‘15 years of aviation safety’ A review of the state of play Nov-Dec 2010 Issue 77 ‘Train in vain?’ Continuing discussion on making a pilot ssue i y r a s r e iv 15th Ann AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL AIRSHOW AND AEROSPACE & DEFENCE EXPOSITION AVALON2011 1-6 March 2011 Geelong Victoria THE ESSENTIAL SHOWCASE The Australian International Airshow and Aerospace & Defence Exposition is the essential industry event for Australia and the Asia Pacific region. A comprehensive industry exhibition, featuring 599 participating companies from 17 nations, it will attract industry, military and government leaders from Europe, North America, Asia, Middle East, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific. Showcasing the latest developments in technology and equipment, it is a unique networking forum for aviation, aerospace and defence professionals from around the world. TRADE VISITORS WELCOME DON’T MISS IT! www.airshow.com.au CONTACT PO Box 4095, Geelong VIC 3220, Australia Telephone: +61 (0)3 5282 0500 Email: [email protected] ISSUE NO. 77, NOV-DEC 2010 CONTENTS DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, CASA John McCormick MANAGER, SAFETY PROMOTION Gail Sambidge-Mitchell Features EDITOR, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Margo Marchbank WRITER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Robert Wilson DESIGNER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Fiona Scheidel ADVERTISING SALES P: 131 757 or E: [email protected] CORRESPONDENCE Flight Safety Australia GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601 P: 131 757 F: 02 6217 1950 E: [email protected] W: www.casa.gov.au CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS? To change your address online, go to http://casa.gov.au/change For address-change enquiries, call CASA on 1300 737 032 DISTRIBUTION Bi-monthly to 87,000 aviation licence holders, cabin crew and industry personnel in Australia and internationally. CONTRIBUTIONS Stories and photos are welcome. Please discuss your ideas with editorial staff before submission. Note that CASA cannot accept responsibility for unsolicited material. All efforts are made to ensure that the correct copyright notice accompanies each published photograph. If you believe any to be in error, please notify us at [email protected] PRINTING IPMG (Independent Print Media Group) NOTICE ON ADVERTISING Advertising appearing in Flight Safety Australia does not imply endorsement by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Warning: This educational publication does not replace ERSA, AIP, airworthiness regulatory documents, manufacturers’ advice, or NOTAMs. Operational information in Flight Safety Australia should only be used in conjunction with current operational documents. Information contained herein is subject to change. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. © Copyright 2010, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia. Copyright for the ATSB and ATC supplements rests with the ATSB and Airservices Australia respectively– these supplements are written, edited and designed independently of CASA. All requests for permission to reproduce any articles should be directed to FSA editorial (see correspondence details above). 8 ‘15 years of aviation safety’ A review of the state of play and a dash of ’90’s nostalgia. 12 ‘Macarthur Job’ The aviation safety doyen retains his eagle eye. 15 ‘The more things change … ’ A fond look back at FSA’s predecessor, Aviation Safety Digest. 20 ’Firmly on the ground’ Flight simulators can be even better than the real thing … sometimes. 23 ‘Look out – locusts about’ They may be small, but there are billions of them. 24 ‘Train in vain?’ The discussion rolls on about the many ways to produce a pilot. 28 ‘Firebombing is tough enough’ Bushfires are no place for airborne sightseers. 31 ’Maintenance safety: a new way of thinking’ New and simpler legislation for aircraft maintenance. 38 ‘Transponders and ADS-B’ Don’t let yours transmit gibberish – or wrong data. 40 ‘Is your ELT fit for an emergency?’ Your beacon can’t save you if it isn’t wired in correctly. 44 ‘Poised for take-off’ The unmanned sector is maturing rapidly. 58 ‘Reforming airspace usage’ Changes happening on 18 November. 62 ‘Laser surgery and the aviator’ A pilot’s guide to ‘getting your eyes done.' Regulars 2 16 18 18 31 Flight Bytes–aviation safety news ATC Notes–news from Airservices Australia Accident reports–International Accident reports–Australian Airworthiness pull-out section 33. SDRs 41. Directives 46 Close Calls 46 ‘Friday afternoon fever’ 48 ‘Wire worry’ 50 ‘Tasmania or bust’ Registered–Print Post: 381667-00644. ISSN 1325-5002. COVER: Fiona Scheidel 52 66 70 71 ATSB supplement Av Quiz Calendar Quiz answers BROWNLOW FOR FLIGHT SAFETY FSA NOV-DEC10 2 who was the Foundation’s editor of publications from 1981 until shortly before his death in 1988 at age 61. Flight Safety Australia has won a Brownlow ‘medal’, not for football of FIERY MEMORIES any type but for kicking journalistic goals. The Flight Safety Foundation Australia’s Airways museum at bestowed the 2010 Cecil A. Brownlow Essendon Airport is a fascinating place for any aviation-minded visitor. Publication Award on the magazine. Its 2010 open day on Saturday 13 The award recognises significant November focuses on firefighting. contributions by journalists to aviation safety awareness. Candidates for the Before 1955, rescue and fire-fighting at prestigious international Brownlow Australia’s civil airports was provided award may be individuals, publications by a combination of a few regular or organisations. Nominations may firefighters at the capital city airports, be for long-term achievement or for backed up by volunteers drawn from outstanding articles, books or works airport and airline personnel. in electronic media published or In 1955 the Department of Civil broadcast in a 12-month period. Aviation Fire Service was formally Previous winners of the award established and a program undertaken include Aviation Safety Digest editor to construct and equip airport fire Macarthur Job, who won in 1972 stations at the major airports. for his editorship of Flight Safety Today the civil ARFF Service is Australia’s predecessor. The Digest operated by Airservices Australia won again in 1987. Other past winners and employs 725 firefighting and 45 include Robert N. Buck, author of the support staff at 21 airports around classic books Weather Flying and The Australia. Pilot’s Burden; Flight International, and its operations editor David Learmount The 2010 Airways Museum Open Day (separate awards); and the Australian will feature the history of the ARFF Service with the opening of a new Transport Safety Bureau. photographic exhibition, and guest First presented in 1968 as the FSF speakers and films throughout the Publication Award, the award was day. Airservices Australia will also renamed in 1988 in memory of Cecil provide one of the latest Mark 8 Ultra A. Brownlow, a veteran newspaper, Large Fire Vehicles, which will be wire service and magazine journalist open for public inspection. NEW CPL & ATPL SCHOLARSHIPS The Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators (Australian Region) in conjunction with Assessment Services Pty Limited are pleased to announce two new scholarships for 2011. One is for a full set of commercial pilot licence (CPL) examinations and the other for a full set of air transport pilot licence (ATPL) examinations, and both scholarships include the associated CASA examination fees. Scholarship applications will be available in early 2011 from the www.gapan.org.au website, where you can also apply for membership. Further details of this scholarship will be announced in the January-February 2011 issue of Flight Safety Australia. SHADES OF GREEN Which is worst, from a green point of view? Aircraft or other vehicles? A team of researchers led by Jens Borken-Kleefeld of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria has quantified and compared for the first time, the NEVER TOO OLD climate impacts of various passenger and freight transportation modes over The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) bas conferred five, 20 and 50-year periods. the highest honour in the world Although CO2 emissions, which of civil aviation, the 39th Edward remain in the atmosphere for over 100 Warner Award, on Romanian/ years, are considered the main culprit Canadian lawyer Nicolas Mateesco for global warming, other short- Matte, in recognition of his eminent lived components and compounds contribution to the development, contribute significantly to the climate promotion and understanding of impact of transportation, with the air and space law around the world. magnitude varying over time. Dr Matte is 97 and still working in Because of the high contribution from aviation and space law. contrails and cirrus clouds, aviation has a far higher climate impact in the short term than all other forms of transport, but over the longer term, car travel has an equal or higher impact per passenger kilometre, the study finds. Over the long-term horizons the researchers found the transport specific climate impact of car travel was larger than air travel on global average. Both are about three times higher than the impact from bus and Dr Matte obtained his first doctorate rail travel. of law from the University of ‘This once more underlines the Bucharest in 1939. After World War II, importance to address aviation- he moved to Paris where he obtained induced cloud effects as the single a doctorate of international law from biggest warming agent from aviation,’ the Université de Paris. He moved to say the researchers, who call for more Canada in 1950, at a time when his studies into non-CO2 climate warming writings in the field of air law had already made him a well-known impacts. proponent of a new international legal The findings are laid out in the order. American Chemical Society’s journal Environmental Science & Technology. SIGHT FOR SORE EYES Airline pilots in Dallas, Texas, US got an eyeful when they flew past a strip club - but not in the way you might think. A powerful spinning searchlight on the roof of Bombshells club, flooded the flight deck of a Southwest Airlines flight from Albuquerque as it prepared to land at Love Field Airport, in August a local radio station reported. The incident happened when the flight was on final approach, about 1000ft, officials said. The pilot reported a laser strike, thinking a hand-held laser pointer had been aimed at the flight deck. However, he was not harmed and landed safely. Police later asked the club owner to switch off the light. The venue complied and manager Zach Carson said it had not intended to flash pilots. The light was installed at an angle which the venue had been told would not interfere with air traffic. He promised not to turn the light back on until the FAA gave approval. We forwarded Ian Drummond from Ontario, Canada, an article on aviation myths he requested, and he responded: ‘I can’t resist sending you a photo taken a couple of months ago of my plane on a local lake, on a beach inside a ring of islands from an old volcanic cone.’ 3 FLIGHT BYTES President of the ICAO Council Roberto Kobeh said: ‘At 97, Dr Matte continues to work, travel and dispense his knowledge and experience with generosity and conviction. Just as he was teacher, advisor and mentor to all those who walked the halls of universities and institutions where he taught, he continues to play these roles in the tenth decade of his life to his many colleagues and former students.’ Mr. Kobeh said: ‘One day soon, the world will need to create a legal and regulatory framework for commercial flights in sub-orbital space and no doubt that the writings of Dr Matte will prove once again of immense benefit to deliberations in a forum like ICAO.’ RESEARCH PROJECTS 2010 The Scientist-Practitioner Gap and Barriers to Research Application in Human Factors/Ergonomics Contact: David Parker: [email protected] An outline of some of the aviation research projects being undertaken in Australian universities. Description: This study aims to determine the practical relevance of HF/E research published in peerreviewed scientific journals as well as the key barriers in the application of research findings for practitioners. Researchers: Dr Steve Shorrock and Amy Chung Contact: Amy Chung: [email protected] Predicting Pilots’ Risk-Taking Behaviour UNSW–Department of Aviation Improving Pilots’ Risk Management Skills Description: This study examines the utility of various training techniques to improve pilots’ risk management skills. Contact: Dr Brett Molesworth: [email protected] Being Heard: The Effects of NoiseCancelling Headphones on the Comprehension of Safety Related Material FSA NOV-DEC10 4 We are investigating whether noisecancelling headphones improve intelligibility of safety related material in the cabin. Researchers: Dr Brett Molesworth & Marion Burgess (UNSW ADFA). Contact: Dr Brett Molesworth: [email protected] The Link between Attitude, Risk Perception and Behaviour with GA Pilots Description: This study examines the relationship between attitude, risk perception, age, flight experience and risk-taking behaviour. Contact: Justin Drinkwater: [email protected] Flight Safety and its Reliance on Cultural Attributes of Cabin Crew: Can Ideal Values be maintained throughout? Description: This study examines the impact of various cultures on cabin crew performance. Contact: Morteza Tehrani: [email protected] Automation in ATC Regulatory Oversight and its Effect on Compliance Description: The main focus of this research is to investigate the link between regulatory oversight and compliance in commercial aviation. mmm$if_Z[hjhWYai$Yec IddbVcneZdeaZ]VkZY^ZY^chjgk^kVWaZXgVh]Zh! i]Vc`hidi]Z^g:AI# I]ViÉhl]nlZÉkZ^ckZciZYhe^YZgigVX`hÄVXgVh]"egdd[! ZbZg\ZcXnadXVi^dchnhiZbi]ViÉhbVYZidhVkZa^kZh# >iigVchb^ihndjgedh^i^dcZkZgnildb^cjiZhk^VhViZaa^iZ [gdbiV`Z"d[[idaVcY^c\#Hd^[ndj\dYdlc!ndjggZhXjZgh l^aaWZldg`^c\idVcVXXjgViZaVhi`cdlcedh^i^dc! cdihZVgX]^c\[dgVh^\cVa[gdbVh]ViiZgZY:AI# I]ZgZhjai4NdjÄa^k^c\egdd[he^YZgigVX`hldg`h# JeÓdZekjceh["l_i_jekhm[Xi_j[ehYWbb&.&&*,'--,$ I>B:IDH6K :A> K : H Description: Some pilots take more risk than others when flying. This research seeks to determine if there are certain characteristics that set these pilots apart. Contact: Daniel Kwon: [email protected] Description: This study examines the drivers underpinning ATCOs’ willingness to accept increased utilisation of automation within their role. Contact: Marek Bekier: [email protected] UNSW–School of Psychology Optimising Flight Rehearsal Description: This project tests alternative methods of metacognitive reflection in promoting generalised compliance with an aviation safety rule. Contact: Professor Jim Kehoe: [email protected] UNSW–Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) Contact: Dr Dominique Estival: [email protected] Contact: Dr Matthew J W Thomas: [email protected] Edith Cowan University Threat and Error Management – Enhancing Flight Crew Performance Evolving civil aviation safety regulation Description: Issues associated with an outcome-based legislative framework are indicated in this study. Contact: Devinder Yadav: [email protected] This research examines the specific mechanisms of threat and error detection by flight crew, using data from both simulator-based training and line observations. Contact: Dr Matthew J W Thomas: [email protected] University of South Australia Effect of laser safety glasses on LCD cockpit display visibility Non-Technical Skills – Training and Assessment Subtle Pressures on Small Commercial Pilot Decision Making Description: We are investigating the use of laser safety glasses to protect pilots from increasingly hazardous attacks from green laser pointers. Researchers: Sean O’Byrne, Martin Copeland, Susan Burdekin, Raymond Lewis, Andrew Neely. Contact: Dr Sean O’Byrne: [email protected] This research, undertaken with a number of airline partners, explores current and innovative approaches to the training and assessment of nontechnical skills. Contact: Dr Matthew J W Thomas: [email protected] This research seeks to identify and reduce the subtle pressures on small commercial pilots that can lead to sub-optimal flight decisions. Contact: Dr Chris Bearman: [email protected] University of Sydney This study aims to identify difficulties in radio communication in general aviation. UniSA works with a wide range of aviation organisations in relation the design and implementation of scientifically defensible Fatigue Risk Management Systems. This research examines the identification and resolution of breakdowns in coordination between distributed flight personnel. Contact: Dr Chris Bearman: [email protected] continued on page 7 5 FLIGHT BYTES Effective Communication in General Aviation Fatigue Risk Management Systems Breakdowns in Pilot/Controller/ Dispatcher Coordination AFTER THE ASH SETTLED Iceland is normally a long way from the epicentre of the aviation world. But the eruption of Eyjafjallajökul in April changed that. In September, aviation leaders from industry and government gathered in the country’s capital Reykjavik for the Atlantic Conference on Eyjafjallajökul and aviation. CASA’s manager of operations in the Office of Airspace regulation, Graeme Rogers, was among the delegates. PLAN YOUR AVIATION ‘With all of Europe involved, the tensions generated by the closure provided considerable fodder for discussion at the conference,’ he says. and get in early! ‘Following the European experience, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has established a high level task force to review volcanic ash procedures.’ &$6$RI¿FHVZLOOEHFORVHGGXULQJWKH Christmas and New Year holidays. Normal CASA services will NOT be available from: Rogers says the eruption, and its subsequent impact, both economically and socially, have provided significant impetus to a number of big European issues such as placing the ‘Single European Sky’ project, long an ambition of many aviation bodies, firmly back on the agenda. CHRISTMAS 6 FSA NOV-DEC10 24 DECEMBER 2010 (close of business) until 4 JANUARY 2011 Plan ahead and act now if you’ll need CASA services during the holiday break. Services such as licence renewals or AOC variations will not be available during the holidays. Of course, CASA will be working to deal with urgent aviation safety matters. If you need URGENT safety assistance call: 131 757 Further details available from www.casa.gov.au And, as the widespread closure of airspace only affected turbine aircraft, it created rare opportunities for other parts of the aviation community, such as allowing some vintage Moth aircraft the rare opportunity to fly in formation over Heathrow Airport. continued from page 5 Human Factors Implications of NextGen Technologies This research, conducted with NASA, examines some the potential human factors implications of the new technologies that will be introduced into the Next Generation US airspace system. Contact: Dr Chris Bearman: [email protected] Heightened Emotional Activity HEA This research, conducted as part of a LOSA, observed affective responses to perceived threats on the flight deck as part of threat and error management. Contact: Douglas Drury: [email protected] Fatigue and Heightened Emotional Activity HEA This research examined data from a LOSA conducted by UniSA into the relationship between restricted sleep and affective responses to perceived threats on the flight deck. Contact: Douglas Drury: [email protected] University of Newcastle Airmanship in Australian Aviation A comparison of the views of Australian aviators in military and civilian sectors. Contact: Kirstie Carrick: [email protected] ATSB Pilot training innovations This joint research between UniSA and ATSB examines some recent pilot training innovations and their underpinning principles. Contact: Melanie Todd: [email protected] 7 FLIGHT BYTES XC Milan LASER SAFE Laser-Gard™ protects pilots from flash blindness caused by lasers. dyes and proprietary lens technology to reduce the threat posed by laser pointers during the Around the globe aviation pilots are day and night. increasingly exposed to the safety hazards of hand held red and green Two lens options are available: laser pointers. The Bronze lens provides protection Laser pointers can cause temporary against red and green lasers during flash blindness, creating extremely the day and also protects from sun hazardous situations especially glare and U.V rays. The Salmon lens during take-off and landings. provides protection against green A 5mW laser can easily cause glare lasers and are suited for night use. and distract pilots up to 3700ft. For more information call our Sperian Laser-Gard eyewear product manager (03) 9565 3585 combines narrow band notch laser or visit www.sperian.com Flight Safety celebrates its fifteenth anniversary with a look at aviation safety trends since 1995. FSA NOV-DEC10 8 It was 1995 and Australia had a population of 17.1 million. About 2.6 million had mobile phones, mostly on the analogue system, and a few thousand of us watched pay television, which had just been introduced that year. A similarly small number used an academic curiosity, the internet, which had 16 million users around the world. In Australian aviation the major story of the year was the privatisation of Australia’s overseas airline, Qantas, which was yet to absorb Australian Airlines (although it already owned the domestic carrier). In the business context, Virgin related to a chain of stores selling CDs and videocassettes. DVDs would not be introduced for another four years. The world of general aviation was welcoming the cautious return of small numbers of new Cessna and Piper aircraft, back in production in the United States following US President Bill Clinton’s signing of the General Aviation Revitalization Act the previous year. Also in 1995, an Australian company, Jabiru, which had been making ultralight aircraft, as kits or fully assembled since 1991, introduced its second own engine design, a 2.2-litre flat four. Issue 1, Summer 1995-6 ‘Volcano fires debate’ There was another aviation revival in the summer of that year. From 1953 to 1991 Australian pilots and aircraft engineers had been reading the Aviation Safety Digest, received by subscription, or for a period, free of charge. That publication had closed in 1991, and for four years the role of ‘crash comic’ was fulfilled by publications from the former Bureau of Air Safety Investigation. The fallout from Eyjafjallajökull Sept-Oct 2010 Issue 76 ‘AOD 12 months on’ Reviewing the AOD program VX V XX01 X X0 X01 X 01 01 E EGRR GRR GR GRR R2 21145 21 2114 211458 11458 1145 1 145 1458 45 VA A ADVISOR A ADVISO ADVISORY AD ADVIS ADV DV DVI VISO VISORY ISORY SORY SO Y DTG TG G:: 2010032 G 2 20 2010 1/1200Z 200Z 00Z Z VAAC VAAC: VAA VA AA AC AC C:: L LOND LONDON VO VO OLCANO LCANO: ANO EYJAFJOLL EYJAFJO YJAFJOLL JAFJO FJOLL L PSN P PS SN: N6339 SN: SN N6339 339 39 W 01926 019 0192 19 926 26 i Spanner in the works Keeping track of tools AREA AR AREA: A : IC ICEL I E AND A SUMMIT ELEV: SUMMI LE 1000M 00 00M 00 0M 0M ADVIS A DVISORY SORY S ORY OR Y NR: 2010/00 010/006 0 0/006 0/ 0 6 INFO NFO FO SOURCE: FO SOURCE SO SOU S SOURC OU E ICELAND CELAND ELAND ELA LAND L AN AND ND N D ME M MET i Hear this In 1995, Leroy A. Keith, the then Director of Aviation Safety, commended the first edition of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s new journal, Flight Safety Australia, to the industry. But from the start, this new magazine was not simply a crash comic. As well as stories of near misses, the first issue contained a summary of the then-new GPS satellite navigation system, and its recent approval for IFR primary navigation. There were also stories on aviation medicine, an explanation of the new ICAO-based airspace classifications, and a quiz on IFR operations. Cockpit noise and pilots’ ears AVIATION A VIATION ION ON COLO COLOUR UR U R CODE: C COD ODE DE: UNK U UN NKNO NOW NO N OW WN N ERUPTION ERU DETAILS: TAILS TAILS ILS: ERUP ER TION CONTINUE CO CONTIN NUES NU ES OBS BS B S VA AD DTG DTG: DT 21/1200Z 0Z Z OB OBS BS V B VA AC CLD CLD: LD SFC/FL050 //FL0 /FL050 L050 N N6 331 W0192 0192 192 923-N 23 N6559 2 23-N 655 55 59 5 9W W0 W02 02 i Close calls W 0 3252-N6047 252-N6047 4 W03823-N W03823-N6 W03823-N60 0 3-N - 6 01 017 W W0342 -N63 -N6 31 W019 W0 W FCST FC ST T VA VA CLD + +6HR: 6HR: 6H HR: HR R:: 21/180 2 21/18 1/18 1/1 /180 80 0 8 0Z Z SF SFC/FL050 S SFC FC/FL050 FC/FL050 And ... more W019 W 01919-N6 19-N 19-N6705 N67 N6705 6705 670 70 7 0 5 W02525 W02525-N W0252 25-N67 2 55-N670 N 04 W04 W04323-N5633 04323-N5 4323-N 323-N5633 3-N5633 5 W 03545-N61 W0 03545--N614 4 3 W0 W03 W 0303 W03035 035-N 35 5 N FCST FCS T VA A CLD +12HR HR: R: 22/00 /00 0 00Z 000 000Z ZS SFC/FL05 FC/FL /FL0 FL05 L05 L W01903-N6750 03 0W W02833-N675 W0283 833 N 0W W03955 9555-N 5 -N N61 131 W04 W04 W04459 W04459-N550 04459-N5501 N5501 W032 W03207-N595 W03207-N5 207-N59 N5 N595 5 4 W031 W03105 W0310 03105 0 03 105-N 05 N FCST CST VA CLD +18H +18HR: +18HR 18 1 8 22/06 22/0 2 2/0600Z 00Z 0Z Z SFC/ SF SFC S W01929-N6838 1929-N6838 9 29-N6838 W03232-N6808 W0 0 03232-N6808 W04515-N54 W04515-N5 4515-N5 515-N5 515 5 N N54 542 54 5 4 W03737-N5644 03737-N5644 37 N5644 37-N5644 5644 564 4 W02954-N614 W029 614 14 3 W0324 14 RMK: THIS AD A DVIS V IS SORY S ORY Y SU SUPER SUPE ER RCE CEDES ADV VOLCANIC VOLCA CA ASH NOT T AB A ABOVE BOVE BO OVE FL L050 L050, L05 05 ERUPTI ERUPT RU ON MA NXT XT T ADVISORY ADVIS VIS S : 20100321/1800Z= 201 20100 20100321/1 20100321/ 800Z= 800 Issue 76, September-October 2010 This was a publication aimed at a wider readership than private pilots. It promised to be ‘a quality safety magazine that meets the needs of Australia’s aviation industry … Technological change … will be a focus’, the first editorial said, and true to its word Flight Safety Australia gained an ‘internet address’ in 1996. In 2010 there are 22.5 million Australians–with 21.6 million mobile phone accounts–two billion internet users around the world, and 1.5 million passengers carried on Virgin Blue. The intervening 15 years in aviation safety have been a mix: some things have changed, while others have stayed the same. Hours flown by high-capacity regular public transport aircraft – the major airlines – went from 666,000 in 1995, to 1.2 million in 2008, and according to Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE) figures, passenger numbers grew from 23.4 million to 44 million. General aviation hours flown grew from 1.76 million in 1995, to 1.857 million in 2008, although private flying hours declined as a proportion of general aviation hours. A 2010 ATSB report found private flying accounted for 44 per cent of all accidents and over half of fatal accidents between 1999 and 2008. ‘These figures far surpassed the proportions for any other flying category, even though private operations contributed to less than 15 per cent of the hours flown in that decade,’ the report said. It found three occurrence types accounted for the majority of fatal accidents: collision with terrain (90 per cent); loss of control (44 per cent); and wire strikes (12 per cent). ‘What’s killing pilots in the GA sector is lack of planning, lack of situational awareness and lack of hands and feet skills,’ says CASA’s head of strategic safety analysis and research, Bruce Dowdall. ‘You’re getting a lot of situations of VFR into IMC, flight into terrain. These come back, invariably, to flight planning. They’re highly preventable accidents and the pattern remains the same.’ Although he says these were two crashes, and 23 deaths too many, Dowdall says the overall picture is encouraging. ‘Through the early 2000s the fatal accident rates were effectively flat-lined on zero. In high-capacity RPT there’s been nothing. We’re one of a very few countries in the world to have that accident record.’ However, he says even the best set of figures gives no cause for complacency. ‘It’s a little like the stock market: past trends do not necessarily indicate future performance,’ he says. ‘You’re only as good as your last flight.’ ‘When you’re talking high capacity RPT, the aircraft are getting larger, so that while safety performance has been very strong, there has also been an increase in terms of the outcome of any risk. A fatal single hull-loss accident ten years ago would typically involve about 150-200 deaths. Today it could potentially involve more than 400.’ Looking at the global safety picture, operations editor of Flight International, David Learmount, says the first decade of the 21st century has seen a flattening of the previous long-term and seemingly inevitable trend towards improved safety. ‘With a few irrelevant spikes, the trend has always been to get better, and that trend continued until about 2003, after which it flattened out,’ he says. ‘The question is: have we got as good as it can get? All you have to do to find the answer is look at the accidents that are still happening. There may not be many of them, but when the reports come out it’s clear they are accidents that didn’t need to happen. We haven’t stopped improving because we can’t possibly get better: we’ve just stopped improving.’ Learmount says advances in air safety in the 1990s owed much to two ground-based technologies with no direct relation to flying: the computer and the internet. ‘What happened was during the 1980s the industry was computerised, and instead of accident and incident reports being disseminated to people who’d forget them a few weeks later, that information could be digitised and put into a database. During the 90s the industry got quite good at assembling trends from data, looking at things like the difference in risk between precision and non-precision approaches. 9 15 YEARS ... Then, as now, high-capacity RPT and private flying represented opposite ends of the aviation safety spectrum. Over the 15 years from 1995-2009 high-capacity RPT aircraft had an average of 1.9 accidents a year, none of them fatal. Over the same period, private and business general aviation had an average of 69.2 accidents a year, many of them fatal. (In terms of fatal accidents, general aviation had about 20 fatal accidents per million hours in 2008). There was a trend towards improvement in general aviation with an average accident level for 2005-09 of 54.8 compared with the 19952000 level of 81.5. Dowdall says Australian commercial aviation has had a remarkable safety record. Since 2000, low-capacity RPT has been marred by only two fatal crashes, that of a Whyalla Airlines Piper Chieftain in 2000, and of a Transair Metro at Lockhart River, Queensland in 2005. High Capacity Regular Public Transport 1200 8 7 1100 10 5 1000 4 900 3 800 Accidents Hours Flown (000’s) 6 2 1 700 FSA NOV-DEC10 0 600 -1 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Year Hours Flown (000’s) ‘It became possible to prioritise safety programs. They became, as the Flight Safety Foundation said, data-driven, rather than based on the experience of a safety manager. ‘The other huge benefit is that you can share data. Everybody: the FAA, the JAA in Europe (now EASA), CASA, the UK AAIB, was able to benefit. And what emerged was they all had the same sorts of problems. ‘But since 2003 nothing much has changed. It doesn’t matter whether you’re looking at absolute figures or accident rates. Since that time both have been level.’ But this technology has also brought problems, Learmount says. He says a recent cluster of loss-of-control accidents points to problems in the way some pilots are engaging with advanced systems on the flight deck. The US-based Aviation Safety Network found during the ten years from 1997-2006, 59 per cent of fatal aircraft accidents were associated with loss of control. High-profile crashes such as the January 2004 Flash Airlines Flight 604 into the Red Sea near Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt; Armavia Flight 967, near Sochi, Russia in May 2006; Kenya Accidents Airways Flight KQ 507 near Douala, Cameroon, in May 2007; and Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 near Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Netherlands, in February 2009, have all been attributed to loss of control of a flyable aircraft by the pilots. In 2008, the Flight Safety Foundation director of technical programs, Jim Burin, told the International Aviation Safety Seminar loss of control had taken over from controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) as the jet accident category that killed more crew and passengers than any other. Boeing’s Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents 1959-2009 found loss-of-control accidents killed 1759 passengers and crew and 89 people on the ground between 2000-2009, almost twice the death toll of CFIT crashes, which in the same period killed 961 passengers and crew, but no bystanders. CFIT crashes, described by the Foundation as the kind of crash least likely to have survivors, have declined as a crash type among commercial jets since the mandatory use of terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) on jet airliners. The Foundation recorded no CFIT crashes between 2005 and 2009 for such aircraft equipped with TAWS. However, CFIT remains a major cause of crashes in commercial turboprop aircraft. ‘A substantial proportion of turboprop major accidents continued to be CFIT accidents, and none of those aircraft had a TAWS installed, according to preliminary information, the Foundation reported in December 2009. ‘The trouble was he hadn’t done it for so long. The pilots in that accident were not monitoring airspeed. Why weren’t they? Because the system had never let them down, until one day when there was a glitch [in the radar altimeter, which under-read], the autothrottle started pulling the throttles back and they didn’t notice it until they were out of energy: too low, too slow.’ ‘My theory is that automation has finally got through to the pilot,’ Learmount says. ‘It took quite a long time: we’ve had autopilots since the Second World War, but they took quite a lot of monitoring and you had to keep your mind in the loop at all times.’ Bruce Dowdall adds to that: ‘Fully serviceable aircraft are still being flown into the ground which indicates issues in the crew’s performance.’ He describes the problem in terms of situational awareness rather than complacency. ‘You could mount an argument that pilot skills have been affected by the advent of high-level automation, but the other factor is the pilots being aware of what’s going on with the aircraft. What the automation tends to do is take the pilot out of the loop. But what the automation can’t fix, it tends to dump on the pilot. ‘ By contrast, a modern autopilot coupled to a flight director can largely be left to its own devices, he says. ‘Pilots can select various flight plans and let the aircraft fly them. That’s great, it’s absolutely fine until one day when the system isn’t performing properly and the pilot has to revert to basic flying.’ ‘Their hands and feet skills might be up to the task, if only they knew what was going on with the aeroplane.’ Dowdall says there is a growing mindset that automation should be allowed to fly the aircraft whenever possible. He says this has become a problem in at least one in-flight incident where the crew re-engaged the autopilot after it made abrupt and uncommanded manoeuvres. 11 continued on page 14 15 YEARS ... Learmount says the high performance and reliability of modern flight automation has led to pilot complacency. Commenting on the Schiphol crash he says: ‘The Turkish Airlines captain was brought up in the round-dial era, so he had plenty of practice in monitoring and integrating flight information the old-fashioned way.’ Private / Business 460 100 450 90 430 80 420 70 410 400 60 390 380 50 370 360 40 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Year Hours Flown (000’s) Accidents 2006 2007 2008 2009 Accidents Hours Flown (000’s) 440 Macarthur Job FSA NOV-DEC10 12 Aviation Safety Digest editor 1964-1978 ‘There were severe restrictions on light aircraft flying in He no longer flies, but Macarthur Job still has his gaze anything other than visual conditions. There was no night turned to the skies—with the same hawk-like focus on cross-country permitted; there was no night VFR rating, aviation safety that characterised his editorship of Aviation the only night flying done was night circuits at aerodromes. Safety Digest. After 14 years and 64 editions at the helm of Virtually no light aeroplanes the highly-regarded and awardwinning magazine, he remains a It was an afternoon of analysis, were fitted for IFR because the equipment was too big and contributor to its successor, Flight not reminiscence, in which too heavy.’ Safety Australia, with his next story scheduled for the January/ he reflected, with a certain ‘In that era there was no such February issue 2011. disappointment, that many of the thing as a restricted pilot’s licence: either you were a private pilot, or Job spoke to Flight Safety Australia trends and truisms he observed you weren’t,’ he says. at the Civil Aviation Historical Society’s Airways Museum in between 1964 and 1978 still apply. ‘The private pilot syllabus hadn’t Essendon, Melbourne. It was changed from the open cockpit an afternoon of analysis, not reminiscence, in which he biplane days. In those sort of aeroplanes if you got caught in reflected, with a certain disappointment, that many of the cloud, and could maintain airspeed, you’d probably come out trends and truisms he observed between 1964 and 1978 the other side, but the new clean aeroplanes that had only just still apply. been introduced would wind up in a spiral dive very quickly if you couldn’t keep your attitude right on instruments. But he dismisses the idea that pilots were any better or worse in that era. Then, as now, the decision to pursue or ‘There was no instrument training required for a private ignore airmanship was the individual pilot’s choice. licence—none whatever. As a result people kept spearing into cloud, becoming disorientated, losing control and He says crash rates, and types reflected how aviation was spiralling into the ground. We had accident after accident of changing in the ’60s and ’70s. ‘At the time I took over the that sort. Digest in ’64 we weren’t very long into the modern aircraft era … but the departmental attitude was still in the early days, ‘I found it terribly hard to convince pilots that this was the the biplane era. It hadn’t caught up with the new technology.’ greatest source of fatalities in general aviation. We preached about it: we ran issue after issue on accidents of this sort, On reflection, he says general aviation of the early ’60s but it all seemed to fall on deaf ears because they kept resembled sport aviation today. happening.’ Eventually a requirement was introduced for private pilots to complete three hours of instrument flying training ‘under the hood’ as part of the syllabus. ‘When that happened the pattern of accidents changed from getting out of control in a spiral dive to flying into cumulus granitis clouds – clouds with rocks in them,’ Job says. ‘That was a distinct change.’ Part of the reason pilots were encountering hard-centred clouds was the complacency engendered by the comfort of the new easy-to-fly aircraft in deteriorating weather, and the need for greater accuracy in navigation. It was another hangover of the wood and fabric era being challenged by the greater performance of a newer generation of aircraft, Job says. Pilots getting lost, sometimes by hundreds of nautical miles, was enough of a concern for the Digest to devote a special issue to navigation. ‘Navigation techniques were unchanged since the biplane era, basically a map, compass and watch. When these were applied to fast new, longer-range aeroplanes that’s when trouble started,’ he says. Another theme that emerged in the pages of the Digest as aeroplanes became more sophisticated was cockpit checks. ‘I wouldn’t say it was a frequent cause of accidents but it was sometimes a cause of accidents,’ Job says ‘We used to emphasise it a lot.’ Another difference was a succession of Australian high capacity airline crashes to write about. In the decade from 1960-70 there were six major crashes involving Australian airliners: a TAA Fokker Friendship crash off Cairns in 1960; a DC-4 freighter lost in 1961; a Qantas Super Constellation hull loss the same year in a take-off crash; a Viscount lost over Botany Bay in a severe thunderstorm, also in 1961; a Viscount crash near Winton after an in-flight fire in 1966; and a Viscount that broke up in flight near Port Hedland in 1968. The great difference between then and now was that general aviation was a mainstream and growing activity, he says. ‘All the flying schools were choc-a-bloc with people learning to fly, and flying was a lot cheaper. I can remember waiting for a clearance to take off at Moorabbin in a departmental aircraft for 20 minutes! There was one after another aeroplane coming in to land. I was glad I wasn’t paying!’ ‘I don’t have a tremendously optimistic view of general aviation—it’s becoming increasingly expensive for private pilots to be involved. General aviation will continue at a corporate level where money’s no object, but the era of the private pilot is at risk.’ But he thinks recreational aviation will continue to bloom. ‘Some of the newer recreational aircraft types appear to be well-designed and good performers: quite sound little aeroplanes and economical to operate. I think that will replace much of what has been GA.’ And aviation publishing is essentially the same, judging from the former editor’s recollections. Then as now, it was impossible to please everyone: ‘I always found the bouquets were few and far between compared to the brickbats. But I did enjoy it, in a masochistic sort of way. It was always a joy to get each issue out.’ 13 15 YEARS ... ‘A Tiger Moth had a cruising speed of 78kt and endurance of about two and a half hours, so you’re really not going to go very far. You couldn’t get very lost. In a new modern aeroplane such as a Bonanza, you could cruise at 160kt and get completely lost.’ Among the differences Job perceives between then and now was the tone of instruction. The style and ethos of Second World War military instruction still pervaded flying training in the ’60s, he says, but has faded in recent years. While conceding that some of its severity may be out of alignment with modern mores, he approves of its stringency. continued from page 11 FSA NOV-DEC10 14 ‘Most of the time automation does a pretty good job, but when it goes wrong it goes seriously wrong. What’s disturbing is the flight crew reliance on automation we’re seeing. Even when it’s reasonably clear that the automation is what’s causing the problem, crews are still relying on it.’ Dowdall says this suggests that similar issues of mode confusion and degraded situational awareness that were involved in the first commercial glass cockpit accidents are potentially recurring in similarly-equipped general aviation aircraft. ‘When things do go wrong in highly-complex aircraft, the automation tends to spit out a lot of data, there are a lot of bells and whistles going off, and important clues may be buried deep in a menu,’ he says. ‘The aircraft will provide the crew with a lot of data, but it’s not the same as information.’ ‘It’s an emerging issue that we’ll be looking at, and considering its implications in terms of training and education,’ he says. ‘The technology has clear advantages that it seems aren’t being realised.’ ‘Something relatively small and unforeseen will cascade throughout the entire system.’ Dowdall says automation issues are becoming evident in GA, with that sector’s increasing use of glass cockpit technology. He notes a US National Transportation Safety Board study of general aviation crashes for aircraft with glass cockpits, compared with crashes of aircraft with conventional instruments. According to that report, ‘The percentage of accidents resulting in fatality was about twice as high for the glass cockpit cohort as for the conventional cohort.’ The report found glass cockpit aircraft had lower total accident rates. But accident and fatal accident rates were higher for the glass cockpit group in IMC and at night. March 1998 July-August 1999 After looking back, what of the future? The year 2025 is as far ahead as 1995 is in the past. New technologies, if they appear at the same rate as they have in the past 15 years, could change the face of aviation. Very light jets (VLJs) are an example, combining advanced concepts in structures, engines and avionics to promise business jet performance in relatively cheap aircraft. The business environment has not been kind to VLJ makers in recent years, but the US FAA sees them growing as a sector. It forecasts a US market of 270 to 300 VLJs a year, totalling 4,875 aircraft by 2025. The exact safety implications of this new type taking to the skies en masse are hard to predict, but in general terms the issue is clear. Pilots of the future will have to do as pilots have always done: learn to deal with the most advanced technology of the day, with discipline, an understanding of its limits and an understanding of the only unchanging element in aviation - the human factor. March-April 2000 The more things change … A hallmark of Flight Safety Australia’s predecessor, the Aviation Safety Digest, was its strongly worded editorials, many of which could be described as homilies, sermons or lectures. Many of the themes railed about from 1953 to the Digest’s demise in 1991, remain surprisingly current and, with allowance for the writing style of an earlier era, much of what it said we couldn’t put better ourselves. From the Aviation Safety Digest No 3, January 1954: ‘Although the Department of Civil Aviation tries to give you as much latitude as possible in the conduct of your flying, at the same time the Department is morally obliged to act should it appear that you and your passengers are in any possible danger. In other words, we are concerned with the safety of aircraft operations irrespective of whether the aircraft is a Constellation or a Tiger Moth.’ 'We have done our utmost to make the path of the light aircraft operator as smooth as possible. However, the successful operation of any system can only be accomplished by the cooperation of all parties concerned.' Readers suggested topics including navigation, principles of flight and aviation medicine. (At the risk of sounding smug, all of these have been covered in Flight Safety Australia in 2010). Another evergreen comment was: ‘Difficulty in interpreting Departmental requirements and procedures are mentioned by quite a number who would welcome articles explaining and commenting on these things.’ Another response said: ‘The editor’s comments read like headmaster’s sermons!’ Then, as now, opinions included a degree of nostalgia. ‘Some think past issues were more stimulating than those we are producing at present,’ Job wrote. With a still discernible note of relief, the editor remarked that: ‘Only two readers were blunt enough to suggest we should stop production altogether.’ And he also offered a lament that is – lamentably – still relevant: ‘Though places and circumstances differed, the same sorts of accidents seemed to go on repeating themselves over and over again.’ In 1977, the Digest conducted a survey of 2000 readers to mark 25 years and its 100th issue. The responses were frank, to judge from editor Macarthur Job’s summary in issue 100. March-April 2001 March-April 2005 15 January-February 2008 15 YEARS ... Financial pressures and priorities have changed, however, and some things we take for granted today were big-ticket items in the early '50s. 'Any form of assistance to an aircraft in flight or in possible distress, invariably involves expensive long distance phone calls,’ the Digest thundered in issue number 3. ‘A significant number think the Digest should be more diverse in its approach,’ Job wrote. ‘Rather than confining ourselves to actual accidents and incidents we should include more technical articles on various aspects of aircraft operations.’ FSA NOV-DEC10 16 17 ATC NOTES International Accidents/Incidents 24 August - 6 October 2010 FSA NOV-DEC10 18 Date Aircraft Location Fatalities Damage Description 24 Aug Embraer 190LR near Yichun Lindu Airport, Cina 42 Destroyed Aircraft crashed 1500m short of the runway and was destroyed by fire. Crash is second loss and worst accident for Embraer 190. 24 Aug Dornier 228-101 near Bastipur, Nepal 14 Destroyed Aircraft crashed after crew decided to turn back and divert to Simara Airport due to poor weather at Kathmandu. News reports said the aeroplane had a generator failure. Crash site was a hillside about 18nm from Kathmandu and at 9000ft. 25 Aug Let 410 near Bandundu Airport, Democratic Republic of Congo 20 Destroyed Aircraft reportedly came down in village while on final approach to nearby airport. Media reports suggested fuel starvation, but an operator spokesman said there was 150 litres of fuel in the tanks. 25 Aug Embraer 145 Vitória da Conquista Airport, Brazil 0 Written off Aircraft was substantially damaged in a runway excursion accident. Two people were injured. 26 Aug Fokker 100 Tabriz Airport, Iran 0 Substantial Aircraft lost control soon after landing and plunged into a nearby canal. Two passengers were injured. 31 Aug Cessna 550 Citation II Misima Island Airport, Papua New Guinea 4 Destroyed Aircraft skidded off the runway into trees while landing in heavy rain, and burst into flames. The co-pilot survived with critical injuries. One of the dead passengers was reported to be the Australian co-owner of the airline. 3 Sep Boeing 747-44AF near Dubai Airport, 2 United Arab Emirates Destroyed After 22 minutes of flight to Germany crew declared emergency, saying there was smoke on board. Aircraft missed approach to Dubai airport and crashed nearby. 7 Sep Tupolev 154M Written off At FL350 crew reported electrical failure, including the fuel pumps, leaving Izhma Airport, Russia 0 the aircraft with 3300kg of usable fuel. After emergency descent below cloud level crew saw an abandoned air strip. The strip was 1325m: the Tu-154 requires 2200m to land. Aircraft overran runway by 160m into pine forest. 13 Sep ATR-42-320 near Puerto Ordaz 17 Airport, Venezuela Destroyed Aircraft came down in an industrial area about 4nm short of runway. 1 Oct Cessna 550 Citation II near Manteo-Dare 0 County Regional Airport, North Carolina, US Substantial Corporate jet ran beyond runway and into water of Croatan Sound on landing. 6 Oct Cessna 501 Citation I/SP off Coatzacoalcos, 8 Mexico Destroyed Business jet crashed in sea soon after take-off for unknown reason. Notes: compiled from information supplied by the Aviation Safety Network (see www. aviation-safety.net/database/) and reproduced with permission. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, neither the Aviation Safety Network nor Flight Safety Australia make any representations about its accuracy, as information is based on preliminary reports only. For further information refer to final reports of the relevant official aircraft accident investigation organisation. Information on injuries is unavailable. Australian Accidents/Incidents 7 August - 28 September 2010 Date Aircraft Location 7 Aug Diamond DA 42 Twinstar Robinson R22 Beta Parafield Nil Aerodrome, SA Mount Garnet (ALA), Nil E M 19km, QLD 7 Aug Cessna 152 near Moorabbin Aerodrome, VIC Nil Serious 8 Aug Robinson R22 Beta Nil Serious 10 Aug Cessna 210J Centurion Robinson R22 Beta Cessna U206F Doomadgee Aerodrome, 270° M 46km, QLD Corowa Aerodrome, NSW Wombungi (ALA), 270° M 4km, NT Gladstone Aerodrome, NW M 6km, QLD Nil Serious Nil Serious Minor Serious 7 Aug 10 Aug 12 Aug Injuries Damage Description Serious The crew did not lower the landing gear. Serious During mustering, the helicopter's main rotor struck struck a wedge tail eagle. The pilot landed on grass that was subsequently set alight by the R22's exhaust. On base leg for runway 35L, the pilot reported an engine failure. The aircraft undershot the runway and hit terrain south of the aerodrome. The investigation is continuing. During mustering, the tail rotor collided with a tree. The helicopter landed heavily. During landing, the landing gear collapsed. Engineering inspection revealed a fault in the hydraulic system. Helicopter landed in long grass, which was set alight by the engine exhaust pipe. During initial climb, the pilot reported an engine failure and conducted a forced landing on Wiggan Island. There were seven people on board. The investigation is continuing. Australian Accidents/Incidents 7 August - 28 September 2010 Date Aircraft Location Damage Description 14 Aug Amateur-built Searey Ballarat Aerodrome, Nil S M 37km, VIC Serious 19 Aug Bell 206B Jetranger Serious 26 Aug Cessna 182B Skylane 30 Aug Robinson R44 II Raven near Maryborough Nil (Qld) Aerodrome, QLD Narromine Nil Aerodrome, 284° M 53km, NSW Jandakot Minor Aerodrome, WA 31 Aug Mooney M20C Jandakot Aerodrome, WA Serious 3 Sept CESSNA 182H Skylane near Commonwealth Minor Hill (ALA), SA Serious 6 Sept Enstrom F-28F Serious 7 Sept Amateur-built CH200 Cooma Aerodrome, Nil 305° M 37km, NSW Kilcoy (ALA), QLD Nil 10 Sept Robinson R22 Beta During cruise, the engine lost power and began running roughly. The pilot conducted a precautionary landing on a nearby road. On final approach, the aircraft encountered turbulence, resulting in a hard landing and the landing gear collapsing. An engineering inspection found evidence of fuel contamination in the fuel filters, needle and seat. During powerline inspection, the engine out light illuminated and the turbine RPM began to decline. The helicopter was autorotated and hit the ground hard. An engineering inspection could find no fault with the engine. While landing in a gusty crosswind, the aircraft bounced and then landed hard to the right of the strip. The nose landing gear leg sheared and the aircraft flipped over. As the helicopter became airborne, the pilot lost control and the main rotor blades struck the concrete apron. The helicopter rolled and came to rest on its right hand side. The investigation is continuing. During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed resulting in the aircraft running off the runway and coming to rest on the grass. The engineering inspection revealed the eye bolt on the push rod failed. While mustering, the aircraft engine lost part of its power. The pilot attempted a precautionary landing but conducted a go-around from short final due to windy conditions. The engine was unresponsive to throttle movement and the aircraft collided with a tree. The company subsequently advised that carburettor icing was the likely cause. While inspecting an area for aerial spraying at 100 ft AGL, the helicopter's engine failed. The pilot conducted a forced landing. During the take-off run, the aircraft veered left off the grass airstrip and struck a fence. The sole occupant was uninjured but the aircraft was seriously damaged. During mustering, the engine began running roughly and lost power. While the pilot was attempting to land, the helicopter collided with trees before hitting the ground. During takeoff, the aircraft collided with terrain. The investigation is continuing. 14 Sept Nil Serious Serious Serious Nil Serious Fatal Destroyed Nil Serious Pantijan (ALA), 091° Nil M 33km, WA Serious During the landing roll, the aircraft veered to the right and the pilot initiated a go-around. The left landing gear subsequently collapsed and the propeller struck the runway. During initial climb, the low rotor RPM buzzer sounded and the helicopter descended. The pilot conducted a forced landing but the helicopter landed heavily. While recovering from a manouevre at low level, the helicopter collided with the ground, damaging the landing gear. During the subsequent landing, the helicopter encountered ground resonance. During the recovery, the main rotor severed the tail boom and the helicopter rolled forward. During a crop spraying run, the aircraft struck a powerline and hit the ground. During a touch-and-go landing, the aircraft veered off the runway onto sodden earth. The front nose landing gear collapsed and propeller struck the ground. 20 Sept Robinson R44 20 Sept Schweizer 269C Moorabbin Aerodrome, VIC Minor Serious 23 Sept Air Tractor AT402A Cirrus SR22 Echuca Aerodrome, 349° M 24km, VIC Dalby (ALA), QLD Minor Serious Nil Serious Rockwell International 114 Commander Cessna T210L Centurion near Geelong (ALA), VIC Minor Destroyed On approach, the aircraft struck powerlines, crashed and caught fire. The investigation is continuing. Serious It was reported the aircraft ditched into water. There were no fatalities. The investigation is continuing. 24 Sept 25 Sept 28 Sept Gurney Airport, NE Nil M 46km, Other Text courtesy of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Disclaimer – information on accidents is the result of a co-operative effort between the ATSB and the Australian aviation industry. Data quality and consistency depend on the efforts of industry where no follow-up action is undertaken by the ATSB. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the use of these data. Please note that descriptions are based on preliminary reports, and should not be interpreted as findings by the ATSB. The data do not include sports aviation accidents. 19 ACCIDENTS 19 Sept Wrotham Park (ALA), W M 46km, QLD Cessna A188B/ Geraldton A1 Agtruck Aerodrome, E M 30km, WA Amateur-built Wollongong Pitts Special S-1 Aerodrome, NSW Injuries FSA NOV-DEC10 20 With flight simulators poised to take a greater role in both initial and recurrent pilot training, Flight Safety Australia hears from the experts about their benefits and limitations. You’ve all heard the jokes: a perfect landing in a simulator is as relevant as doing successful surgery on a cadaver, or about as exciting as dancing with your sibling. But the role of simulators in pilot training and checking is a serious question, undergoing serious consideration. In December 2009, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority began investigating whether mandatory simulator training should be made more widespread. Currently it is only required for low-visibility flight situations, but a notice of proposed rule-making due to go to press about the same time as this issue of Flight Safety Australia will announce CASA’s intention to mandate the use of flight simulators for non-normal training exercises in aircraft with 10 or more passenger seats (or over 8618kg MTOW) if a simulator is available. The crash of 22 March 2010, in which two pilots died while performing an asymmetric take-off in an Embraer EMB-120 Brasilia at Darwin Airport, made a strong and tragic case for simulator training - the same exercise could have been carried out without leaving the ground in a simulator. But with the prospect of simulator sessions becoming more widespread - both for recurrent and initial training - the question of how to maximise their benefit is more topical than ever. In common use, the word simulator covers a range of training devices, from full immersion motion simulators with authentic flight decks and six degrees of freedom on a platform of six hydraulic rams, to personal computer-based systems and, at the most basic extreme, ‘paper tiger’ procedure trainers. Each type brings its own advantages and issues. Personal computerbased part task trainers don’t replicate aircraft motion or cockpit layout, but can be almost trivially inexpensive compared to the cost of operating even the most basic aircraft. The same cannot be said for full mission simulators, which, while cheaper than the aircraft they represent, can still have running costs of up to $1500 an hour including instructor. All the flying instructors interviewed by Flight Safety Australia for this story approved of simulators, with reservations only about the detail of how they should be used. Chief flying instructor of New England Flight Training, Stewart Hignett, is a regional flying instructor whose operation specialises in training private pilots. He finds would-be pilots come to him from their computers with some preconceived ideas, thanks to simulator software. ‘You get it with young guys whose parents have bought them a TIF (trial introductory flight) for their birthday,’ he says. ‘You explain how you’re flying the aeroplane by attitude and set it up for them - their eyes aren’t even outside - they’re flying by artificial horizon, because that’s what you do on flight sim. You can pick it straight away.’ But Hignett says a simulator of any standard is potentially a very valuable teaching tool. ‘It’s a great place to make a mistake,’ he says. ‘We do the first hour of basic instrument flight in it. I wish I had done more synthetic training when I was learning instrument flight. ‘The beauty of it is you can stop it. Flying an NDB approach, which is one of the more tricky things to learn, you can stop and ask “where’s the needle?”’ Other instructors say the pause button on a simulator can be overused. Chief flying instructor of Coffs Harbour-based Professional Pilot Training, Robert Loretan, remembers an experience early in his career that taught him a hard lesson about how to use simulators appropriately. The incident happened when he was an exchange instructor in the US Air Force on the Northrop T-38 Talon supersonic trainer. ‘The images were very real and I was scared by the experience. I became determined not to let my jet get into that situation. However, she was relaxed and just hit the reset button to put us back on to finals as though nothing had happened.’ ‘She went flying with another instructor a day later - they got in the same situation, she delayed her reaction because she did not understand the outcome, and they hit the approach lighting just short of the runway. Fortunately they got the ’burner in on the second engine just as they hit, and they got enough vertical trajectory to eject safely as the aeroplane broke up.’ ‘I blame myself a bit - I let her crash in the simulator and taught her the wrong thing when I thought I was doing the right thing. The problem of practising dangerous activities in a simulator is that you do not have the outcome of death to motivate your reactions: if you let However, Loretan says the safest place to practise dangerous activities is in a simulator. ‘As an experienced pilot, I transferred the aeroplane skills to the simulator to build my situational awareness for operations in the aeroplane. She took the same experience in the simulator to the aeroplane and damaged her situational awareness.’ Loretan allows his airline cadets unlimited time on PC simulators and approved synthetic trainers. ‘It’s costing me next-to-nothing and the benefits are worthwhile, but we still limit the experiences they are allowed to experiment with,’ he says. He estimates that one hour of instruction in an aircraft is worth about three in an average general aviation synthetic trainer (part task trainer), but says simulated flight instruction becomes more useful as the student gains more aircraft experience and negative transfers diminish as actual flying hours build. Full flight simulation (full-mission trainers) as used by the military and airlines has much higher transfer rates into skill development (often one for one), but the operating costs of full mission simulators can be as much as ten times the operating cost of a basic flight training aircraft. ‘There’s a certain amount that has to be experienced in an aeroplane during ab-initio flight training,’ he says. Not all skill transfer goes from simulation to the aeroplane, Loretan says. ‘It is a two-way street, many activities; particularly threedimensional activities and emotional experiences transfer from the aeroplane to the simulator where the skill is further developed and transferred back to the aeroplane at a higher standard, and the cycle goes on and on. Every activity must be evaluated and the combination of aeroplane and part task training or full mission simulation must be carefully designed, considering safety and positive or negative transfer as well as efficiency and cost effectiveness.’ ‘The issue becomes how much can you transfer and at what cost. As a pilot gets more experience in the atmosphere, you get more transfer from the simulator. As you gain competence in the simulator, it transfers to the aircraft. There are plenty of experienced pilots who can do an entire type endorsement in a full mission simulator.’ At the other extreme of complexity, Hignett says the benefits of basic procedures trainers are often overlooked in discussions about flight modelling and fidelity. ‘The other one that’s great for learning procedures is the old Beech 1900 paper tiger. You can sit there and go through all the checklists - and it really works - you know where everything is.’ ‘You explain how you’re flying the aeroplane by attitude and set it up for them - their eyes aren’t even outside - they’re flying by artificial horizon, because that’s what you do on flight sim. You can pick it straight away.’ 21 WHEN TO SIM ‘I taught a girl on a T-38s in an all-singing, all-dancing, six-axis, terrain-modelling, full mission simulator. The T-38 at 160 knots on finals with a simulated engine failure was behind the drag curve, and too slow to go around, or even maintain a three degree approach path. To imprint this danger into her perception I put the simulator on finals too slow and too low and we could not maintain the approach path in afterburner, so we crashed short of the runway. We did this three times.’ it get to the point of crashing you can cause a negative transfer into the perception of the pilot.’ ‘A student should come out of a simulator relieved and confident that they can safely handle a realistic exercise.’ One airline insider told Flight Safety Australia, ‘If you are setting up an aircraft for start-up and taxi, the question has to be “does this really need to be done on a full flight simulator?”’ ‘If you’re training to CAR 217, it’s important to remember you have a choice between aircraft, flight training devices and full flight simulators. Each one has its place, but it’s important to develop an appropriate lesson plan for each.’ Instructor and retired Boeing 737-300 captain, John Laming, says the instructor is often the forgotten factor in simulator training. He remembers his first simulator instructor without affection or respect. FSA NOV-DEC10 22 ‘He was an irritable pedant who had risen to the God-like status of check captain purely through seniority in the airline rather than any ability to instruct; the simulator he ran was called the horror box.’ Another retired airline captain has a similar story: ‘This is a philosophy that’s plagued the industry for years,’ he says, ‘that it’s acceptable to break people in the simulator. It’s archaic but prevalent, the Machiavellian simulator instructor who piles failure upon failure. I was once literally stabbed in the back with a pen while flying a simulator exercise and didn’t notice it - what benefit did that have except to a sadistic instructor?’ Laming says simulator sessions have the ‘greatest benefit when they are relatively short, and structured to teach, rather than deliberately overload the pilot.’ ‘Any schoolteacher knows that forty-five minutes of lecture time is about the maximum that students can absorb without losing interest: beyond that the learning curve flattens and clock-watching sets in. Yet I have been to simulator sessions where two hours of briefings precede four hours in the simulator, followed often by a one hour de-brief.’ Laming strongly believes that pilots’ manual flying skills need to be maintained and says the simulator is an ideal environment for this. If pushed to choose, he would regard hand-flying training as more important than line-oriented flight training (LOFT), or even crew resource management (CRM) exercises. Citing the cluster of loss-ofcontrol accidents of the past decade and the alarming lack of basic skills he has seen in some students and licensed pilots, he gives special emphasis to using the simulator to train for recovery from unusual attitudes. ‘I believe more accent should be on pure flying skills - meaning manual handling - especially on take-off and landing in strong crosswinds on wet runways.’ A commercial full-mission simulator instructor says instruction has to be topical and relate to actual problems and situations. ‘A few years ago, the biggest killer was controlled flight into terrain, now the problem seems to be runway overruns. A training organisation has to be progressive, to keep up with trends. For example, I know some organisations are looking at training for volcanic ash.’ ‘Unfortunately you can’t train for everything. The problem is there’s limited time. We’d love to have every airline pilot in our simulators once a month, but the biggest issue for airlines is taking crews out of the line. They want pilots in aeroplanes, not pilots in simulators.’ *7*<)1<¼; )>1)<176<0-7:A;+0774 Hanger N Wirraway Drive, Redcliffe Airport. QLD 4021 Check out our web page at www.bobtait.com.au BAK & PPL All CPL subjects plus IREX Courses available full-time or by home study 32%R[5HGFOLIIH1RUWK4/' 3 ) :ZZZEREWDLWFRPDX (EREWDLW#EREWDLWFRPDX Ideal weather conditions recently in south-eastern Australia have led to high-density hatchings of locusts. And when these insects hatch, there is plenty of their preferred foods – grasses and cereal crops - because of the strong spring rain much of the southeast has enjoyed. Billions of the insects are expected to hatch and swarm across South Australia, New South Wales and Victoria by mid-December. Accordingly, a NOTAM warns pilots of the possible threat to aviation these pest insects can cause. The hatchings began in parts of northern NSW in early September and in the central west in the second week of September. This has been followed by hatchings near Broken Hill, in farming areas around the Flinders Ranges in South Australia, and near Mildura in northwestern Victoria in midSeptember. Locust swarms were expected to have formed by late October and are predicted to continue forming in NSW, South Australia and northern Victoria from October until mid December. Queensland appears to have been spared plague locust infestation with the Australian Plague Locust Commission reporting : Population densities in western Queensland are low and no significant spring nymph population has been detected.’ However, there is concern about the number of the spur-throated locust in Queensland if the recent heavy rains persist. FOR MORE INFORMATION Aerial spraying has treated almost 60,000 hectares of locust- Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry affected land in NSW, while aircraft have surveyed a vast http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/locusts area (five million hectares) of that state on locust watch. DAFF FACT SHEET If you are flying in affected areas, you’re advised to visit the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and state government agencies websites for updates on the current, and forecast, locust situation, as well as potential areas of infestation. You can also assist DAFF by reporting any infestations of locusts you see from the air, or by reporting sightings to the local state agency. Swarms of adult locusts can pose a direct threat to aviation. In sufficient numbers, and especially the numbers being talked about this year, locusts can mask ground features so you can’t see the ground reliably. Locusts can accumulate to about 100 per square metre, and possibly range over tens or even hundreds of square kilometres in an individual swam. Ingestion of locusts into engine intakes and pitot tubes of aircraft can present cooling problems and unreliable airspeed indications. It’s commonsense, and good airmanship, to fit pitot covers and engine intake blanking to prevent locust ingestion while the aircraft is in a hangar or secured in the open. Locusts on windscreens and goggles cause reduced visibility. http://www.grdc.com.au/uploads/documents/Plague_Locusts_ Factsheets.pdf Current locust situation and news http://www.daff.gov.au/animal-plant-health/locusts/current#regions Australian Plague Locust Commission (APLC) http://www.daff.gov.au/about/media-centre/audio Queensland http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/4790_18493.htm Report locust sightings to Bio-security Queensland on 13 25 23 Victoria http://new.dpi.vic.gov.au/agriculture/pests-diseases-and-weeds /plague-locusts Report locust sightings to DPI Locust Hotline on 1300 135 559 Western Australia http://www.agric.wa.gov.au/PC_92901.html Report locust sightings to AgLine on 1300 725 572 New South Wales http://www.lhpa.org.au/pests/locusts Report Locust sightings: Telephone contacts are found at: http://www.lhpa.org.au/contact South Australia http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/locust Report Locust Sightings Local Control Centres: Orroroo 8658 1456 - Loxton 1800 833 451 23 LOOK OUT ... LOCUSTS Locust bodies can also mark paintwork. Exercise caution when flying in areas of known locust activity. Locusts have been observed at altitudes up to 3000ft AGL and can be in swarms of up to 50 million. Locusts can be active 24 hours a day, with adults’ day flights ranging up to 30km, and night flights of up to several hundred kilometres if conditions are suitable. Locust infestations [nymph, the non-flying immature form and/or adult] can also attract birds. This raises the increased potential for bird strikes – particularly near waterways – waterfowl habitat. Pilots should also take special care near aerodromes supporting aerial operations associated with locust control, as there may be increased aircraft traffic (including low-flying helicopters and fixed-wing spray aircraft). The greatest potential risk may occur during take-off and landing associated with aerodromes in locust-affected areas. If you are flying near such aerodromes, you should be especially careful in monitoring radio frequencies. As Flight Safety Australia rediscovered recently, almost nothing stirs up the aviation community like a discussion on how to train pilots. FSA NOV-DEC10 24 Training is an ongoing, evolving issue of direct relevance to aviation safety, and if the experts in the field agree on anything, it is that there is no single right route to the right stuff. Flight Safety provides some more perspectives on this vital issue ... ‘You can be flying in a very different environment to what you would in a big airline,’ he says. ‘The other thing is if you’re flying on your own a lot you can get into some bloody bad habits. Nobody’s monitoring you.’ There are many recipes, but no official blueprint for making the perfect airline pilot. Some say wisdom comes from basic flying in regional charter and air work operations, a finishing school that builds skill, character and the mysterious composite of those two elements called airmanship. Others contend that university education, equipping the future pilot with skills to outlast their career behind the yoke, is the way to build the profession. ‘Flying night freight or outback charter might “make a real man of you” but it doesn’t necessarily make you a good pilot.’ The safety and operations editor of Flight International, David Learmount, learned to fly the conventional way, earning a private pilot's licence, then in the British Royal Air Force, building his skills to the high standard required of a C130 Hercules pilot. But he wonders whether this is still the best way to train for a career in automated multi-crew flight decks. ‘If you go and fly night freight in a Caravan, for example, you’re going to learn quite a few things; but what you learn is going to depend on what you encounter,’ Learmount says. Other voices emphasise the importance of command authority and say it is vital, regardless of what sort of flying machine it is gained on. ‘Nothing matches time in command,’ says author Macarthur Job, noting that the celebrated pilot of US Air Flight 1549 which ditched in the Hudson River in January 2009, Chesley Sullenberger, had been an air force fast jet pilot and a glider pilot. ‘He had that basic feeling for the air.’ Job says extracurricular flying reinforces what he sees as an important truth easily lost in the complexity of modern aviation: an aeroplane is not a just collection of systems, but a flying machine still subject to all the laws of aerodynamics. ‘I think you can draw an analogy with the old naval training when officer cadets had to learn how to sail a whaleboat. It’s about learning the basic tenets of aviation: wind, weather, aerodynamics and aerofoils – being aware of the realities of flight.’ The training debate is becoming pointed because of a predicted global shortage of pilots. The latest crew assessment forecast from Boeing is that the world’s airlines will need 466,650 pilots over the next two decades, or an average of 23,300 new pilots a year until 2029. The biggest growth area would occur in the Asia-Pacific region, which would need 186,600 pilots, Boeing found. This is the context for a new school of thought in pilot training. Its advocates say even if there is nothing wrong with the traditional method of accumulating hours in GA or military aircraft, this stream will not be able to supply sufficient pilots for the future. The managing director of ab-initio training at Oxford Aviation Academy, which runs an abinitio cadet program for Jetstar cadet pilots in Australia, Anthony Petteford, says training should concentrate more on the distinguishing aspect of airline flight decks - multi-crew operations. ... the world’s airlines will need 466,650 pilots over the next two decades, or an average of 23,300 new pilots a year until 2029. ‘While experience may have been beneficial, there has to be an emphasis on conflict resolution. Very rarely is the aeroplane in such a state that it’s going to cease flying immediately.’ He is sceptical about the idea that command time bestows unique advantages. ‘Our counter to that is, what gives the captain monopoly on the right command decisions?’ Petteford argues that air transport operations, and air transport emergencies in particular, require the skills of the entire crew. ‘I was flying a sim trip with an old-school skipper who basically went into single pilot mode and evacuated the aeroplane into a running engine: there was no review process,’ he says. 25 ‘And when it comes to skills, all our courses include recovery from unusual attitudes.’ Learmount says it is too early to make a definitive judgement on the MPL model, although he foresees no major issues with it. Instead he sees a more fundamental problem: ‘We still train pilots as if they were flying Super Constellations back in the 1950s,’ he says. Noting that engine failure at take-off has become a staple of simulator testing among most airlines, he asks: ‘Why? Engine failures hardly ever happen nowadays and, what’s more, modern aeroplanes are very much easier to handle when you do get engine failure. There’s plenty of rudder authority and in a lot of more sophisticated aeroplanes the rudder goes on even if you don’t put it there.’ (The Boeing 777 has a thrust asymmetry compensation system [TACS] that commands a rudder input if it detects asymmetric thrust levels.) TRAIN IN VAIN? The solution: a short, sharp pilot training course with structured, but minimal flight time, coupled with a strong emphasis on teamwork from the first hours in cockpit or classroom. This puts a trainee into the first officer’s seat of an airliner after 260 hours of actual and simulated flight. Rather than what its advocates see as pointless hours in irrelevant aircraft types, the graduate of this multi-crew pilot licence (MPL) scheme bring training in human factors, crew resource management and communication to the flight deck. ‘You can fly a small aircraft for the required number of hours and find yourself in the righthand seat with insufficient training about concepts such as pilot-flying and pilot-not-flying, or the diagnostic approach. You’re there with people in the back and you don’t know enough about how to work together during non-normal conditions. That is crazy,’ he says. ‘The other thing about modern jet transport aeroplanes is there’s plenty of power to spare. These days, maintaining a single-engine climb is the least of your problems.’ Learmount says training needs to broaden its scope to take on the insidious failures that have contributed to a spate of air transport loss-ofcontrol crashes in the first decade of this century. Training for instrument failures, anomalous readings, unusual attitude recovery and situational awareness is every bit as important as practising handling skills, he says. ‘Modern pilot training should incorporate a huge amount more of threat and error management. We should be training pilots not just to use the instruments and systems that are available but to be sceptical about them, and to recognise that they can lull you into a false sense of security.’ FSA NOV-DEC10 26 The chief pilot of Professional Pilot Training in Coffs Harbour, NSW, Robert Loretan, takes an astringent view that transcends the distinction between what might be called the old-school and modern approaches to training. He has a distinguished record in both camps, having been a flight instructor in the RAAF, and on exchange in the USAF, where he instructed on the T38 supersonic trainer and studied human information processing at the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory. On his return to Australia he was appointed examiner of examiners in the RAAF (and flew with the Roulettes display team). Later, in the Civil Aviation Safety Authority he was involved in the development of the MPL concept. But his opinion is that most forms of training fail to consider basic principles of perception and information processing. Poor instruction at ab-initio level often creates problems that can trip up pilots years later, he argues. ‘Information processing does matter for things you will be doing later in a slightly different context. Unfortunately a lot of the basic stuff is setting up problems for the advanced stuff. Information processing has to be set up so it goes consistently through training in all activities,’ he says. ‘For example, on the first flight a student goes to the training area and the instructor says “Look at that landmark over there, we are near that”. Then when the student goes on navigation training, we abandon that and tell them to navigate from the map to the ground. But for the first 30 hours of training we teach students to orientate from ground to map.’ ‘You have to unlearn what has been taught to you in the beginning.’ He uses final approach as an example of the contradictions and complexity that have crept into instruction. ‘If you’re low on finals you’ll be told to increase power to reduce the rate of descent; but in the flare you will be taught to pull the nose up to flare – which is also reducing the rate of descent.’ ‘If you’ve got to do something differently in two different places, one or both procedures is wrong.’ This perceptual confusion has a dangerous side effect, Loretan says. ‘The control manipulations have become very complicated, because you have to add up so many wrongs to get a right there’s no capacity left in the brain to think. So we’ve got these poor zombies flying along who really have nothing left to think with when things get a bit difficult, say in turbulence or emergencies, because they are dong four or five times more thinking than they need to. We are overloading their basic ability to process information because the information has been programmed incorrectly in their brains.’ ... training pilots not just to use the instruments and systems that are available but to be sceptical about them, and to recognise that they can lull you into a false sense of security. Loretan’s other target is what he calls the 'Shaka Zulu' school of standardised training. The 19th century Zulu warrior king was famous for conquering other tribes by drilling his army in the basic movements of fighting, a mode of instruction Loretan says has no place in aviation. ‘The Zulu idea is that if everybody has the same size spear, and acts in the same way, they will prevail. It ignores the fact that hands and feet are slabs of meat that do what they’re told by the brain - so it is the brain we must train,’ Loretan says. ‘Training professional aircrew is too focused on the technical skills of flying an aeroplane and the odd list of human skills under the label of human factors. It should be incumbent to train the person as a functional employee and a useful member of the aviation environment and that means broadening a lot more than beyond the very limited skills of a commercial pilot's licence.’ However, he is unconvinced that university aviation courses do this, saying that the training they provide is the same as the rest and falls short of the education they aspire to. Disquiet over naive faith in technology was a common theme among training organisations interviewed for this story. Whether it was an instructor at a country flying school commenting on how he could tell when a 16-year-old on a trial flight had used Microsoft Flight Simulator because their head was down rather than looking out; the commercial instructor lamenting the tendency of students to engage with glass cockpits rather than the aeroplane’s attitude; or the airliner simulator instructor finding some students incapable of, or unwilling to manually intercept a localiser, the common theme is of a few pilots letting technology fly them. Safety and quality manager for the Royal Aero Club of Western Australia, Warren Drake, summed up the issue pithily: ‘I teach my students that automation is the third member of the flight crew, and should be treated as such,’ the former Royal Air Force officer and instructor in the club’s commercial pilot course says. ‘You have to bear in mind that it could be fallible.’ ‘When things used to fail it was more obvious, and from time to time you’d get practice dealing with minor failures. Now you don’t get that practice in line flying, so the practice you get in simulator sessions is more important than ever. But if you go back to the line having only practised the kind of failures you’d get in a Super Connie, what kind of training is that?’ The last word goes to Loretan, who says if modern pilots lack airmanship, (which, on the whole he doesn’t believe), it’s not their fault but the fault of their teachers. ‘The student I graduate here today would step into my shoes ten years down the track,’ he says. ‘I went to a conference and all the old guys were complaining about how bad today’s pilots were. I took this single book out containing all of my CPL notes and told them: “This is what you had to learn for your CPL. A modern CPL is seven thick text books.” A modern CPL is seven thick text books compared to one book of hand-written CPL course notes from the sixties. ‘I said: “You knew nothing, you grew up by accident and by a stroke of luck you are still alive. When you graduated you were not at the standard of a well-trained modern pilot. Help the young pilots of today.”’ TRAIN IN VAIN? David Learmount adds to this, saying technology dependence is a problem that results, ironically, from the high reliability and performance of modern aircraft. 27 A timely warning for pilots It’s a harsh truth, but as far as firefighters are concerned, a sightseer is a nuisance, whether on foot, in a car or in an aircraft. Sightseers on the ground get in the way, and in the air they can make an already crowded and dangerous situation worse. FSA NOV-DEC10 28 Aerial firefighting is an intense form of low-level aviation that becomes potentially dangerous when mixed with general aviation or media aircraft. A large firefighting operation could involve heavy helicopters, carrying up to 9000kg of water or retardant used for firebombing; other helicopters used for firefighter crew transport; and smaller helicopters flying for command and control, mapping and aerial ignition. Then there is the range of fixed-wing aircraft now used in firefighting: agricultural aircraft modified for firebombing, and referred to as single-engine air tankers (SEATs); turbine twins; and, last Australian fire season, a DC-10 wide-bodied jet. Most of these will be operating at altitudes of 200ft or lower. Light fixed-wing aircraft used for fire detection, reconnaissance and command-and-control are likely to be in the area at higher altitudes. This is why the National Aerial Firefighting Council strongly recommends all aircraft not involved in firefighting operations to stay 5nm horizontally and 3000ft (AGL) vertically away from aerial firefighting operations. NOTAM Unnotified intense aviation activity associated with firefighting operation may occur within 5nm and below 3000ft AGL of observed fires. Aircraft not coordinated through the state fire authority are requested to remain clear. CASA’s Adelaide-based, rotary wing flying operations inspector and former firefighting pilot, Mark Crumblin, says a bushfire is no place for airborne sightseers. “First of all, there’s not much to see because of smoke,’ he says. Crumblin says airspace will also be crowded away from the fire scene with aircraft transiting between water pick-ups and the flames. ‘We operate in a racetrack pattern, with aircraft shuttling between the water pickup and the fire. It’s like a larger version of the circuit, and can be just as crowded. The radio’s pretty busy with the air attack supervisor setting aircraft priorities and pilots making their position calls,’ he says. Due to smoke, firefighting operations are often conducted in conditions of reduced visibility. ‘It’s not exactly the best environment for see-and-avoid,’ Crumblin says. Although the racetrack pattern reduces the chances of collision between firefighting aircraft, any unauthorised aircraft entering the area brings with it heightened risk of traffic conflict or worse. Stay clear! Stay outside 5nm and above 3000ft AGL of observed fires NSW Rural Fire Service operations officer - aviation, Keith Mackay, says an important point to note is that firefighting aircraft rarely operate alone. ‘Generally they’ll be operating in twos or threes,’ Mackay says. ‘By convention, the racetrack pattern used in firefighting is a right-hand circuit, but local terrain sometimes requires exceptions,’ he explains. Firefighting aircraft do not necessarily confine their operations to where the flames are, Mackay says. ‘A situation could be where the observation aircraft sees a gully that the fire might reach. The air-attack supervisor might send two or three aircraft to drop fire retardant in that gully. And that could be up to 10 nautical miles from the fire. Mackay stresses the need for even well-intentioned pilots flying near firefighting operations to be aware of two things: the area QNH altimeter setting and the area frequency. ‘The other point I’d make is to have the area QNH so you know your altitude is accurate.’ Crumblin says flying near bushfires is not a pleasant experience for a private pilot. ‘We’re operating in hot windy conditions at maximum load. It’s flying to the maximum performance capacity of the aircraft.’ Many fires are in steep or mountainous areas which bring the added hazards of lee and rotor turbulence,’ Crumblin says. ‘I would discourage anyone from being there without a good reason.’ 29 FIREBOMBING DANGERS The air attack supervisor’s aircraft will be assisting pilots by notifying drop pilots of wires and other hazards and setting priorities for drops. It generally flies at altitudes of between 500ft and 1000ft, while the observation aircraft will be higher to take a broader view of the incident and formulate wider strategy. It’s unlikely that any of these will be higher than 3000ft, Mackay says, but if they are rotary wing aircraft they are likely to make frequent climbs to, or descents from, their operating altitude as they take various personnel aloft. ‘All our aircraft have two comms units, one tuned to the area frequency and one used for plane-to-plane communications and speaking to ground-based fire units. The point is if you are anywhere near a firefighting operation, and if you’re in any doubt about traffic separation, all you have to do is announce yourself on the area frequency and they will hear you.’ (But you should never assume this). S E R V I C E S Multi-Engine Command Instrument Rating Course 4 week course - accommodation included Training on Beechcraft Baron Includes GNSS RNAV $14,525.00 - Leaders in M/E command instrument ratings. - PPL and CPL Courses - Initial issue & renewal - all grades of instructor ratings - Accomodation provided Flight Instructor Rating Course 7 week course - accommodation included Maximum 3 students per course Comprehensive resources package provided $15,500.00 30 For further information and pricing please contact us FSA NOV-DEC10 Phone: (02) 6584 0484 Email: [email protected] Web: www.johnstonaviation.com.au For these and many other free safety promotion products visit the CASA online store www.casa.gov.au/onlinestore please note that postage and handling fees applies View our students achievements on Facebook at Johnston Aviation MAINTENANCE SAFETY: A NEW WAY OF THINKING Maintenance is one of the pillars of aviation safety. Any aircraft, whether new or with thousands of hours and cycles, needs expert attention paid to it for every hour it flies. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau quotes an average of 12 man-hours of maintenance for every hour of flight. The safety implications are obvious. Over several years, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has consulted extensively with the Australian aviation industry and has determined that improvements could be made to the current regulations for aircraft maintenance and maintenance personnel: There is scope for new regulations that will not have to rely on the exemptions that have been added to the current regulations over the years. Freshly-drafted regulations will be easier to understand and comply with. There is scope for new regulations to allow innovation and improved efficiency to industry, while maintaining high levels of safety. There is an opportunity for new rules to align with international regulations. This would allow Australian aviation to respond to international changes in safety-related practices, and allow Australian aviation maintenance organisations to compete for international work. Newly-drafted regulations would make clear the standard of compliance expected by CASA and would allow for eventual technological change. New regulations would clarify differing requirements for varying industry sectors. CASA’s approach to developing new regulation is outcomes-based: legislation details what safety standards need to be achieved, and then allows businesses to determine how best to achieve those outcomes. CASA will provide an acceptable means of compliance which reflect the standards. Operators can suggest an alternative means of compliance, which will be assessed and approved by CASA if it achieves the standards to an equivalent or great extent. This does not mean a free-for-all, or imply any relaxation of standards. In practice, stringent enforcement of standards will dictate what maintenance methods and techniques are required to meet those standards. However, under the new regulations there will be scope for innovation within this disciplined environment. Outcomes-based legislation recognises that significant level of expertise in aircraft maintenance resides in the industry. Individual maintenance organisations can decide what works best for their particular circumstances, but must always meet the required safety outcome. High standards would be required for any alternative to be deemed to be an ‘acceptable means of compliance.’ CASA maintains close and effective relationships with civil aviation authorities around the world, including the European and United States authorities. 31 AIRWORTHINESS There are also regulations about what these people should do to keep aircraft in top, airworthy shape. But these regulations themselves are in need of some maintenance - some improvements - to make a safe industry even safer. PULL-OUT SECTION MAINTENANCE REGULATIONS PULL-OUT SECTION With the formation of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), CASA took a keen interest in the aviation regulatory framework being developed to cover the members of the European Union. FSA NOV-DEC10 32 EASA faced the challenge of developing a system that would work and provide a safe and standardised safety result in an environment with 31 different nations, using 23 official languages, all with differing regulation and enforcement processes and training systems. EASA decided on a set of safety outcome-based legislation which directs their aviation industry to the required result of the legislation, rather than having a prescriptive rule set. The philosophy is predominantly ‘you will achieve …’ rather than ‘you will do’. CASA looked at EASA’s maintenance rules and concluded that they would make a sound starting point for developing equivalent Australian regulations. The EASA regulatory model for maintenance provides a safetyfocused, pragmatic, flexible and outcomebased regulatory environment for industry to operate in. EASA’s model embraces human factors in search of a better safety outcome. CASA set out to reform Australian maintenance regulations with two goals in mind: to provide Australia with a modern and effective set of safety regulations covering all elements of aviation maintenance and training; and to implement a new form of regulatory model. Work then began on adapting the EASA regulations to Australian legal drafting requirements, with as little change to the outcomes as possible. Completion of the new regulations is planned for November 2010. Implementation will take place in two stages. Stage one, beginning in June 2011, will be for all organisations operating or maintaining regular public transport (RPT) aircraft and/or aeronautical products for aircraft currently operated under CAR 206(1)(c) air operators’ certificates (AOC), as well as LAMEs and maintenance training organisations. Stage two, anticipated to begin in June 2013, will be for organisations maintaining aircraft and the aeronautical products for all aircraft not operated under an RPT air operator’s certificate such as charter, aerial work and general aviation. Implications The new Australian regulations will be based on an existing and effective set of European legislation. The inherent flexibility of the regulation style allows consideration of flexible implementation in various sectors, such as RPT and GA. Harmonising our regulatory requirements for maintenance organisations and maintenance training organisations with a major overseas system, and on the basis of recognised certification, will allow Australian maintenance organisations to compete for business internationally. The flexibility in the system allows industry to be more innovative with new work methods, and appropriate regulatory approaches. Enhanced management of safety information and systems. The project team is adopting the European system, while ensuring that the new system is tailored to Australian requirements. It incorporates Australian aviation strengths, such as competency-based training, and our acknowledged expertise in aviation safety. Key facts The new regulations include a revised regulatory arrangement for the training, qualification and experience of those controlling and performing maintenance. The new regulations adopt a regulatory style similar to that utilised by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This regulatory style also allows for different methods of achieving the outcomes for large and small aircraft and various types of operations. The regulations are the result of extensive consultation with industry. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS Boeing 737476 Hydraulic system contactor faulty. SDR 510011150 Hydraulic system ‘A’ circuit breaker tripped without pump being turned on. Investigation found faulty contactor R317. P/No: 106144524. 1 August 2010 – 30 September 2010 Note: occurrence figures not included in this edition. AIRCRAFT ABOVE 5700KG Airbus A320212 Flight data recorder unserviceable. SDR 510011050 Digital flight data recorder (DFDR) unserviceable. Boeing 73733A Aircraft elevator push/pull rod clevis broken. SDR 510011061 Left-hand elevator tab push/pull rod attachment horn fitting clevis snapped off during installation. Investigation found evidence of previous cracking. Airbus A320232 Elevator hinge fitting arm damaged. SDR 510011019 No. 4 left-hand elevator hinge fitting arm damaged and delaminated. Arm is constructed of composite material. Boeing 73733A Aircraft oxygen system hose cracked. SDR 510011057 Flexible oxygen hose cracked/broken/torn. Hose is located at passenger service unit (PSU) 167 left. P/No: 417N31382. Airbus A320232 Flight augmentation computer faulty. SDR 510011176 No.1 flight augmentation computer (FAC) faulty. P/No: B397BAM0617. TSN: 13,585 hours/6,023 cycles. Boeing 73733A ELT unserviceable. SDR 510011060 Nil output from ELT following antenna change. P/No: 9260065. Airbus A320232 Landing gear failed to extend at first attempt. SDR 510011174 Landing gear failed to extend. Gear extended after a second try. Investigation could find no definitive cause for the defect and landing gear operated normally on ground functional checks. Airbus A330202 Main landing-gear wheel brake stator failed. SDR 510011011 No. 2 main wheel brake stator failed. Investigation continuing. P/No: 215782. Airbus A380842 Flight control system computer faulty. SDR 510011146 Electrical flight control secondary computer faulty. Investigation continuing. BAC 146200 Windshield heating system filter unserviceable. SDR 510011036 Windshield heating system filter 2HL20 burnt and unserviceable. P/No: ND00751764. BAC 146300 Fuselage lightning strike. SDR 510011041 Aircraft suffered a lightning strike in the nose area. Investigation could find no entry/exit points and no damage. BAC Jetstream3206 Inverter unserviceable. SDR 510011072 Essential inverter unserviceable. P/No: 1B3501B13. BAC Jetstream4101 Engine mount bolt fractured. SDR 510011030 Rear engine mount bolt head separated. P/No: NAS6706DU75. Beech 1900D Landing gear motor failed. SDR 510011252 (photo following) Landing gear extend/retract electric motor failed internally. P/No: 571302. Boeing 73733A Spoiler actuator eye end piston stripped thread. SDR 510011055 No. 4 ground spoiler inboard actuator eye end piston internal thread stripped. P/No: 65448517. Boeing 737376 Aircraft landing light missing. SDR 510010948 Left-hand outboard landing light assembly missing. P/No: 4500837. TSN: 48,067 hours. TSO: 2,392 hours. Boeing 737376 Crew oxygen cylinder shutoff valve leaking. SDR 510010971 Crew oxygen cylinder leaking from shutoff valve spindle. TSN: 2,780 hours. Boeing 737476 Aircraft emergency lighting battery pack failed. SDR 510010972 Emergency lighting system battery pack not holding sufficient charge to illuminate emergency lights for more than approximately 15 seconds. P/No: M1134. Boeing 737476 Air conditioning control panel suspect faulty. SDR 510011124 Pressurisation system problems. Suspect faulty pressurisation control panel. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737476 APU failed. SDR 510010937 APU failed in flight. Investigation found evidence of fresh oil in exhaust. Suspect turbine seal failing. Investigation continuing. P/No: 737M49503011. TSN: 55,332 hours. TSO: 1,473 hours. Boeing 737476 Engine pylon strut panel missing. SDR 510011278 No. 2 engine pylon strut access panel separated in flight. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737476 Flight attendant oxygen mask panel stuck. SDR 510011155 Forward flight attendant double oxygen mask covering panel sealed shut with Silastic. Allso found a piece of trim fouling the latch. Boeing 737476 Trailing edge flap system faulty. SDR 510011258 Trailing edge flap asymmetry. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737476 Wing leading edge slat arm failed. SDR 510010994 No. 2 leading edge slat outboard track guide arm broken. P/No: 65C266564. Boeing 7374L7 Elevator excessive play. SDR 510011170 Excessive movement in right-hand elevator of approximately 8.89mm (0.350in). Maximum play as per maintenance manual 5.33mm (0.210in). Boeing 7374L7 Wing to pylon plug burnt. SDR 510011171 Left-hand wing to pylon disconnect plug D05124 ‘B’ phase socket burnt and welded to pin. P/No: D05124. Boeing 7377BX Elevator pitot tube heater open circuit. SDR 510010921 Right-hand elevator pitot tube heater open circuit. P/No: 0851HT1. TSN: 19,485 hours/10,864 cycles. Boeing 7377BX Wing fuel surge tank panel seal split. SDR 510011248 Right-hand wing surge tank access panel seal split, dislodged and leaking. Seal was also in very poor condition. P/No: 110A01141. Boeing 7377FE Wing leading edge slat actuator leaking. SDR 510011249 Left-hand wing No. 2 leading edge slat actuator leaking from area of inboard swivel. Loss of hydraulic fluid. P/No: 3818001005. TSN: 16,241 hours/11,387 cycles. Boeing 73782R Wheel well bulkhead vapour barrier cracked. SDR 510011100 Left-hand wheel well forward bulkhead (rear spar) lower LH web vapour barrier cracked from LBL 31.83 to LBL 45.64. Boeing 737838 Air conditioning system pressurisation faulty. SDR 510011167 Pressurisation system problems. Boeing 737838 Aircraft fuel tank access panel gasket leaking. SDR 510010974 Fuel tank access panel located inboard of No. 1 engine strut leaking due to faulty gasket. P/No: 656C330952. 33 AIRWORTHINESS Airbus A330202 Engine anti-ice valve faulty. SDR 510011128 No. 2 engine anti-ice valve faulty. Valve was closed with anti-ice ‘On’. P/No: FYLB521452. Boeing 73733A Fuselage structure corroded. SDR 510011053 Aircraft structure corroded beyond limits in numerous locations. Boeing 737476 Potable water tank failed. SDR 510011202 Right-hand potable water tank plug failed. Loss of tank contents. Plug/snap ring shattered. Investigation continuing. PULL-OUT SECTION Airbus A330202 Cockpit air conditioning system odour. SDR 510011197 Oil fumes in cockpit. Investigation found oil contamination of cockpit trim air valve and hot air valve. Boeing 737476 Hydraulic system pump failed. SDR 510010938 System ‘A’ and System ‘B’ engine driven hydraulic pumps failed. Metal contamination of both case drain filters. Investigation continuing. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Boeing 737838 APU failed to start. SDR 510011236 APU failed to start. Aircraft would not accept ground power. Investigation continuing. PULL-OUT SECTION Boeing 737838 Elevator pushrod attachment bolt nut missing. SDR 510011151 Right-hand elevator pushrod aft attachment bolt P/No 69-44683-2 nut missing. Inner and outer bolt nuts P/No BACN10JC10CD and P/No BACN10JC7CD not in safety and able to be turned. Investigation continuing. P/No: 69446832. FSA NOV-DEC10 34 Boeing 737838 Engine bleed air wiring harness faulty. SDR 510011144 No.1 engine bleed air faults. Investigation found faulty wiring harness between bleed air regulator (DP1102) and engine firewall (DP1104). Harness P/No 325-029-905-0 and bleed air regulator P/No 107492-6 changed. P/No: 3250299050. Boeing 737838 Hydraulic system low pressure switch connector plug corroded. SDR 510010973 Hydraulic ‘B’ system low-pressure switch SW 142 connector plug D0816 corroded. P/No: 1225P62. Boeing 737838 Integrated standby flight display failed. SDR 510011245 Integrated standby flight display (ISFD) failed. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 Trailing edge flap actuating bellcrank sheared. SDR 510011203 Right-hand outboard trailing edge flap actuating bellcrank sheared off. P/No: 113A39104. Boeing 737838 Uncommanded ELT activate. SDR 510011040 Uncommanded ELT activation. Investigation continuing. P/No: 11534261M512. TSN: 2,058 hours. TSO: 2,058 hours. Boeing 7378FE Air cycle machine seized. SDR 510011023 No.1 air cycle machine (ACM) seized and one fan blade fractured. P/No: 22064002. TSN: 73 hours/48 cycles. Boeing 7378FE Alternate pitot probe heat system unserviceable. SDR 510011073 Alternate pitot probe heat system unserviceable. P/No: 0851HT1. TSN: 22,809 hours/13,350 cycles. Boeing 7378FE Elevator pitot probe drain blocked. SDR 510010927 Right-hand elevator pitot probe visco jet drain blocked. Boeing 7378FE Engine fuel supply spar valve actuator intermittent. SDR 510011179 No.1 engine fuel supply spar valve actuator intermittent in operation. P/No: MA30A1001. TSN: 330 hours/219 cycles. Boeing 747438 Aircraft fuel override jettison pump seized. SDR 510011145 Fuel override jettison pump rotor seized due to swarf/debris. Debris also found in pump cavity. Boeing 747438 Crew oxygen bottle time expired. SDR 510011240 Upper crew oxygen bottle time expired. Bottle installed with overdue hydrostatic test date. P/No: B423651. Boeing 747438 Engine hydraulic pump drive shaft sheared. SDR 510011159 No2 engine driven hydraulic pump drive shaft sheared. Case drain filter contaminated. P/No: 6506605. Boeing 747438 Forward galley oven smoke/ fumes. SDR 510011130 Forward galley oven 124/2 heating element and fan contaminated. Smoke and fumes issuing from oven. Boeing 747438 Main landing gear tyre tread separation. SDR 510010949 Main landing gear No. 6 rear tyre tread separated. Tyre deflated. Damage to fairing aft of tyre and minor damage to RH body landing gear outboard shock strut door aft edge. Investigation continuing. Boeing 747438 Trailing edge flap rod failed. SDR 510011239 No. 2 trailing edge flap rod failed and damaged canoe fairing. Investigation continuing. P/No: 65B156513. Bombardier DHC8202 Landing gear failed to extend – air in hydraulic system. SDR 510010953 Landing gear failed to extend. Gear eventually extended and aircraft landed safely. Investigation found air in No2 hydraulic system. CVAC 340 Wing fuel tank boost pump failed. SDR 510011279 LH wing fuel tank boost pump failed. P/No: TF39002. TSO: 3,785 hours. Embraer EMB120 Aileron shroud damaged. SDR 510010930 (photo below) Left-hand upper aileron shroud damaged and partially separated. Investigation found that the inboard 15 fasteners had not been reinstalled at last maintenance visit. Shroud had broken at approximately two-thirds of length. Support bracket P/No 120-31648-001 had cracked along trailing edge radius. P/No: 12021945001. TSN: 50,101 hours/58,676 cycles. Boeing 747438 Trailing edge flap spindle loose. SDR 510011220 Trailing edge outboard aft flap spindle not secured to structure. One screw was loose and both screw threads were worn. Washers also missing. Investigation continuing. P/No: 65B0197038. Boeing 747438 Wing fuel surge tank drain coupling loose. SDR 510011222 Main fuel tank fuel imbalance. Investigation found wing surge tank forward drain tube coupling directly inboard of tank access panel 646AB loose and incorrectly lockwired. No.4 tank forward drain tube rigid coupling at tank wall into No.3 main tank missing an o-ring seal. Boeing 767336 Elevators felt heavy during landing. SDR 510011277 Elevators unusually heavy during landing flare. Investigation continuing. P/No: 32687929. Boeing 767336 Fuselage skin cracked. SDR 510011255 Fuselage skin cracked at location BS 1660 stringer 13L. Crack length approximately 44.4mm (1.75in) and splits in two. Crack is located aft of the pressure bulkhead in an unpressurised zone. Boeing 767338ER Cargo power drive unit inoperative - loom chafed through. SDR 510011034 No. 3 aft cargo power drive unit (PDU) failed to operate. Investigation found loom adjacent to PDU chafed through and sparking. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767338ER Spoiler rub strip separated. SDR 510011133 Unknown piece of metal separated from RH wing during flap extension. Investigation found the metal was the No.10 spoiler lower aft edge rub strip. P/No: 88PH15034B. Bombardier DHC8202 Flaps failed to extend micro switch contaminated. SDR 510010951 Flaps failed to extend when selected. Nil other indications and no circuit breakers popped. Investigation found flap selector micro switch contaminated with dust/lint and earth wire at flap power unit plug 2752-p3 had cracked insulation. Embraer EMB120 Electronic horizontal situation indicator failed. SDR 510011177 No.1 electronic horizontal situation indicator (EHSI) failed. P/No: 6226197002. TSO: 4,994 hours/3,320cycles/53 months. Embraer EMB120 Elevator trim tab hinge bracket corroded. SDR 510011162 Left-hand elevator trim tab middle hinge brackets contained exfoliation corrosion. Found during CPCP inspection. P/No: 12011293001. Embraer EMB120 Main landing gear wiring loom worn and damaged. SDR 510011178 Right-hand main landing gear wiring loom contained severe corrosion on connectors, severe chafing and multiple breaches of wire to the core. Wire numbers W608-0114-24, W608-0076-22, W608-0099-22 and W608-0096-022. P/No: W608. Embraer ERJ170100 IRU unserviceable. SDR 510011103 No. 2 inertial reference unit (IRU) failed. P/No: HG2100AB02. TSN: 7,182 hours/7,282 cycles. Embraer ERJ190100 AC electrical terminal lug open circuit. SDR 510010928 AC essential bus terminal TB0021 lug open circuit. P/No: MS25036103. Embraer ERJ190100 Main landing gear trunnion bearings moved. SDR 510011264 LH and RH main landing gear upper side stay trunnion bearings migrated. LH main gear side stay trunnion bearing had migrated by 4.6mm (0.18in). RH main gear side stay trunnion bearing had migrated by 4.5mm(0.177in). TSN: 6,036 hours/4,031 cycles. Embraer ERJ170100 Nose-wheel steering disarming switch faulty. SDR 510011135 Nose-wheel steering disarming switch failed. P/No: MS21346231. TSN: 7,214 hours/7,313 cycles. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Fokker F27MK50 Landing gear selector panel faulty. SDR 510010939 Landing gear selector panel faulty. Investigation continuing. P/No: D49414001. TSO: 996 hours/707 cycles. operate during test. Investigation found intermittent contacts in the internal micro switch. Investigation also found high resistance in the control panel engine fire bottle squib firing switch contacts. P/No: 5942014. Fokker F28MK0100 Cargo door handle in unlocked position. SDR 510010940 Forward cargo door handle in unlocked position, although the door was still closed and latched. Suspect secondary lock handle was forced open by aerodynamic loads when handle was allowed to enter the airflow due to faulty springs. Primary locking mechanism was unaffected. Saab SF340B Engine intake duct anti-ice wire burnt duct. SDR 510010964 Left-hand engine lower intake duct anti-ice wiring caused burn damage to duct. TSO: 5,143 hours/5,707 cycles. Hawker-Beech 900XP Wing fuel tank boost pump faulty. SDR 510011254 (photo below) LH wing fuel tank boost pump failed. Investigation found a broken power wire, which was arcing against the body. A small amount of fuel was also leaking through the wiring receptacle and being ignited by the arc. P/No: 2C402. TSN: 798 hours/549 cycles. AIRCRAFT BELOW 5700KG Beech 200 Landing-gear power pack faulty. SDR 510011218 Landing gear relay circuit breaker tripped. Investigation found two faults: 1. power pack P/No 101-388005-17 internal fault 2. LH main landing gear actuator P/No 101-388014-19 leaking internally. P/No: 10138800517. Beech 58 Nose landing-gear failed to extend. SDR 510011147 Nose landing gear failed to fully extend. Nose landing gear collapsed during landing causing damage to nose gear and radome area. Investigation continuing. Lear 35A Horizontal stabiliser trim actuator faulty. SDR 510011089 Horizontal stabiliser trim actuator faulty. P/No: 35010203. Raytheon 850XP Hydraulic non-valve faulty. SDR 510011246 Hydraulic non-return valve leaking fluid into bleed air lines. Valve is located between the bleed air supply and hydraulic reservoir, providing reservoir pressurisation. P/No: HTE4853. TSN: 790 hours. Saab SF340B Battery thermal switch ground wire burnt. SDR 510011161 DC battery thermal switch ground wire PA 0301 burnt. Investigation continuing. P/No: 55T8015249. Saab SF340B DC bus bar to circuit breaker feeder wire burnt. SDR 510010967 Wire HD 134 found burnt in several areas. Damage included melted and bubbled insulation as well as cracked and missing insulation. Wire is feeder wire from DC bus bar to circuit breaker 1HD. Several circuit breakers exhibited weld marks on screws. Suspect caused by circuit breaker panel being shifted when power was ‘On’. P/No: HD134. Saab SF340B Engine fire shutoff valve failed to operate during test. SDR 510011009 Right-hand engine fire shutoff valve failed to Cessna 172M Window separated. SDR 510010979 Right-hand window separated in flight causing damage to hinge and minor paint damage to underside of RH wing and flap. Window was opened in flight by passenger wanting to take photographs. P/No: 0711050207. Cessna 172RG Nose landing gear safety switch wire broken. SDR 510011182 Nose landing gear safety switch wire broken. Wire had a total of ten joiners in 0.76m (2.5ft) length. TSN: 5,430 hours. Cessna 182H Landing gear brake master cylinder bracket cracked. SDR 510011069 Right-hand brake master cylinder lower attachment bracket cracked and master cylinder pulled out of bracket. P/No: 07136283. TSN: 8,997 hours. Cessna 208B Wing fuel sump panel corroded. SDR 510011091 Left-hand wing fuel sump panel severely corroded. P/No: 26222634. TSN: 6,390 hours. TSO: 6,390 hours. Cessna 210N Main landing gear actuator bolt incorrect part. SDR 510010985 Main landing gear actuator attachment bolts incorrect part. Bolts were also not safety lock-wired. P/No: NAS464P5LA29. Cessna 402C Main landing gear torque link bolt separated. SDR 510011242 Right-hand main landing gear torque link centre bolt disconnected from torque links allowing the wheel to rotate around the leg. Investigation found the bolt and nut intact with the split pin still fitted. Further investigation found incorrect washers fitted beneath the nut and the head of the bolt. Cessna 402C Nose landing gear wheel well angle cracked. SDR 510011166 Nose landing gear wheel well damaged. Investigation found buckling and cracking of attachment angle of sidewall and top plate located at Stn 79 left-hand side. P/No: 521304021. TSN: 11,932 hours. Cessna 404 Fuselage/wing root hydraulic line leaking. SDR 510011275 Hydraulic oil line leaking from pinhole in area where line exits fuselage to left-hand wing root. P/No: 581710210. Cessna 421C Main landing gear trunnion cracked. SDR 510011033 Right-hand main landing gear trunnion cracked vertically along casting mark for approximately 304.8mm (12in) then diagonally for approximately 63.5mm (2.5in). Crack is completely through the wall of the tubular structure with the lower fork of the trunnion distorted by approximately 2mm (0.078in) at the crack. P/No: 59411102. TSN: 6,596 hours. Cessna 441 Nacelle hydraulic line holed. SDR 510011083 Right-hand hydraulic pressure line located in righthand nacelle had a pinhole leak. P/No: 572700258. Diamond DA42 Multi-function display unserviceable – smoke/fumes. SDR 510011025 Smoke and fumes coming from top SD card slot on multi-function display (MFD). MFD screen information dimmed to almost unreadable. Nil external evidence of burning, but MFD smelt burnt. P/No: 0110097203. TSN: 846 hours. Grob G115C2 Engine oil cooler and filter contaminated. SDR 510011086 Engine oil cooler and oil pressure filter contaminated with pink abrasive granules. Suspect contaminant was from manufacture of oil cooler, which was only 11.4 hours time since new. P/No: 20006A. TSN: 11 hours. Jabiru J230DL Elevator trim cable broken. SDR 510011108 Elevator trim cable broken/separated at rear swage. Aircraft is registered with Recreational Aviation Australia. TSN: 19 hours. 35 AIRWORTHINESS Beech 58 Nose landing-gear drag brace broken. SDR 510011165 Nose landing gear aft drag brace failed on RH side. Failure appears to be at the welding vent hole. It was also noted that the RH side spacers located between the brace pivot hole and the wheel well sidewall were missing. P/No: 4582507239. TSN: 12,514 hours. Cessna 210N Nose landing gear actuator spring guide damaged. SDR 510010984 Nose landing gear actuator spring guide damaged. Inspection found that the guide was early model P/No 1280206-1 and not the improved P/No 9882024-1 as required by SE84-3. P/No: 12802061. PULL-OUT SECTION Fokker F28MK0100 Engine oil coolers SUP. SDR 510011136 Newly-received engine oil coolers, suspect unapproved part (SUP). Two oil coolers had the same serial number as each other. One of the coolers had a data plate but the other cooler had the same part number and serial number engraved on the body. Investigation continuing. P/No: JR31848A. Saab SF340B Passenger compartment fluorescent tube failed - odour. SDR 510011002 Passenger compartment fluorescent lighting tube located at row 2BC failed. Flight attendant detected an odour and heard a crackling noise but no smoke was seen. P/No: F8T5CW. Cessna 210N Nose landing gear actuator bolt seized. SDR 510010983 Nose landing gear actuator rear bolt seized in bushing. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Kavanagh G450 Balloon burner load frame cracked. SDR 510010990 Balloon burner load frame cracked in several places along original welded joints. P/No: KLF201088. TSN: 466 hours/27 months. Pilatus PC12 Trailing edge flap PDU seized. SDR 510010968 Trailing edge flap power drive unit (PDU) seized. P/No: 9787320003. TSN: 450 hours/4 months. PULL-OUT SECTION Piper PA28161 Aileron actuator attachment fitting cracked. SDR 510011065 Right-hand aileron actuator attachment fitting cracked in radius. Crack length approximately 10mm (0.39in). P/No: 3564022. TSN: 9,619 hours. FSA NOV-DEC10 36 Piper PA28R201 Nose landing gear actuator rod end broken. SDR 510011064 Nose landing gear actuator rod end broken through threaded area. P/No: 452729. Piper PA30 Main landing gear oleo strut cracked. SDR 510011070 Right-hand main landing gear oleo strut cracked and leaking in area of web. P/No: 2705301. TSN: 8,333 hours. Piper PA32300 Hydraulic power systems hydraulic line holed. SDR 510011047 Hydraulic pressure line pinhole leak due to corrosion. P/No: 67700116. TSN: 5,684 hours. Piper PA44180 Main landing gear trunnion cracked. SDR 510011225 Left-hand and RH main landing gear trunnions P/No 67926-037 and P/No 67926-036 cracked in area of forward lugs. Found during FPI. P/No: 67926037. Swearingen SA226TC Autopilot trim servo intermittent. SDR 510011276 Autopilot pitch servo faulty causing random pitching and controls to stick. P/No: 6222366001. Swearingen SA226TC Cockpit window failed. SDR 510011026 Right-hand cockpit side window failed resulting in explosive decompression. Investigation found that the window had been incorrectly installed. P/No: 2621383010. TSN: 4,695 hours. Swearingen SA227AC Hydraulic pump failed. SDR 510011188 Right-hand engine driven hydraulic pump failed. Investigation found the drive shaft teeth stripped and the drive gear damaged. P/No: PV3044026. TSO: 2,707 hours/4,690 cycles. Swearingen SA227DC Engine EGT harness cannon plug unserviceable. SDR 510011048 Left-hand engine EGT short harness cannon plug pins and sockets worn causing random EGT fluctuations. P/No: MS3451L10SL4P. Swearingen SA227DC Flap hydraulic pressure pipe split. SDR 510011185 Flap system rigid hydraulic pressure pipe split and leaking at outer radius of 90-degree bend. Pipe is located in LH wheel well. P/No: 27810321040. TSN: 20,551 hours/28,549 landings. TSN: 20,551 hours/28,549 landings /204 months. Swearingen SA227DC Inverter wire worn and damaged. SDR 510011187 No.2 inverter failed. Investigation found inverter wire chafing through insulation on RH 26VAC bus bar causing short circuit and circuit breaker trip. P/No: SPC38A. Further investigation found other incorrect wiring in the electrical system. ROTORCRAFT Bell 206L1 Fuselage frame cracked. SDR 510011125 Rear fuselage frame (tail boom attachment) cracked in two places at upper-LH and upper-RH sides. P/No: 206032308003. TSN: 10,661 hours. Bell 206L1 Tail rotor drive shaft cracked. SDR 510011012 Tail rotor driveshaft cracked from coupling attachment bolt hole. P/No: 206040370003. TSN: 8,815 hours. Bolkow BO105LSA3 Tail rotor gearbox bearing corroded. SDR 510010976 Tail rotor gearbox bearing inner and outer races corroded. Ball had lost chrome plating. Bearing also exhibited approximately 0.25mm (0.010in) axial play (nil allowed). P/No: 4639311003. Eurocopter AS350BA Starter-generator unserviceable. SDR 510011142 (photo below) Starter generator failed. Investigation found the starter drive spline sheared. Corrosion was found on the shaft, indicating stress corrosion cracking. P/No: 524031. TSO: 844 hours/1,884 landings/18 months. Robinson R44 Main rotor blades spindle worn. SDR 510011016 Main rotor spindle worn/damaged by dust between the spindle and sealing boot. P/No: C1581. TSN: 1,100 hours. PISTON ENGINES Continental GTSIO520M Engine cylinder bolt failed. SDR 510010946 Right-hand engine No. 5 cylinder had four retaining bolts with the bolt heads sheared off. The two cylinder through bolts were intact. Investigation found no obvious damage to the cylinder. TSO: 489 hours. Continental GTSIO520M Engine cylinder cracked. SDR 510010945 Left-hand engine No. 5 cylinder low compression. Initial investigation indicated leaking piston rings. Cylinder removed and inspected. Overhaul facility found an internal crack in the cylinder in the area of the lower spark plug port. P/No: 655474A9P005. TSO: 937 hours. Continental IO520C Engine connecting rod failed. SDR 510011081 (photo below) Left-hand engine No. 6 cylinder connecting rod failed. Damage caused to engine. TSO: 1,165 hours. Eurocopter EC135 Engine air intake screen damaged. SDR 510011018 (photo below) No.1 engine failed to motor during start. Investigation found FOD in the form of solder particles in the intake area and in the compressor. Further investigation found the solder came from the engine intake screen. It was found that the aircraft had previously been parked and shut down with the tail into the wind. The wind then entered the exhaust and went through the engine at a temperature high enough to cause the solder to melt. P/No: 319718500PRESB319712039. TSN: 4,596 hours. TSO: 1,611 hours. Continental IO550N Engine cylinder rocker arm broken. SDR 510010977 (photo below) Engine exhaust rocker arm broken. Suspect defective manufacture with suspected casting blow hole and/or fold inclusion. P/No: 628530K. TSN: 90 hours. TSO: 90 hours. Solder propagation point - intake screen MDHC 369E Engine starting wiring incorrect part. SDR 510011122 (photo following) Engine starting system wiring incorrect part. Three 10-gauge wires running in parallel instead of one single two-gauge wire as per manufacturer confirmation. Following removal of incorrect wires, it was found that the insulation in the wires was cracked in conduit running under fuel system. Continental TSIO550G Turbocharger inlet pipe cracked. SDR 510011113 Right-hand turbocharger inlet pipe cracked. P/No: 657687. TSN: 529 hours. Lycoming IO360A1A Engine exhaust system cracked. SDR 510011184 (photo following) Exhaust tailpipe and muffler cracked. P/No: 630045503630045501. TSN: 4,159 hours. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Garrett TPE33112UH Engine fuel manifold unserviceable. SDR 510011186 Left-hand engine aft fuel manifold leaking from ‘B’ nut area where flow divider pipe joins the manifold. Investigation found a fatigue crack in the manifold flare. P/No: 31024692. Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine camshaft worn and damaged. SDR 510011257 (photo below) Camshaft lobes worn/damaged and associated lifters spalled. P/No: 05K22721. TSN: 306 hours. TSO: 306 hours. Garrett TPE33114HR Engine oil system tube fractured. SDR 510011031 Right-hand engine rear bearing oil scavenge tube fractured. P/No: 31054521. TSN: 20,147 hours/22,362 cycles. Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine fuel pump incorrect part. SDR 510010954 During pre-fitment inspection of engine-driven fuel pump, it was found that the drive shaft was slightly longer than normal. Further investigation found the shaft was an incorrect part. This prevented full mating of the drive and driven splines. P/No: RG9080J1. Garrett TPE3318403S Engine EGT compensator faulty. SDR 510011035 Left-hand engine EGT compensator faulty. Compensator sending erratic signals to the LH fuel computer causing a high EGT reading (overtemp). Investigation found that no actual overtemp was experienced. P/No: 8974768. GE CF680C2 Engine turbine disc cracked. SDR 510011022 Stage 2 high-pressure turbine disc contained crack indications in aft dovetail serrations. Found during FPI. Investigation continuing. P/No: 936M43P02. Lycoming IO540 Magneto housing corroded. SDR 510011226 Magneto housing badly corroded. Magneto is believed to be from a BN2 aircraft used on coastal surveillance duties. P/No: 10349394. GE CF680E1 Engine turbine seal unserviceable. SDR 510011028 Engine high-pressure turbine rotating seal unserviceable. Investigation continuing. P/No: 1778M69P04. Lycoming O235L2C Engine bearing worn. SDR 510011256 Engine centre main bearing worn, found following engine oil filter check. P/No: 18D26100. TSN: 3 hours. TSO: 3 hours Lycoming O360A1A Cylinder spark plug loose. SDR 510010926 No.3 cylinder top spark plug loose. Spark plug was found hanging on lead with last two threads burnt. Spark plug is an automotive plug fitted in an insert. PWA R985AN14B Engine cylinder exhaust valves seized. SDR 510011210 Investigation following partial engine failure with loss of power found four exhaust valves almost seized due to a large amount of carbon build up and the other five exhaust valves with moderate carbon build up. P/No: 3485. TSO: 667 hours. TURBINE ENGINES Garrett TFE73150R Engine uncommanded rollback. SDR 510011262 Left-hand engine uncommanded rollback during power adjustment. Engine restarted OK. Investigation continuing. P/No: TFE73150R1H. TSN: 798 hours/549 cycles. TSO: 798 hours/549 cycles. IAE V2527A5 Engine bleed air system coupling failed. SDR 510011251 Bleed air coupling located between ‘Y’ connector and IP check valve failed. Duct separated from check valve with flange seal missing. Air leak caused further to components. HP bleed valve cannon plug sheared and fire shield damaged. Skin and honeycomb damaged. Wiring harness damaged. P/No: 62992580400. IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine disc unserviceable. SDR 510011231 Engine second stage high-pressure turbine hub contained linear indications in the pressure face of the fir tree root in eleven locations. Found during penetrant inspection. P/No: 2A4802. TSN: 18,001 hours/9,314 cycles. IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine disc unserviceable. SDR 510011232 Engine first stage high-pressure turbine hub contained linear indications in the pressure face of the fir tree root in fifty five locations. Found during penetrant inspection. P/No: 2A5001. TSN: 18,709 hours/11,201 cycles. Lycoming LTS101700D2 Engine exhaust cone inner baffle unserviceable. SDR 510010986 Engine exhaust cone inner baffle broken apart, and contacting rear face of power turbine wheel, Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine turbine blade failed. SDR 510011117 No.4 engine failure with noticeable vibrations. Initial investigation found an uncontained failure of the intermediate power turbine blades with associated damage. Investigation continuing. PROPELLERS Hartzell BHCC2YF1 Propeller governor control cable broken. SDR 510010943 Propeller governor control cable broken in area forward of firewall. P/No: B190954. TSN: 13,666 hours. COMPONENTS Continental S6LSC200 Distributor gear unserviceable. SDR 510010963 Magneto distributor gear unserviceable. Gear was not rotating true. Inspection found gear out of true by approximately 1.524mm (0.060in). Further inspection found four out of five gears in stock with the same condition. P/No: 10357586. Continental S6RN1225 Rotor damaged. SDR 510011223 (photo below) Magneto rotor damaged. Rotor casting distorted due to high temperature. Magneto failed during testing following overhaul. P/No: 103493512. TSO: 3 hours. Mytton 55 Gas tank cracked and corroded. SDR 510011121 Balloon LPG fuel tank surface corrosion. Leak test following corrosion removal found gas leakage due to cracks in body of tank. Crack lengths approximately 10mm to 20mm (0.39in to 0.78in). 37 AIRWORTHINESS Lycoming IO540K1A5 Engine seized. SDR 510011052 Engine started making knocking noises with a drop in engine oil pressure to approximately 413.7 kPa (60psi). Engine then seized. Investigation continuing. Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine surged. SDR 510010936 No.1 engine surged after takeoff. FMU, VIGV Controller and bleed control unit changed. Investigation continuing. P/No: RB21542GT. PULL-OUT SECTION Garrett TPE33112UH Engine low oil quantity. SDR 510011066 Right-hand engine low oil pressure. Investigation found low oil quantity but no evidence of leakage. Following oil top up and ground run, the engine was found to be seized solid. After cool down, the engine could be rotated freely but exhibited a ‘graunchiness’. The engine was removed and sent for inspection/repair. Suspect oil was leaking from turbine labyrinth seal. Investigation continuing. P/No: TPE33112UHR701G. TSN: 17,255 hours/22,926 cycles. causing rubbing damage. See attachments for photographs. Similar problem found on another aircraft in the fleet. Aircraft is registered in PNG. P/No: 350A54100502. PULL-OUT SECTION FSA NOV-DEC10 38 Australia is in the process of introducing new generation air traffic control (ATC) systems. The two that will probably have the greatest impact are mode S secondary surveillance radars (SSR) and automatic dependant surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B). With the introduction of the new mode S radar system a number of older-type mode A/C transponders, based on electron tube technology (basically valve type oscillators generating the output carrier signal), have been identified as transmitting incorrect or spontaneously varying data to ATC. So an amendment to AD/RAD/47, due for release shortly, requires an additional set of tests to be conducted. Other issues that have surfaced include: Mode S transponders require the allocation of a unique 24-bit address for each aircraft also known as the ‘mode S address’. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) administers the worldwide addressing system, allocating a number of 24-bit addresses to each state. In Australia, CASA allocates a 24-bit address to each VH-registered aircraft, either when it is first registered, or when its registration mark is changed, irrespective of whether a mode S transponder is installed. Other Australian aircraft are allocated an address on request by a recreational aviation administration organisation recognised by CASA. Since Airservices introduced AMSTAR radars at Melbourne and Coolangatta airports, many aircraft have been detected with incorrect 24-bit addresses. The most common errors detected include the transmission of an address allocated by the former state of registration, or the transmission of a bogus address. If you’re an aircraft owner, operator and/or maintainer you need to ensure the 24-bit address is checked whenever airworthiness directive AD/RAD/47 is carried out. As an example, Airservices Australia has detected several instances of aircraft fitted with transponders intermittently transmitting incorrect ADS-B position reports. ADS-B position reports displayed to controllers intermittently jump, usually exceeding 10nm, from the aircraft’s true position. The manufacturer is aware of the problem and, we understand, well on the way to resolving it. Airservices, with CASA agreement, may revoke ADS-B based ATC services for aircraft transmitting corrupt data. Airservices believes this is necessary to ensure the integrity of ATC services. So ... operators: be aware of the equipment installed on your aircraft and what is being transmitted. I[hl_Y[:_\ÓYkbjoH[fehji TO REPORT URGENT DEFECTS 97BB0')'-+-<7N0&(,('-'/(& or contact your local CASA Airworthiness Inspector [freepost] Service Difficulty Reports, Reply Paid 2005, CASA, Canberra, ACT 2601 Online: www. casa.gov.au/airworth/sdr 39 AIRWORTHINESS The aircraft identification you enter in the flight notification and the transponder should not exceed seven characters and the ICAO three-letter designator for the aircraft operator followed by the flight number (i.e. QFA511 for Qantas flight 511). You should not add any zeros, dashes or spaces if the aircraft identification is fewer than seven characters. If you transmit the aircraft registration mark, again, enter it in full without zeros, dashes or spaces added (e.g. for a CASA-allocated registration mark: VHABC, or RA-Ausallocated registration: 551875). Airservices, with the commissioning of the ADS-B ground station network, now provides five nautical mile separation standards from coast to coast. Regulations published a few years ago, require noncompliant ADS-B transmissions to be disabled. If you’re the operator of an aircraft installed with functional ADS-B systems then you must not transmit misleading data (under Civil Aviation Order 20.18 paragraph 9A). PULL-OUT SECTION Most mode S transponders can transmit flight identification (also known as aircraft identification, flight ID or FLTID). The Australian Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP GEN 1.5 Section 6) requires that you must transmit an aircraft identification exactly matching the aircraft identification entered in Item 7 of your filed flight notification (flight plan). If you have not filed a flight notification, then the aircraft registration mark is transmitted. The most common errors detected include the transmission of the International Air Transport Association’s two character airline designator (AB rather than ABC); added spaces, zeros or dashes; ICAO aircraft operator designator omitted (246 instead of ABC246); departure/destination detail (MELBNE); truncated registration mark (ABC instead of VHABC); or bogus data such as @@@@@@. ? R AN EMERGENCY IS YOUR ELT FIT FO PULL-OUT SECTION FSA NOV-DEC10 40 In February 2009, COSPAS SARSAT satellite alerting services for 121.5/243MHz emergency beacons ceased. These121.5/243MHz beacons were replaced with new 406MHz beacons that can be detected by satellites and processed by COSPAS SARSAT. After the aircraft’s ELT was recovered, subsequent testing revealed no evident fault which would cause the ELT not to function. Further research and testing confirmed the ELT functioned exactly as its designer intended. Consequently, in December 2008, CASA amended civil aviation regulations to reflect this change. The amended regulations mean those aircraft that are required to be fitted with an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) must have replaced the old 121.5/243MHz emergency beacon with a new 406MHz ELT. So why didn’t it work in the aircraft if it had been installed correctly? Unlike the earlier 121.5/243MHz model ELTs, this particular unit requires two pins to be shorted out through the external plug-wiring loom to ensure the G-switch circuit is complete. Simply changing the old plug with the new plug and installing the ELT into the existing cradle did not ensure that the ELT would function as intended. There are some potential safety issues surrounding this replacement. The design of the mounts and the rigidity of the structure on the aircraft for the old style ELT and the 406MHz ELT are, in most cases, the same, as can be seen in the first photograph. As a result of this, many manufacturers have facilitated the change by re-using the old mounts, and in some cases, the existing trays. This is fine, but … it’s important to ensure that the old mounting position and structure were handled correctly the first time around. There are many incidents of the earlier designs and mounting not being sufficiently rigid, resulting in false activation, or no activation at all, for the ELT. Manufacturers of 406MHz ELTs supply sufficient documentation to operate, install and maintain their equipment into an aircraft. However, this is only generic information, and not specific to any particular aircraft or installation. [see the second photograph.] In other words, this is not approved data for installing the equipment into an aircraft. So unless the new ELT is a direct one-for-one replacement that requires no change to the existing system, then the installation must be designed and approved by a suitably qualified person, and installed by an equally qualified person. A recent accident in Western Australia highlights the issues which can arise if the new ELT is not correctly installed. In this case, the ELT was changed from the old 121.5/243MHz ELT to a new 406MHz ELT of the same style, from the same manufacturer. In this accident the ELT failed to operate, and therefore failed to do its job in assisting in the search for the aircraft. So if you are the owner/operator of an aircraft with a fixed ELT, and you have replaced the 121.5/243MHz version with the new 406MHz ELT, CASA recommends that you check to ensure that it has been installed correctly. This means using approved data, that all wiring is configured correctly, and the maintenance schedules have been amended to reflect any changes in the ELT’s maintenance requirements. 1 2 APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 2–15 July 2010 Lighter than Air Hot Air Balloons AD/BAL/3 Amdt 5 - LP Gas Cylinders Rotorcraft Agusta A119 Series Helicopters 2010-0142-E - Rotors Flight Control - Pilot and Co-pilot Control Box Assemblies - Inspection / Replacement Above 5700 kg Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes AD/A330/3 Amdt 2 - Escape Slide Girt Bar Slider Mechanism - CANCELLED 2010-0135 - Doors - Pax/Crew and Emergency Exit Doors - Girt Bar Slider Mechanism - Functional Check and Lubrication Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0138 - Stabilizers - Elevator Inboard Hinge Fitting Lower Stop Angles - Inspection / Replacement Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes AD/B747/53 Amdt 4 - Longitudinal Skin Lap Joint and Body Frame Corrosion and Cracking AD/B747/296 Amdt 1 - Body Station 2598 Bulkhead - CANCELLED 2010-14-01 - Environmental Control System Polyurethane Foam Installation 2010-14-07 - Body Station 2598 Bulkhead 2010-13-12 - Electrical Arcing - Fuel Pumps 2008-01-01 - Flight Deck Door 2010-14-09 - Nacelle Strut Front Spar Chord Assembly 2010-14-10 - Fuselage Lower Lobe Longitudinal Lap Joints AD/B747/398 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives - 1 AD/B747/399 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives - 2 2010-14-17 - Cracks in Overwing Intercostal Webs between Stations (STA) 1160 and STA 1220 - Detect and Correct Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes AD/B767/41 Amdt 1 - Leading Edge Slat Drive Mechanism 2008-01-01 - Flight Deck Door Boeing 777 Series Aeroplanes 2008-01-01 - Flight Deck Door 2010-13-03 - Keyway of Fuel Tank Access Door Cutout of the Lower Wing Skin Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes 2010-15-01 - Flight Deck Window 1 Arcing Boeing 777 Series Aeroplanes 2010-15-01 - Flight Deck Window 1 Arcing 2010-14-13 - Inboard Main Track Slat Can for Outboard Slat Number 12 - Detect and Correct Damage Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-05 - Ram Air Turbine Balance Screw 2010-07-03 - RH Engine Compressor Stall AFM Amendment Fokker F28 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0139 - Fuel - Fuelling Control Panel Cam Inspection / Replacement / Functional Check (Fuel Tank Safety) Piston Engines Thielert Piston Engines AD/THIELERT/3 - FADEC Software - CANCELLED Turbine Engines Pratt and Whitney Canada Turbine Engines PW500 Series AD/PW500/3 - Hydro-mechanical Fuel Control Units CF-2010-19 - Intercompressor Bleed Valve/Servo Valve Malfunction Equipment Propeller Governors 2010-13-10 - Ontic Governors - Pilot Valve Plunger Inspection / Repair Propellers - Variable Pitch - Dowty Rotol AD/PR/40 Amdt 1 - Propeller Backplate Sealant 16–29 July 2010 Rotorcraft Eurocopter BO 105 Series Helicopters 2010-0153 - Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Main Rotor Blades with Bolted Lead Inner Weight - Life Limitation Kawasaki BK 117 Series Helicopters TCD-7558-2010 - Jettisonable Sliding Door TCD-7705-2010 - AFM Amendment Below 5700 kg Cessna 208 Series Aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 208/19 Amdt 3 - Flight and Ground Icing Operations De Havilland DHC-1 (Chipmunk) Series Aeroplanes AD/DHC-1/31 Amdt 2 - Fin Rear Spar Piper PA-28 Series Aeroplanes 2010-15-10 - Incorrectly Assembled Control Wheel Shafts Piper PA-32 (Cherokee Six) Series Aeroplanes 2010-13-07 Correction - Engine - V-Band Exhaust Coupling - Replacement 2010-15-10 - Incorrectly Assembled Control Wheel Shafts Piper PA-44 (Seminole) Series Aeroplanes 2010-15-10 - Incorrectly Assembled Control Wheel Shafts Piper PA-46 (Malibu) Series Aeroplanes 2010-13-07 Correction - Engine - V-Band Exhaust Coupling - Replacement Robin Aviation Series Aeroplanes 2010-0151-E - Exhaust - Exhaust Pipes - Inspection Above 5700 kg Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/173 - DASELL Toilet Walls Corrosion CANCELLED 2010-0148 - DASSELL Lavatory Walls - Inspection/ Repair 2010-0149 - Flight Controls - Elevator Aileron Computer (ELAC) System Power Supply Modification Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0145 - Hydraulic Power - High Pressure Manifold Check Valve - Inspection 41 Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/6 Amdt 2 - Rear Pressure Bulkhead 2010-15-08 - Outboard Mid-Flap Carriage Spindle Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes 2010-14-08 - Fuel Tank Ignition Sources Notice - 2010-14-08 - Notice to Operators Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes AD/B767/138 Amdt 3 - Nacelle Strut Midspar Fitting - CANCELLED AD/B767/256 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives 2010-14-18 - Primary Strut Midspar Fitting Tangs - Detect and Correct Fatigue Cracking Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-20 - Horizontal Stabilizer Trim Actuator (HSTA) - Assembly of Discrepant Load Bearing Balls in the HSTA Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-21 - Fuel System - Inadequate Electrical Bonding of the Motive Flow Check Valve CF-2010-22 - Main Landing Gear Stabilizer Extension Spring CF-2010-23 - Main Landing Gear - Failure to Extend British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0141-CN Correction - Placards & Markings N2 Limitations for Anti-Ice Selection - To Introduce a Placard on the Flight Deck Overhead Panel and Wiring to Inhibit the Airbrake Auto-retract Function Turbine Engines Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines PW4000 Series AD/PW4000/15 - 14th and 15th Stage Rubstrips Equipment Oxygen Systems 2010-0152 - Equipment and Furnishing - Oxygen Mask Regulator - Modification Propellers - Variable Pitch - McCauley 2010-14-20 - Propeller Hub Inspection AIRWORTHINESS Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/322 - B/E Aerospace Oxygen Masks CANCELLED 2010-14-06 - B/E Aerospace Oxygen Masks 2008-01-01 - Flight Deck Door Embraer ERJ-170 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-04 - Ram Air Turbine Balance Screw 2010-07-02 - RH Engine Compressor Stall AFM Amendment Piper PA-34 (Seneca) Series Aeroplanes 2010-15-10 - Incorrectly Assembled Control Wheel Shafts PULL-OUT SECTION Bell UH-1 Series Helicopters 2010-14-12 - Low Skid Landing Gear Forward Crosstube British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes AD/BAe 146/107 Amdt 3 - Forward Fuselage Skin - CANCELLED 2009-0070R1 - Fuselage - External Forward Fuselage - Inspection / Repair 2010-0141-CN - Placards & Markings - N2 Limitations for Anti-Ice Selection - To Introduce a Placard on the Flight Deck Overhead Panel and Wiring to Inhibit the Airbrake Auto-retract Function APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ... CONT 30 July– 12 August 2010 Lighter than Air Hot Air Balloons AD/BAL/13 Amdt 1 - Portable Fire Extinguisher Rotorcraft PULL-OUT SECTION Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters 2010-0100R1 - Navigation - Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output - Operational Limitation / Operational procedure / Reinforcement 42 Schweizer (Hughes) 269 Series Helicopters 2010-16-08 - Oil Cooler Impeller Blades Below 5700 kg Diamond DA42 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0155 - Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement Gippsland Aeronautics GA8 Series Aeroplanes AD/GA8/3 Amdt 2 - Forward Cargo Door Slide Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 Series Aeroplanes AD/BN-2/35 Amdt 3 - Airframe Structural Fatigue Life Limitations FSA NOV-DEC10 Above 5700 kg Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/232 - Rudder Side Shell Skin - CANCELLED 2010-0164 - Stabilizers - Rudder Side Shell Skin Inspection 2010-0165 - Oxygen System - Passenger Oxygen Masks - Identification / Modification / Replacement Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes AD/B737/200 Amdt 1 - Outboard Mid-Flap Carriage Spindle - CANCELLED 2010-16-06 - Flight Crew Oxygen System - Low Pressure Flex-hose Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes 2010-16-05 - Flight Crew Oxygen System - Low Pressure Flex-hose Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes 2010-16-04 - Flight Crew Oxygen System - Low Pressure Flex-hose Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-24 - Hydraulic Accumulators - Screw Cap/ End Cap Failure British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0166 - Time Limits / Maintenance Checks Airworthiness Limitations - Implementation British Aerospace BAe 3100 (Jetstream) Series Aeroplanes 2010-0162 - Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Main Landing Gear Radius Rod Mounting Shaft Assembly - Safe Life Limit / Replacement Embraer ERJ-170 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-01R1 - Inspection of the Lower Region of the Rear Pressure Bulkhead Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-06-02R1 - Inspection of the Lower Region of the Rear Pressure Bulkhead Fokker F28 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0156 - Fuel - Outer Wing Upper Skin Panel Reinforcement Structure - Inspection / Rework (Fuel Tank Safety) Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series Aeroplanes 2010-0157 - Fuel - Fuel Quantity Probe & Wiring Installation - Inspection / Modification (Fuel Tank Safety) Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes 2010-0158 - Fuel - Crossfeed Valve System and Fire Shut-off Valve System - Modification 2010-0159 - Fuel - Wing Tank Overflow Valve Sense Line & Wiring Conduit Hose Attachments Inspection / Modification (Fuel Tank Safety) SAAB SF340 Series Aeroplanes AD/SF340/111 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives Airbus Industrie A380 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0167 - Fire Protection, Nacelles / Pylons - Wing Pylon Interface / Double-Wall Fuel Pipe Assembly - Inspection 2010-0168 - Doors - Wing Landing Gear Door (WLGD) Hinge and Rods - Inspection / Replacement Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0173 - Fuselage - Fuselage Internal Structure at Frame 39.1 - Inspection 2010-0174 - Time Limits and Maintenance Checks - Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items ALS Part 2 - Amendment Airtractor 800 Series Aeroplanes 2010-17-18 - Wing Lower Spar Cap Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes 2010-17-05 - Power Control Relays in the P91 and P92 Power Distribution Panels 2010-17-19 - Aft Attach Lugs of the Elevator Control Tab Mechanisim Turbine Engines Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes AD/B747/269 Amdt 1 - Engine Core Cowl Latch Modification Rolls Royce Turbine Engines - RB211 Series 2010-0008R1 - Engine - Intermediate Pressure Shaft Coupling Splines - Inspection Boeing 777 Series Aeroplanes 2010-16-12 - Oil Scavenge Tube on the Turbine Rear Frame Turbomeca Turbine Engines - Arriel Series 2010-0101R1 - Engine - Module M03 (Gas Generator) - Post-TU347 Second Stage Turbine Disc - Reduced Life Limit Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes 2010-17-03 - Chafing of the Wiring Bundle in the Centre Auxiliary Fuel Tank Equipment Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-25 - AC Electrical Load Distribution Propellers - Variable Pitch - Hartzell AD/PHZL/87 Amdt 2 - Propeller Thrust Bearings 13–26 August 2010 Rotorcraft Bell Helicopter Textron 412 Series Helicopters 2010-0171 - Fuselage - Wire Strike Protection System (WSPS) - Upper Cable Cutter - Inspection / Replacement Eurocopter BK 117 Series Helicopters 2010-0154 - Optional Equipment - External Mounted Hoist System - Visual Check / Replacement Eurocopter EC 135 Series Helicopters AD/EC 135/22 - External Mounted Hoist System CANCELLED 2010-0154 - Optional Equipment - External Mounted Hoist System - Visual Check / Replacement Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series Helicopters 2010-0100R1 Correction - Navigation - Vertical Gyro Unit Data Output - Operational Limitation / Operational procedure / Reinforcement Below 5700 kg Hawker Beechcraft (Raytheon) 390 Series Aeroplanes 2010-17-15 - Armature Insulating Materials Above 5700 kg Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes AD/A330/31 Amdt 4 - Airworthiness Limitations Items - Time Limits/Maintenance Checks CANCELLED Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-26 - Main Landing Gear Door Alternate Release Cable - Turnbuckle Fouling and Cable Wear CF-2010-27 - Flight Controls - Backlash in the Crank Arms of Elevator Torque Tube CF-2010-28 - Elevator Power Control Unit - Shaft (Tailstock) Swaged Bearing Wear Dornier 328 Series Aeroplanes AD/DO 328/73 - Flight Compartment Door Locking Device - CANCELLED 2010-0169 - Equipment & Furnishings - Flight Compartment Door Locking Device - Replacement Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-08-02 - Pylon Shear Pins - Replacement Turbine Engines CFM International Turbine Engines CFM56 Series 2009-0088R1 Correction - Engine - High Pressure Compressor (HPC) - Inspection / Replacement General Electric Turbine Engines - CF6 Series AD/CF6/51 Amdt 2 - LPT Shroud - Replacement Rolls Royce Turbine Engines - RB211 Series AD/RB211/39 - High Pressure Compressor Rotor Discs and Rotor Shafts - CANCELLED 2009-0073 R1 correction - Engine - High Pressure (HP) Compressor Stage 1 to 4 Rotor Discs and HP Compressor Rotor Shafts – Inspection APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ... CONT 27 August–9 September 2010 Above 5700 kg Rotorcraft Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/183 - Additional Centre Fuel Tanks CANCELLED 2010-0177 - Fuel System - Additional Centre Tanks Manhole Cover Seal - Replacement Agusta AB139 and AW139 Series Helicopters 2010-0183R1 - Equipment/Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searchlight - Inspection/Removal Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 222 Series Helicopters CF-2010-29 - Servo Actuator Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 430 Series Helicopters CF-2010-29 - Servo Actuator Eurocopter EC 135 Series Helicopters 2010-0183R1 - Equipment/Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searchlight - Inspection/Removal Kawasaki BK 117 Series Helicopters TCD-7698-2010 - Rescue Winch System Sikorsky S-92 Series Helicopters 2010-0183R1 - Equipment/Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searchlight - Inspection/Removal Below 5700 kg Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes AD/B767/256 Amdt 1 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives CFM International Turbine Engines CFM56 Series AD/CFM56/30 - Engine - High Pressure Compressor - CANCELLED Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines PW4000 Series AD/PW4000/16 - Front Pylon Mount Bolts Equipment Radio Communication and Navigation Equipment 2010-0186 - Communication - Very High Frequency (VHF/AM) Transceiver - Modification Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes CF-2010-30 - Cracking of the Nacelle Attachment Fitting(s) CF-2010-31 - Fuel System Safety - Introduction of Design Changes 43 British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes AD/BAe 146/141 - State of Design Airworthiness Directives Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes 2010-08-03 - Airworthiness Limitation Section (ALS) - Changes ever had a Write to us about an aviation incident or accident that you’ve been involved in. If we publish your story, you will receive CLOSE $500 CALL? Write about a real-life incident that you’ve been involved in, and send it to us via email: [email protected] Clearly mark your submission in the subject field as ‘CLOSE CALL’. Articles should be between 450 and 1,400 words. If preferred, your identity will be kept confidential. Please do not submit articles regarding events that are the subject of a current official investigation. Submissions may be edited for clarity, length and reader focus. AIRWORTHINESS Diamond DA42 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0155R1 - Landing Gear - Main Landing Gear Damper-to-Trailing Arm Joints - Inspection / Replacement Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes 2010-17-14 - Fatigue Cracks at Certain Frame Sections in Addition to Stub Beam Cracking Turbine Engines PULL-OUT SECTION Eurocopter BK 117 Series Helicopters 2010-0183R1 - Equipment/Furnishings - Spectrolab Nightsun XP Searchlight - Inspection/Removal BAe Systems (Operations) Jetstream 4100 Series Aeroplanes 2010-0179 - Doors - Upper and Lower Passenger/ Crew Door Pin Guides - Inspection / Replacement Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series Aeroplanes 2010-0182 - Fuel - Fuel Pipes in Engine Nacelles Inspection/Replacement (Fuel Tank Safety) UA INDUSTRY POISED FOR TAKE-OFF Flight Safety talks to CASA’s unmanned aircraft specialist, Philip Presgrave. FSA NOV-DEC10 44 There’s a strong hint of things to come in CASA’s in-tray. It contains more than 45 applications for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) air operator’s certificates, in addition to the dozen currently valid. The Australian unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) industry certainly appears to be preparing for take-off. UAS specialist Philip Presgrave, from CASA’s flying standards office, says activities being applied for include pollution monitoring, law enforcement, mining survey and related land rehabilitation, power line survey, border protection, pipeline monitoring and real estate photography. The industry is establishing a distinct economic niche, and a direct benefit to the community, Presgrave says. ‘I get calls every couple of days seeking more information from intending entrants. One of the things I would emphasise is that we’re talking about aeroplanes, aircraft. They’re certainly not models, they’re doing real work.’ Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are working commercial aircraft, Presgrave says. ‘We’re trying to move away from the idea that they’re toys – they’re very sophisticated vehicles, capable of performing air work tasks with unique cost and safety advantages.’ From an operator’s point of view the industry is maturing rapidly, Presgrave says. There’s a strong ‘anti-cowboy ethos’ among operators he says, which reflects respect for CASA’s regulations and an understanding that the industry’s status comes from how it is seen to comply. ‘We’re getting operators advise us of practices they observe that they consider potentially unsafe or a poor reflection on the industry and we are able to act accordingly.’ The recent UAV Outback Challenge held in late September, at Kingaroy, in Queensland, demonstrated the ability of unmanned aerial vehicles to fly and interact safely with manned aircraft, he said. stale Time of next CoT platform position message me This his is the time at which the position message sage is is no longer valid; use ISO 8601 how m-p How ow the position was obtained (machine ne- passed). Reference CoT definitions in Event.xs ent.xsd v 1.4 2007/02/27 for further explanation on and a other possible values. detail/_flowdetail/ floow- tags_ Current Time Indicates that system “touched” uched” the event and at what time. Format ass EG0601.1CoT EG or EG0104.55CoT = ’YYYYY-MM-D EG0104.5CoT YY DThh:mm:ss.ssZ’ with the current time. time sensor/azimuth 5 Platform Heading Angle 188 Sensor Relative tive Azimuth Az Angle Sensor absolute azimuth obtained ed by adding platform heading angle andd sensor se relative azimuth angles together; togeth CoT req equires uir decimaal degrees sensor/fov 16 Sensorr Horizontal Hor Field ield of View Sensor Horizontal Fieldd of VView; CoT requires decimal degrees sens sensor/vfov 17 Sensor Vertical Field of View Sensor Vertical Field of View; CoT require ires decimal degrees sensor/model 11 Im Image Source Sensor Image Source Device vice sensor/range 21 Slantt Range Ra CoT requires this be in meters point/lat 13 Sensor Latitude CoT Co requires WGS-84 decimal degrees with North posi positive tive point n 14 Sensor Longitude CoTT req point/lo requires WGS-84 decimal degrees with EEast positive point/ha t/hae 15 Sensor True Altitude The KLV key is altitude; it must be converted ver to Ellipsoid Height; given in met meters e point/ce 9999999 99999 This represents “no value given”” point/le 9999999 This rrepresents “no value given” version 2.0 CoT Version Num Number type a-f-A-M-F (as an example) mple) Atom-friendly-Air A AOB- Military-Fi ry-Fixed Wing (Refe ce CoT definitions in Eve (Referen vent.xsd nt.x v 1.4 2007/02/27 for otheer “types” as applicable to other platforms) platf uid 10 Device D Designation 3 Missionn ID … for 0601.1 implementations, ns, concatenate Tags 10 and 3 separated by an underscore ore ((“_”) _ character. time 2 UNIX Time ime SStamp Convert to ISO 8601 YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm YYY m:ss.ssZ :s (Fractional seconds are optional o and number of decimal imal places unbounded); this is the time the me message is generat rated start 2 UNIX Time Stamp mp Convert Co to ISO 8601 YYYY-MMM-DDThh:mm:ss.ssZ this is the timee the m messagee bec becomes o valid (should be the same as Time) stale Time of next CoTT platfo platform p positio ition message This is the time at which thhe position positio message is no longer valid; usee ISO 8601 how m-p How thee position was obtained (machine- passed). Refereence CoT definit efinnitions in Event.xsd v 1.4 20007/02/27 for further explanat ation and other possible valuees. detail/_flow- tags_ Current Time Indicates that system “touched” thee event and at what time. Forrmat as EG0601.1CoT or EG0104.5CoT = ’YYYY-MM M-DDThh:mm:ss.ssZ’ Z’ w with the current timee. sensor/azimuth 5 Platform Heading Angle 18 Sensor Relative Azimuth Angle Sensor abs bsolute azimuth obbtained by adding platform heeading angle and sensor relaative azimuth angles together; CoT requires decimal degre rees sensor/fov 16 Sensor Horizontal Field of View Sensor Horizoontal Field of View; CoT requiress decimal degrees sensor/vfov ov 17 Sensor Vertical Field of View Sensor Vertical Field of View; CoT requiress decimal degrees sensor/model 11 Image Soource Sensor Image Source Deevice sensor/range 21 Slant Rannge CoT requires this be in meeters For now, the dominant mode of UAS operation is visual line-of-sight operation. A ‘sense-and-avoid’ capability for UAS is the major hurdle worldwide inhibiting full integration of UAS into non-segregated airspace. An Australian UAS organisation working in the area of sense-and-avoid technology is the Australian Research Centre for Aerospace Automation (ARCAA). The Centre, a joint venture between Queensland University of Technology and the CSIRO aerospace research centre, officially opened in September. Its headline project is ‘dynamic sense-and-act’, which uses an onboard camera, graphics processing hardware and image processing algorithms to detect potential mid-air collisions. It acts much like a visual version of a commercial aircraft’s traffic collision avoidance system (TCAS), using cameras instead of TCAS’s radar. The system has been test flown in an autonomous mode, and ARCAA researcher and QUT lecturer, Luis Mejias, says it could form the basis for TCAS-like systems on UAVs and general aviation aircraft. The category has become diverse very quickly, he says. ‘Some multi-rotor UAVs have up to 12 rotors; then there are singlerotor designs; fixed-wing UAVs ranging from less than a metre wingspan to sizes approaching a 737 aircraft; and lighter-thanair UAV airships. For now, the dominant mode of UAS operation is visual line-of sight operation. ‘Most companies that are applying plan to fly visual line-of-sight and in visual meteorological conditions, and therefore seek exemption to the instrument rating examination requirement of the regulations (CASR 101-295),’ Presgrave says. The ability to license for higher categories of flight such as beyond line-of-sight, semi-autonomous and all-weather operation remains important for the growth of UAS, he says. CASA is also examining the unique requirements of UAS licensing. ‘We’ve established an industry training development team looking at the various types of training required for different types of unmanned vehicles and recommending how they might be appropriately licensed,’ Presgrave says. He says licences would reflect the size and type of the UAV, and its type of operation. Images courtesy of cat.csiro.au Stefan Hrabar ‘If you were operating a fixed-wing UAV at the lower end of the scale there could be a different range of subjects and practical skills to cover than if you were operating a multi-rotor UAV, for example.’ CASA is examining an industry recommendation on UAS certification standards, and this could also reflect operational realities more closely. We are also monitoring worldwide UAS certification developments, especially those from ICAO, the FAA and EASA. ‘The argument is that if you’re operating a UAV in a remote area the consequences of a failure or forced landing are far less than in a built-up area and so there may be a case for a range of certification standards to reflect this,’ he says. CASA is also working with the UAS industry on possible use of unmanned aircraft for bushfire surveillance, among other tasks. Unmanned vehicles would provide low-cost, nighttime, eye-in-the-sky monitoring of bushfires, giving controllers realtime information on the status of fire fronts, and helping avoid the situation where fast-moving fires can catch firefighters or communities by surprise. 45 UA INDUSTRY TAKE-OFF ‘We had some 10 movements of manned aircraft over the competition period, even though the airport was closed, and they were all conducted and co-ordinated professionally and safely. We also saw UAVs flying under automatic control in the competition area, and that was a minor milestone for the Challenge, as previous attempts had failed at take-off. Name withheld by request I was so excited! My career-long dream of being a jet pilot had come true. I was now a 12-month line first officer flying in a new state-of-the-art jet based in my hometown, Melbourne. FSA NOV-DEC10 46 On this Friday afternoon I was rostered to operate four sectors: a return trip to Hobart, and then to Sydney and back. I was with a new captain with whom I hadn’t flown before. It was a hot and windy day in Melbourne and a frontal system was on its way. A line of storms was approaching from the northwest after we arrived from Hobart. We landed on Tullamarine runway 34 and spotted the cumulonimbus build-ups in the distance, but didn’t think too much of it at the time. After 60 minutes on the ground and a change of aircraft, we pushed back and started on our way for Sydney. Being a Friday afternoon, we had a full load of business people. On our taxi out we noted the storm was now quite close, and a Boeing 767, which taxied out ahead of us, opted to taxi the full length of runway 34 and use the turning bay at taxiway kilo to point north and look with its weather radar for a heading to avoid the weather. The taxi out was busy, as we had to re-do the take-off figures because it started to drizzle very lightly (despite the sunshine!) and wet figures would be more appropriate. This combined with a change in standard instrument departure (SID), to a radar one, necessitated a quick re-briefing. The 767 took a heading right 070 degrees and departed without incident. The storm was now getting close to 3nm of the airport, but it still looked safe to depart. After a look at the radar we thought it wise to depart on a similar heading to the 767. It was my sector and away we went! We got distracted at 500ft as we had pre-selected the heading of 070 and the plane turned, after autopilot engagement, as it was designed to do, but earlier than the 1500ft the SID required. This necessitated some heads down time on both our parts: obviously a big no-no when the storm was so close. In what seemed like about two seconds (I’m sure it was longer), we clipped the edge of the storm and crunch! Lightning strike number one – there were more on the way! Then heavy rain, and as we climbed, some light hail. Things were getting a little frantic now, trying to speak to ATC and fly clear of the weather. Hearing each other was very difficult because of the noise – and then bang! Another strike. Somewhere in here I tried to clean the plane up and find a heading that would be good not only for us, but also for ATC – we ended up on a heading around 110 degrees. Because of this, we were held at 5000ft due to inbound traffic. It was at this point we looked at each other and agreed; staying on the ground would have been a better idea! The rain and hail slowly stopped, and we sustained one more strike. Tullamarine was now closed because the storm was well and truly over the top of the field. This was when cooler heads prevailed – we asked to stop climb at 10,000ft and be vectored away from the weather whilst we spoke to the engineers on the ground and checked vital systems. It looked as if the electronic engine controls (EEC) may have suffered some damage and gone into alternate mode. We ran through the appropriate checklist. After a discussion with a company engineer via air-to-ground radio, we agreed unanimously to hold until the weather cleared and return to Melbourne, where maintenance could have a good look over our bruised and battered ship. we clipped the edge of the storm and crunch! Lightning strike number one – there were more on the way! Then heavy rain, and as we climbed, some light hail. 47 I conducted a VOR/DME approach into runway 34 in Melbourne – (please tell me if they ever plan on installing an ILS!). It was uneventful when compared to the start of the flight. On arrival, a group of engineers quickly came out and inspected the aircraft, and I will never forget the expression of the head engineer. When he entered the cockpit, he told us in no uncertain terms that this plane ‘won’t be going anywhere for a week!’ This brought mixed emotions: on the one hand, elation that we had made the right choice in returning to Melbourne, but on the other, professional disappointment and dejection. If we had done a few things differently, maybe this whole mess would have never occurred. In hindsight, perhaps we could have departed from runway 27 and turned left for Sydney, well clear of the weather. If we had used full thrust, perhaps we would have climbed higher, turned earlier and not touched the storm? If we hadn’t spend as much time heads-down sorting out the autopilot issues perhaps we would have seen the imminent danger. What if we had simply taxied back at the gate and waited 60 minutes for the weather to clear? Looking back it seems so obvious, but at the time when you have a full flight, curfew considerations with the plane later in the day, blue skies over the field and only two sectors before beer o’clock, logic doesn’t seem so clear. This event taught me emphatically to put airmanship first and commercial pressures second. Again, I feel a little dumb making that statement now, in hindsight, but it’s weird how things don’t seem as easy at the time. On a more positive note, our crew resource management (CRM) worked well, both between the captain and me, but also with the cabin crew post-event. We conducted a thorough analysis of systems after the event and were confident of our choice to return to Melbourne after this analysis was completed. We decided to hold near Avalon in case we needed to get down in a hurry: this was good airmanship on both our parts, I thought. Lastly, I am forever grateful to my training captain who prepared me thoroughly to have little things ready for the day something happens. These included having my frequencies set up on back up and my landing charts for the departure airport at arm’s reach for when we need to come back. Thanks! You always have a natural tendency to think ‘it won’t happen to me.’ Heck, that 767 got away fine, just two minutes ahead, why would we not be OK too? I learned this day never to take thunderstorms for granted. Don’t even try and skim close to them, despite what weather radars and modern technologies say. Better safe than sorry right? I was definitely sorry after this experience! CLOSE CALLS The captain liaised effectively with the cabin crew, and made a particularly good announcement to the passengers explaining in detail what had happened and why we had to return to Melbourne. He regretted that some passengers would be getting home late to their families, but said it always best to check the plane after such an incident. He also suggested that he didn’t think the damage would be too bad and we would be on our way to Sydney in no time. How wrong he was to be on that front! FSA NOV-DEC10 48 December 1995 – a beautiful day at Jackson’s International Airport, Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea (PNG) with almost perfect flying weather forecast. I was the base manager/pilot for one of the larger helicopter operators in Papua New Guinea and that morning we had a government charter, including a local government minister, a few officials and a police escort. This was a full complement of six passengers for my Bell 206 Longranger. The charter was to Waitope Village, and scheduled takeoff time was 0700, something I failed to notice during the sequence of events for that morning. All passengers arrived on time, so after weighing them, and manifested, we actually departed on time. The route took us to the north of Pt. Moresby, into the beautiful Waitope Valley. Waitope village is located at the top of the valley, at the base of Mt Albert-Edward, in the Owen Stanley Mountain Range, at about 5000ft altitude. The airstrip is suitable for small fixed-wing aircraft, with a tourist lodge near the end of the strip. As I lined up my approach to the far end of the Waitope airstrip, still about half a mile out and about 500 ft AGL, we passed a primary school on our left, which the local government minister, the member for Goilala, told me he attended as a child. This prompted him to ask me to land at the school, rather than the airstrip, as he was due at the school to address a grade six graduation. Of course I complied, and immediately commenced a descending left turn from the eastern boundary of the school to initiate a high overhead inspection of obstacles and terrain to select an intended landing point. There was a large soccer field in the middle of three school buildings, with a basketball court on the eastern side of the complex. I chose the soccer field. As I neared the southern boundary of the school grounds approaching from the east, I commenced a right-hand turn surveying the layout of the school and possible forced landing areas for the approach. I noticed three large high-tension wires on large power poles approaching the school from the south. My eyes followed the wires, which turned east and literally formed a border along the soccer field's northern side. I also noticed three steel poles: two forming a ninety degree turn from south to east on the southern edge of the school, with another pole approximately 130 metres away on the northern side of the soccer field. The wires appeared to terminate on the second pole on the southeastern side of the soccer field, while the third telephone pole on the northern side of the soccer field appeared to have no wires attached. Rather than levelling off at about 200ft AGL and conducting a full 360-degree inspection of the site, I opted simply to continue the approach resulting in a 270-degree flight path, executing my approach to the east. I flew between two buildings, commencing the approach by slowing my airspeed and continuing a standard approach and resultant rate of descent to the field. I kept a close watch on the heavy high-tension wires immediately to my left, clearing them by about six metres from my rotor tips. Just as I shifted my field of vision ahead to my intended landing point, I saw a smaller wire literally at the end of my HF antenna (only about two metres in front of the nose of the helicopter), perpendicular to my aircraft, and level with the antenna itself. This indicated the wire was actually under my rotor disk, and I still had translational lift (about 20 knots of airspeed) and a four to five degree approach angle! At his point everything I did was by reflex. Immediately, I hauled back on the cyclic, pointing the nose of my B-206 straight up, while holding my approach power with the collective. This manoeuvre allowed me to drop straight down, tail first, before reaching the wire and then level the chopper in one continuous motion. I then pulled enough collective to try to arrest my descent, and almost succeeded. However, the rate of descent was too rapid for such a low altitude and I hit the flat surface of the playing field rather smartly. The skids spread out completely flat and there we sat! I snapped off the ELT, reached down and flipped the fuel emergency cutoff switch, silencing both the beacon and engine in a matter of seconds, and said to my passengers (who still had their head sets on), 'Listen to me! Do not leave the aircraft! The rotor is low enough to knock your head off. Exit the aircraft slowly, bend way over, and walk away. Make sure you do not stand up until you are well clear of the rotor!' Fortunately all of the passengers did as they were instructed. Thinking back, I am very glad I gave the ‘boring’ pre-flight briefing to the passengers, telling them to follow my instructions ‘in the unlikely event of an emergency’! I can only guess that was why they didn’t dart from the helicopter immediately. Luckily, no one was injured, as the rate of descent had been slowed considerably, as well as the shock-absorbing affect of the skids collapsing provided adequate protection. The rest, as they say, is history. I must say I never made another approach to a village or field again without doing at least one 360-degree over fly, continually searching for wires, regardless of where I was. Sometimes I even did two or three high and low overhead flights if I had any doubt. The mindset of ‘saving the passenger money’ is not the right one for a safe approach. Contributing to this accident was the fact that at altitude, I was getting the full easterly glare from the sun in the direction of my approach, but the sun had not risen high enough over the mountain range to illuminate the ground or the wires below me. There were three wires crossing the soccer field from the steel pole at the southeast of the field, across the field to the northernmost steel pole, where they actually did terminate. The wires had been placed there years ago, and were the result of an abandoned hydro-electric scheme. Believe me, there are very few wires in rural PNG, very few! When I exited the aircraft and looked up, the wires were actually over the mast of the helicopter. That was a close one! You’ll never guess what the local member (my front seat passenger) said when I finally walked away from the scene and up to him. 'Why didn’t you land on the basketball court?' To which I queried, 'Did you know those wires were there?' 'Yes! Of course,' he replied! There's a moral there somewhere. CLOSE CALLS I was surprised – I couldn’t believe I had actually ‘pancaked’ the skids! The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was howling so loudly in my headset I could hardly hear myself think. The rotor was still powered and turning at full flight RPM, and the fuselage was now about a metre closer to the ground, with the rotor spinning at about neck height for the average person! I asked my front seat passenger if he was all right, and he replied he had not felt the impact, and neither had I. The surprised look on his face and his bulging eyes told of his real state of mind! I then realised that at any moment one of my passengers in the rear compartment could bolt from the aircraft, probably stand up and start running with most likely terminal results! 49 by Nasir Rakhangi FSA NOV-DEC10 50 I was very close to my housemate, Dilan Shanmughadas, while I was at Basair. We went on all our cross-countries together, and used to head to the Gold Coast often for weekends. Sometime in late December 2007, towards the end of our 10 months in Australia, we had run out of exciting places to visit and still had so many hours of command building left. Sitting in our car one day, we had a bright idea: why not Tasmania - the southernmost place in the world before Antarctica? We got our approval from the school, and booked the best bird on the fleet, a Piper Arrow. A week later we were ready ... all packed and pumped, with blue skies all the way to Tasmania except for some tempo periods over the Tasman Sea for thunderstorms. We took off with full fuel and oil, the aircraft was just a few hours after its 100-hourly, and we were full of confidence. It was an uneventful flight until halfway between Mallacoota and West Sale. Having refuelled at Merimbula, we planned to follow the coast as far south as possible, to about Wilson’s Promontory, and then head straight across to Tasmania via the Kent Islands and Flinders Island. However, with reports of thunderstorms in the area, we decided to land at Bairnsdale as a precaution. And it’s a good thing we did, because for three hours the cumulonimbus belched out rain and lightning. Finally the skies cleared, and we did a quick preflight. We had enough fuel, and the oil just needed a quick one-quart top up. Next thing we were cruising over the Tasman Sea … my God, it was beautiful. We were doing 185kt ground speed, and hit the coast of Tasmania soon after. No one in our school, students or instructors, had crossed the Tasman before. We followed the valley down towards Launceston, and landed, deciding to stay the night there and leave for Hobart the next morning. The next morning we did our preflight. We hadn’t lost much oil and the tanks were filled. We decided to follow the valley down to Hobart, a mere one-hour’s flight. We submitted our flight plan over the radio to Launceston tower, and for the first time in my entire stay in Australia, I didn’t submit a SARtime. ‘Why bother? It was such a short trip … what could possibly happen?’ I thought. We took off from Launceston on the northerly runway, made an overhead departure and climbed to our cruising altitude of 4,500 feet. The plane performed like an ace, climbing beautifully as we cut through the crisp cool air. We trimmed it out and let the plane fly itself, when suddenly, as we were enjoying the scenery; we felt a light continuous vibration through the yoke. I asked Dilan if he felt it too. He shrugged it off lightly. But in that time, these light vibrations had quickly grown to a full-blown shuddering. Our headsets wouldn’t stay on our heads, the plane went out of control, there was all this dirt, and strange black sooty stuff was suspended in the air. I remember it going into my mouth and eyes. We took control of the aircraft and noticed that the needle on the tachometer had gone all the way, reading more than 3,500 rpm. I tried to reduce the speed using the pitch lever - no change. I noticed the oil pressure gauge reading zero, and the oil temp being within the green arc. I knew we’d lost oil. Dilan could see oil spraying out the side of the cowling. I declared Pan Pan Pan because we still had partial power. The rpm would come back into the green only if I idled the throttle, so I kept the power up to a compromise with the rpm at 3000. We were cleared back to Launceston for landing, but we were losing height, and about 11nm from the airport. As we slowly descended, I picked three fields to land in just in case we lost power completely. Sure enough, half a minute later, we lost all power We sat there stunned for about 15 seconds. When we did exit, we almost slipped on the wing as it was covered in oil. In fact, there was oil all the way to the fin! We looked around … nothing … just a few dead trees and dead grass. Dilan and I had always dreamed of landing on a field or a beach … but never with no power. We gave Launceston tower our coordinates and soon enough a spotter plane came up overhead, did a few circles and went back. We were expecting choppers or something to get us out of there, but it wasn’t to be. The tower advised us to say put near the aircraft and the police would rescue us. The search and rescue team called us and assured us that since we were unhurt, there was no need for them to rush in, and that the police would pick us up. After an hour’s wait, I called the helpful tower controller again. When he spoke to the police, he realised the police thought the tower controllers would arrange our rescue. Sorting out the confusion took a while, but finally we were asked to walk east until we hit the Midland Highway where the police would be ready to pick us up. We walked into the bush, following the small shadow we were managing to make with the midday sun. Halfway through, the same spotter plane managed to spot us through the trees and flew over us, close to the tree tops, firing white smoke trails to direct us towards the east … that was amazing. We jumped two gates, crossed railway tracks and finally about 45–60 minutes later, reached the highway where we were assured the police would pick us up. Which they did, after another 40-minute wait. Apparently, the oil line that connects the oil sump to the CSU governor had developed a hairline fracture, and since it is pressurised, the oil spurted out, causing the propeller to run away to full fine and hence overspeed the engine. The engine finally blew two holes in the walls due to pressure. The engine had seized and caused the prop to stop wind milling. When the maintenance engineer went to survey the aircraft later, he said we must have stopped the aircraft within 200 to 250 metres. I thank God that the engine seized, because had the prop kept wind milling, we probably wouldn’t have cleared the trees. We flew to Tasmania at an average 4000ft and flew back at 40,000. The aircraft engine was replaced, the aircraft flown straight out of that field, and it is still used to train on today. 51 CLOSE CALLS and the propeller stopped wind milling, which is odd for an Arrow. We declared a Mayday. Now I could only see one field off to my 2 o’clock, as the other two were behind me. The airspeed indicator was gone as well - it was reading 200kt at one second and zero the next. We seemed high and I put the gear down. Flying on attitude alone, we prayed for the best L/D. I flew the plane almost sub-consciously - I was not in the least worried - it was like any other landing. It was midday, so you couldn’t see terrain slopes very well, and as we closed in towards the empty field in the middle of the surrounding bush, I looked over to my left and saw a row of trees and I thought, ‘Well, no clearway here.’ A few seconds later we landed, and it was a smooth one, but as soon as we looked up, we could see a huge upslope at about 30 degrees or so ahead. That was when I got scared - the combination of 270 litres of fuel and a failed engine … fire? Just as we closed to the base of the upslope, I yanked on the yoke and pulled the nose wheel off the ground to cushion its blow. We climbed up the slope with a heave and at its top, we were airborne again, and flared off again. This time we both braked hard, stopping about 10 metres from a fence which we hadn’t seen earlier either. The Australian A Chief Commissioner’s message Earlier this year the ATSB engaged an independent market research agency to undertake research with our key industry stakeholders. The aim of the research was to get feedback on where we are going well, where we could do better and how we could improve the way we communicate key safety messages. 52 The research comprised one-on-one interviews, mini focus groups and an online survey with more than 700 people. FSA NOV-DEC10 The results presented some interesting findings which were mostly consistent across all three transport modes. Overall I was pleased to discover that the majority of respondents thought the ATSB is performing well. In fact 86 per cent of stakeholders who have had dealings with the ATSB rated our performance, based on direct personal experiences, as good or better. However, our stakeholders also identified areas that we need to improve. In particular, timeliness of completing investigations and communicating the status of investigations were the areas that rated lowest in terms of overall performance at 49 per cent. There was also a view, particularly outside specialised safety areas of transport operators, that we needed to be better at communicating the safety messages coming out of our investigations and research. Timeliness and communication are two areas we are committed to improving. By setting new performance benchmarks and undertaking greater planned communication activity, we will better meet industry’s expectations. The survey findings will now be used to develop an ATSB communication and education strategy. The research results will also form a benchmark for further stakeholder research planned for July 2011. I thank everyone who participated in the survey and encourage you to continue providing feedback. Your ideas and suggestions help us improve our business of advancing transport safety in Australia. . . Martin Dolan Chief Commissioner ATSB supporting aviation safety in PNG and the region ne of the ATSB’s core responsibilities is helping to promote aviation safety, not just in Australia, but throughout the region. The benefits are many – many countries lack the capability to investigate anything other than major accidents; they simply do not have the resources to investigate serious incidents. In addition, encouraging a culture of safety feeds back to us, ensuring Australia keeps it aviation standards at their highest. Finally, Australians are enthusiastic and adventurous travellers, and are likely to be flying in neighbouring countries. It’s in their interests to do it safely. Recently, the ATSB has been taking major steps in working with Australia’s closest neighbour, Papua New Guinea. O After the crash of a Twin Otter aircraft P2-MCB near Kokoda on 11 August 2009, in which nine Australians died, the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) formally requested that the ATSB assist them with their investigation. These sorts of collaborations are specifically provided for under Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. ATSB investigators worked alongside AIC staff on site in PNG, and AIC staff have subsequently travelled to Canberra for further discussions related to the investigation. The ATSB has provided investigator support, information and technical advice and facilities support. The AIC expects to release the report by the end of the year. Recently, a team of ATSB investigators flew to Misima Island in PNG to assist the AIC with their investigation into an accident that took place on 31 August, 2010. A Cessna Citation aircraft apparently overran the runway on landing, impacting with trees. The aircraft caught fire and burned, with four of the five people on board perishing. The AIC investigation is continuing, and the ATSB is working closely with PNG officials to assist where possible. The ATSB is assisting the Australian next-of-kin. The ATSB’s assistance to PNG is managed under a Transport Safety Investigation Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Australia and Papua New Guinea on Cooperation in the Transport Sector. The Annex was signed by the ATSB and AIC on 13 November 2009. Both agencies are committed to enhancing the capabilities of their investigators, and the heads of the agencies have recently discussed how to work together even more effectively to build the region’s capacity for aviation safety. Q Aviation Safety Investigator Improve your odds orty-four per cent of all aviation accidents and over half of the fatal accidents between 1999 and 2008 were attributed to private operations. These figures are even more disturbing when you consider that private operations represent less than 15 per cent of the hours flown in that decade. F The ATSB has released a Research and Analysis Report, Improving the odds: Trends in fatal and non-fatal accidents in private flying operations, which identifies some of the underlying causes of the poor safety performance in this sector. The report is available from the ATSB website. Problems with pilots’ judgement and planning were identified as contributing factors in about half of fatal accidents in Action errors and decision errors were both common to fatal accidents. Violations, while less frequently found, were mostly associated with fatal accidents. In light of the contributing factors associated with fatal accidents in private operations, the report provides advice to pilots for improving the odds of a safe flight. Pilots are encouraged to make decisions before the flight, continually assess the flight conditions (particularly weather conditions), evaluate the effectiveness of their plans, set personal minimums, assess their fitness to fly, set passenger expectations by making safety the primary goal, and to seek local knowledge of the route and destination as part of their pre-flight planning. Also, becoming familiar with the aircraft’s systems, controls and limitations may alleviate poor aircraft handling during non-normal flight conditions. Some ideas to consider when assessing and planning your flight include: Make decisions pre-flight tEFDJEFIPXZPVXJMMEFBMXJUIMJLFMZ threats and errors as part of your pre-flight planning (and don’t forget to discuss these with your copilot if you have one) Seek local knowledge t#FGPSFUIFĘJHIUTFFLPVU local knowledge (of the weather and terrain for example) on the routes and destination Set personal minimums t,OPXZPVSQFSTPOBM minimums for deciding if and under what conditions to fly or to continue flying based on your knowledge, skills and experience. t5BLFJOUPBDDPVOUUIF terrain, weather, external pressures, the aircraft’s performance limitations and any limitations you may bring to the flight (for example, stress and inexperience). Finally, pilots need to be vigilant about following the rules and regulations that are in place – they are there to trap errors made before and during flight. Ignoring these regulations only removes these ‘safety buffers’. A checklist for establishing your personal minimums can be found on the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s (CASA’s) website. Q ATSB investigation report AR-2008-045 53 ATSB The report also identifies the factors contributing to fatal accidents in private operations and how these factors differed from nonfatal accidents. Three occurrence types accounted for the majority of fatal accidents: collision with terrain (90%); loss of control (44%); and wirestrikes (12%). When all incidents and accidents are taken into account, the likelihood of being killed was about 36 per cent for a collision with terrain occurrence, 30 per cent for loss of control occurrences, and about 50 per cent for a wirestrike. For non-fatal accidents, there was greater variability in the common occurrence types – forced landings, hard landings, problems with the landing gear, and total power loss/ engine failure were also common. private operations, and about a quarter involved problems with aircraft handling. Other contributing factors associated with fatal accidents were visibility, turbulence, pilot motivation and attitude, spatial disorientation, and monitoring and checking. Non-fatal accidents were just as likely to involve aircraft handling problems, but had fewer contributing factors than fatal accidents. Investigation briefs Robinson helicopter training to be reviewed Maintenance not just by the book Aileron servo fault rectified ATSB Investigation AO-2009-053 ATSB Investigation AO-2009-021 ATSB Investigation AO-2009-032 The ATSB encourages operators and maintenance personnel to consider all available information relating to the history and performance of aircraft components and systems when planning maintenance activity. Manufacturers’ service bulletins and communications only form a part of an aircraft’s information. They should not be used to the exclusion of other knowledge, such as operational history and world-wide fleet experience. The ATSB issued a Safety Advisory Notice, encouraging operators of CFM56-7 and CFM56-5 engines to review their procedures after a Boeing 737-8BK experienced issues with one of its engines. A manufacturer has modified its assembly practices after an ATSB investigation identified the source of vibrations in an Airbus Industrie A320-232. The investigation also found an identical fault had occurred to the same aircraft eight months before the incident. This had not been reported to the ATSB despite the requirements of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. An ATSB investigation into a faltal helicopter accident has prompted CASA to review the requirements for initial pilot training and endorsement and recurrent training on Robinson R22 helicopters. This includes a review of the Helicopter Flight Instructor’s Manual to ensure that the required competencies are being covered by flight instructors and trained to students. FSA NOV-DEC10 54 The accident occurred on 2 July 2009 when the pilot of a Robinson Helicopter Company R22 Beta II, was carrying out solo circuit training at the Gold Coast Aerodrome. Witnesses saw the helicopter climbing, followed by a rolling motion that progressed into an exaggerated rolling and pitching movement. A piece of the helicopter separated from the aircraft, with the helicopter rotating a number of times before descending almost vertically into trees. Investigators found no evidence of any mechanical problem with the helicopter, and the weather conditions had been fine. The post-mortem found no evidence of any medical condition that may have affected the pilot’s performance. The investigation concluded that over or mal control by a pilot more accustomed to aeroplanes than helicopters was the most likely precursor to the accident. In addition, the investigation found that one of the pilot’s instructors had an expired rating. Since the accident, the helicopter operator has made a number of changes to their induction process, which includes the recording of instructors’ ratings and their respective validity periods. Q The incident took place on 20 August 2009, during a scheduled passenger service. The aircraft departed Launceston for Sydney when several loud bangs were heard from the left engine, consistent with a compressor surge. The left engine was reduced to flight idle and the aircraft returned to land at Launceston. The compressor surge and damage to the engine was found to be the result of advanced variable stator vane bushing/ shroud wear. The manufacturer was aware of the engine’s propensity for inner bushing wear and had previously released a number of service bulletins to eliminate the issue. The bulletins specified inspection requirements for detecting bushing wear and advised of the availability of an improved bushing. While the operator incorporated the service bulletins into their inspection and maintenance program, the 20 August event occurred before the engine had reached the recommended date for inspection. Since the occurrence, the manufacturer and operator have taken steps to address the safety issue and the ATSB will continue to monitor the issue. Q The aircraft, departed from Mackay, Queensland on 18 May 2009. Operating on a regular public transport flight, and destined for Melbourne, the aircraft had 125 passengers, four cabin crew and two flight crew on board. It was established in the cruise at Flight Level 350 when a light continuous vibration manifested within the aircraft. Cockpit indications showed that the left aileron was oscillating. Shortly after, the cabin manager reported to the pilot in command that there was ‘quite a bit of shaking’ at the rear of the aircraft. The crew diverted the aircraft to the Gold Coast Aerodrome and landed, with the vibrations intensifying during part of the descent. The source of the aileron oscillation was found to be an internal fault in one of the left aileron’s hydraulic servos. The fault occurred during manufacture by an incorrect adjustment of the servo, which caused internal wear in a number of the servo’s hydraulic control components. The aileron servo manufacturer has since incorporated a new method of adjusting the aileron servos during assembly to minimise the likelihood of the problem reoccurring. In addition, the operator has improved the training of its staff and the reportable event requirements in its safety management system manual in an effort to address the non-reporting risk. Q Who cares if stuff happens? T ‘We get around 15,000 notifications a year,’ says Ethan Eastman, ‘and that includes everything.’ Ethan is the supervisor for the ATSB’s aviation notifications team. He and his team of five are called upon to assess and classify any notifications that come in. And they do come in. Every day, dozens of faxes, letters, phone calls and emails flow into the Canberra office, alerting the ATSB of incidents, accidents and general problems. These notifications run the gamut of seriousness, ranging from minor breaches of protocols, somebody crushing a lizard on a runway, to a collision with terrain involving multiple fatalities. Periodically, people will wonder why a particular accident or incident is not being investigated – particularly if someone has died. However, the ATSB isn’t budgeted to investigate everything. Investigations have to be selective. The ATSB investigates events that are likely to yield the biggest safety benefit and provide important safety messages. ºº Anyone who is ‘a responsible person’, as defined in the regulations, is required to notify a ‘reportable matter‘ This is not to say, however, that a notification is of no use if the ATSB does not investigate it. Those thousands of occurrences (around 243,000 since 1969) create a vivid and useful portrait of aviation safety in Australia. Investigators and researchers use it to identify patterns and trends. The ATSB also receives many requests each year from the media and researchers (both private and professional) for details and figures of accidents and incidents. So what exactly needs to be reported? And who needs to report it? is required to notify the ATSB of a ‘reportable matter,’” explains Ethan. The regulations in question are the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003. While not waiting room fare, they do provide a definition for who constitutes a ‘responsible person.’ If you fit the criteria for being a ‘responsible person’, then it may pay you to acquaint yourself more fully with what you are obliged to tell the ATSB about, and when. If you know that the incident has already been reported, it doesn’t need to be reported again, but it is your responsibility to make sure that the ATSB has been notified. And it is important that the notification reports are as accurate as you can make them. Submitting deliberately false or misleading information is actually a serious criminal offence under the Criminal Code. In fact, aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring or urging the submission of false or misleading information is also a serious offence. Some of the requirements may seem like more trouble than they’re worth. Some of the reportable matters on their own may seem insignificant. But the occurrence reports all provide important insights into the health of the aviation system. They could also prove vital for our understanding of aviation safety issues, and how to address them. They could prove vital for our understanding of aviation safety, and how to improve it. Q “Anyone who is ‘a responsible person’, as defined in the regulations (see below), Who has to notify the ATSB? Do you? The following persons are responsible persons in relation to reportable matters: a) b) c) d) e) a crew member of the aircraft concerned the owner or operator of the aircraft a person performing an air traffic control service in relation to the aircraft a person performing a dedicated aerodrome rescue or firefighting service in relation to the aircraft a person who a. Is licensed as an aircraft maintenance engineer under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 or the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998; and b. Does any work in relation to the aircraft f) a member of the ground handling crew in relation to the aircraft g) a member of the staff of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority h) the operator of an aerodrome -Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (avaliable in full at <www.atsb.gov.au>) 55 ATSB Of the 15,000-odd notifications that come to the ATSB, about 8,000 are classified as safety occurrences and entered into the database. Those that don’t make the cut are usually duplicate-reports on the same occurrence from different sources, or they describe things that aren’t assessed as a transport safety matter. The 8,000 that actually do constitute safety matters are reviewed, and any that warrant closer review are forwarded to investigators. Depending on the circumstances, about 100 will be investigated each year. ºº he ATSB does! We know problems happen. In an industry like aviation, there are always going to be problems – mechanical problems, people problems, problems with the weather. When an aviation problem (or incident) happens then, by law, it most likely needs to be notified to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. REPCON briefs Australia’s voluntary confidential aviation reporting scheme REPCON allows any person who has an aviation safety concern to report it to the ATSB confidentially. Unless permission is provided by the person that personal information is about (either the reporter or any person referred to in the report) that information will remain confidential. The desired outcomes of the scheme are to increase awareness of safety issues and to encourage safety action by those who are best placed to respond to safety concerns. FSA NOV-DEC10 56 Before submitting a REPCON report take a little time to, consider whether you have other available and potentially suitable options to report your safety concern. In some cases, your own organisation may have a confidential reporting system that can assist you with assessing your safety concern and taking relevant timely safety BDUJPO:PVNBZBMTPXJTIUPDPOTJEFS reporting directly to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) if you are concerned about deliberate breaches of the safety regulations, particularly those that have the potential to pose a serious and imminent risk to life or health. REPCON staff may be able to assist you in making these decisions, so please don’t hesitate to contact our staff to discuss your options. REPCON would like to hear from you if you have experienced a ‘close call’ and think others may benefit from the lessons you have learnt. These reports can serve as a powerful reminder that, despite the best of intentions, well-trained and well-meaning people are still capable of making mistakes. The stories arising from these reports may serve to reinforce the message that we must remain vigilant to ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and others. If you wish to obtain advice or further information, please contact REPCON on 1800 020 505. Obstacle Limitation Surface (OLS) control R200800103 Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns about the Obstacle Limitation Surface (OLS) at an International Airport, reporting that the outer horizontal surface is infringed by the construction of five tower buildings in the City CBD. One is reported to penetrate the outer horizontal surface by 54.5 meters. The reporter believes that even higher structures are planned for the future. The reporter believes that there may be jurisdiction problems with regards to which government agency approves these apparent departures from standards and what safety case process is employed in the approval process. The Airports Act 1996 vests powers with the Minister to enforce building height limitations, but the reporter believes that the Department does not employ appropriate specialists. Civil Aviation Safety Regulation (CASR) part 139 and the associated Manual of Standards (MOS) appears to be all about monitoring after the event, rather than Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) approval or disapproval of tall structures in the OLS. Reporter comment: OLS infringement is a serious safety risk factor. The situation at [the aerodrome] suggests a blind eye or a ‘she’ll be right’ approach, rather than traditional Safety Management. There is an urgent need to ascertain and clarify which Commonwealth agency approves these OLS penetrations and on what basis. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied the aerodrome operator with the de-identified report. The aerodrome operator provided the following response: The primary Commonwealth legislation that regulates activities on and in some cases around [the aerodrome] is the Airports Act 1996. Airports Act 1996 The Airports Act 1996 (Act) and Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996 (Regulations) made pursuant to that Act provide a framework for the protection of what is known as the ‘prescribed airspace’ around [the aerodrome]. That ‘prescribed airspace’ is determined in accordance with international conventions and standards. ‘Prescribed airspace’ is made up of both the OLS [Obstacle Limitation Surface] and PANS-OPS [Procedures for Air Navigation Systems Operations] surfaces for the airport as well as specified airspace declared by the secretary of the [Department of Infrastructure and Transport (the Department)]. One of the key elements of this legislation is to protect that airspace from unauthorised infringements - such as buildings - that could affect the safe efficiency or regularity of both existing and future aviation operations at the [the aerodrome]. Any structures (permanent or temporary) infringing the prescribed airspace are called ‘controlled activities’, as defined under s182 of the Act, and require approval under the Regulations. Controlled Activities include: t 4USVDUVSFTTVDIBTCVJMEJOHTBOUFOOBT and cranes: and t *OTPNFDJSDVNTUBODFTBDUJWJUJFT causing non-structural intrusions into the protected airspace of artificial light, reflected sunlight, air turbulence, smoke, dust, steam or other gases or particulate matter. The Act and Regulations are administered by [the Department]. [The Department] decides whether or not to approve a ‘controlled activity’. The Aerodrome Operator has no approval authority for long-term controlled activities. Note: For short-term ‘controlled activities’ (3 months or less durations) as described under the regulations, approval authority is delegated by the Department to the Aerodrome Operator, who facilitates assessment and advice from both CASA and Airservices Australia. REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report and a version of the aerodrome operator’s response. CASA provided the following response: CASA has no authority to stop such developments. The existing regulatory regime for obstacles, as set out in Civil Aviation Safety Regulation 139, does not empower CASA to prevent a development which creates an obstacle nor does it make CASA responsible for the presence of obstacles. These matters are under consideration in the context of the development of the Government’s National Aviation Policy Statement. Notwithstanding the above, CASA also advised that: Under CASR 139.360, the aerodrome operator must inform CASA of details of any proposed development near the aerodrome that is likely to penetrate the OLS of the aerodrome and create an obstacle. Under CASR 139.370 CASA makes a determination if the proposed development will be hazardous to aircraft opera- tions because of its location, height or lack of marking and or lighting. CASA gives written notice of the determination to the proponent of the building or structure and to the relevant authorities whose approval is required for the construction of the building or structure. REPCON supplied the then Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government (the Department) with the de-identified report and a version of the aerodrome operator’s and CASA’s response. The Department provided the following response: assessment and decision. Importantly, the Government’s aviation safety agencies, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and Airservices Australia are consulted. In making a decision on an application, the Regulations require the Department to have regard to the opinions provided by CASA and Airservices on the application. Decisions must be made in the interests of the safety, efficiency or regularity of existing or future air transport operations. In summary, we can confirm that [the Department] implements the legislative framework protecting airspace above the OLS based on advice from CASA and Airservices for each application to conduct a controlled activity.’ ‘Part 12 of the Airports Act 1996 (the Act) and the Airports (Protection of Airspace) Regulations 1996 (the Regulations) establish a legislative framework for the protection of the following airspace at and around airports: t BJSTQBDFBCPWFUIF0CTUBDMF-JNJUBUJPO Surface (OLS) t BJSTQBDFBCPWFUIF1SPDFEVSFTGPS"JS navigation Systems Operations (PANS-OPS) surfaces a Who is reporting to REPCON? t BJSTQBDFEFDMBSFECZUIF [Department] as airspace Facilities maintenance Flight crew 40% to be protected in the personnel/ground crew 1% interests of future air Unknown 3% transport operations. Cabin crew 3% The Act defines any activity Air traffic controller 3% resulting in an intrusion into an airport’s prescribed Passengers 8% airspace to be a ‘controlled Aircraft maintenance activity’, and requires that personnel 20% controlled activities cannot be carried out without Others b 22% approval. This includes the construction of buildings that intrude into the a. from 29 January 2007 to 31 August 2010 b. examples include residents, property owners, general public prescribed airspace. The Regulations provide for [the Department] or the airport operator to approve REPCON reports received applications to carry out controlled activities around leased federal airports, of 117 Total 2010 a which [the airport] is one, 118 Total 2009 and to impose conditions on an approval. 121 Total 2008 The Department assesses 117 Total 2007 long-term (longer than 3 months) proposed 25 50 75 100 125 controlled activities and a. as of 31 August 2010 short-term penetrations of the PANS-OPS. The airport may assess short-term controlled activities. How can I report to REPCON? The airport operator On line: ATSB website at <www.atsb.gov.au> coordinates long-term Telephone: 1800 020 505 controlled activities’ by email: [email protected] assessments and forwards by facsimile: 02 6274 6461 by mail: Freepost 600, these and the application to the Department for final PO Box 600, Civic Square ACT 2608 57 ATSB The approval process involves the proponent submitting building details including the proposed maximum structure height (including appurtenances) and location coordinates to [the aerodrome operator], and [the aerodrome operator] then facilitates assessment from Airservices Australia, CASA and the local building authority, before forwarding comments to [the Department] for final assessment and approval. The Department may approve, approve with conditions or refuse to approve the proposed ‘controlled activity’. On approval, a condition of approval required by the Department is for the structure to not exceed the approved height by the Department. Under the Act, penalties apply for nonapproved ‘controlled activities’ that penetrate the prescribed airspace surfaces. Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASRs) Under CASR 139.365 and 139.370, notification to CASA is required of any proposed structure (including construction cranage) in excess of 110 m AGL [Above Ground Level]. This may result in CASA requiring that the structure be appropriately marked and lit. CASA is also able to make a determination under r 139.370 if a proposed development would be hazardous to aircraft operations including a gaseous efflux having a velocity of greater than 4.3m/s. Recent Building applications approved by the Department in the [City] CBD include: t <#VJMEJOH8>BQQSPYN")% t <#VJMEJOH9>BQQSPYN")% t <#VJMEJOH:>N")% BOE t <#VJMEJOH;>N")% FSA NOV-DEC10 58 Defence operates almost exclusively using the restricted area system for its airspace requirements. Whilst this has been successful in the past, giving Defence the necessary flexibility to achieve what it has to do, what happens within this restricted airspace, and the services provided in it, differ widely. Consequently, the audit and flexible usage of airspace working groups have identified ways in which it can improve greatly for all participants. There have been a significant number of changes to restricted areas recently and there are more to come in 2010. Some areas have disappeared, and undoubtedly, there are further rumours of more changes. This article is designed to keep you in the picture and give a user's guide to the changes happening on 18 November. One of the goals of last December's aviation white paper was to improve aviation safety by means of a more effective, efficient and responsive flexible use of airspace. 'Flexible airspace' means maximising the So ... what use of available airspace volumes while providing the what do you required segregation for non-compatible activities. Aircraft operations can then take place in a less restricted, more efficient and often more environmentally friendly manner, while meeting safety standards at all times. Flexible use of airspace optimises civil access to military airspace and vice versa, whenever safety and operational imperatives permit, and when the overall benefits of such flexibility to civil and military airspace users outweigh the costs. Over the last two years, there has been considerable work on auditing defence usage of airspace. Through this work, CASA's Office of Airspace Regulation (OAR) has identified key areas of airspace which could be used more efficiently. Better guidelines on restricted area activation and the type of control have identified the need to increase transparency for all stakeholders, thus achieving greater usage of airspace with gains in efficiencies and environmental benefits. The changes will be in place for the November 2010 publications. are the facts, and need to know? Reforming airspace usage Defence, Airservices and industry will continue to work through the OAR and with other agencies to improve the flexibility of both civil and defence-administered airspace consistent with the increased commonality and interoperability of our future air traffic management systems. Clarifying airspace management A joint working group involving Defence, CASA, Airservices Australia, departmental and industry representatives has been looking at how we can manage airspace better to give more civilian access to defence airspace, and more defence access to civilian airspace. First is the airspace managed like controlled airspace – typically the areas around major airfields such as Williamtown, Pearce or Amberley. When active, RAAF air traffic controllers manage the airspace. You can plan to go through, and request a clearance through, this airspace and will get a clearance if the traffic situation permits. Second are those restricted areas that allow defence to have priority for the area, without necessarily having ATC management. These areas might be used for air-to-air practice, or naval gunnery, where the risks would be higher to non-participants, and the cost to defence would be significant if it have to give priority to non-participants. Many of these areas adjoin the airspace around major airfields - the areas to the east of Williamtown being a prime example. Importantly, there may be times when such an area is activated by Defence but is not necessarily being used right at that moment. In these circumstances, a clearance may be available to transit the area. Third are the other areas designed for the protection of nonparticipants, such as radar sites and firing areas. The risks are too high to allow over-flight of these areas. Typically, range controllers, who are not qualified to provide air traffic services to civilian aircraft, manage them. When active you will not be able to get a clearance through these areas. 59 Fewer 'active H24' areas The Defence/OAR audit identified some restricted areas that could be modified, or removed, such as some areas had not been used in years, and were just cluttering maps. As these areas were not being activated, they were not actually stopping aircraft over-flight, so there was no point retaining them. Other areas have been identified as having strict operating hours; for example, a local range may have curfew hours, which prevent it from operating at night. So the promulgated restricted area hours now reflect this, although often with the caveat that they may be active outside these times by NOTAM. Defence has also moved from having many areas as 'active H24', but de-activating them by NOTAM, to 'active by NOTAM'. In effect there will be no real change to the airspace activation hours, but the method of notification will change. While there will still be some H24 areas (for transmitters, storage areas and the like), generally now you only have to look for what is being activated. This also provides benefits to airlines where automated flight planning systems have not been able to see areas that are de-activated by NOTAM. REFORMING AIRSPACE One of the group’s recommendations is to be clearer about how airspace is being used. So, in 2010, there will be a noticeable change to the way restricted areas are portrayed. This will give a better idea of who is managing the area, and thus the likelihood of getting a clearance through it. A bit of background as to how defence uses airspace will help explain, and will show how usage can be broken down in to three types: Unfortunately, the current arrangements do not delineate between these types of management. All that pilots see is a red line on a map, and a NOTAM telling them whether it is active. While experience and local knowledge may let the pilot know if they are likely to get a clearance or not, to many pilots this is not clear. However, in November, 2010, all restricted areas will be identified as fitting in to one of the three types listed later in this article. Read the NOTAM conditional status carefully, and plan accordingly. If you cannot determine the area's conditional status, then treat it as if it is an RA3 and avoid the area. This move will not substantially increase the number of NOTAMs being released. Instead of airspace being de-activated by a NOTAM as before, it will now be activated by a NOTAM, giving a more dynamic picture of what really is being activated. At times, Defence will still have the option of short-notice activation, but this will be the exception rather than the norm. FSA NOV-DEC10 60 And as always, the rules of airmanship apply – read and digest the NOTAMs before flight. If you're not sure about activated areas, then ask, or ultimately avoid. November reform – changes to restricted area classification Existing restricted areas will have further reclassification to conditional status (CS) to show accessibility. Each CS is based on volume for that given area of airspace. This will allow certain routes to be accessible. Conditional status RA 1—you can plan through/expect clearances when area is active – NOTAM/message will advise if this is not the case (for areas such as MIL ATC terminal airspace and flying training areas managed by ATC). Conditional status RA 2—you cannot plan/should not expect a clearance through when active, although tracking may be offered on a tactical basis by ATC – NOTAM/message will advise if this is not the case (R574 and some other areas where ATC and AIRDEF work together). Conditional status RA 3—clearance is never available when active, except in emergency (most firing areas, laser, bomb dump, high powered transmitter sites and non-ATC supported flying training). You should also note that the conditional status is for general planning purposes and does not override any specific existing agreements. There is still the option to tactically provide clearances between ATC units, as happens now. Generally, ATC will have a controlling component to most restricted airspace. Each restricted area will be clearly identified, and if ATC is operating, they will advise you if transit is available or not. Read the NOTAM conditional status carefully, and plan accordingly. If you cannot determine the area's conditional status, then treat it as if it is an RA3 and avoid the area. Temporary restricted areas and airspace reservations The above proposal works equally well for temporary restricted areas (TRAs) as it does for standard restricted areas. You would find any additional information regarding TRAs in the body of the NOTAM, or in the AIPSUP. Flexibility comes at a price Defence is concerned about an increased risk of airspace infringements following these changes, and so is working with CASA on implementing a wide communication campaign on the changes. CASA's network of safety advisors will assist industry during the course of their ongoing AvSafety seminar program. Be responsible and be informed, so that you can take advantage of the changes on offer. Ultimately this comes down (again) to reading your NOTAMs. The reform design has made the transparency of restricted air space more user friendly and thus building the situational awareness of all airspace users. Again, if you have any doubt, stay out! These reforms provide more transparency of when airspace can be shared use, or exclusive use, and also provide a degree of certainty to enable civil aviation to plan more effectively. They are part of an attempt to be more realistic about Defence’s ability to take advantage of airspace at short notice, and place certain responsibilities on Defence in the event of unplanned, short notice activation. The options proposed do not change Defence’s current airspace usage or limit its options. The proposal is also not solely for Defence-managed restricted airspace; it is applicable to any volume of restricted airspace, regardless of who manages it. If you would like further information about these changes, please contact the Office of Airspace Regulation at CASA. Look and learn: eye surgery 62 FSA NOV-DEC10 The eye has two components that focus, or refract, light onto the retina. They are the cornea and lens. About two thirds of this refraction is done by the cornea and one third by the lens. Myopia (short-sightedness) occurs when light rays are focused in front of the retina. Traditionally these conditions have been managed by visual correction with spectacles or contact lenses. Hyperopia (far-sightedness) occurs when light rays are focused on a point behind the retina. Several laser and non-laser refractive surgical procedures have been developed to modify the shape of the cornea and correct myopia, hyperopia, astigmatism and presbyopia, with the aim of dispensing with the requirement for the use of visual correction via spectacles or contacts. Astigmatism is when there is a differential focusing of light passing through different part of the cornea. Presbyopia is the inability to focus accurately on near objects. The main ones are: photorefractive keratectomy (PRK); laser-assisted, in-situ keratomileusis (LASIK); and laser-assisted sub-epithelial keratomileusis (LASEK). In these procedures, an excimer laser, which disrupts the surface bonds of organic material, rather than cutting or burning it, ablates or removes the front part of the cornea’s stroma (framework) connective tissue. The main difference between PRK and LASIK is that LASIK creates a corneal flap before the excimer laser reshapes the cornea. In PRK, the central portion of the thin outer layer of the cornea (the epithelium) is removed from the eye, usually after being loosened with a dilute alcohol solution. The excimer laser treatment is then applied to the underlying corneal tissue (the stroma) to reshape the eye. After the laser treatment, the cornea is covered with a bandage contact lens. Within days, new epithelial cells grow back and the bandage contact is removed. Another technique falls between PRK and LASIK: laserassisted sub-epithelial keratomileusis (LASEK) also known as Epi-LASEK. It cuts a fine flap of 50 microns thickness (as opposed to 100-180 microns in LASIK) and the patient’s original epithelial sheet is repositioned onto the stromal bed after laser ablation. The main difference between LASIK and LASEK is the thickness of the flap, which includes corneal stroma tissue in LASIK, and epithelial tissue only, in LASEK. In LASIK, the excimer laser ablation is done under a partial-thickness lamellar corneal flap. A microkeratome (a precision surgical instrument with an oscillating blade) creates the flap, or a femtosecond laser (that uses pulses of a tenth of a billionth of a second, or shorter) can create a much more uniform flap giving better quality of vision. A hinge is left at one end of the flap, and the flap is folded back, allowing access to the corneal stroma. The excimer laser is then used to re-model the stroma. Once the ablation is completed, the corneal flap is repositioned. There are possible risks of flap-related complications such as wrinkles, epithelial in-growth under the flap, debris, folds, buttonhole and diffuse lamellar keratitis. LASIK is also more likely to produce higher-order aberrations such as starbursts, ghosting, halos, night vision disturbance and double vision. This is no longer the case in the latest versions of LASIK using a femtosecond laser and a wavefront-guided ablation laser that ablates the cornea more accurately. And what does all this mean for the pilot? For more information These guides to laser surgery from Australian providers discuss suitability, expectations and possible complications for people considering the procedure. Is LASIK Suitable For Me? www.healthnetwork.com.au/skin-beauty/lasik-eyesurgery.asp A detailed guide on the risks of lasik surgery. www.lasik-eye-surgery-info.com.au/content-pages. php?PageID=884 CHOICE survey of members’ experience with eye surgery. www.choice.com.au/Reviews-and-Tests/Food-andHealth/General-health/Therapies/Laser-eye-surgery Risks and complications of laser eye surgery. An online guide from an Australia laser surgery consortium. www.lasik.com.au/Expectations/Risks.aspx 63 EYE SURGERY This leads to a wound-healing response that might result in greater stromal haze and scarring then in LASIK. Recovery is slower and more painful than LASIK, and because of this, PRK is now largely an historical technique. Compared with PRK and LASEK, LASIK results in earlier and faster improvement of vision with minimal postoperative discomfort, improved stability and predictability. Refractive Eye Surgery and the Aviator Dr David Fitzgerald from CASA Aviation Medicine takes a close look at trends in eye surgery, and their implications for pilots. FSA NOV-DEC10 64 For almost as long as there have been aircraft it’s been accepted that the pilots who fly them must have sharp distance vision. An Australian Flying Corps recruiting advertisement from 1916 called for volunteers with ‘a sound heart and good eyesight’1. Vision standards for pilots are still high, but the good news is that, in the words of the Designated Aviation Medical Examiner's Handbook, ‘CASA has not placed restrictions on applicants who require high levels of correction in order to meet the required visual standards. CASA considers the ability to meet the standard is all that is required, regardless of the power of corrective lenses necessary to achieve this outcome.’ But not every pilot wants to fly with spectacles, which can be dropped, or broken, and bring unavoidable visual distortions; or contact lenses, which can be uncomfortable, particularly in the dry air of a pressurised flight deck at high altitude. Refractive eye surgery is a recent way of achieving acute vision without the need for corrective lenses of any type. Since the first vision correction operations in the late 1980s, refractive eye surgery has become hugely popular, so much so that DAMEs are encountering many existing and prospective pilots who have either undergone the surgery, or are considering it. CASA recently conducted a review of the aviation implications of refractive surgery with the help of aviation ophthalmologists and the Australian College of Optometry. For some years, the certification management of aircrew who have had refractive surgery has been fairly liberal. Reports have generally been sought from treating ophthalmologists; however, specific examination of aviation-specific visual function has not generally been a focus. When CASA reviewed overseas regulators’ practices we found that, in general, most do not allow certification until three months after the procedure. The particularly significant consequences for flight safety regarding night flight and flight in low contrast situations have led CASA to require testing of contrast sensitivity function before certification. Ongoing impairment of low contrast acuity in some applicants may bar them from flying at night or in instrument conditions. Following CASA’s review, the following guidelines for certification were developed. The main aeromedical issues surrounding refractive surgery include: 1. Post-operative recovery time 2. Complications of surgery 3. Effect on glare and contrast sensitivity, and therefore night visual function 4. Ongoing gradual myopic deterioration and long-term effects. CASA recommends a minimum four weeks’ grounding after the operation, although up to three months would not be excessive. (Ophthalmologists say most recreational activities are not recommended for at least four weeks). ... loss of sharpness at certain times of day or night In terms of post-operative screening for complications – a report from the treating ophthalmologist is suggested before being cleared back to flight, detailing: If it’s less than 12 weeks after surgery, diurnal variation of refraction (loss of sharpness at certain times of day or night) over two weeks needs to be tested and reports provided Pre-operative visual acuity and dioptres Size of the pupil and ablation zone Post-operative visual acuity and dioptres Results of an objective test of mesopic contrast sensitivity, which relates to vision in outdoor night-time or street-lit settings. (Results and methods for this are to be provided). No particular test or method is preferred – there are a number of different tests to measure contrast sensitivity. Ophthalmological examination for haze or other abnormalities Noting any other issues. If abnormalities of mesopic contrast sensitivity, haze or halos are noted, the medical certificate will be restricted as not valid for night flying until such issues have resolved. In follow-up, the aviation medical should be able to screen for myopic deterioration in the case of good results, but detailed ophthalmological review may be required for difficult cases after one or two years, and an ophthalmological review will be required for all applicants a year after surgery. Postoperative issues Stability of visual acuity It takes up to three months post surgery for the visual acuity to stabilise2. Acutely, there is some evidence that the effect of hypoxia may lead to some corneal expansion and flattening, leading to hyperopic shift 3. There is also evidence that in the 12 months after surgery, there is some continuing regression of visual acuity back towards the original myopia. Dry eye Dry eye is the most common issue post refractive surgery (in up to 48 per cent of patients4) due to the disruption of corneal nerves and resulting decreased tear production. It is usually rectified by the use of artificial tears, or in more severe cases by surgically blocking the lachrymal punctum duct that drains tears from the eye. In the low humidity at high altitude, dry eye is already a problem for even the normal eye – and further impairment of tear production due to eye surgery is potentially especially problematic for pilots. Flap displacement The flap created in the cornea in Lasik surgery heals by normal wound healing processes such as collagen deposition, and this can be quite slow to reach its full strength. As a result, the flap is subject to slippage in the first few days or weeks, after surgery. This can happen several months after surgery and could be caused by such minimal trauma as eye rubbing. It is generally suggested, therefore, that patients avoid contact sports or trauma for at least four weeks after surgery. Glare and halos – night vision disturbance Glare disability and halos may be produced after refractive surgery. Glare disability, image degradation and loss of contrast sensitivity are problems that may occur in individuals who have otherwise excellent vision during the day5. These symptoms are most noticeable at night, or in low ambient light, when the pupil dilates and more light rays enter the eye through the untreated peripheral cornea, particularly if the area of treatment is small or the pupils large. One reason why these changes may not be as apparent in daylight is that in daylight, the pupils are very small. Corneal scars or haze can also cause intraocular light scattering. This has significant ramifications for aircrew flying at night or in conditions of low ambient visibility such as in IMC. Where flight in VFR day conditions may not be associated with notable visual dysfunction, flight at night or in poor light may result in unacceptable loss of visual acuity or image degradation in the form of halos or starbursts from runway lights and beacons. To sum up: refractive surgery is becoming an increasingly common and effective way of correcting for myopia and avoiding the use of spectacles or contact lenses. However, there are some possible significant ramifications for pilots who undergo such surgery. Any decision to have refractive surgery should be one made in conjunction with the treating ophthalmologist and should be made after weighing up the benefits and risks of such a procedure. Return to flying after surgery may take up to three months, or even longer, and unimpaired contrast sensitivity is required before flying at night or in low ambient light conditions. It may be prudent to determine which ophthalmologist or optometrist can conduct the contrast sensitivity test in your area before surgery, as not all practitioners routinely test this. 1 2 3 4 5 ‘Unconscious of any distinction?’ Social and vocational quality in the Australian Flying Corps, 1914–1918 Michael Molkentin Journal of the Australian War Memorial No 40 January 2007 Clinical Ophthalmology 2010:4 455–458 Ophthalmic Research; 2000: 32, (1); 32-40 American Journal of Ophthalmology 2006: 141:733–739 Surv Ophthalmol 2002: 47 (6) 2002 65 EYE SURGERY For monovision-corrected refractive surgery, (where one eye is corrected for near vision and the other eye is corrected for distance vision) visual correction should still be worn to meet the distance visual standards. Pilots would be wise to avoid aerobatics or high G manoeuvres in the postoperative period. 1. 5. 2. The ‘leans’ is a condition encountered in instrument flying which is initiated where (a) strong northerly winds over southern Australia. (a) a rate of roll is below the threshold of detection by the vestibular system. (b) strong south westerly winds over southern Australia. (b) a low rate of yaw is not detected by the vestibular system. (c) strong westerly winds over southern Australia. (c) an inexperienced pilot attempts to keep the head vertical during a turn. (d) a col resulting in light and variable winds between the two systems. 66 FSA NOV-DEC10 When a low-pressure system is present over the Tasman Sea and a there is a high pressure system over the Bight the two systems combine to produce: When a pilot discovers a defect in an aircraft, details of the defect should be noted in the column of the maintenance release document headed: (d) longitudinal acceleration is mistaken for a descent. 6. When tracking north in a westerly wind the balance ball (a) will be slightly to the left and left drift will be experienced. (a) ‘Maintenance Required’. (b) will be slightly to the left and right drift will be experienced. (b) ‘Endorsements’. (c) should be centred and right drift will be experienced. (c) ‘Daily Inspection’. (d) should be centred and left drift will be experienced. (d) ‘Permitted Unserviceability’. 7. 3. As the water vapour in the atmosphere increases, the density of the air (a) either on the ground or airborne and will result in yaw to the right. (a) decreases. (b) either on the ground or airborne and will result in yaw to the left. (b) increases. (c) remains the same. (c) only when on the ground and will result in turn to the right. (d) increases until precipitation occurs. 4. A possible cause of relatively sudden incapacitation of a flight crew is (a) chronic fatigue. (b) heatstroke. (c) dehydration. (d) food poisoning. During a landing with a right crosswind, ‘weathercocking’ can occur (d) only on the ground and will result in turn to the left. 8. You wish to steer a heading of 120(m) and notice on the compass deviation card ‘FOR 120 STEER 124’. To correct for the compass deviation you should set the directional gyro to (a) 124 (m) when the magnetic compass indicates 120 (c). (b) 124 (c) when the magnetic compass indicates 120 (m). (c) 120 (c) when the magnetic compass indicates 124 (m). (d) 120 (m) when the magnetic compass indicates 124 (c). 9. Unstable atmospheres are associated with (a) cumuliform clouds and large temperature lapse rates. (b) cumuliform clouds and small temperature lapse rates. (c) stratiform clouds and large temperature lapse rates. (d) stratiform clouds and small temperature lapse rates. 10. If the aerodrome elevation was 300ft and with 1013 HPA set on an altimeter subscale, the altimeter reading was zero when the aircraft was on the ground, the QNH would be (a) 1023 and the pressure height would be zero feet. (b) 1023 and the pressure height would be 300ft. (c) 1013 and the pressure height would be zero feet. (d) 1003 and the airfield pressure height would be 300ft. (d) is not influenced by outside magnetic fields. 1. ‘Washout’ refers to a design feature where the angle of incidence of the wing (a) AN834-4. (b) increases towards the tips and is adjustable on some aircraft. (b) AN834-4D. (c) reduces towards the tips and is not adjustable. (d) AN837-4D. 6. (a) is not regarded as a suspected unapproved part, but should be reported via the defect reporting program. (c) 50 per cent to useful work. (b) 75 per cent to useful work. 7. (a) coarser pitch, which would have a tendency to increase RPM. (b) coarser pitch, which would have a tendency to decrease RPM. When an airworthiness directive from a foreign state requires information to be sent back to the Nation Airworthiness Authority (NAA) of that state, the required information (c) finer pitch, which would have a tendency to increase RPM. (d) finer pitch, which would have a tendency to decrease RPM. (a) should be submitted via CASA only. (b) should be submitted only to the NAA. (c) should be submitted to the NAA and copied to CASA. (d) need not be submitted to either airworthiness authority since the foreign NAA only controls aircraft in its own state. A starter-generator on a turboprop engine acts as a (a) series motor during engine start, and a shunt or compound generator during running. (b) series motor during engine start, and a series generator during normal engine running. (c) shunt motor during engine start, and a shunt or compound generator during normal running. (d) shunt motor during engine start, and a shunt generator during normal running. On a propeller, the centrifugal twisting moment tries to change the blades to 8. A constant displacement oil pump delivers (a) a constant volume per revolution, and therefore requires a pressure relief valve on the suction side. (b) a constant volume per revolution, and therefore requires a pressure relief valve on the delivery side. (c) a constant pressure, and therefore does not require a pressure relief valve on the delivery side. (d) a constant pressure, and therefore requires a pressure relief valve on the delivery side. QUIZ (d) 30 per cent to useful work. (d) is regarded as a suspected unapproved part and should be the subject of a suspected unapproved part (SUP) report. 4. Of the energy released from fuel, a typical piston aircraft engine converts approximately (a) 80 per cent to useful work. (c) is regarded as a suspected unapproved part and should be reported via the defect reporting program. 67 (c) AN837-4. A particular part, manufactured by an approved source, which has been determined to depart from the type design (b) is not regarded as a suspected unapproved part and is not necessarily required to be reported. 3. A standard hardware designation for a ¼in elbow, 45 degree, flared tube, steel is (a) increases towards the tips and is not adjustable. (d) reduces towards the tips and is adjustable on some aircraft. 2. 5. 9. Filters are some times rated in microns. A micron is approximately (a) 0.003,937 in. (b) 0.000,393 in. (c) 0.000,039 in. (d) 0.000,003 in. 10. An active clearance control in a jet engine increases the efficiency by directing cooling air (a) to the turbine stator vanes to reduce tip clearance. (b) to the outside of the turbine casing to reduce tip clearance. (c) into the labyrinth seal to reduce leakage. (d) into the turbine blades to maintain stable operating temperatures at the tips. GPS arrival and GNSS RNAV FSA NOV-DEC10 68 You are inbound to Shepparton (YSHT) Victoria in a category B aircraft tracking along W477 (refer TAC -3), currently passing 6500 on descent and in cloud. You have copied the current AWIS, part of which reads ‘... wind 360/05, QNH 1005, cloud BKN 009, visibility 4000m.’ Your aircraft is equipped with a TSO 129 approach approved GNSS, current database and you are qualified and current. At 3 GPS to run in cloud you lose the Morse identifier of the SHT NDB, and the ADF needle wanders. 4. What action must you now take? (a) Continue descent to MDA using GPS alone to provide tracking data. (b) Execute the missed approach, tracking 008 and climbing to 1900ft, the 25nm M.S.A. The following questions relate to the instrument approaches available into YSHT, dated 28th Aug 2008 and 28 Aug 2010. (c) Continue at the present altitude when the NDB failed, using the GPS to provide tracking data. 1. (d) Execute the missed approach, tracking 243 and climbing to 3800ft, the 25nm MSA. Based on the current AWIS, you elect to conduct the GPS arrival (RAIM available). Passing 25 GPS SHT, what altitude may you descend to? (a) 3800ft. (b) 1900ft. You have conducted the missed approach, currently at 5 GPS north, north east of YSHT on a heading of 010m, and levelling at 3800ft. You now elect to conduct the GNSS RNAV approach runway 18. (c) 2800ft. (d) 3000ft. 2. 3. 5. Passing 9 GPS what altitude may you now descend to, and what is the speed range applicable at this distance? Which of the following IAFs would be the most expedient to track to, and how would this be expressed in the radio call to advise Melbourne Centre. (a) 1600ft, 120 to 180kt. (a) SHT ND, expressed as ‘Sierra Hotel Tango November Delta’. (b) 2000ft, 120 to 180kt. (b) SHT ND, expressed as ‘November Delta’. (c) 1600ft, 85 to 130kt. (c) SHT NI expressed as ‘Shepparton November India’. (d) 2800ft, 120 to 180kt. (d) SHT ND, expressed as ‘Shepparton November Delta’. When may you descend to MDA, and what is this minima? (a) After passing 5 GPS, MDA is 930ft on QNH/2.4km visibility. (b) After passing 4 GPS, MDA is 930ft on QNH/2.4km visibility. You load and activate the appropriate GNSS RNAV approach. Having then done a RAIM prediction, you find there are no outages. 6. What scaling ‘mode’ will the GPS unit be in, and what is the scale if this is the navigation presentation: (c) After passing 4 GPS, MDA is 1030ft on QNH/2.4km visibility. V (d) After passing 5 GPS, MDA is 1030ft on QNH/2.4km visibility. (a) ‘Terminal’ mode. 1 ‘Dot’ equals 1nm. (b) ‘Terminal’ mode. 1 ‘Dot’ equals 0.3nm. (c) ‘Terminal’ mode. 1 ‘Dot’ equals 0.2nm. (d) ‘Approach Active’ mode. 1 ‘Dot’ equals 0.06nm. Your heading is now 020m, altitude 3800, approaching the IAF ‘SHTND’. 7. Which of the following is correct concerning the ‘capture region’ to be able to go in to the approach? 9. What will be this MDA for the approach? (a) The aircraft is within the 70° capture region and thus can go straight into the approach on a track of 249. (a) 1030ft/2.4km. (b) The aircraft is not within 30° of the initial approach track of 249 and thus cannot go straight in to the approach. Manoeuvring is necessary. (c) 880ft/2.8km. (c) The aircraft is not within the 180° capture region and thus cannot go straight into the approach on a track of 249. Manoeuvring is necessary. (d) Because the aircraft is not within the capture region at ‘SHTND’, you should track to ‘SHTNC’ where a published sector entry can be flown to position for the approach. Inbound on the approach, having passed ‘SHTNI’ using the turn anticipation and established on a track of 179 you descend toward ‘SHTNF’. 8. You consider the MDA for circling having regard to no AWIS for the last 20 minutes when the SHT NDB failed. You set the YSHT TAF QNH. In order for the GPS to achieve its final scaling (approach active) what parameters must be met, and what is the scaling? (a) The aircraft must simply be positioned at ‘SHTNF’ and the scaling automatically becomes ±0.3nm. (b) 930ft/2.4km. (d) 780ft/2.8km. (e) 1080ft/2.4km. The MAPT is at 0.2nm from the threshold. 10. Which of the following is correct concerning the missed approach procedure? (a) Priority one is establish the climb, then turn right, tracking to ‘SHTNH’, climbing to 1900ft. (b) Select ‘SHTNT’ for track guidance then initiate climb to 1900ft. At ‘SHTNT’ turn right, tracking to ‘SHTNH’. (c) Priority one is establish the climb, then resequence the GPS to track 179 to ‘SHTNT’, climbing to 1900ft. At ‘SHTNT’, turn right and track to ‘SHTNH’. (d) Priority one is establish the climb, and continue tracking 179 to ‘SHTNT’ since the GPS has automatically sequenced to this waypoint, climbing to 1900ft. (b) The aircraft is positioned at ‘SHTNF’. The scaling remains at ±1.0nm. 69 (c) The aircraft is at ‘SHTNF’, in sequencing mode, RAIM is available and the scaling becomes ±0.3nm. (d) The aircraft is within 2nm of ‘SHTNF’ in sequencing mode, the HDG is toward the FAF, RAIM is available and the scaling becomes ±0.3nm. QUIZ Invest wisely in your CIR training with Peter BINI ADVANCED FLIGHT TRAINING When it comes time for you to invest in your Command Instrument Rating, you need to know your investment is spent wisely. Peter Bini Advanced Flight Training has been teaching and successfully producing quality pilots for over 30 years. :LWKRYHUKRXUVRIÀ\LQJH[SHULHQFH&),6WHYH3HDUFH and his team of instructors not only teach what is required, but DOVRHQVXUH\RXEHQH¿WIURPWKHLUSUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJH Invest in pearls of wisdom, not just the basics. )RUDVKRUWWLPHRQO\ZH¶UHRIIHULQJRIIWKHWRWDOFRVWRID%DURQHQGRUVHPHQW Conditions apply, so call our friendly staff for details. 3KRQH(PDLOLQIR#ELQLÀLJKWWUDLQLQJFRPDX CALENDAR 2010 S M T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 november z Flight Safety Foundation International Air Safety Seminar 2010 7-12 zCivil Air Navigation Services Organisation Global Safety Seminar 9 Regional Airspace and Procedures Advisory Committee 10-11 z Business Aviation Safety Seminar-Asia 2-5 13 S 5 12 19 26 M T 6 7 13 14 20 21 27 28 W T F S 1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 15 16 17 18 22 23 24 25 29 30 31 z Open day Civil Aviation Airways Museum & opening of new photographic display featuring the Aviation Rescue & Fire Fighting Service Milan Marriott Hotel, Italy Singapore http://flightsafety.org Brisbane www.casa.gov.au www.canso.org Singapore Aviation http://flightsafety.org Academy, Changi Village, Singapore Essendon Melbourne www.airwaysmuseum.com or Roger Meyer 03 9818 4950 Phil Vabre 03 9432 9287 december 7-9 8-9 9 24 z HFACS Workshop: Managing Human Error in Complex Systems z Fourth EASA Rotorcraft Symposium z Human Factors in Transport 2010 Las Vegas, US www.hfacs.com Cologne, Germany Crowne Plaza, Darling Harbour, Sydney easa.europa.eu www.informa.com.au CASA offices close for Christmas/ New Year break www.casa.gov.au FSA NOV-DEC10 70 S M T W T F 2 9 16 23 30 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 17 18 19 20 21 24 25 26 27 28 31 S M S 1 8 15 22 29 T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2011 S M 6 7 13 14 20 21 27 28 T W T F S 1 2 3 4 5 8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 18 19 22 23 24 25 26 29 30 31 january 4 7-10 CASA offices re-open after Christmas/ New Year break z Great Eastern Fly-in www.casa.gov.au Evans Head www.greateasternflyin.com Houston, Texas, US www.quaynote.com Avalon Hotel Tivoli Lisboa, Lisbon, Portugal www.airshow.net.au http://flightsafety.org Deniliquin Fremantle, WA David McPherson 03 5881 3991 www.fatigueconference2011.com.au Hotel Realm, Canberra www.informa.com.au february 8-9 z Tackling Kidnapping, Hostage-taking and Hijacking conference march 1-6 zAustralian International Airshow 15-17 z 22nd annual European Aviation Safety Seminar 2010 19-20 z Disabled Pilots fly-in 21-24 z 8th International conference on managing fatigue in transportation, resources and health 29-30 z Asia-Pacific AVSEC 2011 aviation security conference KEY: CASA events z Other organisations' events z $23$1DWLRQDO$LUÀHOG 'LUHFWRU\ 1RZDYDLODEOH H 7KH$23$1DWLRQDO$LU¿HOG'LUHFWRU\ LVQRZLQVWRFN 0/11 )LUVWSXEOLVKHG\HDUVDJRWKH1DWLRQDO$LU¿HOG'LUHFWRU\LV WKHRQO\FRPSUHKHQVLYHFROODWLRQRISODFHVWRODQGDQDLUFUDIW DFURVV$XVWUDOLDEHLW\RXU%HHFKFUDIWRU\RXU%RHLQJ,W JLYHVYLWDOLQIRUPDWLRQWRDLGVDIHHI¿FLHQWÀLJKWSODQQLQJE\ DYLDWRUVWUDYHUVLQJWKHFRQWLQHQW Log on to www.aopa.com.au DnG KHDG to tKH µ,nIoUPDtLon &HntUH¶ to GoZnOoDG \oXU oUGHU IoUP DnG VHnG Lt Ln to tKH oI¿FH E\ SoVt HPDLO oU ID[ to VHFXUH \oXU FoS\ National $iU¿HlG 'iUHFtoU\ 201 Aircraft O RRP $6 wners and Pi 5 lots 71 Associ ation of Austra lia Ph: 02 9791 9099 Email: [email protected] u Web: www.aopa.com.au QUIZ ANSWERS QUIZ ANSWERS Flying Ops IFR Operations Maintenance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 1 2 (d) (a) 3 (b) 4 (b) 5 6 (d) (c) 7 8 (c) (d) 1. (d) 2. (a) unapproved parts CAAP 51-2 3. (a) AC 39-01 and CASA 39.005 4. (a) 5. (c) 6. (d) 7. (c) 8. (b) 9. (c) one millionth of a metre. 10. (b) 9 (a) (b) (b) (a) (d) (a) (c) (c) (d) the DG should indicate the magnetic heading. When this is 220 (m) this particular compass will indicate 224 (c). 9. (a) 10. (a) 10 (c) YSHT GPS arrival plate. YSHT GPS arrival plate. AIP ENR 1.5-11 Para 1.15.1. YSHT GPS arrival plate. AIP ENR 1.5-30 Para 5.3.2. YSHT GPS arrival plate. AIP ENR 1.5-43 Para 13.2.2. D. YSHT RNAV RWY 18 approach plate. This is typical terminology. Check the handbook for the GPS equipment concerned. AIP ENR 1.5-15 Para 2.4.1 C. These are the typical criteria. Check the handbook for the GPS equipment concerned. YSHT RNAV RWY 18 approach plate. AIP ENR 1.5-30 Para 5.3.2. Note: add 50ft only if using area QNH. YSHT RNAV RWY 18 approach plate. FSA NOV-DEC10 72 The Guild of Air Pilots & Air Navigators (GAPAN) Griffith University Applications are invited for the 2011 scholarship, established to promote aviation management excellence. 2011 Aviation Management Scholarship One scholarship will be awarded. This will cover tuition fees at Griffith University for either the Bachelor of Aviation Management, the Graduate Certificate in Aviation Management or the Master of Aviation Management. For further details and an application form, email [email protected] Applications close 28 January 2011. flightsafety … essent essential t ial aviation reading INSIDE JAN-FEB 2011 Maintenance special: Ageing aircraft update The new maintenance regulations The 2005 Grumman Mallard crash And … more close calls OnTrack Ca Lau irns, nce Cam b s to n c ridge om ing and soo n TRY BEFORE YOU FLY! OnTrack is the industry’s newest interactive flight planning tool available on the CASA website. Using video, audio, pop-up alerts and text, OnTrack helps brief pilots on how to operate in and around controlled airspace and avoid dreaded airspace infringements. OnTrack features interactive maps with added visual terminal chart (VTC) information, plus video guides on how to fly inbound and outbound tracks into newly-designated Class D aerodromes. You will be able to navigate around airspace boundaries, VFR routes, VFR/ Class D reporting points and military control zones – and do so safely before you take off to fly for real. REMEMBER to plan your route thoroughly, and carry current charts and documents. Always check ERSA, NOTAMs and the weather BEFORE you fly. For more information please visit our website www.casa.gov.au/ontrack ;OLYLOHZUL]LYILLUHIL[[LY[PTL [VIL^P[ONVVKWLVWSL *RRGSHRSOHWREHZLWK 8),0UZ\YHUJL(\Z[YHSPH3PTP[LK()5! (-:3PJLUJL5V *VU[HJ[KL[HPSZMVY`V\HUK`V\YIYVRLY! 4LSIV\YUL7O! :`KUL`7O! )YPZIHUL7O! (KLSHPKL7O!
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