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SECURITY SAGE’S
Guide
to
Hardening the
Network Infrastructure
Steven Andrés
Brian Kenyon
Foreword by
Erik Pace Birkholz
Series Editor
Jody Marc Cohn
Nate Johnson
Justin Dolly
Syngress Publishing, Inc., the author(s), and any person or firm involved in the writing, editing,
or production (collectively “Makers”) of this book (“the Work”) do not guarantee or warrant
the results to be obtained from the Work.
There is no guarantee of any kind, expressed or implied, regarding the Work or its contents.
The Work is sold AS IS and WITHOUT WARRANTY.You may have other legal rights,
which vary from state to state.
In no event will Makers be liable to you for damages, including any loss of profits, lost savings,
or other incidental or consequential damages arising out from the Work or its contents. Because
some states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for consequential or incidental
damages, the above limitation may not apply to you.
You should always use reasonable care, including backup and other appropriate precautions,
when working with computers, networks, data, and files.
Syngress Media®, Syngress®, “Career Advancement Through Skill Enhancement®,” “Ask the
Author UPDATE®,” and “Hack Proofing®,” are registered trademarks of Syngress Publishing,
Inc. “Syngress:The Definition of a Serious Security Library”™, “Mission Critical™,” and “The
Only Way to Stop a Hacker is to Think Like One™” are trademarks of Syngress Publishing,
Inc. Brands and product names mentioned in this book are trademarks or service marks of their
respective companies.
KEY
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
SERIAL NUMBER
KLBR4D87NF
829KM8NJH2
JOY723E3E3
67MCHHH798
CVPL3GH398
V5T5T53455
HJJE5768NK
2987KGHUIN
6P5SDJT77Y
I295T6TGHN
PUBLISHED BY
Syngress Publishing, Inc.
800 Hingham Street
Rockland, MA 02370
Security Sage’s Guide to Hardening the Network Infrastructure
Copyright © 2004 by Syngress Publishing, Inc. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States
of America. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication
may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or
retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher, with the exception that
the program listings may be entered, stored, and executed in a computer system, but they may
not be reproduced for publication.
Printed in the United States of America
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
ISBN: 1-931836-01-9
Series Editor: Erik Pace Birkholz
Technical Editor: Justin Dolly
Page Layout and Art: Patricia Lupien
Cover Designer: Michael Kavish
Copy Editor: Beth Roberts
Indexer: Nara Wood
Distributed by O’Reilly & Associates in the United States and Jaguar Book Group in Canada.
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge the following people for their kindness and support in
making this book possible.
Ping Look and Jeff Moss of Black Hat for their invaluable insight into the world of com­
puter security and their support of the Syngress publishing program.
Syngress books are now distributed in the United States by O’Reilly & Associates, Inc.The
enthusiasm and work ethic at ORA is incredible and we would like to thank everyone
there for their time and efforts to bring Syngress books to market:Tim O’Reilly, Laura
Baldwin, Mark Brokering, Mike Leonard, Donna Selenko, Bonnie Sheehan, Cindy Davis,
Grant Kikkert, Opol Matsutaro, Lynn Schwartz, Steve Hazelwood, Mark Wilson, Rick
Brown, Leslie Becker, Jill Lothrop,Tim Hinton, Kyle Hart, Sara Winge, C. J. Rayhill, Peter
Pardo, Leslie Crandell, Valerie Dow, Regina Aggio, Pascal Honscher, Preston Paull, Susan
Thompson, Bruce Stewart, Laura Schmier, Sue Willing, Mark Jacobsen, Betsy Waliszewski,
Dawn Mann, Cindy Wetterlund, Kathryn Barrett, and to all the others who work with us.
A thumbs up to Rob Bullington for all his help of late.
The incredibly hard working team at Elsevier Science, including Jonathan Bunkell, Ian
Seager, Duncan Enright, David Burton, Rosanna Ramacciotti, Robert Fairbrother, Miguel
Sanchez, Klaus Beran, Emma Wyatt, Rosie Moss, Chris Hossack, and Krista Leppiko, for
making certain that our vision remains worldwide in scope.
David Buckland, Daniel Loh, Marie Chieng, Lucy Chong, Leslie Lim, Audrey Gan, Pang
Ai Hua, and Joseph Chan of STP Distributors for the enthusiasm with which they receive
our books.
Kwon Sung June at Acorn Publishing for his support.
Jackie Gross, Gayle Voycey, Alexia Penny, Anik Robitaille, Craig Siddall, Iolanda Miller, Jane
Mackay, and Marie Skelly at Jackie Gross & Associates for all their help and enthusiasm
representing our product in Canada.
Lois Fraser, Connie McMenemy, Shannon Russell, and the rest of the great folks at Jaguar
Book Group for their help with distribution of Syngress books in Canada.
David Scott,Tricia Wilden, Marilla Burgess, Annette Scott, Geoff Ebbs, Hedley Partis, Bec
Lowe, Andrew Swaffer, Stephen O’Donoghue and Mark Langley of Woodslane for dis­
tributing our books throughout Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Fiji Tonga,
Solomon Islands, and the Cook Islands.
Winston Lim of Global Publishing for his help and support with distribution of Syngress
books in the Philippines.
v
Authors
Steven Andrés (CISSP, CCNP, CNE, MCSE, CCSP, CCSE,
INFOSEC), is the Director of Technical Operations at Foundstone,
Inc., a leading information security software and services firm based
in Southern California. He principally manages the infrastructure
and ensures the confidentiality of sensitive client data within the
Foundstone Managed Service. Steven is the co-inventor of the
award-winning FS1000 Appliance, and in his role as Chief Architect,
he continues to lead the development and innovation of the entire
Foundstone Appliance product line. Additionally, as Manager of
Product Fulfillment, Steven oversees all aspects of product licensing
and electronic distribution of software and periodic threat intelli­
gence updates to customers and worldwide partners.
Prior to Foundstone, Steven designed secure networks for the
managed hosting division of the largest, private Tier-1 Internet
Service Provider in the nation. In previous employment, he man­
aged the largest fully-switched Ethernet network in the nation,
encompassing over a dozen buildings in a campus-wide connectivity
solution. Steven has nine years of experience managing high-availability networks in the Entertainment, Health Care, Financial, and
Higher Education industries, and is frequently invited to speak on
security issues and provide insight for webcasts on newly announced
vulnerabilities.
His other works include the best-selling Hacking Exposed: Network
Security Secrets & Solutions, Fourth Edition (ISBN 0-072227-42-7) as
well as a contributing author for Special Ops: Network and Host Security
for Microsoft, Oracle and UNIX (Syngress Publishing, ISBN 1-93183669-8). Steven has earned the Certified Information Systems Security
Professional (CISSP) designation, as well as vendor certifications such
as the Cisco Certified Network Professional (CCNP), Novell
Certified Netware Engineer (CNE), Microsoft Certified Systems
Engineer (MCSE-2000), Cisco Certified Security Professional
(CCSP), Checkpoint Certified Security Engineer (CCSE), Nokia
vii
Security Administrator, and was awarded the INFOSEC Professional
designation, jointly-issued by the U.S. National Security Agency
(NSA) and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS).
Steven earned a Bachelor of the Arts degree from the University of
California, Los Angeles (UCLA).
Brian Kenyon (CCNA, MCSE) is the Director of Product
Services for Foundstone, Inc., a leading information security soft­
ware and services firm based in Southern California. Foundstone
offers a unique combination of software, hardware, professional ser­
vices, and education to continuously and measurably protect an
organization’s most important assets from the most critical threats.
Since joining Foundstone in 2001, the company has leveraged
Brian’s deep domain expertise across a variety of functional areas
including professional services, hardware innovation and software
development. Brian is the Chief Architect of Foundstone’s Security
Operations Center, which monitors vulnerabilities at client sites, and
has been integral in designing and developing Foundstone’s cuttingedge hardware solutions, including the award-winning and highly
acclaimed FS1000. Brian is also responsible for the development and
expansion of the company’s entire Product Service line—a key
strategic growth area for the company. Brian is considered to be an
industry expert on vulnerability management best practices and is
frequently invited to speak and train.
Prior to Foundstone, Brian specialized in designing and securing
large e-commerce infrastructures for two technology start-ups. Over
the course of his ten-year IT career, Brian has consulted for a
number of firms providing architecture insight and project planning
services. Brian is a contributing author on network architecture for
Special Ops: Network and Host Security for Microsoft, Oracle and UNIX
(Syngress Publishing, ISBN: 1-931836-69-8) and frequently hosts
popular webcasts across a wide range of network security topics.
Brian holds a Bachelor of the Arts degree from Loyola Marymount
University.
viii
Contributors
Jody Marc Cohn (CNE, CCNA) currently works as a network
engineer for a private consulting company. During his 18 years in
information technology, he has installed and maintained cuttingedge networks based on Ethernet,Token Ring, ATM, FDDI, and
CDDI technologies. Prior to consulting, he worked for the
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), helping to maintain
what was currently the largest switched Ethernet network in the
world. From there, he moved to network administration for a pre­
mier network switch manufacturer, and then worked as the IT
Manager for the leading Health & Fitness publisher. Jody has a
Bachelor of Arts degree from UCLA.
Nathan Johnson (MCSE) is a founder and CTO of RIS
Technology Inc. (www.ristech.net), an Internet application hosting
company focused on custom hosting and managed services. RIS
Technology offers its customers an inclusive package of ultra-high
quality data center space, top-tier Internet connectivity, redundant
network infrastructure, and managed security and systems adminis­
trative services. RIS Technology hosts high traffic websites for clients
like the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences who put
on the Grammy Awards as well as complicated Internet applications
like business networking site ZeroDegrees.com.
Nate has deep technical experience with designing high avail­
ability network infrastructures. In his 10-year career in IT, Nate has
designed and implemented the internal network infrastructure for
corporations and financial institutions, as well as the Internet net­
work architectures for many large e-commerce sites and ISPs. Nate
holds a degree in Computer Science from the University of
California, Riverside
ix
Matt Wagenknecht (CISSP, MCSE, MCP+I) is a Senior Security
Administrator with Quantum Corporation. He is key contributor to
a team responsible for incident response, intrusion detection, vulner­
ability assessment, penetration audits, and firewall management for
Quantum’s global infrastructure. His specialties include Microsoft
Windows security, intrusion detection, forensics, network trou­
bleshooting, Virtual Private Network architecture and design, and
firewall architecture and design.
Matt lives in Colorado with his wife, Janelle, and his children,
Kiersten, Amber, Hunter, and Dylan. Matt is passionate about secu­
rity, but passion alone did not write his contribution to this book.
Without support and encouragement from his wife, his kids would
have overtaken him and driven him to hours of therapy. Janelle,
thanks for supporting him in everything he does and for keeping
the kids at bay. Kids, thanks for the chaos and for reminding him
what’s important.
Technical Editor
Justin Dolly is the Information Security Officer at Macromedia. In
this role, Justin has global responsibility for ensuring the security and
integrity of information, infrastructure, and intellectual property at
Macromedia.
He is also heavily involved with product security, risk manage­
ment, audit compliance, and business continuity planning initiatives.
He is a founding member of SecMet, the Security Metrics
Consortium (http://www.secmet.org), a non-vendor and industryneutral group of security executives. SecMet’s goal is to seek to
empower security professionals with the ability to continually measure
their organization’s security posture by defining real-world, standard­
ized metrics. Previously, Justin held a variety of technical and engi­
neering positions at Wells Fargo Bank. He has nine years experience
in network engineering and design; infrastructure, information and
Web security. Justin holds a Bachelor of Arts degree from the National
University of Ireland and Le Mirail-Toulouse, France.
x
Series Editor
Erik Pace Birkholz (CISSP, MCSE) is a Principal Consultant for
Foundstone, and the founder of Special Ops Security
(www.SpecialOpsSecurity.com), an elite force of tactical and strategic
security luminaries around the globe. He is the author of the best-selling
book, Special Ops: Host and Network Security for Microsoft, UNIX and Oracle
(Syngress, ISBN: 1-931836-69-8). He is also a contributing author of SQL
Server Security and on four of the six books in the international best-selling
Hacking Exposed series. He can be contacted directly at
[email protected]
Erik is a subject matter expert in information assurance with the
Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC). IATAC is a
Department of Defense entity that belongs to the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC).Throughout his career, he has presented
hacking methodologies and techniques to members of major United
States government agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
National Security Agency, and various branches of the Department of
Defense. He has presented at three Black Hat Windows Security Briefings,
SANS Institute, Microsoft, WCSF, RSA, and TISC. Before accepting the
role of Principal Consultant at Foundstone, he served as the West Coast
Assessment Lead for Internet Security Systems (ISS), a Senior Consultant
for Ernst & Young’s National Attack and Penetration team and a
Consultant for KPMG’s Information Risk Management group.
In 2002, Erik was invited by Microsoft to present Hacking
Exposed: Live to over 500 Windows developers at their corporate
headquarters in Redmond. Later that year, he was invited to present
Hacking NT Exposed to over 3000 Microsoft employees from
around the globe at the 2002 Microsoft Global Briefings. Evaluated
against over 500 presentations by over 9,500 attendees, his presenta­
tion was rated first place. Based on that success, he was a VIP
Speaker at the Microsoft MEC 2002 conference. In 2003, Erik was
awarded “Best Speaker” for his presentation of Special Ops:The Art
of Attack and Penetration at the 6th Annual West Coast Security
xi
Forum (WCSF) in Vancouver, Canada. In 2004, Erik is scheduled to
speak at RSA, the Black Hat Briefings, ISACA, and for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Erik holds a Bachelor’s of Science degree in Computer Science
from Dickinson College in Carlisle, PA. In 1999, he was named a
Metzger Conway Fellow, an annual award presented to a distin­
guished Dickinson alumnus who has achieved excellence in his or
her field of study.
xii
Contents
Foreword
xxv
Chapter 1 Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
Introduction
Internal versus External Segments
Explaining the External Segment or Perimeter Segment
Wireless Access Points: Extending the Perimeter
The Internal Segment Explained
Assigning Criticality to Internal Segments
Footprinting: Finding the IP Addresses Assigned to Your Company
Using whois to Understand Who You Are
Using DNS Interrogation for More Information
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
7
7
9
12
13
13
14
14
15
Chapter 2 Assessing Your Current Networks
Introduction
Monitoring Traffic
Sniffing
Network Sniffing Basics
Sniffing Challenges
The Sniffers
Sniffing the Air
Counting the Counters
17
18
19
19
20
20
24
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35
1
2
2
3
3
4
5
xiii
xiv
Contents
Network Device Counters
SNMP Counters
Windows 2000 Performance Monitor
Looking at Logical Layouts
Get on the Bus
Bus Topology
Ring Topology
Mesh Topology
Network Mapping 1-2-3
Vulnerability Assessment Tools
Mapping-Only Tools
Performing Security Audits
Vulnerability Assessment
Local Application
Free Tools
Managed Vulnerability Assessment
Remediation
Delegate Tasks
Patch Management
Follow-Up
Examining the Physical Security
Who’s Knocking on Your NOC?
More Is Better
Stay Current with Your Electrical Current
Extra Ports Equal Extra Headaches
Default Disabled
Conference Room DMZ
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
35
37
37
39
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42
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75
Contents
Chapter 3 Selecting the Correct Firewall
Introduction
Understanding Firewall Basics
Seal of Approval
Security Rules
Hardware or Software
Administrative Interfaces
Traffic Interfaces
DMZ Interfaces
Need for Speed
Additional Interfaces
Logging
Optional Features
Network Address Translation and Port Address Translation
Advanced Routing
Point to Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE)
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Client and Server
Virtual Private Networks
Clustering and High Availability
URL Filtering, Content Filtering, and Antivirus Protection
Exploring Stateful Packet Firewalls
What Is a Stateless Firewall?
Keeping Track of Conversations
Too Much Chatter
Stateful Failover
Explaining Proxy-Based Firewalls
Gophers
Modernization:The Evolution of Gophers
Explaining Packet Layers: An Analogy
Chips n’ Salsa
Cheddar, American, Swiss, or Jack?
Mild or Extra Spicy?
Employee Monitoring
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xv
xvi
Contents
Examining Various Firewall Vendors
3Com Corporation and SonicWALL, Inc.
Check Point Software Technologies
Cisco Systems, Inc.
CyberGuard
Microsoft ISA Server
NetScreen
Novell
Secure Computing
Stonesoft, Inc.
Symantec Corporation
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
Chapter 4 Firewall Manipulation: Attacks
and Defenses
Introduction
Firewall Attack Methods
Attacking for Information
Denial-of-Service Attacks
Remote Firewall Compromise
Check Point Software Attacks and Solutions
VPN-1/SecureClient ISAKMP Buffer Overflow
Attacking Check Point VPN with Certificates
Tools for Attacking Check Point’s VPN
Mitigation for Check Point VPN
Check Point SecuRemote Internal Address Disclosure
Check Point’s IP Disclosure
Tools for Exploiting Check Point’s VPN
Defending against Internal IP Address Disclosure
Cisco PIX Attacks and Solutions
Cisco PIX SNMPv3 Denial of Service
109
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113
113
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135
135
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136
137
Contents
Using SNMPv3 to Crash a PIX
SNMPv3 Tools and Uses
Defending against SNMPv3 Denial-of-Service Exploits
Cisco PIX SSH Denial of Service
Using SSH to Crash a PIX
SSH Tools for Crashing the PIX
Defending against SSH Denial-of-Service Exploits
Microsoft ISA Server Attacks and Solutions
ISA Server Web Proxy Denial of Service
Using Web Requests to Crash ISA Server
Web Proxy Tools for Crashing the ISA Server
Defending against Web Proxy Exploits
ISA Server UDP Flood Denial of Service
Using UDP Floods to Crash ISA Server
UDP Floods Tools against ISA Server
ISA Server UDP Flood Defenses
NetScreen Firewall Attacks and Mitigations
NetScreen Management and TCP Option Denial of Service
Manipulating TCP Options to Crash ScreenOS
Registry Tweaks for TCP Options to Crash ScreenOS
Defending ScreenOS against the TCP Option DoS
NetScreen Remote Reboot Denial of Service
Manipulating the WebUI to Crash ScreenOS
Crafting the Long Username to Crash ScreenOS
Defending ScreenOS against the Invalid Usernames
Novell BorderManager Attacks and Solutions
Novell BorderManager IP/IPX Gateway Denial of Service
Attacking the IP/IPX Gateway
Tools for Attacking the IP/IPX Gateway
Defending against the IP/IPX Gateway DoS
Checklist
Summary
137
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xvii
xviii
Contents
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
156
158
159
160
Chapter 5 Routing Devices and Protocols
163
Introduction
164
Understanding the Roles of Routers on Your Network
165
Understanding the Roles of Routers on Perimeter Segments
167
Examining the Roles of Routers on Internal Segments 168
Securing Your Routers
170
Examining Possible Attacks on Your Routers
171
Locking Down Your Routers
172
Keeping Your Routers Physically Safe
172
Preventing Login Access to Your Routers
173
Means of Accessing Your Router
174
Configuring Access Controls
175
Configuring Logging and Auditing on Your Routers 177
Controlling What Your Routers Do
178
Disabling Unnecessary Router Services and Features 178
Access Control Lists and Packet Filtering
180
Securing Network Protocols
181
Maintaining Your Routers for Optimal Security
181
Performing Configuration Storage
181
Keeping Up with Operating System Updates
182
IP Routing Devices
184
IP Routers
184
Looking at Additional Router Functionality
186
Routing Switches and Load Balancers
187
Considering Security for Network Switches and Load Balancers
190
Routing at the Operating System and Application Level 190
IP Routing Protocols
191
Routing Information Protocol
192
How RIP Works
192
Securing RIP
195
Contents
When to Use RIP
Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
How IGRP Works
Securing IGRP
When to Use IGRP
Enhanced IGRP
How EIGRP Works
Securing EIGRP
When to Use EIGRP
RIPv2
How RIPv2 Works
Securing RIPv2
When to Use RIPv2
Open Shortest Path First
How OSPF Works
Securing OSPF
When to Use OSPF
BGP v4
How BGPv4 Works
Securing BGPv4
When to Use BGPv4
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
Chapter 6 Secure Network Management
Introduction
Network Management and Security Principles
Knowing What You Have
Controlling Access Vectors
Console
Shoulder-Surf
Local Subnet
Local Network
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xix
xx
Contents
Wireless
Dial-Up Modem Virtual Private Networks Internet
Malicious Outbound Plan for the Unexpected Back Up Your Management,Too Watch Your Back Authentication
Authorization
Encryption
Management Networks IPSec and VPNs IPSec Modes and Protocols IPSec Configuration Examples Windows 2000 Server Windows Server 2003 Cisco IOS Routers Network Management Tools and Uses Big Brother Big Sister MRTG
Paessler PRTG IPsentry
SolarWinds Orion IPSwitch WhatsUp Gold Cisco Systems CiscoWorks Computer Associates Unicenter Microsoft Systems Management Server
Hewlett-Packard OpenView
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
228
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265
265
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267
Contents
Chapter 7 Network Switching
Introduction
Understanding the Open Systems Interconnect Reference Model
The Seven Layers
The Physical Link Layer: Layer 1
The Data Link Layer: Layer 2
The Network Layer: Layer 3
The Transport Layer: Layer 4
The Origin of Switching
Hubs
Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Detection
Bridging
And Then Came the Switch
Evaluating Switching Standards and Features
Which Switch Type Is Right for Me?
Cut-Through Switches
Store-and-Forward Switches
Combination/Other Switches
Evaluating the Physical Footprint
Stackable Switches
Chassis Switches
Network Speed
Distance Limitations
Duplex Mode
Spanning Tree Protocol
Content Addressable Memory
Backplane and Switching Fabric
Optional Features
Switch Management
Virtual Local Area Networks
Port Aggregation
Moving Switching beyond Layer 2
Understanding the Need for Layer 3 Switching
Routing
Layer 3 Switching in Action
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xxi
xxii
Contents
Full Routing
304
Route Once, Switch Many
304
Layer 3 Switching and VLANs
304
Understanding Multilayer Switching
305
Using Switching to Improve Security
306
Patching the Switch
306
Securing Unused Ports
308
Adding Passwords to the Switch
308
Port Mirroring
308
Remote Management
309
Remote Monitoring
310
Simple Network Management Protocol
310
Other Protocols
311
Setting the Time
312
Using VLANs for Security
312
Using Multilayer Switching (MLS) for Security
312
Choosing the Right Switch
313
Understanding the Layers of the Campus Network
313
Access Layer
313
Distribution Layer
313
Core Layer
314
The “Grab Bag”
314
Assessing Your Needs
314
Mapping the Campus
314
Understanding the Data
315
Assembling the Pieces
315
Single-Floor Office Building with a Central Server Room and Wiring Closet
315
Multifloor, Multibuilding Campus with Distributed Wiring Closets
316
Living in the Real World
317
Checklist
322
Summary
324
Solutions Fast Track
326
Links to Sites
328
Mailing Lists
329
Frequently Asked Questions
330
Contents
Chapter 8 Defending Routers and Switches
Introduction
Attacking and Defending Your Network Devices
Cisco IPv4 Denial of Service
Exploiting the IPv4 DoS
Defending Your Router against the IPv4 DoS
Cisco HTTP Get Buffer Overflow and UDP Memory Disclosure
Exploiting 2-for-1
Defending against the HTTP and UDP Vulnerabilities (Cisco Renatus Est)
Cisco Discovery Protocol Denial of Service
Exploiting the CDP Denial of Service
Preventing CDP Attacks
Confusing the Enemy
MAC Flooding
Flooding the CAM Tables
Preventing the CAM Flood
ARP Spoofing
Tools and Their Use
Defending against ARP Spoofing Techniques
Breaking Out of Jail
VLAN Jumping
Hop through VLANs in a Single Leap
Building a Stronger Wall around VLANs
Attacking Simple Network Management Protocol
Sniffing the Management… Protocol
Defending against Inherent SNMP Weaknesses
Vulnerability Chaining
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
333
334
336
337
338
339
340
342
342
343
344
344
345
345
346
347
347
349
350
351
352
353
353
354
355
360
361
362
363
363
366
366
367
xxiii
xxiv
Contents
Chapter 9 Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems 369
Introduction
370
Understanding Intrusion Detection and Prevention Basics 371
Intrusion Detection System Sensors
373
Intrusion Prevention System Sensors
377
How Did We Get Here?
378
Where Are We Now?
379
Comparing IDS/IPS Vendors
381
Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems
381
Snort
382
Sourcefire
385
Cisco
386
eEye
387
Internet Security Systems
387
Network Associates
389
Sana Security
394
Symantec
395
TippingPoint
397
Application-Level Firewalls
399
eEye
401
Hogwash
402
KaVaDo
403
NetContinuum
404
Sanctum
405
Teros
407
Whale Communications
409
Honeypots/Honeynets
410
ForeScout
410
Honeyd
413
Sebek
414
Tarpits
414
ipt_TARPIT, an IPTables Patch
415
LaBrea
416
Subverting an IDS/IPS
416
Port Hopping
417
Fragmenting
417
Contents
Summary
Checklists
Solutions Fast Track Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
419
419
421
421
423
424
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design 427
Introduction
428
Looking at Design Principles
428
Selecting and Deploying Firewalls
430
Placing Firewalls for Maximum Effect
431
Determining the Right Type of Firewall for Your Perimeter Network Design
432
Including IDSs and IPSs in Your Design
436
Where Is an IDS Most Effective?
437
Creating Network Segments
437
Securing Your Perimeter Network with VLANs and Routers with Access Control Lists
438
Segmenting Using DMZ Networks and Service Networks
439
Designing an Internet Access Network
440
What to Consider when Designing Internet Access Networks
440
Designing the Logical and Physical Networks
442
Designing Internet Application Networks
445
What to Consider when Designing Internet Application Networks
445
Logical and Physical Network Design
447
Designing VPN and Remote Access Termination Networks
449
What to Consider when Designing Remote Access Termination Networks
449
Logical and Physical Network Design
451
Checklist
452
Summary
453
Solutions Fast Track
456
xxv
xxvi
Contents
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
458
458
459
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
Introduction
Design Principles and Examples
Firewall Placement and Selection
Perimeter Placement
Internal Placement
IDS Placement
Host Intrusion Detection System Placement
Network Intrusion Detection System Placement
Proper Segmentation
Access Control Lists, Routers, and Layer 3 Switches
Use of DMZs and Service Networks
Configuring the Hosts
Configuring the DMZ and Service Network
Configuring the Firewall for the DMZ and Service
Network
Checklist
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Links to Sites
Mailing Lists
Frequently Asked Questions
461
462
462
464
464
468
470
471
474
479
482
486
487
488
490
490
492
493
494
495
496
Index
499
Foreword
When I created the book Special Ops: Host and Network Security for Microsoft,
UNIX and Oracle, I attempted to include a chapter to cover each common yet
critical component of a corporate network. More specifically, I coined the
phrase internal network security; which was really just an asset-centric approach to
securing your hosts and networks from the inside-out. After the release of
Special Ops it became clear (to Syngress and me) that some of the topics cov­
ered in Special Ops warranted an entire book.To satisfy this need, we have cre­
ated the exciting new series entitled: Security Sage’s Guides.
Security Sage’s Guide to Hardening the Network Infrastructure is the first book in
this series; concentrating on the bottom OSI layers that provide a solid founda­
tion to any sound security posture.The next book in the series is Security Sage’s
Guide to Attacking and Defending Windows Server 2003.This book will give
readers the practical knowledge they need to defend their resources from both
a management and operational level using Microsoft’s new Windows Server
2003. In Hacking Exposed I stated, “The majority of my (security) concerns, in
most cases, are not a result of poor products but products being implemented
poorly.”The Security Sage’s Guides aim to deliver you the information you need
to fight host and network negligence.
Drawing from their extensive real world experiences and showcasing their
successes as well as their failures, Steven Andrés and Brian Kenyon provide the
reader with a comprehensive tactical and strategic guide to securing the core of
the network infrastructure.This book details how to attack, defend and securely
deploy routers, firewalls, switches, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and the
network protocols that utilize them.The goal was to create a readable and
usable book that would empower its readers to mitigate risk by reducing attack
vectors, remediation of known vulnerabilities, and segmenting critical assets
from known threats. Security Sage’s Guide to Hardening the Network Infrastructure is
xxvii
xxviii
Foreword
an indispensable reference for anyone responsible for the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of critical business data.
UNIX or Windows? Apache or IIS? Oracle or MySQL? . . .Regardless of
where you draw your political line, you need a solid foundation to communi­
cate securely and reliably with your corporation’s networks, servers, and users.
Network infrastructure is the foundation and underlying base of all organiza­
tions. Unless you were blessed by the Network Fairy, it is likely you are faced
with supporting, securing, and monitoring an infrastructure designed for
usability rather than security. Shifting this network paradigm is not a simple
task; expect heavy resistance from users and administrators while reducing their
usability to increase their security.
A great network doesn’t just happen—but a bad one does. Some
of the worst network designs have reared their ugly heads
because of a lack of forethought as to how the network should
ultimately look. Instead, someone said, ‘Get these machines on
the network as cheaply and quickly as possible.’
—Chapter 11 “Internal Network Design”
On January 28th 1986, a similar mentality cost America the lives of seven
pioneers when the space shuttle Challenger exploded just 73 seconds into its
mission.The real tragedy was that the whole thing was avoidable; the potential
for cold temperature O-ring failure was a known vulnerability.The engineers at
Thiokol issued a written recommendation advising against a shuttle launch in
temperatures below 53 degrees Fahrenheit. Some would argue it was a break
down in the communication process that held these facts from the final deci­
sion makers, but others point to the fact that the previous three launch cancel­
lations had severely damaged the image and publicity of the whole event; in
turn affecting potential future funding of NASA.Whatever the case, the tem­
perature on January 28th was a shivery 36 degrees and usability won out at the
cost of security.
Over the past two years, network based worms opened the eyes of execu­
tives in boardrooms around the globe. From management’s perspective; the
security of a corporate network can exist in two states; working and not working.
When business operations halt due to a security issue, management is forced to
re-assess the funds and resources they allocated to ensure they are adequately
protecting their critical host and network based operations. In this case, wealthy
corporations won’t hesitate to throw money at the problem of security;
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Foreword
xxix
expecting to find a panacea in the industry’s newest security solution.
Alternatively, corporations concerned with ROI and TCO for IT investments
would be better served to empower their InfoSec staff; Asking them to assess
their current network architecture and rearchitect low cost yet secure solutions
that keep the corporate packets moving securely, day after day.
The good news is that everyone is finally thinking about security; now is
our time to execute. Security Sage’s Guide to Hardening the Network Infrastructure is
dedicated to delivering the most up-to-date network layer attacks and mitiga­
tion techniques across a wide assortment of vendors, and not just the typical
attention paid to market leaders such as Cisco and Checkpoint (although these
are obviously covered in great detail).This expanded breadth will help reach a
wider range of network engineers who may not have the budget to purchase
and install best-of-breed hardware, but want to know how to make the most
out of what they do have.
In the early parts of my career I worked as a young auditor for two of the
Big 5 accounting firms. I assisted the audit teams by reviewing the effectiveness
of information security controls as part of the larger General Control Reviews
(GCR). Large client after large client, I found the state of InfoSec controls was
worse than I could have imagined.
I would find critical choke routers protecting the financial servers, and was
able to gain complete control of the router with default SNMP community
strings of private. This little oversight allowed me to download or modify router
configurations and access control lists. Frequently, financial servers were running
on Windows and were therefore part of an NT Domain. After a cursory assess­
ment of the PDC or BDC, I would find Domain Admin accounts with weak or
blank passwords. I developed quite a talent for divining privileged windows
accounts with poor passwords. As an all-powerful Domain Admin, I connected
directly to the financial servers with the ability to view, modify or delete crit­
ical corporate data. Finally, I can’t count how many poor Solaris boxes running
an Oracle database were easily compromised because the administrator didn’t
bother to change the password for the Oracle user account. Our running joke
was something about how all you needed to know to hack UNIX was
oracle:oracle.
After each engagement I would carefully document my findings and deliver
them as draft to my manager or the regional partner for inclusion in the audit
report.What a joke. Did my ineffective security control findings cause the
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xxx
Foreword
auditors to take a closer look at the integrity of this data the controls were
failing to protect? Not even close, the information was “adjusted” up the line
before it ever saw a genuine audit report. How bad was it? Let’s just say that no
matter how many high risk or critical vulnerabilities I uncovered, the end result
communicated to the audit team and eventually the customer was always effec­
tive internal controls.
New SEC legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley will force infrastructure
accountability by requiring management to report on the effectiveness of their
corporate internal controls over financial data and systems. Hopefully, the days
of ineffective control “adjustments” will dwindle once executives are account­
able for the disclosure and integrity of these controls. Just maybe this new
found accountability will force companies to create, review, implement and
enforce effective corporate security policies and procedures supported by
securely architected network infrastructures. If it does and you have read this
book; executing on your infrastructure initiatives should be a snap.
—Erik Pace Birkholz, CISSP
Series Editor
Foundstone Inc. & Special Ops Security
Author of Special Ops: Host and Network Security for Microsoft, UNIX and Oracle
Co-author of SQL Server Security and Hacking Exposed
www.syngress.com
Chapter 1
Defining
Perimeter and
Internal Segments
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Internal versus External Segments
■
Footprinting: Finding the IP Addresses
Assigned to Your Company
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 2 Assessing Your Current Network
■
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Frequently Asked Questions
1
2
Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
Introduction
With the proliferation of wireless access points (WAPs), virtual private networks
(VPNs), and extranets, it’s becoming increasingly difficult to determine where
your network begins and ends. Add this complexity to common economic fac­
tors, such as company mergers and acquisitions, and now you have a tangled web
of interconnected segments and networks that you will need to understand.
While this book aims at providing you the necessary tools to protect your net­
work infrastructure assets, it is imperative that before we dive into the details you
have a good understanding of how your network is designed.
Having a commanding knowledge of your network topology today is no
simple feat. We are often reminded of a financial services company at which we
performed some consulting work.This company has grown over the past few
years by acquiring related financial companies. At the end of the day, this team of
network engineers had to manage over 300 Frame Relay lines, over 100
Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 domains, and numerous Internet access points
(IAPs).To add insult to injury, these networks are not static environments; in fact,
there are numerous routing changes and firewall modifications made on a daily
basis.The only saving grace this team of dedicated foot soldiers has are solid
topology diagrams detailing each Frame Relay network and IAP, and a compre­
hensive list of all of their outwardly facing IP addresses.
While these tools sound like networking basics, we are constantly surprised at
the number of IT departments that are without this information. Without
knowing how your network is laid out, or understanding which segments touch
the Internet directly, it will be nearly impossible for you to begin locking down
your network devices. If you are not armed with these tools already, this chapter
will help you find your external IP address presence and help you get a handle
on understanding the differences between your core network segments and those
that lie on your perimeter. Chapter 2, “Assessing Your Current Network,” will
help provide you with those all-important topology maps if you aren’t fortunate
enough to have them in your toolbox already. Furthermore, the end goal of this
chapter is to arrive at common language that can be easily understood, and used
throughout the entirety of the book.
Internal versus External Segments
Most of the time it might be quite simple to define your network segments as
internal or external, core or perimeter; in larger, more heterogeneous
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
organizations, this is not an easy task. Corporate acquisitions, multiple Internet
service providers (ISPs), and remote offices offer areas of complexity that might
result in some uncertainty as to which network is connected and where it leads.
The following section will help you define and piece together those segments
that will lead to a better understanding of your network topology.
Explaining the External
Segment or Perimeter Segment
Simply defined, an external, or perimeter segment, is any network that exists in a
low security zone of your environment. In other words, any network that connects
your physical environment to another untrusted network, such as the Internet. A
good example could be a network that is attached to the external interface of your
firewall and connects to the external interface of you ISP’s router. In this scenario,
the network is untrusted from the standpoint of your organization because it is
ultimately controlled by the ISP.
This definition could extend to other network segments as well, such as a
demilitarized zone (DMZ) that houses and provides Web or application services to
other untrusted networks. In many cases, this type of network would be considered
external, or on the perimeter, since many of those services map directly to external
or public IP addresses.This class of service would still fit in our description because
the firewall is passing certain types of untrusted traffic to that DMZ network; thus,
you cannot always guarantee the safety of those devices from Internet traffic.
If you begin to think about your network from the perspective of a potential
attacker on the Internet, the definition of the external segment will become
clearer. An untrusted Internet attacker will only have access to devices or services
that are directly connected to the Internet. With this in mind, you now have a
clear picture of what we would consider a perimeter network or device. Does it
serve content to the Internet? Can anyone PING or connect to the device?
Wireless Access Points: Extending the Perimeter
As wireless technology has matured over the years, so has its acceptance in cor­
porate America. More and more, companies are turning to wireless technology to
extend usability to employees and management. While this increase in usability
can drive efficiency in the workplace, it also adds risk to the IT department that
is working to protect the corporate assets.
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4
Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
Without diving into too much detail on how WAPs work, each device emits
a radio frequency (RF) that is used to pass network communication and proto­
cols. Many of these devices have a substantial range, meaning that people who are
physically located far from the access point will still be able to communicate with
it. Additionally, in many companies these WAPs are located on internal segments,
providing connectivity to corporate mail servers, payrolls servers, intranet sites,
and potentially users’ desktops.
The inherent risk from these devices comes from that fact that they might not
be properly secured. Unsecured WAPs provide a gateway into the internal network
for untrusted users. Potential attackers could take advantage of misconfigurations or
lax security policies on these devices and begin to communicate on your internal
network. Because of the increased range capabilities of these devices, the untrusted
user might be walking by your building, sitting in your parking lot, or on a dif­
ferent floor in your office building. Regardless of the user’s location, this unsecured
device just opened the door to your internal network.
So, how do WAPs extend the perimeter? If you recall our basic definition of
an external segment (providing services or connectivity to an untrusted network
or user), this technology falls into that scenario.This device could potentially
allow an untrusted user with no privilege access to your company’s internal assets
and resources, thereby extending the perimeter onto your internal segments.
What’s worse is that any type of elaborate firewall setup (that might be air-tight)
has been completely circumvented and done so from the comfort of the
untrusted user’s ’83 Toyota across the street.
The Internal Segment Explained
Using the information already presented in this chapter, it is quite simple to
deduce what the definition of an internal segment is. For the purposes of this
book, we define an internal segment as any network that resides in the secured
portion of your environment and provides resources or services that are only for
internal use (that is, should not be accessible by untrusted Internet users).
Similar to how we thought about our external properties, if you think about
the internal segments as providing resources only to internal assets, you will get a
clearer picture of how the network should be defined. Most of the networks
within your corporate environment will be internal, as many companies have
only a few IAPs.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
Assigning Criticality to Internal Segments
Since most of your networks are going to be internal segments, they cannot all
have the same importance for your organization. Prioritizing these segments is an
important step in aligning your network for security and business continuity
plans. For example, many of your network segments will only house employee
desktops or laptops, while some might contain mission-critical servers, such as
mail, payroll, software development source code, customer databases, or HR
applications. While you will want to provide the most comprehensive security
policy and defense for your entire environment, it is not practical when the latest
security tsunami hits.
Assigning network and device criticality is an essential step in planning for
how you are going to handle security patches, network recovery, and continuity.
For example, a few months ago a serious design flaw was discovered in the Cisco
Internet Operating System (IOS) that runs on all Cisco routers and some other
Cisco network devices. Many organizations have hundreds, if not thousands, of
Cisco routers in use on their network. Instantly, those companies had a massive
project on their hands.The use of network and device criticality helped those
administrators put together a plan of action on which Cisco devices needed to
be updated first and which were less important.
For the perfect example, we refer back to our favorite financial services com­
pany that we previously mentioned. When the Cisco IPv4 vulnerability hit the
wire in July 2003, this company was not prepared for the chaos and damage that
could potentially ensue from such a threat. With nearly 700 Cisco devices
deployed across their worldwide enterprise, this bank only had a few spreadsheets
with asset information, mainly comprised of IP addresses and physical asset loca­
tion. What’s worse, the security team had zero information as to which depart­
ment or person was in charge of the maintenance of each device. Any inkling of
network device criticality at this point was nothing but a distant dream.
Within a few hours, reports started to surface as to the dire circumstances
surrounding this vulnerability.The security team was feverishly trying to make
heads or tails of the asset inventory information they did possess. Questions sim­
ilar to, “Is that our router or does the Telco maintain it?” were shouted from
offices. Spreadsheets were being circulated through e-mail like a bad Outlook
virus! Alas, IT personnel had very few answers and a tremendous amount of
questions. Almost four hours into the crisis, they had made zero progress on their
remediation efforts.
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
All told, it took nearly six business days for the bank to fully remediate their
Cisco devices.The main reason for this delay was not policy or change control,
but rather, the network engineers did not have accurate inventories of the net­
work device assets and their respective owners/maintainers. Essentially, it took
them six days just to find all of their routers and the corresponding individual
who administered the device. It was not an impressive showing, but thankfully
the vulnerability turned out to be nothing more of a scare, so little damage was
actually realized.
Nevertheless, had they moved on from this incident without learning any­
thing this anecdote would not have made the pages of this book.The security
staff spent many weeks after the Cisco scare working on assembling all of the
asset information into a consolidated spreadsheet.They documented their net­
work architectures and spent time going through all of their telecommunications
contracts to understand where their responsibilities ended and the ISP demarca­
tion began.Their data collection did not stop with networking devices, but
stretched to the desktop where they inventoried systems down to the OS revi­
sion. With this information in hand, they began to decide which devices and
networks were most important to the business. While this information didn’t
prove useful immediately, it wasn’t long until the next Microsoft worm exploded
onto the scene.
When the Microsoft Messenger Service Buffer Overflow began to make
headlines in October 2003, this security team was well poised to respond. Even
with thousands more Windows devices to patch (compared to only 700 Cisco
devices), the total time for complete remediation was only three days–a signifi­
cant improvement in their processes. Part of the reason why they were able to act
so swiftly this time was the asset inventory spreadsheets and the asset criticality
information. Rather than spinning their wheels on less critical Microsoft systems,
they focused on the business-critical servers and workstations first, and then
broadened their approach outward as resources became available.This allowed
them to ensure the continuity of the business through the security threat, and
lessen the potential impact across the enterprise.
As you begin to map out your network, it would be wise to begin thinking
about how important that segment is to your business. Documenting this infor­
mation will help when crisis strikes and you and your team need to act swiftly.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
Footprinting: Finding the IP
Addresses Assigned to Your Company
Now that you have a clear understanding of where your perimeter networks are,
and more importantly what they are connected to, the next important step is to
ensure that you haven’t missed any of them. Since your perimeter networks
should be the only gateway for untrusted Internet attackers to enter your net­
work, you will want to make certain that there aren’t any other IAPs out there
that were acquired through a business merger or a new remote office.The fol­
lowing sections will help you begin to collect information about the public IP
addresses assigned to your organization.
Using whois to Understand Who You Are
The International Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, better known as
ICANN, defines the Address Supporting Organization (ASO), which maintains
databases of assigned public IP addresses.These databases are broken down into
Regional Internet Registries (RIR). Each geographic region has an organization
that is responsible for tying the publicly assigned IP addresses with the corre­
sponding company. In other words, when you or your ISP purchases a new net­
work block, the company and contact information is stored in these databases.
These providers correlate the IP address block information with your public com­
pany information.The following is some sample output of a RIR IP block record:
OrgName:
BrianCorp Inc.
OrgID:
BrianCI
Address:
One Brian Way
City:
Newport Beach
StateProv:
CA
PostalCode: 92660
Country:
US
NetRange:
192.0.2.0 – 192.0.2.255
CIDR:
192.0.2.0/24
NetName:
BCorp
NetHandle:
NET-192-0-2-0-1
Parent:
NET-192-0-0-0-0
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
NetType:
Direct Assignment
NameServer: NS1.US.bkhome.COM
NameServer: NS2.US.bkhome.COM
Comment:
RegDate:
2002-09-26
Updated:
2004-03-01
TechHandle: BK763
TechName:
Kenyon, Brian
TechPhone: TechEmail:
[email protected]
# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2004-03-03 19:15
# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.
There are currently four active RIRs and one pending approval.The RIRs
are as follows:
■
ARIN North and South America Registry also serving parts of SubSahara Africa
■
APNIC Registry serving the Asia Pacific region
■
LACNIC Latin America and parts of the Caribbean
■
RIPE Registry for Europe, Middle East, Central Asia, and parts of
Africa
■
AfriNIC Pending approval, will serve African regions
Unless your organization is located in several different countries, you will
most likely be using ARIN for the majority of whois queries.
RIRs can be queried by using IP address or domain name to provide specific
company information. Only UNIX-based operating systems come with an
embedded whois client; however, there are several freeware utilities available for the
Windows platform. For the most part, you could use various Web sites to handle
the whois query for you, such as www.network-tools.com or www.dnsstuff.com.
The Network-Tools site will allow you to search through the ARIN, RIPE, and
APNIC databases only, while the DnsStuff site will attempt to ascertain the appro­
priate RIR to query before giving you an error. For further searching capabilities
you can go directly to the particular RIR’s Web site, such as www.arin.net or
www.apnic.net.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
Using DNS Interrogation for More Information
What happens if you do not know all of the domains or IP addresses that might
be assigned by your company? If your organization, or parent company, is a pub­
licly traded company, you can use the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Web site to gather information about potential subsidiaries.
The SEC has a search utility named EDGAR used for searching through public
SEC filings. Using this utility, you can query your company name for a detailed
list of all the SEC filings. For simplicity, we typically look at the 10-Q filings for
any given organization.These filings take place each quarter and will have the
most up-to-date information. Once you open the filing, search for the term sub­
sidiary, or any variation of it, to find other related entities to your organization.
For example, a search on a fictional company, BrianCorp Inc, might yield the
subsidiary, Brian-Ventures. With this information, we are going to do a little
more digging.
Using the utility NSLOOKUP, which is on all versions of Windows and
UNIX operating systems, do a quick lookup for Brian-Ventures.com, BrianVentures.org, and so forth.
C:\>nslookup brian-ventures.com
Server:
dns.bkhome.com
Address:
192.0.2.111
Non-authoritative answer:
Name:
Address:
brian-ventures.com
192.0.2.21 Our results show that the domain brian-ventures.com does exist and it
resides at the IP address 192.0.2.21 (not a public IP address and used for example
only). Using this information we go to the ARIN Web site and do a quick
lookup on the IP address to see what the entire network block is and to deter­
mine if it actually belongs to the company.The following is some sample output:
Search results for: 192.0.2.21 OrgName:
BrianCorp Inc.
OrgID:
BrianCI
Address:
One Brian Way
City:
Newport Beach
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
StateProv:
CA
PostalCode: 92660
Country:
US
NetRange:
192.0.2.0 – 192.0.2.255
CIDR:
192.0.2.0/24
NetName:
BCorp
NetHandle:
NET-192-0-2-0-1
Parent:
NET-192-0-0-0-0
NetType:
Direct Assignment
NameServer: NS1.US.bkhome.COM
NameServer: NS2.US.bkhome.COM
Comment:
RegDate:
2002-09-26
Updated:
2004-03-01
TechHandle: BK763
TechName:
Kenyon, Brian
TechPhone: TechEmail:
[email protected]
# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2004-03-03 19:15
From this information provided by the ARIN database, we are able to ascer­
tain that the Web site is owned by BrianCorp, and we own the entire 192.0.2.0
Class B network. Keep in mind, however, that BrianCorp might not own the
entire Class B range, as they might just lease a small subset of the Class B from
their upstream ISP or Web hosting provider. However, with this information we
can cross-reference our network topologies and make sure that we accounted for
this public (external facing) network.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
Tools & Traps…
The DNS Zone Transfer
DNS has always provided a volume of information regarding which
domains belong to a company and on which network it resides. While this
information is generally used so that the general public can access your
public Web sites by mapping an IP address to the domain name, it can
also provide a lot of useful information in tracking down which domains
are owned by the company.
If you do not have access to your DNS zone information, you can try
to obtain it through a common DNS feature called the zone transfer. Zone
transfers were previously used to share updated information with other
DNS servers, primarily for redundancy in case the primary DNS server were
to fail. While open Internet zone transfers aren’t common practice any­
more, some DNS servers and networks are still misconfigured to allow
this. The most common attribute of a DNS server that allows zone trans­
fers is the presence of TCP port 53 being open. Since common DNS
queries are performed on UDP port 53, TCP does not need to be open and
can be blocked, thereby disabling zone transfers on the network layer.
Using a utility like NSLOOKUP will provide the mechanism for the
zone transfer.
C:\>nslookup
Default Server:
Address:
dns.corp.com
10.22.164.12
> server dns.bkhome.com
Default Server:
Address:
dns.bkhome.com
192.0.2.111
> set type=any
> ls -d bkhome.com
[dns.bkhome.com]
bkhome.com
SOA
dns.bkhome.com
bkhome.com
MX
30
bkhome.com
NS
dns.bkhome.com
bkhome.com
A
192.0.2.2
mail.bkhome.com
Continued
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
mail
A
192.0.2.3
www
A
192.0.2.2
brian-ventures
A
10.162.183.21
brian-invest
A
10.162.183.22
The preceding output shows all the subdomains and the mail record
for the bkhome.com domain. From this information, we can see that
there are two different networks that are providing Web services:
192.0.2.0 and 10.162.183.0.
While we used this for internal IP address allocation reasons,
attackers can use this information to learn about your networks and your
topology. As a general rule, you want to disable zone transfers from both
the Internet and internal segments.
DNS zone transfers can be disabled both from a networking and an
application perspective. To block zone transfers on the network you can
filter TCP port 53 to the DNS server. While this will block the zone transfer
from occurring over the network, the DNS application would still allow it
if you could connect to the server on that port. Each DNS application,
such as the Windows DNS implementation and BIND (Berkley Internet
Name Domain) for UNIX, have different remediation steps to disable zone
transfers. The zone transfer can be disabled entirely, or it can be enabled
to only allow transfers to particular hosts, which is a more common
implementation method.
Checklist
■
Take the time to make an accurate diagram of your network infrastruc­
ture, including IAPs and leased lines from your telecommunications
provider.
■
Use vulnerability assessment (VA) tools, or port scanners to discover and
record devices on your network.
■
Using VA tools look for WAPs and examine their security policies.
■
Check Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) for detailed information on
your company’s network blocks and assigned IP addresses.
■
Query and examine your DNS servers regularly to determine if there is
any unneeded information leakage or the possibility of zone transfers.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
Summary
This chapter helped provide some of the basic information that can later be used
in diagramming and understanding the network topology. While much of this
information is not ground breaking, we have established a common language that
will be used throughout the book.The use of external or perimeter segments will be
used to refer to untrusted networks, or those that can be easily accessed from the
Internet, while the internal segment will be used to describe the protected internal
company networks.
We also provided some valuable information on tracking down domains and
rogue networks that your IT department might not be aware of.The Regional
Internet Registries will provide detailed information on the network blocks
owned by your company.This information is extremely valuable, as it will help
you understand what is publicly available and to where your perimeter extends.
Additionally, we touched on the notion of assigning a criticality value to each of
your internal and external network segments.This data will help you decide how
to react when a serious security vulnerability emerges and you are forced to react
to protect you company’s networks.
Ultimately, having these data points will help you apply the techniques and
procedures in this book. Having a solid knowledge of where all your devices are
and how they interconnect will be essential in providing a solid defense-in-depth
strategy to protecting your environment.
Solutions Fast Track
Internal versus External Segments
External or perimeter segments are networks that are directly connected
to an untrusted network, such as the Internet.
Internal segments are networks that are highly protected and secured
and provide interior resources that should not be available to untrusted
networks.
Wireless access points (WAPs) extend the perimeter into the internal
segments, as they can allow untrusted and unprivileged users access to
internal resources.
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
Network and asset criticality is an important data point allowing you to
prioritize your work in remediating security vulnerabilities across the
enterprise.
Footprinting: Finding the IP
Addresses Assigned to Your Company
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) provide detailed information
regarding IP blocks assigned to your company.
These RIRs can be queried using a whois client or through various Web
sites.
DNS information can be a valuable source in finding rogue domains
and networks in use by your company.
Links to Sites
■
www.arin.net The RIR site for North America.
■
www.apnic.net The RIR site for the Asia Pacific region.
■
www.ripe.net The RIR site for Europe, the Middle East, and Africa
regions.
■
www.lacnic.net The RIR site for Latin America.
■
www.network-tools.com A basic network management site featuring
multiple network lookup features.
■
www.dnsstuff.com A site with various CGI network management
and DNS-related tools.
■
www.sec.gov The U.S. Government Securities and Exchange
Commission used for publicly traded companies and their filings.
■
www.freeedgar.com A site dedicated to searching the SEC filings.
Mailing Lists
■
www.apnic.net/community/lists/index.html Provides general dis­
cussions on the APNIC registry.
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Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments • Chapter 1
■
www.arin.net/mailing_lists/index.html Provides numerous mailing
lists regarding the North America Internet registry.
■
www.cisco.com/offer/newsletter/123668_1 This Cisco mailing list
provides quick information on Cisco products and vulnerabilities.
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: How should I begin to discover and map devices on my network?
A: Port scanners and vulnerability assessment tools offer a great way to discover
live devices on your network. Most tools allow you to export the results into
a CSV or XML for further manipulation. Refer to Chapter 2 for more
details.
Q: I have multiple Frame Relay lines in my network, but very little information
on them; what should I do?
A: As boring as this sounds, digging up and reading your telecommunication
contracts can be extremely beneficial in uncovering details about your leased
lines.
Q: I do not have a DMZ and do not provide any services out to the Internet, so
do I have a perimeter?
A: Yes, you do. Even if you have a drop-all policy on your firewall, and no DMZ
connected to it, you still have devices that are connected to the Internet and
could potentially be compromised. For example, at the very least your fire­
wall has an untrusted interface connected to the Internet.This interface can
fall victim to some firewall exploits and provide a door into your internal
network. If you have a router connected to your Internet lines, that would be
a perimeter device and poses some risk to your infrastructure.
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Chapter 1 • Defining Perimeter and Internal Segments
Q: All of my network segments are critical; how can I differentiate them and
assign different values?
A: This is actually simpler than you might think.Take some time and set up a
meeting with your CFO or Risk Management person and ask him or her
what the most critical aspects of the business are, and what could potentially
cause your business to come to a crashing halt if it were to stop working or
become unavailable.Then, examine your networks with these factors in
mind. When you isolate those segments or devices that provide value to those
vital business factors, than you have decided on which are most critical net­
works and devices. Everything else cascades down from there.
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Chapter 2
Assessing Your
Current Networks
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Monitoring Traffic
■
Looking at Logical Layouts
■
Performing Security Audits
■
Examining the Physical Security
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
■
Chapter 12 Secure Network Monitoring
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Frequently Asked Questions
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Introduction
“Nothing in the world is more dangerous than sincere ignorance
and conscientious stupidity.”
—Martin Luther King, Jr. Dr. King’s words ring true even in the case of your humble network.You can’t
start to defend your network if you don’t know everything about it. Before you
skip this chapter and say, “Oh, come on—of course I know everything about my
network. I am the admin, the ruler of the CAT5; I am the One” (Matrix-like
stunts aside), you might want to rethink that statement. Although most adminis­
trators can immediately tell you what type of network they run (a stable one,
right?) and where their important servers are located, the less physical manifesta­
tions of their digital domain might escape them. From this, sincere ignorance as
to the dangers that might lurk in their network develops quite easily.This chapter
will answer “what” you need to secure, and we’ll see the “how” to secure por­
tions in other chapters.
To fully assess your network, you need to examine more than just the servers.
Every path that a network packet could take should be reviewed and documented.Yes, the evil word: documentation.You’ve spent most of your waking hours
avoiding it, but now is the time to set aside an hour or two and get it done We’re
going to show you some methods in this chapter to make that chore a bit more
bearable. After a few dozen pages, you’ll have enviable documentation that will
impress absolutely no one at a bar on weekends, but will provide the basis of a
security roadmap.
Our journey of discovery starts with listening in on the wire to find out
what is really happening. We discuss a handful of tools that make this task both
simple and educational. We also show the statistical counters that will be the
odometer for our network and give us a method to see trends in our network
month to month. Examining the logical layout of your network will give us a
good framework for understanding what’s wrong with the network later.
Vulnerability Assessment (VA) tools will be our main provider of security infor­
mation for our network, and as such, we review most of the major players in the
market in both software and managed service varieties. Remediation of the issues
discovered is discussed as well as patch management. We finish the chapter with a
discussion of creative physical security techniques that should be a part of every
network.
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Monitoring Traffic
An effective security plan is not going to happen if you’re flying blind.You need
to have visibility into your network to find out how to secure against any threats
that might endanger your data. How do we discover the invisible world of 1s and
0s zipping across wires? Staring into the strands of fiber is only going to blind
you, and putting your ear up to the CAT5 punch-down block won’t get you
very far either.There are only a couple of methods to peer into the wired world,
but many tools to accomplish that task.The two common methods we explore
in this chapter are:
■
Sniffing the wire
■
Checking the statistical data of the wire usage
Sniffing
Not only will you get strange looks from the CEO when you tell him you’re
going to sniff some wires in the back closet, you’ll likely be asked for a urine
sample for drug testing. Besides the funny name, a network sniffer (or, as they are
referred to by corporate types, “network packet analyzers”) are an essential part
of any network administrator’s toolkit.
Notes from the Underground…
Sniffer versus Sniffing
Sniffer is a product; sniffer is a type of product. The capitalization dis­
tinction is important. Sniffer has emerged as a proprietary eponym for
network packet analyzers. Network General originally developed the
product, which Network Associates now owns through its acquisition of
Network General back in the late 1990s. Network engineers generically
use the word to refer to all network packet analyzers, similarly to how
people ask for a Kleenex when they really just want a facial tissue.
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Network Sniffing Basics
In its simplest form, a sniffer is the computer network equivalent of a doctor’s
stethoscope. Much like the doctor puts his stethoscope on a patient’s chest to
investigate the symptoms pestering the patient, a sniffer can give a network engi­
neer valuable insight into performance bottlenecks in your network. We seek to
display the characteristics of packets zooming past our computer, and to peer
inside these packets to examine their data.
In essence, all we ask the basic sniffer to do is to copy the packets that enter
our network interface card (NIC) to the screen, hopefully in a format we can
understand (seeing binary information would be of little use—interpreting that
binary into ASCII characters is a minimum requirement).
Some sniffers don’t stop there, and instead provide packet header information
and protocol decodes.The latter is almost always found in your more expensive
sniffers and is one of the many features that set them apart from their free
counterparts.
Sniffing Challenges
Sounds pretty simple, right? A packet comes into the NIC, gets passed up the
operating system layers, and eventually the packet driver (whether built into the
sniffer or a third-party tool) receives the information. Once at the packet driver,
the sniffer examines the packet and performs some formatting on it for display
on your screen. Easy as pie.
Snoop on Your Neighbor
But wait—there’s more! More complications, that is.This example works great if
the packet were actually destined for your NIC (as determined by the destination
MAC address). Remember that Ethernet is a logical bus topology.This means
that every host within a particular collision domain (see Chapter 7, “Network
Switching,” for a complete discussion on topologies and collision domains) will
“hear” or receive all packets on the network, including ones that aren’t destined
for your NIC. By design, the MAC layer will examine the incoming packet and
if it is not addressed to itself (and not a multicast or broadcast packet, intended
for all hosts), it will discard the packet before any other system components get a
chance to see it.
Only seeing the packets destined for your machine would still be interesting,
but it would only help you diagnose the traffic going to or coming from one
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
machine and wouldn’t give you a complete picture of the traffic traversing your
network. Luckily, there is a way to prevent the MAC layer from discarding these
extra packets.
Since this would basically enable your machine to be “nosey” and view all
packets on the shared data bus, the term promiscuous mode is used to describe this
special condition.The first task a sniffer has is to instruct the NIC to enter
promiscuous mode so that all the packets will be captured and none will be discarded.To do this on a small percentage of troublesome NICs, a special driver is
needed. For the most part, your sniffer will be able to easily start promiscuous
mode.
Damage & Defense…
Password Sniffing
Even though it’s been said thousands of times, now is a good time to
remind you that clear-text protocols such as Telnet, POP3, and FTP really
will transmit your password in broad daylight on the wire. When you
begin sniffing, you’ll start to see these passwords zipping by your sniffer
at an alarming rate. If your users enjoy instant messaging or “chat” pro­
grams, you’ll not only be able to see their IM passwords, but also the con­
tent of their conversations (and hopefully they’re not discussing
confidential client data in clear text).
If you’ve been having trouble convincing management that blocking
IM traffic is a good security measure, just leave your sniffer running for a
few days. Then, send e-mails to all those who opposed you using your
new-found knowledge, like “I sure hope that rash clears up so that we can
approve the new IM firewall rules,” or “I know you’re really busy, what
with juggling a wife, two kids, and a mistress in Encino, but I’d really like
to get consensus on this instant messaging traffic on our network.” It
works like a charm!
Snoop on the Whole Neighborhood
Perfect—so now we’re listening in on the party line conversation thanks to promis­
cuous mode. We can hear our neighbor (on the local subnet), but we might not be
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
able to hear the whole neighborhood (the entire network).To properly assess your
network, you need to have your ears open to everything on the network, not just
the local subnet. If your network is a switched network (meaning it employs net­
work switches to divide the large logical bus into smaller collision domains), your
NIC will only see packets specifically addressed to you, from you, or broadcast
packets. A more detailed description of switching technologies can be found in
Chapter 7, but for our purposes all we need to know is that we want to turn our
big expensive network switch into a cheap five-dollar hub.
The reason for this is that on a hub, all ports see the packets for all other ports
(horrible for network performance, but fantastic for network sniffing). On most
managed switches, there is a configuration command especially designed for
sniffing and other network monitoring (such as Intrusion Detection Systems—see
Chapter 9 for more information). Cisco calls this feature a “SPAN” (switched port
analyzer) port, while the rest of the world refers to it as “port mirroring.”This
command should be used with caution and only enabled on one or two ports that
are directly under your control. It would be a security breach if someone were to
get into your network switch’s configuration and set himself up with a SPAN
port—make sure you guard your passwords! Figure 2.1 shows a number of popular
network switches. For the purposes of our configuration example, we will be using
port 24 on the Cisco Catalyst switch as our SPAN port.
Figure 2.1 Front View of the Cisco Catalyst 2924XL, Extreme Networks
Summit24, and Dell PowerConnect 3024 Network Switches
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
We begin by connecting to the switch (using the console serial port,Telnet,
or SSH).The connection to the switch is unimportant and covered in much
greater detail in your manufacturer’s documentation. We’re going to jump ahead
and get to the good stuff. Once you have entered the configuration mode (on a
Cisco Catalyst, this would be the “enable” mode), you would enter something
similar to the following:
Switch (enable) set span 1/1-23 1/24 Destination : Port 1/24
Admin Source : Port 1/1-23 Oper Source : Port 1/1-23
Direction : transmit/receive Incoming Packets: disabled Learning : enabled Multicast : enabled Filter : -
Status : active %SYS-5-SPAN_CFGSTATECHG:local span session active for destination port 1/24
This would enable port 24 (the rightmost port on our Cisco 2924XL) as a
SPAN port, for switches that run the CatOS, the Cisco embedded operating
system for Catalyst switches. Some Cisco switches do not use CatOS, and instead
run the IOS normally found on routers. In that case, we would use a configura­
tion similar to:
Switch(config)# interface FastEthernet0/24
Switch(config-if)# port monitor FastEthernet0/1-0/24
Switch(config-if)# Here, again, we designated port 24 as our SPAN port. Cisco’s higher-end
switches, such as a Cisco 12000 Global Switching Router, or GSR, usually run a
variation of IOS, rather than the lower-end switches that run on CatOS.
Remember that when you’re done with your sniffing activities, you should
always disable the SPAN port, remove the SPAN feature from that port, or just
always reserve that port for sniffing activities and never assign it to a user or other
networking device. If you did allow a user’s workstation to connect to the SPAN
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
port, not only would that user suffer a high percentage of collisions (after all, his
network card would be receiving traffic from all over the network), but you would
also be opening up a security risk.That user would just have to use any of a
number of packet analyzers to read sensitive information directly off the wire.
The Sniffers
Now that we have the challenges out of the way, we can move on to working
with the actual sniffer software. As with most useful network utilities, the soft­
ware ranges from open source to expensive and from command-line to extensive
GUI-based applications. While not an exhaustive list by any stretch of the imagi­
nation, here we present some popular sniffers and some quick info on each.
■
Ethereal
■
TcpDump/WinDump
■
Snort
■
Microsoft Network Monitor
■
eEye Iris
■
TamoSoft CommView
■
WildPackets EtherPeek
■
Network Associates Netasyst
Remember most of all that your selection of sniffer depends more on just
price—the features that you value should also be taken into consideration. Even
if you are just curious, or need an occasional view of your network, your needs
will differ from someone who wants a full-featured sniffer package with all the
bells and whistles. Don’t let anyone tell you which is best; try all of them first
(they all allow for free trials) and choose the one that suits you.
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Tools & Traps…
From Italy with Love
All sniffing tools (and indeed, other open source products as well) rely on
a packet capture driver that takes the information off the NIC input buffer
and exposes it to an application. This allows the author of the tool to con­
centrate on the interpretation of the network data, and not have to worry
with the particulars of how to get the data off the wire. One extremely
popular packet driver is called WinPCap (known as LibPCap for UNIX) pro­
duced by the Netgroup division of the Politecnico di Torino university, in
Torino, Italy. This gem is a requirement for some of the tools discussed
next, and can be downloaded and installed quite easily from the
Netgroup Web site (http://netgroup-serv.polito.it). So, next time you’re
enjoying the powerful features of one of the open source tools,
remember to thank our friends in Italy—or better yet, make a donation on
their Web site (http://winpcap.polito.it/misc/wlist.htm) to thank them for
their benevolent contributions to the security community.
Ethereal
We really wanted to mention Ethereal first just because it is so versatile and it is
the de facto open source tool for sniffing. Not only can it sniff off the wire, it can
also import sniff dump files from other programs such as TcpDump, Network
Associates’ Sniffer, Microsoft’s Network Monitor, WildPacket’s EtherPeek (and
AiroPeek), and many more. Add to this flexibility the power to decode 407 pro­
tocols and you really get a feel for just how much collaborative effort went into
this tool (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1).
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Figure 2.2 Ethereal Network Analyzer, Showing Captured DNS Traffic
Table 2.1 Ethereal at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.ethereal.com
Free (open source, GNU General Public License)
Requires WinPCap
NOTE
Interested in learning more about the Ethereal Packet Sniffer? We recom­
mend the book Ethereal Packet Sniffing available from Syngress
Publishing (ISBN: 1-932266-82-8).
WinDump (derived from TcpDump)
Yes, the same Italians who gave us the WinPCap driver also have provided a
great Windows port of the venerable UNIX tcpdump command.This is as raw as
sniffing gets; packets are read off the wire and spooled to your stdout (your
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
screen).The nice part is that people who are very used to using TcpDump in the
UNIX world will feel right at home with WinDump.The same syntax is used so
even your old scripts should work with WinDump. If you’re troubleshooting at a
client site and don’t have your laptop full of commercial sniffer software with
you, WinDump does the trick. On many occasions, we’ve saved the client many
hours’ worth of troubleshooting by downloading WinDump, WinPCap, and
taking a look on the wire. WinDump supports the entire rich filtering features of
TcpDump, so you can view exactly what you’re looking for. In Figure 2.3, we’re
trying to find any Yahoo! Messenger traffic, to see what the VP of Development
has planned.
Figure 2.3 WinDump Capture of ICMP Traffic to 192.168.10.1
Table 2.2 WinDump at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
http://windump.polito.it
Free (open source, GNU General Public License)
Requires WinPCap
Snort
While primarily an Intrusion Detection (IDS) tool, Marty Roesch’s wonderfully
useful Snort can also be used as a command-line sniffer much like WinDump.
Rather than use filters to trigger alarms, you can simply output the packets to
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
the display. Using the -d -e -v switches will give you the most sniffer-like view
of data, showing the raw packet as well as the decoded information. Snort is dis­
cussed further in Chapter 9, “Intrusion Detection Systems.” In Figure 2.4 we
show an example of Snort listening for any TCP port 5190 (AOL) port traffic.
Yes, we’re hunting for AOL Instant Messenger gems (see Table 2.3).
Figure 2.4 Snort Log of ICMP Traffic to 192.168.10.101
Table 2.3 Snort at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.snort.org
Free (open source, GNU General Public License)
Requires WinPCap
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Tools & Traps…
Foundstone SuperScan 4
Recently improved in version 4, Foundstone SuperScan is a Swiss army
knife tool that belongs in every security professional’s bag of tricks.
Combining a rudimentary port scanner, OS identification, Windows
NetBIOS enumeration, and a host of quick WHOIS, DNS, and HTTP lookup
tools, SuperScan is useful when you just need a quick scanning solution
in a nice GUI. This tool is great for junior administrators and those just
getting started; they can get their feet wet without causing a whole lot
of damage. Since no attack methods are in the tool, you don’t have to
worry as much about interns using the tool, versus arming them with an
eEye Retina or ISS Internet Scanner (with which they could launch intru­
sive vulnerability checks against your sensitive servers by mistake). This
free tool does not require WinPCap, and you can grab it at www.foundstone.com/resources/freetools.
Microsoft Network Monitor
An easy way (albeit less powerful than the previous two sniffers) to get started
with monitoring your network is with the Microsoft Network Monitor, bundled
together with Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS). A limited version of
the tool, available in Windows NT Server and Windows 2000 Server, only allows
monitoring of traffic to and from the local machine (instead of the entire net­
work segment). As with most sniffers, capture filters can be defined to narrow the
focus to just the traffic that is interesting to you. Microsoft Knowledge Base
Article 148942 discusses this at length. One particularly interesting feature of
Network Monitor is that when you start using it, a notification packet will be
broadcast to the local subnet. Other users of Network Monitor will be able to
know when you start sniffing the wire.This was intended by Microsoft to be a
deterrent to having just anyone sniff your network without knowing, but as a
security information gathering tool, it really blows your covert cover! (See Figure
2.5 and Table 2.4.)
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Figure 2.5 Microsoft Network Monitor Displaying Network Interface
Statistics
Table 2.4 Network Monitor at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.microsoft.com/windowsserversystem
Free (included with server operating systems)
Sends out notification to others on the network when you use it
TamoSoft CommView
One of our favorite network sniffers, the TamoSoft CommView product is really
well written. An IP Statistics window shows you all the active conversations on
the wire from a very high-level view; this is very useful to just leave running and
look at during different times of the day. A user who is usurping the company
T1 line to download the latest Red Hat Linux distribution CD-ROM is going
to stand out quickly on a display such as this. When switching over to the real
packet-sniffing portion of the program, you can pick an individual packet and
examine the raw data in a built-in viewer. More useful, however, is allowing the
program to decode the packet into the various protocol portions and do the data
translation for you. If you right-click on a packet, you can select the entire “con­
versation” (where it selects all the packets that were involved in the back-andforth of the selected host with the remote server).This is much easier than trying
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
ysis (over 100 protocols can be decoded) or replay the packets on the wire (very
useful for forensic analysis but potentially destructive if you are replaying the
packets involved in an attack). If you’re trying to perform monitoring on a very
large network, you’ll appreciate the remote agent monitoring capabilities; install a
small agent on a machine in the target network and sit back at your desk and
perform all the packet analysis—without balancing the laptop on your knee in
the fourth floor wiring closet! (See Figure 2.6 and Table 2.5.)
Figure 2.6 TamoSoft CommView Sniffer Captures and Reconstructs Entire
TCP Communication
Table 2.5 CommView at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.tamos.com/products/commview
Home user (noncommercial) license is $129, enterprise license
is $249; demo version available
Remote agent available for monitoring many points in your
network
eEye Iris Network Traffic Analyzer
Originally purchased in summer 2000 from SpyNet, the CaptureNet product was
reworked and renamed to Iris, fitting the rest of eEye’s product line.The user
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
interface is deceptively simple; there is a lot packed into this program.Your stan­
dard set of capture filters is enhanced by a number of extras: the ability to create
your own packet and transmit on the wire is especially useful for any security pro
tinkering on a test network. One of the most entertaining features is the ability
to mark a set of packets (a “conversation”) and right-click on them to “send to
decode.”This will attempt to reconstruct the order of the packets and the end
result. Do this on some HTTP traffic and Iris will render the actual HTML in a
window for you.Therefore, not only can you find out who is visiting the job
listing sites, you can actually see the results of their searches from the comfort of
your own office. (See Figure 2.7 and Table 2.6.)
Figure 2.7 eEye Iris Network Analyzer Demonstrating the Flexibility of
Decoding Raw Packets
Table 2.6 Iris at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.eEye.com/html/Products/Iris
With one-year maintenance, $995; free trial available
Uses its own packet driver (WinPCap not needed), easy-to-use
graphical interface
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
WildPackets EtherPeek
One very popular protocol analyzer that has been featured in more technical
books than we can imagine is EtherPeek. Its excellent GUI (with distinctive
speedometer-like analog gauges in the corner) and a very easy-to-understand
decode panel walk you through every part of a selected packet—truly an excel­
lent way to learn about the inner workings of network communications.
EtherPeek manages to offer all of the decoding, filtering, and diagnostics of a
high-end analyzer in a well thought-out interface that beginners can digest easily.
A decade after the company was founded, the AG Group renamed themselves
“WildPackets” in September 2000, and has since introduced new products such
as AiroPeek (the version of EtherPeek for wireless networks) and EtherPeek NX,
the expert edition of their sniffer. (See Figure 2.8 and Table 2.7.)
Figure 2.8 WildPackets EtherPeek Dashboard Displaying Network Traffic
Analysis
Table 2.7 EtherPeek at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.wildpackets.com/products/etherpeek
With one-year maintenance, $995; demo version available
Uses its own packet drivers, good dashboard showing net­
work health
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Network Associates Netasyst
No review of network packet analyzers would be complete without giving credit
to the sniffer that has been on the market (in one form or another) for the past
15 years.Those readers with experience measured in decades will remember the
old Sniffer luggable appliances that looked more like carry-on luggage than a
sensitive network-troubleshooting device.The product has evolved from a 50­
pound shared resource to an advanced suite of applications that can be loaded on
a network engineer’s laptop. In addition to the familiar Sniffer Mobile, Sniffer
Portable, Sniffer Voice, and Sniffer Distributed, Network Associates released a
new younger brother to the family: Netasyst.Targeted at the small and mediumsized business (SMB) customers who need powerful analysis at an entry-level
price, the product line replaces Sniffer Pro. In addition to the standard fare of fil­
ters and packet decode capabilities you would expect from the product that
started the industry, the latest offering includes some advanced quasi-human
intelligence dubbed “Expert Analysis” that attempts to analyze and interpret
streams of packet capture information as a skilled network engineer would (an
engineer with 15 years of experience, at that!). Netasyst can be purchased in
wired-only, wireless-only, and wired/wireless combinations, as well as with or
without the optional Expert Analysis. Additional add-on modules such as
Netasyst Voice can detect and decode Voice-over-IP (VoIP) packets, and the
wireless editions of Netasyst can decode wired equivalency protected (WEP)
traffic, either during capture or post-capture, so that you can analyze encrypted
communications. (See Figure 2.9 and Table 2.8.)
Figure 2.9 Network Associates Netasyst Graphs and Charts Depicting Your
Network Traffic
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Table 2.8 Netasyst at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.networkassociates.com
Pricing starts at $1,395 (without “Expert Analysis”) or $3,295
The most expensive commercial packet analyzer out there
Sniffing the Air
A relatively recent variation on the sniffing theme has come about due to the
proliferation with wireless networks. Although we won’t specifically discuss
assessing your network for wireless devices (that could be an entire book in
itself ), we should point out the unique challenges involved in wireless sniffing.
Indeed, a great primer into wireless sniffing is found in Chapter 15 of the book
Special Ops: Host and Network Security for Microsoft, UNIX, and Oracle (ISBN
1-931836-69-8).
To get started, you’ll need specialized software and hardware.The sniffing
tools that we described previously are for wired sniffing. Some vendors, like
WildPackets, have wireless versions of their software. Still other vendors specialize
in only wireless sniffing. Next, you might need a special wireless NIC. Some
software will only work on wireless network cards that are based on the
PRISM3 chipset. Still other software is more restrictive and will only work on
certain models and brands of NICs. Consult the vendor Web sites for more
information and make sure to read Chapter 15 of Special Ops: Host and Network
Security for Microsoft, UNIX, and Oracle, Syngress Publishing ISBN 1-931836-698. It goes into depth about the differences between PRISM3 network cards and
different antennae styles.
Counting the Counters
A fair amount of statistical knowledge can be gleaned quite easily by using the
counters that are present in most network devices and even Windows 2000.
While they won’t provide as clear a picture as a sniffer will, a performance
counter will be able to give you a snapshot of the state of your network.
Network Device Counters
Most managed network devices such as routers, switches, and firewalls will have
some type of counter mechanism where they track important statistics about the
packets that are flowing through them.This information is particularly important if
the device is a gateway to the Internet or placed in your network where it is near a
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heavily used server. In both cases, this device will see a large percentage of your
network’s packets and can therefore be a good source of statistical information.
Some of the information that might be of interest is the number of “runts”
(fragments) and oversized packets that have traversed your network. Moreover, it
can show you how many collisions the network device has tracked. All these are
very important indicators of network performance.You should get into the habit
of zeroing-out the counters on a monthly or quarterly basis, and then measuring
each month/quarter against the previous one. With this raw information, trends
can be found easily and network growth forecasting is much simpler.
Figure 2.10 is an example of the counters built in to the Cisco
Internetworking Operating System (IOS), which can be found on Cisco routers.
While only high-end Cisco switches run versions of IOS, the CatOS also has the
same network counters built in.
Figure 2.10 Code Listing Showing Cisco IOS and Its Counters
Router# show interface counters
Port
InOctets
InUcastPkts InMcastPkts
InBcastPkts
Fe0/1
23324617
10376 185709
126020
Fe0/2
0
0 Port
OutOctets
OutUcastPkts
0
0
OutMcastPkts
OutBcastPkts
Fe0/1
4990607
28079
21122
10
Fe0/2
1621568
25337
0
0
Router# show interface counters errors
Port
Align-Err
FCS-Err
Fe0/1
0
0
0
0
0
FE0/2
0
0
0
0
0
Port
Giants
Single-Col Multi-Col
Xmit-Err
Rcv-Err
UnderSize
Late-Col Excess-Col Carri-Sen
Runts
Fe0/1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Fe0/2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Make note of these counters, as they can be an early warning indicator to
poor physical infrastructure (perhaps bad wiring or rodents in the walls eating
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
away at your CAT5). If you see a sharp rise in error packets and retransmissions,
you should check the cabling with a decent CAT5 tester—sometimes called a
reflectionometer because it sends a signal out on the wire and measures the roundtrip time it takes the electrical impulse to bounce back to the source.
SNMP Counters
Most network devices will also provide their counter information by exposing
them through SNMP.This can be useful by retrieving the same error and colli­
sion packet information as mentioned in the previous section.The added benefit
is if an automated task is collecting this SNMP information, it can dynamically
graph these counters for you and present it on a Web page for you to review (see
Chapter 6, “Secure Network Management,” for examples of this).
Windows 2000 Performance Monitor
Your server’s operating system might also have counter functionality. Microsoft
Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 have performance counters built in to
most of their services and hardware interactions.These counters can be accessed
by using the Performance Monitor application located in the Administrative
Tools section of your Start menu.
Once you start Performance Monitor, immediately you will see that it has
very little to report to you.That’s because we haven’t asked it to track anything
yet. Click on the “+” icon on the toolbar and select from a wide assortment of
performance counters. Some particular ones that you will find interesting
include:
■
■
“Network Interface” object
■
Output Queue Length
■
Packets Outbound Discarded
■
Packets Outbound Errors
■
Packets Received Discarded
■
Packets Received Errors
■
Packets/sec
“TCP” object
■
Connection Failures
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
■
■
■
Segments Retransmitted/sec
“UDP” object
■
Datagrams No Port/sec
■
Datagrams Received Errors
“IP” object
■
Fragment Reassembly Failures
■
Fragmentation Failures
■
Datagrams Outbound No Route
■
Datagrams Outbound Discarded
After adding a few counters, you’ll have a large number of line graphs all
over your screen, as shown in Figure 2.11.You need to adjust the scale of the
graph and the multiplier of the values (to scale down really large values or scale
up really small values) so that it fits nicely. Once set, however, you can save your
settings and call them up at a later time. Performance Monitor is one of those
nice, free tools that you can leave on display on some large plasma screen in your
NOC (preferably behind smoked glass) to wow your nontechnical folks and
investors.
Figure 2.11 Microsoft Performance Monitor with Several Network-Related
Counters
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Looking at Logical Layouts
While not overly time-consuming, looking at the logical layout of your network
is important in any assessment, as it will come into play later when we redesign
the network (see Chapter 11, “Internal Network Design”).This shouldn’t take
very long to accomplish, as there are a number of quality tools out there that do
automated mapping. Other times, you will find a network-mapping component
in other tools, such as a wizard buried within Microsoft Visio or as a component
of a vulnerability assessment (VA) tool such as Foundstone Professional.
Get on the Bus
To make things easy, start out assuming your network is a logical bus topology,
because that’s what most Ethernet networks are. Even though they are physically
wired as a star topology (with workstations going directly back to a central
switch on each floor), logically and electrically the voltage travels in a bus.
Notable exceptions to this are FDDI and Token Ring networks that are logically
ring configurations, yet wired as star topologies. In terms of what you will see
physically in any corporate network this side of the millennium, the most
common would be a physical star network.The other types are physical bus
topology, ring, and mesh.
Bus Topology
A relic from the networking days of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the bus still
lives on in the electrical wiring of modern Ethernet networks (see Figure 2.12).
Thankfully, you won’t find the bus topology in its physical form in most net­
works. In a bus topology, all workstations connect to one backbone cable that
snakes through the entire network. Because of the electrical properties in which
the packets are sent over this backbone, the ends of the bus need to be capped
with “terminators,” which prevent the packets from bouncing and reflecting back
on the wire (causing a storm of packet echoes).These little 50-ohm devices look
a bit larger than a thimble and can bring your network to a halt if they were to
be removed (see Figure 2.13).
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Figure 2.12 Typical Ancient Bus Architecture
Terminator
Figure 2.13 T-Connector (left) Used in Bus Topology, along with 50-ohm
“Terminator” (right)
Ring Topology
While FDDI and Token Ring still use a logical ring topology, it is cumbersome
to wire a physical ring. In this setup, each host is wired directly to the next
downstream host, with the last host linked back to the first host (thus making the
ring). Each host is only allowed to send packets on the network during its
assigned time slice.This is usually represented by a “token” being received by the
workstation. When the token arrives (much like that cool vacuum tube at some
old banks), a message can be placed in it (if the token is empty) and forwarded
along the ring. When the token returns (from the bank teller, for instance), you
remove the contents (money, data, whatever) and send the packet along the ring
for someone else to use. Rings were useful at a time when proper segmentation
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
and network switching (VLANs and so forth) were not an option.Their allure
came from the fact that they were deterministic: you knew exactly how long it
would take for the token to come back to you.This was very attractive for scien­
tists developing early video-streaming systems for research and medicine (you
don’t want to drop packets in the middle of a live brain surgery video stream),
but has been deprecated by high-bandwidth solutions such as fiber. In the 21st
century, you’re not likely to run into a Token Ring network unless you work in
government or education. (See Figure 2.14.)
Figure 2.14 The Ring Architecture, the Network Historian’s Favorite
“TOKEN”
Ethernet
Ethernet
“TOKEN”
Mesh Topology
Much like the bus topology, mesh architectures are rarely used and are more of
an anecdote in networking publications (such as this one). In a mesh topology,
every host is connected to every other host in the network. As you can imagine,
this can get annoying after 6 or 7 hosts (15 to 21 individual connections), and
downright impossible after 18 or 19 hosts (153 to 171 connections). Excluding
the lonely hobbyist who had a lot of CAT5 laying around and an urge to prove
us wrong, nobody in his right mind has ever deployed a mesh network. If you
have the time to crimp 171 CAT5 cables, we doubt you have the money to fund
that many NICs in each host. Prove us wrong—check the Syngress Web site and
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click on “Ask the Author.” We’d love to see actual photos of an operating mesh
network. Prizes will be handed out in the second edition. (See Figure 2.15.)
Figure 2.15 The Last Mesh Topology You Will Ever See
Network Mapping 1-2-3
A staple of good documentation is an eye-catching network map. When disaster
strikes and the network grinds to a halt due to a faulty piece of routing equip­
ment, your network map will be the first thing you reach for to triage the situa­
tion. Here we present some tools that can make the job easier.
Vulnerability Assessment Tools
Nearly all VA tools will present some form of a graphical map. Since the section
“Performing Security Audits” goes into detail about these tools, we won’t list
them again. Unlike dedicated network mapping tools that scour your network,
VA tools will usually only create network maps on the portions of your LAN or
WAN that you have asked them to scan for vulnerabilities.
Mapping-Only Tools
These tools were designed from the ground up for network mapping and thus
may have more flexibility or mapping features than their VA counterparts.
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Cheops
One of the older tools (dating back to at least 1998) is the Cheops Network
User Interface.The most recent release of this tool—version 0.61, released
September 2001—seems to be the last one that Mark Spencer is planning on
updating.This venerable Linux tool has been recently superceded by cheops-ng
(for “next generation”), written by Brent Priddy and available as version 0.1.12
(released May 2003). (See Figure 2.16 and Table 2.9.)
Figure 2.16 Cheops 0.61 Network Mapping
Table 2.9 Cheops at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
http://cheops-ng.sourceforge.net
Free (open source, GNU General Public License)
Core engine hasn’t been updated since 2001
NTObjectives Fire & Water Toolkit
Ntomap is a simple command-line tool capable of creating robust HTML-based
network maps (see Figure 2.17 and Table 2.10). While flexible and powerful
enough to map even the largest networks, the real strength of ntomap is its capawww.syngress.com
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bility to seamlessly integrate with the Fire & Water Toolkit—a set of XML-based
network tools that share data between one another.The toolkit’s comprehensive
HTML reporting allows one to graphically view your network architecture,
while linking all data to compressive host information, including vulnerabilities,
network/application services, information trending, and more.This information
can be viewed in its standard HTML format, which can even be modified
through the provided XSLT templates, or used discreetly through its XML files.
As a command-line tool, ntomap can easily be uploaded to remote hosts.
Figure 2.17 Ntomap Displaying Basic Network Maps from Traceroutes
Table 2.10 Ntomap at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.networkassociates.com
Free for noncommercial use
As part of an XML-based toolkit, you can chain the output of
one tool with the input of another.
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Qualys FreeMap Service
Qualys, a provider of network security auditing and vulnerability management
services (and covered later in this chapter), provides a free mapping service to
anyone with a Java-enabled Web browser at http://freemap.qualys.com. Since the
promotion started in May 2003, they have received a large amount of visitors
looking for a quick peek at their network from an external point of view.To sign
up, you simply enter a valid e-mail address, a range of 255 addresses, and agree to
a standard license agreement. Minutes later, the probe packets start flowing from
their Redwood Shores data center. As the service is scanning your network, the
objects that are detected are populated into an animated dynamic network map
(shown in Figure 2.18). Clicking on a router will show the hosts detected behind
that router hop, causing them to animate across the screen and explode out from
the router. After spending time playing with the Java animation of your network
(and believe us, you will find yourself playing with it and rearranging your net­
work on the screen), you can run a one-time vulnerability scan of the network
range to find any security holes. (See Table 2.11.)
Figure 2.18 Qualys FreeMap Service
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Table 2.11 FreeMap at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
http://freemap.qualys.com
Free
Interactive Java-based UI
NetworkView
One of only two tools listed here that is not free, NetworkView is a powerful
mapping utility that has an impressive SNMP and MAC database of over 11,000
entities—yet still fits on a single floppy disk. What’s truly amazing is that all this
power is contained in one very compact executable with no supporting DLLs or
database files needed.This makes it very attractive to be another valuable item in
your day-to-day toolbox of utilities. Like most mapping tools, NetworkView will
use tracerouting to determine the logical layout of your network, and then proceed
to probe each responding host to determine which of 19 types (router, worksta­
tion, server, printer, etc.) it is. Right-clicking on any object will allow you to per­
form individual port scanning on that node. (See Figure 2.19 and Table 2.12.)
Figure 2.19 NetworkView Topology Map
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Table 2.12 NetworkView at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.networkview.com
Personal licenses start at $59; demo version available
If you leave the program running, it can even serve as a rudi­
mentary network monitoring tool.
NOTE
Interested in learning more about network monitoring tools? Chapter 6,
“Secure Network Management,” has a wealth of information regarding
these and other complementary tools.
Microsoft Visio
The humble workhorse of any network administrator, Microsoft Visio has always
been on the short list of “must have” programs for day-to-day survival. One par­
ticularly convenient feature was the Network AutoDiscovery wizard that would
search the local subnet (using SNMP) or import the objects in a Novell NDS
Tree or Microsoft Active Directory tree and populate your diagram automatically.
Available in Visio 2000 Enterprise Edition and wildly popular, this feature was
inexplicably yanked from later versions of Visio.The Visio 2003 FAQs states that
due to customer feedback, they invested their resources in other areas on the
product and refer you to use other third-party tools for your mapping needs. So,
if you happen to have an older version of Visio 2000 Enterprise, hang on to it.
The rest of us with Visio 2003 might ask you to bring your laptop over and do
some diagramming for us. (See Table 2.13.)
Table 2.13 Visio at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.microsoft.com/visio
$168 for Visio 2003 Standard; $460 for Visio 2003
Professional
Comes with hundreds of stencils and icons to help make
excellent network maps (how do you think we made all of the
illustrations in this book?).
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Performing Security Audits
If you have read this far into this chapter, security is high on your list of priori­
ties. One of the most important activities in any network assessment is a review
of the current (and trust us, you have some) security vulnerabilities that exist in
your network.This can be accomplished using a local application or a third-party
hosted (managed) security service.The former is the choice of large corporations
or consultant groups that have the time and the energy needed to devote to
these systems.The latter is best suited for very tight IT budgets (and shrinking IT
staff head count) that need a quick way to examine their external, Internetfacing server vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability Assessment
Having a well-designed firewall policy is not enough to fully protect your net­
work; all you have done is fortify your perimeter defenses. However, what can
happen with just the few ports that you have allowed through the firewall?
Certainly, the NIMDA and Code Red worms of 2001 have shown that even with
just the HTTP (port 80) open, your network is still exposed to plenty of external
threats. What VA attempts to do is examine your network for weaknesses and find
as-yet-unexploited deficiencies in your current software. Much in the way a home
inspection will tell you if you’ll likely need to replace the roof in a couple years
simply by inspecting the termite damage on the cross-beams, a good VA package
can examine the running processes and revision levels on your servers and clue you
in to areas where you might have issues in the future. Better to proactively patch
up your servers today than reactively run around shutting down infected machines
tomorrow.
Notes from the Underground…
Reading Tea Leaves
OS identification is an art form, not a science. What you are basically
asking software to do is to ascertain the operating system that is running
by looking at the peculiarities of the way they construct their packets.
They aren’t triggering on anything that is screaming out the OS name—
Continued
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
there is no universal OS identification string included in your transmission.
What we’re asking is a little like determining someone’s future by reading
tea leaves or tarot cards. We’re looking at the artifacts of network trans­
missions and making inferences based on that.
All software (that isn’t based on pre-installed agents) is taking its
“best guess” at the remote OS. In some cases, guessing correctly is impos­
sible; there is no difference between Macintosh OS X, 10.1, and 10.2, for
example. Other times, there are two OS types that are very similar and the
software guesses incorrectly. Most of the software mentioned here pro­
vides for a way of tweaking the OS identification process to better fit your
network. In some cases, it’s as simple as weighing one OS more heavily
than another in ranking tables (thereby influencing the vote one way or
another).
All major vendors welcome customer input, and if you are consis­
tently getting erroneous results, or if you have a peculiar device on your
network that they might not have had access to in their testing, contact
them so that they can include it in their databases during a maintenance
release or update package.
Local Application
The products in this group are meant to run on your laptop (if you’re a traveling
network security consultant) or on a dedicated server in your infrastructure (for
larger installations). All of them have a method of updating their internal database
of vulnerability checks on a regular basis (much like anti-virus software) so that
you are always scanning your network with the most current information. Most
software offerings have three major parts:
■
Discovery, where the VA tool attempts to determine which of the IP
addresses you entered as targets are actually alive on the network, and
which services those live machines have running.
■
Vulnerability assessment, where each running service is probed from
a repository of known attack sequences.
■
Reporting the results of the assessment in an easy-to-read format (usu­
ally HTML with plenty of pie graphs and charts).
Some of the VA tools try to differentiate their product offering from the rest
of the industry (and especially the commercial offerings need to differentiate
themselves from Nessus, the open-source alternative) by adding unique features,
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faster performance, more usability, or providing more vulnerability tests (often
referred to as “checks” or “check count”). Here we will briefly review the six
most prevalent VA tools on the market, but there are certainly more.
Nessus
In earlier sections we saw how commercial sniffers must convince users to pay for
their products, while (seemingly) getting similar results from an open-source tool
(Ethereal, WinDump, etc.).They accomplish this by adding advanced features on
top of a core set of functionality, but they are always compared to their opensource older brothers.The VA tool market is much the same, with commercial
tools constantly trying to outdo the yardstick for the industry: the open-source
Nessus vulnerability scanner. In line with the communal thinking of the opensource movement, Nessus has an open database where anyone can contribute vul­
nerability checks to the product, using a special Nessus Attack Scripting Language
(NASL). Much like the worldwide Internet user community support of the Snort
IDS (where new checks are available hours after a new attack is detected), the
NASL database of checks keeps growing. However, since checks are written by
people with different levels of experience, your mileage may vary.
Nessus has smart service recognition and won’t be fooled by “security
through obscurity” techniques (such as running your Web server on port 8080
instead of 80). Another interesting feature is Nessus’ built-in network intrusion
detection system (NIDS) evasion techniques, which takes many of the common
methods used by attackers to avoid detection (see Chapter 9 for more informa­
tion about IDS and IPS) and makes them one-click simplicity. Report output
from Nessus is available as ASCII, HTML, or LaTeX (that can be converted to
PDF).
Nessus 2.0 was the current stable build as of the publication date of this
book, and is available for UNIX environments. Windows users can install a native
client application to connect to a UNIX server running Nessusd, but there is no
native version of the Nessus server for Windows environments. (See Figure 2.20
and Table 2.14.)
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Figure 2.20 Nessus NG Console Showing NetBIOS Vulnerabilities
Table 2.14 Nessus at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.nessus.org/download.html
Free
Subject to false-positives with open-source vulnerability scripts
NeWT
If you fell in love with Nessus when you worked at a UNIX-centric data center,
but now live in the Windows world,Tenable Network Security has ported
Nessus into a product called NeWT.The GUI is easy to use and resembles the
simplicity of the Microsoft Baseline Security Advisor. NeWT includes many
things that make penetration testing very easy, such as an address book of
common targets, customizable security tests, and live updates of new checks. If
you don’t like one of NeWT’s canned reports, you can write a new XML style
sheet or import your data directly into Microsoft Office.The basic edition of
NeWT is licensed per machine (not target address) and can scan whichever Class
C network segment the machine is currently attached to (meaning that you can
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travel from network to network, but you can only scan 256 IP addresses in one
shot). NeWT Pro has no IP address limitation and also has the capability to act as
a Nessus daemon (and receive requests from Nessus clients). (See Figure 2.21 and
Table 2.15.)
Figure 2.21 Tenable Security NeWT Security Scanner in Action
Table 2.15 NeWT at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.tenablesecurity.com/newt.html
$500 for 256 addresses; NeWT Pro also available for $3,000
(unlimited scanning)
Based on Nessus, has a huge amount of community support
for the latest vulnerabilities
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Tools & Traps…
Passive Vulnerability Scanning:
Never Ask for Permission or Forgiveness
Anyone who has done vulnerability scanning has most likely had to either
ask for permission to scan a network, or explain why a certain scan
crashed a key network resource. Tenable’s NeVO passive scanner changes
this. It determines vulnerabilities completely through passive analysis of
the network traffic. It’s deployed like a sniffer, but gives you data as if it
came right from Nessus. Tenable has written NeVO to produce output
compatible with the Nessus vulnerability scanner. NeVO can identify
hosts, their OS, their services, their applications, and the vulnerabilities
found in those applications. More information about NeVO is available at
www.tenablesecurity.com/nevo.html.
eEye Retina
Retina from eEye has a slick GUI wrapped around a powerful VA scanner.You
might have heard of eEye in your monthly Microsoft security bulletins; their
research and development teams pride themselves on the amount of vulnerabili­
ties in Microsoft software they discover.You can find a nod of thanks embedded
in Microsoft Security Bulletins MS03-036, MS03-039, and others. Because of
their expertise in vulnerability analysis, updates to Retina happen almost daily,
while other products update weekly or semi-monthly. Like Nessus, Retina makes
no assumptions that a Web server will answer on port 80; instead, it will analyze
the traffic and determine the service running regardless of its use (or more likely,
nonuse) of standard IANA-assigned port numbers. For OS detection, Retina has
licensed the popular NMap database of OS fingerprints, which is very extensive.
To further differentiate their product offering, eEye includes wireless access point
(AP) detection and a fuzzy logic vulnerability detection system they call
CHAM—Common Hacker Attack Methods. Retina, like most VA tools, is
licensed based on the amount of target IP addresses you intend to scan. See
Figure 2.22 and Table 2.16.)
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Figure 2.22 eEye Retina Showing an IIS Vulnerability
Table 2.16 Retina at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.eEye.com/html/Products/Retina
$995 for 16 IP addresses; $6,520 for 256 IP addresses
With the talented eEye Research team churning out new
Microsoft vulnerabilities at a steady pace, this scanner will
have an arsenal of information for each check.
eEye REM
Worth noting are the enterprise-level capabilities of REM, the eEye Remote
Enterprise Management module. While not a VA tool itself, it allows many
copies of Retina (as well as other eEye products such as SecureIIS and Blink) to
plug in to one central console for advanced reporting and management. Using
REM allows an organization to use the ticketing system to assign remediation
tasks (install patch, etc.) to various users within a large IT department. With dif­
ferent levels of user authority and differing “scopes” of responsibility for each
user account, you can quickly concentrate each technician on your staff to his or
her vulnerabilities. (See Table 2.17.)
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Table 2.17 REM at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.eEye.com/html/Products/REM
Contact vendor for customized price breakdown for your envi­
ronment
Combine the power of many copies of Retina into one central
console
Foundstone Professional
Designed for the small office or the network security professional on the go,
Foundstone Professional is the portable edition of Foundstone’s full-strength vul­
nerability assessment tool, Foundstone Enterprise.The core engine is built for
speed and can scan a 65,000+ address Class B network segment in about six hours;
a huge 16 million+ address Class A segment takes about 48 hours. After detecting
the active machines on your network, the library of Foundstone Scripting
Language (FSL) checks are launched at the targets where appropriate (checks
intended for UNIX systems will not be wasted on detected Windows systems).
Vulnerability probes begin with less-intrusive checks and escalate in
sophistication (much like a real attacker would) across all targets. An FSL devel­
oper class is available that can teach you how to author custom FSL scripts tar­
gets for any peculiar network applications or custom Web applications you have
in your network.The language is based largely on the extensible ECMAscript
standard. Foundstone Professional will generate a detailed network map showing
which machines and subnets have high-risk vulnerabilities on them, as well as
note any (potentially rogue) wireless APs. By assigning a criticality to each
scanned asset, the software can take this into account when determining overall
digital risk (you might be more concerned about a medium-risk vulnerability on
your accounting server than you would be on a high-risk vulnerability on a secretary’s workstation).
Reports with detailed vulnerability analysis and executive-level sum­
maries can be presented in HTML or exported via XML.The Foundstone
Professional-TL product is licensed with professional service organizations or
freelance security consultants in mind; unlimited scanning on all your customer
networks with all results reporting back into one database.This enables the
smaller consultants to provide a high level of personal attention to all their clients
by reviewing all the results across the entire Professional-TL database. (See Figure
2.23 and Table 2.18.)
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Figure 2.23 Foundstone Professional HTML Reports
Table 2.18 Foundstone Professional at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.foundstone.com/products/pro.htm
$5,900 for 100 IP addresses; Free trial version available
Results are stored in a highly relational SQL database, which
makes ad hoc reporting or other data mining techniques
simple.
Foundstone Enterprise
For larger environments that need an enterprise view of their business risk,
Foundstone Enterprise builds on the feature set of Foundstone Professional and
adds an interactive Web portal that can manage many scan engines around your
WAN.The Foundstone Enterprise Manager portal allows your IT staff to view
the results of past scans, track the risk exposure of your network using the
trending provided by the Executive Dashboard view, and research the most
recent changes (new hosts appearing or new vulnerabilities) in your network.
Included with the Enterprise Manager is the Remediation Ticket Center, which
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opens a new incident or “ticket” for each vulnerability found during the course
of a scan. As an administrator, you can assign these tickets as to-do tasks for your
technicians, and track their progress, as described in the “Remediation” section
later in this chapter.
By purchasing add-on components such as the Threat Correlation Module
and Enhanced Reporting Module, you can extend the detailed reporting capabil­
ities of Enterprise.The Threat Correlation Module (shown later, in the “Managed
Service” section) is a customized security news feed that will correlate upcoming
or potential threats to your digital security with previously obtained vulnerability
information on your network.
Foundstone makes good use of their professional services experience in the
industry by quantifying your business risk in their Foundstone Security Factors.
These include the security ranking called FoundScore, which compares specific
aspects of the scanned environment against best practices.This number, ranging
much like an exam score from 0 to 100, provides a useful abstraction of security
information into a format that can be easily tracked over time. When the board of
directors wants to know if your network security is better now than it was last
year, you usually would have to find a way to describe the complex mix of vulner­
abilities, hosts, and services to a nontechnical audience. With the FoundScore, you
can easily track an improvement in network security (noted as an increase in your
FoundScore). By comparing your FoundScore with other published industry
FoundScores for your industry, you can answer the board’s next question: “Are we
doing better than our competition?” (See Figure 2.24 and Table 2.19.)
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Figure 2.24 Foundstone Enterprise, Showing FoundScore Trending Across
Most Recent Scan Jobs
Table 2.19 Foundstone Enterprise at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.foundstone.com/products/enterprise.htm
Contact vendor for customized price breakdown for your envi­
ronment
Along with a centralized “dashboard” of your organization’s
risk, the Web portal allows centralized scheduling of multiple
scan engines across the globe.
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Tools & Traps…
Apples to Oranges
When considering which VA tool to purchase, you need to take into
account more than just raw “check count” (that is, the number of vulner­
ability checks the software comes with). In order to inflate their numbers,
some vendors write two or three checks for the same vulnerability, and
give them slightly different names. One excellent way to level the playing
field is by using the MITRE Corporation’s “Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures” (CVE) universal reference numbers. These index numbers are
an excellent way to cross reference what one tool found versus the other,
which is very useful when you’re evaluating many tools and deciding
where to spend your budget dollars. The references also allow you to root
out duplicate checks provided by the vendor, for the same CVE entry.
Before a particular vulnerability is assigned a CVE number, it undergoes a
great deal of scrutiny by the review board. During this period, it is a can­
didate vulnerability and noted as such by the “CAN” prefix. Some of the
vulnerabilities listed in the next section have CAN identifiers that will likely
be approved and converted to CVE identifiers by publication time. Find
out more at http://cve.mitre.org.
Free Tools
Apart from the software listed earlier, many vendors rapidly produce free scan­
ning tools after a major worm or vulnerability is announced.They do this not
only because of their own generosity in giving back to the security community,
but also in the hopes that you will like their free tool so much that you will at
least consider them when you have the budget ready for a real VA package.
Quick links to recently released tools (that address problems that are probably still
plaguing your network as this book went to press) include:
■
■
Microsoft Messenger Service (CAN-2003-0717)
■
www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/MSGSVC.html
■
www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/messengerscan.htm
Microsoft MSBlaster Worm (CAN-2003-0352)
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■
■
www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/RPCDCOM.html
■
www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/rpcscan.htm
■
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=824146
Cisco Denial of Service (CAN-2003-0567)
■
■
www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/ciscan.htm
Microsoft SQL Slammer (CAN-2002-0649)
■
www.eeye.com/html/Research/Tools/SapphireSQL.html
■
www.foundstone.com/resources/proddesc/sqlscan.htm
■
http://support.microsoft.com/?kbid=323875
Managed Vulnerability Assessment
When you’re short on time and do not want to build out an infrastructure to
perform scanning of your network for vulnerabilities, you can benefit from
having a managed security service do all the hard work for you.The two solu­
tions listed here perform a pure managed vulnerability assessment, while other
solutions (from Guardant, Symantec, and others) mix vulnerability assessment
with IDS and firewall management for an all-around outsourced security. If you
have enough on your plate with just keeping up with server patches and want to
perform security assessments on demand, these solutions are a good fit.
Foundstone Managed Service
The Foundstone Managed Service uses the Foundstone Enterprise software,
deployed at one of the company’s secure data centers. Customers can purchase a
subscription and have a Web portal where they can launch scans as needed or on
a schedule. With zero onsite deployment, no administration or maintenance, and
very little training, any member of the IT staff can gain control of the exposed
vulnerabilities of an organization.The Foundstone Managed Service produces
attractive HTML reports that can be downloaded in compressed archives or
viewed online.The real power of the system is evident when creating accounts
for all the members of your team within the portal. After a scan has completed,
each newly found vulnerability is tracked in a Remediation Center (see Figure
2.27) and can be assigned to a member of your team.
A recent addition to the service offering is the Threat Correlation Module,
which is continually updated with forward-looking security threat information.
Before the next worm becomes an actual vulnerability (with the associated
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
vulnerability check or signature updated in the database), it shows up as a poten­
tial vulnerability or threat in this correlation module. News stories are updated
twice a day from the Foundstone Labs research team, and clicking on any story
will link to further detail on the right.The “correlation” part of the name (rather
than just being a nifty interface to a security newsletter) is that for each selected
threat, the module will scan your existing scanned host information and project
which machines can or will be victimized by the upcoming threat. If you take
the time to rank your critical assets in the portal with a number from 1 to 5, this
ranking will be taken into consideration when determining the overall risk for
that host (the colored numbers on the bottom left, see Figure 2.25). Long before
the Microsoft DCOM vulnerabilities were unleashed on the world in September
2003, there was a threat article warning about impending attacks. Based on cor­
relation information (banner, port, OS, services found) embedded in the news
article, your at-risk DCOM installations can be determined and patched before
the vulnerability hits the open streets. (See Table 2.20.)
Figure 2.25 Foundstone Managed Service Threat Correlation Module
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Table 2.20 Foundstone Managed Service at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.foundstone.com/products/managedservice.htm
$2,500/year for five live IP addresses; Free trial subscription
available
Available soon—a Threat Compliance module that will graph
an organization’s responsiveness to discovered vulnerabilities.
Qualys QualysGuard
Many of Qualys’ customers enjoy the immediacy of a Web-delivered vulnera­
bility management service. Customers can simply scan their network perimeter
or internal systems without installing software, building out complex systems to
protect their sensitive vulnerability data, or investing in more personnel to
manage these systems. Qualys’ approach to vulnerability management enables
customers to perform the complete cycle of network discovery (mapping), vul­
nerability assessment (scanning), reporting, and remediation all within the
QualysGuard system. (See Figure 2.26 and Table 2.12.)
External (perimeter) scans are performed on request or can be scheduled for
frequent testing. Qualys maintains an impressive Knowledge Base of unique vulnerabilities—currently totaling over 3000 entries—which allows the QualysGuard
service to provide very comprehensive and accurate scanning. Internal scans are
performed using the same Knowledge Base and use QualysGuard Intranet scanner
appliance(s), which can be easily deployed and configured in minutes. Qualys has
three core offerings based on the QualysGuard service:
■
QualysGuard Enterprise Designed for large, distributed organiza­
tions with thousands of desktops, servers, and remote networks, many
administrators can have controlled access to vulnerability information,
while still providing executives with a high-level view of the enterprise’s
security status.
■
QualysGuard Express Ideal for small departmental intranets or an
organization with a small number of Internet-facing Web, extranet, and
other DMZ servers.
■
QualysGuard Consultant For professional service organizations or
freelance security consultants who provide network auditing and riskreduction services and require a solution that can be quickly deployed
and used remotely.
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■
QualysGuard MSP Designed for other managed service providers to
immediately deploy their own managed service as a stand-alone solu­
tion, or as part of an integrated suite of managed security offerings.
Figure 2.26 Qualys QualysGuard Sample HTML Report
Table 2.21 QualysGuard at-a-Glance
Web site
Cost
Notes
www.qualys.com/webservices
$3,495/year for 5 IP addresses (pricing varies on IP address
pool size)
Pay-per scan options are also available.
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Remediation
This could be the most obvious step in your overall network assessment. When
you find problems in your network, fix them! Rather than carry around a note­
book or the ubiquitous spreadsheet of vulnerability data that we all have on our
desktops (admit it—you do!), let some of these tools put the management in your
vulnerability life cycle.
Delegate Tasks
The key to tackling the large remediation task ahead of you after performing a
security audit is to delegate the laundry list of fixes to a group of system adminis­
trators. Assemble Windows, UNIX, and Network Device teams, and divide up the
list according to responsibility among these groups. Some VA tools will allow you
to designate particular users to whom you can assign specific vulnerability tasks,
which can greatly reduce your overall median time-to-remediation. For example,
Web-server related vulnerabilities might be delegated automatically to the IT pro­
fessional managing the Web servers. Critical issues (“High” in Foundstone
Enterprise, “Level 5” in QualysGuard) might be automatically assigned to an
internal tiger team for quick response and remediation. In Figure 2.27, we see an
example of delegating a remediation task, as illustrated by the Foundstone
Enterprise Manager portal. In Figure 2.28, the same action is illustrated within the
QualysGuard platform.
Figure 2.27 Foundstone Enterprise Manager Portal, Remediation Center
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Figure 2.28 Qualys’ QualysGuard Vulnerability Management and Ticketing
For each vulnerability found, a trouble ticket is created.These tickets can be
assigned to users and given a deadline for completion. Much like a full-blown
helpdesk application, a history of ticket assignment, notes posted, and activities
surrounding that ticket are kept in the database. After a system administrator has
fixed a problem, he or she can mark the ticket as closed.These systems can create
a “micro-scan” for just that vulnerability and host machine combination to make
sure that the issue has truly been resolved. Because micro-scans are highly tar­
geted, they execute very quickly.
Alternatively, the next network scan will also uncover if the vulnerability is
still present and re-issue the ticket to the user.The nice part about this is that as
the security administrator, you know that any tickets returned to you are truly
completed and verified by the system.
Patch Management
Sometimes, the best bet for the ever-present Microsoft hotfix is to purchase soft­
ware to deal with the problem automatically. While outside the scope of this
chapter, we should mention some products that can manage the download, distri­
bution, and reporting of patches across your network, such as:
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■
Shavlik HFnetchkPro
■
Patchlink
■
Citadel Hercules
Of special interest is Citadel Hercules, which combines the best of both
worlds (see Figure 2.29). It takes the input from your favorite VA tool (including
Foundstone Enterprise, ISS Internet Scanner, Microsoft MBSA, Nessus, Qualys
QualysGuard, and eEye Retina) and uses that as the basis for patch distribution.
This efficient model allows one product to excel at what it does best (the VA
tool seeking out vulnerabilities) and allows the remediation tool to make those
vulnerabilities go away (within reason).The nice part is that the Hercules patch
management software can then close the vulnerability cycle and go from dis­
covery to remediation with little human intervention.
Figure 2.29 Citadel Software’s Vulnerability Remediation Best Practices
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Follow-Up
Essential to any security audit is the scheduling of a follow-up audit.The purpose
of this is to see if the state of security in your network has improved or deterio­
rated. Having a one-time security audit is useful, but not nearly as useful as
having a history of quarterly security audits. If you can afford it, monthly audits
are even better since they allow you to react on a much faster scale. If you are
using enterprise-level VA software that allows for advanced scheduling (eEye
REM and Foundstone Enterprise both do), you’ll be able to have trending infor­
mation that shows your recent scans and if the trend is toward a more secure net­
work. Some particularly security-conscious folks might even opt for daily scans
of their most valuable externally facing assets just to make sure they are the first
to know about a potential flaw instead of the evil-doers of the world.
Examining the Physical Security
After examining everything about your network from a digital point of view, it is
necessary to take a good look at the physical attributes of your network. Every
safeguard that you take at the network layer won’t mean much if your attacker is
able to walk in, pick up your firewall, and toss it in the back of his pickup truck.
Who’s Knocking on Your NOC?
All of your infrastructure rooms or network operation centers (NOCs) should
have proper physical security. First, you must ask yourself if your entire infrastruc­
ture is actually enclosed in rooms! How many networks have you seen where a
critical hub or switch or router was carelessly placed underneath someone’s desk?
Your firewall security policy might be first rate, but if the firewall is in danger of
being unplugged by someone’s foot, you really haven’t secured your network.
All sensitive network equipment should be stored in rooms that have most if
not all of the following characteristics:
■
Locking door
■
Dedicated power circuit
■
Dedicated, round-the-clock air conditioning, heating (and
humidifier/dehumidifier, if necessary)
■
Video monitoring (or other log) of entries and exits
■
Data-grade fire suppression
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Let’s face it, how many people can tell the difference between HALON and FM­
200 fire suppression? Okay, put your hands down, show-offs. For the rest of us,
there’s hope. Large data center companies employ highly talented sales engineers
to know the intricate differences in heat dissipation, humidity levels, and fire sup­
pression qualities. Even if you’re not in the market for collocated rack space, it
certainly wouldn’t hurt to call up Global Crossing, SBC Data Services, Cable &
Wireless, Equinix, or your favorite local hosting provider to pick their brains a
bit. Just act interested and smile a lot.
More Is Better
Physical security definitely adheres to the “more is better” approach. In fact, lay­
ering methods is usually your best bet to slow down a determined attacker and
provide adequate mobility to your staff. Consider starting out with a digital com­
bination lock on the NOC rather than keys.This will allow you to issue unique
codes to all of your staff that you can track later. Supplement this with individual
rack door locks and only give the appropriate people keys.This way, you still
allow your junior-level staff to enter the NOC to monitor the system and do
front-line troubleshooting of network outages, while retaining control of the rack
to your senior-level staff.
From this basis, you can scale up to having biometrics on the NOC door.
This proves that your senior network engineer really is entering the NOC, and
not some crafty mailroom worker who has been watching the codes being
entered. As a second layer, closed-circuit surveillance cameras recording to tape
inside the NOC and aimed at the door will provide a log of who actually
entered; although this doesn’t prevent the mailroom malcontent from entering, it
does document it for later review. A third layer could be to have digital combina­
tion locks on the rack doors to cut down on the expense of keys.
Stay Current with Your Electrical Current
With additional hardware known as “intelligent power strips” installed in your
rack, you can measure the amount of electrical current that your equipment is
drawing from your power circuit. After you blow your first circuit at the data
center and have your entire network come to a screeching halt, you’ll want to
look into measuring your amperage draw from the circuit. Remember that
having backup power is good—but if you’re drawing more amps than you had
originally planned, your UPS will not last as long as expected. In the worst case,
you might overload the UPS and then be faced with a hard and very abrupt
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
shutdown of your network (trust us on that one). During the writing of this
chapter, one of our racks blew a fuse downstream from the UPS, which resulted
in an abrupt shutdown.The UPS batteries were powerless to stop the power
failure since the fuse was downstream. Since then, we monitor our amperage reli­
giously. Well, maybe not religiously; but definitely monthly.
Extra Ports Equal Extra Headaches
Modern buildings have the benefit of being pre-wired with one or two Ethernet
ports in every room. By the same token, modern buildings have the security risk
of having an access point to your network in almost every room. How easy
would it be for a vendor to be sitting quietly in your conference room, waiting
for a meeting to start, and get on your network? If you’re using DHCP, all the
vendor would need to do is plug in and start browsing your network. Armed
with this information, the vendor might use his knowledge of your departmental
budget to charge you a high price, or simply sell the information to your com­
petitor should you decline his offer.
Default Disabled
The best strategy for these heavily pre-wired buildings is to “default disable” your
ports.This means either do not patch all the available ports, or patch them but
have those ports administratively disabled in your switch’s configuration. Most
people do the former, since it saves them money on ports that will never be
used. Some, however, do the latter since they want to be able to remotely enable
a port without visiting a wiring closet.
In large data centers, you’ll see all ports patched into the switch but adminis­
tratively disabled.You might even have experienced this school of thought if
you’ve visited a hotel that had Internet service in the rooms. All the ports are
patched in, but until you accept the $9.95 charge, your port is not activated.
Conference Room DMZ
One particularly good application of secure network design is to put all confer­
ence rooms and other public spaces on their own DMZ within your firewall.
This ensures that visiting guests are still provided with Internet access so that
they can check their e-mail, but protects your network from unauthorized
browsing. Authorized employees who are making a presentation in a conference
room can just use the VPN to get to the files that they need.This provides the
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added benefit of encrypting the information end to end so that the other laptops
in the conference room can’t sniff the traffic and get their hands on information
they really shouldn’t have. An in-depth look at proper segmentation of your
internal network can be found in Chapter 11, “Internal Network Design.”
Checklist
Find a sniffer that you are comfortable with and practice examining
normal network traffic; you’ll need those skills when there are real prob­
lems on the network
Know how to check and track the built-in performance counters of
your networking equipment.
Have an updated network map on hand in your “emergency” set of
documentation.
Perform regular tests for vulnerabilities on your internal networks.
Contract with a third-party vendor to test your external networks for
vulnerabilities.
Purchase automated patch management software to lighten the burden
of monthly Microsoft security bulletins.
Plan for adequate physical security of your networking devices.
Disable anything (ports, services, etc.) that doesn’t have a valid business
case today; if you need it tomorrow, you can add it later.
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Summary
Neither sincere ignorance nor conscientious stupidity has any place in good
internal network security.To defend your digital castle, you must have the
blueprints. More than likely, when you assumed the keys to the castle on your first
day of work, there were no stacks of well-documented network routing maps. Find
a good network protocol analyzer that you are comfortable with and begin to
understand the makeup of your traffic flows. Use an automated network mapping
tool to provide some context for any changes you intend to make to your network
later. Without a proper map, the impact of even minor network changes cannot be
fully understood.The vulnerability assessment industry has transformed itself into a
new practice: vulnerability management.The tools presented in this chapter are
excellent ways to proactively manage your organization’s digital risk to attack.
Using asset-criticality algorithms provided by some vendors, you can triage your
problems to ensure you’re always protecting the most valuable assets first. Once all
high- and medium-level vulnerabilities have been fixed on your high-value servers,
consider a remodeling of your organization’s physical security. Protecting the
castle’s inner sanctum only makes sense if you’ve remembered to bolt the
drawbridge door.
Solutions Fast Track
Monitoring Traffic
To truly understand network infrastructure, you must study what is
actually being transmitted on the wire.
Network protocol analyzers or “sniffers” are powerful tools in the
network administrator’s tool belt.
In modern switched networks, sniffing usually involves some
preliminary configuration of the switch to copy all packets to one port
for monitoring.
Sniffers range from the free to the commercial high-power variety; make
sure to pick the one that best fits your needs.
Built-in network device counters can provide a useful (and free) indi­
cator of pain points in your network and areas where increased band­
width might be helpful.
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Looking at Logical Layouts
Most networks are physically wired as star networks, and the underlying
technology is a logical bus (Ethernet), a ring (FDDI), or some derivative
of a mesh.
Network mapping tools will help document your network and will save
valuable time pinpointing failures when trouble happens on your net­
work.
Performing Security Audits
Regularly test your networks to ensure that no new vulnerabilities or
hosts are added.
Use one of the free or commercial tools listed to give your network a
thorough checkup.
When a new worm breaks, check the VA vendor Web sites for free
detection (and sometimes remediation) tools to quickly scan your entire
network to find out just how bad the outbreak is.
If you are short staffed or just enjoy the independent analysis of a third
party, consider one of the Managed Vulnerability Assessment Services
listed earlier to offload detection of vulnerabilities.
Once you unearth all the vulnerabilities facing your network, formulate
a plan to remediate and correct those vulnerabilities. Don’t take it all on
yourself—delegate tasks to your team.
Use automated patch management software to deploy the never-ending
stream of operating system patches out to all your desktops and servers.
Examining the Physical Security
Adequately plan the physical security of your NOC or data center.
Combine multiple technologies (biometric, video recording, door locks)
for a layered, defense-in-depth approach.
Invest in environmental monitoring tools—they will save you money in
the long run should disaster strike.
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Don’t overlook your electrical requirements, and heed the guidelines of
your electrician.
Disable any unused ports on your switches.
Relegate any general-purpose rooms (conference rooms, kitchen, etc.)
to their own DMZ with very little network access.
Links to Sites
■
www.Snort.org Makers of Snort IDS that can be used as an effective
sniffer.
■
http://windump.polito.it WinDump, a popular raw network sniffer
based on UNIX TcpDump.
■
www.tamos.com Makers of TamoSoft CommView network-sniffing
software.
■
www.ethereal.org Makers of Ethereal network-sniffing software.
■
www.wildpackets.com Makers of EtherPeek, AiroPeek, and
EtherPeek MX sniffer software.
■
www.networkview.com Makers of NetworkView network-mapping
software.
■
www.networkassociates.com Makers of Netasyst network-sniffing
software.
■
http://cheops-ng.sourceforge.net Cheops-NG, the next-generation
freeware network-mapping tool.
■
http://cve.mitre.org MITRE organization that lists common vulner­
abilities and exposures (CVE).
■
www.ntobjectives.com Makers of the NTO Fire & Water Toolkit,
including ntomap network-mapping tool.
■
www.nessus.org Makers of Nessus freeware VA tool.
■
www.qualys.com Makers of QualysGuard MSP managed security
service and the freemap.qualys.com tool.
■
www.patchlink.com Makers of PatchLink patch management software.
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
■
www.shavlik.com Makers of HFnetchk LT and HFnetchk Pro patch
management software.
■
www.eeye.com Makers of eEye Retina VA tool, and numerous free
scanning tools.
■
www.foundstone.com Makers of Foundstone Enterprise VA tool,
and Foundstone Managed Service.
■
www.citadel.com Makers of Citadel Hercules patch management
software.
■
www.cwusa.com/services/facility_services Cable and Wireless
Data Centers.
■
www.sbcdata.com SBC Communications Data Services.
■
www.globalcrossing.com Global Crossing Data Centers.
■
www.equinix.com Equinix Data Centers.
Mailing Lists
■
www.snpx.com Security News Portal—excellent source for latebreaking security news.
■
[email protected] The latest security tools from a large
community of developers lacking any funds to advertise on their own.
(www.securityfocus.com/subscribe?listname=110).
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Assessing Your Current Networks • Chapter 2
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: I’ve downloaded WinPCap and Ethereal, but I can’t see any traffic other than
my own. What’s wrong?
A: Your network is either not very busy (doubtful) or has network switches
upstream from your connection.You will need to configure your port to
receive all the packets on your network (sometimes known as a SPAN port)
to be able to adequately assess your network traffic.
Q: My network switch is not an expensive managed switch and has no provision
for SPAN ports. Am I out of luck?
A: Not entirely.You just have a lot more work to do. Locate the one or two bus­
iest servers on your network, or if you’re monitoring outbound usage of the
Internet, locate your main border gateway. Unplug that device’s NIC (during
a scheduled maintenance window) and attach it to one of those micro-hubs
that you can find in major electronics stores for $20. Attach your sniffer to
the micro-hub and then a third cable back to the server. Presto—you have a
$20 wiretap for Ethernet.
Q: I used Foundstone Professional/eEye Retina/ISS Scanner to discover hosts
on my network, but it has misidentified a number of my device operating
systems. What can I do?
A: OS identification is an art form, not a science. As such, the software takes a
“best guess” among several likely OS types. If your networked Sega
Dreamcast is often being mislabeled as an Axis Webcam, it might be because
both devices use the same low-level device kernel in their electronics. If you
only have Dreamcasts on your Ethernet and none of the Axis Webcams, then
you can safely rename that entry in the OS type database for major software
vendors. In addition, you should e-mail the vendors so they can update their
database and benefit all customers worldwide.
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Chapter 2 • Assessing Your Current Networks
Q: I tried using the Visio Network AutoDiscovery wizard, but I can’t find it.
Where is it?
A: Sadly, support for the AutoDiscovery wizard has been removed from current
and future versions of Microsoft Windows software. Visio 2000 Enterprise
Edition still has the AutoDiscovery Wizard.
Q: Why would I need a patch management tool like Citadel Hercules when I
already get by just fine with the Windows Update notification in the corner
of my screen?
A: While the Critical Update Notification Service is useful at an individual host,
it loses some of its appeal on a large enterprisewide deployment.The nice
thing about Patch Management tools such as Hercules is that you can push
out patches to machines and confidently know that they have been applied,
rather than just hoping your user community notices the icon in the corner
of the screen and double-clicks on it. Furthermore, many Patch Management
systems (Hercules included) can push out other files to your machines (anti­
virus update files, or similar) in much the same way it transmits patches.
Finally, tools like these allow you to push out security configurations (such as
disabling exploitable services or adjusting anonymous enumeration settings),
which is definitely not something that can be done with WindowsUpdate.
Q: Why should I spend thousands of dollars on commercial VA tools when I
have my trusty freeware Nessus? For that matter, why should I spend money
on a sniffer when I have my trusty freeware Ethereal?
A: Great question, and one that can only be answered by the person asking it. If
all you need is a quick peek at your network now and then, Ethereal will
definitely fit your needs and is very easy on the pocketbook. If you want
more in-depth packet analysis or remote network monitoring, you’ll want to
upgrade to a commercial tool such as TamoSoft CommView. Likewise, if you
are a one-person security team and just need to quickly scan the network for
obvious vulnerabilities, then Nessus will serve you well. However, if you are a
larger organization with a dozen or so IT employees who need a way to per­
form automated and scheduled network security scans, you need a commer­
cial tool such as Foundstone Enterprise.
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Chapter 3
Selecting the
Correct Firewall
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Understanding Firewall Basics
■
Exploring Stateful Packet Firewalls
■
Explaining Proxy-Based Firewalls
■
Examining Various Firewall Vendors
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 4 Attacking Firewalls
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
■
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Frequently Asked Questions
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Introduction
Early in human history, people recognized fire as both a tool and a danger. We
could easily say the same thing about information—the right information in the
wrong hands has probably destroyed almost as many companies as fires have.
Therefore, borrowing an architectural term used to denote a structure for con­
taining a potential disaster seems apropos. A firewall, when discussed in the realm
of computers, prevents unauthorized access to protected networks from users
outside the protected network.
Firewalls likely serve as the most important component to network security,
second only to the physical security of the network. Prior to the Internet, most
firewalls were used in networks that protected high-security installations where
employees had distinct security ratings, such as defense contractors. Firewalls were
originally employed for the purpose of allowing certain employees to connect to
the inner sanctum of the company’s data as a form of access control.
The Internet has changed the purpose and function of the firewall. By plug­
ging in a single cable, a network administrator has the potential to make a company’s data as accessible to the CEO as it is to the other six billion people on the
planet.The new breed of firewall needs to allow a small population of that six bil­
lion to have expanded access, and the rest must be stopped at the door. All this
must be accomplished with the flexibility to protect against attacks that hackers
haven’t even invented yet. Of course, a piece of hardware cannot take the place of a
well-crafted security policy that incorporates all aspects of the network. However,
in many installations the firewall is the only manifestation of the security policy.
To that end, we are going to examine the basic building blocks of modern
firewalls. Once we understand what makes a firewall tick, we have to find out
which of the two major types of firewalls—proxy or stateful inspection—are
right for your organization.There’s a big difference between the two, and it
comes down to a trade-off between functionality and performance. Finally, we’ll
round out this firewall festival with a discussion on all the major vendors and
what makes them so special.
Understanding Firewall Basics
Firewalls need to do more than just protect the good guys from the bad guys.
The United States government has taken an active interest in computer security
since well before the first integrated circuit rolled off the assembly lines. With
this in mind, it makes sense to examine the government’s regulations on
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
firewalls…except there aren’t any. Similar to the movie industry, firewall manu­
facturers police themselves.
Seal of Approval
ICSA Labs, a division of TruSecure Corporation, provides firewall certification
based on the input of the Firewall Product Developer’s Consortium (FWPD), a
46-member organization of the who’s who in network security
(www.icsalabs.com/html/communities/firewalls/membership).This certification
is an important seal of approval for the industry but does not imply that a partic­
ular firewall is fit for your network.The goal of the ICSA Labs certification is to
ensure that what a vendor markets as a firewall actually operates in a firewall
capacity.The network firewall criteria are available for download and center on a
set of feature tests.The specific objectives for personal firewalls spells things out
more clearly:
■
Capability to support Microsoft Networking capabilities while providing
endpoint protection
■
Capability to support concurrent dial-up and LAN connectivity
■
Capability to block common external network attacks
■
Capability to restrict outgoing network communications
■
Capability to maintain consistent protection across multiple successive
dial-up connections
■
Capability to log events in a consistent and useful manner
All the firewalls that we discuss later in this chapter have attained ICSA Labs
certification. Being the only barometer for the industry, you should demand that
your next firewall vendor has passed this important baseline certification. Attaining
this certification is not so much an award the vendor receives, but a seal of approval
that their product will perform as anyone would expect a modern firewall to perform.To aid you in selecting a firewall, after reading this chapter you should also
check out the Firewall Buyers’ Guide produced by ICSA Labs
(www.trusecure.com/cgi-bin/download.cgi?ESCD=W0048&file=doc594.pdf ).
A firewall has to do more than just protect a secure network from a lesssecure network. If a firewall only needed to do that, couldn’t you just cut the
cable connecting the two networks? That would protect the secure network from
any computer that couldn’t lob nuclear missiles. Firewalls need to allow com­
puters from the secure side to access information on the public side: “Packets get
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out but they don’t get in.” All firewalls must allow access to the outside world.
Conceivably, this would include full, unfettered access, which some firewalls do
provide, but the ICSA 4.0 criteria only test firewalls against the following services:Telnet, Active and Passive FTP, HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, DNS, POP3, and
IMAP. Unless allowed by a security rule, a firewall needs to prevent all access into
the network from the outside world.
Security Rules
Every firewall processes traffic based on an ordered set of rules.These rules could
be considered the heart of the firewall. A body of security rules specifies not only
what can come into a site but also what is allowed to leave a site. Most people
would think that a proper security policy concentrates only on what can come
into a site. Most network administrators trust their internal networks, so they
usually don’t consider outgoing traffic a problem. Unfortunately, that assumption
is exactly what has made worms such as SQL Slammer, mass-mailing viruses like
Melissa, and other malicious traffic possible.
A proper set of security rules should consider what type of traffic needs to
leave the organization. A common security policy allows all outbound traffic to
be permitted.The reason is simple—at 3 A.M. when configuring the firewall, the
last thing you want to do is guess at what services to which your users are going
to want access. Sure, it’s easy to assume that they will want Web access (outbound
HTTP and HTTPS), but what else? Do you want to make a rule for every flavor
of instant messaging program that lives on your users’ desktops? Certainly not.
Therefore, we just allow all forms of traffic outbound and call it a night.
Unfortunately, this means that you’ve not only allowed legitimate traffic (such
as Web browsing and FTP downloads), you also open your network up to Trojan
programs. Malicious code writers know that most companies allow everything
out, so they create their evil programs and hide them in pretty screen savers.Your
users download and execute the screen saver, and in the background, the Trojan
program starts up.To communicate back to the author, it starts an outbound ses­
sion from your network to his machine. Since everything was allowed, the pecu­
liar traffic destined for port 31337 isn’t stopped by the firewall because it is
traveling from the trusted internal network to the untrusted external network.
A much better plan would be to follow the “most restrictive” strategy: allow
only what your users need and block everything else by default.This will result in
more phone calls to your helpdesk, but it is the most secure method of operating.
Start out with only allowing common outbound services: DNS, FTP, HTTP, and
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
HTTPS. When a request comes in for additional access (for example, outbound on
port 5190 for ICQ chat services), evaluate the request in a business context and
determine whether it should be allowed. Document the requestor and his stated
purpose for the added access.Then, determine if you would be better served
opening up this access to all users (if it’s a common request) or just for this user.
This strategy is not limited to user workstations, however. For example, why
should your corporate Web server need to access other external Web servers?
HTTP traffic on Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 80 coming from your
Web server and headed toward the Internet could be an indication of an infected
host. Some worms (in particular, Code Red and NIMDA) spread by having one
Web server contact other Web servers and attempt to infect these foreign targets. A
firewall rule that only allows the corporate Web server to respond to Web requests,
but not initiate any of its own, would prevent such a problem.
Notes from the Underground…
Outbound 31337 Is Not Very Elite
In August 1998 (yes, ancient by Internet calendars), the smart folks over
at the Cult of the Dead Cow group (some would call them hackers) cre­
ated “Back Orifice,” a Trojan program that allows remote attackers to con­
trol a victim’s machine. Borrowing its name from the Microsoft Windows
BackOffice suite of applications, Back Orifice is installed on a machine
after it has been compromised, leaving the attacker with back-door access
at some point in the future. While the listening port is configurable, many
amateur attackers leave the default port of TCP 31337 running. Upon
hearing this, one can easily draw the conclusion that any inbound traffic
on TCP 31337 showing up in IDS logs is malicious in nature (either
someone probing for Back Orifice or someone using Back Orifice).
However, this is still reactionary—looking at logs of a problem and taking
action (hopefully) after the machine in infected.
The question that sage firewall admins should be asking is, “Does our
corporate Web server have any reason to be communicating outbound on
port 31337? For that matter, does it have any business communicating
outbound from any ports other than TCP 80 and 443?” Construct your
firewall rules such that Web servers are only allowed specific outbound
ports on which to communicate. This will give you an important layer of
Continued
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defense should your server fall victim to Back Orifice. And, for those who
are curious but haven’t figured it out yet, 31337 was picked because if
you stare at the numbers long enough (and change 3 to “e,” 1 to “l,” and
7 to “t”), it spells out the word elite, a common term of distinction among
the hacker community.
Hardware or Software
Firewalls usually take the form of either a computer running a common oper­
ating system (OS) with the firewall software installed on top, or a purpose-built
hardware appliance that the manufacturer intended as a firewall from the ground
up.Those that fall into the latter category either run on pre-hardened versions of
a common, general-purpose OS (such as NetBSD or Solaris), or they run a cus­
tomized, real-time OS that was only intended to run the firewall.Table 3.1 intro­
duces the major vendors and where their products line up in the marketplace.
Table 3.1 Firewall Vendors and Types
Firewall Vendor
Form
OS
3Com Corporation & SonicWALL
Check Point Software Technologies
Cisco Systems, Inc.
CyberGuard
Microsoft
NetScreen
Novell
Secure Computing
Stonesoft, Inc.
Symantec Corporation
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
Hardware
Both
Hardware
Hardware
Software
Hardware
Software
Hardware
Software
Software
Hardware
Custom
Windows, Solaris, IPSO
Custom
Custom
Windows 2000 Server
Custom
NetWare
Custom
Linux
Windows, Solaris
Custom
Microsoft ISA Server and Symantec Enterprise Firewall fall into the software
category, while the Cisco PIX firewalls fall into the hardware appliance category.
Interestingly enough, Check Point FireWall-1 falls into both categories: it can be
installed on a common OS (Solaris or Windows), but through a partnership with
Nokia, most Check Point firewalls actually run on Nokia IPSO appliances.
The vendors that do run as pure software installed on a common, general-purpose OS usually employ some form of hardening process so that hackers do not
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
compromise the security of the underlying OS. Rather than try to subvert the fire­
wall, they could just attack the OS that is hosting the firewall and cause that
machine to route packets before the firewall sees them, or just obtain a remote ter­
minal session with the desktop and change the security policy altogether.
Axent Raptor, the predecessor to Symantec’s Enterprise Firewall, runs a ser­
vice called “Vulture” to kill any rogue processes (such as viruses,Trojans, or other
malicious applications) that attempt to start. Rather than lock the Windows OS
down such that outside programs can’t infect the server, the Vulture “watchdog”
process just makes sure that no new processes start up once the firewall is
installed. Similarly, Novell’s BorderManager, which runs on NetWare, requires a
special version of the NetWare core SERVER.EXE file to prevent access to the
console before authenticating to the machine.
Manufacturers that specialize in hardware appliances will often flaunt the secu­
rity holes in general-purpose OS as a weakness of products that run on those plat­
forms. Furthermore, they’ll usually state that hardware appliances have better
security since the firmware that runs them has no other function.The argument
seems to make sense, but it doesn’t cover every situation. Check Point Firewall-1
and Symantec Enterprise Firewall easily exceed the minimum ICSA requirements,
while numerous hardware appliances have needed firmware upgrades to fix secu­
rity holes.Therefore, you cannot make a judgment about a firewall’s security based
mainly on this one aspect.You do, however, need to know into which category
your firewall falls because each type presents a different challenge to hackers.
In the end, the decision of which firewall type to use is more of a personal
preference.You should select your firewall according primarily to which features
you need. Only as a secondary or tertiary criteria should you consider the
delivery format—hardware or software. For many, us included, the ease of a plugand-play hardware appliance is very attractive. If something goes wrong, just slide
in a new appliance and off you go. Others might not want to pay the extra
money for a purpose-built custom appliance, and instead would like to repurpose
some of their old servers that can be converted to use as a firewall. Depending
on your organization and the budget you have for your firewall, you will natu­
rally gravitate to either the hardware (more expensive, usually higher perfor­
mance) or software (able to repurpose old hardware at substantial savings) types
of firewall.
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Chapter 3 • Selecting the Correct Firewall
Administrative Interfaces
For the most part, any firewall will not work the way you need it to for your indi­
vidual organization straight out of the box. Firewalls are not a “one size fits all”
solution; each firewall requires individual tinkering and tweaking so that it fits your
needs.Therefore, all firewalls require an administrative interface to make these
changes to their configuration and security policies. Administrative interfaces can
take many forms. Hardware appliances can use a simple serial connection for the
initial setup and then allow the user to switch to Telnet or a graphical user interface
(GUI) installed on an administrative machine.The GUI could be a proprietary
application or an open standard, such as a Web browser. Software firewalls will typi­
cally have an interface directly on the machine, but many also allow for remote
access configuration. (See Figures 3.1 through 3.4.)
Figure 3.1 Initial Serial Connection
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Figure 3.2 SonicWALL Administrative GUI Using a Web Browser
Figure 3.3 Cisco PIX Administrative GUI Using a Java Web Applet
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Chapter 3 • Selecting the Correct Firewall
Figure 3.4 Check Point Firewall-1 Administrative GUI Using Proprietary
Application
Since the administrative interface allows the user to configure the firewall,
this feature needs special security to protect itself from hackers. All decent fire­
walls need at the very least an option to prevent reconfiguration of the firewall
from an untrusted network. Better firewalls will allow for secure remote adminis­
tration, such as through proprietary software or an open standard such as SSL.
You must understand all remote access features of your firewall because hackers
will often attack these first. We will look at the types of administrative interfaces
for major firewall vendors later in this chapter.
NOTE
If you can easily change your firewall rules from outside your trusted
network, a hacker might be able to do the same. Before enabling remote
administration of your firewall, carefully weigh the risks versus the
rewards. If you work 60 hours a week onsite, you probably have ample
time to craft your security policies in the office, so you probably don’t
need remote administration. If you work as a consultant, administering
dozens of networks for your customers, you probably couldn’t do your
job without it. Moreover, if you’re not sure what you have to worry
about with remote administration, keep reading…
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Traffic Interfaces
Firewalls protect resources by delineating what needs protecting versus from where
the attacks could come. Many people refer to this as “us” versus “them.” Firewalls
usually do this by acting as a highly selective router between the trusted network
that needs protecting and the untrusted network full of potential hackers. Standard
routers can add a great deal of latency to a network, so a firewall could make this
worse. Firewalls work with complex rule sets that require fast processors and fast
connections. Network administrators need to make sure that the firewall they
choose can process information quickly enough to keep up with their network.
Many firewalls now have 100 Mbps interfaces, so network administrators often
assume that their firewalls can pass traffic that quickly. In most cases, this simply
isn’t true. Fortunately, most networks probably don’t need a firewall that moves
traffic that quickly.
DMZ Interfaces
Network engineers often speak of a network gray area called the “demilitarized
zone,” or DMZ.The DMZ contains resources that need protecting from the out­
side world but from which the majority of the inside world needs protecting. For
example, a company that hosts its Web server onsite needs to allow traffic from
the outside world into the Web server. A typical setup will look something like
Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5 Firewall without a DMZ
Trusted Network
Web Server
100 Mbps
T1 Serial
(1.54 Mbps)
Mail
Server
100 Mbps
Internet
Firewall
(without DMZ)
End-User
1
End-User
2
End-User
3
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Chapter 3 • Selecting the Correct Firewall
At a minimum, the firewall needs to pass Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP) traffic on TCP port 80. However, what happens when a security hole in
the operating system allows a hacker to take control of the Web server through
traffic sent as a Web request? Once this happens, the hacker can then use the
Web server as a stage to mount an attack against the rest of the network. If we
re-examine Figure 3.5, we immediately see that the Web server sits on the
trusted network.The firewall cannot protect any of the workstations from the
Web server, so once the hacker controls the Web server, all of the attacks come
from inside the protected network.
Let’s compare this to Figure 3.6. Here, the firewall has a DMZ interface for
the Web server so that the Web server is not on the same network as the workstations. Since all traffic from the Web server to the trusted network must travel
through the firewall, the network administrator can set up security policies to
prevent a rogue machine in the DMZ from compromising the entire network.
Figure 3.6 Firewall with DMZ
DMZ
100 Mbps
DMZ
Interface
88
Web
Server
100 Mbps
Mail
Server
100 Mbps
Internet
T1 Serial
(1.54 Mbps)
100 Mbps
Trusted Network
Firewall
(with DMZ)
End-User 1
End-User 2
End-User 3
Now, speed becomes an issue. In Figure 3.5, the firewall could only accept
traffic to and from the Internet at T1 speeds (1.54 Mbps). Most decent firewalls
can handle this amount of traffic without slowing the network. However, in
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Figure 3.6, the workstations must go through the firewall to get to the Web
server, just as the computers from the Internet. However, unlike the Internet, the
path from the trusted network to the Web server use only 100 Mbps links.This
presents a network design challenge.
Need for Speed
Almost any firewall will pass the traffic, but only the better firewalls will do it
without significantly compromising the speed. Does your network need this
much speed? Can your CFO afford this much speed? This is the challenge. Of
course, even the best firewall will introduce latency to the network. What if your
network needs even more speed than the best firewall can achieve, but you still
want a DMZ? Some switch vendors produce equipment that can do multilayer
switching (MLS), which you can use to create DMZs that need more speed than
security policy flexibility. We’ll take a look at these closer in Chapter 7,
“Network Switching.”
Additional Interfaces
Not all firewalls have the capacity to create a DMZ, while for others the DMZ is
not a singular entity. Some firewalls have more than three interfaces allowing for
multiple DMZs. Software firewalls usually have an advantage here since most of
these are built on computers that can easily accommodate additional network
interface cards (NICs), which the firewall turns into the various networks (Figure
3.7). Some firewalls also include an auxiliary port (Cisco even names theirs
“AUX”) for plain old modem or ISDN backup in case the primary interfaces die.
Figure 3.7 WatchGuard Firebox X1000 Integrated Security Appliance,
Showing Multiple DMZ Interfaces
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Logging
All firewalls need to keep track of what they see happening on the network.
Without a log, an administrator would have little warning of an attack in
progress. Low-end firewalls will only log security exceptions and don’t have the
capacity to keep the logs for an extended period of time. High-end firewalls gen­
erally have richer logging features that show both potential problems and usage
trends.These enhanced logs can also track the traffic leaving your site. Beyond
just security, these logs can give you an idea of how much of your bandwidth is
being used, who’s using it, and when.These statistics can help you in your next
budget meeting with the CFO when you want to ask for a faster connection to
the Internet.
Damage & Defense…
You Can’t Just Track the Inbound Traffic
Most network administrators take a quick look at the logs to check for
hacking attempts, and then ignore them, never realizing that they should
also track what leaves the company. Believe it or not, not everyone at
work works all of the time—say it ain’t so! Santa didn’t install the
Christmas Light desktop decorations and his little helpers didn’t down­
load Elf bowling by themselves. These things might merely annoy you, but
some employees take a big step past this and actually commit cyber
crimes from within your network. When the police, or the lawyers, or the
police with lawyers trace this back, they’ll probably only know that it
came from your network. Then, they’ll eventually come to you to trace it
to the real perpetrator. If your firewall tracks this activity, you can easily
feed the right person to the wolves and the company can put the whole
sordid mess behind it. If your firewall doesn’t track this information—and
you were overlooked for a promotion last year—you can always just point
the authorities at your boss and solve two problems at once!
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Optional Features
Just about every firewall has the previous features, but the following optional cat­
egories help to differentiate the products:
■
Network Address Translation
■
Port Address Translation
■
Advanced routing
■
Point to Point Protocol over Ethernet
■
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Client and Server
■
Virtual private networks
■
Clustering and high availability
■
URL filtering
■
Content filtering
■
Antivirus protection
When buying a firewall, nothing substitutes for security, but with all other
things being equal, the extras can tip the balance.
Network Address
Translation and Port Address Translation
Every machine that communicates across the Internet needs a unique Internet
Protocol (IP) address—or so the story goes. Engineers started noticing that even
32
though a 32-bit address space creates up to 4,294,967,294 (2 –2) usable IP
addresses, many of these addresses get wasted by organizations taking huge blocks
that they barely use. As a result, the rulers of the Internet foresaw a time when
we would run out of IP addresses and have to abandon IPv4 (which we all know
and love) for IPv6, with a much greater capacity for addresses. In the short term,
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) established what eventually evolved
into Request For Comment (RFC) 1918.
RFC 1918 (ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc1918.txt) specifies which IP
addresses network administrators can use privately.These addresses allow compa­
nies to give each of their machines a unique IP address within the company
without having to pay for them and without having to worry about conflicting
with another machine at another company.The addresses don’t conflict because,
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as per RFC 1918, Internet routers do not route these IP addresses.Therefore,
these IP addresses work fine for companies internally, but they do not allow users
to access information on the Internet.
Notes from the Underground…
1918: A Year to Remember?
An important reason to remember RFC 1918 is the near ubiquity with
which it is used in internal networks. As you can see from Table 3.2, RFC
1918 provides more than enough address space for even the largest
organizations to uniquely identify every network device on their internal
network.
Table 3.2 RFC 1918 Private Address Space
IP Address Range
Number of
Usable Hosts
Number of Class C
Subnets
10.0.0.0–10.255.255.255
172.16.0.0–172.31.255.255
192.168.0.0–192.168.255.255
16,777,214
1,048,574
65,534
65,536
4,096
256
Most people select the 10.0.0.0 network for the simplicity of the
numbers involved (it’s much easier to remember your corporate IP
address space as being “ten-dot-something” instead of “one-nine-twodot-one-six-eight-dot-something”). However, most organizations never
even dream of having more than 16 million network devices. Most home
users will recognize the 192.168.0.0 address space because it is most
often used with SOHO routers and firewalls.
So, you have RFC 1918 private addresses on your internal hosts, but we just
said that these special addresses are not allowed on the Internet. So, how do we
convert from private to public address space? Network Address Translation
(NAT) solves this by proxying the internal requests for Internet services using a
registered public address (or addresses) controlled by the device performing NAT.
In short, NAT allows all of the private addresses to act as public addresses for
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outgoing requests. Since the Internet does not route private addresses, this also
adds a layer of security to the workstations since the Internet community never
sees the true IP address of the workstations. If a hacker tries to access a NATed
workstation using the reported public IP address, the hacker merely attacks the
device doing the NATing, which, in the case of firewalls, is designed to with­
stand these attacks.
Private addresses may add security because no one can route to them, but
this would also prevent users from accessing Web servers behind a firewall. NAT
takes this into account and can map a public address back to a private address if
necessary. In the case of a Web server, an administrator would probably only want
to accept HTTP traffic for a Web server not running Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).
In this case, only TCP port 80 would get mapped. Many vendors refer to this as
Port Address Translation (PAT) instead of NAT.
Tools & Traps…
Creative IP Addressing with RFC 1918
You could just take the RFC 1918 private address space at face value and
start handing out addresses with the first available one, and continue
from there. A much more effective IP addressing schema would be to use
the flexibility that all those extra IP addresses provides. For most of our
customer networks that we design, we usually set aside distinct class C
subnet “chunks” to represent different classes of network devices. For
example, 172.16.x.x could represent your Los Angeles office, and
172.17.x.x could be New York, and so on. Further breaking down the net­
work into “purpose” classes can help administration as well. For example,
x.x.0.x can be networking devices such as routers, x.x.8.x can be servers,
x.x.16.x can be peripherals like network printers or copiers, and x.x.32.x
can be the average user range. The value comes in later during log anal­
ysis. If you get an alert from your SNMP management console (see
Chapter 12, “Secure Network Management” for more information), you
can instantly tell that a brute-force password attempt coming from
172.17.32.14 is a user workstation in your New York office, and that a
high amount of outbound SMTP traffic from any network other than your
Los Angeles mail server at 172.16.8.11 should be investigated.
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Advanced Routing
Most firewalls also need to act as routers since they usually connect at least two
different subnets. A simple network can set up all of the routers to use static
routing tables, but a large network needs more flexibility. Since the firewall works
as a router, the firewall might also need to run routing protocols such as Routing
Information Protocol (RIP) or Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) just as the rest
of the networking equipment does. Not all firewalls do this, so if you need this
feature, check the specifications carefully.
NOTE
For more information on routing tables and routing protocols, refer to
Chapter 5, “Routing Devices and Protocols.”
Point to Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE)
Telecommunication providers at the consumer level use PPPoE on Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) broadband connections to force their broadband cus­
tomers to authenticate their connections as though they’re using a dial-up connection.This allows the regional telecommunication providers to only allocate
the IP address as a station needs it.This works great for the phone company, but
for consumers it’s just one more thing to go wrong. Often, firewalls connect
directly into the telecommunication provider’s DSL modem, which means that
the firewall must have PPPoE capabilities for the connection to work.
Fortunately, most business-class DSL services do not use PPPoE, so you prob­
ably won’t see this in most offices. As for residential broadband, if the DSL
provider in your area uses PPPoE, check to see if you can get a cable modem in
your area, since those never use PPPoE and the speed is usually as good or better
than DSL.
Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol (DHCP) Client and Server
DHCP allows machines to automatically get IP addresses or assign addresses,
depending on whether the machine acts as a client or a server. Most firewalls
today can do both simultaneously, although from different interfaces. If a site gets
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a dynamic address from the ISP, the firewall will need to act as a DHCP client
on the outside interface.To ease configuration on the inside equipment, many
firewalls can dole out private addresses on the inside interface.This can make for
easy configurations since the firewall can then dispense information that it
gleaned from connecting to the Internet, such as Domain Name Services (DNS)
servers, to the machines on the trusted network. Administrators at large networks
probably have another machine doing this already (perhaps even one integrated
with your Microsoft Active Directory), but smaller networks might need this.
Note too, that DHCP does provide a slight information security risk in the ease
in which an attacker can receive valuable reconnaissance information about your
network. However, each company’s individual security policy must balance the
ease of use with protection of IP addressing information.
Virtual Private Networks
Virtual private networks (VPNs) allow remote users or remote sites to connect to
each other securely over the Internet. In the beginning, companies rolled out
VPNs for employees who wanted to work from home, but they still connected
remote offices to each other through expensive WAN links, such as point-to-point
T1s.Today’s VPNs can create secure tunnels to each other using relatively inexpen­
sive links to the Internet instead of paying for a dedicated link between offices.
Some companies produce VPNs as separate products from their firewalls and
recommend running these devices in parallel or behind a firewall.These vendors
usually recommend removing the VPN functions from the firewall due to the
processor-intensive nature of the VPN connections.This makes sense in some sit­
uations, but current high-end firewalls have enough processing power to handle
both functions. Generally, a firewall with a built-in VPN costs less than a compa­
rable firewall without VPN capabilities and a separate VPN. In addition, it usually
takes less effort to configure and maintain one box instead of two.
Clustering and High Availability
Most administrators have heard of clustering servers, but not everyone has heard of
clustering firewalls. Any network is only as resilient as its weakest link. Most net­
works lose access to the Internet when the firewall dies, which might inconve­
nience many companies, but won’t kill the business if it doesn’t come up for a few
hours. However, if your business involves a Web site taking credit card orders, every
minute that customers can’t see the site costs your company money.You might
have “five nines” uptime on your servers, but—proverbially—if a server falls in the
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woods with no one around to hear it, will your company have enough cash for
your paycheck to clear?
Clustering firewalls allows for a hot-standby firewall to take up the slack if
one dies. In some advanced setups, multiple firewalls can load balance, and if any
one firewall dies, the remaining firewalls take up the slack. Most times, firewalls
are mirrored in an “HA” or high availability setup, where one firewall is the
“active” member (passing traffic) and the other is the “standby” member waiting
in the wings. We cover this topic more later in the section Stateful Failover.
URL Filtering, Content
Filtering, and Antivirus Protection
Most firewalls can block simple Universal Resource Locators (URLs), but most
cannot block specific content or even recognize viruses. Many firewalls, however,
have third-party support for companies that compile databases of Web sites and
then categorize the sites (WebSense and SurfControl, to name just two).
Administrators can then subscribe to this service and download the lists to the fire­
wall. Once the firewall has these lists, the administrator can then determine the
type of content permissible for viewing. Usual categories include sexually explicit
material, hate sites, gambling, drug use, and things of that nature. High-end firewalls
will often allow the administrator to match the content rules to specific worksta­
tions based on an IP address, but even better firewalls (or third-party applications)
will take this a step further and integrate this information into the company’s
directory (for example, Microsoft’s Active Directory or Novell’s eDirectory) and
allow the administrator to make exceptions based on users rather than computers.
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Notes from the Underground…
Think about the Children
Many network administrators consider inappropriate content a social
problem and not a technological one. Everyone’s an adult here, so what’s
the harm? However, if you run a school network, now you have kids
accessing the Internet, so everything changes. Some schools will cry
poverty and claim that they can’t afford filtering software, but the reality
is that the poorest schools qualify for Federal subsidies (E-rate) for
Internet access. One caveat is, though, that the site must have filtering
software installed as per the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA),
www.sl.universalservice.org/reference/CIPA.asp. For a coherent explana­
tion of E-rate, see www.kelloggllc.com/erate/primer_02.pdf.
Better firewalls will also allow administrators to subscribe to third-party prod­
ucts that scan all traffic for viruses and hostile applets and then kill them before
they ever reach the users. Even if you have antivirus protection on the machines, it
doesn’t hurt to eradicate these bugs before they ever hit your network.
Exploring Stateful Packet Firewalls
Quite possibly, the most underrated feature among modern firewalls is their
capability to be “stateful” with their routing and pass/drop decisions. In other
words, modern firewalls are able to ascertain if a transmission is in response to a
request that originated on the trusted network, or a transmission that originated
on the scary “outside” network.This might sound simple since this is what we
expect from our firewalls when we write in our security policy “must allow out­
bound connections but no inbound connections.” In reality, what we are asking
our firewalls to do is to “allow all outbound connections, allow all inbound
responses to those outbound connections, and block all other inbound attempts.”
What Is a Stateless Firewall?
Any conversation on stateful firewalls should really begin with a look at how bad
it really could be: stateless firewalls. Although you won’t find anyone selling a
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stateless firewall, it does exist as a concept. Basically, it would involve a very literal
interpretation to your security policy without much “business logic” to make the
device perform adequately. In essence, a stateless firewall would do “what you
told it to do and nothing more,” when what you really want is a firewall that will
“do what I mean, not what I say.”
For an example of a stateless firewall, imagine a router that is being forced to
perform firewall-like functions.The following example uses notation that appears
alarmingly similar to Cisco IOS, but it is purely for illustration. In Cisco’s
defense, their routers (with the appropriate Firewall Feature Set) include the
Adaptive Security Algorithm (ASA), which allows them to operate more securely
than the following demonstration. Let’s start with a basic security policy for
Company XYZ:
10. permit outbound from 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port to any_ip on any_port
20. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.11 on smtp
30. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.13 on http
40. deny all
Pretty basic—we have two rules to allow Web and e-mail to flow to our
servers, we have the obligatory deny all statement for completeness at the end,
and we have the rule to allow outbound connections from our network to for­
eign locations on the Internet. We’ve even gone so far as to practice good secu­
rity policies by specifying the source network (172.17.x.x) where our internal
hosts are coming from. So, why can’t the CEO get to eBay? A quick peek at the
firewall log gives us a clue:
12:01:14 src=172.17.32.142:1025 dst=4.2.2.2:53 action=PASS rule=10
12:01:15 src=4.2.2.2:53 dst=172.17.32.142:1025 action=DROP rule=40
12:01:16 src=172.17.32.142:1025 dst=4.2.2.2:53 action=PASS rule=10
12:01:17 src=4.2.2.2:53 dst=172.17.32.142:1025 action=DROP rule=40
Right away we can see that to get to www.eBay.com, his machine must first
do a lookup on his ISP-provided DNS server (4.2.2.2, the Genuity DNS server
with the most memorable IP address ever). When the DNS server attempts to
respond, the firewall is dropping the packets.Therefore, we add this rule, just
above rule 20:
19. permit inbound from any_ip on dns to 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port
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Now, we head over to the CEO, confident in our abilities, and ask him to try it
again. Still nothing. Now the CEO is getting steamed because the auction close is
coming soon, and he needs a new leather laptop bag. Back to the firewall log:
12:08:21 src=172.17.32.142:1027 dst=4.2.2.2:53 action=PASS rule=10
12:08:22 src=4.2.2.2:53 dst=172.17.32.142:1027 action=PASS rule=19
12:08:23 src=172.17.32.142:1027 dst=66.135.208.101:80 action=PASS rule=10
12:08:24 src=66.135.208.101:80 dst=172.17.32.142:1027 action=DROP rule=40
We forgot to allow for Web traffic to respond back. With little time to spare,
you react without thinking and add another ill-conceived permit statement to
your access list, and another, and another, until the CEO is able to bid on his
item and chat with his daughter on AOL Instant Messenger:
16. permit inbound from any_ip on http to 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port
17. permit inbound from any_ip on https to 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port
18. permit inbound from any_ip on 5190 to 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port
The CEO is happy, you’re happy, and you go home feeling on top of the
world. Later that night, the 13-year-old in southern Yemen who just got infected
with the latest HTTP-borne worm leaves his computer on while he goes to
school.The worm sends packets to your network, infects your Accounting server,
infects your CEO’s computer, and manages to transmit sensitive documents across
e-mail to a hacker in Western Fraudikstan, just outside Moscow. Let’s watch that
again, in slow motion:
23:13:02 src=147.45.35.40:53 dst=172.17.32.142:139 action=PASS rule=19
23:13:03 src=147.45.35.40:80 dst=172.17.8.18:80 action=PASS rule=19
23:13:04 src=172.17.32.142:1034 dst=147.45.35.40:25 action=PASS rule=10
23:13:05 src=172.17.8.18:1026 dst=147.45.35.40:25 action=PASS rule=10
The rules you added were too permissive and while they did let in the
responses to your CEO’s Web requests, they also allowed packets that originated
outside the firewall to walk right in. Since your outbound policy does not
specify that workstations cannot transmit mail directly to the outside world (even
though you have a corporate mail server), your trade secrets are now sitting in
some evil-doers’ Inbox. But what else are you to do? If only there was a way to
keep track of the outbound conversations.
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Keeping Track of Conversations
We’ve seen that allowing a broad selection of network traffic (such as HTTP
inbound) is a really bad idea due to the security implications. If we instruct the
router to keep track of packets (or more specifically, of conversations) that exit the
network, we will be able to allow the response to those queries to enter the network.This is most commonly implemented in a sessions table. Sometimes referred
to as a state table, this is the essence of “keeping state” of the conversations.This is
what separates a simple packet filtering firewall/router from a stateful inspection
firewall.
When network requests pass from the internal segment to the external seg­
ment, the firewall makes a note of the host that initiated the request, the target,
and the corresponding ports (source and destination).Then, it alters the security
policy just slightly to allow a “pinhole” entrance for the return traffic. Let’s look
at our previous example of our CEO attempting to reach eBay, but with a
stateful firewall.This time, let’s start with the original security policy:
10. permit outbound from 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port to any_ip on any_port
20. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.11 on smtp
30. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.13 on http
40. deny all
We are allowing everything outbound from our internal network and only
allowing external access to our mail and Web server—looks good so far. Now
let’s watch as our CEO’s laptop performs a DNS request to resolve
www.eBay.com:
14:38:39 src=172.17.32.142:1025 dst=4.2.2.2:53 action=PASS rule=10
Upon seeing this traffic exit the router, an entry in the session table will be
made, indicating that 172.17.32.142 has sent traffic to 4.2.2.2 on port 53.The
result can best be visualized if we assume that the router quickly rewrites the
security policy and inserts the following rule at the very top, before rule 10:
9. permit inbound from host 4.2.2.2 on dns to host 172.17.32.142 on 1025
This “pinhole” window in the security policy is what the DNS server needs
to respond to the query. After the traffic passes through the router, from the out­
side to the internal segment, the rule is immediately deleted to prevent someone
from piggybacking on that rule.The response comes back to the CEO’s laptop
and then a Web request goes out:
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14:38:40 src=4.2.2.2:53 dst=172.17.32.142:1025 action=PASS rule=9
14:38:41 src=172.17.32.142:1027 dst=66.135.208.101:80 action=PASS rule=10
Again, the “pinhole” opens:
8. permit inbound from host 66.135.208.101 on http to host 172.17.32.142 on
1027
and the return traffic is able to come back in to your network:
14:38:43 src=66.135.208.101:80 dst=172.17.32.142:1027 action=PASS rule=8
What is most important to realize about this whole transaction is that no
administrator intervention was needed to modify the security policy.The best
part is that after the return Web traffic reached the laptop, the security policy is
back to the original rule set with the pinhole permit statements removed:
8.
<deleted>
9.
<deleted>
10. permit outbound from 172.17.0.0/16 on any_port to any_ip on any_port
20. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.11 on smtp
30. permit inbound from any_ip on any_port to host 172.17.8.13 on http
40. deny all
Too Much Chatter
This previous example of processing network traffic works great if you just have
one host accessing external resources at any given time. What happens when
multiple hosts try to reach external resources simultaneously? Well, the router or
firewall must then store the requests in a First in First Out (FIFO) buffer and
store more lines in the sessions table. Many modern firewalls can handle incred­
ible amounts of simultaneous conversations measured in the maximum size of
their sessions table.The higher-end firewalls have more memory and can store
many more sessions than a SOHO firewall that perhaps is better suited for home
networks of 10 or less machines.
When the number of sessions exceeds the memory available for the state
table, the oldest session is dropped from the table and no longer tracked.This
means that when the response to that particular request (perhaps the HTTP
traffic back from a Web server) gets to the firewall/router, there will be no pin­
hole permit statement to allow that traffic through the firewall.Thus, the traffic
will be dropped and the end user will experience a loss of connectivity.
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Stateful Failover
In larger firewall deployments, high availability is mandatory, which means at a
minimum, two firewalls in a mirrored configuration. As mentioned previously,
you could also cluster firewalls (three or more) to balance the load of traffic
across many firewalls. In either case, there needs to be a mechanism to determine
when there is a failure in the system. In mirrored firewall configurations, a heart­
beat function allows the standby firewall(s) to determine if there was a failure in
the primary firewall. Most times, this is a simple one-packet “ping” to determine
whether the other firewall is online.
If there is a lot of traffic going to the firewalls, there exists a possibility for
this ping packet to be lost in the noise of regular traffic.Therefore, most heart­
beat implementations will have a dedicated crossover cable between the mirrored
pairs so that there is no chance of latency or dropped packets.This dedicated
heartbeat network offers a nice secondary benefit: a high-speed data transfer
method for state or session table information.
Even if a vendor claims that their firewall has failover capabilities, only the
very best will offer stateful failover.The difference between the two is simple:
■
Normal failover simply boots up the standby firewall when the primary
is down.
■
Stateful failover means that the session table and other operational infor­
mation is transferred to the secondary firewall so that it can pick up
exactly where the other firewall left off.
When stateful failover happens, the end user should not notice any difference.
Many times, the only way to know that a stateful failover happened is by looking
at the log file. In contrast, a stateless failover (or just a regular failover) will be
noticed by LAN users because they will have a momentary loss of network con­
nection (2 to 10 seconds) and might have to retry their most recent Web request
or e-mail transmission.The reason is that in stateless failover, the newly activated
firewall (the standby one) springs to life without any prior knowledge of active sessions.Therefore, when HTTP requests leave via the primary firewall, the failover
happens, and then HTTP responses come in via the secondary firewall, they will
appear to be unauthorized access attempts and will be blocked. If there were any
VPN connections to the firewall from remote clients or from distant partner net­
works, these will have to be manually reestablished and a new key exchange will
have to take place.This can introduce a level of latency or LAN-to-LAN VPN
failure that is unacceptable to very integrated business partners.
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In stateful failover, the newly activated firewall will have an up-to-the-second
session table so it will be able to process that return HTTP traffic immediately.
VPN sessions and key exchange information will also be preserved so no connec­
tions will be dropped. As stated previously, the easiest and most common way that
firewall vendors implement this is via a dedicated cross-over cable, as illustrated in
Figure 3.8. Part of the heartbeat process includes sending updates of the session
table to the secondary firewall so it has a mostly updated table. When the primary
reaches a fatal error and needs to shut down, it sends a copy of its routing table,
session table, and other pertinent information over the dedicated link and then
dies. In the case of a catastrophic failure (such as power failure) where the primary
doesn’t have a chance to send this last batch of information, at least the secondary
firewall has a recent copy of the session table (perhaps 5 to 10 seconds old).
Figure 3.8 Wiring Diagram Showing Stateful Failover Heartbeat Cable
between Two Cisco devices
Explaining Proxy-Based Firewalls
Until now, we’ve discussed the firewalls that examine packets at the lower end of
the OSI layers and make their forwarding decisions based on port, protocol, and
session information.There exists an entirely separate class of firewall that makes
decisions based on very high-level information provided by Layer 7, the applica­
tion layer.This allows for a richer feature set but at the expense of performance.
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A packet filtering firewall will be the best performance possible, but has limited
use in today’s networks (see the earlier stateless firewalls example). A stateful
inspection firewall will always outperform a proxy firewall just based on the
amount of work involved for each technology. However, which is better for your
organization? Figure 3.9 gives an indication of the performance tradeoff when a
firewall performs deep inspection into the upper OSI layers.
Figure 3.9 Tradeoff between Performance and Packet Inspection
High Performance
Slow Throughput
Limited Packet Inspection
Full Packet Inspection
Packet-Filtering
Stateful Inspection
Router with ACL's
Checkpoint Firewall-1
Cisco PIX Firewall
Proxy-Based
Microsoft ISA Server
Novell BorderManager
Symantec Enterprise Firewall
Gophers
If you looked at network architecture in the early 1990s, you would find that the
Internet still hadn’t reached “critical mass” as a vital part of business. Some orga­
nizations didn’t have an ISP and managed to turn a profit.The ones that did usu­
ally had a dial-up line connected to one machine appropriately called the
gateway host.This machine would usually provide the e-mail exchange between
your organization’s private e-mail (something like the antiquated MS Mail or
cc:Mail) and the Internet at large. Prior to Web sites, many research institutions,
libraries, and universities ran gopher servers to provide information (aptly named
both due to the action of “going for” the data, and because most gopher server
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admins rarely saw the light of day). A gopher server was an efficient method of
posting information about your organization in an organized manner. For uni­
versities and research institutions, the first inhabitants of the Internet, this was a
great place to publish research documents or student theses. As time passed,
people inside the LAN wanted access to these gopher servers, but obtaining
Internet access for each computer became cost-prohibitive.There, the concept of
an Internet proxy was born.
Software, such as Microsoft Proxy Server, would be installed on a dualhomed gateway machine and provide the link from the external network to the
internal one. Requests from the inside network would be routed to the proxy.
Then, the proxy would establish its own connection to the target gopher server.
The response from the gopher server would be sent to the proxy and then the
proxy would respond to the original LAN machine. What is very important to
note here is that at no point in time are any internal machines (save the gateway
machine) connected to the outside world.
Modernization: The Evolution of Gophers
Gopher servers have come and gone, but the Internet has only increased in impor­
tance to an organization.The original need for proxy servers has disappeared, but
today’s proxy-based firewalls are much like their predecessors. When a request
comes in from the outside to deliver e-mail to a company’s mail server, the proxybased firewall will actually open another connection, sourced from itself, to the
destination mail server. Once the TCP handshake is complete, it will proxy the
connection by copying packets from one connection to the other. When the trans­
mission is complete, the firewall will tear down both connections. Again, it is very
important to note that at no time is the remote host ever connected to the company’s mail server.
Some vendors will tell you that by definition this is more secure. Well, there
is always something to be said for security by obscurity, but a malicious attack on
a Web server using a Code Red type attack will still be successful if the firewall
is copying all packets from one connection to the other.The only way a Code
Red attack would be stopped prior to reaching the Web server would be for
advanced packet inspection rules to peek into the upper layers of the Web
request and note the offending URL string.
Since each packet must be processed at Layer 7, the top of the OSI reference
model, the firewall has access to all the packet information.The downside is that
processing each layer takes time, with more time taken in the higher layers
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because data must be interpreted rather than just read; looking at an IP address to
match a permit list is relatively trivial, but dissecting the parts of an HTTP request
searching for a malformed content-type string is more CPU intensive. After the
packet has been flagged as allowed traffic, it needs to be packaged in all seven
layers into another connection.This explains the large performance difference
between proxy and packet-filtering firewalls.
Explaining Packet Layers: An Analogy
Any discussion on the benefit of proxy-based firewalls and their ability to peer
into the upper layers of a packet must include a definition of these layers. In the
early 1980s, the International Standards Organization (www.iso.ch), headquar­
tered in Geneva, Switzerland, designed their Basic Reference Model as part of
their suite of networking standards known as Open Systems Interconnection
(OSI).The reason why the 147 countries that the ISO represents wanted to
define a standard was simple: many very different networking systems were
starting to be developed and they needed to connect with one another. What the
OSI Basic Reference Model (now known as the seven layers of OSI) provided
was a common vocabulary of network transmission components across vendors
and technologies. From its humble beginnings designed to enable large, clunky
mainframes to talk with one another, the OSI layers still serve a valuable purpose
today in explaining complex network communications with a logical abstraction.
Every book on networking has a section on OSI—it’s almost a law. However,
rather than throw figures and tables out, a gastronomical analogy would work
much better.
Chips n’ Salsa
A Super Bowl party staple is the cacophony of calories that is known as the 7­
Layer Dip.This melding of cheese, guacamole, sour cream, and other waistexpanding foods goes great on a chip and has—okay, bear with us here—a rich
“feature set” of flavors. In one bite, you’re able to examine all the ingredients
(from the tortilla chip as the physical layer to the all-important presentation layer
with the solitary sliced black olive) and how they interact with one another.This
might seem entirely silly, but it does illustrate how proxy-based firewalls are given
a lot more ingredients on which to base their forwarding decisions. Just as you
can say that you will only enjoy a cheese layer if it is of the cheddar variety and
only if the bite occurs on Super Bowl Sunday, you can also be very specific with
proxy firewall rules: allow Web traffic but only if it is HTTPS and only on weekwww.syngress.com
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ends. A packet-filtering firewall is just like salsa—gets the job done but just isn’t
as rich. Let’s look at both methodologies.
Cheddar, American, Swiss, or Jack?
When it comes down to it, cheese is cheese, so who cares what variety is used in
our favorite party snack? Well, the answer depends on your security policy.
Perhaps your company has stated that it doesn’t mind audio files being down­
loaded from the Internet, as long as they are WAV and not MP3. In this case, a
packet-filtering firewall won’t be able to help you because that information is
stored in higher levels that are ignored. Figure 3.10 shows the layers involved in
an e-mail transmission.
Figure 3.10 Comparing Packet Inspection between Firewall Types
Proxy-Based Firewalls
Application Layer
[email protected]
Presentation Layer
SMTP
Statefull-Inspection Firewalls
Session Layer
(no TCP/IP equivalent)
TCP Port 25
Transport Layer
TCP Port 25
IP 172.17.32.148
Network Layer
IP 172.17.32.148
MAC 00:02:DA:23:91:F3
Data Link Layer
MAC 00:02:DA:23:91:F3
Ethernet
Physical Layer
Ethernet
In Figure 3.10, we see the same packet but from the point of view of both
firewalls. In most cases, you can get away with just port and protocol information.
However, what if we wanted to filter out all e-mail bound for [email protected]
.com? We would have to examine Layer 7 to find out the recipient of the informa­
tion. Perhaps you don’t want anyone on the outside sending mail to the root
account and want to avoid any possibility of a virus infecting that mail account;
using a Layer 7 packet inspection rule would work quite nicely.
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Mild or Extra Spicy?
Even the humble salsa has undergone a recent makeover. A decade ago, salsa
came in “chunky” and “extra chunky” varieties.That seemed a little plain sitting
on the coffee table next to the seven-layer dip. Now you have a salsa bar that
ranges from mild, extra hot, low sodium, and chipotle blends.The same modern­
ization can be seen in packet filtering firewalls.
The advanced high-level packet inspection that was a strong selling point for
proxy-based firewalls has been incorporated into some packet-filtering software.
While still fundamentally different from proxy firewalls, the added features do
erode some of the advantage that proxy firewall vendors would like you to
believe they have.This goes by many names (Stonesoft calls it Multi-Level
Inspection, Symantec calls it Full Inspection), but in the end it means a hybrid
that combines the speed of stateful inspection with very specific agents or appli­
cation proxies that can be selectively enabled.
Employee Monitoring
One last perceived advantage of proxy-based firewalls is their capability to docu­
ment the most visited Web sites and—since most proxies require some form of
login—who is visiting which sites.This is the feature that usually makes the HR
department salivate and the IT Director cringe.
Since the firewall itself is making the connection to these sites on behalf of
the internal host, it can easily document the requestor’s username, the destination
URL, and classify the content of the site using keyword searches or a database of
naughty sites. All this information gets converted into a variety of graphs, charts,
and reports of your choosing that can then be discussed at length during man­
agement meetings.
Just as we saw with the Layer 7 inspection features, packet-filtering vendors
have stepped up to the plate and incorporated some of the proxy-based firewall
features in their software. Modern packet-filtering firewalls can use plug-ins such
as WebSense and SurfControl to determine inappropriate Web site access. Rather
than worrying about the URLs, the firewall will ask the URL filter for permis­
sion before completing any outbound HTTP request.These third-party filters are
updated on a weekly or daily basis and can offer detailed reporting just as well as
their proxy-based counterparts can. Using integration plug-ins between DHCP
servers and Microsoft Active Directory or Novell NDS Directory Service, these
filters can also correlate a username with a source IP address to document who is
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
visiting the inappropriate sites. Moreover, the user isn’t forced to authenticate
using yet another username/password.The final decision on proxy versus packetfiltering firewalls rests within your security policy and an informed balance
between features and performance.
Examining Various Firewall Vendors
Armed with a thorough overview of what goes into a firewall and the different
types of firewalls, the only thing left to do is to select the right one for your
needs. Before examining the field from which to choose, you should write down
what the “must have” features are for your organization and not get distracted by
extra bells and whistles that might be helpful but not necessary. By no means is
this an exhaustive list of firewall vendors, but it does represent the majority of
products out there.
3Com Corporation and SonicWALL, Inc.
3Com and SonicWALL have similar product offerings; many of the 3Com small
office firewalls are really SonicWALL devices that have been re-branded as 3Com
products through a partnership agreement. Solid performers, they all have sup­
port for VPN tunnels in the same hardware (with the use of an unlocking license
code).The Web-based user interface really takes the guesswork out of a complex
task like setting up IP Security (IPSec) tunnels, Internet Key Exchange (IKE),
and Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) set­
tings. Web filtering is also provided in the same box, which makes this a very
compelling choice for small offices that cannot afford a more robust external
URL filter. A yearly subscription is required, but updates are downloaded to the
firewall weekly and violations to the content filter can be sent via e-mail to an
administrator.
One unique offering from 3Com that really brings the concept of “defense in
depth” to the market is their Firewall Desktop PCI Card (model 3CRFW200, also
available in PCMCIA versions).This allows you to deploy a strong hardware fire­
wall on all of your critical servers without taking any valuable rack space or
altering your network infrastructure. Since the OS recognizes the card as just
another network card, compatibility is not an issue. All the cards are managed cen­
trally by a Firewall Policy Server to ease administration.The best part is that no
“wandering hands” in the data center can accidentally subvert this firewall because
it is not inline. It lives within the server case and thus would be very difficult to
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bypass without obvious detection (server shut down, case opened up, and so forth).
(See Table 3.3.)
Table 3.3 3Com / SonicWALL at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.3com.com/products/en_US/prodlist.jsp?tab
=cat&pathtype=purchase&cat=134482
www.sonicwall.com/products/vpnapp.html
3Com OfficeConnect Internet Firewall 25
3Com SuperStack 3 Firewall
3Com Firewall Server PCI Card
SonicWALL SOHO3 Firewall
SonicWALL PRO330 Firewall
Innovative embedded firewall is industry first
Best suited for smaller networks
Check Point Software Technologies
Depending on which survey you read, the Cisco PIX and Check Point Firewall­
1 share market dominance. In our experience, most networks that we run across
(that are larger than the SOHO class) have Check Point running on Nokia IPSO
appliances. Claiming to have invented stateful inspection, FireWall-1 is a hybrid
stateful inspection firewall that has configurable application-layer proxies to per­
form inspection.The software can be installed on Solaris or Windows NT, but is
most often deployed on hardened NetBSD appliances provided by Nokia (for­
merly manufactured by Ipsilion). (See Table 3.4.)
Table 3.4 Check Point Software Technologies at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.checkpoint.com/products/protect/firewall-1.html
Check Point Firewall-1 NG
Check Point Provider-1 NG
Nokia IPSO 350 appliance
Nokia IPSO 650 appliance
Market leader, high performance with good balance of rich
features
Product licensing is second only to differential calculus in
difficulty
The Check Point Policy Editor, their administrative GUI, is very well
thought out, with logical groupings of commands and a simple tabular display of
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
security rules in columns with headings in plain English.This management con­
sole is so nicely designed and well received by the industry that competitors are
starting to duplicate the “look and feel” of the Check Point console.The security
policy screen of the Cisco PIX Device Manager (see next section) was modeled
heavily after this GUI.
FireWall-1 has an innovative attack-forecasting feature called SmartDefense.
Using this technology, your firewall can connect to one of several Internet Storm
Centers, such as the one operated by the SANS Institute, Dshield.org.You can
contribute anonymous logs to the community effort, but more importantly, you
can download a list of top attackers and use that to block future attacks on your
network.This mimics the idea of a collaborative blacklist for firewalls, much like
the SPAM blacklist services that exist. Using a mixture of hardware accelerators
and software enhancements, the SecureXL feature set can enable FireWall-1 to
process up to 3.2 Gbps of throughput. Most discomfort in Check Point installa­
tions comes from a very restrictive and difficult-to-understand licensing policy.
NOTE
For more dedicated information on the suite of products available from
Check Point and Nokia, refer to the following other books also available
from Syngress Publishing.
Check Point Next Generation Security Administration, ISBN
1-928994-74-1.
Nokia Network Security Solutions Handbook, 1-931836-70-1.
Check Point NG VPN-1/Firewall-1 Advanced Configuration and
Troubleshooting, 1-931836-97-3.
Check Point Next Generation with Application Intelligence Security
Administration, 1-932266-89-5.
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Cisco has been known as the most unfriendly but powerful firewall in the industry
for quite some time. While certainly not glamorous, the PIX Firewall configuration
commands are fairly easy to understand if you have knowledge of the Cisco IOS
command set. With the exception of NetScreen, the PIX is the only firewall that
runs on a custom real-time operating system (referred to as PIX OS, but in reality
it is the brainchild of one of Cisco’s acquisitions and they called it Finesse) rather
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than a hardened off-the-shelf OS. Many people believe in the power and features
of PIX, but up until recently, the only way to fully configure the firewall was to
use a command-line interface (CLI) on their text-based administrative interface
(serial or Telnet connection).This might have been a bit daunting for some users,
so Cisco recently introduced a Web-based Java applet called the PIX Device
Manager (PDM) that hopes to win back some of the market share that was lost to
Check Point based on user interface. (See Table 3.5.)
Table 3.5 Cisco at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030
Cisco PIX 501
Cisco PIX 506
Cisco PIX 515
Cisco PIX 525
Cisco PIX 535
Market leader, fantastic performance, interacts with Cisco
routers; can shun active attacks
Command line can be difficult for beginners
PIX appliances are all solid-state and have no hard drives in them (unlike the
Nokia IPSO).To their advantage, this means fewer parts to wear out or worry
about during an abrupt power outage. A slight disadvantage is that firewall log­
ging cannot be performed locally. Instead, the PIX will stream log entries to any
SYSLOG dæmon of your choosing.
The PIX product line ranges from the SOHO to large enterprise levels.The
PIX 501 is about the size of a VHS cassette tape, yet runs the complete PixOS
just like the larger counterparts.The PIX 515, previously the entry point to the
PIX product line, is a popular inhabitant of data centers across the country due
to its compact, 1U design. For companies that have high demands of their fire­
walls, the PIX 525 is a good compromise between the sometimes overwhelming
power of the 535 and the always overwhelming price tag.The high-end Cisco
PIX 535 will provide 1.7 Gbps of throughput and 500,000 simultaneous connec­
tions in the session table. Along with Symantec, it also supports the new Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES, or Rijndael) encryption method for VPN components.
Most firewalls only support the older NIST standard,Triple DES.The PIX 520,
now obsolete and unsupported, is the last of the PIX models to still “look” like a
normal PC, complete with floppy drive in the front. All the newer models are
based on purpose-built chassis design.
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CyberGuard
This line of proxy-based firewalls is likely one of the best for this category, earning
the prestigious SC Magazine Best Firewall award (www.westcoast.com/
events/awards) for the second year in a row t (2002 and 2003).They stress the
importance of protocol and application awareness during the firewall packet-forwarding decision. One of the largest (physically) firewalls out there, this 4U behe­
moth boasts up to four SCSI drives in a RAID 5 hot-swappable configuration and
can support up to 12—yes a dozen—Ethernet 10/100 interfaces running on a
derivative of UnixWare.The high end of the CyberGuard spectrum includes some
very helpful smart proxies that are preconfigured (for Telnet, HTTPS, and FTP) to
click-and-install.The WebSense URL filtering software can be purchased in a
bundle to allow for greater control over what your users are doing with their time.
Additionally, the F-Secure Anti-Virus system enables scanning for evil e-mail
attachments at the gateway.This allows you to regain control over these malicious
attachments before they get distributed to the internal e-mail server. (See
Table 3.6.)
Table 3.6 CyberGuard at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.cyberguard.com/solutions/product_overview.cfm
CyberGuard FS250
CyberGuard SL3200
CyberGuard KS1500
Common Criteria EAL4+
Fantastic performance
Interacts with Cisco routers; can shun active attacks
Command line can be difficult for beginners
Microsoft ISA Server
Regardless of what the marketing documents say, ISA Server is really nothing more
than the old Microsoft Proxy Server with better wizards. However, ISA Server’s
integration with the Active Directory provides centralized management and control
over ISA settings, Windows network username logging for firewall traffic, and
built-in availability features based on the resiliency of Active Directory.The “pub­
lishing” wizards are helpful in creating a rule set, but are specified using the oppo­
site terminology than the rest of the industry. (See Table 3.7.)
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Table 3.7 Microsoft at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.microsoft.com/ISAServer
Microsoft Internet Security & Acceleration Server
Integrated with Active Directory to provide resiliency of fire­
wall information
Rule sets might be hard for veteran firewall admins to under­
stand; appear to be written from the wrong point of view
NetScreen
NetScreen has always been known for performance.Their high-end packet-filtering firewalls can process an insane 12 Gbps and have earned them the 2003
Network Magazine Product of the Year award (www.infoxpress.com/reviewtracker/
reprints.asp?page_id=1538). Most of their performance boost can be attributed to
their highly optimized ScreenOS operating system and custom ASICs that perform
the forwarding decisions for the firewall. NetScreen’s high availability solutions
include the typical active-standby configurations but also a nice active-active one
where the two firewalls share the network load cooperatively.Their SOHO offer­
ings even include an innovative anti-virus scanning functionality usually found on
higher-end firewalls.The Trend Micro AV engine is featured on the NetScreen
5GT and can scan SMTP, POP3, and Web traffic. (See Table 3.8.)
Table 3.8 NetScreen at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.netscreen.com/products/firewall
NetScreen-25
NetScreen-208
NetScreen-500
NetScreen-5400
Extremely optimized for speed FIPS as well as Common Criteria certification
Configuration language hard to use if you have deep under­
standing of the Cisco IOS command set.
Users with no prior IOS experience should not have a problem
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Novell
Novell, famous for the very successful NetWare network operating system and
later the highly scalable NDS Directory service, also offers a firewall solution
called BorderManager. One of the nice features of BorderManager is the tight
integration with NDS. We don’t mean just integrating firewall logs with usernames from NDS. All the firewall features can be controlled from within your
favorite NDS browser, which really cuts down on administrative headache.
Starting with version 3.7, BorderManager has the SurfControl content database
integrated into the firewall, which makes URL filtering as easy as the 3Com
with the power of a third-party solution. BorderManager is still a proxy-based
firewall, so performance does suffer. However, if you’re an all-Novell shop it is a
great solution that will reduce the strain on your IT department. Since
BorderManager is offered as part of the Novell Small Business Solution, small
offices that don’t have an IT department can get a firewall for free with their
network operating software package. (See Table 3.9.)
Table 3.9 Novell at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.novell.com/products/bordermanager
Novell BorderManager
Heavily Integrated with Novell NDS and that provides an easy
administration task
SurfControl for content screening
Specialized knowledge of NetWare 5.1 or later is required
Secure Computing
Another firewall in the hybrid category, Secure Computing has a stateful packet
inspection firewall that has intelligent adaptive proxies that can perform Layer 7
inspection without slowing the network connectivity to the speed of a pure
proxy solution. A mature solution, the Sidewinder has been around since 1994
and keeps getting better each year.Their Sidewinder G2 firewall has won the
Network Computing magazine’s Well-Connected Award for 2003 (www.nwcwellconnected.com). Primarily delivered as a ready-to-go hardware appliance, the
Sidewinder G2 is different from the other hardware appliances listed here in that
it is really just a Dell PowerEdge 2650 server that has been preinstalled with their
special SecureOS UNIX variant.The software can also be purchased separately,
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to run on your own hardware. We would stick to using what they’re calling an
appliance just to reduce the headache of any strange SCSI card in your flavor of
server that might not be supported in SecureOS. (See Table 3.10.)
Table 3.10 Secure Computing at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.securecomputing.com/index.cfm?skey=232
Secure Computing Sidewinder G2
Automated response engine can react in real time to attacks
EAL4 common criteria certified
Because of a very detailed method of inspecting packets,
Sidewinder is slower than other firewalls
Lack of a solid state “true” hardware appliance means you
might have to manage different hardware platforms for all
your different Sidewinder firewalls
Stonesoft, Inc.
Stonesoft products are obsessed with high availability. Everything they do has an
eye toward failover, and this doomsday view of life makes for some very robust
offerings. StoneGate, their high availability clustered firewall, has a mix of application-layer agents that provide information to their stateful inspection engine
(they call this multilayer inspection) that we mentioned earlier. Running on a
hardened version of Debian Linux, StoneGate performs heartbeat functions (dis­
cussed earlier) with all members (up to 16) of the firewall cluster and has won
SC Magazine’s Best Buy award (www.stonesoft.com/products/StoneGate/
Certifications_and_Awards/SC_Magazine_-_Best_Buy). StoneGate is also the
only firewall offering to be available for the IBM zSeries mainframe.This is a
huge plus for financial organizations that might be forced to keep their large
mainframes around to support legacy applications, and don’t want to manage yet
another device in front of the mainframe to protect it from network attacks. In
Q2 of 2004 (right around the time you’ll be reading this sentence), Stonesoft will
have a product offering on Linux, designed to run on the IBM eServer iSeries.
(See Table 3.11.)
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
Table 3.11 Stonesoft at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.stonesoft.com/products
Stonesoft StoneGate
Very strong clustering and high-availability features, based on
the work they have done with clustering other vendors’
devices as well
Available for IBM z990 mainframe
Does not come in its own appliance; users must supply their
own server
If the emphasis on high availability seems intense, it’s because Stonesoft
began by providing third-party clustering solutions (called StoneBeat) for Check
Point Firewall-1, Microsoft ISA Server, Raptor (now Symantec Enterprise
Firewall), and Secure Computing’s Gauntlet. Even if you decide not to use the
Stonesoft firewall, you should definitely look into their clustering technology to
complement an installation of any of those four products.
Symantec Corporation
Symantec purchased the Raptor firewall product and renamed it Enterprise
Firewall. With version 7.0, Enterprise Firewall is EAL-4 certified for Common
Criteria compliance (important for government facilities). Symantec describes
their firewall as “full inspection” as opposed to stateful inspection firewalls.This
just means that they are much like StoneGate and FireWall-1 by being a stateful
inspection firewall that has elements of Layer 7 inspection to allow it to make
intelligent forwarding decisions. Enterprise Firewall, much like BorderManager,
teamed up with a content filtering provider and includes the WebNOT tech­
nology with its firewall and is one of only a few vendors that use AES for VPN
connections.The software can be installed on Solaris or Windows NT platforms,
but is also offered in a VelociRaptor appliance that is more attractive (much like
the Nokia IPSO platform). (See Table 3.12.)
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Table 3.12 Symantec at-a-Glance
Web Site
Models
Pros
Cons
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content/
ProductJump.cfm?Product=47&EID=0
Symantec Gateway Security 5200
Symantec VelociRaptor 1200
Symantec Enterprise Firewall 100
As part of the Symantec Gateway Security offering, the firewall
component has some good company, including Symantec
AntiVirus and other intrusion prevention methods
User interface can be hard to navigate at times
WatchGuard Technologies, Inc.
With its distinctive bright red appliance chassis, the WatchGuard firewall can be
identified from clear across the data center floor.Their lower-end Firebox
SOHO 6 Wireless is a great idea for small remote offices that need to connect to
headquarters using LAN-to-LAN VPN tunnels. Not only does it allow for IPSec
encryption of the wireless and wired sides, but through a partnership with
McAfee the Firebox has a VirusScan ASaP subscription to help with virus issues
at the remote office with little or no IT support. On the high end of the spec­
trum, WatchGuard has really stepped up to the ISP and large organization level
and introduced their Firebox V200 that can provide up to 2 Gbps of throughput
and support up to 40,000 branch office VPN connections.The Firebox 4500,
while supporting less capacity, still has an impressive 200 Mbps throughput and
uses application layer proxies to complement its stateful inspection engine.They
include Web content filtering as well, provided by CyberPatrol. (See Table 3.13.)
Table 3.13 WatchGuard at-a-Glance
Web site
Models
Pros
Cons
www.watchguard.com/products/wgls.asp
Firebox SOHO 6
Firebox III
Firebox X
Firebox vClass
With the Firebox X, you can easily grow your firewall in pace
with the growth of your networks
High availability active/active configurations
Four embedded RISC processors on the vClass line, for extra
number crunching power
Management software is Windows based only
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
The most exciting product offering from WatchGuard is their new line of
Firebox X devices. Distancing themselves from the almost cartoonish front panel
design of the Firebox III, the X has a crisp appearance, an LCD screen, and
expandable capacity for two to six NICs. As your network grows, entering in a
software license activation key will enable the additional NICs and additional capa­
bilities. Spam filtering, antivirus, VPN, intrusion prevention, and Web filtering can
also be activated easily, as your company grows, using just an activation key.
Checklist
Decide what is more important to your organization (performance, or
packet inspection) and select accordingly.
Plan ahead and don’t paint yourself into a corner when doing an eval;
know what targets you’re trying to hit and clearly articulate these to
your vendors.
Understand the pros and cons of each firewall technology.
Visit the vendor Web sites listed in this chapter to find out the features
provided on each model.
Visit the mailing lists and message boards listed at the end of this chapter
to hear the real skinny from the trenches on using and maintaining dif­
ferent firewall types.
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Summary
The firewall is your front lines of defense against attackers on the Internet.
Everyone knows that you need a firewall, but who has stopped to examine the
reasons behind that need? More than just “keeping the bad guys out,” a sound
firewall policy will make your network more efficient by only dealing with the
traffic that is truly essential to your business operations. In essence, a firewall can
concentrate your networking efforts and turn a noisy network into a laser-beam
focused data delivery service.
Through the course of this chapter, we explained the different types of fire­
walls and their inner workings. Certifications, in the firewall industry, are an
important way to show third-party acceptance of your product. Restricting your
Web servers to only performing Web-related services, and your mail servers
restricted to performing mail-delivery services, you will have less cause for alarm
at night.This makes both good business and technological sense; you would only
give particular employees the key to the NOC, so too should you be particularly
discriminating about the ports to which you allow servers to make outbound
connections.
While some vendors have a hardware appliance offering, others concentrate on
the software only and leave the hardware to the end customer (still a couple of
others will offer the software in both variations). All firewalls will have some form
of administrative interface or GUI to configure the firewall for your company’s
particular needs. Most firewalls will provide a third NIC to define a service net­
work, or DMZ, for your mail servers and other trusted-but-feared machines.
The differences between proxy-based and stateful packet inspection firewalls
make for good debate. However, other, less controversial issues tend to get equal
press in the security publications: logging, VPN, clustering, high availability, con­
tent filtering, and antivirus features are all powerful add-ons to look for when
choosing your next firewall. Just remember not to sacrifice stable performance
and a track record for quality software for the latest and greatest command-line
utility that masquerades as a firewall.
Good ol’ RFC 1918 makes it easy to segment your network according to
functional business units, rather than arcane network address range assignments.
Stateful failover, a feature often reserved for very high-end firewalls, is critical in a
24/7 operations center. Finally, go through the Web sites for all the vendors listed
here and discover the solution that works best in your environment. Don’t be
afraid to kick the tires and make sure you’re getting what your network needs
today and this year. A pushy salesperson convincing your company of 10
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
employees that they need the PIX 535 is just criminal. Make sure you don’t fall
victim to the same tactics.
Solutions Fast Track
Understanding Firewall Basics
A firewall must make packet routing decisions based on its preconfig­
ured security profile.
Better firewalls include features like detailed reporting and URL content
filtering.
Exploring Stateful Packet Firewalls
Although attributed to Check Point, the advent of stateful packet fil­
tering firewalls allows us to be very restrictive in our security policy and
yet know that return traffic will be handled.
Explaining Proxy-Based Firewalls
Proxy firewalls will always be slower than the competition.
Detailed reporting is possible due to the full-packet inspection process
involved.
Examining Various Firewall Vendors
Each vendor has its strengths and a weaknesses—what works for your
organization will vary.
Look for content filtering software pre-bundled with firewalls today.
Use embedded PCI NIC firewalls for maximum security.
Links to Sites
www.sl.universalservice.org/reference/CIPA.asp
e-Rate Federal subsidized Internet access for schools.
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■
www.websense.com WebSense provides Web content filtering soft­
ware that can plug in to firewalls like Cisco PIX.
■
www.surfcontrol.com SurfControl also provides content filtering
software to prevent users from navigating to inappropriate Web sites.
■
www.cyberpatrol.com CyberPatrol produces content filtering soft­
ware dubbed “Parental Control Software” due to its home-computer
target, rather than Enterprise deployment.
■
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030
Information on the entire Cisco PIX product line.
■
www.checkpoint.com/products/protect/firewall-1.html
Check Point Firewall-1 is one of the best selling firewalls around.
■
http://secure.dshield.org By correlating a massive amount of data
from user-submitted firewall logs, DShield can show the current
“weather” condition of the Internet.
■
www.watchguard.com/products/wgls.asp More information on
the WatchGuard family of firewalls.
■
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content/
ProductJump.cfm?Product=47&EID=0 Symantec Enterprise
Firewall information and detailed product specifications.
■
www.novell.com/products/bordermanager Novell
BorderManager is the only product (oddly enough) to integrate seam­
lessly with Novell NDS.
■
www.stonesoft.com/products Stonesoft provides highly redundant
firewall architectures.
■
www.netscreen.com/products/firewall NetScreen firewalls range
from small office to data-center grade performance.
■
www.microsoft.com/ISAServer/ Microsoft Internet Security and
Acceleration Server information.
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
■
www.sonicwall.com/products/vpnapp.html SonicWALL makes a
range of firewall appliances to fit any budget, from home office to large
company.
■
www.3com.com/products/en_US/productsindex.jsp?tab=
cat&pathtype=purchase Information on the 3Com Firewall
Desktop PCI card, allowing all of your servers to have a robust hardware
firewall-on-a-NIC.
■
www.icsalabs.com/html/communities/firewalls/ ICSA
Certification criteria for network firewalls.
■
www.icsalabs.com/html/communities/pcfirewalls/ ICSA
Certification criteria for PC firewalls.
Mailing Lists
■
fi[email protected] A great, vendor-neutral discussion that
has contributions from people all over the globe.
■
fi[email protected] Smaller membership than SecurityFocus,
this list also has some useful information.
■
www.snpx.com/newsticker.html This continuously updating news
ticker is specifically geared toward the security industry.You can embed
this little applet on your company’s intranet and always stay up to the
minute on the latest exploits and vulnerabilities.
■
http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
ICSA Labs is the major certification for firewall products, and as such,
this mailing list provides many useful tips and tricks from the firewall
veterans.
■
www.isc.org/services/public/lists/firewalls.html ISC, the organi­
zation behind the prestigious CISSP certification, maintains a firewall
mailing list that tends to be more academic and theory than vendor-specific issues, but it still quite useful.
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■
www.securitynewsportal.com/pagetwo.shtml The lighter side of
the security industry news, this is the place to keep up with the latest
gossip or Web site defacements.
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: What makes a proxy-based firewall so slow?
A: Remember the diagram explaining OSI layers earlier in the chapter? Of
course you do—it was so concise and well written, it’s resonating in your
brain as we speak. Each time a software process must travel up or down the
OSI layers, there is going to be a performance hit.Traveling between layers
means either opening the lower layer’s data packet “envelope” or wrapping a
higher layer’s data in its own envelope.To send a packet between two hosts,
the proxy-based firewall must unwrap these envelopes all the way up at Layer
7, copy the data to another buffer, and reseal all seven envelopes. Anyone who
has worked in accounts payable can tell you—licking that many envelopes
will definitely slow you down (and might cause a nasty paper cut on your
tongue).
Q: I’ve heard rumors that Check Point firewalls have back doors built into
them; is this true?
A: You should keep out of the Cisco booth at trade shows! There have been
rumors floating around for years (mostly from San Jose residents) that the
Mossad, the Israeli equivalent of the United States’ Central Intelligence
Agency, wrote the Check Point software and has a back-door password to get
into any Firewall-1 protected network in the world. If such a back door
existed, the amount of scrutiny that modern firewalls endure would almost
certainly flush out this fact in a number of online forums known for pointing
out flaws in security design. While we cannot say anything about Check
Point source code with certainty, we know that if you throw enough smart
people at an issue (say, for instance, the worldwide population of hackers),
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Selecting the Correct Firewall • Chapter 3
you’re bound to find out if there’s a back door. Check out Chapter 4,
“Attacking Firewalls,” for a description of a Check Point vulnerability that is
more of a “front door” hole than a back door one.
Q: Wow—security software written by Israeli intelligence agencies! This sounds
like a Tom Clancy novel. How can I find out more?
A: We’re not going to perpetuate any rumors about ties to the Mossad, but we
will tell you this: in April 2001, the Mossad published advertisements in
major publications, encouraging electronic engineers and computer scientists
to apply to their special “Technology Department.”The ad stated “The
Mossad is open / Only to 13 engineers … The Mossad is open. Not to
everyone. Not to many. Maybe to you.”You draw your own ending to this
novella; just make sure nobody discovers your true identity, 007.
Q: Who invented stateful inspection firewall technology?
A: Again, our friends at the Mossad, er… we mean Check Point take credit for
this one. Although nobody really should be allowed to take credit for a type
of technology, many Check Point publications reference the assertion that
they “invented” this technology. In fact, they do hold the patent on stateful
inspection firewall technology—but that does not necessarily mean they
invented it. It just means they were the first to patent the technology. It
would be the same thing as if we said “We’re going to patent the process of
logging in to a Web site so that it can show us personalized content.”You
would say, “You’re crazy—that’s just a concept.You can’t patent the concept
of logging in. Any dynamic site on the Internet today has some mechanism
of logging in and having pre-stored preferences recalled. I mean, even some­
thing as simple as MyYahoo would be infringing upon that patent! You’re
crazy!”You can stop yelling at us—we won’t try to patent that idea. But only
because Gateway Computer beat us to it (U.S. Patent 6,530,083). And as
soon as you stop yelling about how ridiculous that sounds, remember that the
BT Group went to court against the Prodigy online service in February 2002
because they claimed to own the patent on hyperlinks.
Q: Where is future firewall technology headed?
A: If you ask us (and well, we guess you just did), firewalls are going to become
smaller and more pervasive. Right now, you’ll only find personal firewalls on
very smart home users or very security savvy business users. In a year’s time,
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nobody would think of powering on his or her machine without a personal
firewall set on “red alert.”The emphasis of choke points on your network
where all traffic must filter through one device (the firewall) will disappear as
that technology gets pushed out to the end points. A real big winner in this
field is 3Com; they’ve already designed the product (the firewall-on-a-NIC
described earlier) and are just waiting for the industry to take off. Soon, your
data center won’t have a single firewall in it! Instead, it will have 85 firewalls,
one on each NIC port.They will all report back to a centralized manage­
ment console and it will provide for the ultimate in granular manageability.
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Chapter 4
Firewall
Manipulation:
Attacks and Defenses
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Firewall Attack Methods
■
Check Point Software Attacks and Solutions
■
Cisco PIX Attacks and Solutions
■
Microsoft ISA Server Attacks and Solutions
■
NetScreen Firewall Attacks and Solutions
■
Novell BorderManager Attacks and
Solutions
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 3 Selecting the Correct Firewall
■
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
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Introduction
As you read in Chapter 3, “Selecting the Correct Firewall,” the concept and
underlying technologies of firewalls have changed dramatically over the years. In
like manner, the way in which attackers prey on networks and the techniques
used have also matured. In previous years, the concept of sharing information or
allowing Web services into your network was as foreign a concept as the
Anaheim Angels winning the baseball World Series.The firewall policies of old
were without complexity and the intricacies of modern business. Generally, these
policies consisted of only a “Drop-All” rule that prevented any incoming traffic
from the Internet, or your perimeter.This left the firewall itself as the only attack
vector available. From an attacker’s perspective, this meant that we had to manip­
ulate or subvert the firewall before we could make a move on any of the internal
systems or resources.
As time marched on, companies began to offer services to the Internet at
large. While not as sexy or complicated as some of the policies in recent times,
the services were opened by typically allowing functions like Web, mail, and
DNS. Attackers now had multiple attack vectors at their disposal (Web, mail, or
DNS servers) and didn’t have to primarily focus on compromising the firewall as
the main point of entry. Even when we could successfully compromise the
internal servers, we still needed other points of entry into the network,
prompting us to attack the firewall from the inside out.
Fast forward a few more years to present day and we are faced with the fact
that the Anaheim Angels did finally win the World Series, and firewalls are now
configured to allow a myriad of protocols and services from the Internet.This
allows us, the external attackers, numerous attack vectors and points of entry to
the DMZ and internal segments. With this in mind, the need and demand to
attack and compromise the firewall device itself is nearly extinct. Instead, current
firewall vulnerabilities and exploits provide the missing pieces that allow us to
more efficiently attack our target networks and resources. While the vendor vul­
nerabilities of recent years are much less extensive, the information provided
through such attacks is instrumental in helping us chart our course into the
internal network.
The following pages will help you understand the different and more promi­
nent firewall attack methodologies and techniques and provide you with multiple
vendor vulnerabilities and exploits. With this information, you will be prepared
to tune and patch your devices to limit your exposure to the external evildoers.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Firewall Attack Methods
In today’s networking climate, there are really only three valid firewall attack
methods: information gathering, denial of service, and remote system compromise. Each
offer extremely different outcomes, and have differing requirements; however,
combined they provide a bulk of the known vulnerabilities and attacks on recent
firewall platforms and applications.The following two sections describe these
attack methodologies.
Notes from the Underground…
Firewall Hacks: From the Inside Out
It used to be common practice to attack firewalls to provide the main
entry point to internal networks. Penetration Testing professionals, and
hackers alike, used to work to compromise systems in the DMZ, usually
Web servers, mail servers, or DNS. Once compromised, the attacker would
move all of his tools and resources to the “owned” box, providing a new
launching point for his “Army.” To provide further inroads into the internal
segments, the attacker would then begin to launch attacks on the firewall
from the internal or DMZ segment.
In this context, the intruder is not actually attacking the firewall
application, but rather is attacking the underlying operating system (OS).
For example, many administrators run the Check Point Firewall-1 applica­
tion on a Windows 2000, Linux, or Solaris platform. In this scenario, the
attacker would be exploiting vulnerabilities present in the Windows OS,
or perhaps Solaris, rather than the firewall module.
While this is somewhat outside the scope of this book, it is important
to realize that unless you are running your firewall on a completely hard­
ened appliance, there are potentially some underlying vulnerabilities that
could compromise your firewall installation.
Attacking for Information
Information disclosure is one of the most pervasive types of attacks used today.
Once the exploit is initiated, the attacker is trying to cull as much information
about the victim’s networks or resources as possible.Typical disclosure includes
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internal IP addressing schemes, network topologies, and sometimes, through
more extensive exploits, firewall rules and policies. With this information at
hand, intruders can more efficiently plot their moves and confine their attacks.
While this attack provides the necessary footprinting information on our target
networks, it does not provide any further footholds for us to compromise deeper
into the Lion’s Den.
All firewall vendors are susceptible to these types of attacks. In the upcoming
sections, we will look at different information disclosure vulnerabilities on several
different vendors, including Check Point, Cisco, and NetScreen. While some of
these vulnerabilities exist through flaws discovered in the firewall application,
many of them are present from common misconfigurations.
Denial-of-Service Attacks
The absolute converse to information gathering would be a DoS style of attack.
These attacks are written to disrupt network activity and business productivity by
causing resources to be unavailable or unreachable. Attacks of this type generally
provide little value in terms of network reconnaissance. Moreover, these attacks
are not discrete, as any type of logging or intrusion detection will surely provide
enough information to lead administrators to the offending IP address.
Attacks of this type come in many different forms, including buffer overflows,
TCP SYN attacks, or through software flaws in the firewall application itself.
Notes from the Underground…
Denial of Service: The Corporate Fire Alarm
DoS attacks can pose an interesting problem when they are being initi­
ated from your own internal segments. We think of these attacks as the
equivalent of a high-school student pulling the fire alarm on his way to
Algebra class, just so he doesn’t have to sit through another boring lec­
ture. If you think of the potential damage these attacks can reap on your
internal resources, the analogy is not that far off.
Even in our own “real job” there are meetings that we would rather
not attend, and e-mails we surely would not like to answer. How perfect
would it be if we downloaded the latest Check Point DoS exploit and
unleashed it on our own internal firewalls? That would easily solve all of
Continued
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
our problems! In like manner, we have found that many of the attacks
successfully performed on the internal networks are more often than not
DoS. The following are reasons as to why this is true:
■
Increased bandwidth on internal segments Many DoS
attacks require that an immense amount of data be pushed to
the target device. While this is technically feasible across the
Internet, with the increased speed and resiliency of internal
segments, the bandwidth limitation is nonexistent.
■
No need for network reconnaissance Typically, the internal
attacker is an unskilled user who came across an exploit or
tool that could invoke such an assault. Using that as our
primer, most of these would-be attackers have no use for
information disclosure attacks or other mild exploits that only
provide limited information or access. In short, they are not in
this for the long haul; they just want to knock something over
quickly.
■
Relaxed firewall rules or access control lists (ACLs) More so
than the Internet, our users generally have more relaxed per­
missions and access controls on the inside. This means that
attacks that might be blocked by edge routers will pass unno­
ticed on our internal segments.
While all of these characteristics might be true, and present, on your
network, it does not necessarily mean that you cannot mitigate against a
DoS type of attack. For example, keep your network devices as up to date
as possible with the latest OS or software revisions. Additionally, try to use
Quality-of-Service (QoS) or bandwidth throttling techniques on all of your
critical segments so that users cannot successfully send large amounts of
traffic during an exploit.
Remote Firewall Compromise
Perhaps the rarest of all the firewall attacks, the remote system compromise, pro­
vides attackers the ability to gain access via the firewall’s graphical user interface
(GUI), or command-line interface. Either method will yield significant influence
over the firewall application or underlying OS, and allow the attacker to make a
myriad of modifications.
Typically, these types of attacks exist within flaws in the firewall application
itself, and not usually the underlying OS. Nevertheless, it is quite common for
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the intruder to be able to make modifications to the firewall rule base, thereby
altering the security context of the victim’s network. With this capability, the
attacker will commonly allow all traffic inbound and outbound to his source IP
address, and in so doing, open the gates to the fortress. Moreover, a crafty
intruder will disable all of the logging for that rule, leaving little trace of the
traffic the passes through the device.The only saving grace left is your host-level
defenses via an Intrusion Prevention System, or other router and switch ACLs in
the environment.
While these attacks are rare, we have seen more research and exploits in this
arena in recent months, most notably with Check Point. In the following sec­
tions, we detail some of these attack types.
Check Point Software
Attacks and Solutions
Depending on which survey you read, the Cisco PIX and Check Point Firewall­
1 share market dominance. Claiming to have invented stateful inspection,
FireWall-1 is a hybrid stateful inspection firewall that has configurable application-layer proxies to perform inspection.The software can be installed on Solaris
or Windows NT, but is most often deployed on hardened NetBSD appliances
provided by Nokia (formerly manufactured by Ipsilion). Being one of the major
market leaders in the firewall space prompts many vulnerability researchers to
focus on your software, and the potential flaws therein. With this in mind, Check
Point currently has many vulnerabilities associated with its software offerings. In
the next section, we will dissect some of the most critical exploits and exposures.
VPN-1/SecureClient ISAKMP Buffer Overflow
As of print, this is the most recent and potentially damaging attack that affects
any of the firewall technologies. Originally discovered by the X-Force team at
Internet Security Systems, the vulnerability exists in the virtual private network
(VPN) server and clients for Check Point’s Firewall-1 product.This functionality
allows remote users the ability to VPN to internal networks and resources. While
many methods exist to handle the client and server negotiation of the tunnel,
this particular vulnerability resides in the code that handles the firewall’s certifi­
cate exchange.This vulnerability affects Firewall-1 version 4.1 up to Service Pack
5a, and Check Point NG, Feature Packs 0 and 1.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Attacking Check Point VPN with Certificates
For VPN tunnels to be established and secured, the client and server must
exchange encryption keys prior to establishing the tunnel.The method to
exchange these keys is known as Internet Key Exchange, or IKE.The network pro­
tocol used to enable this key exchange is known as the Internet Security
Association and Key Management Protocol, or ISAKMP. Check Point’s imple­
mentation of the ISAKMP protocol is where the major vulnerability resides.
The way in which a Check Point VPN server handles how certificates are
requested is where the vulnerability lies. Certificates are used to negotiate the
security of the VPN tunnel. When an unauthenticated client connects to the
VPN server and requests a certificate, if the payload buffer is larger than the
server can handle, a routine stack overflow is accomplished and the system is suc­
cessfully exploited. Since an unauthenticated user is able to perform this attack
without knowing a username or password, this exploit is open to all untrusted
Internet or internal users who connect to a vulnerable system.
According to the ISS X-Force team, the exploit is extremely easy to execute
and has far-reaching impact. Furthermore, X-Force, although not released as of
yet, has produced proof-of-concept code that can repeatedly exploit this vulnerability.The inevitable result of this vulnerability allows a remote attacker to have
an interactive command-line shell to the firewall device. In this context, the
remote attacker can make alterations to the firewall rules policy, thereby poten­
tially compromising the principal security of the remote network. Once the
modifications are made, the remote attacker can then use these openings to
launch more attacks deeper into the victim’s internal networks.
Tools for Attacking Check Point’s VPN
At the time of print, the only known working exploit to this vulnerability is
within the confines of ISS’ X-Force team; however, we would be naïve to think
that a public exploit won’t be available soon. Since there is no tool to carry out
this attack as of yet, the threat to your network infrastructure is relatively mild,
giving you ample time to remediate your systems from this vulnerability. By the
time this book prints there is likely to be an exploit available. Continue to mon­
itor the following URL for the presence of exploit code: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9582/exploit/.
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Mitigation for Check Point VPN
It is has been stated that the only true way to remediate this vulnerability on
your Check Point devices is to upgrade to the latest service or feature pack for
your current software versions. If you are running Firewall-1, version 4.1, you
can upgrade to Service Pack 6 to remove the vulnerability. If you are already
running the Check Point Next Generation (NG) release, you must upgrade to
Feature Pack 2. Keep in mind that version 4.1 of Firewall-1 has been relegated to
end-of-life by Check Point, meaning there will be no further updates or product
releases for that version. If future vulnerabilities arise in the 4.1 version, users will
need to upgrade to NG to mitigate the vulnerability.
Another potential remediation tactic exists with limiting the source IP
addresses of your VPN users.This mitigates the vulnerability by removing much
of the untrusted Internet from being able to exploit the vulnerability. In other
words, by locking down your VPN access to only specific IP addresses, the
attackers who are not part of the confined group would not be allowed to con­
nect to your VPN server and initiate the exploit.This also means that if any of
your corporate users are evildoers, they could still launch the attack, as their IP
would be allowed to connect.
This is by no means an effective or efficient workaround if you have more
than a few remote VPN users, as you would need to know the source IP address
of each of the remote workers. Additionally, this technique does not fully miti­
gate the vulnerability, as your VPN users could initiate the exploit. However, if
you are resource and time constrained, then this might be a quick remediation
effort, rather than testing and implementing the latest service pack.
Check Point SecuRemote
Internal Address Disclosure
The Internal Address disclosure is yet another vulnerability that revolved around
Check Point’s implementation of the VPN. While this vulnerability does not
provide the remote system compromise, like the previous Check Point attack, it
still provides invaluable information about the internal segments connected to
the firewall. With this information, a skilled attacker can plan the next phase of
the attack.
Originally discovered by Andy Davis at Information Risk Management in
London, the vulnerability provides the IP addresses, and therefore the directly
connected networks, of the internal interfaces on the firewall.The vulnerability
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
affects Check Point Firewall-1 versions 4.0 through 4.1 Service Pack 4. Check
Point NG is not vulnerable to this attack.
Check Point’s IP Disclosure
SecuRemote, the predecessor to Check Point’s SecureClient, is an agent that
installs on the computers of remote VPN users. SecuRemote handles all of the
VPN negotiation with the firewall transparently to the user, until the user needs
to enter the VPN credentials.The Firewall-1 application listens on TCP ports
256 and 264 for VPN connections. During the unencrypted communication
with the firewall, the VPN server will send the internal IP addresses to the
SecuRemote client. While this information is never displayed on the screen, it
can be captured via a packet sniffer off of the wire. Since the information is sent
in clear-text, it is also possible for remote attackers to be able to see this informa­
tion being passed when normal SecuRemote activity is taking place.
Since the transfer of the IP address information takes place during the unen­
crypted portion of the VPN negotiation, it was simple for IRM to determine
exactly what nudge the VPN server needed to be able to send the IP informa­
tion. From this analysis, IRM was able to create a proof-of-concept exploit and
publicize their findings.
Tools for Exploiting Check Point’s VPN
Two separate exploits are currently available that perform this attack. Again, since
this attack is only providing information to the attacker, the exploits are nonin­
trusive and will generally not set off any Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
alarms. Furthermore, typical firewall behavior and traffic will continue without
interruption or disturbance.
IRM’s proof-of-concept code is named “fwenum” and is available for down­
load at their Web site: http://www.irmplc.com/advisories.htm.Their script is
quite simple to use, having only one parameter to provide—the IP address of the
firewall. Once compiled, the exploit can be run with the following parameter:
#fwenum 192.0.2.24 In this example, the target firewall has the IP address 192.0.2.24. Once the
command is issued, the exploit code queries the target device on TCP port 256
and provides the number of active firewall interfaces and the list of the respective
IP addresses.
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The second active exploit in the wild was written by Jim Becher and is avail­
able at http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8524/exploit/. Similar in usage and
technique, the only differentiator in this exploit is the ability to provide a range
of IPs to test this exploit against. In other words, if you are not sure where or
how many Check Point firewalls are present on your network, you can simply
provide the entire network range and let the exploit test them all.Therefore, in
many respects, this exploit is like a mini-port scanner for Check Point firewalls.
Once compiled, the exploit can be run with the following parameters:
#fw1_getints
192.0.2.1
192.0.2.254
Using the same IP range from our previous tool, this exploit will look for the
presence of TCP port 256 on Firewall-1 version 4.0 or earlier, and TCP port 264
on version 4.1 or later.
Defending against Internal IP Address Disclosure
There are a few mitigating circumstances for this vulnerability. First, if
SecuRemote or VPN access is not necessary on the firewall,TCP ports 256 and
264 can be filtered or disabled. If VPN access is a necessary component, then
software updates to Firewall-1 must be performed.
To update version 4.1, you must install Service Pack 6. Currently, version 4.0
of Check Point Firewall-1 is only the end-of-life list from the vendor. If you are
running this old version, then you will have to upgrade to version 4.1 Service
Pack 6 to be fully patched.To get the latest updates, you must have a current
support and maintenance contract with Check Point. As mentioned previously,
the Next Generation version is not vulnerable to this information disclosure.
Cisco PIX Attacks and Solutions
We all know of Cisco’s reputation as market leader in terms of both market share
and quality networking products. However, in the firewall market, the Cisco PIX
has taken a backseat to vendors like Check Point and NetScreen, mainly because
of the poor user interfaces on previous versions of the firewall. With those follies
behind them, Cisco is getting a second wind with their new device manager
interface and is beginning to gain market prominence once more.
While their dominance in the industry has earned them many accolades, it
has also earned them the interest of vulnerability researchers worldwide—and
from this research comes the many vulnerabilities and exploits that we have to
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
understand and defend against. In the next few sections we will look at some of
the more recent Cisco PIX vulnerabilities and flaws.The following vulnerabilities
were selected for inclusion because of their simplicity and potential damage.
Cisco PIX SNMPv3 Denial of Service
As will be extensively discussed in Chapter 8, “Defending Routers and
Switches,” Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is the main manage­
ment protocol for administrators to monitor their networking devices. In SNMP
version 3, the protocol began to support encryption, a much-needed feature as
previous versions were subject to all kinds of attacks with the clear-text protocol.
This latest Cisco PIX vulnerability revolves around the way the PIX firewall
handles incoming SNMPv3 messages, or traps.The vulnerability was released on
January 26, 2004, so by any standards this is a new attack. According to the Cisco
advisory, this vulnerability affects versions of PIX OS 6.3.1, 6.2.2 and earlier,
6.1.4 and earlier, and 5.x.x and earlier.
Using SNMPv3 to Crash a PIX
The mere presence of this protocol targeted at the device will cause the firewall
to crash and then reload itself, even if the given firewall does not have the
SNMPv3 feature-set loaded.This exploit will cause a brief interruption of ser­
vice and connectivity while the device recycles.
Detailed information is limited as to exactly why the PIX firewall module
cannot handle the SNMPv3 message. Sending the SNMPv3 message or trap to a
Cisco PIX device configured to accept SNMP messages will cause the machine
to crash and then reload.The exploit can be performed from any number of
SNMP tools and is easily repeatable, opening the doors to a potential automated
worm or worse. In fact, it is quite astonishing how simple it is to use this attack,
as there are no other requirements in the SNMPv3 payload, just the presence of
the protocol is enough to cause the failure.
SNMPv3 Tools and Uses
Currently, there is no automated exploit code available on the Internet; however,
we believe by the time this books prints we will see some automated proof-ofconcept code in the wild. Even without a scripted attack on this vulnerability,
the SNMPv3 DoS can be easily exploited through the use of SNMP tools such
as SolarWinds or Castle Rock Computing’s SNMPc software package.
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To successfully exploit this vulnerability, all you will need to do is configure
the software package to connect to the target firewall. Once the connection is
established, the remote firewall will drop and recycle, causing the desired denial
of service.
This is an extremely dangerous exploit, as it can be performed with very
simple tools and a limited knowledge of networking devices and protocols.
Should an easy-to-use, automated tool emerge in the wild, this could result in a
pretty nasty threat for Cisco PIX administrators.
Defending against
SNMPv3 Denial-of-Service Exploits
Fortunately, Cisco has provided us with three mitigating tactics to prevent suc­
cessful exploitation of this vulnerability. It is important to note that this attack is
only successful if the PIX firewall is running the SNMP server service. If the
device is just sending SNMP traps to a SNMP monitoring agent, a much more
common configuration, the exploit will fail. If the SNMP server is running and
is not a necessary component of your firewall, you can disable it by using the fol­
lowing commands:
BrianPIX(config)# clear snmp-server
BrianPIX(config)# no snmp-server enable traps
BrianPIX(config)# no snmp-server [interface_name] [ip_addr]
The preceding commands will disable the SNMP server on the Cisco PIX
device. If the SNMP server is required, another sanctioned Cisco workaround is
available by limiting the devices that can connect via SNMP. By defining which
IP addresses can connect to the device with SNMP, you limit the wide exposure
of this being exploited by unknown hosts.This does not completely mitigate the
vulnerability, though, as the approved IP addresses could send the SNMPv3 mes­
sage, thereby resulting in the denial of service. Use the following command to
define the allowable IP addresses:
BrianPIX(config)# snmp-server host [interface_name] [ip_addr]
Finally, the last mitigation technique would be to update your Cisco PIX
installation to the latest software revision. According to Cisco, the correct and
patched versions are 6.3.2 and later, 6.2.3 and later, and 6.1.5 and later.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Cisco PIX SSH Denial of Service
For many of us, Secure Shell (SSH) is the only trusted network management
communication protocol, and is widely deployed throughout the enterprise.
Administrators use SSH to remotely connect to networking devices and UNIX
machines to perform remote management. Previously, protocols like Telnet were
used, but given their clear-text nature, and the security risks inherent with it,
many administrators moved away from the insecure protocol and began adopting
the usage of SSH on critical devices.
Most networking devices now support the use of SSH, including the Cisco
PIX family of firewalls. In late 2001, a vulnerability was released affecting the
SSH protocol. Since the protocol itself was flawed, and not necessarily the
vendor’s implementation, multiple vendors were negatively affected, including
Cisco. However, in Cisco’s haste to release an updated revision on the PIX OS
and IOS, they introduced a serious flaw in the SSH handler that causes a DoS
vulnerability on all PIX firewalls that had the SSH server enabled.
Using SSH to Crash a PIX
As mentioned previously, SSH is the de facto standard for managing remote net­
work devices. Network administrators rely on this protocol to make configura­
tion changes and updates to the devices on their network. With this in mind,
most Cisco networking devices, PIX especially, are running the SSH server and
are thereby vulnerable to this exploit.
The Cisco SSH vulnerability was discovered and released in June 2002.The
vulnerability was introduced after Cisco made an update to their software by
patching a previous SSH vulnerability.This new exposure can be triggered by
sending an overly large SSH packet to the device. Once the packet arrives, the
SSH server attempts to perform a Cyclical Redundancy Check, or CRC, on the
SSH packet.This CRC check commits far too much CPU processing and limits
the ability for other functions to operate on the device, thereby causing the
denial of service.The exploit can be repeatedly sent to the device, causing it to
unexpectedly reload and introduce loss of connectivity.Typically, a reload on a
Cisco PIX firewall can take several minutes; however, since the vulnerability can
be exploited repeatedly, this reload loop could continue ad infinitum, or until
you patch your system.
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SSH Tools for Crashing the PIX
Currently, there is only one known public exploit for this vulnerability, although
anyone crafty enough to use a packet generator and create his own malformed
SSH packets can trigger this exploit.The public exploit is available through
Rapid 7, Inc. and is called SSHredder.This tool is a collection of binary packets
that can be sent to the vulnerable device through tools like Netcat. Complete
with over 600 different binary packages, this tool is built to test the exploit on a
variety of different vendor platforms.
To successfully trigger the exploit, you will need to run Netcat on your local
machine and send the binary packet to the PIX firewall SSH server. Netcat is a
networking utility used to read or write packets across network connections. It
serves as a popular hacking tool, as it can be used to send traffic and set up TCP/IP
listeners on a target machine. Netcat can be downloaded for Windows or Unix
platforms from: http://www.atstake.com/research/tools/network_utilities/. Once
Netcat is loaded on the local machine, you can download the SSHredder utility
from Rapid 7 at http://www.rapid7.com/Product-Download.html.
To execute the exploit, use the following command:
F:\Tools\NT>nc –v 192.0.2.1 22 < 0000037.pdu
Dissecting the preceding line, you can see that we executed the Netcat pro­
gram with the nc command.The -v option instantiates the “verbose” option for
Netcat, detailing basic information once the connection is established.The IP
address provided is our victim PIX firewall, and the number 22 is the port
number for the SSH server. Finally, the < is used to send the file 0000037.pdu to
the target device on port 22.This has successfully sent the malformed SSH
packet that will cause the PIX firewall to crash. Obviously, this type of exploit
can be easily scripted in Perl, or your other favorite shell scripting variant.
Advanced features of Netcat also allow you to spoof your source IP address
to hide your identity a little better. Since only one packet needs to be sent to the
target device to trigger the exploit, IP address spoofing will work. By spoofing
your IP address, the administrator will have a much harder time tracking down
the offending machine.
Defending against SSH Denial-of-Service Exploits
Cisco has provided many mechanisms to protect you from this basic vulnera­
bility. It is important to note that SSH is not enabled by default on PIX firewalls,
so unless you have configured the SSH server, you are most likely not vulnerable.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
However, if you are performing remote device management, SSH will most
likely be your one lifeline to the networking device; thus, disabling the service is
probably not an attractive option. However, instead of disabling the server, it
might be worthwhile to limit the IP addresses or devices that can connect to the
firewall via SSH.This can be achieved through the use of ACLs. Cisco recom­
mends blocking all SSH requests from the untrusted Internet segment, and only
allowing specific IP addresses to connect. While this will not fully protect you
from the vulnerability, as the approved IP addresses could still initiate the attack,
it will mitigate you from most of the would-be attackers.To apply an access-list
of this nature, follow this example:
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 permit host 192.0.2.32 22
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 permit host 192.0.2.195 22
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 deny any BrianRouter(config)# interface Ethernet 0/1
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip access-group 25 in
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip access-group 25 out
BrianRouter(config-if)# exit
Additionally, since this particular exploit has been available for some time,
Cisco has many updated versions of the PIX OS. Check with the Cisco Web site
to find the most updated version for your PIX device. If you are running an
older version of the PIX software, it might make sense to use this opportunity to
upgrade.
Microsoft ISA Server
Attacks and Solutions
Regardless of what the marketing documents might say, ISA Server is really
nothing more than the old Microsoft Proxy Server with better wizards. Add to
this the fact that Microsoft is certainly the “black sheep” of the security world
and you end up with one disaster of a firewall product. Regardless of the lack of
functionality and features within the product, early on, ISA server was targeted
by many vulnerability researchers as their number-one task. Researchers and
hackers were determined to find vulnerabilities and flaws within the firewall,
thereby invalidating Microsoft’s attempt at becoming a major security player.
They achieved this goal in short order.
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Since then, researchers have turned back to their favorite firewall vendors,
such as Check Point Cisco and NetScreen, causing a lack of recent discoveries in
the ISA Server product. Of course, it is always possible that Microsoft finally got
their act together and put out an impenetrable firewall product. Okay, stop
laughing, perhaps we were correct, and leading vulnerability researchers did move
on to other targets. Nevertheless, while some of these exploits are old, they are
equally damaging to those who are running various versions of ISA Server. In
this section, we will describe some of the most damaging, and simple to run,
exploits for the ISA Server product.
ISA Server Web Proxy Denial of Service
The very first vulnerability to be discovered in the product exploded on the
scene in early April 2001. Of course, in pure Microsoft fashion, the first vulnera­
bility was an exploitable DoS attack.This vulnerability resides in the Web Proxy
service of the firewall, which is used to pass Web requests from internal resources
to external Web servers. In other words, when an internal device requests con­
tent from a Web site outside the corporate network, the ISA Web Proxy service
requests the content on behalf of the device and then relays the data once it is
received from the Internet.
This vulnerability affects the Web Proxy service by creating a DoS condition
that stops all processing of outgoing HTTP traffic. An administrator will need to
manually restart the Web Proxy service on the ISA firewall to restore connectivity.
The vulnerability affects Microsoft ISA Server version 1.0 on Windows 2000.
Using Web Requests to Crash ISA Server
The Web Proxy attack is easily scriptable and can be routinely initiated from
internal resources. Inherently, ISA Server runs the Web Proxy service, so all ISA
Server installations are vulnerable.The attack is mainly triggered by sending an
elongated URL string to the target firewall. Regardless of the ultimate location,
or whether the resource is available, once the ISA server begins to process the
URL, the Web Proxy service will assume nearly 100 percent of CPU resources
and stop passing all incoming or outgoing Web traffic.The attack can be per­
formed by simply requesting a long URL resource, or by opening an HTML email with this URL attack defined in the content.The latter attack is potentially
more dangerous, as unsuspecting users might open unsolicited HTML from out­
side attackers that could initiate the exploit.This could be repeated several times,
as once the firewall service is restarted, it is still vulnerable to the attack.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
The Web Publishing service included with ISA Server processes HTTP
proxy services from the Internet to internal Web servers. By default, the Web
Publishing service is disabled and needs to be configured by an administrator
prior to functioning. If the service is running, the same attack that can be instan­
tiated from inside the network could potentially be performed from the Internet.
From the Internet, the attacker would have to address a Web server currently
available and protected behind the ISA server.
Web Proxy Tools for Crashing the ISA Server
To date, the only available exploit for this vulnerability is from SecureXpert labs:
http://downloads.securityfocus.com/vulnerabilities/exploits/repeat.c.The scripted
exploit can easily be executed from Linux machines. However, to show you the
true power of this vulnerability, we will demonstrate the exploit without the
scripted companion and just perform it through a Netcat session. Using the fol­
lowing command, you can overflow the Web Proxy service on your target ISA
server:
F:\Tools\NT>nc –v www.stuckintheattic.com 80 < urlpush.txt
This is very similar to the Netcat command we provided in the previous
Cisco attack. Essentially, we are opening a connection to the Web server stuckintheattic.com on port 80. Since the ISA server is proxying the request for us, it
will handle all of the connection negotiation. Once the connection is opened,
we send the contents of the text file urlpush, which contains our malicious payload.The contents in the text file are:
GET http://www.stuckintheattic.com/aaa(2997 more a's) HTTP/1.0
This single URL string is enough to overflow the Web Proxy service and
cause the denial of service. In the text file, we have a simple HTTP 1.0 GET
command, asking for the resource referenced in the URL.The actual URL reads
“http://www.stuckintheattic.com/aaaaaaaaaaa.html,” where there are a total of
3000 “a’s” listed in the URL string. As you can see, this vulnerability is extremely
easy to exploit.
The same type of exploit could be performed from the Internet if the Web
Publishing service was running.The only exception being, where the fictional
stuckintheattic.com domain is used from the inside, an Internet attack would
actually need to use the real, and valid, address of a Web server behind the ISA
server.The rest of the attack is identical and will cause the same result.
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Defending against Web Proxy Exploits
Unfortunately, unlike the Web Publishing service, the Web Proxy service is a
required component of ISA Server and must be running.This springs from the
fact that ISA Server is a derivative of the old Microsoft Proxy Server application.
With this being the case, the only remediation effort would be to update your
installations of Microsoft ISA Server.This can be performed by installing the
Microsoft hotfix MS01-021.
The Web Publishing service, while still vulnerable to this exploit, can be dis­
abled if it is not needed.This will mitigate the risk of this attack being triggered
from Internet intruders.The vulnerability to this service is also corrected with
the MS01-021 hotfix.
ISA Server UDP Flood Denial of Service
ISA Server has a flaw in how the Winsock Proxy service handles fragmented
UDP packets.The flaw can cause a DoS condition where the firewall is unable
to process any traffic inbound or outbound. While it is common for most devices
to suffer from “flood” attacks, this particular vulnerability revolves around how
ISA Server handles the fragmented nature of the packets, requiring far fewer
packets to be processed than most “flood” attacks.
Originally discovered by Tamer Sahin at Security Office, the vulnerability
was released in November 2001. While this attack does take advantage of how
ISA Server (more specifically, the Winsock Proxy service of ISA Server) processes
the fragmented packets, the exploit does require that a significant amount of
traffic be directed to the firewall. For the most part, this limits the success of the
exploit from Internet attackers, pending bandwidth resources and Internet choke
points. However, in respect to internal resources, this attack can be successful due
to the increased bandwidth and resources on internal networks.The vulnerability
affects all versions of ISA Server 2000.
Using UDP Floods to Crash ISA Server
Network flooding attacks are not new to the network security space.The orig­
inal distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks used to use these tactics to limit
the accessibility of their victim’s networks and resources. Additionally, this type of
attack is not the most graceful; generally, they are easily tracked, and administra­
tors can easily find the offending attacker.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
The core of the attack results in the firewall processing a large amount of
bogus traffic, thereby limiting the amount of processing available for legitimate
traffic.This coupled with fixed resources on the firewall causes the denial of ser­
vice, as there is only a finite amount of memory that can be consumed by a run­
ning application. In this instance, the Winsock Proxy service has a memory leak
when presented with a large volume of fragmented UDP packets. In short, this
causes a rapid consumption of system memory, which can cause substantial
packet loss or an all-out loss of service.The loss of service typically requires a
reboot on the part of the administrator.
UDP Floods Tools against ISA Server
A few days after the discovery of the vulnerability,Tamer Sahin released proof-ofconcept code that sends a large amount of spoofed, fragmented UDP traffic to
the target firewall.This exploit will certainly generate a large amount of network
traffic and invariably set off any IDS sensors that are watching the wire.That
being said, the exploit can successfully repeat and execute the vulnerability on
target ISA firewalls, making this a real threat for your internal networks.The
exploit code, named Opentear, is available from the Security Office Web site at
http://www.securityoffice.net/articles/isa/index.php.
The exploit includes a simple-to-use interface; just ensure before you execute
the program to have plenty of system resources on your machine and plenty of
bandwidth between your machine and the target firewall. After executing the
attack, the ISA firewall should be in a degraded state. For the best effect, you can
run this exploit from multiple locations on the internal network, but by doing
this, you are setting off every network monitoring alarm in the building.
Once compiled, simply run the exploit from a command prompt as follows:
#opentear 192.0.2.1 Once run, this simple command will begin to flood the provided IP address
with the fragmented UDP packets.The exploit will spoof the source address of
each packet sent with a false address, helping to obfuscate the attacker.
ISA Server UDP Flood Defenses
Microsoft released a hotfix that fixed this vulnerability, plus two others, prior to
the discovery of the memory leak. MS01-045 fixed the Winsock Proxy service
by correcting the way in which the service allocates and deallocates memory.
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Applying this patch will remove the existence of the memory leak in the
Winsock Proxy service; however, it does not fully mitigate you from flood attacks.
UDP and TCP flooding attacks are written to occupy and allocate as much of the
firewall resources as possible, thereby causing connection disruptions and degraded
performance. In most cases, these attacks do not take advantage of a particular vul­
nerability (this attack excluded), but rather brute-force DoS condition. While
ensuring your firewall is on the most current software revision will help mitigate
most attacks, you cannot be fully protected from flooding types of assaults.
Some defense techniques will help you deal with network flooding attacks.
First, the use of quality-of-service (QoS) or packet shapers will help remove the
threat of large amounts of malicious traffic from being transmitted on your net­
works. Second, the use of active IDS can help reduce the amount of malicious
traffic on network segments.These systems monitor traffic on your networks, and
when abnormal or malicious traffic is encountered, they either block the traffic
from progressing or make modifications to the firewall rule policy to block the
unauthorized traffic. Using these techniques in concert with keeping up to date
with firewall software revisions will help mitigate future and existing attacks from
being successful on your devices and networks.
NetScreen Firewall
Attacks and Mitigations
NetScreen has always been known for performance. Running on their own
custom appliance, their high-end packet-filtering firewalls can process an insane
12 Gbps and have earned them the 2003 Network Magazine Product of the Year
award (www.netscreen.com/company/news_room/new_releases/
pr_20030423_453.jsp). A strong market contender, this firewall manufacturer was
just purchased by Juniper Networks for nearly $4 billion.
Even though the company has made promising firewall innovations, and con­
tinues to surprise the marketplace with new features and functionality, the secu­
rity of their devices has been scrutinized by leading researchers worldwide. Over
the past few years, several DoS vulnerabilities were found, as well as some infor­
mation disclosure leaks within the core firewall product. In the next section, we
will highlight a few of the more highly exploitable vulnerabilities within the
NetScreen product suite
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
NetScreen Management and
TCP Option Denial of Service
Administrators can manage the NetScreen firewall in a few different ways:
through a command-line interface accessible via Telnet, SSH, or direct-connection through a console cable, or a WebUI that is available via standard HTTP or
HTTPS.The firewall is capable of having an IP address for each active interface,
as well as a “Management” IP address that administrators would use to configure
the firewall via the methods mentioned previously. Firewall ACLs and permission
can be set to allow or disallow certain hosts from connecting to the management
IP address.
A flaw exists in a certain version of ScreenOS, NetScreen’s proprietary oper­
ating system for their appliances, which can cause a system reboot if certain TCP
options are set. In other words, users connecting to the management IP address
with malformed TCP option settings can cause the firewall to assert and reboot,
causing a loss of service and network interruption. Versions of ScreenOS 4.0.1r1
through 4.0.1r6, 4.0.3r1, and 4.0.3r2 are vulnerable to this attack.
Manipulating TCP Options to Crash ScreenOS
This vulnerability was discovered in July 2003 by the Papa Loves Mambo
Research Group.The group found that Windows hosts that connect to the man­
agement interface of the NetScreen firewall with extremely large TCP window
sizes would cause the device to crash.The TCP window size is used to deter­
mine the initial size of data that can be transferred during a normal TCP con­
nection. In other words, one side of the TCP connection tells the other side how
much data it can send before sending an acknowledgment packet.This type of
TCP tweak is commonly used when you want to speed up transfer rates
between hosts.The downside is that the increased data transmission consumes
more memory in the process, as the IP stack needs to buffer the data before and
after transmission.
The DoS condition exists when a Windows host with the increased TCP
window size connects to either the Telnet or WebUI management interface. As
soon as the connection is established with the firewall, the device sends invalid
information to the onboard Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC), which
cannot properly process the incoming data, thereby causing a reload of the entire
device.This reload typically take a few moments to bring the device back to
normal operating conditions, causing a loss of connectivity and dropped traffic.
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Similar to many of the other exploits we have witnessed in this chapter, the
attack can be triggered by an unauthorized user, as authentication does not need
to take place for this exploit to be successful.This makes this attack open to
anyone who knows the management interface of the device.
Registry Tweaks for TCP Options to Crash ScreenOS
Perhaps the most dangerous part of this attack is that there is zero need for any
type of exploit code. A user can simply add a few tweaks to his Windows
Registry and connect to the vulnerable device to cause the outage.The only
saving grace here is if you have strong desktop policies that prohibit the average
Windows users from making Registry modifications. If this is not the case, then
anyone with knowledge of the firewall IP addresses could potentially launch the
attack from the internal network.
To create the appropriate TCP window size to carry out the attack, the fol­
lowing Registry changes must be made.This information was provided by the
Papa Loves Mambo Research Group
\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
Tcp1323Opts, HEX, 3
\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Tcpip\Parameters
TcpWindowSize, Decimal, 131400
With this information, the user will need to create two new DWORD values
in the Registry.These new DWORDS should be named “TcpWindowSize” and
“Tcp1323Opts.”The TcpWindowSize value should be as a decimal value of
131400.The Tcp1323Opts DWORD should be set to a hexadecimal value of 3.
These two values must be under the Parameters key in “Tcpip.” Once these
entries are added, the user must reboot the Windows machine
Now that the Registry entries are set, the user can connect to the firewall
device to trigger the vulnerability.The user can perform this through a couple of
methods, since both the Telnet and Web interface are vulnerable to this attack.To
connect via Telnet use the following command:
F:\Tools>telnet 192.0.2.1
In this example, we are opening a Telnet session with the target host,
192.0.2.1, which is our NetScreen firewall. Once the initial TCP connection is
established, the firewall should fall over.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
To exploit this vulnerability through the Web interface, a user can simply
open a Web browser and input the IP address into the address bar, such as
http://192.0.2.1/. In addition, at a DOS prompt a user can start Internet
Explorer by issuing the following command:
F:\Tools>start http://192.0.2.1/
F:\Tools>start https://192.0.2.1/
With either method, the firewall will crash once the TCP connection is
established. Additionally, both of these tactics can be performed by using Netcat
as follows:
F:\Tools>nc –v 192.0.2.1 23 F:\Tools>nc –v 192.0.2.1 80 F:\Tools>nc –v 192.0.2.1 443 In the preceding examples, Netcat will connect to the target device and
cause the denial of service.
Defending ScreenOS against the TCP Option DoS
A couple of tactics can be employed to help protect against this attack. First, you
can set the allowable devices that can connect to your management IP address
within the NetScreen command-line interface. By using this command, only the
specified hosts, or networks, will be allowed to open connections with the man­
agement interface. While this will protect you from untrusted attackers, the
allowed hosts or networks could launch the attack and exploit your firewall.The
following is the command necessary to define the allowable hosts or networks:
#set admin manager-ip 192.0.2.134 255.255.255.255
In this first example, we add a rule allowing only the IP address 192.0.2.134
to connect to the NetScreen management interface.This will prohibit anyone
except the preceding IP address from accessing the management portion of the
device.
#set admin manager-ip 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.0
In this second example, all users on the Class C subnet of 192.0.2.1-254 can
connect to the management interface.This is a broader application of the first
access control rule.This allows access to the potential 254 devices on the
192.0.2.x subnet.
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Another remediation tactic, if you do not use the WebUI interface, would be
to disable Telnet access to the device and only use SSH. Since SSH is not vulner­
able to this attack, this protocol can be used to securely administer the device (a
tactic you should have been using anyway).You can disable the WebUI or Telnet
interface through the command-line interface.
Lastly, you have the option to upgrade to the latest version of ScreenOS. At
the time of print, NetScreen firewalls are currently shipping with version 5.0 of
ScreenOS.Therefore, if you are running one of the vulnerable versions, you can
upgrade.
NetScreen Remote Reboot Denial of Service
While this is a somewhat older vulnerability, the possibility exists that an unautho­
rized user connecting to the WebUI management interface of a NetScreen firewall
can cause a reboot of the device. As mentioned in the previous NetScreen vulnera­
bility, the WebUI interface is designed to allow administrators the ability to make
modifications to the firewall and firewall policies. While other options to manage
the firewall are available, such as SSH,Telnet, and direct console connections, the
WebUI is most commonly used among administrators and has a DoS flaw.The
vulnerable only exists on the popular NetScreen 25 appliance and on versions 2.5
through 3.0.1r1.1 of ScreenOS. Other versions are not vulnerable.
Manipulating the WebUI to Crash ScreenOS
The NetScreen WebUI has a simple login display that provides access control to
the main configuration sections of the interface.The user management system is
proprietary to NetScreen, although third-party authentication mechanisms such
as LDAP and SecueID are supported by the firewall.The vulnerability exists in
the way the authentication is handled, specifically how the authentication mech­
anism handles the use of a long username.This vulnerability only exists when an
authentication mechanism is being used.
The attack, once successfully applied, causes a general exception error and
immediately reboots the appliance.This attack is extremely easy to initiate and
does not require a legitimate username or login credentials. Furthermore, once
the device reboots, and is properly functioning again, the vulnerability still exists,
providing the evildoer an infinite loop of possible attacks.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Crafting the Long Username to Crash ScreenOS
As with many of our other examples, this attack does not require complicated
exploit code, or any code for that matter.To trigger this attack, a user would only
need to have a Web browser and the IP address of the WebUI, or management
interface on hand. By opening a connection with a Web browser to the WebUI
interface, the user is prompted for a username and password. Once the login page
is loaded, the user can enter the letter “x” 257 times in the username login box
and press Enter without providing a password.
The vulnerability exists since there is no boundary checking on the exces­
sively long username.This overflows that amount of memory allocated for the
field and causes the crash—and can be reproduced ad nauseum.
Defending ScreenOS against the Invalid Usernames
As with the previous vulnerability, the same mitigation and remediation steps can
be followed to protect yourself from this vulnerability. First, you can set the
allowable devices that can connect to your management IP address within the
NetScreen command-line interface. By using this command, only the specified
hosts, or networks, will be allowed to open connections with the management
interface. While this will protect you from untrusted attackers, the allowed hosts
or networks could launch the attack and exploit your firewall.The following is
the command necessary to define the allowable hosts or networks:
#set admin manager-ip 192.0.2.134 255.255.255.255
In this first example, we add a rule allowing only the IP address 192.0.2.134
to connect to the NetScreen management interface.
#set admin manager-ip 192.0.2.1 255.255.255.0
In this second example, all users on the Class C subnet 192.0.2.1-254 can
connect to the management interface.
Another remediation tactic would be to disable the use of the WebUI inter­
face and only use SSH or Telnet to remotely administer the device. For security
best practices, you should probably only use SSH as your administrative protocol.
You can disable the WebUI through the command line.
Lastly, you have the option to upgrade to the latest version of ScreenOS. At
the time of print, NetScreen firewalls are currently shipping with version 5.0 of
ScreenOS.Therefore, if you are running one of the vulnerable versions, you can
upgrade to the latest.
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Novell BorderManager
Attacks and Solutions
Novell, famous for the very successful NetWare network operating system and
later the highly scalable NDS Directory service, also offers a firewall solution
called BorderManager. We are not typically ones to pick on Novell, as they did a
really good job with NetWare, but we bring up this vendor because there is a
fairly obvious vulnerability within their firewall product. For those of you who
remember and idolize IPX, this might bring back some fond memories. For us,
we think that our descriptions of IPX in Chapter 7, “Network Switching,” are
most likely the last time that protocol will be written about for years to come, so
you might want to take a few moments to skip ahead and enjoy Chapter 7.
Don’t worry; we will be here when you get back.
Novell BorderManager
IP/IPX Gateway Denial of Service
A denial-of-service vulnerability was discovered in the BorderManager product
in August 2002.This vulnerability resides in how the IP/IPX gateway handles
large inputs of data on TCP port 8225.The IP/IPX gateway does exactly what it
sounds like; it provides IP access to devices running the IPX protocol. In version
3.6 of BorderManager, the IP/IPX gateway is configurable through the
NWADM32 utility. In this version, the listening ports are configurable; however,
the standard port is TCP 8225.The vulnerability exists in version 3.6 SP1a of
BorderManager.
Attacking the IP/IPX Gateway
Although configurable, most installations of BorderManager have the default lis­
tening ports of the IP/IPX gateway set.The DoS attack is triggered by sending
over 2MB of data to the IP/IPX gateway listening port, typically TCP port 8225.
The gateway receives that data and places the information in the buffer; once the
buffer is filled, the module abends, causing the denial of service and ending all
traffic flows, inbound or outbound.
This exploit, as with many of the previous examples, is extremely easy to
perform, especially in the context of an internal network segment with increased
bandwidth and relaxed network permissions. While it might be difficult to attack
the IPX portion of the gateway since few people have IPX installed today, the IP
portion is open and quite accessible.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Tools for Attacking the IP/IPX Gateway
While there is no current exploit available that can automatically trigger this
denial of service, it is quite simple to perform with the Netcat utility we previ­
ously used in this chapter.The following command will send a file we have
selected and cause the gateway to abend.
D:\Tools\Netware> nc –v 192.0.2.12 8225 < somethingcorporate.mp3
The previous command instantiated a Netcat session to our target
BorderManager server on TCP port 8225.To trigger the condition, we needed to
supply a file, or random data, that was larger than 2MB. Luckily, we found an
MP3 file of my favorite band named Something Corporate performing a rendition
of Dramarama’s Anything, Anything that was around 2.5MB. We figured if that
can’t crash a Novell BorderManager server, nothing can.
Because of the manner in which the gateway crashes, we will never get con­
firmation that our attack was successful. However, if you are behind the
BorderManager firewall and are on the inside of the network, you can simply try
to connect to a resource on the Internet.You should find that the connection is
dropped and you cannot connect to the site, demonstrating that you successfully
took down your BorderManager server. Now you better go and dust off your old
NetWare manuals, figure out what the equivalent to “Control-Alt-Delete” is in
Novell, and then go find which one of the dusty, antiquated 386 machines in the
wiring closet is the one you knocked over.
Defending against the IP/IPX Gateway DoS
Fortunately, there are a couple of workarounds to protect yourself from this basic
attack. First, if you are afraid of disrupting the perfect balance your NetWare
server has enjoyed for the last three years by installing a patch, then you can add
some basic filters to protect yourself from this vulnerability. Make sure to drop all
traffic destined to TCP port 8225, or whichever port you have the gateway con­
figured to run on, for your BorderManager machine. In some cases, the use of
Novell IP SOCKS clients necessitates the availability of TCP port 8225. If you
support SOCKS clients in your environment, then you might not be able to
install filtering for that port.
If TCP filtering is not an option for your environment, you can also install
the BorderManager patch for version 3.6.The patch is available from the Novell
site at http://support.novell.com/filefinder/12743/index.html. Detailed instruc­
tions are provided on how to install the patch.
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Checklist
Keep all firewall devices as up to date as possible with their software
revisions.
Lock down management interfaces by providing only the necessary
hosts or networks access.
Remove unnecessary components and services from your firewalls; if
they are not being used, they do not need to be accessible.
Periodically perform a full port scan of your firewall devices to
determine if any unusual ports are open.
Invest in Intrusion Detection technologies to help alert you when
abnormal traffic is observed on your networks.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Summary
The firewall is usually seen as the chief security provider for your networks and
resources; however, it is often overlooked that they might be the most vulnerable
asset as well. Hopefully, this chapter helped demystify firewall technologies from
being infallible networking devices to their true being: software developed by
skilled humans. As we critique software vendors for sloppy development practices
and shoddy releases, we too need to look at our firewall technologies in the same
light. Many of the vulnerabilities demonstrated in this chapter were basic, and
remarkably easy to exploit. While firewall vendors should most certainly be held
to a higher standard for the services they provide, we too need to realize that
anything created by human engineering is not perfect.
Through the course of this chapter, we examined the different types of attacks
that are normally performed on firewall devices. Armed with this information you
can begin to ask yourself questions similar to, “What damage could be done if my
internal addressing scheme was compromised?” or “How much disruption would a
DoS attack cause on my main Internet access points?” Having answers to these
questions provides valuable data as to how you should construct your networks and
what defense strategies you should employ to protect it.
The several critical vulnerabilities and their associated exploits were demon­
strated to provide you with real-world examples of common attacks.These sam­
ples show that even the most dominant firewall vendors have serious flaws within
their technology.These flaws could invariably cause you downtime, or much
worse, provide inroads to your most protected assets on the internal networks.
Finally, while we touched on the major vendors, chances are you might be
using a firewall technology that we did not discuss in this book. If this is the case,
you should spend some time combing through security Web sites and your
vendor’s advisories to see if there are any significant vulnerabilities associated
with your devices. Many of the mitigation tactics referred to in this chapter will
apply, regardless of the vendor, and should be used when you cannot update the
firewall software. Spend the time to protect your most critical security asset,
without which, your networks will be nearly defenseless.
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Solutions Fast Track
Firewall Attack Methods
Information Disclosure attacks yield valuable information about firewall
policies, network topologies, or IP address schemas.
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are the most common firewall tactics
and cause disruptions through loss of connectivity or degraded firewall
performance.
Remote Firewall Compromise attacks provide the most dangerous level
of exploitation, allowing intruders to be able to manipulate the oper­
ating system or firewall policies.
Check Point Software Attacks and Solutions
Check Point’s ISAKMP implementation provides a powerful remote
system compromise attack vector that could provide GUI access to the
attacker.
SecuRemote clients can disclose internal IP addresses for the firewall’s
interfaces through unauthenticated connections.
Load the latest service or feature pack for your Check Point software to
protect against these vulnerabilities.
Version 4.1 has been placed on an end-of- life list by Check Point.
Users will need to upgrade to NG soon.
Cisco PIX Attacks and Solutions
Cisco PIX firewalls are susceptible to DoS conditions when SNMPv3
traps are sent to the device and when the device is configured to act as
an SNMP server.
PIX firewalls should either be patched to the latest revision or have the
SNMP server functionality disabled to protect against the SNMPv3
DoS.
Certain versions of the PIX OS are vulnerable to malformed SSH
packets that could cause the device to reload, causing a denial of service.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Upgrade to the latest PIX revision or limit hosts or devices that can
connect to the firewall via SSH to defend against the SSH CRC vul­
nerability.
Microsoft ISA Server Attacks and Solutions
Passing an elongated URL string through the ISA Web Proxy service
will cause a service crash and all Web traffic will fail to traverse the fire­
wall.
Apply the Microsoft hotfix MS01-021 to defend against this
vulnerability.
ISA is vulnerable to UDP flooding attacks because of a memory leak in
the Winsock service.This leak will ultimately lead to an interruption of
service as system resources will be exhausted.
Install Microsoft hotfix MS01-045 to mitigate the presence of this vul­
nerability.
NetScreen Firewall Attacks and Solutions
NetScreen appliances will crash if a connection to a Telnet or Web
administrative session is initiated with improper TCP options set.
Limit the hosts or networks that can connect to the NetScreen
management interface, or upgrade to the latest version of the ScreenOS
to protect against the attack.
The NetScreen WebUI authentication mechanism can be overflowed by
providing an invalid username, which will ultimately cause the device to
reload.
Limit the hosts or networks that can connect to the NetScreen manage­
ment interface, or upgrade to the latest version of the ScreenOS to pro­
tect against the attack.
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Novell BorderManager Attacks and Solutions
BorderManager has an overflow in the IP/IPX gateway, which will
abend if more than 2MB of data is sent to the TCP listening port for
the service.
Either filter TCP port 8225 to mitigate the attempt or install the
BorderManager update for version 3.6 to protect against this
vulnerability.
Some Novell installations require port 8225 for SOCKS connections
and cannot have filtering enabled; if this is the case, download and install
the Novell patch.
Links to Sites
■
www.securityfocus.com Great security resource for finding vendors’
bugs and vulnerabilities.
■
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/ The
main Cisco PIX product page.
■
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_security_
advisories_list.html Cisco Security Advisory page, detailing all public
Cisco vulnerabilities.
■
www.checkpoint.com/products/protect/firewall-1.html Check
Point’s firewall product page.
■
www.checkpoint.com/techsupport/alerts/index.html Check
Point’s product security alerts and bulletins.
■
www.netscreen.com/products/firewall/ NetScreen’s product
Web site.
■
www.netscreen.com/services/security/security_notices.jsp
Security notices for NetScreen products.
■
www.microsoft.com/ISAServer/ Microsoft ISA Server product page.
■
www.microsoft.com/security/security_bulletins/ Security bul­
letins for MS products.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
■
www.novell.com/products/bordermanager/ Novell’s
BorderManager site and details.
■
support.novell.com/filefinder/security/index.html Novell spe­
cific security alerts.
■
www.atstake.com/research/tools/network_utilities/ @Stake’s
Web site and tools section.
■
www.rapid7.com/Product-Download.html Rapid 7 Security site.
Mailing Lists
■
[email protected] To subscribe, send a message to
[email protected] with a single line in the body “info cust-security-announce”.
■
fi[email protected]first.org A mailing list dedicated to security incidents
and research. Subscribe at www.first.org.
■
[email protected] A mailing list dedicated to vulnerabilities
bugs.To subscribe to this, and a number of other mailing lists, go to
www.securityfocus.com/archive.
■
[email protected] A mailing list dedicated to NetScreen vulnera­
bility and security alerts. Subscribe at http://www.netscreen.com/cso.
■
[email protected] Microsoft’s security notification service.
Subscribe at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/
bulletin/notify.mspx.
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Chapter 4 • Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: If someone can attack the underlying operating system of a firewall, why
would anyone install it on Windows or Linux instead of an appliance?
A: In the past, the price of firewall appliances like Check Point’s Nokia IPSO
were cost prohibitive to small companies.This lead to many administrators
installing firewall products on beefy desktops of servers with common oper­
ating systems.The underlying security risks associated with the insecure OS
was eventually addressed by each of the firewall vendors. Many vendors
imbedded Intrusion Prevention Systems or process watching applications that
made sure that the underlying OS could not be compromised, or if it was
hacked, it would not start any unnecessary services, applications, or open any
rogue ports. While these technologies still exist in firewalls, the cost of fire­
wall appliances has dropped, making it more economical for smaller outfits.
Q: How can VPN technologies, like SecuRemote, have so many vulnerabilities?
A: SecuRemote has been the long-time “black sheep” of the VPN world. If you
can successfully get Check Point’s unsupported VPN client to install on your
operating system without causing major IP stack damage, then you are well
ahead of the game. Check Point’s approach to this client is that it is a neces­
sary evil in their industry, and not much attention has been paid in the devel­
opment or QA efforts of this application.The only satisfaction we have is
that Check Point is now starting to feel the pain of this, as other VPN tech­
nologies are becoming more prominent in the space, such as one from their
appliance vendor Nokia. In short, many firewall vendors focus the bulk of
their efforts on the core technology and do not give the necessary attention
to ancillary features like VPN support.This ultimately opens many attack
vectors for would-be hackers.
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Firewall Manipulation: Attacks and Defenses • Chapter 4
Q: What is the harm of having IP address disclosure of information leakage vul­
nerabilities?
A: While these seem to provide very little information and have seemingly low
impact on your entire environment, for many attackers this provides the first
steps in an all-out attack. If your firewall is openly providing the IP addresses
of your internal interfaces, an attacker could take advantage of this informa­
tion by leveraging one type of spoofing attack, where the hacker’s source IP
address is that of an internal segment. Default firewall configurations might
allow any type of traffic to traverse the firewall if the network of the source
IP address is defined on any of the firewall’s interfaces. Many vendors have
prevention mechanisms to prevent this, such as Check Point’s Anti-Spoofing
settings, where the firewall will drop traffic that has a network source address
of interface one, and originates on interface two, or vice versa.These tech­
niques are efficient at mitigating the attack; however, it requires administrative
configuration that might not be present. So, while in many cases this infor­
mation leakage might be rather benign, it could cause some serious damage if
the firewall is not fully configured.
Q: Outside of patching my firewall, how else can I defend against DoS attacks
from the inside or outside?
A: Most often, your firewall will have some type of routing device in front of it
on the perimeter.This device can be tuned to drop fragmented packets,
ICMP, or other types of unauthorized traffic through the router’s access con­
trol lists (ACL). While this might substantially degrade the performance on
the router for a period of time, most large perimeter routers can handle that
type of usage for long durations. Conversely, on the inside of your network,
routing devices or Layer 3 switches might not precede any of your firewall
devices.To combat DoS style attacks on the inside, you can use networkbased Intrusion Prevention Systems.These devices monitor all network traffic
on the wire and drop malformed or unauthorized traffic prior to it reaching
the target. Moreover, these systems are configured to look for a myriad of
attacks and malformed traffic. Look at the NetScreen Intrusion
Detection/Prevention product for a perfect example
(www.netscreen.com/products/idp/index.jsp).
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Chapter 5
Routing Devices
and Protocols
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Understanding the Roles of Routers on
Perimeter Segments
■
Securing Your Routers
■
IP Routing Devices
■
IP Routing Protocols
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
■
Chapter 8 Defending Routers and Switches
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Frequently Asked Questions
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Chapter 5 • Routing Devices and Protocols
Introduction
Ask most networking professionals to create an analogy for routers and many
would classify them as the “traffic cops” of your network infrastructure.This is
because they guide and control the flow of network packets from source to desti­
nation. In our minds, we don’t only think of routers as “traffic cops” because they
are capable of so much more than simply directing traffic. We also think of routers
as the sentinels patrolling and protecting your network’s borders. Additionally, we
think of them as the judges of your network because they can control the proto­
cols used and thus define the laws of the land.To stretch this further, we often also
consider them to be your ambassadors to the rest of the networking world by con­
necting your network to the Internet. As a matter of fact, in most organizations it
wouldn’t be difficult to think of core routers as the Presidents of the entire net­
work, connected to everything and negotiating, facilitating communication, and
keeping a watchful eye on the entire infrastructure. Routers have great capabilities,
awesome strength, and are extremely important to your network. For these reasons,
securing, maintaining, and properly configuring your network’s routers is important
to ensure that your network is as secure as it can be.
This chapter is designed to examine routing devices and their overall role in
your network infrastructure. It is aimed at helping you understand why the security
of your network’s routers is one of the most important aspects in the overall secu­
rity of your network.The chapter begins by examining the roles of routers on your
network. We will discuss the roles of routers on the perimeter segments of your
network, known as border routers. Border routers act as the sentinels at your network’s boundaries and as your ambassadors to the rest of the networking world.
This section also covers the major security considerations of border routers. Next,
the chapter looks at routers on the internal segments of your network, the routers
known as core routers. Core routers act as your network’s judges, deciding the law
of the land and as the Presidents of your entire infrastructure.This chapter also
details the security concerns of core routers in these roles.The chapter then exam­
ines router security in general, covering physical router security, access controls,
auditing, logging, and protocol security. Most of the contents of this chapter relate
to Cisco routers running the Cisco Internetworking Operating System (IOS).
However, this chapter also lists some of the other manufacturers and models of net­
work devices that perform IP routing as of the time of this writing. It details some
of the capabilities of those devices and shows what to consider when dealing with
the security of each device classification. Finally, this chapter looks at the most
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
important IP routing protocols and describes how those protocols are secured
using industry best practices.
After completing this chapter, hopefully you will look at the routing devices
in your infrastructure with a newfound respect.You will both understand the
threats posed by unsecured and nonoptimally configured routers, and see how,
when properly configured and secured, routers can be some of your biggest allies
when it comes to securing and protecting your network.
Understanding the Roles
of Routers on Your Network
It’s true that routers form the basis for all modern internetworking, but what do
routers really do? At the most basic level, routers direct packets of information
across networks. In this most basic scenario, they unite multiple network seg­
ments and facilitate the communication between devices on those segments.
Routers can connect many different types of media as well. A router might have
Ethernet or Fast Ethernet interfaces, a CSU/DSU card for a T-1, a high-speed
serial interface (HSSI), a fiber distributed data interface (FDDI), or maybe even
interfaces for analog phone lines.
As this scenario gets more complex, with more network segments being
added, different types of media being used in those segments, and many routers
and other network devices in the picture, routers not only direct traffic but also
work together to direct packets to destinations via the best paths. Routers also
work together to maintain the accessibility of network segments by redirecting
traffic around network failures. At this level, routers use protocols to exchange
information about the status of the network. Routers then store this information
in what is called a routing table and use that table to decide where to send packets
based on the destination information each packet contains. Routers can use a
variety of different protocols to communicate with each other, and we will
examine some of the most commonly used protocols in the IP Routing Protocols
section in this chapter.
Routers also play an important role in maintaining the security of your net­
work. Given their positions, stationed between network segments, they have the
perfect opportunity to deny unwanted traffic from traversing network boundaries.This type of security measure (commonly referred to as packet filtering) can
be a very effective technique for preventing unauthorized network traffic from
flowing freely on your network. Packet filtering, access lists, and other techniques
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Chapter 5 • Routing Devices and Protocols
for using your router to secure your network are discussed in greater detail in the
Securing Your Routers section later in the chapter.
Routers can play many different roles in your network architecture. Some of
the more common classifications for network routers are based on the function
they provide the network and their location within the network architecture.
Routers that are situated on external perimeter segments are called border routers,
whereas routers that are situated on internal segments of your network are typically called core routers or backbone routers. Figure 5.1 shows examples of
perimeter, internal, and DMZ networks.
Figure 5.1 Example Perimeter, Internal, and DMZ networks
ISP2
ISP1
Border Routers
Perimeter Switches
Internet Network
Perimeter Firewalls
RAS Device
Core Routers
VPN
Concentrator
Internal Network
Segments
Internet Facing Server
DMZ network
Private
Servers
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Desktops
Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Understanding the Roles
of Routers on Perimeter Segments
To begin to understand the roles of routers on perimeter segments, we want to
be clear on the definition of the term perimeter segment. Perimeter segment refers
to any network segment that is either located outside your corporate firewalls or
to any network segment that connects an untrusted network to yours. As an
example, the network segment between your firewalls and the rest of the
Internet would be a perimeter segment.Your DMZ network (which is a network
that contains your Internet-facing and publicly accessible servers and applica­
tions) or a network that connects your organization to business partners would
also be classified as a perimeter segment.
Routers on these perimeter segments of your network would include border
routers that might connect your network to the Internet, or border routers that
might connect your organization to the untrusted networks of business or
trading partners. Because of their responsibilities, border routers can be the some
of the most important routers in your organization.Your border routers are usu­
ally responsible for your company’s Internet access. Perhaps they are running
BGP (described later in the chapter) and maintaining your organization’s con­
nection to the Internet via multiple providers.Your border router might even
link your network to your manufacturing partner’s network via a private leased
line. In all cases, your border routers are responsible for directing packets from
your network to untrusted networks (beyond your control), and a failure of these
routers to perform their tasks would cause a major disruption in your organization’s ability to do business.
Generally, routers on perimeter networks have interfaces on public networks or
networks reachable via unfiltered Internet access.This makes them extremely vul­
nerable to attack attempts. For that reason, routers in the perimeter segments of
your network are quite possibly the devices on your network that can benefit the
most from increased security configuration. Moreover, because they are exposed,
they can be the most difficult routers to secure. An unsecured border router can be
an easy target for a denial-of-service (DoS) attack or might expose confidential
information about your network configuration to potential attackers. An unsecured
border router is also ineffective at filtering unwanted traffic, such as informational
scans and attack attempts. However, a well-configured border router can prevent
simple attacks, port scans, and can also serve as a valuable tool for detecting and
monitoring attack attempts. Configuring routers for these jobs is discussed in the
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Chapter 5 • Routing Devices and Protocols
Controlling What Your Routers Do section of the chapter. Because of the importance
of border routers, and their relative vulnerability to the outside world, it is
extremely important that extra time be spent securely configuring them.
Examining the Roles of
Routers on Internal Segments
An internal segment of your network is any network segment on the inside of
your organization’s firewalls. Internal network segments are generally trusted net­
works. An example of an internal segment would be the network to which your
company’s file servers connect.The network segment that your workstations
directly connect to would also be considered an internal network segment.
Internal routers are those that direct traffic between two or more networks
within your organization.Your internal segment routers might be running OSPF,
IGRP, EIGRP, RIP, or RIPv2, all of which are detailed later in the IP Routing
Protocols section of the chapter.These routers might be connecting internal seg­
ments that span the different floors of your building or connecting your branch
offices via some private communications medium like a point-to-point T-1 or a
leased serial connection. In all cases, internal segments include the most impor­
tant routers of all, your organization’s core routers. In most network architectures,
core routers are the routers through which all network traffic must eventually
pass. Core routers are generally the largest and most powerful routers in your
infrastructure. Wherever your internal segment routers are, they are undoubtedly
a crucial piece of your network infrastructure.
A big difference between internal segment routers and border routers is that
the former connects networks that share the same or very similar security contexts—there is a high level of trust between the networks. However, just because
internal segment routers are located on fairly protected and trusted networks
does not mean they can be neglected. In fact, core routers should be adequately
secured based solely on their importance to your organization and your network
infrastructure. Proper security will prevent attack attempts that might come from
inside your network or might slip through all other means of network security.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Notes from the Underground…
Securing Your Internal Routers
Just because routers on your internal networks are protected from the rest
of the network world by firewalls doesn’t mean they are automatically pro­
tected. Intrusions can come from sources that you might not have consid­
ered. Picture this likely scenario: an e-mail worm is developed that exploits
a known vulnerability in your router’s operating system. Perhaps it’s a vul­
nerability like the one discovered in July 2003 whereby certain types of
packets sent directly to Cisco network devices can cause a DoS on those
devices that can only be resolved by rebooting the device. You patch your
border routers and make sure that no offending traffic can slip into your
network. You have virus protection in place at all points of entry. Your mail
server removes all offending attachments and your workstations all have
the latest antivirus updates. You think you are fairly safe.
Unexpectedly, your network grinds to a halt. Your core routers are
no longer routing packets. “How could this have happened?” you
wonder. On your way to the server room, you walk past a conference
room where a sales rep for some outside company has plugged in his
laptop to check his Web-based e-mail account. He grabs you as you walk
by. “Hey Buddy. Help me out for a second. Will ya? I just opened the
weirdest e-mail, and now my system won’t work. I didn’t even know this
person, but he claimed I needed to review this attached document. I
opened the attachment and nothing happened. Now my computer is just
sitting there.” And thanks to this guy, that’s exactly what your entire
company is also doing. His “attachment” turned out to be the worm. His
system wasn’t patched against the vulnerability the worm was pro­
grammed to exploit, and when he executed the attachment, the worm
quickly scanned your network for the devices it was programmed to
exploit, found your core routers, and attacked.
As you can see, properly securing your internal routers is just as
necessary as securing your border routers. As the saying goes, “an ounce
of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” It might not be possible to pre­
vent a worm from entering your network via means such as this. However,
with a good security configuration in place on your entire network infras­
tructure, including your interior routers, it is very possible to prevent any
damage from occurring.
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Securing Your Routers
So far, we have seen that your organization’s routers are some of the most impor­
tant devices on your network; unfortunately, we have also shown that because of
their function they can also be some of the most vulnerable devices as well. So,
how do you protect what is possibly your most valuable network asset? One
technique is to begin by considering an overall security strategy for your routers.
The security strategy we find most efficient and effective begins with the basics,
starting outside the router and working inward, developing multiple layers of
security.This strategy is similar to historical security strategies used in building
castles, and in fact, you can think of your routers as the castles of your network
kingdom. If you can imagine a castle floor plan, simplified, it might look some­
thing like Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2 Think of Securing Your Routers in Terms of a Castle Architecture
Think of securing your routers in terms of a castle floor plan. Beginning
from the outside, we want to start with considering physical security. Much like a
castle has a moat and walls to keep unwanted visitors out, we need to establish a
physically secure location for your routers. After all, if one were to gain physical
access to your router, he could simple unplug it and shut it down, or perform a
password recovery on the unit to gain access. Next, progressing inward, we want
to focus on configuration-level security. Much like a castle has a drawbridge and
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a gatehouse to control who is allowed entrance to the castle, we need to secure
login access to your router for the same reason. Securing this access protects the
router configuration, the router operating software, and the router’s operating
information.This level is also where we would consider logging and auditing.
Just as the castle guards might have recorded all comings and goings, we must
know when and what the users of your router are doing. Finally, at the center,
we need to focus on your router’s network security. We need to control what
your router does, the protocols it routes, and the services it runs. Just as a castle
has a keep, which is the most guarded section, your router’s network security is
the most important and guarded aspect of your network device.
Examining Possible Attacks on Your Routers
As previously mentioned, your routers can be the most vulnerable devices on
your network.They can be the target of all types of malicious attacks and access
attempts. Some of the most common threats to your routers include:
■
Attempts to gain access These attempts are usually tried via known
vulnerabilities in running services or through brute-force password
guessing.
■
Hijacking sessions An attacker might try to hijack a session after IP
spoofing, predicting and altering sequence numbers, or some other
means.
■
Re-routing This attack is usually done by manipulating router updates
and causing traffic to route to unwanted destinations.
■
DoS attacks This type of attack can be tried with a number of
methods such as circular redirects,Transmission Control Protocol –
Synchronize (TCP SYN) attacks, and by attacking running services such
as Simple Network Mail Protocol (SNMP).
■
Masquerading attacks These attacks are preformed by altering IP
address information within packets in an attempt to bypass packet
filtering.
■
Vulnerability exploits This type of attack attempts to exploit known
vulnerabilities in the router’s operating software or protocols.
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Locking Down Your Routers
Locking down your router begins with physically securing your router.This
includes considering the location where the router will be stored and the oper­
ating conditions inside that location.These measures are just the beginning steps
to securing your router, but are the bases in which the rest of your routers secu­
rity is built.This section looks at choosing and configuring the physical location
where your router lives. It will examine the requirements for physical router
security in terms of locks and personnel access control, and also touch on issues
like climate control, fire suppression, and the means by which other harmful ele­
ments can be avoided.
Keeping Your Routers Physically Safe
At most organizations with a significant enough investment in technology, a
room is created to house the delicate and expensive network and server infrastructure.These locations are called data centers, server rooms, or a network operation
center (NOC). Hopefully, your organization has already established a data center
for your entire network and server infrastructure ,or your organization leases data
center space from a provider of data center services. In either case, knowing what
to look for in a data center or in a space that will become the home for all of
your network and server infrastructure, including your router, can always come in
handy in the event that your organization decides to move data centers, or create
one of its own.The two key components in most data centers are:
■
Physical security
■
Environmental control and monitoring
In the simplest terms, physical security means storing your router in a room
with limited access. In more complex environments, physical security can mean
biometric scanners, surveillance systems, and armed guards.The value and impor­
tance of your devices and your organization’s budget will dictate which physical
security solution is right for your situation, but the bare minimum necessary to
maintain the physical security of your router is a data center room with locks on
the doors that only authorized people can enter.
Another important component of your data center is environmental condi­
tioning and monitoring.This means making sure that your router is protected
from the elements. High temperatures, humidity, fire, and water can all damage
your valuable equipment, and every care should be taken to prevent your router
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from coming in contact with these elements.The room in which you store you
router should have an adequate air conditioning unit to ensure the proper tem­
perature is maintained. Because the temperatures inside your components can be
15 to 25 degrees hotter than the temperature of the room in which they are
stored, try to keep the temperature between 65° and 75°F. Again, depending on
the value of your equipment and your organization’s budget, air conditioning
systems (sometimes called air handlers) can be anything from portable air condi­
tioning units to complex air conditioning and climate control systems.The very
minimum necessary for keeping your router in a stable temperature is an air con­
ditioning unit that can be individually controlled and will function continuously.
The room in which your router is stored should also have a sufficient fire
suppression system. With lots of electricity and continuously running devices,
your data center is a fire risk. Depending on your budget, fire suppression can be
anything from the minimum of smoke detectors and a fire extinguisher, to a
sophisticated Very Early Smoke Detector and Alarm (VESDA) system with a fire
suppression substance like FM-200, carbon dioxide, FE-13, or Inergen.
Finally, try to protect your routers from water.The room you choose for your
data center should not have water pipes running through it or around it. It
should not be located near any major water sources and optimally should not
have exterior windows or skylights that can leak into the data center. If your
HVAC uses chilled water to cool the room, make sure those pipes don’t run
right over your servers. In more complex data center installations, even the fire
sprinkler system within the data center is drained and connected to a pre-action
fire alarm that immediately pressurizes the sprinkler system with water should a
fire be detected. If your data center has a fire sprinkler system, connecting the
sprinkler system to an emergency power cutoff switch might prevent the worst
of damage should the sprinkler system ever be set off.
Preventing Login Access to Your Routers
Preventing login access to your router means configuring access controls and
securing all means of connecting to the router itself. Preventing unauthorized
logins and attempted logins to the router will protect the router configuration,
the router operating software, and the router’s operating information.
Configuring access controls include configuring some means of authentication
and authorization, while securing the means of access includes securing all means
that can be used to configure your device.This section looks at all the means of
accessing your router and describes each. It also delves into the process by which
those means are secured from unauthorized access.
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There can be many ways to access your router, and it is important that each
of these access points is secured or disabled. Many routers have all the means of
accessing them enabled by default, and by disabling those means that are not in
use we can focus on securing the means of access that are in use. For securing
the means of access that are commonly used, there are various different types of
access control methods, and it’s important that we choose the right method for
the situation. Let’s begin by examining the means by which your router can be
accessed.
Means of Accessing Your Router
There are six main means of accessing your router. Some use network connec­
tivity and some do not. Some have default privileges while others are config­
urable. It is important to understand how a router can be accessed so that you
can secure those access points.
■
The console port This is the main access point and the only one
enabled by default.The console port can be used for password recovery
and requires a physical connection to the router.
■
Auxiliary port A modem or terminal server can be connected to the
auxiliary port for accessing the router should the network be unavailable.This port should be disabled and only used if a modem or serial
device needs to be plugged in for access to the system.
■
The Virtual Teletype (VTY) or Virtual TTY ports The VTY ports
are virtual terminal ports that can be access via Telnet or Secure Shell
(SSH) through the network.There are five VTY ports enabled by
default on most Cisco routers.
■
SNMP SNMP uses community strings to control read-only or readwrite access to your router’s configuration and information. SNMP is a
very valuable service, but can be very dangerous to leave unprotected.
■
Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) TFTP is a simple means of
transferring files to and from your router.TFTP is usually used for
uploading or downloading software versions or configuration files.TFTP
can be dangerous because TFTP has no means of authentication. It can
both run on your router and run on a server in your network.
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■
HTTP or HTTPS Most routers provide some means of configuring
or monitoring through HTTP with a common browser. HTTP access
should be disabled on routers. Even though it’s convenient for quick
configuration, the security risks are not worth the time saved.
Configuring Access Controls
There are various means of controlling access to your router, just as there are var­
ious means of accessing your router. Basic access control can be broken down
into authentication and authorization. Authentication is basically identifying who
can log in to the router, and authorization is controlling what they can do once
they are logged in.There are various means of access control among different
manufacturers of routers, but because Cisco controls 85 percent of the router
market, they have set the standards for access control. On Cisco routers, the two
main types of access control are those that are Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) protocols and those that aren’t. AAA incorporates access con­
trol protocols such as Terminal Access Control Access Control System Plus
(TACACS+), Remote Access Dial-in User Service (RADIUS), and Kerberos.
Other means of access control that aren’t AAA protocols include simple authentication,TACACS, and extended TACACS. Cisco recommends using AAA
methods for access control because of the protocol’s superior capability to con­
trol, protect, and account for system access.
AAA Protocols
Non-AAA Protocols
TACAS +
RADIUS
KERBEROS
Simple authentication
TACAS
Extended TACAS
Non-AAA methods of access control can and still are used to secure access
to routers even though it is not recommended. Simple authentication includes
both line authentication and local username authentication. Line authentication
comprises of setting up passwords that must be entered to connect to any of the
VTY, auxiliary, or console ports.These passwords are generally set up on an
access-point specific basis and the password is stored in the router configuration.
Local username authentication gives us the ability to define username and pass­
word combinations to define different types of access. Again, the username and
password combinations are stored in the router configuration.TACACS and
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extended TACACS are older protocols that allow centralized storage and mainte­
nance of usernames and passwords.These protocols have been surpassed in func­
tionality and security by newer protocols and are now generally unsupported by
many router manufacturers.
AAA access control protocols are the best and most secure means of defining
who can access your router. AAA services can use the TACACS+, RADIUS, and
Kerberos protocols.TACACS+ is a proprietary Cisco protocol and despite its
similar name is incompatible with TACACS and extended TACACS. RADIUS is
generally compatible among equipment manufacturers and has many of the same
features and advanced functionality of TACAS+.TACAS+ and RADIUS both
use a central server to store username, passwords, and attributes that can be used
to specifically define user privileges. Both protocols protect network traffic using
a shared secret encryption algorithm as well. Kerberos is means of authenticating
two users on an unprotected network and is generally set up on an organiza­
tional level and then incorporated into authentication for the network infrastruc­
ture. It uses secret-key cryptography and a trusted third party and would be a
complicated and involved process to configure for a single or small group of
routers. AAA services can use TACACS+ for authentication, authorization, and
auditing, while Kerberos is a network authentication system only.
One final detail that is important in access control is configuring your router
with login-warning banners. Login-warning banners don’t really perform any
technical security functions, but they are important for protecting your routers
legally. A basic login-warning banner should include the following information:
■
A “No trespassing” warning
■
An unauthorized use warning stating that all use of equipment must be
authorized by the owner
■
A “No expectation of privacy” statement that alerts users to the fact that
their use is being monitored
Things that should not be on a login-warning banner include:
■
Location information on the router
■
Router model or any configuration details
■
A “Welcome” message
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Configuring Logging and Auditing on Your Routers
Configuring logging and auditing on your routers is an important step in getting
a handle on router security. Logging and auditing give us insight into what the
router and its users are doing. Having accurate logging information is invaluable
in diagnosing problems and detecting unauthorized access attempts. For this
reason, it is extremely important to examine the output from your routers on a
regular basis.The problem with logging is that, once configured, the output can
be overwhelming and it can be difficult to differentiate important log entries
from those that can be safely ignored.Therefore, it is important to be able to
manage your log output with software that will sort and parse logs based on cri­
teria that you can define.This section covers why log information is important
and the different types of logging available on your router.
What Information Does Logging Capture?
We have said that logging is an invaluable resource, and that if correctly config­
ured it can aid in the diagnosing of problems and the detection of unauthorized
access. However, what information can be captured by logging, and how can that
information help? At its most basic, logging captures events that occur on your
router. Some events that are helpful in securing your router include:
■
Router reboots and changes in interface status
■
Configuration changes
■
Traffic that violates access control lists (ACLs)
■
Router login and command history
Logging also captures the time an event occurred, and it is crucial that the
time on a logged event is accurate. For this reason, configuring your router with
a Network Time Protocol (NTP) source is key for the accuracy of your logs.
Examining the Different Types of Logging
Most routers have many different types of logging. On Cisco routers, there are
six different types of logging. Log messages can generally be sent to any combi­
nation of these log types:
■
Console logging When the router sends log information directly to the
console of the router.These logs are valuable only when you are logged in
to the console because they are not stored or seen anywhere else.
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■
Buffered logging When the router sends logging information to a
memory buffer that can be configured to store logged information.This
buffer can only be viewed by logging in to the router and is cleared
with each reboot.
■
Terminal logging When any terminal line is configured to receive
log messages. Like console logging, only the user logged in to the ter­
minal at the time can see the log information.These logs are not stored
anywhere on the router.
■
Syslog logging When your router is configured to send its logging
information to a syslog server. Syslog servers are processes that run on a
server that listen for log messages and record those messages in a central
log file. Some syslog services can also perform actions like alerting on
the received logs.
■
SNMP trapping When your router is set up to use SNMP and to
send traps to a listening SNMP host.
■
AAA If AAA is being used, the router can be configured to send
detailed information to the authentication server.
Controlling What Your Routers Do
Controlling what you routers do is all about controlling the protocols being used
and the default services being run on the router.These considerations are the
core of your router security. Properly configuring the services your router runs,
what protocols it uses, and the types of traffic it will accept and pass can prevent
your router from being an easy target for attack or from being used to attack
others.This section covers disabling unnecessary router services; what services are
needed and which can safely be disabled. It also covers implementing ACLs to
prevent your router from accepting and passing unwanted traffic. Rate limiting
and packet filtering are also covered in this section. Finally, this section covers the
configuration and security of the network protocols your router runs.
Disabling Unnecessary Router Services and Features
The default configuration of many routers includes services running on the
router that are unnecessary. Sometimes, these services are there for legacy support
and other services support special configurations. Disabling these unneeded ser­
vices eliminates the risk that those services will be used to exploit the router or
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to gain information about the router. Doing this will not degrade the perfor­
mance of the router, and in many cases will enhance your router’s performance.
In some cases, a service cannot be disabled or it is in use. In these circumstances,
controlling access to the service is the best means to make those services as
secure as possible.
Here are some of the most common services to be disabled:
■
Small Services for TCP and UDP Small services are services that
the TCP and UDP protocols recommend that a host should provide.
These services are Echo, discard, daytime, and chargen. In some versions
of the Cisco IOS, these services are enabled by default.These services
are completely unnecessary on your router and should be disabled.
■
Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) On Cisco routers, this protocol
will provide you router information on other Cisco routers connected
to it. Unfortunately, it can also provide information to would-be
attackers.This service should be disabled.
■
Finger service Finger is a service that allows remote users to query
your router about the currently logged-on users.This protocol could
reveal information about valid user accounts and should be disabled.
■
HTTP Service The HTTP Service is a Web-based configuration and
administration service that is provided by most router manufacturers.
This service should be disabled on your router because the HTTP
traffic is transmitted in the clear, including login and configuration
information.
■
Bootp Server Bootp is a protocol that allows other routers to boot
from your router’s configuration.This service should be disabled on your
router to prevent unauthorized access to your router’s operating system.
■
Configuration auto-loading This feature allows your router to boot
from a network location.This feature should be disabled on your router
mainly because someone could exploit this feature to change your
router’s configuration.
■
IP source routing This feature of IP allows packets to specify routes.
This feature is generally enabled by default, but should be disabled due
to its use in many different attacks.
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■
Proxy Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) ARP is used to trans­
late network addresses like IP addresses into media or MAC addresses.
Normally, ARP is confined to a single segment and does not traverse
routers. However, the Proxy ARP service responds to ARP requests on
an interface and effectively extends a segment across the interfaces upon
which it is enabled.This service should be disabled on your router
because of the danger it poses in leaking media addresses to untrusted
networks.
■
IP Redirects, Mask Replies, and Unreachable messages These are
all specific message types of Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP).
ICMP is useful in determining information about your network, and it
would almost be impossible to live without the commands ping and
traceroute that use the protocol. However, these three types of ICMP
messages are commonly used by attackers in gathering information
about your network and should be disabled on your router.
■
Domain Name System (DNS) service Most routers support DNS
lookups, and if no DNS is configured will send DNS queries to the
broadcast address 255.255.255.255. Unconfigured DNS servers can
cause unnecessary broadcast traffic at the minimum, and in worst cases
result in incorrect information being received by your router from rogue
DNS servers. If not absolutely necessary, DNS should be disabled on
your router.
■
Unused interfaces All unused interfaces on your router should also be
disabled.This prevents them from being used and also enforces the need
for administration privileges when adding new interfaces.
Access Control Lists and Packet Filtering
Another important technique for securing your router is controlling the type of
network traffic that reaches and passes through it This technique is called packet
filtering, and the most common method of performing packet filtering is by con­
figuring ACLs to prevent unwanted traffic from getting to and/or through your
router.The process of creating ACLs to limit traffic can be complicated, so it is
important to start with the following basic ACL ideals:
■
Create ACLs that prohibit all unnecessary traffic.
■
Create ACLs that filter both incoming and outgoing traffic.
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■
To prevent spoofing, create ACLs on untrusted interfaces that deny
packets with source addresses of trusted and private networks.
■
Create ACLs on trusted interfaces that only allow traffic with source
addresses that are in your trusted network to pass.
■
Create ACLs that restrict access to router services from external net­
works.
Securing Network Protocols
The final step in controlling what your router does is securely configuring the
protocols it uses.The most common way to secure networking protocols is with
the use of routing authentication. Unfortunately, only the newest protocols sup­
port authentication, and even some of those protocols don’t protect the authenti­
cation password in transit. Another method for controlling routing protocols is by
using protocol filtering. It is important to both filter the protocol information
that is leaving your network and the protocol information that is entering your
network. Configuring and securing the most common network protocols is dis­
cussed on a protocol-by-protocol basis later in the chapter.
Maintaining Your Routers for Optimal Security
Configuring optimal security on your routers is not just a one-time affair; it is a
continual process that requires effort and diligence.The threats to your routers
are constantly changing, and your security configuration should evolve to address
those threats. As your router’s configuration evolves it is important to maintain
accurate records and archives of the changes and updates made. Equally impor­
tant is keeping your router’s operating system updated with the latest version
from the manufacturer.
Performing Configuration Storage
An important consideration for maintaining the security and integrity of your
routing infrastructure is the safe storage and archival of your router’s configura­
tion files.There is a method for storing the configuration of almost every router
made, and this method should be used to store a copy of the configuration in a
secure location every time there is a configuration change on the router and at
specified intervals.
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Your configuration files will contain information about how your router
operates, including how it filters traffic, and the protocols in use. For this reason,
these configuration files should be stored in a location that is secure from access
by unauthorized individuals on a reliable storage medium. Because most of these
files will be plain text, a protection mechanism such as encryption is also recom­
mended to ensure that the configuration files don’t fall into the wrong hands.
Keeping Up with Operating System Updates
Most manufacturers maintain the operating system that their devices use, period­
ically repairing any flaws that have been found and occasionally adding new fea­
tures. In some cases, manufacturers charge a yearly maintenance fee for access to
the latest operating system version that will include all fixes and updates.These
services are extremely valuable and generally worth the price of admission. Most
manufacturers also maintain a mailing list or Web site that alerts users to updates
and version releases. Mailing lists are extremely beneficial because once joined,
announcements are pushed out to all members as soon as they are available. With
Web sites that maintain update information, you have to remember to schedule
an appointment on your calendar to check for updates on a regular basis. As
important as it is to keep current with the latest operating system updates,
installing updates should be handled with care:
■
Before installing any updates, remember to back up your current config­
uration and operating system so that you can roll back any upgrades that
don’t go exactly as planned.
■
If possible, updates should be installed on test equipment first to try new
features and ensure compatibility. If that is not possible, the updates
should be applied and tested on your least important routers first before
installation is attempted on your core router or border router.
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Damage & Defense…
Vendors Move to a Secure-by-Default Strategy
In general, securing routers should be approached with a great deal of
determination. It can be a tedious process of configuring, testing, and
reconfiguring. Given this, it is no wonder that security configuration on
routers doesn’t happen as often as it should. To counteract this trend of
insecure configurations, most network device and operating systems
manufacturers are turning to a security mindset where devices are secure
by default. Secure by default means that right out of the box, these device
configurations will have the minimum of services and protocols enabled.
One major example of this trend is Cisco’s new AutoSecure com­
mand that is available starting in IOS version 12.3(1). This feature is aimed
at greatly simplifying router security configuration. Using the AutoSecure
feature enables users to disable the less frequently used IP services that
are often the targets of attack and to also enable IP services that can be
beneficial in protecting a network from attack. Some of the IP services
automatically disabled at the global level are the Finger service, PAD ser­
vice (packet assembler and disassembler), Small-Servers Service, Bootp
Server, HTTP server, Identification Service, Cisco Discovery Protocol Service,
Network Time Protocol Service, and Source Routing. At each interface,
AutoSecure also automatically disables ICMP redirects, ICMP unreach­
ables, ICMP mask reply messages, Proxy-ARP, Directed broadcasts, and the
Maintenance Operations Protocol Service.
In addition to disabling potential security threats, AutoSecure also
enables features that enhance the overall security of the router. Primarily,
AutoSecure globally enables commands such as service password-encryption, which protects passwords within the configuration from being vis­
ible, and service tcp-keepalives-in and service tcp-keepalives-out, which
remove TCP sessions that aren’t terminated properly. Auto secure also
enables security on all access points to the router including the console
port, vty, tty, and AUX ports and disables SNMP if its not being used or
configured with default settings. AutoSecure also enables important secu­
rity logging to internal buffers and all VTY and TTY ports, as well as
securing the forwarding plane of the router.
Continued
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Unfortunately, the current version of AutoSecure provides no roll­
back feature, so be sure to back up your existing running configuration
before attempting to run this configuration.
IP Routing Devices
We have already discussed how, in a way, routers are the glue that connects the
network world.This section covers the basics of all different types of IP routing
devices. It examines the commonalties among the different types of IP routers
and looks at the now common practice of including routing functionality into
devices not typically responsible for that function. In each subsection, we
examine various types of network devices that also perform IP routing, listing
the top manufacturers of these devices and giving a quick overview of security
considerations when dealing with these device types:
■
IP routers
■
Routing switches and network load-balancing devices
■
Routing software and operating systems with routing level
IP Routers
When thinking of IP routing devices, the most obvious things that come to mind
are routers themselves. Network devices classified as routers are dedicated to the
purpose of IP routing.They are highly customized for this task, and because of that
are faster and have more features and functions than the other types of IP routing
devices covered in this section. Routers can be classified according to a number of
different characteristics, but some of the most common characteristics used are
their functionality and their capacity. While all routers can handle the basics of IP
routing, it’s how much traffic a particular router can process that separates it from
the rest of the pack.The amount of data a router can process depends on its
internal design and architecture and is generally measured by how much data can
be processed by a router on a per-slot basis.To facilitate our further discussions of
routers, we define the following categories:
■
Small office routers These routers are generally stand-alone devices
in a smaller than standard rack mount form factor.These routers might
have a static architecture or have minimal upgrade and customization
capacity. Routers in the small office routers category can handle less
than 1 Gbps per slot of bandwidth.
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■
Small to medium-sized Small to medium-sized routers are generally
a step above small office routers in form factor and functionality.These
routers are generally housed in a standard form factor for rack mounting
in a data center and generally have more than one slot for upgrades and
customization. Routers in the small to medium-sized classification also
have less that 1 Gbps per slot bandwidth capacity.
■
Medium- to large-sized Medium- to large-sized routers are yet
more advanced than their small to medium-sized brethren.They typi­
cally have more memory, better upgrade and customization capabilities,
and are housed in a standard rack mount form factor. Routers in the
medium- to large-sized classification have at least 1 Gbps of per-slot
bandwidth and can have up to 2.5 Gbps of per-slot bandwidth.
■
Large- to extra-large-sized Large- to extra-large-sized routers are
the ultimate in IP routing technology.They are generally housed in a
chassis-based form factor allowing for redundant and sometimes hotswap upgrades and components. Routers in this classification have
greater than 2.5 Gbps of per slot bandwidth to handle awesome levels of
IP routing traffic.
There are many different manufacturers of IP routers. Some manufacturers
focus on niche router markets while others make general IP router models that
handle all levels of IP routing. Some of the more common router manufacturers
include:
■
Cisco Systems (www.cisco.com)
■
Lucent Networks (www.lucent.com)
■
Juniper Networks (www.juniper.net)
Cisco systems is said to have up to 85 percent of the IP router market.They
design and sell all levels of IP routers.Table 5.1 lists their most common models.
Table 5.1 Cisco Router Models
Category
Model
Small office routers
Small to medium-sized
Model 700 series, 1000 series, and 1600s
Model 1700 series, 2500 and 2600 series,
and Model 3810
Continued
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Table 5.1 Cisco Router Models
Category
Model
Medium- to large-sized
Model 3600 and 3700 series, model 4000
series, and model 7202, 7204, and 7206
Model 7500 series, 7300 series, ESR 10000
series, and the 12000 and 12400 series
Large- to extra-large-sized
Lucent Networks also focuses on many levels of the IP routing market. It
designs and sells routers all the way from the small office router category to the
extra-large-sized router class.Table 5.2 lists some of the more common Lucent
networks router models.
Table 5.2 Lucent Router Models
Category
Model
Small office routers
Small to medium-sized
Pipeline models 25, 50, 75, 85, 130 and 220
Office Router HS, LS, AccessPoint 300, and
SuperPipe 155, 175
AccessPoint 450, 600, 1500
GRF 400, 1600, and NX64000 multi-terabit
switch/router
Medium- to large-sized
Large- to extra-large-sized
Juniper Networks focuses on large, high-end routers. Juniper designs and sells
routers in the medium to large and large to extra large classifications.Table 5.3
lists some of the more common models.
Table 5.3 Juniper Router Models
Category
Model
Medium- to large-sized Large- to extra-large- sized
M5 and M10 series
M20, M40, M40e, J20 and M160 Internet
backbone router, and the T320 and T640
Looking at Additional Router Functionality
In addition to routing packets, routers are versatile devices and can be integrators
of diverse technologies in your network. As networks have increased in com­
plexity, so have routers increased in functions. In many organizations, traditional
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data networks are being asked to handle telephone and video communications as
well as data packets. Routers have become so flexible that it is very likely a man­
ufacturer makes a model to accommodate just about any known media type and
device. Some router models have even become application aware.They are able
to direct packets based on the traffic type or information contained in the appli­
cation layer of the packet.
There are vast arrays of router models that can accommodate virtually any
type of network hardware available. Moreover, while all models can handle the
basics of IP routing, the differentiation between router models is apparent in the
types of devices the router can accommodate, the amount of data the router can
handle, and the level of redundancy built into the router. Device compatibility
and capacity are probably the biggest differentiators in IP routing devices.The
most basic router models might have one or two Ethernet connections plus a
serial interface for a WAN link and be able to perform the basic interior routing
protocols, while higher-end routers might have many Ethernet interfaces, be able
to handle ATM networks, and have the capacity for multiple fiber-optic links.
Higher-end routers might also be able to handle more complicated routing pro­
tocols, including extended features like quality-of-service (QoS) prioritization,
voice over IP (VoIP) protocols, video protocols, and extended security features
like VPNs. In addition to these differences, another feature of higher-end routers
is built-in redundancy and failover capabilities like multiple power supplies.
Routing Switches and Load Balancers
As network infrastructures have become more complex, it has become increas­
ingly common for mid- and higher-end switches to include some level of
routing functionality as a built-in feature.This trend has progressed to the point
where even load balancing (Layer 4 through 7 traffic management) features have
been integrated into some switch models as well. As a matter of fact, because of
the increasing complexity of networks and continued consolidation of resources,
many infrastructures are increasingly using mid-range switches for routing
between small network segments, and in some cases consolidating core routing
responsibilities into higher-end core switches. Many of these high-end enterprise
class switches are used in large to extra large networks and are chassis-based
switches. Chassis-based switches have a modular configuration, or chassis, that
allows additional modules to be plugged directly into the switch backplane. Some
chassis-based switches can even accommodate a complete router module inside
the chassis. For more information on network switching, refer to Chapter 7,
“Network Switching.”
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There are many manufacturers of network switches making a vast array of
switch models. Using a similar categorization referenced in the previous section
disregarding the slot-bandwidth measurement, let’s look at some of the more
common switch manufacturers:
■
Cisco Systems (www.cisco.com)
■
Extreme Networks (www.extremenetworks.com)
■
Foundry Networks (www.foundrynetworks.com)
Cisco systems is said to have up to 70 percent of the network switch market.
They design and sell switches for all levels of network infrastructure,; however,
routing functionality begins with Catalyst 3000 series switches.Table 5.4 lists
some of Cisco’s most common models that support routing.
Table 5.4 Cisco Switch Models with Routing Functionality
Category
Model
Small office switches
Small- to medium-sized
Medium- to large-sized
Large- to extra-large-sized
Model
Model
Model
Model
Catalyst
Catalyst
Catalyst
Catalyst
3550
4000
4000
6500
series
series
series and 6500 series
series and 8500 series
In addition to Cisco’s switch models that support routing, Cisco also has a
number of switch models that support routing along with load balancing and
extended traffic management.These features are able to direct traffic based on
information in what is considered Layers 4 through 7 (the transport through
application layers) of the OSI network model, like the actual protocol being
used, or details about a particular session of network traffic.Table 5.5 lists some of
Cisco’s switch models that support both routing and load balancing.
Table 5.5 Cisco Switch Models with Routing and Load Balancing
Functionality
Category
Model
Small office switches
Small to medium-sized
Medium- to large-sized
Model Content Service Switch (CSS) 11501
Model CSS 11501 and CSS 11503
Model CSS 11503 and CSS 11506 and Catalyst
6500 with content switching module
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Extreme Networks also designs and sells network switches with built-in
routing functionality.Table 5.6 lists some of the more common Extreme
Networks switching models that include some level of routing feature set.
Table 5.6 Extreme Networks’ Switch Models
Category
Model
Small office switches
Small to medium-sized
Medium- to large-sized
Large- to extra-large-sized
Summit 1i, 5i, 7i, 24, and 24e3
Summit 48, 48i, and 48si
Alpine series and BlackDiamond series
BlackDiamond Series
Extreme Networks’ switches also support a server load-balancing feature set
in most of its “i” series of switches. Foundry Networks is another popular manu­
facturer of network switches with routing feature sets.Table 5.7 lists some of the
more common Foundry Networks models.
Table 5.7 Foundry Networks’ Switch Models
Category
Model
Small to medium-sized
Medium- to large-sized
Large- to extra-large-sized
FastIron 4802, 400, and 800
FastIron 1500, and BigIron 4000 and 8000
BigIron 8000 and 15000
Foundry Networks also has a specific line of switch models that focuses on
routing and load balancing.Table 5.8 lists some the ServerIron Foundry Network
Line.
Table 5.8 Foundry Networks’ ServerIron Switch Models
Category
Model
Small to medium-sized
Medium- to large-sized
Large- to extra-large-sized
ServerIron XL and ServerIron 100
ServerIron 400
ServerIron 800
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Considering Security for
Network Switches and Load Balancers
While most of the security measures discussed previously for routers directly
apply to network switches, there are a few considerations unique to network
switches operating as IP routing devices that you might want to consider when
approaching the security of a network switch. Primarily, we must consider access
control. While a router has very few ports, a network switch has multiple ports
that are easily connected to.This could allow network sniffing and possible attack
attempts should the network switch not be in a secure location. Another consid­
eration is that network switches might have many networks of varying security
levels all running on the same device segmented by VLANs. In these circum­
stances, all network management services and access control mechanisms should
be secured completely for all VLANs, not just networks of a lower security zone.
VLANs are not foolproof, and network hosts can create packets that traverse
VLANs on some devices.
Routing at the Operating
System and Application Level
Yet another means of performing IP routing is with your network operating
system or with an additional application. Many network infrastructures use net­
work servers with multiple network adapters as routers. Most network operating
systems are able to perform basic routing features at the OS level, with some
even able to participate in basic dynamic routing protocols. However, to support
some of the more complicated dynamic routing protocols, additional applications
are used.
Of the most common network operating systems, Microsoft Windows
NT/2000/XP, Linux, SUN Solaris, FreeBSD, and UNIX all support basic IP
routing functionality. Most versions of Linux, Solaris, FreeBSD, and UNIX come
with a route command that allows static configuration of routes within an internal
route table. Microsoft Windows NT/2000/XP also supports basic routing func­
tionality with the route command. In addition to basic routing, Microsoft Windows
NT with Service Pack 4 supports basic dynamic routing with RIP and RIPv2.
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server supports dynamic routing with the Routing and
Remote Access feature. It supports both basic RIP and OSPF routing protocols.
To begin to participate in complex dynamic routing protocols, additional
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
tions are GateD, ZebOS, and Zebra GateD. Now distributed commercially by
Nexthop technologies (www.nexthop.com), Zebra GateD runs on Linux 2.4 or
Sun Solaris 8 or 9. GateD supports RIPv1 and v2, OSPF, IS-IS, and BGPv4
dynamic routing protocols.The ZebOS product suite is made by IP Infusion
(www.ipinfusion.com) and supports RIPv1 and v2, OSPF, and BGPv4, and runs
on Red Hat Linux, SUN Solaris, and FreeBSD. Finally, Zebra (www.zebra.org) is
an open-source routing application that is distributed under the GNU general
public license (www.gnu.org). It runs on Linux 2.0.x and 2.2.x, FreeBSD, NetBSD,
OpenBSD, and SUN Solaris 7. It supports RIPv1 and v2, OSPF, and BGP-4.
IP Routing Protocols
IP routing protocols are the languages that enable the dynamic IP routing pro­
cess. Similar to languages, protocols facilitate information exchange. Dynamic
routing is the process by which routers automatically discover the available paths
within the network and the topology of the network itself. Protocols enable
routers to communicate the information needed for this process to take place.
With dynamic routing, routers must keep their routing tables up to date with the
latest information about the routes on the network.This is the only way they are
able to keep segments of the network reachable when links fail. Without routing
protocols, all routes would have to be manually entered into each router on your
network and then changed at each device when changes were made or failures
occurred, which in most modern networks would be impossible.
Most modern routing protocols are one of two types:
■
Distance vector protocols These are generally older and simpler pro­
tocols that work via broadcasts of all routing information between
routers. Each router in a network broadcasts its routing table to its
neighbors and then adds routes to its table from the broadcasts it
receives. Deciding if a received route is inserted into the routing table
depends on rules defined by the protocol.
■
Link-state protocols These are the more complex and generally more
modern protocols. Link-state protocols rely on each router to build a
network topology map from any updates it receives from its neighbors.
Each router then calculates the best path to each network using a
common algorithm. Updates are only sent to neighbors when requested
or when the state of a link in the network changes.
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In addition to the two basic types of protocols, it is also possible to classify
routing protocols as either Interior gateway protocols or Exterior gateway
protocols.
■
Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) IGPs are protocols designed to
route within an organization or autonomous system (AS).
■
Exterior Gateway Protocols (EGPs) EGPs are protocols designed to
router information between organizations or autonomous systems.
Routing Information Protocol
The routing information protocol (RIP) is one of the oldest dynamic routing
protocols still in wide use today.The first version of RIP was contained in BSD
as routed when released in 1982, but some of the basic algorithms within the pro­
tocol were used on the ARPANET as early as 1969. RIP is a widely used pro­
tocol within small to medium-sized networks because it is relatively easy to set
up and is generally compatible among different device manufacturers. RIP began
as an EGP but is now almost exclusively used as an IGP. RIP is a distance vector
protocol, which means that it compares routes mathematically using a value that
represents distance, in hops, to a destination. Hops is a term used to describe how
many networks a particular packet of data must traverse before arriving at the
destination network. Some key pieces of information to remember about the
RIP protocol include:
■
RIP is a distance vector protocol.
■
RIP is an open protocol described in RFC 1058.
■
RIP updates use UDP on port 520.
■
RIP updates are sent every 30 seconds by default.
■
RIP allows a router to request updates from its neighbors when it
comes online.
■
The maximum size of a network that is using RIP is 15 hops.
How RIP Works
RIP defines the best route as the route having the shortest path to the destina­
tion network regardless of the specifications of your link or connection such as
capacity or latency. RIP determines which path reaches a network via the
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shortest distance by comparing a distance metric, which is associated with each
path in the route table.This distance metric is calculated by adding 1 for every
hop between two routers along the path to a destination.To prevent routing
loops, which are discussed later in this section, and other problems, the distance
metric in the RIP protocol is limited to 15 hops. A distance metric of 16
denotes a network that is unreachable.
Routers using RIP exchange routing updates with their neighbors to build a
complete table of all routes in the network.These routing updates are comprised
of each router’s entire routing table, which includes a list of networks and dis­
tance metrics for each of those networks. When a router receives an update, it
must choose whether to enter each route in the update into its routing table.
RIP uses the following rules to determine if received route updates should be
kept or discarded. Using these rules, routers running RIP populate their route
tables and are able to make routing decisions.
■
■
The routes in updates will be entered into the route table if:
■
The network in the update is not currently in the routing table and
the metric is less than 16.
■
The network in the update is currently in the routing table, but the
metric is lower.
■
The network in the update is currently in the routing table, the
metric is higher, but the update has come from the same neighbor
from which the original update came.
The routes contained in updates will be discarded if:
■
The network in the update is already in the route table, but the dis­
tance metric in the update is larger.
■
The network in the update is already in the route table, and the dis­
tance metric in the update is the same. (In some manufacturers’
implementations of RIP, routes to the same destination with the
same distance metric to different neighbors will be included in the
route table and traffic will be load-balanced across up to four
routes.)
Once RIP is running and all routers have populated their route tables, any
changes or failures in the network mean that all routers must receive updates.
This convergence process starts when a network change occurs, and ends when all
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routers have the correct network information.The time it takes for a network to
recover from any change depends on timers that are a part of RIP and are gener­
ally a part of most distance vector protocols.These timers are associated to each
individual route:
■
Update timer The update timer is the amount of time to wait
between sending updates.The default for this timer is 30 seconds.
■
Invalid timer The invalid timer has a default limit of 180 seconds and
is reset to 0 every time an update is received for a route. If the route has
not been updated in 180 seconds, then the route is marked as invalid.
This, however, doesn’t mean that the router stops forwarding traffic to
the next hop for that route.
■
Hold-down timer The hold-down timer is also set at 180 by default
and is set on a route when the invalid timer expires. When the holddown timer expires, a route is put in a hold-down state and can’t be
updated. A route is also put into a hold-down state when an update is
received for that route with a metric of 16, meaning that the route is
unreachable.
■
Flush timer The flush timer has a default of 240 seconds and is set
each time an update for a route is received. If the timer expires, the
route is flushed, even if the route is in a hold-down state.
RIP has built-in methods to speed convergence and help prevent routing
problems like routing loops from creeping into the routing tables. Routing loops
can occur when incorrect information gets into the routing table and gets
updated throughout the network. One of the means by which a router speeds
convergence is flushing all routes learned through an interface that it detects as
down.This bypasses all timers and speeds convergence of the network. Routers
also send updates to their neighbors immediately when they detect a change in
metric for a route.This is called a triggered update and can dramatically speed con­
vergence. Poison reverse is another method used by routers for speeding conver­
gence. With poison reverse, if a router detects a downed link, it automatically
sends an update with a metric of 16 for those routes to its neighbors. Its neigh­
bors will automatically put those routes in hold-down and not propagate those
routes to the rest of the network.
Routers also do not send updates back through interfaces from which they
were received. Split horizon, as it is known, resolves the problem where if one
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router were to lose the connection to a network on one of its interfaces, its
neighbor router could then send it an update for the same network.This would
create a endless loop where each router would re-update its neighbors with the
network it just learned from them with a higher metric. Each router would keep
the route with the higher metric because the update is being received from the
original router from which the update was originally received. Without split
horizon, this routing loop would continue until the metric in the update reached
16 and the route update would no longer be accepted.
Along with providing methods for accelerating convergence, RIP also sup­
ports features that simplify configuration and ease protocol overhead. As a basic
means of simplifying configurations within a RIP-enabled network, RIP sup­
ports the configuration of a default route. A default route simplifies configura­
tions because it allows routers to forward traffic to a default next hop if a specific
route to a destination can’t be found.To reduce the amount of traffic used in
route updates, RIP also supports route summarization. Route summarization is the
process by which multiple routes are represented by a single more general route
in route updates. In this way, updates representing multiple routes can be con­
tained in a single update.
Another important thing to note about RIP updates is that route updates
don’t contain subnet mask information.The subnet mask to associate with a par­
ticular network in an update must be determined by the router receiving the
update. If a router receiving an update has an interface on the network for which
it receives an update, then the router will automatically assume the same subnet
mask for the network in the update as it has on its own interface. If the router
does not have an interface on the network for which it is receiving an update,
the router will assume the subnet mask that is naturally associated with the net­
work number. Because of this, networks using RIP cannot use variable-length
subnet masks anywhere in their network.This means that all networks in an
environment connected by routers running RIPv1 must use the same subnet
masks.This might cause problems on some networks with segments of varying
sizes and will likely result in IP address space not being used very economically.
Securing RIP
Even though RIP doesn’t provide any type of security within the protocol or
any authentication mechanism to protect communication between routers, there
are still a couple of techniques that can be used to make your RIP protocol envi­
ronment as secure as possible. At the very least, when implementing RIP, be sure
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to configure RIP networks and neighbors explicitly within your configuration.
This will provide a basic control level over the interfaces that are able to
exchange routing updates. In addition, configure access lists to prevent your
router from receiving RIP traffic on interfaces that are not participating in the
protocol. Finally, prevent your router from sending out routing updates on inter­
faces that don’t need them by configuring those interfaces as passive interfaces.
When to Use RIP
RIP is a very reliable protocol, and is well suited to small and medium-sized net­
works. However, there are a couple of things to consider before deciding on RIP
as the protocol for your network.The first consideration relates to the types of
connections within your network. Are they all similar in capacity? Are all of your
connections the same size in terms of bandwidth? What about latency and relia­
bility? Are all of your connections a similar speed and similar media? If the answers
to all these questions are yes, then RIP could be sufficient for your dynamic
routing needs. If your network has disparities among its various connections, RIP
might not be well suited for your network because RIP’s distance metric does not
consider any of a connection’s attributes.To RIP, a 56k serial line is considered
equal to a 1.54 Mbps T-1. Another consideration would network size. Does any
path on your network contain more than 15 hops? If so, RIP is definitely not for
you. RIP can only handle networks with paths less than 15 hops. Even if your net­
work doesn’t contain a path greater than 15 hops, in large networks, routing infor­
mation updates every 30 seconds can mean network utilization at an unacceptable
level and in some cases convergence can take too long.
Interior Gateway Routing Protocol
The Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (IGRP) was developed in the mid
1980s by Cisco systems. IGRP was designed specifically for routing within an
autonomous system or within a network under a single entity’s control and
therefore is classified as an IGP. IGRP was also designed in an attempt to capture
most the effectiveness of RIP while simultaneously extending its functionality
and capabilities. Some fundamental details to remember about IGRP include:
■
IGRP is a proprietary Cisco protocol.
■
IGRP is a distance vector protocol.
■
IGRP updates are sent using IP protocol 9 (IGP) IP datagrams.
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■
IGRP uses a metric that can represent a calculation of bandwidth, delay,
reliability, load, MTU, and hop count.
■
IGRP allows update requests from neighbor routers and are sent every
90 seconds by default.
■
IGRP uses autonomous system numbers to segment routing domains.
■
IGRP updates contain three types of routes: interior routes, system
routes, and exterior routes.
How IGRP Works
Although in many respects IGRP is similar to RIP, it differs in fundamental fea­
tures that extend upon the weaknesses in the RIP protocol. IGRP is a distance
vector protocol, and as such determines the best route by mathematically evalu­
ating routes using a metric value. IGRP also implements many of the conver­
gence enhancing features that RIP contains, such as triggered updates, split
horizon, poison reverse, and the flush, invalid, update, and hold-down timers. For
the sake of brevity, we will not discuss any of the features that IGRP and RIP
have in common; instead, we will focus on how IGRP differs from RIP and
extends its functionality and usability.
A major improvement of IGRP over RIP is its capability to factor the speci­
fications of a particular connection into the metric it uses to calculate best paths.
The IGRP metric is a value that represents not only hop count as in RIP, but
can also take into consideration bandwidth, delay, link reliability, load, and in
some cases the maximum transfer units (MTUs) of a particular connection.The
default configuration for the IGRP metric is to consider bandwidth and delay,
but the metric can be customized to include weighted values for any of the link
aspects discussed previously.The metric itself is calculated using constants that are
combined with the link attribute values in an algorithm that provides a single
value. It is possible to adjust IGRP’s route selection by adjusting the value of the
constants used in the metric calculation.
IGRP also implements autonomous system numbers and allows networks to
be segmented into different routing domains.This practice can be helpful in lim­
iting bad routes from propagating too far in your network. However, because dif­
ferent routing domains do not exchange information, segmenting your network
should be done along obvious delineation points of region or organization.
Another unique feature of IGRP is route updates. IGRP route updates can
contain three different types of routes.The updates also only include three octets
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of the network number but still do not contain subnet mask information. A
route update can contain system routes, interior routes, and exterior routes.
System routes are routes that contain networks that might have been summarized
when crossing a network boundary. Interior routes are routes that contain infor­
mation regarding the subnet for the network number of the interface to which
the update is being sent. Exterior routes could be designated as the default route.
Because IGRP route updates only contain three octets, the fourth is calculated
based on if the route is an interior route, exterior route, or system route. If the
route is an interior route, the first octet of the network number is assumed to be
the same as the interface that received the update; the following three octets are
filled in with the information from the update. For exterior and system routes,
the first three octets are filled by the update, and the fourth octet is 0 because the
routes have been summarized.
IGRP supports some unique features in routing that extend its capabilities
beyond RIP:
■
IGRP supports multipath routing and unequal cost load-balancing
among routes.
■
When a router running IGRP receives a route update that contains the
same network it already has in its table from another neighbor, the
router will install that route in the table as well and load balance traffic
between multiple paths.
■
IGRP can also be configured to load balance across unequal cost links,
using a variance configuration.
■
Links that fall within a configurable variance can be used in a load-balancing configuration.
Securing IGRP
Unfortunately, IGRP does not include any means of security within the pro­
tocol, and like RIP there are only a couple of different techniques to help make
your IGRP environment as secure as it can be.The primary technique for
securing IGRP would be to implement access lists that prevent IGRP traffic
from unauthorized networks. Second, configuring IGRP correctly is the min­
imum you should do to protect your IGRP routers. Remember to configure
IGRP neighbors explicitly and to configure the networks from which you plan
to receive IGRP updates.
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When to Use IGRP
IGRP is very well suited to small to medium-sized networks that contain many
different types of links. However, IGRP ( just as RIP) does not support VLSM,
which can cause problems for complicated networks that are made up of many
different types and sizes of networks. Networks using IGRP must be designed
using contiguous blocks of natural networks. Finally, for larger networks, conver­
gence times can be unacceptably long and the overhead of complete route table
updates can be too high.
Enhanced IGRP
Enhanced IGRP (EIGRP) is an extensive improvement to the IGRP protocol. It
is also a proprietary Cisco protocol that was designed for use as an IGP. EIGRP
accommodates diverse network topologies and media, has fast convergence times,
and a low network overhead. EIGRP has all the benefits of a link-state protocol
even though it is an enhanced distance-vector protocol. Some fundamental facts
to remember about EIGRP include:
■
EIGRP is a proprietary Cisco protocol.
■
EIGRP is an enhanced distance-vector protocol.
■
EIGRP calculates routes using the Diffusing Update Algorithm
(DUAL).
■
EIGRP uses a metric that can represent a calculation of bandwidth,
delay, reliability, load, MTU, and hop count.
■
EIGRP supports VLSM.
■
EIGRP only sends partial updates when the metric for a route changes,
and it uses Reliable Transport Protocol (RTP) to send updates.
■
EIGRP maintains three tables: a route table, a neighbor table, and a
topology table.
How EIGRP Works
EIGRP is slightly different from the two protocols we have examined so far. It is
classified as an enhanced distance-vector protocol because like all distance-vector
protocols it relies on routing information provided by neighbors to create its
routing table. However, unlike other distance-vector protocols, EIGRP does not
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send complete updates to all neighbor routers on a set timed basis. EIGRP only
updates its neighbors when network changes occur, and then the routers only
send the changed information. Because of this, EIGRP uses a lot less network
bandwidth than RIP or IGRP do.This becomes important as your networks
scale to larger sizes.
To find neighbors, routers using EIGRP use a neighbor discovery and
recovery mechanism. Once identified, EIGRP sends only small hello packets to
its neighbors to verify that they are still functioning. In addition, EIGRP uses a
different means of calculating best paths than the other protocols we have exam­
ined so far. EIGRP uses a DUAL to make routing decisions. DUAL is a finitestate machine and is capable of storing the current router’s route table and all its
neighbors’ route tables as well.This gives EIGRP the ability to converge very
quickly, almost instantaneously. If a neighbor router were to fail, or a route were
updated as unreachable, the router will already have a known second-best route
that it can install in the routing table.
EIGRP relies on three tables to effectively make its routing decisions:
■
Primarily, EIGRP maintains the routing table. Routes that are calculated
as the best path based on route metrics are kept in this table.
■
EIGRP also maintains a neighbor table.This table tracks all protocol inter­
action with the neighboring routers. Each neighbor router is entered
into the table with its address and the interface on which it is reachable.
EIGRP maintains contact with its neighbors via small hello packets, and
the timers for these packets are also stored in the neighbor table along
with packet sequence information used by RTP.
■
Finally, EIGRP maintains a topology table, which enables EIGRP to con­
verge extremely rapidly.The topology table contains all routes advertised
by neighbors, whether they are the best paths or not.
Unlike RIP and IGRP, EIGRP updates contain subnet mask information.
This allows EIGRP to do a number of things that RIP and IGRP cannot.
Primarily, EIGRP supports VLSM.This allows network architects to use IP
address space more efficiently and create non-natural subnet masks that more
accurately reflect the size of a given network.The fact that EIGRP updates con­
tain subnet mask information also allows the protocol to improve route summa­
rization by allowing the summarization of routes based on any bit boundary.This
in effect can reduce the route table size on all routers, thereby making the pro­
tocol more efficient.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Securing EIGRP
There are a couple of main techniques to help make your EIGRP routing
domain as secure as it can be.The primary means of security within all protocols
that support it is configuring authentication among routing neighbors.This tech­
nique can prevent unauthorized routers from participating in your EIGRP
routing. EIGRP supports the use of MD5 authentication for neighbor routers
exchanging updates.
It is also a good idea to prevent the sending and receiving of routing infor­
mation on interfaces that don’t need it or that are using another routing pro­
tocol. With EIGRP, you can prevent the router from sending route updates and
receiving route updates by configuring the interface that you want to restrict as a
passive interface.To do this on Cisco devices, use the passive-interface command
with the interface-type and number.
Finally, you should also control what is contained in routing updates that are
sent and received through your router.This is accomplished by configuring route
filtering on the interfaces that are participating in EIGRP routing. Route fil­
tering can generally be configured on a global level or on a per-interface level
and can also be configured to filter incoming updates, outgoing updates, or both.
Route filtering is configured by using ACLs.
When to Use EIGRP
EIGRP is a substantial improvement over RIP and IGRP for mid-sized net­
works. It’s capability to converge quickly after network changes, its support for
variable-length subnet masks, combined with its low network overhead make it
an efficient alternative for RIP and IGRP networks.There are a couple of draw­
backs to EIGRP, though. Primarily, DUAL is rather complex and can be difficult
to troubleshoot. It can also become CPU intensive during periods of network
instability when frequent recalculations are required. In addition, EIGRP also has
a larger memory requirement than any of the previously discussed protocols
because of the many tables it uses.
RIPv2
RIP version 2 or RIPv2 as its name suggests is essentially an update of its
younger brother RIP. RIPv2 is a distance-vector protocol and is used primarily
as an IGP. It was designed mainly to enhance RIP with additional functionality
and was also specifically designed with backward compatibility in mind. Some
basic details to remember about RIPv2 include:
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■
RIPv2 is an open protocol described by RFC 2453.
■
RIPv2 is a distance-vector protocol.
■
RIPv2 updates use UDP on port 520.
■
RIPv2 updates carry subnet mask information.
■
RIPv2 enables authentication between neighbors.
■
RIPv2 is generally backward compatible with RIP.
How RIPv2 Works
RIPv2 essentially uses the same metric, calculation algorithm, and routing update
process as RIP, so the means by which it populates its routing table and chooses
optimal routes essentially remains the same.This has both good and bad implica­
tions for the protocol. On the plus side, RIPv2 is backward compatible with RIP.
The extended information included in RIPv2 updates are positioned in parts of
the update packet that RIP assumes to be empty, therefore allowing RIPv2 and
RIP routers to communicate with each other. On the negative side, RIPv2 still
broadcasts updates every 30 seconds, still uses a metric that does not account for
any link attributes such as bandwidth or delay, and still suffers from long conver­
gence times.
There are some enhancements in the RIPv2 protocol as well.The updated
functionality of the protocol is worth a look.This updated functionality stems
from the additional information carried in the RIPv2 routing update. One of the
pieces of additional information that RIPv2 packets carry is subnet mask information.This allows RIPv2 to support variable-length subnet masks along with
noncontiguous address space and classless inter-domain routing (CIDR). Another
extremely valuable new feature that RIPv2 brings is authentication. Routers par­
ticipating in RIPv2 routing can now protect updates by including authentication
information, either as a plain-text password or MD5 authentication as supported
by some manufacturers. Finally, RIPv2 updates carry a next-hop IP address,
which becomes useful when routes are being redistributed between RIPv2 and
another protocol, and they also carry a route tag for each entry, which while not
used by RIP, can contain information on the source of the route.
Securing RIPv2
One of the substantial updates to RIPv2 over RIP is the addition of authenticated
update exchanges between partners. When supported, authenticated updates should
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
be the primary means of securing the routing protocol. Authenticating route
updates from neighbor routers protects the router from accepting bogus routing
updates that would then be propagated to the rest of the routers participating in
the routing domain.The compromise of the routing tables could allow for re­
routing of traffic, which could lead to either DoS attacks or allowing unauthorized
access to your network. RIPv2 supports both simple authentication and MD5
authentication. Simple authentication includes a plain-text password with every
route update. If the password in the update matches the configured password, the
route update is accepted. While better than no authentication at all, simple authen­
tication transmits the password without any protection across the network.This can
leave the password vulnerable to eavesdropping. A better solution is to use the
MD5 authentication scheme. MD5 includes with the update a hash that is gener­
ated from the update itself and a password or key. When an update is received, the
hash is then compared to a hash that is computed by the router that received the
update. If the hash matches, the update is accepted.
Along with authentication, it is important to configure the interfaces that are
allowed to send and receive updates along with the networks that can be sent or
received within those updates.To control which interfaces updates are sent from, it
is possible to configure interfaces not participating in RIPv2 as passive interfaces.
This will prevent updates from being sent on those interfaces, but unfortunately, it
won’t prevent updates received on those interfaces from being processed. Another
level of security is controlling the networks that can be contained in route updates.
A technique called route filtering can be employed at a global or per-interface level
to filter the routes contained in updates.This filtering can be configured for route
updates being sent, route updates being received, or for route updates both sent and
received. Route filtering is accomplished by using ACLs to list networks that are
explicitly allowed or denied.Those lists are then applied to incoming or outgoing
route updates.
When to Use RIPv2
RIPv2 was designed to enhance the functionality and improve upon some of the
original protocol’s weaknesses. However, because RIPv2 still relies on the same
metric information as RIP, still has problems with convergence times, and pro­
tocol overhead, it is still not suitable for larger networks. RIPv2 is a perfect
upgrade for small networks still running RIP that don’t foresee large growth but
would like to take advantage of some of RIPv2’s enhanced features like authenti­
cation and variable-length subnet masks.
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Open Shortest Path First
In addition to being a dynamic routing protocol, Open Shortest Path First
(OSPF) is the first link-state protocol we will look at.The Open in OSPF repre­
sents the fact that the protocol is an open standard developed by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) and described in RFC 2328. It was designed as
an IGP to route within a single autonomous system (AS), but with the Internet
environment in mind. OSPF can tag routes that come into the AS from outside
the network.The Shortest Path First in the name refers to the algorithm the pro­
tocol uses to compute the shortest path to every destination in the route table.
OSPF can be an extremely complex protocol in very large networks, so in this
section we will only examine the basics of the protocol functionality. Some basic
details to remember about OSPF include:
■
OSPF is an open protocol described by RFC 2328 and is generally
compatible between devices from different vendors.
■
OSPF is a link-state protocol.
■
OSPF exchanges information with Link State Advertisements (LSAs).
All information exchange is authenticated.
■
OSPF updates are directly encapsulated in IP with the protocol field set
to 89.
■
OSPF is scalable.There is no hop count limit on the size of the net­
work, and OSPF is designed hierarchically so that networks are divided
into areas for easier management.
■
OSPF supports VLSM.
■
OSPF requires a lot of processor and memory resources on your router.
How OSPF Works
As mentioned earlier, OSPF is a link-state routing protocol.This means that
OSPF determines the best path from itself to other destinations by maintaining a
map of its network area in memory and computing the best path using that map.
When a router is configured to run OSPF, it broadcasts hello packets from each
interface configured with OSPF. It finds other OSPF routers by listening for
OSPF hello packets. When another OSPF router is identified, the two routers
authenticate and exchange configuration information before they exchange
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
link-state advertisements (LSAs). Link-state databases are built by LSAs that are
flooded to the entire network. LSAs describe each of the connections on a given
router. LSAs contain information on each connection to a router, which includes
a cost for each connection.This cost is a number based on details of the connec­
tion, including throughput, latency, and reliability. OSPF deals with network
changes by flooding the network with LSAs whenever there is a status change
within the network. When the link-state database is complete, the router can
then calculate the best path from it to the rest of the network using the Shortest
Path First (SPF) algorithm. In this way, routers using OSPF no longer have to
rely on possibly bad routing information from other routers.They only have to
ensure the accuracy of their own link-state databases to be able to find the best
path to any destination on the network.
Because OSPF is a very processor-intensive protocol, OSPF is designed to
simplify large networks by creating different areas. Routers within each area are
then only responsible for maintaining a link-state database of the topology in
their local area. In this way, OSPF can scale to accommodate extremely large
networks. Each area then summarizes its routes into what is called a backbone area.
This backbone area then summarizes routes to all areas attached to it. All traffic
going from one area to another must go through the backbone area.
Securing OSPF
Two simple configuration changes can easily be made to help secure the OSPF
protocol on your network.The first deals with changing the way in which OSPF
finds and communicates with OSPF neighbors, and the second deals with
authentication of the transmissions between OSPF routers. OSPF is an IGP and
should never be seen outside your network; however, it is important to secure all
aspects of your network, even your interior routing protocols.
In most installations, OSPF is configured in broadcast mode, meaning that
any router on the network running OSPF with the appropriate configuration
information can participate in OSPF routing. A more secure configuration would
be to change the OSPF configuration from broadcast mode to directed mode. In
directed mode, each OSPF neighbor must be explicitly defined in each router’s
OSPF configuration.This configuration provides a basic layer of protection
against any misconfiguration because your router will only communicate with
routers that have been configured to communicate with it.
Another configuration change that can be made to your OSPF configuration
to increase security is to use the most secure authentication means possible.The
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OSPF protocol supports authentication of all transmissions. However, the means
for authentication can either be none, simple, or MD5. Simple authentication
uses a password that is transmitted in clear text over the network.This leaves the
password vulnerable to anyone capturing packets on your network. MD5 is the
most secure authentication type and should be used. MD5 is the fifth generation
of the message digest algorithm that allows messages to be converted into finger­
prints or message digests. With this technique, the MD5 key is not transmitted
over the network; instead, a message digest of the key known as a “hash” is sent
instead.
When to Use OSPF
OSPF is great protocol for large to extra large networks. Because it is hierar­
chical, OSPF allows networks to grow by simply dividing large areas into smaller
ones. However, OSPF can be very CPU and memory intensive; computing the
shortest path first algorithm on a large link-state database can require a large
amount of CPU resources, and the size of the link-state database can tax
memory resources. OSPF is also a slightly complex protocol that can require
extensive experience and training to design and operate properly.
BGP v4
BGP-4 or BGP version 4, is the latest revision of the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP). BGP is an exterior gateway protocol that manages routes between ASs.
BGP is probably most commonly used among ISPs and enterprises with multiple
Internet connections. In fact, BGP has been referred to as the protocol that glues
the Internet together. BGP is an open protocol that was originally defined in
RFC 1105 in 1989. Shortly after, in 1990 and 1991, BGP was updated to BGPv2
in RFC 1163 and BGPv3 in RFC 1287. BGPv4, which is the version in use
today, was described by RFC 1771 in 1995. In this section, the terms BGP and
BGPv4 are interchangeable. BGP can be a fairly complex protocol and there are
entire books devoted to it, so in this section we only look at the basics of the
protocol. Some important details to remember about BGP include:
■
BGP-4 is an open protocol described in RFC 1771.
■
BGP-4 is an exterior gateway protocol (EGP) that manages routes
between ASs.
■
BGP-4 is a distance-vector protocol.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
■
BGP-4 uses TCP port 179 for communication between peers.
■
BGP-4 neighbors must be set up explicitly; there is no neighbor autodiscovery process.
How BGPv4 Works
As mentioned earlier, BGP is an exterior gateway protocol that routes traffic
between autonomous systems. An autonomous system can be thought of as a sin­
gular network entity or collection of networks that are under independent
administrative control and share the same routing policies. For example, a large
corporation’s privately owned network would be an AS, as would an ISP’s
Internet network. Each of these networks operates independently of each other
and is under the control of a single organization.These autonomous systems
might have different routing policies and protocols running within them. BGP
allows these autonomous systems to communicate with each other while still
maintaining their independence.
Each AS that connects to the Internet using BGP must apply for and receive
an autonomous system number (ASN) from the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (ARIN). ASNs are then used by BGP to describe network prefixes.
Network prefixes are groups of network addresses that are classless and can repre­
sent any number of network groups. BGPv4 manages routes by receiving BGP
paths to network prefixes.These updates are called prefix advertisements. Prefix
advertisements are the basic unit of information for BGPv4 and contain various
details about the paths to other AS entities. One of the most important pieces of
information in the prefix advertisement is the AS-PATH information. For each
prefix advertisement, the AS_PATH information is a list of AS entities that traffic
must pass through to reach the destination AS.
BGP is essentially a distance-vector protocol by design. BGP routers listen to
their BGP neighbors for prefix advertisements and then use a distance-vector
algorithm to compute the best path, which is then stored in the route table. BGP
then advertises this best path to its neighbors. BGP, unlike other protocols, cannot
build neighbor relationships on its own. Each neighbor relationship must be
explicitly entered into the configuration manually. Given that BGP is a protocol
that can connect two completely different entities, this is a feature, not a limita­
tion. When a new neighbor is configured, every prefix is then sent to that
neighbor; after that, only advertised prefixes are sent. Each AS is also able to cus­
tomize BGP to enable their specific routing policies.
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BGP actually takes two forms. I-BGP stands for Interior BGP and is used
between BGP routers that connect to other autonomous systems but are located
within the same AS. I-BGP allows all BGP routers within an AS to maintain the
same routing table and communicate protocol information. E-BGP is the other
form of BGP and stands for Exterior BGP. Routers belonging to different
autonomous systems use E-BGP.
Securing BGPv4
BGPv4 is an exterior gateway protocol, which by definition means that the
routing device running BGP will be communicating and exchanging informa­
tion with a router that is outside your organization and not under your direct
control. Of all the dynamic routing protocols, BGP’s position as the protocol
used on your network’s boundary, outside your network’s firewalls, makes it espe­
cially susceptible to attack attempts.This means that securing the protocol and its
transmissions is extremely important.
There are a number of techniques to make your border router secure, which
we discussed in the previous section Securing Your Routers. What we will discuss
here is some of the things that can be done to secure your BGP routing environ­
ment. A couple of the most important techniques for securing BGP are imple­
menting the strongest type of neighbor authentication and implementing access
lists to prohibit BGP traffic from any source other than your BGP peers. BGP
supports authentication of BGP peers or neighbors with the MD5 message digest
algorithm.This feature should be implemented with all of your BGP peers, both
external and internal.This will help protect your BGP routing process from
unauthorized prefix advertisements. Additionally, the implementation of access
lists to filter any BGP traffic that is not from your specified BGP peers will also
add an additional level of security.
When to Use BGPv4
While BGP is an incredibly useful protocol for ISPs and large organizations with
multiple Internet connections, it can be a bit much for small to medium-sized
organizations to handle.The hardware requirements to handle BGP are substan­
tial and the protocol can be tricky to configure properly.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Checklist
Physical security
■
Make sure the router location is secure.
■
Make sure the router location is safe from the elements (fire, water,
excessive heat).
Secure access
■
Configure access restrictions on VTYs, console, and AUX ports.
■
Configure logging and auditing on all access attempts.
■
Disable or protect SNMP,TFTP, and HTTP access mechanisms.
■
Configure login banners.
Secure the router configuration
■
Make sure you have a secure backup of the latest router configuration.
■
Disable unneeded services.
■
Implement ACLs and packet filtering.
Secure the routing protocols
■
Choose the appropriate protocol for the situation.
■
Use protocol authentication with the strongest level of secret key
protection.
■
Prevent unnecessary networks and devices from communicating
with your router via your chosen protocol.
■
Prevent the protocol from being run on unnecessary interfaces.
Maintain good security practices
■
Back up and secure router configuration whenever the device is
changed.
■
Maintain the latest patches and updates from the device manufacturer.
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Summary
Routers are some of the most important devices in your network. More than
likely, a router is responsible for your network’s connection to the Internet, as
well as for connecting remote office networks to yours.This chapter examined
routing devices and their overall role in your network infrastructure. It aimed at
helping you understand why securing your routers is one of the most important
tasks to accomplish in securing your network.This chapter covered the roles of
routers on your network and discussed the roles of border routers as well as
routers on internal segments. It then covered general security considerations for
your network’s routers and talked about physical security, access controls, auditing
logging, and protocol security.The chapter then looked at some of the most
commonly used IP routing devices and finished with a discussion of some of the
most commonly used routing protocols.
Routers within your network play different roles.Their basic function is to
direct packets of information across networks, but they end up doing far more
than just directing traffic. Routers actually work together to maintain direct
traffic through the best paths on the network and to maintain the accessibility of
network segments by redirecting traffic around network failures. Routers also
play an important role in maintaining the security of your network. When prop­
erly configured, routers are able to prevent unwanted traffic from traversing net­
work boundaries.
There are many different roles a router on your network can play, and these
roles can generally be classified based on the location of the router within the
network architecture. Most roles can be broken down into routers along the
perimeter of your network and routers on interior segments of your network.
Routers on the perimeter of your network are generally more accessible to the
outside world than routers on your internal network are, making them more vul­
nerable to attack attempts.These routers can quite possibly benefit the most from
increased security configuration. However, routers inside your network are pos­
sibly the most important devices in the entire network infrastructure. Any attack
on a core router could prove devastating for your network, so it is equally impor­
tant to secure routers on the interior of your network as well.
Although securing your networks routers is a difficult job, it is a very impor­
tant task and should be handled with great care. It is important to view this task
with an overall strategy in mind. It is always a good idea to develop layers of
security that work together to form a complete security picture.You always want
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
to consider the basic physical security primarily, as well as security of the router’s
configuration and access points. Logging and auditing are another level of secu­
rity that plays an important role in maintaining your routers well being. Finally,
the last but not least thing to consider is your router’s network configuration,
securing the protocols it uses, and the services it runs.
IP routing and the devices that support routing protocols allow for a signifi­
cant amount of flexibility in order to facilitate diverse and unique network
infrastructures/implementations. It is important to be familiar with the types and
classifications of hardware devices that support routing. It also important to know
what to consider when securing different types of routers or routing devices.
Dynamic routing protocols are the core of IP routing, and to begin to secure
these protocols it is important to have a basic level of knowledge about the pro­
tocol itself.The six basic routing protocols in use today are RIPv1, IGRP,
EIGRP, RIPv2, OSPF, and BGPv4. Each of these protocols has its strengths and
weaknesses. Ensuring the security of the network protocols that your network
uses is a major step toward accomplishing a secure network infrastructure..
Solutions Fast Track
Understanding the Roles
of Routers on Your Network
A very important part of an in-depth security strategy is securing and
understanding the roles of routers on perimeter segments.
It is equally important to secure and understand the roles of routers on
internal segments.
Securing Your Routers
To properly defend your networks routing devices, it is imperative to
examine possible attacks on your routers.
One of the first steps to take in securing your routing devices it to
prevent login access to your routers.
Another key component to an overall security strategy for your routing
devices is to control what your routers do.
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Chapter 5 • Routing Devices and Protocols
Ongoing security requires diligent maintenance of your routers for
optimal security.
IP Routing Devices
Routers are the fundamental IP routing devices.
Switches and load balancers can also include IP routing capabilities.
Routing at the operating system and application levels is also an option
for many networks.
IP Routing Protocols
The oldest of the dynamic IP routing protocols, RIP is a distance-vector
protocol that, although not secure, is suited to small networks and is still
in use today.
IGRP is a distance-vector Cisco protocol that is suited to small net­
works and implements features not handled by RIP.
EIGRP is also a Cisco protocol that is a substantial improvement over
IGRP and RIP. It is an enhanced distance-vector protocol that supports
authentication and is commonly used in small to medium-sized net­
works.
RIPv2 is an open protocol that implements some of the features lacking
in RIP, such as variable-length subnet masks and authentication. It is also
generally backward compatible with RIP, which makes it an easy
upgrade.
OSPF is a link-state protocol and is open, meaning that it is based on an
open standard. It is a fairly complicated protocol with many features. It
is extremely useful in large complex networks.
BGP v4 is an exterior gateway protocol that is used to route data
between different organizations’ networks. ISPs and large organizations
with multiple Internet connections most commonly use this protocol.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Links to Sites
■
www.ietf.org The IETF Web site.This is the standards body for all of
the open routing protocols used on the Internet, among many other
things. Access to all of the RFCs mentioned in this chapter can be
found on this site.
■
www.cisco.com Cisco Systems is the leader in IP routing devices.
This site has valuable information about IP routing, the latest IP routing
devices, and Cisco proprietary routing protocols.
■
www.juniper.net Juniper Networks is a manufacturer of high-end IP
routers.This site has valuable information about IP routing and proto­
cols.
■
www.extremenetworks.com Extreme Networks is a manufacturer of
network switches.This site has good information on network design, IP
routing, and IP routing devices.
■
www.foundrynetworks.com Foundry Networks is a manufacturer of
network switches.This site has good information on the latest IP
routing devices and IP routing protocols.
■
www.nsa.gov/snac/cisco This NSA Web site contains valuable infor­
mation on Cisco router security configuration.
■
www.cisecurity.org/bench_cisco.html This Web site provides both
a configuration guide and audit tool for your router configuration.
Mailing Lists
■
[email protected] Cisco mailing list for security
alerts.
■
www.ietf.org/maillist.html Mailing lists for the IETF.
■
www.us-cert.gov/cas/index.html US-Cert security alert notification lists.
■
www.nanog.org North American Network Operators Group
(NANOG) mailing list.
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Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: Why is securing network routers so important?
A: Your network lives and dies by its routers. Without routers, network inter­
connectivity would be impossible. Routers are most likely crucial in your
everyday network functions such as Internet access and communications with
business partners. Unsecured, your networks routers can be vulnerable to
DoS attacks that could cripple their functions, or even worse, used against
you to re-route traffic exposing confidential data.
Q: What are the benefits of a properly secured and configured network router?
A: A properly secured and configured router on your network not only func­
tions properly with less maintenance required, but can be your biggest asset
when it comes to securing your network as a whole. With routers’ excellent
position between network boundaries, they are able to prevent unwanted
network traffic from roaming freely on your network.
Q: What is a basic strategy to consider when securing your router?
A: A basic strategy to consider when securing your routers is to develop mul­
tiple layers of security that all work together to form a complete security pic­
ture.
Q: What are dynamic routing protocols and why is it important to securely con­
figure them?
A: Dynamic routing protocols are the core of IP routing.They are the language
used between routers to communicate details of the network state around
them. Securing the routing protocols running between your routers assures
that incorrect information cannot be injected into the normal stream of pro­
tocol traffic to make unauthorized changes or cause a DoS to the network.
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Routing Devices and Protocols • Chapter 5
Q: Are routers the only devices that can perform IP routing?
A: No. Many different types of network devices support types of IP routing and
even dynamic IP routing protocols. Purpose-built routers are designed to
accommodate many different types of networks, protocols, and traffic levels.
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Chapter 6
Secure Network
Management
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Network Management and Security
Principles
■
Management Networks
■
IPSec and VPNs
■
Network Management Tools and Uses
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 1 Understanding Your Perimeter
■
Chapter 2 Assessing Your Current Network
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
■
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
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Chapter 6 • Secure Network Management
Introduction
Throughout the preceding chapters, we described what an “internal” network
segment really is, presented methods on how to assess the security of your net­
work, document the network topology and aggregation points, presented infor­
mation on the major firewall technologies and their associated products, how to
attack those products using contemporary exploits, and we even talked about dif­
ferent ways to route information back and forth between our internal and
external segments through your firewall. It won’t be until the following chapters
where we’ll be presenting the wonders of network switching, internal segmenta­
tion, Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems, and an in-depth look at
applying the principles of this book in the Chapter 11. So, why would we stick
the boring topic of network management right smack in the middle of all this
excitement?
The answer is simple: before we dive head first, we need to make sure the
lifeguard is on duty. Now is the time to discuss management of the network,
before you spend a bunch of time designing an unmanageable beast of a network.
Most people will tell you that network management is a boring task relegated to
caffeine-addicted network operations center (NOC) drones who just wait for the
big red button to light up—not true! The true bragging rights of the network
engineer come from being able to measure your successes in bar graphs and pie
charts, suitable for board-room meetings. What we discuss in this chapter will
allow you to quantify all the late hours that you spend in the wiring closets and
data centers, and prove to the budget steering committee that it really was worth
the extra $100k to outfit all floors with managed switches instead of dumb hubs
(see Chapter 7 for more information on managed switches—but not before you
finish this chapter!).
In the next section, we present five basic network management principles
that will guide us through setting up our “Mission Control” center (space helmet
optional). As a glimpse into the segmentation discussion in Chapter 11, we are
going to discuss the concept of a management network and how to best keep
things segregated on that network. No management network is complete
without some form of transport layer encryption (this is the one network that
will have far-reaching control over your entire infrastructure, so you’re going to
be highly motivated to keep prying eyes away). We will present IPSec and other
VPN technologies as a way of maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of
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ciples applied in a sampling of popular tools, running the full gamut from free
open-source tools, to high-end five-figure enterprise management suites of appli­
cations. At the end of the day, you’ll have a room full of blinking lights that
would bring a tear to any NASA scientist’s heart.
Network Management
and Security Principles
Like any good chapter with the word management in the title (be it Business,
Sewage Treatment, or Network Management), you have come to expect the
body of knowledge boiled down into a handy wallet-sized version that can serve
to guide us throughout the rest of the chapter. Well, we certainly don’t like to
disappoint, so we have summarized all you’ll ever need to know about network
management into five very broad security principles that we will refer back to
throughout the rest of this chapter. In addition, if you are one of the first 1000
readers to turn the page, we will even throw in a diagram at no extra charge
Figure 6.1 Network Management Principle Pentagon
Watch Your Back!
Backup Management Data Too
Plan for the Unexpected
Controlling Access Vectors
Knowing What You Have
As you can see from Figure 6.1, after you have a solid foundation with
Knowing What You Have, Controlling Access Vectors, and Planning for the
Unexpected, you are ready to build on that with intelligent backups of your
most critical management data.The pinnacle of our diagram is Watching Your
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Back, where we introduce prudent security measures that can dramatically
decrease your exposure to electronic eavesdropping, and with any luck turn you
into an appropriately fearful, paranoid security engineer who encrypts every­
thing, including your business cards.
Notes from the Underground…
Specially Coded Business Cards
While it might seem insane to encrypt your business cards that you hand
out to people, there is something to be said for encoding them. We’re not
going to confess to any of our tricks, but let’s just say that some people
have different versions of business cards printed at work, all with different
extension numbers for our telephone, as well as slight variations in e-mail
addresses ([email protected] versus [email protected] versus [email protected]).
Need to drop off a business card to receive a cool T-shirt at a
booth (and how many of us have done that at one too many RSA
Conferences?), but don’t want to get listed on a telemarketer’s call sheet?
No problem; give them the card with the phone extension that goes
directly to voicemail, and the e-mail address that goes directly to the
spam folder. Have an important business contact that you just ran into at
Black Hat? Give him the one with the “priority” e-mail and the extension
number that forwards directly to your cell phone.
Knowing What You Have
As shown in our Principles Pentagon, any good network management strategy
begins with an inventory to get a handle on what you have in your environment.
Most of the tools that we discuss later in this chapter either have a network dis­
covery wizard built in, or insist that you provide them with an inventory of your
networking devices as part of their initial setup. If you’ve been reading along
with us, we covered the importance of network asset inventory back in Chapter
2. We also covered a number of great tools to make this (sometimes dreaded) task
a lot more manageable (pun intended).
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The importance of an asset inventory cannot be overstated. Without a
detailed list, you will not know where to spend most of your dollars and most of
your time. If you have relatively few Windows machines, there hardly seems to
be a reason to invest money in a Microsoft SMS solution. By the same token, if
you have very few UNIX servers, using a management system based on rshell and
rexec commands would be impractical at best.
Controlling Access Vectors
Once you have a snazzy-looking network map and a detailed asset inventory in
front of you, it becomes a lot easier to see all of the access vectors to your infor­
mation resources. An access vector is any conduit or method with which an
unauthorized or authorized user can view, manipulate, or erase sensitive data.The
most common access vectors are summarized in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1 Common Access Vectors
Name
Method/Conduit
Console
Direct access to the file server’s keyboard, or the firewall/router’s serial configuration port.
Peering over one’s shoulder to watch keystrokes.
Computers within same collision domain might eaves­
drop or attack.
Computers within the same network might be able to
attack information resource.
Often overlooked, this includes both authorized and
hostile wireless connections.
Legacy dial-up modem pools can be a dangerous
vector if not managed correctly.
Virtual private network (VPN) connections that come
through the firewall should watched.
Anything that your firewall does not block can
become an access vector.
Don’t forget that sensitive data transmissions can
originate inside and be destined for malicious hosts
beyond your firewall.
Shoulder-Surf
Local Subnet
Local Network
Wireless
Dial-Up Modem
VPN
Internet
Malicious Outbound
While you certainly can’t annotate every variation of an access vector on
your network map, it can be beneficial to call special attention to VPN, dial-up,
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and wireless connections, since those are so easily ignored during security plan­
ning. Contemporary wisdom brings us to conclude that everything in the big
cloud labeled “Internet” is bad (or potentially hostile), and everything on this side
of the firewall is good. However, that’s not always the case. While every network
is different and you must craft your own strategy using the constraints placed
before you, we will attempt to provide some guidance on minimizing your risk
exposure for these attack vectors.This isn’t a “How To” chapter; it is about guid­
ance and principles and tips to get you started.
Console
While it is undoubtedly the most damaging access vector, console access is also the
easiest to mitigate.This access vector can, by definition, only be used if there is
direct, physical access to the hardware in question (router, firewall, file server,
database, etc.). If the attacker can actually walk right up to the device and touch
it, then you know you’re in trouble.The best password policy in the world won’t
stop the attacker from popping open the case and walking out the door with
your hard drives. With your data safely at home, she can spend days or weeks
with password-cracking programs to try to get at your data. In reality, there are
backdoor methods to avoid password protections altogether that take less than an
hour. Or, the attacker could not even care about the data for herself, but instead
just use it to extort money from the victim (perhaps resulting in a public rela­
tions backlash should this incident be reported to the mainstream media).
Make absolutely sure that you have appropriate physical access controls in
place wherever there is in information storage device.This includes not only
your nicely chilled “showcase” NOC with the smoked glass windows and the
multimillion-dollar fire suppression system, but also each and every one of your
wiring closest and server rooms. Now, notice that we said appropriate physical
access controls; while you might need a state-of-the-art proximity card system for
your NOC, your wiring closets might be okay with just a good, solid deadbolt
lock.The point is to have something—anything—to prevent a casual tinkerer or
a determined attacker from laying their hands on your information. If all he has
to do is reach under the receptionist’s desk to find your HR database—and don’t
tell me you haven’t heard of that urban legend—you have not exercised proper
controls. If the attacker has to saw through a deadbolt (and thus making quite a
ruckus) to get to your hubs and switches, you have succeeded.
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NOTE
More information about physical access controls can be found toward
the end of Chapter 2, as well as the Network Management Tools section
later in this chapter.
Shoulder-Surf
We’ve all seen the “shoulder-surfer” in action.The login prompt comes up on
the screen, and the coworker next to you leans in uncomfortably close so that he
can watch your keystrokes as you type them, hoping to capture your password.
The usual mitigation technique for this is to either type ridiculously fast, such
that your coworker can’t keep up, or give him a menacing stare and tell him to
back off. Both are troublesome. We even know some people who will make mis­
takes on purpose in their passwords and use the backspace key frequently while
typing, so that the potential shoulder-surfer gets confused in the process.
We’re going to stop short of embarrassing ourselves by telling you about cul­
tural etiquette and proper personal space issues; anyone who has seen either of us
eating lunch can tell you that etiquette is something we do not list on our résumés.
However, besides the obvious mitigation step of having others turn their heads,
another (more techie) method is to employ two-factor authentication. In this
strategy, the user only has a short PIN to enter, and the rest of the “password” is
made up of a short-lived numerical sequence (the “token code”) that appears on a
key fob, credit card-sized device, or Palm Pilot applet. If the annoying individual
next to you leans in for a peek, chances are he will spy your token code and not
your PIN, since it is more easily read.The look on his face when he realizes that
the number is only valid for the next 59 seconds is quite priceless!
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Notes from the Underground…
Take My Token… Please!
I’m definitely anything but tactful when it comes to personal-space issues.
I’ll either ask someone to move out of the way and turn their head, or I
will just move them out of my way and turn their head. That being said,
I must confess that I did lose my patience with a particular shoulder-surfer
back when I was working for the University of California. We will call him
“Tim” (since that was his name). UCLA had invested heavily in the SecurID
two-factor authentication system for their centralized billing and campus
authentication project, and all staff members were issued big 3- x 5-inch
token cards and instructed to never put them in their wallet (although
they were wallet sized). Eager to learn about all the access privileges that
he did not possess on the IBM ES9000 Supercomputer that ran the Bruins’
über-database, Tim would always get especially close and intimate with
you as you went to log in. It became so bad that at one point, I just
handed him my token and asked him to read the “password” off to me!
Little did he know that I used the diversion to enter in my PIN without
observation, before sliding the keyboard over to him and having him
enter the token code (which would expire in a matter of seconds). Shortly
after this little stunt (about 10 seconds after, with time still ticking down
on the SecurID), Tim excused himself to rush to the “bathroom” and
apparently made a pit stop at his desk to attempt a login using my cre­
dentials.
Not only did Tim not have my PIN (only my token code, which was
invalidated as soon as I used it no matter how much time was left), he
also received a call from Academic Information Services, the campus’
authentication police. After a four-hour “tutorial” on the punishments
associated with California Penal Code section 500 (unauthorized access to
a State-owned computer system), Tim was relocated to a Circuit City
nearby, where he now enjoys snooping on credit-card numbers and pes­
tering senior citizens with extended warranty sales pitches.
If you’re interested in learning more about two-factor authentication, a
number of white papers at vendor Web sites are definitely worth reading.The
major player in this market is RSA Security, with their SecurID tokens, but you
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can also find similar token solutions from ActivCard, Authenex, CryptoCard, and
Rainbow. Links to vendor Web sites are listed at the end of this chapter.
Tools & Traps…
A SecurID by Any Other Name
Although there are a number of vendors out there sporting two-factor
authentication options (a recent search on Google revealed 31,400 hits),
our favorite is still the original: the SecurID token from Security Dynamics,
which later purchased RSA Security and adopted the acquired name.
Many newer vendors have tokens in the form of USB keys, but we prefer
the rugged design and simplicity of the RSA SecurID key fob. Newer
models even employ the Rijndael cipher, also known as the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), newly certified from the U.S. Government.
Notes from the Underground…
Alien Technology?
DES (the data encryption standard), which was the encryption standard
for over 20 years, was replaced in 2000 by AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard). AES is based upon the Rijndael block cipher written by Joan
Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, two Flemish gentlemen from Belgium. Since
the 70’s, the United States had very strict regulations governing the
export of crypto outside of the United States. These regulations were
‘relaxed’ in 1999 and quickly afterward, the encryption standard adopted
by NIST and the US Government was a ‘foreign’ one that could not have
legally moved across US borders just months before…
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Local Subnet
Machines that are located within the same collision domain of one another will, by
definition, be able to see each other’s network traffic.This is usually the case
when you are using hubs; with network switches, each port becomes its own
collision domain and these issues are not present. Note that at aggregation points,
again by definition, all the traffic will be aggregated into one stream, which can
lend itself to eavesdropping. However, the point of this access vector is the ease
with which machines, within the same collision domain of the information
resource, can eavesdrop on data bound for the file server, and requests being ful­
filled back out to workstations.
The easiest mitigation step for this attack vector is also one that will greatly
increase network performance; replace all of your hubs with manageable switches
and you can (practically) cross this attack vector right off your list. See Chapter 7
for an extended discussion on collision domains, broadcast domains, hubs,
switches, and beef jerky (we’re not kidding).
Local Network
The access vector that we’re calling local network is your run-of-the-mill networkbased attack, with an emphasis on ones originating within the “trusted” part of
your network infrastructure.These are the ones that can surprise you at 3 A.M.
on any given Sunday because you assume (perhaps incorrectly) that anyone
within your organization would have no reason to maliciously pilfer information
from your databases. Even the world’s largest Internet service provider, America
Online (AOL), fell victim to this attack vector.
Notes from the Underground…
AOL SecurID Bypass
With your personal bias for or against AOL aside, you have to admit that
they do have a pretty amazing user membership. Accordingly, their
internal customer information systems must have high security. One such
system (which has since been replaced) was the Customer Records
Information System (CRIS), which held sensitive information on more than
23 million subscribers. The system was engineered with two-factor
Continued
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authentication (using RSA SecurID tokens), but was set to implicitly trust
all “on campus” connections from within the AOL headquarters.
Some former AOL employees knew the architecture of CRIS and
knew that it was much too difficult to try to hack the SecurID system to
access CRIS remotely. Instead, they just needed to compromise an internal
machine, and redirect all requests via that workstation. Sadly for AOL
Customer Service, this was not very difficult. In June 2000, through the
normal coercion that happens in every spam message we all receive, a
particularly non-savvy customer service representative clicked on a link
that launched a malicious Web site (www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,46090,00.html). Therein, an ActiveX control
was loaded and (thanks to the user clicking “YES”) executed on the
internal AOL computer. From there, it was quite easy for the attacker to
route requests via this workstation. Since the CRIS security architects
made the assumption that internal requests were always valid (and thus
ignoring the local network attack vector), millions of subscribers were
affected.
Since that time, AOL has changed their authentication methods to
always use SecurID two-factor authentication regardless of internal or
external connections, and has since rewritten their internal systems
(calling the new system “Merlin”). Sadly, once again an AOL customer ser­
vice rep was tricked into accepting (and executing) a file transfer via
instant messaging in February 2003 (www.wired.com/news/infostructure/0,1377,57753,00.html). Although the new Merlin application
required a username, two passwords, and a SecurID token, using ele­
mentary social engineering and spoofed e-mails from AOL Operations,
attackers were able to gain access to the Merlin database of 35 million
subscribers!
We don’t mean to beat up on the AOL security engineers—we’re sure
they’re kept quite busy and we would probably have just as difficult a
time securing a network that big across an employee community of very
differing skill levels. However, if nothing else, it makes you consider the
local network attack vector in an entirely new light, as well as ponder the
wisdom in allowing these customer service workstations to access the
Internet at all.
And if that doesn’t get you thinking, just sit back and consider that
their customer database went from 23 million to 35 million in just three
years! Guess all those CDs by mail really do have an effect.
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Wireless
The time might soon come when all of us feel completely safe in deploying a
wireless segment of our networks. As of our publication date, that level of com­
fort is still not there. From a corporate security engineer’s point of view, there
simply isn’t enough benefit to outweigh the potential security costs introduced
by wireless networks. Unfortunately, sometimes other parts of the company
(Sales, Marketing, Executives) have more pull in IT efforts than those in security,
and the convenience of a wireless local area network (WLAN) is demanded by
many these days.
If you are one of the many who have been forced to (or perhaps willingly)
install a wireless network, you should definitely pay close attention to these
attack vectors and note them with some ridiculously bright yellow highlighting
in your network map. Some mapping tools mentioned in Chapter 2 even use a
different icon for wireless access points (WAPs) to make your job of identifying
them easier. After documenting all of the WAPs throughout your network, it
wouldn’t be a bad idea to hire an outside firm to “sweep” through your
building(s) to make sure that no unauthorized WAPs have found their way on
your network. With the price point of these devices going south of $50, don’t be
surprised to find a WAP right next to the chewing gum and tabloids in the
“impulse buy” section of your supermarket.
Make sure to consider the attack vectors introduced by both unauthorized
and authorized wireless workstations.The unauthorized threat is pretty obvious:
someone can park across the street, point a Pringles can at your building, and get
to your HR intranet—even the U.S. Secret Service is using the popular potato
chip receptacle as part of their regular security sweeps
(www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/story/0,10801,74806,00.html).
What you might not consider at first is the danger posed by authorized wire­
less connections. All too often, these connections are not encrypted, or the
machines themselves are subject to compromise because they lack some form of
personal firewall software installed. A study performed by AirDefense (a WLAN
security vendor) in April 2003 showed that 88 percent of wireless connections at
a Boston trade show are unencrypted. Additionally, some WLAN workstations
were configured to connect to any WAP available, putting your corporate work­
station (and any information on it) at risk if it were to connect with a WAP run
by an attacker (referred to as a “rogue access point”). Without a personal firewall
and by associating with these rogue access points, an attacker could compromise
the security of your sales executive’s laptop using any number of common
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exploits, install a Trojan program to record keystrokes, and then sit back and wait
for the laptop to wander back to your access point. Even with encryption
enabled, the Trojan would be able to piggyback on the authorized wireless con­
nection, retrieve sensitive information, and transmit it back to the attacker. Make
sure you are aware of both authorized and rogue access points operating within
or near your building.
Dial-Up Modem
Some of you reading this might never have heard of a “Shiva” before, but those
who have will know it is synonymous with dial-up modem pools that were pop­
ular before broadband Internet access was made available to most U.S. homes. If
your company does have these legacy dial-up modem pools, you should defi­
nitely run—not walk—to your nearest VPN vendor and plan a strategy to phase
them out. With high-speed Internet access down to $30/month in some areas,
there just isn’t much sense in having a dozen phone lines (each with minimum
telco charges, usage charges, and perhaps even toll-free surcharges if your com­
pany provides that) waiting to accept connections.
If you used that yellow highlighter we talked about in the previous section
for the wireless segments, you should use a red marker to circle any leftover dial­
up modem pools.These usually sit behind the firewall, and aren’t heavily
guarded. Anyone in the world with a dial tone can reach your modem pool and
attempt to log in. While brute-forcing a VPN password over a few weeks will
definitely be noted in the firewall logs and the IDS logs, it would be quite
believable to hear that the dial-up pool either performs no logging, or that logs
are almost never reviewed, since the connections are assumed to be trusted.
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Tools & Traps…
Who Is Shiva?
Many vendors exist (or existed) for dial-up networking services, but the
name Shiva stands out among the rest of them. Their LANrover series of
connectivity products was quite popular, and we’ve come across it on a
number of engagements. Luckily for us on the attack and penetration
team, these devices almost always have single-factor (password) authen­
tication, which is easily brute-forced (set password = username, or try a
blank password). Worse yet, the default administrator password of
“shiva” is almost never changed.
The Shiva LANrover was an excellent product, don’t get us wrong.
It’s just a technology that has come and gone, and now needs to take its
place on the shelf along with eight-track tapes and laser discs.
Virtual Private Networks
VPN connections are a difficult attack vector to visualize. Often times, your
VPN device is also your border firewall. In some large installations, dedicated
VPN concentrators such as the Cisco 3005 VPN Concentrator (formerly the
Altiga 3005) perform all the encryption services and offload the number
crunching from the main firewall. In both cases, you must consider the authenti­
cation methods used as well as the authorization to use network resources.
If your firewall is performing VPN services, you at least have one thing going
for you: your firewall definitely has knowledge of the VPN traffic. If you run a sep­
arate VPN concentrator, this might not be the case. Most times, dedicated VPN
concentrators are installed “next to” the corporate firewall (meaning they have one
interface on the Internet and the other interface connected to the internal net­
work), rather than being in-line with the corporate firewall.This means that while
an attacker might not be able to attempt too many telnet connections to your firewall’s outside interface without your IDS becoming suspicious, you might be
ignoring the same type of probing on the VPN concentrator.
Once a workstation makes a connection to the VPN concentrator (or VPN
services running on your firewall), what authentication methods are used? Again,
more is better in this case, and we like to see two-factor strong authentication
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used in conjunction with these devices.The good news is that the integration
between VPN concentrators and back-end authentication systems running
RADIUS (discussed later in this chapter) is quite mature.You should be able to
add two-factor authentication to your VPN deployment without too much con­
figuration hassle (there will, of course, be a hefty price tag).
After successfully authenticating to the VPN concentrator or firewall, the big
question is, just what is that remote user authorized to connect to? It’s not enough to
be satisfied with authentication; you must consider the dangers involved in pro­
viding remote users with unrestricted authorization throughout your internal
network. Because these remote connections are likely from machines that are
outside of your control (home computers) or that your IT team only maintains
infrequently (a traveling salesperson with months’ old anti-virus signatures is a
common occurrence), you must have a healthy amount of distrust for these
machines. Most VPN installations we have seen on our customer engagements
are architected such that once a user is connected, he is on the local network and
is able to do anything and contact any machine he pleases.
This is quite dangerous! Imagine if your vice president’s young son was able
to reach the keyboard during a currently logged-in session. In the process of
downloading the latest Jennifer Garner movie from an illegal warez site, his son
was also able to infect that laptop and spread—via the authorized and authenticated
VPN connection—to the rest of the internal network.
It is for this reason that we suggest quarantining VPN connections so that
they are only allowed to connect to essential servers, and that they are given IP
address assignments from a completely different DHCP pool than normal users,
so you can easily identify them. In Figure 6.2, we see a suggested topology where
the VPN users have a dedicated network segment for their connections, apart
from normal internal workstations. Furthermore, the VPN service network is
only connected to the resource network (housing directory services, e-mail, etc.).
Even if someone were to compromise a VPN session or even one of your
remote users’ computers, she would not be able to connect to the HR database
or any Accounting data stores.
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Figure 6.2 Sample Topology Showing Dedicated VPN, Resource,
Management, and DMZ Service Networks
Internet
Firewall
VPN
Concentrator
DMZ Network
FTP
192.16
8.1.6
VPN Quarantine Network
Web
192.16
8.1.7
Email Relay
192.168.1.5
Router
Internal Network
Resource Network
Management Network
Restricted Network
Mail Server
10.0.0.5
User 1
10.10.0.101
Active Directory
10.0.0.6
HR
10.1.0.5
Mgmt
Consol
e
10.20.0.
5
Accounting
10.1.0.6
User 2
10.10.0.102
Figure 6.2 illustrates the concept of a highly segmented network, and we will
showcase the benefits to a dedicated management network later in this chapter.
Don’t let the complexity of the diagram distract you from the concept behind it;
the more you can segment your network and classify the traffic that traverses it,
the easier your management task becomes.
Internet
At last, we arrive at the one access vector that you knew you had all along: the
big wide world of the Internet. If you are living in the 21st century and your
network doesn’t have some form of connection to the Internet, you probably
have a good reason for it (perhaps a military network with an “air gap” defense).
For the other 99 percent of us, we must treat the Internet very seriously when
we consider attack vectors. By just sliding in one rather small RJ45 cable into
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your firewall, you have now allowed the 6.4 billion inhabitants of Earth (or, more
accurately, the small percentage of those Earthlings who have Internet access) an
opportunity to invade your network. We all knew that this was an important
attack vector, so there’s no sense in convincing you of it now.The fear of
Internet-based attacks is inherent in any modern network, and should continue
to be feared and respected for many years to come.
Malicious Outbound
A malicious outbound attack vector is one where the “attack” is usually invited
(whether it should be is another story) and the damage is in the opposite direc­
tion in which most of your equipment is designed to detect. Much like the
example of the AOL customer service rep that we presented earlier, it is quite
easy to convince a less-savvy computer user at an organization to click on a
URL within an e-mail, open an e-mail attachment, or accept a file transfer from
an unknown person on instant messaging (IM).The process is illustrated suc­
cinctly in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3 Malicious Outbound Connections Can Lead to Information
Attacker
www.evil.co.jp
Internet
2. Dumb User clicks
on link within e- mail,
taking him to
malicious Web site
1. Attacker sends spoofed e- mail
4. Attacker makes SQL
query for all
customers
Firewall
Internal Network
Resource Network
3. Malicious ActiveX
applet sent to
Web browser, and
Dumb User is coerced
into executing the
malicious ActiveX
object
Dumb User
5. SQL query
sent from “safe”
pre-authorized
terminal
Customer
Database
The attack begins with a spoofed e-mail from the organization’s IT team or
upper management, usually sent to a wide distribution of employees ( just to make
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sure the attack works).The next phase involves convincing the user to click on the
link, execute the attachment, or save the files sent via IM. Once this Trojan soft­
ware installs itself, the attacker has remote control over the victim’s machine.The
attacker wastes no time, and runs a query of the customer database, but routed via
the victim’s computer, so that the database server believes that (and logs as such)
the request is coming from the (assumed to be genuine) workstation.This, as you
can imagine, can lead to a great deal of information disclosure and a huge public
relations blemish should the newspapers find out about this.
So, what can be done about this and where do you use the highlighter on
the topology map? You can put the highlighter away.There isn’t just one conduit
that might have malicious intentions; there is a potential for hundreds of attack
vectors (one for each computer that sits on your internal, trusted segment).The
key to mitigating this attack vector is employee education and a strongly
enforced, written security policy for your network. If there is no business reason
to be accepting file transfers from a stranger during business hours, make sure
that this is not being done! If you have outsourced call centers to other coun­
tries, make sure they uphold the same high standards as you do at corporate
headquarters. Stay vigilant!
Plan for the Unexpected
Yes, we can hear the groans from here: nobody likes talking about disaster
recovery or backup strategies, but when things go south, you don’t want to tell
the boss that you skipped that section of the chapter. If you’re really going to
invest the time and energy to create a secure network management infrastruc­
ture, you’re going to want to add in redundancy wherever financial and time
constraints will allow. Many of the products that we present later to manage and
monitor your network can be purchased in a high-availability configuration, so
that should one of the management stations fail, the other would pick up and
continue to monitor your network and/or manage your network. As shown in
Figure 6.4, you should attempt to place your redundant management platforms
on diverse network segments, such that the demise of one upstream router does
not knock out both monitoring stations.
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Figure 6.4 Redundant Management Stations on Diverse Network Segments
Firewall
Internet
Internal Network
Router
Router
User 1
10.10.0.101
Management Network
User 2
10.10.0.102
Secondary Mgmt Network
Mgmt
Console
10.20.0.5
Secondary
Console
10.22.0.5
For more demanding monitoring needs, your organization can contract with
third-party monitoring services (such as those provided by Keynote,
www.keynote.com) that can check on the status of your externally facing equipment (such as Web servers, mail servers, and FTP sites) several times per minute
and from different parts of the world. While your local management station might
claim that your Web site is online, it might have different latency characteristics
depending on your originating IP address.The real benefit here is if you are, for
example, a multinational swimsuit company with Web order placement; it might be
of interest to you that your site loads extremely slow from Thailand and is completely offline if you’re in Australia. If you run a secure corporate network, it is
much more important to know about some internal distribution-layer switch or
router that failed.Third-party monitoring services will never be able to give you
that level of detail because the devices are tucked away behind your border firewall.
Depending on how mission-critical your network management activities
become, you might also want to invest in a secondary NOC, sometimes referred
to as a “hot site” because it can be activated at a moment’s notice and you can
start managing your entire network from that location. If you were a nationwide
insurance company with a centralized NOC that controls thousands of branch
offices, you would definitely be interested in a secondary base of operations. If
you are like most network administrators, with important but not mission-critical
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network operations, you will be quite happy with some off-site data backup
storage, and perhaps some drills to simulate network outages.
After the 9/11 attacks in New York, many financial customers of ours imme­
diately began “hot site” projects, to make sure that they are ready should some­
thing of that magnitude happen again. In fact, one large financial institution is
even running nationwide commercials showing off their multi-site operations
center and redundant-powered data centers. Building your own “hot site” can be
quite expensive, and you should probably consider going with a third party that
provides these services for you.
Tools & Traps…
Hot, Warm, or Cold?
A “hot site” is named that for the same reasons why “hot swappable”
hard drives have that designation. The hard drives can be changed at a
moment’s notice and without rebooting. A hot site can be placed into
operation in a matter of minutes, which is very comforting to the board
of directors and shareholders. However, for this level of comfort, there is
a great deal of cost. All information resources must be duplicated, and
any database records that are updated need to be synchronized to the hot
site almost instantaneously.
A “cold site” is one that has most of the infrastructure to take over
network operations, but perhaps not any of the real high-ticket items (like
large database servers). This is the least costly solution and works great
when you just need a second base of operations online within a couple of
days. This allows enough time for you to order off-site backup tapes to be
delivered to the cold site, new equipment to be purchased, and network
routing rules to change.
A nice middle ground to both of these options is a “warm site,”
which can come online within hours. As you can expect, the costs lay
somewhere between the hot and cold sites, but the benefits are great.
You can’t just flick a switch and have all of your network operations move
from New York to Iowa, but with a good deal of coordination, some
courier-delivered backup tapes, and a lot of coffee, you should be able to
pull off a company-saving miracle before dawn.
Continued
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The costs involved in doing this yourself are rather high (unless
you’re of the Fortune 500 variety). Don’t try to reinvent the wheel; seek
the help of third-party companies that specialize in disaster recovery, such
as VeriCenter (www.vericenter.com/products/disasterrecovery). They offer
hot, warm, and cold sites, as well as other managed services.
In addition, the most mundane but often overlooked measure of redundancy
is to make sure that any notification procedures used by your notification and
network monitoring tools have multiple paths.This means that notifications
shouldn’t be e-mail only (what if the e-mail server is down?). Make sure that
your notification options include telephone, alphanumeric pager, SMS cellular,
FAX, and print-out options.
Back Up Your Management, Too
While this is the least glamorous of the network management principles, it defi­
nitely has its place among the other four. Many times, we are aware of the sensi­
tive nature of our customer database, our financial records, and other
company-specific information stores. All of these will likely have a backup
method and rotation that is far outside the scope of this book. However, what is
often overlooked is the value—and indeed, the importance—of your network
management systems. In case of disaster, you will certainly worry about your cus­
tomers and other revenue-generating databases first. However, after the initial
shock wears off, you will likely lament the loss of your network management
system if you have failed to include it in your normal backup procedures.
Perhaps nightly backups are too cumbersome, but certainly monthly backups
of your network management and monitoring systems are in order.The costs
involved in adding your management stations to your existing backup jobs are
nearly nonexistent. Even if you don’t want to add the management systems to
your regular backup, burning everything (system Registry settings and init scripts
included) to a CD-R and taking it home with you certainly isn’t an enormous
amount of effort.This management principle is satisfied if you employ the use of
hot/warm/cold sites, which practically require the backup of management sys­
tems along with the data-centric devices.
Watch Your Back
The final suggestion, and the pinnacle of our principle pentagon (try to say that
10 times fast!), is a caution to “Watch Your Back!” At each stage in designing
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your network management solution, consider a healthy dose of paranoia as your
best yardstick.Your network management console will be able to monitor band­
width as well as deactivate routes. With a flick of the mouse, you could quite
easily (and hopefully accidentally) bring your network to a screeching halt.
Therefore, you need to take an ounce of prevention in everything that you do
regarding your management network.There’s definitely a reason why we called
the chapter “Secure Network Management.”
Authentication
The first part of a healthy paranoia is finding out whom you can trust. Put in
network management terms, this means who are your authorized managers? If
you’re reading this chapter, certainly you probably fit into this short list, but who
else should be allowed to control your network resources? Make sure to include
people who can fill in for you when you are sick or away on vacation (okay, that
last part was a joke; we know that you don’t actually take vacation).
Once you have compiled this list, you have to determine how these
people can be authenticated and how this authentication is embodied in the
myriad of network management equipment available. As discussed previously,
two-factor authentication is very attractive because it is hard to compromise.You
not only need to know a username and a PIN, but also a temporary, everchanging code that can only be obtained by physical possession of a key fob or
calculator-sized token.The two-factor authentication server (in the case of the
RSA SecurID system, the back-end is referred to as the “ACE Authentication
Server”) will make the determination as to whether the username + PIN +
token code is genuine, but that is all it will do. Authentication is just a matter of
saying you are who you say you are, but it does not allow you to do anything.
That is the function of the authorization method you choose.
Even if you don’t choose a two-factor system and decide to use passwordbased authentication instead, you still need a centralized server to store all this
information.You’re definitely not going to enjoy setting up (or removing) user
accounts from all your managed devices, and you certainly don’t want to use
general-purpose accounts that are shared among a number of people. All man­
agers should have their own login credentials so that audit trails and activity logs
can actually have some meaning behind them, and so that we know who to
point the finger at when things mysteriously stop working in the middle of the
night. So, what’s the best way to centralize all this information?
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Most authentication vendors (be it the RSA ACE Authentication Server, or
otherwise) will have a service or daemon that you can run on one of your lessused servers.This will accept the authentication requests and respond with a
thumbs-up or a thumbs-down. Almost all of the solutions on the market today
will support the RADIUS protocol, which allows for cross-vendor (and crossplatform) integration of billing technologies (and was originally developed for
the big phone company in the early 1970s) and authentication. Using a
RADIUS server (or more likely, a proprietary authentication server that speaks
the RADIUS protocol), your individual network devices will be able to inter­
communicate and decide on access to configuration functions. A similar, but
incompatible, authentication protocol is TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller
Access Control System Plus), developed in June 1993 and documented in RFC
1492 (www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1492.html).TACACS+ (and its predecessor,
TACACS without the +) has been all but replaced by RADIUS in most net­
works, with Cisco being the most notable hardware vendor that still has strong
roots in TACACS+.
To use this centralized user authentication system, it’s just a matter of config­
uring your network devices to forego their internal database of users and instead
consult the local RADIUS or TACACS+ server for user logon requests.To
enable TACACS+ on a Cisco 1720 router and have it consult the authentication
server located at 192.2.0.22, the appropriate commands issued in configuration
mode would be:
Router(config)# aaa new-model
Router(config)# aaa authentication login default tacacs+ enable
Router(config)# aaa authentication enable default tacacs+ enable
Router(config)# tacacs-server host 192.2.0.22
Router(config)# ip tacacs source-interface loopback0
This would instruct the router to contact the TACACS+ server at 192.2.0.22
for authentication duties during initial login (line two) as well as for entering
privileged mode (line three, also called “enable mode”). If the TACACS+ server
cannot be located, the authentication method will fall back on the standard Cisco
IOS “enable” password.
RADIUS servers are available on almost all flavors of UNIX, Novell
NetWare, and Microsoft Windows.You can even use some tools to integrate
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directly with your Novell NDS (now called eDirectory) or Microsoft Active
Directory directory services, thus eliminating the need to have separate accounts
at all, and giving users the added benefit of single-sign-on (and no reason to
forget their network management password).
Tools & Traps…
And Liberty and RADIUS for All
It’s not too hard to find a RADIUS server that will slip right into your
existing network architecture without breaking the bank. If you are a
Novell-centric organization, check out Novell BorderManager
Authentication Services, which is a souped-up version of the Novell
RADIUS Service for NDS announced in September 1997. Microsoft bun­
dles a RADIUS server with its Internet Authentication Service, available in
their Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 server products. And
when in doubt, you can visit Funk Software and read up on Steel Belted
RADIUS, their humorously named authentication server. They’ve been
around since 1992 and have some very educational white papers available
on their site, www.funksoftware.com.
Authorization
Once someone has established his identity to the satisfaction of your authentica­
tion server, the process of authorization begins.This is usually very simple and
can be summarized succinctly: you’re here, now what do you want? In most
cases, such as the Cisco router configuration noted previously, the thumbs-up
signal from the authentication server will just authorize the user to connect to
the network device. Other times, the authentication server itself plays a bit of the
authorization role, by storing certain access-level information and providing that
to network devices when asked.
It is important to remember that it is the network device that is performing
the authorization (in other words, allowing itself to be placed in configuration
mode, etc.).The authentication server might provide hints as to the users’ access
levels, but it does not dictate them.The authorizing device must be willing to
accept and enforce those hints. Using the Cisco Secure Access Control Server
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(ACS), shown in Figure 6.5,you can set a user's privilege level 7, (for instance, 15
is the default, signifying full administrator, and 1 is the guest level of access) and
thus restrict which commands he/she may issue on the router.
Figure 6.5 Configuring Network Devices Using Secure ACS
Encryption
The easiest piece of paranoia-avoidance to employ is also the most powerful.
Encryption is so very critical to a network management strategy. We saw in
Chapter 2 how easy it is to sniff packets off the network wire. What if, while you
were using a network management tool to log in to a remote router, someone
on your local subnet was able to intercept that password being transmitted during
that telnet login session? Certainly, all the authentication and authorization
schemes that you have worked so hard on will now be useless.
Nothing on your management network should be transmitted in clear text, if
possible.You should never use telnet to log in to a router, firewall, or managed
switch. Insist on using Secure Shell (SSH) for your management logins. If your
network equipment doesn’t support an encrypted management method, you
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should demand this feature from your vendor. SSH should be used whenever
telnet would have been used previously. Any management tasks that are per­
formed using Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) should use a
nondefault community string (in other words, not “public”), and you should
strive to use SNMPv3, which includes encryption. If you are unable to use the
newer SNMPv3, you should disable all read-write abilities within the SNMP
agents, and use SNMP only for monitoring.
Even nonmanagement network traffic that traverses your management segment
should be encrypted.This means that if your help desk system checks a POP
mailbox for incoming tickets, you should be downloading this e-mail using POP3S
(Post Office Protocol v3, via SSL/TLS) to protect your password as well as the
contents of the e-mails. If your network operations team is fond of using instant
messaging for quick communication with other engineers, make sure that they are
using an enterprise version of these IM systems that provides for encryption, so
that sensitive network configurations aren’t discussed out in the open.
Tools & Traps…
A Trillion Times Better
After seeing how easy it was (in Chapter 2) to eavesdrop on your network’s data packets zooming by, you might be concerned that your IM
software is also leaking valuable company information. In fact, it is, but
not for the reasons you are thinking. While most folks know that e-mails
can be read, inspected, or manipulated in transit, they seem to have made
an assumption that IM messages are private (owing to the fact that there
is no one central scary IT director to stand in their way). In reality, the
network manager can easily read an IM session and perhaps capture more
damaging information about the employee’s love life, car troubles, and so
forth.
If you must use IM products at work, you owe it to yourself to check
out Cerulean Studios’ Trillian product (www.ceruleanstudios.com). The
intent of the software is to bring all your IM protocols together in one
utility, to avoid running three sets of IM software. However, the best fea­
ture of Trillian is the ability to encrypt all AOL Instant Messenger (AIM)
conversations, using what they refer to as SecureIM and 128-bit key
Continued
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lengths. Using Trillian, you are free to comment to your network engineer
across the country about network vulnerabilities that you have found, as
well as transmit passwords (it’s more secure than using the phone!).
Management Networks
In Chapter 3, “Selecting the Correct Firewall,” you were introduced to the con­
cept of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) or service network.This is where you
should provision all of your servers that are going to need outside access.The
reasoning is sound and simple: provide limited external access to a small segment
of your network, rather than allowing potentially hostile traffic to enter the
“inner sanctum” of your network fortress. In this fashion, any externally launched
attacks can only be targeted toward DMZ machines, and any compromised
machines in the DMZ will only be able to attack others in this screened subnet
(assuming no access from the DMZ to the internal segment).Your external Webbrowsing customers can still get to your content, but they can’t ping the vice
president’s laptop.
The need to segment your network is paramount. If you are to provide
proper management to the rest of the network, this special “control” network
segment must be subject to very different rules than other segments are. As we
learned in the previous section, encryption on the management network is very
important.To be thorough, you would want to make sure to encrypt anything
and everything on this network segment, preferably at the network transport
layer.This means that you wouldn’t have to worry about using telnet or other
clear-text protocols because everything on that network would be encrypted.
Not only will segmentation aid in defining the boundaries of this “encrypt
everything” security policy, it will also greatly ease the creation of access control
lists (ACLs) within routers at the edge of the management network.
The firewall (if possible) or router that you place between the internal net­
work and the management network should be configured to only pass a discreet
set of management protocols (SNMP, ICMP, etc.) to your management console(s)
and only from predetermined management agents. Figure 6.6 depicts a properly
filtered management network segment, blocking commonly used (and abused)
file-sharing services, but allowing management data to flow to the consoles.
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Figure 6.6 Management Network with Firewall Blocking Nonessential Traffic
Internal Network
Firewall
Management Network
SNMP
Telnet
SMB
RPC
rexec
SNMP
Mgmt
Console
10.20.0. 5
It is recommended to keep your management stations as dedicated consoles,
and not used additionally as normal computers (for word processing, e-mail, or
web-browsing activities).This also means keeping these machines off your
Microsoft domain or Novell NDS tree.These machines should be pure network
management and not dependant on your normal IT infrastructure. As stand­
alone workstations, you can effectively close off all Microsoft SMB ports (135,
137, 139, 445) and really lock down that firewall policy to ensure security.
IPSec and VPNs
The need for network-level security and encryption on your management segment
is essential.The traffic on this network is sensitive by nature, so we must treat it
with a different level of care than our usual internal network traffic. As mentioned
in previous sections, encrypting the entire contents of this management network
segment would be ideal. One way to achieve this goal is to use purpose-built com­
mercial solutions that can divert all traffic through an encrypted tunnel, thus pro­
tecting the contents inside. Another solution, somewhat preferred due to the low
costs involved, involves using the IP Security (IPSec) suite of protocols to ensure
confidentiality and authenticity of network packets.
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cols that lie above the transport layer, and without any changes in the users’ functionality.This flexibility is due to the fact that IPSec is an end-to-end encryption
strategy; only the two endpoint computers need to be IPSec-aware.The routers,
firewalls, and other devices that are along the path between the two do not need
to understand (and preferably cannot) the IPSec traffic that is traversing through
them.This allows IPSec to be run across very diverse network infrastructures—
even over the Internet.You could use IPSec on your management station in
California sending traffic to a DNS server in Hong Kong, and the routers and
satellite signal relays between the two endpoints (including the ones that are
under your control as well as the ones that belong to the ISP) would not have to
be reconfigured, as shown in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7 IPSec Tunnels Across Diverse Networks
unencrypted
Any network device
encrypted
Domestic Telco
International Telco
Remote Firewall
(IPSec tunnel endpoint)
Internet
encrypted
Border Firewall
Internal Network
Management Network
encrypted
unencrypted
Internal Firewall
(IPSec tunnel endpoint)
Mgmt
Console
10.20.0.5
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IPSec Modes and Protocols
This use for IPSec is called transport mode, in which two endpoints use TCP/IP
and the data is secure from the originating machine all the way to the destination
device. Another mode for IPSec is tunnel mode, in which the IPSec security is
performed by the gateway devices nearest the endpoints, but not by the actual
endpoints themselves.This is useful sometimes when the end devices are not
intelligent enough to speak IPSec, but you still want to provide encryption services.There’s no big mystery why it’s called “tunnel mode”; the IPSec services on
the gateway construct a virtual tunnel between itself and the other gateway,
allowing client-to-client communications to flow in the tunnel away from eaves­
dropping.
As an added bonus, IPSec also allows for a rich set of message authentication,
which means you can trust that the source machine identified in the TCP/IP
headers is genuine and not spoofed.This is performed by the Authentication
Header (AH) protocol, one of two protocols that implement the core IPSec
encryption services. AH ensures the integrity of the header data by performing a
cryptographic hash on the entire header block. On the receiving end, the same
cryptographic hash is computed and compared to the one stored within the AH
datagram, to detect if anything has changed in transit. If nobody has changed the
headers, the message is genuine and can be trusted. Note that if you are behind a
firewall performing NAT for your endpoints, the firewall will by definition change
the source IP address (in other words, not maliciously), and that will make the
AH hash fail. In that case, you would define the IPSec services in tunnel mode,
terminating at your firewall (or not use AH). AH does not encrypt any data and
thus does not provide confidentiality of your messages.The whole point of AH is
proving that the message headers have not been tampered with.
The other major protocol is Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), which can
provide authentication and encryption services.The difference here is that the
original TCP header is not authenticated (like in AH). Instead, the ESP header in
transport mode is placed between the original header and the TCP header, thus
protecting the data payload without fussing with the TCP header.This makes
ESP especially useful for NAT-based networks, where the exterior header can
and will be changed by the firewalls on either side.
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IPSec Configuration Examples
We could spend the better part of an evening discussing the myriad ways to con­
figure and deploy IPSec (trust us—we’re a ton of fun at parties!), but we’re going
to concentrate on two examples that will present a good example on IPSec
deployments. Consult your particular hardware vendor’s documentation for more
specific configuration steps.
Windows 2000 Server
For Windows 2000 Server, an IPSec Policy Agent is built in to the operating
system, making IPSec deployments quick and painless. Well, perhaps a little pain,
but more of a paper cut than a knife wound.You can make light work of the
IPSec configuration process by using one of the three built-in IPSec policies, or
you can be really thorough and create your own. Begin by starting the Microsoft
Management Console (MMC) named Local Security Policy, located under
the Administrative Tools section of your Start menu. Along the left-hand side,
you’ll see the IP Security Policies on Local Machine. Once that is selected,
you will see three built-in IPSec policies in the right pane of the window, as
depicted in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8 Windows 2000 Built-In IPSec Policies
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Although you could start from scratch and roll your own policies, the three
that are provided are more than enough to get you started.These predefined
policies are bidirectional; if you attempt to connect to a non-IPSec machine after
enabling one of these policies, the connection will fail. Make sure you trou­
bleshoot all of your connectivity issues prior to tinkering with IPSec. Next, we
will briefly examine all three policies.
■
Client (Respond Only) This policy is used when you want your
workstation to be willing to establish an IPSec connection, but only if
the other machine requires it.This might come in handy if you are set­
ting up a regular user’s workstation.You could safely leave all the users at
“Respond Only” and then just enable the file server to require IPSec.
For our purposes in network management, we won’t be using this
policy extensively.
■
Secure Server (Require Security) This policy is a lot more our
style: forceful and demanding. If the other machine does not respond to
the IPSec request or is too old to know what IPSec is, the connection
will fail. In other words, this policy rigorously enforces encryption with
the other network devices at all times.This is going to be the policy that
we want to use, but it might not be the policy that we are able to use,
depending on the rest of the network.
■
Server (Request Security) The final built-in policy is (as you could
have guessed) a compromise between the other two.This policy will
cause the server to politely request an IPSec tunnel negotiation from the
remote machine. If the negotiations fail or the other machine is not
IPSec aware (such as Windows NT or Windows 95), an unsecured net­
work session is established.This allows for greater flexibility while you’re
building up your secure management network and before all of your
devices are IPSec capable.
Windows Server 2003
Much of what was said in the previous section will apply for Windows Server
2003, which has virtually the same IPSec Policy Agent packaged with it. Some
notable differences are that Win2003 will support the newer Triple Data
Encryption Standard (3DES) by default, whereas Win2000 requires the High
Encryption Pack or Service Pack 2 in order to support 3DES. Additionally,
Win2000 only allows for Diffie-Hellman Group 1 and Group 2 key strengths,
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which correspond to 768-bit and 1024-bit lengths, respectively. Win2003 adds
the ability to use a 2048-bit key length.
NOTE
For more in-depth information on Microsoft Windows Server 2003, you
will enjoy reading another book in the Security Sage series (and even if
you don’t enjoy books, you should buy this one anyway). Security Sage’s
Guide to Attacking and Defending Windows Server 2003 by Erik Pace
Birkholz, Joshua Leewarner, and Eric Schultze (ISBN: 1931836027) is an
excellent resource for the busy CISO who needs more than just the basic
installation and configuration information. If you have questions about
the changes to the underlying OS security and how to best protect your
Windows Server 2003 installations from compromise, this is the book
for you.
Cisco IOS Routers
With Cisco routers, there are no nicely predefined IPSec policies. All configura­
tion must be done manually. However, the configuration itself is pretty straight­
forward, and the ability to configure and monitor absolutely everything involved
with the IPSec tunnel setup, negotiation, and tear-down makes the IOS configu­
ration tools very versatile. Although your exact configuration might vary from
the example provided here, all of the steps that we will discuss will have to be
performed regardless of individual IP addressing, and so forth.
The first step is to define the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) policy that the
router will be using. IKE policies are the set of values that this network device is
willing to use with another system. It helps to remember that this is a list of all
the acceptable values on this router; when the remove device connects to the
router, the negotiation occurs across this set of possibilities. In the following
example, we set the encryption type to 3DES and the hash type to use the
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).Then, we inform the router that the encryption
will be based on a pre-shared secret (a common password that is used on both
ends), and that the security association (SA) for this tunnel should last for one
day (86,400 seconds):
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router(config)# crypto isakmp policy 10
router(config-isakmp)# encryption 3des
router(config-isakmp)# hash sha
router(config-isakmp)# authentication pre-share
router(config-isakmp)# lifetime 86400
router(config-isakmp)# end
The next step is to actually specify that pre-shared secret that we’re going to
use on both endpoints of the IPSec tunnel. With these commands, you must
specify the IP address of the remote router so that the correct pre-shared pass­
word can be used for encryption (here we specify passwords for two remote
routers at two different branch offices):
router(config)# crypto isakmp identity address
router(config)# crypto isakmp key UCLAbruins address 192.2.231.12
router(config)# crypto isakmp key LAlakers address 192.2.112.3
So far, we’ve just done preparatory work. Now, the actual IPSec tunnel must
be created. First, we need to define just what traffic should be encrypted. For our
purposes, we want to encrypt everything flowing from the management network
depicted in Figure 6.2 to our remote Los Angeles branch office:
router(config)# access-list 110 permit ip 10.20.0.0 0.0.0.255 host
192.2.231.0 0.0.0.255
Now we come to the final configuration step, which is very difficult to read
and understand.The first group of commands is the “transform set,” which
defines the IPSec mode (tunnel) as well as the algorithms to be used with AH
and ESP:
router(config)# crypto ipsec transform-set MyTransformSet ah-sha-hmac esp-3des
router(config-ctypto-trans)# mode tunnel
router(config-ctypto-trans)# exit
Now that we have the encryption settings defined by the transform set, we
need to make a set of attributes by linking a particular transform set with the
appropriate remote network device and the address list (previously defined as
ACL 110) that will trigger the IPSec tunnel to begin encryption:
router(config)# crypto map TheBigMapping 10 ipsec-isakmp
router(config-crypto-map)# match address 110
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router(config-crypto-map)# set peer 192.2.231.12
router(config-crypto-map)# set transform-set MyTransformSet
router(config-crypto-map)# exit
Just when you thought you were done, there’s just one more thing you have
to do: assign this newly created crypto-map to one of the interfaces, hopefully
the interface that will see all of the encrypted traffic:
router(config)# interface ethernet 0
router(config-if)# crypto map TheBigMapping
router(config-if)# exit
Whew, now that was a mouthful. Other network device vendors make this
IPSec configuration process easier, so don’t be scared away just because of the
complexities involved in the Cisco IOS configuration steps. Whatever encryption
solution you end up creating, make sure that you leave yourself some backdoor
access to manage the IPSec settings.There is nothing more frustrating (trust us
on this) than spending hours crafting a wonderful IPSec security architecture,
and then locking yourself out of the remote branch office due to some silly
error. Since you specified strict IPSec settings, the remote servers will not listen
to you since you are unencrypted. Make sure to have an extra pair of hands near
the remote machines while you are configuring the servers.
Network Management Tools and Uses
And now, for our feature presentation: Bring out the tools! The heart of any
good management network is the monitoring and management tools that you
use.The mark of a good network management tool is one that has three out of
the following four qualities:
■
Reliability
■
Ease of Use
■
Flexibility/Configurability
■
Reliability
And yes, we’re not mistaken when we list reliability in there twice. If your
management software can’t be relied upon, then you might as well just not have
it.The ideal solution is software where you just “set it and forget it” (much like
the popular chicken rotisserie oven) and it provides you with timely alerts, easy
management, and rock-solid stability.
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Secondly, the ease of use for the software package that you decide on must be
there. With other enterprise software deployments (like some CRM packages
that we have endured), there is an extremely high learning curve, but they say
that it’s worth it in the end.The difference is that with network management
software, there can be no learning curve. If it’s going to take you 45 minutes to
figure out how to get a detailed uptime report for a router that just lost its
upstream connection, this software is of absolutely no value at all.
Lastly, the flexibility and configurability of your management solution should
also factor into your selection. While any tool (even a DOS batch file) will work
if you just want to PING a bunch of addresses, for those with more demanding
needs, you’re going to need a software package that will have the scalability to
grow with your company. It must also have a rich feature set that is ready for
tomorrow’s management needs.You’ll want to look “under the hood” and see if
the particular software package that you’re investigating stores data in a readily
accessible database (MySQL, Microsoft SQL, Oracle) or if it uses a proprietary
data format (or even worse—plain text flat file). Additionally, you want to note
how many different methods the software package has to monitor your net­
works’ health. While a simple ICMP PING is nice, it’s hardly useful in today’s
locked-down networks. Make sure you can perform TCP port scanning, response
time monitoring, custom HTTP query string checks, etc. If your budget allows
for it, environmental monitoring would be a great thing to invest in now, and
plug-in to the monitoring platform that you purchase.
Big Brother
As with our other chapters, we like to start listing out the free or open-source tools
first, so that you can try them out without getting a big budget approval process
going. One of the perennial favorites in any discussion of network monitoring is
Big Brother, now owned by Quest Software. Spending many years as a community-supported monitoring tool, Big Brother enjoys quite a following with over
2000 subscribers to their mailing list and over 200 custom monitoring plug-ins
written by passionate users. Now, Quest Software supporting the product, a new
version dubbed Big Brother Professional Edition has been released with the
Professional Edition has enhanced diagnostics and a simplified installation routine.
Much like other open-source software, sometimes getting the right version of the
software for your particular CPU can be difficult.The Professional Edition includes
a no-hassle installer, automatic configuration, and best of all, the comfort of telephone-based technical support in case you run into trouble.
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While the user interface may be a bit simplistic (see Figure 6.9), it is also
incredibly easy to understand. With its color-coded HTML display, it’s hard to
find a reason not to install Big Brother, at least at first. If you find that it fits your
needs, great—continue on to chapter 7. If you still want some more features or
configurability, continue onward to the following pages.
Figure 6.9 Big Brother HTML status display
Big Sister
Borrowing its name from the success of the Big Brother network monitor,
Thomas Aeby from Switzerland wrote the Big Sister software to also provide
basic network monitoring functionality in an open-source format. Version
0.99b1 was the most recent as of our publication date, and it has both a
Windows binary as well as Unix distributions. For each item in its HTML
output, you may drill-down into the details and see statistics and status down to
the partition level for a monitored server. Changes in status (up and down) are
maintained in a log for service-level agreement (SLA) monitoring. And, if you’re
a real Big Brother fan, you can even apply a stylesheet to Big Sister to make the
entire interface appear like Big Brother.
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Figure 6.10 Big Sister Network Monitoring with Graphical Map
MRTG
MRTG is one of the most versatile statistics graphing packages on the market.You
can’t walk into a network operators’ group meeting without someone trying to
show off their impressive connectivity backbone by using MRTG statistics and
graphs. Chances are, even your ISP uses MRTG to monitor your dedicated
Internet connection.There are certainly more expensive solutions, but MRTG is
such a well-focused solution for basic monitoring and historical performance log­
ging reasons, it is no wonder it has thousands of happy companies on its user list.
MRTG is based entirely on a PERL script that performs the SNMP polling
of traffic counters. MRTG marries the real-time data from the SNMP requests
to trending information on what has happened within the past day, week, month,
and year. A lightweight C program logs all information, performs the trending
calculations, and generates beautiful (at least in our mind) graphs that can be
embedded in HTML for presentation to management or geeks alike.
Anything with an SNMP addressable counter can be used as an input for
MRTG, so don’t feel like you have to limit yourself to monitoring the outbound
traffic on your company’s Internet link (the most common use for MRTG).
There have been some creative people that have turned MRTG into an early
warning system for DDoS attacks on their IIS web farm, but just graphing the
amount of web requests per second that the IIS web servers were taking.
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Figure 6.11 MRTG HTML Output showing router utilization statistics
Paessler PRTG
Borrowing on the same logic that Big Sister used with its Big Brother analog,
the PRTG product from Paessler provides much the same functionality as
MRTG, but with an easier installation process and a much simplified configura­
tion interface. If you are installing on a Windows-based machine, PRTG is a
better bet for you than MRTG because the former can install as an NT service
under Windows NT 4.0, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows Server
2003. Combine this with the fact that you don’t need to install your own PERL
interpreter and PRTG starts sounding pretty good.
A free version of PRTG is available for non-commercial use and will do
most of what any normal user could want in terms of monitoring and graphics.
A Professional version of PRTG is available for only $49.95, and offers the ability
to monitor unlimited amounts of devices and can customize the HTML reports
that are presented to the user. PRTG maintains trending and statistics for up to
one year, and can present hourly, daily, and weekly reports. Additionally, an auto­
matic e-mail can be sent out nightly to keep the entire IT team abreast of the
sensor usage statistics. Notifications can also be sent out when a certain threshold
of usage (daily or monthly) has been exceeded.This is very useful for ISPs and
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Web Hosting companies that sell their services under contract not to exceed a
certain number of bytes transferred.
Figure 6.12 PRTG HTML Output showing network utilization
Tools & Traps
IPCheck Server Monitor
Paessler also makes IPCheck Server Monitor, which does more than PRTG
can do in terms of monitoring. Furthermore, IPCheck has an advanced
notification engine which PRTG itself lacks. IPCheck lacks the strong
accounting features of PRTG, but it makes up for that in a very slick webbased user interface that is extremely easy to configure.
IPsentry
A small step above open-source software is the realm of shareware software.
IPSentry, by RGE Inc., is a simple network monitoring tool that concentrates
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more on notification than on a graphical user interface with network maps. In
fact, most of the IPsentry system is text-based. As you can see from Figure 6.13,
the software will run through a battery of “checks” to run against predefined
machines at a predefined schedule. For debugging purposes (as well as just plain
nerdy fun), you can see exactly at what stage of the monitoring process the pro­
gram is in, and the outcome of the monitored machines.
IPsentry is able to perform not only ICMP PINGs to determine if a remote
host is alive, but also TCP open port monitoring, drive space monitoring, ODBC
data source monitoring, NT event log monitoring, File content monitoring
(looking for keywords in log files), and even third-party temperature probes to
report environmental conditions. In terms of notification options, IPsentry does
not disappoint. Along with standard e-mail messages, IPsentry is able to perform an
audible notification using a pre-recorded .WAV file, SMS messaging on your cel­
lular phone, launch an external application (presumably for further notification fea­
tures), send an error report to your centralized SYSLOG server, restart the machine
or the service, transmit an HTTP POST command, or even control the lights in
the office (provided the lights are part of an existing X10 home management
system).Through the use of plug-ins, IPsentry is able to quickly respond to the
emerging needs of the small-to-medium business which cannot afford Unicenter,
but are still willing to pay some money for software that is a cinch to install, con­
figure, and use.
Figure 6.13 IPSentry Shown Modeling Different Devices
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SolarWinds Orion
Many network engineers have become familiar with SolarWinds by downloading
the company’s free Advanced Subnet Calculator and free TFTP server. Beyond
their free products, SolarWinds offers a slew of networking tools that they’ve
divided into nine separate categories, which they bundle into five different pack­
ages. Each package targets a different position, ranging from the system adminis­
trator to a ISP network engineer. For our purposes, we want to look at the
“Orion” suite of utilities for network monitoring.
This powerful set of web-based monitoring tools definitely does not disap­
point. While more pricey than the open-source alternatives (currently $2370 to
monitor up to 100 devices), the money is well worth it in terms of a rich user
interface and detailed reporting—down to the raw SNMP data that it is cap­
turing. Network Computing magazine awarded Orion their Editor’s Choice
award for its “…uncluttered and flexible display show[ing] network status, diag­
nostic direction, and trends clearly and without requiring customization.” Out of
the box, Orion is able to perform PING as well as TCP sweeps of your network,
and can report on bandwidth, CPU, Memory, and Disk Space utilization. With a
completely customizable report writer interface, you can customize Orion to
product details service level agreement (SLA) justification documents for your
customers or management.You can also create an entire role-based access control
system, so that you can give your more trusted IT employees the ability to login
and view certain areas of the network, while not being able to edit some other
areas. All together, we were quite intrigued by Solarwinds Orion. If you have a
couple thousand dollars lying around, I think it would definitely be a wise pur­
chasing decision.
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Figure 6.14 Solarwinds Orion Details Location Monitoring
IPSwitch WhatsUp Gold
IPSwitch gained recognition by offering quality shareware before the Internet grew
into a household word. Educational professionals and students probably recognize
the name since IPSwitch produces the freeware FTP client program WS_FTP LE.
WhatsUp Gold grew from an earlier IPSwitch offering, WS_Ping, a shareware
utility that allowed network administrators to graphically map their network
resources for scheduled ping sweeps or telnet access. Since its humble beginnings,
IPSwitch has added a laundry list of features to the product that make it a logical
choice for monitoring small to medium sized networks for which Computer
Associates Unicenter or Hewlett-Packard OpenView would be overkill.
The original version of the product from 1996 monitored devices at the net­
work layer of the OSI model, but the current version has monitoring abilities at
the application layer for some popular databases and groupware applications. A
powerful network profiling function can detect and create a map of all the TCP,
NetBIOS, and IPX services (yes, even IPX) detected on the wire. As expected,
WhatsUp Gold can produce all of the expected real-time alerts that we all hate to
receive at 2 AM in the morning. With their most recent version 8.01, WhatsUp
Gold has added a failover option, which automatically switches monitoring control
to a secondary machine should the primary machine fail.
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Cisco Systems CiscoWorks
Cisco actually produces five versions of its CiscoWorks management software: IP
Telephone Environment Monitor, LAN Management Solution, Routed WAN
Management Solution, Small Network Management Solution, and
VPN/Security Management Solution. Each bundle specializes in configuring and
monitoring the devices in one of the previous five categories. Within the LAN
Management Solution alone, there are six sub-components: nGenius Real Time
Monitor, Device Fault Manager, Campus Manager, Resource Manager Essentials,
CiscoView, and Common Services.This isn’t a network management system for
the faint of heart.
Unlike the other tools mentioned here, CiscoWorks only works with Cisco
products. For campuses that have homogeneous Cisco networks, or even hetero­
geneous networks with a large number of Cisco devices, this suites of products
make management much easier. CiscoWorks allows administrators to backup
device configurations on their entire inventory of Cisco routers and switches, as
well as roll out new configuration changes across the board.This sweeping power
comes in handy when the next DDoS attack knocks on your door, and you need
to apply very particular access control list (ACL) filters to all of your perimeter
routers.
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CiscoWorks also provides a wealth of statistics and health-monitoring func­
tions for your Cisco devices and presents them in a way that is more easily
digestible than a show counters command within the IOS software. Naturally,
CiscoWorks provides real-time alerts in case we’re sleeping during some of the
really exciting network attacks.
Computer Associates Unicenter
Computer Associates’ Unicenter calls itself an Enterprise Management solution
based on its capability. Since no network will contain everything that Unicenter
can monitor, you purchase the core product and then purchase individual mod­
ules based on your network needs. For instance, Unicenter has Lotus Notes,
Microsoft Exchange, and DB2 modules. Many of these modules do more than
just monitor the health of systems.The Exchange module, for example, includes
backup capabilities in addition to a full barrage of statistic monitoring.
Unicenter allows the IT Director to run the department as if it were a com­
pletely separate service business, mapping IT needs directly to Business costs and
benefits.This helps immensely with the “business side” of justifying a server
upgrade to the C-level management. Decisions can be made using a stack of his­
torical performance metrics and TCO trending. If something happens on the
network, Unicenter has numerous ways to get your attention in real-time.The
real power, however, is in an intelligent event correlation engine, that can tell you
whether the blast of a hundred SNMP failure alerts the NOC just received from
retail stores all over Australia is really due to the single event of a distribution
switch in Buenos Aires being restarted. Because of its support for industry-based
standards such as SOAP, XML, and UDDI, Unicenter can be as extensible as you
have the patience for it to be. IT can link to your custom point-of-sale cash reg­
isters in rural Minnesota, as well as your home-grown payroll software, with just
the need for a lightweight API between them.
Microsoft Systems Management Server
The Microsoft entry into the world of management and monitoring is more of a
server-based management tool, than a network-centric one. Coming a long way
from the version 2.0 release in May 1999, Microsoft Systems Management Server
(SMS) 2003 has a massive amount of fixes and new features built in to the
November 2003 release. SMS 2003 has an entirely re-worked GUI client, new
server roles for easy one-click deployment, integrated reporting, and a healthy dose
of stability (remember how we harped on reliability a few page ago?). While,
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sadly, Microsoft has now removed support for Novell NetWare (along with eight
others) in the list of OSes that SMS will attempt to manage, we still think that
this is a solid management tool for networks that are mostly Windows-based.
SMS allows you to perform true asset-based management of your large
enterprise network, collecting a bunch of inventory data in one place to bring
smiles to the faces of your auditors. Using Windows Management
Instrumentation (WMI), you can drill down to a crazy amount of detail for each
managed resource, including BIOS chip revision and chassis enclosure data (if
supported by your CMOS). SMS allows for detailed software metering, to ensure
that not only are you not exceeding your software licenses, but that you also
don’t over-purchase licenses for software that is underutilized.
Notes from the Underground…
Microsoft System Center 2005
Still in development, Microsoft is definitely positioning all of its enterprise
management tools and software to end up being plug-ins to the
Microsoft System Center 2005, to be released sometime during 2005 (we
hope). As part of their Dynamic Systems Initiative, Microsoft hopes that
System Center 2005 can bring together all of your management resources
into one view, “reduce the total cost of ownership for IT investments”,
and virtually eliminate the manual operational tasks that contribute to
configuration errors, “…the underlying cause of failure more than 50% of
the time.”
The behemoth that will be named System Center 2005 will be com­
prised of SMS 2003, the OS Feature Pack, the Device Management Feature
Pack, the Administration Feature Pack, Microsoft Operating Manager
(MOM) 2005, and the System Center Reporting Server. They will also have
a lighter version called MOM 2005 Express, which has most of the func­
tionality of MOM but targeted for smaller environments.
Hewlett-Packard OpenView
OPenView is the management product that needs no introduction. Arguably, HP
OpenView sets the standard for network management with plug-ins for virtually
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any device or application currently in use in enterprise networks today.This
device fills the same niche as CA Unicenter, though it arguably has better name
recognition. Any large network with 24/7 operations needs to give this package a
serious look. Of course, you do not purchase this product lightly. Due to the
extensive modules, you need to plan the purchase carefully to make sure that you
have all of the necessary systems covered. As many people mistake the stack of
manuals for a phonebook of the United States, taking a week long class to use
this product will make sense, especially since this package costs tens of thousands
of dollars.
Tools & Traps…
Eyeballs in the NOC
While outside the scope of this chapter, we did want to mention an excel­
lent monitoring hardware appliance called WallBotz from a company
called NetBotz. These little devices (you almost want to say “cute”) are
about the size of a VHS cassette and have a ton of functionality packed in
them. They come with an on-board surveillance camera, many environ­
mental sensors, and an RJ45 on the side. Plug them in, give them an IP
address, and ta-dah! You can now monitor the inside of your server room
racks with just an HTTP session. Attach a dry contact sensor and you can
get emailed every time the rack door opens. After getting the email, just
a quick trip over to the web browser and you can actually watch the tech­
nician as he corrupts your database after-hours.
Newer versions allow you to zoom the camera lens in and out, as
well as pan/tilt the camera head with an amazing video capture rate of 30
frames per second, at 1280 x 1024 in stunning 24-bit color. A full com­
plement of temperature, air flow, humidity, amperage, and fluid sensors
can be purchased and plugged right into each WallBotz. A small micro­
phone built-in to the camera housing allows you to even listen in on the
conversations happening in the NOC. This is truly one toy that I hope to
get in my Christmas stocking this year—can’t wait to set one up inside my
fridge and catch whoever is stealing my Butterfinger bars. Stop by at
www.netbotz.com to find out more information, or to purchase me one
of these units.
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Checklist
Always use encryption
Plan your management network.
Know what you have.
Control Access Vectors
Plan for the unexpected.
Backup your Management Data
Watch your back.
Plan for a redundant management
network or hot site.
Use an end-to-end encryption
method like IPSec.
Start with the free tools, and then
work your way up the ladder.
Summary
While Network Management might not be the most interesting topic of the
many that we will present throughout the course of this book, it is the one that
reflect on a year from now, after you’ve turned your hodgepodge collection of
standalone workstations into a well-connected, properly segmented and firewalled enterprise network. Once you have the infrastructure in place and the
means by which to diligently monitor and proactively manage the network, you
can lean back in your chair, remember what a smile felt like, and slide a stack of
network performance statistics over to your CEO.
Using the five basic network management and security principles, we can
construct a framework for designing and implementing our new, secure network
management center. Once we have a good idea of what we have in our very
own network, we can begin to classify and categorize devices, users, and access
control lists. By controlling access vectors, we can cast a watchful eye towards the
most likely network invasion conduits and hopefully stop them from growing
out of control. If we plan for the unexpected we can rest easy at night, knowing
that two sets of monitoring equipment are making sure that your company’s vital
operations are still running strong, even in the middle of the night. After taking
the time and effort to create this elegant management system, the last thing you
want to do is see all of that torn down by the next big tornado, earthquake, or
theft. If you backup your management data at least half as often as your customer
data, you would sleep better at night too. Finally, watch your back. Use layered
encryption (or the built-in encryption of your network monitoring protocol) to
protect against eavesdropping. In this fashion, you protect against discovery of the
service port being open, as well as the contents of the message sent.
Take the time now to design a separate management network, away from the
general user population on the internal segment.This is extremely important due
to the sensitive nature of the data being transmitted back and forth. Encryption
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on the entire network segment is not a bad idea either. With dedicated manage­
ment consoles on the management network, you will be able to parade the ven­
ture capitalists through the room without worrying about the impression it may
make on them.
IPSec is a great tool that helps hide the contents of your message while they
are in transit.The pre-defined policies in Windows 2000 or 2003 are most defi­
nitely preferred, as they are less prone to error and likely to be a good fit. For
those network devices that can perform the IPSec encryption themselves,
attempt to perform encryption from the originating management console to the
remote network device. Cisco has a step-by-step discussion of their IPSec imple­
mentation, so help is available.
Once your network infrastructure is in place, you’re ready to install all the
exciting network monitoring and management software that your wallet can
afford. Starting out with something small, inexpensive, and uncomplicated is a
good strategy. As you find yourself bumping up against the limits of the software’s
capabilities, you need to purchase one of the more expensive and robust applica­
tion product suites.Your choice in network monitoring software should consider
the support structure in place behind some of these open-source companies.You
want to make sure the same company is going to be around next month when
your network goes down and you need to track down an old router configura­
tion. Back up all of your network management data just like your customer data,
but you can feel free to do it less frequently. A good rule of thumb is to take a
backup image whenever a router configuration or other critical monitoring
device is changed, and then just store that CD off-site.
Intermission is over! Now onwards to the wonderful world of Network
Switching in Chapter 7.
Solutions Fast Track
Network Management and Security Principles
Knowing What You Have Without a good idea of what you’re in
charge of managing, you have little hope of effectively controlling.
Control Access Vectors Know where your enemy will strike from,
and fortify those locations.
Plan for the Unexpected If you have the ability to afford redundant
networks and management consoles, implement them! When the
downtime hits (and you know it will), you will at least prove due
diligence.
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Backup Management Data Remember to backup your valuable
management information; in case there is tragic loss of building or
property, you’ll be able to land on your feet at a different location.
Watch Your Back There are malicious people out there and there are
casual sniffers, but both groups are out to get your passwords. Make
them work for it; encrypt all your network management
communications.
Management Networks
Segregate your network management activities on to its very own
segment
You will be able to keep an eye on network health without worrying
about internally initiated attacks
IPSec and VPNs
IPSec Purpose in a Management Network Not only does IPSec
assist in providing confidentiality to your clear-text protocol traffic, it
also allows you to mask any open port activity by hiding everything
within the tunnel.
IPSec Modes and Protocols Depending on the capabilities of your
network devices, you can either perform end-to-end encryption
(preferred) or have the gateways nearest to the devices perform the
encryption on behalf of the devices.
IPSec Configuration Examples Windows 2000 and 2003 make the
IPSec task simple with predefined policies. Cisco is much more
configurable, but has a much steeper learning curve.
Network Management Tools and Uses
Reliability If you have to spend time monitoring your management
software, it just isn’t useful anymore.
Ease of Use Spending hours to figure out the user interface of a
complex management system completely ruins your ability to respond
to network outages in a timely fashion.
Flexibility/Configuratbility Your network management software
needs to grow along with your organziation
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Links to Sites
■
http://nsa2.www.conxion.com/win2k/guides/w2k-20.pdf
National Security Agency guide to setting up and properly configuring
Windows 2000 IPSec services.
■
www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/planning/security/ipsecsteps.asp Microsoft’s step-by-step guide to IPSec
(including planning and deployment methodologies).
■
www.blueridgenetworks.com Blue Ridge Networks makes commer­
cial end-to-end encryption tunneling products, like their CryptoServer.
■
www.openview.hp.com HP OpenView network management suite.
■
www.ca.com/etrust Computer Associates eTrust Security Command
Center.
■
www.ipsentry.com RGE, Inc. IPSentry network monitoring software.
■
www.bb4.com Big Brother flexible network monitoring.
■
http://bigsister.graeff.com Big Sister network monitoring.
■
http://people.ee.ethz.ch/~oetiker/webtools/mrtg/ Multi Router
Traffic Grapher (MRTG).
■
www.paessler.com/prtg Paessler Router Traffic Grapher.
■
www.paessler.com/ipcheck Paessler IP Check Server Monitor.
■
www.solarwinds.net/Orion/ Solarwinds Network Monitoring
software.
■
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/netmgtsw/ CiscoWorks
Network Management software
■
www.cai.com/unicenter/ Computer Associates Unicenter
■
www.microsoft.com/smserver Microsoft Systems Management
Server (SMS) 2003
■
http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/aes/rijndael/ Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES); Rjindael.
■
www.rsasecurity.com/products/securid/ RSA SecurID two-factor
authentication.
■
www.cryptocard.com Cryptocard two-factor authentication.
■
www.authenex.com Authenex two-factor authentication.
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■
www.activcard.com/products/tokens.html ActivCard two-factor
authentication.
■
www.wardriving.com Information on wireless local area network
(WLAN) eavesdropping.
■
www.shiva.com Legacy dial-up modem pools.
■
www.vericenter.com/products/disasterrecovery Disaster
Recovery “hot sites.”
■
www.netbotz.com NetBotz WallBotz server room monitoring
devices
■
www.solarwinds.net Solarwindws Network Management suite of
applications
Mailing Lists
■
www.nanog.org/mailinglist.html North American Network
Operators’ Group
■
www.canog.org Canadian Network Operators’ Group
■
www.swinog.ch Swiss Network Operators’ Group
■
www.frnog.org French Network Operators’ Group
■
www.sanog.org South Asian Network Operators’ Group
■
www.afnog.org African Network Operators’ Group
■
http://list.waikato.ac.nz/mailman/listinfo/nznog New Zealand
Network Operators’ Group
■
www.mplsrc.com/mplsops.shtml Great resource for people
involved in large, MPLS networks
■
http://listserv.nd.edu/cgi-bin/wa?SUBED1=resnet-l&A=1
Must-read information for anyone in charge of a University’s
Residential Housing Network
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Secure Network Management • Chapter 6
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: It seems like a ton of work to setup dedicated management networks (in
some cases you even recommend redundant management networks) and ded­
icated management consoles. I can just load up my trusty Sam Spade utility
and troubleshoot whatever I need on my laptop. What’s the point?
A: Listen, we’re not going to pretend that everyone reading this book is going to
run out and implement all of the suggestions. Moreover, a management net­
work when your “enterprise” consists of about 20 machines is complete
overkill. But once you get to the point where you need to worry about mul­
tiple internal routers, multiple internal segments, several Class-C blocks’
worth of user workstations, and some site-to-site VPN connections, you
really owe it to yourself to invest in a management infrastructure that begins
with a separate network and a dedicated console.
Q: Okay, you’ve sold me on the management network, but I don’t see why I
need to waste money on a dedicated management console. Why can’t I just
have my Network Engineer’s computer be designated as the management
console?
A: Well, one reason is because we told you not to, but that answer never worked
real well with your parents either.The main reason is for separation of duties.
While your network engineer might be primarily responsible for the uptime of
the network, what happens when he/she steps out to lunch and locks their
workstation (as all good security-conscious users should do)? A router went
down in Duluth and instead of fixing the problem, you’re trying to crowbar
your way past the engineer’s workstation lock.Then what happens when the
engineer goes on Jury Duty? Are you going to make that person change their
password before they leave, and change it back? Should they just write their
password on a sticky-note and put it on the screen? You can see where we’re
going with this one, and you should really consider that with prices for reliable
desktop computers sliding well south of $1000, it’s a no-brainer.
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Q: How often should I backup my Management Network data?
A: Excellent question with an easy answer: as often as the data changes. In most
networks, the router configurations, topology layout, and routing tables are
fairly static over several months. If this describes your network, I would just
backup each time you had a change in configuration or routing or anything
else that has a material effect on your ability to manage and monitor your
network. If the only thing that changes about your network management is
your log files, we would suggest moving those logs onto a dedicated
SYSLOG server, and backing up that server nightly along with the rest of
your dynamic data.
Q: Should I place my wireless access points in front of, behind, or parallel with
my corporate firewall? I’ve heard arguments for all three, but since you’re the
experts I’m going to ask you.
A: Although it sounds tempting and is very convenient, we’re going to strongly
urge that you do not put your wireless access points behind your firewall.You
just don’t want to invite that level of risk into your sphere of influence.Treat
your wireless segments just like hotel broadband access; allow people to con­
nect and receive a DHCP address, but they can only access the Internet after
agreeing to a boilerplate end-user license agreement and entering in their
employee ID and password.This just gets them on to the Internet, however.
If they want access to their network file share, they need to use their VPN
client just as if they were connecting from home or a hotel room. In this
manner, you protect yourself from wardrivers that just want to use you for
free Internet, plus, you stop people from inadvertently creating a conduit
from the airwaves directly to your Oracle Financials server.
Q: The IPSec section of the chapter frightens me; is this level of encryption
really necessary is all I want to do is monitor the bandwidth pumping
through our core routers?
A: Absolutely! Do you think we would write all of this if it were optional?
Okay, you’re right—we probably would, but you should still implement
IPSec. Even when you are using encrypted protocols such as SSH, you still
give away information to a potential attacker about the methods in which
you manage the network. If they see a lot of port 22 activity from you
machine to a router, they can safely assume that the router has an SSH
daemon listening. In contrast, IPSec tunnels all the communication such that
anyone sniffing on the wire would only be able to see the tunnel itself and
not any data inside.
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Chapter 7
Network Switching
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Understanding the Open Systems
Interconnect (OSI) Reference Model
■
The Origin of Switching
■
Evaluating Switching Standards and
Features
■
Moving Switching beyond Layer 2
■
Using Switching to Improve Security
■
Choosing the Right Switch
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 1 Understanding Perimeter and
Internal Segments
■
Chapter 2 Assessing Your Current Network
■
Chapter 8 Defending Routers and Switches
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
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Introduction
Welcome to the wonderful world of switching. No other component better
defines an organization’s network than the switches that it uses. Without the
switch, you don’t have a network; you have a bunch of disconnected workstations
working at a fraction of their potential.This chapter will tell you why you need a
switch instead of a hub, and how to pick the right switches for your organiza­
tion. Many readers right now probably think they already know this, but these
same readers probably buy their networking equipment in one of two ways:
■
They check out what’s on special at the local computer superstore.
■
They ask for as much money as they can get out of the CFO and buy
whatever they can afford.
Both of these techniques will produce a network, but what do you tell the
CFO when he or she asks, “Why do you want $100,000.00 for a switch when I
just saw an advertisement for a $20.00 switch?” Let’s flip it around and see how
you answer this question: “The IT director of my last company requested
$100,000.00 for our network infrastructure and you can do the same thing for
$20.00? I know how much I’m saving, but what am I losing?”
At the end of this chapter, you still won’t know what switch to buy or how
much it costs. It is not our intent to recommend a specific vendor or brand of
switch over another.You will, however, know the proper questions to ask when
you’re shopping for a switch, and more importantly, you will know how to
defend your decision. A prepared consumer is an informed consumer. Moreover,
if you read carefully, you’ll find a few helpful hints on securely configuring your
switches regardless of whom you buy them from.
Understanding the Open
Systems Interconnect Reference Model
Switching is designed to work within the confines of the Open Systems
Interconnect (OSI) model. Unless you’ve been operating your network from
beneath a bridge (this will seem funnier later in the chapter), or under a rock, you
should already be familiar with this concept. However, although the mechanics of
the OSI model might not be foreign, the origins of the OSI model might.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) created the seven-layer OSI
model to explain how data travels across a network so that engineers could create
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
their products with a common framework.The model divides all network infor­
mation into seven discrete layers. Every node on the network has a component
responsible for a specific layer of this model. Each node allows the appropriate
component to code/decode the data, generically called a protocol data unit (PDU),
intended for that layer.This allows the component responsible for a specific layer
of the source computer to communicate directly with the component respon­
sible for that same layer on the destination computer.This compartmentalizes the
design process so that multiple engineers can successfully work on different
pieces of the same product and allow for complete interoperability of that
product with other products engineered to the same standard. Figure 7.1 presents
a simplified view of the model.
Figure 7.1 Simplified View of the OSI Reference Model
Layer 7
Application
Layer 7
Application
Layer 6
Presentation
Layer 6
Presentation
Layer 5
Session
Layer 5
Session
Layer 4 Transport
TCP, UDP, & SPX Protocols
Layer 4 Transport
TCP, UDP, & SPX Protocols
Layer 3
Network Routers
Layer 3
Network Routers
Layer 2
Data Link Switches
Layer 2
Data Link Switches
Layer 1
Physical Hubs & Cabling
Layer 1
Physical Hubs & Cabling
Workstation 1
Workstation 2
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The OSI model mainly serves as a guide for the advisory bodies that really
create the standards. Much of the networking hardware and software that exists
today can fit nicely into the model, but not quite everything.The two most
common networking protocol suites,Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) and Internetwork Packet Exchange/Sequenced Packet
Exchange (IPX/SPX), existed well before the ISO created the OSI and both suites
still get the job done, although IPX/SPX is approaching retirement. Since they
pre-date the standard, they don’t fit the model perfectly, but they come close.
The OSI model also helps network engineers understand some of the com­
plexities of the networks that they create and maintain. During a network crisis, a
network engineer can apply his knowledge of the OSI model to determine the
layer at which the problem is occurring.Then, the network engineer can closely
examine the components responsible for that layer and only that layer so that he
can quickly resolve the problem.
Notes from the Underground…
The Real Reason to Learn the OSI Model
You’ll never use the OSI model to troubleshoot a problem and, even if
you’re actually designing networking equipment, you won’t need it for
that either. You will need to understand at least the first four layers when
selecting switches so that you can properly assess their features. However,
if you don’t learn all seven layers of the OSI model you will never pass a
single networking exam. And now that cars have more silicon in them
than plastic surgeons have on hand, don’t be surprised if the first ques­
tion on your driving exam starts with, “At what OSI layer does the ignition
operate?”
The Seven Layers
The OSI model consists of seven distinct layers. Most examples diagram the OSI
reference model with Layer 7, application, at the top, and work down to Layer 1,
physical, at the bottom. Conceptually, this works better than starting with Layer
1, because as the data goes down the chain, the next layer adds header informa­
tion to identify the PDU to the reciprocal layer at the destination.
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
Let’s take a look at a very simple network (see Figure 7.2).This sample net­
work consists of an end user using a Web browser to access content from a single
Web server.The end user physically connects to the Web server using four seg­
ments of category (CAT) 5e cable, two switches, and a router. We will refer back
to this network in steps as we discuss the OSI model.The OSI model consists of
seven layers as follows:
1. Physical
2. Data link
3. Network
4. Transport
5. Session
6. Presentation
7. Application
Figure 7.2 Sample Network
Switch 1
CAT 5e
Cable
Segment 1
CAT 5e
Cable
Segment 2
End User
Web Browser
192.168.12.28
Router
CAT 5e
Cable
Segment 3
Switch 2
CAT 5e
Cable
Segment 4
Web Server
192.168.10.31
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Switches generally operate on Layer 2; however, more advanced switches can
also operate on Layers 3 and 4. With the exception of niche products and load
balancers, switching seldom takes place above Layer 4; therefore, we will stop our
discussion at Layer 4, the transport layer.
The Physical Link Layer: Layer 1
Layer 1 prescribes the nuts-and-bolts hardware used in networking. Examples of
this include network cables and hubs. In our sample network, the CAT 5e cable
links the end-user workstation to Switch 1, the switches to the router, and the
Web server to Switch 2, all at the physical layer of the OSI model.
The Data Link Layer: Layer 2
Traditional switching occurs at the data link layer. Data link layer functions
include examination of MAC addresses for end-to-end delivery of frames and
Logical Link Correction (LLC). Switches serve as the best example of a compo­
nent for this layer. PDUs at this layer are called frames.The frames travel across
Layer 1 of our sample network on the CAT 5e cabling until they reach Switch 1,
which then uses the frames’ MAC addresses to move the data out the proper port
of the switch. Since the switch has to use the MAC addresses of the frames, this
part of the trip happens at Layer 2 of the OSI model.
The Network Layer: Layer 3
The network layer users networking protocols, such as IP (Internet Protocol) and
IPX (Internetwork Packet Exchange) to provide communication between nodes.
Routing occurs at this layer, so the traditional network device responsible for this
is a router, but that’s changing. PDUs at this layer are called packets or datagrams.
In our sample network, the end-user Web browser sends a simple PDU over the
CAT 5e cabling at Layer 1. Switch 1 gets the PDU and encodes it for the next
part of its journey, transforming the PDU into a frame at Layer 2 of the OSI
model. Since the Web browser is on the 192.168.12.0 network and the Web
server listens on the 192.168.10.0 network, a Layer 2 device cannot transmit the
data to the Web server. Instead, the router sees the frame, encodes it for transmis­
sion as a packet, and then sends it to Switch 2.This leg of the journey takes place
at Layer 3 of the OSI model.
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
The Transport Layer: Layer 4
The transport layer includes the higher-level protocols such as TCP from the
TCP/IP suite and Sequenced Packet Exchange (SPX) from the IPX/SPX protocol
suite. In the real world, this is the layer that transports Web and e-mail traffic.
PDUs at this layer are called segments. In our sample network, the data goes from a
humble collection of 0s and 1s from the end-user workstation to Switch 1. Here,
the switch encodes the data at Layer 2 as a frame, and then sends that frame to the
router.The router realizes that the frame needs to go to another network, so the
router encodes the frame as a packet at Layer 3 of the OSI reference model. Since
the router has to send the PDU to Switch 2, a Layer 2 device, the router adds the
necessary Layer 2 header, and then passes the frame onto the switch.The switch
then sends the frame to the Web server.The Web server receives the electrical
signal at Layer 1.The network interface card (NIC) drivers remove the Layer 2
header information while the TCP/IP protocol stack unpacks the Layer 3 header
information. Now the Web server has a segment to examine.The segment tells the
computer what type of traffic it has. In this case, the segment contains a Web server
request using HTTP. Now, the upper layers of the OSI model take this information
so that the Web server can then return the requested information. Now that you
understand the networking niche that switches must fill, we can examine their
evolution.
The Origin of Switching
Switching lends itself to many topologies, such as Token Ring and Fiber
Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), but most network administrators consider
switching as an advanced descendent of Ethernet networking. Ethernet started
with Robert Metcalfe of Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in the 1970s.
Two other companies, Digital Equipment Corporation and Intel, realized the
potential of Ethernet, and together these three companies established DIX (Digital
Intel Xerox) Ethernet in 1980. For Ethernet to emerge as a mature technology, it
required the blessing of organizations that could anoint it as a standard.The
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE) transformed DIX
Ethernet into the IEEE 802.3 standard officially on June 23, 1983, which the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) approved on December 31, 1984.
Most networking professionals now consider Ethernet a synonym for IEEE 802.3.
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Notes from the Underground…
Novell and Ethernet Frame Types
Novell divides Ethernet into four different frame types:
■
802.2
■
802.3
■
Ethernet II
■
Subnetwork Access Protocol (SNAP)
Novell NetWare used what Novell called 802.3 as the frame type for
Sequenced Packet Exchange/Internetwork Packet Exchange (SPX/IPX),
Novell’s proprietary protocol suite, in version 3.11. The rest of the industry
calls this “802.3 RAW” because Novell introduced the product before the
IEEE ratified the standard, so it’s not quite 802.3. When Novell introduced
NetWare 3.12, they switched the default frame type to what they called
802.2, which they explained was 802.3 with Logical Link Correction (LLC).
The rest of the industry calls this “802.3.” Any NetWare administrator
needed to know this (and still does in some instances) because NetWare
servers using different frame types cannot communicate with each other
even though they’re using the same protocol. Therefore, by default, any
administrator who installed a new server with the default settings had a
server that could not see any of the other servers, and more importantly,
the clients configured to use those other servers. Fortunately, NetWare
servers could bind all four frame types to a single NIC, so properly con­
figured NetWare servers could communicate with the rest of the installed
base.
What about the other two frame types? Novell TCP/IP traffic uses
Ethernet II, and AppleTalk uses the SNAP frame. The IEEE designed the
SNAP frame so that vendors could run multiple protocols—any protocol—
simultaneously. Switches really don’t care what the frame type is; they
just pass the traffic. Routers, however, need to know what frame types to
route, so this really becomes more of an issue for routers than for Layer 2
switches. This used to be a big deal on Novell networks that spanned wide
area networks (WANs), because Cisco called the frames one thing and
Novell called them another, so the people configuring these things had to
make a couple of passes at the configuration. In many medium to large
Continued
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
companies, one group configures the servers and another group config­
ures the routers, so, when coupled with the inconsistent frame names,
this can make routing NetWare problematic. Now, since Novell uses native
TCP/IP, there’s no point in routing IPX at all for most companies using
NetWare. Even if you want to use IPX on the LAN side, it still makes more
sense to use TCP/IP for WAN connections. Some folks will try encapsu­
lating IPX in TCP/IP, which again doesn’t make much sense unless you
really need to use a version of NetWare more than six years old. Moreover,
all current versions of NetWare support Macs natively over TCP/IP, so
NetWare shops don’t need to worry about AppleTalk, either.
Ethernet transmits data across a physical medium in the form of a linear bus.
Most administrators familiar with the current look of Ethernet probably don’t
see the architecture as a bus, but rather a star or, in the case of a large network, a
star cluster. Originally, a thick coax cable, known appropriately enough as
Thicknet, snaked its way from workstation to workstation creating the original
Ethernet networks. Eventually,Thicknet gave way to a less ponderous grade of
coaxial cable that most engineers called Thinnet.Thinnet made it easier to link
computers, but network engineers still had to deal with the limitations of the bus
architecture. Creating a network of computers from a single cable, or multiple
cables patched together to create the equivalent of a single cable, presented its
own special challenges, especially when connecting computers between floors. If
one station malfunctioned or if an end user carelessly kicked the wire loose on
his computer, the entire network could crash. Network engineers demanded an
easier method of building a network. Enter the hub.
Notes from the Underground…
Types of Ethernet
Ethernet comes in multiple physical flavors. All of the current forms of
Ethernet evolved from 10Base-T. The “10” indicates that data flows over
this network at 10 Mbps. The “T” means that this network architecture
uses twisted pair cable. Specifically, it uses unshielded twisted pair (UTP)
cable, similar to telephone cable.
Continued
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■
10Base5 predates 10BASE-T. The “10” here still refers to the
speed, but the “5” stands for the maximum length of the net­
work, which can measure 500 meters. 10Base5 uses Thinnet.
■
10Base2 predates 10Base5 and even predates using the metric
system. This form of Ethernet uses thick coaxial trunk cable
(Thicknet) and can transmit data a maximum of 185 meters, or
just slightly over 200 yards. This accounts for the “2” in its
name.
UTP isn’t the only game in town, though. Replace the “T” with an “F”
and now we’re using fiber. Fiber comes in multiple grades and connection
types, so manufacturers usually talk about these connections as “FX,”
where the “X” can stand for any type of connector or grade of fiber. We
call Ethernet that transmits data at 10 Mbps over fiber 10Base-FX. If the
data moves at 100 Mbps, this is 100Base-FX.
For additional information on this, please see the “Network Speed”
and “Distance Limitations” subsections of “Evaluating Switching
Standards and Features.”
Hubs
Many novice system administrators confuse switches and hubs, so before we
examine switches, we should understand the switches’ closest ancestor, the hub.
The invention of the Ethernet hub allowed network engineers to organize the
network in the now-familiar star topology. Network designers could now place a
hub in central wiring closets and then run a wire from each port of the hub to a
terminal. A hub is network concentrator with multiple ports that connects end
stations or other concentrators to each other.The hub, the simplest type of
medium attachment unit (MAU), operates at Layer 1 (physical) of the OSI
model, acting as a switchboard that, in essence, transforms the star topology into a
linear bus from an electrical perspective. From a visual perspective, it looks like a
star, but from the data’s perspective, it looks like a straight line connecting all of
the terminals. Network engineers can easily increase the size of the network by
daisy chaining hubs together to create even larger local area network (LAN) seg­
ments. However, the ease of adding stations proves to be a double-edged sword.
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
NOTE
Even though each terminal connects to a hub with a unique segment of
cable, this is not what network engineers mean when they discuss a net­
work segment. All terminals plugged into a hub and even a daisy
chained collection of hubs share a common segment in network-speak.
Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Detection
Ethernet transmits data using a mechanism known as Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Detection (CSMA/CD).The phrase multiple access seems simple
enough: multiple machines can use the network. However, only one station at a
time can transmit data on the bus. Ethernet uses carrier sense to see if the network
will accept its data before sending, but carrier sense can only tell the station that
the network has availability at this exact instant. By the time the terminal acts on
this information, the situation could have changed, and if two or more stations
transmit data on the same segment at the same time—regardless of the data’s destination—this will cause a collision. Any data involved in a collision do not reach
their destination.This leaves us the last part of the term, collision detection.The ter­
minals learn of the collision, reset for a random time period, and then repeat the
procedure, much like the instructions on a bottle of shampoo (lather, rinse, repeat
translates into send, collision, repeat). If the resend window were fixed as opposed
to random, each station involved in the collision would wait the exact same time
to resend its data, which of course would force collision after collision in perpe­
tuity, creating a never-ending cycle of failed transmissions: lather, rinse, repeat at
its worse. All of the terminals on a network segment form a collision domain.
Figure 7.3 demonstrates a single collision domain.
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Figure 7.3 Single Collision Domain
Hub 1
Workstation 1
Workstation 3
Workstation 2
Workstation 4
Collision Domain
Hub 2
Workstation 5
Workstation 6
Workstation 7
Workstation 8
As the number of stations increases on the segment, the number of collisions
will increase as each station fights for its share of bandwidth. Not only do colli­
sions decrease the speed at which data make it to their destination, collisions clog
the segment, which can cause additional collisions. End users will see their net­
work access speeds slow to a crawl and might even believe that their computers
have crashed again. With enough workstations, this can create a condition in
which only collisions occur and no useful data is transmitted. Further slowing
data, Ethernet is a shared medium, so every node on a segment must examine all
the information on that segment to determine if the information is destined for
it. If the information is really intended for that station, the station will act on it.
If not, the station will ignore it, but only after wasting some processor cycles
determining the relevance of the data.To correct this condition, a network
designer will have to reduce the number of collisions without reducing the
number of workstations.
If we restate the problem in still another way, the new network design must
decrease the size of the collision domain without decreasing the number of
nodes on the network.This creates the logical choice of creating multiple colli­
sion domains. Switches help with this, but, as with the old joke says, “You can’t
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
get there from here.” CSMA/CD makes Ethernet possible, but it also makes
switching necessary. However, we need to make one more stop before we get to
switches.
Bridging
Each segment functions as a unique collision domain, so proper network design
must split the LAN into multiple segments, while allowing each station on all of
the segments to communicate with each other. Network engineers originally
used a device known as a bridge to segment the network. A bridge consists of
little more than a computer with multiple network ports, a central processing
unit (CPU), and a set of instructions that tell the unit how to transfer data.The
IEEE 802.3 specification divides data that travels over the network segments as
frames. Ethernet divides the frame into nine discrete fields.The third field con­
tains the 6-byte Media Access Control (MAC) address of the frame’s destination,
and the fourth field contains the 6-byte MAC address of the frame’s source. If
the source machine does not know the MAC address of the machine to which it
wants to send data, the source machine creates a frame with a destination address
of FFFFFFFFFFFF.This is called a broadcast address and forces all machines on the
local area network (LAN) to examine the frame. Usually, a frame has a specific
machine as its source; this type of frame is a unicast.
If the destination address belongs to a node on the same segment as the
source, the bridge will ignore the frame since it will get to its destination
without any intervention from the bridge. If the bridge determines that the
frame’s destination will take it to another segment from its source, the bridge will
forward the frame to the correct port. Only the stations on the originating seg­
ment and the correct destination segment will see this frame. If the bridge does
not know to which port it should send the frame, it will flood all of the ports
except the port on which it received the frame with a broadcast to request the
location of the destination node. If the machine exists on the network, it will
reply to the bridge.The bridge will now forward that unicast frame to the port
on which it received the reply, and it will remember the location of that node for
as long as it can so that it can forward future frames to that node without having
to re-learn its location.This accomplishes the original task of segmenting the
network while maintaining complete connectivity, but the process of examining
each frame comes at a cost of speed. Examining all of the frames with a CPU
takes time, so the frames take longer to reach their destination. We call the
amount of time that a bridge takes to examine a frame before forwarding it
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latency. High latency not only decreases the total transmission speed, but it can
make some applications such as Voice over IP (VoIP) and video conferencing
worthless. High latency will make everyone on a VoIP call sound like robots
from a bad 1960s sci-fi movie.The network now has collisions under control, but
at the cost of increased latency.The increased complexity of this system also raises
the OSI layer from one to two.
Tools & Traps…
Media Access Control (MAC) Address
The MAC address is a unique 12-digit hexadecimal identification number
given to every network device by its manufacturer. This has nothing to
with Apple Computers and their Macintosh product. To avoid confusion,
network engineers will alternately call this number the hardware address.
Despite its name, most NICs allow you to change the MAC address, which
you should never do without an excellent reason and full understanding
of the ramifications of your decision.
The first six hex digits are known as the organizational unique iden­
tifier (OUI), which the IEEE grants to hardware manufacturers. For addi­
tional information and a complete list of OUIs, see http://standards.
ieee.org/regauth/oui/index.shtml. Do you have a guess as to the owner of
the first entry on the list? You guessed it—Xerox.
And Then Came the Switch
If an engineer could design a multiport bridge that could use a chip specifically
designed for forwarding packets, frames could flow across the network without
any latency (or as the kids call it these days) at wire speed, the maximum rate at
which the specification will allow data to travel on a given topology. Well, the
engineers at Kalpana did just this in 1990 with their invention of the Etherswitch.
The Etherswitch can transparently (in other words, does not change the data in
any way) bridge the data from one segment to another segment.The silicon
responsible for the frame forwarding is an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
(ASIC). Each port on the switch is its own collision domain. Network engineers
can use the switch ports to attach hubs, limiting the collision domain just to that
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hub, or attach nodes directly to a switch port for even greater bandwidth to the
station. (See Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4 Collision Domains with Switches
Switch 1
Workstation 1
Collision
Domain
Workstation 2
Collision
Domain
Workstation 3
Collision
Domain
Workstation 4
Collision
Domain
Workstation 7
Collision
Domain
Workstation 8
Collision
Domain
Switch 2
Workstation 5
Collision
Domain
Workstation 6
Collision
Domain
Evaluating Switching
Standards and Features
Many companies offer a variety of switches, while other companies make a wide
range of NICs. Despite these obstacles, almost all of the Ethernet switches work
with each other, as do the Ethernet NICs. Why? They work together because
they all have to (at a minimum) conform to the IEEE 802.3 specification.The
switch manufacturer can add additional features once the switch meets minimum
requirements—as long as the new features do not cause any of the mandatory
features to stop working. Since switches all work minimally at Layer 2, any
switch will offer improved security over a hub. Whereas a hub sends traffic to all
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workstations regardless of the intended recipient, switches only send data where
they need to go.This makes sniffing a switched network much harder than
sniffing a nonswitched network. Once we accept this one-switch commonality,
we then need to look at what makes each different so that we can choose the
right switch for each environment.The following sections describe different
types of switches, including:
■
Which type of switch is right for your needs?
■
Physical footprint
■
Speed
■
Distance
■
Duplex mode
■
Spanning Tree Protocol
■
Content Addressing Mechanism
■
Backplane and Switching Fabric
■
Optional Features
Which Switch Type Is Right for Me?
Switches fall into three major categories:
■
Cut-through switches
■
Store-and-forward switches
■
Combination switches
Cut-through switches take the least amount of engineering, while a highquality store-and-forward switch takes the most engineering. Since an Ethernet
switch must stay IEEE 802.3 compliant, each of the three types produces the
same result, although the speed and latency will vary.
Cut-Through Switches
Efficient switches need to keep latency to a minimum. Cut-through switches do
this by forwarding frames as soon as the switch reads the destination address.This
saves time since the switch does not have to read the entire frame.The drawback
is that this method prevents the switch from determining if it’s sending a valid
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frame to an end station. If the switch does forward an invalid frame, this will
cause a complete retransmission from the source machine.This can cause an
unacceptable level of performance on a network with a high number of errors.
This type of switching takes the least amount of processing power, so most of the
less expensive switches will use this method.You will generally find this type of
switch only at the access layer of the network.
Store-and-Forward Switches
Every Ethernet frame without an optional extension ends with a 4-byte frame
check sequence (FCS) field. Network devices can run a cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) on this field to determine the validity of a frame. If the frame fails its
CRC, the destination device requests that the source device resend the frame. A
store-and-forward switch reads the entire frame by storing it in memory. Once
the switch stores the frame, it can then run a CRC on the frame. If the frame
passes the CRC, the switch forwards it to its destination; hence the name “storeand-forward.”
If the frame fails the CRC, the switch reports this to the source device and
requests that it resend the frame.This limits the failed traffic to the local collision
domain, greatly reducing the impact of invalid frames on the entire network.This
process requires significant processing power, which could increase the latency of
the transmission, but most of the current switches that employ this technique
have extremely powerful processors that can perform these checks at wire speed
so that they do not add to the latency of transmission.
Combination/Other Switches
Switch vendors don’t exclusively have to use either of the previously described
methods. Some use a combination of both. For example, Cisco has a switching
methodology called “FragmentFree” in which the switch waits until it has
enough data to qualify as a full Ethernet frame before forwarding it.This doesn’t
eliminate all frame problems, but it does prevent a common frame error, called a
runt.You could encounter other proprietary methods from different vendors, but
each vendor should be able to compare its method to either cut-through or
store-and-forward.
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Evaluating the Physical Footprint
Switches have mass, and by definition, anything with mass occupies space. In the
world of computers, we refer to the amount of space that equipment consumes
as its footprint. Lower-end networking equipment will rest on shelves, but all of
the professional equipment will provide a mechanism for mounting inside of a
rack. Network engineers measure the amount of rack space that equipment
occupies in rack units. When it comes to the physical dimensions, switches fall
into two basic categories: stackable and chassis. Usually, stackable switches take up
less space but also have fewer ports than chassis switches do.
Notes from the Underground…
Racks and Rack Units
Most vendors design their equipment to fit into a 19-inch-wide rack.
Vendors use rack units to measure the vertical distance that rack-mounted
equipment occupies, with 1U being the least amount of vertical space
that any rack-mounted device can occupy. One rack unit measures
approximately 1.75 inches.
Mountable equipment with considerable depth and/or weight will
require a four-post rack or cabinet so that the device can get support from
the front and back.
Stackable Switches
Stackable switches get their name from their low height, allowing engineers to
“stack” multiple switches vertically in a small amount of space and then chain
them together as a cohesive unit, or “stack.” Generally, any switch in this category
will only occupy one or two rack units.
One vendor, Xylan, used to describe its stackable switches as “pizza boxes”
because of their close resemblance to the genuine article. Stackable switches fit
snuggly into 19-inch racks and usually occupy no more than four rack units of
space. Stackable switches rarely exceed 50 ports, configured as 48 normal ports
and two high-speed uplinks.
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Stackable switches come in fixed configurations with very little expandability.
Some modules will have one or two slots that can accept various uplink mod­
ules, such as fiber connectors for Gigabit Ethernet or 100Base-FX. Don’t expect
too much more expandability than this. Some stackable switches, such as the
early 3Com SuperStack models, use proprietary cables to connect to each other
to give the illusion of one large switch.The cables act as the backplane for this
configuration. Other switches use standard CAT 5 cable to interconnect with
other switches.
Stackable switches come in the managed and unmanaged varieties. Some
high-end managed varieties even have redundant power supplies, Layer 3
switching and VLANs, although you will probably not find a stackable switch
any fancier than this. Most of these features will be covered shortly, so don’t
worry if you don’t recognize some of these terms; you will come to love them
soon enough.
Chassis Switches
Chassis switches consist of a large frame, or chassis, into which a network engi­
neer installs modular components, such as port blades, management modules,
power supplies, memory, PCMCIA cards, and other miscellaneous pieces of hard­
ware. Chassis allow for the greatest flexibility and the greatest port density over
other configurations. Xylan, an early switch manufacturer (now part of Alcatel),
heavily advertised its ability of “any-to-any” switching. An engineer could con­
figure a single Xylan OmniSwitch with Ethernet, Fast Ethernet, FDDI, Copper
Distributed Data Interface (CDDI),Token Ring, and ATM, thus enabling dis­
parate OSI Layer 1 technologies to coexist.
Chassis switches usually need some type of configuration, so these always are
of the managed variety and either come with a redundant power supply or the
option to add one. Vendors usually reserve their top features for their chassis
solutions, so anything that a vendor has will usually make it into these models.
Some chassis switches can take as little space as a large stackable, but most come
with a much larger footprint and a price to match. Not any room can take every
chassis. Some chassis switches can require 20amp or larger circuits, while some
might completely monopolize three 15amp circuits simultaneously. Sucking
down all of the power can create a huge heat buildup, so some switches might
generate up to 7500 Btu/hr, requiring adequate ventilation.
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Tools & Traps…
Inadequate Ventilation and
Power Can Harm Your Security!
Network engineers often neglect the environmental factors surrounding
the installation of network equipment. Often, a network engineer has
earmarked a locked cabling closet for a switch without thinking about the
heat that the switch will generate. Once the switch gets in there, the
room heats up like a convection oven. The equipment will burn out at
those temperatures, so the network engineer will then keep the closet
door open so that the heat can vent into the rest of the building. This
keeps the temperature lower, but it completely negates all of the security.
Any slightly knowledgeable hacker in the building now has free reign to
run password recovery routines on the switch, allowing him to hijack it
and any data that flows through it.
A similar situation occurs when the switch room doesn’t have
enough power to run the switch. Switches have minimum power require­
ments, and if the switch doesn’t get this minimum amount of power, it
won’t run. This doesn’t sound like a security problem, but after spending
$50,000.00 or more on a large chassis switch, some network engineers
don’t want to go back to the CFO and ask for a few hundred dollars more
to run additional circuits into the room. Instead, they’ll just crack the door
open and run a few extension cords from around the corner. There goes
the security.
In short, if you can’t meet the minimum environmental needs for a
given switch, get another switch.
Network Speed
The IEEE set the speed of Ethernet at 10 Mbps over coax with the original
specification 802.3-1985, and then later revised the standard in 1990 to allow this
same speed over unshielded twisted pair (UTP) CAT 5 cable.The 802.3u -1995
standard increased the speed to 100 Mbps over CAT 5 UTP; the industry com­
monly refers to this networking topology as Fast Ethernet.The 802.3U specifica­
tion also covers Ethernet and Fast Ethernet using fiber. Still, even over fiber, the
speed needs to stay at 10 Mbps and 100 Mbps, respectively, to maintain adher­
ence to IEEE 802.3.
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Tools & Traps…
How to Know Your Bits from Your Bytes
Is there any difference between “Mbps” and “MBps?” They look almost
the same. However, as Mark Twain once noted, “The difference between
the almost right word and the right word is the difference between the
lightning bug and the lightning.”
The uppercase “M” means “Millions” using the standard convention
of the metric system, while a lowercase “M” means “milli,” or “thou­
sandths.” Using a lowercase “b,” The abbreviation “bps” stands for “bits
per second.” An uppercase “B” changes the meaning to “bytes per
second.” As there are 8 bits to a byte, using an uppercase “B” instead of
a lowercase “b” gives an error of nearly a magnitude. Is that big? In
California, a magnitude five earthquake destroys your nerves, but a mag­
nitude six earthquake destroys your house. One magnitude matters.
Remember: you always measure network transfer speeds in “bits per
second.”
In 1998, the IEEE set a standard for Ethernet transmissions at 1000 Mbps,
which the industry calls Gigabit Ethernet, or 1000Base-X. Gigabit Ethernet has
multiple standard revisions based on the medium over which the signal will
travel, typically either copper or fiber. Fiber cabling comes in many different
cable types and termination types, but the data must operate at 1000 Mbps to
conform to the Gigabit Ethernet standards.The IEEE ratified standard 802.3ae
for Ethernet running at 10 Gbps (10 GE) in June 2002, but the products at this
level have not yet fully matured, so this chapter will not spend too much time
discussing this standard.
Distance Limitations
Unlike speed, the type of cabling will affect the distance that all varieties of
Ethernet can transmit data. In all cases, all switches must reliably transmit frames
100 meters using CAT 5 cable. Ethernet, Fast Ethernet, and Gigabit Ethernet
using CAT 5 cable are called 10Base-T, 100Base-T, and 1000Base-T, respectively.
Fiber dramatically increases the distance that frames can travel. Most network
engineers call Ethernet over fiber 10Base-FX, and Fast Ethernet over fiber
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100Base-FX.The more common implementations of 10Base-FX—10Base-FB
and 10 Base-FL—can transmit frames 2 km.The less common 10Base-FP has a
500-meter limitation. 100Base-FX can transmit frames up to 2 km using multi­
mode fiber, but some instances of the specification can be as short as 300 meters.
Gigabit Ethernet over fiber can have multiple names depending on the type of
fiber used, such as 1000Base-LX (Long Wavelength Laser), 1000Base-SX (Short
Wavelength Laser), and 1000Base-LH (Long Haul). Gigabit Ethernet can extend
a network anywhere from 220 meters up to 5 km, and even well beyond that
using the latest technology.The distance not only varies with the type of fiber
but also with the type of laser that the manufacturer chooses to employ.
Damage & Defense…
Cabling, Cabling, Cabling
Bad cabling will haunt you more than refinancing telemarketers will. The
reason? Most network administrators do not have the proper tools to
troubleshoot CAT 5 cabling, much less fiber. The faster the data travels,
the more likely improper cabling will affect your network. Symptoms can
include stations connecting at low speeds, but not high speeds; a high
number of frames with errors; or a link indication without the ability to
transmit data. The definition of “bad” in this instance does not just refer
to physical defects. You must take into account distance and termination.
If you have the opportunity to run new cabling, get a company that
actually knows how to do it! Many administrators and consultants think
that they can run CAT 5, but many of these people have not seen the
EIA/TIA 568A & 568B Standards for terminating CAT 5 cabling. Simple
test: quiz your cable installer on the differences between the 568A and
the 568B specifications. If he doesn’t grumble something about colors
and instead rolls his eyes, you know you should be investing your money
elsewhere.
Don’t try to save money by pulling less expensive cabling, because
the cost of the materials represents a small portion of the total cost of the
job. When using copper, always pull at least CAT 5e four-pair cabling.
Even though Ethernet and Fast Ethernet only use pins 1, 2, 3, and 6 (one
pair for sending and one pair for receiving), 1000Base-T uses all four pairs.
Although it might be tempting, never use the extra pairs to transmit voice
Continued
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or other traffic because you might need those extra pairs later for data.
Run dedicated cable for your telephone extensions. We’ve even seen net­
works where they split a four-pair cable into two Ethernet drops. As you
can imagine, poor network quality was rampant at this company.
Finally, and most importantly, fiber connections use a real laser to
transmit data. Never stare into a strand of fiber or the fiber interface on
a switch—you can do serious damage to your eyes. What if the switch is
turned off? Cemeteries are filled with people killed by “unloaded” guns.
Don’t take a chance, and keep unused fiber ports covered at all times.
Duplex Mode
Duplex mode controls whether a switch can send and receive information simul­
taneously or only perform one action at a time. Half duplex mode resembles a
telephone conversation; one person listens while the other person speaks, and
then they switch. A switch in full duplex mode can transmit and receive data at
the same time.The duplex mode can vary by port, so that some ports can work
in half duplex mode while others can operate in full duplex mode. In addition,
for a switch port to function at full duplex the device attached to that port must
also function at full duplex. Full duplex mode can only work in an environment
free from collisions. A hub cannot guarantee a collision-free connection, so all
hubs work in half duplex mode only.The specification insists that a switch autosense the mode, but that does not preclude vendors from adding options to select
the mode manually. Whenever possible, don’t rely too heavily on auto-negotiation, as it can sometimes fail, leaving you with puzzling results. If you manually
adjust your settings, make sure that everyone on the networking team under­
stands this.This will save a lot of debugging time when a station fails to access
the network.
Spanning Tree Protocol
Unlike routers, switches can only have one path to a node. What happens if
someone plugs in two cables to the same switch, causing a loop? Spanning Tree
Protocol (STP) takes over. Figure 7.5 gives an example of a network loop. If
Workstation 1 wants to send data to Workstation 2, Workstation 1 must first send
the data to Switch 1, and Switch 1 must get the data to Switch 4. Switch 1 has
learned through the network that it can reach Switch 4 by sending frames either
through Switch 2 or Switch 3. If Switch 1 sends the data to Switch 2, Switch 2
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must now make a decision to where to send the data. Switch 2 has learned
through network discovery that it can reach Switch 4 directly or it can send it to
Switch 1, which can send it to Switch 3, which can then send it to Switch 4. If
Switch 2 decides to take the latter path, this throws the network into a loop.
Switch 1 receives data that it already sent and the entire process repeats indefinitely.
Figure 7.5 Network Paths without STP
Workstation 1
Switch 1
100
Mbps
Link 1
Switch 2
100
Mbps
Link 2
100
Mbps
Link 4
Switch 3
100
Mbps
Link 3
Switch 4
Workstation 2
When STP senses a loop as in Figure 7.5, it immediately takes steps to deactivate one of the redundant links. STP cannot physically unplug the cables, but it
can put ports in blocking mode instead of forwarding mode so that they cannot
send data. Once STP has dealt with the offending ports, each switch can now
learn the correct paths to each station. Even though the physical network will
look similar to Figure 7.5, the data will see something similar to Figure 7.6. In
this diagram, STP has removed Link 3 from the network. However, what if Link
1 were to die? If it weren’t for the network loop, Link 3 added redundancy, but it
also appears that STP has killed that. Fortunately, that isn’t the case.
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Figure 7.6 Network Paths with STP
Workstation 1
Switch 1
100
Mbps
Link 1
Switch 2
100
Mbps
Link 2
100
Mbps
Link 4
Switch 3
Switch 4
Workstation 2
STP has the intelligence to sense a malfunctioning link and then reactivate a
redundant link so that the data flow can continue. In many implementations, it
can take about 50 seconds for a port to change states from blocking to for­
warding once it receives information about a topology change. In a very large
network, this can cause a disruption of several minutes while the switches
converge, or change their port configuration based on the topology change.
Network engineers should monitor Spanning Tree changes closely. A stable
network should only see changes with the addition or deletion of switch links.
An STP change can indicate a fault or the unauthorized addition of network
equipment into the environment. A savvy hacker with access to a couple of live
network ports onsite could even purposely cause an STP change that forces
traffic across a switch that he controls.
Content Addressable Memory
Switches need to forward frames, and to forward frames they need to know
where to deliver them. Each frame contains a 6-byte MAC address of the station
to which the frame needs to go.The MAC address acts similarly to a house
address. Once we know the address of a house, we can eventually get there. If
we’ve never gone to that house, we’ll probably have to look it up on a map or
ask for directions. A switch has to do the same thing. It asks directions by
flooding all ports with a request for the MAC address. If the machine with that
MAC address hears the call, it responds with directions.
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Just like looking up an address on a map, this takes a lot of time. Couldn’t
you get to the house more quickly next time if you could remember how to get
there without checking the map again? Of course you could, and so could the
data. Once a switch learns a path to a station, it stores the path in its memory.
The Ethernet specification does not prescribe how manufacturers hold this infor­
mation, but many use content addressable memory (CAM). Generally, you can
measure the power of the CAM by how many MAC addresses the switch can
remember at any given time. If a switch cannot maintain a large enough CAM
table to handle all of the traffic in your network, it will constantly have to re­
learn the location of MAC addresses that it should already know.This increases
network traffic and latency. Some advanced switches might use a different mech­
anism than a CAM or use another component in conjunction with the CAM, so
if you cannot find statistics for this component ask the vendor what replaces the
CAM on that particular switch.
Backplane and Switching Fabric
Once a frame enters a switch port, the switch must now move this frame to
another port. Depending on the type of switch, this journey can take the frame
across the switch’s backplane, or, as some manufacturers call it, the switching fabric.
The ports on some switches are on cards that slide into slots in the switch frame­
work, or chassis. If the destination port is on the same card as the source port, the
frame never travels across the switch’s backplane; instead it travels across the card’s
fabric, freeing the switch’s backplane to move other frames.
The capacity of a backplane is measured by how much data can move across
it in a given time, the same way we measure port speeds. Usually, you will see
these speeds reported in Mbps or gigabits per second (Gbps). If the backplane of
a switch can handle all of the traffic that the ports can send its way, the switch is
known as “non blocking.”This is a good thing. If the aggregate bandwidth of all
the ports exceeds the capacity of the backplane, the switch will have to refuse the
excess traffic by blocking it.This will cause the network to slow down as devices
must re-transmit data or throttle back their speeds.
The IEEE does not set a standard for the speed of the fabric, so each vendor
has a large amount of latitude in this category. As such, this category easily differ­
entiates cheap switches from their faster cousins. We’ll return to this when we
discuss choosing the right switch.
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
Optional Features
The 802.3 specification provides for a consistent platform so that Ethernet
devices can interoperate. Manufacturers must meet these minimums if they want
to boast IEEE 802.3 compliance. However, the IEEE 802.3 standard also
describes the parameters for optional Ethernet features. Some of these features
even have their own specifications, such as IEEE 802.1Q for VLAN trunking,
which we’ll discuss in the VLAN subsection. A switch doesn’t need to meet the
IEEE 802.1Q standard to be an Ethernet switch, but if the manufacturer says that
the switch is compliant to this standard, you know that you’ll be able to create
VLANs using this switch and switches from other manufacturers’ products that
make the same claim.
Switch Management
The management feature quickly divides switches into two camps. Switches that
do not allow administrators to perform any configuration are called, appropri­
ately enough, unmanaged. Configuring an unmanaged switch is simple: plug in
the power and then attach the computers—you’re done! Most don’t even have a
power switch, so they come up automatically when you plug in the power. It
doesn’t get much simpler than that. Why would you want to manage a switch
when you can get one that doesn’t need it? There are quite a few reasons.
Every switch will have its own list of features that you can use through the
management console, but most will allow you to change port parameters, such as
the speed and duplex; monitor performance metrics on your network; send alerts
when errors occur through Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
messages; and allow the implementation of advanced features. Oddly enough, it is
the powerful management features that make these switches targets for attack (see
Chapter 8). Unmanaged switches cannot be attacked because the higher-level
intelligence is just not there.
Although each switch can implement management in its own way, most
managed switches will have a console port to which you can make a serial
connection.
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Notes from the Underground…
Common Serial Port Settings
There’s no law or standard that dictates the serial settings, but this will
cover 95 percent of the managed devices on the market today:
■
Speed 9600 bits per second
■
Parity None
■
Data Bits 8
■
Stop Bits 1
■
Flow Control None
The first four settings abbreviate to 9600, N, 8, and 1.
Once you’ve connected to the console port, most switches will allow you to
put an IP address and gateway on the switch for management through telnet,
secure telnet (SSH), SNMP, or a Web browser.The IP address on the switch
exists for management only. A common Layer 2 switch will never use an IP
address for moving data.
Remote management using one of the IP protocols makes it possible to
finish configuring the switch from the comfort of your office instead of standing
in a cramped wiring closet balancing your notebook in one hand while you try
to type with the other. Most modern switches even have advanced Web inter­
faces that make most common tasks as easy as pointing and clicking, so even if
the switch sits on a box next to your desk, you’ll still want to put an IP address
on it so that you don’t have to do everything through the command-line inter­
face (CLI).
Virtual Local Area Networks
Switches already segment networks, but virtual local area networks (VLANs) take
segmentation to the next level. VLANs allow you to designate which ports can
directly communicate with each other and which ones need the assistance of a
router. For example, a hypothetical company has two departments, Finance and
Sales. Neither department shares data, but all of the company’s computers
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connect through a single switch.To make sure that network traffic from each
department doesn’t interfere with the other department (or to keep certain data
away from prying eyes), you could create a group of ports that belong to the
Finance department’s LAN and another set of ports that belongs to the Sales
department’s LAN. VLANs can even extend past the boundaries of a single switch.
In the previous example, the Finance and Sales departments could have
workstations that connect to multiple switches within the company’s LAN. In
this case, the Finance and Sales VLANs can also extend across all of these
switches.The IEEE 802.3 standard has specifications for manufacturers who want
to include VLANs as a standards-based feature.The IEEE 802.1Q standard deals
with VLANs; therefore, VLANs created on one vendor’s switch that conforms to
the 802.1Q standard will work with VLANs on any other vendor’s switch that
complies with the 802.1Q standard.
Vendors often find that strictly adhering to standards stifles their ability to
provide superior solutions and differentiate their offerings from the rest of the
pack, or a vendor might need a solution prior to the ratification of a standard.
For example, Cisco engineered the Inter-Switch Link (ISL) protocol as a propri­
etary trunking protocol similar to the 802.1Q standard. ISL gives Cisco switches
additional VLAN functionality, but it can only work with other Cisco devices, so
Cisco now opts for 802.1Q on its newer products instead of its proprietary ISL.
Some advanced switches can form VLANs dynamically based on a wide
range of information, such as IP addresses or user logins.These abilities will vary
by manufacturer and even by product lines from the same company. Obviously,
VLANs don’t set themselves up out of the box, so only managed switches will
have VLAN capabilities. We’ll see in later chapters how the security provided by
VLANs can be subverted, but at a minimum they do provide features that make
them worth the time needed to configure them.
Port Aggregation
Port aggregation allows a switch to combine, or aggregate, multiple connections
that act as single pipe to transfer data.This increases the total bandwidth, and
adds fault-tolerance in case one of the links in the bundle dies. Port aggregation
takes more than just plugging in multiple connections between switches. As you
learned in the section on STP, this will just cause a network loop. On switches
that support this feature, the network administrator can manage the switch and
create the aggregate.The 802.3 standard has provisions for vendors who want to
enable this feature and make it interoperable with port aggregation from other
vendors who also conform to the specification.
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Moving Switching beyond Layer 2
Conventional switching uses MAC addresses to move traffic to the correct switch
ports at Layer 2 of the OSI model. Networks have grown far more complex
since the first switch entered the market, and as such, network engineers now
require switches that can move data based on more than just MAC addresses.
These advanced switches can now use information from higher layers of the OSI
model. As such, we say that these switches can perform multilayer switching.
Understanding the Need for Layer 3 Switching
Switches do an excellent job of eliminating collisions from the network, allowing
LANs to grow much larger than with hubs.This does not mean, however, that a
switched network can grow indefinitely. Switches deal with the garbage and con­
gestion from Layer 1 and Layer 2 of the OSI model, but there are five more
layers above those, and each of these layers can add its own special problems to
the network. Layer 3, the network layer, creates protocol-based connections
between network devices. Most administrators will recognize IP, IPX, AppleTalk,
and NetBEUI as common protocols at this layer. Instead of the MAC addresses
that Layer 2 uses, Layer 3 uses protocol addresses configured through software.
Protocols at this layer fall roughly into three categories: routable, unroutable,
and routing. A routable protocol by definition can transmit packets between mul­
tiple networks or subnets; an unroutable network cannot. Routable protocols use
routing protocols to find the routes that they need to get from network to net­
work. Common routable protocols include IP, IPX, and AppleTalk. NetBEUI is a
common unroutable protocol. Routing Information Protocol (RIP) for IP and
IPX and Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) are common routing protocols. Does
this mean that unroutable traffic can never cross a WAN? No. Some routers, for
example, can bridge NetBEUI traffic, which allows it to transverse a WAN.
Therefore, some administrators would argue that NetBEUI is routable, since a
router is moving the packets.The individuals who create networking exams usu­
ally do not agree with this argument.
IP uses its familiar 32-bit address to connect devices across the LAN and
across the world. IPX uses an 80-bit address. Routers can move these packets
between networks because part of each address represents the network and part
of the address represents the host.Think of the host address as your street address
and think of the network address as your city and state. If someone tried to send
mail to your home address of 123 Main Street from the same city as you, the
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local postmaster could probably find you. If the mail came from another city,
however, the post office wouldn’t have any idea where to send the mail. Even
when the mail does make it properly between cities, it takes more time than
when sending mail within the city, just as switching moves data much faster than
routing.
Figure 7.7 Comparing IP Addresses to House Numbers
City of 192.168.2
House # 1
City of 192.168.1
House # 1
Let’s take a look at two houses in the hypothetical state of Taxilvania.The
first house is in the city of “192.168.1,” and the second house is in the city of
“192.168.2.” Both of these houses have the identification of “#1.” If someone in
the southern city wants to send a letter to House #1 in the northern city, that
person will need more information than just the house address. In this example,
the person would have to address the letter to House #1 in the city of
192.168.2. Using a real TCP/IP address, this would look like “192.168.2.1.”
Just as with Layer 2, Layer 3 uses both unicasts and broadcasts. When a station
knows the destination for its data, it uses a unicast packet, but when it doesn’t
know, it floods the network with a request. Examples of these requests include IP
Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) requests and IPX Get Nearest Server (GNS)
requests.This works well on a small network, but what happens when thousands
of stations on the same network send these requests? Unlike Layer 2 collisions,
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Layer 3 broadcasts extend beyond each segment to the entire network.Therefore,
all of the network devices on a single network or subnet comprise a broadcast
domain. With enough stations on a network, broadcasts can choke out real data
and bring the network to its knees.This condition is called a broadcast storm.
Sound familiar? We’ve effectively recreated the same Layer 2 problem (colli­
sions) as a more colossal problem at Layer 3. Clearly, the network engineer needs
to reduce the size of the broadcast domain without reducing the number of
machines on the network, and still allow all the machines to communicate with
each other.
Routing
A network engineer can reduce the size of the broadcast domain by introducing
routers into the network. If we take the sample network in Figure 7.8 and add a
router to it, we get the network in Figure 7.9.This second network diagram
divides each workstation into its own collision domain, and divides the network
into two broadcast domains instead of just one.
Figure 7.8 Single Broadcast Domain
Switch 1
Workstation 1
Collision
Domain
Workstation 2
Collision
Domain
Workstation 3
Collision
Domain
Workstation 4
Collision
Domain
Workstation 7
Collision
Domain
Workstation 8
Collision
Domain
Switch 2
Workstation 5
Collision
Domain
Workstation 6
Collision
Domain
Broadcast Domain
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Routers divide broadcast domains as effectively as switches divide collision
domains. Routers squelch broadcasts. A broadcast storm on one side of a router
has no effect on network devices on the other side of the router.This seems so
easy, why wouldn’t a network engineer just replace all of the switches with
routers?
Figure 7.9 Multiple Broadcast Domains Using Routers
Switch 1
Workstation 1
Collision
Domain
Workstation 2
Collision
Domain
Workstation 3
Collision
Domain
Workstation 4
Collision
Domain
Broadcast Domain
Router
Switch 2
Workstation 5
Collision
Domain
Workstation 6
Collision
Domain
Workstation 7
Collision
Domain
Workstation 8
Collision
Domain
Broadcast Domain
There are many reasons not to do this. First, routers cost extremely more
than even high-end switches on a price-per-port basis. Second, the amount of
work that it takes a router to manipulate packets takes so much more processing
power that routers can introduce a great deal of latency into a network.
Therefore, network engineers have to balance the need to logically divide a net­
work with the monetary cost and packet latency associated with a router “hop.”
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Layer 3 Switching in Action
The venerable network engineer, remembering how much switches improved
over bridging, tried to do the same thing with routing. By adding routing pro­
cessors to switches, engineers allowed the switches to route packets in addition to
just forwarding frames. Moving the routing to the switch lowers the cost and
reduces the latency. However, many mechanisms exist for accomplishing Layer 3
switching. Some switches need to add additional modules to the switch or they
might need to add daughter cards to existing modules. Daughter cards are modules
that connect to the main, or motherboards, to extend the functionality of the
main boards. Some switches use ASICs permanently attached to the switch.You
might think that even though the implementations differ the results should be
the same, but that’s not true either. Most Layer 3 switches move packets one of
two ways.
Full Routing
These switches look at a data stream, determine that the destination belongs to a
different network than the data source, and routes each packet. Even though
switches can do this faster than a router, this still makes Layer 3 switching slower
than Layer 2 switching.
Route Once, Switch Many
More advanced Layer 3 switches will look at the first packet and route it.The
switch will then conclude that the rest of that data stream needs to go to the
same location.The remaining packets from the stream are switched rather than
routed.This reduces the amount of time that the switch has to deal with the
data, so the latency drops dramatically.
Layer 3 Switching and VLANs
As you might recall from earlier in the chapter, VLANs allow network engineers
to isolate traffic on the network.This does isolate the traffic, but at some point,
the stations from one VLAN might need to talk to a station on another VLAN.
More importantly, stations from two different VLANs might need to reach a
connection on a third VLAN, perhaps to get to the Internet. Network engineers
can use these VLANs to create multiple networks or subnets in the same switch
or in multiple switches installed throughout the campus. Switches with Layer 3
functionality now allow the multiple VLANs to communicate with each other
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quickly and efficiently. Without the Layer 3 functionality, the switches would
have to access an external router to move packets between the VLANs.This
could greatly reduce performance and increase latency on the network.
Understanding Multilayer Switching
Multilayer switching refers to moving data based on OSI layers beyond Layer 2
without using an external router. Some vendors will call “Route Once, Switch
Many” at Layer 3 multilayer switching and leave it at that. Other vendors will
actually use information at the higher levels to make additional switching deci­
sions. Most vendors who go beyond Layer 3 to make switching decisions usually
only go one level higher. Switches with Layer 2 and Layer 3 functionality give us
transparent bridging and routing, respectively, at high speeds. What happens at
Layer 4?
Just as when playing “Name That Tune,” a collection of individual notes
finally resembles a song, at Layer 4 data starts to resemble protocols that people
can recognize. From the TCP/IP world, Layer 4 defines such protocols as
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure
(HTTPS), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). A network engineer
could, as an example, use Layer 4 information to route all SMTP traffic to a par­
ticular switch port. From a security standpoint, a network engineer can use Layer
4 switching to make sure that only SMTP traffic reaches a mail server, thereby
eliminating potential hacking. A firewall can serve the same function, but a fire­
wall does not have the same performance as a switch.
MLS can also provide Quality of Service (QoS). For example, if a campus
network carries both voice and data, the switch can assign a higher priority to
voice traffic to reduce choppy conversations caused by congestion of other data
traffic or high latency. Data traffic can typically survive higher latency than voice
or video streams can, due to all of the built-in error-correcting mechanisms.
Only the highest-end switches can perform MLS. It requires additional
memory and processing power that your average switch will never hope to have.
As such, these switches cost more money and take more expertise to configure.
You’ll usually only find these switches at Fortune 1000 companies, large govern­
ment installations, or other organizations that have large networks and even larger
budgets.
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Using Switching to Improve Security
Locking the door to the wiring closet doesn’t cut it as high security anymore;
the savvy network engineer has to take a few more precautions. Most network
engineers don’t give switch security a second thought because switches don’t
store any data. However, they do transfer data (and potentially confidential data),
and that’s all the motivation a talented hacker needs.
Patching the Switch
Many switches allow for firmware upgrades to fix known problems. Usually, this
only applies to managed switches, but unmanaged switches might have a big
enough problem that the vendor will release updated chips for the switch.
Anyone who has ever “flashed” a switch can attest to how nerve-racking it is. If
anything goes wrong, that could be it for the switch, and you’ve just ruined your
evening. Given that, why flash them?
Depending on the nature of the patch (and prevailing indecency laws in your
state), you can elect not to install the patch. Some patches directly affect the
security of the switch, and if this is the case, no matter what else you do, you will
always have this security hole until you fix this. When it comes to security, you
cannot keep your head in the sand. Make it part of your routine to regularly
check your vendor’s Web site for code updates, or better yet, if you’re low on
SPAM, see if you can sign up for your switch manufacturer’s proactive notifica­
tion mailing list.
Damage & Defense…
Flashing a Switch
Many things can go wrong upgrading a switch image or firmware, but
you can avoid most of these by preparing for the upgrade. This is not the
type of thing that you do off-the-cuff.
■
Prepare a back-out plan You need to have a specific plan to
correct the condition or work around it before things go south
because you won’t be thinking clearly after the fact.
Continued
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■
RTFM No vendor wants its helpdesk flooded with frantic calls
about dead switches, so all vendors go out of their way to list
the steps in excruciating detail (usually). You need to read the
instructions at least twice—once before you start and once as
you’re performing the upgrade. If you don’t understand a
step, call the vendor for clarification. This is not a good time
for improv.
■
Know your equipment Is the patch that you just down­
loaded really intended for the product and particular model
that you’re trying to flash? If it is, does the switch meet the
minimum specifications, such as memory or storage space? If
the answer is “No” or “I don’t know,” do not continue!
■
Gather your materials If you need more memory, different
cables, or anything else, make sure that you have all of these
handy before you begin.
■
Back up the configuration A switch will sometimes lose its
configuration after a firmware upgrade. If you have a compli­
cated configuration, you don’t want to recreate it from
memory at 2 A.M.
■
Use a UPS The switch and the station pushing the update
need to be on an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) during
the procedure, because even a minor power fluctuation at the
wrong moment could lead to a weekend you’ll never get back.
The switch should always connect to a UPS at all times
anyway, so this step shouldn’t inconvenience you too much.
■
Choose the right time Flashing a switch will probably require
a reboot, so you don’t want to do it in the middle of the day
when everyone should be working. Avoid the temptation of
loading the switch early with the hope of just rebooting it on
your way out the door, because you could get a lockup in the
middle and kill the switch. Warn your users well ahead of time
whenever possible and keep abreast of important company
events so that you can schedule around them.
■
Verify the update After you’ve followed all of the vendor’s
instructions, confirm that the firmware did upgrade, and make
sure that the switch is working. If everything looks good,
you’re done. Congratulations!
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Securing Unused Ports
Do you know where all your ports are? Administrators will often light up unused
jacks in case they need to plug in a station there in the future.This can make
sense if the administrator has extra switch ports, but consider the location of the
empty, hot jack. Is it in a conference room frequented by numerous, unmoni­
tored visitors? Is it next to an open loading dock in a warehouse that’s never had
a computer? Scenarios such as these and similar ones present quick entry points
for a fast hacker with a light notebook. Boom! DHCP kicked the hacker an
address, and now he has the “My Documents” subdirectory from every Windows
2000 workstation with a blank password. However, all your users save all their
work on the servers, so you don’t have to worry, right? Honestly, beyond physical
security, this is all that you can do for an unmanaged switch.The rest of the safe­
guards rely on configuration options only available on managed switches.
Adding Passwords to the Switch
Most managed switches will allow a password for viewing mode and a password
for configuration. Some switches might use different passwords for direct (con­
sole) access and another set of passwords for remote access (Telnet, SSH, HTTP,
and so forth). Determine which ones your switch supports and set all of them
with hard-to-crack passwords. Many administrators don’t see a need to password
the switch, especially a Layer 2 switch without VLANs, since the worst thing that
could happen is that someone could shut it down and then lock everyone else
out with a password. A quick reset in the wiring closet will fix this.The company
suffers some downtime, and the administrator gets annoyed.This doesn’t seem
like much, but if you add up how much productivity this little stunt just cost the
company and put some salary numbers behind it, you come up with a substantial
cost. Unfortunately, it gets worse from here.
Port Mirroring
One of the best traditional tools in a network engineer’s arsenal is a capturing
device, or sniffer.Traditional Ethernet transmits data over a shared medium, so
every station on the wire sees all of the traffic. Usually, stations ignore data that
the sender did not mean for them to see. However, a network sniffer operates in
promiscuous mode, which means that it acts as if every frame that it sees belongs
to it. A network engineer can find a lot of problems this way, but a hacker can
steal all of a company’s data this way, too. Switches don’t use a shared medium,
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which is how they avoid collisions.This also prevents sniffing from all but the
best hackers who can actively fake MAC addresses, discussed in Chapters 6 and
8.This also prevents network engineers from diagnosing problems on a network.
Computer engineers took this into account when they designed switches.
What should a network engineer do if he needs to see all of the traffic going to
and from a server on a particular port? Many switches have a feature called port
mirroring that allows a network engineer to send all of the activity from one port
to another port without affecting the traffic of the original port.The network
engineer can now attach his sniffer to the second port to look for irregularities.
If the switch doesn’t have a password, a hacker can easily do the same thing, and
capture everything going to and from that server. Most data travels across the
network unencrypted, so it becomes trivial for the hacker to reassemble the data
stream into usable files. Most POP3 mail passwords go across the network unen­
crypted, also, so the hacker can continue to download user mail from home if the
company uses POP3 mail and has remote access to its mail system.
Remote Management
Most managed switches allow users to configure them or to check the network
status from a workstation using Telnet, SSH, HTTP, HTTPS, or some other pro­
tocol. Consider the limitations of each protocol. Most administrators will use
HTTP if available because the graphical interface makes it easier to configure the
switch.The drawback is that HTTP has no encryption, so consider the path that
you take to the switch. Is it secure? Could someone put a sniffer between you
and the switch and get the switch password? If this seems like a likely scenario in
your shop, using a Web browser from your desk might not be an option. Does
the switch support management using HTTPS, which is also known as Secure
Socket Layer (SSL)? If so, this provides a much safer management platform. What
if you need to use a text interface to make changes with the CLI? Telnet suffers
from the same security problems as HTTP. SSH gives access to a CLI, plus it uses
encryption. Check to see if your switch can use SSH, and use that instead of
Telnet. Some administrators feel safe enough by not configuring an IP address on
a switch, thereby eliminating all remote access functions. Some switches come
preconfigured from the factory to use DHCP to obtain an IP address, so the
switch might get an address despite your best efforts.
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NOTE
No version of Windows has a built-in SSH client, so you can wait for Bill
Gates to write one, or you can download PuTTY for free from
www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/.
Some switches will allow administrators to restrict remote management to
specific IP addresses. If your switch has this feature, determine from which sta­
tions you need to access the switch, and then enable the restrictions accordingly.
Remote Monitoring
A network engineer cannot be everywhere in the organization, but he does have
to know what every piece of equipment is doing all of the time. Fortunately,
most managed network devices allow network engineers to monitor these
devices from a central, remote location.
Simple Network Management Protocol
Many managed switches allow administrators to monitor status through SNMP.
SNMP is a powerful, standards-based protocol that can monitor any aspect of a
switch that a vendor allows. Vendors create special files called Management
Information Bases (MIBs) that contain all of the SNMP functionality unique to
their devices.This allows the protocol to work for devices from multiple vendors,
while still giving each vendor enough flexibility to account for all of the features
in each unique device. Unfortunately, most SNMP messages travel in clear text
over the network, which makes them subject to sniffing on nonsecure links. On
February 12, 2002, the CERT Coordination Center issued an SNMP advisory,
which was updated as recently as May 14, 2003.The advisory (www.cert.org/
advisories/CA-2002-03.html) lists specific security issues with this protocol and
lists vendors affected by it. If you need to use SNMP, check to see if your
product made it to the advisory. If it has, check with your vendor to see if a
patch exists, and if it does, apply it. If no patch exists, carefully weigh the benefits
versus the risks before implementing SNMP.The advisory also gives a piece of
common-sense advice: if you don’t need SNMP, turn it off.This applies to most
features in the world of computing.
After all of this, if you’ve decided that you do need SNMP, remember that
SNMP “passwords” are called community strings, and most implementations have a
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read-only community string and a read-write community string.The defaults are
usually “Public” and “Private.”You should change these immediately.
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the organization responsible for
maintaining Internet standards through Requests for Comment (RFC), has cre­
ated a second revision to SNMP called SNMPv3. RFC 3414 (www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc3414.txt?number=3414) deals specifically with security for SNMPv3.
Examination of this protocol shows that the IETF has included provisions for
user authentication and encryption, making SNMPv3 much more secure than
earlier versions.This standard has only existed in its present form since December
2002, so only very new devices will support all the features of this standard.
Damage & Defense…
Do You Need the Read-Write Community?
SNMP not only has the power to monitor a switch, but vendors can also
write MIBs to configure the switch. Most administrators who use SNMP
to proactively monitor the condition of their switches never use it to
reconfigure the switches. If you fall into this category, deactivate the
SNMP read-write features of the switch if possible. Remember: before ver­
sion 3, SNMP stood for “Security’s Not My Problem.”
Other Protocols
Some vendors use proprietary protocols for monitoring or configuring their
switches. For example, Cisco switches and routers use Cisco Discovery Protocol
(CDP), a Layer 2 protocol, to exchange network topology information.This
information floats across the network unencrypted without a password.
Depending on the configuration of your network, this information might even
get transmitted across the Internet. Given the huge prevalence of Cisco equip­
ment, other vendors, such as Hewlett-Packard, have started supporting CDP.
Even if a particular vendor doesn’t support CDP, this does not preclude that
vendor from having a similar feature using a different protocol.. Check the docu­
mentation thoroughly and turn off any features that you don’t plan to use.
Vendors usually brag about these features, so you shouldn’t have much of a
problem learning about these features, and that’s half the battle.
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Setting the Time
Many switches log activity that could prove vital if you have to investigate a pos­
sible security breach. If this happens, you will need to know that the time logged
for each event is accurate or you won’t be able to correlate these logs with the
logs from any other machines. Most current switches allow administrators to
configure automatic time synchronization via Network Time Protocol (NTP).
This will give your switch accurate time, but be careful when you configure this
option: some equipment will allow you to configure it as a time server as well as
a client, which could inadvertently give away information about your network.
In addition, either configure all of your devices to use the same time source or,
better yet, if you have one device capable of acting as an NTP server, configure
that device to synch its time with a reliable time source and then configure the
rest of your internal devices to get their time from your internal time server.This
will decrease your amount of Internet traffic and increase security since you can
close the NTP port on your firewall for all of the other devices.The less traffic
that can leave your network, the better.
Using VLANs for Security
VLANs can effectively divide LANs into multiple subnets that administrators
connect through routing or Layer 3 switching. However, as an administrator, if
you have a group of computers to which most users should not have access,
some switches with a VLAN feature will allow you to create a VLAN that most
other users cannot access. In some cases, an administrator can create a VLAN for
the management interfaces of the switches themselves and create another VLAN
for user traffic. In this way, the administrator can limit who can get to the man­
agement functions of the switches.
Some switches will allow you to create VLANs limited to certain protocols.
For example, if all of your network services rely strictly on TCP/IP, you could
create VLANs that filter out the other protocols to prevent possible security
breaches.
Using Multilayer Switching (MLS) for Security
MLS can switch traffic based on the content of that traffic. For example, an
administrator could configure an MLS switch to send all of the campus’ SMTP
traffic to the only port where the administrator has set up the company’s SMTP
server.This can prevent pirate mail servers or mail-enabled viruses from operating
inside the network where the firewall can’t stop this type of activity.
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Choosing the Right Switch
Now that you know what features differentiate switches, how do you know what
switch you should purchase? Buying a switch with features that you don’t need
will drain your budget of money that you could spend elsewhere, while under­
buying could force you to upgrade earlier than you should. In most campuses,
you’ll need to purchase more than one switch. Should you only purchase the
same, exact switch no matter where you place it in the campus? You probably
don’t want to do this.
Vendors divide campus networks into multiple layers. 3Com uses the terms
“desktop,” “workgroup,” and “core,” while Cisco uses “access,” “distribution,” and
“core.” Other vendors have their own terms for each layer. For example, most
vendors will use “backbone” synonymously with “core” and “edge” instead of
“access.” As Cisco has created a business training administrators, let’s discuss the
campus network using their terms.
Understanding the
Layers of the Campus Network
Designing a large network might seem to be a daunting task, but it becomes
much more manageable if you split it into smaller pieces. Most large networks
will have three distinct layers: access, distribution, and core. Each layer serves a
specific function in the campus network, and as such, each layer will use different
devices. Even small networks will still have these three layers at a functional level,
although multiple layers could get combined into the same piece of equipment.
Access Layer
Switches at this layer of the campus connect directly to workstations. High port
density and low price per port differentiate switches at this layer from the other
layers. Switches at this layer might provide for more aggregate bandwidth from
the ports than the backplane can handle to deliver the lowest price per port.
These switches seldom do more than Layer 2 switching and will often even lack
management functions.
Distribution Layer
Switches at this layer aggregate traffic from the access layer before passing it up to
the core layer. Most of the special features, such as VLANs, MLS, and access
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policies get set at this layer.These switches need to have high bandwidth, fast
processors, and enough ports to accept all of the switches from the access layer.
These switches also need to have high-speed uplinks to the core. If the campus
has topologies other than Ethernet, such as Token Ring or Fiber Distributed
Data Interface (FDDI), switches at this level should provide the translations.
Core Layer
This layer meshes all of the traffic from the distribution layer, controlling traffic at
an enterprise level.This level cares about nothing except speed. Although most
switching involves Ethernet, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) still plays a
huge part at this layer, especially in the telecommunications industry. Legacy
FDDI continues to survive in this space due to its reliability, but at a high cost
and only 100 Mbps transfer speeds, don’t expect to see any new installations.
The “Grab Bag”
Those of us older than dirt should remember Pierce Brosnan’s pre-007 days
when, hawking soda with his proper British accent, he declared, “Ours is not a
perfect world.”Your needs might not perfectly fall into any of the previous three
categories. Cisco calls a combination of the distribution layer and the core layer a
collapsed backbone, so admittedly, even Cisco realizes that all networks do not con­
tain each layer as a separate entity. Some networks might find it necessary to col­
lapse the backbone even further and combine all three layers into a single switch
or a group of switches acting as peers. Don’t let a preconceived notion of “layers”
lock you into a structure that doesn’t work for your company.
Assessing Your Needs
This is the point where you combine your knowledge of what’s available with
what you can use.To do this, we need to examine the entire campus environ­
ment and understand how the company works.
Mapping the Campus
You don’t need an elaborate map of your campus, but you do need an accurate
one that you can read. If you haven’t used a diagramming tool like Microsoft Visio
in the past, you should consider it now.The campus map needs to show all of the
wiring closets, server rooms, user and printer locations, and any other wiring drops
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cate any cable runs that could approach or exceed 100 meters. Remember: you
have to consider the length of the cable between two locations and not the actual
distance; meandering conduits can greatly increase distance.This distance also
includes drop cable lengths, and not just the cabling in the wall.
On your second pass through the network, concentrate on the rooms where
you need to place the switches. Make a note of the available power, air conditioning/heating, racks, cabinets, and data drops. Contact facilities if necessary to
get this information. Note any equipment already in these locations so that you
can estimate the power and environmental control resources left for the switches.
Understanding the Data
Believe it or not, many network engineers and administrators know surprisingly
little about what their company does. If the company halted its normal opera­
tions and started to make widgets, these administrators probably wouldn’t notice
any difference. However, to design a network you have to understand what the
users need it to do.You need to understand how much data the users move and
how often.You also need to know the location of the users in relation to their
data. All of this will make a big difference in designing your network.
Assembling the Pieces
Now, you have a good idea of your environment. Let’s look at a few example
networks to see where we would use each type of switch.
Single-Floor Office Building
with a Central Server Room and Wiring Closet
The network doesn’t get any simpler than this.You might think that any switch
might do here, but we haven’t analyzed all of the data. We need to factor into the
equation how many users we have and what they do. First, let’s consider 24 users,
six network attached printers, a single fileserver, and a single mail server. All of
these connections could easily fit into a single 36 or 48 port 10/100 stackable,
unmanaged switch. If this switch has two Gigabit Ethernet uplinks, the servers
will find a high-speed home. If you need to track network performance, you
could look for the same type of switch with management capabilities. A network
this small doesn’t require more than fast Layer 2 switching. If the users work with
large files, the switch should be nonblocking, which means that the total aggre­
gate bandwidth of all of the ports will not exceed the capacity of the backplane.
What if the office grows to 100 users?
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Most stackable switches don’t have more than 48 standard ports, so this sce­
nario requires at least three stackable switches. Assuming that each switch has two
Gigabit Ethernet uplinks, you could use one Gigabit uplink between each switch
to form a chain, or designate one switch as the core and use it to uplink to the
other two switches. Either scenario leaves one Gigabit Ethernet uplink for each
server, with a Gigabit uplink remaining. Computer usage should dictate which
you use. Look for the heaviest users of the file server, and put these people in the
same switch as the file server.Try to do the same with the mail server. Users who
need equal access to both servers can go into the core switch of the second
configuration.
If you take this same scenario, but with a chassis switch, you can configure
the box with enough 10/100 blades for all of the workstations and printers, and
a Gigabit Ethernet card for the servers. Provided that the switch is nonblocking,
all workstations have equal access to the servers. If you need additional speed and
flexibility, you could replace all of the Ethernet blades with 10/100/1000 blades.
Switch blades with Gigabit ports have a lower port density than 10/100 blades,
so this will take more slots in the switch, limiting future upgrades.You could add
Layer 3 functionality to this network to divide departments, but given only 100
workstations, you would probably not see much of an improvement in
performance.
Multifloor, Multibuilding
Campus with Distributed Wiring Closets
Now, let’s imagine the same network, but concentrate on just one floor in just
one skyscraper of a large, multibuilding campus. Each floor has 200 users and
about 20 printers. Each floor has its own wiring closet, but there’s only one cen­
tral server room in the complex. We would probably start with high-density
stackable switches for the workstations or a single chassis loaded with 10/100
blades on each floor.The floor switches would uplink to a high-end switch in
the ground floor wiring closet of each building. If we use a single chassis on each
floor, we could aggregate up to four 1000Base-LX links between the ground
floor switch and each of the other switches on the floor. Aggregate links will
provide increased bandwidth and fault tolerance in case of a cable or port issue.
In the case of stackable switches, each stackable switch will get a single
1000Base-LX connection to the ground floor chassis. All inter-floor connections
will use fiber due to distance restrictions.
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Regardless of whether we use stackable switches or a chassis, we’ll create a
VLAN on each floor with its own subnet. If we use a chassis on the floors, the
floor switches will provide the Layer 3 switching functionality; otherwise, we’ll
use the Layer 3 functionality in the ground floor switch.The ground floor
switches from each building will connect to a central chassis in the server room
using aggregated 1000Base-LX connections for increased throughput and fault
tolerance. All chassis will have dual power supplies, but the central switch will
also have a dual management card for fault tolerance. All servers will plug directly
into the core switch, with the intranet server using two aggregated 1000Base-T
connections for throughput and fault tolerance.
One of the servers belongs exclusively to Accounting, but the Accounting
department has users all over the campus on every floor. After studying the department’s data usage, you discover that all Accounting users regularly access a specialty
finance package on the Accounting server that uses port 1678 TCP. Since your dis­
tribution switches at the bottom of each floor have Layer 4 switching features, you
create a dynamic VLAN based on port 1678 TCP that connects Accounting
directly to their server, while limiting everyone else’s visibility to it.
Finally, the core switch attaches to the company WAN using ATM OC-3 to
connect this site to the company’s second campus at the other end of the
country. Now, the company has all of the resources necessary to get its job done.
Living in the Real World
Imagining the perfect network is a lot of fun, but we live in a world of budgets
and legacy equipment. Don’t limit your network design based on your percep­
tion of the budget; let the CFO worry about that.Your job is to present the best
network that you can with a price estimate. Map the network and indicate the
type of switch and features that you want in each location. Now, check with the
vendors to see what they have that matches what you want. If they don’t have
exactly what you imagined, ask one of their sales engineers what their equivalent
is and see how that works into your design. If the CFO can’t afford this design,
repeat the process until you have one that the CFO will approve, but with each
new design, highlight features that you had to omit to make the price point;
that’s the CYA feature of network design. While you’re practicing CYA tech­
niques, don’t forget to add annual maintenance into your budget request for
equipment that needs it.
Most of this chapter has stayed vendor neutral, but now you need to pick a
vendor.The 802.3 standard provides for a lot of interoperability, but the truth is
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that most of the top name vendors have used proprietary techniques to improve
upon the standard. Mixing vendors forces you to stick with a strict standard and
not use the features that you probably paid for when you bought the switch.
Moreover, vendors have tested their equipment the heaviest with their own
equipment. A bug from one vendor might cause another switch to malfunction,
which will take you forever to diagnose because the malfunctioning piece of
equipment really isn’t the problem.You can usually exclude unmanaged access
layer switches from this dogged brand loyalty since they don’t have any special
features about which to worry; however, cross-platform bugs are still an issue.
Unfortunately, not every network engineer has the luxury of upgrading an
entire network at once. Often, infrastructure can get upgraded one switch at a
time, which means that the network might temporarily have a mix of vendors at
the distribution layer or even core layer. In this case, you have to carefully con­
sider the equipment that you’re proposing and check with each vendor to see if
they know about any potential problems.Then, adjust your plan accordingly.
Even though a multivendor network makes it hard for you to diagnose problems,
it makes it easier for the vendors. As soon as you call one of them with a
problem, they won’t hesitate to tell you that it’s the other vendor’s fault!
Choosing an Established Vendor
How should you choose your vendor? In the late 1980s, IT professionals often
joked, “Nobody ever got fired for buying IBM.”You can never overlook the 800­
pound gorilla in any industry. Consider the reputation of each vendor. When you
see the vendor’s name with a product review, which way do most of the reviews
go? How long has the company been in business? Using an established, stable com­
pany usually means that they will still be in business long enough to honor the full
warranty of your equipment. Established companies usually have a large client base,
which means that if a problem does exist with a particular product, you probably
won’t be the first one to encounter it, and the company might have a patch for it
by the time it affects you. Many established companies stay in business by using a
conservative strategy; they rarely release the first-of-its-kind products, but they usu­
ally aren’t too far behind the company that did.These veterans of networking have
learned the difference between the cutting edge and the bleeding edge. When
these companies do fall too far behind the curve, they simply buy a startup leading
the pack, which puts them back on top.
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Gambling on a Startup
At the other end of the spectrum, you have startups, the best of which are usually
formed from the top engineers from the big companies.These small companies
usually enter the market with a superior product at a low price and a lot of
enthusiasm. If possible, you want to meet with representatives from these compa­
nies at trade shows such as NetWorld+Interop.These trade shows allow you to
see the products, and more importantly, the people behind them. Startups often
can’t afford a large sales force to attend these shows, so you get to talk to the
actual systems engineers (SEs) who will help you when you encounter a
problem. SEs have trained so hard to learn their product lines that they’ve had to
lose all other skills, including the ability to lie. Pump these people for as much
information as you can. Find out how many support staff they have, the hours
they work, and how long it takes for them to get back to you, and where they
have a physical presence. Equipment from startups can sometimes require an
onsite visit from the regional SE.The first time you find out that your region
includes 10 other states, with your SE living at the far end of your region,
shouldn’t be when your network has stopped passing traffic.
You expect to find SEs tired, especially at a Las Vegas trade show, but if it
looks like they’re one step short of asking you to put them out of their misery,
there’s a good chance that their product has a lot of bugs and it will take a long
time before they answer your support call. If the SEs look well rested and knowl­
edgeable, you could have a winner on your hands. If the company has a decent
staff, but hasn’t sold very many units, you can usually expect personal attention. If
you buy enough of the vendor’s products and have a clean shop, the vendor
might even offer you a discount on the condition that you tour potential cus­
tomers through your facility so they can see the switch in action. Not only does
this save you some money and get you a little recognition from your peers, it also
puts you on the fast track for technical support.The last things a startup needs
are a disgruntled reference and a malfunctioning demonstration network. Finally,
get all contracts and Service Level Agreements (SLAs) in writing, but always
remember that these are just pieces of paper, and they can’t bring a failed com­
pany back to life. Warranties by themselves don’t fix networks.
Looking at the Brand Names
In networking, Cisco is the 800-pound gorilla. Cisco has an established reputa­
tion in the industry and has either built or bought technology for every level of
your enterprise. Cisco started as a router manufacturer, but now derives more
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revenue from switches than from routers. Cisco’s recent acquisition of LinkSys
even gives them a significant stake in the Small Office/Home Office (SOHO)
market. Cisco’s size also means that you will probably find more people familiar
with Cisco equipment than from any other manufacturer, so hiring staff to work
with your network becomes much easier. Cisco products usually come with a
90-day or one-year warranty, depending on the product. Cisco has various sup­
port plans (SmartNet) to extend the warranty for at least three years beyond the
date that they discontinue the product. Cisco technical support will usually not
disappoint you, which is good considering how much the support contracts cost.
3Com occupies the same market space as Cisco, although 3Com gets far less
attention these days. Like Cisco, 3Com has a product for every level of most
enterprises, including some of the best NICs on the market.You won’t see any
bleeding-edge products from 3Com, but you will see stable products that per­
form well. 3Com usually has good technical support, and depending on the
product, longer warranties than Cisco. 3Com core products usually have a oneyear warranty, while access layer products can have five-year or lifetime war­
ranties. Review the warranty on each product carefully before you buy it. If
you’re considering a simple, unmanaged switch, you’ll never have to apologize
for any of the 3Com SuperStack 3 Baseline models.
Notes from the Underground…
Getting System Engineers
to Help Design Your Network
On a personal note, years ago, I scribbled out some requirements for my
new network and then I visited various vendors at NetWorld+Interop. I
invited a sales engineer from each to build a quick diagram of my require­
ments using their products. I had a nice collection of diagrams by the time
I hit the 3Com booth. When I gave my requirements to the 3Com sales
engineer, he considered my list and said, “You don’t need a chassis switch,
you need stackable switches.”
“No, I need a chassis. Please design the network around that param­
eter.”
“No, this type of network only needs stackable switches. I can design
this whole thing in just a minute,” he insisted.
Continued
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“I’ve spent a year talking to my users to understand how they use the
network, I’ve built the servers, and I know where and what type of cabling
I have available. I used to work for a company that makes switches. I
really, really want chassis switches in this design.”
He and I discussed this for a few minutes, until he decided to stop
arguing with me and draw me a network design—with stackable
switches. I thanked him, and dropped his card and his design in the
trashcan on my way out of the booth.
Over the next two years my company purchased almost a half million
dollars from a startup that we first saw that day at the trade show; the
ones that drew me a network with chassis switches.
Hewlett-Packard figures prominently in this category also.Their performance
and warranties closely parallel 3Com, and the folks at technical support do their
best to help you even with products well beyond their salad days. HP offers both
managed and unmanaged, stackable and chassis solutions. HP also offers a 10G
switch (made by Foundry). If you run a shop heavy with HP servers and
printers, looking at HP switches makes a lot of sense.
IBM has stopped selling all switches except Token Ring—which it
invented—since it formed a strategic alliance with Cisco. If you have legacy
Token Ring that you need to integrate into a modern LAN, try Alcatel.Their
acquisition of Xylan allows them to build switches with Token Ring, Ethernet,
ATM, and WAN ports all in the same chassis.
This certainly does not complete the list of established networking compa­
nies. If you want to be thorough, you should also examine offerings from Nortel
(Bay) and Enterasys (Cabletron).
Moving from the familiar to the startups, let’s begin with Extreme Networks.
Founded in the mid 1990s, Extreme barely qualifies as a startup anymore.Their
products start at the core layer and then get faster.The company isn’t venerable
by normal business standards, but those standards don’t really apply to the IT
sector. Unlike older networking companies, Extreme doesn’t have a product at
each layer.Their lowest-end switch, if you can call it “low,” comes with a ton of
high-end features pounded into a 16-Gbps backplane.Their high-end switch can
hold up to 1,440 10/100 ports on a 768 Gbps backplane, and the firmware runs
a feature set that pushes the envelope well past Layer 3 switching to include load
balancing and transparent Web cache redirection. If you normally buy your
switches from the same store where you buy beef jerky, prepare yourself for
sticker shock; however, when you start comparing the prices to other high-end
switches, you’ll realize that you have a real contender here.
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Next comes Foundry, which like Extreme, should really come out of the
startup category. Foundry produces high-end switches and load balancers.Your
CFO might not know the name “Foundry,” which had its initial public offering
(IPO) in 1999, but anyone familiar with the equipment at major co-location
facilities will recognize it. Unlike Extreme, Foundry does have a product line for
the access layer, if you need high performance at the network edge.
A more traditional startup, Force10 Networks, founded in 1999, did very well
in a series of tests reported in the February 3, 2003 issue of Network World maga­
zine (www.nwfusion.com/reviews/2003/020310gbe.html). Force10 only has 10
GE products, so you won’t see it at the network edge anytime soon, but you will
see it at the core of any company that needs the highest throughput possible and
doesn’t mind betting on a newcomer.
In the final category, we want to mention SOHO vendors, but not by name.
You know these companies because you install their products every time one of
your friends wants you to split his DSL connection. If your company’s business
network has the same importance as the network your friend’s son uses to down­
load cheat codes for his latest video game, feel free to install these switches. If
you do install these, don’t forget to get some double-stick tape for the bottom of
the switch so the weight of the CAT 5 cables doesn’t pull it off the shelf. And
while you’re at your favorite hardware vendor getting the switches, pick us up a
pack of beef jerky.
Checklist
Only patch ports as necessary.
Update the switch firmware whenever possible to remove possible bugs.
Password-protect the switch whenever possible.
Use secure protocols, such as HTTPS and SSH, whenever possible, or
better yet, perform all of your configuration from the console.
Limit remote management of the switch to only the stations that you
need, if possible. If the switch allows for this, turn off remote manage­
ment if you’re not using it.
Disable unnecessary monitoring/reporting protocols on the switch.
Learn how to properly configure the ones that you do use to avoid
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security holes. In most cases, make sure you disable SNMP read-write
abilities.
Consider using VLANs to give special stations extra security when
possible.
Create at least one extra VLAN, if possible, for most of your worksta­
tions, so that the primary VLAN remains as an administration-only
VLAN for extra security. Many vendors use VLAN1 as a default admin­
istrative VLAN1 with special access privileges, so you’ll want to move
your end users to another VLAN for this reason alone.
Use MLS to configure static or dynamic VLANs to provide extra secu­
rity for single-function servers, such as mail and Web servers.
Keep a backup of managed switch configurations in case of emergency.
Diagram and document your network to aid in troubleshooting. Include
warranty support phone numbers, contract numbers, serial numbers, and
other information that will help you quickly resolve a problem if you
need to call technical support.
Baseline your network performance. Lower than usual performance can
indicate tampering or an intrusion.This also gives you an opportunity to
learn to use your diagnostic tools in a nonemergency situation.
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Summary
Switching grew out of the need for increased network bandwidth. Various net­
work topologies exist today, but Ethernet, as defined by the various IEEE 802.3
standards, accounts for the vast majority of current LANs.The original Ethernet
installations required snaking cables between computers in a bus topology.The
introduction of Ethernet hubs allows for installations that look like a star
topology, but actually still act as a linear bus.This allowed network engineers to
increase the size of the networks.
Ethernet works on CSMA/CD, which means that too many stations con­
nected with hubs will adversely affect the performance of the entire network
since they all belong to the same collision domain.The invention of the switch
allows network engineers to split the network into multiple segments, with each
segment acting as an individual collision domain.
The first switches were little more than ASICs acting as transparent bridges.
Traditional switches work entirely on Layer 2 of the OSI Reference Model,
using MAC addresses to forward frames between network devices. Even though
switches eliminate collisions, they do not eliminate broadcasts. Broadcasts,
whether at Layer 2 or Layer 3, generally consist of service requests flooded over
an entire network. All machines participating in this exchange of flooded frames
and packets belong to a single broadcast domain. A network experiences a broad­
cast storm when the sheer volume of broadcasts prevents other information from
passing between the devices.
Routers, working at Layer 3 of the OSI model, kill broadcasts by splitting a
LAN into multiple networks or subnets. Each subnet works as its own broadcast
domain.The expense and latency that routers add to the design of the network
curtail their use. Layer 3 switching moves the routing function into a less expen­
sive, faster device so that networks can more easily reap the advantages of
routing.
Some switches can even use more extensive measures for moving data by
examining Layer 4 of the OSI model. At this layer, switches can examine the
common protocols, such as HTTP and SMTP, to make their switching decisions.
Switches that work at this layer need high-level hardware to perform these func­
tions without increasing the latency of the network.
Switches vary greatly in features and price. A small, stackable switch can take
as little as a couple of inches in a rack, while a large chassis switch could monop­
olize the entire rack. All switches fall into two categories: unmanaged and man­
aged. Unmanaged switches come in fixed configurations and allow for little more
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except Layer 2 switching. Managed switches could add nothing more than simple
monitoring functions, or include high-end features, such as VLANs, Layer 3 or
Layer 4 functionality, remote monitoring, port aggregation, redundant power, or
other propriety functions. Depending on the capabilities of the switch, some
switches operate as cut-through, which means that they forward frames immedi­
ately after reading the frame’s destination. Store-and-forward switches wait for
the entire frame and then forward it. Usually, very fast switches opt for the storeand-forward approach since they can process the frames quickly and reduce the
number of runts on the network.
Whether managed or unmanaged, switches can vary greatly in performance.
High-performance switches have fast backplanes so that even when all of the
ports send the maximum amount of data at once, the switch does not have to
block any data. High-performance switches also have large CAMs so that they
can maintain very large switching tables.
When choosing a switch, consider where in the network the switch will go.
Campus network models often contain three layers: the access or edge layer, the
distribution layer, and the core or backbone layer. Simple, inexpensive switches
usually go at the edge to connect workstations. Extremely fast, powerful switches
sit at the core to control traffic for the enterprise. In between, network engineers
usually use high-performance, feature-rich switches to provide policy-based
switching and aggregate the access layer traffic for transmission to the core.
Switches come from multiple vendors.The established vendors, such as Cisco
and 3Com, provide a full line of switches for all layers of your network and have
the reliability that comes from longevity in the field. Often, startups can provide
a better price per performance ratio, have bleeding-edge features that established
companies do not have, or fill a niche ignored by the sector giants. Of course,
these companies have little or no track record, which means that you assume
some risk when purchasing from these companies. Regardless of the vendor you
choose, sticking with a single vendor as much as possible—especially at the
core—makes sense so that you can avoid incompatibility problems and leverage
proprietary features.
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Solutions Fast Track
Understanding the Open
Systems (OSI) Reference Model
Hubs work at Layer 1, switches work at Layer 2, routers work at Layer
3, and TCP works at Layer 4 of the OSI Reference Model.
Starting with Layer 7, the OSI model layers are: application,
presentation, session, transport, network, data link, and physical.
The generic term for data encapsulated at each level is a Protocol Data
Unit (PDU).The PDU at Layer 2 (such as from a switch) is a frame.The
PDU at Layer 3 (such as from a router) is a datagram.The PDU at Layer
4 (such as from HTTP traffic) is a segment.
The OSI model allows engineers to compartmentalize their designs so
their work can easily integrate with the work of other engineers.
The Origin of Switching
Most switches are flavors of Ethernet based on IEEE 802.3.
Switches bridge data using ASICs instead of slower processors.
Transparent bridging and switching are generally used interchangeably.
Switches segment network traffic into separate collision domains.
Switching Standards and Features
Switches vary from each other by their speed, management, size, perfor­
mance, memory, multilayer switching abilities, port aggregation, VLAN
abilities, and other special features.
All switches must meet certain interoperability standards before they can
claim IEEE 802.3 compatibility.
In most cases, you can connect switches with CAT 5e cable up to 100
meters. Beyond that distance, you should use fiber.
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Manufacturers can add proprietary features to their switches and still
achieve IEEE 802.3 compatibility.
Moving Switching beyond Layer 2
Multilayer switching looks at Layer 3 and sometimes all the way to
Layer 7 to make switching decisions to better segment the network.
Multilayer switches can route traffic faster than external routers can.
Multilayer switches increase the efficiency of VLANs by adding routing
within the switch.
Multilayer switches can add firewall features inside your network
without sacrificing performance.
Using Switching to Improve Security
Switches, like servers, need a proper configuration to maintain security.
Turn off all unnecessary features.
Password-protect managed switches.
Every feature a switch adds could also add a security hole, so read the
documentation carefully.
Beware of protocols that transmit too much information, such as CDP
and SNMP.
Check any log files often to look for security violations.
Choosing the Right Switch
Choosing the right switch involves understanding your networking
needs and examining the product lines from the various vendors.
The Campus Network model divides the network into three layers:
access, distribution, and core.
Make sure that the switch you buy is right for the network layer where
you plan to use it.
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Make sure that your plan can accommodate necessary growth.
Use presales engineers from different vendors to help you design your
network, and then examine their designs carefully to see if the plans
meet your requirements.
Compare the offerings of multiple vendors before making a final deci­
sion.
Links to Sites
■
www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/ Download site
for PuTTY, a freeware SSH client.
■
http://standards.ieee.org/regauth/oui/index.shtml Index of
IEEE OUIs.
■
www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html CERT Advisory for
SNMP.
■
www.nwfusion.com/reviews/2003/020310gbe.html Network World
review of 10GE switches.
■
www.sniffer.com Information on protocol analyzer from Network
Associates, Inc.
■
www.tamos.com/products/commview Information on
CommView protocol analyzer from TamoSoft.
■
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2273.txt?number=2273 IETF specification for
SNMPv3 Applications.
■
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3414.txt?number=3414 IETF specification for
SNMPv3 Security.
■
www.wildpackets.com Information on protocol analyzer from
WildPackets.
■
http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/portfolio.html IEEE down­
load site for 802 standards and links to other IEEE download groups.
IEEE makes any of their standards that are at least six months old free
for download. New standards require a subscription.
■
www.iso.ch/iso/en/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
s020269_ISO_IEC_7498-1_1994(E).zip OSI Reference Model part
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
1 standard.The links on the main page are broken, but this link modi­
fied from their general page works.
■
www.iso.ch/iso/en/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
s025022_ISO_IEC_7498-3_1997(E).zip OSI Reference Model part
3 standard.The links on the main page are broken, but this link modi­
fied from their general page works.There does not appear to be a part 2
link on their page.
■
www.iso.ch/iso/en/ittf/PubliclyAvailableStandards/
s014258_ISO_IEC_7498-4_1989(E).zip OSI Reference Model part
4 standard.The links on the main page are broken, but this link modi­
fied from their general page works.
■
http://download.microsoft.com/download/VisioStandard2002/
vviewer/2002/W98NT42KMeXP/EN-US/vviewer.exe Link for
free Microsoft Visio reader so you can share your network diagram with
other users, even if they don’t have Visio.
Most established manufacturers, such as Cisco and 3Com, have intuitive
homepages that we will not list here.The following are for harder-to-find
companies.
■
www.extremenetworks.com Extreme Network’s homepage.This
startup specializes in high-performance, feature-rich switches.
■
www.foundrynetworks.com Foundry Network’s homepage.This
startup specializes in high-performance switches and load balancers. It
has enough of a reputation in the industry that many no longer consider
this a startup.
■
www.ind.alcatel.com/technologies/index.cfm?cnt=index
Alcatel’s infrastructure homepage.
■
www.force10networks.com Force10 Network’s homepage.This
startup only makes 10 GE products.
Mailing Lists
■
www.extremenetworks.com/apps/Subscribe/GetEmail.asp Sign
up for the Extreme Velocity Newsletter.This newsletter provides informa­
tion on the latest products from Extreme Networks and informative
How-To articles.
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■
www.eweek.com/newsletter_manage eWEEK Product Update
Newsletter.This newsletter gives you the latest information on products
tested by eWEEK for Ziff-Davis.
■
http://infosecuritymag.bellevue.com Security Wire Digest. A
newsletter specifically for security alerts.
■
www.submag.com/sub/nc?wp=wpdly2 Network Computing
Newsletters.This link allows you to sign up for multiple industry newslet­
ters geared toward networking.
■
www.cisco.com/tac/newsletter/signup Cisco Technical Assistance
Center Newsletter.This mailing list provides the latest information from
Cisco’s technical support team. Cisco uses this mailing list to inform
subscribers about security problems relating to Cisco equipment.
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: What are common examples from the first four layers of the OSI model?
A: Hubs and cabling from Layer 1; switches from Layer 2; routers from Layer 3;
TCP protocols, such as HTTP, and SMTP at Layer 4.
Q: What is the difference between a collision domain and a broadcast domain?
A: Collision domains include all of the network devices on a single segment,
while a broadcast domain consists of all of the devices on a single network or
subnet. Usually, all devices connected to a single switch port comprise a colli­
sion domain, while routers demark the boundaries of a broadcast domain.
Q: What is the maximum number of network devices that I should have in a
single broadcast domain?
A: A single TCP/IP subnet allows a maximum of 16,777,214 (224–2) network
devices; your network should never approach this maximum. A typical net-
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Network Switching • Chapter 7
work will generally support up to 254 devices on high-quality switches.
Networks running multiple protocols (TCP/IP, IPX, AppleTalk, DLC,
NetBEUI, and so forth), low-end switches, or bandwidth-intensive applica­
tions should consider reducing this number. Some vendors claim that their
equipment can handle up to 2000 machines, but most network engineers
would recommend implementing VLANs and/or Layer 3 solutions well
before you hit this number.
Q: Since switches work at Layer 2, below the network protocol layer, does the
number of protocols that I run on my network really affect switch perfor­
mance?
A: Yes. All traffic consumes bandwidth.You should eliminate unneeded traffic
from the network to reduce the total volume moving over the switches.
Workstations configured with IPX/SPX will still send out requests for data
via this protocol, even if the network lacks the servers to respond. Extending
the example, if all of your servers only run TCP/IP, uninstall or unbind all
other protocols from all of your workstations. Check all of your network
attached printers; many of these automatically run TCP/IP, IPX/SPX, DLC,
and AppleTalk, creating unnecessary broadcasts. Most Apple Macintosh com­
puters run on TCP/IP natively, so you can usually disable AppleTalk on the
Macs without adversely affecting them. Limiting your number of protocols
also improves security since you don’t have to examine extra traffic for secu­
rity problems.
Q: Can a network analyzer help diagnose problems on a fully switched network?
A: Although a switched network prevents a network analyzer (sniffer) from
seeing every frame, the analyzer can still quickly discover broadcast storms, a
common network problem. Port mirroring allows sniffers to dig deeper into
specific problems without affecting network access. Network engineers can
examine port traffic on switched ports without port mirroring by tem­
porarily connecting a hub to the port in question and then connecting the
sniffer and the other network device into the hub. If you don’t have a pro­
tocol analyzer, you should get one. Check out Chapter 2 for a detailed
description of the most popular protocol analyzers on the market.
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Q: Should I get all of my switches from the same vendor?
A: Unmanaged, Layer 2 switches almost always interoperate well. If your net­
work has more complexity than that, you should stick to a single vendor,
especially at the core. Working with a single vendor will allow you to
leverage all of the switches’ proprietary features and reduce the amount of
“finger pointing” when a problem arises.
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Chapter 8
Defending Routers
and Switches
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Attacking and Defending Your Network
Devices
■
Cisco IPv4 Denial of Service
■
Cisco HTTP Get Buffer Overflow
■
Cisco Discovery Protocol Denial of Service
■
Confusing the Enemy
■
Breaking Out of Jail
■
Attacking Simple Network Management
Protocol
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 5 Routing Devices and Protocols
■
Chapter 6 Secure Network Management
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
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Introduction
Even with today’s heavy concentration on protecting the internal segments, net­
working devices rarely get their share of attention. Administrators have been
focusing on end-point security, or securing the desktop—efforts geared to stop
the next SQL Slammer or Blaster worm. Virus scanners, patch management, and
vulnerability assessment systems continue to be purchased by IT and security
teams to ensure that their internal networks will not be devastated by the next
virus or worm outbreak.The IT mindset continues to be that Microsoft products
pose the biggest security risk to their enterprise.
While the validity of that last statement will be argued for many years to
come, the fact is that while administrators are focusing on securing those vulner­
able systems, the devices they use to segment and protect their networks could
pose just as serious a risk.Tell us if these statements sound familiar:
■
Don’t fix what isn’t broken.
■
Our routers and switches are doing their job, no reason to make any
changes there.
■
The core router uses a non-Microsoft operating system, so it is secure by
default.
■
I’ve never had to reboot my router, so it must be doing its job securely,
right?
■
There’s a new slew of Microsoft patches every month! Thankfully, our
routers aren’t like that at all!
While it might be true that your network infrastructure has been working
flawlessly for many months, it does not necessarily mean that you can neglect
those devices. Network devices need just as much attention, if not more, than
any Microsoft operating system or application. By the end of this chapter, you
should be able to answer your co-workers quips as follows:
■
Don’t fix what isn’t broken.
■
■
If it were broken, how would you really know? How often do you
log in to the routers? How often do you examine the log files?
Our routers and switches are doing their job, no reason to make any
changes there.
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
■
■
The core router uses a non-Microsoft operating system, so it is secure by
default.
■
■
While a vendor can claim that their operating system might be more
secure, it’s an entirely different story to be secure by default.The
only thing that routers do by default is to route packets. Whether
that is a packet of confidential data routed out to the Internet or not
is up to the configuration.
I’ve never had to reboot my router, so it must be doing its job securely,
right?
■
■
How are you measuring the performance of your routers and
switches? Do you know how many dropped packets or network
input queue overruns you’ve had lately?
Out of sight, out of mind, right? In fact, with many of the vulnera­
bilities listed throughout this chapter, denial-of-service (DoS) of the
router isn’t the goal. Silently reading your configuration (or worse,
your traffic) is the goal—and all without a reboot!
There’s a new slew of Microsoft patches every month! Thankfully, our
routers aren’t like that at all!
■
You’re right, most router vendors aren’t like that at all. By that we
mean that you aren’t going to get the latest router vulnerability noti­
fication in e-mail, in the system tray, on your favorite newsgroup,
and on CNN.com.You’ll have to visit the vendor’s site and figure it
out yourself. Does that mean there aren’t as many patches? No, it
means you aren’t being notified of them.
This chapter highlights some of the most common and damaging attacks that
focus on the core of your network.These attacks take advantage of protocols and
devices running at Layer 2 (switches) and Layer 3 (routers) within your enter­
prise. After completing this chapter, we wouldn’t be surprised to see the look on
your face when you realize that the latest Cisco IOS version is a double-digit
number. Before you move on to other chapters, it might be a good idea to take a
few minutes and check each of your network devices’ current operating system
revision.
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Attacking and
Defending Your Network Devices
A quick search on SecuirtyFocus.com, or your favorite security site, will surely
detail thousands of potential network device vulnerabilities. While we set out to
offer a comprehensive guide to network infrastructure security, drowning you in
hundreds of attack techniques and exploits would neither benefit you, or us.
Instead, we have set the following criteria to decide which attacks to demonstrate:
■
Ease of exploit (How easy is it to accomplish?)
■
Popularity (How common is this?)
■
Impact (How dangerous is this exploit?)
While most of the attacks shown here focus primarily on Cisco devices, they
are not the only vendor susceptible to these techniques. We choose to focus on
Cisco primarily because of their market dominance and prevalence in the
industry. Furthermore, because some of the attacks described here revolve around
the protocol, and not necessarily the vendor’s implementation of the protocol,
the attack might work on other vendors’ devices.
Notes from the Underground…
Why Only Cisco?
This is just one of many examples where market dominance and perva­
siveness in the industry can have some negative repercussions. Cisco
Systems has been blessed with the ability to consistently deliver quality
products to the networking world and therefore are revered in the
industry as being the best at what they do—developing cutting-edge net­
working devices. However, their industry prominence also places a very
large “Bulls-Eye” on their devices, motivating researchers and hackers
around the world to find and compromise vulnerabilities on their appli­
ances and their underlying operating system, the Cisco IOS.
Prominent security research groups such as Phenoelit have been
focusing much of their time and effort on Cisco devices, resulting in sig­
nificant vulnerability findings and exploits. Many of these vulnerabilities
Continued
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have major ramifications on the security of your network, such as remote
packet sniffing and DoS characteristics (detailed in depth later in this
chapter). Why do these researchers spend most of their time inspecting
the Cisco line of devices? Quite simply, it’s much cooler to write exploits
that affect 85 percent of the Internet, rather than only 5 percent. For
these reasons, we spend the majority of this chapter covering these vul­
nerabilities and various exploit tools.
It is important to note, though, that this does not mean that nonCisco related networking devices are vulnerability free. In fact, many of
the lesser-used networking devices, such as 3Com, have had vulnerabili­
ties discovered. Most often these vulnerabilities are of a very low-risk
nature (low-risk exposure is similar to information disclosure types of
attacks), and do not present the clear and present danger as those
depicted later in the chapter. Moreover, many of these researchers find
flaws in an underlying protocol the network device uses, such as SNMP,
expanding the impact to any networking vendor that supports SNMP
communication. While many of these vulnerabilities affect numerous ven­
dors, many of the exploit tools are written solely to work on Cisco devices,
simply because it will have the largest affect and wreak the most havoc.
If you would like to perform further research as to whether your net­
working devices have any known vulnerabilities or flaws, you can use
www.securityfocus.com/bid.
Simply select your vendor from the drop-down box provided and
look through the results set to find your particular device or hardware
revision. Other security-related Web sites can be found at the end of this
chapter and can be useful for vulnerability research.
Cisco IPv4 Denial of Service
The Cisco Ipv4 DoS vulnerability was originally released on July 16, 2003.This
Cisco vulnerability was the most publicized network infrastructure vulnerability
in recent times. While the worldwide impact of this attack was much less than
security experts expected, the potential damage to networks was nearly catas­
trophic given the proliferation of Cisco routers and switches on internal and
Internet networks.
This DoS attack revolves around Cisco’s implementation of an input queue.
In other words, the malicious traffic inappropriately marks the input queue on
the Cisco device as full. Once the input queue is marked as full, it causes the
device to stop processing traffic on the affected interfaces.To make matters
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worse, once the device is affected by this DoS attack it does not self correct by
reloading or clearing the input queue. Administrators need to manually reload
the Cisco device in order to restore operation. Furthermore, without any correc­
tive action or performing any workarounds, once the device is reloaded it is con­
tinually susceptible to the attack, potentially causing further DoS conditions. At
the time of the release, nearly all Cisco routers and switches that were configured
to handle IPv4 packets were vulnerable to this attack.
According to Cisco, a specific sequence of IPv4 packets could initiate the
DoS condition on all of the Cisco devices.The protocols necessary to trigger the
attack were IP 53, better known for SWIPE and most commonly used for IP
encryption; IP 55, known as IP Mobility, and was used to support mobile nodes
connected to the Internet; IP 77, known as SUN-ND, was used for Sun
Network disks prior to NFS; and IP 103, or Protocol Independent Multicast, was
used for routing. Sending each of those IP packets to the victim device with a
Time to Live (TTL) of 1 or 0 would cause the DoS condition.
Exploiting the IPv4 DoS
There are multiple exploits available for this DoS vulnerability now, and most are
written for the Linux platform.You can find exploits at:
www.hackingspirits.com/eth-hac/exploits/exploits.html. While most of these
exploits need to be compiled and then run, it is possible to inflict this condition
on a given Cisco device with just the use of Hping, available at www.hping.org.
Hping is a common command-line packet assembler for Linux, FreeBSD,
NetBSD, OpenBSD, Solaris, and MacOs X.The following is an excerpt of how
you would use Hping to flood the input queue on a Cisco device:
#hping (routerip) –-rawip –-ttl X –-ipproto 53 –-count 76 ––data 26
In the preceding command, we used the Hping utility to send an IP 53
packet to the router IP address. We used the rawip setting to send the raw IP
header and data.The TTL was set to X, because it would change for each host
we were targeting.To define the TTL, complete the following steps:
1. Ping or traceroute the host to determine the TTL.
2. Subtract the number provided from the traceroute or ping from 255.
If you recall, the TTL must be 0 or 1 by the time it reaches the target IP.The
ipproto setting is used to define which of the IP protocols to use.The count setting
determines how many packets to send or receive.The data switch dictates how
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
big the payload should be. In this scenario, it will be 20 bytes for the header, plus
26 bytes for the payload.The exploit code currently circulating on the Internet
uses variations of this very same Hping command to carry out its attacks.
Defending Your Router against the IPv4 DoS
As with many vulnerabilities, the best way to defend against this attack is to
update the device’s software to the latest revision. At the time of the release,
Cisco made available updates to all their versions of IOS, the main Cisco router
OS, and CatOS, the main Cisco Catalyst OS.The latest version of the operating
systems all have fixes for this particular DoS vulnerability.
In many scenarios, it is not always practical to think that you can quickly and
correctly update all of your networking devices with the latest software revision.
Change control procedures are sometimes implemented to help ensure that
patches or updates to a system do not cause outages or other problematic
behavior on a production network. While these procedures do provide account­
ability and protect the core network from failures, they can also add a substantial
amount of time for testing and approval prior to rolling out your update pack­
ages. For this particular vulnerability, Cisco supplied device-level workarounds in
the form of access lists to provide the necessary protection to mitigate this attack.
These workarounds can often be implemented much quicker and easier than a
full IOS update, allowing administrators to react more efficiently to the vulnerability.The following are some examples:
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 125 deny 53 any any
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 125 deny 55 any any
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 125 deny 77 any any
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 125 deny 103 any any
BrianRouter(config)# interface Ethernet 0/1
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip access-group 125 in
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip access-group 125 out
BrianRouter(config-if)# exit
In the preceding example, you can see that we disallow IP traffic 53, 55, 77,
and 103 to all devices. We then apply the access list to interface Ethernet 0/1 for
bidirectional traffic (denoted by the in and out).Theoretically, we should apply
this access list to all interfaces that are currently active on the device. It is also
important to note that while this is a fairly straightforward access list, if you are
currently using any of the protocols listed for production reasons, then this will
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negatively affect your enterprise network. While it would be uncommon to use
these protocols in today’s networks, prior to implementing these rules you should
use a packet capture application and examine to see if they are currently being
used on your network.This will help ensure that you will not cause any degrada­
tion of service to your internal users.
Cisco HTTP Get Buffer
Overflow and UDP Memory Disclosure
As if July weren’t a tough enough month for Cisco, the talented hacker called
“FX” of the Phenoelit group discovered another bug in the IOS code. FX dis­
covered that the HTTP server, usually used for configuration and control, is sus­
ceptible to a buffer overflow that can result in remote command execution.
Furthermore, they discovered that using an existing UDP memory leak vulnera­
bility in the Cisco IOS in conjunction with the HTTP overflow resulted in an
extremely high success rate of exploitation. We will first discuss these two vul­
nerabilities separately, but the true power comes from taking these two mediumrisk exploits and combining them into one, extremely high-risk vulnerability.
In August 2003, Cisco released the UDP Memory Disclosure vulnerability.
On nearly all versions of IOS, routers running the “UDP small-servers” service
were vulnerable to this information disclosure attack.Through expert analysis,
Phenoelit discovered that a specially crafted UDP echo packet destined to the
victim router could result in a response from the affected router that contained
actual packet data. Using the leak in the memory IO blocks, it was possible then
to remotely sniff actual traffic on a remote Cisco router. As a proof of concept,
Phenoelit created the application IOSniff, available at www.phenoelit.de/
fr/tools.html.
Almost simultaneously, Phenoelit discovered a buffer overflow in the HTTP
server on Cisco routers. Nearly all versions of the IOS were vulnerable to this.
The overflow occurred when 2GB of data was passed in a URL string to a
victim router.The overflow allowed for the execution of arbitrary code, meaning
that this exploit code returned a remote shell from the victim router. While 2GB
of data is a significant amount to send over the Internet, it is quite feasible when
you think about the high-speed networks on the internal corporate segment.
Therefore, this exploit has particularly far-reaching consequences when you
think about your internal Cisco routers.
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
As previously mentioned, while these two vulnerabilities seem to have very
little in common, using them in concert provides a near perfect exploit of
remote Cisco routers.The HTTP exploit code from Phenoelit uses parts of the
IOSniff code that relies on the UDP small-servers, causing the need for both
vulnerabilities to exist on the same router.The HTTP exploit first sends its 2GB
of data within the URL to begin the process.The UDP echo memory leak pro­
cess is then initiated, sending the UDP echo packets to the victim router repeat­
edly to pull known IO memory addresses.The IO memory addresses collected
from the UDP vulnerability provide the logic that the Phenoelit exploit will
then use to determine which memory address to send the shell code to.
Notes from the Underground…
Beware the Low-Risk Vulnerabilities
This is just one of many examples where two (or more) low-risk vulnera­
bilities can be strung together by a savvy attacker to create one very large
and very high-risk vulnerability. The same can be said about a number of
low-risk information disclosure vulnerabilities marked “low” or “informa­
tional” in most Vulnerability Assessment software packages (see Chapter
2 for more information). When united, these little pieces of information
can focus the attacker with laser-like precision on the task at hand,
without wasting any time on nonexploitable attack vectors.
For most exploits, addressing the right block of memory is the trickiest pro­
cess. Many exploits require an intimate knowledge of the operating system or
application where the overflow exists to successfully exploit it. By using the
UDP memory disclosure bug, the guessing is removed from the equation as we
can reliable determine how best to send our exploit code.
Once the shell code is sent to the remote router, and the HTTP server has
been successfully overflowed, the result will be a remote shell to the affected
router.The shell code returns a command-line interface to the router, disables all
of the VTY, or virtual interfaces, and removes the Enable password verification,
which is used to obtain the highest level of privilege on the router.Thus, you are
left with complete backdoor access to all of the router’s configurations and debug
capabilities. In short, you now own this remote router.
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Exploiting 2-for-1
It’s no difficult task to figure out the most damaging or well-known exploit of
this vulnerability.Yes, you guessed it—our friends at Phenoelit have a handy tool
just waiting to exploit both the HTTP and the UDP vulnerabilities.They’re the
2-for-1 special at the router vulnerability supermarket.
Phenoelit has cornered the market on Cisco IOS research and development
and is revered in the industry for providing proof-of-concept code.The exploit
used to pull off this security coup is called “CISCO CASUM EST” and is avail­
able at www.phenoelit.de/fr/tools.html. For those of you who are curious, that
exploit tool is loosely translated (thanks to the Internet translation Web sites and
our ninth-grade Latin teacher) into “Cisco is destroyed” or “Cisco has a violent
death.”
The proof-of-concept code provided primarily works on Cisco 1600 and
2500 series routers running UDP small-servers and the HTTP server and version
11.x of Cisco IOS. It is important to note that most internal routers used in
enterprise networks will be these smaller series routers that are vulnerable. In
short, this exploit could cause major outages on most internal network segments.
Written for most UNIX platforms, once compiled the actual use of the exploit is
extremely easy.
BrianRouter # ./CiscoCasumEst –i <interfaceid> -d <targetrouterIP> While there are a few options available in the command, such as -v for ver­
bose and -T for Test-Mode only, you can see that actual usage is quite straightfor­
ward. Phenoelit did an outstanding job on this exploit, as it performs many
different tasks behind the scenes. Of particular note is that the IOS remains fully
functioning throughout the entire exploit and that the configuration is preserved.
In fact, without serious IDS monitoring or tight router controls, the only way to
know that the exploit took place would be the error messages that pop up on
the router console during the exploit.
Defending against the HTTP and
UDP Vulnerabilities (Cisco Renatus Est)
The title for this section either means “Cisco is born again” or I’ve insulted your parents
accidentally (if you are reading this chapter, Sister Ann Marie, I’m sorry I didn’t pay
more attention in class). Like most of the other Cisco vulnerabilities discussed in this
chapter, there are a number of ways to protect yourself from this vulnerability. For
starters, there are very few reasons why you would need the UDP small-servers service
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
running. In many Cisco hardening guides, this service is seen as unnecessary and it is
often recommended that it be disabled. Disabling this service not only removes the pos­
sibility of this exploit working, but also mitigates the UDP memory leakage vulnerability.To disable the service, simply type this command on a Cisco router:
BrianRouter(config)# no service udp-small-servers
The next step in mitigating this attack would be to disable the HTTP server
on the router.To disable the service, simply use this command:
BrianRouter(config)# no ip http server
If the HTTP service is an integral part of your IT processes, then access con­
trol lists (ACLs) should be used to prevent unauthorized access to the service.
BrianRouter(config)# ip http access-class 25
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 permit host 192.168.1.32
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 permit host 192.168.1.195
BrianRouter(config)# access-list 25 deny any BrianRouter(config)# interface Ethernet 0/1
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip http access-class 25 in
BrianRouter(config-if)# ip http access-class 25 out
BrianRouter(config-if)# exit
In this example, we are only allowing the HTTP traffic from the hosts
192.168.1.32 and .195.The rest of the HTTP traffic to the router is dropped,
thereby eliminating the chance of the vulnerability being exploited from other
remote systems. However, it is important to note that the two hosts referenced in
the preceding code still could take advantage of the vulnerability in the service
since HTTP traffic is permitted for their IP addresses.
Lastly, unless certain processes and controls prohibit it, you should update the
version of IOS on your routers. Updated versions have fixes already present that
will mitigate these attacks on your devices.
Cisco Discovery
Protocol Denial of Service
Cisco Discovery Protocol (CDP) is an administrative protocol that works at
Layer 2 of the IP stack and is used on Cisco routers to share information with
neighboring routers. Information disclosed in these transmissions include Cisco
IOS version, IP address, and other management information such as management
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IP address, duplexes, device capabilities (router or switch), and native VLANs.
While this information is dangerous enough in the hands of an attacker, there are
more serious consequences with this protocol.
The vulnerability, also first discovered by FX at Phenoelit, can cause any of
the three symptoms to your Cisco device:
■
A device reboot after 3–5 CDP frames are received.
■
Device will stop functioning after 1000+ frames are received.
■
Use all available device memory to hold CDP neighbor information.
In all of these circumstances, this attack will cause a DoS on your Cisco
device.
Exploiting the CDP Denial of Service
To make matters worse, a simple tool is in the wild from the crew at Phenoelit.
This tool, when used, will effectively cause a DoS condition on all vulnerable
Cisco devices on your network.The tool is called Phenoelit IRPAS and can be
downloaded from Phenoelit at: www.phenoelit.de/irpas.The tool currently only
works on Linux-based machines.The following is some sample usage, taken from
the Phenoelit Web site, which will cause the DoS condition on your Cisco
devices:
BrianRouter# ./cdp -i eth0 -m0 -n 100000 -l 1480 -r -v
This command will send the maximum-sized CDP frame with random data
link addresses to all hosts within your multicast domain. Nothing else is needed
to potentially cause a large outage on your network segments.
Preventing CDP Attacks
Mitigating your risk against this attack is quite simple: disable CDP on all of your
Cisco routers and switches, or update to the latest version of Cisco IOS.The vul­
nerability was first fixed in version 12.0 of the IOS. However, if you are still run­
ning a version of IOS prior to 12.0, then the command to disable this feature is:
BrianRouter(config)# no cdp run
This will disable CDP on your device and protect against this attack.
Remember, however, that CDP is used in some applications, such as CiscoWorks
2000, so there might be a use for the protocol in your environment. If this is the
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
case, weigh the risks versus the rewards of running this protocol and determine
what your ultimate goals are.
More information on this vulnerability can be found at the Phenoelit Web
site and the Cisco Web site:
■
www.phenoelit.de/stuff/CiscoCDP.txt
■
www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cdp_issue.shtml
Confusing the Enemy
The primary goal for an attacker once he or she has compromised a system or
network is to make the decision of where to go next. Attackers plot their moves
by footprinting the networks and computers around them.This data collection
can be as simple as a port scan on the local subnet or sniffing the local traffic on
the compromised system. Both techniques are useful, but watching the traffic as
it goes by will give the attacker a chance to see clear-text passwords and other
useful information. By confusing the enemy using a flood of information, it is
possible to bypass certain security or management features in high-end and lowend products alike.
MAC Flooding
In the past it was believed that being on a switched network would prevent users
from listening to other traffic. In today’s world this is no longer true; even
though your networks are switched, a malicious user can still sniff traffic through
Media Access Control (MAC) flooding and turn your expensive switches into
10-dollar hubs.
The following example gives a brief review of the importance of MAC
addresses and how this attack can cause large problems.
Assume Computer A wants to send some data to Computer B and both
nodes are physically located on the same switch. Computer A transmits the data
to Computer B via a switch to which both computers are connected. When data
is received at the switch, the OS on the switch looks at the MAC address of the
destination node to determine the port to which to send the traffic.The switch
then references the Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table, which houses
the MAC addresses of each node physically connected to a port on the switch.
The switch then determines that the MAC address for Computer B is located on
port 2 and forwards the traffic to the host.
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CAM tables have the capability to learn what MAC addresses are on a partic­
ular physical switch port. When a host becomes live on the network, the MAC
address is entered into the CAM table and stored so that traffic can be forwarded
to and from the computer. Understanding this, we can exploit the CAM by forcing
it to learn incorrect MAC entries. Furthermore, when a switch does not have an
entry for a host in its CAM table, the traffic is broadcasted to each port to help
find the host. When the destination computer responds, the MAC address is then
entered into the table and all subsequent traffic is only forwarded to the correct
port. In addition, since CAM tables are fixed size (size depends on the manufac­
turer and type of switch) we can flood the table with incorrect entries, thereby
allowing us to see all of the traffic. For example, suppose that as Computer A, an
attacker wants to see all traffic that is destined for Computer C. Using DSniff (a
tool that is explained in the next section) he can flood the CAM table with entries
that are incorrect. By his filling this table, the switch will not know the physical
location of Computer C and will broadcast all of the traffic to that host to each of
the physical ports.This will allow the attacker to see some of the traffic on the
subnet.
On a grander scale you can see how quickly someone would be able to see
what is going on with the network. Assume that a 48-port switch suddenly has
to broadcast all of the traffic to all of the ports. If you are sniffing the wire when
this happens, you will see a lot of traffic.
Flooding the CAM Tables
The original tool used to exploit this vulnerability was known as macof, written
by Ian Vitneck.Today, the more widely used tool, DSniff, written by Dug Song
accomplishes the MAC flooding attacks and a few other Layer 2 exploits in a
simple interface. DSniff can be downloaded from Dug Song’s site at
http://monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff. It is written for just a few platforms,
including Linux, OpenBSD, and Solaris; however, older versions of the tool that
were ported for Windows can be found at www.datanerds.net/~mike/
dsniff.html.
This tool is quite easy to use and very powerful. It has the capability to fill
even the largest CAM tables within a matter of seconds.There are many other
uses for the tool as well, including password sniffing, and launching man-in-themiddle attacks.The primary use of the tool has been for sniffing traffic and
pulling passwords on a switched environment; however, there are a few other
great tool bundles with it, such as mailsnarf, urlsnarf, and webspy. mailsnarf is
great at decoding mail messages
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Preventing the CAM Flood
Since MAC flooding convinces the switch that all of the MAC addresses for a
particular subnet are located on a single port, the easy defense for this uses port
security. Port security for this exploit means allowing the switch to only associate
or learn a particular number of MAC addresses for a specific port. In other
words, you could limit the switch to learn only one MAC address per port.This
would mean that only one computer could be connected to a specific port, dis­
abling the ability for DSniff to incorrectly fill the CAM table with erroneous
entries. Furthermore, depending on the vendor implementation, a port might be
able to be shut down if a large number of MAC addresses are requesting entry
into the CAM table for the port (much like how DSniff would work).
The downside to this security measure is that you would have to be cautious
of how many computers or devices would reside on a specific port. In our
example, we said that only one MAC address could be present on a port. If we
add another switch or hub to that port, and connect multiple computers, then
the port might shut down since you have more MAC addresses present on the
port than the permitted one address.To accommodate this, you would have to
change the security on the port to allow more than one MAC address. It is easy
to see the administrative overhead that would occur; however, this is a relatively
easy solution for such a severe problem.
ARP Spoofing
Another simple way for our unfriendly attacker to footprint the network is
through the use of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing.This technique
is somewhat similar to the MAC flooding where all traffic is transmitted so that
the attacker can listen; however, it has a few more devious effects.This type of
attack is also known as a man-in-the-middle attack.
When a computer wants to transmit on the network, it must know the destination’s MAC address. Assume Computer A wants to send data to Computer B.
Computer A knows the IP address for B (10.10.10.2), but doesn’t know the
MAC address.Therefore, Computer A broadcasts an ARP message asking “Hey,
10.10.10.2, what is your MAC address, I have some data for you.” Each computer
on the subnet will receive this message; however, only Computer B, with the
correct IP address, will answer—the rest will disregard the ARP packet. When
Computer B receives the ARP message it will respond with the correct MAC
address. When Computer A received the ARP response from Computer B it will
send the data, and the switch will forward it on to the correct port (refer to the
CAM table example in the previous section).
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An ARP attack exists when, in this example, an illegitimate computer, say
Computer X, responds, impersonating Computer B before the real Computer B
has the opportunity. Computer A then sends the data unknowingly to the wrong
computer. Once Computer X has the data, it can then hold on to it and do
nothing, or send it on to the original recipient, Computer B.This process can
also work in reverse where Computer B sends the data back to Computer X,
and then Computer X forwards the data back to Computer A.
The result of this is that Computer A completed the transmission, but had no
idea that the data was passed through another computer on the network. Figure
8.1 illustrates the attack in more detail.
Figure 8.1 Normal and Attack ARP Communication
Computer B
10.10.10.2
Whats the MAC
for 10.10.10.2?
Computer A
10.10.10.5
Computer X
10.10.10.3
Computer B
Responds with the
MAC, Computer X
Ignores
Computer B
10.10.10.2
Computer A
10.10.10.5
Computer X
10.10.10.3
Computer A and B
Transfer the
Traffic
Computer B
10.10.10.2
Computer A
10.10.10.5
Computer X
10.10.10.3
Computer X
Claims it is
Computer B and A
sends all Traffic to
X
X Forward Traffic
to B and back to A
Computer B
10.10.10.2
ARP Attack
Computer A
10.10.10.5
Computer X
10.10.10.3
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On a grander scale, you can see how this could be quite disruptive on your
network. Imagine an end user getting a hold of one of these tools and initiating
this attack against the CEO of your company.The end user would be able to see
much of the traffic the CEO transmitted during the course of the day.Traffic
that could be viewed would be HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SNMP, and many others.
Therefore, as you can see, this could be a huge problem on your network.
Furthermore, this is only exacerbated when you see how easy the following tools
are to use.
Tools and Their Use
DSniff has the functionality for this type of attack built in also. Additionally, a
newer tool known as Ettercap can provide the same results with an even simpler
interface (http://ettercap.sourceforge.net).
Written for many platforms, including Windows, Ettercap is an easy-to-use
tool that has almost all of the features of DSniff. Inherently, Ettercap can collect
passwords for Telnet, FTP, POP, HTTP, SMB, SSH, and many others. It also has
the capability to sniff HTTPS encrypted traffic.
The graphical interface Ettercap uses makes it all that much easier for net­
working novices to execute on your network. Figure 8.2 depicts a simple ARPbased sniff of two hosts on a switched network.
Figure 8.2 Ettercap ARP Sniff
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In this example we are using ARP-based sniffing on the host address
10.0.16.115 with destination traffic going anywhere on the network. While there
are far too many commands to include, we will detail how to begin this sniff.
Upon launching Ettercap, the application probes to find all of the devices and
MAC addresses on the local subnet and attempts name resolution on each. In
Figure 8.3 you can see all of the available IP addresses and possible destination
addresses.
Figure 8.3 Ettercap Startup Screen
By selecting a source IP address and typing the letter a, you begin to ARP
sniff that particular host. It is a simple as that. Of course, you can drill down into
the ASCII output or raw HEX output of each of the packets by pressing the
Enter key on the packet trace as evidenced in the first capture (see Figure 8.2).
As if this wasn’t simple enough, help menus are available on each of the screens
with descriptions of the commands and functionality.
Defending against ARP Spoofing Techniques
Preventing an ARP spoof is not as straightforward as preventing a MAC flooding
attack. A few defenses are applicable in this circumstance, but each m requires a
good deal of administrative overhead to implement. Furthermore, not all switch
vendors have any technology in place to defend against this behavior.Therefore,
our recommendation is to use a combination of the following solutions:
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
■
Tuning IDSs for large amounts of ARP IDS sensors can be tuned
to look for large amounts of ARP traffic on local subnets.This could be
a good way to keep an eye on the possibility of one of these attacks
being launched.To our knowledge, there isn’t currently a signature for
this type of attack, so the sensor will be ineffective in determining an
actual ARP spoofing attack. While this limited information can be
helpful in hunting down possibilities, many false positives will be real­
ized under this configuration.
■
Placing static ARP entries on critical devices Placing static ARP
entries on critical devices, such as router and servers, is also a possible
solution in the prevention of this attack. Since the entries will be stati­
cally placed on each device, the host will not have to query the network
to find the MAC address of the device to which it wants to transmit.
Without this ARP request, the attacker will never have the ability to
spoof the host.The downside to this is the obvious administrative over­
head.
■
Using private VLANs Private VLANs can be a possible solution to
this problem as well. Private VLANs create communities within a given
VLAN to limit the amount of ARP traffic that exists.There are many
downsides to this solution. First, private VLANs are not supported by
every switch vendor, which might make this solution difficult to deploy
in many organizations. Second, the use of communities limits the
amount of interhost communications. Many hosts will not be able to
communicate with devices outside their communities.
As mentioned, ARP spoofing attacks will be difficult to defend. It is best to
keep this in mind as you start to develop VLANs and subnets—all the more
reason to keep critical systems and users on their own segments.
Breaking Out of Jail
As you might have learned already in Chapter 7, VLAN technology is a great
way to segment your network without the hassle of running new physical
cabling. While this gives security-conscious network admins an advantage in
terms of segmenting, the foolish network admin will assume that segmentation
means security. In fact, VLANs are not a security measure, but rather a segmenta­
tion tool that happens to (accidentally) aid in security by removing the ability to
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access certain resources. However, remember: the walls that separate nodes in a
VLAN’ed switch are made of silicon, and they will always be easier to topple
than an air-gapped physically segmented network.
VLAN Jumping
This attack is a little more sophisticated than the others mentioned thus far.
Thankfully, our friends have not automated this through a simple interface yet, so
the use of this exploit in the wild has only occurred on a minimal basis.The goal
of this attack is for the user to see all the traffic from each of the different
VLANs and subnets.The malicious user will try to convince the upstream switch
that his workstation is also a switch with trunking enabled.This will work on
several different brands of switches, but can easily be mitigated.
There are a couple methods for a user to jump from one VLAN to another.
Starting with the most basic, the user will need to convince the switch that his
workstation is a switch through the use of the Dynamic Trunk Protocol (DTP).
Trunking and DTP are used to pass all VLAN traffic and information to other
connected switches.
Previously, we talked about using VLANs to separate users and department
subnets. We also mentioned that while users might be in the same department,
they might be physically located in another building. Consequently, the use of
VLANs would have to span many switches.Trunking and DTP are the method
in which this is done.
In this basic attack, a malicious user will need to craft a packet that makes the
upstream switch think that the device is another switch with trunking enabled.
When this happens, all traffic from various VLANs will be transferred through the
link to this host, giving the user access to all the traffic on that switch. While this
attack is basic in nature, it can easily provide access to all the data on the network.
The slightly more complicated attack is a variation on this theme. A mali­
cious user will insert/use two headers of 802.1q encapsulation within his packet
to fool the switch. When the packet is transmitted to the first switch, the switch
will peel off the 802.1q header and pass it on to the next upstream switch.The
second switch will receive what looks like an 802.1q trunk packet from the
downstream switch (because of the second 802.1q header) and pass it on to the
destination address. In this manner, the malicious user can send illegitimate traffic
through multiple VLANs to the target host.Two switches have to be in use for
this to work.
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
Notes from the Underground…
Dot One Queue
For more information about the VLAN trunking described here, you can
download the IEEE specification file at http://standards.ieee.org/
getieee802/download/802.1Q-2003.pdf. Pay close attention to section 8,
which explains the principles of operations that would make this type of
attack even feasible. If you’re still a bit cloudy on the whole trunking con­
cept, visit Annex D of the IEEE 802.1q standard, which gives a concise his­
tory of VLANs.
Hop through VLANs in a Single Leap
Currently, there are no known tools that can automate these attacks; however, it
is possible to modify the packet contents to achieve the hack. Given the amount
of work it would take to accomplish this, it does not seem feasible that a large
attack could be used on a network. However, understand that new tools come
out every day for automating attacks like these, and it probably won’t be too long
before someone finds a way to accomplish this.
Building a Stronger Wall around VLANs
The easiest way to mitigate the basic VLAN attack is to set all user and server
ports to DTP Off.This will disable the ability for a normal user to trick the
switch into becoming a trunk on that particular port. Second, you will want to
make sure that all of your legitimate trunking ports are in their own VLAN and
are not part of any of the departmental subnets you have set up.
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Damage & Defense…
Better VLANs
Think securing your VLANs against a VLAN jumping attack is difficult? It’s
just a matter of changing your switch ports from the defaults (which are
likely “auto-negotiate”) to “off.” Witness the degree of difficulty in the
Cisco Catalyst CatOS family:
CoreSwitch> (enable)
set trunk 1/1-1/24 off
Port(s) 1/1-1/24 trunk mode set to off.
Attacking Simple
Network Management Protocol
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is the most-used network man­
agement mechanism in place. Almost all vendors include SNMP Management
Information Bases, or MIBS, for their devices.These MIBSs collect the data that
will be polled by the SNMP agent. Given that SNMP is such a widely used tool,
it should come as no surprise that most versions of the protocol are completely
insecure. In versions 1 and 2, the only authentication that exists is the commu­
nity strings for the SNMP read and write permissions.These community strings,
although they have a catchy name, are still pass-phrases that are stored on most
network devices in clear text. Furthermore, these community strings, unless
encrypted with a different technology, are passed on the wire in clear text,
making it quite easy for someone sniffing your network to pull the pass-phrases.
Recently, SNMP worms have been released that look for devices with null read
and write strings, or with devices that have “public” as their read string, which is
generally a device’s default configuration.
Securing the protocol isn’t as tough as you can imagine. Some vendors have
begun to implement version 3 of the protocol. Inherently, this new version sup­
ports encryption and authentication, two huge advances from the previous
implementations. Because not all vendors have support for the new version, it
becomes difficult to use it as a standard within your environment. Borrowing
from a joke found in a previous chapter (can you find it?), some have said that
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
earlier versions of SNMP used to be an acronym for “Security’s Not My
Problem!”
Notes from the Underground…
Can You Be Too Managed?
Additionally, take a look at the devices that you currently monitor via
SNMP. Do all of them have to be monitored? Some devices rarely need to
be polled and can easily have SNMP disabled on them. Furthermore, even
if a device has to be monitored with SNMP read access, you need to ask
yourself, “do I need to be able to change the setting or modify the record
and therefore necessitate SNMP ‘write’ permissions?” If not, disable the
Read-Write level of access and use only SNMP Read-Only. You’d be sur­
prised at just how many oddball devices on your network (printers, newer
copiers, fax machines) have SNMP enabled by default with default pass­
words. Although it might be fascinating to be able to poll the paper tray
capacities of all those devices from the HQ office in Fort Lauderdale,
sometimes you have to know where to draw the line on SNMP.
Sniffing the Management… Protocol
The following is an example of how dangerous community strings can be in
clear text. In this example, we used Snort to sniff some SNMP traffic and pulled
the clear-text community string (Figure 8.4). We used the Snort application to
prove that no advanced decoding capabilities were required to pull the passphrase. In Figure 8.5 you’ll see that we used SolarWinds to download the Cisco
router running configuration. Obviously, this information is deadly in the hands
of an attacker, as it shows all of the configuration settings of the Cisco router.
What’s worse, in Figure 8.6, we use the built-in Cisco Password Decoder utility
in SolarWinds to crack the Telnet password for the router. Consequently, by
simply capturing and using the SNMP community string, we now have a legiti­
mate login to the router.
As mentioned previously, our first step in this multifaceted attack will be to
use a common freeware sniffer to watch passing traffic pull SNMP community
strings from the wire. SNMP version 1, the most commonly implemented
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version, is completely in clear text and without any form of encryption, thereby
allowing us to easily pull the password off the network.
Figure 8.4 Snort Capture of SNMP Community String
As you can see from Figure 8.4, the trace shows our computer sending
SNMP requests to the router, IP address 10.20.5.2, via port 161. On the righthand side you can see in clear text the community string used— “public.”The
next step will demonstrate the use of IP Network Browser in SolarWinds to
enumerate the router.
Using our recently discovered SNMP community string, we now will use the
application to connect to the router. SolarWinds is a sophisticated Windows
application that allows administrators to connect to their networking devices and
perform remote management. In the wrong hands, this application can provide a
treasure trove of information. Simply launching the application and providing the
IP address of the router and the community string will unlock the keys to the
kingdom.
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Figure 8.5 IP Network Browser Router Enumeration
Figure 8.5 is a full view of all the information the router provided via SNMP.
Immediately, we have access to information showing the router interfaces, IOS,
ARP tables, and routes. While on the surface this information seems fairly
benign, it can provide the necessary network topology and routing details to an
attacker. While access to this data can be dangerous enough, we are going to use
more of the advanced features in the SolarWinds product to further compromise
the device.
Once we have enumerated the device, we will then move on to our next
step, which will be to download the running configuration of the router.The
running configuration contains all of the instructions and information the router
needs to perform its job. It also contains all the necessary information we need to
“own” the router (yep, you guessed it, router passwords).
By clicking the Config button on the toolbar, we will be able to download
the running Cisco configuration.
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Figure 8.6 IP Network Browser Router Enumeration
Figure 8.6 shows the first page of our router’s configuration file. As you can
see, the file shows the encrypted enable password in the file, as well as the IOS
version (12.0). At the bottom of the screen you can see the first Ethernet inter­
face and some of the corresponding IP information. While the IP information is
exciting, it really doesn’t help us further compromise the device.To really take
this to the next level, we will need some passwords.
In Figure 8.7, we scroll down the configuration file toward the bottom.
There we find the XOR’ed password for the console and Telnet connections—
the gold mine we were looking for.
Figure 8.7 Router Configuration with Weak Encrypted Passwords
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In Figure 8.7, you can see the XOR’ed passwords and more information
regarding the console and Telnet (listed as VTY, or virtual) interfaces.
The next step is to click the Decode button on the SolarWinds tool bar.This
will launch the SolarWinds Cisco password decoder. It is important to note that
the decoder will only be able to decode the Telnet or console passwords.The
enable secret password (shown in Figure 8.6 as “$1$m9x2$MpZmkp//76Da4HE”)
uses a different, more advanced encryption algorithm, as opposed to the enable
password or console/Telnet password that uses a weak XOR encryption.
Figure 8.8 SolarWinds Cisco Password Decoder Used
Figure 8.8 depicts the running configuration once the magical “decode”
functionality is used. Voilà! the passwords appear to us in clear text. Now we have
two methods to gain access to these boxes:
■
We can Telnet to them and use the decoded telnet password, “easypass”
(shown in Figure 8.8 under the “Line VTY” section).
■
If we are an employee with physical access to the router, we can use a
console cable and use the Line Con 0 password (in this example they
both happen to be the same; in the real world, this should not be
the case).
This example demonstrates the ease in hacking a router and gathering infor­
mation when SNMP information is out on the wire in clear text. While many
external factors exist that would make this example slightly more difficult in a
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true, enterprise network, the theory is the same. Internal attackers will chain vul­
nerabilities or misconfigurations together to gain more information on your net­
work and your network devices.
Defending against Inherent SNMP Weaknesses
The easiest and most fitting solution to this clear-text password (excuse us,
“community string”) issue would be to employ SNMP v3 on all of your net­
working devices. In the cases where the use of SNMPv3 is not achievable, the
use of IP Security (IPSec) might be. Many hardware vendors, including Cisco,
support the use of IPSec as a secure transfer of SNMP information to a manage­
ment station.This is not the easiest solution to implement; however, it does pro­
vide a reliable transmission method. It is worth further note to add that IPSec
can add some overhead to the networking device you are monitoring, as all the
packets must be processed and decrypted.
The first step in setting up IPSec to run on a Cisco router, or any Cisco
device, is to create extended access lists that will permit the IP traffic through.
IPSec uses protocols IP 50 and 51 as well as UDP 500 for communication. Using
the example in the ACL section you can see how to create these ACLs.The next
step is to create our ISAKMP Policy. Policies define the use of authentication
(pre-shared secrets), encryption, and hash information.The following is an
example of setting up an ISAKMP Policy:
BrianRouter(config)# crypto isakmp policy 5
BrianRouter(config-isakmp)# authentication pre-share
BrianRouter(config-isakmp)# encryption 3des
BrianRouter(config-isakmp)# group 2
BrianRouter(config-isakmp)# exit
In this example, we have used pre-shared secrets as our authentication
method with triple-des encryption for communication.The next step is to set
the authentication pass-phrase.This password should use a combination of letters,
numbers, and symbols.
BrianRouter(config)# crypto isakmp key str0ngp4$$w0rd address 192.168.1.100
Here we have set the password to the preceding key and tied it to our man­
agement station at 192.168.1.100. Next, we create our transform mode and set
the values for protecting our traffic; in this case, triple-des with SHA hash. We
will also use the transport mode instead of tunnel.
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BrianRouter(config)# crypto ipsec transport-set 3des-sha-xport esp-3des esp-
sha-hmac
BrianRouter(cfg-crypto-trans)# mode transport
BrianRouter(cfg-crypto-trans)# exit
Since we have already have included our extended ACLs to allow the traffic,
we must now create a crypto map and install the newly created policy to an
interface (ideally a separate management interface).
BrianRouter(config)# crypto map snmp 5 ipsec-isakmp
BrianRouter(config-crypto-map)# set peer 192.168.1.100
BrianRouter(config-crypto-map)# set transport-set 3des-sha-xport
BrianRouter(config-crytpo-map)# exit
BrianRouter(config)# interface Ethernet 1/1
BrianRouter(config-if)# crypto map snmp
BrianRouter(config-if)# exit For further information on how to lock down your management networks,
or the best ways to securely manage you network infrastructure, refer to
Chapter 6.
Vulnerability Chaining
From the experienced attacker’s perspective, what is more valuable: one high-risk
vulnerability, or two medium- to low-risk vulnerabilities? Well, we suppose the
answer would vary, but for the most part attackers like to be armed with many
medium- to low-risk vulnerabilities when they start to pick through a network’s
defenses. Why would this be true? Simply stated, attackers like to chain their vul­
nerabilities together. As the level of sophistication of network engineers increases,
it might become harder and harder to find blatant, high-risk vulnerabilities open
and Internet accessible. However, it is completely conceivable to have a number
of low-risk vulnerabilities on a router that the engineer just hasn’t had a chance
to tend to yet.
Just as we witnessed in the Cisco HTTP and UDP vulnerabilities, and the
SNMP weaknesses (as alluded to in previous sidebars), having multiple exploits in
your arsenal can sometimes be significantly more dangerous than having a highrisk vulnerability. Attackers will often use information garnered from one system,
or a particular vulnerability, to attack another.
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For example, if we compromise a router on the perimeter and discover a
weak Telnet password in the running configuration, we might try to use that
Telnet password on each of the subsequent routers and switches we encounter.
While no vulnerability might be present on the other devices, we are using the
information we culled from our previous attacks to try to compromise devices
further into the network.
Yet another example would be where a Microsoft IIS server is set up with
the default script mappings enabled and is set with the default file permissions
enabled. While medium-risk vulnerabilities exist within the mapped applications
in IIS, there are also inherent low-risk vulnerabilities associated with the filesystem permissions. However, when these two scenarios are coupled, the result is
one, serious, high-risk exploit. Being able to exploit the script mappings, and
then having very loose file permissions on the server, provides the attacker any
number of options to “own” the server.
Administrators are usually overburdened with too many systems to look after
and way too many users to support.This is why we commonly see reused pass­
words and misconfigured systems.To combat these types of attacks, varying
methods of defense need to be deployed throughout the enterprise; this is com­
monly referred to as a “Defense in Depth” strategy. In our previous IIS example,
even though the vulnerabilities would still exist, a host-based intrusion preven­
tion system would not allow the compromise of the server. Furthermore, in our
earlier SNMP example, the use of IPSec and tunneling would have removed the
clear-text community string retrieval from the realm of possibility. While the
burden of an administrator isn’t likely to decrease in years to come, it has become
more important to leverage differing types of security technologies to provide
your “Defense in Depth” strategy.
Checklist
Take a complete asset inventory of all your network devices.
Assess the criticality of each device in regard to your business continuity.
Audit each device and determine the critical services necessary for each.
Disable all unnecessary services and use ACLs to limit access.
Make sure security technologies are used whenever possible, including
SSH instead of Telnet and IPSec instead of clear-text management
techniques.
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Summary
Networking devices are designed to pass traffic from one node to another, one
network to many. In theory, these devices should be invisible to attackers, but as
we learned from this chapter, unfortunately they are often naked to even the
most novice of attackers. Given that these devices are the core to our networks,
one would think that they would get the appropriate amount of attention and
care, but we have come to learn that this is just not the case. Apparently, since
routers and switches do not have a nice little graphic located in their “System
Tray” to remind us of updating them, they rarely get updated.
Next time you talk to your network administrator, or routing team, ask them
what version of IOS a particular router is running, and wait to see the dumb­
founded expression. It is not that they are to blame; networking devices just
often can easily be forgotten about because they do their job: route and pass
traffic. Now, when these devices fail, well, then it is a different story. Many of the
attacks demonstrated here can be the cause of these devices failing.The Cisco
IPv4 and CDP DoS exploits can easily bring the highest-end routers to their
knees, and with an easy, command-line utility to boot. Just because your highend router cost $65,000 doesn’t mean that the $25,000/yr office assistant cannot
render it useless with some simple tools downloaded from the Internet.
If you take away nothing else from this chapter, remember the simple mitiga­
tion techniques used to defend against most of these attacks.The use of ACLs
and disabling unnecessary services have limited investments in time and
resources, but they certainly pay off when compared with the consequences.
With the proper ACLs and router hardening, updating the version of your IOS is
almost a secondary or tertiary level of defense.
Solutions Fast Track
Cisco IPv4 Denial of Service
Using a special sequence of packets, the router believes that the input
queue is filled and stops accepting new traffic.
Use ACLs to prohibit unauthorized traffic from reaching the router.
Filter out and disable unneeded and exotic functionality (such as IP
Protocol 53, which is SWIPE, and Protocol 77, which is SUN-ND).
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Stay updated on the latest versions of IOS.
Use an IDS (covered more in Chapter 9) to look for suspicious traffic.
Cisco HTTP Get Buffer Overflow
Specially crafted UDP packets can cause an information disclosure of
actual packet data.
Unusually large HTTP requests can cause the built-in Web server to
return a shell prompt to the remote attacker.
Disable UDP Small-Servers and HTTP Services—they are hardly ever
needed.
Use ACLs to limit access to the router’s HTTP interface.
Stay updated on the latest versions of IOS.
Cisco Discovery Protocol Denial of Service
If not configured properly (or disabled), CDP can provide valuable
infrastructure information to your potential attacker.
Disable CDP on all routers where it is unnecessary.
When absolutely necessary (for management consoles such as
CiscoWorks), only enable CDP on the interfaces that absolutely need it.
Use ACLs to control the CDP traffic coming in to and going out of
your internal network segment.
MAC Flooding
MAC flooding can happen by overloading the switch’s CAM table with
enough phony MAC addresses appearing on all ports that it doesn’t get
a chance to catch up.
Enable port security on all switches.This should stop the problem dead
in its tracks.
Move all critical assets to a secured VLAN.
Tune IDS systems to look for irregular traffic.
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Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
ARP Spoofing
An easy attack that is still hard to track down, ARP spoofing simply
involves taking over another node’s identity and convincing surrounding
network devices that you should receive all network traffic that once
belonged to the other machine.
Apply static ARP entries on all critical devices.
Move all critical assets to a secured private VLAN.
Tune IDS systems to look for irregular traffic.
Breaking Out of Jail
Although difficult to reproduce, it is possible to jump from one VLAN
to another.
Turn off Dynamic Trunking Protocol (DTP) on all ports on all switches.
Statically set all trunking ports.
Move all trunking ports to a single VLAN.
Attacking Simple Network Management Protocol
Because SNMP versions prior to 3 did not support username/password
authentication or encrypted tunnels, it is quite easy to sniff the wire for
important (and damaging) information about the inner workings of
your company.
Use SNMP v3 for encryption wherever possible.
Disable SNMP on unnecessary devices.
Use IPSec where SNMP v3 is not applicable.
Medium and low-risk exploits can be used together to form a high-risk
vulnerability.
Be conscious of the low-risk vulnerabilities present on your network
and the exposure they cause.
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Deploy preventative technologies like IPSec or Host-Based Intrusion
Prevention Systems to reduce your exposure and lessen the likelihood of
a successful attack.
Do not use common passwords on critical networking devices.
Links to Sites
■
www.phenoelit.de The absolute authority on all Cisco vulnerabilities.
Expert research and analysis.
■
www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/advisory.html#advisories All
Cisco advisories and security-related information.
■
www.securityfocus.com/bid/ Great security resources for multivendor bugs and vulnerabilities.
■
http://monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff The main site for down­
loading Dug Song’s DSniff application. Site also includes documentation
and articles on the value of using DSniff to help secure your enterprise.
■
www.datanerds.net/~mike/dsniff.html More information
regarding DSniff and its many uses. It is also the main distribution for
Windows ports of famous tools and utilities such as WinPcap.
■
http://ettercap.sourceforge.net This site houses all of the Ettercap
releases and documentation for download. Also present are FAQs and
Ettercap history.
Mailing Lists
■
[email protected] To subscribe, send a message to
[email protected] with a single line in the body “info cust-security-announce.”
■
fi[email protected]first.org A mailing list dedicated to security incidents
and research. Subscribe at www.first.org.
■
[email protected] A mailing list dedicated to vulnerabilities
bugs.To subscribe to this, and a number of other mailing lists, go to
www.securityfocus.com/archive.
www.syngress.com
Defending Routers and Switches • Chapter 8
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: What is the best way to make my network devices invisible to attackers?
A: The use of access control lists (ACLs) is the best way to accomplish this.
There are very few reasons why an IP would need to connect directly to
your device; mostly this is used for management purposes. Allow the specific
IPs that need access and deny the rest.
Q: How should I react to 0-day exploits affecting my core network devices?
A: Depending on the nature of your business, making changes to core devices
could be a no-no during normal business hours (especially if you are a bank).
The proper use of ACLs and keeping your IOS revision updated during
maintenance windows will go a long way in protecting you. In cases where
you have done all of the preventative maintenance possible and you are still
vulnerable, we would have all of our IDS systems listening and watching for
illegitimate traffic destined for our hardware network devices.You cannot
prevent the attack, but at least you will know what is happening.
Q: Should I use TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) to manage my network
device configurations?
A: TFTP does serve a great purpose in network administration. In large net­
works it is very difficult to keep track of configurations and changes. Keep in
mind, however, that TFTP is not a secure network transfer and should be
used with extreme caution. Consider placing ACLs on routers or switches
that have TFTP configured. In addition, consider an implementation of TFTP
with IPSec to encrypt the data on the wire.
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Q: Where can I find more information on hardening Cisco routers?
A: A great hardening guide is available at: http://nsa2.www.conxion.com/
cisco/.This is a National Security Agency Guide on how to configure Cisco
routers securely. It provides information and tips on various Cisco security
features.
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Chapter 9
Implementing
Intrusion Detection
Systems
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Understanding Intrusion System Basics
■
Comparing IDS/IPS Vendors
■
Subverting an IDS/IPS
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 1 Understanding Perimeter and
Internal Segments
■
Chapter 2 Assessing your Current Network
■
Chapter 3 Selecting the Correct Firewall
■
Chapter 6 Secure Network Management
■
Chapter 10 Perimeter Network Design
■
Chapter 11 Internal Network Design
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Introduction
Protecting a corporate network is a game of sorts—administrators pitted against
hackers. Unfortunately, security administrators must always play defense.You
don’t know when or from where the opponent will attack. It could be a stam­
pede or a precision strike.Your job is to prevent the attack from happening or, as
a worst-case scenario, clean up afterward.
One thing that you do know is what will be attacked—every resource that is
accessible from the Internet and everything to which those resources connect,
internal and external. Ideally, you would want to prevent these attacks from even
happening.That is where firewalls (see Chapter 3, “Selecting the Correct
Firewall”) and proper network segmentation (see Chapter 11, “Internal Network
Design”) come into play. However, inevitably, some packets will creep past your
defenses. What then?
Let’s imagine that your house has been or is in the process of being burglarized.Your firewall (deadbolt lock) should have prevented this, but you forgot that
you left the side window open (unprotected VPN connection). What is next?
Well, at the very least you would want to know what happened, what was stolen,
or what was damaged. Proper logging (insurance photos) can take care of what is
missing, but that gives you little comfort. What if you could have been notified
while the burglary was taking place? A home burglar alarm (your Intrusion
Detection System, or IDS) will watch for suspicious activity (signature/trigger
strings), and when something odd happens, it should notify the authorities (send
an e-mail or an alphanumeric page to your belt).
You’re doing well so far, but you still worry about someone being able to
break into the house and steal your wife’s jewelry before the authorities arrive. If
there were a way to prevent the jewelry box from opening, you would feel safer.
A special monitoring device (an Intrusion Prevention System, or IPS) where any
attempts at opening the jewelry box are met with the lid slamming closed would
be excellent.
And while you’re at it, you can make the game more interesting; add decoys,
divert the burglar’s attention. Hide the street address (using Network Address
Translation, or NAT) to confuse the burglar.You can even go as far as diverting
the front walkway from reaching your front door, and instead lead to a fake front
door (honeypot). If someone walks right up to the fake front door and tries to
force it open, it must be a burglar, because all of your friends and family know to
use the side door.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
This chapter guides you through an understanding of IDS basics and types of
components within intrusion detection systems. It presents comparisons of just
some of the many IDS solutions available.You will also be shown how attackers
fool IDS systems and navigate around them. In addition, a new breed of IPS is
introduced, with their benefits and detractors, and using honeypots and hon­
eynets to divert an attacker’s attention. When you’ve finished this chapter, you
will be able to decide what type of IDS solution (whether a mix of IDS, IPS, and
honeynets, or just a simple signature-based router trigger) will work well in your
environment.
Understanding Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Basics
The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication
SP800-31 aptly describes intrusion detection as “the process of monitoring the
events occurring in a computer system or network and analyzing them for signs
of intrusions, defined as attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity,
availability, or to bypass the security mechanisms of a computer or network.”
Understanding the different types of IDS components and where they fit best
allows you to build a solid protective mechanism for your network.
IDSs fall into two basic categories:
■
Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs)
■
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs)
HIDSs usually take the form of software agents that install on important hosts
to report and prevent unauthorized activity back to a central console.This man­
agement station usually has a very large database of known attack signatures (the
clues that show someone is trying to break in) and a reporting mechanism to
notify the network administrator.The software agents are usually highly OS-specific because they hook into the operating system at a very low level.This is nec­
essary because they need to monitor all threads and system call activities, to make
sure there is no suspicious activity. Because of this, a HIDS agent will almost
always have a performance impact on the machine on which it is installed.
NIDSs are often network appliances or hardened servers with special software
that attaches to the network and monitors traffic looking for attacks. NIDSs can
be further subdivided into passive devices (which simply monitor the traffic that
flows past them) and inline devices (which actually inspect traffic as it flows
through the machine, using two or more NICs).
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A new wrinkle to the market has been the introduction of a new breed of
device that is essentially a souped-up IDS. An IPS will make automated changes
to a system under attack or actively endeavor to prevent those same attacks.
Some can directly modify firewall rules to filter out future packets from the same
attacker or—when in an inline configuration—drop the offending packets before
they even reach the target device.This is a vast improvement over an IDS, that
will usually only detect an attack; its only response mechanism is to send an alert
to an administrator (via e-mail, pager, etc.).
An important distinction to make here is the two roles that IDS and IPS play
in a modern network. While many vendors might have (mistakenly) touted IDS as
the watchdog for your network, it is hardly a one-click installation. Neglected IDS
servers are usually quickly located to be the scapegoat of network intrusions, when
it was really the lack of tuning an IDS that was at fault. Rather than consider the
IDS the night watchman of the network, you should think of it more as the
closed-circuit cameras that are sometimes installed; they won’t prevent an attack on
their own, but if a skilled technician is watching them (or the IDS logs), you can
learn a great deal about your attackers and potential adversaries. In much the same
way that packet sniffers (see Chapter 2 for more information on the vast array of
protocol analyzers on the market today) allow a skilled network engineer to diag­
nose a routing problem, a well-tuned IDS can allow a security engineer to improve
security in other prevention devices. Gary Golomb, an IDS expert and noted
speaker at conferences such as CanSecWest, remarked in October 2003 that “The
IDS serves the single purpose of sitting back and watching over everything to see if
people are still getting though.” He goes on to say, “Whether it’s because of vulner­
abilities in network designs, application vulnerabilities, or unknowingly misconfig­
ured devices, they [attackers] do get through.”
So, do you need an IDS or an IPS? What about both? Which product is
which? And as if the concepts weren’t muddled and confusing to begin with,
many vendors’ marketing departments are having an identity crisis over what to
label their product. Some products marketed as IDS are really more IPS in
nature, and the reverse is often true as well. Industry pundits have gone so far as
to announce the death of IDS in favor of IPS in 2003. More people still recog­
nize the term IDS over IPS so the burial ceremony might be a bit premature.
Most vendors will likely incorporate IPS features into their IDSs to make them
viable long after the bagpipes stop playing.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
Intrusion Detection System Sensors
In the September/October 2000 issue of IEEE Software, members of CERT dis­
cussed the role of IDS in a “defense in depth” strategy.They mention it is to
“positively identify attacks without falsely identifying non-attacks.” Another role
is to issue warnings to “help users alter their installation’s defensive posture to
increase resistance to attack.” A successful IDS implementation should take into
account:
■
Network inventory The IDS should know if it is located amongst a
gaggle of Windows Web servers, versus strictly UNIX-based FTP
servers.This will greatly reduce the amount of false positives when a
misguided attacker attempts an IIS attack on your UNIX machine.The
event should be noted, but not as severe as an IIS attack on your
Windows Web servers.
■
Sensor deployment The sensors (also called intrusion detectors) that
make up an IDS must be placed in the optimal locations to provide rel­
evant results to the security team. Just like you wouldn’t put your bur­
glar alarm’s motion sensor in the hall closet, you should also make sure
that your sensors are positioned so they can “see” a great deal of your
traffic.
Sensors come in one of three main categories, with a fourth emerging cate­
gory sure to make a strong showing in years to come:
■
Network-based Network-based IDS (NIDS) sensors monitor network
traffic at a collection point, like the internal and/or external interface of
a firewall.They allow passive responses to events (an e-mail alert), and
they may capture all packets involved in the detected attack for later
analysis. Some allow sending TCP RST (reset packets) back to attacking
hosts, which forces existing connections to disconnect.This will not
keep an attacker from coming back later and trying again, and it will
inform the attacker that he is dealing with an automated system, which
might be more information than you’re willing to give away.
■
Host-based Host-based IDS (HIDS) sensors are software packages
installed locally on a machine you want to monitor.The sensor watches
for events involving local system attack patterns, like account creation,
password changes, system file changes, and so forth.They usually report
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their findings back to a central management console, which then can
send an e-mail alert or other notification mechanisms.
■
Hybrids Hybrids are host-based sensors that also watch network traffic
to and from the monitored host.They watch for system-level events like
a host-based sensor, but also watch for “suspicious” network activity
aimed at the host they are protecting.
■
Honeypots Honeypots and honeynets are a bit different from other
sensor categories.They can detect known attacks, but are much better
suited to detecting and recording as-yet-unknown attack patterns (the
so-called Zero Day attacks).They are vulnerable systems or virtual sys­
tems that emulate vulnerable systems. Since they are not and should not
be used for legitimate services, any activity at all on these systems should
raise an alarm. Initial reports of the worm that would eventually be
named MS Blaster came from people who had set up honeypots.They
noticed a change in the normal scans of their network and used the
honeypot logs to determine that a new worm was circulating.
Sensors are passive by design, although we will see in later sections that
some inline IDS solutions and most IPSs are active by definition. IDS sensors
will typically monitor all the activity on a particular network segment, sitting and
listening quietly without altering any of the information. All activity is analyzed
for a match to what the sensor has been told is bad.The sensor can use a number
of methods to determine this. See Table 9.1 for a list of the methods and a
description of each.
Table 9.1 Methods Used by Intrusion Detection Sensors to Differentiate
Good and Bad Traffic
Method
Mechanism
Pros
Cons
Pattern matching
Scans incoming
packets for specific
byte sequences
(the signatures)
stored in a database of known
attacks.
Identifies known
attacks.
Provides specific
information for
analysis and
response.
May trigger false
positives.
Requires frequent
updates of
signature tables.
Attacks can be
modified to avoid
detection.
Continued
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
Table 9.1 Methods Used by Intrusion Detection Sensors to Differentiate
Good and Bad Traffic
Method
Mechanism
Pros
Stateful matching Scans for attack
signatures in the
context of a traffic
stream rather than
individual packets.
Identifies known
attacks.
Detects signatures
spread across
multiple packets.
Provides specific
information for
analysis and
response.
Protocol anomaly Looks for deviaCan identify
tions from
attacks without a
standards set forth signature.
in RFCs.
Reduces false
positives with
well-understood
protocols.
Traffic anomaly
Watches for
unusual traffic
activities, such as
a flood of UDP
packets or a new
service appearing
on the network.
Statistical anomaly Develops baselines
of normal traffic
activity and
throughput, and
alerts on deviations
from those
baselines.
Can identify
unknown attacks
and DoS floods.
Can identify
unknown attacks
and DoS floods.
Cons
May trigger false
positives.
Requires frequent
updates of
signature tables.
Attacks can be
modified to avoid
detection.
May lead to false
positives and false
negatives with
poorly understood or complex
protocols.
Protocol analysis
modules take
longer to deploy
to customers than
signatures do.
Can be difficult to
tune properly.
Must have a clear
understanding of
“normal” traffic
environment.
Can be difficult to
tune properly.
Must have a clear
understanding of
“normal” traffic
environment.
NIDS placement is an important part of its effectiveness. If the sensors are
monitoring a small portion of your total network traffic, you might miss an
attack and leave yourself exposed. NIDSs should be placed at all traffic concenwww.syngress.com
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tration points. In a switched network, you will not be able to monitor all traffic
at first because a switch will only transmit packets to your particular port if they
are destined to that port.This can be easily overcome by enabling “port mirroring” features on the ports where your IDS sensors live. In Chapter 2, we discuss this in greater detail, but port mirroring (or “SPAN” ports as Cisco refers to
it) changes your expensive managed switch into a low-end hub that repeats all
packets to the SPAN port.This is horrible for performance but fantastic for
monitoring. Figure 9.1 shows where NIDS sensors could be placed in a typical
WAN topology.
Figure 9.1 NIDS Placement in a Typical WAN Topology
Internet
NIDS01
NIDS04
Firewall
DMZ
NIDS02
Email
FTP
Web
Internal Network
Data Center
NIDS03
Notice that each network segment has its own sensor. Some would consider
this excessive: Why would you need both NIDS02 and NIDS04? Isn’t that
redundant? In fact, it is not. NIDS04 will most certainly experience the most
traffic of all the sensors, but that doesn’t mean that NIDS02 is useless. In fact,
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
having NIDS04 as a baseline is extremely useful for finding where your firewall
has leaks. If an attack sequence is detected in NIDS04 and then also in NIDS02,
you know that your firewall allowed malicious traffic through.You can correlate
this with the firewall’s log file as well (although during an attack this might be
compromised). Now let’s say that you notice an attack sequence in the NIDS02
log file, with a source IP address of 192.0.2.94. Of course, you will assume that
this is an external attack by the IP address. However, what if the source IP
address was spoofed (many modern worms do just this)? A quick scan of the
NIDS04 log will show that the packet was never seen outside the firewall.This
leads us to believe that the attack was launched from inside the firewall and with
a spoofed source IP address. Watch out—you might have a talented and angry IT
employee on your hands!
Notes from the Underground…
Poo-Pooing the Honeypot
A number of people have been researching ways to demonstrate the lim­
itations of honeypot technology, as well as proof-of-concept tools. The
whole premise of honeypots is to covertly monitor the activities of a
target audience, who are technically skilled and are likely able to manip­
ulate and query any resources attached to the honeypot itself. One article
references www.antihoney.net, but as this book is heading to press, no
site exists at this address.
Intrusion Prevention System Sensors
A new acronym to toss into your (already crowded) techie vocabulary is
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS). While many analysts and some over-zealous
sales managers will attempt to sell you on the fact that it is a revolution in com­
puter security, it’s more of an evolution from a monitor-and-report system, to a
monitor-and-do-something system.The clear call to action for many security
teams has been the recent (perceived) failures of firewalls in stopping the Code
Red and NIMDA attacks of a few years ago.The uninformed scream, “But we
have a firewall? Isn’t it supposed to block the bad stuff?”
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How Did We Get Here?
Indeed, the firewall should block the “bad stuff ” and block it does—but limited to
the rule base that is defined. Certainly, a decade ago, when the NCSA Mosaic Web
browser was just hitting the streets, nobody ever worried about HTTP being a
vehicle for an attacker; go back just five years and you would still find people who
believed Web traffic to be “safe.” So, we all go about our lives, setting our firewalls
to fiercely defend against attempts to reach the unencrypted Telnet port, the collec­
tion of Microsoft Networking ports, and prevent unauthorized remote procedure
calls on our Sun workstations. Want someone to connect to our Apache Web site
to view the latest press releases—sure, what’s the harm in that?
As soon as the attackers-at-large realized that they weren’t getting anywhere
running head-on into the firewall, they started investigating what they could do
with the few ports that were left open.The HTTP port was not only inviting, but
due to the constant stream of traffic going to today’s Web servers, a small attack
packet mixed in with thousands of legitimate requests would be hard to detect
manually.
This Darwinian evolution should have been pretty obvious to any of us.
When someone wants to break into a company, he studies the layout of the
building. Soon, he learns that the side door leading to the lunch area is never
locked (no firewall at all). Consequently, the attacker walks in, steals a laptop, and
goes home. Next week, the CEO orders that all doors be locked at all times
(firewall put into service). However, of course, the front door is still open during
business hours for customers to walk in (akin to the HTTP port being left
open), right? Therefore, the attacker now just pretends to be a customer, walks in,
and when nobody is looking, swipes another laptop.The following week, the
CEO orders that closed-circuit cameras be mounted at all doors to prevent fur­
ther loss.This time, the attacker returns at night, with a mask, and fetches yet
another laptop. It’s only the day after when the videotape is reviewed that the
loss is detected.
No matter what countermeasure we put into place, there will always be a
method to get around it. In that last example, the company’s IDS solution was
represented by the cameras.They monitor the intrusion points but do little more
than notify the owner after the theft has occurred. What’s the next logical step for
the CEO and his laptops? Hiring a security guard wouldn’t be a bad idea.The
nice part is that the guard will be able to stop and question people who show up
knocking on the doors (ports) of the building. No longer is it a reaction to the
videotapes; it is instead a proactive security move. In much the same way, the
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
evolution from IDS to IPS is natural and expected.To stay ahead of the attackers,
we must move from reacting to being proactive about our network security.
Where Are We Now?
Modern IPS solutions go further than IDS systems by actively attempting to stop
an in-progress attack. In June 2003, the Gartner CIO Update defined this new
evolution of technology as follows:
Intrusion prevention must block malicious actions using multiple
algorithms. Intrusion prevention systems must provide blocking
capabilities that include signature-based blocking of known attacks.
However, intrusion prevention systems must also move beyond
simple signature-based approaches—such as those used by
antivirus and intrusion detection systems—to at least support
policy, behavior, and anomaly-based detection algorithms. These
algorithms must operate at the application level in addition to
standard, network-level firewall processing. It must also have the
wisdom to know the difference (between attack events and normal
events).
The real risk with IPS sensors is that there is very little difference
between attack events and normal events (the “false-positives”). If legitimate
traffic or system functions are falsely deemed “bad” by the sensor, blocking the
legitimate event might shut down a business process without human interven­
tion. Because of the powerful blocking features in these IPS solutions, a degree of
caution must be used before “flipping the switch.” John Dias, security analyst at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, quips that “For those using IPS, by the
time they’ve mastered the subject of blocking, they’re being blamed for every­
thing.” Lloyd Hession, chief security officer for Radianz, agrees: “These devices
become a lightning rod inside an organization, and it’s typical to blame the IPS
for any problem.”
After evaluating your IPS strategy in a test lab, factor in a few weeks of
“baseline” testing before activating the IPS blocking mode. During this time, you
can teach the IPS what is good and what is bad. During this all-important
learning period, it is imperative that all possible valid activities are performed on
the monitored system. Make sure your weekly patch update procedure or data
backup routine is allowed by the IPS. Otherwise, the IPS will block the very
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beneficial activity of updating your machine, because it is an unknown system
activity.This is extremely important, so let’s all read that again: Make absolutely
sure that your IPS rules allow for legitimate patch updates and data backup rou­
tines! Your baseline testing should last longer than just a few days because some
automated update routines only run once per week. Maybe you only back up
your servers weekly—whatever the case, you want to make sure that all of your
well-crafted disaster recovery and data backup plans aren’t blocked by your shiny
new IPS.
There are three main delivery formats for IPSs, summarized as follows:
■
Network-based Network-based IPS (NIPS) sensors use a different
architecture than network-based IDS sensors do.The traffic is analyzed
for known attack patterns. When a pattern is matched, the configured
reaction (alert, log, send reset, etc.) is performed. Unlike IDS sensors,
they can also take action to prevent the attack from happening again. By
either modifying firewall rules or blocking the traffic themselves, IPS
sensors can make a response to an event happen almost immediately.
Network-based IPS sensors act very similar to network-based IDS sensors.They monitor network traffic at a collection point, like the internal
and/or external interface of a firewall. Usually, they are inline and have
traffic flow between two or more network interfaces.They allow passive
responses to events as well, but their true power is in their capability to
dynamically block the offending traffic.
■
Host-based Host-based IPS (HIPS) sensors are similar host-based IDS
systems with one major difference. HIPS sensors have teeth.They have
the capabilities to respond to an attack instead of just report that one is
happening.They can prevent malicious access to system resources and
intercept malicious actions before any damage is done.This type of
sensor is particularly useful on publicly exposed high-profile Web
servers. Should an attacker manage to get through your security layers,
he will still not be able to change the content of your homepage
(defacement) because any disk writing activity will be prevented.
■
Tarpits A network that responds to an attacker’s probe packets with the
slowest possible response is a tarpit (a term borrowed from geologists,
and the dinosaurs that eventually died in the pools of tar just south of
Los Angeles). With most modern (and rapidly spreading) worms, a probe
packet for reconnaissance precedes the attack packet. Capitalizing on this
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knowledge, a tarpit will slow the initial probe by responding very slowly
and forcing the attacking computer to retransmit the probe packet many
times. More information on tarpits can be found later in this chapter.
Like NIDSs, the placement of your NIPS devices directly affects their effec­
tiveness. In network-based IDS or IPS systems (such as those represented by
Figure 9.1), you usually place a sensor on each network segment; in a host-based
system, there would be a small software agent on each machine that reports back
to a central management console.This IDS or IPS console would hopefully be
located in a secure management segment of your network (see Chapter 6 for
more information on designing dedicated monitoring and management VLANs).
Comparing IDS/IPS Vendors
This section lists various IDS packages as well as several honeypot and tarpit products—both commercial and open source. While the aim of this chapter is not to
definitively recommend a product for your organization, it is our sincere hope that
we can present a representative cross-section of the IDS and IPS market that will
aid you in your eventual purchase decision. Evaluation versions of these products
are (usually) readily accessible and should be installed in a test network before
making any final determinations. Most of the products listed in the following IDS
section have really evolved in the past couple of years into a blended IDS/IPS
system. Rather than split hairs by shoehorning them into either the IDS or the IPS
bucket, we present them here as a combined section. We had hoped to invent a
new acronym (IDAPSE, for Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
Extraordinaire), but we didn’t get the required amount of signatures on our peti­
tion. If you’d like to donate money toward the effort, operators are standing by.
Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems
As with many products in the security industry, the most innovative products
start life as pet projects from talented hackers. As part of the community of secu­
rity professionals, these tools are almost always posted for the world to review
and use in the form of open-source applications.These solutions result in a
quality product and have an extensive community of end users who share con­
figuration tips and usage notes. Most of the problems you’ll encounter during
installation or use have already been solved or discovered. However, in some cor­
porate environments, the lack of a single entity to get on the phone in the
middle of the night for emergency support might make a CISO nervous. Several
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commercial packages provide this accountability and add many enhancements
not available in their open-source counterparts. In the following sections, we pre­
sent the most influential open-source tools and their commercial contemporaries.
Snort
Snort (www.snort.org) is the most commonly used open-source network intru­
sion detection package available. Written by Marty Roesch, it is a signature-based
solution that has a huge user base and is supported very well by the public com­
munity. Snort was originally intended as a packet sniffer. In November 1998,
Marty Roesch wrote a Linux-only packet sniffer called APE. Despite the great
features of APE, Marty wanted a sniffer that also does the following:
■
Works on multiple OSs
■
Uses a hexdump payload dump (TcpDump later had this functionality)
■
Displays all the different network packets the same way (TcpDump did
not have this)
Marty’s goal was to write a better sniffer for his own use. He also wrote
Snort as a libpcap application, which gives Snort portability from a network fil­
tering and sniffing standpoint. At the time, only TcpDump was also compiled
with libpcap, so this gave the system administrator another sniffer with which to
work. Snort became available at Packet Storm (www.packetstormsecurity.com)
on December 22, 1998. At that time, Snort was only about 1600 lines of code
and had a total of two files.This was about a month after Snort’s initial incep­
tion, and was only used for packet sniffing at this point. Marty’s first uses of
Snort included monitoring his cable modem connection and debugging network
applications he coded.
Snort’s first signature-based analysis (also known as rules-based within the
Snort community) became a feature in late January 1999.This was Snort’s initial
foray down the path of intrusion detection, and Snort could be used as a
lightweight IDS at the time. By the time Snort version 1.5 came out in
December 1999, Martin had decided on the Snort architecture that is currently
being used until version 2.0. After version 1.5 was released, Snort was able to use
all the different plug-ins available today.The latest version of Snort is 2.1, which
is a rework of the architecture and contains approximately 75,000 lines of code.
Signature updates are almost instantaneous thanks to a very active signature
distribution list. Within hours of an issue being discovered (a new worm, virus,
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and so forth), Snort users post signatures designed to detect the malicious traffic.
The availability of these particular signatures has been so universally accepted that
many of the top commercial packages allow importing Snort signatures into their
own signature database. Snort signatures are easy to write.The following is one
of the default signatures for Code Red v2.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"WEB-IIS
CodeRed v2 root.exe access"; flow:to_server,established;
uricontent:"/root.exe"; nocase; classtype:web-application-attack;
reference:url,www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html; sid:1256; rev:7;)
All “$” values in the preceding code are defined in your snort.conf.This sig­
nature tells Snort to log an alert for any traffic from the external network on any
port going to our defined HTTP servers on the defined HTTP ports with
“/root.exe” in the URL string. Since Code Red v2 tries the following URL
string while propagating:
GET /scripts/root.exe?/c+dir HTTP/1.0
the previous rule would put an entry in alert.ids in the log directory that would
look like:
[**] [1:1256:2] WEB-IIS CodeRed v2 root.exe access [**][Classification: Web
Application Attack] [Priority: 1]04/04-23:43:00.538443 211.38.132.221:4493
-> 211.38.45.165:80 TCP TTL:123 TOS:0x0 ID:57686 IpLen:20 DgmLen:112 DF
***AP*** Seq: 0xEF40ABB9 Ack: 0xEF287695 Win: 0x4470 TcpLen: 20
In addition to the basic Snort features, Snort can be set up to provide realtime alerts.This provides you with the ability to receive alerts in real time, rather
than having to continuously monitor your Snort system. Logging support is
extensive as well. Snort can log alerts to databases such as MySQL and MSSQL,
text files, and syslog servers. It can log with SNMP traps and e-mail alerts as well.
Figure 9.2 shows Snort’s basic architecture and alert logging capabilities. Snort
has packet logging and packet sniffing capabilities as well (see reference to Snort
in Chapter 2 under Packet Sniffing).
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Figure 9.2 Snort Architecture and Alert Logging Capabilities
Alerts/
Packets Sniffer pre-processor detection engine Logging
Monitored
Network
Snort
Rules
Email
SNMP trap
Database(MySQL, MSSQL, etc)
Log Files
Syslog
Tools of the Trade…
Can’t Snort Enough?
Looking for more information about Snort? The tool is really very pow­
erful and we could go on for pages and pages about it. In fact, you could
probably write an entire book just about the Snort IDS. Luckily, you don’t
have to; it has already been written and released in August 2003 (Snort
2.0 Intrusion Detection, ISBN 1931836744), written by actual members of
the Snort.org team. Within the (over 500!) pages, readers are given
invaluable insight into the code base of Snort, and in-depth tutorials of
complex installation, configuration, and troubleshooting scenarios. A CD
containing the latest version of Snort as well as other open-source secu­
rity utilities accompanies the book. One review from Richard Bejtlich
(influential security expert and author of the TaoSecurity.org security
journal) states, “I’ve read the best IDS books, and used IDS technology,
since 1998, and Snort 2.0 is the first to give real insight into an IDS’ inner
workings.”
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Sourcefire
Sourcefire (www.sourcefire.com) is the commercial version of the popular Snort
IDS, covered previously.This solution starts with the Snort engine, adds an intu­
itive user interface (instead of the sometimes difficult-to-use command-line
interface), some fascinating data analysis, and slams it all onto some hardware that
was hand-picked to provide a high-performance IDS environment. A nice
advancement in the Sourcefire product line is the availability of a GigabitEthernet version of their Network Sensors (NS).This means that if you are a
large organization that uses GigE within the core switching layer, you don’t have
to slow your network down just to have effective inspection performed. Add to
this the fact that multiple sensors can be load balanced and have automatic
device failover, and you can see that the Sourcefire solution definitely deserves
attention from any serious buyers.
To reduce the effectiveness of common IDS evasion techniques (detailed later
in this chapter), the Sourcefire NS provides packet reassembly and fragment
reordering.The NS uses a dual-NIC architecture to allow it to listen (unde­
tectable) on one interface, while reporting the information back to a manage­
ment console (MC) on the other interface. Speaking of management, the MC
allows your numerous/multiple Sourcefire NS devices across your network to
report their findings in a central data window.This “contextual intelligence,” in
the words of the Sourcefire marketing department, “finally enables users to pro­
tect the real assets on their networks instead of merely attempting to assess the
hostility of the packets traversing the network.”
NOTE
The name Snort came from the fact that the application is a "sniffer and
more." In addition, Martin said that he has too many programs called
a.out, and all the popular names for sniffers called TCP-something were
already taken.
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Cisco
Cisco has a product for virtually every niche of an enterprise network, so it
shouldn’t surprise anyone that Cisco has products in the IDS space as well.The
older IDS offering from Cisco was a well-intentioned-but-lacking product called
NetRanger. After the January 2003 acquisition of Okena, Inc., Cisco dropped the
NetRanger product and quickly renamed the (far superior) Okena offering.
Cisco’s host-based IPS product was dubbed the Cisco Security Agent, for­
merly known as Okena StormWatch. It is flexible enough to protect Windows
NT, 2000, XP, and even some flavors of UNIX.The configuration console, how­
ever, runs on Windows 2000 Server. Like many other HIDSs, the agent installs
on the host systems and receives configuration parameters from the console.
These components communicate with each other over SSL. Administrators access
the console through an HTTPS Web site.The important differentiator between
the Okena (now Cisco) product is that it feels equally at home protecting work­
stations and servers.You can find out more about the newly renamed Cisco
Security Agent at (better go grab a pencil—Cisco isn’t known for easy to
remember URLs): www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5057.
Moving beyond HIDS and onto NIDS, Cisco has a wide range of products,
some developed in-house and others acquired by buying entire companies. Cisco
makes IDS modules for most of its nearly ubiquitous routers and switches. Many
times you can add IDS features into a router or switch that you might already
own with very little effort. Cisco also has stand-alone appliances with the sole
purpose of providing IDS / IPS.
Cisco’s network-based product is called IDS Sensor. It is designed to accu­
rately identify and classify known and unknown threats targeting your network,
including worms, denial-of-service (DoS), and application attacks. Cisco IDS uses
an array of detection methods to accurately detect nearly all potential threats.
Building on seven years of IDS experience, Cisco delivers a hybrid system using
detection methods most appropriate for the threat, including stateful pattern
recognition, protocol analysis, traffic anomaly detection, and protocol anomaly
detection.You can find out more about the Cisco IDS at
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2113.
Pulling the individual products together, Cisco’s Threat Response software
provides an automated, just-in-time analysis of each targeted host to determine
whether a compromise has occurred. Only by investigating the host under attack
can you efficiently uncover the real intrusions and address them quickly. Cisco
even goes as far as claiming that their product virtually eliminates false alarms,
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escalates real attacks, and aids in the remediation of costly intrusions. Find out
more about the comprehensive Cisco Threat Response system at
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps5054.
eEye
The eEye Blink product is one of the newest offerings in this arena. As this book
went to press, the software was in the last phases of beta testing and should be
released sometime in early summer 2004. For completeness, we’ve included the
product in this section even though we don’t have experience with it (we’re not
one of the beta testers).Therefore, instead of reviewing this product, we will just
present the feature list from the software publisher and hope that it is available
for trial download by the time these pages hit your favorite bookstore.
Blink will provide threat mitigation through multiple layers of security tech­
nologies. Using smart protocol analysis and application monitoring engines, Blink
claims to protect against even unknown vulnerabilities. Security policies will be
fully customizable and allow security administrators to lock down and secure
against intruders and owner misuse.The following is a quick overview of the
proposed features of Blink.
■
Intrusion Prevention Engine (Protocol Analysis) Blink will
reconstruct network traffic to analyze the protocol data to discover an
attack in progress, responding to attacks by logging the attack, dropping
the packets, or resetting the TCP session.
■
Intrusion Prevention Engine (Signature Checking) As a sec­
ondary layer of defense, Blink should be able to block well-known
attacks using pattern matching against a database of signatures.
■
Firewall Engine (Network Layer Protection) Blink intends to ship
with a limited firewall capability that can analyze each packet of
incoming and outgoing network traffic. By monitoring all outgoing net­
work traffic in real time and verifying that the traffic is coming from an
approved application, Blink will be able to protect against Trojan code
execution as well.
Internet Security Systems
Internet Security Systems (ISS), founded in 1994, is one of the larger fish in the
IDS ocean. With 1200 employees in 27 countries, this is a far cry from a startup
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or open-source software.The ISS RealSecure suite of programs is designed to
watch every corner of an enterprise network.The real value that sets ISS apart is
its talented staff who make up the “X-Force” team of vulnerability researchers.
The products that make up the RealSecure system are as follows:
■
SiteProtector Provides centralized management for all ISS products.
Event prioritization and correlation within the console allow on-site
administrators to view real-time attack information and, if necessary, use
filters to screen for exceptions and false alarms. SiteProtector also greatly
automates the deployment of other RealSecure modules.
■
Server Sensor The HIDS portion of the RealSecure system provides
real-time intrusion monitoring, detection, and protection by analyzing
events logs and inbound and outbound network activity on critical
enterprise assets such as your payroll or HR servers.The Server Sensor
combines its database of built-in signatures with protocol analysis and
behavioral pattern sets to prevent known attacks and (with any luck)
thwart some unknown attacks, too.
■
Network Sensor The NIDS component of RealSecure comes in both
10/100 Ethernet and Gigabit Ethernet varieties.These sensors are then
centrally administered and maintained through SiteProtector.The
researchers in the X-Force (funny name, yes) provide security intelligence
to ISS customers and issue “X-Press Updates” (yes, they might have
gotten a bit too cute with the naming) to add to customer attack signa­
ture databases. Side note: For those of you searching for a stockingstuffer this Holiday season, there were some ISS X-Force action figures
(yes, action figures) produced as employee gifts. Check eBay for your
very own four-inch security researcher sitting right there on your desk.
■
Guard An inline Network Intrusion Prevention System (NIPS),
RealSecure Guard actively protects network segments by automatically
blocking malicious attacks. Unlike most IDS components that silently
monitor a network segment on one port and send alert information on
another port, the inline nature of RealSecure Guard means that all data
flowing in to or out of your network must pass through this machine.
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On the one hand, this provides for a very high level of security; every
packet is inspected and must conform to a security policy before being
passed through the device.The trade-off (and you could have seen this
coming) is, of course, performance.You must make sure that the addi­
tion of this data choke point in your network architecture won’t bring
your speedy Internet connection to its knees.
The RealSecure product line can also be purchased pre-installed on a new
line of ISS Proventia G-Series appliances. For further product information,
deployment guides, whitepapers, and evaluation copies of RealSecure, please con­
sult www.iss.net/products_services.
NOTE
Although RealSecure does offer many features to help you assess your
network’s risk, it does have some challenges that you will want to
understand. Perhaps most importantly, this product does not come at a
small price, especially when considering a large deployment on your
internal segments. Even though this is a commercially supported
product, you will need to decide if this product can fit your budget.
Secondly, this application is not the easiest to deploy or maintain in your
environment. Companies have spent large sums of money on the
deployment of these systems. Oftentimes, ISS or third-party VAR consul­
tants are required to assist in the deployments. This will only add to the
cost and complexity of the product.
Network Associates
In April 2003, Network Associates (NAI) bought two companies: Entercept
Security Technologies and Intruvert Networks. Entercept brought its host-based
IDS products with it, and Intruvert brought its network-based products. By June,
NAI had released its first product line and was doing well. In a bold departure
from the rest of the herd, NAI indeed markets their products specifically as
Intrusion Prevention Systems, which will remove the guesswork as to their
approach and capabilities. Most other vendors, hoping to catch the buzz sur­
rounding both acronyms, use IDS and IPS interchangeably.
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Host-Based Products
The host-based products are specialized for each type of application. Each has
been designed to protect the most common type of hosts that are attacked.
■
McAfee Entercept Web Server Edition Anyone who has used (or is
still using) the Entercept IPS software (pre-acquisition) will recognize it
under the new name: McAfee Entercept Web Server Edition (WSE).
Without a doubt, we can definitely say this is powerful software. Having
installed Entercept on a large Web farm (and only after spending many
hours in configuration), we can report to you that we sleep better at
night knowing it is protecting our network (not to mention our teeth
are whiter and our dishes are sparkling, but we digress). Since Web
servers are externally accessible (by definition), they are within easy
reach of attackers. Protection provided by firewalls and perimeter secu­
rity is no longer enough, since they will happily allow traffic destined
for port 80 straight through the front door of the firewall and knocking
on the door of the server. Increasingly knowledgeable hackers have dis­
covered ways around firewalls and existing detection systems to launch
attacks, such as buffer overflows and worms, directly against Web servers.
Entercept WSE proactively defends Web servers against the myriad of
buffer overflow and privilege escalation attacks by preventing any (and
we do mean any) unauthorized server processes.
■
McAfee Entercept Standard Edition The McAfee Entercept
Standard Edition is much like the WSE, but is meant for your more
general-purpose (but critical) enterprise servers. With agents available for
Windows NT and Windows 2000, Solaris 2.6, 7, 8, and 9, and HP-UX
11, McAfee Entercept is a formidable product offering.
■
McAfee Entercept Database Edition A third variation on the same
theme is the McAfee Entercept Database Edition. Building upon the
protection capabilities of the core Entercept product, the Database
Edition offers a wide array of prevention mechanisms to thwart the
popular SQL Injection attacks of today with the as-yet-unknown attacks
of tomorrow. McAfee Entercept Database Edition locks down a
Microsoft SQL 2000 database to both enforce correct behavior and
block abnormal behavior, putting it almost in the Application-Specific
IPS category to follow.
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■
McAfee Entercept Management System The McAfee Entercept
Management System is the hub of all Entercept data collection activi­
ties. Up to 5000 Entercept Agents can be managed on a single manage­
ment server, which is great news for IT departments that are quickly
running out of rack space in their data centers. Entercept is able to
adjust security policies to all of your management agents, across
Windows NT, 2000, HP-UX, and Solaris platforms.
You can find more information about Entercept at www.nai.com/us/products/mcafee/host_ips/management_system.htm. In addition, make sure to read
through the FAQ located at www.nai.com/us/_tier2/products/_media/
mcafee/entercept_faqs.pdf to find some great information on the Entercept
“adaptive auditing” functionality, which allows it to easily “learn” the applications
that are on your Web server or network file server.This minimizes the time it
takes an administrator to set up a set of rules and allows for a faster overall secu­
rity deployment. After determining a baseline for your server, a protective enve­
lope is wrapped around your most valuable processes (if it’s a Microsoft IIS
server, we’d make sure to protect inetinfo.exe). Any time an application wants to
write to the executing file or otherwise disturb the envelope, the Entercept man­
ager has to approve the action. In this fashion, it is very possible that no
unknown threat or vulnerability will be able to bring your Entercept-protected
Web server down. (See Figure 9.3.)
Figure 9.3 McAfee Entercept
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Network-Based Products
The network-based products are based on Intruvert’s IntruShield product line
before the acquisition.There are three products in the line-up. Each product has
the same feature set but increases through the list in performance capabilities.
■
McAfee IntruShield The McAfee IntruShield appliances vary in size
and capacity to fit your different network needs.The IntruShield 1200 is
designed for your branch offices, and includes two Fast Ethernet detec­
tion ports, a response port, a management port, and can still deliver 100
Mbps performance.The IntruShield 2600 is a slightly beefed-up box,
intended for perimeter deployment.This appliance includes two Gigabit
Ethernet and six Fast Ethernet detection ports, with three response
ports, and a management port. With performance numbers near 600
Mbps, it has more than enough capacity to measure all but the largest
Internet data pipes.The final and largest sensor offering is the
IntruShield 4000, which is best suited for the core of your company’s
switching architecture where speed is in high demand.This device con­
tains a whopping four Gigabit Ethernet detection ports, two Fast
Ethernet response ports, one management port, and still manages to
deliver up to 2 Gbps of performance. (See Figure 9.4.)
■
McAfee IntruShield Manager Tying together all of your sensors into
one management console, the IntruShield Manager runs on any
Windows 2000 management station, supported by a MySQL back end
database.You’ll need additional IntruShield Manager installations for
networks with more than six sensors.This software sets itself apart from
many others by supporting an incredibly rich policy management
framework, which allows for very granular access control. CISOs will be
able to tailor security policies down to the individual business unit or
geographical location sub-division.
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Figure 9.4 McAfee IntruShield
Equally interesting to note is the ability for the IntruShield solution to be
integrated into your existing (and perhaps much larger) network management
system. IntruShield Manager supports the forwarding of alert messages via
SNMP to applications such as HP OpenView, IBM Tivoli, or Computer
Associates’ Unicenter TNG (see Chapter 6 for more information). Find out more
about the IntruShield line of products, acquired from IntruVert, at
www.nai.com/us/products/sniffer/network_ips/category.htm.
Notes from the Underground…
Merger Mania
Confused about the many logos beneath the NAI umbrella? In April 2003,
Network Associates acquired Entercept Security Technologies and the
product was renamed McAfee Entercept. Why not call it NAI Entercept?
Good question. The name Network Associates came about through the
merger of McAfee Associates and Network General (known for their pop­
ular Sniffer tool) in December 1997. Since then, the company has been
NAI and the products have generally carried the McAfee name. Ready for
another one? McAfee IntruShield appeared on the NAI Web site after the
Continued
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acquisition of Intruvert Networks, also in April 2003. If IDS really is dead
(as some misguided analysts claim), why would NAI purchase two leading
IDS technologies in the same month? IDS, whether morphed into IPS or
an as-yet-unseen technology, will be around for the next few years—you
can count on it.
Sana Security
The Primary Response intrusion prevention software from Sana Security is based
on the work of Dr. Steven Hofmeyr, while at the University of New Mexico.
There he studied ways to replicate the powerful adaptive and defensive qualities
of the human immune system to digital networks. It is this research that is the
basis for the Sana Profile (SP) technology that learns normal OS and application
activities by observing low-level code paths in running programs. Much more
than just examining the currently running process list in Task Manager, SP per­
forms deep inspection on the interdependencies of system-level calls and studies
the “normal” process spawning sequences. Once the learning mode has con­
cluded, any anomalous activities can be detected and blocked at the kernel level.
If the code path that a Web server takes is strangely altered suddenly, Primary
Response will detect that as a possible remote code exploit. If a new process is
spawned, or an authorized process is spawned in an unusual sequence, Primary
Response will also flag that malicious activity. Service packs or patching of the
OS will cause Primary Response to “re-learn” the code paths of authorized
activities, and thus it is safe to install the software on production servers without
fear of having incompatibilities between your IPS and your day-to-day systems
management.
Because of the detailed system-level inspection the software performs,
Sana Security is able to claim that they can stop zero-day attacks (so called
because within the first day of a vulnerability being announced and before others
can issue updates to their databases, a “zero day” exploit can attack your net­
work). Primary Response works in a tiered architecture, with a centralized man­
agement console and agent software installed on your various servers. Up to
7000 agents can communicate with the management console using SSL
encrypted channels and can alert different users or groups depending on the
nature of the malicious activity detected. Agent software is available for Windows
as well as Solaris platforms, and Primary Response is the first protection software
specifically designed to work with IIS 6.0 (in native mode, not isolation mode),
which comes with Windows Server 2003. (See Figure 9.5.)
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Figure 9.5 Sana Security Primary Response
Symantec
In July 2002, Symantec bought Recourse Technologies and its ManHunt
product.This acquisition pushed Symantec toward the top of the market with a
product that could perform well, even at gigabit speeds. Symantec paired the network-based ManHunt with their existing host-based Host IDS. Adding ManTrap
in September 2002, Symantec launched their Enterprise Security Suite.The suite
of products allows you to watch the critical portions of your network infrastruc­
ture, as well as confuse and distract your attackers using one of the very few
commercial honeypot implementations.
■
ManHunt (from Recourse) Providing a high-speed NIDS that is
able to perform real-time attack correlation and proactive prevention,
ManHunt protects large networks from internal and external intrusions
and DoS attacks. Using anomaly detection, ManHunt is able to look at
network traffic and determine what seems outside of the “norm” of
legitimate traffic. By doing this, an educated guess can be made that
anything that is outside of an established range of network traffic is an
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anomaly, and all anomalies are (or might be) new, as-yet-unknown
attacks.This helps to eliminate the inherent time-delay vulnerability in
signature-based intrusion detection products. One unique feature that
we enjoyed discovering was the traffic rate monitoring capability, which
allows for detection of slow, methodical stealth scans and DoS attacks
that can cripple even the most sophisticated networks. (See Figure 9.6.)
■
Host IDS As a complement to firewalls and other access controls, the
HIDS component of the Symantec solution enables administrators to
develop proactive policies to stop hackers, or authorized users with
malicious intent, from misusing systems.
■
Intruder Alert The central management component from Symantec,
Intruder Alert will sound an alarm or take other countermeasures
according to pre-established security policies when an attack is detected.
From a central console, administrators can create, update, and deploy
policies, and securely collect and archive audit logs for incident analysis.
■
Decoy Server (formerly ManTrap) Although more appropriately
listed in the honeypot category, ManTrap is a great addition to the
Symantec family of products. ManHunt provides early detection of
internal, external, and unknown attacks by monitoring attempted con­
nections to fictitious network resources. By creating a realistic “mock”
network environment, the ManHunt solution serves as an enticing target
for potential attackers.
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Figure 9.6 Symantec ManHunt
For more information on the complete Symantec solution to intrusion
detection and prevention, visit http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/
content.cfm?articleid=1608. Make sure not to miss the excellent article on “The
Importance of Layered Security,” featured at http://enterprisesecurity
.symantec.com/article.cfm?articleid=769.
TippingPoint
The TippingPoint UnityOne offering comes in an impressive range of hardware
performance, from the low-end UnityOne-200 meant for branch offices (up to
200 Mbit/sec), to the mind-boggling data center speeds of the UnityOne-2400
that just screams at 2.0 Gbit/sec. UnityOne uses a combination of software and
high-performance ASIC design to offer a (in their words) “Threat Suppression
Engine (TSE) that enables intrusion prevention at multi-gigabit speeds.” Having
the inspection software in ASIC form greatly improves speed over software-only
solutions. As mentioned previously, knowing the composition of Windows and
UNIX servers in your environment can greatly reduce false positives.To that
end,TippingPoint includes a network discovery tool that allows UnityOne to
automatically tune to the segment in which it is placed.
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As an inline device, the stability and robustness of these appliances is defi­
nitely something to consider; you don’t want anything that will quit on you and
bring your entire network to a screeching halt.TippingPoint has you covered
there as well, with an automatic failover of the appliance to a regular Layer 2
switch in case of malfunction. In addition, many appliances can be interlinked for
redundancy. With over 850 attack signatures out-of-the-box,TippingPoint places
a substantial amount of research behind their “security intelligence” by tapping
into exploit researchers at SANS, CERT, and SecuriTeam. An innovative add-on
module to UnityOne, released in the last half of 2003, is called the Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) Piracy Prevention option.The device can be set to completely limit (or set
quotas on) P2P file-sharing applications such as KaZaa, Gnutella, Limewire,
Bearshare, iMesh, and WinMX. (See Figure 9.7.)
Figure 9.7 TippingPoint UnityOne-2400 Appliance
NOTE
Just as we were going to press, Elisa Lippincott, marketing manager for
TippingPoint, wrote us and let us know that they have expanded both
their low-end and high-end offerings. A small-office 50 Mbps UnityOne­
50 appliance and the industry’s first 5.0 Gbit/sec IPS, the UnityOne-5000,
will be available in Q3 of 2004.
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Application-Level Firewalls
The tools presented in this section are different because they are not IDS solu­
tions that have evolved into IPS. Rather, they have always been a form of intru­
sion prevention and were all recently introduced to the market.They specialize in
addressing the nature of “good traffic” that is allowed through the firewall, but
might have “bad content.” Some have called these “Application-Layer IPSs” but
we believe they are really more of a firewall.The major features that these fire­
walls have in common are summarized in Table 9.2.
Table 9.2 Common Web Application Firewall Features
Vulnerability
Attack Method
Buffer Overflow A common type of input
validation attack that overflows a
buffer with excessive data.
Successfully executed, the hacker
can run a remote shell on the
machine and gain the same
system privileges granted to the
application being attacked.
Parameter
An input validation attack that
Manipulation
illegally modifies data that is
passed to a server-side script.
Without proper validation of
query parameters passed to CGI
scripts, a hacker can gain un­
authorized system privileges.
Hidden
Modifying the contents of a
hidden field in an attempt to trick
Form Field
the application into accepting
Manipulation
invalid data.
Cross-Site
Tricking the user’s browser into
Scripting (XSS) sending an attacker confidential
information that can be used to
steal that user’s identity.
Ease of Exploit
Difficult to write your
own; Very easy to use a
precompiled exploit
found in chat rooms
Easy to manipulate
parameters; difficult to
get additional privileges
because of it.
Easy to manipulate
hidden fields; difficult to
force application to
accept invalid data.
Very easy—can be
accomplished as simply
as posting malicious
JavaScript code in a
public chat room.
Continued
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Table 9.2 Common Web Application Firewall Features
Vulnerability
Attack Method
Ease of Exploit
SQL Injection
An input validation attack that
sends SQL commands to a Web
application, which are then
passed to a back-end database.
Successfully executed, the hacker
can gain access to a sensitive
information store.
Allows access to certain parts of
the Web site that aren’t meant
for public consumption. This can
sometimes happen by random
guessing of unlinked directory
names, or by causing the Web
server to enumerate the
directory names.
If the identity management of a
Web application is handled by
cookies or URL values with weak
encryption, a logged-in user
(with low privileges) might hijack
the session of another currently
logged-in user (with higher
privileges) by changing parts of
his session cookie to impersonate
the other user.
Submitting malformed data to an
application with the goal of
generating errors and gaining
sensitive information about the
application environment.
Exploiting misconfigurations,
including the failure to fully lock
down or harden the Web server,
disable default accounts and
services, or remove unnecessary
functionality.
Easy to inject com­
mands; sometimes diffi­
cult to know which
commands to use for
desired results.
Directory Traversal/
Forceful Browsing
Authentication
Hijacking
Error Triggering
Information Leaks
Server
Misconfiguration
Easy to perform, if Web
server is configured for
directory browsing or
has a vulnerability that
allows browsing.
Difficult to discover;
once found, however,
this is very easy to
exploit and can have
disastrous results (espe­
cially if an administrator
is logged in at the time).
Easy to perform, if
application is poorly
configured with detailed
error reporting.
Easy to attempt
(defaults are well known
and documented) if
allowed by server admin
negligence.
Because of the examples of Web-delivered worms in 2003, more and more
companies are beginning to feel the pressure to have an additional layer of secu­
rity between the traditional (port/protocol-based) firewall and the Web server.
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Richard Stiennon, an analyst at the Gartner Group (you remember—the folks
who said IDS was dead?), advises: “You’ve got to have a Web application firewall.
New e-commerce services will just be too vulnerable without something like
that.” He goes on to offer, “My advice is: Buy a Web application-specific firewall
today and install it in front of all your Web servers as soon as you can.” While we
believe that a well-configured HIPS can greatly reduce this threat, a layered,
defense-in-depth strategy of network-based firewall, then application firewall,
then HIPS is a recipe for peace of mind.
This emerging market is definitely going to see some acquisitions very soon.
As the importance of Web-delivered applications (and the security of those Web
applications) increases, watch for the big players in the market to swoop in on
the market leaders and affix their brand name to a winning technology. We pre­
sent, for your consideration, a selection of Web firewalls and a brief note on their
capabilities (although they can be largely summarized in Table 9.2). If you
manage any size Web farm, you should definitely evaluate one of these technolo­
gies before the next worm tests your defenses for you!
eEye
Hardly anyone would argue if we said that the team over at eEye are experts at
finding vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s IIS Web server.Therefore, it makes sense that
they would be experts at making software to prevent all these vulnerabilities.
Rather than address the more generic problem of Web vulnerabilities, eEye has
chosen to concentrate its efforts on just the IIS Web server, with much success.
The SecureIIS product integrates as an ISAPI—an Information Services
Application Programming Interface—that plugs into IIS itself. Instead of sitting
in front of your Web farm, SecureIIS is integrated much like modules integrate
into Apache; every time a Web request is made, SecureIIS inspects the request for
known vulnerabilities and malformed data, and then decides whether to allow
the request to be serviced by IIS, or to block the request. Instead of relying on a
database of known attack signatures (that usually require frequent updates),
SecureIIS inspects Web traffic for common attack methods such as buffer over­
flows, parser evasions, high-bit shell code, and directory traversals.
Through the SecureIIS management console, shown in Figure 9.8, you can
control all of your IIS Web servers. Once settings are made for one server, they
can be exported and pushed out to the others. All blocked requests are logged so
that you can troubleshoot legitimate requests and keep a vigilant eye out for
malicious activity. Since SecureIIS runs in concert with IIS, it has access to
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HTTPS Web requests after they have been decrypted, allowing these to be moni­
tored as well. Other products that sit in front of the server (and do not terminate
the SSL session themselves) will be blind to these attacks.
As an added feature, you can also have SecureIIS monitor arbitrary files on
the Web server file system, looking for any additions, modifications, or deletions
that are unauthorized (like someone attempting to delete your HTML, or
attempting to add something to your knowledge base remotely). Commercial
licenses of SecureIIS can be ordered online for $995 per server. Noncommercial
use for one Web site is absolutely free with the SecureIIS Personal Edition.
Figure 9.8 eEye SecureIIS
Hogwash
Back in 1996, Jed Haile and Jason Larsen had a problem.They were at Idaho State
University and had a mission-critical Web application hosted on an ancient version
of Microsoft IIS. Due to some tight integration, they were unable to patch the old
NT machine and they couldn’t migrate the application. Knowing they had vulner­
abilities, they could not just leave the matter as-is (the box was being hacked daily).
They needed a way to intercept packets on the way to the Web server, but without
installing anything on the Web server itself.They needed to do it that night and
without any budget money. Over one weekend, Jason created a basic packet
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
inspection engine and married that to some filtering intelligence to come up with
a method to clean up malicious packets; he called it Scrub.
Years later, Jason came across Snort and was impressed by its inspection
engine (see Figure 9.2). He replaced his own “Cheap and Dirty detection
engine” with Snort, and renamed his project SnortScrub. Fast forward to modern
times and many different contributions later, and what you have is a way to
“scrub” incoming Web packets of anything malicious that has an existing Snort
signature. As a nod to the pink pig that is the Snort mascot, he renamed his cre­
ation Hogwash. If you’d like to try your hand at some open-source intrusion
prevention, we’d recommend getting your feet wet with Hogwash.
KaVaDo
With both a scanning and a protection component, KaVaDo can protect your
Web farm from both sides.Their ScanDo product will perform an assessment of
your Web application security and then feed the results to the Web application
firewall, InterDo, using what they call “AutoPolicy” technology. By setting up
your policy in the InterDo Enterprise management console, you can manage
many InterDo installations across your organization.To provide the most granular
configuration, InterDo allows you to define “pipes” that identify the flow of
information into your Web farm. Once traffic matches a particular pipe, it is
inspected using the rules for that information path.The software will block a
large amount of known attacks, and you can configure it to protect against a
number of potential attacks by just using some common sense when creating
your pipes. For those who want to do a little custom-integration programming
work, you could even use the Pipes SDK to allow your program to dynamically
create and modify the InterDo pipes. Unlike some of the other technologies
listed here, InterDo works with not only Microsoft IIS, but also on Apache and
Netscape Enterprise Servers, on both Linux and Windows, and is even Check
Point OPSEC certified.
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NetContinuum
Unlike previously mentioned software solutions, the NetContinuum NC-1000 is
a hardware appliance that solves many of today’s Web farm needs all in one box.
The NetContinuum solution starts with a fully ICSA-certified firewall to protect
against the usual network-borne attacks discussed in Chapter 3.To this, they add
their Web Cloaking technology, which hides the details of the back-end applica­
tion that is servicing the Web requests.This is an important step in preventing
information disclosure. During the learning mode (called Dynamic Application
Profiling), the NC-1000 inspects all traffic going to and from the Web server,
attempting to determine the correct and legitimate dialogues allowed with each
particular Web application. Explicit rules can be set using the management con­
sole, shown in Figure 9.9 (a command-line interface is also available for those
who prefer it). Rather than tax the individual Web servers with the HTTPS
encryption, you can use the NC-1000’s Instant SSL features to quickly terminate
SSL tunnels at the appliance, and then pass unencrypted Web requests back to
the Web server.This allows for deep packet inspection even on HTTPS-protected requests, since the NC-1000 has access to the unencrypted request con­
tents before they are passed along to the Web server.
The NC-1000 will allow you to extend the concept of NAT to Web sites,
but using Web Address Translation.This allows you to expose internal company
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applications without disclosing internal resource names (Web server hostnames).
To help with new compliance laws, the NC-1000 also provides centralized log­
ging for your entire Web farm, and can even set up different log files for different
Web applications—even those running on the same Web server.This can greatly
help troubleshooting efforts, since you can weed out requests that weren’t des­
tined for a particular Web application and concentrate on the offending packets.
However, by far the best feature of the NetContinuum Web Security Gateway is
under the hood and (perhaps) little-appreciated. A custom, purpose-built ASIC
chip performs all the TCP session setup and tear-down, attack prevention, and
SSL encryption.This powerful piece of silicon has 48 hyperthreaded processors
embedded, and a beefy 280 Gbit/sec nonblocking switching fabric to ensure fast
throughput. Moreover, if high availability is your concern, the NC-1000 is able
to perform Active/Active and Active/Passive failovers with another appliance.
Figure 9.9 NetContinuum Web Security Gateway Management Console
Sanctum
The AppShield software can either be purchased as a stand-alone, or pre-loaded
on the AppShield appliance (a SunFire V100). During learning mode, which
leverages their patented Policy Recognition Engine, you can set an internal IP
address to be a “trusted source” for the basis of creating a policy. Any Web
requests from this machine will be considered genuine, and thus a policy will be
built around what this machine does and does not request from your Web
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servers. Sanctum AppShield comes with high praise, as being the first security
product to achieve the Certification for Web Application Policy Enforcement
from ICSA Labs. All of the Top 10 Web application vulnerabilities published by
the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) are addressed by
AppShield out of the box. AppShield is also OPSEC certified and can seamlessly
integrate with your IBM Tivoli network management framework or other
SNMP-based management software. It is no surprise that AppShield won the
Network World Best of the Tests award for 2003 in the Security Infrastructure cat­
egory (www.nwfusion.com/best/2004/0223securityinf.html). With no software
updates or patches to download, ever, the AppShield solution is a comforting
one. With a long track record for excellence, Sanctum truly shows that they were
the innovators in this arena, with their first version of the product released back
in 1999.
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Notes from the Underground…
Sanctum Patents Web Application Scanning
In June 2003, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued Patent No.
6,584,569 to Sanctum for “describing a process for automatically
detecting potential application-level vulnerabilities or security flaws in a
Web application.” Unlike the product patents with which we are most
familiar, this was a method patent, which means that the very process of
probing a Web server for application vulnerabilities (something that all of
the VA tools listed in Chapter 2 and most of the tools in this section do)
is patented. This could cause quite an uproar in the industry if Sanctum
finds a way to enforce their patent against all these other vendors. Could
you imagine if every time you wanted to scan your own Web farm (using
a tool other than AppShield of course), you would have to pay a royalty
to Sanctum? Join in on the thought-provoking discussion located at
www.securityfocus.com/archive/107/349930.
Teros
The Teros Secure Application Gateway is an all-in-one solution for networks that
need protection from today’s complex Web-based attacks.Teros CEO Bob
Walters says, “With the advent of Web services, IT departments are now faced
with the prospect of deploying yet another single function device to protect
XML traffic. In response, a new class of security appliance, called an application
security gateway, has emerged.These appliances provide unified protection for
both HTML and XML applications, while performing additional security and
networking functions currently handled by single-purpose products.”
Teros’ Secure Application Gateway solution is available on a family of appliance
platforms to meet all performance and availability requirements. All Teros security
appliances are purpose-built and integrate Teros’ award-winning application protec­
tion to secure any Web infrastructure against known and unknown attacks. Both
families of Secure Application Gateway appliances offer models integrating hardware-based SSL acceleration and FIPS 140-2 Level 3 Secure Key Management.
One unique feature that the Teros offers is the ability to sift through the Web
server responses on the way to the client, and filter out any information that has
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been predetermined to be of a sensitive nature.You can instruct Teros to look for
credit card information or social security numbers (using pattern matching), and it
will prevent any accidental information disclosure from getting to the outside
world.The e-commerce functions are so well thought out, that the Teros gateway
can recognize American Express, Diners Club, Discover, JCB, MasterCard, and
VISA account numbers and prevent them from being viewed by the remote user.
The software actually calculates a credit card checksum and uses this to recognize
sensitive information. A random collection of 16 digits (with appropriate hyphens)
will be passed by the Teros gateway, but a valid MasterCard account number will be
stopped dead in its tracks.This means that even if someone were able to compro­
mise your Web application’s logic and convince your Web site to spit out a customer’s credit card number, the Teros would prevent that from happening.You can
also set the Teros to allow credit cards, but to only allow one per HTML page.This
would allow normal order processing, but prevent an attacker who has managed to
use SQL poisoning to get a list of thousands of credit card numbers from ever
seeing that list. (See Figure 9.10.)
Figure 9.10 Teros Application Protection System
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Whale Communications
There is little doubt that the application firewall has a place in today’s networks.
Elad Baron, CEO of Whale Communications, notes that “When network attacks
became prevalent, companies installed TCP/IP firewalls and IDSs. But, today,
devastating worms and viruses attack at the application level … Against such
problems,TCP/IP firewalls and IDS are powerless and do not offer protection; to
regain security you need an application-level firewall.”The e-Gap Application
Firewall from Whale Communications is delivered as a robust hardware appliance
and promises to deliver tight control over your Web applications by using “Air
Gap technology.”The device has an impressive list of features, including an auto­
matic learning mode that can generate and enforce rule sets that are tailored to
your Web application, encryption, PKI, and HTTP payload screening wrapped
up in one integrated software/hardware platform.
The truly ingenious feature in this appliance is an honest-to-goodness phys­
ical “air gap” (most often found in military networks) between the two networks
that the unit bridges. By using two internal single-board computers inside the
appliance, the e-Gap Firewall can perform all of the security inspection on the
internal (shielded) computer without fear of being attacked itself. A patentpending analog switch connects a 512 KB memory bank to one and only one
computer at a time using a SCSI interface. Only application layer data is trans­
ferred in real time through the analog switch, and the switch itself has no oper­
ating system, no TCP/IP address, and no programmable units.
With most other security software, the underlying operating system can still
be undermined no matter how many safeguards are in the protection software
itself. Because of this air gap, the appliance doesn’t rely on the security of the
underlying operating system of the external computer; it does all the sensitive
operations and stores encryption keys on the internal, shielded computer, behind
the physical gap. Find out more about the gap and how it can protect your net­
work at www.whalecommunications.com/site/Whale/Corporate/
Whale.asp?pi=35. (See Figure 9.11.)
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Figure 9.11 Whale Communications’ e-Gap Application Firewall
Honeypots/Honeynets
Honeypots are the youngest of the different intrusion prevention components
described here; however, they are maturing very fast. As the fallout from the
worms of 2003 is discussed and analyzed, many will begin to see the deceptive
nature of honeypots to be useful in researching the next big “Slammer” type of
worm. By monitoring which remote hosts “take the bait” and begin to attack
fictitious systems, it becomes very easy to classify those hosts as 100-percent hos­
tile (an honest user wouldn’t be sending packets to a fictitious machine, now
would he?) and take corrective defensive actions—or sometimes even offensive
action if you want to be really nasty about it—in response to that information.
ForeScout
The ActiveScout solution, from ForeScout, is a very aggressive honeypot. While
most honeypots will just lure an attacker in and distract and/or confuse the
attacker, ActiveScout will “actively” solicit an attacker’s probing and react to any
exploit attempts.The logic behind this is blindingly simple. On unused, exter­
nally facing IP addresses, ActiveScout advertises the availability of services that are
attractive to attackers. When a potential attacker performs a port scan as part of
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his reconnaissance effort, he will find a wealth of open services (but not all) on
the ActiveScout-enabled ports. In response to his probing, ActiveScout will
respond with a specially tainted packet. Should that tainted packet ever be used
to establish another connection, the software can determine with 100-percent
certainty that the user is malicious, since no genuine request would have been
routed to the ActiveScout IP addresses in the first place. Once it has been deter­
mined that there is a malicious user knocking on the door, ActiveScout will
block that IP address across all machines, to prevent further probing or attacks.
Because of this methodology, ActiveScout is uniquely able to stop zero-day
attacks, no matter what their payload happens to be.This is because the inspec­
tion software doesn’t even check the packet’s payload, but instead works off the
behavior that the attacker has shown.
ForeScout CEO T. Kent Elliot states that “ForeScout’s Anti-Hacker and AntiWorm solutions are based on a patented technology called ActiveResponse. One
of the key distinguishing features of the technology is the ability to BLOCK
zero-day attacks.” If there is a probe, ActiveScout responds with the “bait,” which
is a tainted packet. When the attacker takes the bait and responds using the
tainted packet, he is blocked. “The key to the ActiveScout and WormScout solu­
tions is accuracy. One-hundred percent of ForeScout’s installed base has the auto­
matic blocking capabilities turned on.This is a testament to the accuracy of the
detection mechanism that makes the data actionable.” With most other IPS tech­
nologies, customers are sometimes gun-shy to enable full blocking because they
are worried about false positives (mistakenly blocking legitimate traffic). Because
of the high confidence that the software has in identifying attackers, this is not an
issue. In fact, 75% percent of their customers don’t have an IDS at all; they just
use ActiveScout.
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Tools and Tips…
Stop Worms from Spreading
A spin-off product, WormScout, uses the same ActiveResponse tech­
nology that is so effective on the perimeter of the network and applies it
to smaller segments without your internal infrastructure. If you have
studied the recommendation in Chapter 11, you know the importance of
segmenting your important internal networks. Let’s say that you have a
Sales VLAN, an Accounting VLAN, a Mobile User VLAN, and a general user
VLAN. What happens if an infected mobile user, dialing in through the
VPN and without the proper security patches that the in-house computers
enjoy, connects to your network with a vulnerable service running or with
a live worm? When the user connects, immediately the laptop starts to
infect the other users in the Mobile VLAN. It is not long before the selfpropagation routines in the worm start to attack the rest of your net­
works, from the inside! Even after you spent all that time and effort on
blocking the vulnerable port at the firewall, the worm was still able to get
inside your network.
With WormScout, you are able to quarantine the worm to just one
small segment of your network. At each choke point (or segmentation
point) in your network, you would install WormScout. There, it would
advertise a large number of potentially vulnerable ports to that segment.
If a worm infection does begin from within that segment, WormScout will
receive a probe from the worm. Like before, the ActiveResponse tech­
nology will respond with a tainted packet. When the worm responds to
this tainted packet, WormScout will know with certainty that this is mali­
cious traffic, and will prevent all of this traffic from escaping this seg­
ment. The nice part is that, in contrast to ActiveScout where the entire
machine is blocked, with the internally minded WormScout product, only
the malicious port and traffic are blocked. This means that instead of
having your entire network overcome with SQL Blaster, you just have the
Mobile User VLAN under attack. In addition, instead of cutting off the
entire VLAN, you just filter out any attempts to spread the virus to other
parts of the network, while allowing these (infected) users to still access
other network resources. (See Figure 9.12.)
Continued
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Figure 9.12 ForeScout WormScout Enterprise Manager
Honeyd
Honeyd (www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/honeyd) is a small server process that
creates virtual hosts on a network.The hosts can be configured to run arbitrary
services, and their personality can be adapted so that they appear to be running
certain operating systems. Honeyd enables a single host to claim multiple
addresses. From a defense point of view, it deters adversaries by hiding real sys­
tems in the middle of virtual systems. A short list of features includes:
■
Simulates thousands of “virtual hosts” at the same time.
■
Configuration of arbitrary services via simple configuration file.
■
Simulates multiple operating systems.
■
Simulation of different routing topologies.
■
Subsystem virtualization:
■
Run real UNIX applications under virtual Honeyd IP addresses:
Web servers, FTP servers, and so forth.
■
Dynamic port binding in virtual address space, background initiation
of network connections, and so forth.
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Sebek
Sebek (http://honeynet.lss.hr/tools/sebek) is a tool designed for data capture; it
captures all of the attacker’s activity on the honeypot without the attacker
knowing it.The Sebek client covertly sends the recovered data to the Sebek
server, as seen in Figure 9.13.Typically, the Sebek client is not installed on the
same machine as the Sebek server.The whole point is to not let the attacker
know that he is being watched. If the Sebek Server is on the compromised
machine, the attacker will find the data pretty quickly and make a quick exit.
Now what fun is that?
Figure 9.13 Sebek Architecture
Internet
Attacker
Traffic encrypted to cover tracks
Honeywall/Gateway
(Sebek Server)
Decrypted traffic captured and archived
Honeypot01
running Sebek client
Honeypot02
Honeypot03
Tarpits
Tarpits reverse the normal assumption that connections should be optimized for
maximum speed and maximum throughput. For unused IP addresses, you really
shouldn’t expect any connections.Tarpits are configured to listen on those
unused IP addresses. A tarpit will listen on certain ports, or all ports for that
matter, waiting for a connection. During the three-way TCP handshake, the
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sion windows); this results in slowing the transmission rate of the attacking
machine. Furthermore, a tarpit will never send back an ACK (acknowledgment)
packet to the transmitting machine, and thus the built-in transport-layer retrans­
mission features will retry every transmitted packet over and over.This also serves
to tie up the attacker for up to several hours.
The spread of worms on the Internet continues to be a major issue, affecting
hundreds of thousands or even millions of network hosts around the world.The
outbreaks of MS Blaster and Nachi/Welchia should be proof enough of that.The
concept behind a tarpit is fairly simple—connections come in, but they don’t get
back out. An August 2003 posting to SecurityFocus.com explains the process of
slowing network-based worms in much greater detail (www.securityfocus.com/
infocus/1723).Tarpits can be very valuable to a security administrator, especially
if you route a large range of addresses through a concentration point. A tarpit
placed at the concentration point can slow information scans and stop new
attack vectors before they cause problems.
ipt_TARPIT, an IPTables Patch
IPTables is a very commonly used firewall on Linux. It is command-line driven,
usually by a predefined script. Most scripts are written to allow specific traffic to
pass and block everything else. IPTables uses the concept of “targets” for its rule
actions. Examples of IPTables targets are accept, reject, and drop. ipt_TARPIT
(www.netfilter.org/patch-o-matic/pom-extra.html#pom-extra-TARPIT ) is a
patch for IPTables. It adds a TARPIT target to IPTables. If an attack matches a
certain pattern, the connection can be tarpitted.
For example, to significantly slow Code Red/Nimda/Blaster/Nachi-style
scans, you can forward unused IP addresses to a Linux box not acting as a router.
Enable IP forwarding on the Linux box, and add the following lines to your
IPTables startup script:
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -j TARPIT
iptables -A FORWARD -j DROP
Figure 9.14 shows how this would work.This would cause any TCP connec­
tion coming into the Linux box—which would be bad traffic since we’re routing
all unused IP addresses to the tarpit—to be tarpitted.The scan performance on
the attacker’s side would become so slow that the scan would take days to com­
plete even a small number of IPs, if not fail.The attacker would get bored or
impatient before he discovered the Web server toward the end of the scan.
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Figure 9.15 Example ipt_TARPIT Deployment
Internet
router
Route everything else
to the tarpit
Route “in-use” IP
addresses (1.1.1.200) to
the appropriate place.
Linux
running IPTables
with ipt_TARPIT patch
IP: 1.1.1.20-1.1.1.199
DMZ
web server
IP: 1.1.1.200
Firewall
LaBrea
LaBrea (http://labrea.sourceforge.net) takes over unused IP addresses and creates
virtual servers that are attractive to worms and hackers.The program answers
connection attempts in such a way that the machine at the other end gets
“stuck,” sometimes for a very long time. LaBrea works by watching ARP requests
and replies. When LaBrea sees consecutive ARP requests spaced several seconds
apart without any intervening ARP reply, it assumes that the IP in question is
unoccupied. It then creates an ARP reply with a bogus MAC address, and fires it
back to the requester.The nearest router takes note of the reply and forwards all
traffic destined for that IP to the bogus MAC address.
Subverting an IDS/IPS
IDSs only see what they are looking for. As long as traffic is massaged to stay out
of the IDS’s alert context, most attacks will go unnoticed. For example, a port
scan of a single system timed over many days would not cause an alert. Viruses,
worms, and script kiddies won’t take the time to use the following techniques.
Their method is to smash in, make the kill, and hope nobody is watching. Finesse
is not a word in their dictionary.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
Port Hopping
Some ways of avoiding detection are simple and easy to do. Some IDS signatures
only look for activity on a certain port to identify the attack. For example,
BackOrifice connections use port 31337 by default. Simply changing the port to
another port would leave most IDSs clueless.You should review critical signatures
for easy ways to get around them.
Fragmenting
Packet fragmenting is another method that is often used. Low Maximum
Transmission Units (MTUs) allow a malicious payload to be spread over many
tiny packets that have to be reassembled to read them. Some IDSs will reassemble
packet streams, but if the attack is spread over a long enough time, the IDS gives
up and stops reassembling that session.There are a couple techniques that use
fragmentation in different ways to evade IDS, including:
■
Fragmentation overlap
■
Fragment overwrite
Fragmentation overlap involves sending packets so subsequent fragments over­
write data from previous fragments, changing the attack signature enough for the
IDS to ignore it and the destination to receive the attack.
For example, PacketA could have the payload of “GET /scripts/root,”
PacketB could have a payload of “t.exe /cc,” and PacketC could have a payload
of “c+dir.”The IDS would see the request as “GET /scripts/roott.exe /ccc+dir,”
but when reassembled on the destination the packets would be reassembled as
“GET /scripts/root.exe /c+dir,” a typical Code Red check for vulnerability.
PacketA:
GET /scripts/root
PacketB:
t.exe /cc
PacketC:
c+dir
Fragmentation overwrite involves subsequent fragments overwriting an entire
previous fragment, instead of just a portion.To extend the previous example, the
packets could have the following payloads:
PacketA:
GET /scripts/root
PacketB:
xyxyxyxyxyxyxy
PacketC:
.exe c+dir
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PacketC would be set to overwrite PacketB.The destination would receive
the URL correctly, but the IDS sees a long URL that doesn’t match any of its
signatures.
Doug Song’s FragRoute (www.monkey.org/~dugsong/fragroute/) is a utility
that will implement the fragmentation overlap and fragment overwrite attacks for
you. FragRoute intercepts, modifies, and rewrites egress traffic destined for a
specified host, implementing most of the attacks described in the Secure
Networks “Insertion, Evasion, and Denial of Service: Eluding Network Intrusion
Detection” paper of January 1998 (found at
www.securityfocus.com/library/745). It features a simple rule set language to
delay, duplicate, drop, fragment, overlap, print, reorder, segment, source-route, or
otherwise monkey with all outbound packets destined for a target host, with
minimal support for randomized or probabilistic behavior.
Flooding
When all else fails, attackers will overwhelm the IDS with a multitude of useless
attacks and bury the real attack in the fray. Anyone who is responding to such an
attack likely won’t go through 1000 alert messages for well-known attack vectors—like Code Red. It’s easy to assume that someone just brought up an
infected machine and there is little cause for alarm. Surges of this type are
common.
In March 2001, ISS X-Force reported a new attack tool that can be used to
launch a stress test against many popular IDSs. Called Stick by its creators, the
tool reduces performance, and/or denies service to many commercial IDS prod­
ucts. Stick directs thousands of overt attacks at IDSs.The additional processing
required by IDSs to handle the new load causes a DoS to occur.
Stick does not employ any new methods, nor does it expose any new flaws
in signature-based IDSs. Stick uses the straightforward technique of firing
numerous attacks from random source IP addresses to purposely trigger IDS
events.The IDS will attempt to keep up with the new flood of events, but if
incoming events cross the IDS detection threshold, a DoS might result.The
effectiveness of the Stick attack is a function of the attacker’s available bandwidth.
Stick is essentially a flooding tool. If a lot of bandwidth is available to the
attacker, he or she might be more successful. Stick is available at www.eurocompton.net/stick/projects8.html.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
Summary
This chapter took you through an understanding of Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) basics and types of components within IDSs. It presented comparisons of
some of the many IDS solutions available.You learned how attackers fool IDSs
and navigate around them.You should now be able to decide what type of IDS
will work well in your environment. Once the IDS is implemented, regular
maintenance and attention will return many benefits that make IDSs a perma­
nent part of “defense in depth.”
Checklists
Deployment Checklist
Planning Many people try to skip this part and go straight to the
installation. Many problems can be identified and resolved in the plan­
ning stage. If discovered later in the deployment, money and time could
be wasted.
■
■
Determine Scope of Policy
■
Identify what the sensor will be looking for.
■
Decide how the sensor will react to attacks. Alert? Log? Block
Access?
Set Response Procedure
■
■
■
Establish a primary response person.
Research and Architect
■
Gather network topology information.
■
Identify type(s) of sensors to be deployed.
■
Determine whether the attack responses will be sent over the moni­
tored segment or a different segment.
Design Topology
■
Identify assets that need to be watched.
■
Determine where the sensor will be placed.
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■
Determine where the management station(s) will be placed.
Pre-Installation Once the design and research have been completed
and the deployment locations are identified, put together a “shopping
list” and get quotes from several vendors if possible.
■
Purchase
■
Ensure timely ship date. Delayed ship dates lead to delayed
deployments.
Installation Once the equipment has been delivered, installation can
begin. Make sure you have reviewed the installation documents by now.
■
■
■
Build
■
Remove any unnecessary services from each sensor. Do not connect
any sensors to the network until the sensor can be hardened.
■
Make sure each sensor is running the same version of software and
watch for the appropriate attacks.
Test
■
Attach to a test segment and send a few attacks by the sensor. Adjust
as needed.
■
Check for false positives and adjust as needed.
Deploy
■
Once tuned to an acceptable level, move the monitored interface to
the live network.
Post-Installation
■
Review Design
Routine Maintenance
■
Review IDS logs for irregular activity.
■
Follow up on every alert. Real attacks can be buried in a surge of false
attacks. If a signature is alerting too often, adjust the sensitivity to an
acceptable level.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
■
Review for false positives. Adjust the signatures to reduce the number of
false positives.
■
Check sensors regularly. Run an attack by one and see if it alerts on it.
Solutions Fast Track
Understanding Intrusion
Detection System Basics
There are several different components available within IDS environ-
ments.Your environment will dictate which ones (network-based sen­
sors, host-based sensors, hybrid sensors, honeypots, tarpits) will work for
you and which ones will not.
Comparing IDS/IPS Products
Many open-source products are very useful and can add tremendous
value.They tend to be less “point-and-click” than commercial solutions.
Choosing the right solution for your environment will provide you with
a truly usable resource and will help justify expanding later, if warranted.
Subverting an IDS/IPS
Attackers will use many different techniques to fool your IDS. Be pre­
pared for the attacks and don’t rely solely on the IDS to find the attacks.
IDS evasion techniques will constantly be evolving. Follow them; learn
them.They will be used against you.
Links to Sites
■
www.nai.com/us/products/mcafee/host_ips/category.htm
NAI’s Host Intrusion Prevention Web site.This site features information
on the McAfee Entercept agent and console.
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■
www.nai.com/us/products/sniffer/network_ips/category.htm
NAI’s Network Intrusion Prevention homepage. Old-time network
engineers will notice that the Web address contains a reference to the
former Network General’s Sniffer; NAI has owned NG since the late
1990s and has continued to develop the line.
■
www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/secursw/ps2113/
products_data_sheets_list.html Cisco’s IDS information page.This
page gives you a starting point for examining Cisco’s IDS/IPS products.
■
www.netfilter.org/patch-o-matic/pom-extra.html#pom-extraTARPIT TARPIT patch page.You’ll find information about this patch
for the IPTables firewall on this page.
■
http://labrea.sourceforge.net LaBrea homepage.This site has good
information about how tarpits work.
■
http://honeynet.lss.hr/tools/sebek Sebek homepage.
■
www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/honeyd Honeyd homepage.
■
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?
articleid=1608 Symantec’s Enterprise Security page.You’ll find infor­
mation about all the products available from Symantec.
■
www.iss.net/products_services ISS RealSecure Guard.
■
www.snort.org Snort Web site.This site has many add-ons and
enhancements to Snort. Good documentation is available as well.
■
www.sourcefire.com Sourcefire, the commercial version of Snort.
■
www.syngress.com/catalog/sg_main.cfm?pid=2440 Snort 2.0
Intrusion Detection book, over 500 pages of valuable information on the
Snort IDS.
■
www.monkey.org/~dugsong/fragroute Doug Song’s FragRoute
utility will allow you to try your hand at fragmentation overlap and
overwrite attacks.
■
www.forescout.com/products.html ForeScout ActiveScout and
WormScout.
■
www.whalecommunications.com Whale Communications’ e-Gap
Application Firewall.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
■
www.teros.com/products/appliances/gateway/ Teros Secure
Application Gateway.
■
www.sanctuminc.com/solutions/appshield/ Sanctum AppShield
and AppScan.
■
www.sanasecurity.com/products/ Sana Security Primary Response
host-based intrusion prevention.
■
www.netcontinuum.com NetContinuum NC-1000 Web Security
Gateway.
■
www.kavado.com/ProductsInterdo.htm KaVaDo, InterDo, and
ScanDo.
■
www.eeye.com/html/Products/SecureIIS eEye SecureIIS.
■
http://hogwash.sourceforge.net/ Hogwash, a Snort derivative.
Mailing Lists
■
[email protected] This mailing list is vendor neutral.
You’ll find lots of discussions relating to IDS.
■
www.snort.org/lists.html Several discussion lists that are actively
used by other Snort users worldwide.
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Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: Where is the best place to watch for traffic?
A: That really depends on your network layout. Some networks are routed and
have several “choke points” or aggregation segments through which all traffic
passes. Common places for IDS components are behind and in front of
Internet points of presence, inside a DMZ, behind a VPN switch that is used
for remote access and VPN-based WAN links, and on uplinks for a data
center.
Q: Since I watch my firewall logs, do I really need an IDS?
A: Yes! You might be able to identify some attacks from firewall logs, but many
attacks are buried in legitimate connections. Most firewalls only log connec­
tions and not packet contents.
Q: My IDS has been running for a few weeks and I don’t have the time to look
through all 10,000 alert e-mails that it has sent to me. Which IDS package
should I buy that has fewer alerts?
A: Tuning is so important to an IDS deployment yet it is often overlooked. Most
administrators believe that they can just install the IDS and walk away from
it.That is not true. In most sophisticated burglar alarms, you can’t simply buy
one off the shelf at the supermarket and plug it into the wall outlet.You need
to plan where the equipment will be placed and tune the motion sensors so
that it triggers on human intruders but allows your dog to walk around the
house freely.The same is true for IDS. A properly tuned IDS should only be
sending out alert e-mails for critical issues. If you are receiving a high
number (it is not unheard of to receive 100 to 200 e-mails/day from some
IDS) of messages, you haven’t done your homework.
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Implementing Intrusion Detection Systems • Chapter 9
Q: What legitimate services should I be cognizant of when I “flip the switch”
and engage my IPS’ blocking mode?
A: Remember to consider automated update methods (such as Microsoft
Windows Update, Symantec LiveUpdate, and so forth), your own scheduled
tasks, and your nightly backup routine. If you do a different backup method
only monthly (perhaps full backup monthly, differential backups every other
day), make sure you consider whether the monthly backup needs more or
less rights than the daily, quick backup.
Q: My router has some IDS features; why would I want to dedicate a whole
machine to this?
A: The router has plenty to do with routing packets without trying to compare
each one to a database of signatures. As far as databases go, the one provided
with router-based IDS solutions is woefully inadequate. Only the very
obvious attacks will be picked up, at the expense of slowing all packets.
Q: Which ports should I allow through the firewall and into my honeynet?
A: One of the most important concepts of a honeynet is that it is not to be
trusted. It should be a completely separate entity from your production net­
work. Ideally, you should have a dedicated T1 or DSL line for this network to
keep it far away from your “good” servers. If possible, noncontiguous IP
address space is desirable to keep attackers from associating your network
with the honeynet. Since you know the honeynet might be compromised,
you don’t want to provide a jumping-off point for potential attackers to
reach your internal network. If a completely new Internet connection is not
feasible, a dedicated DMZ interface on your firewall (one that is not shared
with other servers) can be substituted. Do not allow any packets to flow from
this DMZ to your internal network.
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Chapter 10
Perimeter
Network Design
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Looking at Design Principles
■
Designing an Internet Access Network
■
Designing Internet Application Networks
■
Designing VPN and Remote Access
Termination Networks
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 1 Designing Perimeter and Internal
Segments
■
Chapter 3 Selecting the Correct Firewall
■
Chapter 4 Firewall Manipulation: Attacks
and Defenses
■
Chapter 5 Routing Devices and Protocols
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Chapter 10 • Perimeter Network Design
Introduction
Most computer networks can be categorized by the function they perform and
the services they provide. Perimeter networks can be defined as any network that
provides services to any other user or network of unknown security status.These
provided services might include Internet access to corporate networks, public
access to Internet applications, or possibly even remote access or VPN services.
Networks of unknown security status to which those services are provided can
be anything from the public Internet, the home networks of corporate users, or
even the private networks of partner organizations.The category of perimeter
network includes many different types of network functions; however, the one
common function found in perimeter networks is a connection point to less
trusted networks. Given this fundamental attribute, it is important to have secu­
rity as one of the primary objectives when designing perimeter networks.
Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems
(IPSs), filtering routers, and network segmentation are just some of the devices
and techniques that are used in designing secure perimeter networks. And while
a perimeter network is by no means the only location in your network architec­
ture where security is paramount, perimeter networks are probably the most
important place to implement security devices.
In this chapter, we focus on some of the main issues relating to designing
perimeter networks. We discuss the general design principles commonly used
when designing all network architectures and consider how those principles
change when applied to designing perimeter networks. We also discuss the dif­
ferent types of security devices most commonly used to protect your perimeter
network, including firewalls, IDS, and IPS, and some of the most common secure
design techniques such as network segmentation and filtering. We discuss the
techniques of choosing the best type of firewalls and IDSs for the job, and con­
sider the optimal location for security devices within an overall perimeter net­
work design.To end the chapter, we cover three examples of classic perimeter
network design challenges, an Internet access network, an Internet application
network, and a remote access service network, detailing the design characteristics
of each and going over the basic considerations made in their designs.
Looking at Design Principles
As with any complex system, the design of computer networks begins with the
careful consideration of many factors to ensure that the result performs optimally.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Even though computer networks are constantly evolving and changing with the
advance of technology, good network design principles are just as relevant now as
they were in the early days of computer networking. In this section, we look at
some of the more accepted network design principles and see how they apply to
secure perimeter network design. We discuss firewall placement and selection,
IDS placement and selection, and proper network segmentation using DMZ net­
works, service networks, and filtering routers.
Most network design professionals will tell you that to design an optimally
performing network you have to start at the top. For some, the top is the applica­
tion using the network, and for others, the top extends past the application to the
users of that application. What most will agree on is that competent network
design principles start by considering the purpose of the network. Whether that
network is a corporate network supporting file and print sharing along with
Internet access, an Internet application network supporting a busy e-commerce
application, or an ISP network supporting data transport around the globe, the
important thing to consider is the applications and users themselves, including
the technical goals and business objectives that the network will be used to
accomplish.This network design technique is generally called the top-down net­
work design philosophy. Practitioners of top-down network design first focus on
collecting information that will allow them to determine the requirements for
capacity, functionality, performance, availability, scalability, affordability, manage­
ability, and security. With these requirements complete, top-down network
designers proceed to create logical network designs that encompass the specific
needs of the application or user base. Only after the logical design has proven to
meet requirements, do they proceed to the physical design phase where real net­
work devices are introduced.
In designing perimeter networks, a slightly modified top-down design philos­
ophy is necessary. Because of the prevalence of interconnected networks and
Internet applications in today’s perimeter network architectures, most designers
of perimeter networks put an equal amount of emphasis on designing for secu­
rity as they do designing for application requirements. As always, a balance must
be struck between what can sometimes be two opposing needs. Secure network
designs generally are costlier, necessitate more equipment, and are often more
difficult to manage and maintain than are designs built strictly for application
performance.These additional costs must then be balanced against the possible
consequences and costs of an insecure perimeter network that may allow unau­
thorized or malicious access to private networks and resources. It may be difficult
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Chapter 10 • Perimeter Network Design
to express the costs of a security breach in terms of dollars and cents because the
effect of a security breach can range from data being lost or destroyed to the loss
of reputation and media exposure if valuable information or applications are
compromised. In most scenarios, a balance between security and application per­
formance can be arrived at that both protects private networks with strong
perimeter network security and maintains acceptable levels of application perfor­
mance.
Selecting and Deploying Firewalls
Firewalls are probably the most common network security device, and these days
one can be found on almost any network.There are many different types of fire­
wall devices that are based on various platforms and architectures.The tech­
nology behind firewalls has progressed steadily through many evolutions of
performance, functionality, and price. Firewalls today are faster, more capable, and
cost less than the devices of only a couple of years ago. Firewalls have also pro­
gressed beyond the corporations, government entities, and ISPs who were among
the first implementers of firewall technology.The explosion of broadband
Internet connectivity has created a demand for basic firewall devices in small
offices and homes that has been met by simple hardware firewalls that cost less
than $100 and various software firewall applications.This explosion of firewall
technology will only continue as networks become more interconnected and the
devices themselves become faster, contain more features, and become more cost
effective to deploy on a wider scale.
Firewalls in general are meant to be points of control between two network
security zones through which all network traffic must pass. At this point of con­
trol, firewalls perform a variety of functions on passing traffic.The two main
functions most conventional firewalls perform are enforcing security policies and
logging. By enforcing security policies, firewalls decide whether to allow network
connections.These decisions are based on rules that the administrator has config­
ured into the firewall or rules that the firewall has configured based on past con­
nections. For example, an administrator might configure a rule to allow HTTP
traffic on TCP port 80 from hosts inside the firewall to hosts on the Internet, or
a firewall might create a dynamic rule to allow traffic to an internal host from a
host outside the firewall based on an established session. Firewalls also have the
capability to log all aspects of traffic flow between the networks they join.
Logging can be the key to determining traffic patterns and for forensic analysis.
Firewalls are such a powerful tool in securing your network that they are often
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
considered the most important security devices you can implement. And while
this might be true, it’s important to also remember that a firewall alone does not
provide complete network protection.
In this section, we look at how you can use firewalls to protect your perimeter
networks. We look at where in your overall perimeter network design a firewall
is most effective, and how to determine which type of firewall is best for your
network design.
Placing Firewalls for Maximum Effect
Because perimeter networks are fortified boundaries between networks of different security levels, firewalls are a key component in a good perimeter network
design. A good firewall implementation is designed to keep out all network
traffic that is not specifically allowed, and this key tenet should be the overall
goal of your perimeter network design as well. A good perimeter network design
should aim to control all points of access to the perimeter network, and firewalls
are responsible for maintaining the security policies at those access points.
Firewalls should be placed at any access point to your perimeter network as well
as between any network segments within your perimeter network architecture.
Multiple firewalls or firewalls with multiple interfaces can be used to create different security zones for different types of traffic that might require different
security policies. For example, a public zone that contains Web servers should be
segmented from any higher-level security zones like a management network,
backup network, or data access network (see Figure 10.1).
Figure 10.1 Typical Internet Application Network Design
Border Routers
Perimeter Firewalls
ISP2
Internal switches
Load Balancing
Switches
Perimeter Switches
ISP1
Hub
Perimeter Segments:
Border Routers, Perimeter Switches,
Perimeter Firewalls
Hub
Hub
7
Internal Segments:
Web Servers,
Application servers
Internal Firewalls
Hub
Internal Segments:
Database Servers
Leased Line
Internal Router
Hub
Hub
Internal Firewalls
Internal Segments:
Management and Backup
Servers
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Chapter 10 • Perimeter Network Design
Damage & Defense…
Eliminate Single Points of Failure
Because a firewall is a single point through which all network traffic must
pass, it is also an easy place to have a single point of failure in your net­
work architecture. To avoid this common failure point, most of the cur­
rent enterprise class firewalls have the capability to be deployed in a
redundant or high availability mode. This configuration usually allows the
firewall pair to seamlessly transfer session information to one another so
that traffic flow is not disrupted should one device fail. Implementing
high availability firewalls increases network reliability and provides
another level of defense against some types of network attacks. If one
firewall is compromised and fails, the other will automatically resume pro­
tecting the network.
Determining the Right Type of
Firewall for Your Perimeter Network Design
There are many different types of firewalls, and each has unique strengths and
weaknesses. Deciding on the right type of firewall for the job depends on the
details of the situation where it will be used. Requirements for low network
latency, high network capacity, the network protocols in use, and the applications
being placed behind the firewall all play a major role in deciding which type of
firewall is best suited for a particular design.
Firewalls are generally classified by the methods they use to enforce security
policies, by how they handle network traffic, and by the physical configuration of
the device. In this section, we look at the various classifications of firewalls,
examining the strengths and weaknesses of each, and give examples of where
each type of firewall best fits into a perimeter network design.
Packet-Filtering and Proxy-Based Firewalls
When classified by the way in which they enforce security policies, most firewalls
fall into at least one of three categories.The first category is packet-filtering firewalls.This type of firewall operates at the network or IP level of a network stack.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
It examines a network packet’s IP content and filters traffic based on addresses,
ports, and packet options.This category includes stateful packet inspection fire­
walls, which maintain a state table of authorized connections and use this table to
deny traffic that doesn’t match with expected session states of existing connec­
tions. Stateful packet inspection firewalls are a very common type of firewall in
use today. Because packet-filtering firewalls operate at the network level, they are
usually very high-performance firewalls. So much so that some manufacturers of
stateful packet inspection firewalls claim that their devices can perform at wire
speed, meaning that traffic flows though the device with no noticeable delay.
Packet-filtering firewalls are excellent solutions when application performance is
an important requirement, such as when designing a network to host an Internet
application such as an e-commerce site.
The second category of firewall is the application-proxy firewall.This type of
firewall works at the application layers of a network, and actually terminates all
incoming and outgoing connections at the firewall. If the connection is per­
mitted, the application-proxy firewall then initiates a connection to the destina­
tion host on behalf of the source host. Application-proxy firewalls are able to
make sure traffic flowing through them conforms to network security policies,
and that functions within a protocol or application conform to specified security
policies as well. For this reason, application-proxy firewalls are considered more
secure than packet-filtering firewalls. Unfortunately, by the vary nature of application-based firewalls, they must be able to understand the application before
they are able to proxy it. It is nearly impossible to create proxies for each indi­
vidual application that exists, so most application-proxy firewall vendors provide
proxies for the most common Internet applications.
The third category of firewalls is the circuit gateway firewall.This type of
firewall works at the transport layer of a network and filters traffic based on
addresses. A circuit gateway firewall is intended to create a virtual circuit between
source and destination host allowing for a more seamless connection. Most cir­
cuit gateway firewalls are implemented using SOCKS, an IETF approved standard
for application proxies.The SOCKS implementation uses sockets to keep track of
separate connections and requires a SOCKS-compatible client on the source host
system. Even though most common Web browsers include a SOCKS client, cir­
cuit gateway firewalls are more commonly used in corporate Internet access sce­
narios where the administrator has control over the client system.
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Server-Based Firewalls and Firewall Appliances
When classified by the physical configuration of the firewall, there are two gen­
eral types of dedicated firewall devices.The first is a server-based firewall. A
server-based firewall runs on a secured or specially modified common operating
system like UNIX, Linux, Solaris, or Windows NT/2000 running on commodity
server hardware.The second type of firewall configuration is known as a firewall
appliance. Firewall appliances are purpose-built hardware devices that run propri­
etary operating systems.
Each firewall configuration has strengths and weaknesses and it is important
to consider these when choosing the type that is right for your perimeter net­
work design.The strengths of server-based firewalls are that they are generally
more customizable and have a higher degree of complexity owing to the fact
that they run on commodity server hardware on top of a general operating
system. Server-based firewalls also generally have more internal storage for logs
and are easier to upgrade than firewall appliances are. Some of the weaknesses of
server-based firewalls are cost (server-based firewalls generally are more expensive
solutions), performance (server-based firewalls are usually slower than most fire­
wall appliances), and manageability; because server-based firewalls run on
common operating systems they become vulnerable to any weakness discovered
in the operating system platform.To maintain a server-based firewall, patches and
updates for both the firewall software and the underlying operating system must
be tracked and applied religiously. Still, server-based firewalls are generally the
only firewall configuration that supports application proxy and circuit-gateway
firewall solutions, which is still the highest level of firewall security available.
The strengths and weaknesses of a firewall appliance are mainly based on the
purpose-built hardware that runs the device. Firewall appliances derive their
major strength from the fact that most of the network logic and firewall func­
tions happen on purpose-built hardware and not up through the network stack
of an operating system.This fact makes these devices capable of handling traffic
at higher rates of speed and in higher quantities than server-based firewalls can.
These devices have become extremely prevalent in high traffic applications such
as Internet application and ISP networks because of their high-performance
characteristics. Unfortunately, the purpose-built hardware platform is also a weak­
ness for firewall appliances. Proprietary hardware generally makes these devices
less upgradeable than server-based firewalls, and is less likely to have standard
server features that can be convenient, such as a hard disk drive for log storage.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Examining Routing Firewalls and
Transparent Bridging Mode Firewalls
When classified by the way in which a firewall deals with network traffic, two
general types of firewall configurations have become prevalent in most firewall
solutions.The more traditional configuration is the routing firewall. Because most
firewalls manipulate packets at the network layer and higher, they generally are
placed in a location between different networks and are responsible for routing
packets between two or more interfaces and network numbers; hence the classifi­
cation of routing firewall. More recently, firewalls have taken their game down a
level to the data link layer.This type of firewall still inspects a packet’s IP infor­
mation and is a single point through which all traffic passes; however, this type of
firewall bridges traffic at the data link layer and hence is known as a bridging
firewall or transparent firewall.
A bridging firewall is a relatively new configuration that does offer a couple
of advantages in some circumstances. Primarily, a bridging firewall can be
inserted into any network environment without any serious reconfiguration of
network numbers or default gateways.This makes a bridging firewall an excellent
device to use for quiet monitoring of network traffic or to protect a device
within a complex network environment where configuration changes aren’t pos­
sible. Another benefit of bridging firewalls is that the firewall itself might not
need to have an IP address at all, and in this configuration the device is totally
transparent to the network and any potential attacks or threats. However, this
configuration is slightly more difficult to manage, as any configuration would be
done through a serial terminal CLI.
Routing firewalls are still the standard for most firewall configurations and
probably will continue to be based on the fact that routing-based firewalls allow
for features that are very important in many network designs. NAT, multiple
interfaces and networks, and ease of management are all strong features not avail­
able in pure bridging firewalls.
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Tools & Traps…
Bridging Firewalls Can Help Fix a Problem Quickly
Because bridging firewalls do not require any changes to existing network
infrastructure, it is possible to deploy one in front of an entire network in
minutes. It is a good thing to have handy when an emergency requires
that strict policies be implemented immediately. Keep a bridging firewall
configured and ready to deploy and you will be prepared for the next time
the fire alarm goes off.
Including IDSs and IPSs in Your Design
While firewalls might be considered the foundation of your network security
design for their capability to secure all access points to your perimeter network,
IDSs and IPSs are fast becoming just as widely deployed for their capability to
examine traffic as it flows through your network to detect possible attacks.
Additionally, the increasing threat of DoS attacks, DDoS attacks, and self-replicating
Internet worms and viruses has also lead to intrusion detection/prevention systems
becoming more common in a complete perimeter network design. Where IDSs
were once almost exclusively used to detect rogue traffic patterns that matched a
preconfigured set and to send alerts, new generations of IDS/IPS are increasing in
features, functions, and performance to the point where IDS/IPS are now actively
denying traffic that matches patterns or is a statistical anomaly. Perimeter network
designers are increasingly dovetailing IDS and IPS with existing firewall solutions
to create layered security solutions that are more effective than firewalls alone.
There are two main techniques for IDSs and IPSs to detect intrusions.The first
technique is a knowledge-based technique. IDSs based on a knowledge-based
technique work by examining traffic at the network layer and above and com­
paring patterns within those network packets to known attack or intrusion signatures.This technique is the most commonly used technique in IDSs today because
it is very accurate. Knowledge-based IDSs are very good at detecting traffic that
matches signatures they know about. However, just because these systems are accu­
rate doesn’t mean they catch all intrusions and attacks. A knowledge-based system
has to be updated continually with the latest signatures to keep up to date.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Another technique for IDS design is a behavior-based system. A behaviorbased system works by examining traffic patterns and comparing them with his­
torical trends. Alerts are generated on any traffic patterns that are out of the
ordinary. Behavior-based IDSs can be very good at catching all attacks and intru­
sions; anything that looks out of the ordinary will generate an alarm.
Unfortunately, behavior-based IDSs generally aren’t as accurate as knowledgebased systems, and tend to generate many false alarms as well.
Where Is an IDS Most Effective?
Most IDSs have traditionally been deployed behind the firewall in a passive role,
monitoring all traffic as it flows past the firewall into the network through mir­
rored ports on a switch or via a tap device inserted directly between the firewall
and core switches. However, newer IDS and IPS devices are designed to connect
directly between the perimeter firewall and network switches, intercepting all
network traffic.This position puts these devices in a better location to prevent
intrusion and attack traffic by dropping the offending packets. More and more
devices are also being designed for deployment outside the perimeter firewall
between the perimeter router and the perimeter firewall.These devices are
designed to stop DoS and DDoS attacks before they reach your firewall device.
The optimal location for an IDS or IPS depends on its features and func­
tions. An IDS with passive monitoring and alerting capabilities won’t need to be
in a position to deny traffic. Its optimal location is behind the perimeter firewall
closest to the data that is protected. An IPS that is capable of stopping DoS and
DDoS attacks should be deployed on the perimeter network between the
perimeter router and perimeter firewall where it can do the most good. In addi­
tion, an IPS that can match traffic patterns quickly and accurately enough to
deny intrusion attempts as they happen should be deployed inline to all network
traffic right behind the perimeter firewalls in a redundant configuration to elimi­
nate any single points of failure.
Creating Network Segments
One of the methods commonly used for alleviating network congestion and net­
work segmentation can also be used to increase the security of perimeter net­
works. Network segmentation is the practice of dividing your network
architecture into sections, and is usually implemented to reduce the size of
broadcast domains and to increase network efficiency. In designing perimeter
networks, network segmentation is implemented to separate networks based on
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content and use.This technique enables network security devices to be imple­
mented at the boundaries between network segments, which allows for more
control over network traffic that reaches critical information assets.
Network segmentation can be implemented in a variety of ways, and it is
important to consider which method best meets your perimeter network design
goals. In this section, we discuss the various methods and tactics used to prop­
erly implement network segmentation, and a couple of different ways to consider
network segmentation in your perimeter network architecture.
Securing Your Perimeter Network with
VLANs and Routers with Access Control Lists
Implementing network segmentation means dividing your network into smaller
pieces, which can be done by either physically separating your networks or using
VLANs. Physically separating your networks is probably the most secure method of
segmentation, but it is also the costliest in terms of additional NICs, switching
infrastructure, and increased management. For this reason, most networks use
VLANs. VLANs are a technology that is supported on most enterprise-class
switches and allows different ports on the same switch to be assigned to different
virtual networks.Traffic on one VLAN can’t traverse onto other VLANs without
being routed by a Layer 3 network device.This allows for network segmentation
without implementing additional switches; however, it is important that some secu­
rity considerations be taken before implementing VLANs.
Primarily, all switches should be properly secured at the switch OS level.
Implementing VLANs on an improperly secured switch provides little security
improvement, as the switch might be easily compromised and reconfigured. In
addition, all VLANs should be created specifically for the networks to which they
will belong, and the default VLAN should either be removed or configured with
no member ports. Finally, all unused ports on your VLAN switch should be con­
figured to belong to no VLANs at all.These techniques will help keep your VLAN
configurations secure and your network properly segmented.
Because each network segment becomes its own network broadcast domain,
traffic cannot freely travel between network segments.To get from one segment
to another, all traffic must pass through a Layer 3 network device like a router,
routing firewall, or a switch with Layer 3 capabilities. It is this fact that makes
network segmentation such a useful technique for secure network design; it pre­
sents the perfect opportunity to control the flow of traffic. While we have already
discussed the importance of implementing firewalls at every major network
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
boundary, another method for controlling traffic between network segments is
ACLs on the routers that direct traffic between them. ACLs are similar to packetfiltering firewalls in that they prevent or authorize traffic based on rule sets.
These rule sets reference IP network and address information, and protocol
details and control network traffic based on these parameters. ACLs and router
security are covered in more depth in Chapter 5, “Routing Devices and
Protocols.”
Segmenting Using DMZ
Networks and Service Networks
DMZ, as many people know, is actually a military term for demilitarized zone.The
military definition of DMZ means a zone, or area, from which military installa­
tions, operations, and forces are prohibited.This area generally separates two
opposing forces and is owned by neither.The term DMZ first became commonly
used in describing a particular part of a network that was in many ways similar to a
military DMZ.The network segment between a gateway router and a firewall was
generally unprotected and separated “us” from “them.” More recently, the term
DMZ has evolved to describe a zone on the network that isn’t necessarily unpro­
tected, but still exists as a buffer between areas of dissimilar control.
When segmenting perimeter networks, there are various ways to separate the
architecture.The first technique involves segmenting the network based on the
function and location of the resources within each segment. Resources that need
to be available to users and networks of unknown security status are regularly
designed into a DMZ network, and that approach can also be used to segment a
perimeter network internally. Servers and resources such as Web servers, e-mail
gateways, and anonymous FTP servers that require constant access via public net­
works would be segmented from other areas of the perimeter network that
might include database servers that contain Web server display data, or private
FTP servers.This technique can aid in segmenting the network based on utiliza­
tion because servers that are publicly available would be separated and protected
from servers that still need to be accessed by known users from outside your
security domain.
Another approach to segmenting a perimeter network is to consider the ser­
vices provided by the various resources on each segment, and segment the net­
work accordingly. Each network segment would be defined based on the services
the resources within that network provide.This approach allows very tight con­
trol over the traffic flowing between each of the network segments because each
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segment only provides one type of service. However, this approach can also lead
to a large number of network segments if too many services need to be pro­
vided, and a large number of network segments can mean additional network
security devices and management overhead.
Designing an Internet Access Network
An Internet access network is one that connects a trusted network to the public
Internet.This type of perimeter network is probably one of the most common
types of perimeter networks deployed and is most often used to connect the
trusted networks of businesses or public institutions to the Internet.The Internet
has become so prevalent and necessary in daily business functions that most
Internet access networks are also considered mission-critical resources, meaning
that their design must be fault tolerant, highly available, and secure.The Internet
access network is mainly designed for network hosts on the trusted network to
make requests and access information on the public Internet. An Internet access
network is not designed to allow any access from the public Internet to reach the
trusted network.This type of perimeter network is called an Internet application
network. We discuss design considerations for Internet application networks in the
next design example.
In this section, we look at designing a typical Internet access network for a
sample company of 250 people using a top-down network design approach
while keeping security a top priority. We begin by looking at the typical types of
information that we need to collect to design the appropriate solution, and from
there we progress to a logical network design that can be easily translated into a
physical network architecture design.
What to Consider when
Designing Internet Access Networks
When designing an Internet access network, the first step is to collect requirements.These requirements can generally be broken down into two types: busi­
ness requirements and technical requirements. Business requirements include
things like project budget, project goals, project schedules, and the scope of the
project.Technical details include requirements for network availability and per­
formance, network manageability and usability, and most importantly of all in an
Internet access network design, network security.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Collecting business and technical requirements requires diligence and patience.
All requirements should be recorded and documented. Only after all of the busi­
ness and technical requirements have been collected can we begin translating those
requirements into technical details that we can then use to create our logical net­
work design. A good place to begin collecting the requirements is in assessing the
business requirements and scope. Are we designing an Internet connection network
for the entire organization or for a small field office? Other important considera­
tions are the budget and schedule of the project.
Business requirements play a big role in influencing the types of technologies
used when translating the technical requirements into a logical and physical net­
work design. With a good understanding of the business requirements, collecting
the technical requirements allows us to delve one level deeper into the design process.The technical requirements will dictate the level of network availability and
performance.These requirements will help us answer questions like “Does the level
of availability require redundant Internet connections, and how much capacity will
our Internet connections need to accommodate the application performance
required?”Technical requirements will also allow us to decide important factors
like usability and manageability. What protocols and application will be allowed?
Will caching and/or proxying of the Internet connection be necessary? Finally, the
technical requirements will also translate directly into considerations for network
security. What types of firewalls will be necessary? Will they be redundantly
deployed and configured? How will logging and auditing of Internet access be
addressed? Will usage be authenticated, and if so, how? How will IDSs or intrusion
prevention be integrated into the design? The answers to all of these questions
should be contained in the technical requirements, and as the design progresses a
matrix that maps the technical decisions to business and technical requirements
should be created to make sure all requirements have been accommodated.
Once all of the business and technical requirements have been considered, the
next step is designing the logical network and physical networks. For this example,
we will assume that we have collected the small set of business and technical
requirements listed in Table 10.1.
Table 10.1 Technical Decisions to Requirements Map
Business
Requirements
Technical Requirements
Technical Decisions
Internet access is
mission critical.
Bandwidth necessary is
5 Mbps.
Multiple Fractional T3
circuits.
Continued
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Table 10.1 Technical Decisions to Requirements Map
Business
Requirements
IMAP e-mail clients,
Web browsing
allowed. No IM or
other network
applications allowed.
Technical Requirements
Technical Decisions
IMAP and HTTP will be the Redundant firewalls with
only protocols allowed.
appropriate rule configu­
ration.
Detect possible network
intrusions.
Allow Web browsing un­
authenticated but log all
browsing activity.
Log all firewall events and
unauthorized activity.
Secure perimeter network
devices.
Redundant and secure
routing protocol needed.
Implement IDS.
Implement Web proxy
server.
Implement syslog server
and configure firewalls.
Routers and switches
configured to guard
against DoS attacks.
BGPv4 implemented for
redundant dynamic
routing. BGPv4 also sup­
ports authentication.
Designing the Logical and Physical Networks
With the business and technical requirements captured and translated, the next
step in designing an Internet access network is the logical network design. For
this task, most network architects use a visual design application such as
Microsoft Visio or SmartDraw.These tools allow you to visually lay out your
network design and choose the optimal placement for your firewalls, network
switches, proxy or caching servers, and IDSs. Once complete, a logical network
design should show at a high level how the Internet access network works, and
should demonstrate each of the technical and business requirements. Logical net­
work diagrams do not detail the exact device models and port-level connections;
these details are contained in the physical network design.
For this example, we have included redundant border routers connecting to
different ISPs. If possible, we would also try to ensure that each ISP uses a difwww.syngress.com
Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
ferent local service provider for connectivity to the location. We have specified
an IDS and installed it on the perimeter network, outside the firewalls, where it
can detect any intrusion attempts. We have also specified redundant firewalls to
provide extremely reliable access to the Internet (see Figure 10.2).
Figure 10.2 Basic Internet Access Logical Network
Border Routers
Perimeter Firewalls
ISP2
ISP1
Perimeter Switches
Hub
Internal switches
Hub
Internal Segments:
Internal network hosts and servers
Perimeter Segments:
Border Routers, Perimeter Switches,
Perimeter Firewalls
Intrusion Detection/
Prevention System
Hosts on trusted
Network
With a logical network design complete, the next phase of the network design
is the physical network design process.The physical network design process
includes choosing actual device models.This process can be time consuming, but
should be facilitated by the fact that your logical network design shows how the
devices need to function, and all of the requirements have been translated into all
of the performance, capacity, cost, and manageability details for the device. Most
network architects have a good understanding of the current network devices
being manufactured, including an understanding of features, functions, and limita­
tions in the real world. However, if this is not the case, you will have to do exten­
sive product evaluation to make sure that the devices you choose really can
perform up to the specifications detailed in the design process so far. How will the
firewall perform at your level of utilization? Will the logging and auditing tools
selected provide the information needed? Questions like these can be answered
during an evaluation process so that come implementation time, you can be assured
that your devices will function to your specifications. With the device selection
complete, a physical network diagram can be created with details about device
models and port-level connections and configurations of devices themselves.
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The physical network diagram brings more detail to the design (see Figure
10.3). It specifies the actual devices being used and details where all the devices
connect down to the port level.This diagram shows that the Web proxy and
caching server is set up behind the redundant firewalls in addition to a syslog
server. Each server is multihomed to separate switches to provide reliable service
in the event of a device failure. Each host system would then be connected to
one of the switches. Because most host systems don’t have multiple network
adapters, each switch would only be filled to 50-percent capacity, so that in the
event of a switch failure, one switch could handle all hosts until the failed switch
was brought back online.
Figure 10.3 Basic Internet Access Network Physical Network Diagram
Basic Internet Access Network Physical Network Diagram
ISP-1
ISP-2
2
2
3
W1
ETHERNET 1
NT1
2W
W1
W0
B1
BRI
U
NT1
2E
2W
W1
W0
B1
BRI
U
ETHERNET 1
ACT
ETHERNET 1
1
INPUT 100-240VAC 50/60HZ 3.0-1.5 AMPS
NT1
BRI
U
SERIAL
CONN
SEE MANUAL BEFORE INSTALLATION
STP
AUI
EN
ETHERNET 0
B2
SERIAL
CONN
SEE MANUAL BEFORE INSTALLATION
LINK
ACT
ETHERNET 0
B2
SERIAL
CONN
STP
AUI
EN
LINK
LINK
STP
1
2E
W0
B2
SEE MANUAL BEFORE INSTALLATION
STP
AUI
EN
ETHERNET 0
ETHERNET 1
AUI
EN
LINK
2W
SERIAL
CONN
LINK
2E
B1
BRI
U
ACT
NT1
LINK
B2
LINK
W0
B1
SEE MANUAL BEFORE INSTALLATION
ACT
W1
LINK
2W
ACT
2E
ACT
3
ACT
Perimeter Routers
ACT
444
ETHERNET 0
INPUT 100-240VAC 50/60HZ 3.0-1.5 AMPS
Intrusion Detection System
Calalyst 2900
SYSTEM
10BaseT/100BaseTX
RPS
1X
2X
3X
4X
5X
6X
7X
8X
9X
10X
11X
SERIES
13X
14X
15X
16X
17X
18X
19X
20X
21X
22X
23
Calalyst 2900
XL
100BaseFX
12X
SYSTEM
10BaseT/100BaseTX
RPS
24
1X
MODE
2X
3X
4X
5X
6X
7X
8X
9X
10X
11X
SERIES
XL
100BaseFX
12X
13X
14X
15X
16X
17X
18X
19X
20X
21X
22X
23
24
MODE
PowerEdge
2450
C
O
N
S
O
L
E
O
U
T
S
I
D
E
C
O
N
S
O
L
E
I
N
S
I
D
E
Redundant
Firewalls
I
N
S
I
D
E
115/230V - 1/0.5A
115/230V - 1/0.5A
Calalyst 2900
SYSTEM
O
U
T
S
I
D
E
10BaseT/100BaseTX
RPS
1X
2X
3X
4X
5X
6X
7X
8X
9X
10X
11X
SERIES
100BaseFX
12X
13X
14X
15X
16X
17X
MODE
18X
19X
20X
21X
22X
23
Calalyst 2900
XL
SYSTEM
10BaseT/100BaseTX
RPS
24
1X
2X
3X
4X
5X
6X
7X
8X
9X
10X
11X
13X
14X
15X
16X
17X
18X
19X
20X
21X
22X
23
MODE
Optiplex
GX 200
COMPACT
Host System
PowerEdge
2450
Web Proxy/ Cache Server
PowerEdge
2450
SysLog Server
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100BaseFX
12X
Redundant
Switches
24
XL
Redundant
Switches
Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Designing Internet
Application Networks
An Internet application network is a type of perimeter network that allows hosts
on the Internet to access resources on your network.Typically, these resources are
Web sites, e-mail servers, DNS servers, FTP servers, or a similar type of public
Internet service.To provide these services securely, an Internet application
perimeter network is used to support Web servers, e-mail servers, and FTP
servers outside the protected internal network. Internet application networks
generally have specific requirements depending on the application hosted; how­
ever, there are some common features to most Internet application networks,
which we examine in this section. In most cases, Internet application networks
are considered mission critical and must be designed with fault tolerance and
application availability in mind. Internet application networks by definition are
available to any Internet host, which means that network security is also a top
design priority.
In this section, we examine the process of designing a typical Internet appli­
cation perimeter network. Using a top-down design process, we consider the
case of a sample e-commerce Internet application where downtime can mean
lost revenue, and stored credit card payment information requires enhanced secu­
rity. We start by collecting the typical types of information necessary to design
our solution, and progress down to a logical network design and finally to a
physical network design.
What to Consider when
Designing Internet Application Networks
When designing an Internet application network using a top-down network
design approach, the first step is to collect both business and technical require­
ments. In the case of an Internet application network, business requirements
include things such as project scope, budget, and schedules. It is also important to
understand the Internet application from the business perspective. What does the
application do? How is it used by customers and end users? What are the ulti­
mate goals that the application is trying to accomplish? What level of application
availability must be maintained? What type of data will be stored and trans­
mitted? Understanding these aspects of the Internet application will give you a
framework upon which you will be able to begin to build your network design.
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After collecting business requirements, the next step in the design process is
to collect technical requirements. A good place to start gathering technical
requirements is by examining the application from a technical perspective. Which
protocols will the application use? How will those protocols flow between layers
of the application? What is the expected utilization of the application and what
resources are necessary to support that utilization level? All of these questions will
lead to technical requirements that must be accommodated in your network
design. For our example, we will use the small set of business and technical
requirements listed in Table 10.2.
Table 10.2 Sample Technical Decisions to Requirements Map for Internet
Application Network
Business
Requirements
Mission-critical
e-commerce
application.
Application will
process credit card
transaction.
Application will be
database driven.
Application will store
customer information.
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Technical Requirements Technical Decisions
Bandwidth must be
scalable and burst-able
for dynamic growth.
HTTP and HTTPS are
primary application
protocols.
Detect possible network
intrusions.
Application will have three
tiers: Web servers, application servers, and
database servers.
Log all firewall events and unauthorized activity.
Secure perimeter network
devices.
Data center location with
plenty of available band
width.
Multiple firewall layers
with appropriate access
controls.
Implement IDS.
Segment network based
on services to provide
superior application
performance and security.
Implement syslog server
and configure firewalls.
Routers and switches
configured to guard
against DoS attacks.
Redundant and secure Obtain an Autonomous
routing protocol needed. System number and imple­
ment BGPv4 for redundant
dynamic routing. BGPv4
also supports authentica­
tion for added security.
Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Logical and Physical Network Design
Once the business and technical requirements have been mapped to technical
decisions, we can proceed to create a logical network diagram (see Figure 10.4).
For our example, we have segmented our network by services to increase performance and security of the network infrastructure. We have also secured each of
the segments with a firewall between the network boundaries to ensure traffic
passing between the segments meets our defined security policies. Redundant
Internet access from multiple ISPs and BGPv4 provides reliable access to the
Internet. Finally, a management network is created for backup, maintenance, and
monitoring of the application. Access to the monitoring network is provided by
a dedicated leased connection, which allows the tightest possible rule set at the
Internet-facing firewalls.
Figure 10.4 Sample Internet Application Network—Logical Network
Diagram
Border Routers
Perimeter Firewalls Typical Internet Application Network Design
ISP2 Perimeter Switches
ISP1
Hub
Hub
Internal Segments:
Web Servers
Application servers
7
Hub
Perimeter Segments:
Border Routers, Perimeter Switches,
Perimeter Firewalls
Internal switches
Load Balancing
Switches
Internal Firewalls
Hub
Internal Segments:
Database Servers
Leased Line
Internal Router
Hub
Hub
Internal Firewalls
Internal Segments:
Management and Backup
Servers
After completing the logical network design, a physical network design can
be completed (see Figure 10.5).This level of details provides information on
exactly how the networks defined in the logical diagram will be implemented. In
our example, firewalls with multiple interfaces and load-balancing switches are
used to segment the network according to service type using VLANs, and servers
are multihomed to multiple networks to increase security and performance.
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Chapter 10 • Perimeter Network Design
Figure 10.5 Sample Internet Application Network—Physical Network
Diagram
Basic Internet Application Network - Physical Network Diagram
ISP-1
ISP-2
2
3
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2E
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NT1
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ETHERNET 0
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SERIAL
CONN
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ETHERNET 1
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ACT
LINK
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CONN
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LINK
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2E
Perimeter Routers
2
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ACT
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ETHERNET 0
INPUT 100-240VAC 50/60HZ 3.0-1.5 AMPS
Intrusion Detection System
Calalyst 2900
SYSTEM
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RPS
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NETWORKS
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NETWORKS
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Database Servers
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Redundant
Firewalls
Redundant
Load-Balancing
Switches
NETWORKS
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Management and Backup
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Designing VPN and Remote
Access Termination Networks
A VPN or remote access termination network is a perimeter network that con­
nects remote users to your network via VPN or POTS (Plain Old Telephone
Service) dial-in.This type of perimeter network has become very common as the
need for access to information has grown. It is most commonly deployed by com­
panies or organizations that want to increase employee productivity by providing
them access from their home offices or that have many traveling employees such as
sales resources who require remote access from locations outside the corporate net­
work. VPN and remote access termination networks are also commonly deployed
by organizations that have multiple trading partners with which they exchange
information on a regular basis.This type of perimeter network allows a firewall to
be placed between the endpoint of a VPN or RAS server to ensure that traffic
passing to the internal network conforms to security policies.
In this section, we examine a VPN and remote access termination network
for a sample company of 250 traveling employees and five remote manufacturing
partners. We start by collecting all of the requirements, both business and tech­
nical, and translating those into technical decisions. We will create a technical
decision matrix to make sure all requirements have been satisfied. We will then
proceed to create logical network diagram and a physical network diagram of the
final perimeter network design.
What to Consider when Designing
Remote Access Termination Networks
One of the first things to consider when designing a VPN and remote access ter­
mination network are the business requirements driving the need for the net­
work. Who are the end users of the VPN or dial-in connections? What is the
security status of the network from which they will be connecting? How impor­
tant are the VPN and remote access services to the organization? The answers to
these questions will lead to your set of business requirements.
Once the business requirements are complete, gathering technical require­
ments begins. It will be important to establish various technical details that will
stem from the business requirements already gathered. Which applications and
protocols will the users need to use? How will these users or organizations
authenticate to your network? How will usage be monitored and audited? If
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VPNs are to be established, how will key negotiation and encryption policies be
established? There will more than likely be multiple rounds of requirements gath­
ering for any project, because inevitably the process of gathering technical
requirements uncovers hidden business requirements that then must be consid­
ered. Although sometimes frustrating, this process is normal, and eventually all
business and technical requirements will have been collected. When all require­
ments have been collected, we can move forward to make technical decisions
based on the requirements. For our sample, the technical decision matrix shown
in Table 10.3 will be used.
Table 10.3 Sample Technical Decisions to Requirements Map for VPN and
Remote Access Termination Network
Business
Requirements
VPN and remote
access is mission
critical.
250 RAS clients
using dial-in and
dynamic VPN clients.
Five partners with
static VPN tunnels
using Web services.
RAS clients will be
able to use IMAP
e-mail clients and
will be able to access
Web-based document
management system.
Log and audit all
RAS activity.
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Technical Requirements Technical Decisions
Bandwidth necessary is
5 Mbps.
Multiple fractional T3
circuits.
48 POTS dial-in lines will
be needed to handle
~20% of users dialed in.
Clients will be authenti­
cated.
2 x 24 line voice PRI
terminating to dedicated
RAS server.
Implement IPSec VPN
tunnels with VPN
concentrator.
Allow Web browsing un­ Redundant firewalls with
authenticated but log all appropriate rule
browsing activity.
configuration.
Log all firewall events
Implement syslog server and
and unauthorized activity. configure firewalls.
Secure perimeter network Routers and switches condevices.
figured to guard against
DoS attacks.
Redundant and secure
BGPv4 implemented for
routing protocol needed. redundant dynamic routing.
BGPv4 also supports authen­
tication.
Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Logical and Physical Network Design
Once all of the requirements are collected and translated into technical decisions,
we can begin to create a logical diagram of the network design (see Figure 10.6).
In our example, a VPN concentrator and dedicated RAS server with 48 POTS
lines will handle both dial-in users as dynamic VPN clients.The VPN concentrator will also be the endpoint for the five IPSec VPN tunnels to partner networks. All users will be authenticated via an LDAP server on the internal
segment, and the firewalls are configured to restrict traffic that does not conform
to the security policy.
Figure 10.6 Sample Remote Access Termination Network—Logical Network
Diagram
Basic Remote Access Logical Network Diagram
Border Routers
ISP2
ISP1
Hosts on trusted
Network
Perimeter Firewalls
Perimeter Switches
Internal switches
Hub
Perimeter Segments:
Border Routers, Perimeter Switches,
Perimeter Firewalls
Intrusion Detection/
Prevention System
Hub
Internal Segments:
Internal network hosts and servers
VPN Concentrator
Hub
Perimeter DMZ Segments:
VPN Concentrator and Remote Access Server
RAS Server
With the logical network diagram and design created, a physical network diagram is created to detail how all of the actual components will integrate together
(see Figure 10.7). Multiple interfaces on redundant firewalls segment the network
into security zones.The perimeter segment includes the border routers,
perimeter switches, and IDS, while the perimeter DMZ segment contains the
termination endpoints for all RAS connections and VPN tunnels. All devices are
multihomed to independent switches for reliability and performance.
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Figure 10.7 Remote Access Network—Physical Network Diagram
ISP-1
ISP-2
Perimeter Routers
Intrusion Detection System
Redundant
Switches
Redundant
Firewalls
Checklist
Designing secure perimeter networks using a top-down design process
■
Examine and collect business requirements.
■
Examine and collect technical requirements.
■
Create a technical decision matrix to verify all requirements have
been accommodated.
■
Create a logical network diagram that encompasses
■
Create a physical network diagram.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Summary
Perimeter networks can be defined as any network that provides services to any
other user or network of unknown security status. Firewalls, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPSs), filtering routers, and
network segmentation are just some of the devices and techniques that are used
in designing secure perimeter networks.
One of the best design principles to use when designing perimeter networks
is the top-down design method. Practitioners of top-down network design first
focus on collecting information that will allow them to determine the require­
ments for capacity, functionality, performance, availability, scalability, affordability,
manageability, and security. With these requirements complete, top-down net­
work designers proceed to creating logical network designs that encompass the
specific needs of the application or user base. Only after the logical design has
proven to meet requirements do they proceed to the physical design phase where
real network devices are introduced. In designing perimeter networks, network
security should be given an increased priority.
Firewalls are probably the most common network security device, and these
days one can be found on almost any network. Firewalls in general are meant to
be points of control between two network security zones through which all net­
work traffic must pass. Firewalls also have the capability to log all aspects of traffic
flow between the networks they join.There are many different types of firewalls,
and each has unique strengths and weaknesses. Deciding on the right type of
firewall for the job depends on the details of the situation where it will be used.
The first category is packet-filtering firewalls.This type of firewall operates at the
network or IP level of a network stack. It examines a network packet’s IP con­
tent and filters traffic based on addresses, ports, and packet options.The second
category of firewall is the application-proxy firewall.This type of firewall works
at the application layer of a network, and actually terminates all incoming and
outgoing connections at the firewall. If the connection is permitted, the application-proxy firewall then initiates a connection to the destination host on behalf
of the source host.The third category of firewalls is the circuit gateway firewall.
This type of firewall works at the transport layer of a network and filters traffic
based on addresses. A circuit gateway firewall is intended to create a virtual cir­
cuit between source and destination host, allowing for a more seamless connec­
tion. Firewalls can be server based, running on top of a security hardened
operating system, or a firewall appliance, a purpose-built hardware device that
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runs a custom operating system dedicated to firewalling. Firewall appliances
derive their major strength from the fact that most of the network logic and fire­
wall functions happen on purpose-built hardware and not up through the net­
work stack of an operating system.This makes these devices capable of handling
traffic at higher rates of speed and in higher quantities than server-based firewalls
can.The strengths of server-based firewalls are that they are generally more cus­
tomizable and have a higher degree of complexity, owing to the fact that they
run on commodity server hardware on top of a general operating system. Serverbased firewalls also generally have more internal storage for logs and are easier to
upgrade than firewall appliances are.
While firewalls might be considered the foundation of your network security
design for their capability to secure all access points to your perimeter network,
IDSs and IPSs are fast becoming just as widely deployed for their capability to
examine traffic as it flows through your network to detect possible attacks.There
are two main techniques for IDSs and IPSs to detect intrusions.The first is a
knowledge-based technique. IDSs based on a knowledge-based technique work
by examining traffic at the network layer and above and comparing patterns
within those network packets to known attack or intrusion signatures. Another
technique for IDS design is a behavior-based system. A behavior-based system
works by examining traffic patterns and comparing them with historical trends.
Alerts are generated on any traffic patterns that are out of the ordinary. Behaviorbased IDSs can be very good at catching all attacks and intrusions; anything that
looks out of the ordinary will generate an alarm. Unfortunately, behavior-based
IDSs generally aren’t as accurate as knowledge-based systems, and tend to gen­
erate many false alarms as well.
One method commonly used for alleviating network congestion, network
segmentation, can also be used to increase the security of perimeter networks.
Network segmentation is the practice of dividing your network architecture into
sections, and is usually implemented to reduce the size of broadcast domains and
to increase network efficiency. In designing perimeter networks, network seg­
mentation is implemented to separate networks based on content and use.
Network segmentation can be done by either physically separating your net­
works or by using virtual local area networks (VLANs). Physically separating
your networks is probably the most secure method of segmentation, but it is also
the costliest in terms of additional network interface cards (NICs), switching
infrastructure, and increased management. For this reason, most networks use vir­
tual local area networks (VLANs). VLANs are a technology that is supported on
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
most enterprise class switches and allows different ports on the same switch to be
assigned to different virtual networks.Traffic on one VLAN can’t traverse onto
other VLANs without being routed by a Layer 3 network device.
Segmenting your network using demilitarized zone (DMZ) networks and
service networks is also an effective method for segmenting perimeter networks.
The term DMZ first became commonly used in describing a particular part of a
network that was in many ways similar to a military DMZ.The network segment
between a gateway router and a firewall was generally unprotected and separated
“us” from “them.” More recently, the term DMZ has evolved to describe a zone
on the network that isn’t necessarily unprotected, but still exists as a buffer
between areas of dissimilar control. Another approach to segmenting a perimeter
network is to consider the services provided by the various resources on each
segment and segment the network accordingly. Each network segment would be
defined based on the services the resources within that network provide.
The first of three design examples we tackle in this chapter is an Internet
access network. An Internet access network is one that connects a trusted net­
work to the public Internet.The Internet access network is mainly designed to
allow network hosts on the trusted network to make requests and access infor­
mation on the public Internet, and generally does not allow hosts on the public
Internet to access hosts or applications on the trusted network. When designing
an Internet access network using a top-down network design approach, the first
step is to collect requirements.These requirements can generally be broken down
into two types: business requirements and technical requirements. Business
requirements include things like project budget, project goals, project schedules,
and the scope of the project.Technical details include requirements for network
availability and performance, network manageability and usability, and most
importantly of all in an Internet access network design, network security.
The second design example is an Internet application network. An Internet
application network is a type of perimeter network that allows hosts on the
Internet to access resources on your network. In the case of an Internet applica­
tion network, business requirements not only include things like project scope,
budget, and schedules, it is also important to understand the Internet application
from the business perspective. After collecting business requirements, a good place
to start with gathering technical requirements is by examining the application
from a technical perspective. Internet application networks by definition are
available to any Internet host, which means that network security is also a top
design priority.
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The final design example is a VPN and remote access termination network. A
VPN or remote access termination network is a perimeter network that connects
remote users to your network via VPN or POTS (Plain Old Telephone Service)
dial-in.This type of perimeter network has become very common as the need for
access to information has grown. It is most commonly deployed by companies or
organizations that want to increase employee productivity by providing them access
from their home offices, or that have many traveling employees such as sales
resources who require remote access from locations outside the corporate network.
Even though most users of this network will be authenticated, it is still very impor­
tant to secure this type of network because the networks you are connecting to are
not under your control and therefore cannot be trusted.
Solutions Fast Track
Looking at Design Principles
Firewall selection and placement is a critical piece of perimeter network
design.The right type of firewall for your application depends on the
details of the situation where it will be used.
While firewalls might be considered the foundation of your network
security design for their capability to secure all access points to your
perimeter network, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPSs) are fast becoming just as widely deployed for
their capability to examine traffic as it flows through your network to
detect possible attacks.
In designing perimeter networks, network segmentation is implemented
to separate networks based on content and utilization.
The network segment between a gateway router and a firewall was gen­
erally unprotected and separated “us” from “them.” More recently, the
term DMZ has evolved to describe a zone on the network that isn’t
necessarily unprotected, but still exists as a buffer between areas of dis­
similar control.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Designing an Internet Access Network
When designing Internet access networks, it is important to consider the
types of applications that will be used by the internal hosts and con­
figure firewall rules appropriately.
When all business and technical requirements have been collected, create
a technical decision matrix to make sure all of the requirements have
been accommodated.
After all of the requirements have been met, start by creating a logical
diagram to show the high-level network design. After completing the
logical diagram, design a physical diagram to document the details of
device models and connections.
Designing Internet Application Networks
When designing an Internet application network, it is important to
examine the application completely for business and technical require­
ments.
After all requirements have been gathered, make sure you have
accommodated them all by creating a technical decision matrix.
Create logical and physical network diagrams to show the details of the
network design.
Designing VPN and Remote
Access Termination Networks
When designing a VPN and remote access termination network it is
important to consider the users of the service. Plan which application
and protocols will be allowed to traverse network boundaries based on
user needs.
Make sure all requirements are met by creating a technical decision
matrix.
Create a logical and physical network diagram to finish you network
design.
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Links to Sites
■
http://www.ietf.org Internet Engineering Task Force Web site pro­
vides texts for all network RFCs and Internet drafts.
■
http://www.sans.org/rr/ The Sans InfoSec reading room contains
articles and papers that relate to many networking and security subjects.
■
http://www.checkpoint.com Check Point Software Technologies is
the market leader firewall maker.
■
http://www.netscreen.com Netscreen Technology makes firewalls
and VPN devices.
■
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/
index.html Cisco Security and VPN devices homepage.
Mailing Lists
■
http://www.checkpoint.com/services/mailing.html Mailing lists
for Check Point firewalls.
■
http://honor.icsalabs.com/mailman/listinfo/firewall-wizards
Mailing list that discusses issues related to firewalls.
■
http://www.qorbit.net/mailman/listinfo/nn List for Netscreen
support and communication.
■
http://www.securityfocus.com/subscribe?listname=129 Security
Focus list concentrated on firewalls. Security Focus also maintains var­
ious other lists, including BugTraq.
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Perimeter Network Design • Chapter 10
Frequently Asked Questions
The following Frequently Asked Questions, answered by the authors of this book,
are designed to both measure your understanding of the concepts presented in
this chapter and to assist you with real-life implementation of these concepts. To
have your questions about this chapter answered by the author, browse to
www.syngress.com/solutions and click on the “Ask the Author” form. You will
also gain access to thousands of other FAQs at ITFAQnet.com.
Q: What is a perimeter network?
A: Perimeter networks can be defined as any network that provides services to
any other user or network of unknown security status.
Q: What are the different types and classifications of firewalls?
A: There are three common types of firewalls.The first category is packet-filtering firewalls.The second category of firewall is the application-proxy fire­
wall, and the third category of firewalls is the circuit gateway firewall.
Firewalls can also be classified by the physical attributes. Host-based firewalls
run on a security-hardened operating system, and firewall appliances run on
purpose-built hardware.
Q: How is network segmentation used in secure perimeter network design?
A: Network segmentation is the practice of dividing your network architecture
into sections, and is usually implemented to reduce the size of broadcast
domains and to increase network efficiency. In designing perimeter networks,
network segmentation is implemented to separate networks based on content
and use. Network segmentation can be done by either physically separating
your networks or by using virtual local area networks (VLANs).
Q: What are the different types of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs)?
A: There are two main techniques for IDSs to detect intrusions.The first is a
knowledge-based technique. IDSs based on a knowledge-based technique
work by examining traffic at the network layer and above and comparing
patterns within those network packets to known attack or intrusion signa­
tures. Another technique for IDS design is a behavior-based system. A
behavior-based system works by examining traffic patterns and comparing
them with historical trends.
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Chapter 10 • Perimeter Network Design
Q: What is the top-down network design philosophy?
A: Practitioners of top-down network design first focus on collecting informa­
tion that will allow them to determine the requirements for capacity, func­
tionality, performance, availability, scalability, affordability, manageability, and
security. With these requirements complete, top-down network designers
proceed to creating logical network designs that encompass the specific needs
of the application or user base. Only after the logical design has proven to
meet requirements do they proceed to the physical design phase where real
network devices are introduced.
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Chapter 11
Internal
Network Design
Solutions in this Chapter:
■
Design Principles and Examples
■
Proper Segmentation and Placement
Related Chapters:
■
Chapter 2 Assessing Your Network
■
Chapter 3 Firewalls
■
Chapter 7 Network Switching
■
Chapter 9 Intrusion Detection and
Prevention
Summary
Solutions Fast Track
Frequently Asked Questions
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Introduction
Many network administrators believe that once they’ve protected their network
from the outside world, they’ve done their job. However, according to the 2001
National Retail Security Survey, employees’ account for 47 percent (nearly half )
of all retail loses.This could be translated to the statistic that a network protected
only from the outside only provides 50-percent protection.
Before this statistic frightens you into locking up the candy jar on your desk,
keep in mind the old German proverb, “Opportunity makes thieves.”You can
keep the honest people in your office honest by removing the obvious security
holes from your network. Behold! Lead not your end users down the path to
corporate espionage and identity theft. Keep them from the temptation that is
the employee payroll file. And verily, protect them from reading the CEO memo
to the Board. When the CFO complains about the cost, pick up your wooden
staff and proclaim, “Sinner, how canst thou put a price on saving souls? I do the
Lord’s work.”This routine might actually buy you enough time to construct a
valid plan or it might get you sent to a windowless room with soft walls (in
which case it will probably be your only chance to take a vacation without
having to carry your pager). Good network security doesn’t just happen. It takes
careful planning, a solid knowledge of your current infrastructure, a thorough
understanding of your company’s business process, and the proper budget.
Most businesses do not produce Information Technology (IT) as their core
deliverable. Consequently, IT expenditures fall into the “cost center” category.
This already makes it hard to sell IT projects, but security is an intangible
product, making it an even harder sell.The CFO can see the results from a faster
server, but he cannot see, taste, feel, hear, or smell “safer.” Successful completion
of an expensive security project will usually only garner employee indifference at
best. Does this mean that you should drop the project? Absolutely not! When
someone steals intellectual property from the company, management will look
squarely to IT for not protecting them. Network administrators need to attack
this problem proactively and provide a solid solution for security holes with suffi­
cient documentation. If the CFO doesn’t want to pay for it, you at least have a
shield for when the hammer falls.
Design Principles and Examples
Nothing good comes from a bad design, and the worst designs come from net­
works formed with no planning at all. If we may borrow a page from sports
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
psychology, we need to visualize our goal before we start. Ask yourself, “What
does this network need to do?” Often, end users conduct their business based on
the capabilities of the network, but a well-designed network should work trans­
parently. Marshall McLuhan noted with television, “The medium is the message.”
Unlike television networks, computer networks should facilitate the work and not
become the work. Once you’ve answered what the network should do, now you
can focus on the “how.” Network engineers could debate this point, but the net­
work design should start from the “inside out.” Plan your internal networks and
then work on connecting your LANs to each other and to external networks,
such as the Internet.
The lessons from Chapter 7 should guide your initial designs.Your first
design pass needs to connect each station to the network as cleanly as possible.
Once you’ve accomplished this, now consider adding fault tolerance to the net­
work. Examine the important links, such as backbone connections between
floors and buildings in your campus model. What happens if one of these links
malfunctions? How can you prevent a single failure from crashing your network?
You need to answer these questions during this phase of your planning.
Notes from the Underground…
SPOF-Busters
Although it might not be the most popular Halloween costume, I like to
regularly don my Ghostbusters-inspired SPOF-Buster costume and hunt
through wiring closets for the evil critters. I’m talking, of course, about
SPOFs—Single Points of Failure. You should, at any time, be able to bust
down the doors of your wiring closets and Network Operation Centers
(NOCs), and point out the nasty SPOFs. We actually make a sport of it. We
trade networks for the day with a stack of bright orange sticky-notes.
When we see a SPOF in the other’s network, we slam a sticker on it and
rack up the points. Costumes optional.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Firewall Placement and Selection
Firewall placement is probably the single most important task in infrastructure
security.This section will give you a chance to apply what you learned from
Chapter 3, in a design situation. Firewalls, even more so than routers, demark
where the public network ends and your private network begins. What is a fire­
wall? Briefly, a firewall is a device used to prevent unauthorized access into a
protected network from some other network. Usually, this “other network” is the
Internet. What isn’t a firewall? A firewall is not a magic bullet that will solve all
of your security issues.
Perimeter Placement
Given the simplified definition of a firewall, most of these devices will eventually
find themselves at the network’s edge. First, let’s examine a simple network in
Figure 11.1.This network shows a group of workstations on the third floor con­
nected to the mail server on the first floor with a Gigabit Ethernet connection.
Figure 11.1 Sample Network
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Mail
Server
Floor 1
Floor 3
From an internal standpoint, this network looks fine. However, what about
Internet mail and Web access? Most modern networks need access to external
resources such as these. So far, our sample network has perfect security from the
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
outside world by virtue of not having any connections to the outside world. We
could connect our sample network to the Internet with merely a router and no
firewall, but this would leave the network with very little protection. If we apply
some of what we learned from Chapter 3, we know that we need a firewall with
an ICSA rating of either Small/Medium Business (SMB) or Corporate, since the
Residential certified firewalls do not need to support internal servers and we
need support for the first floor mail server. We can choose from dozens of
models to suit our modest needs in this example.
For this example, let’s choose a very basic firewall with just an external and
an internal interface. Since public addresses have a high recurring cost, we should
make sure that our firewall also performs Network Address Translation (NAT), so
that we can use one or two public addresses for Internet access instead of a
unique public address for each device in the network.
Tools & Traps…
Private Addressing
NAT allows a device such as a router or firewall to proxy Internet connec­
tions for the network devices behind it. The NAT device keeps track of the
Internet connections going through it, and directs the traffic to the
proper recipients. The host machines on the Internet only see the IP
address of the NAT device and not of the actual machine requesting the
connections. For this to work properly, each machine behind the NAT
device needs an IP address unique within the company network that isn’t
publicly routed. In 1996, The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) rati­
fied Request for Comment (RFC) 1918 (www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt?
number=1918), “Address Allocation for Private Internets,” to give net­
work engineers a list of IP addresses from which to choose when creating
NATed networks. The IETF felt the need to make this document nine
pages long, but the relevant section takes all of three lines on page three:
10.0.0.0
-
10.255.255.255
(10/8 prefix)
172.16.0.0
-
172.31.255.255
(172.16/12 prefix)
192.168.0.0
-
192.168.255.255
(192.168/16 prefix)
Continued
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
These three lines list the permissible private networks when using
NAT to connect to the Internet. Please note, however, that you can subnet
these networks to fit your own needs. For example, even though the “10”
network uses an 8-bit subnet mask by default, you can divide this range
into 65,536 networks, each with 254 hosts, by using a 24-bit subnet
mask.
Once we connect our network to the Internet, we should get a configuration
that looks similar to Figure 11.2.This figure depicts a network with a DS-1 (1.54
Mbps, also referred to as T-1) connection to the Internet through a router.The
router then connects to the external interface of the firewall, while the firewall’s
internal interface links to the sample network. For minimum security, the firewall
should only allow Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) traffic into the mail
server, but deny all other inbound traffic.The mail server will also need to send
mail, so the firewall should also allow SMTP traffic out from the mail server. If
the network users require Web access to the Internet, the firewall should at least
allow HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) out to the Internet.
Figure 11.2 Sample Network with Firewall
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Mail
Server
Floor 1
Floor 3
Firewall
100 Mbps
DS1
1.54 Mbps
Internet
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100 Mbps
Switch
Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
This looks pretty good, but can we do better? Our firewall rules allow traffic
into the mail server on port TCP 25, the standard SMTP port.This seems harm­
less enough; however, this rule assumes that the mail server can safely handle
SMTP traffic. As we know, Microsoft issues patches on almost a weekly basis to
correct security problems, but other vendors also have problems. For example, in
September 2003, CERT released an advisory that all versions of Sendmail earlier
than 8.12.10 have a serious flaw that needs patching
(www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/AAMN-5RGP4Q). A hacker could potential exploit
this flaw merely by sending an e-mail message to an e-mail server. Since the mail
server sits directly on the trusted network, a hacker could use the compromised
mail server as a launching point for attacking the rest of the network.
Let’s upsize our firewall to include an additional interface. Previously, the fire­
wall in Figure 11.2 of our sample network had only two interfaces:
■
Inside
■
Outside
More sophisticated firewalls add a third choice called a demilitarized zone, or
DMZ. Some advanced firewalls can have multiple DMZ interfaces instead of
merely a single DMZ interface. Figure 11.3 shows our new network, now with a
DMZ and an SMTP proxy. In this design, the firewall sends all inbound e-mail
to the SMTP proxy server.The SMTP proxy server masquerades as the real mail
server for the purposes of virus and content filtering and many other functions.
Once the SMTP proxy server has confirmed that the mail has passed its inspec­
tion, it sends it back through the firewall, which passes the data to the real mail
server.This prevents Internet traffic from entering the protected network directly.
If the SMTP proxy is compromised, it has limited access to launch an attack
against the protected network since all of its traffic is processed by the firewall
before gaining access to the protected network. Internet access for the worksta­
tions continues to pass through the firewall as in the previous example of Figure
11.2, although this network configuration no longer requires a connection
between the second and third floor switches, as the firewall now provides this
connection.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Figure 11.3 Sample Network with DMZ
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Mail
Server
Floor 1
SMTP
Proxy
Floor 2
User 1
User 3
User 2
User 4
Floor 3
Firewall
100 Mbps
DS1
1.54 Mbps
Internet
Internal Placement
Most firewalls exist on the edge of the campus network, but sometimes a company
needs protection from itself. Let’s rip this next example from the headlines.Ten
Wall Street banking firms have recently settled a case for $1.4 billion brought
against them by the New York State Attorney General (www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2003/05/01/rtr959208.html). Attorney General Eliot Spitzer con­
tended that the firms mislead investors into buying stocks in which the firms had a
significant interest.To avoid future lawsuits, these firms now need to keep their
banking operations separate from their analysis operations.The new, segmented
design is illustrated in Figure 11.4.This network example separates these two enti­
ties, but still gives the Legal department access to both.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Figure 11.4 Internal Firewall Placement
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
Firewall
100 Mbps Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Banking
Analysis
100 Mbps
Switch 100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Legal
Figure 11.4 has a firewall clearly at the core of the network. All communica­
tion between the three departments, Analysis, Banking, and Legal, must cross the
firewall. For this example, the firewall rules would:
■
Disallow any traffic from Banking to Analysis and from Analysis to
Banking.
■
Allow two-way conversations between Banking and Legal and Analysis
and Legal.
This firewall has three interfaces, but we wouldn’t consider any interface
necessarily as internal, external, or DMZ.
Network engineers have other choices beyond firewalls to separate depart­
ments. Engineers have optimized firewalls to allow the flow of certain traffic
under stringent controls.This level of security usual comes at a high cost, and
since it requires more processing power than normal switching or routing, it also
has lower performance than most routers or switches.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
IDS Placement
Being the paranoid sort, I have a Martian protection charm hanging over my
door to protect me from (drum roll) Martians. It works great—so far, I haven’t
seen a single Martian anywhere near my house, so it must be working. Network
security works a lot like my anti-Martian charm. Network engineers set up the
security and then they assume that it works because they haven’t had any prob­
lems. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) fill this gap.
Originally, IDS devices analyzed network traffic patterns against known
attacks. If the current network traffic matched any of the patterns, the IDS would
send an alert through a predefined channel, such as a console, syslog, pager,
e-mail, or other method. Network engineers could then use this information to
craft a plan to defend against the attack. Unfortunately, the alerts resembled car
alarms:
■
They happened so often for no apparent reason that everyone ignored
them.
■
Even if the event were legitimate, by the time anyone got there, the car
was already vandalized.
Engineering has improved since the original IDSs were introduced, and the
new devices give far fewer false positives and in some cases can actually stop intru­
sions themselves. Many people in the industry now call these devices Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS) since they not only detect the threats, but also stop them
in their tracks. Some IDSs can additionally prevent attacks by reconfiguring access
control lists (ACLs) on switches and routers, dynamically rewrite firewall policies to
exclude the suspect traffic, and even drop the offending packets. Of course, mul­
tiple manufacturers offer IDS/IPS products, and each product has its own strengths
and weaknesses. Some vendors even have multiple IDS and IPS products, each
occupying a separate niche. For example, Cisco classifies IDS products as either a
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) or a Host Intrusion Detection
System (HIDS). A NIDS is usually a network appliance that plugs into the network
and monitors traffic. A HIDS is usually a software agent that runs on a server and
alerts the network administrator to attacks, prevents these attacks from succeeding,
or does both. Chapter 9 covers these two types of systems in depth.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Host Intrusion Detection System Placement
Network admins install HIDSs on servers and workstations that need extra pro­
tection above what the OS and AV software can provide. Examples of this
include McAfee Entercept from Network Associates, and the Cisco Security
Agent, formerly Okena StormWatch.This type of software examines all of the
activity on the host, disallows anything that it feels compromises the security of
the host, and sends an alert to inform the administrator about the attempted
breach. Often, normal operations cause false positives, events that the agent thinks
are security intrusions, but are really normal operations. Network administrators
must tune the agents for their own environment to reduce the number of false
positives.
Figure 11.5 HIDS Placement
Internet
DS-1
1.54 Mbps
100 Mbps
Firewall
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Si
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
Floor 1
100 Mbps
IT User
100 Mbps 100 Mbps
IT User
IT User
Sub-Sub Basement
That Even Scares the Rats
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
MLS
1000 Mbps
HR
User
100 Mbps
Floor 2
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
HIDS
Console
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Accounting Finance
HR
Marketing
Server
Server
Server Server
HIDS
HIDS
HIDS
HIDS
Floor 3
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Figure 11.5 shows suggested HIDS placement: you’ll notice that all of the
servers have an agent on them. Chapter 2 discusses asset inventory, which you
can use to determine exactly which servers need agents. Even though we quickly
discovered the agent placement, the placement of the HIDS console, however,
might not jump out at you in Figure 11.5. In this instance, we’ve placed the
HIDS console with the IT department. In this example, the console could have
stayed with the servers, but since you probably wouldn’t keep your keys with the
lock that they open, you might want to consider moving the console away from
the machines that it protects. In our configuration, we have a Gigabit Ethernet
connection to the highly desirable IT subbasement where we’ve located the console.This gives us a reliable connection that the communication between the
HIDS and the console will not saturate. Since, in this example, the connection
goes through a multilayer switch, we can add filtering rules that only allow HIDS
traffic between the HIDS agents and the console. For example, Entercept’s HIDS
agents use either TCP port 5000 or 5005 (version dependent) to communicate
with the console, so the network administrator could easily set up a filter on the
MLS only to allow those ports from the agents to the console.This will add an
additional layer of protection against tampering.The HIDS console should also
have an agent installed on it to harden the console itself.The Cisco Security
Agent uses standard SSL traffic (TCP 443), which can make it harder to filter
since many Web sites use SSL for legitimate business.
Figure 11.5 only installs HIDS agents on the servers. What about the work­
stations? HIDS generally work by preventing unauthorized activity. Server data
changes constantly, but the configuration and functions remain static. A worksta­
tion, however, can change with the wind, which makes a HIDS on a workstation
much more of a challenge, but perhaps even more important. Do you think that
one of your travelling colleague’s notebook computer with the built-in wireless
card has less of a chance of getting hacked than one of your company’s servers
that never ventures beyond the firewall? Infected notebooks can bypass contain­
ment faster than a cold through a Kindergarten and it can take longer to fix the
damage than it takes to lose the sniffles. Due to the difficulty (or perhaps to a
lack of a perceived market), some companies only make HIDS agents for servers
and not workstations.Therefore, if you feel that you need the protection of a
workstation HIDS, shop around carefully before you make a decision.
In addition to affecting your choice of product, using a workstation HIDS
will probably also affect where you place the console. Figure 11.6 shows that
with the addition of the workstation HIDS on a notebook, we have created a
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
DMZ for our console. We could have left the console in its former location and
put in a firewall rule to allow traffic from the notebook to reach the console.
However, this creates an opening from the outside world directly into a highsecurity machine nestled snugly in the center of the protected network. Granted,
the console should have an agent on it, making it one of the most secure hosts in
the company, but that should not stop us from taking the extra step if possible. In
this configuration, we lose the Gigabit Ethernet link to the console, but properly
tuned HIDS agents should never saturate a 100 Mbps link. With this new configuration, if anything happens to compromise the HIDS console, the firewall can
still protect the inside network. We will discuss this in more depth in Chapter 6,
“Secure Network Management.”
Figure 11.6 HIDS Placement with Notebook
Internet
Notebook
HIDS
Broadband
DS-1
1.54 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Firewall
HIDS
Console
DMZ
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Si
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
Floor 1
100 Mbps
IT User
100 Mbps
IT User
100 Mbps
IT User
Sub-Sub Basement
That Even Scares the Rats
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
MLS
1000 Mbps
HR
User
100 Mbps
Floor 2
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
HIDS
Console
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Accounting Finance
HR
Marketing
Server
Server
Server Server
HIDS
HIDS
HIDS
HIDS
Floor 3
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Tools & Traps…
Test, Test, and Retest
Security is a double-edged sword. A workstation HIDS is a powerful
weapon against hackers and even your own users. A workstation HIDS
can stop your users from getting into the holiday spirit by preventing
them from installing kitten screensavers, the latest version of DOOM, and
a million other pieces of unauthorized software. Used properly, it can lock
down the configuration better than a Group Policy object (GPO), which
can save the IT department from having to constantly re-image wan­
dering machines. However, this same control could prevent your road
warrior from using PowerPoint for that big sales presentation or changing
his IP address to access the hotel’s broadband connection. You need to
test everything on the machine that an end user could possibly need
before sending the machine out into the cold, cruel world. This includes
all of the applications and network interfaces. In many cases, a HIDS is not
like antivirus software that you can just turn off with a password. If you
find that you can easily bypass the HIDS, you should try another product.
Network Intrusion Detection System Placement
NIDSs need to see network traffic so that they can analyze it. Most modern net­
works use a fully switched infrastructure and virtual local area networks (VLANs)
(see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion), which can make it difficult for a NIDS
to see most of the traffic. Many managed switches have port mirroring/monitoring options so that traffic intended for other ports will get copied to the mir­
rored port. In addition, many VLANs have promiscuous ports that can see traffic
from multiple VLANs. A NIDS needs to connect to these types of ports so that
it can see as much traffic as possible. In Chapter 2, we went into depth about set­
ting up this type of port for network sniffing operations—the same information
can be used for a NIDS.
As to the exact placement of a NIDS, two schools of thoughts exist:
■
One wants a NIDS outside the firewall, as depicted in Figure 11.7, so
that it can see every possible attack occurring against a site.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
■
Then there is the school of thought that says that a NIDS should con­
nect inside the firewall, as depicted in Figure 11.8, so that it only reports
the attacks that have entered the protected network.
Figure 11.7 NIDS Outside Firewall
Internet
DS-1
1.54 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Hub
100 Mbps
Syslog
Server
DMZ
NIDS
100 Mbps
Firewall
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
Floor 1
100 Mbps
IT User
Si
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
IT User
Sub-Sub Basement
That Even Scares the Rats
HIDS
Console
100 Mbps
Floor 2
MLS
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps 100 Mbps
IT User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
Accounting Finance
Server
Server
HIDS
HIDS
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
HR
Marketing
Server Server
HIDS
HIDS
Floor 3
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Figure 11.8 NIDS Inside Firewall
Internet
DS-1
1.54 Mbps
100 Mbps
Firewall
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
NIDS
HR
User
Marketing Finance Accounting
User
User
User
Hub
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
Floor 1
100 Mbps
IT User
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps 100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Floor 2
MLS
Syslog
HIDS
Server Console
Sub-Sub Basement
That Even Scares the Rats
IT User
Si
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
Accounting Finance
Server
Server
HIDS
HIDS
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
HR
Marketing
Server Server
HIDS
HIDS
Floor 3
Both methods have pros and cons. Outside the firewall, a NIDS can see
attacks from the moment they start, giving a network administrator the max­
imum amount of time to react to the situation and prevent any damage.
However, a NIDS outside the firewall will report minor attacks that the firewall
would have stopped easily. For example, a properly configured firewall should
stop the SQL Slammer worm (www.microsoft.com/technet/security/
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
bulletin/ms02-061.asp) dead in its tracks, but a NIDS outside the firewall will see
and report this problem. Just as with the “Boy who cried wolf,” a network
administrator could eventually start ignoring all problems that this NIDS reports
just because of the sheer volume of trivial events.
Depending on your network configuration, a NIDS inside the firewall, such
as in Figure 11.8, might see an attack from one source that a NIDS outside the
firewall would miss. Many network administrators terminate their virtual private
network (VPN) connections behind the firewall. Any attacks routed through a
compromised VPN client will bypass all firewall protection entirely, which will
also bypass a NIDS in front of the firewall. A NIDS on the same network seg­
ment as the company servers would have a perfect vantage point to see attacks
coming from this source, since the hacker would probably try to crack the servers
as part of the incursion.Terminating the VPN connection in front of the firewall
can mitigate some of these problems, but often this requires opening so many
holes in the firewall for the VPN connection that the firewall has trouble stop­
ping the attacks. Most VPNs have split tunneling deactivated by default, which
prevents the VPN client from accessing any other Internet traffic outside of the
secure tunnel. In most cases, this prevents someone from actively controlling the
compromised VPN client while it’s attached to the VPN tunnel.This, however,
does not stop a machine infected with a worm, such as MS Blaster, from
infecting unprotected machines on the inside network.
Notes from the Underground…
What’s “a Lot?”
We talk about a large volume of alerts, but what does that really mean?
A NIDS on an active network could easily accumulate five events a second.
Most of these would—or should—fall into the trivial category, but an
improperly configured policy could easily start dumping all of these to
your e-mail or pager. Many policies have time components so that one
event could have a different significance at 10:00 A.M. than at 2:00 A.M..
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Fine-tuning the reporting mechanism on a NIDS can greatly reduce the
number of “false positives” and trivial events that get reported, but that also mini­
mizes the benefits of having the NIDS outside the firewall. Minor event-gathering events often precede a full-scale attack, so a network administrator must
carefully tune the reporting engine or he will miss the early part of the attack
and miss the opportunity to defend against the attack before it escalates.
Given the many opportunities for bypassing a corporate firewall, a network
administrator needs a tool harder to bypass. Since a HIDS sits directly on a pro­
tected box, this makes it extremely difficult to successfully attack a HIDS-protected machine. Any important server or workstation should have a HIDS on it,
especially if it sits in a DMZ or service network. Most HIDSs use a console to
configure them, so if a hacker compromises the console, he can easily compro­
mise all the protected machines.Therefore, the console should also have a HIDS
on it.The HIDSs from both Cisco and Network Associates, for example, use this
as the default configuration. In addition, you should take great care in placing the
console on a secure segment, perhaps using VLANs or a multilayer switch to pre­
vent as much traffic as possible from reaching the console. For example, the con­
sole could sit on an administrative VLAN with no Internet access and that can
only see protected servers internally.This makes it difficult for anyone to tamper
with the console.
A NIDS inside the firewall, such as was shown previously in Figure 11.8, will
see a significantly reduced number of attacks, which means that it will also
require less tuning, thereby speeding the installation. Since this device sits behind
the firewall, any attacks that this device reports have already made it through the
firewall and need immediate attention. False positives here can mean the differ­
ence between a full night’s sleep and an unproductive trip to the office at 2:00
A.M. For these reasons, you must filter carefully here.
Please note that Figures 11.7 and 11.8 still make reference to HIDSs. A
secure network does not need to make a choice between a HIDS and a NIDS—
it should have both. Moreover, the NIDS diagrams do not reference a console.
Network administrators configure most NIDSs directly, either through a command-line interface (CLI) or through a Web browser.The NIDS will need to
send alerts, though, which means that it could need access to a mail server, pager
gateway, or syslog server depending on the alert mechanism used.These two fig­
ures show suggested placements of the syslog server for collecting alerts. With the
NIDS inside the firewall in Figure 11.8, the NIDS can stay in the protected net­
work since the NIDS does not need to cross the firewall. In Figure 11.7, with
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
the NIDS outside the firewall, setting up the syslog server in a DMZ or service
network makes more sense so that we minimize the amount of “dirty” traffic
coming into the protected network.
Proper Segmentation
A great network doesn’t just happen—but a bad one does. Some of the worst
network designs have reared their ugly heads because of a lack of forethought as
to how the network should ultimately look. Instead, someone said, “Get these
machines on the network as cheaply and quickly as possible.”
Segmenting a network involves balancing the following items:
■
Security
■
Speed
■
Cost
■
Convenience
The highest security network would have a firewall between every server and
workstation on the network, but that would slow the network to a crawl, be
extremely expensive, and require an inordinate amount of time to configure.The
best network design will balance all four criteria. Any network that emphasizes
one aspect too heavily will most likely contain serious design flaws.
Tools & Traps…
Hardware Firewalls for Every PC
3Com makes a family of network interface cards (NICs) that have firewall
functionality embedded in the hardware (www.3com.com/products/
en_US/prodlist.jsp?tab=cat&pathtype=purchase&cat=134482&selcat=Fi
rewalls+%26+Filters&family=134494). A network administrator would
use 3Com’s Embedded Firewall Policy Server to configure and control up
to 1000 of these devices from a central location. This family of product
makes it affordable to add hardware firewall protection to almost any PC
in the enterprise. 3Com does not offer a Gigabit version of this card,
which might make it impractical for extremely busy servers at the core of
Continued
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
a network. However, this shouldn’t limit its use of servers that primarily
handle Internet traffic, since the Internet connection at most companies
carries less than 100 Mbps of traffic.
Let’s ease into segmenting the network with an easy requirement first: Layer
2 segmentation. Assuming that you’re building your network around Ethernet,
you will want to use switches exclusively instead of hubs.This immediately puts
each host into its own collision domain as discussed in Chapter 7.This is some­
thing that you’ll want to do regardless of any other requirements for the net­
work. Moving up the difficulty ladder, consider the physical topology of your
campus. Use a diagramming program such as Visio and other tools, as discussed
in Chapter 2, to map out the locations of all of your network devices. Now, start
placing switches in logical locations, keeping in mind the availability of resources
where you want to place the switches. For example, Figure 11.9 shows a typical
main server room, or “Main Distribution Frame” (MDF).This diagram tracks
everything of significance in the room.This includes racks, outlet size and loca­
tion, uninterruptible power supply (UPS), server, and phone switch (PBX).
Figure 11.9 shows specific dimensions so that there are no surprises when it
comes time to place equipment and run cabling. Figure 11.9 also includes a text
key with instructions for items that the diagram cannot make clear visually.The
important detail that this diagram does not show is the distance to any hosts that
connect to the switches in the racks. Distance can vary by the equipment used,
but you can usually assume that you can get 100 meters using copper and at least
500 meters with fiber when planning the network.
NOTE
Remember, before you buy any equipment, you should confirm that your
environment will accommodate the equipment that you’ve selected.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Figure 11.9 Sample MDF
MDF - 4‘ x 7‘ Plywood.
5 quad 110 VAC, 20 Amp Dedicated outlets (1 per circuit) with Isolated
ground.
Bolt racks to floor and secure to rear wall with ladder racks.
Air Condition room to maintain 70 degrees Fahrenheit.
7‘-0"
subselect.
3‘-0"
m
10"
Rack
Rack
Ladder
Racks
7‘-0 "
1‘-9"
2‘- 6 "
1‘-9"
1‘-3"
2‘- 0"
9"
S e rv e r
UPS
UPS
PBX
1‘- 6“
9"
1‘-6"
4‘-3"
MDF
The complete physical campus diagram will require a similar sketch of every
closet and then an overview drawing to show how each closet attaches to the
other closets.This final drawing will need to account for the distances between
the closets so that you can make sure that you have not exceeded any distance
limitations.This diagram works very well for populating your wiring closets and
server rooms, but it doesn’t replace diagrams that represent the topology of your
network. For example, as much detail as this diagram has, it does not show the IP
addresses or operating systems of any servers or the type of switches in the racks.
This information will prove vital when it comes time to connect all the different
devices into a cohesive network.
This next step requires a little more thought than the previous steps did. We
now have to consider traffic patterns. We just designed a completely switched net­
work, which greatly reduces our collisions, but we haven’t addressed any other
issues such as broadcast storms. Layer 2 segmentation does nothing to control this,
so to solve this problem, we need to move to Layer 3 and perform subnetting.
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Access Control Lists, Routers, and Layer 3 Switches
The network design in Figure 11.10 starts with complete switching, but it
doesn’t end there. Any network with over 100 devices will probably benefit from
subnetting. We can probably find some logical places to subdivide our network.
To do this properly, we should now consider the function of each machine on
the network. For example, we might find that half the users on a particular floor
belong to a single department.This would make a great place to segment the
network at the Layer 3 level.
As discussed in Chapter 7, routing protocols work at Layer 3. Not too long
ago, a network administrator would immediately add a router to the network to
accomplish subnetting, but today, network administrators have another choice.
Mid- to high-end switches can switch at Layer 3, taking the place of a router.
This provides a switch with same benefits as the router, but with far less latency
than a router would add. A fully switched network could segment physically dis­
parate users from the same department using VLANs and a Layer 3 or Multilayer
Switch (MLS). Figure 11.10 demonstrates this using a MLS at the core. All of the
users connect to the same switches, all of which have a specific VLAN for each
department.These VLANs extend across all the switches on the campus. Each
VLAN gets its own subnet, which the MLS routes. For added security, the MLS
can even prevent traffic from crossing subnets so that each user group can only
see its own traffic.
Pay close attention to the phrase “for added security.” Some network admin­
istrators assume that because each group has its own subnet that these groups
automatically cannot see each other. VLANs need routing information to see
other VLANs, so initially, they don’t see each other. However, they also probably
don’t see the Internet traffic, necessitating the administrator to add routing infor­
mation to the VLAN. Assuming that the network administrator routed every­
thing properly, all the VLANs now accidentally see each other. At this point, the
network administrator can either:
■
Remove the unwanted routing information
■
Configure the filtering on the MLS if it supports it
Most administrators should opt for the latter, since it will provide higher
security and will look like a purposeful separation of the networks. Using a defi­
cient routing table can often look like a mistake to new administrator that might
get “fixed” accidentally.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Figure 11.10 Network Segmentation Using VLANs
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps Switch
100 Mbps
Si
MLS
Switch
1000 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps Switch
100 Mbps
1000 Mbps
Accounting
User
HR
User
Marketing Finance
User
User
Floor 1
100 Mbps
HR
User
Switch 100 Mbps
Accounting Finance
HR
Server
Server
Server
Floor 3
Marketing Accounting Finance
User
User
User
Floor 2
100 Mbps
Marketing
Server
Different manufacturers have different mechanisms for filtering traffic, but
most companies use some form of access control lists (ACLs). ACLs allow net­
work administrators to use rules similar to those on firewalls on routers and some
high-end switches. An ACL can take the form of a simple filter that prevents
traffic from one subnet from reaching another, or it can get as granular as speci­
fying which protocols can interoperate between specific hosts. For example, RFC
2827, “Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which
employ IP Source Address Spoofing,” offers simple advice for filtering traffic at
routers.This works especially well on exterior routers attached to the Internet
when combined with the advice from RFC 1918, “Address Allocation for
Private Internets.” We can see a simplified version if we look at Figure 11.11.
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Figure 11.11 Simple Network with ACL
Internet
1.54 Mbps
241.1.1.0 / 24
Interface S0
241.1.1.2
Interface FastEthernet 0/0
240.1.1.1
100 Mbps
240.1.1.0 / 24
Outside Interface
240.1.1.2
Firewall
Inside Interface
192.168.1.1
100 Mbps
192.168.1.0 / 24
100 Mbps
Workstation 1
100 Mbps
Switch
Workstation 2
100 Mbps
Workstation 3
Workstation 4
The sample network in Figure 11.11 has a router connecting to the Internet
through a serial interface (S0).The serial interface has an address on the 240.1.1.0
network with a 24-bit subnet mask.The ISP in this example has given the network
administrator the 241.1.1.0 network with a 24-bit subnet mask to use as the company’s public addresses.The company attached a firewall to the Fast Ethernet inter­
face of this router and then used NAT to give the internal 192.168.1.0 network
Internet access. Based on this scenario, the network should never see traffic from
the 241.1.1.0 / 24 range enter the network from the S0 interface of the router. In
addition, the network should allow not traffic from any private network (RFC
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
1918) entering from the interface. Using RFC 2827 as our guide and Cisco’s IOS
syntax, we could construct an ACL that looked like this:
access-list 1 deny
10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
access-list 1 deny 127.0.0.0 0.255.255.255
access-list 1 deny 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255
access-list 1 deny 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255
access-list 1 deny 240.1.1.0 0.0.0.255 any
This ACL also includes the reflexive addresses, 127.0.0.0 / 8, which, like the
RFC 1918 addresses, should never arrive from the outside interface. Finally, we
must apply this to the serial interface by entering the following commands at the
router:
interface Serial0
ip access-group 1 in
ACLs can also restrict traffic based on protocols, ports, and specific hosts. In
addition to stopping traffic from entering a network, they can also stop traffic
from leaving a network. For example, we could have applied the previous ACL to
the interior port of the router using the commands:
interface FastEthernet 0
ip access-group 1 out
Notice that since we’ve applied this to the inside interface, we had to swap
the word in for out. Now, the router allows the restricted traffic to enter through
the interface attached to the Internet, but then the router stops this traffic from
exiting.These two examples achieve the same basic result—blocking spoofed
traffic—but the second example consumes additional router resources since two
interfaces have to deal with the traffic before dropping it.
The previous examples use ACLs at the network edge, but ACLs can work at
almost any Layer 3 boundary. For example, an ACL crafted from RFC 2827 can
prevent spoofing on an internal router connecting departments just as easily as
on an external router. ACLs can also restrict access on a more granular level.
ACLs from many vendors can filter on protocols, ports, and specific hosts.This
allows for a granular approach to security similar to what we would see from a
firewall.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Tools & Traps…
Dropping Traffic
When constructing an ACL, try to eliminate unwanted traffic as soon as
possible. This means revising campuswide ACLs so that restricted traffic
never makes it past the first hop of your network. Every additional hop
that the traffic takes wastes bandwidth and processor cycles. Whenever
you create an ACL, examine your campus diagram and ask yourself, “Can
I block this traffic upstream instead?” If you can, move the ACL. If not,
you have a keeper—probably. Don’t forget that most ACLs include an
“invisible” deny all statement, so you might have to add a generic permit
statement at the end to handle normal traffic. Just don’t be too generous
with your permits: a permit ip any any statement set in the wrong place
can make the rest of your ACL worthless.
Use of DMZs and Service Networks
Network administrators consider themselves at war with users, hackers, their
bosses, vending machines, and most everything else they encounter, so it
shouldn’t surprise anyone that they borrow military terms. Politicians use the
term demilitarized zone, or DMZ, to refer to a region devoid of weapons with
heavy barriers on the outside separating warring factions. In computerese, a
DMZ refers to a network protected from the outside network, but also protected
against from the inside.
Previously, Figure 11.3 showed a sample network with a DMZ.The SMTP
proxy server sits behind the protection of the firewall, but this server must also
cross this same firewall to send information to the mail server on the inside network.The SMTP Proxy server finds itself “surrounded” by the firewall.The fire­
wall protects the SMTP relay server, but if the machine falls to the hacking
hoards, the firewall will now protect the inside of the network from the compro­
mised proxy server.
What happens to a DMZ that actually gets settlers? In the computer world,
we call this a service network. Service networks often resemble DMZs because they
are surrounded by a firewall, but just as a continent differs from an island by
virtue of size, a service network differs from a DMZ by the number of machines
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
protected. Usually, these machines serve a common purpose, such as a Web server
farm or a bank of mail servers. Many administrators don’t consider themselves up
to the challenge that service networks and DMZs represent, but they are not that
much different from regular networks.
Configuring the Hosts
Even though these have special names, DMZs and service networks are really just
networks. Configure the machines just as you would on the inside of your network.These machines will have their own subnet distinct from the rest of your
network, and any communication between this network and any other network
will require routing or Layer 3 switching. Since these machines will contact users
from a public network, you should harden these machines as much as possible.
This includes performing the following actions:
■
Applying all the latest patches
■
Disabling any unnecessary services
■
Fully configuring all applications
Tightening all the rights
Each operating system and application will have a set of steps unique to it
regarding hardening. Finally, you should install a HIDS on these machines when­
ever possible for the highest possible level of protection.
■
Tools & Traps…
Information for Hardening Microsoft Products
Microsoft’s TechNet (www.microsoft.com/technet) contains a wealth of
information for securing Microsoft’s products. Given Microsoft’s current
reputation for security, going to this site might seem like taking an oath
of loyalty from Benedict Arnold, but you can hardly beat the developers
for information about their own products. The page www.microsoft.com/
technet/security contains links to security checklists for most of
Microsoft’s products that really require it.
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Administrators refer to a severely hardened server as a bastion host.These
machines usually run a single application, such as a Web server, and have all other
functionality disabled. Since the administrator has disabled so much of the oper­
ating capabilities, troubleshooting these machines takes much longer than their
unhardened brethren do. During the hardening process, take careful notes as to
what you’ve done to the machine because you might have to back out some of
your work to get your application to function if you go too far.
Damage & Defense…
Install First, Harden Second
Some hardening procedures make it very difficult or even impossible to
install new software. If you plan to create a bastion host, install all of your
applications before you begin hardening it. Better yet, consider using a
HIDS instead of creating a bastion host. A HIDS on a properly configured
box can provide as much protection as a bastion host, and give you
reporting functionality. A HIDS also has the ability to quickly deactivate in
case you need to make changes to the host. Try making changes quickly
to a bastion host. If you do need to deactivate a HIDS, isolate the machine
from the rest of the network, if possible, so that it does not become com­
promised during this period.
Configuring the DMZ and Service Network
Once you have your hosts configured, you now have to tie them together into a
cohesive unit. Figure 11.12 shows a simple service network and its relation to the
inside network and the Internet.This diagram closely resembles Figure 11.3,
except that the DMZ in Figure 11.12 contains more machines.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Figure 11.12 Sample Service Network
Internet
T1 1.54 Mbps
100 Mbps
Firewall
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
Web
Server
Web
Server
Service Network
Web
Server
100 Mbps
Switch
100 Mbps
100 Mbps
Workstation 1 Workstation 2 Workstation 3 Workstation 4
Trusted Network
The service network uses a simple Layer 2 switch to connect all the
machines and then connects to the other networks using the firewall as both a
filter and a router. If the service network contained enough machines, you could
subnet them, VLAN them, or both. In Figure 11.12, the firewall uses 100 Mbps
links to connect to the inside network and the service network, but only highend firewalls can actually process traffic fast enough to take advantage of links
this fast. Keep this in mind when planning the service network. In most cases,
traffic to the Internet will never approach 100 Mbps, but traffic from the inside
could easily move that quickly. If you need extremely fast access to the service
network from the inside of your campus, you might have to use a high-end fire­
wall or even split the service network into several smaller networks and use mul­
tiple firewalls to create your DMZ. An NIDS on this network can help identify a
situation before it becomes a problem.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Configuring the Firewall
for the DMZ and Service Network
Anyone can go to the local computer store and buy a $30.00 piece of equipment
that calls itself a firewall.These boxes come preconfigured to allow all traffic out
and nothing in to the protected network.This works fine for the average home
user, but many network administrators give their corporate firewalls the same
treatment.Typically, the firewall will let any traffic from the protected network
out to the Internet and into the DMZ.The administrator will limit inbound
traffic to the DMZ and the protected network to specific machines and protocols.This seems to work well because no one complains and the administrator
can continue to play CounterStrike uninterrupted. Unfortunately, this can create
security problems later.
A properly configured firewall should give users only what they need and
nothing more.This usually takes some trial and error, but the added security will
pay for itself. For example, why does an end user need an open SMTP port to
the Internet when the company has an internal mail server in the DMZ? He
doesn’t.The open port allows the user to send mail that bypasses the company’s
mail server, which avoids any filtering that the company might have configured.
Since most new viruses have their own SMTP engines, this open port also allows
an infected machine to further spread across the Internet.
A similar situation exists for the DMZ and service network. A mail relay
machine needs very few ports to fulfill its function. For example, it might need
to get DNS information and SMTP from the outside and transfer SMTP with
the inside. As an administrator, you might take the attitude, “Why should I pro­
tect the Internet from my own machines?”The extraneous port or protocol that
you don’t block could be the one that your hacked mail server uses to commu­
nicate back to the hacker.This can open a reflexive hole in the firewall that the
hacker can then use to start attacking your inside network directly from the
DMZ. Once the hacker has compromised your DMZ, he has a pretty good start
on cracking the rest of the network.
Checklist
Keep all systems patched and up to date.
Review security logs daily.
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
Review maintenance logs daily.
Review firewall policies and ACLs regularly to check for tampering and
configuration errors.
Avoid single points of failure (SPOF) wherever and whenever possible.
Use only RFC 1918 addresses for private networks.
Consider using firewalls internally for high-security departments or
segments.
Use Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) agents on critical servers
and workstations.
Heavily test any HIDS installation thoroughly before deploying the
system into the field.
Placing a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) in front of a
firewall will produce different results than placing one behind a firewall,
so study the differences carefully before placing the unit.
A properly segmented network balances speed, security, cost, and
convenience.
Before you buy anything, make sure that the physical space where you
to plan to install any piece of equipment will accommodate the
equipment.
Use virtual local area networks (VLANs) to increase security and to
reduce broadcast traffic.
Don’t be afraid to use access control lists (ACLs) on the inside of the
network to increase security.
Any resources accessible from the Internet should reside on a demilita­
rized zone (DMZ) or service network.
Before hardening any system, try to install all applications.This will get
much harder after hardening the system.
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Chapter 11 • Internal Network Design
Summary
A network designer must plan every aspect of the network to maintain proper
security.The network design needs to account for how the users will use the
resources and the placement of assets.The network administrator will use this
information to create a functional network that meets the basic connectivity
needs of the organization.
Once the network engineer has a basic network, he can then start adding
security components to the diagram. Most engineers start with adding firewalls
to the perimeter of the network, although some highly secure networks could
require internal firewalls as well. Networks that require a separation between
entities, but also require high-performance connections, could opt for routers,
multilayer switches, VLANs, or both instead of an internal firewall.This configu­
ration sacrifices some security, however, as these higher performance options usu­
ally do not have the same tolerances as high-end firewalls. ACLs on routers and
multilayer switches can help to make these devices almost as secure as firewalls.
Network engineers should consider using a DMZ or service network for
servers that need to accept traffic from an unprotected network, such as the
Internet. DMZs and service networks are usually local area network (LAN) seg­
ments that connect to both the inside (protected) network and the outside
(unprotected) network through a firewall.This limits the exposure of the
machines on these segments from most unwanted traffic from the outside, while
also protecting the inside network from these machines should they fall to a
hacker.
After the network engineer has hardened the network, he now needs a
mechanism for ensuring that his protective measures work. Classic Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDSs) provide this function.The newer systems even prevent
the security breaches from happening in the first place. IDSs fall into two basic
categories: Host and Network. Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) are
usually software agents installed on key hosts, configured by an external console,
that prevent unauthorized access to these hosts and report the intrusion. A thor­
ough network evaluation, as discussed in Chapter 2, will help determine what
hosts need protecting. Once the engineer makes this determination, he can install
the agents on the hosts.
NIDSs are either appliances or hosts with special software installed that
examines network traffic for possible attacks. Some NIDSs can report about
attacks in progress, and can also prevent these attacks from succeeding by taking
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
reactive measures, such as reconfiguring a router or firewall. A network engineer
can install a NIDS either in front of or behind a firewall. A NIDS in front of a
firewall will see many more trivial events than a NIDS behind the firewall will,
but a NIDS behind a firewall might not see an attack in progress because the
firewall might block the offending traffic.The location of the NIDS, therefore,
will vary with the needs of the particular network.
Solutions Fast Track
Design Principles and Examples
Firewalls at the perimeter.
Firewalls can divide interior networks that need high security.
When using NAT internally to conserve public addresses, choose
networks listed in RFC 1918.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) fall into two categories: Host
Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDSs) and Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDSs).
IDSs need careful installation and “tuning” to avoid false positives.
HIDSs are software agents that protect important hosts.
HIDSs need a secure console for configuration.
NIDSs are network appliances that analyze traffic to look for and
prevent breaches.
NIDSs can work in front of or behind a firewall depending on the
traffic that you need to examine.
If connected to a switch, a NIDS needs a promiscuous port to see as
much traffic as possible.This port should span all VLANs if possible.
Proper Segmentation
Networks need careful planning.
Segmentation must balance security, speed, cost, and convenience.
Network interface cards (NICs) with embedded firewalls can give every
host a hardware-based firewall for high-security environments.
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Consider your physical environment first and map everything.
Consider the “political” environment next.
Use routers, Layer 3 switches, or multilayer switches to subdivide large
networks.
No subnet should have more than 100 devices in most cases.
ACLs can provide firewall-like features at the core of your network
without having to actually use a firewall.
RFC 1918 and RFC 2827 make basic ACL suggestions.
Hosts in a DMZ or service network should be hardened through
advanced configuration techniques or with a HIDS.
Links to Sites
■
www.ietf.org The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) homepage.
The IETF maintains the authoritative list of RFCs, the documents that
set the standards for the Internet.
■
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1918.txt?number=1918 RFC 1918, “Address
Allocation for Private Internets.”This document lists the network
addresses that network engineers can use when creating private net­
works that use NAT to connect to the Internet.
■
www.forbes.com/markets/newswire/2003/05/01/rtr959208.html
Reuters article detailing network changes due to a $1.4 billion lawsuit.
This article has very little technical information, but it does show how
the business needs to drive network designs.
■
www.microsoft.com/technet/ Microsoft Security Bulletin MS02061.This page links to a patch to fix the SQL Slammer worm vulnera­
bility in Microsoft SQL 2000 and MSDE, and the site describes the
nature of the vulnerability.
■
www.3com.com/products/en_US/prodlist.jsp?tab=
cat&pathtype=purchase&cat=134482&selcat=Firewalls+%26+Filt
ers&family=134494 Embedded Firewall Products.This page links to
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Internal Network Design • Chapter 11
3Com’s embedded firewall product line. Basically, these products are
NICs with built-in firewalls.
■
www.microsoft.com/technet Microsoft TechNet.Technical informa­
tion and “Best Practices” for Microsoft products.
■
www.microsoft.com/technet/security Microsoft Security
Checklists. Security checklists for Microsoft’s server products, including
Windows servers and Internet Information Server (IIS).
Mailing Lists
■
www.securitypipeline.com/newsletter.jhtml Security Pipeline
Newsletter. Newsletter designed to summarize the latest security threats
to the computer industry.
■
www.cisco.com/tac/newsletter/signup Cisco Technical Assistance
Center (TAC) Newsletter.The official newsletter from Cisco’s Online
Technical Support Department.
■
www.securityfocus.com/archive SecurityFocus Mailing List
Directory.This pa