Aeroprakt-22L, Forced Landing

Aeroprakt-22L, Forced Landing
Air Accident Investigation Sector
Accident
- Summary Report AAIS Case No AIFN/0012/2016
Forced Landing
Operator:
Make and Model:
Nationality and Registration:
Place of Occurrence:
State of Occurrence:
Date of Occurrence:
Jazirah Aviation Club
Aeroprakt-22L
The United Arab Emirates, A6-XGG
Al Marjan Island, Ras Al Khaimah
The United Arab Emirates
4 October 2016
Investigation Objective
The Investigation was performed by the Air
Accident Investigation Sector (AAIS) pursuant to
the UAE Federal Act No. 20 of 1991, promulgating
the Civil Aviation Law, Chapter VII- Aircraft
Accidents, Article 48. It is in compliance with the
Civil Aviation Regulations (CARs), Part VI Chapter
3, in conformity with Annex 13 to the convention on
International Civil Aviation, and in adherence to the
Air Accidents and Incidents Investigation Manual.
2.
Unless otherwise mentioned, all times in
the Report are local time (UTC was local
time – (minus) 4h).
3.
Photos and figures used in this Report are
taken from different sources and are
adjusted from the original for the sole
purpose to improve the clarity of the
Report. Modifications to images used in
this Report are limited to cropping,
magnification, file compression, or
enhancement of colour, brightness,
contrast, or addition of text boxes, arrows
or lines.
4.
The structure of this Summary Report is
an adjustment of the Final Report format
depicted in Annex 13. This adjustment is
made to suit the investigation into this
Accident.
The sole objective of this Investigation is to
prevent aircraft accidents and incidents. It is not a
function of the AAIS to apportion blame or
determine liability.
This Summary Report is made public at:
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/epublication/pages/investigationRep
ort.aspx
Investigation Process
The occurrence involved a sport light aircraft
Aroprakt-22L, registration A6-XGG, and was
notified to the AAIS Duty Investigator (DI) by phone
call to the Hotline Number (+971 50 641 4667).
After the Initial/On-Site Investigation phase, the
occurrence was classified as an 'Accident'.
The scope of this Investigation is limited to the
events leading up to the occurrence; no in-depth
analysis
of
non-contributing
factors
was
undertaken.
Notes:
1.
Whenever the following words are
mentioned in this Report with first Capital
letter, they shall mean the following:

(Aircraft)- the aircraft involved in this
accident

(Investigation)- the investigation
into the circumstances of this
accident

(Accident)- this accident referred to
on the title page of this report

(Report)- this accident summary
report

(Pilot)- the pilot of the accident flight

(Club)- Jazirah Aviation
(operator of the aircraft)

(Operations)the
operations
department in the Club.
Club
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
1
Factual Information
History of the Flight
On 4 October 2016, at approximately 1720
United Arab Emirates (UAE) local time (LT), an
Aeroprakt-22L fixed-wing light sport aircraft (LSA),
registration mark A6-XGG, owned by Jazirah
Aviation Club, conducted a pleasure flight in Ras Al
Khaimah area. There were two persons on-board;
the Pilot and a passenger.
Before 1700 LT, the Pilot decided to have a 10
to 15 minute pleasure flight with the passenger. At
approximately 1700 LT, preparation for the flight,
which involved cleaning the windshield, checking
the engine oil, refuelling, and pre-flight checks were
performed. The Pilot also reviewed the weather
forecast (METAR1) for OMRK2 which was printed
and available in the Club Operations Office. OMRJ3
had no facility providing weather forecast.
At approximately 1720, the Aircraft took off from
OMRJ runway 34. Since OMRJ is an uncontrolled
airspace aerodrome, the Pilot broadcast his
intention during the takeoff.
After approximately 10 minutes flying time, the
Club contacted the Pilot requesting him return to
the aerodrome and land the Aircraft as soon as
possible because the weather was changing. While
the Aircraft was in the Al Hamra area on its return
to OMRJ, the Club Operations requested the
Aircraft position, and requested the Pilot to expedite
the landing. The Pilot provided his position and
stated that he would expedite the landing. Runway
28 was given for the landing by the Operations.
When the Aircraft was flying about 2.8
kilometers (km) (1.5 nautical miles) north of OMRJ,
the Operations asked whether the Pilot had the
runway in sight, and he replied “negative”. The Pilot
stated that the weather front was moving towards
the Aircraft, and that visibility was less than 1 km.
The Pilot decided to approach closer to the
aerodrome in an attempt to identify a familiar
landmark and to use this reference to see the
runway and land.
1
Meteorological Terminal Air Report (METAR) is a format
for reporting aviation routine weather information of
aerodromes. The information is normally given hourly
(current weather observation)
As the Aircraft approached the aerodrome, the
Pilot was unable to identify a landmark or see the
runway. The Pilot stated that there were a
considerable number of electric power lines
surrounding OMRJ. Therefore, when the Aircraft
was approximately at 400-500 feet above ground
level (AGL), he decided not to descend further, and
he called the Operations advising that he would
divert and land the Aircraft at Marjan Island, since
he was aware that there were many open areas.
The reported wind obtained from the
Operations was between 280 and 160 degrees.
When the Aircraft was flying over Marjan Island,
the Pilot performed one orbit looking for the landing
site. He identified a sandy area where car tire marks
were visible, and he decided to land at that location.
He estimated that the length of the selected location
was sufficient for the landing.
After deciding on the landing site, the Pilot flew
the Aircraft on a right downwind. The Pilot
maintained the downwind as he identified electrical
pylons on the approach path of the final leg and he
considered these to be obstacles. After flying a long
downwind leg, the Pilot performed a right turn to
base leg and the flaps were set to the first position,
and then he continued the right turn to the final leg.
In the approach on final, the Aircraft flew over
the electrical pylons and the glide path was then
increased to bring the Aircraft onto the touchdown
point as planned by the Pilot. During the approach,
the Aircraft experienced a headwind and a small
crosswind component. The wind speed was
between 15 and 20 knots, as estimated by the Pilot.
On landing, the Aircraft was on a heading of
approximately 310 degrees, the airspeed was
about 100 km per hour. The landing was
uneventful. As the Aircraft decelerated on the
landing roll, the Pilot realized that there was a ditch
in front of the Aircraft, and that the Aircraft would
not stop before reaching the ditch. Preparing for the
impact with the ditch the Pilot ensured that he and
2
ICAO Code for Ras Al Khaimah International Airport
3
ICAO Code for Al Jazirah Airport
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
2
the passenger were properly restrained by the
harness and that they had positioned themselves
with their backs supported by the seatbacks.
There were two ditches in front of the Aircraft
as shown in figure 1. The Aircraft entered the first
ditch which had a depth of about 80 centimeters,
and it then continued into the second ditch which
had a depth of approximately 130 centimeters.
Figure 3. Off-field landing site (↑ first ditch, ↑ second
ditch)
Figure 4 shows the area of OMRJ aerodrome
and the selected off-field landing site.
Figure 1. Ditches (↑ first ditch, ↑ second ditch)
As the Aircraft entered the second ditch, it
turned over slowly and came to rest in an upsidedown position, as shown in figures 1 and 2.
Figure 4. OMRJ and the off-field landing site
The Accident occurred approximately 15
minutes before the sunset.
Figure 2. Aircraft final position
There were no injuries to the Pilot or passenger.
The distance between the touchdown point and
the point where the Aircraft came to rest was
approximately 177 meters, as shown in figure 3.
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
3
Damage to Aircraft and Property
Meteorological Information
As a result of the occurrence, the Aircraft was
damaged beyond repair.
The weather information used for OMRJ was
the METAR for OMRK. The OMRK METAR over
the period 1700 and 1800 LT (1300 and 1400
UTC) on 4 October 2016 is given in table 1.
There was no damage to property, or the
environment.
Personnel Information
The Pilot had a fixed wing ultralight/microlight
pilot permit from the Club, with permission to carry
a passenger. The permit had a two-year validation
expiring on 9 June 2017.
Aircraft Information
The Aircraft was an AEROPRAKT-22L (A22L) light sport aircraft, and the serial number was
220. The Aircraft was manufactured in 2007 by
Aeroprakt, Ukraine. The time since new was 95.5
hours.
The AEROPRAKT-22L (A-22L) is a two-seat,
high-wing strut braced monoplane of "classic"
aerodynamic layout with a closed cockpit, nonretractable landing gear with a nose wheel. The
Aircraft was powered by a Rotax-912 engine with
a tractor three-blade adjustable pitch propeller
located in the nose of the fuselage.
Table 1. METAR and the description
OMRK 041400Z 20016KT 2000 BLDU FEW040
28/20 Q1008 A2977
Time
1400 UTC
Wind
200 degrees / 16 Knots
Visibility
2,000 meters
Clouds
Few (1-2 oktas) at 4,000
feet
Air Temperature
28 degrees Celsius
Dew Point
20 degrees Celsius
Pressure (Altimeter)
1008 millibar / 29.77 inch
of mercury
Condition
Blowing widespread dust
OMRK 041340Z 19020KT 1000 BLDU FEW040
29/19 Q1008 A2977
Time
1340 UTC
Wind
190 degrees / 20 Knots
Visibility
1,000 meters
Clouds
Few (1-2 oktas) at 4,000
feet
Air Temperature
29 degrees Celsius
Dew Point
19 degrees Celsius
Pressure (Altimeter)
1008 millibar / 29.77 inch
of mercury
According to the Flight Manual, the stall speed
of the Aircraft with flaps set to the second position
at maximum take-off weight, and with the engine
at idle is equal to 60 km per hour. With the flaps in
the first position the stall speed is 65 km per hour,
and with retracted the flaps retracted the stall
speed is 70 km/h. The wind limitation of the aircraft
is 10 meters/second (19.5 knots) for a headwind,
and 4 meters/second (7.8 knots) for a crosswind.
It is not recommended to extend the flaps with a
headwind of more than 8 meters per second (15.6
knots).
Condition
Blowing widespread dust
According to the Flight Manual, after entering
into the final approach, the throttle is set to idle and
the descent is flown at a speed of 90-100 km/h.
When windshear is expected, the approach must
be performed at a speed of 100 km per hour
minimum.
The installed engine serial number was
5848828. The time since new of the installed
engine was 95.5 hours.
The records of airframe and engine
maintenance and inspection provided to the
Investigation showed no technical defects prior to
the Accident, nor any mechanical anomaly prior to
take-off.
OMRK 041300Z 17004KT 9999 FEW040 32/17
Q1006 A2972
Time
1300 UTC
Wind
170 degrees / 4 Knots
Visibility
10 kilometers or more
Clouds
Few (1-2 oktas) at 4,000
feet
Air Temperature
32 degrees Celsius
Dew Point
17 degrees Celsius
Pressure (Altimeter)
1006 millibar / 29.72 inch
of mercury
Condition
---
Sunset time was at 1800 LT.
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
4
Aerodrome Information
OMRJ is a private aerodrome operated by the
Jazirah Aviation Club and it is located near Al
Jazirah Al Hamra, Ras Al Khaimah. The
aerodrome has two runways, Runway 16/34 and
10/28.
Organizational and Management
Information
Operations Approval
Jazirah Aviation Club was authorized to
operate its aircraft only within the approved area
as mentioned in the GCAA Operating Approval
Reference number 24960/1257 dated 18
December 2000.
The approved area was within tangents joining
circles of three nautical miles centered on Jazira
Al Hamra and Saqr Field aerodromes, and to the
north and north-east of northern boundary of Ras
Al Khaimah Control Zone extended to the East
until UAE-Oman border, but excluding Ras Al
Khaimah Control Zone.
The approved vertical limitation was from the
surface to 1,400 feet above ground level (AGL).
The Club had a total of 65 light sport aircraft,
of which five 5 aircraft belonged to the Club, and
the rest belonged to individuals. All the aircraft
were A6-registered.
Under
paragraph
3.3,
the
requirements for weather minima are
given, as follows:
“No flight shall be conducted:



Particular attention should be given to the
sections dealing with hazards such as:


“Pilots in command may carry
passengers in two place aircraft subject
to the CFI‘s approval and subject to the
limitations
of
their
license.
Nevertheless, permission to carry a
passenger in an aircraft may be withheld
any time at the discretion of the Chief
Flight Instructor or his delegate. …“
Section 3 of the Manual prescribes the route
requirements for its activities. Under paragraph
3.2, the requirements for flight planning including
checking the weather are given, as follows:
“… Check the weather actual reports
and forecasts are above the club
minima for all stages of the flight
(weather minima are included further
on in this Section). …”
Turbulence
Downdrafts.”
Under paragraph 3.7, the requirements for offfield landing are given, as follows:
“A precautionary landing at a nonprepared site may be performed at pilot’s
discretion in order to avoid unexpected
weather, in case of severe illness of the
pilot or a passenger, or if technical
defects are suspected, for example
sudden and severe rotor vibrations.


Operations Manual
Section 1 of the Club’s Operations Manual
prescribes the general operations requirements
for the Club’s activities. Under paragraph 1.12, the
requirements for carriage of passengers are given,
as follows:
If the visibility is below 5KM and
the cloud base is below 1500
FEET.
If the wind conditions seem to
exceed 35 Km/h.
If weather warning has been
issued on the METAR/TAF for
the day.


Select a suitable landing site from
safe altitude, considering slope,
wind speed and direction.
Fly a reconnaissance pattern to
check for obstacles, especially
power lines, wires, and cables in
the approach and go-around path
Overfly the landing site to check
for obstructions such as fences,
ditches,
rocks,
height
of
vegetation, and select most
suitable touch-down zone.
Perform a normal approach and
touch-down into wind with minimal
ground speed.”
Regulatory oversight of the Club was a
responsibility of the UAE GCAA.
Additional Information
UAE Civil Aviation Requirements
Part II, Chapter 10 of the UAE Civil Aviation
Regulations – Light Sports Aviation Activities
(LSA), prescribes the requirements for light sport
aircraft activities. A pilot is permitted to carry
passenger which is in accordance with Article (5)
and) of UAE CAR Part II Chapter 10 – Conditions
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
5
for Flying Club Approval, and its guidance material
(GM) to Article (5).
Analysis
Preparation of the Flight
Inspection of the general condition of the
Aircraft was performed during the pre-flight check
which was in accordance with the Club’s
Operations Manual. The Pilot stated that he also
checked the weather (METAR from OMRK),
however, most probably he considered that he
would not encounter the weather since he planned
to perform the takeoff at 1720 LT and would have
a flight duration of only 15 minutes.
Based on the METAR, a reduction of visibility
to 1,000 meters and blowing widespread dust
were expected at 1740 LT, and in fact the Pilot
experienced the reduced visibility down to less
than 1,000 meters due to widespread blowing
dust.
As mentioned in the Operations Manual, no
flight shall be conducted if a weather warning has
been issued on the METAR/TAF4 for the day. In
this case, since there was a weather warning, the
Pilot should not have performed the flight.
The Pilot stated that, after 10 minutes in the
air, he received a call from the Club’s Operations
asking him to return to base as soon as possible
because the weather was changing. Most
probably, the weather had started to change at
about 1730 LT, which was 10 minutes ahead of the
forecast, as given by the METAR. The
Investigation found that the Pilot believed that the
change in the weather would not occur during the
flight.
Diversion and Forced Landing
The diversion decision was made after the
Pilot had attempted to land at OMRJ. However, he
was not able to return to OMRJ due to poor
visibility, and he decided to perform an off-field
landing (diversion) at Marjan Island.
When selecting the landing site in Marjan
Island, the Pilot performed the following required
actions: He flew the Aircraft from a safe altitude
4
Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is a format for
reporting aviation routine weather information of
while selecting the landing site; After the Pilot
recognized car tire marks at a site, he decided to
select that landing site with the assumption that
the surface at that site would be firm enough to
support the Aircraft; Then, the Pilot checked for
obstacles such as power lines, poles, etc. There
was a row of electrical pylons on the final approach
path which caused him to extend the downwind leg
before he turned the Aircraft onto base leg, so that
the Aircraft would have a longer distance on the
final approach in which to adjust the approach
path.
Although it was windy, and the visibility was
limited, the landing was uneventful until the time
when the Pilot was surprised by the first ditch. The
Investigation believes that the Aircraft was already
close to the edge of the first ditch when the Pilot
realized that there was a ditch in the selected
landing area. The Pilot did not use maximum brake
to stop the Aircraft before it reached the first ditch.
Since the landing site was a sandy area, even
had the surface been firm enough, the Pilot, most
probably, considered that the use of maximum
braking should be avoided as this might have put
a heavy load on the nose wheel and might have
cause the nose wheel to dig in, and lead to the
Aircraft turning over. Had this condition occurred,
it might have led to worse consequences than
those that actually happened.
The Investigation believes that the forced
landing at Marjan Island was rushed as the time
was close to sunset and the weather was changing
to windy conditions and poor visibility. Because of
these challenging conditions, the Pilot, most
probably, did not overfly the landing site, and as a
result, he did not notice the ditches. The distance
from OMRJ to the off-field landing site was about
5 km, and the Investigation believes that the
weather at the landing site may have had better
visibility, but apart from this, the weather at the
landing site was little different than that at OMRJ.
The Aircraft Flight Manual specifies a speed of
between 90 and 100 km per hour for descent on
final approach. The stall speed was 65 km per
hour with first position flap setting.
The Pilot stated that the Aircraft touched the
ground at approximately 100 km per hour. If the
Pilot slowed the Aircraft to 90 km per hour in the
aerodromes. The information is normally given every six
hours (predicted weather in the near future)
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
6
descent on final, and reduced the speed on the
final approach before touchdown, but to not less
than 81 km per hour (1.3 times the stall speed), the
Aircraft may have stopped before the edge of the
first ditch. However, since the weather was windy,
which was not in Pilot’s favor, he chose a speed of
100 km hour for, most probably, expected
recovery from any windshear effects.
The headwind speed was between 15 and 20
knots on the final approach as estimated by the
Pilot. The Pilot set the flaps to the first position for
the landing, which was not recommended
according to the Flight Manual. Although the flap
setting used was not a contributing factor to the
Accident, the Investigation recommends that the
Club ensures its pilots strengthen their knowledge
of the limitations of the aircraft they fly.
Had the Pilot not been subjected to time
pressure, and had he overflown the landing site in
accordance with the Club’s procedure, he may
have identified the ditches and consequently
chose a different off-field landing site.
Considering the evidence and the resulting
analysis, the Investigation believes that the Pilot
selected an undesirable off-field landing site,
which resulted in a shorter available clear landing
distance than that actually required.
No evidence was provided to the Investigation
indicating that the Pilot was suffering from fatigue,
or any physical or psychological effect that could
have contributed to the Accident.
There were no abnormalities of the flight
controls, steering or brake systems prior to the
Accident.
Conclusions
Findings
(a) The Aircraft was certificated, equipped and
maintained in accordance with the existing
requirements of the Civil Aviation Regulations
of the United Arab Emirates.
(b) The Aircraft was airworthy when it was
prepared for the flight before the Accident.
(c) The Pilot did not expect that the forecast
weather change would occur during the flight.
(d) The Pilot was not able to return to the
departure airport due to widespread dust and
poor visibility, consequently he decided to
carry out off-field forced landing at Marjan
Island.
(e) The forced landing was rushed as the weather
was becoming windy with poor visibility, and
sunset was approaching.
(f) The Pilot performed a precautionary off-field
landing actions, but he did not overfly the
landing site.
(g) The Pilot did not observe two ditches in the
selected landing area.
(h) The landing was uneventful until the Pilot was
surprised by the first ditch.
(i) The Pilot did not apply maximum braking to
stop the Aircraft before reaching the first ditch
because of his consideration that the nose
wheel would dig into the sand causing Aircraft
turn over.
(j) The Aircraft continued its landing roll and
entered the second ditch where it turned over
slowly and came to rest in an upside-down
position.
(k) Neither the Pilot nor the passenger sustained
injury.
(l) The Aircraft was damaged beyond repair.
(m) The Pilot was not suffering from fatigue or any
physical or psychological effect that could
have contributed to the Accident.
Causes
The Air Accident Investigation Sector
determines that the cause of the Accident was the
decision of the Pilot to conduct a flight in adverse
weather conditions that was not in accordance
with the published limitations of the Operations
Manual.
Contributing Factors
The Air Accident Investigation Sector
determines that contributing factor to the Accident
was the inappropriate selection of the off-field
landing site as the Pilot did not carry out the
required overflight site exploration due to time
pressure as the weather conditions were rapidly
changing and sunset was approaching.
Accordingly, the Pilot was unable to identify
ditches located in the selected forced landing area,
which added to the severity of the Accident in
terms of Aircraft damage.
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
7
Safety Recommendations
The Air Accident
recommends that:
Investigation
Sector
Jazirah Aviation ClubSR01/2017
Ensures
adherence
to
weather
minima
procedures by all pilots, as required in the
Operations Manual.
SR02/2017
Ensures adherence to the precautionary off-field
landing actions procedures by all pilots, as
required in the Operations Manual.
SR03/2017
Ensures that all pilots have the full knowledge of
the limitations of the aircraft they fly in accordance
with the Manufacturers’ Flight Manual.
The General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) of
the United Arab EmiratesSR04/2017
Evaluates the flight operations culture of the
Jazirah Aviation Club pilot body, especially
regarding adherence to basic aircraft operating
instructions.
This Report is issued by:
Air Accident Investigation Sector
General Civil Aviation Authority
The United Arab Emirates
Fax:
+971 2 4491 599
Email:
aai@gcaa.gov.ae
Website: www.gcaa.gov.ae
Accident Investigation Summary Report № AIFN/0012/2016, issued on 25 January 2017
8
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