Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706

Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706
KECS-CR-16-50
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706,
M5360, C4060, C4062 Series
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-CISS-0731-2016
2016. 8. 1
IT Security Certification Center
Certification Report
Page 1
History of Creation and Revision
No.
Date
Revised
Pages
Description
Certification report for Samsung Multifunction X704, X706,
00
2016.8.1
-
K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062 Series
- First documentation
Certification Report
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This document is the certification report for Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706,
M5360, C4060, C4062 Series of SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory (KSEL)
Certification Report
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Table of Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 5
Identification ........................................................................................................ 7
Security Policy ..................................................................................................... 8
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ........................................................... 8
Architectural Information .................................................................................... 9
Documentation .................................................................................................. 13
TOE Testing........................................................................................................ 13
Evaluated Configuration ................................................................................... 15
Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 15
9.1
Security Target Evaluation (ASE) .................................................................. 15
9.2
Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ............................................................. 16
9.3
Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD) ....................................................... 16
9.4
Development Evaluation (ADV)..................................................................... 17
9.5
Test Evaluation (ATE).................................................................................... 17
9.6
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .................................................................... 18
9.7
Evaluation Result Summary .......................................................................... 19
Recommendations ............................................................................................ 20
Security Target................................................................................................... 20
Acronyms and Glossary ................................................................................... 21
Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 23
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the results
of the EAL2+ evaluation of Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360,
C4060, C4062 Series from SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd. with reference to the
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter)[1]. It
describes the evaluation result and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is MFPs (Multi- Function Peripherals) as an IT
product. It controls the operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and
fax functions on the MFP controller.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory
(KSEL) and completed on July 7, 2016. This report grounds on the evaluation technical
report (ETR) [3] KSEL had submitted and the Security Target (ST) [4]. The ST has
conformance claim to U.S. Government Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version
1.0 (IEEE Std.2600.2™-2009) [5]. All Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the
ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the
SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2. Therefore, the
ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional
Requirements (SFRs) are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, and the
TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST. Therefore, the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2
conformant. The TOE is operated in an internal network protected by a firewall. U.USER
is connected to the TOE and may perform jobs that are allowed (see Figure 1).
[Figure 1] TOE Operational Environment
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The TOE is intended to operate in a network environment that is protected by a firewall
from external malicious attacks, and with reliable PCs and authenticated servers.
U.USER is able to access the TOE by using local user interface (LUI) or remote user
interface (RUI). The LUI is designed to be accessed by U.USER. The U.USER can
operate copy, scan, and fax functions through the LUI. In the case of a scanning job,
U.USER can operate the scanning job using the LUI and transfer the scanned data to a
certain destination by email addresses and servers. U.USER can also use their PCs to
print out documents or to access the TOE through the internal network.
U.ADMINISTRATOR can enable/disable Automatic Image Overwrite, start/stop Manual
Image Overwrite, and change a Password via the LUI. U.ADMINISTRATOR can access
TOE through the RUI using a web browser through IPSec protocol. If IPSec is not
configured in the TOE, all of network connection would be blocked. From there,
U.ADMINISTRATOR
can
add/change/delete
user
accounts,
change
the
U.ADMINISTRATOR’s ID and password, review the security audit service, and download
the security audit report. The U.USER’s account information that requires asking for
internal authentication by the TOE can be stored on the hard disk drive of the TOE. All
of the information stored on the hard disk drive is protected by the TOE. In the case of
external authentication using Kerberos, LDAP, SMB server, the external authentication
servers will perform the user authentication using database of authentication server. The
authentication server is assumed to be protected from external environmental space.
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by
the government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or
gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives
effect to the certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2. Identification
The TOE is identified as follows:
Developer
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Name
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060,
C4062 Series
Version
V1.00
Hardware
X704LX, X706GX, K705LX, K706GX, M5360RX, C4060FX, C4062FX
(MFP Model)
[Table 1] TOE identification
Scheme
TOE
Common Criteria
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(June 27, 2016)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Regulation for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360,
C4060, C4062
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~
CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
EAL
EAL2+ (EAL2 augmented by ALC_FLR.2)
Protection Profile
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE
Std.2600.2™-2009)
Developer
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Sponsor
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS Co., Ltd.
Evaluation Facility
Korea Security Evaluation Laboratory Co., Ltd.
Completion Date of July 7, 2016
Evaluation
Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
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[Table 3] shows the specification for TOE.
MFP Model
X704LX
X706GX
K705LX
K706GX
M5360RX
C4060FX
C4062FX
Color/Mono
Color
Color
Mono
Mono
Mono
Color
Color
PPM
39ppm
59ppm
49ppm
59ppm
53ppm
40ppm
40ppm
Processor
A3000 (1.5GHz)
DDR3
6GB
RAM
ROM
DDR3
4GB
DDR3
3GB
eMMC 4GB
High-Speed USB 3.0 Host,
High-Speed USB 3.0 Peripheral
Interface
High-Speed USB 2.0 Host,
High-Speed USB 2.0 Peripheral,
Ethernet 10/100/1000 Base TX
FAX
ITU-T G3, Super G3, 33.6 Kbps, MH/MR/MMR/JBIG
HDD
SATA2 320 GB
Scanner
Display
(LUI)
General
Spec
DSDF
RADF
Up to
A3 size
Up to
Legal size
10.1” 1024 x 600 WSVGA TFT Color Graphic
LCD with Touch-Screen, 24-bit color
DSDF
Up to
A4 size
Up to
Legal size
7” 800 x 480 WVGA TFT Color Graphic
LCD with Touch-Screen, 24-bit color
[Table 3] General Specification for TOE
3. Security Policy
The TOE complies security policies defined in the ST [4] by security objectives and
security requirements. The TOE provides security features to identify and authenticate
authorized users, to generate audit records of the auditable events, and to securely
manage the TOE functionality and authorized user accounts information.
For more details refer to the ST [4].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational environment
in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed and precise
definition of the assumption refer to the ST [4], chapter 3.3):

The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides
protection from unmanaged access to the physical components and data
interfaces of the TOE.
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
TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization
and are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.

Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organization, are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer’s guidance and
documentation, and to correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with
those policies and procedures.

Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
PP as described for this TOE in the ST. Other functionality included in the product was not
assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality provided by the MFP needs to be
assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness. All
evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that need
clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications of this
evaluation. This evaluation covers only the specific TOE version and MFP models as
identified in this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] and [Figure 3] show the scope of the TOE.
U.USER
Paper Document
Paper Document
Paper Document
PSTN
Flatbed Engine
Printer Engine
Fax Modem
TOE
UI (Operation Panel) Unit
DSDF Engine
UI Control Board
DSDF Control Board
Main Control Board
RIP Controller
FAX Controller
Processor
RAM
FLASH ROM
NVRAM
HDD
Scanner Engine Controller
Printer Engine Controller
Power Unit
U.USER
USB Port
Network Unit
U.USER
Finisher Unit
Optional Tray
Finisher Control Board
Opt. Tray Control Board
Paper Document
Paper
[Figure 2] Physical Structure of MFP
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[Figure 3] Logical boundary of the TOE
The following security functions are provided by the TOE:

Identification & Authentication
The TOE provides two types of user identification and authentication methods. If
U.ADMINISTRATOR configures the local authentication, the MFP will authenticate the
U.USER against an internal database. If U.ADMINISTRATOR selects the external
authentication as an authentication method, then MFP will authenticate the U.USER using
an external authentication server.
U.USER should be identified and authenticated by entering both ID and Password to access
to the TOE management functions. If U.USER fails to login specific times, the system blocks
the session of the U.USER during predefined duration.
U. ADMINISTRATOR can configure Identification & Authentication Policy by using LUI or
RUI.
U. ADMINISTRATOR can also give specific permission for U.USER to only use certain
feature of the machine.
The TOE provides the Common Access Control & TOE Function Access Control based on
the user role assigned to a user group ID by U.ADMINISTRATOR when U.NORMAL
performs read/delete/modify operations on the data owned by U.NORMAL or when
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U.NORMAL accesses print/scan/copy/fax functions offered by the MFP.
The TOE shall terminate an interactive session after predefined time interval of user
inactivity.

Network Access Control
The MFP system has a network interface connected to a network. The MFP system can
send/receive data and MFP configuration information and thus is able to configure MFP
settings.
There are a couple of methods to access and communicate with the MFP from outside of
the TOE through the network, and the TOE manages all incoming packets via a network
interface.
1) Protocol and Port Control:
The TOE can only allow protocols and ports configured by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
U.ADMINISTRATOR can configure this information via the LUI or RUI.
2) IP and MAC address filtering:
U.ADMINISTRATOR can make filtering rules for IP addresses and MAC addresses.
After that, packets are only allowed as per the IP filtering rule registered by
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Packets via MAC addresses registered by U.ADMINISTRATOR are not allowed.

Security Management
The TOE accomplishes security management for the security function, TSF data, and
security attribute.
Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can manage the security functions through the LUI (Local User
Interface) and RUI (Remote User Interface): security functions can be start and stop by
U.ADMINISTRATOR. The LUI is touch-screen based management service which is
provided by TOE. RUI is web-based management service using HTTP/HTTPS protocol.
TSF data and their possible operations are specified by U.ADMINISTRATOR.
Security attributes can be operated by U.ADMINISTRATOR.

Security Audit Data
The TOE creates an audit record security audit event including job log, security event log,
and operation log. The audit data consist of the type of event, date and time of the event,
success or failure, log out and access of log data.
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Only U.ADMINISTRATOR is authorized to view (or export) the audit data but even
U.ADMINISTRATOR shall not delete log data manually.
The TOE protects Security Audit Data stored on the hard disk drive. It prevents any
unauthorized alteration to the Security Audit Data, and when each log events exceeds
the maximum number, the TOE overwrites the oldest stored audit records and generates
an audit record of overwriting.

Image Overwrite
The TOE provides Image Overwrite functions that delete the stored file from the MFP’s
hard disk drive. The Image Overwrite function consists of Automatic Image Overwrite and
Manual Image Overwrite. The TOE implements an Automatic Image Overwrite to
overwrite temporary files created during the copying, printing, faxing and scanning (scan
to e-mail, scan to FTP, and scan to SMB task processes). The image overwrite security
function can also be invoked manually only by U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI.
Once invoked, the Manual Image Overwrite cancels all print and scan jobs, halts the
printer interface (network), overwrites the hard disk according to the procedures set by U.
ADMINISTRATOR. If there are any problems during overwriting, the Manual
Image Overwrite job automatically restarts to overwrite the remaining area.

Data Encryption
The TOE provides an encryption function during the data storage procedure and a
decryption function in the process of accessing stored data from hard disk drive.
The TOE generates cryptographic keys when the TOE is initialized at the first setout the
secret key (256 bits) is used for encrypting and decrypting user data and TSF data that is
stored on the HDD. Access to this key is not allowed to any U.USER including
U.ADMINISTRATOR.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with overwriting a used
cryptographic key with a newly generated cryptographic key. Before storing temporary
data, document data, and system data on the HDD of the MFP, the TOE encrypts the
data using AES 256 algorithm and cryptographic key.
When accessing stored data, the TOE decrypts the data using the same algorithm and
key. Therefore, the TOE protects data from unauthorized reading and falsification even if
the HDD is stolen.
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
Fax Data Control
If the received fax data includes malicious content, it may threaten the TOE asset. To
prevent this kind of threat, the TOE inspects whether the received fax image is
standardized with MMR, MR, or MH of T.4 specification or not before forwarding the
received fax image to e-mail or SMB/FTP. U. ADMINISTRATOR can restrict this
forwarding function. When non-standardized format data are discovered, the TOE
destroys the fax image.

Self Testing
During initial start-up, the TOE performs self test. Self testing executes TSF function to
verify the correct operation of the HDD encryption function. Also, the TOE verifies the
integrity of the encryption key data and TSF executable code by the self testing.

Secure Communication
The TOE also provides secure communication between the TOE and the other trusted IT
product to protect communicated data from modification or disclosure by IPSec. The
network which connected without IPSec shall not be allowed to communicate with MFP.
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier
Version
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062
Series User’s Guide
V1.2
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062
Series Installation Guide
V1.2
[Table 4] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the security services provided by each
TOE component based on the operational environment of the TOE. The developer’s tests
were performed on each distinct operational environment of the TOE (see chapter 1 of
this report for details about operational environment of the TOE).
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The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the assurance
component ATE_COV.1. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI defined in the
functional specification, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as described in the
functional specification.
Therefore, the developer tested all SFRs defined in the ST [4].
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests, and conducted independent testing
listed in ETR [3], based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The evaluator set up
the test configuration and testing environment consistent with the ST [4]. The evaluator
considered the followings when devising a test subset:

TOE security functionality: The TOE is MFPs (Multi-Function Peripherals) as an
IT product. It controls the operation of the entire MFP, including copy, print, scan,
and fax functions on the MFP controller, and

Developer's testing evidence: The evaluator analyzed evaluation deliverables
for ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1, and ATE_IND.2 to understand behavior of the
TOE security functionality and to select the subset of the interfaces to be tested,
and

Balance between evaluator's activities: The targeted evaluation assurance level
is EAL2+, and the evaluator tried to balance time and effort of evaluator's
activities between EAL2+ assurance components.
In addition, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
tests cover privilege check of executable code, bypassing security functionality, invalid
inputs for interfaces, flaws in networking protocol implementation, vulnerability scanning
using commercial tools, disclosure of secrets, and so on. No exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential were found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [3].
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8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062. This
TOE is MFPs (Multi-Function Peripherals) as an IT product. It controls the operation of the
entire MFP, including copy, print, scan, and fax functions on the MFP controller.
The TOE is identified by TOE name and version number including release number. The
TOE identification information is provided via GUI and Report.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 4] were evaluated with
the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [3] which references Single
Evaluation Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports. The
evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance components of
EAL2+.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in a
narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the CC
and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem definition
and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational environment is clearly
defined. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The ST doesn't define any extended component. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned
to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
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consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification describes how the TOE meets each SFR, and it is
consistent with other narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_TSS.1.
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis for
the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The configuration management document describes the method used to uniquely identify
all configuration items. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.2.
The configuration list includes the TOE itself, the evaluation evidence required by the
SARs, and the parts that comprise the TOE. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures that are necessary to maintain
security when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
The flaw remediation procedures are established and they provide for the correctness of
security flaws and for assurance that the corrections introduce no new security flaws.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_FLR.2.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been documented
and result in a secure configuration. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality and
the interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure use
of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates prevention
and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE in
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a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users(e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The security architecture document is structured to ensure that TSF cannot be
compromised or bypassed, and appropriately describes that the TSF which provides the
security domain separates these domains from each other. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The functional specifications specifies the purpose of an interface, method of use, input
and output parameters, actions of an interface, and error messages generated by the TSF
at equal detail level, and accurately and completely describes the TSFI. Therefore, the
verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.2.
The TOE design description provides the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems,
identifies all subsystems of the TSF, describes the behavior of each SFR-supporting or
SFR-non-interfering subsystems, and summarizes the behavior of the SFR-enforcing
subsystems. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.1.
Therefore, the security architecture description(the TSF architecture attribute which
describes how to the TSF security enforcement is not compromised or bypassed),
functional specification(TSF interfaces description) and TOE design description, which are
included in the development documentation, are adequate to give understanding about
how the TSF satisfies the SFRs, and how these SFRs implementation are not damaged or
bypassed.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and the developer's test coverage evidence
shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation and the
TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_COV.1.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
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behaves as specified in the design documentation and had confidence in the developer's
test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore, the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation evidence
(described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable vulnerabilities
by attackers possessing basic attack potential in the operational environment of the TOE.
Therefore, the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.2.
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), don’t allow
attackers possessing less than an enhanced-basic attack potential to violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
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9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Evaluator Action
Evaluator
Class
Component
Elements
Action
Elements
ASE
ALC
AGD
ADV
ASE_INT.1
AVA
Assurance
Component
Class
ASE_INT.1.1E
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E
PASS
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_CCL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_OBJ.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E
PASS
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_REQ.2.1E
PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E
PASS
ALC_CMS.2
ALC_CMS.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.2
ALC_CMC.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DEL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_FLR.2
ALC_FLR.2.1E
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E
PASS
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1.1E
PASS
ADV_TDS.1
ADV_TDS.1.1E
PASS
ADV_TDS.1.2E
PASS
ADV_FSP.2.1E
PASS
ADV_FSP.2.2E
PASS
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2
ATE_IND.2.1E
PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E
PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E
PASS
ATE_COV.1
ATE_COV.1.1E
PASS
AVA_VAN.2
AVA_VAN.2.1E
PASS
AVA_VAN.2.2E
PASS
AVA_VAN.2.3E
PASS
AVA_VAN.2.4E
PASS
ADV_FSP.2
ATE
Assurance
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
[Table 5] Evaluation Result Summary
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10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:

There are possibilities that the data stored on the TOE are exposed to an attacker
in an unauthorized manner if the TOE is carried out of an organization without
deleting the stored file from the MFP’s hard disk drive. Therefore, make sure of
using Manual Image Overwrite function to overwrite the critical and sensitive data
when the TOE is taken out of an organization for repair, replacement, disuse, etc.

All of the external IT entities (User/Administrator’s PC, External storage server,
External authentication server, NTP server, etc.) that communicate with the
TOE over a network should support IPSec protocol that is compatible with the
security policy of the TOE. It should be remembered that all network
communications are not allowed if there is no IPSec channel to securely
communicate with the TOE.

If there are any problems, such as blackout or power failure, during manual
image overwriting, the image overwriting function is terminated remaining the
image overwriting of the memory area uncompleted. Therefore, administrator
should keep in mind that the manual image overwriting function automatically
restarts to overwrite the remaining memory area if the power is supplied again.

Use the TOE function “Login IPv4 Address Protect” to register the allowed
administrator’s IP so that unauthorized access can be blocked.
11. Security Target
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062 Series, Security
Target V1.2, July 1, 2016 [4] is included in this report by reference.
Certification Report
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12. Acronyms and Glossary
CC
Common Criteria
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
LDAP
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MH
Modified Huffman Coding
MMR
Modified
Modified
READ(Relative
Element
Address Designate) coding
MR
Modified
READ(Relative
Element
Address
Designate) coding
OR
Observation Report
PP
Protection Profile
PPM
Pages Per Minute
RFC
Request For Comments
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
Image Overwrite
This is a function to delete all stored files on the
hard disk drive. There are two kinds of image
overwriting: Automatic Image Overwrite and
Manual Image Overwrite
Automatic Image Overwrite
Certification Report
The Automatic Image Overwrite automatically
Page 21
carries out overwriting operations on temporary
image files at the end of each job such as copy,
scan, scan-to-email, scan-to-FTP, or scan-toSMB.
Or
the
Automatic
Image
Overwrite
overwrites the files on the hard disk drive when a
user initiates a delete operation
Manual Image Overwrite
The Manual Image Overwrite function overwrites
all stored files, including image files and preserved
files on the hard disk drive, and the function should
only
be
manually
performed
by
a
U.ADMINISTRATOR through the LUI. The image
data is completely overwritten by using DoD
5220.28-M, DoD 5220.28-M(ECE), Australian
ACSI 33, VSITR(German standard) standard, and
Custom setting methods
Image file
Temporarily stored file that is created during scan,
copy, or fax job processing
LUI, Local User Interface
Interface for U.NORMAL or U.ADMINISTRATOR
to access, use, or manage the MFP directly
RUI, Remote User Interface
Interface for U.NORMAL or U.ADMINISTRATOR
to access, use, or manage the TOE through a web
service
MFP, Multi-Function Printer
MFP
is
a
machine
that
incorporates
the
functionality of multiple devices (copy, print, scan,
or fax) in one.
Certification Report
Page 22
U.ADMINISTRATOR
A User who has been specifically granted the
authority to manage some portion or all of the TOE
and whose actions may affect the TOE security policy.
U.NORMAL
A User who is authorized to perform User
Document Data processing functions of the TOE
U.USER
Any authorized User. There may be two types of
Users: U.NORMAL and U.ADMINISTRATOR.
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3]
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062 Series,
Evaluation Technical Report V1.00, July 7, 2016
[4]
Samsung Multifunction X704, X706, K705, K706, M5360, C4060, C4062 Series,
Security Target V1.2, July 1, 2016
[5]
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std.2600.2™-2009)
Certification Report
Page 23
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