GOV.UK Guidance End User Devices Security Guidance: Apple iOS 8 Published Contents 1. Changes since previous guidance 2. Usage scenario 3. Summary of platform security 4. How the platform can best satisfy the security recommendations 5. Network architecture 6. Deployment process 7. Provisioning steps 8. Policy recommendations 9. Enterprise considerations This guidance is applicable to devices running iOS 8.0. This guidance was developed following testing performed on iPhone 5S device running iOS 8.0. 1. Changes since previous guidance This document is an update of the previous iOS 7 guidance to cover iOS 8. Some changes to the recommended configuration have been made to take account of new features and changed behaviours in the platform. iOS 8 introduces a number of updates which have particular security considerations. However, these can be effectively managed using techniques highlighted previously in iOS 7. Deployments which followed the previous iOS 7 guidance can update the configuration of those devices to ensure that when the devices are updated to iOS 8, the alwayson VPN will automatically connect. It will be necessary to update the supporting infrastructure to make use of the new IKEv2 alwayson VPN. There are several benefits to adopting the new iOS 8 alwayson VPN: Users cannot disable the device VPN, lowering the risk of data being transmitted outside the VPN. The VPN does not disconnect when the screen is locked, permitting push notifications for email and incoming Voice over IP calls to work. Local WiFi traffic cannot transit outside the VPN (unless explicitly permitted), lowering the risk of compromise on a hostile WiFi network. If you have previously decided a carrierprovided Access Point Name (APN) is required to mitigate certain risks then nearly all of those risks will be mitigated by using the alwayson VPN, allowing the APN to be removed from the architecture. The previous iOS 7 (and below) approach to the VPN can still be used in iOS 8, though the risks associated with the previous approach must be considered if this option is taken. 2. Usage scenario iOS devices will be used remotely over 3G, 4G and noncaptive WiFi networks to enable a variety of remote working approaches such as: accessing OFFICIAL email reviewing and commenting on OFFICIAL documents accessing the OFFICIAL intranet resources, the Internet and other webresources To support these scenarios, the following architectural choices are recommended: All data should be routed over the native IKEv2 alwayson enterprise VPN to ensure the Confidentiality and Integrity of the traffic, and to allow the devices and data on them to be protected by enterprise protective monitoring solutions. Arbitrary thirdparty application installation by users is not permitted on the device. An enterprise application catalogue should be used to distribute inhouse applications and suitable assessed thirdparty applications. CESG guidance on thirdparty application development for iOS can be used to assist with this process. 3. Summary of platform security This platform has been assessed against each of the twelve security recommendations, and that assessment is shown in the table below. Explanatory text indicates that there is something related to that recommendation that the risk owners should be aware of. Rows marked [!] represent a more significant risk. See How the platform can best satisfy the security recommendations for more details about how each of the security recommendations is met. Recommendation Rationale 1. Assured data intransit protection The builtin VPN has not been independently assured to Foundation Grade, and no suitable thirdparty products exist. 2. Assured data atrest protection iOS data protection has not been independently assured to Foundation Grade. Only applications which opt to use the relevant Data Protection APIs on iOS will have their sensitive information protected when locked (rather than powered off). 3. Authentication 4. Secure boot 5. Platform integrity and application sandboxing App groups can be used by developers to allow their applications access to a shared storage container, shared preferences and shared keychain. Sensitive data generated within one application may potentially be accessible to another if those applications are part of an app group. Application whitelisting can help mitigate this. 6. Application whitelisting Not all classes of application extension respect managed to unmanaged application restrictions (e.g. a sharing extension may allow PDF documents to be shared from the managed email app to an unmanaged sharing provider app). Administrators should pay particular attention to the extensions installed by whitelisted applications, to ensure that managed documents are not able to be trivially shared outside of managed applications. 7. Malicious code detection and prevention 8. Security policy enforcement Policy settings applied through Apple Configurator cannot be overridden (when using recommended security settings). However, MDM profiles can be removed by the user. The MDM APIs offer a limited set of controls. 9. External interface protection Radio interfaces such as WiFi and Bluetooth cannot be controlled by policy. 10. Device update policy 11. Event collection for enterprise analysis [!] There is no facility for collecting logs remotely from a device, and collecting forensic log information from a device is very difficult. 12. Incident response iOS devices can be remotely locked, wiped, and reconfigured by their MDM. 3.1 Significant risks The following key risks should be read and understood before the platform is deployed. The VPN has not been independently assured to Foundation Grade. Without assurance in the VPN there is a risk that data transiting from the device could be compromised. iOS data protection has not been independently assured to Foundation Grade. However, CESG has previously determined that the level of protection is commensurate with Foundation Grade for applications that use Data Protection APIs to protect data when the device is locked. Applications can choose classes of data encryption on a perfile basis. By default, only a limited number of files remain encrypted whilst the device is locked, including email and attachments (within the mail app), managed books and location data. Files belonging to other applications may not be encrypted when the device is locked, and could be extracted without knowledge of the password using a vulnerability in the platform. Thirdparty applications are automatically optedin to the encryption class which protects their data when the device is in a powered off state (but not when locked). Developers can then choose whether to optout of this encryption entirely, or optin to the highest encryption class (encrypted when locked). Custom keyboards should not be deployed via MDM. Keyboards deployed via MDM are considered managed and can then be used within other managed applications such as the mail app. If the user allows “full access” to the keyboard extension (which may be required for its correct operation), it is then not restricted from logging and sending keystrokes to external servers. Collection of events for enterprise analysis is limited, meaning protective monitoring and forensic analysis following any compromise may be much more difficult than on other platforms. There are no policy controls available to restrict the external interfaces a user can enable, meaning that external interfaces may be accidentally or deliberately enabled by the enduser. Enabling external interfaces means increasing the exposed attack surface, and data could be inadvertently or maliciously leaked without enterprise visibility. Procedural controls must be used to achieve some of the requirements where no technical controls could be used, which means that users have to be trusted not to alter certain settings on the device, or perform actions which may impact the security of the device. These controls are discussed in later sections. 4. How the platform can best satisfy the security recommendations This section details the platform security mechanisms which best address each of the security recommendations. 4.1 Assured dataintransit protection iOS 8 provides a new native IKEv2 VPN client which can be configured in an ‘Always On’ mode to guarantee all traffic is routed through the organisational infrastructure for inspection. The native IKEv2 VPN client should be used until a Foundation Grade VPN client for this platform becomes available. 4.2 Assured dataatrest protection iOS data protection is enabled by default. The Mail application uses Data Protection APIs to encrypt emails and attachments when the device is locked. By default, this level of protection also extends to location data and app launch images. Thirdparty developers can also request this protection class to gain the benefit of the technology. 4.3 Authentication The user should use a strong 7 character password to authenticate themselves to the device. This password unlocks a key which encrypts certificates and other credentials, giving access to enterprise services. 4.4 Secure boot This requirement is met by the platform without additional configuration. 4.5 Platform integrity and application sandboxing This requirement is met by the platform without additional configuration. A new feature of iOS 8 is that applications may install extensions. Although extensions allow applications to share data and provide extended functionality to each other, they are sandboxed in the same manner as other applications. 4.6 Application whitelisting An enterprise application catalogue can be established to permit users access to an approved list of inhouse applications. If the App Store is enabled, the MDM can be used to monitor which applications a user has installed. Extensions (a new feature of iOS 8) are installed along with a containing application, and cannot be installed alone. It is therefore possible to apply application whitelisting rules that target these applications in order to restrict extensions. Administrators must be fully aware of the extensions installed by their whitelisted applications, to ensure that they do not introduce unexpected methods for sharing data outside of managed applications. It is not currently possible to define granular rules that block extensions, but permit the containing application (beyond implementation of managed / unmanaged application boundaries). 4.7 Malicious code detection and prevention The enterprise app catalogue should only contain inhouse applications and thirdparty applications which have been approved by an administrator. Contentbased attacks can be filtered by scanning on the email server. 4.8 Security policy enforcement Settings applied through Apple Configurator can be configured such that they cannot be removed by the user. Policy applied through an MDM can be removed completely by an end user through removal of the Remote Management profile. However, this will also remove any data stored as part of accounts configured through MDM (e.g. email and credentials). When configuring an MDM, it should be configured such that (i) arbitary devices cannot be enrolled, (ii) end users are prevented from reenrolling. Users should not be allowed to directly reenrol, as it may be possible for the user to affect the security of the device by: (i) removing the MDM profile, (ii) modifying the ondevice configuration options, (iii) reenrolling the device through a self service portal. It is recommended that email accounts are provisioned via MDM, as only email accounts provisioned via MDM will operate correctly with restrictions to disallow opening documents in unmanaged applications (Managed Open In). 4.9 External interface protection The USB interface is used by Configurator to put the device into supervised mode, and to install configuration profiles. No technical controls exist to prevent users from enabling WiFi and Bluetooth. 4.10 Device update policy Users are free to update applications and firmware when they wish, though the enterprise can block this at the proxy server if desired. In addition, an MDM can be used to monitor the iOS versions currently installed and access could be revoked if necessary. 4.11 Event collection for enterprise analysis iOS does not support remote or local historic event collection. Limited information regarding device state can be retrieved from the device. The features may depend on the MDM. 4.12 Incident response iOS devices can be locked, wiped, and configured remotely by their MDM. 5. Network architecture All remote or mobile working scenarios should use a typical remote access architecture based on the Walled Garden Architectural Pattern. The following network diagram describes the recommended architecture for this platform. Recommended network architecture for deployment of iOS 8 A Mobile Device Management server is required. Apple’s OS X Server with Profile Manager is sufficient for this purpose. Alternatively, thirdparty products exist which may offer additional functionality over and above Profile Manager. 6. Deployment process The steps below should be followed to prepare the enterprise infrastructure for hosting a deployment of these devices: 1. Deploy OS X 10.9.5+ and install iTunes 11.4(18)+ and Apple Configurator 1.6(445)+ onto a dedicated provisioning terminal. 2. Procure, deploy and configure other network components, including an approved IPsec VPN Gateway. 3. Set up the MDM and create policies for users and groups in accordance with the settings later in this section. 7. Provisioning steps The steps below should be followed to provision each end user device onto the enterprise network to prepare it for distribution to end users: 1. For devices with Touch ID, the feature should be disabled (as MDM only “locks” the setting to its current value rather than turning it off). 2. Use Configurator to supervise the iOS devices (this is necessary for the “supervised only” restrictions enforced via the MDM to be effective). 3. Enrol the devices into the MDM deployed earlier and install the predefined configuration profile. 4. Apply any additional required security controls by using the Restrictions menu locally on the device. 8. Policy recommendations This section details important security policy settings which are recommended for an iOS deployment. Other settings (e.g. server address) should be chosen according to the relevant network configuration. 8.1 Configurator settings These settings should be applied to the device by creating profiles in the Configurator utility. Configuration Rule Configuration Setting General Group Security (user can remove profile) Never Automatically Remove Profile Never Supervision On Allow devices to connect to other Macs No The Global HTTP Proxy settings should also be set to match your particular network configuration for when the device is connected to the VPN. 8.2 MDM settings These settings should be applied to the device by creating profiles on the MDM server. Passcode Group Allow simple value No Require alphanumeric value Yes Minimum passcode length 7 (characters) Minimum number of complex characters 1 Maximum passcode age 90 (days) Maximum AutoLock 5 (minutes) Passcode history 8 Maximum grace period for device lock 5 (minutes) Maximum number of failed attempts 5 Security & Privacy Privacy: Allow sending diagnostic and usage data to Apple, and sharing crash data and statistics with app developers No Restrictions Group Allow installing apps No Allow screenshots No Allow installing configuration profiles (supervised devices only) No Allow iCloud backup No Allow iCloud documents & data No Allow iCloud keychain No Allow iCloud photo sharing No NEW: Allow backup of enterprise books No NEW: Allow managed apps to store data in iCloud No NEW: Allow Handoff No NEW: Allow notes and highlights sync for enterprise books No Force encrypted backups Yes Allow users to accept untrusted TLS certificates No Allow Siri whilst device is locked No Allow modifying account settings (supervised devices only) No Allow documents from managed sources in unmanaged destinations No Allow sending diagnostic and usage data to Apple No Allow AirDrop (supervised devices only) No Allow Touch ID to unlock device No Show Control Center in Lock screen No Show Today view in Lock screen No NEW: Allow Internet results in spotlight No Show notification center in lock screen No If you are using Profile Manager, you should ensure that the option to sign configuration profiles is selected. Other MDMs may have a similar option which should be selected. 8.3 Ondevice notifications menu To prevent sensitive data appearing on the lock screen, the following settings should be set on each device. Configuration Rule Recommended Setting Messages Show Previews Disabled Mail Show Previews Disabled 8.4 Ondevice restrictions menu These settings should be set on each device. Configuration Rule Recommended Setting Contacts Don’t allow changes Enabled Calendars Don’t allow changes Enabled Photos Don’t allow changes As per organisational policy Share My Location Don’t allow changes Enabled Bluetooth Sharing Don’t allow changes Enabled Allowing changes to these restrictions will allow applications on the device to request access to the named data store. Any that are not required should be disabled. To make the provisioning steps less onerous, the risks mitigated by these settings could also be met in other ways. Contacts, Calendars, Photos and Bluetooth permissions are only risky if thirdparty applications which use these permissions are installed on the device. Some users’ locations may not be sensitive, in which case having Location Services enabled is not necessary. In these scenarios, the use of the above restrictons settings is not necessary. 8.5 VPN profile The deployed VPN solution should be configured to negotiate the following parameters. Not all of these settings can be configured on the device so the configuration needs to also be enforced from the VPN server. Module / Algorithm Type Algorithm Details ESP Encryption AES128 IKEv2 Encryption AES128 in CBC PsuedoRandomFunction PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256 Diffie Hellman Group 14 (2048 bits) Integrity HMAC_SHA2_256_128 Note that for an iOS device to verify the VPN server certificate, the certificate must have an alternate subject name entry that matches the common name. Further information on the supported server configurations can be found at http://help.apple.com/deployment/ios/ 9. Enterprise considerations The following points are in addition to the common enterprise considerations, and contain specific issues for iOS deployments. 9.1 App Store applications The configuration given above prevents users from accessing the App Store to install applications, but an organisation can still host its own Enterprise App Catalogue to distribute applications to their employees if required. 9.2 Cloud integration As with iOS 7 previously, iOS devices do not need to be associated with an Apple ID to operate as required within an enterprise. For example, it is still possible to receive push notifications, and to install enterprise applications without associating to an account. However, an Apple ID is required to obtain applications from the App Store, and to use certain other ondevice services. If an Apple ID is used to enable iCloud services on the device, then documents and other sensitive data may be inadvertently synchronised with iCloud. As a mitigation, organisations who wish to prevent this should implement controls to prevent users from enabling unneeded iCloud services on their device, thereby preventing enterprise data from being synchronised with Apple servers. 9.3 App groups Apps and extensions that are produced by the same developer can potentially share content when configured as part of an ‘app group’. Sensitive application data could therefore be made available to another application on the device, potentially being shared from managed to unmanaged applications. Third party applications should be reviewed to identify membership of an app group, and appropriate whitelisting should be applied where necessary. 9.4 Unmarked email domains A new feature in iOS 8, “unmarked” email domains can now be configured. When a user is composing an email using the system email client, any email address entered which does not match the configured domains will be highlighted (marked) in red. Administrators should consider using this functionality, to warn users who may be inadvertently attempting to send sensitive information to untrusted email addresses. 9.5 Managed Safari web domains In iOS 8 a list of domains can now be configured that the device will treat as “managed” in the Safari web browser. Using Safari, documents downloaded from these domains are then subject to Managed Open In rules and should not be accessible to unmanaged applications. Configuring these domains can help to stop sensitive documents from being trivially shared to other applications. Legal information This guidance is issued by CESG, the UK's National Technical Authority on Information Assurance. One of the roles of CESG is to provide advice to UK government entities and organisations providing services to UK government. The guidance found here is provided and intended for use by this audience. It is provided 'asis' as an example of how specific requirements could be met. It should be used to help inform risk management decisions on the use of the products described, but it should not be used for procurement decisions; it is not intended to be exhaustive, it does not act as an endorsement of any particular product or technology, and it is not tailored to individual needs. It is not a replacement for independent, specialist advice. Users should ensure that they take appropriate technical and legal advice in using this and other guidance published by CESG. This guidance is provided without any warranty of any kind, whether express or implied. It is provided without any representation as to the accuracy, completeness, integrity, content, quality, or fitness for purpose of all or any part of it. CESG cannot, then, accept any liability whatsoever for any loss or damage suffered or any costs incurred by any person as a result of, or arising from, either the disclosure of this guidance to you, or your subsequent use of it. This guidance is UK Crown Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
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