry of Home Affairs, guardian of the
political establishment. Numerous bona fide investors have been targeted for take-over by Zambian
partners and summarily deported, with the profits and shareholding purloined.
6.2
Zambia Business Forum
The Zambia Business Forum consists of seven Member Associations: the Zambia National Farmers
Union (ZNFU), the Chamber of Mines of Zambia (CMZ), the Zambia Association of Manufacturers
(ZAM), the Tourism Council of Zambia, (TCZ), the Zambia Chamber of Small and Medium Business
Associations (ZCSMBA), the Zambia Indigenous Business Association (ZIBA), and the Bankers
Association of Zambia (BAZ). It takes its cue from the CEE Act and the public statement of its
Chairman, Sherry Thole, “Zambia for the Zambians”.
107
URL:http://Country profile: Zambia. ‘The Local Government System’, www. clgf.org.uk. Accessed: 201002-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIDIv7uF)
191
6.3
Anti-Corruption Commission
Zambia was ranked the 17th most corrupt country in the world on the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for 2007.
The ACC was established in 1980 as an independent body to promote transparency and minimise
corruption. It has since achieved very little, being highly centralised and under political control.
Reports and interviews of the author with them regarding the illegal alienation of part of the West
Mvuvye National Forest and the Mosi oa Tunya National Park did not result in any action. The recent
decision to drop charges of theft against the Food Reserve Agency Executive Director brought
criticism from TIZ (Changala 2009).
The ACC in late 2009 absorbed the Taskforce on Corruption.
6.4
Commission for Investigations
This Dickensian Commission operates in total obscurity in well-hidden offices. Requests to it to
investigate the illegal alienation of West Mvuvye National Forest and Mosi oa Tunya National Park
did not receive acknowledgement or action of any kind.
6.5
Citizens Economic Empowerment Commission
This Commission is lent its statutory powers by the Citizens Economic Empowerment (CEE) Act No.
9 of 2006. Some of the salient pillars of the CEE Act are as follows:
i)
An Act to establish the CEE Commission and to define its functions and powers;
to establish the CEE Fund; and to promote the economic empowerment of
citizens, in particular, targeted citizens - defined as someone who is or has been
marginalised or disadvantaged and whose access to economic resources and
development capacity has been constrained due to various factors including race,
sex, educational background, status and disability.
ii) In the performance of the Commission's functions under this Act, the Commission
shall effectively liaise and consult appropriate State institutions and shall have the
power to give such instructions or directions to any State institution or a
company.
iii) The President may give to the Commission such general or specific directions
with respect to the discharge of its functions as the President considers necessary
and the Commission shall give effect to such directions.
iv) The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President.
v) The Commission shall be empowered to take whatever actions necessary to
ensure broad based economic empowerment of targeted citizens, citizen
empowered companies, citizen influenced companies, citizen influenced
companies and citizen owned companies.
The Zambian CEE Act of 2006 is legislation which centralises further power in the Presidency, gives
wide powers to a Commission reporting directly to him, enriches, in the short term, the political elite,
discourages foreign investment, ensures the continued impoverishment and unsustainable use of
natural resources, and greatly exacerbates the already unacceptable erosion of national life by
corruption and theft in the name of black economic empowerment.
The aforementioned is also currently the case in South Africa where the imposition of the South
African legal instrument: Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act No. 53 of 2003, is being
implemented by the Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council directly under the control of
the South African President. Broad Based Black Empowerment Act (BBBE) is now considered by the
192
Peer Review Mechanism Report (NEPAD) on South Africa to pose a serious obstacle to that country’s
development, something the South African Government is at pains to downplay (Hutchings 2008).
In South Africa – as has been seen in Zambia – moves by the black elite were not influenced by
socialism but rather on statist economic models that they saw as necessary for breaking the power of
white-owned corporations and for harvesting what the latter had sown. That they were successful is
evident in the small class of an unproductive black elite and the lack of entrepreneurship evident in
South Africa. The supreme irony is that the originators of black economic empowerment were the
white economic oligarchs controlling the mining, finance and engineering industries, who sought to
‘buy-off’ the ANC leadership by a massive transfer of assets to them at no cost. This effectively
weaned the ANC away from any massive re-distribution of economic largesse to the poor, allowed the
oligarchs to move their assets outside of the country, to have first access to government contracts and,
by closing off international competition for consumer goods and the manufacturing sector, gave them
a competition-free environment in which to do business (Mbeki 2009, p.67).
In Zambia, prior to the promulgation of the CEE Act, the civil service were instructed to start
implementing it, this resulting in a racial bias on such issues as lodge leases and the illegal issue of a
massive TCA lease in the tiny Mosi oa Tunya National Park to Legacy Holdings Zambia, whose
Chairman was also the Chairman of the CEE Commission. As in South Africa this mantra of the
supposed ‘disadvantaged person’ has been taken up avidly by the elite, particularly by its corporate
raiding vehicle, the Zambia Business Forum, justifying elite Zambians access to the same things given
the elite in South Africa.
The CEE Act was introduced to Zambia at a time when the Commission for Africa was formed to
assist Africa raise the living standards of its people. After extensive consultations and lobbying it
persuaded the G8 group of nations at the Gleneagles Summit to write off much of Africa’s debt in
return for undertakings by African countries to improve standards of governance. Thus, once Zambia
achieved the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) Completion Point in April 2005, most of
the Paris Club creditors cancelled Zambia’s public debt, and the African Development Bank, the IMF
and the World Bank - under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative born out of the 2005 Group of 8
Gleneagles proposal, are currently doing the same. If to this is added the agreed commitment to the
mission of NEPAD, the UN Millennium Development Goals and the African Peer Review
Mechanism, Africa is supposedly bent on self-improvement – with the help of the world.
Zambia played a full role in the consultations with the Commission, and through its Zambia
International Business Advisory Council (ZIBAC) – a member of which sits on both the Business
Council of Zambia and ZIBAC (and is also Chairman of the CEE Commission – as well as Chairman
of the Tourism Council of Zambia - and what may be described as the first Indigenous Zambian
business group), therefore appeared set to become a role model for Africa.
The CEE Act appears therefore to wish to rectify a mythical colonial wrong, to remove some of the
control and ownership of businesses from those who came to Zambia more recently and who are not
native Africans, in the case of some of the first European settlers, fifty years after the arrival of the
Ngoni in 1835. It will negate a wave of new investment, of innovative new partnerships with tribal
communities that do not alienate the land; and will diminish the growth of democracy.
The CEE had hampered the work of such bodies as the Natural Resources Consultative Forum
(NRCF), a neutral platform for stakeholder participation in the management of natural resources particularly policy formulation - established by the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural
Resources (MTENR). Now civil servants of that Ministry are unwilling to participate in its
deliberations, knowing that they and the private business sector will be subject to the control and
direction of the CEE Commission, itself directly under the control of the President.
193
The CEE will have an especially deleterious effect on businesses that employ 25 or more people by a
deluge of regulations and bureaucratic restrictions, discouraging firms from employing more than this
arbitrary number. This adds to the onerous labour laws that effectively ensure that workers are paid for
fourteen months but only work for eleven months of a year.
6.6
Drug Enforcement Commission
The Drug Enforcement Commission was established in 1989 by an Act of Parliament and enforces the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, the Prohibition and Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, and the Penal Code Act. It acts, confusingly, as a parallel organisation to the ACC.
7
GOVERNMENT, CHIEFDOMS AND INVESTORS
The sheer scale of the MMD Government’s dysfunction and immersion in grand patronage, now
criminalised, may be gleaned from the reports of the Auditor-General and from the experience of
investors and of civil society generally in Zambia.
The aforementioned far exceeds the rather benign state of African patrimonialism and clientelism
where rule is regarded as being conducted through personal patronage rather than law or ideology,
this now having mutated beyond the imperatives of culture, survival patterns, simple patronage and
economic reciprocity, but also being beset by the commoditisation policies of the WB/IMF and the
ravaging of natural resources by the amalgam of international investors/donors and the urban elite, the
compradors. It is this group, the Washington Consensus of WB, IMF and WTO, the donors, the large
foreign capitalists, who join with the compradors to restrict rural development. For, as can be seen in
this section, there is no shortage of money or resources, but merely of principle and accountability to
the country. Instead, as the Gini coefficient clearly shows, Zambia exceeds a 0.50 Gini score placing it
with South Africa and a few others at the top of global rankings (at number 0,0: everyone has the same
income; and at 1: one person has all the income and everyone else has nothing) (World Bank 2006,
p.39). This in a country beset by systemic poverty and inequality, where women are adversely affected
by a hundred years or more of male migrant labour flows and culturally oppressive practices (Bond
2006, p.7).
However, it is the theft of public money, particularly within those Ministries and Departments having
responsibility for the poor and the natural resources which sustain them, that remains an abiding
national disgrace (Appendix 2). The amount of public money stolen since self-government is simply
unknown. That it is a staggering amount, particularly since 1974 when civil service controls and
expertise became severely impaired by the Zambianisation policy, is beyond doubt. But it was in the
age of neoliberalism, in the time of President Chiluba, that grand corruption became institutionalised.
And that it is rural people who have had to suffer most cannot be contested. The evidence is in plain
view in the Auditor-General’s reports and in the comprehensive analysis of the years 1984-2004 by
Transparency International Zambia (TIZ) (Djokotoe & Chama 2007).
The risk of being held accountable for theft is virtually non-existent, protecting the kinships and clans
with such dubious excuses as being hampered by a ‘statute of limitations’. The former President,
Chiluba, although found to be guilty of the theft of $46 million in a London Court, continues to live in
retirement with all state privileges, and recently found not guilty in a magistrate’s court of the theft of
$500K, the State declining to appeal. Yet those who have lent support to customary communities or
who have attempted to interfere with the web of corruption have been targeted by corrupt elements in
the State and, in the case of investors, deported. The corruption is therefore one of theft and the abuse
of State powers under the hegemony of the MMD party.
194
7.1 Legislation supporting primary stakeholders
7.1.1 The Co-operative Act
This Act may be deemed an entry level legal mechanism for binding a small or large group, not
necessarily bound up with the sale and purchase of goods. In the past Co-operatives have performed
poorly in Zambia.
7.1.2
Societies Act
A community may register a Society with the Registrar of Societies requiring that the Chief, the
District Council, the Police and the Office of the President (OP) – the state security arm – and finally,
the Registrar of Societies, give their assent. Therefore, Societies - and Trusts under the Lands
(perpetual succession) Act as shall be seen later - unlike Trust Companies registered under the
Companies Act, are under the control of the Office of the President, and by Section 13 of the Societies
Act, CAP 119, the Minister may cancel the registration of any society.
7.1.3 Lands (perpetual succession) Act
A Trust may be formed by trustees on application to the Minister of Lands under The Land (perpetual
succession) Act Chapter 186 of the Laws of Zambia and may be granted a certificate of registration as
a body corporate. Any community of persons may apply, as long as the Minister deems that their
incorporation would benefit Zambia. For the Trust to acquire any land, its amount and the purpose for
which it is required, requires the assent of the Minister, which then vests in the Trust. The Minister
may require the document outlining the details of the land to be lodged with the Registrar of Lands
and Deeds. The Trust is allowed to acquire, and to convey, assign and demise any land in which it
holds an interest. Being able to assign (i.e. transfer the rights to receive benefits in land), is helpful in
accommodating investors. However, the fact that the Minister may remove such right under political
influence may limit the Act for the building of the customary commons.
7.1.4 The Companies Act: limited by guarantee
A not-for-profit company registered under the Companies Act CAP 388 of the Zambian Laws is one
limited by guarantee. It may appoint a maximum of ten Trustees with a quorum of two-thirds, and may
establish a Trust Fund. It requires an annual audit by a firm registered with the Zambia Institute of
Chartered Accountants, appointed by the Trustees. The Company may enter into any partnerships for
sharing profits with any person, firms or companies that the Trustees deem would benefit the Trust.
Should any Trustee leave Zambia then – by approval of the remaining Trustees – a resident (or cotrustee) may be delegated as Trustee through Power-of-Attorney.
This arrangement, having the necessary rigour and protection under the Companies Act might be the
ideal vehicle - being less prone to political influence - for a community to conduct its business of
building the customary commons.
8
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, CHIEFDOMS AND INVESTORS
The efficacy of donor and capitalist effort in trying to either profit or develop African nations, has
been comprehensively assessed and, in most cases, skewered: (Adebajo et al. 2006), (Giles 2008),
(Chang 2007), (Moyo 2009), (Bond 2006), (Hancock 1989), (Kingsnorth 2004), (Collier 2007),
(Stephan et al. 2006), (Calderisi 2006), and (Easterly 2006). In particular, a brilliant analysis of the
conditions which gave rise to the Industrial Revolution poses considerable questions on any possible
outcome of donor aid on societies that have not been long settled and are without the necessary
institutions, training and education (Clark 2007); while another, much earlier work questions the
195
economic controls imposed on free societies, views which led to the Washington Consensus (Hayek
2001).
Although Zambia is not a partner of the Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005 (an international
agreement of both countries and organisations to improve aid delivery with a set of monitorable
actions and indicators), it is hoped that the Declaration will assist development by bringing a motley
group, behaving much as those who originally scrambled for Africa, into some sort of order.
However, the Harmonisation in Practice (HIP) and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Zambia (JASZ) (it
is claimed) is focusing aid efforts. Although donors concentrating on wildlife and environmental
matters are left by other donors to deal with their area of speciality, this does lessen their interest and
funding. ‘While the intention is for them instead, to mainstream environmental issues into all their
programmes, there is a significant risk of marginalisation of important environmental issues until
environmental mainstreaming is better defined and articulated as a sector-wide, cross-cutting issue’
(Pope 2006).
As outlined in Chapter 2 and 5, donors have a very poor record in the natural resources and wildlife
management area, both in Zambia and in Africa.
9
ZAMBIAN NGOs, CHIEFDOMS AND INVESTORS
9.1
The Zambia Land Alliance
The Land Alliance is made up of 30 civil society organisations in Zambia that participated in a
National Civil Society Consultative (NCSC) meeting on the Zambia's draft Land Policy of October
2006 on 21 and 22 August 2007 in Lusaka. Perhaps central to its findings was their view that the
equality of rights of all people to land, protection for disability care, gender equality and resource
conservation - as provided for in the Constitution of Zambia - needs to be provided for in the dual
tenure system. They proposed the following (Zambia Land Alliance 2007):
i)
Government should establish a mechanism to revise and align the draft land
policy before adoption.
ii) The Land Policy data should acknowledge that present data is old and invalid;
this data should be omitted from the Land Policy. The Policy should state that a
national land audit should be conducted and results fed into the Land Policy.
iii) The completed draft Land Policy should be widely disseminated through the
media, that is television, radio and newspapers, in both English and local
languages. It should also be made available on the Internet.
iv) The draft Land Policy should be discussed at public meetings.
v) Comments from the general public should be solicited and complied with by the
Committee.
vi) A National Conference should be held to validate the content of the draft, and
finalise the Land Policy.
9.2
Transparency International Zambia
TIZ plays a major role in corruption whistleblowing. Recently it has begun to assist the AntiCorruption Commission with the preparation of cases so that the ACC has more time to prosecute
them.
9.3
The Human Rights Commission
The Commission is an autonomous body established under article 125 of the Constitution of Zambia
and under the Human Rights Commission Act, 1996. It was permanently created in March 1997 and is
196
headed by a Supreme Court Judge. According to section 9 of the Act, the functions of the Commission
include:
i)
ii)
The provision of basic human rights information to the public;
The investigation of human rights violations and maladministration of justice;
and,
iii) Making proposals for effective measures to prevent human rights abuses.
The Commission has the power to send written reports of its findings to the parties concerned and,
dependent on the findings made, to make such recommendations, as it considers necessary, to the
appropriate authority (section 13 of the Act).
Recently it was reported:
The Human Rights Commission have resumed their charge that there's a general
disrespect for the rule of law by some chiefs (alongside enforcement agencies). They
are calling on Government to seriously stop the illegal detention, torture and arbitrary
arrests of innocent people being perpetrated by some chiefs... only government state
agencies are allowed to detain people at respective supervised detention facilities and
not at chiefs’ palaces. There's certainly an issue about traditions and human rights, but
I am not sure a confrontational approach is the way forward. The HRC needs to work
with chiefs to bring about the necessary reforms.108
A Commission seeking to ensure that universal notions of human rights are respected has the difficulty
of dealing with issues of customary law, culture and religion. Chief Macha pointed out that Chiefs
need schooling on many legal issues that will save them from embarrassment and even prosecution in
the courts.109 Statutory law, which supports human rights – as opposed to customary law supporting
the rights of the group being Paramount over the individual, presents difficulties.
108
URL:http://www.houseofchiefs.com/2009/05/traditions-vs-human-rights-2nd-edition.html. Accessed: 201002-04. (Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIC3Ss6w)
109
URL:http://www.lusakatimes.com/?p=11567. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5nICLOU7P)
197
10
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11
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Corruption in Ministries affecting customary residents
202
Appendix 1: Corruption in Ministries affecting customary residents
1
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS: DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION
This Department, and its Ministry of Home Affairs, remains one of the greatest obstacles to
investment in Zambia, despite now having a customer service charter and an Integrity Officer in place.
The Auditor General reports its relatively minor ‘official’ peccadilloes in 2007: that in that financial
year $992,000 could not be accounted for, and that numerous receipt and visa books were missing. In
the Ministry Headquarters (HQ), further misappropriation was noted: $25,000 paid to suspended
officers, supposedly on half pay; $183,000 paid out as loans and not recovered by December 2008;
$94,000 in imprests not recovered; $178,000 expended on two brick machines which had not been
utilised.110 However, its disregard for the rights of investors, it’s obvious embroilment in what is now a
common practice of investors being deported for little reason, or being imprisoned, leaving behind
businesses and in many cases, Zambia partners who benefit from the removal, is a scandal which
appears to have no end. 111 112 Moreover, those with long years of residence may suddenly find that
their status is changed.
It is instructive that the service charters adopted by the Zambia Revenue Service, the Minister of
Lands and Immigration have not fulfilled their pledges to produce quarterly reports.
2
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AT CABINET OFFICE
During 1984 – 2004 the Presidential Fund, which took up 86% of the total budget of the office, was
simply used as a private account. Expenditure on education, health, agriculture and local authorities
comprised a miserly 12.59%, with money on traditional ceremonies outstripping agriculture by 0.8%,
with more being spent social clubs, NGOs and churches than on municipal councils. Furthermore, it
was revealed in the 2004 A-G report that the Task Force on Corruption under the Cabinet Office could
not account for massive sums of money.
In Lusaka Province in 2007, $2.47 million was made available for a poverty reduction programme,
$2.15 million was released, and the A-G reports stated as follows: $42,000 was spent on unrelated
activities; $25,000 in unlawful wages; $76,000 in unretired imprests; $21,000 paid for stores with no
receipts.113
3
MINISTRY OF LANDS
Ground rent paid by owners of alienated land is essential for both good governance and for income
generation. In 2006, the Ministry failed to collect $71 million 114; in 2007, $63 million remained
uncollected; a further $33,000 remitted from the provinces was unaccounted for.115
The Ministry, bedevilled by corruption, with one of its Minister’s convicted of obtaining land illegally,
has now put in place an Integrity Officer, as well as an overly ambitious customer service charter.
Attempts to inquire about the cancellation of the illegal alienation of portion of the West Mvuvye
National Forest were not given the cooperation expected of the Integrity Officer.
110
A-G report December 2007.
http://zambian-economist.blogspot.com/2008/06/ian-manning.html.
112
http://zambiagamefieldsjournal.blogspot.com/2007/08/zambia-to-remove-crew-of-ssmbeza.html
113
HEAD: 90. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT report by the A-G 2007.
114
Paragraph 21 of the Auditor General’s report of 2006.
115
Paragraph 18 of the Auditor General’s report of 2007.
111
203
4
MINISTRY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL SERVICES
The Department of Social Welfare in 1994 developed the Public Welfare Assistance Scheme in order
to improve the welfare of the vulnerable in society. The scheme works through a decentralised system
with the participation of NGOs and established Community and Area Welfare Assistance Committees
in twenty-six districts. In 2007, $2.4 million was provided, of which $2.1 million was sent to the
districts. Of the twenty-six districts, only seven districts received $290,000, with very little of it being
accounted for, and if so, illegally spent.
Street Children in 2007 were provided for in the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure with $1.68
million, $1.5 million being actually released. A review of the records maintained at headquarters and
in eight towns revealed that there were no guidelines for the administration of the Street Children
Fund, nor targets or budgets. The A-G stated, “It is therefore questionable if the Ministry will achieve
its goal of no child sleeping on the street by 2010”.
5
MINISTRY OF HEALTH
In 2007 amounts totalling $950,000 had been disbursed to ten District Health Management Teams
(DHMTs), however the DHMTs acknowledged receipt of only $483,000, leaving $468,000
unaccounted for.
As far as the overall performance of the DHMTs: $434,000 was expended without receipts being
available; $372,000 worth of imprests had not been retired; $161,000 was paid out and not signed for
by the warrant holders; $361,000 was paid out to officers illegally; $180,000 was paid out for items
that could not be accounted for; $338,000 was paid out as staff salary advances and not recovered;
$567,000 for store items with no receipt or disposal records; $65,000 worth of drugs allowed to
expire; and $100,000 was paid to staff employed without treasury authority.
At headquarters more records of the theft and misappropriation of funds are recorded for 2007 by the
A-G. In 2009, an investigation was mounted into the misappropriation of K27 billion, prompted by
Sweden and the Netherlands withdrawing all aid as a result.
6
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
In the 2007 report of the A-G, the following irregularities were uncovered: $8,000 stolen by staff
through the falsification of receipts; and $57,000 owed on uncollected rents from the Judiciary’s flats.
7
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
The single most significant loss reported between 1984–2004 occurred in 1995 with the gross
mismanagement of the strategic food reserves: the non-repayment of loans for fertiliser purchases,
mismanagement of the Agriculture Credit Management Programme, non-collection of interests and
principals for the Crop and Fertiliser Marketing and Financing Revolving Fund, and irregularities in
the procurement of strategic maize reserves and its transport to strategic storage sites. A minimum of
K2.48 billion could not be accounted for.
Given that maize is the staple diet, that it attracts state intervention on pricing, that it is vulnerable to
climatic conditions and animal impacts, that the poor rely on hybrid and fertiliser deliveries, that
villagers rely on the state to collect the maize itself, makes it a human rights scandal. Such
mismanagement continues to this day, the A-G reeling out an endless litany of theft and
misappropriation. Notably, as these are important for rural people, the Veterinary Department released
$1.57 million in 2007, with $160,000 worth of vaccines purchased outside of the tender process, and
$284,000 issued without receipts; while Fisheries were given $249,000, with $241,000 expended with
no accounting and with unretired imprests.
204
8
MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND BROADCASTING SERVICES
Lack of information being one of the most significant factors in the continuing impoverishment and
disenfranchisement of rural people, this Ministry has a crucial role to play. The A-G report of 2007
chronicles the purchase of four Nissan Mobile vans at a contract price of $207,000. When the A-G
inspected in October 2008 they found that the vehicles supplied were in fact four Ford Ranger Double
Cabs. These vehicles cost $109,000 less than the specialist Nissans, and as at December 2008, the
difference had not been refunded. “Further, although the vehicles were procured to be used for
dissemination of information in the districts, the vehicles were being used as utility vehicles at Zambia
National Information Service (ZANIS) headquarters, as the vehicles were considered not suitable for
the districts. Therefore, the activity of information dissemination in the districts was adversely
affected”.116 The Ministry had also entered into a contract with suppliers for wireless communication
equipment for $103,000. Although the equipment was intended to be used by the districts to transmit
text, pictures and voice messages from any location to Lusaka, they were never used. In addition the
A-G found that $152,000 in imprests had not been retired; $35,000 worth of stores had disappeared;
$13,000 worth of office equipment had not been delivered one year after payment; and cameras were
purchased from the UK at a cost of $300,000 - $38,000 more than the local purchase price for the
same cameras. In October 2008, the A-G revealed that the cameras were for domestic and not
industrial use as they could not be connected to an external microphone.
9
MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND NATIONAL PLANNING
In June 2003, Government entered into an agreement with the International Development Association
(IDA) and the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) to provide support for the Copperbelt Environmental
Programme (CEP) for a period of five years. The total project amount was estimated at USD$52.6m.
The project consisted of two components, namely the Environmental Management Facility (EMF) and
the Strengthening of the Environmental Regulatory Framework (SERF). EMF was used as a primary
mechanism for addressing environmental and social mitigation measures arising from the operations
of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) prior to privatisation to meet the environmental
obligations of the Government and ZCCM-Investment Holdings plc (ZCCM-IH). The executing
agency for this component is ZCCM-IH Environmental Coordinating Unit (ZECU). SERF was aimed
at strengthening the institutional capacity of Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ), Mine Safety
Department and delegated authorising agencies in reviewing environmental impact assessments. The
executing agency for this component is the Environmental Council of Zambia.117
A provision of $6.3 million was made in the Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the financial
year ended 31st December 2007 to cater for various activities under the Copperbelt Environmental
Programme and the whole amount was released. A $2 million contract to build houses was awarded to
a contractor - the A-G reported that no tender authority was obtained from the Zambia National
Tender Board; the contractor failed to account for usage of $184,000; and the project was not
completed two years after the original completion date, resulting in the loss of $70,000 from renting
accommodation for displaced staff. Moreover, management had made no claims from the contractor
for damages as a result of the delay.
10
MINISTRY OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING
In the Department of Planning and Development responsible for the bursary scheme to enable students
to have vocational training, the following was reported by the A-G report of 2007: $1.18 million had
been made available, but only $966,000 had been released.
116
117
26/01 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Service, A-G report, 2007.
21/01 LOANS AND INVESTMENTS MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND NATIONAL PLANNING. A-G
Report, 2007.
205
As a blogger recently opined:
…the Technical Education and Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority
(TEVETA) have now embarked on a program, ostensibly aimed to improve the quality
of training in the country, but which will have the opposite effect. Only about 40,000
of the over 250,000 students that graduate from Grade 12 are catered for each year in
colleges and universities. The many Grade 7 and Grade 9 children that do not make the
cut off point marks to move on to the next grade, are destined for the streets of our
towns and cities to become unskilled workers, roadside vendors, and street kids. The
future is very bleak for this lot. This program launched by TEVETA introduces new
Registration fees, Accreditation fees, Trainer Accreditation fees, Curricula Approval
fees, and the associated Penalties for Non Compliance. The move is exactly what the
Government has been trying to eliminate in the ongoing reforms on Public Sector
services.118
These programmes are being funded by Irish Aid and other donors, who give their funds directly to
Government.
11
MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
In the 20 years reviewed by TIZ, massive sums went missing from the Constituency Development
Fund managed at the district level.
11.1 House of Chiefs Department
The House of Chiefs is a department of massive importance given that it advises the head of state on
94% of the area of Zambia. The following table gives some idea of the theft of money.
DETAILS
2005
2006
Misapplied and not spent on chiefs
$775,000
$782,000
Bank transfers sent
To accounts not on official schedule
Retained by Ministry
$1,353,000
$130,000
Unidentified debits
$30,000
2007
Released to H of C
Payment for Chiefs
Actually sent to chiefs
Retained by Ministry
$5.7 million
$2.3 million
$1.66 million
$683,000
Released for car procurement for chiefs
$1.73 million
Remitted to Zambian Embassy, Japan
Balance unaccounted for
$1.65 million
$79,000
In November 2007, the Ministry gave vehicle loans to chiefs. Subsequently, the Ministry entered into
a contract with Japanese Vehicles Supplies Limited for the supply of 150 used motor vehicles at a
contract price of US$800,000. Although the contract sum was US$800,000, the Ministry disbursed
amounts totalling US$1,678,359 to the Zambian Mission in Tokyo out of which US$1,314,200 was
paid to the supplier, leaving a balance of US$364,159. Out of 138 invoices provided, 60 invoices in
amounts totalling US$555,500 were not signed by the supplier, making their authenticity
118
Zambia Economic Development Blog: http://zecdev.blogspot.com/c
206
questionable. 119
The House of Chiefs is looked on by fellow chiefs as being unresponsive to their inputs. Recently
however, the House of Chiefs, in a report compiled in October, 2008, accused politicians and some
government officials of fanning succession wrangles in the Kalindawalo Chieftaincy of the Nsenga
people of Eastern Province, a recommendation being made that the government should direct its
officials and all politicians to stop fanning trouble in the Kalindawalo Chieftaincy.120 It is likely that
the same report has made the same accusations in the matter of the Luembe Chiefdom.
11.2 District Council
In 2006, the Ministry issued $2.3 million to Councils, which by the end of 2007 had not accounted for
the funds. In addition, retrenchment funds to the amount of $658,000 were sent to the 72 Councils, but
23 Councils had not received the funds by the end of 2007.
11.3 Constituency Development Funds
These funds are absolutely essential for the villages of the hinterland for such basic necessities as
water supplies, sanitation, primary education, health, agriculture, road and other essential services.
Funding provisions of $2.3 million were made for 2005 and 2006. In 2005, $2.37 million was sent,
and in 2006, no funds were available as they were released late. An audit of the actual projects on
which the money was spent revealed widespread theft and misappropriation.
119
29/8 Ministry of Local Government and Housing, House of Chiefs Department. Report of the Auditor –
General on the accounts for the financial year ended 31st December 2007
120
Silkwamba, Chibaula. February 27, 2009. The Post Newspaper, Lusaka.
207
CHAPTER 5:
INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN ZAMBIA
209
ACRONYMS
ADC
ADMADE
ALERT
AWF
CAMPFIRE
CBNRM
CBO
CBWM
CCSC
CLA
CLZ
CONASA
CPPP
CPR
CRB
CTA
DED
D-G
ECZ
EIA
EPPCA
EU
FNDP
FZS
GMA
GRZ
HCA
HQ
ICDP
IRDNC
JFGE
JFMA
JMC
JMCA
KAZA
LIRDP
LZNP
MCA
MD
MET
MoU
MP
MTENR
NA
NGO
NHCC
NLCP
NP
NPWS
NRCF
PFAP
Area Development Committee
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas
African Lion and Environment Research Trust
African Wildlife Foundation
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
Community-base Natural Resource Management
Community-Based Organisation
Community-based Wildlife Management
Communities for Conservation Society of Cologne
Chiawa Leaseholders Association
Conservation Lower Zambezi
Community-based Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Agriculture
Community Public-Private Partnership
Common-Property Resource
Community Resource Board
Concession Tourism Agreement
German Development Service
Director General ZAWA
Environmental Council of Zambia
Environmental Impact Assessment
Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act
European Union
Fifth National Development Plan
Frankfurt Zoological Society
Game Management Area
Government of Zambia
Hunting Concession Agreement
Headquarters
Integrated Conservation and Development Project
Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation
Japan Fund for Global Environment
Joint Forest Management Area
Joint Management Concession
Joint Management Concession Agreement
Kavango-Zambezi
Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project
Lower Zambezi National Park
Mwanachingwala Conservation Area
Managing Director
Ministry of Environment and Tourism
Memorandum of Understanding
Member of Parliament
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
Native Authority
Non-Governmental Organisation
National Heritage Conservation Commission
North Luangwa Conservation Project
National Park
National Parks and Wildlife Service
Natural Resources Consultative Forum of Zambia
Provincial Forestry Action Programme
210
PH
PPP
REMNPAS
SADC
SEED
SRT
TC
TCA
TFCA
UK
UN
UNESCO
UNDP
UPND
USA
VAG
WCS
WECSZ
WSSD
WWI
WWII
WWF
ZAWA
ZESCO
Professional Hunter
Public-Private Partnership
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
Southern African Development Community
Support for Economic Expansion and Diversification
Save the Rhino Trust
Tourism Concession
Tourism Concession Agreement
Transfrontier Conservation Area
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
United Nations Development Programme
United Party for National Development
United States of America
Village Action Group
Wildlife Conservation Society (USA)
Wildlife and Environment Conservation Society of Zambia
World Summit on Sustainable Development
World War One
World War Two
Worldwide Fund for Nature
Zambia Wildlife Authority
Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation
211
1
REGIONAL INTEGRATED COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION AND
DEVELOPMENT
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), that had their beginning at the 1982
World Congress on Parks and Protected Areas, have been thoroughly reviewed (Hughes & Flintan
2001), and the failures to deliver of ICDPs (called Community-based Natural Resource Management
(CBNRM)), explicitly dealt with (Blaikie, 2006). Second generation ICDPs such as CBNRM and
CBWM (Community-based Wildlife Management), are usually donor-funded Non-Governmental
Organisation (NGO) managed biodiversity conservation projects with rural development components.
This is an approach seeking to attain conservation goals by delivering socio-economic development to
rural people in wildlife areas, a quid pro quo, and a clearly apolitical approach.
In Southern Africa, the present leaders in the field of community ICDPs are Namibia and Botswana –
having taken over that mantle from Zimbabwe - though paradoxically they are the two countries
adjudged to have the highest disparity between the haves and the have-nots (Bond 2006, p.39). South
Africa, through the CITES Implementation Project which established the Chamber of Wildlife (now
defunct) to act on behalf of all civil society and government stakeholders having to do with the
utilisation of wildlife resources, found the Professional Hunters Association of South Africa and the
European game ranching industry resisting customary community membership and empowerment
(Manning 2001). This was a sad development as game ranches had in many cases been set up in the
post-apartheid era as a political strategy to thwart land reform, private game estates being exempt from
land reform under South Africa law (Brinkate 1996, cited in Brechin 2003, p. 10).
1.1
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe
Despite the generally unsustainable nature of donor led projects, grass roots initiatives in Zimbabwe
up to the mid-90s provided some success. In the former Rhodesia, the Communal Areas Management
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) was once a fairly successful example of benefit
flows to local people from hunting. This scheme operated in approximately a quarter of the districts of
Zimbabwe where significant wildlife populations existed. The initiative grew out of the 1975 Parks
and Wildlife Act, legislation greatly influenced by the pioneering game ranching work carried out on
the Henderson brothers’ Doddieburn Ranch. In 1959, the Fulbright Scholars, Raymond Dassman and
Archie Mossman begun an experimental game cropping scheme there (I Henderson 2010, personal
communication, 26 February) - encouraged by Rhodesia’s Chief Wildlife Research Officer, Alan
Savory, and Thane Riney of F.A.O., and with the full support and guidance of Ian Henderson. The
success of this scheme saw other ranchers begin sustained cropping operations, notably by George
Styles and Ray Sparrow, and the establishment of Wildlife Utilisation Services Limited by Mossman,
Savory and Robinson with the cropping of game on Liebig’s Ranch and in the Forestry Commission’s
Gwaai Forest Reserve (Manning 1995).121 The 1975 Wildlife Act, containing a major de-centralisation
shift to allow private ranchers ownership of their wildlife, eventually allowed those living on the
communal lands to receive benefits from hunting and other wildlife utilisation. This was then taken up
by South Africa with a massive ongoing investment in wildlands and wildlife.
CAMPFIRE was highly successful until 2000, with village and district wildlife committees writing
land use plans incorporating the conservation and sustained use of wild species, as well as the raising
of livelihoods. They recognised that project management alone would not establish sustainable
management without local commitment:
Communally situated wildlife management has been threatened by uncontrolled access
to its flow of resources for some time. The state and its bureaucracy, through
unrealistic or manipulative demands for control, technical competence and financial
accountability, have often played an undermining role. Wildlife could be part of the
121
The author was a contract hunter to Wildlife Utilisation Services Ltd, Bulawayo, in 1965/66.
212
rural means of production, and therefore an integral part of the social organisation of
rural communities. Material and aesthetic aspects have been, and could again be, much
more clearly linked. Assumptions of human selfishness and an inevitable 'tragedy of
the commons' are possibly the result in circumstances where neither individuals nor
social groups have been allowed to exercise control over their resources. Where a local
group has the right, and the means, to manage resources, socially supportive behaviour
may be mutually reinforcing, but there can be no guarantee, in the real world, that the
'playing field' will ever be level enough for the communal people to overcome their
disadvantages in the face of political and economic elites. Elites however, political and
economic, cannot ensure sustainable management of the local environment, without
the full cooperation of communal people. The objective of establishing a cooperative
management structure between government and rural people rests on communities
having an assumed right of group proprietorship to 'their' resources. It also depends on
both parties ensuring that access rights can be made exclusive. Successful conservation
and development activities are unlikely unless government provides appropriate
legislation and policy as well as efficient and effective technical assistance and support
to local rule enforcement. The private sector also has a critical role in developing
ethical, stable, and accountable joint marketing ventures with communities (Metcalfe
1994).
However, post 2000, Zimbabwe has seen an almost total dismantling of CAMPFIRE, and where once
90% of hunting revenue went to the community, this has dried up following a complete take-over of
CAMPFIRE leadership by the new totalitarian elite. However, there are some signs – as in the Nkanyi
and Lupane districts - that it was not just political factors alone which led to the decline, but also
historical issues which shaped people’s views and resistance to CAMPFIRE initiatives (Hughes 2001).
In the lowveld of Zimbabwe, and around Mahenye ‘People are deeply disillusioned with the
CAMPFIRE project on other grounds - in particular a feeling that it has not delivered on its promises
to transfer either money or political authority to the local level’ (Wolmer 2007, p. 179).
1.2
Namibia (Appendix 1)
In Namibia, a programme of conservancy establishment is in place whereby wildlife quotas are made
available and ownership rights awarded to organised communities within specific geographical
bounds. However, they too do not address true devolution and the shoring up of the customary
commons.
In Namibia, guided by Common-Property Resource (CPR) management theory (Ostrom 1991), the
CAMPFIRE programme and the successes of the NGO, Integrated Rural Development and Nature
Conservation (IRDNC), CBNRM policy legislation was approved by the Namibian Cabinet in March
1995 (Appendix 1). This entitled residents of communal areas to form conservancies, a ‘conservancy’
in Namibia being defined as ‘a community or group of communities within a defined geographical
area who jointly manage, conserve and utilise the wildlife and other natural resources within the
defined area’ (Jones 1995, cited by Forslund 2007). The conservancy members, suitably elected and
institutionalised as a corporate body, with the traditional authority included, are awarded exclusive use
rights over game and commercial tourism within a defined conservancy on both communal and
privately owned property. The first four conservancies were registered in 1998, increasing to thirtyone in 2004. Presently more than eighty communities (fifty-five are registered) have established
conservancies in which they are able to utilise their wildlife, with in excess of 3,700 animals
translocated there by government. 122
However, the rights enjoyed by registered conservancies are limited. They are allowed the ownership
122
Kunene Conservancy Safaris publicity booklet: URL:http://www.kcs-namibia.com.na. Accessed: 2010-02-27.
(Archived by WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nqqvi96t).
213
of game; the sale of government approved hunting quotas; the powers to lease out the area as a
tourism concession; and are allowed to control common problem animals, other than endangered
species. A criticism of the policy and legislation is that it does not take landuse planning into
consideration, nor does it allow for hired community game guards to be legally mandated as law
enforcement officers. In addition, the policy framework for land reform in communal areas is unclear.
In some areas there is no broadly accepted authority over land with ‘growing tension between those
who are fencing large areas of land for their private use, and the majority who are thereby excluded
from access to this land’ (Corbett & Jones 2000).
Confusingly, not all communal area residents are registered conservancy members, Wildlife Councils
being established in order to manage wildlife for the benefits of non-conservancy members (Forslund
2007).
1.3
Malawi
Malawi, with 85% of the population living on customary land, approved a Strategic Plan for CBNRM
in November 2001, implementing some fisheries and forestry projects. In the case of fishery ICDPs,
this led to ‘unexpected and detrimental outcomes for fishing communities’(Blaikie, 2006). This is
further evidence that as far as fisheries exploitation is concerned, bottom-up and abstract comanagement development ideas may be compromised by broader social, political and economic
contexts, as found in Namibia’s Caprivi fishery (Gordon 2006, p.169).
1.4
Botswana
In Botswana the preferred model since the start of CBNRM projects in 1998 is the formation of
community trusts, being registered as a Cooperative or as a non-profit trust, enabling access to
sustained use quotas that can then attract investment partners. However, cattle lands have not attracted
any form of ICDP, due to their high traditional value among the Motswana elite, the cause of
disastrous schemes mounted in the past at Ncojane and Makalamabedi (Manning, 1978). Not
surprisingly, the rangelands are being privatised due to the neoliberal agenda mounted by the elite,
cynically putting forward claims of supposed overgrazing by villagers’ cattle and therefore the need to
introduce a ‘modern’ system that will not degrade the land (Blaikie 2006).
1.5
Tanzania
The ICDP route taken by the Tanzania 1998 Wildlife Policy was to establish Wildlife Management
Areas (WMAs). There are 16 WMA pilot projects.
The process of establishing a WMA involves the following main steps: creation of
awareness among villagers of the merits and disadvantages of having a WMA; a
village assembly’s approval of an application for WMA formation taking into
consideration village council recommendations; formation of a Community-Based
Organisation (CBO); preparation of a strategic plan; preparation of a land-use plan;
carrying out of an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) prior to approval of a landuse plan; preparation of village by-laws that support a land-use plan; and preparation of
a resource management zone plan. The CBO then makes application to the director of
wildlife for designating part of village land as a WMA; the director considers the
CBOs application and sends his recommendation to the Minister of Natural Resources
and Tourism; and finally the minister declares a designated WMA by order in the
gazette. After this, the CBO applies to become an Authorised Association (AA), and
the AA applies for a user right and hunting block to the director of the Wildlife
Division. The AA may also enter into investment agreements with potential investors.
However, from local people’s perspective, this seems to be a complicated process,
214
which may delay the formation of WMAs and the realisation of tangible benefits
accrued from them. (Wilfred 2010)
The 1998 Policy gives control of wildlife hunting quotas to local communities, which tends to produce
conflict between village groupings and clans. In an area around the Selous an attempt was made to
enjoin a number of disparate communities into a co-operative society, meeting with little enthusiasm.
The fact that Government refuses to compensate villagers for wildlife damage led to increased
opposition from them to the WMA scheme (Songorwa 1999). Like so many ICDPs elsewhere,
Government avoids land and wildlife ownership decentralisation issues, the WMAs therefore
hamstrung. By 2007 none of the 16 projects were operational. An assessment of the situation in the
same year recorded the following:123
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
2
Recent history of conflict over land alienation for parks and game reserves has
contributed substantially to the lack of progress on the establishment of WMAs in
areas such as Tarime and Loliondo.
Capacity building is the main issue emerging after the WMAs have attained an
AA status and resource User Rights. All such WMAs do not have business and
strategic plans to manage the WMAs and run business.
Poor governance with little transparency and accountability is the general
condition of many of the local level institutions. In some villages CBOs have
distanced themselves too much from the Village Councils and hence also from the
local communities. On the other hand, some of the Village Councils lack
transparency in income and expenditures.
In villages with rich wildlife and/or potential for investors there are strong antiWMA establishment sentiments often fostered by individual investors and
conflicting interests from some NGOs. Innovative and flexible ways need to be
devised by facilitators to raise awareness among the local communities and
promote the WMA option as a more attractive and viable economic venture.
Benefit sharing between the Central Government and the local communities, and
between villages with different land sizes contributed to the WMAs, or with
different resource bases, is still not well enough defined.
The focus of Regulations on wildlife management ignores the importance of other
resources such as forests, water, minerals, and land, which could as well
contribute to poverty alleviation. The situation calls for an integrated approach to
the management of these resources and to the formation of resource management
teams at the AA, district and national levels.
Lack of harmonisation of policies and legislation has made harmonisation of the
management and exploitation of the natural resources inherent in a WMA riddled
with uncertainties and conflicts, as has been the case of forest resources in Ipole
and Uyumbu WMAs, or the licencing of mineral exploration in the Songea
WMA.
WMAs are not homogeneous. There are different socio-economic conditions and
cultural lines within and between WMAs that need to be properly understood as
they each demand different approaches to planning Best Practices.
ZAMBIA
The history of formal Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) of an integrated conservation and
development nature in the country had their beginning after World War Two (WWII) with the
Provincial Administration’s efforts to see that local people benefited from game cropping, from fee123
Tanzania Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources : Wildlife Division 2007. Assessment and Evaluation of
the Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania. Institute of Resource Assessment.
215
paying hunters, and from properly organised and conducted hunting safaris. This was one of the
pioneer schemes of its kind in Africa. In May 1949, the District Commissioner at Lundazi, Errol
Button, suggested that it would be advantageous to nurture non-hunting tourism for the benefit of the
local people, saying that it would not interfere with the activities of local hunters. This was accepted,
and the Director of the Game Department, T. Vaughan-Jones, instructed a Game Ranger, Norman
Carr, to take over the Department’s camp, Chipera, in Nsefu, and convert it to tourist use, with all
revenue accruing to the Nsefu Native Authority. Senior Chief Nsefu, having been a willing partner in
these important developments, subsequently requested that his area be converted into a National Park.
This was at first refused. Unfortunately, having entered into a scheme for his people’s benefit, Chief
Nsefu became an unwitting partner in the alienation of his tourism customary land into a Game
Reserve in 1954, and a National Park in 1972, from which they now receive little benefit, and with the
loss of a large and massively valuable piece of their wildlife customary common.
The Game Department in 1949 also initiated the Government Controlled Hunting Scheme, which
conducted safari-hunting operations in the Eastern Province, with a large percentage of the income
accruing to the Native Authority (NA). In 1962 it was privatised, with the local authorities receiving
no further direct income until the late 1980s. The next potentially significant scheme was the
establishment of the Black Lechwe Project in 1973 (Grimsdell & Bell 1975), of which Phase III was
intended to allow the local people to utilise black lechwe - this never achieved as the scheme was
abandoned by Government on the departure of the author as a result of the strictures of the Watershed
Speech of 1975 (Manning 1976). In the 1980’s the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS-US) with its
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas project (ADMADE), and
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) with its Wildlands and Human Needs project, sought to derive
direct benefits from wildlife for villagers, this aspect not being successful. Later, the Luangwa
Integrated Rural Development Project (LIRDP) was mooted, attempting on a far grander scale what
ADMADE had attempted. It too proved unsuccessful.
The Zambian leadership (though not legislation and policy) is ambivalent both in its attempts to
devolve power from the centre to the regions – despite the Decentralisation Policy of 2002 - in
particular to land under the customary authority, and to attract investment, wary of being swamped by
aggressive outsiders whom they believe will capture the opportunities for wealth creation.
Zambia under current laws provides opportunities for investors to enter into joint ventures with
customary authorities and District Councils. Unfortunately, the 1995 Lands Act allows the alienation
of customary land to leasehold for 99 years, renewable, with the permission of the chief and the
District Council, and with the additional permission of the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) should
this be in a Game Management Area (GMA) – though the latter is more honoured in the breach than
the observance. This attracted a certain level of investment in the form of payments to Chiefs,
particularly from the sale of lodge sites and land for game ranches, resulting in some cases in the
permanent alienation of the land and the removal of any possible future sustained income for
customary communities. The usual purpose of investors is to obtain large areas of land on 99-year
leasehold – freehold ownership having been abolished by Kaunda in 1975, something to which
customary Africa as a whole should unite in rejecting. In order to avoid such a pitfall, it is necessary to
have a development model available that does not alienate land under statutory law, but which
encourages investment under usufruct instead.
At present, virtually the only income received by customary areas - and then only a small percentage
of those in wildlife rich areas - is from hunting safari concessions, though the amounts are paltry
considering that communities must shoulder the cost of protecting their areas as part of the bargain, as
well as bear the pillaging by wildlife on themselves, their houses and crops. And despite legislation
and policy affirming the rights of customary authorities, and despite its ratification of international and
Pan-African conventions, Government resists giving greater autonomy to chiefdoms.
216
2.1
Customary areas investor partnerships
Investment by way of PPPs in those parts of customary areas classified as GMA, which make up 22%
of the protected area estate but which contribute some 70% of the funding, presents a number of
constraints. Chief of these are the legally questionable and contradictory claims ZAWA has staked on
those GMAs by tendering them out as hunting concessions to safari outfitters, bound by a Hunting
Concession Agreement (HCA) which serves the ZAWA interest and not that of the community or the
safari operator; and by creating proxy CRBs that report and serve their interests, rather than the
communities themselves. The fact that the Wildlife Act specifically empowers them with the final
decision on tourism development or alienation, is contradicted by the more senior Lands Act of 1995,
which gives chiefs the power over land allocation in all of their customary areas. In many areas,
ZAWA has turned a blind eye to alienations (e.g. Chiawa) and obtains ground rentals, as do some
CRBs. GMAs also, in terms of land use planning, if not of natural resource management, fall within
the ambit of Council planning.
2.1.1 Nyawa Community Trust
The Nyawa Trust was established in 2001 by John Tolmay and James Hubert Young, the latter a
grandson of a former Governor-General of Northern Rhodesia, and Chief Nyawa. Later, Kalaluka
Mulyakela, then the ZAWA Southern Province Warden, joined, facilitating the process with Tolmay.
Unfortunately, the chiefdom, and the Sichifula GMA contained in it, being an important hunting
concession, fell within the remit of corrupt elements in ZAWA who saw the Nyawa Trust as a threat to
their profiteering from illegal safaris.
In early 2002, The Hunting Report stated that hunting might soon commence but a possible hindrance
might be the announcement that Professional Hunter (PH) John Tolmay and the Nyawa Community
Trust had filed a court injunction to stop ZAWA from allocating areas, claiming that it would
perpetuate a system that is unfair to local chiefs. The magazine opposed any ‘abrupt effort to place
complete control of the wildlife in Zambia in the hands of local chiefs’, equating it to grants of land
made by the US Government to American Indians. It then made the serious allegation that Tolmay and
his group were motivated by the money to be made from hunting. They were also dismayed that Safari
Club International in the USA appeared to be supporting the Nyawa Trust project idea (Causey 2002).
On 23 March 2003, a meeting of the customary community was called by ZAWA on the instructions
of State House, its purpose being to vote on the issue of the Nyawa Trust project. The District
Governor of Kazangula at the time – still in place in early 2009 – Fred Siasuntwe, did not call for a
vote to begin with, and many people left, knowing that Government had decided to quash their wishes
for a decentralised system of natural resource management in Nyawa, an area which contained part of
the prime hunting concession, Sichifula. Tolmay, who had been assisting voters to attend the ballot,
was threatened with deportation (J Tolmay 2009, personal communication), which duly took place.
Subsequently, the Trust declined, the wildlife situation deteriorated, more people invaded the area, and
the prospects for Nyawa’s people diminished. In October 2008, 8,500 people within 72 villages,
commonly known as the ‘Nduzya community’, were evicted from the Sichifula GMA (shared by
Chief Nyawa and Chief Siachitema) after defying ZAWA’s orders to relocate. In this extraordinary
action, some reports claimed that Government were supported by the two Chiefs (the current Chief
Nyawa, not the one who had formed the Trust). The Nduzya claim they had been allowed to settle
there by the chiefs in 1985. It is likely that this is true.
On the 26th February 2009, Siasuntwe, now the District Commissioner of Kazangula, made a
statement that GRZ (ZAWA) had evicted squatters in the Sichifula GMA, and that wildlife had begun
to increase, appealing to investors to take up game ranching in the GMAs. Recently Southern Province
Minister, Daniel Munkombwe, said that he would use his powers as Minister to forcibly evict anyone
who encroached on GMAs (Mbulo 2009a). Since this statement, 44 opposition parliamentarians have
217
petitioned the President of Zambia to order the Minister (MTENR), Catherine Namugala, to halt
further brutality against the residents of Sichifulo in Kalomo and Kazungula.
We, the undersigned members of parliament, hereby petition Your Excellency and seek
your redress to the plight of the landless poor people in Sichifulo whose humanity has
been degraded, their ego and self-esteem eroded beyond redemption. On Wednesday,
11 February 2009, the Minister of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Hon.
Catherine Namugala, MP presented a Ministerial Statement in the National Assembly
on the forced removal of the settler community in Sichifulo which has lived in that
Game Management Area (GMA) since 1985. …She said that she would like to reserve
Sichifulo for hunting expeditions and photographic safari, a preserve of a foreign
company called Alfa Recreation Safaris… However, she did not mention the fact that
the game scouts who removed those people at gunpoint, also burnt down their houses,
grain barns and crops. She further did not reveal that in a place called Dindi, game
scouts raped some women and tortured men and children… and since GMAs are not
state land by definition, it follows, therefore, that chiefs Siachitema, Nyawa IV and V
were all legally constituted to authorise settlements in their traditional areas of
Sichifulo. In all 36 GMAs across the country, people live side by side with wildlife...
how come Hon. Namugala, singled out the people of Sichifulo without risking being
accused of segregation. The future of those two thousand two hundred (2,200) helpless
kids who were going to fourteen (14) schools, will need to be borne in mind. (Kalaluka
2009a)
Chief Nyawa, one of three Southern Province chiefs, met with Munkombwe and told him that the law
should uphold the eviction of the ‘squatters’. The Kalomo MP, Request Muntanga, accused
Munkombwe of coercing the chiefs to issue a statement against their people who had been evicted
from Sichifulo GMA. Muntanga said,
Chief Siachitema of his constituency had phoned him to inform him that Mukombwe
had sent a vehicle from Livingstone so that he could be picked together with other
chiefs so that they could go and issue the statement in support of the government.
Chief Siachitema, Mukuni and Nyawa are not part of what has happened to the people
and their support was not voluntary because when Mukombwe sent a vehicle to pick
Chief Siachitema in my constituency, he phoned me saying “I am being told to go and
make a statement” (Kalaluka 2009b).
Chief Nyawa was reported as denying these claims.124
In 2007, both Chief Nyawa and Chief Siachitema had made strenuous calls for the owner of Alfa
Safaris and ZAWA to leave the area, claiming that they and their CRBs had received no benefits from
the hunting - or pay - for 20 months. In particular they stated that the owner of Alfa, G. Kaweche
(former Chief Research Officer of the NPWS), had sub-leased the area without their permission and
had not fulfilled his pledges under the HCA (Manning 2007c).
Major Chizhyuka, the Namwala UPND member of parliament, who was suspended from parliament
for 60 days as a result of his supposedly intemperate outbursts in the House in support of the evicted
people, filed an injunction in the High Court to restrain ZAWA and Chief Nyawa VI from taking any
foreign or local investor to the area from which the 8,500 settlers had been forcibly evacuated. He
explained that the injunction, if granted, would remain in effect until President Banda had responded
to the petition from over 40 opposition parliamentarians on the matter (Kalaluka 2009b).
124
URL:http://www.lusakatimes.com/?p=8556. Accessed: 2010-02-27. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5nqrCkSeI)
218
2.1.2 Luembe Conservancy Trust (Appendix 3)
In November 2003, The author, seeking to provide a single grass roots community structure as a first
step towards the provision of a platform to usher in investment into the Luembe chiefdom of Nyimba
District in Eastern Province, suggested the formation of the Luembe Natural Resources Conservation
Society. The decision was subsequently made to register the Luembe Conservancy Trust as a
Company (limited-by-guarantee), a non-profit company under the Companies Act. The founding
trustees of this Trust were Senior Chief Luembe, the Gamefields Ltd MD (the author), the
ProjectsAfrica (a virtual facility formed at the World Summit on Sustainable Development)
representative (C.A.Manning) - (WSSD), the Norman Carr Foundation represented by J. Carr
(established to assist ZAWA), the Chairman of the Nyimba District Council and the Chairman of the
Luembe CRB.
The Landsafe Chiefdom Partnership Model was developed in 2003 by the author after wide
consultation (then known as the Chipuna model). Essentially, investors, chiefs, Government, NGOs
and CRBs would form development trusts to oversee landuse and investment plans, attract investment,
and receive rentals - earmarked as development funds - into a trust account, all without alienating the
land. In addition, so as to allow customary landowners to have more security and access to credit, and
to counter the increasing clamour for customary landowners to convert to leasehold tenure - something
that would ultimately impair traditional culture - the imposition of a customary land registry book was
considered mandatory.
The Landsafe Trust model has, in principle, now been accepted by the House of Chiefs of Zambia,
their representative stating: ‘The land leased for commercial use should attract royalties and fees
which will form part of the income and resources for financing administration and development
projects in their areas’ and ‘…we should be allowed to retain absolute title to our land while giving
investors and non-subjects renewable lease rights under various chiefdom trusts’.125
2.1.3 Royal Empowerment Foundation
This Foundation was formed by Chief Chibesakunda (North Luangwa Valley and plateau), and aims
at the socio-economic empowerment of rural communities under their customary authority (Manning
2007d). The author was a trustee.
2.1.4 Itumbi-Kaingu Community Trust
The Trust was established on 1 June 2007 in the Kaingu Chiefdom (Itezhi Tezhi District) within
Namwala GMA, incorporated as a Company (limited-by-guarantee). The Trustees are drawn from the
investors and the local community, with an Executive Committee that consists of the above Trustees,
together with Chief Kaingu as Patron, and two other voting members, plus a non-voting member
representing the Area Development Committee (ADC). The Executive of five members, including the
Trust’s founder, T. Heinecken, runs the affairs of the Trust, which includes a representative of the
Kaingu CRB. Some project funding was sourced from the Danida Itezhi Tezhi CBNRM program and
partly from Kaingu Safari Lodge. A newly formed Dutch Trust in Holland may possibly fund a school
building project.
The Trust operates on the Kaingu customary land within the Namwala GMA, with no land alienated,
and currently forms part of a Hunting Concession Agreement (HCA) between ZAWA, Nsonga Safaris
and the Kaingu Community Resource Board. A landuse plan with a zoning plan for the Namwala
GMA has been drawn up and is awaiting final support from ZAWA before being gazetted.
125
James Matale. 2006. Verbal recommendations of the House of Chiefs at the Fifth National Development Plan
(FNDP) Stakeholders’ Meeting. Lusaka, Zambia.
219
2.1.5 West Lunga Trust
The Trust is incorporated under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act with three trustees drawn from
the Rea family. It operates in the Chibwika and Ntambu GMAs, and, recently, in Sikufele. The first
draft of a landuse plan has been completed.
2.1.6 Mwanachingwala Conservation Trust
This Trust concerns the 20% of the Blue Lagoon GMA that falls under Chief Mwanachingwala in the
Mazabuka district.
In November 1999, WWF Zambia under the WWF – Partners for Wetlands Project, facilitated the
creation of the Mwanachingwala Conservation Area (MCA), an area of 55,000 ha, 40,000 of which
was contributed by Chief Mwanachingwala without the agreement of his headmen. In addition, in
2001, the commercial farming operations of CERES, Nanga Zambia Sugar, Zambezi Ranching and
Cropping, and Messrs Pinkney and Bignell in Mazabuka, also donated land and entered into a
partnership with the Mwanachingwala community and WWF for the management of the conservation
area. However, over 100 families and 17,000 cattle of Kabanje village, on land claimed by Nanga
Zambia Sugar, faced eviction. Chief Mwanachingwala allegedly supported the evictions; also
threatening not to give the Kabanje people customary land once they were evicted (Mpundu undated).
There is a cruel historical irony apparent. The Soldier Settler Scheme after WWI opened a land rush in
the Magoye Sub-district on the Batoka plateau with 69 farms taken up by 1921. Kapasos (chiefs’
messengers) sent to speed matters up were brutal, burning villages, though some villagers clung to
their land. Although most of Chief Mwanachigwala’s land had been surveyed for settler farms, the
chief refused to move, having done so once already, despite the Administrator’s orders to move again.
Many of their cattle were impounded by the few settlers who had taken up land in their area. Finally, a
curate’s egg settlement was reached whereby they were given more land, moved themselves from
some of the land, and continued to live on the land as ‘squatters’ (Vickery 1986, pp.122-129).
2.1.7 Nyakolwe Trust
In order to establish a game ranch, the Petauke District Council obtained the old Petauke Secondary
Hunting area, Kaundi, from Chieftainess Mwape, and incorporated it under a Trust - with trustees
made of the Chieftainess and various notables – including members of the Petauke District Council.
The Council then handed over Kaundi to a Mr Iqbal Alloo (owner of Sable Transport), who allegedly
bought out the trustees, operating the unfenced area as a hunting concession, leasing it out to a safari
operator, with hunting quotas supplied by ZAWA. The Nyimba District Council now has the Mwape
area under its jurisdiction. This alienation of prime wildlife customary land supposedly under the
protection of a community and local authority Trust, reveals great dangers to progressive moves to
build the customary commons under secure Trusts. Some chiefs and District Councils are
unfortunately not to be trusted where there is a possibility of enriching themselves.
2.1.8 Shinganda-Lumba Conservancy
The Shinganda-Lumba Conservancy is situated within the Mushima Chiefdom in the Mufumbwe
District of North-Western Province. It is approximately 50km north-west of the Kafue National Park,
adjacent to the Kasonso-Busanga GMA, with a total size of 20,000 ha, comprising a 4,000 ha “core”
under a 99-year leasehold title, with a 16,000 ha ‘remainder’ managed under a MoU with Senior Chief
Mushima. The conservancy is demarcated by a 56 km government-surveyed boundary outline. The
conservancy was established with the express purpose of restoring wildlife in the area, while
contributing to rural development, with the longer-term intent of establishing a wildlife-based ecotourism venture to ensure project sustainability. Crucially, the Conservancy supports the promotion
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and retention of local Kaonde traditions and culture; as well as contributing on an annual basis to
Chief Mushima’s Makundu Traditional Ceremony held at Lalafuta.
Initial negotiations were held in 2001 with Chief Mushima. The Mushima Council and Mufumbwe
District Council and approval obtained for the establishment of the conservancy. The area was
surveyed in 2002, and an Operational Management Plan and a Socio-Economic Plan completed in the
same year. In 2006, a 4,000 ha portion of the conservancy was alienated to the Conservancy. The
project has close links with the Mubambe Community Resource Board in the Mufumbwe District.
In ecological terms, the project area fulfils the role of an ecological corridor for the movement of large
animals in and out of protected areas, and potentially between protected areas such as the KasonsoBusanga GMA to the south and the Chizela GMA to the north-west of the conservancy (MacDonald
2007).
2.1.9 Royal Luembe Trust
On 24 June 2006, Senior Chief Luembe called an extraordinary meeting at his HQ attended by a
Nyimba District Councillor, 27 headmen, his two kapasos (messengers), the Chairman and secretary
of the Luembe CRB and the ZAWA community liaison officer. The purpose of this meeting was to
choose, from a number of candidates, the community’s business partner for the take-over of part of the
West Mvuvye National Forest No. 54 that lies between M’nyamadzi Game Ranch in Luembe and
Chimalesa Ranch (illegally alienated from the West Mvuvye to a Mr Zaeed Patel). The chief stated
that, ‘The Government has advised the chief over the same piece of land that if this area is to be given
to any investor the community must be a shareholder in order to benefit with a certain percent’. The
applicants were listed as Gerald Mulowa (brother of the chief – and brother of Chieftainess Mwape),
Jack Kawinga, M’nyamadzi Game Ranch and Messrs Baldry and Younger (Royal Luembe Trust and
directors of M’nyamadzi Game Ranch, which adjoins the Mvuvye)). The chief and the Nyimba
councillor then put forward the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
There would be a camp built for hunting purposes;
The ranch would be fenced;
The ranch would have two managers, one representing the community;
Shareholding would be split as follows: 60% for the Royal Luembe Trust; 10%
for the chief; 30% for the community;
The ranch would be run by a board comprising the investor, the CRB chairman
and the chief;
Title to the land would be applied for;
Three of the applicants had refused to have the Luembe Community as partners,
therefore Baldry/Younger were selected;
The community could hunt on the ranch, provide they held a licence;
The CRB Chairman said that the headmen had decided on the issue
democratically (later he stated that he had been forced to agree with the decision
on Baldry under duress, i.e. fear of chiefly witchcraft).126
In 2007, the Royal Luembe Trust met with President Mwanawasa and received permission for the
Trust to 'have' the Luembe section of the West Mvuvye National Forest (T Younger 2007, personal
communication). Later in 2007, the author wrote to the Anti-Corruption Commission:
Another attempt at alienation was made by the Royal Luembe Trust, who, despite
knowing it was a National Forest, had tried to have it de-gazetted so that they could
take ownership of it along with Patel - who is involved with them in the M’nyamadzi
126
Axon Lungu. 24 June 2006. Luembe CRB Chairman hand-written minutes of meeting, Luembe.
221
Game Ranch - which the former Minister of Lands had told Chief Luembe had had its
provisional lease corruptly extended. 127
Fortunately, adverse publicity over the illegal alienation by Mwape, Patel and the Forestry Department
over Chimalesa persuaded Baldry and Younger to drop their attempts. However, Baldry in particular,
made numerous attempts to wrest away the Luembe Conservancy Trust’s custodianship of the Open
Area land and to have the Mbeza safaris concession cancelled.
2.1.10 Nyakaulu Mwape Community Trust
Gerald Mulowa was informed that the title given to Z. Patel for the northern part of the West Mvuvye
National Forest had been cancelled, though no prosecutions for the act of corruption had yet occurred.
With the author’s help, Mulowa then formed the Nyakaulu Mwape Community Trust and has been
attempting to have the forest de-gazetted from a national to a local forest, despite the author’s advice
that any removal of its protective state should be very carefully considered. The Forestry Department,
complicit in the one alienation – and in an attempt on another – have ignored the original verbal
agreements reached with the Luembe Conservancy Trust in respect of establishing a Joint Forest
Management Agreement.
2.1.11 Sioma Falls PPP
Sioma Falls, part of the Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (TFCA), has embarked on
the establishment of a Community Public-Private Partnership (CPPP) between the Royal Barotse
Establishment, ZAWA and the customary community in the area. The proposal is to develop a large
tourist lodge and other amenities that will ‘benefit’ the local community. The institutional framework
is for the signing of a co-management agreement between ZAWA and the community (two villages).
2.1.12 Nyalugwe Conservation Trust (refer Chapter 8: Part II)
This chiefdom Trust, with the assistance of Gamefields Limited, was formed by the Nyalugwe
customary community in 2009 under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act. Much of what was the
Chilinga Native Reserve in the Open Area is now vested in this Trust and registered with the Ministry
of Lands. In August of 2009 it was leased to Gamefields, with the latter having oversight of Trust
development funds. Gamefields will continue to assist with a critical mass of development projects,
one of them being to link Nyalugwe with the customary authority across the border in Mozambique.
3
INTERNATIONAL DONOR FUNDING
3.1
The Kabuwebulwe Trust
The Kabuwebulwe Trust (Mumbwa) was registered as a Society in December 2003 and incorporated
as a Trust in November 2005. The Kafumba Kwale Community Lodge was then built with funding
from DANIDA on proposed alienated land in the GMA. The general objective of the Trust is to
provide a legal framework for integrated conservation and development in the Kabuwebulwe
Chiefdom. The CRB was the community partner for the Project, but when an application for land was
made, the Department of Lands advised that the CRB could not legally hold land and that they should
form a Trust under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act. Trustees are drawn from the headmen, a
representative of the chieftainess, the CRB and the ZAWA Ranger-in-Charge. The District Council
has been charged with oversight of the accounts and the selection of a business partner. In 2010, the
lodge was leased to a businessman.
127
I.P.A. Manning, 1 November 2007. E-mail message to Gibson Chizanda of the Anti-Corruption Commission.
222
3.2
Mpumba Conservancy Trust (Appendix 4)
Mpumba was first organised as the Mpumba Natural Resource Conservation Society in 2000, a
process driven by Leonard Bowa with the assistance of Mutinondo Wilderness, owners of alienated
land in Mpumba. Later a Trust was created under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act into which the
chief wished to alienate all the remaining land in his chiefdom. However, it was finally decided to
alienate 8,940 ha to the Trust and approval was obtained from the Mpika District Council in October
2002. On 27 November 2003, the first meeting of the Trust was held. Application was then made to
the Commissioner of Lands, caveats being registered as follows: the land cannot be sold; it cannot be
mortgaged; it reverts to customary land if the Trust dissolves; and it must only be used for
conservation. The title has yet to be issued.
WWF-USA had assisted in funding the process, carried out by Mano Consultants, who were
motivated by the fact that villagers could not convert their traditional land rights into modern ‘deeds’
and were therefore unable to obtain loans or to sell their land. Mano wished to address the issue of the
exploitation of rural areas with nothing being invested there for development, identifying the existing
legal institutional framework governing rural lands and villages as the main impediment. Their second
objective was to create a government mechanism by which villages could receive revenue from safari
hunting. Mano then established the Trust so that Mpumba land could be alienated to it for the benefit
of the customary community. The second objective - increasing responsiveness and accountability for
the distribution of safari revenues - was addressed successfully through legal action taken on behalf of
specific village plaintiffs. Mpumba has since languished, the trustees from the Mutinondo Wilderness
and Shiwa Ngandu having resigned, the land awaiting alienation; and the legal actions begun, not
taken up by other CRBs and communities who are owned money by ZAWA. Having alienated the
land, there is now the very real danger of the scheme being taken over, as is the case already with the
Kaundi portion of the Mwape Chiefdom by Alloo.
3.3
Chikuni Community Partnership Park
At the instigation of the ZAWA/UNDP project: Reclassification and Effective Management of the
National Protected Areas System (REMNPAS) in September 2007, the customary communities within
the Bangweulu and Chikuni GMAs agreed to create the Chikuni Community Partnership Park. This
was done so as to ensure that the area would be protected and kept free of permanent human
settlement and cultivation, and managed by a partnership between the chiefdoms of Senior Chief
Kopa, Chiefs Chitambo, Nsamba, Bwalya Mponda, Kabinga and Chiundaponde, and ZAWA and one
or more private sector partners.
On the 25th of February 2008, African Parks was invited by over 30 community representatives and
ZAWA representatives to be the private partner:
The customary communities, African Parks and ZAWA will agree on the terms of the
partnership and form a company that will take over the management of the Chikuni
Community Partnership Park. The company will be granted management authority
through agreements with ZAWA and the Ministry of Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources. The Ministry, through the REMNPAS project, will fund the Park in
its development phase for a period of four years.128
At a meeting of the African Parks Board on 26th May 2008, the organisation agreed to accept the
invitation by the communities and ZAWA to be the partner for the management of the Chikuni
Community Partnership Park.
128
Newsletter May 2008. REMNPAS: Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected
Areas System, MTENR, Zambia.
223
Agreement was reached on the Articles of Association to form and register the Bangweulu Wetlands
Management Board. The Board is made up of seven Directors (three each from the community and
African Parks, and one from ZAWA) and will be registered as a Company (limited by guarantee). The
D-G of ZAWA is currently Chairman of the Board. Once registered, the Board will negotiate a
management agreement with ZAWA to manage the Chikuni Community Partnership Park within the
Bangweulu GMA.129 The African Parks, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and WWF
(Netherlands) are funding the project.
Currently, Chikuni Island, formerly the site of the Black Lechwe Research Project, is being developed
as the African Parks/Chikuni CCPP headquarters. An application has been made to ZAWA for hunting
quotas for the 2009 season. The Chikuni CPP will have a similar status to that of a National Park but
with regulated fishing and hunting permitted. The six chiefdoms have put aside for the project
approximately 3,000 km2 in the Chikuni CPP and about 3,000 km2 in the Bangweulu. ZAWA remain
the governing authority and will approve quotas and oversee the sale of licences. However, this will be
based on recommendations made by the Bangweulu Board.
These developments have occurred in complete ignorance of the Black Lechwe Project of 1972-1976;
ZAWA, REMNPAS, UNDP, and African Parks at the outset, not being aware of the project’s work or
publications. The Black Lechwe Project recommended a different solution to the one presently being
implemented (Grimsdell & Bell 1975, pp.170-174).
3.4
Chiawa Community Partnership Park
The REMNPAS proposal for the Chiawa Community Partnership Park (CCPP) - taking up the eastern
part of Chiawa and adjoining the Lower Zambezi National Park (LZNP) - first required that a Trust be
established and given responsibility for the area. The first steering committee for a proposed Lower
Zambezi Conservation Trust (LZCT) handed over the project to the nominated trustees on 12 February
2008. The Trust deed was only signed on 1 April 2010 and will now be registered under the
Companies Act (limited by guarantee). The equal beneficiaries of the Trust are the biodiversity of the
proposed Chiawa Community Partnership Park (CCPP) and the Chiawa Customary Community.
Chieftainess Chiawa signed a land declaration on 30 June 2009 and released it to the Trust on 16
March 2010. This declaration, which lists the leaseholders and their land, still needs to be corrected,
and a business plan produced before the CCPP can be gazetted. The agreement between ZAWA, the
Chiawa Community Resource Board, the Trust, the Chiawa Leaseholders Association (CLA) and the
management still needs to be drafted and ratified. The CLA is the civil society partner representing its
members in the eastern Chiawa GMA. Funds will be raised for the Trust through bed-levies;
GEF/UNDP matching the levies raised for a period of four years (S Featherby 2010, personal
communication, 4 April). A management plan was drafted in March 2008 and is currently being
revised.
The proposal by Protea Hotels Zambia – under the Chairmanship of Mark O’Donnell (currently both
chairman of the Tourism Council of Zambia and a member of the ZAWA Board) – to construct a 144bed hotel and conference centre designed in the military/industrial style on the Zambezi, some ten km
upstream of the Lower Zambezi National Park and directly across the river from the Mana Pools
National Park (a World Heritage Site), has evoked the anger of those who value this primary wildlands
area where tourism development is appropriately small and relatively eco-friendly. The area is already
part of the AWF Zambezi Heartlands programme that is attempting to create the Mana-Lower
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area involving the Governments of Zimbabwe, Zambia and
Mozambique. Protea Hotels has provided a prolix EIA report supporting its building and operation
proposal, requiring civil society inputs to be made to the Environmental Council of Zambia by 14
April 2010. The fact that Mana Pools National Park, the LZNP and the planned Chiawa Community
129
Newsletter. July 2008. REMNPAS: Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected
Areas System, MTENR, Zambia.
224
Partnership Park are to become the Mana-Lower Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area - was
sufficient to persuade the NECZ that the planning decision has already been made for the area, any
deviation requiring changes to the Chiawa Management Plan and the agreement of the Zambian
Government (ZAWA), the Zimbabwe Government, UNESCO and members of the future Lower
Zambezi Conservation Trust. The Protea EIA and application, widely regarded as ultra vires, has
been withdrawn.
3.5
Kazungula Heartland Trusts
The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) Kazungula Heartlands programme has created five
community trusts in chiefdoms in southern Zambia and in the Lower Zambezi area in Chiawa GMA
and Rufunsa GMA and the Siavonga Open Areas. However, what they have fostered and delivered are
land alienations, one to a private investor and others to the customary communities themselves,
justifying the latter on the grounds that:
…the trusts are designed to avoid land converted from customary to leasehold tenure
slipping out of the control of the community by using the advantages of private title for
its own purposes… Chiefs agreed that allocating leases on customary land alienated it
in perpetuity (sic) and further agreed that a community trust structure could hold a
“head lease” and directly manage sub-leases to private sector investment partners.
AWF has invested in the trusts as common property institutions because it believes that
secure and effectively managed property rights can help determine conservation and
development outcome. (Metcalfe 2005, p.8)
But such alienations brought about by AWF have placed chiefdom customary commons at great risk
elsewhere. And there are other considerations, not least the fact that statutory leasehold alienations are
prone to takeover by corporate raiders, even with caveats in place.
3.5.1 Mukuni Trust
The Mukuni Development Trust formed under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act in the Livingstone
area was registered in 2003 and is located in an Open Area. The allocation of land to the Trust by
Chief Mukuni was formalised in a petition signed by the Trustees to the Minister of Lands and
deposited with the Registrar of Deeds. Each of the 12 villages in the Mukuni chiefdom elects a board
that sends a representative to the board of Trustees at chiefdom level. The Chief has earned notoriety
by his full support of the illegal alienation of 220 ha of the Mosi oa Tunya National Park, and of plans
to build an 18-hole golf course and 350 chalets in the World Heritage Site. AWF made no criticism of
this development, nor would they answer emails from the author and other conservationists to explain
their position.
The Trust has negotiated contracts with local investors so that it receives a percentage of tourist
takings for the use of facilities built within the chiefdom. AWF has assisted the Trust in proposal
development and negotiations for a partnership with Sun International for an up-market lodge and for
the development of a 100,000 ha Bweenga conservancy below Victoria Falls.
3.5.2 Sekutu Development Trust
The Sekute Trust, registered with the Registrar of Societies in March 2003, developed out of the
CONASA project (of which AWF was a part) that concentrated on the three southern GMAs adjoining
Kafue NP. According to AWF, their support to Sekute Development Trust is helping halt illegal
allocations of land, democratise land rights, enforce natural resource management practices and
effectively partner with the private sector in the area. Metcalfe (2005) reports that:
225
A private sector consortium has been negotiating with Chief Sekute with a proposition
to form a partnership between itself and the Chiefdom to establish a conservancy. Part
of the conservation logic of the conservancy is that it would contribute to the proposed
corridor. Population density in Sekute is low with 60% settled near one peri-urban area
leaving a lot of the 230,000 hectares uninhabited. The Sekute investment group sees
this as a pilot scheme for the whole conservancy. The arrangement hinges not so much
on the alienation of land but on exclusive use rights to the wildlife. Despite its bold
vision the scheme has not progressed for several reasons. Firstly, negotiating directly
with Chief Sekute and his advisors on such a bold concept is problematic because the
“deal” is based purely on customary authority and may be subject to several vagaries
and misunderstandings over time and not a sound basis for a big project. Whereas a
community can think in terms of perpetuity what is the life of a “partnership” and what
provision is there for conflict resolution. The Sekute Trust would facilitate the
possibility of a contractual relationship between two legal personalities and provide for
structured community participation and more clarity on roles, responsibilities and
beneficiaries. The private sector group undoubtedly has entrepreneurial skills that the
trust lacks but it is also clear that the private sector group is depending on the trust to
raise substantial capital investment from donors.
3.5.3 Siluwe Trust
Chief Musokotwane has supported the establishment of the Siluwe Trust. The Chief has negotiated an
investment with a private sector operator who has constructed a lodge, drilled boreholes and installed
pumps. A system of anti-poaching patrols has been established on a 20,000 ha site. The investor has
acquired leasehold title to 5,000 ha of the area with exclusive use rights over the other 15,000 ha and
an option to apply for leasehold title.
3.5.4 Other Trusts
The AWF also mention having formed the Musokotwane, Simwatachela and Inyambo Trusts, though
no information on these was made available by AWF.
3.6
Joint Forest Management Areas (JFMAs)
Five Joint Forest Management Areas (JFMAs) in Zambia have been gazetted: Lukangaba, Mwewa,
Dambwa, Ndondi and Kastaino. It had taken four years since the onset of the Provincial Forestry
Action Programme (PFAP), funded by the government of Finland, for the necessary legal instrument
to be put in place allowing for the establishment of the JFMAs.
In the case of the Dambwa forest, the Forestry Department entered into an agreement with ALERT,
the ‘walking with lions’ business (Shenton 2006). Such an agreement, posing a real threats to humans,
required an EIA, mandatory in accordance with the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control
Act (Cap 204 of the Laws of Zambia), Regulation 3 (1) of the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 28 of 1997. In April 2008, a review of an Environmental
impact statement was held by the ECZ on the use of Dambwa for the lion project, but this was done
after permission had been given by the Forestry Department for the project to commence. The EIA
was subsequently passed. The mayor of Livingstone has now appealed to Government to de-gazette
part of the Dambwa forest reserve due to the shortage of land after the creation of Kazungula District
(Mbulo 2009b). However ZAWA currently are pursuing an extension of the Mosi oa Tunya National
Park into the Dambwa. In April 2010, ALERT were advertising for donations from the public in order
to purchase antelope for release into the Dambwa so that their captive lion could hunt them.
Attempts by the Luembe Conservancy Trust to establish a JFMA in the West Mvuvye National Forest
was unsuccessful as a result of the forest being illegally alienated, subsequently (after a campaign)
226
supposedly cancelled by the Surveyor-General. A recent visit to the area by the Minister of MTENR
had her railing against the fact that the land was still held under leasehold by Z. Patel (W Njobvu
2010, personal communication, January)
4
MAFUNTA CBNRM PROJECT
In the Mafunta GMA (gazetted in 2007), WWF-Zambia, funded by the Norwegian Embassy and with
the co-operation of Chief Kahare of the Nkoya people of the western buffer zone of the Kafue
National Park, are busy converting the area into a multi-production zone making use of VAG groups
and the CRB elected for the area. Here they have established about 154 commodity groups in order to
provide ‘alternative livelihoods’ - i.e. as opposed to commercial poaching - and income generation
activities to members of the local communities. After training, some VAGs have embarked on a
number of ventures such as horticulture, poultry, piggery, honey and wax production, fish farming,
carpentry, tailoring and handicrafts.
An area with poor soils and little water available, criticism has been levelled as to the suitability of the
development programme and its likely impact by way of increased fire on the GMA and the adjoining
National Park.
5
TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVATION AREAS
5.1
Kazangula and Zambezi Heartlands
AWF partners in Kazangula are Peace Parks Foundation, the Southern African Trust, The Nature
Conservancy, USAID / Regional Centre for Southern Africa, the Wildlife and Environment
Conservation Society of Zambia; and in Botswana they are the Botswana Department of Wildlife and
National Parks, the Elephant Pepper Development Trust, Integrated Rural Development and Nature
Conservation (IRDNC Namibia) and the Japan Fund for Global Environment (JFGE).
In the Zambezi Heartland, AWF, with funding from USAID, has embarked on a conservation project
incorporating Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In Zambia it includes the Rufunsa GMA, the
Lower Zambezi National Park and the development of the Chiawa cultural village within the Chiawa
GMA where it has shared interests with the Chiawa Community Partnership Park. AWF’s principal
interest is in elephant conservation and on their website they state that the elephant population in the
Zambezi Heartland is on the rise - with an 8% increase overall since 2002, and a dramatic 137 % rise
in Zambia, claiming that landscape-wide management techniques and poaching prevention efforts are
working. This flies in the face of the information presented at the CITES CoP15 meeting in Doha
which revealed the area to be one of the most heavily poached in Zambia.
The Landsafe programme in Nyalugwe and Luembe chiefdoms, the former adjoining the Luangwa
district within Tete Province of Mozambique, has plans to create a customary commons transfrontier
area there. AWF is currently creating the 138,000 ha Chawalo Community Conservation Area in Tete
Province.
5.2
Malawi / Zambia TFCA
On 13 August 2004, the Zambian and Malawian Governments signed an MoU agreeing to the
establishment of this TFCA, and an international coordinator was appointed to steer the TFCAs
development. The Global Environmental Facility approved a project preparation grant of $328,000,
which the two governments requested the Peace Parks Foundation to manage and oversee to
implementation phase. The legal agreement between the World Bank and the Foundation has since
been signed, as has the letter of agreement initiating the process to establish an endowment fund for
the project that will receive a capital injection of $5.9 million once established. In the first component,
227
management and tourism plans have been drafted and a joint law-enforcement project combats
commercial poaching in the Nyika TFCA (Nyika and Vwaza/Lundazi component of the TFCA). A
wildlife-restocking programme for Lundazi Forest Reserve and Vwaza Marsh Wildlife Reserve
commenced in 2007. In May 2008, the ministerial committee approved the investment framework and
logo for the Malawi-Zambia TFCA, as well as the Nyika TFCA joint management, integrated tourism
development and restocking plans, and the Kasungu-Lukusuzi project plan.
AWF is working with the Wildlife Conservation Society (USA) to support the implementation of
COMACO, in the area between Kasungu National Park in Malawi and Lukusuzi National Park in
Zambia in the Kasungu-Lukusuzi TFCA (the second component of the Malawi-Zambia TFCA). They
hope that this will provide a secure wildlife dispersion route between the two parks.
5.3
KAZA (Kavango - Zambezi TFCA)
Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe are establishing a 278,000 km2 TFCA in the
Okavango and Zambezi river regions. The MoU was signed at Victoria Falls on 7 December 2006.
KAZA TFCA includes the Okavango Delta, and the National Parks of Chobe, Makgadigadi, Kafue,
Sioma Ngwezi, Mosi oa Tunya, Hwange, Chizarire, Bwabwata and the Moremi and Luiana reserves.
AWF Kazungula Heartlands is part of the project along with Conservation International, Integrated
Rural Development and Nature Conservation, Peace Parks Foundation, Roots of Peace and WWF. It
has the CBNRM objectives of community assistance: support to local communities through the
development of income-generating opportunities such as community-run tourism enterprises, cultural
and eco-tourism villages, and basketry projects within ecological corridors linking protected areas.
228
6
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231
7
APPENDICES
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
The CBNRM Policy and Legislation for Namibia
Objectives of the Luembe Conservancy Trust Limited.
232
Appendix 1: The CBNRM Policy and Legislation for Namibia
Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Area Policy of 1995 (i.e. the CBNRM
policy). The policy objectives are as follows:
i)
To establish an economically-based system for the management and utilisation of wildlife and
other renewable living resources on communal land so that rural communities can:
•
•
•
•
participate on a partnership basis with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism
(MET) and other Ministries in the management of, and benefits from, natural
resources;
benefit from rural development based on wildlife, tourism and other natural
resources;
benefit from rural development based on wildlife, tourism and other natural
resource management; and
improve the conservation of natural resources by wise and sustainable resource
management and the protection of biodiversity.
ii)
To redress the past discriminatory policies and practices which gave substantial rights over
wildlife to commercial farmers, but which ignored communal farmers.
iii)
To amend the Nature Conservation Ordinance of 1975 so that same principles that govern rights
to wildlife utilisation on commercial land are extended to communal land.
iv)
To allow rural communities on state land to undertake tourism ventures, and to enter into
cooperative agreements with commercial tourism organisations to develop tourism activities on
state land.
The policy states:
•
•
•
•
The right to utilise and benefit from wildlife on communal land should be
developed to a rural community that forms a conservancy in terms of the
Ministry’s policy on the conservancies.
Each conservancy should have the right to utilise wildlife within the bounds of
the conservancy to the benefit of the community. Once a quota for each available
species has been set, the conservancy members may decide how these animals
may be utilised. They may decide to allow hunting by members of the
conservancy, culling game for meat, the sale of animals for trophy hunting, or the
live sale of game.
The conservancy should be able to enter into business arrangements with private
companies to carry out some or all of these activities.
The conservancy would also have the right to establish tourism facilities within
boundaries or engage in a commercial arrangement with registered tourism
operator to act on its behalf.
And the Nature Conservation Amendment Act (i.e. the CBNRM legislation).allows the following:
i)
ii)
To match the rights over wildlife between residents on communal land to the ones enjoyed by
private land-owners, the Nature Conservations Amendment Act amends the Nature
Conservation Ordinance from 1975.
To provide legal provision for any group of persons residing on communal land to have, upon
permission from the MET, the area they inhabit, declared a conservancy. The Minister is to
declare a conservancy in the Government Gazette if:
233
•
•
•
•
•
•
the applying community have provided the MET with the names of the elected
representative committee listed.
the conservancy boundaries are decided and agreed upon.
the applying conservancy area is not subject to any lease or proclaimed a game or
nature reserve.
the community comply with to the legal constitution requiring sustainable
management and utilisation of game in the conservancy.
the conservancy committee has the capacity to manage funds
the conservancy committee has an appropriate method for equitable benefit
distribution derived from consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife.
If the requirements are met the Act confers on the conservancy committee similar rights, privileges,
duties, and obligations that the Nature Conservation Ordinance from 1975 confers on commercial
farmers.
234
Appendix 2: Objectives of the Luembe Conservancy Trust Limited.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
To work closely with its principal partners in Luembe Landsafe conservancy
development, Gamefields Limited, who will attract appropriate investment and the
partnerships and assistance necessary for the sustained development of the conservancy.
To contract Gamefields Limited for the development and management of the
conservancy.
To support an active and fully capacitated Community Resource Board which will
assume responsibility – in close co-operation with the national line Ministries - for all
natural resource management in the area.
To promote integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs).
To co-operate with NGOs who have similar development objectives as the Trust.
To enter into joint-ventures with other investors and partners, particularly ZAWA and the
Department of Forestry.
To seek to achieve the UN Millennium Development goals, recognizing that ecosystems
stability is essential for improving human livelihoods. This in particular to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.
Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five.
Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality rate.
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of
malaria and other major diseases.
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies
and programmes.
Reverse the loss of environmental resources; reduce by half the proportion
of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water.
To support the World Conservation Strategy in:
−
−
−
Maintaining essential ecological processes and their support systems;
Preserving genetic diversity and;
Ensuring the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems.
viii) To encourage the growth of appropriate tourism, conservation agriculture and the
sustained use of the natural resources.
ix) To foster education in traditional knowledge, the ecology and biodiversity conservation
for future investment projects, as well as to take advantage of resulting opportunities.
x)
To foster education in traditional knowledge, the ecology and biodiversity conservation.
The Trust will be guided by the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
The existing legal and political framework, supporting government’s capacity and its
implementation process.
Inculcate a ‘rights-based’ approach: protecting local communities by way of such
principles as ‘prior informed consent.’
Impact positively on women and youth.
Promote accountability and responsibility.
Provide financial investment incentives that will benefit all investors in a proportional
manner.
Take action to reverse the loss of environmental resources.
235
VOLUME II: THE LANDSAFE CUSTOMARY COMMONS
237
CHAPTER 6:
THE LANDSAFE INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT MODEL
239
ACRONYMS
CA
CATFCA
CBO
CBWM
CC
CONASA
CRB
DC
FD
FMA
FMC
GMA
GRZ
HURID
ICDP
JFM
JFMA
MMD
MoU
MTENR
NBSAP
NCC
NGO
NP
NRCF
OP
PPP
PWE
REMNPAS
TCA
UN
USAID
ZAWA
Customary Authority
Central African Transfrontier Conservation Area
Community-Based Organisation
Community-Based Wildlife Management
Customary Community
Community-Based Natural Resource Management and Sustainable Agriculture
Community Resources Board
District Commissioner
Forestry Department
Fisheries Management Area
Fisheries Management Committee
Game Management Area
Government of Zambia
Institute of Human Rights, Intellectual Property and Development Trust
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
Joint Forestry Management
Joint Forest Management Area
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Memorandum of Understanding
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
National Constitutional Conference
Non-Governmental Organisation
National Park
Natural Resources Consultative Forum of Zambia
Office of the President
Public-Private Partnership
Private Wildlife Estate
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
Tourism Concession Agreement
United Nations
United States Aid
Zambia Wildlife Authority
240
1
THE EVOLUTION OF LANDSAFE
The author’s concept for ushering in investment into chiefdoms with significant populations of
wildlife was originally conceived as a structure based on the traditional three-legged African stool - in
Bemba, named Chipuna – a stool carved from a single piece of wood, providing strength, stability and
comfort, and impervious to attack (termites), its three legs made up of the chief and his people, the
District Council, and the Community Resource Board, the latter empowered under the Wildlife Act of
1998.
1.1
The Chipuna Investment Model for Chiefdoms (Appendix 1)
In developing the idea for a suitable institutional structure the author realised that it would have to be
registered as a society or as a non-profit trust company having as its trustees the sitting chief, an
investor, and representatives of the main partner NGO, the CRB, the District Council in which the
Chipuna would be conducted, and other key stakeholders. The rationale for this was self-evident with
many of the chiefdoms being rich in wildlife, yet being plundered. These areas have not been
developed, and the opportunities for raising living standards are few in a place where villages are
scattered and lie far from markets. Moreover, the Zambian government has had neither the money nor
the capacity to deliver development, and donor support has merely provided a crutch.130
Thus, the way forward was to encourage investment in these areas, but investment that came in as a
partner of communities, that would support the traditional structures and that would not alienate the
land. Furthermore, a Chipuna could make use of the current wildlife and land laws – apart from
customary rights to the land - as well as the Forest Act of 1999 and the National Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan (NBSAP), to lay the groundwork for future development.
The Customary Authority was clearly the key as the senior partner of the conservancy development,
with responsible for ensuring that secure access and use of the land was possible, and that the
customary residents were partners with investors in the process. In wildlife areas, the CRB was
essential to gaining rights to wildlife and to those parts of customary land designated GMA, as well as
for deploying and managing Village Scouts, protectors of the very resource that was to be sustainably
utilised.
Further then, the main investor/manager was essential to provide the seed money to start the project,
and to recruit additional investors. For this to happen there had to be an incentive to do so, as well as
the necessary protection and security of tenure for the investors. The main investor/manager would
also have the crucial role of managing a large chiefdom, one containing scattered villages, and
possibly endangered species and valuable forest and water resources. This would be holistic
development requiring experience in wildlife management, biodiversity protection, tourism
development, artisanal and commercial agriculture, forest exploitation, community development,
small business development and so on. In addition, the services of an NGO would be necessary to act
as an umpire between managers and investors, the customary authority, the Community Based
Organisations (CBOs) and Government. They would assist the scheme to grow, and lay the
groundwork for long-term sustainability. Crucially, they would be empowered to carry out community
development, drawing on money built up and secured in a development trust fund.
It was envisaged that all of this would create a business partnership between the chiefdom and an
investor, expressed in the form of a trust company in which the chiefdom, the investor/manager,
NGOs, CBOs and the District Councils are subscribers, with the ‘use and occupation of the land’
being placed in the hands of the trust company.
130
This point is included in Appendix 1 – the document handed to the chiefs.
241
1.2
The Chipuna Partners (Appendix 2)
It was apparent that there should be an NGO that understood the local conditions and the history of
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). ProjectsAfrica, an online facility for conservation investment
introduced by the author at the World Summit, had been established for this purpose. It was, however,
necessary to have a local NGO, thus the Norman Carr Foundation was established in 2002 at the
request of the eldest daughter of Carr (Judy) and the eldest son of Barry Shenton (Rolf) (Norman Carr
and Barry Shenton had run the early ICDP projects in Nsefu in 1949), with the founding President of
Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, as its Patron131. Its mission was to support ZAWA in assisting the CRBs, in
encouraging PPPs for protected areas and for empowering customary people by lobbying for a return
of their customary rights to wildlife. Initial funding was received from Gamefields Limited, an
international company formed by the author and Khalid Al Tajir, and dedicated to integrated
conservation and development work, with branches established in Zambia and Tanzania. The mission
of the Foundation was as an integral part of an investor and NGO partnership with the customary
authorities in the development of land under customary tenure, but with a major role in providing
leadership and direction in the sustainable management of Zambian wildlife resources. To guide future
activities a simple Chipuna roadmap was produced (Appendix 3).
Because of the rather restrictive language and its limitations as a purely investor driven model, the
Chipuna was later renamed the Landsafe model, whereby a community institution is formed in which
the chief and his headmen vest land (and the responsibility for its management) according to an agreed
participatory landuse plan. This institution then enters into a series of co-management agreements with
Government, capturing the management rights to protected land, wildlife, fish, forestry and water and,
inevitably, some rights to its minerals as well, all of this leading steadily towards a form of devolution
which would provide for Zambia a canton-type structure of semi-autonomous chiefdom commons
embraced within a federal state, lending it stability and cultural, economic and ecological integrity.
2
LANDSAFE
What separates Landsafe from other models and plans is that it considers the customary commons
(and the associated protected areas once part of it) to be sacrosanct. It will not alienate land on
leasehold to investors or to the customary authority or to chiefdom residents, and it is unequivocal in
its support for the re-instatement of customary ownership rights to wildlife and all renewable
resources being supported on customary land, but, critically, stressing its co-management with
Government.
2.1
The Focused Objectives
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
131
To safeguard customary land and its associated protected areas.
To strengthen the traditional authority and encourage the democratic structures.
To conserve the wildlife and natural resources for the benefit of the chiefdoms.
To provide a land and business management plan for the appropriate development
of chiefdoms, one that fully respects the ecology and the traditional, cultural and
religious norms.
To facilitate chiefdom institutions that may enter into co-management agreements
with Government over land and renewable natural resources, in conformity with
the prescriptions of the Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws of Zambia of 1974
and the Fisheries (Amended) Act of 2007, The Forestry Act No. 39 of 1973,
Forestry Policy of 1998, the Forestry Act No. 7 of 1999, the Local Forests
(Control and Management) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 47 of 2006, the
Kaunda had formerly been the Patron of the Wildlife Conservation Trust, established by the author, his son Panji Kaunda, and Norman Carr.
242
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
2.2
Lands Act Chapter 184 of the Laws of Zambia of 1995, the Water Act Chapter
198 of the Laws of Zambia of 1948 and the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998.
To provide the necessary incentives for both investors and the chiefdoms to enter
in to mutually beneficial partnerships and investments.
To identify, propose and facilitate small businesses able to harvest natural
resources.
To establish a development trust fund and the implementation of development
projects required by the customary community .
To foster education in the chiefdom’s history, culture and religion, and in its
ecology.
To re-instate the traditonal system of nature guardians.
To foster conservation agriculture, health and education.
The Expected General Outcomes
i) The creation of community Trusts in which land may be vested and safeguarded.
ii) The production of a chiefdom landuse plan.
iii) Where appropriate, the conversion of part of the unutilised Open Areas into
community game ranches or conservancies and assigned under law of contract to
investors.
iv) The conversion of these same ranches into a single game conservancy .
v) The vesting of GMAs into these Trusts and their assignment to a limited liability
company – to be used as an exclusive wildlands tourism area.
vi) Where feasible, the creation of transfrontier conservation areas.
vii) The creation of a critical mass of appropriate development projects for the socioecological well-being of the two chiefdoms.
viii) An investment trust fund account for the sustained investment in the chiefdoms
established with a sound system of fiduciary management in place.
ix) The establishment of co-management agreements between the Trusts and
Government departments and ministries responsible for fisheries, forestry,
wildlife and water, and as a result, the conservation of these resources for the
benefit of the people.
x) The two chiefdoms customary commons established and sustained over time.
2.3
The Expected Benefits
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
2.4
The protection and conservation of customary land.
Avoidance of the forces of accumulation by dispossession and negative
externalities in the form of poverty, pollution, despair and illness.
Inculcating a sense of ownership and responsibility in residents for the land
and the natural resources being supported on it.
The provision of the necessary structures to attract responsible aid and
investment.
The re-imposition of pre-colonial guardians of nature, i.e. resource guilds and
other indigenous forms of title.
Villagers to be shareholders in chiefdom funds.
The Expected Constraints
i)
ii)
iii)
Failure to protect and control the chiefdom trust funds.
The capture of these funds and development opportunities by the chief and a
local elite of Big Men.
The destruction of an egalitarian society and the continued impoverishment of
the villagers.
243
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
xii)
2.5
Failure to ring-fence the common’s benefits so that an open-access regime
continues in operation in one form or another.
Failure of Government to lend impetus to decentralisation and devolution.
The unwillingness of Government to enter into co-management agreements
and revenue sharing with the Trusts.
Failure of Government to adhere to hunting concession agreements and to
make payments under these agreements to Community Resource Boards.
The gerrymandering of the membership of CBOs – critically, the Trusts – and
the failure to hold proper, free and fair elections.
The unwillingness of chiefs to fully accede to a more democratic process,
seeing it as a threat to their authority.
The alienation of the land by chiefs, particularly when the chiefdom trust has
entered into land user agreements for the same land with investors.
Heterogeneous chiefdom areas where residents are made up of an admixture
of different people (particularly close to urban areas), would encounter greater
difficulties than homogenous and far-flung rural groups.
The failure to allow for the full emergence of the traditional guardians of
nature as a counterpoint to any over-modernisation of the commons.
Outputs and Activities to Implement Landsafe
OUTPUT 1:
FORMALISATIONS
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
OUTPUT 2:
Vesting of land in the Trusts and registration with the Registrar of Deeds.
Trusts make application to ZAWA, through the CRB, for registration of
appropriate land as community game ranches, with all the conditions and
regulations implied. ZAWA inspects and surveys proposed areas.
Trust signs co-management agreement with CRBs and ZAWA over the GMA
section, which provides support to the CRBs.
Trusts – with the assistance of the embryonic Landsafe Foundation – provide
a management plan.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with the Forestry Department in
respect of protected forest areas.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with the Department of Fisheries
within the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries; requiring the following:
• Declaration of a Fisheries Management Area.
• Election of a Fisheries Management Committee.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with Water Affairs Department.
Trusts enter into assignment or lease agreements with investors, or take up
joint ventures. Ideally these would be auctioned by the Trusts.
THE COMMUNITY GAME RANCHES
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
Conduct a rapid rural appraisal and sensitisation exercise.
Survey of proposed reserves and agreement with Trusts and chiefs on
boundaries.
Record boundary co-ordinates and mapping.
Compile baseline date on wildlife and forestry.
Survey the riverine stretch as to suitable lodge and camp sites.
Assess current poaching activities.
EIA assessment of adjoining private game ranch fencing.
Cost various options.
244
OUTPUT 3:
GMAs
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
OUTPUT 4:
TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVANCY
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
OUTPUT 5:
Initiate contacts with the neighbouring government and chiefs for the creation
of a joint chiefdom TFCA .
Establish the TFCA according to the Central African Transfrontier
Conservation Area planning framework or to a similar framework elsewhere.
Vest the necessary land for such a TFCA in the chiefdom Trust.
Develop the TFCA.
SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
Activity 9:
Activity 10:
OUTPUT 6:
Use village scout reports and other intelligence to assess the current state of
wildlife, including threats and utilisation.
Provide a wilderness use and protection plan.
In addition to the Njinga reports provided by the Village Action Groups
(VAGs), carry out a rapid rural appraisal.
Provide a participatory/social landuse plan for the Trust.
Provide capacity support to the Trust and appoint an executive officer.
Provide capacity support to the CRBs on animal depredation reports
(Appendix 2), wildlife protection, quota production and monitoring, accounts
management, project development, etc.
Implement villager landuse registration with the use of a GPS, and open a land
registration books.
Provide support to education by bolstering of teacher-assistants cum natural
resource officers based in the Village Action Groups (VAGs).
Support health clinics.
Implement conservation farming.
Implement honey production and aquaculture, and establish furniture cooperative.
Encourage village-based tourism businesses.
Implement some micro-credit schemes, particularly one serving women – but
only if an EIA of the process encourages it
BUSINESS PLANS AND MARKETING
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Produce business proposals for the respective Trusts for the game ranches and
conservancies, the GMA and the TFCA.
Produce project proposals and business plans.
3
TOWARDS
INVESTOR/CHIEFDOM
SOLUTIONS
3.1
Introduction
TRUSTS
EQUITABLE
FINANCIAL
Theoretically, with customary land vested in customary area Trusts, and with co-management
agreements entered into with Government in respect of forestry, fisheries, wildlife, and tourism - both
consumptive and non-consumptive – the basis for a degree of semi-autonomy and the provision of
development incentives should be in place. Environmental goods and services may therefore –
according to a landuse plan which remains the intellectual property of the community - be leased out
to suitable business partners. The income from these leases, placed within a secure Trust fund, will
245
then be drawn upon for development. However, without capacity support from investors and other
interested parties, both within and outside of the customary community area, the theft of development
funds would be inevitable. Thus, whilst there will be an income, this would also have to be balanced
against the costs of delivering the Landsafe scheme for equitable socio-ecological development.
However, in advancing Landsafe, it is necessary to learn from the current experience of other African
countries who now experience land grabbing under suspect and inequitable contracts with
agribusiness, investment funds and government agencies.
Together with applicable national and international law, contracts define the terms of
an investment project, and the way risks, costs and benefits are distributed. Who has
the authority to sign the contract and through what process greatly influences the extent
to which people can have their voices heard. And the terms of the deals can have major
and lasting repercussions for agriculture and food security in recipient countries. Yet
very little is known about the exact terms of the land deals. Negotiations usually
happen behind closed doors. Only rarely do local landholders have a say in those
negotiations. Few contracts are publicly available…In relation to many of these issues,
a number of the contracts reviewed appear not to be fit for purpose: some are short,
unspecific documents that grant enforceable, long-term and largely transferable rights
to extensive areas of land, and in some cases priority rights over water, in exchange for
little public revenue and apparently vague and potentially unenforceable promises of
investment and/or jobs. Also, a number of the deals are being negotiated in legal
contexts where safeguards for local interests are weak, and some contracts do not
properly address social and environmental issues. As a result, there is a substantial risk
that local people internalise costs without adequately participating in benefits, and
major environmental issues are not properly factored in (Cotula 2011, p. 1)
3.2
Landsafe Land Lease
Some of the variables to be taken into consideration when assessing land rentals in Zambia are:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
the size of the land;
the game stocks;
the carrying capacity and habitat; accessibility;
villager populations;
habitat and wildlife impacts;
Open Area or GMA;
the length and security of lease;
fenced or unfenced;
the distance from tar roads and centres; and
the agricultural capability.
Rental and lease payments, once agreed upon within an equitable contract with the necessary
stabilization clauses, would be paid into the Trust fund – with a percentage to the chief to
support his critical role - and used according to the customary community’s development plan.
Increasingly, the scarcity value of land, in particular that of ‘primary nature’, will attract great
value.
Most land leases in Africa are for agricultural purposes (whereas Landsafe is wildlife and wildlands
based), land rentals ranging from less than $1/ha in Sudan, less than $2/ha in Ethiopia (payment
exempt for the first five years), $5/ha in Liberia, $13.80/ha in Cameroon – with the rates periodically
adjusted for inflation. And where payment is made, it is to the host government with little going to the
local villagers. In all of the cases non-payment of the land fee is a reason for contract termination.
However Senegal and Mali charge no land rentals, and the low Sudan and Ethiopia payments suggest
that what the host country wants to do is to attract investment in the form of capital and infrastructural
246
development (Cotula 2011, p. 23)
In Zambia prime agricultural and livestock land may obtain a rental of 5% of the land’s value per
annum, with land considered to increase by at least 3% per annum. However, in the case of land in the
Three-rifts, which is non-agricultural and unsuitable for domestic stock, a rental amount of 1.5% - 3%
(max.) would be reasonable, escalating annually (good agricultural land adds 3% or so of its value a
year). The question of stabilization clauses however remains problematic.
Stabilisation clauses included in the contract should require that a process of dispute resolution takes
place (as in the highly theoretical Hunting Concession Agreement between hunting operators and
ZAWA) i.e. good faith negotiations, followed by mediation and then arbitration, failing which the
investor will have redress in the courts, and failing that, access to the available international arbitration
instruments to which Zambia is signatory. In the case of a contract entered into on customary land
which has been passed as a game ranch by ZAWA the contract should prevail over ‘any new law’
which may affect project implementation ‘and that no new law or measure will be applied to the
project if it affects the rights of the parties in a way to cause direct or indirect prejudice to the project’
(Cotula 2011 pp.38-39).
What is important is to work towards making direct and regular payments to villagers so that the
connection between wildlife and natural resource conservation is indelibly imprinted and enforced.
Ideally a subsistence amount of a dollar a day, in return for the villagers working for the maintenance
of their land’s integrity, would produce results. Given the scarcity of prime game land with striking
physical attributes, Trusts should look to an auction system to obtain the highest land rents.
Financial management and security should be second only to the protection of the land from alienation
- an investment system that would protect the principle but allow for the careful use of investment
returns is vital. This system may not be suitable for Trusts established under the Lands (perpetual
succession) Act as these exist at the discretion of the Minister, it perhaps being better suited to Trusts
established under the Companies Act (limited by guarantee). However, it is important to explore the
efficacy of all the statutory instruments available.
Land may either be leased from the Trust, or from a joint-venture initiated with the Trust for the land’s
development. Should the first option be chosen - once a reasonable lease amount is arrived at for a
given piece of land, and subject to a landuse plan - this amount, projected for the period of the lease,
would be discounted and paid by the investor into an investment trust fund, with the interest being
paid to the Trust for its projects. This would have the dual effect of safeguarding the capital and
ensuring investor security by way of an investment that has paid for the full tenure of the lease.
Phase I: Unfenced situation - For a unit of virgin game land of a reasonable size (and unsuitable for
agriculture) leased out to investors, a lease amount of 1.5% - 3% of the land’s value would be
appropriate, escalating according to increasing land values or inflation.
Phase II: Fenced ranch in Open Area - This phase could consider a full 50-year customary lease paid
up-front but discounted by 50%. For example: placing a value on a unit of virgin land for game
ranching at $1,000,000 would provide $500,000 if paid over in a lump sum – some of it in cash but
most of the sum invested securely at interest by a Community Trust. Additional to this would be the
purchase of existing game stocks from the Trust (who would have received them free and gratis from
ZAWA), local employment benefits and contributions to the development of the Trust, and infrastructural investment. Should four of these units be established (provided there is adequate
unpopulated land available), real and sustainable income will follow. A GMA could be leased out as a
wilderness area, remaining unfenced and bring in further income. All of this would far surpass the
present dismal state of affairs where no development takes place at all, the CRB remains unpaid and
dysfunctional, poaching is rampant, agriculture relies on antiquated techniques, the clinics ill-serve the
people, schooling is rudimentary, etc.
247
In ensuring an economic and ecological equilibrium it is of considerable importance that an assignee
covenants with the Trust for the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
To adheres to all existing laws.
To provide a liaison officer as the representative.
To adhere to a fire management and landuse plan with the Trust.
To allow any Trust official, chief or Government representatives of those
departments responsible for wildlife, forestry, fisheries and water to inspect
the property, with reasonable notice to be given of such intention.
To actively patrol and safeguard the area with the mutual support of the
Community Resource Board and its village scouts.
To employ persons in accordance with Zambian legislation.
To allow as far as possible (in compliance with the landuse plan and under the
Trust permit) the continued operation by the customary community of
communal access rights to natural resources on the leased property and the
encouragement of traditional guardians of nature. This would include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
3.3
Annual thatching harvest;
Honey production concessionary rights;
Seasonal medicinal plant harvest;
An annual game harvesting quota for meat and traditional use;
Community access to hydro power;
Community access to religious and traditional heritage sites; and
Any other rights normally accorded the residents of the chiefdom
who have full access to those renewable resources not owned by
the government. Were this not enshrined and guaranteed, then the
leasing of land should not be considered as it would merely be
alienation by another name.
Other Comparative Lease Costs in Zambia
3.3.1 An Operating Agribusiness
Currently, to lease an operating irrigation farm in the Choma district, 12% of annual turnover is
required.
3.3.2 Concession Tourism Agreements (CTAs)
ZAWA are currently awarding tourism concessions in the Kafue National Park for an initial term and
in consideration of a fixed charge, a variable payment per bed night per person and capital investment
as follows. One lodge on a fifteen year concession basis, Rose of Sharon (24 bed/six month operation
annually) pays the following:
Fixed annual charge (2010):
Variable charge:
$4,320
$25 per person per bed night inclusive of Park entry fees ($10
for local tourists). The minimum variable charge is based on
the bed occupancy in the first two years of operation, 15% in
the third year, 20% in the fourth and subsequent years.
Certain rebates are considered for occupancies above 55 per
cent.
Capital investment
The concessionaire committed itself to a capital investment
in fixed assets outlined in a business plan. In the case of
permanent structures the concessionaire agrees to turn over to
248
ZAWA at the end of the initial term or at the termination of
the agreement, all the structures erected by him.
ZAWA is generally asking for large payments in both operating and capital investment for its new
Luangwa and Kafue leases which bear little relationship to investment returns (G Shaw 2008, personal
communication.). Smaller operators, having signed leases at reasonable levels, suddenly find their
lease amounts doubling.
3.3.3 Hunting Concession Agreements
These leases run to ten years and are not area based, but rather on whether they are classified as Prime,
Secondary or Understocked areas. The charges are levied by ZAWA on the number of classical and
mini hunts on offer, this being related to the ‘quota’. A safari company would therefore pay in the
range of $10,000 - $100,000 concession fee per annum, with further payments for trophy fees. Fifty
percent of all fees are in theory supposed to be shared with the CRBs.
4
THE FORMALISATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF LANDSAFE
4.1
Statutory Institutional Structures for Natural Resource Management
Support for Landsafe has come from a recent survey of current efforts in the region that concluded that
customary residents should be accorded full management rights to the natural resources in their
chiefdom. Furthermore:
When a community structure is recognised as the holder of devolved rights,
negotiations should be held with the state and traditional authorities to confer the status
of “holders of land and resource rights’ subject to agreed conditions (DSI 2008).
This does not imply alienation of customary land but formalising such an allocation of land through a
legal document. It is here that the difficulty lies, for it is conservation and rural development lying at
the heart of the political process. Moreover, there are no guidelines available for chiefs and their
subjects to provide the structures for future development without destroying the chiefdoms, and along
with it Zambian culture and religion. However Landsafe charts the formalisation process in the
Luembe Chiefdom, and now the adjoining Nyalugwe Chiefdom, providing a manual on the way
forward, this being updated on an ongoing basis in the light of the current implementations.
4.2
Facilitation
Persuading chiefs and their people of the merits of a particular guide to development offering greater
control of its resources as well as some protection for investors, is a slow and arduous process.
However, the culmination of this process, however achieved, is the signing of an MoU by a chief and
his headmen with the assistance of a facilitator, be it a future investor or pro bono assister, this being a
contract of their willingness to proceed with implementation (Form 1).
Table 1: Agreement on the implementation of a Landsafe chiefdom conservancy
STAGES
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
FORM
Stage 1:
Lobbying for Facilitation of an agreement with a
Customary Authority (CA) for the
Landsafe
establishment of a Landsafe
conservancy.
MoU for the implementation of a
Landsafe signed by the CA and
facilitator and/or investor.
249
Form 1
4.3
The Land
Where greater investment and development security is required, land in a chiefdom needs to be
institutionalised in a customary community statutory structure, rather than being dealt with under
usufruct as in customary law and practice. The first step is for the formation of a chiefdom specific
Society with the Registrar of Companies, one drawn from the customary community itself, with its
elected representatives sitting as members. Following this, the customary authority then cedes the land
to the Society (Form 2), the first stage in moving towards a Trust structure in which the land is vested.
A chiefdom – when choosing the security of the Companies Act, may proceed directly to the
formation of a Trust limited by guarantee, with land then vested in it by the customary authority.
Table 2: Registration of a customary community primary institution
STAGES
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
Formation of a chiefdom specific and
Customary Community (CC)
representative structure in which
customary land may be vest by the CA,
and which may negotiate natural
resource co-management agreements
with government. This requires
registration of a Society by way of the
following:
• Elect twelve members from CC –
including, woman and men and
youth, and two chief’s
representatives, details and
signatures of which to be appended
to the Registrar of Societies
application form.
• Provide a constitution.
• National registration cards of
elected members to be copied and
certified by the District Registration
Officer.
• Obtain the written endorsement for
the Society application from the
District Community Development
Officer. Thence make application to
the District Council, the Zambia
Police and the Office of the
President in the district.
Registration of a chiefdom Conservancy
Society.
FORM
Stage 2:
Customary
Community
institution
creation
Obtain a registration certificate as a
result of the registration of a chiefdomspecific Society with the Registrar of
Societies (Societies Act).
Agreement by the CA that the Society
Form 2
will hold land – its usufruct- on behalf
of the chiefdom, and will be responsible
for being the co-manager of GMAs,
forests, fisheries and water in the
chiefdom.
The next step is for the formation of a chiefdom specific Trust, either by way of a petition to the
Minister of Lands and the issue of a certificate of incorporation under the Lands (perpetual succession)
Act, the Society members then forming the Board of Trustees (Form 3), or by way of a Company
(limited by guarantee) (Table 4).
250
Table 3: Trust formation under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act
STAGES
Stage 3:
Customary
Land
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
The Society may petition the Minister of
Lands for the incorporation of the Society
as a Trust under Section 2 of the Land
(perpetual succession) Act CAP 186 of the
Laws of Zambia.
Requirements for petitioning the
Minister of Lands for
incorporation of the Society as a
Trust.
(Appendix 3)
“…to hold and acquire, and by
instruments under such common seal to
convey, assign and demise, any land or
any interest therein now or hereafter
belonging to, or held for the benefit of,
such community, body or association of
persons, in such and the like manner, and
subject to such restrictions and provisions
as such trustees or trustee might, without
such incorporation, hold or acquire,
convey or assign, or demise the same for
the purposes of such community, body or
association of persons…”
Petition to the Minister of Lands
for incorporation of the Society
as a Trust and of the Minister’s
assent for the Trust to have the
land ceded to it by the
Society/CA, vested in it. Legal
advice - a Vesting Deed is
required to be signed by the
Society, vesting the land in the
Trust – though this was not
needed for Nyalugwe and
Luembe.
“…upon registration shall vest in such
body corporate all land or any interest
therein…”
Make application to the Minister of Lands
for a specific area of land to be vested in
the Trust.
N/B. The application forms for the Trust
should be completed at the same meeting
called to form a Society, so saving time
and expense. Once the Society is
registered, then the Trust petition made is
submitted.
OR
251
Obtain certificate of
incorporation and deposit with
the Registrar of Lands and
Deeds within three months.
THE LANDS AND DEEDS
REGISTRY ACT CHAPTER
185
3) Probate of a will affecting
land or any interest in land
shall be registered within
twelve months of the grant
thereof or the sealing thereof
under the provisions of the
Probates (Resealing) Act, as the
case may be.
(As amended by No. 5 of 1943,
S.I. No. 65 of 1965 and No. 47
of 1970) Cap. 61.
6. Any document required to be
registered as aforesaid and not
registered within the time
specified in the last preceding
section shall be null and void:
documents to be void for want
of registration.
FORM
Form 3
Table 4: Registration of a Trust Company Limited by Guarantee
STAGES
Stage 4:
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
Customary
land
Forming a Trust Company limited-byguarantee that then leases out land or
forms partnerships for its development.
Registration under the
Companies Act (Cap 388)
with a suitable constitution by
up to ten Trustees drawn from
the chiefdom; the opening of a
Trust Fund and the
appointment of auditors.
“to carry on or engage in or to enter
into any partnership or into other
arrangements for sharing profits, union
of interests, co-operation, joint venture
or otherwise with any person, firm or
company carrying or engaged in or
about to carry out or engaged in any
business transaction which the trustees
in their sole discretion shall deem
capable of being conducted so as
directly to benefit the Trust.”
4.4
FORM
Wildlife
In order for the community institutions to sign wildlife management co-management agreements, they
need to have an elected Community Resource Board registered for that chiefdom. Should there not be
one in existence application should be made for its formation (Form 4). ZAWA will carry out its own
surveys, 1) ecological (should a game ranch be applied for) and 2) social, a scoping survey carried out
to sample the views of the population and to assure themselves that the headmen and community are
in favour. However, if there is no intention to establish a game ranch then this is not required; and if
hunting is an option, then a quota can be applied for. But if the intention is simply to assign the land
user rights to investors ZAWA is not involved at all.
Table 5: Application for registration of a CRB
STAGES
Stage 4:
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
Wildlife
(CRB
formation)
Facilitate the election of a Community
Resource Board in order to deal with
wildlife issues, the production of a
management plan for the Game
Management Area, and to carry out its
responsibilities by the establishment of
co-management agreements with the
Trust (The Wildlife Act Part 3: (6))
• The CC to elect 7-10 members.
• To include one representative of
the chief and the District Council
respectively.
• Establish a fund for the social and
economic well-being of the CC.
The chief of the area to be the Patron of
the CRB (The Wildlife Act: Part 3: (6)
3 and Part 3 (9) 1).
FORMALISATION
FORM
Application to ZAWA for
registration of a chiefdom
CRB.
Form 4
Establishment of the CRB
Board by the Minister of
Tourism, Environment and
Natural Resources.
The Trust then enters into a wildlife co-management agreement with the CRB and ZAWA for the
consumptive and non-consumptive use of the wildlife stocks in the chiefdom (Form 5). This will
252
require the application for a game quota, to be made by the Trust to ZAWA (Form 6), and a cession
of such quota to the Trust (Form 7), and possibly also an application to establish a community game
ranch (Form 8). This would of necessity require the provision by the CRB of a game management
plan under the ZAWA template for that purpose – currently unavailable - but a Landsafe guide is
provided instead (Form 9).
Table 6: Wildlife co-management agreements
STAGES
Stage 5:
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
FORM
Wildlife
management
and
investment
through the
CRB/ZAWA
The CRB/ZAWA to enter - with the
powers vested in it by the Wildlife Act
- into a co-management agreement with
the Trust, and, in turn, with an investor,
for the management and appropriate
consumptive and non-consumptive
utilisation of the wildlife resources
being supported on the Customary
Trust land.
MoU application by the Trust
for a Wildlife CoManagement Agreement with
the CRB/ZAWA
Form 5
As allowed under the Wildlife Act of
1998: Part 3: (7), the elected CRB
being empowered to promote and
develop an integrated approach to the
management of human and natural
resources in a Game Management Area
or an Open Area and with the power to:
(2) (a) negotiate, in conjunction with
the Authority, co-management
agreements with hunting outfitters and
photographic tour operators;
(b) manage the wildlife under its
jurisdiction, within quotas specified by
the Authority;
c) appoint Village Scouts to exercise
and perform the duties of a wildlife
police officer under the supervision
of ZAWA;
(d) in consultation with the Authority,
develop and implement management
plans which reconcile the various uses
of land in areas falling under the
board’s jurisdiction;
(e) perform such other functions as the
Authority or Director-General may
direct or delegate to it;
(3) preparation and implementation of
management plans in Game
Management Areas and Open Areas.
253
The purpose of this agreement
is for the CRB/ZAWA to pass
the consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wildlife to
the CC Trust in time, i.e. to
‘internalise’ the hunting
concession as part of the
community institution, but still
paying ZAWA land user fees,
hunting concession and game
licence fees,
Game quota application by
Trust.
Form 6
Game quota cession by
Trust/ZAWA to the investor.
Form 7
Community Game Ranch
application by Trust to
ZAWA/CRB, i.e. application
for game ownership which
requires the fencing of the
area Copies of the Certificate
of Incorporation, the names of
the Trustees, minutes of
meetings reflecting the
agreement of the headmen to
the ranch. If land has been
vested in a Trust under the
Lands (perpetual succession)
Act, a copy of the document
certified by the Minister to the
effect and deposited with the
Registrar of Deeds.
Form 8
CRB Management Plan
template for management plan
submission to ZAWA.
Form 9
4.5
Game Management Areas
The Trust would need to 1) either sign a co-management agreement with the CRB and ZAWA for the
management of a GMAs wildlife in the chiefdom and for the retention of full tourism use (Form 10),
or 2) vest the GMA in a Society/Trust and then assign it under lease to a joint-venture Company, or 3)
follow the procedure for a community game ranch or 4) follow the procedure for a Community
Partnership Park. One of these approaches is essential if the community is to maintain the socioecological integrity of customary land, but yet allow Government to derive continued income.
Table 7: GMA co-management agreement
STAGES
Stage 6:
GMA
4.6
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
FORM
The CRB/ZAWA to enter, with the
powers vested in it by the Wildlife Act,
into a co-management agreement with
the Trust – and they, in turn, with an
investor, for the management and
appropriate consumptive and nonconsumptive utilisation of the wildlife
resources being supported in the GMA
section of the CA (as already allowed
in Section 3 of the Wildlife Act of
1998). All land rents, concession and
trophy fees to be paid to ZAWA.
MoU application by the Trust
for a GMA Co-Management
Agreement for the
consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wildlife
with the CRB/ZAWA.
Form
10
Option 2: Vesting of land in a
Community Trust and then into a
joint- venture Company.
Option 3: Application for the GMA
to be classified as a Community
Game Ranch.
Option 4: Application for a
Partnership Park (e.g.: Chikuni and
Chiawa).
Having surveyed the area, the
final procedure is for the Chief
to register it with the Registrar
of Lands and Deeds in the
Ministry of Agriculture, and
deposit a copy with the
District Council
National Parks
Where the chiefdom adjoins a National Park, that chiefdom, through its community structures, should
persuade Government to agree to a flow of benefits from the NP to the chiefdom, as originally allowed
for when the Trust Land was converted to protected area status – with the agreement of the chiefs –
i.e. to Game Reserve status, and later, National Park. Thus an MoU for a Co-Management Agreement
between the particular Trust and ZAWA is necessary (Form 11).
Table 8: National Park co-management agreement
STAGES
Stage 7:
National
Park
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
With regard to historical agreements
entered into by CAs and government
for the conversion of Trust land to
protected status, i.e. Game Reserve
followed by National Park, ZAWA
should therefore honour the promised
benefits to the chiefdom in question.
254
FORMALISATION
FORM
MoU application by the Trust
to ZAWA for a CoManagement Agreement in
respect of all or part of the
National Parks on their
boundaries.
Form 11
4.7
Local Forests and Forests on Customary Land
Statutory Instrument No. 47 of 2006 lays out regulations for Joint Forest Management Areas (JFMAs).
These Regulations require that Forest Trusts be established for proposed Joint Forest Management
Areas, registered as Societies – given that actual Trusts may also be necessary, i.e. under the Lands
(perpetual succession) Act – a confusing requirement. For each Forest Trust (Society), there is a
requirement to appoint a Forest Committee, which will comprise representatives of the chief, the local
forest office, the District Council and one representative of each village committee, the latter
comprising the headman, a representative of the user group and a forestry officer. The Village
Committee – the regulations state - may advise the forestry officer on the issue of licences, elect
members to the Forest Management Committee (although the S.I. defines no such committee,
confusing it with the Forest Committee) and appoint honorary forest rangers. JFMAs are bound to the
Forestry Department through an MoU. (Form 12)
Table 9: Forestry co-management agreement
STAGES
Stage 8:
Forestry
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
The Trust negotiates with Forestry
Department:
• Forest Trusts under Joint Forestry
Management (JFM) in Zambia are
registered as Societies and are
bound to the Forestry Department
through a memorandum of
understanding (MoU).
• Society manages forestry and all
licencing and income under its
control.
• Application to the Forest
Stewardship Council for
certification.
255
FORMALISATION
FORM
MoU application for a CoManagement Agreement
between Trust and the
Forestry Department
concerning the
Trusts/chiefdom’s forestry
resources.
Form 12
4.8
National Forests
For co-management in protected forests to occur, an MoU needs to be signed by the Customary
Community Society/Trust with the Forestry Department in the form of a Joint Forest Management
Agreement. However, to do so the forest would first have to be de-gazetted, possibly a retrograde step.
However, attempts should be made to enter into some sort of co-management with Forestry over land
that had originally been given over to forest protection for the supposed benefit of the customary
community (Form 13).
Table 10: Protected forest co-management agreements
STAGES
Stage 9:
Protected
forest
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
FORM
The Trust negotiates JFM with Forestry
Department and the production of a
management plan. Where part or all of
the protected forest was given over to
protected status by a particular
chiefdom, a share of benefits should be
mandatory.
MoU for a Joint Forestry
Management Agreement
between the Trust and the
Forestry Department for the
management of Local Forest.
For National Forest, degazetting would be first
required to Local Forest.
However, some sort of cooperative arrangement should
be possible in light of the
prescriptions of Statutory
Instrument No.47 of 2006
which lays out regulations for
Joint Forest Management
Areas.
Form 13
Consideration may be given to the
formation of a Forest Trust, for which
FD has laid out the steps.
256
4.9
Fisheries
Table 11: Fishery co-management agreements
STAGES
Stage 10:
Fishery
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
FORMALISATION
FORM
The Trust applies to FD for declaration
of Fisheries Management Areas
(FMAs) and election of Fisheries
Management Committees (FMC).
Minister ratifies area and FMC subject
to consultation with Society (or/and
riparian communities involved). The
Committee is responsible for the
production of the management plan and
the creation of a fund into which will
be paid all licence money for the
economic and social well-being of the
riparian community. The committee is
required to prepare an annual report
and audited accounts to be submitted to
the Minister.
• Members of FMC comprise six
villagers, one chief’s
representative, one from District
Council, one from an NGO
operating in the FMA (the Trust
NGO partner), one each from the
fishing industry and aquaculture
industry, plus two other persons,
vetted by the Minister who also
appoints the Chairman and ViceChairman.
• The FMC may, in consultation
with the Director, enter into comanagement agreements with
industrial fishing companies, or
with NGOs.
• Aquaculture ventures require to be
licenced and operate under certain
conditions.
MoU Application by the Trust
to the FD for a Fisheries
Management Area (FMA) CoManagement Agreement.
Form 14
MoU Application by the Trust
to FD for a Fisheries
Management Committee
(FMC).
Form 15
257
Statutory Instrument
recognising these
establishments issued by way
of Regulations.
4.10 Water
The Society should endeavour to enter into a co-management agreement with the Department of
Water Affairs so that the chiefdom may best manage its water resources (Form 16). At present moves
are afoot by Water Affairs to create Catchment Councils and Sub-Catchment Councils, which will
provide a sound basis for decentralisation.
Table 12: Water co-management agreement
STAGES
Stage 11:
Water
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
The Trust seek a joint management
agreement with the Department of
Water Affairs
• Provide basic water management
plan.
• Specific applications on water
projects submitted to the Water
Board.
FORMALISATION
FORM
MoU application by the Trust
for a Co- Management
Agreement with Water
Affairs, or directly with the
Catchment Council when
established.
Form 16
4.11 Chiefdom Land user Rights (Usufruct)
Should investors wish to make use of the land and natural resources of the chiefdom – as provided in
the management and development plans – they would be required to enter into a land user rights
agreement with community Trusts established either under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act
(Form 17), or under the Companies Act limited by guarantee (Form 18), once they had received
approval by the chiefdom Trust for the particular investment they were interested in, as laid out in
project proposal format (Form 19).
Table 13: Land user rights
STAGES
Stage 12:
Land-leases
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
The Trust as holders of land and the
co-managed use of renewable natural
resources, it provides the overall land
use and business plans for the
chiefdom. Leases and business
concessions are then entered into with
investors.
258
FORMALISATION
FORM
Under the Lands (perpetual
succession) Act.
Form 17
Under the Companies Act
limited by guarantee.
Form 18
4.12 Business Development
Investors are required to tender a business proposal to the Trust, the preliminary requirement leading
to the compilation of a full business plan.
Table 14: Business development
STAGES
Stage 13:
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
Business
development
Template for project proposal required
to be submitted by potential investors
to the Trust.
FORMALISATION
Project proposal template.
FORM
Form
19132
4.13 Appointment of Chiefdom Advisory Committee
Table 15: Chiefdom Advisory Committee
STAGES
Stage 14:
Appointment
of advisory
committees
drawn from
all
stakeholders:
CA, the
Trust, NGOs,
CBOs (CRB),
District
Council and
GRZ
Departments.
5
THE STATUTORY PROCESS
Consideration might be given to
forming it as a Trust, though, it would
likely be better to form an advisory
group that meets once a year, or when
required.
FORMALISATION
FORM
Appointment and registration
at a district and national level.
CONCLUSION
Landsafe is a social and political process, yet a process rooted in the value-added usage of customary
land. This is its great strength as it is institutionally based within a chiefdom. However, any project is
a perturbation and an inevitable victim of the law of unintended consequence. ICDPs in particular are
a minefield of good and dishonest intentions, of ignorance, of utopian ideas crafted at a distance, of
Big Men and patrimonialism, of Government rent seeking and weak institutions, of donors seeking
projects to fit their annual quota, of consultants manufacturing work…the list is endless. Landsafe is
all about protecting nature, with man an essential and intrinsic part of it. But it will have to deal at
some stage with the modernising wishes of the people with whom it works, with the forces at work
seeking to convert it into ‘Big Man’- entitlements and an endless target of begging. It has to deal with
the machinations of those who wish to take hold of the natural resources, of the land. And it has to
finds ways to deal with those who take on the Landsafe model and use it for their own benefit.
There are a number of key concepts that should be kept in mind when dealing with biodiversity
conservation and social justice (Brechin et al 2003, pp.252- 259):
132
See Addendum 1 for all 19 forms.
259
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vii)
Human Dignity – Establishing a Strong Moral Foundation for Social
Processes.
Legitimacy – Constructing Authority.
Governance – Establishing Modes of Decision Making and Power Sharing.
Accountability – Guaranteeing Responsibility and Performance.
Adaptation and Learning - Institutionalizing Reflection and Self-Correction.
Non-local Forces.
Landsafe pays attention to all of these, and more, but problems and challenges not yet envisaged will
emerge and be dealt with as they do.
260
6
REFERENCES
BRECHIN, STEVEN R., WILSHUSEN, PETER, R., FORTWANGLER, CRYSTAL L., WEST,
PATRICK C., (Editors). 2003. Contested Nature. Promoting International Biodiversity with
Social Justice in the Twenty-First Century. State University of New York Press, Albany
COTULA, LORENZO. 2011. LAND DEALS IN AFRICA: WHAT IS IN THE CONTRACTS? IIED,
London.
DSI. 2008. Review and synthesis of lessons learned concerning optimum forms of community
management structures for multiple resource management in Zambia and Southern and
Eastern Africa. Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources. Lusaka.
261
7
APPENDICES
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
Appendix 3:
Introduction for chiefs to Chipuna conservancy development for customary
and protected land in Zambia
Chipuna main partners
The Chipuna roadmap
262
Appendix 1:
Introduction for chiefs to Chipuna conservancy development for customary
and protected land in Zambia
The Chipuna model
As mentioned earlier, a traditional Zambian chair (Chipuna) has three legs, providing strength,
stability and comfort. Development in a chiefdom, in order for it to be sustainable, needs to be carried
out by a Chipuna partnership, its supports made up by the traditional leadership and local government,
investors, and local and international NGOs. It is a sustainable business partnership of equals who
share a common goal of integrating community development with that of biodiversity management. It
is not donor driven or funded; and it will not alienate the land.
The operating partnership
This partnership must be registered as a trust company (limited by guarantee), in full compliance with
the Companies Act (non-profit), having as its trustees the present chief, an investor, and
representatives of the main partner NGO, the Community Resource Board, the District Council in
which the programme is being conducted, and other key stakeholders.
Why do chiefdoms need Chipuna development?
The chiefdoms cover more than 94% of the land in Zambia and contain a wealth of natural resources.
Despite this, development has not come to these areas, and the opportunities for the raising of living
standards are few in a place where villages are scattered and lie far from markets. The Government
does not have the money or the capacity to deliver full development to these areas, and donor support
merely provides a crutch for a man who can walk. The way forward is to encourage investment in
these areas, but investment which comes in as a partner of communities, that supports the traditional
structures and that does not take away the land.
How can a Chipuna assist development?
The Chiefdoms are empowered under the Lands Act No. 29 of 1995 to dispose of land for up to 99
years on leasehold tenure. Driven by a need to generate income, chiefs have sometimes sold off land,
removing it for many years from the community. The Chipuna model ensures that land remains in the
chiefdom’s control, except perhaps for small areas needed for buildings. Chiefdoms also do not own
the wildlife of their areas, this resource being held by Government and given out as yearly hunting
quotas. In support of GRZs policy of de-centralisation, the Wildlife Act of 1998 offers an opportunity
for the community to obtain more powers over its own wildlife resources, its main opportunity for
raising living standards and for wealth creation, giving as one of its main objectives “to facilitate the
active participation of local communities in the management of the wildlife estate”. This Act also
allows for the recognition of Community Resource Boards (CRBs), which, working with the Zambia
Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), may obtain and make use of game quotas. Chipuna makes use of both
the Acts – as well as the proposed Forest Act of 1999 and the National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan (NBSAP) - to lay the groundwork for the future development of conservancies so as to
conserve the biodiversity and, simultaneously, stimulate much needed rural development.
What is the role of Chipuna partners?
i)
The Customary Authority:
The Authority is, along with the investor, the senior partner of the conservancy
development and is responsible for ensuring that secure access to and use of the land is
possible, and that the community are partners in the process.
ii)
The Community Resource Board:
The CRB, being empowered only under the Wildlife Act, is there to assist in the
sustained use of the wildlife resources for the benefit of the community – in particular
in taking ownership of game quotas and for deploying and managing Village Scouts,
protectors of the very resource which is being sustainably utilised.
263
iii)
iv)
The Investor/manager:
The role of the investor/manager is to provide the seed money to start the project, and
to recruit investors. For this to happen there has to be an incentive to do so, as well as
the necessary protection and security of tenure for the investors. The manager will also
have the crucial role of managing a large area of conservancy, one containing scattered
communities, endangered species and national forest. This is a holistic development
requiring experience in wildlife management, biodiversity protection, tourism
development, artisanal and commercial agriculture, forest exploitation, community
development, small business development and so on.
The NGOs:
The NGOs act as umpires between managers and investors, the customary authority,
the community based organisations (CBOs) and Government. They assist the scheme
to grow, and lay the groundwork for long-term sustainability. Crucially, they are
empowered to carry out community development, drawing on money built up in a
development fund.
What will Chipuna conservancy development do in Zambia?
i) It will create a business partnership between the chiefdom and an investor, expressed
in the form of a trust company (limited by guarantee), in which the chiefdom, the
investor/manager, NGOs, CBOs and the District Councils are subscribers.
ii) It will place the ‘use and occupation of the land’ in the hands of the trust company for
a determined period of time.
iii) It will help to empower the CBOs so that they are better able to conserve the natural
resources of the chiefdom for the benefit of all concerned.
iv) It will provide for sustainable agricultural and natural resource development.
v) It will improve livelihoods and, in comparative terms, create wealth.
vi) It will provide food security.
vii) It will provide a framework for donor involvement.
viii) It will provide a model and framework for the delivery of true rural development,
particularly in resource rich areas.
264
Appendix 2:
Chipuna main partners (over page)
GAMEFIELDS
PROJECTSAFRICA
NORMAN CARR FOUNDATION
MISSION STATEMENT
MISSION STATEMENT
MISSION STATEMENT
To provide - in partnership with the
Customary Authority - investment
support for the development of game
conservancies.
OBJECTIVES
• To identify potential game
conservancy areas requiring
investment and development.
• To identify and promote potential
conservancy partnerships (jointventures) with the CA, the
community and government.
• To provide training and capacity
support to the local community for
the sustained management of its
natural resources.
• To provide investment models that
do not alienate land from the
community, but offer security of
tenure and sustained incomes for
the joint-venture partners.
• To foster its partnerships with
ProjectsAfrica and, in Zambia, the
Norman Carr Foundation, so as to
ensure both sustainable
development and the delivery of
ICDPs – particularly those
involving community food
security.
• To foster sound game management
practices and the sustained yield
off-takes of game species.
• To conduct ethically sound trophy
hunting safaris of high quality.
• To promote and conduct lowimpact tourism.
• To enter into PPPs for the
protection and tourismdevelopment of protected areas.
• To enter into PPPs with
government for the building of
private/public sector dialogue and
the building of private sector
capacity.
To provide for Africa, through
partnerships forged between
business, conservation institutions,
government, donors and indigenous
communities - specific, time bound
and investor targeted conservation
projects aimed at poverty alleviation
and food security.
OBJECTIVES
• To promote integrated
conservation and development
programmes and projects
(ICDPs).
• To promote PPPs in order to
deliver both investment and
management support to ICDPs.
• To render assistance and
support to conservation
institutional capacity.
• To lobby for the political
support of ICDPs.
• To promote and support
optimum conservation
governance.
• To provide accurate, analytical
and unbiased information.
• To prioritise trans-frontier
conservation area programmes.
•
To support and contribute to the
United Nations (UN)
Millennium Development goals
(as listed on page 247) recognising that an ecosystem’s
stability is essential for
improving human livelihoods.
265
To support the Zambian constitution and
ZAWA in protecting National Parks, and
in promoting the sustained use of the
biodiversity – particularly within a
Chiefdom.
OBJECTIVES
• To actively manage, in partnership
with ZAWA, certain specified
National Parks.
• To actively seek, in partnership with
the Customary Authority and their
CRBs, investment for the biodiversity
conservation and economic
development of certain specified
game management and open areas.
• To foster the notion of a Central
African Transfrontier Conservation
Area (CATFCA) linking Zaire,
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique.
• To improve livelihoods in GMAs and
Open Areas.
• To lend assistance to ZAWA in such
matters as policy formulation, the
drafting of legislation and other
processes which directly affect the
integrity of the protected areas,
tourism development and the
biodiversity supports of the people.
• To promote effective communication
and co-ordination between all the
role-players.
• To encourage appropriate research so
as to enable the Foundation to achieve
its objectives.
• To encourage and participate in the
growth of appropriate tourism.
• To foster education in traditional
knowledge and culture.
Appendix 3:
The Chipuna Roadmap133
HOW WE ARE TO GET
THERE
3
WHERE WE ARE
1
WHERE WE ARE GOING
2
1
The Chiefdom, without the
means to raise investment
for development, or the
contacts and knowledge to
interest NGOs.
•
Form a joint-venture (JV)
conservancy company with
an investor, with a NGO
partner as referee, give land
usage concessionary rights
to the JV company, and in
some cases lease land to the
JV company.
•
The Chiefdom brings long-term
investment to the area but does
not unnecessarily alienate the
land from the community,
achieving it through the jointventure approach.
2
The lack of properly
empowered community
organisations able to advise
the Chiefdom on the
sustainable use of the
natural resources.
•
Organise CRBs nationally,
fully trained and empowered
with regulations and
administrative procedures;
and support them at
Chiefdom level through
Chipuna. Take seriously the
obligations and
opportunities outlined in the
Wildlife Act 1998 and the
Forestry Act 1999.
•
National Natural Resources
Board formation, and Community
Resource Boards advising the
Chiefdom and driving all natural
resource sustainable development
as originally intended under the
Natural Resources Act of 1962.
3
The steady reduction in the
biodiversity supports to
local communities.
•
Form Chipuna JV
conservancies which give
wildlife usage and
ownership rights to such
JVs, and which thus will
naturally conserve wildlife.
•
High biodiversity levels
supporting, not threatening, the
food security and survival of
local communities.
4
CRBs unable to take up the
opportunities under the
Wildlife Act of 1998 and
therefore impeding
development.
•
CRBs to be fully supported
by Chipuna. Where Chipuna
enters into investment
partnerships, the CRBs will
apply for quotas and through
co-management agreements,
Will be placed in the
conservancy company.
•
The CRBs fully operational
having obtained wildlife usage
rights in return for its
management of the wildlife and
natural resources, a process
spreading to its joint-partnerships
with forestry.
5
Large parts of Chiefdoms
‘locked out’ of
development through the
allocation of hunting
concessions for little
financial returns.
•
The Chipuna partners and
ZAWA to persuade
concessionaires to join with
the conservancy
development movement.
•
The adoption by concessionaires
of the Chipuna principles,
voluntary joining JV
conservancies – supported by
new policy on PWEs, with
greatly expanded financial
returns.
133
Order of reading roadmap: column 1, column 3 and then column 2.
266
HOW WE ARE TO GET
THERE
3
WHERE WE ARE
1
WHERE WE ARE GOING
2
6
GMAs and Open Areas
depleted of wildlife,
bringing no income to
communities.
•
Full support by the Chiefs
and the CRBs for JV
conservancies; and full
support by ZAWA of the
Chipuna development.
•
Depleted parts of the Chiefdom
brought back to health and
earning incomes for
communities.
7
The lack of sustained
supports to microdevelopment projects which
raise living standards.
•
Chipuna partners to install
capacity in the CRBs, and to
broker the projects with
donors which are identified.
•
Full community capacity and
support within the Chipuna
model for the identification,
proposal, donor funding and
implementation of ICDPs.
267
CHAPTER 7:
THE THREE-RIFTS LANDSAFE PROJECT AREA
269
ACRONYMS
AG
ARDRA
BSA Company
COMACO
CRB
DC
D-G
DMU
ECZ
EIA
FRA
GMA
GRZ
HQ
JFM
MMD
MoU
MP
NCE Company
NPWS
OP
PACU
REMNPAS
RHC
SLAMU
SS
WPO
ZAWA
ZIC
Auditor General
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
British South Africa Chartered Company
Community Markets for Conservation
Community Resource Board
District Commissioner
Director General ZAWA
Disaster Management Unit
Environmental Council of Zambia
Environmental Impact Assessment
Food Reserve Agency
Game Management Area
Government of Zambia
Headquarters
Joint Forest Management
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Memorandum of Understanding
Member of Parliament
North Charterland Exploration Company
National Parks and Wildlife Service
Office of the President
Provincial Accounting Control Unit
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
Rural Health Clinic
South Luangwa Management Unit
Sleeping sickness
Wildlife Police Officer
Zambia Wildlife Authority
Zambia Investment Centre
270
PART I:
1
Environment and Natural Resources
INTRODUCTION
The three rift valleys of Zambia’s Eastern Province – Luangwa, Luano and Lukusashi - have
extremely high biodiversity and habitat richness, encompass three perennial rivers, alluvial
plains, hills and scarps, with a fertile plateau area on the east bank, as well as abundant forest
and wildlife resources. The Luembe chiefdom, which includes much of it, is readily accessible
by a five hours drive from Lusaka on a tar road, with 40 km of good dirt road linking Nyimba
with the Chief’s HQ; or – both chiefdoms - from the Great East Road near Rufunsa (two hours
drive), access being across the Lunsemfwa River; and, as well, from Mkushi on the Great North
Road. Perhaps its chief attraction is that it encloses the Luangwa River for some 128 km (80 km
on one side), a river famous for its alluvial zone of riparian forest, its meandering course and
ox-bow lagoons, and, in addition, it takes in much of the pristine Lunsemfwa (321 km) and
Lukusashi (96 km) rivers. The Nyalugwe Chiefdom lies to the south of Luembe, taking in part
of the Lunsemfwa, a stretch of the Luangwa, and its southern sector bordering Mozambique. It
is cut off from the rest of the Open Area by the Great East Road.
Two thirds of the development area is under Senior Chief Luembe, the southern third under
Chief Nyalugwe. To the north is the Mwape chiefdom of Luembe’s sister, and to the west, his
Nyendwa clan relations, Paramount Chief Mboroma (Upper Luano) and Chief Chisomo.
2
THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRAMEWORK
2.1
Physiography and climate
Three-rifts consists of a small area of eastern plateau in Petauke district lying at about a 1,000
metres with giant granite kopjes (Inselbergs) intruding, and towards the Luangwa the old
plateau is dissected and denuded by numerous tributaries falling to about 730 metres or lower in
the Mvuvye basin and below; the incised rift valleys of the Lukusashi, Lunsemfwa and
Luangwa on three sides, riven by a plateau area of the Muchinga Escarpment at about 300
metres. The Luangwa rift is a trough some 645 km long, an ancient depression occupied by
Karoo beds, lowered at the centre during a post-karoo period of faulting and folding. The other
two valleys are similar in structure. Large sections of the Luangwa are filled with colluvial soils
brought down from the escarpment, while old areas of alluvial deposits lie closer to the river.
Great banks of barren shingles and water-worn stones cover parts of the eastern escarpment and
parts of the Lukusashi and Lunsemfwa valleys. The main valley is enclosed by an almost solid
wall of the western escarpment and hills to the east; finally, about 40 km upstream of the
Lunsemfwa/Luangwa confluence, the hills from both sides meet and the Luangwa is cut off
from the other two rivers by the high western range.
Although the climate of Zambia is generally equitable, the valleys grow hot in the period before
the onset of the rains in November, which typically last until early April – though mid-season
droughts do occur. All life is therefore adapted to the long dry season. The rainfall is generally
lower in the valleys than on the plateau to the east or west. Humidity is also lower than in the
northern part of the Luangwa Valley.
2.2
Geology and soils
Zambia was once covered by sedimentary rocks of the Karoo and Katanga systems, now largely
denuded. In the west the basement of ancient rock has been covered by Kalahari sands, brought
from the south-west during the last arid period of the mid-Pleistocene. The troughs of the
Gwembe, Luangwa and Lunsemfwa are covered by younger Karoo soils washed down from the
271
escarpment areas. The soils classified as Lower Valley soils dominate in the three valleys, being
characterised by the mature and heavy brown soils of mopani woodland that have a tendency to
form nodular lime concretions, interspersed by recent intrusions of alluvium of different origins
and without concretions. typically The area is also notable for thicket covered colluvial sandy
soils. The area generally has been cut into and denuded by the numerous watercourses
(revealing shingle belts of water-worn stones), replaced by a wide variety of immature soils that
generally are members of the same series as the brown pedocal soils. The soils of the brown
pedocal class have been formed on the sedimentary beds of the Karoo formation and on old
colluvial and alluvial deposits derived from them. With a tendency to sheet erosion they are
poor for agriculture, developing into deep gullies.
In the Lunsemfwa Valley pinker brown loam soils with a fine sand fraction occur and paler
brown or greyish-buff, generally fine-textured, sandier soils are found elsewhere, but in the
subsoil assume a stronger texture and colour. Lime nodules commonly occur near watercourses.
Between the rivers, the drainage system is often indefinite and soils may remain waterlogged in
the rains. Old anthills packed with lime nodules are found in the upper areas. The soils of the
western flank of the Luangwa appear to be of a much greater age than the normal valley soils.
The more recent alluvial soils are locally derived from the Karoo beds - their origin often being
mica schisms, granites or gneisses and other rocks of the Basement complex of the escarpments
whose residues have been brought down by flood waters. These alluvial beds, being added to
annually, tend to be higher than the fringing mopani belts. These recent alluvial soils,
particularly on the eastern side of the Luangwa, are extremely fertile (Trapnell 1943, p.31).
2.3
Three-Rift’s rivers
2.3.1 Lunsemfwa
The Lunsemfwa River rises at an elevation of about 1,250 metres to the north of Mkushi and
just south of the Congo Pedicle, and flows south. It is impounded at the Mita Hills Dam for
hydroelectric power generation with a reservoir of about 30 km long by 3-5 km wide, and with
an additional power station at Lunsemfwa Falls.
About 30 km below the dam it enters the Lunsemfwa Wonder Gorge which is 20 km long, up to
500 metres deep, and about 1km wide at the top. The Lunsemfwa is later joined by the
Lukusashi River, which in turn flows into the Luangwa.
2.3.2 Lukusashi
The Lukusashi, which rises on the Congo/Zambezi divide, runs parallel to the Luangwa. The
river is crystal clear with fertile river banks used by scattered and small villages to grow two
crops a year.
2.3.3 Luangwa
The Luangwa rises in the Mafinga Hills in north-east Zambia near the Tanzania and Malawi
borders, and flows in a south-westerly direction through a broad valley. The river continually
shifts its course, leaving behind ox-bow lagoons and abandoned meanders, an area of alluvium
recognised as being of considerable importance by the Ramsar Convention. It is bounded to the
west by the Muchinga Escarpment, and low hills to the east. At the southern end of the Luembe
Chiefdom it enters a gorge, then later meanders through a narrow sandy plain where it joins the
Zambezi.
272
2.4
Vegetation
2.4.1 Soil associations
Villagers are keen judges of vegetation and soils as a guide to good agricultural areas. Miombo
(Brachystegia-Isoberlinia woodland), associated with the older plateau soils, as in Luembe is
found on the flanking escarpments and on the Muchinga mountains that cleave the Lukusashi
and Luangwa valleys. Local dense thickets belts of Kirkia, Pterocarpus, Combretum and
Commiphora are distributed through the mopani areas on sandier soils derived from the Karoo,
while Acacia and the associated Combretum occur in alluvial areas; one spectacular climax
forest of Acacia tortilis gracing the east bank of the mid-Lukusashi River south of Chinika.
Villagers recognise stands of Hyparrhenia, which form dense and tall beds in the rains, as being
areas of potentially high soil fertility. On the other hand, species such as Trichopteryx superba
and T. simplex indicate poor soils and are avoided. Acacia, an efficient nitrogen fixer, is a sure
guide to fertility, while Uapaca spp. denotes poor soils, usually associated with impermeable
ironstone pans. Native agriculturists look for old high woodland or dense thicket, including
bamboo thickets Oxytenanthera abbyssinica, of which watercourses are well stocked; and tall
and luxuriant grass with open rather than closed tree canopies, and the presence or dominance of
well grown Brachystegia hockii, B. Burtii, with Baphia spp, Bauhinia petersiana, large
Erythrophloeuum, Combretum with trees of the family Papilionaceae, Bauhinia thonnongii,
Zizyphus and Sclerocarya caffra; and the absence of miombo or mopani (Trapnell 1943, p.35).
2.4.2 Physiographic associations (after Trapnell 1943)
Roughly speaking, the areas above 3,000 feet are covered generally with miombo, deciduous
woodland comprising mainly Brachystegia-Isoberlinia associations, while other species
belonging to such families as Acacia, Colophospermum (mopani), Afrormosia, Pterocarpus,
Combretum occur lower down, in particular as follows:
Permanent streams
Adina microcephala, Khyya nyassica (Mururu), Trichilia emetica
(Musikili)
Dry streams
Acacia, Ficus and Kigelia pinnata (Mufungwa), Tamarindis indica
(Musika)
Higher ground
Brachystegia (Musamba), Isoberlinia (Sandwe), Dyosperos mespiliformis
(Muchenja), Cordyla Africana (Mtondo)
Stony ground
Terminalia (Kabesya), Commiphora, the ubiquitous Diplorhyncus
mossambicensis (Mwenje), Afzelia quanzenzis (Mupapa), Pterocarpus
angolensis (Mulombe)
Valleys
The grass, Pennisetum purpureum (Malenge), the reed, Phragmites
communis (Mitete)
Small streams
The bamboo, used for making grain bins and hut construction,
Oxytenanthera abbyssinica (Ntere)
2.5
Agriculture
Agricultural land is confined mainly to the plateau terrace on the eastern side of the Luangwa,
and to the dense thicket areas found on sandy soils on Karoo beds, noteworthy in the
273
Lunsemfwa, and the alluvial belts derived from the Basement rocks of the escarpment and
adjoining plateau areas (Trapnell 1943, p.31). In 1904, note was made of the bounteous crops134
grown by the Nsenga of the plateau, these people now much intermarried with the Ambo of
Mwape and Luembe, and with the Tande of Nyalugwe. From the Luangwa Bridge to Nyimba
there are agricultural soils on miombo on either side of the road, with the area between
Kachalola and the Mozambique border long known for its cotton, maize, soya and sunflower
planted by the pioneer, Kachalola Broomfield. With the development of rural electrification and
ready access to a good road, this area, that of the Nyimba River Valley in Luembe and the land
bordering the West Mvuvye National Forest holds out great promise for agriculture.
2.6
Wildlife and hunting (Appendix 1)
All of the Three-rifts is good game country, though, as most of the human settlement is in the
more accessible Open Area on the east bank of the Luangwa, it is generally depleted. The west
bank of the Luangwa is taken up by the West Petauke GMA, classified as a supposedly Prime
safari hunting area, but in reality much plundered - although promising potential for a return to
its former status as well populated game country.
West Petauke is one of the few GMAs that do not adjoin a National Park, and is therefore at a
disadvantage in not receiving a steady flow of wildlife immigration. It carries most of the
common Luangwa species, except wildebeest, and it is likely that it contained some of the last
black rhino in Zambia, unconfirmed reports still being received by the author of their spoor. 135
Elephant are now rare visitors to the Lukusashi Valley as a result of poaching, though they are
common on the Luangwa. Buffalo numbers are much reduced, their behaviour - in going hard
downwind of hunters - evidence of severe predation by man. Hippo – particularly alpha males –
have also been heavily reduced by poachers and hunters, as have adult male lion. All other
species are depleted due to the poaching and excessive fires – particularly grazers.
3
3.1
KEY ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Fire
Three-rifts and the rest of the country today suffers from dry season pyromania. Whatever
controls were once exerted by the Native Authority and the Provincial Administration; or by the
government departments responsible for National Parks and protected forest areas; or before
that, the chiefs, are now wholly absent. In Protectorate days the influence of the Forestry
Department on fire policy was considerable, early burning being promoted so as to protect
forests from damaging late fires. Furthermore, the Game Department in Northern Rhodesia,
without the finance and manpower, and with a massive protected area estate to care for, were
forced to carry out a concerted early burning campaign so as to avoid the late dry-season hot
fires that removed much of the grazing at a time when grazing species were more concentrated
around water and therefore more vulnerable. Additionally, they set fire to the grass in order to
produce green grass for the game (Savory & Butterfield 1999, p.184). However, it was then
generally accepted policy that fires should not be lit after mid to end July.
The effects of early burning are considerable: the soil is exposed, rendering the
surface biologically inactive; vegetation is converted to ash and, although it does
encourage plant growth when the rain finally comes, it dissolves the ash and
transports it into the soil, but the only mineral contribution is potash and a little
phosphorus, the nitrogen being completely lost; organic colloids are also lost
134
Mapira and Chimanga were the staple crops, with a variety of beans, sweet potatoes and yams also
grown. Petauke District Notebook, 1904, P. 462.
135
Animal sign.
274
subjecting the soil to much more violent leaching when the rains set in, the salts
being washed away; erosion of the plateau soils with their poor crumb structure
increases through the destruction of organic material; water run-off is increased
considerably; legumes and large leaved herbs disappear; annual, palatable
grasses are burnt off, as are some sensitive perennials; the land drifting
inexorably into a xeric and de-hydrated state. (Darling 1960, p.82).
The fact that fires now consume the whole country in the dry season; and that the once great
herds of buffalo, other grazers and their predators have declined so precipitously (greatly
reducing the natural disturbance to soil surfaces and vegetation essential to re-seeding), is one of
the prime factors leading to desertification (Savory & Butterfield 1999, p.182). The reduction of
buffalo in the southern part of the Kafue National Park and its environs may be ascribed to
predation by man and the effects on the savannah by rampant fires. In the Three-rifts, a naturally
dry area with low rainfall and humidity, a similar situation is ongoing - the land, with its one
great converter of woody stem to palatable leaf depleted, fire being rampant, is becoming ever
more brittle and thus ever more unproductive.
One of the areas where some fire records exist is the Kafue National Park, which together with
its GMAs, is twice the size of Belgium and comprises 10% of Zambia. After a thirty-three year
absence from the Park, a former Kafue biologist reported the Nkala River and Shakalongo Plain
areas near the old Park HQ as being desertified and vacant, where once reedbuck and waterbuck
existed in profusion. He also reported the Nkala Forest as being seriously damaged - the result
of repeated fire. ‘Without a concerted effort by us all to control bush fires Kafue National Park
will continue to burn every year and allow desertification in Zambia’s giant National Park to
carry on as part of an annual tragedy’ (Moss 2009).
This burning of vegetative biomass, which creates a pall of smoke over the savannah and
grasslands of Africa in the mid to late dry season, contributes to the phenomenon of global
dimming, where a percentage of sunlight is reflected back into the atmosphere from this screen
of smoke. Alarmists have concluded that this global dimming is masking the alleged effect of
global warming and that the global warming problem was therefore much worse than expected.
3.2
Tsetse fly
The Luangwa has only been populated by tsetse fly for the last hundred years, cattle being
regularly driven down from the north until the end of the nineteenth–century. BSA Company
officials reported cases of Sleeping Sickness (SS) and the first recordings of deaths in 1910, and
from about 1925-1935 it was a significant mortality factor, eventually leading to the removal of
much of the population from the lowlands of the Luangwa. From 1912-1925, the Luangwa was
declared a ‘sleeping sickness area’ and was closed to non-residents (i.e. Europeans). From June
1911 to April 1912, a commission was based at Nabwalya to investigate the reasons for the
outbreak. The final movement of people took place in 1931 from the 10,000 square mile North
Charterland Exploration Company concession (NCE Company) on the east bank of the
Luangwa (which had taken over Mwape and what is now Luembe’s country), to the Ambo
Reserve. In a tour of the District in 1935, five people in the last throes of SS were found in the
Ambo Reserve, the symptoms being swollen faces and abdomen, and extreme lassitude. The
mortality in this area was 66/100, a villager in Lisati village commenting, ‘If they keeps us here
another year there will be no need to worry to move us. We shall all be dead’. This village had
shrunk from 34 people in 1930 to 16 people in 1935. The area particularly hard hit in Petauke
district lay between the Luangwa/ Mvuvye Rivers and the Lusangazi/Luangwa confluence. In
October 1930, the Assistant-Director of Medical Services had advised that villages should move
closer for protection and that the bush around the villages should be cleared. This was carried
out in the area around Katipa on the Mvuvye/Luangwa confluence. However instead of
improving matters, it made them worse. The DC wrote, ‘Grave error in condemning these
275
natives to live in an area known for many years to be infected with sleeping sickness and
humanity demands that they should be moved elsewhere without delay’ (Watmore 1935, p.380).
In 1936, Chieftainess Mwape requested the Acting Governor to allow her and her people to
return to their former home. This was refused on the grounds that Mwape’s ancestors had sold
the land to the NCE Company. However, he said that they would make moves to deal with the
tsetse fly in her old home as well as in the reserve where she was presently situated (Dundas
1936, p.363).
In January - November 1978, a tsetse survey of the Lunsemfwa Valley was undertaken as cases
of sleeping sickness had been reported there (cattle being absent from the area since 1939).
Overall, 2,877 Glossina morsitans morsitans and 182 G. pallidipes were caught. An infection
rate of 6.6% of morsitans and 6.0% of pallipedes by Trypanosoma vivax was recorded. Only 1
G.m. morsitans was infected with T.congolense; and no brucei-group trypanosomes were found.
It was observed, however, that because identifications were based only on the site of infection
and, as it is difficult to detect trypanosomes in the gut and salivary glands of preserved flies
(unless very heavily infected), this could mean that some infections, apparently only in the
proboscis, were in fact T.congolense or even perhaps of the brucei group (Hudson et al 1981).
3.3
Animal predation on villagers
The problem of damage to life and property by wildlife - given increased human populations
and ZAWA incapacity - is poorly attended to, leaving villagers exposed and subject to greater
food insecurity, this exacerbated by the refusal of the Government to pay compensation on the
pretext that it is not covered in the Wildlife Act. The aforementioned - a major factor in rural
poverty where populations of wildlife exist - is not even mentioned in Zambia’s Poverty
Reduction Strategy. However, legal opinion is that ZAWA (as the ‘owner’ of wildlife being
supported on their land), and therefore Government, is liable to pay compensation for losses
incurred through legal precedent under English Common Law (on which Zambian statutory law
is based) (P Mvunga, 2006, personal communication, April). The likely effect of this will be to
persuade ZAWA that devolution in respect of wildlife ownership is inevitable. All of this
highlights the need for rural communities to be afforded legal representation and an organisation
that will fight for their eco-social rights.
In the Three-rifts, as elsewhere in Zambia, there is an uneven, though mutually parasitic,
relationship between wildlife and people; the one preying on the other, and in turn being
supported by the other. This relationship was altered by the British occupation and the inherited
template of Westminster Government that the native Africans continued with after British
departure, with restrictions on hunting certain species being imposed, as well as restrictions on
certain areas of settlement. However, in British times, in the 1930’s and onwards, it was
recognised that in certain areas large populations of elephant threatened villagers’ food security,
with action being taken in the form of the Game Control Department and eventually evolving
into a highly centralised quango (ZAWA), where income generation predominates over villager
protection.136
The fact that animal impacts on villagers is a highly emotive issue, is confirmed by a speech of
a rural MP:137
“Mr Speaker, ZAWA goes into rural areas to cheat the people that the wildlife
belongs to the nation and not local people, when, in fact, it is not true. They
136
Chief Luembe thanks acting Governor for assistance rendered by the Elephant Control Department, 30
November 1936, in the Petauke District Notebook, p. 363.
137
Mr Nguni (Chama South), Daily parliamentary debates for the first session of the Ninth Assembly,
Thursday, 5th December 2002.
276
collect, for example, money through licences for hunting. They eat even the little
portion they allocate for the local people, leaving hopeless people exposed. How
will the local people understand the value of the inconvenience they sustain from
wildlife that loots their fields? I can rest assure that one of these fine days, they
will shut the doors to ZAWA in rural areas so that, maybe, we can deliberately
deplete those animals because we do not see economic benefits from the
inconvenience of an elephant coming to gore somebody. I have not seen the
advantages of keeping lions that are going to eat people and if you kill it, you are
going to be hanged. They are using the most primitive methods of torture. Mr
Speaker, the situation that exists on the sharing of the portions of revenue
generated from wildlife leaves much to be Indianred. If K1billion has been
generated, 20 per cent goes to the rural area and 80 per cent remains with
ZAWA. ZAWA does not provide any social facilities in the rural areas. They
claim that they own the wildlife, people walk in footpaths at the risk of snakes,
lions and buffaloes which we are not allowed to kill. When people die, they do
not respond. On the contrary, when an elephant dies, they come in huge
numbers. We cannot accept that kind of situation.”
To this, in Nyimba district, was added the voice of its former MP (Gray): ‘where most of the
land has been turned into game ranches and people cannot grow any food… in the previous
season, the district only produced 10 per cent of its annual maize production’.138 In fact only
two game ranches existed at the time in the area totalling some 40,000 ha, this being in the
region of 2% of the land available for planting; a good example of the sort of misinformation
and deliberate lying in order to exact a benefit: food relief.
In Three-rifts, villagers are prone to attack by hippo, crocodile, lion, elephant and buffalo. In
2008, the local political official at Chitumbi village was killed and eaten by lion while on his
way back from the river where he had gone to collect meat from a hippo shot by ZAWA.
In the dry season of 2006, a study of animal-human conflicts was initiated by the author in the
Open Area/GMA interface on the Luangwa River, within Luembe. In the Nyambweka,
Musharira and Chitumbi villages it was confirmed that damage to crops and fruit trees was
caused by hippo, elephant, baboon, bushpig and porcupine, with the villagers inland in the Open
Area suffering limited damage from bushpig, baboon and porcupine, all of this confirming facts
long known (Frauman 2008).
3.4
Human predation on wildlife
People have, since their arrival in Three-rifts, eaten a wide variety of insects, birds, mammals
and fish, using an equally varied means of capturing or killing what they hunt. They tend not to
eat any animal with claws; or hares, lemurs, ratels and mongoose, though they do eat monkeys,
and some of them baboon. Unlike the Kunda tribe further up the Luangwa, they also eat hippo.
Such bush-food is not a factor in the depletion of the animals supported on these customary
lands, whereas a major factor is the failure of ZAWA to monitor hunting and fishing licences
issued by them and the Fisheries Department to citizen non-residents (who simply keep killing
animals on the same licence), the overshooting of lion, hippo and elephant under the hunting
safari system, and the serious plunder by commercial gangs for bushmeat and ivory. These
gangs include Village Scouts within the CRB and their supervisory ZAWA Wildlife Police
Officers (WPOs), with the tacit support of ZAWA hierarchy, the Zambia Police and their
paramilitary, and other links in the patronage chain. The principal animals targeted are buffalo,
hippo and in particular, elephant (Manning 2007a), (Manning 2007b), (Manning 2007c),
138
Mr R. Gray, MP Nyimba, Maiden speech to Parliament, 5th December 2002.
277
(Manning 2007d). In instances where ZAWA officers have been caught red-handed, they have
not been prosecuted (Manning 2007e).
The meat from these elephant, hippo and decimated herds of buffalo, apart from what is used
locally, is carried to the villages of Rufunsa and Lukwipa on the Great East Road and sold
openly. Much of it is also used locally to purchase favours or the labour of villagers, or sent on
to Nyimba ZAWA HQ where it is sold or shared out (Manning 2007f). The ivory, as already
established, follows the traditional route through Malawi and on to one of Singapore, Manila,
Hong Kong, Taiwan and eventually, Japan and China.
The CRB for the Luembe Chiefdom of Zambia's southern Luangwa Valley took the decision to
suspend all their 12 Village Scouts on Thursday, 30 August 2006. This action by the CRB and
its Chairman, Axon Lungu, was highly significant, for along with the Nabwalya CRB further up
in the Luangwa (who opposed the removal of Mbeza Safaris by ZAWA without due legal
process), it showed the beginnings of resistance by rural people - on whom GMAs were
imposed - against the increasingly heavy hand of ZAWA and that of some corrupt chiefs, in the
management of their lives.
Zambia has been in the grip of patronage harvesting by the very people supposed to protect
wildlife for over 30 years. On 3 July 2007, the Secretary of the Luembe Headmen Traditional
Committee wrote in outrage to the Director-General of ZAWA, saying that nothing was being
done about the poaching of elephant and other game. In particular, he produced proof of the
involvement of the ZAWA WPO Ben Mwale in the killing of two elephant, and of the ZAWA
official in Nyimba, Collins Chibeka for collecting bags of meat and taking it to Lusaka. He also
supplied an affidavit signed by 27 men and women, admitting that they had worked in Ben
Mwale's fields in return for elephant meat. The Association has yet to receive a reply, and
Mwale, Mbo and Chibeka have not been suspended, nor prosecuted. A few months later, Ben
Mwale was given a pair of tusks recovered from an elephant by a fisherman (Ghandi), the latter
later alleging that he had not been paid, nor the tusks sent in to Nyimba ZAWA office.
Furthermore, no action has been taken by ZAWA to suspend the Village Scouts. In a previous
incident the author had caught Mbo and Village Scouts at their meat filled poaching camp, and
had found Chibeka waiting nearby at another camp for delivery of the meat. Although taken to
the police, they declined to press charges on the grounds that no bullet could be found in the
impala. Village Scouts poach excessively as they are not being paid by ZAWA.
A report compiled by the SLAMU CBNRM unit in Nyimba reported that forty-four former and
current Village Scouts, bookkeepers and boatmen had not been paid for an average of fourteen
months (Nkhoma 2009). Some former Scouts have been owed money for three years or more.
3.5
HIV/AIDS
That HIV/Aids is a significant mortality factor in Zambia is indisputable, though it manifests
mainly along the truck routes and in the towns. In the villages of Three-rifts it appears to have
less of an impact than alarmist literature would have one believe, for there are traditional
supports which discourage the behaviour that leads to HIV/Aids. The fact that villagers there do
not differentiate between magic and therapeutic components to medical (muyanda)
prescriptions, may form a bulwark against a disease such as HIV/Aids, as opposed to
tuberculosis, for which they have no antidote. However, infected villagers are left to their own
devices with no support from the chief, the state or donors; and conventional work carried out
by churches tends to be top-down palliative efforts that are not utilised by villagers to any great
extent.
278
3.6
Mining and hydro-electric generation
The spectre of major perturbations to land untouched by man is close at hand. The Luano Valley
Uranium-Coal Project – in the Lunsemfwa rift - comprises two licence areas, Lunsemfwa and
Bulonga, and is part of the Exploration Agreement with Albidon Limited. The two areas cover
part of two Albidon Prospecting Licences (Bulonga covers part of PLLS.246 Kamoto, and
Lunsemfwa covers part of PLLS.247 Lunsemfwa), and have a combined area of 6,970 km2
covering Karoo sediments.139 Were these to be developed, particularly uranium with the
impossibility of curbing the pollution inherent to this, this prime wilderness area would be
destroyed.
The Lunsemfwa lends itself to hydro-schemes and it is therefore very likely that plans are
already afoot to dam the area where it enters the gorge.
PART II:
4
Luembe
LOCATION
The Luembe chiefdom falls within Nyimba District in the Eastern Province of Zambia, taking
up all of the Luembe part of the West Petauke GMA (west bank of the Luangwa). Its boundaries
are as follows: from the Petauke-Serenje district boundary intersection with the Luangwa River
at the Chisani Rapids, down the Luangwa to a line leading west to a point below the
Lunsemfwa/Lukusashi rivers confluence, thence up the Lukusashi to the Mulembo River, then
up the Mulembo to its intersection with the Petauke-Serenje boundary and back to the Luangwa.
Luembe consists only of customary land in which both leasehold (99-years renewable) and
customary tenure applies. Within this area are two categories of land imposed by the Zambia
Wildlife Act of 1998:
4.1
Luembe Open Area (Luangwa East bank)
This takes in all the land between the West Mvuvye National Forest to the east and down to the
Luangwa, and south as far as the Mbizi Ranch boundary at Ndevu, and north to the M’nyamadzi
River, the southern boundary of the M’nyamadzi Game Ranch. Both these game ranches were
once Luembe customary land.
4.2
GMA section (Luangwa west bank)
This takes in Luembe’s country on the west bank of the Luangwa within the West Petauke
GMA between the Luangwa and the Lukusashi Rivers, and south to the Nyalugwe Chiefdom
and north to the Chisomo Chiefdom.
4.3
West Mvuvye National Forest
West Mvuvye lies just north of the land alienated to M’nyamadzi, and to the east of much of the
Open Area.
139
URL:http://Publicity: African Energy Resources Limited, Perth, Australia.
http://www.africanenergyresources.com/projects/zambia.html. Accessed: 2010-02-04. (Archived by
WebCite® at http://www.webcitation.org/5nIDrVCgT).
279
5
THE AMBO TRIBE
5.1
Location
Luembe forms the core of the Ambo tribe’s country which consists of five chiefdoms straddling
three districts: Mkushi, Serenje and Petauke; and two provinces: Central and Eastern, with Chief
Chisomo falling within Serenje, Chiefs Mwape and Luembe in Petauke, and Chiefs Mboshya
and Mboroma in Mkushi. To the west, the Ambo country includes the Chifukunya Hills, to the
north the South Luangwa National Park, to the south the Lunsemfwa River, and to the east some
twenty kilometres or so of the eastern bank of the Luangwa.
5.2
History
The Ambo are a Bantu people of Congolese origin (Luba), who, because of land pressure and
food shortages, moved to the Luapula in the early 1800’s, then into the Congo Pedicle
(Bukanda), and later moving east into the Nsenga country that then incorporated the Lukusashi,
Lunsemfwa140 and Luangwa valleys, tarrying first on the Mlembo River. This movement was
remarkably similar in time and motivation to that of the tribes to the south that spread out far
and wide in a diaspora known as the Difaquane – some of them, such as the Ngoni and Kololo,
moving into the territory as well. The immigration of people still continues today with refugees
escaping to present day Zambia from Angola, Congo and Zimbabwe, and in pre-self-governing
days, immigrants still arriving there from Congo as late as the 1940’s. The chiefdoms are ruled
by matrilineages of the Nyendwa Clan, the first four originating from the founder, Kunda
Mpanda, who, coming from the Mulembo River, defeated some minor Nsenga chiefs, probably
headmen (as in 1902 the Nsenga appeared to have no recognised chiefs141), and took up their
territory, and was then himself killed and subsequently buried on the Mulembo. Today the
descendants of Kunda Mpanda have the honorific title of Kankomba (scraper of pots), with the
Paramount chief of the Nyendwa royal clan (Mboroma as the line is presently called) still
referred to by that name (Stefaniszyn 1956, p.17).
5.3
The Luembe chiefdom
Luembe is the senior chief of the Ambo in the Petauke/Nyimba area, forming a closely knit
political unit with the Mwape Chiefdom - a chiefdom inherited in the female line and which
supplies a son for the Luembe seat. On the death of an Ambo chief, the successor is selected
from the surviving matrikin (family on the female side) of the family. In the case of Luembe, on
his death or impeachment, his successor is selected from the surviving sons of Chieftainess
Mwape – a chief subordinate to Luembe, and to Mboroma – the latter the Paramount chief of
the Ambo in whom the right to trade in ivory was held and used to trade for ‘the wealth’ - this
being guns and calico (this monopoly was called Kulya nsofu, the meat of the elephant, but from
the time of the original Paramount Chief Mboroma, this monopoly faded). A candidate for an
Ambo chieftainship from a minor matrilineage, other than that of the deceased or impeached, is
inconceivable. A chief is selected by headmen of the land – whom he has no power to appoint as well as by his close matrikin. The selection of a chief is supposed to be primarily by people
of the land since village headmen acting as councillors, mpemba, either accept the proposed
heir, or else he is passed over in favour of a man of more equitable temperament and greater
ability (Stefaniszyn 1964, p.53).
Recently, the Luembe Chiefdom was in the midst of a major attempt to remove its chief, Senior
Chief Luembe, for selling off their land and a litany of complaints concerning human rights
abuses carried out by him against them. Removed once from office, then replaced without
140
Now incorrectly called the Luano Valley, the name taken from the Lala speaking, Lwano tribe, people
inhabiting the valley’s western end.
141
Petauke District Notebook, National Archives, Lusaka, 1902, P. 461
280
recourse to traditional systems by the Minister of Local Government, he was due to appear in
the Kabwe High Court in June 2007. Investigations were also at one time underway against him
for his attempt to illegally alienate part of the adjoining West Mvuvye National Forest No. 54 as
promised. He also failed to place a caveat against the 99-year alienation of the M’nyamadzi
Game Ranch. At the time the chief was a co-director and trustee of the Luembe Conservancy
Trust (not to be confused with the Royal Luembe Trust) - whose mission was to conserve the
wildlife and land for the benefit of the villagers – and had at the same time given his blessing
for the same area to be taken over by the Trust in a joint forest management agreement with the
Department of Forestry.
At the end of May 2008, the House of Chiefs conducted a two-day inquiry at Kalanshya School
in Luembe. Six chiefs interviewed Luembe, the community and the family line headed by
Develias Besa Phiri – allegedly the legitimate chief. In October of 2008, the House of Chiefs
reported as follows:142
The late Senior chief Luembe (White Chibuye) – deceased 1990 - had appointed
Develias Besa Phiri to take over from him as Senior Chief Luembe upon his
death and had requested Phiri, a teacher, to be transferred to a nearby school so
that he could groom him for the chieftaincy, the Ministry of Education
complying with the request. On his death, the chieftaincy was passed by
Chieftainess Mwape to her son, Francis Kalungu Njovu, who has been acting
chief since 1991, though his appointment having not been recognised by
government. In 2005, the House of Chiefs removed Njovu’s stamp as Senior
Chief Luembe. The Nyimba District Council had failed to safeguard important
documents in the wrangle, many having gone missing.
The House then recommended the following:
i)
The original arrangement where the lineage of the senior sister succeeded
to the Luembe throne and the junior sisters’ lineage succeeded to the
Mwape throne should be maintained.
ii) The family of Develias Besa Phiri from the senior sister should select a
person to succeed to the Luembe throne.
iii) Chieftainess Mwape should only play an advisory role in matters
concerning succession to the Luembe throne.
In March of 2009, the Zambian President took the advice of the House of Chiefs and gave
orders for the removal of Njovu, confirmed by a notice in the Government Gazette. The
inauguration of Develias Besa Phiri as the new Senior Chief Luembe was expected in July 2009
but political machinations continue to tamper with due traditional process, the Nyimba District
Commissioner being removed after numerous complaints that he was delaying the inauguration,
having formed a liaison with Chieftainess Mwape, Luembe’s sister. In November, the State
President re-appointed Francis Njovu as Senior Chief Luembe. The family of Develias Phiri
then made a legal declaration on the matter, and now await a High Court decision.
5.4
Land tenure
The Ambo people, in common with other tribal nations in the territory, have the right to a
garden within their chief’s country, the individual choosing the land under the direction of the
headman and in consultation with the villagers. This allocation would be reported to the chief,
something he would not refuse. The elderly and widows are given land close to the villages by
headmen; village sites being apportioned by the chiefs since the 1940’s or earlier. In the early
142
House of Chiefs report on the succession wrangles in Petauke and Nyimba district, October 2008.
281
part of the BSA Company administration, new village sites required the permission of the
Native Commissioner in order to prohibit the establishment of small and isolated villages.143
5.5
Customary land alienations
5.5.1 Introduction
Mwape and Luembe were the first chiefdoms to sell off all of their land on the east bank of the
Luangwa River to the North Charterland Exploration Company (NCE Company). More than a
hundred years later, having been given back their land, Chiefs Luembe, Mwape and Nyalugwe
have all sold off customary land greatly in excess of 250 ha. without the agreement of their
headmen and subjects, but with the consent of the District Councils and the Commissioner of
Lands. One current case involves Chieftainess Mwape: she sold that part of the West Mvuvye
National Forest (No. 54) once under the Mwape chieftainship – even though it is now fully
protected state land. The buyer, Zaeed Patel, with the assistance of land agents (Thomas
Mwengwe), the Council of Mwape chieftainship and a few headmen agents, signed an MoU on
12 March 2005, and with the assistance of their Lusaka-based attorney received 99-year
leasehold title from the Commissioner of Lands. This was done despite the fact that the Luembe
Conservancy Trust was negotiating a Joint Forest Management (JFM) lease with the
Department of Forestry in respect of all of the Mvuvye, as well as for an MoU with the Mwape
Chiefdom. This would have allowed the latter to derive benefits from its former traditional area
of ownership. And carried out despite the Luembe Trust assisting the Chieftainess in her efforts
to reclaim another area of land alienated by her late mother to the Petauke District Council, and
later obtained by a Mr Iqbal Alloo. Following complaints from the author and the brother of
Mwape and Luembe, the Patel lease was supposedly cancelled by the Attorney-General on the
advice of the Surveyor-General. But this was not done. No investigation has ever been
conducted by the Anti-Corruption Commission or the Commission for Investigations
concerning the actions of the Forestry Department, the Nyimba Council, the Chieftainess, the
Commissioner of Lands, or the attorney who facilitated the process. Furthermore, certain
reporters of The Post Newspaper, normally vigilant in these matters, also declined to report the
matter.
On the 24 June 2006, Senior Chief Luembe signed an MoU establishing a partnership between
the land speculators, Messrs Baldry and Younger and the Luembe customary community, for
the future alienation of that part of the West Mvuvye National Forest that had once been part of
the Luembe chiefdom. This did not eventuate in alienation.
5.5.2 Mbizi Ranch
Mbizi Ranch – bordering on the Nyalugwe Chiefdom in the Open Area - was obtained by Indian
businessmen in 1995 under 99-year leasehold. In this they were assisted by the Lands Act of
1995 that made such alienations possible for the first time. No evidence exists of any benefit of
the sale to the customary community. The property was later sold to an American businessman
for a considerable sum, again with no benefit accruing to the community from the purchase. The
present owners have built a clinic and computer facility, and maintain a road to Ndevu. The
property is once more up for sale.
5.5.3 M’nyamadzi Ranch
The 10,500 ha. ranch in question (property No. f/10005; certificate of title No. L9879), is on a
25-year provisional lease, registered 9th March 2001, though obtained in 1998, without any
143
Land tenure, Petauke District Notebook, 1912, P. 218.
282
benefit to the community and with Senior Chief Luembe failing to place a caveat with the
Ministry of Lands preventing it being alienated to 99-year leasehold.
In a letter written in 2004, by the Luembe CRB to ZAWA, they stated:
The M’nyamadzi section of Luembe was given to a foreigner by Senior Chief
Luembe, with the agreement of the Nyimba District Council, and the obtaining
of an investment licence from the Zambia Investment Centre (ZIC) for a
provisional lease of 14 years. The agreement with the ZIC required the owner to
fence the property and develop certain infrastructure. This has not been done and
we have discovered that the lease has been illegally extended to 25 years on the
original document held by the Commissioner of Lands. And more, without
consulting us as required by the Wildlife Act, a hunting quota was issued to the
Company to conduct hunting safaris without our involvement and without the
knowledge of local ZAWA officers. And we understand that certain species
have been shot without ZAWA officers being present, some of these species
(such as lions) which are very scarce in our open area, and for which we have
received no income. As well, we have discovered that workers employed by
M’nyamadzi have been poaching animals.
The Luembe CRB therefore urgently request the following:144
i) That no quota be issued in the future to M’nyamadzi.
ii) That a copy of the quota and the species shot be given to us.
iii) That all money from licence and concession fees be given to the CRB, as
well as compensation for our having to come to Lusaka and to hire lawyers
to represent us.
iv) That M’nyamadzi report on how the meat from the animals was given to
the community.
v) That the M’nyamadzi do what they have agreed to do under their
investment permit, meaning they must fence the property in such a way that
it is with our agreement, and within the next six months.
vi) That they must then buy the species inside the fence and pay the full price
to the Luembe CRB/ZAWA.
vii) That any other species within the Luembe hunting block and Open Area
which they may wish to buy to be agreed to only with our permission and
with certain conditions given by us, and that the price be negotiated by us
and ZAWA.
viii) That ZAWA supports us and our patron and his headmen, in obtaining
direct benefits from our wildlife for our community.
No reply was ever received to this letter, nor to an application by the community for harvesting
rights to wildlife in the remaining part of the Open Area, as allowed under the Wildlife Act.
The Luembe Trust then took the matter further, inquiring of ZAWA as to the actual boundaries
between the game ranch and the GMA across the river, and ZAWA confirming that the entire
river was included in the GMA. The Surveyor-General in the Ministry of Lands stated that
private land may not encroach closer than 60 metres from the Luangwa, although hippo and
crocodile are annually issued on quota by ZAWA to the ranch for safari hunting, ZAWA
therefore issuing licences for animals to be shot outside of unfenced private land, and on
customary land, or by their own definition, on GMA land. No EIA by the Environmental
Council of Zambia (ECZ) of the present fence construction has been carried out, nor any
144
Letter by Chairman Luembe CRB and Senior Chief Luembe to ZAWA, 9 November 2004.
283
consultations with the local community, the Mbeza concessionaire, or the Forestry Department;
as is required by the Fencing Ordinance of the Agricultural Lands Act. Furthermore, the quotas
issued for the ranch are not sustainable for the area, with offtakes obviously denuding the West
Mvuvye National Forest to the north, the Nyimba Open Area to the south and the West Petauke
Hunting Concession to the west (the Nyimba Open Area in Luembe having been set aside for
use as a community game ranch under a usufruct lease managed by the Luembe Conservancy
Trust and negotiated in 2003). Scrutiny of the two quota sets is evidence of corruption within
ZAWA/SLAMU.
6
KAZUMBA OPEN AREA SECTION
The lower terrace of the Open Area lying between M’nyamadzi Ranch and Mbizi Ranch was
vested in the Luembe Conservancy Trust in 2003 for use as a community game ranch. In 2005,
on the removal of Luembe from the chieftainship, he arranged to sell part of the area to a
Petauke trader, Ridwaan Munshi, bribing headmen and receiving an undisclosed sum and
promises of a new vehicle. Munshi then allegedly bribed a Nyimba District Councillor who
backdated the application.145 Munshi later withdrew as a result of threats of legal action. As a
result of this, relations between the author and Luembe was strained to the extent that the Trust
was unable to function for four years. In early 2009, the Trust agreed to continue working for
the benefit of the community and the chief was once more paid an allowance as co-director of
the Trust. In February 2009, a chief’s councillor reported to the Trust that Luembe had again
applied to the Nyimba District Council for their approval on the sale of the land to the same
Ridwaan Munshi. This application was refused by the Council. In June 2009, with the removal
of Chief imminent, the pair made a last effort to complete the sale, with Munshi allegedly
donating a vehicle to the Council and bicycles to the councillors, who then agreed to the sale. A
writ of summons was issued in July 2009 by the Luembe Trust attorneys, and injunctions placed
against Ridwaan Munshi and the Nyimba District Council. In August of 2008, a Catholic
Church Taskforce investigated the sale of 4,500 ha by the chief to a Ridwaan Munshi,
discovering that only 50 out of 219 headmen had approved the sale of the land, that the land
encroached on village farming lands, that the community was not widely consulted and that
headmen were given $10 in local currency to sign. As of September 2010, the Luembe Trust
and Gamefields, having obtained an injunction stopping further building on the land, still await
the decision of the High Court.
7
PROTECTED AREAS
7.1
Luembe section: West Mvuvye National Forest
The author met with one of the new investors in the M’nyamadzi Game Ranch, Tom Younger
(originally invited to invest through the Luembe Conservancy Trust), who had formed the Royal
Luembe Trust to act as the vehicle for taking over the Luembe section of the West Mvuvye
National Forest. He told the author that the forest was a local forest, that he had made the
necessary application (with the agreement of Senior Chief Luembe and the Nyimba District
Council) for a 14 year provisional lease and that this had, after an interview, been personally
granted to his Royal Luembe Trust by State President Mwanawasa (T Younger 2007, personal
communication, 24 April). The application for alienation of the national forest did not
materialise, and at the time it had not been de-gazetted from a national to a local forest
(Manning 2006a).
145
Richard Besa. 10 March 2009. Letter to the Commissioner of Lands, Lusaka.
284
7.2
West Petauke GMA
It has been mooted by the REMNPAS reclassification project to increase the protected area status
of some remote GMAs by making them National Parks or wildlife reserves having an intermediary
status between GMA and National Park. One of the three areas under consideration is the three
GMA block in the southern Luangwa-Lukusashi-Lunsemfwa Valleys, Chisomo, West Petauke and
Luano GMAs (Pope 2006).
8
KEY LEGAL ISSUES
8.1
Luembe CRB
The Luembe CRB is elected by the community and hold a seat on the Luembe Conservancy
Trust. On 20th January 2008, Lewis Saiwana, the D-G of ZAWA, called a meeting of the
Nyalugwe and Luembe CRB in Lusaka to agree on the termination of Mbeza Safaris hunting
concession in the West Petauke GMA. Saiwana stated that the meeting had been called so that
the CRBs could assist ZAWA with the re-allocation of the West Petauke, Nyampala and Msoro
hunting blocks to new investors by endorsing letters of termination addressed to the present
operators. The Luembe CRB Chairman refused to agree with the move for termination as:
i)
The operators were not present at the meeting to defend themselves as they
should be, given that hunting agreements are signed between three parties ZAWA, the CRBs and the Operators;
ii) The Luembe community did not want Mbeza Safaris out of the area, having
previously submitted to ZAWA three CRB letters in favour of the operator;
and
iii) He was not given enough time to consult the rest of his CRB before the
meeting was called.
The Luembe Chairman stated that he therefore had nothing more to add.
Saiwana responded by accusing the Chairman of receiving money from Mbeza and having his
children sponsored for schooling in South Africa. The D-G further alleged that Mbeza had not
hunted for one year and that ZAWA could not allow this. Saiwana added that they could not
wait until they received back their self-employed work permits. He concluded by saying that
“the government had informed him that the Mannings would not get another work permit, hence
they cannot wait”. Saiwana then repeated that instructions had been given for the termination of
the hunting agreements and that the areas would be advertised before the end of January. He
further insisted that the CRB members should sign the termination letters. The Luembe CRB
Chairman spoke up and stated that they could not do so without community/CRB consultation
first.
On 24 August 2008, Chief Luembe and ZAWA called a public meeting in Luembe where they
removed the CRB Board. In April, a new board was elected amidst threats by the ZAWA
Nyimba official, Andrew Nkhoma, against the previous Board Chairman. Since that time the
new CRB Board have refused to have any dealings with Mbeza Safaris or the Luembe Trust,
though the current Chairman has been employed as a teacher by the Trust since that time.
There are three game camps in Luembe: Chisanga, Ndevu and Kalanshya (recently torched by
villagers) with nine village scouts, five assistants, three ferrymen and a bookkeeper, all of whom
are owed an average of 14 months salary. CRB Scouts say that the reason given by ZAWA for
not paying them is that the hunting operator in the Luembe section of the hunting block,
Bimm’s Travel, had failed so far to hunt. As of the end of August 2009, the ex-Chairman of the
285
Luembe CRB reported that Bimm’s Travel’s sub-lessee was clearing tracks preparatory to
hunting. As the Hunting Concession Agreement requires an operator to pay his concession fees
in advance, this explanation by ZAWA is a fabrication.
9
THE STATE OF LUEMBE
Luembe is besieged by rumours of witchcraft. Reports on the ‘fire of witchcraft that Francis (the
chief) has set blazing in Luembe’ suggest a chiefdom severely stricken. Rumours of twisted
sorcery have also spread to the chief’s sister, Chieftainess Mwape (in the adjacent chiefdom),
who was recently set upon by villagers and beaten for failing to protect them (with her
witchcraft) from elephant, which had killed ten people. Thirteen villagers were arrested and are
to be charged (Anonymous villager 2009, personal communication, June).
From year to year conditions remain much the same - the villagers dealing with floods or
droughts, severe animal depredations, very poor and restricted education and health facilities, a
lack of motorable tracks and transport, the lack of markets for crops and honey (the people of
Nyambweka have a bee project but cannot sell their produce), a people caught in a time warp
where the Government of Zambia is to them largely irrelevant. Women bear the brunt of the
continuance of sexual cleansing and are pestered even during the funerals of their husbands.
There are a far greater number of women than adult men in the villages, with the men working
elsewhere as migrant labour, an unhealthy situation.
On the western side of the Luembe is the Mbilisao community. They live in isolation a few
kilometres away from the banks of the Lukusashi River. The community numbers 1,350, living
under four headmen. As there is no shop, people have to walk twelve km to buy salt and soap.
There is no health centre.
The education scenario is equally grim: the school consists of 120 children taught in two
classrooms, with four teachers grappling with seven grades, these teachers paid by Gamefields.
There are no Government teachers. There are no toilet facilities, no windows and no desks,
paper, pens or seats, and the nearest potable water is four km away. The parents have no money
to improve the situation. The teachers started spending more and more time away from their
duties until the villagers removed them in August 2009. Gamefields subsequently replaced
them. The closest clinic is eight km away on the west bank of the Lukusashi at the Chingombe
Rural Health Centre. Very ill patients must be carried there - this with great difficulty in the
rainy season, with the river high from November to May, and with crocodile attacks frequent.
Malaria is prevalent, and possibly some HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, with no sensitisation
programme ever conducted in the area. Deaths are ascribed to sorcery.
Food crops planted on the rich alluvium are prone to flooding, thus food security is based on
bush fruits. Sorghum, rice, millet, sweet-potatoes, groundnuts, pumpkins, cassava and two crops
of maize are grown annually. Chitemene is practiced, but much reliance is placed on the
alluvium. Baboon, monkeys and buffalo are the main raiding animals. As the fields are on the
river and the villagers located a few kilometres away, the maize cobs have to be carried out on
flooded paths, then shelled and carried for three to four days to market. There are no boreholes,
no hammer mills, and no extension officers – though the author sent one village leader on a
conservation farming course - and the last Government official to visit was during the elections
in 2006. The local MP has never visited. The area, rich in wildlife, is an open-access area
plundered by bushmeat gangs coming from the Great East Road whom villagers greatly fear.
The other community of the GMA are the people living on the east bank of the Luangwa River
on the Chisanga River - the villagers of Chitumbi and Mushalira, considerably better off than
Mbilisao. They have a large school, a health clinic, a flying doctor airstrip, a school in which
286
there are two Government teachers and an additional two paid for by Gamefields, though the
headmaster is absent two weeks out of four as a result of his journeys to Petauke to fetch the
pay. There is one ZAWA game camp, Chisinga, which at the time of the author’s operation of
safaris in 2005-2006 was an outpost of a crime syndicate collecting ivory and bushmeat for
onward transmission to Nyimba.
The Open Area on the eastern side of the Luangwa is easily accessible from Nyimba, the
villagers better off than their fellows on the Luangwa, and certainly very much so when
compared with Mbilisao. There are a few villages along the Luangwa (Nyambweka), and near
Kalanshya wildlife camp further inland. Children must walk some eight km daily through lion
and elephant country to the Ambo school near the Chief’s HQ. This school has 351 pupils.
Although it is short of teacher housing and toilets for the pupils, it is better off than Chitumbi,
and in turn, Mbilisao. The nearby Chalubilo Heath Centre has one nurse and three untrained
assistants. Further down the road towards Nyimba are a series of villages served by the
Chinambi Clinic and the Chinambi Basic School.
Most of the agricultural activity in the area takes place along the Chief’s HQ to Nyimba road,
served by a truck / taxi service on a daily basis.
PART III:
10
Nyalugwe
THE CHIEFDOM
The Nyalugwe Chiefdom lying to the south of Luembe should have been the chiefdom of
Chieftainess Chitambo, a Nyendwa clan member, but the Provincial Administration appointed
Nyalugwe, a Chikunda elephant hunter, as chief. The Chikunda were formed as a result of the
slaving activities from the 1880’s of the Goanese prazo land-holders of the Zambezi Valley.
The Goanese captured slaves for their estates and commanded a mixed force of slaves, ex-slaves
and mercenaries called the Chikunda, whom they formed into raiding companies and set loose
in search of slaves and ivory. The Chikunda subsequently operated as mercenaries-for-hire to
the Valley chiefs. They were mightily feared and one of them, Matakenya, was still recalled
with dread in the Mfuwe area of the mid-Luangwa eighty years or so later (Astle 1999, p.6). By
1902 however, the Chikunda appear to have attained tribal status, being found scattered
amongst the Asenga whom they had raided in the past, with Nyalugwe being a major
stronghold.146 Current residents speak a mixture of Tande and Nsenga languages - the Tande
having been brought up in the past by the early Chikunda from present day Zimbabwe. Pure
Tande has now almost completely disappeared (P Nyalugwe 2009, personal communication).
11
CUSTOMARY LAND ALIENATIONS
Encouraged by the new Lands Act of 1995, Chief Nyalugwe alienated some 20,000 ha. of land
bordering the Luangwa and Nyimba River to Leopard Ridge Safaris (owned by Ross
Michelson). The latter then fenced and stocked the area, conducting a few hunting safaris. In
2005, villagers informed the author that Rashid Randera was fomenting the removal of
Michelson due to a long standing wrangle over the Nyampala hunting concession, and that the
commercial cooking oil company, Amanita, was seeking land on leasehold for an oil palm
plantation. The author opposed such moves on the grounds that the people of Nyalugwe had not
agreed to it, and that such an alienation would remove a large area of land from the people
forever. On 8 March, Chief Nyalugwe, in an interview with a Post reporter, called for the
removal of Mbeza Safaris from the area (Phiri 2006a). When questioned by the same journalist,
146
Petauke District Notebook (1902), National Archives, Lusaka, P. 461.
287
the author replied that this request by the chief was due to the author’s opposition to leasehold
alienations and not for the reasons the chief had put forward – that he had not been paid the
necessary hunting fees (Phiri 2006b). In early June, Nyalugwe wrote a letter to the President –
leaked to a reporter on The Post newspaper (a self-admitted OP operative), calling for the
author’s and Michelson’s deportation – as well as the deportation of a leading opposition
politician, Guy Scott (Phiri 2006c). This followed Rashid Randera taking the chief to the D-G of
ZAWA (Saiwana) to have Mbeza and Michelson removed, and thence to State House for a
meeting with the President’s Principal Private Secretary, Webby Chipilli.
In 2007/8, Michelson and his partner, harried and hounded by corruption, sold the ranch.
12
LEGAL ISSUES
12.1 Nyalugwe CRB
On 17 April 2008 a meeting of the CRB was called to discuss the issue of the Board Secretary
(Lameck Zulu), who had been taken to ZAWA HQ in January for a meeting called by the
ZAWA DG, Saiwana, to terminate the Mbeza concession; and of the Chairman (Frederick
Tembo), who signed the letter of termination without due permission of the Board or the Patron,
Chief Nyalugwe. Although the chief appeared unhappy at the events, he did not resist any
further and ZAWA summarily gave out concessionary rights to Hunting Horizons Ltd. The
serving term of the current board expired in March 2009, but no new board has been elected.
ZAWA owes CRB scouts their salaries, causing many of the trained scouts to take up
employment with Piamanzi Ranch – now called Nakeenda Ranch, under its new owners. The
CRB has ceased functioning, crop raiders are not dealt with and poaching proceeds uncurbed. A
letter from the Secretary of the CRB to the D-G ZAWA on 1 April 2006, stated the following:
In 2003, Nyalugwe did not receive a share of the ‘underachievement’ of quota
utilisation by the operator, Mbeza Safaris (owned by the Mehta bros.) In 2004,
Mbeza safaris under new ownership, paid an ‘underachievement’ fine of
$42,560 in June of 2005. Yet at the time the CRB was owed K86,776,314, or
approximately $27, 000.
The Nyalugwe CRB Audit report by ZAWA for September 2004 – May 2007 revealed that for
most of the period the CRB had not received funds, and that the theft of money from the funds
held in the account was a serious issue. In addition, a hammer-mill bought with CRB funds,
kept no books of account. The same situation persists to the present time.
In 2009 no hunting took place in Nyalugwe, and the concession fees supposedly paid by
Hunting Horizon Safaris (Tony Masutu) were not used to settle the salary arrears of the
Nyalugwe Village Scouts. Hunting Horizons carried out one three-week hunt on the Nakeenda
Game Ranch. In 2010 no hunting took place and Chief Nyalugwe has finally taken his
complaints to the Minister.
12.2 Nyaluguwe Conservation Trust
On 20 December 2008, an application was made to ZAWA/REMNPAS by Chief Nyalugwe
(assisted by Gamefields), for registration of the Nyalugwe Community Game Ranch. It was
proposed in the letter that this land would be sub-leased to Gamefields Limited who had
developed the Landsafe development model for Zambian chiefdoms. On 27 May 2009, Chief
Nyalugwe signed an agreement with the Landsafe facilitator, Japher Mbewe, for the future
implementation of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy in his chiefdom. The purpose of this
agreement was for the Nyalugwe Customary Authority to agree to have Gamefields assist it in
288
implementing a Landsafe conservancy system in Nyalugwe whereby the Nyalugwe
Conservation Trust Society would be established, followed by a petition to the Minster of Lands
for the creation (initially) of the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust and the vesting therein of the
former Chilinga Native Reserve, followed by other land considered suitable for development.
Once ZAWA had cleared the way for the game ranch, Gamefields – under an agreed set of
conditions, terms and payments – would sub-lease the land. With the Landsafe Foundation, it
would assist the Trust to enter into co-management agreements with the Nyalugwe CRB over
wildlife and the GMA, and with the Departments of Fisheries, Forestry and Water Affairs.
Subsequently, on 24 April 2009, the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust received its registration
certificate from the Registrar of Societies; and on 25 June 2009, the Minister of Lands signed
the certificate incorporating the Trust under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act, the Chilinga
thus being vested in the Trust.
In July, ZAWA completed a survey of the ranch, and has recommended its registration. In
September a social scoping exercise was carried out by ZAWA that gave assurance of the
community’s support. Unfortunately, the documentation from the Ministry of Lands was not
available to include in the application, and the Trustees were unaware that ZAWA HQ wished
to be present at the initial signing. As yet no official document has been produced by ZAWA,
though they have accepted that the community are free to do as they choose with their land.
13
THE STATE OF NYALUGWE
13.1 Education
There are six basic government schools in the chiefdom: Nyalugwe, Muchamadzi, Mombe,
Mkoma, Unyanya, and Kasansamula; and four community schools: Nyamwalika, Mkoma
(GMA), Ucha and Chimilala. A Secondary school is currently under construction at Mombe.
Most of the existing schools were built before 1964. According to the registers, attendance is
good. Government provides some financial grants. For grade one, GRZ introduced a curriculum
to ensure that pupils can read and write in the vernaculars of Nyanja, Bemba, Lozi, Tonga,
Kaonde and Luvale. Most of the schools lack staff housing - one of the main reasons teachers
are reluctant to serve in rural areas, although the late or total failure to pay hardship allowances
is another.
13.2 Agriculture
In April, 2006, at the request of Chiefs Nyalugwe and Luembe, the author met with the Disaster
Management Unit (DMU) in the office of the Vice-President to determine why food relief had
not been forthcoming for some communities in the West Petauke GMA, hard hit by animal
depredations and flooding of villages and cropland. The investigation revealed that money had
been released to agents – the Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
(ARDRA) - in January, but that they had not yet delivered. The army then promised to deliver
food. In addition, undertakings were given to villagers by the DMU and ZAWA in March 2005
to empower specified community members and professional hunters to undertake crop
protection; these promises were not kept. The author had assisted the Director of Conservation
in ZAWA at that time (Lewis Saiwana), in providing training guidelines originally written by
Barry Shenton, former Senior Warden and veteran of the elephant control group in the
Department of National Parks & Wildlife. Later some professional hunters had assisted with the
training of control guards.
In the 2008/2009 season, there was no flooding. Chitemene is followed widely along traditional
lines, no agricultural extension officer visiting since 1992. Wildlife crop damage remains a
critical factor in limiting yields. During times of drought food relief is supplied, with ARDRA
289
providing cooked wheat and maize. The poor receive no inputs of seeds or fertiliser, though the
COMACO project is assisting with rice production.
13.3 Health
The chiefdom is served by two health clinics: Nyalugwe Rural Health Clinic (RHC) and
Kachalola RHC. The former is at the Chief’s HQ 23 kilometres from the Great East Road, and
the latter 500 metres from the Great East Road. At each RHC there should be four members: the
clinical officer, nurse, cleaner and a watchman, but only two of these are in place. Malaria
remains the main problem due to a shortage of drugs, particularly for the under-fives. ARDRA
left ten health posts not functioning after a three-year project, the buildings abandoned.
13.4 Wildlife
There are wildlife camps at Kasolo, Mulilanama and Fundo with a ZAWA WPO in charge and
manned by nine Village Scouts, four assistant Village Scouts and one bookkeeper. Seven former
Village Scouts and bookkeepers are still owed salary arrears after three or more years. ZAWA
occasionally provide rations for patrolling, but as they have not been paid for many months
these patrols are likely poaching operations for meat and ivory. In 2005, Mbeza Safaris
supported the patrolling with an input of US$21,000, assistance that the D-G of ZAWA refused
to recognise as being part of the pledges made in the Hunting Concession Agreement. Elephant
crop damage is particularly severe in the villages of Chilinga, Nyalugwe, Cholibe, Kamatukila,
Nyangwele and Musonda with little help forthcoming from ZAWA for the protection of
villagers.
13.5 Forestry
Since the 1980’s illegal timber offtakes of Mukwa (Pterocarpus angolensis) have been
prevalent. The Forestry Department occasionally confiscates illegal offtakes.
13.6 Justice
The local court holds its sessions in an abandoned council house. There is one clerk acting as a
messenger, with one presiding Assessor. They travel monthly to Petauke to collect their pay.
13.7 Extension services
An officer from ZAWA/SLAMU attends meeting of the Nyalugwe CRB but no extension
officers do agriculture visits.
13.8 Credit availability
The only time credit has been made available was in 1988 when Global 2000 provided funds for
agriculture.
PART IV:
14
State of the Three-rifts and Government services
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT – EASTERN PROVINCE
In 2007, the Auditor-General reported on the Provincial Administration, stating that:
The Constituency Youth Development Fund was created by Government to
finance and support community youth projects in all constituencies in the
290
country in order to promote youth participation in social economic development
and empower them to improve their livelihood. Each constituency would have
its own Constituency Youth Development Committee that would be responsible
for among others to receive, consider and approve project proposals. However,
the administration of the funds was to be done by Local Authorities.
The funds were provided for under the Ministry of Sport, Youth and Child Development, and
were disbursed to Local Authorities through Provincial Accounting Control Units (PACU).
During the year under review, PACU received an amount of $190,476 for various youth projects
in 19 constituencies. In turn, PACU transferred the funds to Local Authorities according to the
number of constituencies in each district. Each constituency received $10,000. An examination
of financial, stores and other related records maintained by PACU, Local Authorities and some
selected youth groups that were funded, as well as a physical verification of the projects carried
out in selected constituencies in Petauke, Lundazi, Katete, Chama, Mambwe, Nyimba and
Chadiza revealed the following:
Amounts totalling $20,000 were paid by four councils to various suppliers for
the delivery of materials for youth projects such as piggery, carpentry, tailoring
and fish farming among others. However, visits to the sites in September 2008
and enquiries made revealed that the projects were non-existent. And various
materials in amounts totalling $2,630 were unaccounted for. One council had
only disbursed 50% of the funds after a year; and although $251,000 given to
rehabilitate schools in five councils had been released various works were either
not completed or not attempted.
15
HEALTH
In 2007, the A-G reported that $9 million in grants were given to the Provincial Health Office in
Eastern Province, $83,000 in withholding tax had not been deducted from officer allowances, $1
million third party payments were made without supporting documentation, and $18,000 in
salary advances were not recovered.
16
AGRICULTURAL AND COOPERATIVES
The Auditor-General’s report of 2007 revealed that the Chipata Agricultural Coordinating office
received a provision of $3 million for its programmes, but only $2.78 million was released. The
five district Coordinating Offices received $942,000, although $1.19 million had been provided;
$47,000 in payment vouchers was not made available for audit; $139,000 in imprests were
unretired; $4,000 in salary advances were not recovered; $23,000 had been spent on stores
without receipts. In the Chipata district office $53,000 was not accounted for; in Petauke
$20,000; in Katete $27,000; Lundazi $31,000; and Mambwe $28,000.
In 2009, the state of crop collection and marketing was dire, with complaints that the Food
Reserve Agency (FRA) only became active during the marketing season - and as in Nyimba,
very late - and not when the rains start; and that they have reduced the number of bags of maize
that would be purchased. Furthermore, the tobacco planters, who have borrowed money to grow
their crops, find there are no buyers at the tobacco sheds (Miti 2009). The same state affairs
took place in 2010.
291
17
REFERENCES
ASTLE, W.L.1999. A history of wildlife conservation and management in the mid-Luangwa
Valley, Zambia, British Empire and Commonwealth Museum.
DARLING, F.F. 1960. Wild life in an African Territory. Oxford University Press.
DUNDAS, C.C.F. 1936. Report on Indaba in Petauke on 30 November 1936, Petauke District
Notebook.
FRAUMAN, EVELYNE. 2008. Geographical information system building for the Luembe
customary area of Zambia: utilisation of geographical information system for humananimal conflict management. Draft Thesis, MPhil Wildlife Management, University of
Pretoria.
HUDSON, J. E., KATHURIA, K.D.S., SIMWANZA. F.J. 1981. Tsetse survey in the
Lunsemfwa Valley, Zambia. Zambia Journal of Science and Technology 6:11, 20-27
MITI, CHRISTOPHER. 2009. MMD leadership is mediocre – Daka in Chipata. The Post
Newspaper, Lusaka, 14 June
MOSS, PETER DE VERE. September 2009. Burning Kafue National Park – an annual tragedy.
Final draft of article for Black Lechwe Magazine, Lusaka.
NKHOMA, G. A. 26 May 2009. Report by SLAMU Nyimba CBNRM Unit to SLAMU Petauke
office on outstanding salaries. Zambia Wildlife Authority.
PHIRI, BRIGHTON. 2006a. Elephant are threatening human life in my area – Chief
Nyalugwe.’ The Post Newspaper, Lusaka, 8March
PHIRI, BRIGHTON. 2006b. ‘Chief Nyalugwe has sold people’s birthright to land – Mbeza
MD. The Post Newspaper, Lusaka, 15 March
PHIRI, BRIGHTON. 2006C. Chief Nyalugwe asks Levy to deport Mbeza Safaris director. The
Post Newspaper, Lusaka, 21 June
POPE, ADAM. 2006. ‘A Preliminary Examination of Public Private Partnerships in National
Park Management in Zambia.’ Whydah Consulting, Lusaka.
SAVORY, A. & BUTTERFIELD, J. 1999. Holistic management: a new framework for decision
making. Island Press.
STEFANISZYN, BRONISLAW. 1956. The Ambo of Northern Rhodesia. Unpublished PhD
thesis, The University of Witwatersrand.
STEFANISZYN, B. 1964. Social and ritual life of the Ambo of Northern Rhodesia/Edited with
a foreword by Raymond Apthorpe. London: Published for the International African
Institute by the Oxford University Press
TRAPNELL, C. G. 1943. The Soils, Vegetation and Agriculture of North-Eastern Rhodesia.
Government Printer, Lusaka.
WATMORE, H.A. 1935. Petauke Tour Report No 2/1935, Annexure 3. Petauke District
Notebook.
Internet
Manning, I. P. A. 2006a. WEST MVUVYE NATIONAL FOREST NO. 54. Zambia
Conservation. 2009-12-20. URL:http://zambiaconservation.blogspot.com/2006/11/westmvuvye-national-forest-no-54.html. Accessed: 2009-12-20. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5m9qxPj2U)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007a. ELEPHANT ANARCHY DESCENDS ON NYALUGWE. Zambia
Elephant Times. 2009-12-20.
URL:http://zambiaeletimes.blogspot.com/2007/10/elephant-anarchy-descends-onnyalugwe.html. Accessed: 2009-12-20. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5m9rPfYhu)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007b. FOLLOW-UP ON NYALUGWE POACHING. Zambia Elephant
Times. 2009-12-20. URL:http://zambiaeletimes.blogspot.com/2007/08/follow-up-onnyalugwe-poaching.html. Accessed: 2009-12-20. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5m9rIWsoK)
292
Manning, I. P. A. 2007c. MACHINE GUN WIELDING ELEPHANT POACHING. Zambia
Elephant Times. 2009-12-20.
URL:http://zambiaeletimes.blogspot.com/2007/11/machine-gun-wielding-elephantpoaching.html. Accessed: 2009-12-20. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5m9rXPTIs)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007d. NYALUGWE VILLAGE SCOUT FOUND WITH TUSKS. Zambia
Elephant Times. 2009-12-20.
URL:http://zambiaeletimes.blogspot.com/2007/08/nyalugwe-village-scout-found-withtusks.html. Accessed: 2009-12-20. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5m9rdwfx5)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007e. ZAMBIA WILDLIFE AUTHORITY CRIME SYNDICATE BEING
INVESTIGATED.... Zambia Elephant Times. 2010-01-12.
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http://www.webcitation.org/5mioHCyWV)
Manning, I. P. A. 2007f. ZAMBIA WILDLIFE OFFICIAL PAYS LABOURERS WITH ELE
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http://www.webcitation.org/5m9rBvBhs)
293
18
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Common game species and hunting quotas for 2007 in the West
Petauke GMA and the M’nyamadzi Game Ranch
294
Appendix 1: Common game species and hunting quotas for 2007 in the West Petauke
GMA and the M’nyamadzi Game Ranch
M’NYAMADZI
WEST
GAME RANCH PETAUKE
10, 500ha
GMA
610, 000ha
Baboon, Yellow
Papio cynocephalus
4
16
Buffalo, Cape
Syncerus caffer
3
14
Bushbuck, Chobe
Tragelaphus scriptus
4
11
Bushpig, Southern
Potamochoerus larvatus
Crocodile, Nile
147
4
Crocodylus niloticus
8
10
Duiker, Common
Cephalophus sp.
4
2
Eland, Livingstone’s
Taurotragus oryx
1
Elephant
Loxodonta africana
Giraffe, Thorneycroft’s
Giraffa camelopardalis
Grysbok, Sharpe’s
Raphicerus sharpei.
Hartebeest, Lichtenstein
Alcelaphus lichtensteini
2
4
Hippo
Hippotamus amphibious
6
16
Hyena, Spotted
Crocuta crocuta
3
8
Impala, Southern
Aepyceros melampus
4
22
Klipspringer
Oreotragus oreotragus
Kudu, Greater
Tragelaphus strepsiceros
2
10
Leopard
Panthera pardus
2
6
Lion
Panthera leo
2
6
Puku
Kobus vardoni
2
4
Reedbuck, Common
Redunca aryndinum
Roan
Hippotragus equines
2
2
Sable
Hippotragus niger
Steenbok
Raphicerus campestris
Warthog
Phacochoerus aethiopicus
4
16
Waterbuck , Common
Kobus ellipsiprymnus
4
7
Wild dog, Painted
Lycaon pictus
Zebra, Burchell’s
Equus burchelli
10
8
147
4
4
M’nyamadzi’s Luangwa River frontage is about 5km, compared with 300km for the West Petauke
GMA.
295
CHAPTER 8:
IMPLEMENTING LANDSAFE IN THE LUEMBE AND NYALUGWE CHIEFDOMS
Three-rifts Landsafe Project Area
297
ACRONYMS
CARITAS
CATCA
CC
CRB
CTA
D-G
GMA
GPS
GRZ
HCA
HQ
JFMA
MMD
MoU
NCF
NGO
REMNPAS
TFCA
VAG
ZAWA
Roman Catholic relief, development and social service organisation
Central African Transfrontier Conservation Area
Customary Community
Community Resource Board
Concession Tourism Agreement
Director General
Game Management Area
Global Positioning System
Government of Zambia
Hunting Concession Agreement
Headquarters
Joint Forestry Management Area
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy
Memorandum of Understanding
Norman Carr Foundation
Non-Governmental Organisation
Reclassification and Effective Management of the National Protected Areas
System
Transfrontier Conservation Area
Village Action Group
Zambia Wildlife Authority
298
1
THE OBJECTIVES
Implementing the Landsafe chiefdom model is motivated by the belief that Zambia’s future
destiny and well-being is directly related to the healthy socio-ecological state of the customary
commons and the protected areas with which they are associated. The particular objectives for
the project area are:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
To safeguard the Luembe and Nyalugwe customary land, the West Petauke
GMA, the West Mvuvye National Forest and the Kachalola local forest.
To strengthen the two traditional authorities and to encourage the
increasingly democratic operations of the Luembe Conservancy Trust and
the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust, and also the Community Resource
Boards advising each chiefdom.
To conserve the wildlife and natural resources for the benefit of the
chiefdoms.
The respective Trusts to provide land and business management plans for
the appropriate development of the chiefdoms, plans that fully respect the
ecology and the traditional, cultural and religious norms.
To assist the chiefdoms’ Trusts to enter into co-management agreements
with Government over land and renewable natural resources, in conformity
with the prescriptions of the Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws of
Zambia of 1974 and the Fisheries (Amended) Act of 2007, The Forestry
Act No. 39 of 1973, Forestry Policy of 1998, the Forestry Act No. 7 of
1999, the Local Forests (Control and Management) Regulations, Statutory
Instrument No. 47 of 2006, the Lands Act Chapter 184 of the Laws of
Zambia of 1995, the Water Act Chapter 198 of the Laws of Zambia of 1948
and the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998.
To provide the necessary incentives for both investors and the chiefdoms to
enter into mutually beneficial partnerships and investments.
To identify, propose and facilitate small businesses able to harvest natural
resources.
To establish development trust funds under the control of the Trusts and
their advisory boards, and the implementation of development projects
required by the customary community.
To foster education in the chiefdom’s history, culture and religion, and in
its ecology.
To foster conservation agriculture, health and education.
To ensure the maintenance of a land registration book in each VAG.
The two chiefdoms of Luembe and Nyalugwe in the lower Luangwa Valley are ideal chiefdoms
in which to try and establish Landsafes. Here are found small homogenous nations of extremely
poor people living wholly traditional lives within a large area of wilderness with reasonably
abundant wildlife stocks, yet its southern margins are readily accessible from the Great East
Road, and a reasonable distance from Lusaka. Between 2002 and 2009, Luembe was the focus
of development efforts, with Nyalugwe coming on stream from 2008.
2
RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNERS
i)
The Luembe Conservancy Trust and the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust are
the custodians of the land vested in it, and are responsible for developing
co-management agreements with Government over natural resources and
over the GMA sections.
299
ii)
Gamefields is responsible for investment support, management and
implementation.
iii) Mbeza Safaris Limited is the rightful hunting safari concessionaire who
should continue operating – subject to a decision of the courts, though on a
much reduced quota.
iv) A proposed Landsafe Foundation will be responsible for guiding the Trust,
Gamefields, Mbeza, and the Luembe Chiefdom on matters of Landsafe
Chiefdom Conservancy Development.
3
STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN PROJECT
3.1
Primary Stakeholders
i)
The Customary Authority: Senior Chief Luembe and Chief Nyalugwe and
their headmen
ii) The village residents
iii) The Luembe Conservancy Trust and the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust
3.2
Secondary Stakeholders
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Ministry of Lands
Ministry of Agricultural and Cooperatives
Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries
Ministry of Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, including the
Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), and the Department of Forestry
v) Ministry of Local Government
vi) Ministry of Water and Energy Development
3.3
Key Stakeholders
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
4
Luembe and Nyalugwe Community Resource Boards (CRB)
The Nyimba District Council
The Landsafe Foundation
Gamefields Limited
Mbeza Safaris
THE EXPECTED GENERAL OUTCOMES
i)
The creation of the Luembe and Nyalugwe chiefdom Trusts in which land
may be vested and safeguarded and the renewable natural resources used
sustainably.
ii) The establishment of chiefdom trust funds under the joint control of the
Trusts and advisory bodies for sustained investment in the chiefdoms
established and run within a sound system of fiduciary management and
with expenditure approved by the residents.
iii) The production of chiefdom landuse plans and their integration.
iv) The conversion of part of the unutilised Open Areas into community game
ranches or conservancies and assigned under law of contract to investors.
v) The conversion of these same ranches into a single game conservancy,
taking up much of the two chiefdoms Open Area as well as the Kachalola
local forest and the West Mvuvye National Forest – the latter under a joint
forest management agreement with the Forestry Department.
300
vi) The vesting of the GMA into these Trusts and their assignment to a limited
liability company made up of the Trusts and investors – to be used as an
exclusive wildlands tourism area.
vii) The creation of a transfrontier conservancy linking Nyalugwe with
Mozambique, and subsequently linking it with Luembe and the other
chiefdoms - joining with the Luangwa National Parks, allowing for the
development of a Central African Transfrontier Conservation Area.
viii) The creation of a critical mass of appropriate development projects for the
socio-ecological well-being of the two chiefdoms.
ix) The establishment of co-management agreements between the Trusts,
Government departments and ministries responsible for fisheries, forestry,
wildlife and water, and as a result, the two chiefdoms’ customary commons
established and sustained over time.
5
THE EXPECTED BENEFITS
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
6
The strengthening of the chiefdoms by way of support to the customary
authorities, the Trusts, the CRBs and other community-based organisations.
Safeguarding the land through a land vestment process.
Gaining some measure of control and income from the renewable natural
resources.
The considerable reduction in open-access to the chiefdom’s resources.
The strengthening of the ancient indigenous forms of title to natural
resources.
The provision of incentives to limit offtakes of the renewable resources so
as to ensure their long-term economic and environmental sustainability.
An improvement in the supply of basic needs of the villagers.
The implementation of appropriate villager-developed landuse plans and
the emergence of an ecological ideology that integrates discourses about
society with those about nature.
Improved education, health and agriculture.
Nationally, the strengthening in the local government of 94% of Zambia.
ONGOING AND ACHIEVED GENERAL OUTPUTS
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
Confidential report to the Vice-President of Zambia on wildlife conservation
situation.
Support to ZAWA on CITES implementation.
Registration of the Norman Carr Foundation (NC) and general pro bono support
to ZAWA.
Assistance provided to ZAWA in the development of guidelines on the
establishment of public-private partnerships in the management of non-flagship
National Parks.
Proposals for the development of PPPs in the Isangano and Lavushi Manda
National Parks.
Consultations with government, the private sector, NGOs and customary
authorities. SWOT analysis of customary law and the Zambian legislation and
policy affecting land tenure, investments and collaborative partnerships in the
development and protection of customary land and associated protected areas.
Developer of a proposed planning framework for the proposed Central African
Transfrontier Conservation Area.
301
viii)
Proposal for the establishment of a participatory conservancy trust in the Kopa
chiefdom, one incorporating the Luitikila National Forest.
ix)
Proposal for the development of private sector and customary authority tourism
development capacity.
x)
Proposal for the building of strategic partnerships (PPPs) within depleted Game
Management Areas.
xi)
Advocacy in the Victoria Falls World Heritage Site relative to proposed
development and impacts in the Mosi oa Tunya National Park. Future funding,
stakeholder communications and development of a management trust with local
and international stakeholders.
xii)
Co-opted steering committee member (2006/7): The Natural Resources
Consultative Forum, cross-sectoral forum advising the Ministry of Tourism,
Environment and Natural Resources of Zambia. Development of project
proposals for the implementation of the National Policy on Environment, and
for donor support.
xiii)
Development with Luembe customary authority, Nyimba District Council and
Luembe Community Resource Board of institutional structures for sustainable
livelihoods programme within a conservancy.
xiv)
Registration of the Luembe Conservancy Trust.
xv)
Development of institutional formalisations for customary communities in
respect of their land and its renewable resources.
xvi)
Development of a business plan.
xvii) Recruitment of investor/management partners.
xviii) Proposal for the establishment of a collaborative conservancy trust in the
Nyalugwe Chiefdom – particularly in the former Chilinga Native Reserve.
xix)
Development of the participatory Landsafe integrated conservation and
development model design for land held under customary tenure and protected
areas and its application to the Luembe customary area of Luangwa Valley.
xx)
Supervision of food security study and animal impacts amelioration plan and
ongoing development of a participatory landuse plan.
xxi)
Registration of a branch of Gamefields Limited (Gibraltar) in Zambia to carry
out Landsafe.
xxii) Signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and landuser agreement for
60 years for the Luembe Chiefdom - and for the Kazumba Community Game
Ranch within it - with the Luembe Customary Authority, the Nyimba District
Council and the Luembe Resource Board.
xxiii) HQ projects in Lusaka concerning community upliftment though a community
brick-making project and a home for HIV/AIDS affected children.
xxiv) Development of a sustainable natural resource management planning
framework to be undertaken as a rapid participatory rural appraisal (PRA) –
based on secure customary and community land tenure rights and a sustainable
livelihoods strategy; and carrying out of landuse plan – including food security
strategy.
xxv) Development and enactment of preliminary action plan: bureaucratic
constraints, legislation and policy, lobbying.
xxvi) Distribution and adoption of the Chipuna/Landsafe Chiefs’ manual by the
House of Chiefs .
xxvii) Training of an accountant, mechanic, paralegal, and liaison officers for the two
chiefdoms in conservation farming.
xxviii) Purchase of the company holding the West Petauke hunting concession, Mbeza
Safaris, and obtaining investment certificates for three of the shareholders.
xxix) Operation of hunting safaris in 2005 and 2006.
xxx) Negotiations with the Forestry Department for a Joint Forestry Management
Area (JFMA) in the West Mvuvye National Forest.
302
xxxi)
Blocking the alienation of further land in both chiefdoms, and of the West
Mvuvye National Forest.
xxxii) Continued development of the formalisation procedures required to establish
statutory community structures and the Landsafe development manual.
xxxiii) Writing of the preliminary Luembe and Nyalugwe landuse plan.
xxxiv) Registration of the Nyalugwe Conservation Society made up of the community
and endorsed by them.
xxxv) Petition to the Minister of Lands by the Society and the registration of the
Nyalugwe Conservation Trust and the vesting of the Chilinga Reserve in that
Trust for the purposes of game ranching, both endorsed by the Minister.
xxxvi) Receiving the approval of ZAWA for the Chilinga to be used as a game ranch.
xxxvii) The Nyalugwe Trust reassigning the lease to Gamefields Limited.
xxxviii) Building the Nyalugwe Trust Fund under secure fiscal control.
xxxix) Negotiating with the Ministry of Health for the building of a medical clinic and
maternity facility.
xl)
Negotiating with the Department of Forestry for a joint management agreement
of the Kachalola forest.
xli)
Facilitating the recovery of funds owed the Nyalugwe CRB and Chief
Nyalugwe by ZAWA.
xlii)
Implementing a process to strengthen the operations of the CRB and its
working relationship with the Nyalugwe Trust, and to provide it with operating
funds.
xliii) Facilitating negotiations between ZAWA, the Ministry of Tourism, the
Nyalugwe CRB, ZAWA and Chief Nyalugwe for a co-management agreement
in respect of the Nyalugwe portion of the West-Petauke GMA.
xliv) Legal training (LLB) of Gamefields’ manager in the School of Law, University
of Zambia.
7
PROPOSED LANDSAFE OUTPUTS REQUIRED FOR THE CHIEFDOMS
OUTPUT 1:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
FORMALISATIONS
Vesting of land in the Trusts and registration with the Registrar of Deeds.
Trusts make application to ZAWA, through the CRB, for registration of
appropriate land as community game ranches, with all the conditions and
regulations implied. ZAWA inspects and surveys proposed areas.
Trust signs co-management agreement with CRBs and ZAWA over the GMA
section, which provides support to the CRBs.
Trusts – with the assistance of the embryonic Landsafe Foundation – provide a
management plan.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with the Forestry Department in
respect of protected forest areas.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with the Department of Fisheries
within the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries; requiring the following:
• Declaration of a Fisheries Management Area.
• Election of a Fisheries Management Committee.
Trusts sign a co-management agreement with Water Affairs Department.
Trusts enter into assignment or lease agreements with investors, or take up
joint ventures. Ideally these would be auctioned by the Trusts.
303
OUTPUT 2:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
OUTPUT 3:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
OUTPUT 4:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
OUTPUT 5:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
Activity 8:
Activity 9:
Activity 10:
OUTPUT 6:
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
THE COMMUNITY GAME RANCHES
Conducting a rapid rural appraisal and sensitisation exercise.
Survey of proposed reserves and agreement with Trusts and chiefs on
boundaries.
Recording of boundary co-ordinates and mapping.
Compilation of baseline date on wildlife and forestry.
Survey of the riverine stretch as to suitable lodge and camp sites.
Assessment of current poaching activities.
EIA assessment of adjoining private game ranch fencing.
Costing of various options.
WEST-PETAUKE GMAs
Using village scout reports and other intelligence, assess the current state of
wildlife, including threats and utilisation.
Provide a wilderness use and protection plan.
In addition to the Njinga reports provided by the VAGs, carry out a rapid rural
appraisal.
TRANSFRONTIER CONSERVANCY
Initiate contacts with the neighbouring government and chiefs for the creation
of a joint chiefdom TFCA .
Establish the TFCA according to the Central African TFCA planning
framework or to a similar framework elsewhere.
Vest the necessary land for such a TFCA in the chiefdom Trust.
Development of the TFCA.
SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Provision of a participatory/social landuse plan for the Trust.
Capacity support to the Trust and appointment of an executive officer.
Capacity support to the CRBs on animal depredation reports (Appendix 2),
wildlife protection, quota production and monitoring, accounts management,
project development, etc.
Implementation of villager landuse registration with the use of a GPS, and the
opening of land registration books.
Further support to education by bolstering of teacher-assistants cum natural
resource officers based in the VAGs.
Support to health clinics.
Implementation of conservation farming.
Implementation of honey production and aquaculture, and establishment of
furniture co-operatives.
Establishment of village-based tourism businesses.
Implementation of micro-credit schemes, particularly serving women.
BUSINESS PLANS AND MARKETING
Production of business proposals to the respective Trusts for the game ranches
and conservancies, the GMA and the TFCA.
Production of project proposals and business plans.
304
8
NATURAL RESOURCES PROTECTION
In the process of building a semi-devolved customary commons in which its residents act as true
custodians of the natural resources, a minimum investment of $50/ km2 would be required so as
to provide a basic protective shield for wildlife, fisheries and forestry. This translates into a
required $200,000 per annum for the 4,140 km2 West-Petauke GMA, which is mostly Luembe
customary land. This targeted income would be used in the manner currently being adopted for
eleven school teacher/natural resource officers - i.e. paying a number of family heads in villages
at the rate of $1 a day for various community activities. The funds would employ 550 villagers,
with employment directly linked to the building of the customary commons. Currently, a start
has been made by employing teacher-assistants cum natural resource officers who are also
responsible for the Njinga reports on the area (Appendix 2).
Hunting safaris might achieve gross earnings of $250K, but its recurrent and capital replacement
costs on the safari operations alone make it a break-even operation. This projection is based on
2006 quotas - quotas now in decline - as was predicted by Mbeza in 2005 meetings with
ZAWA. In Gamefields’ case, when considering all of the GMA and the Open Areas of the
chiefs, some $500 / km2 has been spent since 2002 in Zambia - arriving at the present situation
where very little has been achieved. What is now required is the development of a critical mass
of schemes which will provide the necessary base income, but without negatively affecting the
people’s sense of community, culture and religion.
9
AGRICULTURE
An urgent priority is the adoption of conservation agriculture techniques that stress selfsufficiency and some cash cropping. The GMA section is a subsistence area of low agricultural
potential (with the notable exception of the alluvial zone), which needs specific measures to
meet community food security. It will require that village fields be rationalised and that they be
protected in some areas from animal depredations by solar-powered fencing and other means.
As food security is also a function of income, serious consideration would be given to
establishing an organic honey outgrower scheme and other business ventures that would not
impact negatively on the GMA, and that would completely protect it as relatively pristine
wildlands. The Open Area has moderate to high agricultural potential and is ideal for the
establishment of smaller outgrower (organic cotton and tobacco) schemes. As Nyimba now has
power, some potential exists for irrigated commercial crops lying close to Nyimba town.
The use of cattle to increase the carrying capacity of the range is well known, though it requires
high standards of management and control if it is not to have the opposite effect. As the
proposed game ranches and future conservancy might be game fenced - and in the absence of
many large herbivores (buffalo) - consideration will be given to running a herd of indigenous
cattle under reasonable rotational time management and adhering to strict holistic management
criteria (Savory & Butterfield 1999). This is required to improve range carrying capacity, and as
an income earner and ready source of protein. As cattle cannot survive in a tsetse area, they
would have to be treated. A ready market for meat waits at Nyimba and on the Great East Road.
10
HUNTING SAFARIS
ZAWA leases out the GMA parts of customary areas as hunting concessions, charging
concession fees based on their classification as Prime, Secondary or Understocked. West
Petauke is classified as a Prime Concession, although it is clearly Secondary and moving
downwards to being Understocked. As a Prime concession able to utilise an annual quota which
should provide for the requisite number of four Classical and eight Mini safaris – something not
305
possible in West Petauke because of the low buffalo numbers and the overshooting of adult
bulls – an annual fee for the 4,140 km2 area of $34,500 is charged (based on $5,000 for five
Classical hunts and $1,000 each for seven Mini hunts) - 50% of this is retained, 45%
(theoretically) is to be paid to the CRBs, and the remaining 5% should be paid to the chiefs. In
addition, trophy fee income is split according to the same ratio.
Refer to Appendix 1 for an analysis of the Nyalugwe section of the West Petauke hunting block.
PART I:
11
Luembe Chiefdom
BACKGROUND
On 12 June 2003, at a meeting of Senior Chief Luembe, 153 headmen, the Luembe CRB, the
Nyimba District Council, a Norman Carr Foundation representative and the author (representing
Gamefields), it was agreed to establish a community wildlife estate. The following was also
agreed: to establish a joint venture company involving the community, the Foundation,
Gamefields International and ProjectsAfrica, so as to conserve the natural resources in Luembe
and to uplift the livings standards of the customary community; to establish a private wildlife
estate in the Open Area - the community to hold shares – and with the Luembe CRB instructed
to deal with any project start-up problems.148
On 31 July 2003, an MoU was signed by Senior Chief Luembe, five headmen, the Chairman of
the Nyimba DC, the Chairman of the Luembe CRB and the author for the transfer by the
customary authority of all land user rights for the Luembe Chiefdom to the author for a period
of six months until such time as the Luembe Conservancy Trust was established, at which time
the usufruct rights would be transferred to the Trust.
On 3 September 2003, the Luembe Customary Authority – with the agreement of the Nyimba
District Council and the Luembe Community Resource Board - ceded the land user rights for all
of Luembe chiefdom to the Luembe Conservancy Trust for a period of 60 years.
On 9 September 2003, these land user rights were signed over by the author to the future
Luembe Trust with the agreement of the Nyimba District Council representative and the
Luembe CRB.
On 30 September 2003, Senior Chief Luembe wrote to the Director General (D-G) of ZAWA
requesting that the GMA portion of his chiefdom be placed under the management of the Trust.
No reply was received.
On 3 November 2003, the chief wrote to the District Council to have them endorse a proposed
MoU between the Trust and the Forestry Department for the joint management of the West
Mvuvye National Forest. The decision of Council was that both Luembe and Chieftainess
Mwape should first agree to share in any joint forest management agreement. Subsequently
Chieftainess Mwape sold much of her traditional section under 99-year leasehold, and Luembe
attempted to do the same with the Luembe section
On 4 June 2004, the Luembe Trust Certificate of Incorporation (limited by guarantee) was
issued.
In September 2004, the Trust decided that the concessionaire for the West Petauke GMA should
be invited to join the Trust, failing which they were to be bought out by Gamefields. On their
148
Handwritten minutes all Luembe headmen meeting held on 12th June 2003, venue: Chief’s own palace.
306
refusal, they were then made an offer for their company, Mbeza Safaris, which held the hunting
concessionary rights until 2012. They accepted the offer and Gamefields bought the company.
On 5 March 2005, application was made to the Zambia Investment Centre by the author and his
family for the issue of investment certificates in the name of Mbeza safaris. These were later
granted.
Hunting safaris were conducted in 2005 and 2006 but did not resume thereafter due to the
removal of the concessionary rights by Government (Manning 2007b).
12
PRESENT OUTPUTS
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
13
Employment of eight teachers/natural resource officers, a liaison manager and
the compilation of Njinga rural appraisal reports.
Maintenance of basic safari camp in the GMA, and employment of care and
maintenance staff.
Payment of Trust allowances to liaison officers and Chief Luembe (recently
terminated).
Financial support for travel and meetings of community and District Council.
Liaison with Government offices.
Writing of landuse plan.
PROJECTED INVESTMENT OUTPUTS
OUPUT 1:
FORMALISATION
Activity 1:
Formation of joint-venture company owned by the Trust and an investor for
the lease of the community game ranch.
Registration of Kazumba Community Game Ranch with ZAWA following
community meetings and a land survey.
Signing of either a co-management agreement with the Luembe CRB/ZAWA,
or the creation of the Luembe Community Game Reserve taking up the whole
GMA.
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
14
CONSTRAINTS TO PROGRESS
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
Continuing Luembe chiefdom succession wrangles and the failure of the
MMD Government to follow custom and the findings of a House of Chiefs
committee of inquiry.
Human rights abuses by ZAWA not resolved.
Increasing villager and headmen opposition to the present Luembe
chiefdom incumbent.
The alienation of part of the Kazumba Community Game Ranch to
Ridwaan Munshi without the sanction of the Luembe villagers and despite
the Luembe Trust holding the land user rights.
The failure of ZAWA to pay the CRBs and the chief.
The continued illegal offtake of bushmeat and ivory.
A considerable increase in the activities of sorcerers.
The failure of Government to return the hunting concessionary rights to
Mbeza Safaris.
307
PART II:
15
Nyalugwe Chiefdom
BACKGROUND
On 20 December 2008, Chief Nyalugwe made an application to ZAWA’s Reclassification and
Effective Management of the National Protected Areas System project (REMNPAS), for
registration of the Nyalugwe Community Game Ranch. On 27 May 2009, Chief Nyalugwe
signed an agreement with the Landsafe facilitator, Japher Mbewe for the future implementation
of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy in his chiefdom. The purpose of this agreement was for
the Nyalugwe Customary Authority to agree to have Gamefields assist it in implementing a
Landsafe conservancy system in Nyalugwe, whereby the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust Society
would be established. This would be followed by a petition to the Minster of Lands for the
initial creation of the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust and the vesting therein of the Chilinga
Reserve, followed by other land considered suitable for development.
Once ZAWA had cleared the way for the game ranch, then Gamefields – under an agreed set of
conditions, terms and payments – would rent such land for game ranching purposes. Moreover,
with the Landsafe Foundation, it would assist the Trust to enter into co-management agreements
with the Nyalugwe CRB over wildlife and the GMA, and with the Departments of Fisheries,
Forestry and Water Affairs. Subsequently, on 24 April 2009, the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust
received its registration certificate from the Registrar of Societies; and on 25 June 2009, the
Minister of Lands signed the certificate incorporating the Trust under the Lands (perpetual
succession) Act.
In July, ZAWA completed an ‘ecological survey’ of the ranch, as well as a ‘sociological
scoping exercise’. It has now notified the Ministry of Tourism that they consider the game ranch
as part of the national inventory of game ranches.
16
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
These conform to the projected Outcomes for Luembe.
17
PLANNED OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE OUTCOMES (REFER
TO SECTION 7)
OUTPUT 1:
Formalisations
Activity 1:
Petition to Minister of Lands for registration under Lands (perpetual
succession) Act of the Nyalugwe Conservation Trust, with the Chilinga
community game ranch land vested in the Trust. Deposit certificate of
incorporation and details of vested land with the Registrar of Deeds and
Lands.
Registration with ZAWA of the Chilinga community ranch.
Signing of contract with an investor for the use of the Chilinga Community
game ranch land.
Vesting of unutilised land in the Trust.
Registration of other ranches in the Nyalugwe Open Area.
Signing by the Trust of co-management agreements with Government over
fisheries, forestry, water and wildlife.
Conversion of Nyalugwe section of West Petauke GMA into a co-managed
wildlife area.
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
Activity 4:
Activity 5:
Activity 6:
Activity 7:
OUTPUT 2:
Nyalugwe development
308
Activity 1:
Activity 2:
Activity 3:
18
Preparation by the partners of a Nyalugwe landuse plan.
Preparation of investment project plans and proposals.
Basic needs assessment in respect of education, health, agriculture and
environment.
CONSTRAINTS TO PROGRESS
Progress in Nyalugwe is excellent with the full support of the chief, the Nyalugwe Trustees and
local ZAWA and forestry officials. The chief and the Trust, with the support of local ZAWA
officials, are electing a new CRB, whose Chairman will have a seat on the Nyalugwe Board of
Trustees. However, the cost of progress is high, given the slow pace at which the process
progresses..
PART III: Conservancy expansion: the Central African Transfrontier Conservation
Area (CATCA)
19
BACKGROUND
Trans-boundary conservation and development initiatives are essential to the development of a
critical mass of integrated conservation and development projects, as recognised at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development. As isolated development and tourism projects are prone
to failure, linking them within a geographic and planning framework, will lend greater chances
of progress.
Given the need for the building of critical conservation and development mass, a proposed
CATCA area which takes in part of the Congo Pedicle, the Bangweulu estuaries and National
Parks, joined with the Luangwa was mooted in the Landsafe process. At present, the proposed
Zambian portion of the CATCA has one major tourist node at Mfuwe, isolated development
projects and few linkages of any sort. This area covers one of Africa’s major wetlands, the
upland source of the Congo and Luangwa rivers and the southern part of Africa’s rift valley, an
area of major historical and biodiversity importance. Endeavours to bring development to local
communities have been attempted in isolation and have not led to sustainable development. It is
therefore proposed to create the CATCA as a planning framework, requiring the following:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
Engage with all relevant stakeholders so as to secure the needed
partnerships and linkages.
Create a CATCA Association.
Create and formalise the necessary community institutions on which
development may be based.
Identify projects for presentation to investors and donors.
Alleviate poverty through investment in integrated conservation and
development programmes and projects which provide clear time frames for
delivery.
Promote public private partnerships, investment and management.
Provide support to institutional capacity.
Engender political will and support.
Provide accurate, analytical and unbiased information.
309
20
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
A minimum conservation area requirement could be the establishment of a Central Africa
TFCA. This would include the north-eastern portion of the Zairean pedicle lying between
Kapalala on the Luapula, and south along the Muniengashi River, thence due east through
Kimaki to the border (alternatively, the original proposal of the Serenje District Commissioner,
J.S. Moffat in 1937 that efforts be made to persuade the Belgians to declare the area between the
Luombwa and Luapula rivers a reserve, to join up with the Kasanka reserve) - given the use
made of the areas by elephant; the Mansa and Kalasa Mukosa GMAs, Kasanka, Lavushi Manda
and Isangano National Parks, attendant GMAs and communal areas; the plateau area lying east
of the Great North Road bordering the North and South Luangwa National Parks and the
M’nyamadzi Corridor; the Luangwa Rift down to the Zambezi and Mozambique, including the
Chisomo, Sandwe, West Petauke, Luano and Rufunsa GMAs, and the chiefdom Open Areas.
The AWF Zambezi Heartlands Project has already obtained the agreement of Zambia,
Mozambique and Zimbabwe for a TFCA, though it only extends as far as the Rufunsa GMA
and Mozambique lying opposite the Nyalugwe Chiefdom. It is proposed that Nyalugwe is
essential as the bridge to a future CATCA, and perhaps a vast elephant and people commons of
the future.
The development of the customary areas by way of the Landsafe formalisation path, and the
increasing participation of customary communities in the management and benefit flows from
the GMAs and the National Parks system would produce a mosaic of investor-customary
community partnerships based on sound co-management agreements, rather than the present
approach of the privatisation of massive parts of the wildlife estate, or simply the avoidance of
any kind of development and investment support at all.
PART IV: Critical analysis comparing Landsafe theory to practice
Current critical analysis theory regarding the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) seeks to
measure the progress of development projects. SLA suggests the following
areas for measurement: Natural Capital (natural resources and environmental services), Social
Capital (social relations and networks), Human Capital (skills, knowledge, labour), Physical
Capital (infrastructure) and Economic Capital. However a preview of SLA concluded that:
…putting SLA into practice is not as easy as it may so often appear, and there
are many overlaps with the problems long-reported of making policy in general
more evidence-based. Surprisingly there are relatively few reported attempts to
take a more critical stance as to the feasibility of SLA and its ability to help
deliver real change for people in the developing world (Morse et al. 2009).
Landsafe has not yet achieved much in measurable terms on the ground, and being a
programme, rather than a project, SLA assistance must await future developments. However, as
far as the theory and objectives of Landsafe is concerned – when compared with the present
situation, a brief critical analysis reveals the following:
310
THEORY
PRACTICE
1.
Chiefs will sign up for Landsafe because they
believe it will benefit them and their people.
Chiefs Luembe and Nyalugwe and their headmen
have signed up for Landsafe.
2.
Chiefs will support the establishment of
chiefdom statutory trusts that are elected and
which represent all the villagers.
Chief Luembe at first refused formation of a people’s
society – through the Office of the President - when
the villagers attempted to do it themselves, without
his permission.
3.
Chiefs and their headmen will agree to vest land
in these trusts provided it is not being alienated.
Chief Luembe not as yet, Chief Nyalugwe agreed.
4.
Chiefs and their people will not opt for land
alienations to 99-year leasehold.
Chief Luembe did so (to a local Big Man), despite
having agreed to place land in the Luembe Trust
under usufruct.
5.
The Societies Act and the Lands (perpetual
succession) Act will provide a mechanism to
secure the land without political interference.
As it is in the village residents’ Trust, it is assumed
so far that it is safe.
6.
Chiefdom Trust fund accounts may be secured,
with the chief having no control over them.
Nyalugwe Fund is secure under a Gamefields
signatory. The villagers are very happy about this.
7.
Any expenditure will have the full agreement of
all trustees.
Yes, in Nyalugwe. Luembe still does not have a fund
set up.
8.
Chiefs will support the appointment of a
chiefdom advisory committee to advise on
appropriate development and livelihoods
improvement.
This is supported, though it is yet to be done.
9.
The land now vested in the trusts may now be
leased out.
Nyalugwe – yes.
10. The lessee rights will be respected by
government, the chiefs and by the Trusts.
The rule of law is weak, with investors who threaten
the patrimonial system being deported.
11. The land leased will have very strictly defined
Included in the lease document, to be overseen by the
uses, and will not bar villagers who have
Trust, the Advisory Committee and the chiefs.
traditional access to the land from continuing to
extract resources and have usage of it for cultural
purposes – including hunting.
12. The chief will support a land registration exercise This is taking place in Nyalugwe.
and the keeping of headmen land registration
books.
13. The pre-colonial guardians of nature and tenure
will be allowed to re-assert themselves.
So stipulated in the lease.
14. Bottom-up co-management agreements with the
government departments responsible for wildlife,
fisheries, forestry and water will not have
precedence over traditional guardians of nature or
current local Big Men networks that are
functioning efficiently.
Co-management agreements for fisheries and for
some species of game not protected must allow for
traditional guardian rights. This stage is yet to be
reached.
15. Government departments will actually sign the
ZAWA has signed over rights for game ranching in
311
THEORY
necessary agreements and will allow the
Chiefdom Trusts to have a great deal of
autonomy.
PRACTICE
an area outside of the GMA. The matter of hunting
quota re-assignment is yet to be dealt with.
16. ZAWA will sign co-management agreements
over GMAs.
In Nyalugwe this is being negotiated, but held up by
ZAWA HQ failing to pay the CRB and now
threatening the Gamefields facilitator. ZAWA district
officials are co-operating.
17. ZAWA will co-operate with regard to the
election and functions of CRBs.
Yes, in Nyalugwe. In Luembe they summarily
removed a CRB who were in support of the author
after having revealed ZAWA corruption.
18. ZAWA will decentralise powers to the CRBs as provided for in the Wildlife Act.
This is in process, but it is arduous.
19. ZAWA will respect the terms of HCA
agreements.
ZAWA does not respect any legal process when it
suits them.
20. ZAWA will provide scientifically acceptable
quotas for commercial as well as villager use.
They will do so only if it does not affect their income.
21. ZAWA and other government departments will
fully consult with Chiefdom Trusts and the
villagers over any intended changes to policy or
legislation affecting the resources.
Highly unlikely.
22. Government will support de-centralisation.
Only if they benefit financially and it does not
threaten the patrimonial system.
23. Government will support the establishment of a
National Fund into which 25% of all revenue
from mining is paid, and from which dividends
are paid in a wholly transparent manner.
Will be dealt with only on the election of a new
government in August 2011. Highly likely that they
will do so as they have suggested something similar
already.
24. The issue of externalities and environmental
services will be dealt with such that the rights,
clearly defined, may be auctioned off to mining
companies.
To be dealt with in 2011.
25. Government will support the decisions of
Unlikely.- yet thus far they have not taken on
Chiefdoms and their Trusts for a ban on mining - chiefdoms who have refused.
such as uranium extraction.
26. Government or the President will not appropriate They will appropriate unless Trusts are in place to
customary land and award it to corporates or
protect the land.
other land grabbers.
312
21
REFERENCES
COOKE, B. & KOTHARI, U., 2001. Participation: the new tyranny?, Zed Books.
MORSE, STEPHEN. et al. 2009. Sustainable Livelihood Approach: a critical analysis of theory
and practice. Geographical Paper No. 189, in Geography, Editor, Mannion, A.M., The
University of Reading
SAVORY, A. & BUTTERFIELD, J. 1999. Holistic management: a new framework for decision
making, Island Press
Internet
Manning, I. P. A. 2007b. The current state of litigation – pending and otherwise, in the Zambian
hunting safari industry in 2007. Zambia safari hunting. 2010-01-12.
URL:http://zambiasafarihunting.blogspot.com/2007/08/curent-state-of-litigationpending-and.html . Accessed: 2010-01-12. (Archived by WebCite® at
http://www.webcitation.org/5miqtrcmi)
313
22
APPENDICES
Appendix 1:
Appendix 2:
Nyalugwe hunting block quotas, fees and potential earnings
Landsafe Njinga reports
314
MAXIMUM POSSIBLE
EARNINGS FROM
QUOTA
NYALUGWE POSSIBLE
EARNINGS FROM
QUOTA 2009
6
6
6
60
360
180
Buffalo
4
6
6
6
5
1600
8000
4000
Bushbuck
4
4
4
4
2
380
760
380
Bushpig
4
2
3
2
1
320
320
160
Crocodile
4
5
5
5
2
1600
3200
1600
Duiker C.
2
2
2
2
350
700
350
Grysbok
2
2
2
2
2
250
500
250
Hartebeest
2
2
2
2
1
780
780
390
Hippo
4
6
4
6
4
1600
6400
3200
Hyena
3
2
4
4
1
250
250
125
Impala
5
6
8
10
10
120
1200
600
Klipspringer
3
2
2
2
1
680
680
340
Kudu
4
2
3
4
3
1600
4800
2400
1600
Leopard
2
2
2
2
3
2650
7950
3975
1325
Lion
2
2
1
2
2
4200
8400
4200
90
380
800
800
120
Puku149
210
Roan
4
2
2
1
1
4000
4000
2000
Warthog
4
3
6
6
5
360
1800
900
Waterbuck C
4
3
3
3
3
840
2520
1260
Zebra
3
2
4
4
2
720
1440
720
54060
27030
TOTAL US$
149
ACTUAL EARNINGS
IN 2008
2007
6
SAFARI LICENCE FEES
2006
6
2009
2005
Baboon
2008
2004
NYALUGWE
PROJECTED EARNINGS
BASED ON 40%
UTILISATION OF
QUOTA in 2009
Appendix 1: Nyalugwe hunting block quotas, fees and potential earnings
Puku were not on quota; therefore poached?
315
10812
6425
Appendix 2: Landsafe Njinga reports
SPOKES
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Health: villagers health and current problems and diseases; distance and name of
nearest clinic; presence of health and traditional birth assistant, medicines etc and
costs of treatment; supply and use of mosquito nets.
Food security: crops being grown with/without fertiliser and insecticides; harvests;
food storage and shortages; outgrower schemes; relationship with outgrowers;
income; food aid.
Education: schools; names, number of pupils and teachers; state of school and staff
housing; text books; pupils at secondary school; payments by parents.
Water: drinkable water situation.
Wildlife: common animals in area; animal effects on people, crops etc; problem
animals; bushmeat poaching by outside gangs; ivory poaching; animals shot by safari
hunters.
Honey: Number of villagers harvesting; where do they sell; at what price?
Fish: Villager numbers who fish; fish increasing or decreasing; selling of fish at what
price?
GRZ: Visited by government officials, when and by whom?
Nyimba: how do you get to Nyimba and back?
Employment in area.
Clans in area.
Headmen and villages in area.
Development: what development would villagers like to see in area?
Woman and youth: their problems and the opportunities.
Safari companies: what do they think of them?
Relations with ZAWA.
Weather: floods and droughts.
316
PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS
317
1
COMMON-PROPERTY TRUSTS (THE CHIEFDOMS)
The principal task is for government to provide the necessary policy and legislative framework
making customary common property rights unassailable. In this, common property rights are
fully assigned over land and renewable natural resources to responsible guardians, i.e. the
chiefdoms, on behalf of all Zambians for customary land over all the natural resources except
mining, which is dealt with through the proposed Zambia Permanent Fund. They, through their
Trusts, then control market environmentalism, the chiefdoms having had the property rights to
them fully assigned. They therefore internalise the negative externalities (costs) of pollution or
over-harvesting, charging the necessary fees to concessionaires through an auction system.150
Government must therefore recognise public goods and ecosystem services as things of
considerable value. Such services cannot under any circumstances be privatised, but are to be
held under common property by the chiefdom trusts on behalf of the people.
2
THE ZAMBIA PERMANENT FUND
Following the example of the state of Alaska, the Zambian Government elected in 2011 should
establish the Zambia Permanent Fund with legislation affirming that 75 percent of all mining
royalties be paid to government as a replacement for taxes, and 25 percent paid to the Zambia
Permanent Fund. Annually, dividends would be paid to the registered residents of the chiefdoms
in the form of a living grant to heads of families resident in the villages, the balance - being
subject to a means test - paid to those living outside of the chiefdoms. As a quid pro quo,
chiefdom residents would be responsible for the protection of the renewable natural resources,
following a Landsafe or similar landuse plan supervised by their Trust and their customary
authority. It is critical to this exercise that the mining compradors and any corrupt politicians
overseeing the mining taxes are sidelined, so that mining taxes reflect international financial
reality.
150
BARNES, PETER. 2006. Capitalism 3.0: A guide to reclaiming the commons. Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, San Francisco.
319
ADDENDA
321
Addendum 1: Landsafe forms
Form 1:
Form 2:
Form 3:
Form 4:
Form 5:
Form 6:
Form 7:
Form 8:
Form 9:
Form 10:
Form 11:
Form 12:
Form 13:
Form 14:
Form 15:
Form 16:
Form 17:
Form 18:
Form 19:
MoU: Establishment of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy
Landuser rights cession: customary authority to chiefdom society
Petition to the Minister of Lands
Community application for a CRB to the Zambia Wildlife Authority
MoU: wildlife co-management agreement between a Chiefdom
Landsafe Trust and a Community Resource Board
Community Resource Board game quota application to ZAWA
Game quota cession by CRB to a Trust
Application for registration of a Community Game Ranch by a Chiefdom
Conservancy land-use planning template
Game Management Area co-management agreement between a chiefdom Trust
and a Community Resource Board
Application for the co-management of an adjoining National Park by a CRB to
ZAWA
MoU for a Joint Management Agreement for chiefdom forests
MoU for a Joint Management Agreement for gazetted forest
MoU for a Joint Management Agreement with the Fisheries Department
Community application for a Fisheries Management Committee
MoU for a co-management agreement with the Department of Water Affairs
Chiefdom landuser rights assignment under Lands (perpetual succession) Act
Chiefdom landuser cession to Trust Company (limited by guarantee)
Project proposal template
322
Landsafe
Form 1: MoU: Establishment of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy
1
PARTIES
This document constitutes an agreement between Chief…………………………………
of the ………………………Chiefdom, and a Landsafe facilitator..
2
PURPOSE
The purpose of this agreement is for the Chief, with the assistance of the facilitator, to agree to the
establishment of a Landsafe Chiefdom Conservancy.
3
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
The Chief, who is entrusted with the care and development of the land and people of the chiefdom,
needs to have the necessary support so that the land and natural resources may be co-managed with
Government and the lives of the customary community improved.
The facilitator wishes to assist the chiefdom in the establishment of the Landsafe conservancy
system for Chiefdoms so as to encourage investment in the chiefdom.
4
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The parties agree, in principle, to fully explore the possibilities of establishing a Landsafe
conservancy in future that will incorporate all of the …………………………….Chiefdom held
under customary tenure for an initial period of six months, by which time formalisation procedures
should have begun.
Name: For Customary Authority: Chief ……………………………………………………………
Date: __________________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
Name: Landsafe Facilitator …………………………………………………………………………
Date: __________________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
Name: Witness ……………………………………………………………………………………….
Date: __________________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
323
Landsafe
Form 2: Landuser rights cession: Customary Authority to Chiefdom Society
1
PARTIES
This document constitutes an agreement between the ………………………… Customary Authority
responsible for land held under customary tenure known as………………………and the ……
………………………….Society, appointed as custodian of the said chiefdom lands and due to
petition the Minister of Lands for incorporation under the Lands (perpetual succession) Act CAP
186 of the Laws of Zambia.
2
PURPOSE
The purpose of this agreement is for the Customary Authority to grant the ‘right to use and
occupation of land under customary tenure’ (Lands Act of 1995: Section 8(3), for the following
land……………………………..under its authority to the ……………………… Society in which
the Customary Authority (chief and headmen) is represented.
3
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
The ………………………….Society is in existence to oversee the development of the conservancy
and its management. Its objectives are:
i) To safeguard customary land and its
associated protected areas
ii) To strengthen the traditional authority and
encourage the democratic structures
iii) To conserve the wildlife and natural resources
for the benefit of the chiefdom
iv) To provide a land and business management
plan for the appropriate development of
chiefdoms, one that fully respects the ecology
and the traditional, cultural and religious
norms
v) To facilitate chiefdom institutions that may
enter into co-management agreements with
Government over land and renewable natural
resources, in conformity with the prescriptions
of the Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws
of Zambia of 1974 and the Fisheries
(Amended) Act of 2007, The Forestry Act No.
39 of 1973, Forestry Policy of 1998, the
Forestry Act No. 7 of 1999, the Local Forests
(Control and Management) Regulations,
324
Statutory Instrument No. 47 of 2006, the
Lands Act Chapter 184 of the Laws of
Zambia of 1995, the Water Act Chapter
198 of the Laws of Zambia of 1948 and
the Zambia Wildlife Act No. 12 of 1998
vi) To provide the necessary incentives for
both investors and the chiefdom to enter
in to mutually beneficial partnerships and
investments
vii) To identify, propose and facilitate small
businesses able to harvest natural
resources
viii) To establish a development trust fund and
the implementation of development
projects required by the customary
community
ix) To foster education in the chiefdom’s
history, culture and religion, and in its
ecology.
x) To foster conservation agriculture, health
and education
Form 2 - continued
4
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The …………………………………………Customary Community agrees to cede to its Society, the
usufruct rights to the …………………………………………Chiefdom.
Name: For Customary Authority: Chief
Name: For District Council Representative
…………………………………………………..
………………………………………………….
Date: _____________at __________________
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: _____________________________
Signature: _____________________________
Name: For Customary Authority: Headman
Name: or Representative CRB
…………………………………………………..
…………………………….................................
Date: _____________ at __________________
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: _____________________________
Signature: _____________________________
Name: For Customary Authority: Headman
Name: For Representative Customary
Community Society
…………………………………………………..
…….....................................................................
Date: _____________ at __________________
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: _____________________________
Name: For Landsafe Facilitator
……………………………….............................
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: _____________________________
325
Landsafe
Form 3: Petition to the Minister of Lands
COMMUNITY TRUST INCORPORATION
PROPOSED TRUST DEEDTHE ……………………………………TRUST
THIS TRUST DEED is made the ______ day of ___________________Two Thousand and Three by
………………………………………………………………………………………………residents of the
……………………..Customary Authority, ………………District of the Republic of Zambia (hereinafter called “the original
Trustees”) which expression shall where the context so permits include the trustees for the time being of this Deed)
WHEREAS
(1)
The original Trustees Indianred to declare a trust for the purposes hereinafter specified
(2)
The cash sum of Kwacha 1,000,000 has been paid to the original Trustees to be held by them on the trusts to be declared
hereby and it is contemplated that further monies will be paid or transferred to the Trustees for the time being of this Deed to
be held on the same trusts.
NOW THIS DEED WITNESSETH and IT IS HEREBY AGREED AND DECLARED as follows: 1.
The Trust hereby constituted shall be called the
TRUST (hereinafter called “the Trust”) and shall be
registered under the Land (Perpetual Succession ) Act (Cap. 186 of the Laws of Zambia)
2.
Its mission is to actively support the conservation of the natural resources of the Customary Authority for the benefit of its
human residents. In this Deed Unless the context otherwise require :(a)
“Trustees shall mean the original Trustees or other Trustees hereof for the time being
(b)
“ the Trust Fund “ shall mean:(i)
the said cash sum hereinbefore recited;
(ii)
all property money invested or other assets at any time or times hereafter paid or transferred to or
(iii)
the property for the time being representing the sums property investments money and other assets referred
otherwise vested in the trustees to be held on trusts hereby declared; and
to in the sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) of this sub-clause and of accumulation of income or capital and
any accretion or other addition derived there from
(c)
3.
“ the Trust Assets” shall mean such assets as the Trustees may decide to acquire pursuant hereto
The trust shall be a non-profit making organisation and the objects of the Trust shall be: -
(1)
To support and advise the ……………………….Customary Authority in the sustained management of the land
(2)
To liaise with Government – in close consultation with the Customary Authority, on all matters affecting natural
and natural resources in its custody
resource use
(3)
To provide the Customary Authority with a land-use development plan
(4)
To advise the Customary Authority in its negotiations and participation in joint-venture investments affecting
land-use and biodiversity conservation; and to be represented on the boards of any such joint-venture companies
which may be established as a result
(5)
In conformity with the prescriptions of the Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws of Zambia of 1974, The
Forestry Act No. 39 of 1973 – and when repealed, the Forestry Act No. 7 of 1999, the Lands Act Chapter 184 of
the Laws of Zambia of 1995, the Water Act Chapter 198 of the Laws of Zambia of 1948 and the Zambia Wildlife
Act No. 12 of 1998, to fully comply with the opportunities, responsibilities and obligations enunciated therein
(6)
To foster partnership supports from civil-society organisations and donors in supporting the optimum natural
resource and human development in the area
(7)
To identify, propose, facilitate funding and implementation, of integrated conservation and development projects
within the chiefdom.
326
Form 3 - continued
(8)
(9)
To promote effective communication and co-ordination between all the role-players.
To obtain all the necessary information, legal and otherwise, which will allow it and the Customary Authority to
best serve the interests of the area and it human community
(10) To foster education in traditional knowledge, the ecology and biodiversity conservation.
Etc… etc… etc.
4.
This deed shall not be amended, altered or added to except by special resolution passed by a Two-Thirds majority of
the board of Trustees at a special general meeting convened for that specific purpose, and which notice of the meeting
shall specify the nature of the alteration or amendment. Any such alteration or amendment may thereafter be affected
by the trustees providing always that such alteration, addition or amendment does not constitute any revocation of the
trust or its terms, and provided it does not constitute a right of conferring the Trust Fund, the income or any portion
thereof; otherwise than for the objects of the Trust as hereinbefore set out, and provided further that the capital
and/or income of the Trust shall always be used for the purposes and objects of the Trust as set out in Clause Three
(3) hereof.
5.
The Trust shall be a body of perpetual succession and the Trustees or their successors shall not have the right or
power to terminate the Trust. Notwithstanding, however, that the Trust is created in perpetuity, all the remaining
movable assets of the trust (in the event of the Trust being terminated for any reasons whatsoever) shall be distributed
to any independent organisation with similar objectives within Zambia to be determined by Two Thirds of the
Trustees Board at or before the time of dissolution, which bodies or organisation are themselves exempt from the
payment of income tax.
IN WITNESS whereof the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first before written.
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
by the said ………………………………………………………
by the said ………………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Name: …………………………………………………………...
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………...
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
by the said ………………………………………………………
by the said ………………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
by the said ………………………………………………………
by the said ………………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
SIGNED, SEALED and DELIVERED
by the said ………………………………………………………
by the said ………………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
in the presence of: ………………………………………………
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Name: …………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Address: ………………………………………………………..
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
Occupation: …………………………………………………….
327
Landsafe
Form 4: Community application for a CRB to the Zambia Wildlife Authority
(in terms of the Wildlife Act of 1998: Part 3 of Act no. 12)
DATE
CUSTOMARY AUTHORITY
DISTRICT
PROVINCE
GAME MANAGEMENT AREAS
OPEN AREAS
NATIONAL PARKS
NATIONAL FOREST
LOCAL FOREST
ALIENATED LAND
ELECTED MEMBERS
Chairman
Chief’s rep.
Co-ordinator
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
Member
REGISTRATION NAME
APPLICANT
NAMES
SIGNATURES
Chief
………………………………..
_______________________
Chairman District Council
………………………………..
_______________________
Chairman CRB
………………………………..
_______________________
ZAWA APPROVAL
For Director-General
Date:______________________________
328
Landsafe
Form 5: MoU: Wildlife Co-Management Agreement between a Chiefdom Landsafe Trust
and a Community Resource Board/ZAWA
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes an agreement between the……………………………Trust and the
………………………………Community Resource Board (CRB)/ZAWA
2
PURPOSE
For the CRB/ZAWA and the Trust to develop a co-management agreement for the
…………………. chiefdom whereby the Trust is given sole user rights - under certain conditions to wildlife.
3
BACKGROUND
As allowed under the Wildlife Act of 1998: Part 3: (7) 2: the elected chiefdom CRB being
empowered to promote and develop an integrated approach to the management of human and natural
resources in a Game Management Area or an open area falling within its jurisdiction and with the
power to:
i)
negotiate, in conjunction with ZAWA, co-management agreements with hunting
outfitters and photographic tour operators;
ii)
manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction, within quotas specified by the ZAWA;
iii)
appoint Village Scouts to exercise and perform the duties of a wildlife police officer
under the supervision
iv)
in consultation with the ZAWA, develop and implement management plans which
reconcile the various uses of land in areas falling under the board’s jurisdiction;
v)
perform such other functions as ZAWA may direct or delegate to it.
4
THE PRINCIPLES
The parties to abide by the following principles in the development of a contract:
i)
The CRB to take on the Trust as its exclusive partner in the management of the
wildlife resources, agreeing not to issue hunting licences or any other rights of access
to any other person or organisation.
ii)
The Trust agrees to conserve the wildlife resources and to follow a management plan
agreed to by the parties and approved by ZAWA.
iii)
The Trust will oversee the equitable sharing of benefits between the chiefdom and
ZAWA and the CRB.
iv)
To jointly provide a management plan, approved by ZAWA.
5
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the conservation of the wildlife and its sustained use for the benefit of the customary
community.
6
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
To jointly ensure the socio-ecological conservation of the Chiefdom:
i)
The Trust has the responsibility for seeing that an agreed management plan for the
area is implemented
ii)
The CRB is responsible for carrying out its mandate as laid out in the Wildlife Act
with the full support of ZAWA
iii)
The CRB/ZAWA to give exclusive use of the wildlife resources to the Trust
329
Form 5 – continued
7
SHARED CONCERNS
The Parties share a common concern for the conservation of wildlife and the welfare of the
customary community agree to share information of mutual concern.
8
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of a national asset
ii)
The scientifically managed sustained use of its wildlife resources
iii)
The protection of its biodiversity
iv)
A stable and increasing source of income for communities
v)
A well managed area based on sound conservation principles
vi)
Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well Government policies concerning
decentralisation and PPPs
9
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to designate
a liaison officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed. Matters for consideration
by the standing committee are to include a review of each agency's participation in this agreement,
an assessment of the agreement's effectiveness, and modifications that might be necessary. As
appropriate, the committee will address urgent issues and specific cases of serious non-compliance.
Chairman CRB ………………………………………………………………………………………..
Date: _____________________ at ___________________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
Name: Chairman of Trust ……………………………………………………………………………
Date: _____________________ at ___________________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
Name: Chief ……………………………………………………………. Patron of CRB and Trust
Date: _____________________ at ___________________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
Name: FOR ZAWA………………………………………………………….………………………..
Date: _____________________ at ___________________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________________________________
330
Landsafe
Form 6: Trust Game Quota application to ZAWA
SPECIES
#
DISTRICT
LICENCE
ESTABLISHED
RESIDENT
COMMUNITY
GAME
QUOTA
TOTAL
Buffalo
Bushbuck
Crocodile
Duck & Geese
Duiker B C Y
Eland
Game birds
Grysbok
Hartebeest
Hippo
Hyena
Impala
Jackal
Klipspringer
Kudu
Lechwe Black
Lechwe Red
Lechwe Kafue
Leopard
Lion
Oribi
Puku
Reedbuck
Roan
Sable
Sitatunga
Steenbok
Tsessebe
Warthog
Waterbuck E D
Wildebeest C B
Zebra
…………………………………TRUST CHAIRMAN
SIGNATURES
………………………………………………Patron
_________________________________
……………………………………….FOR ZAWA
_________________________________
DATE:____________________________________
_________________________________
FOR ……………………………………..SEASON
331
Landsafe
Form 7: Game Quota cession by Trust to the investor
(in terms of the Wildlife Act of 1998: Part 3: (7) 2a of Act no. 12)
QUOTA
SPECIES
MEAT HUNTING
#
DISTRICT
RESIDENT
GMA
OPEN
GMA
RESIDENT
GMA
OPEN
TROPHY
CITIZEN/
ESTAB
RESIDENT
GMA
OPEN
SAFARI
CLIENT
GMA
OPEN
Baboon
Buffalo
Bushbuck
Crocodile
Duiker B C Y
Eland
Game birds G F
Grysbok
Hartebeest
Hippo
Hyena
Impala
Jackal
Klipspringer
Kudu
Lechwe Black
Lechwe Red
Lechwe Kafue
Leopard
Lion
Oribi
Puku
Reedbuck
Roan
Sable
Sitatunga
Steenbok
Tsessebe
Warthog
Waterbuck E D
Wildebeest C B
Zebra
…………………………………………….CRB CHAIRMAN
………………………………………...................CRB Patron
………………………………………...................ZAWA: DG.
Date:_____________________________________________
332
SIGNATURES
_________________________________
_________________________________
_________________________________
T
Landsafe
Form 8: Application for registration of a Community Game Ranch by a Chiefdom
1.
Chiefdom:……………………………………………………………………….
2.
Open area/Game Management Area:……………………………………………
3.
District:………………………………………………………………………….
4.
Location:………………………………………………………………………...
5.
Boundaries………………………………………………………………………
6.
Area (approximate)……………………………………………………………..
We, the ……………………………..Trust do hereby make application for the registration
of our designated area as a Community Game Ranch, and, subject to the erection of
fencing suitable to yourselves, the transfer of the ownership of designated game species to
ourselves, to be managed for the benefit of our community.
Name: Chairman ……………………………………………………………………….
Date: _________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: _____________________________________________________________
Name: Secretary ………………………………………………………………………...
Date: _________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: _____________________________________________________________
Name: Chief ……………………………………………………………………………..
Date: _________________ at ______________________________________________
Signature: _____________________________________________________________
Attached documents: Trust Certificate of Incorporation and list of Trustees; landuser rights cession
document and list of headmen signatories; certificate of land vestment under the Lands (perpetual
succession) Act; list of headmen, signatories and minutes of game ranch application, including District
Council, the CRB and local ZAWA office.
333
Landsafe
Form 9: Conservancy land-use planning template
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Reasons for the conservancy
development
1.2
Aims and objectives
2
PRESENT SITUATION
2.1
Physical data
2.1.1 Area and situation
2.1.2 Soils and vegetation
2.1.3 Water resources
2.1.4 Livestock potential
2.1.5 Irrigation potential
2.1.6 Crop potential
2.1.7 Wildlife potential
2.2
Socio-economic data
2.2.1 History of the area
2.2.2 Demographic structure
2.2.3 Existing land-use and land
tenure
2.2.4 Type and level of animal
and crop production
2.2.5 Wildlife consumptive and
non-consumptive use
2.2.6 Sources and levels of
income
2.2.7 Market possibilities (local
and regional)
2.3
Existing social services
2.3.1 Education
2.3.2 Health
2.3.3 Marketing and requisites
supply
2.3.4 Extension and services
2.3.5 Transport and
communications
3
3.2.1.1
3.3
3.4
PROPOSED CONSERVANCY
SCHEME
3.1
Physical Layout
3.1.1 General plan total area
3.1.2 Type and size of enterprises
3.1.3 Roads
3.1.4 Clearing
3.1.5 Fields fencing
3.1.6 Water supplies and
irrigation
3.1.7 Conservation works
3.1.8 Buildings sighting and
layout
3.1.9 Lodge sites
3.1.10 Camp sites
3.1.11 Airstrips
3.2
Conservancy Plan
3.2.1 Agriculture
334
Proposed food
security programme
3.2.1.2
Methods of
cultivation
3.2.1.3
Livestock
programme
3.2.1.4
Irrigation
programme
3.2.1.5
Cost/profit analysis
3.2.1.6
Credit facilities
3.2.1.7
Transport and
marketing
3.2.2 Conservancy members use
3.2.2.1
Camp rentals
3.2.2.2
Vehicle roaming
3.2.2.3
Services
3.2.3 Hunting safaris
3.2.4 Tourism lodge-based
3.2.4.1
Site leases
3.2.4.2
Vehicle roaming
3.2.5 Tourism village-based
3.2.6 Tourism educational and
scientific
Administration of the scheme
3.3.1 Organisation
3.3.2 Management
3.3.3 Staff requirements
3.3.4 Labour requirements
3.3.5 Form and conditions of
contracts or agreements
3.3.6 Fees and charges
Auxiliary services required
3.4.1 Education
3.4.2 Health and nutrition
3.4.3 Community development
3.4.4 Housing
3.4.5 Repair workshops
3.4.6 Transport
4
ECONOMIC APPRAISAL
4.1
Costs (capital and recurrent)
4.2
Returns
4.3
Cash flow budget
4.4
Social cost/benefit analysis
4.5
Monitoring and evaluation
5
IMPACTS ASSESSMENT
5.1
Short
5.2
Medium
5.3
Long term
6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Landsafe
Form 10: Game Management Area Co-Management Agreement between a Chiefdom
Trust and a Community Resource Board/ZAWA
PARTIES
1
This document, proposes an agreement between the…………………. Trust and the
…………………………………………………..Community Resource Board (CRB)/ZAWA
2
PURPOSE
For the CRB/ZAWA and the Trust to sign a co-management agreement for the
………………………………GMA, whereby the …………………Trust is given sole user rights under certain conditions – for the consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife with joint
responsibility for biodiversity and community development.
3
BACKGROUND
As allowed under the Wildlife Act of 1998: Part 3: (7) 2: the elected chiefdom CRB being
empowered to promote and develop an integrated approach to the management of human and natural
resources in a Game Management Area or an open area falling within its jurisdiction and with the
power to:
(a)
negotiate, in conjunction with ZAWA, co-management agreements with hunting
outfitters and photographic tour operators;
(b)
manage the wildlife under its jurisdiction, within quotas specified by the ZAWA;
(c)
appoint Village Scouts to exercise and perform the duties of a wildlife police officer
under the supervision
(d)
in consultation with the ZAWA, develop and implement management plans which
reconcile the various uses of land in areas falling under the board’s jurisdiction;
(e)
perform such other functions as ZAWA may direct or delegate to it.
4
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT
That the …………………………Trust and the…………………………CRB jointly provide a
management plan, approved by ZAWA, to manage the GMAs wildlife resources.
5
THE PRINCIPLES
The parties to abide by the following principles in the development of a contract: The CRB to take
on the………………Trust as its exclusive partner in the management of the GMAs wildlife
resources…………………………………, agreeing not to issue hunting licences or any other rights
of access to any other person or organisations. That the…………………..…agree to conserve the
wildlife resources and to follow a management plan agreed to by the parties and approved by
ZAWA. The ……………………………..to oversee the equitable sharing of benefits between
the……………………………chiefdom and the CRB/ZAWA. And that the Trust continue to pay
such land rents, concession and licence fees as would normally be payable to ZAWA, to be shared
with the CRB and the Chief according to an agreed formula.
6
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the conservation of the wildlife and ecology of the GMA, and its continued sustained use
for the benefit of local communities.
335
Form 10 – continued
7
SHARED CONCERNS
The Parties share a common concern for the conservation of wildlife and the welfare of the
community in the GMA.
8
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The cooperating agencies agree to share information of mutual concern and interest regarding this
agreement.
9
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of a national asset GMA
ii)
The scientifically managed sustained use of its wildlife resources
iii)
The protection of its biodiversity
iv)
A stable and increasing source of income for communities
v)
A well managed area based on sound conservation principles
vi)
Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well Government policies concerning
decentralisation and PPPs
10
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to designate
a liaison officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed. Matters for
consideration by the standing committee are to include a review of each agency's participation in
this agreement, an assessment of the agreement's effectiveness, and modifications that might be
necessary. As appropriate, the committee will address urgent issues and specific cases of serious
non-compliance.
Name: For Chairman: …………………………
Community Resource Board
Name: For Chief ………………………………
Date: ____________ at ___________________
Date: _____________ at __________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: ______________________________
Name: For Secretary Natural Resources
.……………………………………………CRB
Date: ____________ at ___________________
Name: For Zambia Wildlife Authority
Date: _____________ at __________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature:______________________________
Name: For Chairman of the …………….Trust
Date: ____________ at ___________________
Name: For Chief………………………………...
Signature: ______________________________
Date: _____________ at __________________
Name: For District Council Representative
Signature:______________________________
Date: ____________ at ___________________
Signature: ______________________________
336
Landsafe
Form 11: Application for co-management of adjoining national park by Trust to ZAWA
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes an agreement between the Zambia Wildlife Authority and the
………………………………Trust
2
PURPOSE
For the Trust and ZAWA to develop a co-management agreement for the
…………………………section of the ………………………………National Park.
3
BACKGROUND
In 1950, the Kafue National Park was proclaimed as the first national park in the country by
the Governor of Northern Rhodesia in April of that year, being ‘set aside’ within what was
Native Trust Land. The Order in Council defining Trust Land stated, ”land set apart for the
sole use and benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives of Northern Rhodesia…” and further:
“out of the profits or rents accruing from any area of native trust land set aside as a forest or
game reserve… there shall… be paid first the expenditure necessarily incurred by the
Government in connection with the said area, whether by maintenance, development or
otherwise, and the balance shall be paid into the (Native Trust Land) Fund, or into the
treasury of the native authority concerned, as the Governor shall direct”.
In 1954, parts of Nsefu and Luambe were put aside as Game Reserve at the request of the
chiefs for their people’s benefit. They were later converted to National Park status.
4
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT
That ZAWA, in the light of past historical agreements, and in the light of present PPP policy
and the need for ZAWA to share responsibilities and benefits with chiefdoms in adjoining
National Parks, that they agree to enter in co-management agreements for that section of
National Park formerly part of a particular chiefdom.
5
THE PRINCIPLES
That ZAWA agrees to have the ……………………………..Trust as a full partner in a
public-private partnership for the co-management of the ………………………………
portion of the ……………………………….. National Park. And that if an existing PPP is
in force with investors, that all efforts be made to include the Trust in that agreement, but
certainly to see that the Trust, and the community whose interests it represents, benefits
from any commercial activities being carried out by investors in that section, this to include
a share in any Tourism Concession Agreements (TCAs) in force.
6
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the continued preservation of the …………………….National Park and the
sustained benefit streams to the ………………………………chiefdom.
337
Form 11 – continued
7
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
7.1 ZAWA to ensure the historical rights of the ………………..chiefdom are
respected in terms of benefit streams
7.2 The Trust to ensure that people of the chiefdom respect the National Park
8
SHARED CONCERNS
The Parties share a common concern for the protection of the National Park and the welfare
of the chiefdom’s people.
9
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The cooperating agencies agree to share information of mutual concern and interest
regarding this agreement.
10
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of the national park
ii)
A stable and increasing source of income for communities
iii) A well managed chiefdom and national park based on sound conservation
principles
iv) Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well Government policies
concerning decentralisation and PPPs
11
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to
designate a liaison officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed.
Matters for consideration by the standing committee are to include a review of each agency's
participation in this agreement, an assessment of the agreement's effectiveness, and
modifications that might be necessary. As appropriate, the committee will address urgent
issues and specific cases of serious non-compliance.
Name: For Chairman: ………………Trust
Name: For District Council Representative
Date: _____________ at ________________
Date: _____________ at ________________
Signature: ___________________________
Signature: ___________________________
Name: For Chairman
…………………………….....................CRB
Name: For Zambia Wildlife Authority
Date: _____________ at ________________
Date: _____________ at ________________
Signature: ___________________________
Signature:___________________________
Name: For Secretary of the ………….Trust
Name: For Chief…………………………….
Date: _____________ at ________________
Date: _____________ at ________________
Signature: ___________________________
Signature:___________________________
338
Landsafe
Form 12: MoU for a Joint Management Agreement for chiefdom forests
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes an agreement between the……………………Trust and the Forestry
Department
2
PURPOSE
For the FD and the Trust to develop a co-management agreement for the forests of the
………………………………chiefdom
3
BACKGROUND
The legislation and policy documents that form the base for piloting Joint Forest Management
activities in Zambia are the Forestry Policy of 1998, the Forests Act of 1999, and the local forests
(Control and Management) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 52 of 1999 and Statutory
Instrument No.47 of 2006, the latter laying out regulations for Joint Forest Management Areas. In
the process of piloting JFM it is clear that the legislative foundation for JFM is faulty; because the
Forests Act of 1999, which provides the legal framework for JFM, is not yet in force. However, the
respective parties may enter into an agreement based on best practice so that community
empowerment and co-management with Government may flourish.
4
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT
That the ………………Trust and the Forestry Department jointly provide a management plan in
which eco-tourism and the appropriate management and use of the Forest take place under the
general supervision of the Trust and the Forestry Department.
5
THE PRINCIPLES
The Forestry Department to take on the ……………………Trust as its exclusive partner in the
management of the…………………………forest, agreeing not to issue logging licences or any
other rights of access to any other person or organisation. That the Trust agrees to conserve all the
resources and to follow a management plan mutually to be agreed upon.
6
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the conservation of the forest and an equitable sharing of benefits between the Trust and
the Forestry Department.
7
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
i)
To jointly ensure the conservation of the Forest
ii)
The Trust would have responsibility for seeing that an agreed management plan for
the area is implemented
iii)
The Forestry Department would be responsible for full assistance and advice on any
controlled exploitation of the forest for the benefit of the local economy
8
PROHIBITIONS
The FD to give exclusive use of the forest to the Trust, who will assume, with the FD, full
responsibility for its management.
9
SHARED CONCERNS
The Parties share a common concern for the preservation of the forest and the avoidance of any
further illegal settlement or occupation for subsistence agriculture. They also wish to see the forest
be of long-term benefit to the local community through appropriate tourism development, forest
utilization and the production of products from such utilisation.
339
Form 12 – continued
10
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The cooperating agencies agree to share information of mutual concern and interest
regarding the Forest.
11
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of a national asset
ii)
The scientifically managed sustained use of its timber and eco-tourism
potential
iii) The protection of its biodiversity
iv) A stable and increasing source of income for communities
v)
A well managed area based on sound conservation principles
vi) Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well the Forestry
Department's progressive policies around co-management of national and
local forests
12
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to
designate a liaison officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed.
Matters for consideration by the standing committee are to include a review of each
agency's participation in this agreement, an assessment of the agreement's effectiveness,
and modifications that might be necessary. As appropriate, the committee will address
urgent issues and specific cases of serious non-compliance.
Name: Chairman of the
…………………………………………..Trust
Name: Chief…………………………………..
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: _____________________________
Signature: _____________________________
Name: Secretary of the
……………………….………………….Trust
Name: Director Forestry
Department……………………………………
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Date: ___________ at ____________________
Signature: _____________________________
Signature: _____________________________
340
Landsafe
Form 13: MoU for a Joint Management Agreement for gazetted forest
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes an agreement between the………………Trust and the Forestry Department (FD).
2
PURPOSE
For the FD and the Trust to develop a co-management agreement for the ………………………………..Forest
contiguous to the ……………………..chiefdom.
3
BACKGROUND
The legislation and policy documents that form the base for piloting Joint Forest Management activities in
Zambia are the Forestry Policy of 1998, the Forests Act of 1999, and the local forests (Control and
Management) Regulations, Statutory Instrument No. 52 of 1999 and Statutory Instrument No.47 of 2006, the
latter laying out regulations for Joint Forest Management Areas. In the process of piloting JFM it is clear that
the legislative foundation for JFM is faulty; because the Forests Act of 1999, which provides the legal
framework for JFM, is not yet in force. And it is understood that a JFMA cannot be entered into with a national
Forest, it first requiring de-gazetting. As this may be counterproductive – given the reason for its original
promulgation – the Trust and Forestry Department should sign an agreement of co-operation based on best
practice so that community empowerment and co-management with Government may flourish.
4
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT
That the Trust and the FD jointly provide a management plan in which the protection and the use of the Forest
for the benefit of the contiguous community take place under the general supervision of the Trust and the FD.
5
THE PRINCIPLES
The Forestry Department to take on the Trust as its exclusive partner in the protection of the Forest. That the
Trust agrees to conserve all the resources and to follow a management plan mutually to be agreed upon.
6
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the conservation of the forest and an equitable sharing of benefits between the Trust and the FD.
7
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
To jointly ensure the conservation of the Forest
i)
The Trust would ensure that an agreed management plan for the area is implemented
The FD would be responsible for full assistance and advice regarding forest management
8
SUBSTANCE OF AGREEMENT
The cooperating agencies agree to share information of mutual concern and interest regarding the Forest
9
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of its biodiversity and its management on sound conservation principles
ii)
A stable and increasing source of income for communities
iii)
Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well the co-management of national and local
forests
10
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to designate a liaison
officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed. Matters for consideration by the standing
committee are to include a review of each agency's participation in this agreement, an assessment of the
agreement's effectiveness, and modifications that might be necessary. As appropriate, the committee will
address urgent issues and specific cases of serious non-compliance.
Name: Trust Chairman …………………………..
Name: Chief……………………………………….
Date: ___________at ________________________
Date: ___________at _______________________
Signature: _________________________________
Signature: ________________________________
Name: Secretary of the Trust……………………..
Name: Director FD………………………………..
Date: ___________at ________________________
Date: _________at _________________________
Signature: _________________________________
Signature: ________________________________
341
Landsafe
Form 14: MoU for a Joint Management Agreement with the Fisheries Department
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes a Co-Management Agreement between…………………Trust of the
………………………….chiefdom, and the Fisheries Department of the Ministry of Agriculture,
Food & Fisheries.
2
PURPOSE
An application to the FD to register the riparian areas of the ………………………chiefdom as a
Fisheries Management Area under the ………………………….Trust, the latter being the approved
for the management of the land and natural resources of the chiefdom.
3
BACKGROUND
The Fisheries Act Chapter 200 of the Laws of Zambia of 1974 provided for fisheries management at
a departmental level but did not incorporate community participation. Before that it was
administered from 1941 by the Department of Game and Tsetse Control.
The amended Fisheries Act of 2007 gives powers to the Minister to declare Fisheries Management
Areas (FMAs) through a statutory instrument – in consultation with riparian communities, and
subject to the provision of a fisheries management plan, with special care intended for endemic fish.
No fishing is allowed within an FMA without a licence. The Minister appoints Fisheries
Management Committees (FMC) (as co-management structures in Fisheries Management Areas
(FMA)), with members comprising six villagers, one chief’s representative, one from the local
authority, one from an NGO operating in the FMA, one each from the fishing industry and
aquaculture industry, plus two other persons, vetted by the Minister who also appoints the Chairman
and Vice-Chairman. The FMA may, in consultation with the Director, enter into co-management
agreement with industrial fishing companies, or with NGOs. The Committee is responsible for the
production of the management plan and the creation of a fund into which will be paid all licence
money for the economic and social well-being of the riparian community. The committee is required
to prepare an annual report and audited accounts to be submitted to the Minister.
The Act also covers aquaculture, requiring that ventures be licenced and operate under certain
conditions. Government is required to provide an Aquaculture Development Plan for Zambia.
4
PURPOSE OF THIS AGREEMENT
To register a CMA with the Department of Fisheries which, inter alia, would involve the application
by the ………………………Trust, representing ……………………chiefdom, for the registration of
a Fisheries Management Committee, which would comprise the elected members of the Society,
with the addition of three members of riparian fishing communities within the chiefdom.
5
THE PRINCIPLES
See Background.
6
MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE PARTIES
To ensure the conservation of the …………………………chiefdom fishery and its sustained use for
the benefit of the customary community.
342
Form 14 – continued
7
AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES
i)
The Trust to take on full responsibility, through a Fisheries Management Committee,
for the management of the fishery in the Fisheries Management Area
ii)
The Fisheries Department to enter into a co-management agreement with the Trust for
the management of the fishery in the FMA
8
SHARED CONCERNS
The Parties share a common concern for the conservation of fish resources and the benefits to be
derived from its legal usage for the primary stakeholders.
9
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection and scientifically managed sustained use of a national asset
ii)
Derived ecological benefit flows from its conservation
iii)
A stable and increasing source of income for communities'
iv)
A well managed FMA based on sound conservation principles
v)
Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation, as well the Fisheries Department's
progressive policies around co-management of the fishery
10
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
Subject to the FDs agreement, to recommend the FMAs declaration by the Minister.
Name: For Customary Authority: Chief
Name: For District Council Representative
Date: ____________ at __________________
Date: ____________ at __________________
Signature: ____________________________
Signature: ____________________________
Name: For Chairman of the
…………………………………………..Trust
Name: For the Director of Fisheries
Date: ____________ at __________________
Date: ____________ at __________________
Signature: ____________________________
Signature:_____________________________
Name: For Secretary to the Trust
Date: ____________ at __________________
Signature: ____________________________
343
Landsafe
Form 15: Community application for a Fisheries Management Committee
CUSTOMARY AUTHORITY
SIGNATURE
DISTRICT
PROVINCE
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AREA
CUSTOMARY COMMUNITY SOCIETY
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
APPOINTED MEMBERS
CHIEF’S REPRESENTATIVE
DISTRICT COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE
THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY
FISHING INDUSTRY
AQUACULTURE INDUSTRY
ELECTED MEMBERS
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
VILLAGE FISHERMAN
MINISTER APPROVED MEMBERS
MEMBER (SOCIETY)
MEMBER (SOCIETY)
CHAIRMAN
VICE-CHAIRMAN
344
REG. CARD
DATE
Landsafe
Form 16: MoU for a Co-Management Agreement with the Department of Water Affairs
1
PARTIES
This document, proposes a co-agreement between the………………………Trust
representing the ………………………….Chiefdom and the Department of Water Affairs.
2
PURPOSE
For the WAD and the Trust to develop a co-management agreement for the optimum
management of the chiefdom’s water resources.
3
BACKGROUND
Water resources being an essential support to life, common resource regimes and the
ecology, there is a need for the creation of a public-private partnership for its management,
whereby chiefdoms take on their responsibilities for its care and management A major
support project to Government concludes that in Zambia there is a:
i)
Lack of decentralised and sustainable structures that are accessible and provide
for the participation of stakeholders/communities.
ii)
Lack of effective awareness programmes for all levels of water
users/stakeholders including policy makers and legislators.
iii) Lack of involvement of traditional authorities in water resources management
(customary law).
N/B: Component 3 of the Danida Water Sector Programme Support (WSPS) is specifically
addressing how to link proposed catchment/sub-catchment based institutions for water
resources management to existing decentralised local government institutions such as the
local authorities.
4
THE PRINCIPLES
The parties to abide by the following principles in the development of an agreement:
i)
The Department to consult the Trust on all matters affecting the water
resources of the chiefdom
ii)
The Trust to co-operate with the Department on all water affairs and related
matters
5
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
i)
The protection of a national asset
ii)
Establishing lines of communication between a chiefdom and Government
iii) A contribution to customary community development and the conservation of
the chiefdom
iv) Support to GRZ policies of de-centralisation and public-private partnerships
345
Form 16 – continued
6
STANDING COMMITTEE
To facilitate the implementation of this agreement, the cooperating agencies each agree to
designate a liaison officer to serve on a standing committee that will meet as needed.
Name: For Customary Authority:
Chief…………………………………..…
Name: For District Council
Representative
Date: ____________ at ______________
Date: ____________ at ______________
Signature: _________________________
Signature: _________________________
Name: For Chairman of the
……………………………………Trust
Name: For the Director of Water Affairs
Date: ____________ at ______________
Date: ____________ at _______________
Signature: _________________________
Signature:_________________________
Name: For Secretary to the Trust
Date: ____________ at ______________
Signature: _________________________
346
Landsafe
Form 17 : Chiefdom landuser rights assignment under Lands (perpetual succession) Act
CHIEFDOM LANDUSER RIGHTS ASSIGNMENT
of
……………………….COMMUNITY GAME RANCH
…………………………….CHIEFDOM
by
…………………………………….TRUST
TO
………………………………………..
……………………..DISTRICT
ZAMBIA
347
Form 17 – continued
WHEREAS the ………………Customary Authority and its successors in title (hereinafter
referred to as “The Customary Authority”) has adopted the Landsafe chiefdom
conservancy development model whereby it has created a duly registered institution as the
custodian of land and natural resources of the chiefdom in order to attract investment
partnerships and to enter into co-management agreements with the Government of the
Republic of Zambia for the management of its renewable natural resources.
WHEREAS the Customary Authority having been granted the ‘right to use and
occupation of land under customary tenure’ (Lands Act of 1995: Section 8(3), has
vested land known as the Community Game Ranch in that registered institution known as
the ………………Trust pursuant to the provisions of the Land (Perpetual Succession) Act
of the Laws of Zambia.
WHEREAS the Chief ………………….has made application to ZAWA for registration of
the Community Game Ranch, land vested in the Trust, with the rights to receive hunting
quotas should the land remain unfenced (paying the requisite safari licence), or, if fenced,
to receive the ownership of the wildlife stocks - for which a certificate of ownership will be
issued and renewed annually - and also receiving a game ranch outfitters licence every year
entitling it to conduct non-resident hunts.
WHEREAS the assignee is Indianrous of obtaining the assignment of certain contractual
rights in respect of land from the Trust more particularly described in the terms and
conditions hereunder specified.
WHEREAS the assignee has agreed to be assigned the contractual rights defined below.
Definitions
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Assignor means the ……………………Trust
Assignee means ……………………………………
Chiefdom means land under customary control
…………………means the Community Game Ranch located
…………………
v)
Game ranch outfitters licence means the permit issued by ZAWA entitling
a fenced ranch to conduct non-resident hunting
vi) Landsafe means the Landsafe customary commons model for development
vii) Assignor means Chief …………………….. and his headmen
viii) Quota means the number of animals that can be hunted in a given year
without reducing the ability of the remaining population to maintain or
increase its numbers in the future
ix) Safari licence means the permit issued by ZAWA entitling the unfenced
ranch to conduct hunting safaris for non-residents
x)
Trust means the …………………………………..Trust
348
Form 17 – continued
1
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
On ………….., the ……………………………………Trust, a registered institution representing the
………………….Customary local community, received its registration certificate from the Registrar
of Societies; and on …………………., the Minister of Lands signed the certificate incorporating the
Trust under the Lands (Perpetual Succession) Act and deposited it with the Registrar of Lands and
Deeds.
2
COMMENCEMENT
The commencement of this assignment is ………………………..
3
GOVERNING LAW
This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of the Republic of
Zambia.
4
ASSIGNEE OBLIGATIONS
The assignee covenants with the Trust and the …………….chiefdom as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
To ensure that he adheres to all existing laws
To provide a liaison officer as the representative
To adhere to a fire management and landuse plan with the Trust
To allow any Trust official, Chief ……………., or Government representatives of
those departments responsible for wildlife, forestry, fisheries and water to inspect the
property, with reasonable notice to be given of such intention
To actively patrol and safeguard the area
To employ persons in accordance with Laws of Zambia, or through the Community
Resource Board by secondment.
In compliance with the landuse plan, and under Trust permit only, to allow, as much
as possible, the continued operation by the……………………customary community
of controlled communal access rights to natural resources on ………………………..
•
Annual thatching harvest
•
Honey-production concessionary rights
•
Seasonal medicinal plant harvest
•
An annual game harvesting quota for meat, subject to game stocks, and to be
taken off by ranch management
•
Community access to hydro power
•
Community access to religious and traditional heritage sites
Or any other rights normally accorded the residents of the chiefdom who have full access to those
renewable resources not owned by Government
5
TRUST CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
The Trust and the ……………….local customary community and its Customary Authority
covenants with the assignee as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
That the Trust adheres to all existing laws, fully recognizing its rights and that of the
assignee under the Law of Contract
That the assignee be assigned the full rights to the use and enjoyment of the
………………….., in particular for the sustained use of its natural resources
That it agrees to communicate any problems it may be encountering with the assignee
or its representative and workers and activities in an open and ready manner
349
Form 17 - continued
6
PERFORMANCE SECURITY BOND AND FEES
The Assignee undertakes to guarantee the following:
7
CUSTOMARY COMMUNITY BENEFITS
i)
To provide as full local employment as possible
ii)
To maintain public liability insurance
iii)
To allow controlled access to renewable resources
8
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION
The Parties resolve, in the event of a dispute, to adhere to the following:
i)
Good faith negotiations in the customary manner
ii)
Recourse to the Nyalugwe Advisory Committee
iii)
Mediation
iv)
Arbitration under the Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000, which implements the model law
on international commercial arbitration adopted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law in 1985 as well as the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses
and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
v)
Adjudication in the Zambian Courts
9
VARIATION OF THE AGREEMENT
A change in the agreement would require the agreement of the Parties hereto in writing.
Name: For Customary Authority:
Chief……………………………………………..
Name: Secretary: ………………………Trust
Date: ______________ at __________________
Date: ______________ at _______________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: ____________________________
Name: Chairman,…………………………Trust
Date: ______________ at __________________
Name: Chairman, …………………Community
Resource Board
Signature: ______________________________
Date: ______________ at __________________
Signature: ______________________________
Name: For ………………………………………
Name: For ZAWA
Date: ______________ at __________________
Date: ______________ at __________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: ______________________________
350
Landsafe
Form 18 : Chiefdom landuser cession to Trust Company limited by guarantee
CHIEFDOM LANDUSER CESSION
of
……………………….COMMUNITY GAME RANCH
…………………………….CHIEFDOM
by
…………………………………….TRUST
TO
………………………………………..
……………………..DISTRICT
ZAMBIA
351
Form 18 – continued
WHEREAS the ………………Customary Authority and its successors in title (hereinafter
referred to as “The Customary Authority”) has adopted the Landsafe chiefdom
development model whereby it has created a duly registered institution as the custodian of
land and natural resources of the chiefdom in order to attract investment partnerships and
to enter into co-management agreements with the Government of the Republic of Zambia
for the management of its renewable natural resources.
WHEREAS the Customary Authority having been granted the ‘right to use and
occupation of land under customary tenure’ (Lands Act of 1995: Section 8(3), has
vested land known as the …………………..Community Game Ranch in that registered
institution known as the ………………Trust pursuant to the provisions of the Companies
Act limited by guarantee of the Laws of Zambia
WHEREAS the Chief ………………….has made application to ZAWA for registration
of the Community Game Ranch, land vested in the Trust, with the rights to receive hunting
quotas should the land remain unfenced (paying the requisite safari licence), or, if fenced,
to receive the ownership of the wildlife stocks - for which a certificate of ownership will
be issued and renewed annually - and also receiving a game ranch outfitters licence every
year entitling it to conduct non-resident hunts.
WHEREAS the assignee is Indianrous of obtaining the assignment of certain contractual
rights in respect of land from the Trust more particularly described in the terms and
conditions hereunder specified.
WHEREAS the assignee has agreed to be assigned the contractual rights defined below.
Definitions
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Usufruct lessor ……………………Customary Authority
Assignee means ……………………………………
Chiefdom means land under customary control
…………………means the Community Game Ranch located
…………………
v)
Game ranch outfitters licence means the permit issued by ZAWA entitling
a fenced ranch to conduct non-resident hunting
vi) Landsafe means the Landsafe customary commons model for development
vii) Assignor means Chief …………………….. and his headmen
viii) Quota means the number of animals that can be hunted in a given year
without reducing the ability of the remaining population to maintain or
increase its numbers in the future
ix) Safari licence means the permit issued by ZAWA entitling the unfenced
ranch to conduct hunting safaris for non-residents
x)
Trust means the …………………………………..Trust
352
Form 18 – continued
1
REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES
On ………….., the ……………………………….Trust, a registered institution representing the
………………….Customary local community, received its certificate of incorporation from the
Registrar of Companies.
2
COMMENCEMENT
The commencement of this
3
GOVERNING LAW
This agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the Laws of the Republic of
Zambia.
4
LESSEE OBLIGATIONS
The assignee covenants with the Trust and the …………….chiefdom as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
To ensure that he adheres to all existing laws
To provide a liaison officer as the representative
To adhere to a fire management and landuse plan with the Trust
To allow any Trust official, Chief ……………., or Government representatives of
those departments responsible for wildlife, forestry, fisheries and water to inspect the
property, with reasonable notice to be given of such intention
To actively patrol and safeguard the area
To employ persons in accordance with Laws of Zambia, or through the Community
Resource Board by secondment.
In compliance with the landuse plan, and under Trust permit only, to allow, as much
as possible, the continued operation by the……………………customary community
of controlled communal access rights to natural resources on ………………………..:
•
Annual thatching harvest
•
Honey-production concessionary rights
•
Seasonal medicinal plant harvest
•
An annual game harvesting quota for meat, subject to game stocks, and to be
taken off by ranch management
•
Community access to hydro power
•
Community access to religious and traditional heritage sites
Or any other rights normally accorded the residents of the chiefdom who have full access to those
renewable resources not owned by Government
5
TRUST CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
The Trust and the ……………….local customary community and its Customary Authority
covenants with the lessee as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
at the Trust adheres to all existing laws, fully recognizing its rights and that of the
assignee under the Law of Contract
That the lessor be assigned the full rights to the use and enjoyment of the ………….,
in particular for the sustained use of its natural resources
That it agrees to communicate any problems it may be encountering with the assignee
or its representative and workers and activities in an open and ready manner
353
Form 18 – continued
6
PERFORMANCE SECURITY BOND AND FEES
The Lessor undertakes to guarantee the following:
7
CUSTOMARY COMMUNITY BENEFITS
i)
To provide as full local employment as possible
ii)
To maintain public liability insurance
iii)
To allow controlled access to renewable resources
8
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION
The Parties resolve, in the event of a dispute, to adhere to the following:
i)
Good faith negotiations in the customary manner
ii)
Recourse to the…………………………Advisory Committee
iii)
Mediation
iv)
Arbitration under the Arbitration Act No. 19 of 2000, which implements the model
law on international commercial arbitration adopted by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law in 1985 as well as the Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral
Awards and the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards
v)
Adjudication in the Zambian Courts
9
VARIATION OF THE AGREEMENT
A change in the agreement would require the agreement of the Parties hereto in writing.
Name: For Customary Authority:
Chief……………………………………………..
Name: Secretary,…………………………Trust
Date: ______________ at _________________
Date: ______________ at _________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: ______________________________
Name: Chairman, ………………………..Trust
Name: Chairman, ……………….Community
Resource Board
Date: ______________ at _________________
Date: ______________ at _________________
Signature: ______________________________
Signature: ______________________________
Name: For ………………………………………
Date: ______________ at _________________
Signature: ______________________________
354
Landsafe
Form 19: Project proposal template
1
PROJECT NAME
The name should capture the project’s broad objectives
2
PROTECTED AREA
Supported by a map
3
IMPLEMENTING PARTNER
4
PROPOSED PROJECT DURATION
5
BRIEF BACKGROUND
6
PARTNERS INVOLVED IN PROJECT AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITIES
These are the principal members – having signed an MoU - promoting accountability and good
practice, requiring a degree of mutuality and care in order to respect, protect, and make use of a
fellow partner organisation’s identity. Partners must be tolerant of sharing some power and be
willing to adapt and be flexible in the interests of maximizing the project partnership efficiency in
order to achieve the project's agreed objectives.
7
STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED IN PROJECT
Briefly describe stakeholder groups that will be involved in the project, and also those that will be
affected by the project.
8
PROJECT RATIONAL AND OBJECTIVES
State why the project is being put forward and just what it proposes to achieve.
9
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
Describe the expected results of the project.
10
PLANNED OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES TO ACHIEVE OUTCOMES
Identify what specific outputs (name of main task) and activities (actions under each main task) the
project will undertake in order to achieve the expected outcomes (results) i.e. (main heading:
Outputs; sub-heading: Activity).
11
TIME FRAME FOR OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIES SO AS TO ACHIEVE
OUTCOMES
This should identify what specific activities and their completion dates the project will undertake to
achieve expected outcomes in detail, for example.
Output: Activity
Responsible person
/org.
Duration
Expected start and
completion dates
12
ESTIMATED BUDGET
This should include the estimated project development and executing costs over the projected life of
the project and should indicate both the potential sources of funding as well as funds already
sourced.
13
MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF PROJECT PROGRESS
This should identify the way in which the results of the project will be assessed against the stated
objectives.
14
ILLUSTRATION OF PROTECTED AREA
Provide a map
15 FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS (THREE YEARS)
355
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