One partIcular aspect of

One partIcular aspect of
LEADERSHIP MID FINANCING
THE ORGANISATION,
OF UKlCHONTO lIE SIZE
One
partIcular
been
written
been
the
its
since
Umkhonto
we Sizwe about which little has
the beginning of the armed struggle in 1961, has
structure, the nature of its leadership and
This is not surprisIng, since revelations about how the
organisation
be
of
organisation's
funding.
could
aspect
operated,
harmful
who
its
leaders were, and who financed it,
if not
destructive
of
period between 1961 and the middle of the
its
security.
This is
particularly
true
1960's
the armed struggle was being conducted from within South
When
Africa.
During these early years no information was ever officially
released
by
the
interrelations
organisation.
Umkhonto
and
based. on
involved
the
SACP
scholars
As
the
on
the
the
use
of its underground structures;
during
revealed
members
and
any
underground
or
their
these early years, is largely
during the numerous court cases that
alleged members of the underground. ANC and
research
SUbject.
that
has
been
undertaken
by various
Edward Felt was the first scholar to make
of the abovementioned court material for research into
of the ANC, the SACP and Umkhonto between 1960 and 196!.,
result of the work done by him and the information contained in
other
sources
such
clear
picture
can
Umkhonto
funding
on
and functions or who was responsIble for what in the
What is known about the organisation and leadership of
the
hIstory
a
ANC
information
extensive
the
the
to
and
of
its
as
be
Bruno
formed
leadership
Umkhonto
Mtolo's book on Umkhonto a reasonably
of
the
during
organisatlonal
this
period.
structure of
As far as the
is concerned virtually nothing is known besides
the fact that the organisation was set up largely with SACP funds.
of
both
the
organisation,
While
ANC
the ANC and Umkhonto,whlch
this
and
add! tional
Umkhonto,
leadership
reflects
over
and
funding of the two organlsations.
information has added to our knowledge of the
the
overall
picture
of
the
organisation
and
of Ullkhonto between 1961 and the present, remains to be a
s'lcetchy one
insight
leadership
contain specks of information on
at
this
best.
Although the account that follows necessarily
lack of illuminating information, it does provide some
into
how
Umlchonto was
structured, what changes toolc place
the years, whom its leaders were and who funded it, particularly
during the 1980·s.
I
THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTUREOF UMKHONTOWE SIZWE
According
broad
off
soon
the
into
to
Umkhonto's organisational set-up followed the
outlines of Nelson Mandela's M-Plan.
in what
Although Umkhonto started
seemed to have been an unplanned fashion, attempts were
made to transform the new organisation into a modified format of
M-Plan.
a
According to Feit, Umkhonto, like the ANC, was organlsed
web
of
underground
that
Feit(1),
commands
that
linked the various structures of the
organisation together through a system of contact persons
operated
underground
clandestinely
and
vertically.
This
was
similar to
communist structures elsewhere and any deviation from the
M-Plan was done purely for functional reasons.
Although
picture
Ullkhonto followed
of
the
the
organisation's
broad
outlines
of the M-Plan, the
structure is complicated by the fact
that
the M-Plan itself - with the exception of the Port Elizabeth and,
Cator
Manor regions - was never fully implemented In the country, but
was
often
adapted
needs
rather
some
regions
effective
use
by
the
local
ANC leadership to serve their own
than that of the broader organisation.
the
of
leaders
the
As a reSUlt, in
of the ANC and the SACP were able to make
local
structures of the ANC, modified by the
M-Plan to introduce Umkbonto, While in others it had to set up
1.
Felt, Urban Revolt in South Africa, (Journal of Modern African
StUdies 8{l), 1970, p. 66).
entirely
different· andjndependent
structures for Umkhonto.
Elizabeth, for instance, where the M-Plan had been successfully
mented,
the
effectIve
In Port
Imple-
local leaders of the ANC and Umkhonto could and did make
use
of
the local organisational structures and leadershIp
of the ANC and the SACP to set up Umkhonto In 1961.
In
Durban
and
ANC
had
resisted
exception
M-Plan
had
could
of
of
the rest of Natal, on the other hand, where the local
the implementation of the M-Plan (with perhaps the
the
Cato Manor township just outside Durban, where the
been
not
partially
Implemented)
the leadership of Umkhonto
make use of the organisational structure or the membership
the
local
ANC
leaders
could
not make use of the structure of the leadership of the
ANC
in Natal,
Communist
that
members
of
recruit
its
set
It made
Party
years.
to
and
up
use
Umkhonto
of
the
in 1961.
Since Umkhonto's
underground structures of the
SACTU in the province to set up Umkhonto durIng
With most of Umkhonto's national leadership also being
the underground SACP, it was logical that Umkhonto should
leadership
in Durban
from
the ranks of the CommunIst
Party
and its affiliated organisations, such as the Hospital Worker's
Union
in
local
ANC
Durban.
and
Johannesburg,
that
Thus,
the
radical
Umkhonto
as
a result of the hostility between the
leadership
of
the
underground ANC in
obtained an organisational structure in Natal
was somewhat different from Umkhonto structures elsewhere in the
country.
Umkhonto's Organisation and Leadership in Natal(2)
Theoretically, Umkhonto in Natal was designed to consist of a single
Regional (High) Command situated In Durban, and four SUb-Regional
Commands
representative
of the rest of Natal and Zululand.
WIth the
Regional Command in Durban being the most senior and thus the co-ordinating
organ
direct
link
sections
and
in
the
province,
the
SUb-Regional Commands were its
to the lowest level of organisation, namely, the groups,
cells
which
were
execution of the sabotage campaign.
mainly responsible for the physical
AFRICAN NATIOtIAL CONGRESS (ANe)
T1fE SOUTH AFRICAN
COfV1UHIST PARTY
(SACP)
TUE SOUTH AFRICAN CONGRESS
OF TRADE UNIONS (SACrU)
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
( NEC)
UMKHONTO liE SUW!
NATIONAL HIGH C<1VWID
OIlC)
NATAL/ZULULAND
7 ORGAN. REGIONS
AD HOC
COMImE
REGIONAL
COHfumE
LOCAL
ANC
REGIONAL
SUB-COfllUTTEES
t
In addition
seven
to
these divisions, Natal was to have been divided into
organisational
organiser
who was
attached
area
areas,
directly
each
under
the
responsible
to
to the Regional Command in Durban.
organisers
of volunteers
did
control
a
of
regional
an
area
organiser
To ensure that the seven
their work properly - which was the recruitment
for Umkhonto -an overseer was to have been appointed
by the Regional Command In Durban with the approval of the ANC (presumably
the
NEe
were
not
in agreement
In Johannesburg because the ANC and Umkhonto In Natal
Mtolo,< 3) who
Natal,
of
the
both
Is
NHC
the
R14,OO
all
funds
of
source
of
struggle).
information
According
on
to
Umkhonto in
seven
area
organisers, and their overseer.
The seven
to be paid R20,OO a month plus a travelling allowance
per month.
Since the provinces had no funds of their own,
salaries and allowances needed to conduct the armed struggle came
directly
also
a major
the armed
in Johannesburg had the final say on the appointment
organiserswere
of
on
from
from
in
devised
wrote:
by
in Johannesburg, Which in turn obtained its
SACP.
According to Mtolo, the NHC in Johannesburg
the
this
Umkhonto
the NHC
respect had the final say in the organisational set-up
in Natal.
the
ThUS, the seven organisational areas were not
Regional
Command
in Durban but by the NHC.
Mtolo
Mbeki showed me a list of the seven organisational
areas.
When I look at it as a man who knows Natal
I guessed that it had been taken from a map. In
some
places organisers would be crossing one
another's areas.
When I pointed this out I was
told
that
we could zone the areas to suit
ourselves. <40)
It
were
to
is not
known how many of the seven proposed organisational areas
eventually
Mtolo,
(Solly)
whose
Mbanjwa
set up by the Regional Command in Durban,
evidence
is very
According
sketchy on the SUbject, Solomon
was charged with the task of setting up these areas.
Mbanjwa allegedly Visited Pietermaritzburg, Hammersdale and Bergvl11e
3.
4.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Slzwe, pp. 73 - 74.
MtolO, Umkonto we Slzwe, pp. 74 - 75.
during
the
first
half
of
1963 to arrange for the establishment
of
sUb-Regional Commands in these areas.(5)
Shortly
after
proceed
to Bergville to instruct the members of the newly established
sUb-Regional
contact
Mtolo
Mbanjwa
returned
to
Durban, Mtolo was instructed to
Command in the art of bomb making and sabotage.
person in Bergville was known by the name Zondo.
Mtolo's
Zondo, like
(and virtually everyone else in Umkhonto in Natal) was a member
of
the
SACP in the province.
Zondo had been recruited into Umkhonto
by
David Ndawonde, who was one of Umkhonto's group or section leaders
In Durban.
According
four
to
Mtolo,
the Bergvillesub-Regional
people,
namely
Zondo,
failed
to
mentlon.(6)
structure
and
the
Rabbit,
and
Command consisted of
two others whose names he
Beyond this, nothIng else Is known about the
activities of the Bergvllie SUb-Regional Command,
or whether any other sub-Regional Commands were ever set up.
Further
the
mentioned
by Mtolo both in his testimony at
were groups, platoons, sections and cells.
not
result
set
were
Rivonia Trial In 1963 and later In his book on Umkhonto in Natal.
These
did
divIsions
elaborate
on
Unfortunately Mtolo
these divisions, or on their functions.
As a
it is difficult to determine whether these divisions were ever
up
by
the
functioned.
different
organ,
Regional
There
organs
referred
or
to
is
Command in Durban or how they were to have
also
uncertainty
as
to
whether they were
whether these were in fact all one and the same
by
different names.
Given the relatively small
leadership structure of Umkhonto in Natal and the difficulty that it
had in recruiting sUfficient volunteers for the organisation between
1962
and
sabotage
of
the
inclined
1963,
not
committed
Regional
to
SUb-Regional
to
by
mention
the
fact that most of the acts of
Umkhonto in the province were done by members
Command
assisted
by
a
handful of others, one Is
believe
that Umkhonto's structure below the division of
Command
consisted
primarily
of ·cells and that in some
areas, such as in the Durban area, Where Umkhonto had a larger
5.
6.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 89 - 90.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Slzwe, pp. 103 - 109.
following, cells could- be grouped together to form a group, platoon
or section.
What can be gathered from Mtolo's evidence was that a
cell nor.ally consisted of four me.bers of whom one was designated as
the cell leader.(7) The latter person was the only member of the
unit tbat had direct contact with the next level of organisation
which could be either the sUb-Regional Command or a group or platoon,
when sUfficient cells could be grouped together to forllsuch a
sUb-division. In the case of the latter, three cells normally formed
a gr·oupor platoon. This meant that a group or platoon could have up
to twelve members, of Whom one was elected or appointed to act as a
group or platoon leader. This further meant that where a group or
platoon had been formed, the various cell leaders would be
responsible to the group or platoon leader who in turn would be
responsible to the next level of organisation. No horizontal contact
between the various organs of Umkhonto was allowed. In other words,
theoretically the members of one cell or group did not know the
members of another cell or group. In practice, however, this did not
always work well and the members of one cell sometimes became known
to the members of another cell. There is also the possibility that
Mtolo could have confused groups with cells and that the groups such
as those in Durban and Hammersdale which he refers to in his evidence
were In actual fact cells, since they consisted of only four to five
members.
The situation remains unclear. Mtolo for instance alleged
that the acts of sabotage that were commited by the Regional Command
of Umkhonto in Durban towards the end of 1962 to revenge the arrest
of Nelson Mandela were executed by three ·groups· consisting of four
members each. The members of these groups were not ordinary Umkhonto
cadres but were either group or sub-group leaders themselves. The
group that for instance stood under the leadership of Mtolo himself
consisted of three group leaders, namely Solomon Mbanjwa, who was
hImself an Umkhonto group leader in Hammersdalei Ablon Duma, who was
the deputy-leader of the Durban group, and Jerry KUllalowho was the
group leader of the Claremont townshIp group. The other groups were
composed in a similar manner, namely three group, or sub-group
leaders
under
in Durban.
commanded
Kirsten
the direct co••and of a member of the Regional Command
Billy Nair of the Regional Command in Durban for instance
the
second
Moonsammy
themselves
the
respectively.
Umkhonto
group.
and
Ebrahim
leaders
RonnIe
in Durban
He
of
was assisted by Cootzee Naicker,
Ismail.
the
Ebrahim and Moonsammy were
Durban Central and Clairwood groups
Kasrils,
who
was
the
commanded
tbe
third
only
WhIte
group and was assisted by
Justice Mpanza and two others wbose names are unknown.
The
task
of
member of
(a)
these three attack groups which operated directly under
·the command of the Regional Command in Durban was two-fold, namely to
select
been
and reconnoItre targets for attack and. once these targets had
IdentIfied,
to
report them to the Regional Command~who in turn
had to report it to the NHC in JohannesbUrg for approval.
According
was
to
known,
well
as
the
Mtolo, once an attack had been executed and the outcome
a
to
report
M.P.
leftwing
struggle
armed
aware
New
thus
struggle
well
Naicker in Durban who was the local news agent for
paper
was
of
had to be submitted to the Regional Command as
an
Age
in Natal.(')
Important
from
the
this
with
element
beginning.
the
Propagation of the armed
of the ANC and the SACP's
Undoubtedly the government was
result
that
New
Age was banned in
1962.(~O)
In
addition
structure
was
to
Natal.
tion
the
of
try
and
Not
a
local
the
success with.
8.
9.
10.
as
various
structures mentioned so far, a further
the Secretariat was set up in Natal.
sometime
Secretariat,
of
the
known
formed
burg
to
in 1962 by the ANC-SACP leadership in Johannes-
improve
great
This organ
deal
relations between the ANC and Umkhonto in
is known
about
the activities of the
but it appears to have SUbstituted some of the functions
Regional Committee of the ANC, such as the implementaM-Plan
which
the Regional Committee was haVing little
The SecretarIat existed until about February 1963
Mtolo, Umkonto we Slzwe, pp. 26, 27, ~8, 49, 51.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, p. 51.
Pike, A History of Communism in South Africa, p. 274.
when
it was replaced by an Ad Hoc Committee.
Regional
Co.~ttee
was
At the same time a new
set up in Natal, because the old one was not
'/~:.~~~;
co-operating
It
is
were
interesting
not
NEC
'with the
Regional .Command of Umkhonto In the province.
to
appointed
note that the members of the Ad Hoc Committee
by the ANC in Natal bUt by a member of the ANC's
and Umkhonto's NHC in Johannesburg, namely Govan Mbek:i. Although
the task: of the new Ad Hoc Committee was similar to that of the Secretariat it replaced, its members were more carefully selected.(1.1)
According
to
"tolo,
Curdnick Ndlovu, who was the leader of Umkhonto
in
Natal, was instructed by Walter Slsulu of the NHC to resist giving
in
to the demands of the ANC In Natal and to act only on instructions
coming
directly
instructed
1ft
from
the
NHC
In Johannesburg.
He
was further
to make sure that any contact between Umk:honto and the ANC
the province was conducted through the office of Solly Mbanjwa who
was in charge of the Ad Hoc Conmittee.(~2)
Both
the
fore
creations
their
new Regional Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee were therethe
composition
Committee
number
ANC and the SACP in Johannesburg.
and
consisted
of
union
for
and
of
of
functions
a
sUb-committees
sUb-committee,
chairman,
such
as
were
concerned,
As far as
the
Regional
a secretary, a treasurer and a
a finance sUb-committee,
a trade
a rural areas sUb-committee and a sub-committee
propaganda. Two of these sub-committees, namely that on finances
that on propaganda, were headed by members of Umkhonto's Regional
Command
in Durban - Jerry Kumalo was in charge of the propaganda sub-
committee while Curdnick Ndlovu was in charge of the sUb-committee on
finances.(1.3)
The
fUll
Ad
Hoc
control
Johannesburg.
11.
Committee,
of
the
unlike the Regional Committee, was under the.
NBC
of
Umkhonto,
the
ANC
and
the SACP in
It for instance received all its instructions directly
Durban Regional Court, Natal, Case RC. 139/1964, The State
against Pascal Ngakane and 24 others, Evidence of E. Kunene,
pp. 5 - 6.
12.
13.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 28 - 29.
Durban Regional Court, Natal, Case RC. 139/1964, The State
against P. Ngakane and 2~ others, Evidence of E. Kunene,
pp. 25 - 32.
frolll these
means
of
three
organs', and also ceported back to them directly by
a courier.
In contrast to the secretar iat it replaced, the
new
Ad Hoc
Commi ttee
was
allowed
to
was given increased powers and authority.
It
take deci sions independen~¥from the NHC in Johannes.<>i""
burg
as
long
as
organisation's
reduce
the
expedite
of
they
policy
increased
beginning
and
prOVince's
decisions
remained
within
prograDe,
dependence
the broad framework of the
This
was
probably <:Joneto
on the NHC in Johannesburg and to
at the lower levels of organisation.
pOlice
action
against
the
ANC
and
As a result
Umkhonto by the
of 1963, the leaders in Natal sometimes found it impossible
to keep regular contact with JohannesbUr9.(14)
As
far
as
the
sub-coromittees
are
concerned, very 11ttle Is known
about their functions ~yond what can be inferred from their names.
According to Elias Kunene(1~) who briefly described the functions
of
these
committees
SUb-committee
on
While giving evidence in court, the task of the
finances
was
to collect funds and donations from
people who were sympathetic to the struggle. It also handled all
funds received from the NHC in Johannesburg. The SUb-committee on
trade
unions, on the other hand, dealt with matters relating to trade
union
activities
the
recruitment
had
been
Umkhonto
its
of
new members, presumably for Umkhonto.
indicated,
served
as
a
major
SACTU, as
source of recruitment for
in Natal.
The sub-committee on rural areas did exactly what
implied,
namely to organise and promote the armed struggle
name
outside
such as the organisation of workers in industry and
the
urban
areas
and
to
solicit
support
for the ANC and
Umkhonto in the rural areas of Natal.(16)
The
tee,
fourth
was
and last SUb-committee, namely the propaganda sUb-commit~
responsible
mainly for the preparation and distribution of
lectures and propaganda material in the townships.
14.
15.
16.
It also had close
Feit, Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960 - 196~,
Durban Regional Court, Natal, Case RC. 139/1964,
against P. Ngakane and 24 others, Evidence of E.
pp. 30 ~ 34.
Durban Regional Court, Natal, Case RC. 139/1964,
against P. Ngakane and 24 others, Evidence of E.
pp. 30 - 34.
p. 109.
The State
Kunene,
The State
Kunene,
ties
wIth
the
sUb-committee
on rural areas (which it assisted in a
propagandist capacity).
Originally
thus,
organisation
various
were
Umkhonto
with
most
in Natal
of
was
largely
structures
and
that
urban
based
its members living and operating in the
Black townShips around the province.
indications
an
the
o;ganisation
recruitment
By 1963, however, there
was planning to extend its
campaigns to the rural areas.
According
to Mtolo:
In our Regional Command meetings we decided that
we should use our position as SACTU secretaries to
convene a joint meeting of the ANC Regional and
SACTU officials.
The idea was that we should
organise a meeting of all the people - mainly
workers and peasants, chiefs and indunas - so that
we could select certain people to be our contacts
in the rural areas.(~7)
The Organisation of Umkhonto outside Natal
Very
little
outside
is
known
Natal.
local
ANC
lines
of
structure
factually
about the organisation of Umk~onto
In the Port Elizabeth region in the Eastern Cape the
had been successfully reorganised along the organisational
the
M-Plan.
Umkhonto
-
in terms of its organisatlonal
and leadership - immediately identified itself with the ~
and the underground SACP-SACTU structures. Although not a great deal
is known about Umkhonto's structure in the Eastern Cape, indications
are
that
Umkhonto
made
use
it was
basically
similar to the organisational
set-up Of,
in Natal, and that it only differed froll it in that it also
of
the
local
organisational
structure of the ANC In the
region.
As
was
Umkhonto
the
in
case
the
in
Natal, the various organisational dIvisions of
Eastern
Cape
and elseWhere were vertically linked
means of couriers, who ensured the upwards and downwards
flow of information between the provinces and Umkhonto's underground
together
by
headquarters
in Johannes~rg.
the
In
cell.
Tbe lowest organisatlonal division was
the Port Elizabeth region, unlike Natal, the various
divisions of Umkhonto consisted of units of seven - whether it be
houses, cells or zones. For instance, seven houses or a street block
would
form a cell while seven cells would form a zone branch or group
which
would
Committee
resort
in
responsible
Port
to
were
province.
the
Elizabeth,
structure
the
the
directly
MfC
where
under the Regional Command or Regional
The
latter
two organs were directly
and Ullkhonto's NHC in Johannesburg.(U)
Umkhonto. made
use
of
the
In
organisational
of the ANC, the Regional Committee and the Regional Command
probably
the
ANC-SACP
one and same organ thus making it unnecessary for
alliance in Johannesburg to set up an Ad Hoc Committee,
as it did In Natal, to liaise between the ANC and Umkhonto.
Due
to
the
Eastern
region
and
close
Cape,
were
Umkhonto
cadres
are
between the ANC and Umkhonto in the
is not clear whether.all underground cells in the
unified
Indications
the
it
relationship
cells,
or
that Is whether they contained both ANC
whether
a division was kept between them.
that most Umkhonto cells were representative of bOth
ANC
and
Umkhonto.
recruits
who
were captured by the police for having left the country
illegally
According
to
Feit,
many of the Umkhonto
during the 1960's to be trained as guerrillas often did not
know Whether they belonged to the ANC or Umkhonto and considered the
two organisations to be one and the same. Similarly, many of those
Who
were
recruited specifically for Umkhonto made reference to their
membership
of
the
ANC rather than Umkhonto when questioned on their
activities
in
the latter organisation.
Feit ascribed this partially
to the fact that
the ANC and Umkonto were not neatly structured
bodies following prescribed lInes.
Lines, he
pointed out, were blurred even for members; often
they were not really certain Which organisation
they had joined or been transferred to. This
vagueness, together with the tendency for members
of Umkonto to say that they were ANC, was often
used by the police In nailing ANC leaders.(~9)
18.
19.
Felt, Urban Revolt In South Africa, 1960 - 196., pp. 98 - 10l.
Feit, Urban Revolt In South AfrIca, 1960 - 196., pp. 188 - 189.
The National High COlllland(NHe) of Ullkhonto we Sizwe
The
of
size
the
trial
of the NHC as it existed in the early 1960's up to the time
Rivonla
of
ment
At the
the NtIC in 1963, tbe State listed ten names in its indict-
as
being
possible
definite
leaders
NHC.(~O)
or
Francis
does
not
that
those
and
raid in July 1963 has never been determined.
shed
the
SACP
Meli,
in his recently published book on the ANC
light
formed
and
the NHC and some 22 others as
people who had been closely associated with the
much
who
leaders of
on the sUbject either.
He merely stated
Umkhonto in 1961 were all members of the ANC
that
Mandela
had
been the organisation's first
Commander-in-Chief.(2~)
It
is possible,
the
as
SACP
the
such
and
Umkhonto, that the NUC could indeed have been as large
large
process
body
afford.
small
and
it
highly
members
of
much
both
the
years.
Although
It
the
is
and
ANC
periOd
whether
the
inner core that controlled
ANC
and
Executive
the SACP.
of
the
It Is also not clear what
ANC occupied during these
by
which stage it existed and operated exclusively
By then it contained apprOXimately 20 members.
course possible that the underground NatIonal Executive of
and
1961
the NHC of Umkhonto were one and the same organ for the
to
1963
and
that the members of the NEC were also the
The fact that almost no reference is made to the
Supreme Court, Transvaal Division, Case 65/6~, The State
against N. Mandela and others, Revised Indictment, pp. 1 - 2,
and Opening Address Dr. P. Yutar, pp. 1 - 19.
21.
In view of
was never revealed until the Morogoro Consulta-
members of the NHC.
20.
This is of the utmost importance if
size
South Africa.
of
organisation
reference is made to its existence after 1960, its
Conference,
outside
underground
larger than a handful of people, all of whom were
the National
tive
clandestine
mobile.
doubtful
position
membership
a
and flexibility of actions are reqUired.
Is thus
Ullkhonto was
that
Normally, underground command structures like the NHC
decisions
this
However, this Is highly unlikely as
would have severely hampered the decision-making
something
cannot
qUick
the interlocking membership between the ANC,
state suggested In 1963.
a
are
given
Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, p. 1{8.
NEC
during
appeared
this
this
to
was
time
have
more
and
that most
of
its alleged members also
been members of the NHC of Umkhonto, suggests that
than
likely the case, at least until the collapse of
the underground by the mid-i960·s.
As
the most senior organ in the organisational structure of Umkhonto,
the
NHC
was
running
of
alliance,
the
charged
the
the
Central
to
determine
armed
NHC
and
the
task of controlling the day-to-day
struggle.
As
a creation
of the ANC-SACP
had representation on both theNEC
Committee
instructions
powers
with
of
theSACP,
funding.
from where
According
co-opt
new
members,
tactics
and
targets
to
of the ANC and
it
received its
to Mell<a2) the NHC had the
appoint
and was
Regfonal
Commands, to
in overall command of the
training of cadres and the financing of the armed struggle.
All
contact
means
between
the
the provinces were maintained by
of specially assigned courters.
also
sent
by
post,
communication
provincial
but
it was
leaders
of
special
training
in
work.
On
NHC
deal
to
with
instance,
visits
not
a
secure method of
On some occasions
to receive
instructions
or
to
be given
some or other aspect of sabOtage or underground
occasions the provinces were visited by members of
make assessments of developments in the provinces and to
problems.
visited
to
this was
Umkhonto were instructed to report to the NHC
either
other
since
Occasionally instructions were
only used in extreme cases.
in Johannesburg,
the
NHCand
the
NHC
Both
Joe
Modise
and
Nelson
Mandela,
for
Natal in 1962, While Bruno Mtolo paid at least two
1n Johannesburg.
He also escorted recruits from
Natal to Johannesburg between 1962 and 1963.<as)
Although
tional
to
the
NHC,
as
the most senior organ in Umkhonto's organisa-
set-up, had the final say in virtually all matters with regard
the
development
of the armed struggle in the provinces, the need
for the Regional Commands to sometimes act without the prior consent
22.
23.
Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, p. 1~7.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 69 - 88.
of
theNHC,
meant
Johannesburg
was
that In practice the underground headquarters
in
not always consulted on all matters relating to the
armed struggle in the provinces.
1.2
THE POST RIVONIA PERIOD:
UKKHONTO WE SIZWE IN EXILE,
1964 - 1983
As
is
deal
the
case
With
the internal history of Umkhonto, not a great
Is known about the organisation's external history and structure
due
to
the
extensive secrecy attached to its activities and leader-
ship.
With
the destruction of the underground movement by the middle of the
1960's
following
headquarters
of
the
the
control
discovery
ANC,
and
the
of
the
combined
underground
SACP and Umkhonto at Rivonia in July
1963,
the
day-to-day
running of the armed struggle in
South
Africa fell to the ANC's Mission in Exile.
Exactly what became
of Umkhonto and how it was structured in those years is not clear.
The
little
after
the
available
1965,
Umkhonto
control
armed
evidence
of
an
suqgest that for the first few years
did not exist as a separate organisation under
exile NHC but that all activities related to the
struggle in South Africa, such as the recruitment, training and
return
of
cadres
to
ANC-SACP
alliance
Morogoro
Conference
Umkhonto
were
South
Africa
in exile.
in
1969
separated
and
were directly controlled by the
This remained to be the case until the
when
the
functions
of
the
ANC and
the latter was placed under the direct
and day to day control of a Revolutionary Council.
According
the
1965
to
that
600
existed
"Luthuli
two
By
Stuart, a member of the SACP and later member of
ANC·s NEC, who had left South Africa in 1964:, there was litt1eby
could
Umkhonto.
and
James
be
structurally
recognised
as
either the ANC or
Although the ANC and Umkhonto by that date had between 500
people in exile, the ANC's Mission in Exile in Dar-Es-Salaam
of
little
more
than
two
"residences",
one
known as the
residence" and the other the "Mandela residence", as well as
battered vehicles, a Landrover and a Morris Oxford station wagon.
that
stage
Umkhonto also appeared to have had its first military
training
camp at Kongwa "In Tanzania.
sometime
between
of
for
recruIts
Who
political
Kongwa
camp
selected
and 1965 and was the home of the second batch
1964
were sent to the Soviet Union and Red China in 1964
and military training. One of the first commanders of
was Stuart himself.
to
This camp was apparently set up
infiltrate
South
He was also part of the first group
Africa
in
1967 and to organise mass
insurrection.(2.)
To
jUdge
by what has recently been published on this early period in
the
history
of
the
ANC's Mission in Exile, the NHC which conducted
the
affairs
of
Umkhonto
immediately
duplicated
Indications
are
for
the
running
According
in
to
that
of
by
the External
the
up
Mission
to 196., was not
after
that date,
ANC and the SACP were jointly responsible
of Umkhonto and the armed struggle in South Africa.
Meli, a meeting of the NEC of the ANC In Exile was held
Dar-es-Salaam
future
inside the country
the
in
1965
at which the entire armed struggle and the
ANC was assessed.
The meeting, which was an enlarged
gathering of the NEC, followed the pattern of External Mission
consultative meetings held since 1960 whereby representatives from
various
offices
existence
decide
at
on
leaders
purpose
•
and
organs
of
the ANC-SACP alliance that were in
the time, were summoned to Dar-es-Salaam to discuss and
important
of
of
issues.
Umkhonto,
this
the
crucial
The 1965 meeting was attended by th~
SACP
and
meeting
SACTU.
was
to
According to Meli, the
review
the
political
situation, set new tasks, and improve
our
machinery
for
vigorously
pursuing
the
objectives of our armed struggle, including in
particular, the movement of Umkhonto we Sizwe
units to the home front. It was around this time
that the working alliance between the ANC and the
CP became a more open alliance and began to be
officially acknowledged. (25)
In
1966 a further conSUltative meeting of the NECof
in Dar-es-Salaam.
the ANC was held
It was attended by the same people who attended
2{.
The Daily News, (Durban), 1990.04.9 - 10.
25.
Mell, South Africa Belongs to Us, p. 160.
the
1965 meeting.
and
status
SACTU
in
role
In
of
members
the main item on the agenda was the role
and
organisations
such as the SACP. and the
the ANC,'s External Miss ion, especially with regard to their
in the dual responsibility of the Mission to mobilize
South
Africa
struggle
cause
of
the
in
inside
South
preparation
on
the
ANC.
Exile,
preparation
went
in
for
the
resumption
the masses
of the armed
and to build up international solidarity and support for the
Mission
of
This Ume
MeU
went
on to state that by 1966 the ANC's
as a result of the destruction of the underground
Africa, had taken over, ftin short, the whole process of
for
armed
struggle" in South Africa.(26)
to say that the new responsibilities
Although 1'1eli
placed on the shoulders
Mission in Exile called for a drastic reorganisation,
not
say
how
dark
as
to
he does
this was done, with the result that we are still in the
the
organisational
the
Morogoro
structure
of
conference
the ANC and Umkhonto
between
1966
and
of 1969 when some major
changes
were
forced onto the ANC and the SACP by changing conditions
both inside and outside the movement.
Two
major
changes
introduced
in ExIle
at
to
the organisation
of
reductIon
of the NEC of the ANC from twenty-three
a
Mission
were
structure
which
the
which
Morogoro
and
in 1969, was the
to nine members, to
there has been referred to in Chapter Five, and the creation of
separate
organ:
ANC and the SACP
Davis(27) writes:
the Revolutionary CouncIl, joIntly staffed by the
to
conduct
the
affairs
of
Umkhonto.
Stephen
The 1969 conference mandated the restructuring of
the Party's underground, with new attention being
paid to South Africa's black youths. The international solidarity work that had been the external
mission's chief occupation would now, on paper at
least, be assigned second priority after the work
of internal political mobilization.
Another
major
decision taken at 1'1orogorothat affected the organisa-
tion of the Mission-in-Exile,
26.
27.
was the division of the ANC into three
Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, p. 161.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 23 - 24.
major
ters
sections
and the ~ecislon to move the organisation's
from Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania to Lusaka in Zambia,
the
first
dent,
decision,
the
oversee
mili tary
In terms of
three new departments namely that of the Presi-
Secretary-General
the
headquar-
entire
and
Treasurer-General,
were set up to
liberation struggle, to control the various non-
depart1llents and to control the finances of the organisation
respectively.
health, legal
In addition to these offices departments of education,
and religious affairs as well as women's and youth
branches were set up.cae)
Thus
after
1969
the
struggle
were
Umkhonto
on
and
mid-1970's,
the
political
and
military
aspects of the armed
again divided between the ANC-SACP on the one hand and
the other.
Much of the history of Umkhonto between 1969
when
colonies
of
alliance
to resume the armed struggle in South Africa, appear to have
been
taken
guerrillas
the
Angola
a change in the status of the Portuguese
up
with
into
country
struggle.ca.)
and Mozambique made it possible for the ANC-SACP
the
training of cadres and the infiltration of
South Africa to set up underground structures inside
in
preparation
The
achieved
and
the
External
Mission,
for
the
resumption
of
the
armed
more specific means by Which this goal was to be
relationship
between
the
internal
centres, the
and the Revolutionary Council is however not clear
and were never revealed from inside Umkhonto.cSO)
It
is
also not clear how many underground cells, if any, the ANC and
Umkhonto
bouring
had
managed
establish inside South Africa or in neigh-
states between 1969 and the mid-1910's. Indications are - and
this is partially
guerrilla activity
had
to
borne out by the general absence of ANC-Umkhonto
during this time - that the organisation probably
not more than a handful operative inside the country during these
years but that the activity of the latter was largely inhibited
28.
29.
30.
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0i.lO.
Johns, Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare, (The Journal of Modern
African Studies 11 (2) 1973,pp. 286 - 281);
Mayibuye,
1969.05.10, p. 8.
Johns, Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare, (The Journal of Modern
African Studies 11 (2), 1973, p. 281).
by
the vigilance
friendly
borders
country.
whJch
South African
could be used
presence
Africa
up
why
the
explain
armed
the
police and the absence of
to infiltrate arms into the
It also appears that the ANC and Umkhonto had little or no
organisatlonal
South
of
to
In any of the rural and homeland areas of
the
middle of the 1970's,
Mission
struggle
This will help to
in Exile was largely unable to resume the
inside South
Africa before
the second half of the
1970·s.
As
a
result
of
the
fIrst
during
largely
June
caught
the
of
the
unaware
by
the Soweto uprising when it broke out in
The
SUdden
ANC
and
organisations,
and
1970's, the
presented
they
demands
made
on
them,
Umkhonto
was
in
a
while
them with
problems.
as
could
ANC and Umkhonto were
mass influx of recruits into the ranks
Umkhonto,
organisational
best
organisatlonal weaknesses inside South Africa
half
1976.(31)
of
as
its
highly
welcomed
by
these
serious logistical, ideological
Although the ANC and Umkhonto managed
with
the
sudden
organlsational and other
it was not until the end of the 1970's that
position
to
relaunch
and
escalate
the armed
struggle in South Africa.
ThUS,
although
leadership
setting
still
the
ANC had managed to overcome most of its internal
problems
by the middle of the 1970's and had succeeded in
up
a
lacked
advantage
unrest
for
into
in
underground cells inside South Africa, it
necessary
In
coupled
Umkhonto,
Schooled
of
organisational
infrastructure
to take
the revolutionary developments that 'followed the Soweto
1976.
philosophy,
adherents
the
of
in
handful
fact,
with
the
the
growth of the Black Consciousness
sudden
influx
of
thousands
of its
the ranks of the ANC and Umkhonto, While advantageous
presented
Black
a serious problem to the SACP and Umkhonto.
Consciousness philosophy most of the.new recruits
had first to be converted to Marxist-Leninism before they could be
successfully
absorbed
into Umkhonto and the SACP.(32)
ThUS,
instead of being in a position organisationally to capitalise on and
31.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 27 - 28.
32.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 28.
expand
upon the revolutionary atmosphere created by the Soweto unrest
In
1976,
the
the
task
of
ANC and Umkhorito found themselves mainly occupied with
absorbing and re-educating the new recruits.
According
to Stephen Davis,
this task, of absorbing the mounting exodUS of
students into a sUbstantial Umkonto army became
the major preoccupation of Tambo's exile executive. (U)
Although
the
largely
part
the
training
the
of
and
cell-based
of
during
ANC
and
period
military
were
camps
training
set
up.
structure
they
Council
training
of
how
looked
1980,
Angola
inside South Africa for most
the
development
of bases and
and Mozambique was accelerated
Mozambique, for instance. became the new seat of
Revolutionary
the
to
In both
time.
organisational structure remained
underdeveloped
1976
facilitIes
this
Umkhonto's
in 1976, while Angola began to house most
established by the ANC for the political and
Umkhonto's
they
like
cadres.
functioned
and
Exactly when these camps
what
their organisational
is not clear. but, one can assume that since
were centres for the political and military training of Umkhonto
cadres
they
were
probably run along normal military lines under the
direct
and
overall
command
theoretically
responsible
Committee
the SACP.
of
of the Revolutionary Council, which was
to both the NEC of the ANC and the Central
This remained the situation approximately up
to the end of the first quarter of the 1980's.
the
pressure
ANC-SACP
alliance
and
Umkhonto came under increasing
as a result of three major developments,
African
government
isolate
the ANC in the frontline states, especially In Mozambique and
in
achieved
considerable
Firstly, the South
success in its efforts to
Swaziland. The signing of the Swazi-Accord in 1982. the Mozambique
accord
in
198~
and
the across border attacks on ANC-Umkhonto bases
and facill ties by the SADF since 1981 had resulted inter alia in the
Revolutionary
Council's
position in Mozambique becoming unacceptably
vUlnerable.
secondly,
since
the
resumption of the armed struggle
during the latter half of the 1970's and the constant influx of new
recruits into the ranks of both the ANC and Umkhonto from South
Africa
it had become increasingly important for the ANC to provide an
organisatlonal structure that could speed up bOth the political education and
In other
military preparedness of the Black masses in South Africa.
words, it had by the early 1980's become increasingly
necessary
for
the
armed
propagandist
and
rivalry
developed
had
military
political
structures
In
1983
time
the
organisational
tion
with
military
a
of Omkhonto to also fulfil a more
function.
over
And
the years
thirdly,
between
the
an unhealthy
political and
of the ANC both at the upper and lower levels of
organisation.
that
cadres
the light of these developments it was decided in
had
structure
come
for a .a~or overhaul of the existing
serving
Umkbonto, to provide the organisa-
new structure that could combine both the political and
aspects
of
the
armed
struggle.(s.)
The outcome of this
development was the creation of the Political Military Council (PMC)
(See Diagrams MI" and "J" on pp. t2t, ~25).(~5) The PMC together
with
a
revived
hierarchy
which
Military
Councils
Commands
based
Military
in
mic
by
stood
the
the head
mid-1980's
(RPMC)
in the
at
also
of avast
organisational
consisted of Regional Political
known as Regional Political Military
frontline
states;
Provincial
four
and
provinces
of South Africa, Area Alternative structures
Refusal and organlsational Committees for politico-econo-
or alternative authority structures In the provinces.
divisions
inclUded
committees,
organisations
Congress
Political
Councils (PPMC) also known as Implementation Machinery based
the
(AAS),
NHC,
structures
funeral
as
(SOYCO).
such
as
people's
The latter
courts, stay-away
committees, transport, rent and election boycott
well
These
as
Youth Congresses such as the Soweto Youth
latter
divisions
were
followed
by zone,
branCh, street or cell committees Which represented the lowest level
3~.
35.
African National Congress National Consultative Conference,
June 1985, Internal Commission Report, p. l~. See also
M. Morris, ANC of South Africa: Organisation and Hierarchy,
1988/1989 (Single chart with comments); and South Africa:
Hani's Rise, (Africa Confidential 29 (16), 1988.08.12, p. 2).
Morris, ANC of South Africa: Organisation and Hierarchy,
1988/1989, (single chart with comments).
of
organisation
Africa
in the
structure
in Umkhonto'sorganisational
mid-1980·s.
also
made
Political-Military
responsible
Africa,
In addition to these divisions the new
provision
Commands
for
for the establishment
(APMC).
political
resorted
structure inside South
under
Area
This latter division which was
and military
directly
of
operations
the command
of
inside
the
South
PPMC
(or
Implementation Machinery).<s6)
A
further
of
the
division or group that resorted directly under the control
NHC
latter
organ
of Umkhonto was the Special Operations Group (SOG).
appeared
The
to have had no direct connection with any of
the above mentioned divisions but apparently operated as an elite
force within Umkhonto.
According to Morris,< S7) who has done
extensive
Umkhonto
research
the organisationa1 structures of the ANC and
in the 1980's, the SOG was perhaps the most elite of all the
ANC-Umkbonto
.equiped
on
than
organs.
the
Its members
were
average Umkhonto cell.
better trained and better
The SOG operated in groups
of between three and four and was called in when a particularly
diffiCUlt target had to be attacked or When special skills were
required.
were
as
The
mainly
other
African
from
units
security
total
members
of the SOG was about fifty men~ They
elite units such as the.Luthuli Detachment as well
Who
saw
forces
service
against
in Rhodesia
the
during
Rhodesian and South
the
late 1960's, and
against the Unita forces in Angola in the early 1980·s.< sa)
As
the
after
most
198!,
senior
organ
in tbe organisational set-up of Umkhonto
the PMC, 'like the old Revolutionary Council it replaced,
reported directly to the National Executive Committee of the ANC and
the Central Committee of the SACP, wbich both had representation on
the PMC.
36.
37.
38.
Since the SACP had a ma}ority in the ANC's NEC, it was thus
Morris, ANC of South Africa: Organisation and Hierarchy,
Single Chart with Comments.
Morris, ANC of south Africa: Organisation and Hierarchy,
Single Chart with Comments.
C. Hani, The Wankie Campaign, (Dawn, Souvenir Issue, p. 3.) .
1
I
MRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANe)
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMHITTEE (NEC)
30-35 MEMBERS
I
UMJ(HONTO SPECIAL
OPERATIONS GROUP
(SOG)
I
I
UlOOIONTO HIGH COHI1AND (He)
UMKONTO PORTFOLIOS
TRAINING
ORDNANCE
LOGISTICS
INTELLEGENCE
COMUNICATIONS
SOUTH MRICAN COl1PtUNISTPARTY (SACP)
SOUTH MRICAN CONGRESS OF TRADE
UNIONS (SACTU)
POLITICAL-MILITARY COUNCIL
(PMC) 15 MEMBERS
REGIONAL POLITICAL MILITARY COUNCILS
(RPMC) OR
REGIONAL POLITICAL COMMANDS
OPERATED IN THE'FRONTLINE STATES
PROVINCIAL POLITICAL MILITARY COUNCILS
(PPtlC). ONE FOR EACH OF S.A.·s i
PROVINCES (ELEI1INATION MACHINERY)
CELLS
OR
UNITS
AREA ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURES, REFUSAL
AND ORGANISATIONAL COl1l1ITTEES
For Politic-economic or alternative
authority action inside Republic
I
I ZONES OR BRAMCH COfIIUrlEES I
I STREET, SHOP, SHAFT COMMITTEES
I CELLS
AREA POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMANDS
(APtIC )
I CELLS OR UNITS
The above chart and Inforlation is based on
M. Morris, ANC of South AfrIca: Organls ation
and Hlerachy, Terrorisl Research and Res earch
AssocIates, London; 1988/1989.
DIAGIWt J
ORGANlSATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE ANC/UKKHONTO WE SIZiE IN EXILE 1985 - 1988
.I ANC LUDER:
I
AN<: DEPARTPlENTS
-AGRICULTURE
ARTS AMi) CULTURE
Head: Barbara f1asekelc
ECONOKIC AFFAIRS:
FIKANCE
EDUCATION
Head: B.rJakoothI
sec. : S.,Choabi
HO and VIP SECURITY
Head: Shooter Hadebe
HEALT"
INfORMATION , PUBLICIT\
Head: Thabo Mbeki
INTERNATIONAL RELATIO~
Head: J. Itakatlni
(deceased)
--
Nelson Handela
I
SPECIAL PORTFOLIOS
Constitutional COlt.
(Jack Sillons)
Intelligence Anal)sis
Sizakele Sigxashe
Hass 1'I0biHsation
~~R~~~Jesentat1on
Aziz Pahad)
PolItical Education
(Reg. septellber)
Research, RSA Internal
PolitIcal Developments
(5. l'Iahara )
d InterResearch, SA
natIonal (James Stuart)
I
EXILE PRESIDENT: O. TaDbo ~
SECRETARY GENERAL: A. Nzo
TREASURER-GENERAL: 1'.taobi
DEPUTY TREASURER-GENERAL and
DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL
Daniel Tloome
ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL:
Henry Matgothi
I
SEClWlA:, F. Mell
SOLOf«lN tWlLANGU
FREEDOK COLLEGE:
A. I'Iasondo
LEGAL , CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS: Head:
Zola Skweyiya
N.NPOWER , DEVELOPMENT
Head: rtzwai Plliso
RESEARCH
Head: Dr. Palo Jordan
WOKEN'S LEAGUE
Head: Getrude Shope
nEOlA , PUBLIC AfFAIRS
Chief Spokesman:
T. Sebina
~
REPRESENTATIVE STATUS IN 23
COUNTRIES REPRESENTATION IN
UNITED NATIONS THE
ORGANISATION Of AFRICMf
UNITYJOAU) etc.
RECEI SUPPORT fROM
INTERNANIONAL ANTI-APARTHEID
ORGANlSATIONS: Africa-Asia
People's SOlidarity
Committee: Eminent Church
Persons Group; End Loans to
South Africa; International
Defence and Aid fund for
Southern Africa; Ja~,
Asia, Africa and La in
America SOlidarity
Committee; Lawyers Against
~rtheld; Transafrica;
10len's International
De.ecratic Federation;
If,f.T.U.; etc.
I
UMKHON'rO WE SIZiE
National High
Command
ANC/UMKHONTO WE SIm
Political Military
Councll
I
I
I
I
RELIGIOUS AfFAIRS
Chap.Gen, :Rev. F.Gqiba
FOR THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF UMKHONTO WE SIZWE
SEE DIAGIWI I
lOOTH LEAGUE
flead: Jackie 5elebi
The above chart and information Is based on M. Morris,
AHC of South Africa: Organisation and Hierarch~, TerroriSM,
Research and Research ASsocIates, London, 19887 9.
GENERAL-SECRETARIAT
Head: Ruth l'Io!pati
PROTOCOL
Head: Shooter Hadebe
-
KIUTARt AFFAIRS
NHC, 11K: J. ftodise
REFUGEE AFFAIRS
flead: Edward Dllinga
I
I
NEC SECRETARIAT
Head: Dr P. Jordan
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMInEE
(NEC) 1985 - 1988
Increase at Kabwe Conference
to 30 meebers and by
lid-1988 to 35
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FULL DIPLOMATIC STATUS AS
GOVT. IN EXILE accorded to
it ~: Al8rria, Angola,
E~,
In ia, Kenya,
MOz bique, Tanzania, the
USSR, Zambia, ZImbabwe, etc.
PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
Head: Anthony Kongalo
STRUCTURAL ALLIANCE WITH THE
(a) South African Couunist
partI
(eba rlan: Dan Tloolle)
(General secretary:
Joe Slovo)
(b) South African co~ss
of Trade Unions ( TU)
(President: Stephen
Dlallni)
(General-sec. :
J. Nkadillen1)
(Int.Co-ord nator:
I'I.K<jWayi)
In control
such
cal
of
the
As
the SACP via the PMC became directly responsible for all politiand military
Politically
training
the
of
performing
aspects of the armed struggle in South Africa.
PMC
all
establishment
of
controlled the recruitment, transportation and
recruits, while
of specific
and
trained
guerrillas;
concerned
of
it
inside South
supervised
Africa
for
the
the
tasks such as the smuggling of arms into the
the establishment
execution
militarily
underground cells
country
the
polltJcal and military functions of the PMC.
the
of arms caches;
the infiltration of
identification of targets for attack, and
attacks where
and .when possible.
The PMC also
itself with the extention of underground structures inside
South Africa
to
the
many
of
rural areas, particularly the Black homeland
areas.
Exactly
how
established
mid-1985
by
organisatioqal structures had been
the
to say.
Kabwe Consultative Conference in
Indications are that the ANC and the
still in the process of implementing the new structures by
time
that
the
complicates
the
the
after
period
altered
above
time of
is difficult
SACP were
the
the
the
by
conference
1984
ANC
is the
and
diplomatic
counter-insurgency
the SACP
and
actions
alliance
had
to
Mozambique
and
remove most
had
only
fully
to
it was constantly being
counter
following
Regional
and
as
Umkhonto
was
combine
others
Implementation
the
initiatives
the
South African
as
well as its
For
signing of the Nkomati Accord the
scale down
of
its organisational structure
its
key personnel from the
a skeleton staff operating in Mozambique.
Mozambique
One aspect that
a result, by the end of that year the ANC and Umkhonto
operative
SwaZiland
place.
both inside and outside the country.
ANC-SACP
As
that
political
in
country.
1984,
fact
instance
inside
took
assessment of Umkhonto's organisational structure in
the
government's
Kabwe
Political-Military
restricted
a
transit
by
the
Unable to set up
Councils (Commands) in
SwaZi-government
from
using
route between Mozambique and South Africa,
forced to reduce some of its regional structures and to
in
order
Machinery
to survive.
in the
For instance, as far as its
Transvaal and Natal was concerned,
the
ANC-SACP
alliance,.was
Committee .to
co-ordinate
forced to create a special Co-ordinating
the political machinery of the ANC and the
military machinery of Umkhonto after 1984.
Indications
November
are that the RPMC's referred to above were only set up in
1985
divisions.
is not
lesser
when
the
structure was extended to incorporate these
Exactly how many RPMC's were set up during or after 1985
clear
but, given the importance of Angola, Botswana and to a
extent
Swaziland (Umkhonto continued to use Swaziland despite
"
the
restrictions that had been placed on its officials and activities
by the Swazi-government) in the
struggle, the first RPMC's were
countries
a
In
founding
Chairman
1985.
Treasurer
the
and
Committee.
1984.
of the armed
In these three
It was also claimed that Ismail Ebrahim, who was
member
of
overall strategy
probably set up
of Umkhonto
Swaziland
later
in Natal
RPMC in 1985.
Chairman
of
the
in
the 1960's, was made
Prior to this Ibrahim was
aforementioned Co-ordinating
He succeeded Ronnie Kasrils to that position in December
As the Chairman of the Swaziland RPMC, Ismail Ebrahim reported
directly to thePMC
leadership in Lusaka.(39)
The need for a highly flexible organisationa1 structure that could
combine both the political aspects of the armed struggle and could
react
in
ANC
to
the
Southern
and
constantly changing political and military environment
Africa,
the
SACP
by
emphasised
by
the
Conference
at
Kabwe
the
Internal
organisation
had thus become of the utmost importance to the
the
ANC's
to
NEC
at
in June 1985.
Commission
was
mid-1980's.
of
survive,
the
its
This
point
was
clearly
Second National Consultative
In its report to the conference,
NEC
made
it
its operational
clear
that
machinery
if the
and
organisation
39.
G. Moss, MK and the Armed Struggle, (Work in Progress 52,
March 1988, p. 4). See also Morris, ANC of South Africa:
organisation and Hierachy, Single Chart with Comments; and
South Africa: Hani's Rise, (Africa Confidential 29 (16),
1988.08.12, p. 2): Barrel, MK, pp. 63 - 65, and Swaziland
kidnappings. The Case of Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, (Sechaba,
December 1987, pp. 14 - 15).
its
had to be structured to meet a given situation and
should not be frozen for all times ... it is
envisaged, that the structures currently being
established by the PMC, to meet these crIticisms
and difficulties, should be sUb}ect to alterations
as the struggle develops.(·O)
The AYe and SACP's ability to alter their organlsational structures
according to developments in Southern Africa was severely put to the
test In 1986 and again two years later In 1988. At the end of
January 1986 the ANC and Umkhonto found themselves expelled from
their offices and homes In Lesotho, when the pro-ANC-SACP government
of Chief Leabua Jonathan was overthrown by a pro-South African
government under the leadership of Ma}or-General Metslng Lekhanya.
Although Lesotho was never a key element in theANC and Umkhonto's
organisatlonal set-up in Southern Africa, the demise of the Jonathan
government nonetheless represented both a material and moral, if not
a diplomatic setback for the ANC-SACP alliance. A total of more than
300 ANC-Umkhonto officials and operators were expulsed from Lesotho
between 1986 and 1987.
With the destruction of its offices and
Whatever transit facilities it operated in Maseru, the ANC-SACP
alliance was after 1986 increasingly forced to shift the centre of
Its organisation and operations to Botswana.(·~)
A second ma1~ setback for the ANC and Umkhonto In 1986 came at the
end of the year When the South African security police arrested and
interrogated Ismail .Ebrahim. As the Chairman of Umkhonto's RPI1CIn
Swaziland, Ebrahim was a key operative in Umkhonto and the underground.
At the same time, with the information obtained from
captured ANC-Uilkhonto leaders such as Ebrahim, as well as from other
sources, the Mozambican government was forced to expel six senIor
ANC-SACP-Umkhonto leaders from Maputo. They were Jacob Zuma, Sue
40.
41.
African National ConSUltative Conference, June 1985, Internal
Commission Report, p. 14.
R. Edgar, The Lesotho Coup of 1986, (The South African Review
4, pp. 373 - 382). For additional information on the ·Lesotho
Coup· see also The Dally News (Durban) 1986.01.16 - 22; ANC
Attacks S. African Pressure on Lesotho, Radio Freedom, Lusaka,
1986.01.16, (SWB, 1986.01.20); The ANt and Lesotho, Radio
Freedom, Lusaka, 1986.02.10; (swa, 1986.02.14); and Mozambican Radio's Broadcasts of ANt officlal's Views on P.W. Botha
and Lesotho, Maputo, 1986.02.13 - 14, (SWB, 1986.02.18).
These setbacks did not go uncollmented by the ANC-SACP alliance which
was clearly upset by it. In a statement released in october 1986,
the Alliance expressed its deep concern at the setbacks it had
sUffered
with
regards
operational capabilities
It pointed out:
to
its
organisational
structures
and
in both Mozambique and Lesotho since 1984.
Despite all our efforts we have not come any
nearer to the achievements of the objectives we
set
for ourselves, ANC underground structures
remained
weak
and unable to supply reliable
support for Ullkhontocadres. ·Umkhonto units still
operate largely in isolation .••(.~)
Despite
the
attacks
on
fact
the
country
after
declared
by
the
was
able to steadily increase its
ANC
1986
and Umkhonto's organisationa1 development in the
was
undoUbtedly
the general State of Emergency
the South African government in June 1986 and its annual
As a result of the extended powers granted to the State and
police under the Emergency, the ANC-SACP alliance found it almost
impossible
inside
able
Umkhonto
targets inside South Africa after 1985, a third fact that
undermined
renewal.
that
to
the
to
Umkhonto
set up new structures and to maintain these structures
country.
uncover
inside
By the mid- 1980's the South African police was
and destroy the underground presence of the ANC and
South
Africa almost as fast as the organisation was
able to establish it.
• 2,
.3.
South Africa: Hani's Rise, (Africa Confidential 29 (16),
1988.08.12, p. 2). See also Cooper, A Survey of Race Relations,
1987/1988, pp. 697 - 698.
.
PMC document entitled "What to be doneu, October 1986, as
quoted in T. Lodge, The African National Congress after the
Kabwe Conference, (The South African ReView 4, 1987, p. 10).
For a different ANC view on the SUbject see ANC comment
stresses internal struggle (SWB, 1986.10.1~); ANC's Comment on
RSA "Threat" to Mozambique, Radio Freedom, Addis Ababa,
1986.10.11, (SWB, 1986.10.14); ANC Radio's Discussion
Programme with 01!ver Tambo,Radio Freedom, Addis Ababa,
1986.10.16, (SWB, 1986.10.20). See also ANC's Slovo on
Achievements of Umkhonto we Sizwe, PANA, 1987.01.08, (SWB,
1987. 01. 08 )•
As
a result of these developments, Umkhonto's leaders had to admit by
1988
that
tional
site
the organisation was unable to establish a major organisa-
presence inside South Africa whIch was considered a pre-requifor
a people's war.
September
1988,
Ronnie
In an article that appeared in Sechaba, In
Kasrils, Umkhonto's
Chief of Intelligence,
made it clear that
despite the tremendous upsurge of mass resistance
(in South Africa) over the past three years, we
were not able to take full advantage of the
favourable conditions that materialised, We were
unable to deploy sufficient forces at home; our
cadre still found big problems In basing themselves amongst our people; our underground failed
to grow sufficiently and our people were left to
face the enemy and his vigilantes with sticks and
stones;
the incredIble mass resistance and
strikes
were
consequently
not
sufficiently
reinforced by armed struggle.(··)
The
final setback to the ANC and Umkhonto's organlsational network In
Southern
York
Africa
Accord,
remove
all
came on 22 December 1988 with the signing of the New
In terms
ANC
and
beginning
of
down
effect
the
1989.
organisation
of
to
the
escalate
the
situation
virtually
This
tional
ANC
through
began
followed
government
has
had
on the
signing of the New York Accord had but
organisational
infrastructure
in Angola.
effected the organisation's structures and opera-
inside
South Africa which has always depended on the
external structures to keep it operative.
of
ThUS,
diplomatic and military initiatives which
the signing of the Swaziland Accord in 1982 and which was
by
the
had
alliance and
struggle.
44.
the
its
combination
with
development
struggle into a people's war, the reality of
that
Umkhonto's
a
this dramatic
armed
had
ability
and
Although the ANC and the SACP have tried to play
Umkhonto in the region and in particular its ability
was
turn
the Accord, the ANC-SACP alliance had to
Umkhonto bases and personnel from Angola by the
that
destroyed
in
of
Nkomati
managed
Umkhonto
and
by
New
the
York
Accords, the South African
end of 1988 to isolate the ANC-SACP
in Southern Africa i£ not paralysed the armed
R. KasrIls, Politics and the Armed Struggle:
Army, (Sechaba, September 1988, p. 3).
The Revolutionary
2.
A GE~RAL
PROFILE OF THE LEADERSHIP AND CADRES OF
UMKHONto
Although
the
membership
study,
term
of
a
an
"cadre"
underground
definate
Umkhonto
is commonly
used to refer to the total
organisation, for the purpose of this
distinction will be made between those members of
who belong to the leadership echelon of the organisation and
those Who represent its rank-and-file.
At
the
its
formation of Umkhonto in 1961, most of the people who made up
leadership corps at the national and the provincial levels of the
organisation,
SACP,
the
va~lous
but
South
drawn
to
from
African
organisations
true
fully
were
the
Congress
of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the
that were affiliated to them.
principles
mUlti-racial
the leadership ranks of the ANC, the
of
organisation
Unlike the ANC
the SACP and SACTU, Umkhonto was a
which
drew
its members and cadres
from all the main popUlation groups In South Africa.
This
was
cial
level, although Whites appeared to have been more predominant at
the
also
national
planning
true for the organisation's leadership at the prOVinlevel
for
one
White
ture
of
Umkhonto
the
Whites
in
Percy
of
Umkhonto,
who
where most of the forward
In Natal for instance,
Chief
as
He was Ronnie Kasrils, who later
of Military
Lionel
Intelligence.
Other
'Rusty' Bernstein, Joe Slovo,
Strachan and Albie Sachs, were either members
NHC in Johannesburg or were associated with it through
as
of
SACTU
and
a
member
of
the SACP.
With the exception of
Umkhonto in Durban participated in a
of sabotage acts in the 1960's, most Whites in Umkhonto or who
associated
with it, appeared to have served in a training or advisary
capacity.
positions
the
such
Harold
membership
nUmber
in the province.
organisation's
Umkhonto's
Kasrils,
organisation
person had a position on the Regional Command struc-
Hodgson,
their
the
the sabotage campaign was done.
only
became
of
Both
in
planning
Sachs and Hodgson as well as Strachan occupied such
the organisation, While Slovo was in command of most .of
behind the sabotage campaign,
He was made commander of
Umkhonto
after
probably
also
the
arrest
occupied
of Nelson
the
same
Mandela
in August 1962.
He
position during Mandela's absence
from the country during the first half of the same year.
At
the
provincial
in . Natal,
Chaltow
for
(the
Indians.
level of organisation, the leadership of Umkhonto
instance
latter
In the
was
mostly
Coloured
community
the
of
the
also
names
of
Kasrils and Brian
country the leadership of Umkhonto
of Africans.
Two
exception
Chinese), consisted mainly of Africans and
rest
consisted
structure.
with
In the Western Cape members of the
formed part
that
spring
of Umkhonto's
to
mind
underground
here are that of Ben
Turok(~5) and Reginald September.
As
far as educational qualifications are concerned, it is interesting
to
note that at the national level of organisation, most of the White
leaders
with
of UmKhonto or those who were identified as having associated
it, had some or other post-matric qualifications.
Kantor,
Harold
profession,
Arthur
was
Wolpe
While
and
others,
Vivian Ezra were all members of the legal
such
as
Dennis
Goldreich were equally well qualified.
an
engineer,
Bernstein
Slovo, James
an
architect
Goldberg, Bernstein and
For instance, Goldberg
and
Goldreich,
who was
closely associated with the purchase of Lilliesleaf Farm and the
formation of Umkhonto in 1961, was an industrial designer. (.6)
In
terms
Umkhonto
White
Mbeki
were
formal
by
and post-matric education, the Black leaders of
contrast
generally
not as well educated as their
counterparts.
With the exception of Nelson Mandela and Govan
who held post-matric qualifications, most of the remaining
African
poorly
of
members of Umkhonto's NBC and regional command structure were
educated.
Walter
Sisulu
had a matric qualification, while
Wilton Mkwayi, Andrew Mlangeni, Raymond Mhlaba, Elias Motsoaledi and
45.
•6.
B. Turok, Strategic Problems in South Africa's Liberation
Struggle, pp. 1 - 10. See also Vermaak, Braam Fischer. The
Man with Two Faces, pp. 8 - 22•
See Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 15 - 16, 110; Karis and
Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, vol .••
Joe
Modise
five
to
had
the
limited
junior sertificate (standard eight).(~7)
formal
nevertheless
day-to-day
suitable
all
the
Umkhonto.
the
played
before
and
an
asigni£icant
role
these
in
of
for
and qualities
that
leadership that
was
African
leaders
the formation and
the
made
them highly
needed
to
guide
instance, who had only completed the sixth
important
after
role
in the trade union movement both
formation of SACTU in the mid-1950·s.
Having
exceptional leadership skills and an understanding of trade
work,
position
type
Mkwayi,
grade,
undergo
played
qualifications
determination
for
displayed
educational
Despite their
running of Umkhonto after 1961. They all appeared to have
possessed
union
educatlona.l qualifications that ranged from standard
Mkwayi
extensive
he
held
was
sent out of South Africa between 1960/61 to
guerrilla
training.
As
a result of the senior
in SACTU ("hewas the Treasurer) and the close ties
he
had with the SACP (of which he was also a member), Mkwayi was sent
to
the
training.
Soviet
Union
This
was
and Communist China for political and military
to
prepare
him
for
the
eventual
military
leadership of Umkhonto.
With
Slovo's
departure
from
South Africa In April/May 1963, Mkwayi
was made Commander-in-Chief of Umkhonto.
Despite his apparent
limited formal education, Mkwayi turned out to be a master at
guerrilla
to
the
tactics, underground work and on the use of explosives.
time
Umkhonto's new
Rivonia.(~a)
~7.
~8.
of
his
arrest
(second)
NHC
in
that
196~,
Mkwayi
Up
was a key member of
was set up following the raid on
Duma Nokwe: Honourable Son of Africa, (Sechaba 12, Second
Quarter 1978, pp. 31 - 37). See also J. Modise, The happiest
moment In my life, (Dawn Souvernir Issue, nd, pp. 10 - 12).
Van der Merwe, Die Slag om Suid-Afrika, no. 7, ·Bri-Bri: Die
Swart Pimpernel, (Die Huisqenoot, 1971.11.05, pp. l~ - 18);
Karis and Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, vol. ~,
p. 90. For more information on Wilton Mkwayi and the Second
NHC of Umkhonto see also Vermaak, Braam Fischer. The Man with
Two Faces, pp. 1~5 - 15~; Sechaba, March 1987, p. 10; ~'
Souvenir Issue, p. 19; and Mell, South Africa belongs to Us,
pp. 159, 168.
Due
to
many
the close
Africans were encouraged to attend part-time classes in Marxlst-
Leninist
theory
alternative
education,
variety
ties
a
relationship between the ANC, the SACP and SACTU,
which
to Black
not
of
appeared
education.
necessarily
to have
served
as
a
sort
Many blacks missed out on a formal
because
they rejected it, but because a
circumstances, ranging from a lack of money to no facili-
often made it impossible for them to attend a formal school.
result,
were
a
of
As
the extra classes in Marxist political and economic theory
means
of
increasing
their education,
even
i£
it was an
education tailor made for membership to the ANC and the SACP.(49)
The
He
only
Indian
on
the NHC in the early 1960's was Ahmed Kathrada.
left school at the age of 17 years to·join the world of resistance
politics.
It 1s not clear what level of high school education he had
achieved,
but
of
the
Transvaal
In
terms
of age the leaders of Umkhonto's NHC can be roughly divided
two
broad categories, namely those Who were born before the end
into
of
the
period
were
the
First
after
Passive
World
thereafter.
Mandela,
NHC
he had left school, Kathrada joined the offices
War
Among
Mbeki,
Resistance
Council
as
a
full-tIme
(i.e. 1918) and those Who were born in the
those who belonged to the fIrst category
Sisulu and Strachan.
The remaining members of
of Umkhonto belonged to the second age category, which means
they were born after 1918. ~ong those who belonged to this latter
category were Slovo, Bernstein, Hodgson, Mhlaba, Mlangeni, Motsoaledi
and
Goldberg.
Goldberg was probably the youngest member of the NHC
of Umkhonto in 1961.
Most
35
of
and
the
leaders of Umkhonto's NHC were thus between the ages of
~9 years
at
the
time
that Umkhonto
was formed In 1961.
Mandela, for instance, who was the first Commander of Umkhonto was ~3
~9.
Karis and Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, vol. 4,
pp. 120 - 121, 151 - 153; Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe,
pp. 1 - 1~.
50.
Karis and Carter (eds.), From Protest to Challenge, vol .• ,
pp. 48 - ~9. See also Me11, South Africa belongs to Us,
pp. 98, 154, 156 - 157, 168.
years
old, while Oliver Tambo,who
commanded the ANC Mission in Exile
and Umkhonto was H years old in 1"961.
At
the
of
Umkhonto
Whites,
regional
or provincial level of organisation, the leadership
was
somewhat different.
and with the exception of a few individuals, most leaders had
only
limited
formal
only
Kasrl1s,
Billy
qualification.
Command
For one, it contained very few
of
Of
education.
Nair
the
and Chaitow
remaining
had a matric or post-matric
members
of
the Regional (High)
Umkhonto in the province, very few had even a high school
qualification.
Mtolo,
for
explosives
Natal,
only had
Curdnick
In the case of Durban for instance,
in
Ndlovo
and
instance, who was Umkhonto's expert on
a
standard
four
education.(n)
Eric Mtshal1, who both held senior positions in
the Regional Command in Durban, were equally poorly educated,
Although
no
apparently
the
specific
required
Regional
educational
minimum
by
educational
Command
structures
qualifications
senior
tall
in Natal
in the
in
provinces,
the
Africans
considering
in
of education
themselves.
university
South
some
basic
were'apparently laid down by the national
1960's,
only
into the organisation.
Umkhonto's recruitment
people with a junior or a
certificate qualification were sought by Umkhonto.
order,
were
the NHC of Umkhonto for membership to it and
leadership for the recruitment of cadres
According to Mtolo, (52) at the onset of
campaign
qualifications
This was a
the generally low educational level of most
Africa in the 1960's and the generally poor ~evel
held by most of the African leaders of Umkhonto
An African with a matric qualification, let alone a
degree
in
1960,
was
not
a common phenomenon.
In most
cases an "educated' African in 1961 was someone who had successfully
51.
52.
See Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 1 - 3.
Mtolo, Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 10 - l~; Feit, Urban Revolt in
South Africa, pp. 220 - 224.
completed primary school '~r the first or second year of high
school.(53)
To find Africans with a standard eight or matric
qualification
that
would
be prepared
willing
to
ordered
than complied with.
Command
between
1962 and
anyone
NHC
who
the
who
1963.
Durban
practiced
were
In the end, in order to meet their quota of
Regional Command was quite happy to settle for
was remotely Willing to join Umkhonto. Pressurised by the
eventually
youngsters,
This was borne out by the fact that the
in Durban was unable to meet its quota of recruits
in Johannesburg
Durban
in Umkhonto or be
leave South Africa for military training, was thus easier
Regional
recruits,
to serve
to
send more recruits, the Regional Command in
settled
their
for a group of young African pickpockets
skills
at
Durban's
Municipal
Market.
These
according to Mtolo, had virtually no formal education but
suItable for Umkhonto because of their particular lifestyle.
He
wrote:
We know that most of these boys had a hard life
and they would form a tough core of guerrilla
fighters, even though they would need a lot of
discipline.
As for Marxism, they would grasp it
quickly, because they had a personal knowledge of
starvatlon.(!l4)
While not everybody recruited into Umkhonto in the early 1960's were
of the same caliber as the above pickpockets, there is however
evidence
no
that
longer
anyone
who
suggest that by the mid-1960's Umkhonto's leaders were
too
concerned
was
prepared
about educational qualifications, and that
to join
Umkhonto
and be sent out of the
country for military training, was accepted.
As
the
is
the
case
post-1965
with the overall history of the ANC and Umkhonto In
perIod,
very little is known about the ~eadership and
cadres of Umkhonto for most of the period up to the beginning of the
53.
54.
Duma Nokwe: Honourable Son of Africa, (Sechaba 12, Second
Ouarter, 1978, pp. 31 - 37).
Mto1o; Umkonto we Sizwe, pp. 58, 83.
1980's,
when
sUbject.
the
sl1ghtly
Indications
Internal
Unkhonto
In
forced
no
Exile
prior
guide
Umkhonto.
are
available
on
the
in the years between the collapse of
structures
of
the
ANC-SACP alliance and
and the advent of the 110rogoro National
in 1969, the leaders of the ANC' s Mission In
of
the
AHC
as
well
as the 1I1litarywork of
The general impression that one gains from this period is
separate
leaders
became
to take control of both the forner diplomatic and ~~
activities
Umkhonto.
that
that
underground
Conference
were
political
are
the mid-1960's
Consultative
Exile
110re information
structure was set up by the Mission in
to the formation of the Revolutionary Council in 1969 to
of
that
leadership
It
is
thus
also not clear exactly who the exile
Umkhonto were between 1965 and 1969.
people
such
as
Joe Slovo,
Indications however
Joe Modlse, James Stuart and
others, played an Important role in the activities of Umkhonto during
these years.CSS)
Umkhonto
guiding
Wankle
the
at
thus
it
remained
until
the
without
Horegoro
a
specific
Conference
leadership
in 1969.
structure
As far as the
incursions were concerned it appears that these were guided by
combined
the
exile
Moregoro
leadership of the ANC and the SACP.
Conference
the
leadership
of
the
liberation
alliance's
in the mid-1960's.
quoted
in
the
in 1969 that the first major changes to
Unkhonto
Africa
South
It was only
were effected following the collapse of
internal
leadership
structures in South
According to ANC/Umkhonto sources recently
African
press, approximately 1 000 people had
left South Africa between 1960 and 1966 to join the ranks of the ANC
and Umkhonto.
By the end of 1965 however the number of people
leaving
to
be
the
Soweto
ANC
South Africa had slowed down to a mere tricle.
case
uprising
and
Umkhonto
for
most
This remained
part of the period 1966 to 1976 when the
send thousands of new recruits into the ranks of the
in eXile.
According to Stuart, who was among the
second group of recruits who left South A~rica in the early 1960'S,
55.
For a more detaIled discussion on the subject see Dawn,
Souvenir Issue, pp. 10 - 35. Also The Daily News (Durban),
1990,04.9 - 11 (Series of articles based on interviews between
Ken Vernon and members of the ANC's Mission in Ex11e in 1990).
there
was
very
South
Africa
facilities
often
Itttle.,thatone could call a liberation army outside
by
at
its disposal
Umkhonto
had very few training
in these years and as a result it more
than not could not accommodate all those who wished to join its
ranks.
Many,
qualifications
mid-1960's,
the
the mid-1960·s.
that could
had
to be
leadership
nurses,
could
who
not
especially
not
professional
be utilised
by
Umkhonto
accommodated
other
in
the
One such example was a group of 21 Black
had fled South Africa during these years.
them
and
turned away and was thus permanently lost to
in exile.
employ
eventually
those with
or utilise
them
in Tanzanian
in
its
Since the ANC
camps, they were
(Tanganyika) hospitals and as
such were lost to the organisation. (56)
According
early
to
1960's
Algeria,
Stuart,
many of those who had left South Africa in the
ended up in the Soviet Union, while others were sent to
Egypt,
Cuba,
China and the Scandinavian countries.
Stuart
himself was sent to the Soviet Union for military training. After
approximately 15 months of military and political training at Odessa,
Stuart
was
training
Sam
made
camps
Maseomela,
Commanding
at· Kongwa
who
Officer
in
Umkhonto's
one
of
Umkhonto's
near Dodoma in Tanzania.
first
Others, such as
were also trained in the Soviet Union as well as
in Communist China, were posted to
Umkhonto training camps elsewhere.
role
at
similar positions at other
Those who were unsuited for a
training camps were allowed to stUdy overseas or
were send as ANC representatives to countries around the world.
Although
many
ended up stUdying economics or engineering, in reality
theANC
and Umkhonto had little need for either economists or
engineers in the 1960·s. As a result, graduates who wished to remain
With
the
ANC
employment.
to
political
found
themselves
pressed
into
different
types
For instance, engineers often found themselves assigned
and
diplomatic
positions,
while
soldiers
found
themselves administering almost non-existent ANC offices.(5?)
56.
57.
of
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0~.10 (ANC Builds from Within).
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0~.10 (ANC Builds from Within).
The pressing leadership problems that the Mission in Exile had to
face since the mid-1960's were thoroughly dIscussed at the
consultative conference in 1969 where a new leadership structure for
Umkhonto was devised. The most significant change was the formation
of a Revolutionary Council to take direct control of the affairs of
Umkhonto.
Although the exact membership of the RC was never
revealed, most of those who appeared to have served on it were senior
members of the SACP and SACTU. Among the latter who served on the
Council were Slovo, Yusuf Dadoo, RegInald September, Alfred Nzo,
Moses Kotane. Moses l'labhida,Jacob tuma, Henry Makgothi and others
(See Chapter five, pp. 219 - 291). ThIs meant that those who
controlled the underground SACP and its affIlIated organisations in
South Africa during the 1950's and 1960's were still in charge of the
ANC-SACP alliance by the beginnIng of the 1910's. This remained to
be the case at least untIl the middle of the 1910's, when the Soweto
uprising and the massive influx of recruits from South Africa Infused
new blood and with It a spIrit of renewed radicalism into the ranks
of the ABC. the SACP and Umkhonto.
Although the influx of these new recruits did not have an immediate
effect on the leadership of the ANC-SACP alliance and Umkhonto, the
liberation movellent was eventually forced to begIn absorbing some of
the more capable of these new generation leaders Into the leadershIp
of the Alliance and Umkhonto to allow for the representation of theIr
generation In the training camps in Angola and elsewhere. Although
the first wave of new recruits dId not Immediately bring about a
dilution of the old guard leadership of the ANC. the SACP, and
Umkhonto, the second wave of Blacks that left the country in the
mid-1980·s. most of whom were absorbed by Umkhonto. dId place
increased pressure on the exile leadership to give greater recognition to the rIsing of young militant leaders in the liberation
movement.
The unrest and mutiny in Umkhonto's training camps in
Angola in 1984 highlighted exactly this problem. After the appointment of Marks Shope and Jack Simons to Umkhonto's camps in Angola in
the early 1980's to take control of the political education of the
new recruits, many of the former Black Consciousness-inclined Soweto
youths. Who had "been successfully converted to Marxism, had been
incorporated
to
Africa
the
chance
to
be
elected
of
to
in all
1976
probability stood a good
the ANC's NEC in the future. (se) Amongst
out by Africa Confidential for possible promotion were
Kaphepha,
Mayibuye,
According
a number of those who had left South Africa
disturbances
singled
Klaus
the,.leadership of the SACP and the ANC.
Confidential,
during
those
into
Hebe"
the
SACP's
Ogara,
Dan
regional
chief
in
Swaziland,
Peter
Cindi, (humalo Migwe, Raymond Nkuku and
Kingsley Xuma. According to the same source, most of these new breed
of exile leaders had been trained in Umkhonto's training camps in
Angola and elsewhere and seemed to be devoted members of the
SACP.(S9) {Although they were singled out by Africa Confidential
for
possible promotion to the ANC's NEC after 1985, none of the above
leaders
of
Umkhonto
were
however
elected
to the ANC's NEC at its
National Congress held In Durban in early July 1991. )(60)
Africa
the
Confidential
post 1976 generation on board the Mission in Exile was completely
transformed
that
from
gained
dIting
ship
who
Umkhonto
rehabilitation
discontent,
SACP
by sending them into exile.
In other words, those
did not agree with the manner in Which the SACP leader-
were
and
Among the rich array of Stalinist methods
currency in the organisation was the practice of discre-
controlled
Angola
within.
dissenters
recruits
the
went on to point out that once the ANC had taken
or
dominated
summarIly
kIcked
camp,
which
TanzanIa
especially
of
(See
the
out
ANC
or conducted the affairs of
of the organisation or sent to
there were reported to be several In
Chapter
8).
Even the smallest sign of
with the way in which the White leadership of
and Umkhonto had come to dominate the intellectual lIfe and
direction of the ANC, was severely dealt with.(6~)
58.
South AfrIca:
The Party Faithful, (AfrIca ConfidentIal, 31
p. 2).
South Africa: The Party Faithful, (AfrIca Confidential, 31
(1), 1990.01.12,
p. 2).
The Daily News (Durban), 1991.06.08 (ANC unity forged from many
strands).
South Africa: The Party Faithful, (Africa Confidential, 31
(1), 1990.01.12, p. 2). See also Chapter 6.
(1),
59.
60.
61.
1990.01.12,
In
contrast,
completed
often
those
the
supported
transition
rewarded
with
representatives
ANC-SACP
who
of
and
who successfully
from Black Consciousness
to Marxism, were
important
the
ANC
the
SACP
positions
inside the movement or as
in countries around the world where the
alliance had official missions.
Although the NEC of the ANC
was
reduced to nine members in 1969, by 1985 it had again grown to 30
with
the proviso that a further five members could be co-opted by the
NEC
should the need arise.
leaders
and
Military
and
cadres were elected onto the NEC or Umkhonto's Political
Council
Umkhonto
in 1985, a number of the younger leaders in the ANC
were
Jordan,
Chris
leaders
had
or
While none of the post 1976 generation of
Hani,
left
mid-forties
appointed
to
the NEC, notably Thabo Mbekl, Palo
Sipho
Makana
and
Francis Meli,
These latter
South Africa in the 1960's and were in their early
by
1985,
As
such
they
represented
the
second
generation
of exile leaders in the ANC-SACP alliance that had come to
prominence
since
the beginning of the armed struggle,
The third and
fourth generation of leaders are those who had left South Africa in
the mid-1970's and the mid-1980's respectively.
Since
the
between
power
1980's there appeared to have been a growing division
those in the organisation who supported a violent transfer of
in
possibly
both
mid
South
Africa
negotiated
sides
and those who campaigned for a more moderate
solution
to
South Africa's problems.
Although
included devoted Marxists, they differed from one another
in
their
interpretation of the principles of Marxism.
in
the liberation movement such as Hani, who became Chief-of-Staff of
Umkhonto
in
supported
democratic
of
and
Thabo
1987,
others
such
as Kasrils and Mac Maharaj who
him, openly rejected the relatively moderate, social
views of their colleagues who stood under the leadership
Mbeki,
his
and
The die-hards
Lindiwe
supporters
have
Mabuza and others.
attempted
to
From 1985 onwards Hani
build
a
power
base
for
themselves
in the ANC-SACP alliance through their control of Umkhonto
and
influence
their
in
the
SACP.
Consequently,
although the more
moderate
minded Joe Modise was the Commander of Umkhonto, it was Hani
and
supporters who dominated the organisation by the latter half
of
his
the
instance
1980's.
Steve
It was reportedly through Hani's efforts that for
TShwete,
the
first
of
the
1916 generation of ANC
leaders,
was
appointed
pos ition that
and
1987.
of
more
Han! himself occupied in the organisation between 1982
With Tshwete in the number three position and the support
other
key
Military
to Umkhonto's NHC as Political Commissar - a
leaders
in Umkhonto such as Kasrils who was Chief of
Intelligence. Hani was in a position to openly challenge the
conservative
Consequently
moderate
leadership
and.
contrary
leadership
of
the
to the
in the
ANC.
ANC
opinion
Hanl
in
exile
in
1987.
and wishes of the more
and
Tshwete in 1987 openly
called for the armed struggle to be directed against White soft
(civilian) targets in South Afrlca.(62)
The
fact
that
ambitions
the
in
interpreted
by
some sources as a clear indication of
powerful position that Hani and his supporters had come to occupy
the
indeed
in
was
the ANC did not immediately step in to curtail Han1's
liberation
the
the
movement
by
the beginning of 1988.
If this was
case then it can also be argued that the predominant view
liberation
alliance
by
the
beginning of 1988 w~s one that
favoured a military solution led by Umkhonto in South Africa.
Although
the
Tshwete
ANC's
NEC
was
slow
to
react to the Hani challenge.
was suddenly removed from his position as Political Commissar
in early 1988 and reassigned to the rank of Head of Mass Mobilisation. He was also given a seat on the ANt's NEC. His vacant position
in
Umkhonto
was
commander
of
dismissal
from
powerful
Modise
then
filled
Umkhonto
to
by Timothy Mokoena. who was a former senior
in Angola.
Umkhonto
in
1988
With
it was
Tshwete
and
not Hani's
argued that Hani was too
be touched and that he and fellow hardliners rather than
and the moderate were in control of the armed struggle.
however.
effectively
hardliners
three
curbed
in
the
major
the
developments
post tion
liberation
and
had
taken place that have
influence
alliance.
Since
of
Hani
and
his
The first was the relative
fallure of the ANC and Umkhonto's anti-election campaign in October
62.
See South Africa: Hani's Rise. (Africa Confidential 29 (16).
1988.08.12, pp. 1 - 3); Barrett. A Profile of the ANC. May
1989. pp. 21 - 2., 61 - 62; The Daily News (Durban).
1988.08.24.
1988.
The
second
was
of
the
Swedish
(who
pwbl1cally
declared policy to concentrate future ANC attacks on White
targets.
influenced
Accord
the
reaction
government
civilian
is
the unfavourable
the
slqned
destroyed
third but more
power
important
factor
that
of Rani and his supporters was the New York
in December
not
if
The
position
Rani's
shambles
ANC's main financier) to Rani and Tshwete's
1988. This latter agreement effectively
base
and
left him with an organisation in
a cause for which there appeared to be increasingly
less justification after 1988.(63)
All
this
had
so-called
signing
a
dramatIc
"doves"
part
with
the
of
their
closure
of
settling
regional
Hani
of
Since the
influence in the ANC's NEC and the SACP.
international
under
relatIonship between the
and whawks· in the liberation alliance.
changing
the
on the
of the New York Accord, Hani and his followers seemed to have
lost
signs
effect
by
the
hawks
to
the
its bases and other facilities in Angola and a
environment that was rapidly moving away from
conflicts through military means, there were clear
middle
the
Faced
of 1989 that power in the ANChad
doves.
leadership
of
shifted from
Although the latter faction which stood
Thabo
Mbeki were no less Marxist than the
faction they were nevertheless less militant and more in support
a moderate, peaceful solution in South Africa.
with
its
released
pace
strong
The latter faction
social democratic views, together with the recently
internal
leaders
of the ANC, were increasingly setting the
with regards to leadership developments inside the ANC's NEC and
the SACP by the end of the 1980's.
Although
stUdy
it
the
will
SUbject of funding has been referred to earlier in this
be more fully discussed here.
While a fair amount is
known about the funds that the ANC have received during the late
63.
South Africa: UmkhontoPacks its Bags, (Africa Confidential
30 (2), 1989.01.20, p. 6). See also South Africa: Hani's
Rise, {Africa Confidential 29 (16" 1988.08.12, p. 1); The
Daily News (Durban), 1989.06.15, 21.
1970's
the
and the 1980's,very
funding of Umkhonto other than that it was set up with money that
mainly
came
funds
from
from
Although
a
the
SACP
variety
of
Scandinavian
financial
since
1968/69)
11ttle
is known
ANC-SACP
alliance
In
of
view
accurate
later
exclusively
first
such
of
as
which
Sweden
were
have
overseas.
been giving
late 1960's (Sweden began to give aid in
about
in exile,
the actual amounts received by the
or how much was allocated to Umkhonto.
of
the financing of Umkhonto during these early or
up
As pointed out above, Umkhonto was almost
and
run With money provided by the SACP in the
The SACP was apparently also responsible for arranging
weapon supplies by the Soviet Union after 196~.
were
Umkhonto
the
years.
set
1960's.
weapons
most
this it is virtually impossible to draw an even remotely
picture
the
early
sources
assistance to the ANC and other liberation organisations in
Africa
even
who again appeared to have received its
countries
Southern
the
little if anything is however known about
arranged,
is not
clear
supplied
but
and
they were
how
many
probably
were
How these
delivered to
delivered
to the
ANC-SACP alliance free of charge through Dar-es-Salaam and the
Organisation of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee which was
established in that same year.
According
of
the
to Modise, the later Commander of Umkhonto, the early years
armed
funds.
The
between
1961
the
money
claimed,
struggle were difficult years due to a serious lack of
transportation
recruits in and out of South Africa
and the mid-1960's cost a great deal of money.
that
came
of
was
from
Most of
used for transport during these early years, he
within
the
liberation
movement.
Outside the
country the ANC and Umkhonto's cadres, according to Modise, received
assistance from some of the African governments that have indicated
support for the ANC and the armed struggle.
Modise wrote:
We got assistance from the Ethiopian, Egyptian and
later the Algerian governments.
The Algerians
sponsored
our initial training and later the
Chinese.
I think we sent one group to China and
from then onwards we acquired most of our training
from the Soviet Union.(6~)
J. Modise, The happiest moment of my life. (Dawn, Souvenir
Issue, pp. 10 - 12).
Thus in terms of its aid to Umkhonto the Soviet Union not only
provided funds through the SACP but it also provided Umkhonto with
military and political training during the early phase of the armed
struggle.
After the control of the armed struggle had been shifted outside
South Africa after 1965. the ANt also appeared to have received funds
frol1 a variety of other sources. The most important of these was the
Swedish government Who in 1968 passed an act whereby It was obl1dged
to grant foreign aid totalling at least one per cent of its gross
domestic product to liberation organisations. Most of this aId went
to liberation movements In Southern Africa which included the ANC and
Umkhonto.<·S)
In addition to Sweden the ANC also received financial and "humanitarian- aid from other sources such as some African governments. the
World Council of Churches (WCC), the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) in
the UK and the Netherlands, and the United Nations High Commission
for Refugees.
Although the SACP and the Soviet Union was no longer
the chief financiers of the ANC's Mission In Exile and the armed
struggle after 1965, they nonetheless had a ma10r say in the ANC and
Umkhonto's financial affairs through their representation on the
ANC'S Treasurey Department.
In 1963 for instance Moses Kotane,who
was also General-Secretary of the SACP since 1938 was made
Treasurer-General of the ANC's Mission in Exile. This position he
held until 1973 when he was replaced by T.T. Nkobl, who has been
described as a communist by some and a non-communist by others. An
executive member of the ANt's NEC and PMC,Nkobi was reelected to the
position of Treasurer-General in 1985. He still holds this powerful
position to-day.
(66)
Exactly what sort of funding the ANC received in the late 1960's and
the early 1970's, and what percentage went to Umkhonto Is not known.
65.
66.
Sweden: Footing the 8111, (Africa Confidential 27 (24),
1986.11.26, 4).
The African Communist 106, Third Quarter 1986. p. 2,3; South
AfrIca: The ANt. (Africa Confidential 27 (25), 1986.12.10,
p. 2). See also Chapter Six footnote 93.
Indications a~e that ~lthough the o~ganisation was receiving more
money as reflected in the purchase of a boat, the Adventure~, in
1971, to infiltrate 25 Umkhonto combatants by sea (see Chapter four
footnote 212), sUfficient funds were still in short supply. In 1971
the swedish government made some Rl,19 million available to
-refugees· and liberation organlsatlons in Africa, the bulk of Which
went to organisations such as the ANC, ZANU, SWAPO and other
liberation organisations in Southern Africa.
Despite these
increased funds the ANC however seemed to have operated on a shoe
string budget. According to Sindlso ftfenyana,a member of the ANC's
NEC, When he was transferred to the ANC's headqua~ters in Lusaka in
197., the ANC had apart from an offIce It sha~ed wIth other libe~ation organisations such as Frelimo, ZAPU, and SWAPOt only one car and
two rented houses that accommodated about a hundred people. The car
was an old 1932 Flat and it apparently se~ved the entire ANC-SACP
Alliance In Lusaka up to the mid-1910's when the ANC moved out of its
shared office into its own office which it shared with a Zambian
businessman.
(The latter was apparently done in an attempt to avoid
attacks against Lusaka by the Rhodesian security fo~ces.) According
to the same source, while ample food, clothing and other necessIties
were available for the relatively few ANt membe~s in Lusaka in the
mid-1910's, theyp~oved
to be totally inadequate especially after
June 1976 when the ANC was hit by the -huge flood of youths fleeing
South Af~ica in the wake of the Soweto uprising".c•• )
(67
)
On the subject of the ANC's financial position in the 1980's, Stephen
Davis in his ~ecent stUdy on the armed st~uggle in South Africa w~ote
that the ANC Treasury Department administered all funds that kept the
organisation and Umkhonto financially afloat.c•• ) In order to see
that the organisation's limited resou~ces were not wasted, Nkobi and
the Treasury Department were vested with wide powers to ensure strict'
control over all non-military supplies and equipment. In addition,
61.
68.
69.
See Horrell, A Survey of Race Relations, 1911, pp. 9.-95; as
well as Dawn, Souvenir Issue, pp. 33, .3: See also Chapter 5
footnote 70.
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0••10, (ANC Bu1lds from With1n).
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 72-14.
Nkobi
and
his
developing
innovative
liberation
ANC's
or
needed
this
financial
non-military
approximately
projects
position.
bUdget had
RISO
the
responsibility
to
strengthen
of
the
According to Davis the
been
estimated at about $50
million by the mid-1960·s.
a further $50 million (R150m) to conduct its affairs.
Umkhonto
Most of
latter bUdget however was controlled secretly by Umkhonto bUdget
officials
in Angola
anything
Of
money-making
alliance's
annual
million
department. was also _9iven
was
the
known
which
is probably the reason why so little if
about
the financing of the latter organisation.
SSOm (RiSOm) allocated to the ANC for "non-military" purposes
as much as $30 m (R90m) was apparently received by the organisation
in the form of in-service and in-kind aid such as teachers, tractors,
seeds,
of
training,
goods
needed
remaining
the
$20m
as
had
as
organisation
to conduct its affairs.
The
constituted a cash amount used by the ANC for
running
Desmond
concerts
such
the
food, medicines and numerous other types
of its affairs.
The ANC also received funds
been privately raised by organisations and individuals such
Bishop
music
by
(R60m)
day-to-day
that
clothing,
Tutu's Refugee Fund;
politically orientated rock
and by actors including the cast of television series
"Cagney and Lacy" In the United States who had voted in 1986
to donate their entire South African royalties to the ANC. Thus,
every time the series was shown in South Africa, the ANC and thus
Umkhonto benefitted financially by it,(70)
Cash
donatIons
to
the
Scandinavian
countries
significantly
during
substantially
Increased
the
mid-1980's
in
the
annual
aid
a
the
1960's.
its
was Sweden.
One
Scandinavian
country that
financial aid and support to the ANC in
Since it first gave aid to the
ANC-SACP
late 1960's the Swedish government has steadily increased its
been
earmarked for 'humanitarian' purposes, there has never
any control over it with the result that it can be expected that
fair share of this aid ended up with Umkhonto,
Confidential(71)
70.
71,
as well as Third World nations had also grown
contributions to the liberation alliance. Although all SWedish
has
been
ANC from western countries, particularly the
According to Africa
Swedish government aid to the ANC and Swapo in
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 74.
Sweden: Footing the bill, (Africa Confidential 27 (24),
26 November 1986, p. 4).
1986
was
alone
amounted
every
indication
future.
In
additional
the
states
them
ANC
the
1986
was
something like $29 million (R87m) and there
that
this amount
same year
amount
Frontline
amount
to
of $100
and
and
would
be increased in the
the swedish government also granted an
million
(R300m) in financial aid to the
liberation organlsations,
SWAPO.
most visibly among
It is not clear how much of this latter
received by the ANC and UIIJc.honto,
but considering that by
besIdes SNAPO and the PAC, the ANt was the only other liberation
organisation
it can
be
million
was
actively
safely
that
Southern
African
in armed struggle in southern Africa,
assumed that a fair amount of the additional $100
received
reported
engaged
by
the ANC and Umkhonto.
In
1990
it was also
the ANC had received an amount of R24 million from the
Catholic
Bishops'
Conference (SACBC).
This claim
was later denied by the SACBC.(?2)
According to Davis the ANC in Exile acted as a type of borderless welfare
state.
housing
It supplied food, clothing, transportation, education,
and health-care for its 13 000 (some sources indicate 20
constituents
these
persons
(R24,99)
(R78)
or
payments
living
outside South Afrlca.(?3)
Each of
apparently received a minimum allowance of about $8,33
per
per
refugees
000)
month
month
alone,
for
a
stUdent,
ora
token salary of up to $26
for administrators and soldiers.
according
to
Davis,
must
These direct cash
have
amounted
to
approximately $3,6 millIon (R10,8m) per year.(7.)
In an article that appeared in the South African press in AprIl
1990(?!5) it was reported that the ANC had an annual bUdget "of
hundreds
(and
2
000
of
millions
presumably
Zambian
also
of rands" and that members of the organisation
Umkhonto) received a monthly allowance of some,
Kwatcha (apprOXimately R90).
Compared to the monthly
salary of 3 500 Kwatcha (approximately R157) paid to a university
72.
73.
74.
75.
See The Dally News (Durban), 1990.09.24 (Shock disclosure of
aid to ANC) and The Dally News (Durban), 1990.10.24 (Bishop's
denial of church assistance to ANC supported).
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 72: The Daily News (Durban),
1990.04.11 (A New Privileged Elite).
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 72.
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0t.11 (A New PriVileged Elite).
lecturer
in
reasonable
compared
hotels
the
Kwatcha
represented a
In a country as poor as Zambia.
However, when
cost
amount
of
of 2
000
a meal for two at one of Lusaka's better
which could run up to 2 000 Kwatcha, the allowance paid to ANC
was
small.
The financial position of an ANC member in exile
perhaps best summed up by 1)onN<jubane,who was the organisation's
Administrative
PUblicity,
his
the
allowance
to
me_bers
was
Zambia,
Secretary
and lived in Lusaka.
wife
and
a
They
also
after
the
Department
of
Information
and
Ngubane (a nom de guerre) lived with
two small children in a small bUt comfortable suburban
bungalow.(76)
sets,
for the
Within
this
bungalow
the family had two television
video recorder, a hi-fi set, an electric stove and a fridge.
employed
two
organisational
personal
a
maid
children.
hierarchy,
purposes
to help with the housework and to look
As a reasonably senior member in the ANC's
he had
provided
the
that
use
it was
of
not
an
ANC vehicle for
needed
elsewhere.
According to Ngubane:
life is OK.
But there is no doubt we could
not have survived outside the wider community of
the ANC.
We don't really need money because in
the organisation we live largely in a moneyless
society.
I have managed to bUy some luxuries.
like
a
video, from money saved on overseas
assignments,
As for the rest. we managed.
Sometimes I do not know how, but we do.(77)
Although
international
grown
since
short
of
aid
from
linkages
these
itself.
these
bUdget.
in exile had SUbstantially
funds was that it had established a vast hierarchy in exile
governments
ANC
ANC
the mid-1970's. part of the reason why it was constantly
that made increasingly
instance. although its
important
to the
with
heavy demands on whatever funds it had. for
4. external missions (by 1988) provided
the
international
community
and
foreign
missions had to be financed almost entirely by the
In addItion transportation costs involving travel to and
offices
also
took a large slice out of the ANC's annual
Add to this the 200-odd vehicles - sedans. bakkies, kombi's
and trucks - owned by the ANC by 1988, that had to be maintained
76.
77.
The Dally News (Durban), 1990.0i.ll (A New Privileged Elite).
The Daily News (Durban), 1990.0 •.11 (A New Privileged Elite).
annually by the organisation and one begins to understand why it was
always In need of more funds.
.,
In an attempt to meet its needs and to Improvise for the shortfall in
hard currency to finance the work of Umkhonto, the ANC has undertaken
a number of pro}ects over the years - the most noticeable of these
being the farms it operated In Zaabia and Angola. Davis wrote:
Farms and small factories have been started to
promote self-sufficiency In food, clothes, furniture
and constructIon. In most cases the ANC deliberately
employs host-state nationals, at union wage to foster
local goodwill.(7.)
The 3 300 hectares ANC farm at Chongella in Zambia, for instance, was
worked by Zambian labourers to produce vegetables, corn, poUltry and
cattle for consumption by the ANt and where possible surpluses were
sold at the Zambian market to generate income. Similarly, the ANC's
furniture shop at Mazimbu was run by TanzanIans and ANC students and
its products were buIlt both for community needs as well as for
market sales.(7.)
But these projects and others like them have only been partially
successful and very few If any could be considered self-SUfficient.
The farm at Chongella for instance has been heavily dependent on
grants (some $500 000 or Rl 500 000) and equipment from the United
Nations High Commission for Refugees.
The same applied to the
furniture factory at Mazimbu. Here training was provided by donor
countries such as East Germany, Denmark, Zambia and Tanzania.
Similarly, other enterprises such as the clothing factory also at
Mazimbu operated on extensive Dutch grants and equipment that had
been donated to the MC.
In addition to these enterprises and the funds they generated for the
ANC, it has also been claimed by the ANC that substantial sums of
money raised inside South Africa were received by the organisation
78.
79.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 72-73.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 3~
Officials sponsor a 'fighting Fund' appeal that
encourages
compatrIots
in exile
to support
Umkhonto ... In reality, however, the Congress has
not undertaken major professional grass-roots fundraising campaIgns. <ao)
All
this of course had a dIrect effect on the ability of Umkhonto and
the
armed struggle.
its
armed
equipment
attacks
which
Although the organisation had managed to step up
inside
was
Soviet
Bloc
Davis,
"Umkhonto's
South
mostly
countries
was
Africa
donated
mostly
it
Is
also true that its
the Soviet Union and other
by
out of date.
"In short," argued
arsenal has consisted largely of surplus supplies
of outdated Soviet and East European munitions."(81)
ThUS,
the overall picture of the ANC's Mission in Exile and
Umkhonto's armed campaign in "the 1980's showed an organisation
stru9gling
to make financial ends meet.
and
in-kind
had
to
Exile
be
aid was received from a wide array of sources this money
thinly
Which
POPulation,
1980's.(62)
Although large sums of money
had
spread
to
estimated
to meet all the demands of the Mission in
provide
to
be
a
more
home
than
to
20
an
000
ever-growing
exile
by the end of the
through three major
adjustments between its formation in 1961 and the end of 1988. The
first
came
with
the destruction of the internal underground
structures of the ANC-SACP alliance in the mid-1960's while the
second came at the Morogoro Consultative Conference which saw the
Organisationally
formation
of
speaking,
Umkhonto
a Revolutionary Council to guide the day-to-day running
of Umkhonto and the armed struggle.
80.
81.
82.
went
The third major change or
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 71, 73.
Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, pp. 71, 74.
The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1991.07.30 (The ANC' s most
worried man. 20 000 exiles champing at the bit to come home
but there's no cash in the kitty).
adjustment
with
came
in
an entirely
1983 when the Revolutionary Council was replaced
new
andllore
elaborate structure, the political
Military
Council (PMC) and its various sub-structures.
for
the
first
the
armed
Consequently,
time since 1961, the political and military phases of
struggle
were co-ordinated to the best possible advantage
of the liberation movement.
Although
these changes were introduced In the name of the ANC and the
struggle
for
tional
Black
structure
behind
political
was
Umkhonto.
Umkhonto
rIghts in South Africa, the organisa-
drafted
For
all
by
the SACP which was the real force
practical
and
ideological
purposes,
had become the military wing of the SACP rather than the ANC
by the mid-1980·s.
According
to
London,(e~)
Michael
who
Morris
has
of Terrorism
attempted
an
Research
analysis
of
Associates in
the organisatlonal
structure
of
Umkhonto
the
it
is almost impossible to draw an accurate diagram of the
two,
organisatlonal
reasons
for
structure
this.
organisations
Africa
and
the
members
Since
of
distinction
the
constantly
successes
structure
and leadership of the two
changing due to developments In South
of the South African government's
in membership
between
the
members
of
another,
it was
often
between
He gave two
operations and diplomatic initiatives.
overlapping
Umkhonto.
of either the ANC or Umkhonto.
One,
were
the
counter-insurgency
was
and the'ANC and the interrelationship between
one
the
ANC, the SACP and
organisation
difficult
The second
to
were also the
draw
a
clear
the different divisions of the ANC, the SACP and
Umkhonto.
,
A
further
names
and
of
factor
personnel
Umkhonto,
probably
also
to
that
complicates
the issue was the fact that the
were often kept secret, particularly in the SACP
protect
them
from
assassination
attempts
but
to hide internal differences and to remove from public
scrutiny any changes that might be effectd in the organisation as a
83.
Morris, African National Congress of South Africa, Organisation
and Hierarchy, Chart and Comments, sIngle page.
result
by
of differences of opinion and ideology.
Ilanyif
presents
The use of pseudonyms
not most members of the ANC, Ulnkhonto and the SACP, also
a
problem
to
anyone
attempting
to make sense out of the
structures and leadership of these organisatlons.
In
terms
of
Umkhonto,
guard'
the
who
were
the
the
under
ranks
the ANC,
the control
responsible
influx
of
the
of
SACP and to an extent
the
members of the 'old
for the formation of Umkhonto in 1961.
two major groups of radical-minded recruits
of the ANC-SACP-Umkhonto liberation alliance diluted
numerical strength of the old guard leadership, they nevertheless
managed
to bold
educated
younger
ANC's
first
beginning
the
leadership,
remained
Although
into
its
on
to
power,
leadership
National
despite an up and coming and better
corps.
Conference
This trend was confirmed at the
held
inside
South
Africa at the
of July 1991 since its unbanning in February 1990. Although
position
of
organisation
was
several
of
them
Ronnie
Kasrils
organisation
the younger
and often more radical leaders in the
SUbstantially
strengthened through the election of
such as Thabo Mbeki, Palo Jordan, Steve Tshwete and
to
the
remained
ANC's
firmly
NEC,
the
top
positions
in
the
in the hands of the older guard and in
particular the "internal" leaders who
African prisons In the late 1980·s.(a~)
were
released
from
South
In
sharp contrast to the older generation of ANC and Umkhonto leaders
of
whom
only
younger
Mbeki,
of
had
any
leaders
in
post-matric
the
qualifications, the
liberation alliance such as
Jordan, Me1i, Lindiwe Mabuza and others were academically well
Mbeki,
with
several
of
them holding Masters or Doctors degrees.
for instance, gained a Masters degree in Economics from Sussex
the United Kingdom, while Meli, a former editor of Sechaba, held a
Doctors
Germany.
84.
handful
generation
qualified
in
a
degree
in History
from
the
University of Leipzig in East
Similarly, Miss Mabuza and Jordan both obtained Doctors
The Daily News (Durban), 1991.07.8 (ANC unity forged from many
strands).
degrees
from American
(academic)
leaders
education
in the ANC
international
universities.<U)
In addition to their formal
many, i£ not most, of the younger generation of
and
Umkhonto
also
had years of experience in
politics, diplomacy and intrigue, something they shared
with the old guard leadership outside South Africa but which their
counterparts inside South Africa did not have.
In
terms
less
of
organisation's financial position, the position is
clear with regards to the amounts of money allocated to Umkhonto
annually.
Although
suggested
great
the
the
there
deal
little
to conduct its affairs.
This being the position in
the picture for the 1960's and 1970's is less clear.
The
that is known indicates the fact that up to the mid-1970's the
organisation
make
can be little dOUbt that the organisation received a
more
1980's
an amount of some $50 million (R150 m) had been
ends
explain
the
armed
why
the
struggle
of
This
Marxist
regimes
inside
West
as
this
period
financial
in-service
the
Africa in the mid-1970·s.
Soweto
uprising
of
Things
mid-l976 when
have
1976
Mozambique
increasing
and
aid
not
available.
material
steadily
Equally
only
affected the
material
and
financial
aid
individuals and organisations both in the
as In the Eastern Bloc.
are
not
been channelled to the ANC in exile by sympathetic
institutions,
well
and
In terms of organisation and logistics but 'also
After
governments,
South
development together with the establishment of
in Angola
alliance
to
after
latter
financially.
appeared
ANC and Umkhonto were largely unable to restart
recruits began to stream into the offices of the ANC in
exile.
liberation
extremely limited bUdget and that it battled to
If this was indeed the case it will partially help
dramatically
thousands
1970·s.
an
meet.
to
changed
had
aid
What is clear however is that both
whether in the form of cash, in-kind or
increased
important
Again figures and amounts for
is the
over
fact
the
years
that
as
since the late
one liberation
organisation after another in Southern Africa achieved their aims
85.
Information compiled from: The Daily News (Durban) 1989.12.3;
1990.02.28; 1990.03.03; Barrett, A Profile of the ANC, May
1989, pp. 1-72; Meli, South Africa Belongs to Us, Information
on cover page. See also Lodge, State of Exile, (Third World
Quarterly 9 (1), January 1987, p. 17, footnote 61).
between
1975
available
to
and 1980, increased money and other forms of aid became
the
ANC and SWAPO who remained the only two liberation
organlsations
recognised
Consequently,
money
previously
organisations
could
then be channelled to the ANC and SWAPO.
how
this development
financial
financial
1980's
positions
in
exactly
is not
the region by the middle of the 1980'S.
made
available
influenced
clear.
the
Reports
to other liberation
Again,
ANC
and
Umkhonto's
on
the
movement's
position that appeared 1n the daily press by the end of the
indicated that while large sums of money was annually given to
the ANC, the organisation remained financially embarrassed. ( 86)
86.
The Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 1991.07.30 (The ANC' s most ..
worr ied man).
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