Flight Safety Australia Magazine - May/ June 2010

Flight Safety Australia Magazine - May/ June 2010
‘There’s a change in the air.’
3 June 2010 airspace changes
May-Jun 2010
Issue 74
‘Safety, service
and security’
The role of cabin crew
‘The wiring evolution.’
Wiring and ageing aircraft.
And ... more
Close calls
‘Be heard, be seen, be safe.’
Operations at non-towered aerodromes
Australian Aircraft Airworthiness
& Sustainment Conference
17-19 August 2010
Brisbane Convention
and Exhibition Centre
...from both the military
aerospace communities,
to share their knowledge,
experience, ideas and
technologies relating to
platform sustainment.
The Conference covers all aspects of Sustainment, including Fleet
Management, Avionics & Wiring Systems, Mechanical Systems,
Structures & Corrosion, Propulsion, Publications, Software Supportability,
Workforce Capability, Ageing Materials, Spares, Logistics, Supply Chain
Design, Support Equipment, Crashworthiness, Condition Monitoring,
Obsolescence and Knowledge Retention.
Note that the Conference title has changed from its former “ageing
all airworthiness and sustainability issues on platforms, both new and
old. The name also matches that of the renamed US event (formerly
relationship with our US colleagues. Representatives from our US
fraternity will attend as guest speakers.
government, defence, industry and academia alike. By becoming
involved, whether as a speaker, discussion participant or simply
networking with other members of the aerospace community, you are
Please see website below for key dates and registration details.
Enquiries: Event Co-ordinator: Ph: 07 3299 4488
ISSUE NO. 74, MAY-JUN 2010
John McCormick
Gail Sambidge-Mitchell
Margo Marchbank
Robert Wilson
P: 131 757 or E: [email protected]
Flight Safety Australia
GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601
P: 131 757 F: 02 6217 1950
E: [email protected]
W: www.casa.gov.au
To change your address online, go to
For address-change enquiries,
call CASA on 1300 737 032
Bi-monthly to 87,000 aviation licence
holders, cabin crew and industry personnel
in Australia and internationally.
Stories and photos are welcome. Please
discuss your ideas with editorial staff before
submission. Note that CASA cannot accept
responsibility for unsolicited material.
All efforts are made to ensure that the correct
copyright notice accompanies each published
photograph. If you believe any to be in error,
please notify us at [email protected]
‘A change in the air’
Essential reading about the transition to Class D airspace.
20 ‘Be heard, be seen, be safe
The rules have also changed for non-towered aerodromes.
24 ‘Service, safety and security’
The unspoken but vital role of alert cabin crew and check–in staff.
29 ‘The wiring evolution’
These examples of degraded aircraft electrics are Darwinian indeed.
37 ‘Don’t play it again Sam’
Aircraft defects should not be recurring nightmares.
42 ‘Part 90 and the AD General series’
Tidying up the regulation of aircraft maintenance.
58 ‘Don’t sweat and forget’
Drinking up before you take-off to make your flight safer and more fun.
62 ‘Low flight, high risk’
The dangers of low flying.
64 ‘Manning UAS’
UAVs may be unmanned, but they still need pilots. DESIGN & PRODUCTION
Spectrum Graphics – www.sg.com.au
IPMG (Independent Print Media Group)
Advertising appearing in Flight Safety
Australia does not imply endorsement by
the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
Warning: This educational publication
does not replace ERSA, AIP, airworthiness
regulatory documents, manufacturers’
advice, or NOTAMs. Operational
information in Flight Safety Australia should
only be used in conjunction with current
operational documents.
Information contained herein is subject
to change. The views expressed in this
publication are those of the authors, and do
not necessarily represent the views of the
Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
© Copyright 2010, Civil Aviation Safety
Authority Australia.
2 Flight Bytes–aviation safety news
16 ATC Notes– news from Airservices
18 Accident reports– International
19 Accident reports– Australian
31 Airworthiness pull-out section
44 Close Calls
45 ’A brief shining moment’
46 ‘Faith no more
48 ‘Locked into error’
50 ‘The amazing flying bathtub’
ATSB supplement
Av Quiz
Quiz answers
Copyright for the ATSB and ATC
supplements rests with the ATSB and
Australia respectively– these supplements
are written, edited and designed
independently of CASA. All requests for
permission to reproduce any articles
should be directed to FSA editorial (see
correspondence details above).
Registered–Print Post: 381667-00644.
ISSN 1325-5002.
COVER: Spectrum Graphics
Photo: Dreamstime
39. Directives
Flying Boats on
�e Clarence
����� ���� �����
������ ���� ����
���� ��������� �������
�������� ����
�� ���� ������������� ����
The last issue of Flight Safety Australia (March-April 2010,
p. 4) included an item on emergency locator transmitters
(ELTs). CASA would like to clarify that the terminology
used in CASA regulations refers to ELTs [i.e. a fixed ELT
installed in an aircraft), and portable ELTs (i.e. emergency
position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) and personal
locator beacons (PLBs)]. This terminology is different to
that used by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(AMSA)—the term ‘portable ELT’ is unique to CASA
������� ���
����������������� ����
���������������� ���
The article stated that upon registering a 406MHz ELT with
AMSA, a registration label would be sent by AMSA to fix to
the beacon. CASA has been advised that AMSA only send
the registered operator a label if the beacon is an EPIRB or
PLB. AMSA do not send the registered operator of a fixed
ELT a label. However, AMSA does send a letter or email
confirming registration of a fixed ELT.
74 minutes (approx)
includes postage
& handling*
*within Australia
A DVD for anyone who has ever been touched
by the magic of flying. It is a must see journey
for those interested in the history of Australian
aviation. The DVD provides a fascinating account
of the rise and fall of the little known flying boat
airline, Trans Oceanic Airways and the ships that
flew on the Clarence River at Grafton in New
South Wales.
Produced by
Innovators in Professional Pilot Training
2010 Course Dates
Commercial Pilot – CPL-A
Multi Engine Command
Instrument Rating (MECIR)
Flight Instructor Course
* Visit out website www.ftaus.com for full details.
Places are limited - to book phone
(07) 3715 4000 or email [email protected]
Queensland’s Largest Flight
Training Organisation
Owned & Managed By Airline Pilots
CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009
For aircraft with a fixed ELT installed,
CASA recommends that the device’s
registration letter or email is carried
in the aircraft’s flight manual.
come to be accepted as Australia’s
first controlled circling powered flight
when he flew near Diggers Rest,
Victoria, for about a minute.
‘The heavy impact with the ground
smashed the light undercarriage and
splintered the propeller into hundreds
of pieces.’
Over the coming months, CASA
inspectors will focus on compliance
with regulation 252A of the Civil
Aviation Regulations 1988 (CARs),
including checking that the ELT or
portable ELT required under the
regulation is registered with AMSA.
But historians disbelieve the claim
that Custance flew the Bleriot for
more than five minutes and landed
safely. This is for two reasons. First,
the main witness, the Bleriot’s owner,
Fred Jones, recanted the claim late in
his life, describing Custance’s reported
pre-dawn flight as a myth. Aviation
historians also strongly doubt whether
someone who had never flown before
could have piloted the tricky Bleriot for
five minutes in darkness.
Fred Custance was undoubtedly a
brave young man, who may not have
been the first to fly, but was among
the pioneers of Australian aviation.
He went on to serve in the Australian
Flying Corps in Palestine during World
War I.
First flight?
Custance did fly that day, but crashed
the Bleriot. The Adelaide Advertiser
reported: ‘unfortunately the aviator
made a mistake in manipulating the
elevating lever with the result that
the airship descended with great
pace.’ (Stodgy language, it seems,
was an immediately–established
characteristic of aviation reporting)
Further reading: The centenary
of powered flight in Australia;
the Royal Aeronautical Society
– Australian Division 2009
Your Aviation Theory Specialists
2010 Course Dates
28th Jun, 23 Aug, 18th Oct
CPL Theory
28th Jun, 16th Aug, 11th Oct
IREX Theory
2nd Aug
*All 7 subjects – individual subjects may be purchased, see website for details.
Places are limited - to book phone
(07) 3715 4000 or email [email protected]
Queensland’s Largest Flight
Training Organisation
Owned & Managed By Airline Pilots
CRICOS Provider code: 01208J RTO 32009
Single pilot capable  Low operating costs
 Simplicity of Garmin G1000 Avionics
 Short field performance
 Lower operating costs than a King Air
Options include HF, Traffic Advisory System, Chart View,
ADF, Port and antenna for Iridium sat phone,
40 cubic ft oxygen system
CONTACT Nick Jones +61 412 033 236
or [email protected] or visit
Aircraft Sales Maintenance Spare Parts Flight Operations Charter Services
This aircraft is offered subject to verification of the specification.
Aircraft is subject to prior sale or withdrawal from sale without prior notice.
Aeromil Pacific accepts no responsibility for any errors or omissions.
Who was first to fly in Australia?
That depends on how you define a
flight, and perhaps, on where you
live. Barracking for the local team
is an honoured Australian tradition
and some South Australian readers
have taken Flight Safety Australia to
task for neglecting to mention Fred
Custance’s reported flight in a Bleriot
XI monoplane on March 17, 1910. That
was the day before American escape
artist, Harry Houdini, made what has
He died in the South Australian desert
in 1922, aged 33, after his car broke
[email protected]
pilots gather
Roger Weeks, acting manager Flying
Standards Branch, said there had
been an impressive turnout.
CASA held its first balloon instructor
seminar in March. The event took
place in Canberra to coincide with the
Canberra Festival and accompanying
hot air ballooning events.
‘We had around 30 participants,
which included commercial balloon
instructors and those private
instructors operating through the
Australian Balloon Federation,’
he said.
‘Topics covered included principles
of learning, learning styles, oral
questioning, student debriefing and it
culminated in a role-playing briefing
The seminar was presented by
personnel from CASA’s flying training
& testing office. CASA’s balloon
specialists, Don Campbell and Julian
Smibert, also participated, along with
Jim Coyne and Rob Glenn representing
CASA’s sports aviation interface with
the ballooning federation.
Balloon festival Canberra 2010.
State of the Art, Two Place, Touring and Training Aircraft – Certified IFR (FAR Part
• Safety – robust modular design with incredible visibility
• Performance – advanced aerodynamics with high manoeuverability
• Comfort – 48” wide cockpit with huge baggage space
• Utility – Useful load after full fuel 192 kg
• Simplicity – FADEC Engine with digital engine monitoring display
• Economy – 132 knots cruise at 23 litres per hour, up to 500 nm range plus
• Affordability – low purchase price and low operating costs
Book a demonstration
flight now!
Call 0419 355 303
Contact Nigel Hutchinson–Brooks
Liberty Aircraft Company Pty Ltd A.C.N. 118 727 889
Tel 03 5662 5658 Fax 03 5662 5179
Email [email protected]
Details at www.libertyaircraft.com
FAA fines American
American Airlines has been hit with
over $US1 million of fines by the
US Federal Aviation Administration
for allegedly flying aircraft not
in compliance with maintenance
The FAA levied a $US787,500
($A860,000) fine against American
$US300,000 ($A327,000) when
another series of breaches emerged.
The FAA said breaches included
operating a McDonnell Douglas MD82 on 10 flights before replacing a
faulty air data computer. The agency
said flight crews had been ‘led to
believe’ that both air data computers
were working properly.
The FAA also proposed a $US1.5
million ($A1.64 million) fine against
Northwest Airlines which admitted
not inspecting the flight deck window
heating wires of its Boeing 757s for
17 years, after an error was made in
a company maintenance manual.
Writing the book
on firefighting
Aerial firefighting has developed
into a significant general aviation
business, but until now has had
no agreed set of procedures and
practices. Now CASA, in conjunction
with the National Aerial Firefighting
Centre, is facilitating the production
of an Australian Aerial Firefighting
Operator’s Manual. It aims to provide
industry best practice procedures that
meet CASA’s regulatory requirements
and those of state fire authorities.
The process will help to standardise
industry procedures–vital in an
industry that uniquely in aviation
requires disparate operators to
work closely together in a high-risk
environment. It will also provide a
means for improving procedures as
a result of lessons learned.
The project plans to consult all
sections of the industry to ensure
that procedures are practical and
that operators have a strong say. The
manual will encompass fire-bombing,
spotting, insertion of firefighters and
incendiary dropping operations. Fire
authorities will require operators to
insert the manual in Part D of their
operations manual in time for the
season. and
For more fire
input into the project, email
[email protected]
In a second case, the FAA said
American had flown two Boeing 757s
which were meant to be grounded
for rudder inspections. Another MD-
82 was returned to service in May
2009 without completing a required
maintenance checklist, the FAA said.
A follow-up inspection of the plane’s
tail found loose fasteners and other
Hello Sunshine
On 3 June 2010, Maroochydore/Sunshine Coast Airport
will change its name to Sunshine Coast Airport.
Changes to take effect
The aerodrome name, tower callsign, meteorological
products such as forecasts etc, NOTAM, Airspace and Chart
titles will all change from Maroochydore to Sunshine Coast.
The ICAO location identifier will change from YBMC
to YBSU.
NAVAID identifiers (VOR, DME, NDB and RNAV (GNSS))
will change from MC to SU.
The IATA location identifier (MCY) will remain the
same, but the name will change from Maroochydore to
Sunshine Coast.
What you need to do
A call to the
aviation industry
CASA’s Safety Promotion seeks interested industry
members willing to take part in research to assist
in developing our aviation safety promotion products
and campaigns.
Please email [email protected] to register
your interest, providing your contact details and area of
expertise (e.g. airworthiness, human factors, flying training,
safety management). This will enable us to enlist your help in
developing safety promotion products that will contribute to
safe skies for all.
*CASA’s Safety Promotion branch develops a variety of campaign materials
and products, communicating regulatory reform & safety initiatives to industry.
Recent products include the Look out! DVD on situational awareness; the SMS
toolkit; and the campaign surrounding the transition from GAAP to Class D.
safe skies for all
The data elements being changed are used in a variety
of databases, documents and other information sources.
You should think about how the planned changes might
affect your information and data sources, and plan for
their timely amendment.
Further information
AIP Supplement H64/09 Aerodrome Name
Change Sunshine Coast Airport dated 14 Jan 10
Refer also to AIP documents including ERSA and DAP (or
similar documents from other information providers),
effective on 3 June 2010, which will be distributed in hard
copy via the normal amendment service and posted on
the Airservices Australia website early May 2010.
Sunshine Coast Airport:
Danny Eatock, Operations Manager
Tel: (07) 5453 1505
Email: [email protected]
Web: http://www.sunshinecoastairport.com.au
BA in biofuel venture
British Airways is to establish Europe’s first sustainable
jet-fuel plant and plans to use the low-carbon fuel to power
part of its fleet from 2014.
The new fuel will be derived from waste biomass and
manufactured in a state-of-the-art facility that can convert
a variety of waste materials, destined for landfill, into
aviation fuel.
to stall in a turn. He almost recovered but and crashed taillow and wings level into the river. Kindlemann, who like
the rest of the race pilots had completed an his underwater
evacuation training exercise the day before the crash, was
pulled from the water with only minor whiplash injuries.
The next race is in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on May 8 and 9.
The self-contained plant, likely to be sited in east London,
will convert 500,000 tonnes of waste per year into 73
million litres of green jet fuel through a process that offers
lifecycle greenhouse gas savings of up to 95 per cent
compared to fossil-fuel derived jet kerosene.
This volume of fuel would be more than twice the amount
required to make all of British Airways’ flights at nearby
London City Airport carbon-neutral.
BA says the fuel’s reduction in carbon emissions would be
the equivalent of taking 48,000 cars off the road per year.
The project will also generate 20MW of electricity a year
from renewable sources.
Australian air racer Matt Hall came second by 0.48 of a
second to Austrian Hannes Arch in the Perth round of the
Red Bull Air Race last month in Perth. The result moves
Hall up to fourth on the 2010 series ladder
The former RAAF Williamtown F/A-18 air combat instructor
said he had benefited from home crowd support. About
140,000 people watched the races over Perth’s Swan
River, organisers said.
‘This is what I have been looking forward to and aiming for
since I started in the Red Bull Air Race – a great performance
in front of my home crowd in Australia,’ Hall said.
‘My goal is always to improve in everything I do and here
at this race I improved almost every run. Hopefully when
I come back to Perth next year I can improve again and
go one better.’
Defending champion Englishman Paul Bonhomme placed
third to retain the series lead.
The Perth race will be remembered for the first crash
in the series’s seven-year history. Practising in squally
conditions, Brazilian pilot Adilson Kindlemann appeared
British Airways has signed a letter of intent to purchase all
the fuel produced by the plant, which will be built by the
Solena Group, a US bio-energy and biofuels company.
– 3 JUNE
Once upon a time general aviation (GA)
aerodromes were grassed all-over fields
where Tiger Moths, Austers and Chipmunks
buzzed around, taking off and landing into
whatever direction the wind blew from.
It was low-intensity VFR aviation on the
metropolitan fringe, far from the madding
urban crowds. Then came strip operation
and the then radical innovation of contracircuit parallel runway operations. This was
the heyday of general aviation aerodrome
procedures (GAAP) and of general aviation
in Cessnas and Pipers.
In the twenty-first century, GAAP aerodromes
have become home to an aircraft spotter’s
smorgasbord, with types ranging from
ultralights to executive jets. This brings
challenges for pilots. The performance spectrum
in the circuit is wider than ever, even before
counting the helicopters and public transport
aircraft that have become more common in the
past 30 years at GAAP aerodromes. To complete
a complex picture, there’s also the rapid growth
of international flight training, with students
from around the world taking their first flights
at GAAP aerodromes.
This is the context in which Class D airspace
replaces GAAP – things have changed and
it’s time for the rules to catch up. Parafield
in South Australia, Camden and Bankstown
in NSW, Archerfield in Queensland, Jandakot
in Western Australia, Moorabbin in Victoria
will go from GAAP to Class D procedures on
3 June 2010 – Australian aviation’s D-day.
A minor point of housekeeping here: the
changes involve adopting the International
Civil Aviation Organization’s Class D airspace
classification, along with procedures broadly
aligned with the US Federal Aviation
Administration’s Class D procedures.
It’s testament to the fundamental integrity
of GAAP that the changes to procedures that
will come into effect on this date are relatively
minor. They come after two CASA studies
of GAAP: the General Aviation Aerodrome
Procedures Review and the Utility of General
Aviation Aerodrome Procedures, found areas
where safety could be improved.
Replacing the Australian-specific GAAP
with the internationally recognised Class D
procedures is a step towards standardising
Australian aviation procedures with international
practices. Standardisation is especially
important given the boom in overseas student
training at GAAP aerodromes.
To increase safety through standardisation,
the new Class D procedures that will apply at
the old GAAP aerodromes will also apply in all
existing Class D airspace.
This aligns with the Aeronautical Information
Regulation and Control (AIRAC) cycle, so that
new charts and aeronautical publications will
reflect the changes.
Australia is adopting FAA Class D procedures
such as abbreviated clearances and distances
from cloud, including:
VMC criteria
Parallel runway operations
Abbreviated clearance by establishing
two-way communications
Maximum speeds
Entry not constrained by a particular
tracking point.
Although the mandatory requirement for all
aircraft to proceed VFR within a GAAP control
zone disappears under the new rules, pilots of
IFR aircraft are encouraged to advise ATC they
are proceeding VFR whenever possible. Such
action removes delays that may be caused by
the IFR separation requirements between IFR
Entering Class D
Entry points
One of the main changes pilots flying into
former GAAP aerodromes should understand
is that GAAP approach points will become
VFR approach points, and will no longer be
mandatory. However, using VFR approach
points, marked on the visual terminal charts
with a shaded diamond, is recommended
because they:
provide an orderly path for
entering the circuit
help with noise abatement, and
help to keep you out of
nearby controlled airspace.
The VFR approach points are selected because
they are prominent landmarks, which help
with visual navigation, and make it easier for
ATC to segregate traffic.
Under the new rules, ATC will still have the
right to instruct you to enter Class D airspace
via a particular point.
You must receive a clearance before operating
in a Class D control zone. This could be
clearance to take off, instructions for circuit
entry, or transit.
Individual clearances are required for:
1. Take-off and landing;
2. Entering, crossing or taxiing along all
runways; Note: An instruction to ‘Hold
short of runway … [number] left [or
centre or right]’ requires you to hold at a
marked holding point.
3. Turns in a direction contrary to the
circuit for a particular runway; Note: An
ATC circuit entry instruction acts as a
clearance for a contrary turn, if required
to comply with this instruction.
4. Circuits at a height other than 1,000ft; and
5. Operations on routes or at altitudes
different from those published in ERSA.
Establishing two-way
When an aircraft contacts air traffic control at
a Class D aerodrome and provides sufficient
information about track or position, level,
and intentions for ATC to make an informed
decision, ATC may clear the aircraft to enter
the airspace by simply acknowledging the
transmission with the aircraft’s callsign.
Alternatively, and more usually, ATC will
provide brief instructions to the pilot.
Such instructions include ‘join crosswind’,
‘overfly’, or ‘report at [position]’. The
acknowledgment authorises the aircraft to
enter the Class D airspace following the stated
track and level, or alternative instruction given
by ATC. Once clearance to enter the Class
D airspace is given, the pilot is required to
maintain two-way communications and to
comply with any subsequent ATC instructions.
This shortened procedure does not eliminate
the availability of a ‘traditional’ airways
clearance where indicated, but it provides an
abbreviated clearance option for use where
both pilot and ATC understand the proposed
course of action.
Replacing the
Australianspecific GAAP
with the
Class D
procedures is
a step towards
flights within the zone or adjoining airspace.
Readback requirements
There are no changes to readback
requirements except in relation to taxi
instructions. If you get a taxi instruction
which includes a holding point, you must
read back the name of the holding point.
You must read back:
Any airways clearance, in full
Any clearance or instruction to hold
short of, enter, land on, conditional line-up
on, wait, take-off from, cross, taxi or backtrack
on, any runway
Assigned runway, QNH directed to a specific aircraft, SSR
codes, radio frequency instructions
Altitude instructions, direction of turn, heading and
speed restrictions.
Pilot responsibilities
When operating in Class D airspace, you must:
Special VFR
You must not conduct a VFR flight in Class D
airspace when VMC do not exist. However,
at your request, ATC may authorise you to
operate to a special VFR clearance. A special
VFR clearance only applies within the Class D
control zone.
When operating under a special VFR clearance,
you are responsible for ensuring that:
1. The flight is conducted clear of cloud;
2. Visibility is not less than 1,600 m for fixed
wing aircraft and 800m for helicopters; and
3. The flight is conducted in accordance with
CAR 157 with regard to low flying.
Maximum speed within a
Class D control zone
Unless ATC authorises otherwise, your
indicated airspeed should not exceed 200kt.
1. See and maintain separation from other aircraft;
2. Comply with ATC instructions while ensuring you maintain
separation from other aircraft;
3. Immediately advise ATC if unable to comply with a control
instruction; and
In Class D airspace, ATC will provide the
following services to aircraft:
4. Advise ATC if unable to see, or if you lose sight of, other aircraft
notified as traffic.
IFR flights will be separated from IFR and
special VFR flights
VMC criteria in Class D airspace
Special VFR flights will be separated from
other special VFR flights when the visibility
is less than VMC
Flight visibility 5,000m
Horizontal distance from cloud: 600m
Vertical distance from cloud: 1,000ft above; 500ft below.
visibility 5000m
VFR flights will receive traffic information
about IFR and other VFR flights
Traffic avoidance advice and sequencing
will be available on request.
IFR flights will receive traffic information
about VFR flights
visibility 5000m
You must keep a vigilant lookout for other aircraft
even if you have received traffic information.
Under the new procedures, if you’re flying
VFR, you are entirely responsible for
avoiding the wake turbulence from heavier
aircraft ahead, including when you are
landing. The same applies if you’re flying
IFR and you accept responsibility to follow
or maintain own separation with a heavier
aircraft ahead. For these circumstances,
ATC assistance will be limited to issuing a
wake turbulence caution.
Under Class D, surface movement control
(SMC) will be re-introduced at the former
GAAP aerodromes.
[Callsign] ‘ready’, and
The designator of the departure runway.
e.g., ‘ABC, ready, runway [left/right]’.
After landing
On initial taxi
Before taxiing or calling surface movement
control, check that your radio receiver is
functioning correctly and obtain the current
ATIS. The preferred method for checking your
radio is to monitor the ATIS.
When ready, make a taxi call to SMC, giving
the following details:
a. aircraft type and call-sign;
b. number of POB (not required for VFR
c. identification of ATIS code received;
intentions (crosswind circuit training,
first intended landing point, etc); and
g. for training flights, whether dual or solo.
h. ‘request taxi’.
If an airways clearance is required you should
make your request to SMC when ATC is
operating, or to the appropriate ATC Centre
when the control zone is deactivated.
To minimise delays to your departure, you
should notify flight details using the national
aeronautical information processing system
(NAIPS) as the preferred option. You can also
telephone, fax or, as a last resort, radio SMC.
Where possible, you should carry out your
pre-take-off checks in a run-up bay. A taxi
clearance to a particular runway holding
point entitles you to conduct your pre-take-off
checks using an en-route run-up bay.
Never enter or cross a runway en route to the
holding point or run-up bay unless specifically
cleared to do so by ATC.
Ready for take-off
When you are ready for departure and first in
line at the holding point, select the relevant
tower frequency, and report:
After vacating a runway, you must not enter,
re-enter, cross or taxi along any runway unless
ATC has cleared you to do so.
Flying in the circuit
ATC may issue a sequencing instruction
with a take-off or touch-and-go clearance.
When issued with a sequencing instruction,
you must follow the aircraft you have been
sequenced to follow.
Unless otherwise instructed by ATC, you
must report downwind when starting the
downwind leg. This report should include
callsign, aircraft type, ‘downwind’ and
intentions [full-stop or touch-and-go]. If there
is too much radio traffic for the call to be
made in this position, report mid-downwind
or late-downwind as appropriate. ATC will
issue a sequencing instruction based on your
position in the circuit.
If you wish to conduct a non-standard circuit,
such as a glide or flapless approach, advise the
tower with your downwind report. This advice
will also alert other circuit traffic.
You must get tower approval before conducting
simulated engine failure training (note: local
aerodrome procedures may preclude such
In sequencing aircraft, ATC will indicate the
position of the preceding aircraft by reference
to a leg of the circuit or as a clock bearing,
and describe it either as a specific type or in
general terms (e.g., Cessna or twin).
e. flight rules (not required for VFR flights);
If you have landed on a runway that
intersects another runway, you may cross the
intersecting runway, but you must not vacate
onto the intersecting runway unless ATC has
cleared you to do so.
d. location on aerodrome;
Before landing, plan your taxi route to your
parking position. After landing, vacate the
runway as soon as practicable. Remember
that aircraft on a taxiway must give way to
aircraft vacating a runway.
Surface movement control
ATC may issue a sequence number. Sequence
numbers specify the landing sequence
position of an aircraft with respect to any
preceding aircraft.
The instruction ‘follow’ requires you to see the
preceding aircraft, and regulate your speed
and approach path to achieve separation. If
you cannot see and identify the preceding
aircraft, you must advise the tower.
A landing clearance does not diminish your
responsibility to maintain sufficient separation
from the preceding aircraft during landing.
Inbound call
You must establish and maintain two-way
communications with the Class D tower
before entering the control zone from Class
G airspace.
If you intend to transit the Class D control
zone from Class G airspace without landing, it
is recommended you plan to do so via a VFR
approach point.
You must establish two-way communications
with ATC before reaching the control zone
boundary, so you should make your call
approaching the relevant VFR approach point.
Alternatively, you may establish initial contact
with the tower when you are around eight to
10nm miles from the aerodrome.
Your call should include: callsign, type,
position, level, ATIS code received and
intentions (for example, ‘overflying for [next
tracking point]’.
Flight near Class D airspace
You should make your inbound call
approaching the relevant VFR approach point.
Alternatively, you may establish initial contact
with the tower when you are around eight to
10 miles from the airport.
When you’re flying in Class G airspace near
a Class D control zone boundary, you should
consider monitoring the tower frequency to
be aware of traffic entering and leaving the
control zone.
Your inbound call should include: callsign,
type, position, level, ATIS code received, and
intentions (for example, ‘inbound’).
Into Class G airspace
Your call
ATIS code
received and
Transit of a Class D control zone
When departing the control zone into Class
G airspace, you should do so on upwind,
crosswind or downwind by extending the
relevant leg of the circuit and then tracking clear
of VFR approach points and associated routes.
As a VFR flight, you do not need to make a
departure call when departing the control
zone directly into Class G airspace. Nor do you
need to request approval to change frequency
when transiting from the Class D control zone
into Class G airspace.
Into Class C airspace
If you are departing directly into Class
C airspace, the airways and departure
clearances issued by ATC will authorise you to
operate in both Class D and Class C airspace.
A private pilot licence holder who has the
logbook entry to fly an aircraft as pilot in
command (PIC) in a control zone at a GAAP
aerodrome, may, on or after 3 June 2010 fly
an aircraft as PIC in Class D airspace.
In addition, a licensed private pilot will be eligible
for the log book entry to fly an aircraft as PIC in
a control zone which has no radar service.
This information is a brief outline of the
practices and procedures set to be adopted
at Class D aerodromes, and is designed to
provide insight into the general philosophy
behind the procedures. This information is
not necessarily definitive and the information
should not be used operationally without
first cross-referencing with the appropriate
Pilot information
It’s vital that every pilot knows what to do in Class D airspace,
so CASA has developed a comprehensive information and
communication campaign about the Class D changes.
We will provide information brochures to all licence holders,
and instructional material will be distributed to training
Safety workshops will be held around the nation.
There will be two sessions at each of the venues below, each
lasting three hours, with a break for refreshments. The first will
run from 1-4pm, and the second from 6.30-9.30pm.
Registration for these workshops is essential. Log on to www.
casa.gov.au, follow the 3 June changes link on the home page,
and complete the form online.
Monday 10 May 2010 – Sydney Bankstown Travelodge
Tuesday 11 May 2010 – Brisbane Bardon Conference Centre
Thursday 13 May 2010 – Melbourne Dingley International
Tuesday 18 May 2010 – Perth AFA Club, Bull Creek
Thursday 20 May 2010 – Adelaide The Mawson Centre
Those who attend the workshops will be given an information
pack on Class D, containing printed information and a compact
and useful USB memory stick. Among the USB stick’s contents
are CASA’s Look Out situational awareness DVD, the Class D
airspace guide, information on changes to procedures at non-
Information nights at
existing Class D airports
4 May
Aero Club
5 May
Airlie Beach
Peppers Coral Coast
3 May
6 May
The GAAP Q&A page, already available on the website, will
6 May
Alice Springs
Alice in the Territory
continue to provide updated information online.
25 May Tamworth
The informative and widely-used Visual Pilot Guides for each of
26 May Coffs Harbour Novotel Coffs Harbour
the former GAAP locations are being updated and revised, and
12 May Maroochydore Aero Club
will be released to coordinate with the Class D-day on 3 June.
13 May Rockhampton
Aero Club
CASA will mail a booklet, detailing the Class D changes, to all
25 May Avalon Mercure Geelong
registered Australian pilots.
25 May Albury
Chifley Hotel
towered aerodromes and selected articles on the subject from
Flight Safety Australia’s archive.
CASA’s aviation safety advisors and flying operations inspectors
will provide information and assistance at the information nights.
All sessions 18.30 - 21.30
Wests League Club
Pilots will also be able to familiarise themselves with all the detail on the changes online
through CASA’s new eLearning program. Through the program you can complete online
tutorials at your own pace, at any time, in the comfort of your home or office. This allows you
to move quickly or slowly through the material according to your needs. You can repeat the
tutorials as often as you like, and can assess how much you have learned by completing the
occasional, anonymous multiple-choice questions. There will be two eLearning tutorials on the
airspace changes: one covering the Class D changes, and the second on the changes relating to
operations at non-towered aerodromes.
Complete online tutorials at your own
pace, at any time, in the comfort of your
home or office.
Imagine if you could just close your eyes and rehearse
your approach to an unfamiliar aerodrome. In your dream
you would see what reporting points looked like from the
cockpit, as video or photographs, and you would hear a
friendly voice reminding you of radio frequencies and calls.
Violation of controlled airspace (VCA) hotspots and safetycritical procedures would make themselves known, to keep
you out of danger and all relevant documents would be
easily on hand. How good would that be?
Your dream will soon come true when CASA and
Airservices Australia unveil their collaborative OnTrack
project to coincide with the 3 June changes.
OnTrack is an interactive web portal hosted on the CASA
website. It will use video, audio, pop-up alerts and text to
help brief pilots on how to operate in and around controlled
airspace and avoid the dreaded VCA.
You can navigate around airspace boundaries, VFR routes,
VFR/class D reporting points and military control zones –
and do so safely before you take off to fly for real.
If you’re planning your first approach to Bankstown
in Sydney, you can see what the 2RN tower, the R555
restricted zone at Holsworthy and the Wilton parachute
drop zone look like – so you know what to avoid.
If you’re planning to fly into Moorabbin in Melbourne, you can
familiarise yourself with landmarks as varied as Mt Macedon,
the town of Melton, Sandown racecourse and the Altona
baseball stadium.
If you’re planning a northern approach to Archerfield in
Brisbane, you can get a feel for the rather narrow gap
between the top of Mt Glorious and the lower limit of
controlled airspace, and perhaps decide to approach to the
east or west of this landmark (you would be well advised to).
You can also get a look at the railway sheds near Goodna and
the blue motorway bridge that marks the reporting point.
At OnTrack’s Parafield page you can familiarise yourself
with the Bolivar strobe, so that you know what to keep
south of when approaching the Adelaide aerodrome from
Outer Harbour.
Recognising Adventure World, near Perth’s Jandakot,
from OnTrack will give you a better chance of avoiding
real-world navigational misadventures.
OnTrack is one of several initiatives to communicate the
Class D airspace changes that take effect on 3 June. The
site will have interactive maps with added visual terminal
chart (VTC) information, video guides on how to fly inbound
and outbound tracks into newly designated class D
aerodromes, podcasts and printable information.
ATC Notes
What’s your estimate?
xperience shows that in many instances the
estimates provided by pilots in departure reports
are inaccurate, sometimes wildly so.
Estimate inaccuracy is thought to be often caused by pilots
reading their estimate from their GPS and insufficiently
taking into account their reduced ground-speed on climb.
AIP requires an IFR departure report in a nonsurveillance environment to include an estimate for the
first en route reporting point. Air traffic controllers use
that estimate for calculating separation in controlled
airspace and for determining conflicting traffic in
uncontrolled airspace.
Inaccurate estimates compromise separation and traffic
information, so it’s important to get that initial estimate
right. Use a pre-calculated time interval or make an
allowance for increased ground speed in cruise. And
remember to revise your estimate if it differs by more than
two minutes from that previously advised.
Speak up and squawk
Hopefully most of you chose to speak, identify yourselves and follow the controller’s
instructions as this is the most safe and sensible option.
When an unidentified aircraft enters controlled airspace without a clearance the
controller will be wondering:
• What are you doing?
• How are you going to affect the aircraft in my airspace?
By speaking up when you hear a controller calling you these problems are
alleviated. The controller can verify your altitude, provide you with instructions
to exit CTA, or even give you a clearance. Speaking to ATC is the safest course of
action after having infringed airspace.
Airservices Australia Safety
Programs & Promotions initiative
For further safety information please visit our
website at www.airservicesaustralia.com or email
[email protected]
By not communicating with ATC after an airspace infringement you are leaving
the above questions unanswered. The controller has to take extra caution to make
sure you don’t adversely affect any traffic with a clearance. This may require putting
other aircraft into holding, discontinuing an approach or even closing an airport.
It could also result in a breakdown of separation, even a Traffic Alert and Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) Resolution Advisory (RA). To make sure ATC can
contact you always ensure that you are monitoring the correct ATC frequency.
Some pilots in the past have turned off their transponder. This simple act breaks
down the last lines of defence: TCAS and the air traffic control Short Term Conflict
Alert (STCA). Make sure you are squawking the correct code with ALT selected.
So remember, next time you inadvertently stray into CTA, don’t try to hide. Take
the safest route for you and all the other airspace users and speak up and squawk.
You are cruising at 4500 ft and have just crossed into the 3500 ft step because you
were distracted by your inquisitive passenger. Suddenly a call comes through on the
area frequency for an aircraft at your level in your position…what do you do now?
International Accidents/Incidents 14 January 2010 - 22 March 2010
Beagle Bay
Airport, Australia
During cruise, the pilot received a low oil pressure indication. The pilot
diverted to Beagle Bay and during the approach shut down the engine. The
aircraft undershot the runway and collided with terrain. It flipped over and the
engine separated from its mountings.
21 Jan Embraer ERJ- Tijuana-Rodriguez 0
Airport, Mexico
Passenger plane sustained substantial damage following a runway excursion
on landing. The left main landing gear dug in causing the left hand wing to
contact the ground.
14 Jan Cessna
208B Grand
22 Jan Beechcraft
off Sand Point
Municipal Airport,
Cargo plane crashed into the water shortly after takeoff from Sand Point
Municipal Airport. Extensive search by Coast Guard vessels and aircraft failed
to find both crewmembers.
24 Jan Tupolev
Mashhad Airport,
Aircraft crash landed and caught fire at Mashhad Airport in bad weather.
Some 46 passengers reported injured and hospitalised. Aircraft’s tail
reportedly broke apart during the incident.
Ethiopian Airlines passenger plane was destroyed when it crashed into the
sea shortly after takeoff from Beirut Airport. The airplane crashed into the
sea about 6 km past the end of runway 21, about 3.5 km offshore from the
village of Naameh.
25 Jan Boeing
6km off Beirut
737-8AS(WL) International
Airport, Lebanon
25 Jan Embraer
near Senador Jose 2
Rebelo Airfield,
Written off
Passenger plane was damaged when it crashed while on approach to the
airport. The captain and one of the passenges were killed. Preliminary reports
indicate that one of the engines failed during the approach.
28 Jan GAF N22B
Cotabato City,
Crashed in a residential area shortly after takeoff. The pilot was trying to
perform an emergency landing after an engine failure.
31 Jan Yakovlev 40
Luanda, Angola
Three-engined small regional airliner made a belly landing after scheduled
2 Feb
Polish Air Force transport made a forced landing after airframe was subjected
to severe stresses in flight causing separation of both elevators and part of
the right hand main gear door. The fuselage at the wing root was severely
distorted on both sides.
4 Feb
Yakutsk, Russia
Flight fell back on the runway on its belly when the engineer retracted
undercarriage prematurely
11 Feb ATR-42
After engine failure, aircraft diverted to Balikpapan. En route the other engine
also lost power. Crew carried out a forced landing in a rice field.
11 Feb Fokker 100
Monterrey, Mexico 0
Approaching Nuevo Laredo, main undercarriage failed to go down and lock.
Aircraft diverted to Monterrey where facilities were better. Aircraft made
emergency landing and came to rest on right wing.
14 Feb Cessna 550B Schona, Germany
CVR data showed evidence that shortly before the fatal accident, an
aerobatics manoeuvre (barrel roll) was initiated.
01 Mar Airbus
Aircraft came to rest on runway shoulder after reported collapse of main
12 Mar Alenia/
Port Harcourt,
Written off
Nigerian Air Force transport plane skidded off runway on landing during
disaster response exercise
15 Mar BrittenNorman
Kodiak, Alsaka,
Written off
On take-off the Islander contacted the tops of trees past the end of the
runway and came to rest nose down in a stand of trees, the branches
supporting the plane in a vertical position.
Aircraft on ferry flight crash-landed in a forest while on approach to MoskvaDomodedovo Airport, Russia.
22 Mar Tupolev 204- Moscow, Russia
Notes: compiled from information supplied by the Aviation Safety Network (see www. aviation-safety.net/database/) and reproduced with permission. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy,
neither the Aviation Safety Network nor Flight Safety Australia make any representations about its accuracy, as information is based on preliminary reports only. For further information refer to final
reports of the relevant official aircraft accident investigation organisation. Information on injuries is unavailable.
Australian Accidents/Incidents 04 February 2010 - 22 March 2010
4 Feb
Piper PA-31- Armidale
350 Chieftain Aerodrome, NSW
On approach, the pilot selected the landing gear down but did not check the
landing gear lights. On touchdown, the landing gear collapsed and smoke was
seen coming from the throttle console area. Initial inspection revealed the
landing gear had not fully extended.
7 Feb
Amateur-built Augusta (ALA),
Lancair IV-P WA
During initial climb, the pilot received an unsafe landing gear indication. The
aircraft continued to Jandakot where the pilot conducted a wheels-up landing.
Subsequent inspection revealed that an hydraulic flare fitting had failed on the
landing gear pressure line.
7 Feb
Tyabb (ALA), N M Nil
11Km (Baxter), VIC
7BCM Champ
As the aircraft slowed during the landing roll, it encountered a wind gust. The
pilot lost control and the aircraft left the runway and impacted trees.
Aerodrome, NE M
24Km (Braylands
farm), QLD
Shortly after takeoff, the engine lost power. The pilot jettisoned the payload
and landed the aircraft in a cotton crop. The engineering inspection revealed
that the P3 line had failed.
15 Feb Robinson R22 Tindal Aerodrome, Nil
258° M 91Km, NT
During aerial work, the pilot noticed a sudden increase in engine RPM and the
rotor RPM declining. The pilot made a forced landing into trees. Inspection
revealed that one drive belt had detached and one showed signs of wear.
16 Feb Grob G-115C2 Jandakot
Aerodrome, WA
While taxiing, the nose landing gear collapsed, causing the propeller to strike
the ground.
18 Feb Piper PA-25235 Pawnee
While taxiing towards the loading area, the aircraft collided with a concrete
water trough. The propeller and left landing gear were seriously damaged.
18 Feb Robinson R44 near Tom Price
The helicopter landed hard, resulting in serious damage.
19 Feb Cessna 152
Geelong (ALA),
During a missed approach, the aircraft stalled and collided with terrain. The
aircraft was seriously damaged.
20 Feb Bell 206L-1
Mount Hagen
Airport, 297° M
25Km, Other
During initial climb from an interim landing site, the engine compressor stalled.
The power and rotor RPM reduced. The pilot landed the helicopter among trees
and the helicopter came to rest on its left side.
24 Feb Cessna
T188C Ag
Aerodrome, QLD
During the take-off run on runway 12 with the tail raised, the aircraft encountered
a strong southwesterly gust that lifted the right wing and the aircraft turned to
the northeast and ran off the runway. The pilot could not turn the aircraft back
toward the runway and the right main landing gear detached from the fuselage.
The tail continued to rise until the left wingtip struck the ground and the aircraft
nosed over.
On descent, the engine failed. In the subsequent forced landing, the aircraft
struck trees and collided with terrain.
13 Feb PZL
WarzawaOkecie M-18B
Thorpdale (ALA),
Injuries A/C Damage
3 Mar
Transavia PL- Leongatha
12 Airtruck
Aerodrome, 090°
M 15Km, VIC
During the initial climb, the aircraft encountered turbulence and was unable to
continue the climb. The aircraft was returned to Mardan after dumping the load.
The aircraft landed hard.
3 Mar
Cessna 172S Moorabbin
Aerodrome, VIC
The pilot flared the aircraft too high and reduced the power to idle. The aircraft
stalled and landed hard.
While closing the door, the cabin crew member fell from the aircraft.
Investigation is continuing.
4 0Mar Boeing 717200
Ayers Rock
Aerodrome, NT
6 Mar
T188C/A1 Ag
Home Hill (ALA), Nil
SW M 28Km, QLD
As the aircraft entered a procedure turn during aerial spraying operations, the
engine lost power. The pilot force landed the aircraft in a paddock.
7 Mar
Piper PA25-180/S
Cunderdin (ALA),
During initial climb, the engine lost power. After the pilot released the glider
which was being towed the engine failed. In the subsequent forced landing, the
aircraft sustained serious damage. Engineering inspection revealed fuel filter
drain had not been closed after refuelling, resulting in fuel starvation.
10 Mar Robinson R22 near Springsure
During cattle mustering, the aircraft struck a powerline and subsequently
collided with terrain.
13 Mar Beech A36
near Trangie
During the practice forced landing, when the throttle was moved to full power,
the engine did not respond. The pilot conducted a forced landing straight ahead
but struck a wire fence.
22 Mar Embraer
EMB-120 ER
Aerodrome, NT
Written off
It was reported that the aircraft collided with terrain. The investigation is
Text courtesy of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Disclaimer – information on accidents is the result of a co-operative effort between the ATSB and the Australian aviation industry. Data quality
and consistency depend on the efforts of industry where no follow-up action is undertaken by the ATSB. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the
use of these data. Please note that descriptions are based on preliminary reports, and should not be interpreted as findings by the ATSB. The data do not include sports aviation accidents.
27 Feb Amateur-built Serpentine (ALA), Serious
Jabiru UL-T- SE M 6Km, WA
Be heard, be seen, be safe
s for
Don’t be shy about using your radio to enhance
‘Carrying and using
radios will be mandatory
for all aircraft using
certified, registered or
military aerodromes from
3 June 2010.’
flight safety.
See and avoid is common sense, a noble aim and good advice. It’s
also the guiding principle behind aircraft separation at all regional
aerodromes. But it’s easier said than done. Too many diligent and
safety-conscious pilots have found this out after a near miss—or
worse. Haze, glare, scratched cockpit windows and the pernicious
practice of a few pilots sneaking in unannounced to country airstrips
to avoid paying landing fees are all stacked against simply ‘seeing
and avoiding’.
Simple unalerted see-and-avoid is tested to its limits when aircraft
with widely differing performance share the circuit. When regular
public transport (RPT) aircraft and ultralights share the same circuit,
vertical and horizontal closure rates become uncomfortably high.
What looks like empty sky can be filled with an approaching aircraft
within seconds.
You must carry & use radio
There is a better way. Alerted see-and-avoid, where aircraft advise of
their presence at, or approaching an aerodrome, using radio, has been
found by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau to increase search
effectiveness over unalerted see-and-avoid by a factor of eight. Put
it another way: you’re less likely to have a collision or near miss if
you use your radio. That’s the main reason why carrying radios will
be mandatory for all aircraft using certified, registered or military
aerodromes from 3 June 2010. It’s the key change to Civil Aviation
Regulation 166, (CAR 166) which governs operations at non- towered
(non-controlled) aerodromes. The changes come in on the same day
the Class D airspace standard replaces general aviation aerodrome
procedures (GAAP).
There are four types of non-towered aerodrome: certified, registered,
military and uncertified. Certified aerodromes are those with runways
capable of handling aircraft with 30 seats or more. These could be RPT
airliners or, as increasingly common in, for example, Western Australia’s
mining areas, charter aircraft. Certified and registered aerodromes
have to meet certain standards and are inspected regularly.
Two new Civil Aviation Advisory Publications:
(CAAP 166-1(0) and CAAP 166-2 (0) developed
and linked to CAR 166, provide guidance on
changes to standard traffic circuit procedures,
circuit heights and procedures for arriving
and departing the circuit area.
Radios will also have to be carried by any aircraft using a military
aerodrome from 3 June 2010.
Different categories of aircraft
will fly different standard circuit
You should note that some uncertified or non-registered aerodromes
may, by direction from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) or of
their owner’s initiative, require radios on any aircraft using them. This
detail can be checked for any aerodrome in the En-route Supplement
Australia (ERSA). However, as of 3 June 2010, CASA has not designated
any additional aerodromes for compulsory carriage of radios.
By definition, non-towered aerodromes are in uncontrolled Class G
airspace. However, when air traffic control (ATC) is not operating,
a towered aerodrome becomes ‘non-towered’ while ATC is not
operating, and non-towered rules apply, regardless of what airspace
it is normally in.
The revised CAR 166 rules also involve changes to certain traffic circuit
procedures at all non-towered aerodromes.
Joining circuit on
a downwind leg
Crosswind leg
Downwind leg
Joining circuit
at crosswind
Descend to
circuit height
Joining at 45º
Arriving at not
less than 500ft
above circuit
Arriving at not less
than 500ft above
circuit height
Medium performance aircraft, a category which
includes most piston-engined GA aircraft with
circuit speeds between 55kt and 150kt will
use 1000ft above the aerodrome as a standard
circuit height.
High performance aircraft, usually jets
and turboprops, will use a 1500ft above
aerodrome circuit. All aircraft after take-off
should turn on to the crosswind leg at no less
than 500ft above aerodrome. The turn on to
final should also be made no lower than 500ft
above aerodrome.
There are several options for
joining the circuit
Pilots will be free to use their acquired
airmanship skills in appropriate conditions and
locations. What is asking for trouble on a busy
day at Dubbo or Kalgoorlie can be acceptable
on the approach to a remote outback airstrip.
Standard traffic circuit
Active side
1500 FT High performance–above 150 KT
Base leg
Joining circuit
on a base leg
Recommended circuit join
1000 FT Medium performance
Joining for straight
in approach not
less than 3nm
500 FT
Low performance–max 55 KT
Non-active side
Circuit procedures
Low performance aircraft, defined as having
a circuit speed of 55 knots or less, will fly a
standard circuit height of 500ft above the
aerodrome. This category covers some sport
aircraft, such as weight-shift trikes, opencockpit three-axis designs and some closedcockpit sport aircraft.
Pilots should have the airmanship to realise
what is appropriate, where, and when.
It is expected that pilots will use their radios
to announce their intentions at all nontowered aerodromes. The rule says you
must broadcast to avoid a collision, or risk
of a collision. Using all available equipment
to enhance safety is part of airmanship. For
example, you should turn your transponders
on so that other aircraft fitted with a traffic
collision and avoidance system (TCAS) can
see you, but only if you are squawking.
The recommended procedure is to join the
circuit on downwind leg, either from an
extension of the downwind leg, a 45 degree
angle about halfway down downwind, or
from a shortened crosswind leg which takes
the joining aircraft over the runway.
Pilots unsure of conditions at the aerodrome
should overfly or circle the aerodrome at not
less than 500ft above circuit altitude, meaning
at least 2000 ft above the aerodrome. However,
low performance aircraft, or rotorcraft with a
circuit speed of 55kt, should overfly at 500ft
above the aerodrome, to avoid conflict with
higher or faster traffic.
You can join the circuit on base leg or make a
straight-in approach. However, pilots making
these approaches are expected to use their
judgment and airmanship by following the
procedures in the CAAPs to ensure they
don’t conflict with other traffic joining via
the standard procedure. You should only
commence a non-standard approach after
you have announced your intention on radio.
Pilots making straight-in approaches must be
established on final by 3nm from the runway
threshold, and should have announced their
intentions on radio by then. You must give way
to aircraft in the circuit. Pilots must know the
wind direction and speed at the aerodrome
before making a straight-in approach. And
you must not make straight-in approaches
when a reciprocal runway is in use, or there is
the likelihood of conflict with other traffic.
Pilots joining on base leg must also give way to
other aircraft and ensure they can join safely
on base at standard height (500ft) without
potential traffic conflict.
Departing the circuit area should be done by
extending one of the four standard circuit legs.
Only when you are well outside the circuit
area and no traffic conflict exists, can you
make a turn opposite to the circuit direction.
This would normally be at least 3nm from the
circuit, but could be less for aircraft with high
climb performance.
Under CAR 166C, a pilot must make a
radio broadcast ‘whenever it is reasonably
necessary to do so to avoid a collision, or the
risk of a collision, with another aircraft’.
Under the regulations, that broadcast must
include the name of the aerodrome, the
aircraft’s type and call sign, its position and
the pilot’s intentions.
There are seven situations where a pilot would
be expected to broadcast their intentions, in
order to ensure the minimum compliance
with CAR 166C.
1. before or during taxiing;
2. immediately before entering a runway
(whether active or not);
3. inbound 10nm or earlier from
the aerodrome;
‘The rule
says you
to avoid a
or risk of a
4. immediately before joining the circuit;
5. on a straight-in approach, on final, at 3nm
or more from the threshold,
6. on a base-join approach, before joining on
base; and
7. on entering the aerodrome vicinity of a
non-towered aerodrome, where the pilot
intends to fly through the vicinity, but
not land.
Those are required for a minimum safety
standard but CAAP 166-1 (0) explaining the
changes, emphasises using the radio as often
as required: ‘A pilot should not be hesitant to
call and clarify the other aircraft’s position
and intentions if there is any uncertainty,’ it
says. If in doubt, speak out.
Good radio procedure, which means standard
phraseology and minimal non-essential
chat, is as important as it ever was under the
new rules.
VFR pilots, on hearing of
an IFR pilot’s intention to
make an instrument approach,
should make their aircraft known
to the IFR pilot. IFR pilots can help
their safety greatly in these situations by
reporting their position and intentions in
plain English, rather than using IFR approach
points and jargon which VFR pilots may not
know or understand.
Other aspects of the CAR166 changes
include aircraft size and performance,
wake turbulence, windshear, maintaining
separation and collision avoidance. The two
CAAPs: 166-1(0) and 166-2(0) cover these
topics in detail. They are a must-read for
anyone who flies for work or pleasure. Pilots
should use these two CAAPs, rather than
the brief outline given in this article, as their
authoritative guide to operating under the
new rules for non-towered airports.
The CAAPs boil down to a code of conduct and
sound airmanship—things any reasonable,
courteous and safety-conscious pilot is
already doing. Follow them and you’ll fly
legally and safely.
‘A pilot
should not
be hesitant
to call and
the other
position and
intentions if
there is any
Hangar N Wirraway Drive, Redcliffe Airport. QLD 4021
Check out our web page at www.bobtait.com.au
All CPL subjects plus IREX
Courses available full-time or by home study
PO Box 2018 Redcliffe North QLD 4020
P:07 3204 0965
F:07 3204 1902
E:[email protected]
Two points to note are the importance of
communication in avoiding danger when
conditions are a mix of IFR and VFR. Cloud,
haze or smoke can mean IFR conditions and
approaches for high-performance aircraft,
usually commercial aircraft, while GA and
ultra light aircraft can operate in clear
conditions under the low visibility layer. The
possibility of an RPT aircraft emerging from
cloud to find a windscreen full of VFR planes
is horrible to contemplate. ‘Diligent radio
broadcasts and continuous visual scanning
are essential’ CAAPs 166-1(0)
and 166-2(0) emphasise.
They are words of wisdom
which pilots ignore at their
Flight Safety editor,
Margo Marchbank, caught
up with Philip Baum, director
of a London-based aviation
security organisation, at a
recent conference in Sydney.
Philip Baum has a dream: an aviation industry where cabin crew are
trained not only to be the safety and customer service professionals
they are now, but also to be security professionals.
The aviation industry is generally good at flight safety training,
he argues, with considerable investment in recurrent training for
emergency situations, for example, ditching at sea. However, the
industry record is not as good when it comes to security training.
Despite the fact that aircrew have to deal with disruptive and violent
passengers each and every day, ‘the degree of training we afford
aircrew, and the investment in human factors for people on the ground
is woefully limited’.
He cites a list of recent aviation attacks, beginning in 2001 with the
Richard Reid ‘shoe bomber’ incident, and ending with Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab’s attempt to destroy a Detroit-bound airliner late last
year. Between these two attacks there have been at least eight other
incidents of aircraft destruction or attempted destruction, and in
excess of 50 hijackings or attempted hijackings by passengers.
Recent aviation incidents/accidents 11
Richard Reid–the ‘shoe bomber’ attempted to detonate explosive on board Flight 63 from Paris to Miami
A China Northern flight was destroyed in flight 16kms south west of Zhoushuizi Airport, Dalian (China), as a result of an act of sabotage.
Fifty-one passengers and nine crew perished; there were no survivors.
David Mark Robinson, suffering from severe paranoid schizophrenia, attempted to hijack QF 1737 from Melbourne to Launceston.
He attacked and injured two flight attendants with sharpened wooden stakes.
Two flights, which departed Moscow’s Domodedovo International Airport within about an hour of one another, were destroyed.
Two female passengers–Chechen suicide bombers–one on each flight, possibly detonated intra-vaginal bombs, which destroyed the
two aircraft, with the loss of 34 passengers and nine crew; and 38 passengers and eight crew respectively.
Kato Air, Norway–an asylum seeker entered the cockpit of the Dornier 228, and in a suicide attempt, attacked the pilots with an axe.
The aircraft missed the ground by 100m.v
Turkish Airlines flight hijacked by Hakan Ekinci in Greek airspace, while on route from Tirana, Albania to Turkey. Ekinci forced his way into
the cockpit; but the aircraft landed safely in Italy, escorted and forced down by Greek and Italian F-16s.
A woman attempted to hijack Air New Zealand Flight 2279 from Blenheim to Christchurch. (Actually an Air National J32 on charter to
replace the normal Eagle Air aircraft.) The woman threatened Air New Zealand staff, stating she had a bomb on board. Both pilots and
one passenger suffered stab injuries. The aircraft landed safely and the woman was arrested.
An attempt to destroy a China Southern flight en route to Beijing was averted when the crew found a 19-year-old Uighur woman
pouring petrol in the toilet from improvised soft drink cans. The pilot made an emergency landing at Lanzhou Airport, and two passengers
were arrested.
AeroMexico B-737 from Cancun to Mexico City, hijacked by a Bolivian national, Jose Pereira, who claimed he had a bomb. Aircraft
landed safely, with no injuries–Pereira arrested.
Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a.k.a the ‘underwear bomber’, attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253. The device
failed to detonate.
In the majority of the cases above, passengers were the cause, but Baum says, most aircrew training does
a risk
analysis, of
people and
based on
threat, and
carried out
by ‘trained,
not reflect this reality. Rather, he says,
increasingly, the approach to aviation
security is to apply ‘technological solutions to
a very human problem’. These technological
solutions–increasingly sophisticated peoplescanning devices, such as backscatter
X-ray; millimetre wave imaging scanners;
transmission X-ray body scanners, are
appealing to the powers-that-be because
they are, according to Baum, an ‘easily
quantifiable fix’. However, the danger with
many of these technological solutions, is that
we will forever be playing catch-up, because,
he says, ‘we are up against individuals who
are creative, and always trying to explore and
identify our Achilles’ heel.’
‘But ... once you’re dealing with gut feeling
and supposition, that’s a much bigger
challenge, and regulators don’t like the fact
that you can’t quantify this’.
An alternative, human factors-based approach
to aviation security, is profiling, which Baum
describes as a risk analysis, of people and
situations, based on perceived threat, and
carried out by ‘trained, streetwise individuals’.
He can’t understand the opposition to
profiling, which he argues has been proven to
work. Criticism of profiling on the grounds that
is politically incorrect he counters by saying
that immigrations and customs officials are
profiling at airports every day, when they
differentiate between nationals and others,
treating the two groups quite differently.
A passenger risk assessment is made using
baselines of behaviour; and travel patterns;
identifying anyone who doesn’t meet these
baseline expectations. You can look at
this very positively, he explains. ‘I would
imagine that there is a very big difference, for
example, between a family which is travelling
from Sydney to Queenstown in New Zealand
in July for a skiing holiday, and a person
travelling from Hobart to Melbourne on a
business trip.’
With the family group you would look at ‘how
the dad is interacting – focused on the travel
documents, while mum is trying to keep the
younger children under control. You would
be looking at their appearance, their baggage
labels, how long they stay, how long they
arrive before the flight. I’m guessing that they
would not be the people who arrive 25 minutes
before departure: they’ll be the ones who
arrive two and a quarter hours beforehand.
You’re looking at everything which screams
out “family on holiday”. The person travelling
early from Hobart to Melbourne, and
returning nine at night–well your expectation
is that they’re on business. You would expect
far less interaction if they’re on their own,
you’d look at the type of newspaper they’re
reading, their demeanour, dress.’
A lot of vital and useful passenger data is
gathered – through observation, booking
information, but at the moment, Baum
says, there is a disconnect: the information
doesn’t reach the screening checkpoint, the
people at the frontline. This was highlighted
in the Xmas Day 2009 incident on Northwest
Flight 253. Basic profiling, Baum says, would
have identified Umar Abdulmutallab, the
‘underwear bomber’ as a security risk, and
should have screamed out: ‘take care with
this passenger. His ticket was paid for with
cash; and purchased in Ghana for a journey
commencing in Nigeria, altered once the
ticket was purchased; he had no luggage for
a two-week trip; his visa was issued in the
UK but the UK was not on his itinerary; and
previously, he had travelled to Yemen. The
airline had this information, but it did not
reach the screening checkpoint.’
In a media release not long after the failed
bombing attempt, ‘President Barack Obama
said U.S. intelligence agencies had enough
information about Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
to have discovered and possibly disrupted the
plan to destroy the Detroit-bound airline but
“failed to connect those dots”’.
Obama said the intelligence community
knew Abdulmutallab had traveled to Yemen
and established contact with extremists.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has
said it first learned of Abdulmutallab on 19
November 2009, when his father visited the
US embassy in Abuja and sought help finding
him. The plea and warning were not taken
seriously by the Americans, his son came
within a hairsbreadth of murdering nearly 300
people and the father’s visit to the CIA station
was leaked within 24 hours of the attack on
Northwest Flight 253.
And Baum says, ‘the more we automate, the
bigger the problem will become. Now you
can make a booking online, check in online,
and although you will still have to go through
security, the opportunities for interaction
are being reduced. So it becomes all the
important for aircrew to recognise that they
have to identify discrepancies in behaviour.
‘I believe that aircrew are the world’s best
profilers, not only because they fly in the
aeroplane in the passenger cabin, but they’re
also used to thinking as the passengers board
the flight “Who’s going to be my problem
passenger today? Is it going to be the kid
who’s going to scream all the way? Is it the
businessman that’s going to be arrogant? Is it
the young couple who are going to be drunk?”
Now that’s all well and good, but we now
need to capture that information and convert
it into an effective tool, to prevent not only
disruptive passenger incidents, but also other
potential incidents.
‘I use two examples in training of threat
analysis. Let’s say you’re the captain of
airline X, and you are awaiting departure
from Sydney to Bangkok. It is two minutes
before slot time, the doors are closed, you’re
just about to go off blocks and your flight
attendant rings you, or comes to speak to
you, and says, “Captain, the passenger seated
in seat 27F – I’m concerned, he’s behaving a
little strangely, it’s probably all right, but I just
thought we ought to let you know”. What do
you do? You know you’ll miss your slot time,
there will be delay, and the passenger and
his luggage might have to be removed from
the aircraft. A lot of pilots will say–“Just keep
an eye on him.” I’ve never understood that
phrase–if you’ve got a problem on the ground,
deal with it on the ground. Compare that with
a situation where you’re five hours in to the
Sydney-Bangkok flight, and the attendant tells
you that the passenger in seat 11C says that
on page 69 in the in-flight magazine it says
there is a bomb on the plane. “Captain, I’m
convinced that the passenger didn’t write it,
but they found it and they’re totally spooked
by it.” Some I have spoken to say, “Oh, I’d turn
A lot of vital
and useful
data is 61 62 63
60 –
54 king
32 30
back. You’ve got to take it seriously.” My view
is that is actually poor security analysis–if you
know it’s written on page 69 of the in-flight
magazine, and you know it wasn’t written by
that passenger, then it’s not a credible bomb
threat. There’s absolutely no reason why you
should divert, or land: that’s not how terrorist
groups issue bomb threats. If you’re planning
on blowing up a plane, you’re not going to tell
anybody about it ... and, if you do decide to,
it’s in order to prevent detonation and you’ll
make absolutely certain that the message
reaches the authorities. Who even reads inflight magazines?!’
‘If someone is spending an inordinately long
time in the restrooms, the very first thing you
do is to turn security into customer service.
“Sir, you’ve been there a long time, are you
OK? ... Unless you come out, I will have to
open the door for your safety.”’ It was this type
of positive action by the crew, for example,
Baum explains, which saved the passengers
and aircraft in the China Southern incident.
The cabin crew broke in into the restroom, and
interrupted the young Uighur woman in her
attempt to blow up the aircraft using petrol.
Baum’s dream for the aviation security
system of the future involves a better balance
between the use of technology and human
factors. It’s a dream where a sensor-based
system means passengers are ‘sniffed and
sensed’ as they move around the airport;
there are no queues, because for him, they
simply demonstrate inadequate security; and
above all, aircrew are trained, not only to be
safety and customer service professionals,
but importantly, security professionals.
‘A lot of it is how you’re trained to communicate
with passengers. If you see someone acting
nervously, you don’t talk to them straight away,
but to people either side of them, or even a
row or two away, and see if the passenger’s
behaviour changes the closer you get to them,
when they realise you’re just the really friendly
attendant who is chatting to everybody. Do
they close down even more, or do they open
up? If they’re someone who is frightened of
flying, then they’ll probably be quite relieved;
if they feel you’re asking questions, and they’re
receding even more, then you absolutely need
to take some action.
‘Aircrew have loads of opportunities for
identifying unusual behaviours. When
someone strikes you as being a little bit
unusual–have a conversation with them.
There are loads of reasons why people may
The bomber’s underpants. ABC News photo
you do
26 n’t
just tra
28 in
staf f to
report, but
report and
‘But in the first scenario–it’s very much
something to act upon. It’s very much
dependent on training–you don’t just train staff
to report, but report and recommend. There’s
a big difference between reporting, “Captain
that passenger in seat 27F–I’m concerned, he’s
behaving a little strangely, it’s probably all right,
but I just thought we ought to let you know”, and
being much more assertive, recommending
“Captain, this passenger is behaving strangely
we’re not happy about this situation, and we
think it should be resolved before take-off.”
You’re forcing the captain into a situation
to act. We’ve got to build into the training
programs some protection against paranoia,
but I think cabin crew with experience know
the difference between a nervous passenger,
and someone behaving abnormally.
not be happy on a flight: there might have
been a death, or they might be flying back to
be fired. But on long haul flights you have more
opportunity to engage them in conversation,
and to evaluate the situation if you have
concerns. The one thing you don’t do is ignore
the behaviour if you have concerns.
Come and experience the difference Johnston Aviation
Services continues to offer. The value-added training,
professionalism, expertise and high levels of service that
our students have come to expect of us.
- Leaders in M/E command instrument ratings.
- PPL and CPL Courses
- Instructor Ratings
- Initial issue & renewal - all grades of instructor
- Accomodation provided
Multi-Engine Command Instrument Rating Course
4 week course
Training on Beechcraft Baron
Includes GNSS RNAV
For further information and pricing please contact us
Phone: (02) 6584 0484
Email: [email protected]
Web: www.johnstonaviation.com.au
Our Reputation is your Guarantee
Lance Thorogood, a CASA electrical systems
specialist, discusses an often-overlooked aspect
of ageing aircraft: their wiring.
A common perception of ageing aircraft is the obvious one: structural
fatigue failures. These can come from cracks, component breakage or
corrosion in its many forms. Rarely is much thought given to problems
that may lurk in the less accessible areas of the aircraft–behind panels,
under floors or hidden beneath cabin trim. The potential for serious
problems to develop in these dim, dark and often overlooked places is
high. Leaking fluid lines, abraded control cables, corrosion and fatigue
failures, and chafing of wiring looms may slowly develop over time,
but largely go unnoticed.
Common maintenance procedures can result in damage if particular
care is not taken to minimise the risk. For example: a simple skin
repair may result in the drilling through of a hidden loom beneath the
area being repaired. Incorrect handling procedures such as standing
on looms or hanging removed components from their connecting
wires can cause damage that may be hard to see but may well make
its effects felt in flight.
Fuel and oil spills can occur during aircraft servicing. These spills,
if not contained and cleaned, are another factor that can adversely
affect aircraft wiring. Possible effects may include deterioration of
the insulation material, leading to mechanical breakdown of the
insulating properties. As wiring looms age their wires become brittle
and are easily damaged. Incidentally, wiring looms and antennas
are not handholds, ladders or tool rests.
A major issue often overlooked (or ignored) during inspections and
maintenance is that of the all-important wiring connecting aircraft
equipment such as lighting, radio and navigation devices together in
what is known as the ‘electrical wire interconnect system’ – or ‘wiring
loom’. As an aircraft ages, so does its interconnecting wiring. Insulation
breaks down or can be rubbed through due to vibration, poor alignment
or incorrectly fitted clamps. The build-up of dirt and metal swarf on
looms and subsequent rubbing through of the insulation is a common
problem. The result can be short circuits causing further damage to
looms and equipment–with potentially catastrophic effects.
The result of unavoidable ageing and years of non-standard or substandard maintenance can be a sort of ‘evolution’ of an aircraft wiring
loom over time. It can degrade from the organised system fitted by
the manufacturer, to something literally resembling a bird’s nest.
Figure 1 shows a bundle of butt splices joining an old loom to new
wiring to extend the reach of the old loom by an additional 280mm
to fit a new location of a nav com panel. This particular repair has
several major issues, notwithstanding the extension of shielded
wires using unshielded wire. When splicing or performing multiple
repairs on a loom good practice is to stagger the joins to reduce the
cross section increase in size that result from the repair. Further,
the same type of wiring originally used should be used again for the
repair or modification work wherever possible.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows the back of the nav comm. panel which
has switches interconnected by a piece of rigid wire with standard
½ Watt resistors soldered to the wire and a 5W resistor used to even
things up. There is clear evidence, in this instance, that the wire has
overheated and that damage to wire insulation has occurred as a result
of this distinctly dubious modification.
Figure 4 shows a non-aviation part being used to connect separate
sources via a relay. The relay has been sourced from a non-aviation
electronics spares supplier, mounted on breadboard and a standard
5W resistor has once again been used across the contacts. Figure 5
shows the relay has come adrift from the mounting socket and also that
silicone sealer has been used in an apparent attempt to shock mount
or hold the components together. Figure 6 shows the use of a standard
household wiring terminal block joining an extremely short piece of
wire to another length of wire. The use of these types of components is
an extremely unsafe practice and can have catastrophic consequences
to the aircraft. Not only is the workmanship sub-standard, but the
components also are not suitable for the environment or task they are
meant to endure.
Wiring problems aren’t just related to repairs and modifications.
There is also the case of simple neglect of the wiring system over
time. Figure 10 shows a wire heavily impregnated with oil over a
significant part of its length and the other end relatively clean and
in good condition. Figure 11 shows the same wire rubbed through to
bare copper where the mounting clip has deteriorated, causing wear
on the insulation. This type of damage has the potential to cause
everything from erratic electrical behaviour to complete failure of the
aircraft electrical system, and could lead to an in-flight fire. Figures
12, 13 and 14 demonstrate how the neglect of a wiring system can
lead to more serious conditions existing in the aircraft loom and
making a catastrophic event more likely.
Pull-Out Section
Other examples are the incorrect use of joining two short pieces of
wire with a butt splice (Figure 7), multiple use crimp connection in
close proximity (Figure 8) and excess wire bundled and tied with a
cable tie (Figure 9).
While there may be many ways of doing something badly there
are very few ways of doing the job properly. In recognition of the
difficulties encountered in obtaining wiring repair and maintenance
information in general aviation, CASA has released Advisory Circular
21.99 Aircraft Wiring and Bonding for use as a last resort when all other
manufacturers’ information and manuals are exhausted.
While the previous figures and discussion highlighted all things wrong
with wiring looms. It is time to show an example of a sound and
serviceable interconnecting wiring system. Figures 15 and 16 depict
a well maintained wiring loom. The loom is both well supported and
laced together with good bend radii and is clear of contaminants.
So who is ultimately responsible for the condition of the wiring found
in these examples and others that may still be operating? The Civil
Aviation Regulations 42ZE clearly identify the individual who certifies
the completion of maintenance as the person ultimately responsible.
What can be done to improve matters? All people working in those
areas that are not normally accessed during routine maintenance
procedures should be ever-vigilant to all kinds of faults and damage
that may be outside their normal scope of work. If there is any doubt
about anything observed during the access period, these issues
should be brought to the attention of a responsible person or pilot
of the aircraft.
Pull-Out Section
Finally, the wiring system depicted in this
article would most likely have taken many
years to reach its seriously degraded state.
The aircraft would probably have had
strange, intermittent and unexplained minor
faults over a long time. However the cost
of rectification to correct these issues and
return the aircraft to a serviceable condition
has the potential to run into many thousands
of dollars, and these rectification costs do
not include additional downtime.
Recommended practices and materials are
encouraged by manufacturers and regulatory
authorities for good reason. Non-aircraft parts
and wire may not necessarily have the same
long term resistance to the extremes of the
aircraft operating environment as aircraftapproved parts. However, work performed
and materials would have the reasonable
expectation of continuing to function properly
for many years to come. Proper maintenance
can reduce the future cost burden to the
owner over the long term and eliminate many
of the minor annoyances of equipment not
operating exactly as expected–and most
importantly, proper maintenance won’t
create unnecessary hazards.
CASA has produced ‘Ageing
aircraft wiring’ – a CD-ROM for
maintenance engineers. It explores
repair maintenance techniques as
well as guidelines and best practice.
Available from the online store
www.casa.gov.au (Postage and
handling fee of $15.00)
1 Feb 2010 – 31 Mar 2010
Note: Occurrence figures not included in this edition.
Airbus A321231 Landing gear damper/torque
link attachment bolt sheared. Ref 510010260
LH main landing gear damper to torque link
attachment bolt sheared and hanging by lockwire.
Three other attachment bolts remaining.
P/No: NAS6606H38.
Airbus A330203 Main landing gear hydraulic
hose failed. Ref 510010044
LH main landing gear hydraulic hose sheared at
landing gear/airframe interface. Loss of Green
system hydraulic fluid. Investigation continuing.
Airbus A330303 Air conditioning fumes during
engine start. Ref 510010226
Fumes from air conditioning system during engine
start. No2 air conditioning pack regulator faulty.
BAC Jetstream 3107 Landing gear wheel bolt
failed. Ref 510010175
RH main wheel bolt thread failed. Nut and washer
missing. P/No: MS2125005018.
TSO: 1,039 hours/1,507 landings.
Boeing 737476 Elevator spring broken.
Ref 510010255
Elevator fell and centering unit outer spring broken.
Boeing 737476 Fire detection loop sensor
contaminated. Ref 510010128
No1 engine fire detection system loop A
disconnection plug contaminated and detector
suspect faulty.
P/No: 6678. TSN: 504,940 hours. TSO: 504,940
Boeing 737476 Fuselage skin cracked.
Ref 510009922
Fuselage skin cracked beyond limits at BS947.5
Stringer 25L. Crack length approximately 75mm(3in).
Boeing 737476 Ice and rain protection systems
control unit faulty. Ref 510010187
First Officer’s No2 window middle layer overheated
and melted. Investigation found the window heat
control unit suspect faulty. P/No: 8300005603.
TSN: 42,574 hours. TSO: 42,574 hours.
Boeing 737476 Stabiliser trim actuator faulty.
Ref 510010002
Stabiliser trim actuator faulty. P/No: AR7077M3.
TSN: 49,838 hours. TSO: 5,565 hours.
Boeing 73776Q Horizontal stabiliser trim
actuator bolts/washers missing. Ref 510010199
Horizontal stabiliser trim actuator failsafe strap bolts
and washers missing. P/No: 251A45109.
Boeing 7377BX APU bleed air suspected
contaminated. Ref 510009978
APU suspect bleed air contaminated. Oil smells in
cockpit. Investigation could find no fault.
P/No: 1319B. TSN: 3,928 hours/5,154 cycles.
Boeing 737838 Air data module faulty.
Ref 510010070
First Officer’s pitot/static system Air Data Module
(ADM) faulty. P/No: C17001BA01. TSN: 27,262 hours.
TSO: 27,262 hours.
Boeing 737838 Captain’s sliding window
bumper damaged. Ref 510010054
Excessive air noise from Captain’s LH sliding window.
Investigation found the forward frame structure
bumper (Teflon wedge) damaged/deformed and
preventing proper sealing.
Boeing 737838 Emergency over-wing
lighting inoperative – battery charger faulty.
Ref 510009962
LH emergency over-wing lighting inoperative due to
flat battery and faulty charger. P/No: D71702001.
TSN: 27,739 hours. TSO: 27,739 hours.
Boeing 737838 Engine spar valve actuator
unserviceable. Ref 510010211
No2 engine spar valve actuator unserviceable.
P/No: MA30A1001. TSN: 5,677 hours. TSO: 5,677 hours.
Boeing 737838 Galley oven odour.
Ref 510009947
No2 forward galley oven suspect faulty. Electrical
burning smell/odour coming from under oven.
P/No: 8609010000.
Boeing 737838 Main fuel tank refuelling shutoff
valve failed. Ref 510010052
No1 main fuel tank refuelling shutoff valve failed to
close during refuelling.
P/No: 2670136. TSN: 20,050 hours. TSO: 20,050 hours.
Boeing 737838 Wing flap deflection control
rollers seized. Ref 510010001
LH and RH outboard trailing edge flap outboard
deflection control rollers seized. Damage to flap tracks.
P/No: KRP177408VTZ.
Boeing 737838 Wing front spar corroded.
Ref 510010233
RH wing front spar corroded in area of forward boost
pump bonding lead attachment.
Boeing 7378BK Fuselage door sill corroded.
Ref 510009923
L2 door lower auxiliary sill web located at BS991/
WL197/LBL36 severely corroded and holed. Electrical
ground block PNoS280W555-16 was then left free to
arc to surrounding area.
Boeing 747438 Flap track transmission
coupling sheared. Ref 510010039
Air turn back carried out due to ‘FLAP DRIVE STS
MSG’. Investigation found RH inboard No5 flap track
transmission coupling sheared at torque tube output joint.
Boeing 747438 Hydraulic pipe leaking.
Ref 510010173
No1 hydraulic system pipe leaking. LH body gear
truck position actuator hydraulic fuse outlet
attachment nut which was approximately 3/4
of a turn loose. Investigation continuing. P/No:
Boeing 747438 Wing flap track fuse pin
lockwire broken. Ref 510010225
Inboard trailing edge flap No4 flap track forward fuse
pin lockwire broken at nut. Fuse pin nut was also
loose. Further investigation found the lockwire was
of the incorrect gauge (0.032in instead of 0.047in)
and was also orientated incorrectly as per OEM
Boeing 767336 Brake antiskid module
connector corroded. Ref 510010231
Brake antiskid system LH antiskid module connectors
heavily corroded. Connectors were for No1, No2, No5
and No6 antiskid valves. Investigation continuing.
Boeing 767336 Cargo compartment wiring
burnt. Ref 510010241
Cargo compartment wiring loom W0704 burnt.
Investigation found approximately 12 wires burnt
and shorted together. Wires have burnt through
the aluminiumised insulation blanket to the aircraft
frame underneath. It is suspected swarf in the wiring
may have caused the wires to short and burn the
blanket or rub against the wires and the blanket.
Investigation continuing.
Boeing 767336 Galley oven smoke.
Ref 510009906
Smoke coming from forward galley No1 oven.
Investigation found two wires on one of the heating
elements had come loose causing arcing to the
plastic sleeving. The nuts attaching the lower
heating element were found to be the incorrect type.
P/No: 67192.
Boeing 767336 Strong engine exhaust fumes in
cockpit. Ref 510010227
Strong engine exhaust fumes in cabin. Suspect
engine exhaust entering APU inlet or outflow valve
during engine start due to strong winds.
Bombardier DHC8103 Nose landing gear drag
strut actuator hose split. Ref 510010073
Nose landing gear drag strut actuator pressure hose
split and leaking. Loss of hydraulic fluid.
Bombardier DHC8202 Landing gear
alternate extension cable corroded/broken.
Ref 510009968
Landing gear alternate extension cable broken
around pulley located in cabin roof area. Inspection
found severe corrosion at the point of failure and
several other less corroded areas where the cable
passes around pullies. P/No: NAS303254280.
TSN: 22,420 hours/4,270 cycles.
CVAC 340 Hydraulic bypass valve cracked.
Ref 510010261
Hydraulic bypass valve fractured. Loss of hydraulic
fluid. Investigation continuing.
P/No: 110765. TSO: 2,284 hours.
Embraer EMB120 Cabin pressurisation
controller unserviceable. Ref 510010195
Cabin pressurisation controller faulty. Needle
jamming intermittently. P/No: 22201T011400.
Embraer EMB120 Main landing gear jammed.
Ref 510009908
RH main landing gear failed to unlock during manual
gear extension. Investigation found the free fall
mechanism jammed. P/No: 12029041502.
Boeing 737376 ACARS printer overheated.
Ref 510009990
ACARS printer overheated and extremely hot
with acrid fumes. Investigation continuing. P/No:
RDAC12022. TSN: 14,915 hours. TSO: 14,915 hours.
Boeing 7377BX Main landing gear brake hose
leaking. Ref 510009941
LH main landing gear upper brake hose leaking.
P/No: AS154A04EN0294K.
Boeing 747438 Passenger seat backrest pivot
pin sheared. Ref 510010140
Passenger seat backrest RH pivot pin sheared
causing seat back to collapse. Seat located at 67G.
Investigation continuing. P/No: 45203015.
Pull-Out Section
Airbus A330202 Landing gear stop pad missing.
Ref 510009949
RH main landing gear stop pad missing/
damaged. Landing gear contacted targets and
associated brackets. Target and brackets missing.
Investigation continuing.
Boeing 7377BX Engine driven hydraulic pump
failed. Ref 510010204
No1 engine driven hydraulic pump failed. Black sludge
dripping from drain and case drain quick disconnect
fitting adrift.
P/No: 66087. TSN: 24,479 hours/14,277 cycles.
Embraer ERJ170100 Pitot/static/AOA sensor
unserviceable. Ref 510010230
Integrated Pitot/Static/AOA sensor unserviceable.
P/No: 2015GH2H8A.
Embraer ERJ190100 Pneumatic bleed
pre- cooler gasket damaged. Ref 510010200
Bleed air system LH pre-cooler gasket dislodged and
parts missing. P/No: 19007628003.
Pull-Out Section
Fokker F28MK0100 Engine emergency fuel
shutoff cable broken. Ref 510009994
No2 engine LP shaft failure emergency fuel shutoff
cable broken at aft pulley. Investigation found a small
amount of wear on the forward and aft pulleys.
P/No: JR35320A.
Fokker F28MK0100 Flap fairing bracket broken.
Ref 510010220 (photo below)
LH flap fairing bracket broken.
P/No: A83148005.
Fokker F28MK0100 Park brake shutoff valve
faulty. Ref 510010050
Park brake shutoff valve poppet dislodged from seat.
Found during inspection iaw EASA AD 2009-0220.
Investigation continuing.
TSN: 3,813 hours/2,622 cycles.
Fokker F28MK0100 Window and windshield
screws incorrect parts. Ref 510010179
During an unrelated structural inspection it was
noticed that numerous windscreen and windscreen
surround attachment screws were of incorrect
length. Many screws were too short and several
were too long.
ISRAEL 1124 Landing gear ground contact
switch out of adjustment. Ref 510010014
Landing gear selector handle faulty. Further
investigation found the ground contact switch out
of adjustment which prevented the override switch
from retracting and the failure of the landing gear
handle to be selected to the “up” position.
Saab SF340B Brake hydraulic swivel broken.
Ref 510010232
No2 brake hydraulic swivel broken into two pieces due
to failure of internal “C” clip. Loss of hydraulic fluid.
P/No: AIR124770.
Beech 200 Air conditioning bleed check valve
failed. Ref 510009928
Bleed air system check valve holed in four places due
to flapper valves wearing through case.
P/No: 10138417317.
Beech 200 Pneumatic bleed air contaminated.
Ref 510010221
Smoke/fumes in cabin following takeoff.
Investigation found that a power recovery wash
had been carried out on both engines. The customer
bleed air lines had not been disconnected during the
wash and it is believed that contamination of the
bleed air system caused the smell.
Beech 200 Wing bolt attachment fitting scored.
Ref 510010151
Outboard upper forward wing bolt attachment
fittings scored. Caused by incorrect assembly of
barrel nuts following NDT inspection.
P/No: 101110031. TSN: 23,978 hours/19,904
cycles/19,904 landings.
Beech 300 Pressure bulkhead damaged.
Ref 510009966
Rear pressure bulkhead damaged prior to leaving
factory. Investigation found that when the holes
were being drilled for the location and placement of
the pressure bulkhead interior panel the pressure
bulkhead skin had been drilled to a depth of 0.508mm
(0.020in) (skin thickness 0.812mm (0.032in) totally
missing the hat section that should have been drilled.
TSN: 63 hours/19 cycles.
Beech C90 Flight control cables rubbing.
Ref 510010205 (photo below)
Primary control cables (3off) fouling on aircraft
structure in rear fuselage. Found during C of A
inspection. Aircraft had only 68.8 hours since new.
Cessna 441 Nose landing gear actuator support
structure damaged. Ref 510010164
Nose landing gear actuator support structure
(skin and two extrusions) pushed upwards by
approximately 5mm to 10mm (0.19 to 0.39in). Suspect
caused by multiple retractions over an extended
time. Nil evidence of hard landing.
Cessna 441 Pressure bulkhead web cracked.
Ref 510010216
Aft pressure bulkhead web cracked around rivet
securing interior trim attachment rail. Outboard rivet
P/No: 511112077. TSN: 20,254 hours/17,845 landings.
Cessna TR182 Nose landin g gear collapsed.
Ref 510010143
Nose landing gear collapsed during landing. Propeller
contacted ground.
Cirrus SR20 Alternator hold down nuts
incorrect part. Ref 510010248
No2 alternator hold down nuts were incorrect part.
Nuts were PNo MS21044N5 Nylock nuts instead
of PNo MS21045-5 metal lock nuts. Found during
inspection for C of A.
P/No: MN21044N5. TSN: 2 hours/2 months.
Britten Norman BN2A20 Main landing wheel
bearings failed. Ref 510009977
RH main landing gear outboard wheel inner and outer
bearings failed with rollers missing. Wheel axle nut
and split pin were intact. Wheel bolts loose and
missing with one bolt rubbing on brake torque plate.
Tyre was flat.
P/No: 1383620629. TSO: 320 hours.
Cessna 172N Fuel shutoff selector suspect
faulty. Ref 510010137
Engine stopped during takeoff. Investigation could
find no faults with the fuel system except for a stiff
fuel selector. Following lubrication of the selector,
the engine ran normally. Suspect problem caused by
stiff selector.
Cessna 172RG Hydraulic power pack motor
contaminated. Ref 510010000
Hydraulic power pack electric motor contaminated
with hydraulic fluid.
Cessna 172S Aileron crossover cable frayed.
Ref 510010030
LH aileron crossover cable frayed in area where it
passes through the wing aft ribs.
P/No: 0510105364. TSN: 1,294 hours.
Cessna 182T Nose wheel tyre tube ruptured.
Ref 510010252 (photo below)
Nose wheel tyre tube ruptured.
P/No: 0923080. TSN: 250 hours.
Diamond DA42 Aileron control horn corroded.
Ref 510010008
LH and RH aileron control horns corroded in
numerous areas. Corrosion was most evident at
pushrod/bonding strap attachment location.
P/No: DV227100103. TSN: 576 hours/36 months.
Diamond DA42 Aircraft fuel pump transfer
switches not connected. Ref 510009914
LH and RH auxiliary fuel pump transfer switches
had not been connected. Fuel failed to transfer from
auxiliary tanks to main tanks. Investigation continuing.
Diamond DA42 Main landing gear actuator
housing corroded. Ref 510010005
RH main landing gear actuator housing corroded
P/No: X1100061C. TSN: 576 hours/36 months.
Gulfstream 500S Flap retraction actuator seal
incorrect part. Ref 510010142
Flap retraction actuator failed to operate. Actuator
disassembled and non-approved seal found fitted
to piston head. Seal appeared to be quad type seal
with an unknown part number. Correct seal is PNo
MS-28773-214. Unapproved/incorrect part.
Gulfstream 695A Starter-generator bearing
failed. Ref 510010165
Starter/generator rear support bearing failed causing
internal short circuit. TSO: 743 hours.
Jabiru 160DLSA Main landing gear leg
delaminated. Ref 510010021 (photo below)
LH main landing gear leg delaminated. Investigation
found resin had not fully penetrated composite layers.
P/No: 6204023. TSN: 121 hours.
Kavanagh G450 Balloon burner load frame
cracked. Ref 510010074
Balloon burner load frame cracked.
P/No: LF204. TSN: 558 hours/23 months.
Piper PA31350 Main landing gear power pack
heavy sludge. Ref 510010198
Main landing gear failed to extend using normal
and emergency selection. Landing gear eventually
extended and aircraft landed safely. Investigation
found heavy sludge build-up in the power pack
reservoir with the internal o-rings having gone hard.
P/No: WTC21351.
Piper PA31350 Main landing gear uplock hook
worn. Ref 510009942
LH main landing gear uplock hook worn. The LH main
wheel was stuck in the up position due to the uplock
hook wedged between the roller on the lower torque
link and the torque link it self. Uplock hook bracket
failed. Aircraft landed with main landing gear retracted.
TSN: 10,075 hours.
Swearingen SA227DC Hydraulic pump drive
shaft seal leaking. Ref 510009951
RH engine driven hydraulic pump leaking from drive
shaft seal. Loss of hydraulic fluid. Pump was 42.4
hours out of overhaul.
P/No: PV304426. TSO: 42 hours/25cycles/8 months.
Swearingen SA227DC Rudder pedal cracked.
Ref 510009956
Pilot’s RH rudder pedal cracked at RH web above
pivot point. Found during NDT inspection following
removal for refitment to another aircraft.
P/No: 2672003014. TSN: 13,084 hours.
Agusta-Bell A109E Tail rotor retaining nut
loose. Ref 510009999
Tail rotor retaining nut loose. Retaining nut was
prevented from loosening further by the lock washer.
P/No: 1090130851.
Bell 206B3 Emergency floatation system
incorrectly fitted. Ref 510010009
Floatation system would not operate correctly.
Investigation found the system incorrectly wired
and the installation not in accordance with the
manual. Necessary components also missing from
Bell 206B3 Hydraulic pressure hose ruptured.
Ref 510010096
Hydraulic pressure hose located between pump
and filter ruptured in area under “P” clamp. Loss of
hydraulic fluid.
P/No: 70010H000A180.
Bell 430 Windshield shattered. Ref 510009980
(photo below)
RH pilot’s windshield shattered. Initial investigation
could find no evidence of bird-strike or lightning strike
or single point of impact. Investigation continuing.
P/No: 222031105112B.
Piper PA31 Main landing gear actuator failed.
Ref 510009996
RH main landing gear actuator failed at rod end.
Actuator jammed between rear spar and side brace.
Skyfox CA25N Rudder cable broken.
Ref 510010027
RH rudder cable failed at swaged connection to pedal.
TSN: 2,400 hours.
Robinson R44 Tail rotor pitch control bearing
unserviceable. Ref 510010060
Tail rotor pitch control bearings running rough.
P/No: C0311.
Schweizer 269C Main rotor control rod worn.
Ref 510010112
Centre lateral control rod located between pilot
and co-pilot cyclic control worn against centre
console. Wear mark is approximately 19.05mm long
by 12.7mm long to a depth of 0.304mm and located
approximately 19.05mm from the lower rod end.
P/No: 269A9942. TSN: 437 hours/9 months.
TSO: 437 hours/9 months.
Sikorsky S76A Passenger window failed.
Ref 510010222
LH forward cabin window failed. A section of the
window which included the pop out air vent separated
from the aircraft. Investigation found that the vent was
tight in the window and a passenger gave it a ’light tap
with the palm of my hand‘ before the window failed.
P/No: CC3251.
Continental GTSIO520M Engine connecting rod
failed. Ref 510009950
RH engine No6 cylinder connecting rod suspect
failure. Hole in crankcase.
Continental IO550B Engine crankcase cracked.
Ref 510010162
Crankcase cracked in crankshaft rear journal support
structure. Crack length approximately 38mm. (1.5in)
TSN: 567 hours/84 months.
Piper PA34200T Main landing gear trunnion
attachment fitting broken. Ref 510010107
LH main landing gear forward trunnion attachment
fitting broken.
P/No: 67040012. TSN: 4,773 hours.
Skyfox CA25N Main landing gear bungee
failed. Ref 510010026
RH main landing gear bungee failed causing landing
gear to collapse and RH wing tip to contact ground.
Robinson R22BETA Main rotor blade spindle
bearing cracked. Ref 510010212 (photo below)
Main rotor blade spindle bearing cracked. Found
during inspection iaw AD/R22/30.
P/No: A1581. TSN: 1,620 hours.
Continental O470U Engine cylinder
unserviceable. Ref 510010244
No1 and No3 cylinders holed. Further examination
found numerous cracks in the head.
P/No: AEC631397. TSN: 1,400 hours.
Eurocopter AS350B2 Tail rotor pitch control
lever bushing worn. Ref 510010166
Tail rotor pitch control lever bushing loose in arm.
Found during inspection iaw AD/Ecuriel/45.
P/No: 350A33152600. TSO: 399 hours.
Jabiru JABIRU3300 Engine failed. Ref 510010025
Engine failed with large explosion and major
vibration. Inspection found massive internal damage.
Unable to determine sequence of failure.
Piper PA31350 NLG steering link arm
attachment bolts failed. Ref 510010003
(photo below)
Nose landing gear steering link arm attachment bolts
(3off) broken. Investigation found that one bolt had
been broken for some time while the other two had
failed recently. Suspect bolts over-torqued.
TSN: 16,413 hours.
Swearingen SA227DC Engine anti-ice pipe
broken. Ref 510009973
LH engine inlet anti-ice air pipe cracked and broken at
mounting boss on plenum. P3 air leak.
P/No: 8943825. TSN: 20,309 hours/28,324 cycles.
Eurocopter EC225LP Horizontal stabiliser skin
cracked. Ref 510010153
Horizontal stabiliser lower skin cracked. Crack length
approximately 300mm (12in).
P/No: 332A1310000402.
Pull-Out Section
Pilatus PC12 Pilot’s instruments static system
leaking. Ref 510009918
Pilot’s pressure instruments showing erroneous
readings compared to co-pilot’s instruments.
Investigation found a loose connection in the static
system at a T piece under the instrument panel.
Further investigation found the threads on the T
fitting stripped causing the static line to leak.
P/No: 264N04.
Swearingen SA227AC Autopilot yaw damper
servo seized. Ref 510010120
Autopilot system yaw damper rudder servo seized.
Unit subsequently freed up but a loose object was
heard moving inside the unit. Found during removal
to service another aircraft.
P/No: 6222366002. TSO: 5,245 hours.
Pull-Out Section
Lycoming HIO360A1A Engine tube broken.
Ref 510010086
Engine failed due to broken tube. Limited information
provided. Aircraft damaged during autorotation landing.
P/No: LW120980390. TSO: 1,321 hours.
Lycoming IGSO480A1E6 Engine cylinder piston
ring overheated. Ref 510010207
RH engine No4 and No6 cylinder oil compression
rings carboned up due to excessive heat and oil
carbonisation. Investigation found that No4 and No6
cylinders run hottest due to air flow over the engine.
The CHT and EGT probes are located on No5 cylinder
which runs cooler. The problem was cured when the
probes were relocated to the hottest running cylinders.
P/No: CN203. TSN: 150 hours. TSO: 150 hours.
Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine counterweight
rollers incorrect part. Ref 510010068
(photo below)
Major engine failure due to engine seizing in flight.
Investigation found the crankshaft broken due to
counterweight failure. Further investigation found the
counterweight rollers were the incorrect part number
for this model engine. Parts fitted were PNo 73648 and
PNo 76788. Correct PNo 72967 and PNo 72797. The
rollers fitted were approximately 0.254mm smaller in
LH engine starter motor housing and drive gear cracked.
TSN: 1,890 hours.
metal edges found around part number and serial
number markings.
P/No: 2A4802. TSN: 26,225 hours/10,880 cycles.
TSO: 26,225 hours/10,880 cycles.
GE CF680E1 Engine thrust reverser bolt
missing. Ref 510009965
No2 engine inboard thrust reverser forward hinge
attachment bolt missing. Bolt was found laying in the
hinge beam structure. Investigation continuing.
P/No: 683L249G04.
PWA PT6A67B Engine failed due oil loss.
Ref 510009930
Engine failed suspect due to loss of engine oil.
Investigation continuing.
P/No: PT6A67B. TSN: 5,618 hours/6,512 cycles.
TSO: 1,120 hours/987 cycles.
GE CFM563C Compressor bleed valve motor
failed. Ref 510010069
No1 engine EGT exceeded during takeoff.
Investigation found the variable bleed valves failed to
close due to motor failure.
Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine compressor
blade failed. Ref 510010018
No4 engine surge. Investigation found damage to
Stage 1, Stage 2 and Stage 3 Intermediate Pressure
Compressor (IPC) blades. Stage 4 IPC blade (1off)
fractured with damage to the other Stage 4 blades.
Impact damage to blades in downstream IPC stages.
Damage to High Pressure Compressor (HPC) blades
from Stage 1 to stage 6. Further downstream impact
damage found in High Pressure Nozzle guide Vanes
(HPNGV) and turbine blades. Investigation continuing
GE CFM563C Engine MEC faulty. Ref 510010167
No2 engine failed. Single engine landing carried out.
Investigation found the Main Engine Control (MEC) faulty.
TSN: 43,517 hours. TSO: 43,517 hours.
GE CFM563C Turbine blade retainer bolt tabs
broken. Ref 510010090 (photo below)
High Pressure Turbine (HPT) forward blade retainer
bolt retaining tabs (2off) broken away. Tabs were
then trapped in the HPT disc/forward air seal
cavity. Tabs eventually broke through seal arm wall.
Investigation continuing.
Rolls Royce TAY65015 Turbine blade damaged.
Ref 510010040
No1 engine first stage high pressure turbine blade
leading edges damaged. Total of 88 blades affected.
Investigation continuing.
P/No: 65015. TSN: 30,134 hours/25,966 cycles.
TSO: 12,227 hours/6,779 cycles.
P/No: 7364876788. TSN: 1,019 hours.
Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine crankcase
cracked. Ref 510010235
Crankcase cracked under No3 cylinder. Crack length
approximately 25mm. (1in)
TSO: 1,535 hours.
Lycoming O235L2C Engine cylinder tappet
broken. Ref 510010121
No3 cylinder tappet broken and end missing. Tappet
end found in crankcase in three pieces. Crankcase
was found to be cracked in area adjacent to cam
lobe. Damage also to connecting rods, pistons and
crankshaft. Investigation continuing.
P/No: 15B26091. TSN: 2 hours.
Lycoming O360E1A6 Engine starter motor
housing/drive gear cracked. Ref 510010218
(photo below)
P/No: 1475M84P01. TSN: 45,303 hours/28,657
cycles. TSO: 5,368 hours/3,917 cycles.
GE CT79B Engine failed. Ref 510010055
LH engine failed. Initial investigation found oil in
the tailpipe. Engine replaced and sent for further
IAE V2527A5 Engine failed. Ref 510010178
RH engine failed. Flames from engine led to fire bottle
discharge although no fire warning indication was
present. Maximum EGT recorded at 840 degrees
C. Initial investigation found metal debris in the
tailpipe and evidence of a tailpipe fire. Investigation
IAE V2527A5 Engine failed to shutdown.
Ref 510010174
LH engine failed to shutdown using normal means.
Engine finally shutdown using the fire handle. Fault
code FMU/HC/EEC1. Three ground runs carried out
and engine shutdown was normal.
IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine disc cracked.
Ref 510010245
Stage 2 high pressure turbine hub cracked in blade
slot fir trees. Cracks found in a total of 17 positions.
Found during NDT inspection. Evidence of raised
Hartzell HCB3TN3 Propeller link pin screw
broken. Ref 510010091
During engine run following propeller change, the
aircraft began to shake violently. After the engine
was shut down, one propeller blade was found
to be spinning loose in the propeller hub. Further
investigation found the link pin screw broken off in
the hub. The retaining pin was found some distance
away from the aircraft and the screw head was found
to be still lock-wired. Further investigation found that
the counterweight had been incorrectly installed at
overhaul allowing the counterweight to contact the
screw head causing it to shear off.
P/No: B38406.
McCauley 3FF32C501 Propeller latch screw
failed. Ref 510009929
RH propeller latch screws failed/worn.
P/No: 84324. TSO: 586 hours.
Muhlbauer MTV12BCF Propeller control cable
broken. Ref 510010076
RH propeller pitch control cable failed. Investigation
found cable had been installed through too tight a
radius. Cable was part of STC to convert aircraft to
Lycoming engines.
P/No: C616126103002. TSN: 45 hours.
‘Correct analysis of a defect
is necessary. Taking preventive
action to anticipate a problem is
visionary,’ says Roger Alder,
from CASA’s continuing
airworthiness section.
I suspect I am not alone, and I think the reason most of us simply walk
over the bridge and settle in our assigned seat is that we are confident
the aeroplane, along with all the rest of the business of flying is, in a
word, reliable.
The kind reliability that gives us confidence in flying has been achieved
only after a lot of work by a great many people committed to excellence
in aircraft design, manufacture, operation and maintenance. Much of
it has involved learning lessons from history in order to avoid repeating
mistakes. “Lets make a rule so that doesn’t happen again”, has long
been the credo of regulators and manufacturers alike.
Because the results of these investigations have been ploughed back
into design, manufacturing, operation and maintenance of aircraft
whenever possible, we have largely been able to avoid suffering the
same problems over again, and flying has become safer.
Despite all that effort, many aircraft still fly with potential defects that
are already known about in their type, like a lurking bacterial infection.
Let’s make this a little more personal. In aircraft maintenance, without
memory, knowledge and context we are doomed to seeing the same
errors play out again and again, with predictable and often painful
results. As the Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana said:
‘Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’
I always ask ‘What has
been done to prevent
o of ten
happening again? ’ All to
g’. the answer is ‘Nothin
This brings us to what should be the top concern and activity of
everyone involved in aviation – effective preventive action. When
scanning through defect reports, I am always looking first for a good
description of the defect, because if this is sound, the corrective action,
and then, most importantly, the preventive action, will usually be
effective. I always ask ‘What has been done to prevent this happening
again?’ All too often the answer is ‘Nothing’. For example: what would you think if you saw a report of an
undercarriage collapse on a light twin? That’s likely one new propeller
and an engine overhaul at least. Then a little while later, on same
aeroplane, the other main undercarriage collapses for the same reason
the other main undercarriage collapsed. That’s another new propeller
and another engine overhaul. Then, just to finish things off, the nose
Many causes of failures and errors that have, literally, caused grief have
been discovered by diligent investigation, a science whose growth in
sophistication and scope parallels that of aviation itself. Pull-Out Section
and appropriate action to fix it
I could not get on board an aircraft that I suspected was going to
behave unpredictably or dangerously as a result of a failure in the
structure, propulsion or any other system. gear on the very same aeroplane collapses a
little while later, taking out both fairly new
propellers and, of course both engines will
likely need to be torn down again. Oh yes, did
I mention that the nose gear collapsed for the
same reason that both main gears collapsed?
Pull-Out Section
What would you do next if you operated a
fleet of these aeroplanes?
Formulating the preventive action most likely
to prevent a recurrence can be very complex
and costly and may be beyond the ability of
the person who discovered the true cause.
But that’s no excuse for not trying. A
maintenance engineer who merely replaces
components in the desperate hope of fixing
the same re-occurring problem without at
least pondering why the problem is happening
is demonstrating a lack of professionalism
comparable to that of a pilot who habitually
pushes back the annoying circuit breaker
which pops almost every flight.
Remember that solutions evolve: The initial
preventive action will be based on the
evidence at the time and previous experience.
If it appears to address the cause then well
and good.
But if the same or a similar defect reoccurs
prompting further investigation, so might the
preventive action evolve – sometimes into
something quite different from the initial
fix. If the preventive action evolves correctly
it corrects the problem without causing
another one.
In some cases the causes of a problem have
been identified long before and have been
addressed in the maintenance manual, a
service bulletin or, if it is an unsafe condition,
an airworthiness directive. Unfortunately
these sources of data are often ignored.
The problem is we humans. Because we are
only human, and may be uninformed, tired,
distracted, bored and stressed, we make
mistakes. Things still go wrong even with
the increasing use of machines employed to
minimise human error, called computers. They can eliminate or magnify human error
with exactly the same dispassion, as the
flight crew in the 2009 Tullamarine tail-strike
incident discovered.
There is no escape. Every aircraft, no matter
how brilliantly designed, carefully operated or
maintained will develop defects. How these
defects are handled will largely determine the
safety of the aircraft and those on board.
But humans are also the answer. Until
aircraft fix themselves, only human effort
and intellect can prevent isolated mechanical
problems from developing into the equivalent
of an epidemic that grounds the aircraft fleet
– or worse. If failure is a mechanical disease
then aircraft engineers are in the business
of immunisation.
Another quote: ‘If I have seen further it is
only by standing on the shoulders of giants,’
Sir Isaac Newton said. What he meant was
that he had benefitted from the discoveries
and insights of others. They had done the
hard basic work so he didn’t have to. Newton
was free to build on what his predecessors
had discovered.
When we pay careful attention to analysing
a defect, using all the available information
(such manuals, bulletins and airworthiness
directives) we can be like Newton. He
pushed science on by formulating the laws of
mechanics; our challenge is to think carefully
about what went wrong, to understand why
it happened and to take a few, usually simple
steps to make sure it doesn’t happen again.
If failure is
a mechanical
then aircraft
engineers are
in the
business of
18-31 December 2009
AD/GAF-N22/52 Amdt 1–Stub Wing Upper Front
Spar Cap
(MLG)–Modification / Replacement
Part 39–Turbine Engines
Part 39–Rotorcraft
Agusta A109 Series Helicopters
2009-0274-E–Main Rotor–Fixing Bolts of the Scissor
Fitting Assembly–Inspection/Replacement
Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters
2009-0271–Equipment & Furnishings–Hydraulic
Hoist Cable–Limitation / Modification
2009-0275-E–Fuselage–Intermediate Gear Box (IGB)
Fairing Gutter–Inspection/Replacement
Part 39–Above 5700kg
ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0242–Time Limits / Maintenance Checks –
Certification Maintenance Requirements and Critical
Design Configuration Control Limitations (Fuel Tank Safety)
Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland)
DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes
CF-2009-45–Aileron Terminal Quadrant Support
Bracket Cracking
CF-2009-46–Landing Gear Alternate Extension
Access Panel–Potential Failure to Open
Rolls Royce Germany Turbine Engines–
BR700 Series
2009-0273-E–Engine–High Pressure Compressor/Front
Drum Assembly–Reduced Life Limit/Replacement
Part 39–Equipment
Fire Protection Equipment
2009-0278–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire
1–14 January 2010
Part 39–Rotorcraft
Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series Helicopters
AD/S-PUMA/60 Amdt 1–Fuselage Inclined Gearbox
Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED
AD/S-PUMA/81–Fuselage–Intermediate Gearbox
Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED
AD/S-PUMA/82 Amdt 1–Hydraulic Hoist Cable–
Eurocopter AS 350 (Ecureuil) Series Helicopters
2010-0006–Tail Rotor Pitch-Change Links
2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers
British Aerospace BAe 3100 (Jetstream)
Series Aeroplanes
2009-0267–Flight Controls–Flap Selector Switch
Dornier 328 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0266–Flight Controls–Aileron Trim and Rudder
Spring Tab Fittings–Replacement
Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes
2009-0268–Landing Gear–Main Landing Gear
(MLG) Upper Side Brace Assembly–Modification /
2009-0269–Landing Gear–Main Landing Gear
Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters
2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers
Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters
AD/EC 225/9 Amdt 1–Fuselage–Intermediate
Gearbox Fairing Gutter–CANCELLED
Part 39–Below 5700kg
Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series
AD/TBM 700/48 Amdt 1–Main Landing Gear Wheel
2010-0005–Main Landing Gear Wheel Axle
Beechcraft 18 Series Aeroplanes
AD/BEECH 18/17 Amdt 5–Aircraft Modification,
Inspection and Retirement
GAF N22 and N24 Series Aeroplanes
Piper PA-46 (Malibu) Series Aeroplanes
AD/PA-46/19 Amdt 1–Wing and Fuselage Structural
Fatigue Limitations–CANCELLED
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321
Series Aeroplanes
AD/A320/8 Amdt 2–Angle of Attack Sensors
Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0237-E (Correction)–Oxygen–Oxygen
ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes
AD/ATR 42/19 Amdt 2–Fuel Tank Safety Fuel
Airworthiness Limitations–CANCELLED
2009-0276–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers
Boeing 717 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B717/15–Flight Management System–
Boeing 727 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B727/209–Fuel System Airworthiness
Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B737/329–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED
AD/B737/331–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED
2010-01-08–Wing Centre Section Lower Stringers
2008-10-10R1–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems
2008-10-09R1–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems
2009-20-11 (Correction)–Fuel System Limitations–
2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter
2009-26-04–MLG Forward Trunnion Pins
2010-01-09–Fuselage Skin at Stringers S1 and S2
right, between STA 827 and STA 847
Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes
2008-10-06R1–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems
2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter
AD/B747/51–Fuselage Frames–Aft Cargo Bay–
Service Difficulty Reports
CALL: 131
02 6217 1920
or contact your local CASA Airworthiness Inspector [freepost]
Service Difficulty Reports, Reply Paid 2005, CASA, Canberra, ACT 2601
Online: www. casa.gov.au/airworth/sdr
Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger)
Series Aeroplanes
CF-2009-47–Air Driven Generator Electrical Harness
Assembly–Potential Failure Due to Corrosion
CF-2009-48–Air Driven Generator–Non-Conforming
Balance Washers Screws
Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil)
Series Helicopters
2010-0006–Tail Rotor Pitch-Change Links
2009-0277–Portable Halon 1211 Fire Extinguishers
Grob G115 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0279–Canopy Jettison
Pull-Out Section
Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters
2009-0275-E–Fuselage–Intermediate Gear Box (IGB)
Fairing Gutter–Inspection/Replacement
CFM International Turbine Engines–CFM56 Series
2009-0270–Engine–LPT Rotor / Stator Assembly–
AD/B747/52–Lower Fuselage Frames–CANCELLED
AD/B747/155 Amdt 2–Thrust Reverser Pneumatic Drive
AD/B747/157 Amdt 2–P&W JT9D Aft Engine Mount
Tangential Link
1–14 January 2010 (Cont.)
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Pull-Out Section
Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes
2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter
AD/B767/242–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED
Boeing 777 Series Aeroplanes
2009-24-08–Fuselage Scribe Line Damage
2009-26-03–Standby Static Inverter
Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger)
Series Aeroplanes
CF-2009-50–Air-Driven Generator (ADG)–NonConforming Balance Washer Screws
British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes
2010-0001-E–Nose Landing Gear
AD/BAe 146/137 Amdt 1–Nose Landing Gear–
Cessna 560 (Citation V) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 560/9–Minimum Airspeed Placards–
AD/CESSNA 560/11–Aileron Fairlead Interference
Cessna 680 (Citation Sovereign) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 680/2–Honeywell Primus Epic System
Cessna 750 (Citation X) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 750/4–Elevator Inboard–Hinge
AD/CESSNA 750/5–Reset Circuit Breakers–
Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series Aeroplanes
2009-0216R1–Horizontal Stabilizer Control Unit
Dog- Link Attachment
SAAB SF340 Series Aeroplanes
AD/SF340/54 Amdt 2–Ceiling and Lavatory Lights–
AD/SF340/83–Replacement of Hydraulic Hoses–
AD/SF340/109–Ceiling and Lavatory Fluorescent Lights
AD/SF340/110–Passenger Compartment
Fluorescent Lights
Part 39–Piston Engines
Lycoming Piston Engines
AD/LYC/119–ECi Cylinder Assemblies–CANCELLED
2009-26-12–ECi Cylinder Assemblies
Part 39–Turbine Engines
AlliedSignal (Garrett/AiResearch) Turbine
Engines–TFE731 Series
AD/TFE 731/24 Amdt 1–First and Second Stage Low
Pressure Turbine Discs
AD/TFE 731/26 Amdt 1–Low Pressure Turbine First
and Second Stage Disc Suspect Material Properties
Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines–
PW4000 Series
AD/PW4000/6–Inspection of Critical Life-limited
Rotating Engine Components – CANCELLED
AD/PW4000/10–Engine Stability Improvements–
Turbomeca Turbine Engines–Astazou Series
2010-0004–Engine Rotating Assembly–Third Stage
Turbine Wheel–Inspection / Removal
Propellers–Fixed Pitch
AD/PFP/19–Blade Leading Edge Protection–
2006-0345R1–Propeller Blade Leading Edge
Part 39–Below 5700kg
Propellers–Variable Pitch–MT
AD/PMTV/2–Blade Leading Edge Protection–
2006-0345R1–Propeller Blade Leading Edge
Ayres Thrush (Snow) Commander Series
AD/AC-SNOW/24 Amdt 5–Wing Spar–CANCELLED
2009-26-11–Wing Spar
29 January 2010 –
11 February 2010
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Part 39–Rotorcraft
Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
2010-02-04–Engine Fuel Shutoff Valves–Replacement
Bell Helicopter Textron 205 Series Helicopters
2010-03-03–Main Rotor Blades
Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B747/340–Fuselage Main Frame–CANCELLED
AD/B747/378–Airworthiness Limitations and
Inspections–Fuel Systems–CANCELLED
2010-01-01–Fuselage Main Frame
2010-01-10–Engine Nacelle Front Spar Chord Assembly
Bell Helicopter Textron 212 Series Helicopters
2010-03-03–Main Rotor Blades
15–28 January 2010
British Aerospace BAe 146 Series Aeroplanes
AD/BAe 146/139–Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley
2009-0205R1–Aileron Interconnect Cable Pulley Guards
Cessna 550 (Citation II) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 550/2–Landing Gear–Structural Life
Cessna 560 (Citation V) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 560/7 Amdt 1–Engine and Auxiliary
Power Unit Fire Bottle Wiring
Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) Series Aeroplanes
AD/EMB-120/11 Amdt 2–AHRS Power Interruption
Part 39–Turbine Engines
AlliedSignal (Lycoming) Turbine Engines–
ALF502 and LF507 Series
AD/ALF/15–Fuel Manifold Inspections–CANCELLED
2009-26-06–Inspection of Fuel Manifold Assemblies
for Cracks
CFM International Turbine Engines–CFM56 Series
2010-01-05–Low Pressure Turbine Rear Frames
General Electric Turbine Engines–CF34 Series
AD/CF34/5 Amdt 3–Fan Disks–CANCELLED
AD/CF34/13 Amdt 1–Uncontained Fan Disk Failure–
2009-26-09–Fan Disk Inspection for Electrical ArcOut Indications
2010-01-04–Inspections of Fan Blades and Actuator
Head Hoses
Rolls Royce Germany Turbine Engines–
BR700 Series
AD/BR700/8–High Pressure Compressor–
Rolls Royce Turbine Engines–RB211 Series
2010-0008–Engine Intermediate Pressure Splines
Part 39–Equipment
Oxygen Systems
2009-21-10R1–AVOX Systems and B/E Aerospace
Oxygen Cylinder Assemblies, as Installed on Various
Transport Airplanes
Parachute Equipment
2010-0009-E–Emergency Parachutes Thinback T104
and Slimpack T204
Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series
AD/S-PUMA/53 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap
2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist
Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement /
Eurocopter AS 350 (Ecureuil) Series
AD/ECUREUIL/101 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt
2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211
Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement
2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist
Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification
Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series
AD/AS 355/78 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap
2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211
Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement
2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist
Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification
Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters
2009-0277R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211
Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement
Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series
AD/DAUPHIN/71 Amdt 1–Hoist Operator’s Belt Snap
2010-0014–Equipment and Furnishings–Hoist
Operator’s Belt Snap Hook–Replacement / Modification
Sikorsky S-92 Series Helicopters
2009-23-51–MGB Mounting Foot Pads and Foot Ribs
Part 39–Below 5700kg
Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series
2010-0012–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211 Fire
Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement
Pacific Aerospace Corporation Cresco Series
AD/CRESCO/5 Amdt 1–Aileron Control Cables
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
AD/A330/106–Rudder Side Shell Skin–CANCELLED
2010-0016R1–Navigation–Thales Avionics Angle of
Attack (AoA) Probe–Inspection / Replacement
2010-0018–Fuel–Wing Tank Fuel Pressure Switch–
2010-0021–Rudder Side Shell Skin
Propellers–Variable Pitch–Hartzell
AD/PHZL/86 Amdt 1–Propeller Hub Cracks–
11 March 2010
ATR 42 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0276R1–Fire Protection–Portable Halon 1211
Fire Extinguishers–Identification / Replacement
12–25 February 2010
Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) 206 and
Agusta Bell 206 Series Helicopters
CF-2010-07–Non-Conforming Tail Rotor Disc Assembly
Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B747/332–Fuselage Stringers at Body Station
460, 480, and 500 Frame Locations–CANCELLED
2010-01-02–Fuselage Stringers at Body Station 460,
480 and 500 Frame Locations
2010-03-05–Upper Deck Floor Beam Upper Chords
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B767/78 Amdt 1–Midspar Fuse Pins–
AD/B767/130–Nacelle Strut and Wing Structure–
2010-03-08–Midspar Fuse Pins
Bombardier BD-700 Series Aeroplanes
CF-2010-01–Ram Air Turbine (RAT)–Non-Conforming
Balance Washer Screws
Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland)
DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes
CF-2010-05–Angle of Attack Vane–Heating Element
Ageing and Resolver Oil Contamination
Embraer ERJ-170 Series Aeroplanes
2010-01-01–Automatic Activation of Engine Inlet Ice
Protection System
Embraer ERJ-190 Series Aeroplanes
2010-01-02–Air Management System Controller Card
Part 39–Piston Engines
Thielert Piston Engines
2010-0020–Engine–Blow-by Oil Separator–
Part 39–Turbine Engines
Eurocopter EC 120 Series Helicopters
2010-0026-E–Main Rotor Head–Rotor Hub Inspection
Eurocopter SA 360 and SA 365 (Dauphin) Series
AD/DAUPHIN/93–Fuselage–Upper Fin/Fenestron
Part 39–Below 5700kg
Part 39–Below 5700kg
Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series
2009-0238R1–Towing Bar Foam Pad
Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0105R2–Flight Controls–Elevator Tip
Assemblies–Inspection / Replacement
Columbia (formerly Lancair) LC40, LC41 and
LC42 Series Aeroplanes
AD/LC40/3 Amdt 1–Rudder Hinges and Hinge Brackets
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Part 39–Above 5700kg
Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series
AD/A320/199 Amdt 1–State of Design
Airworthiness Directives
2010-0027–Fuel–Fuel Tank Harness Ring Tags–
Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
AD/A330/67 Amdt 1–Keel Beam Fastener Holes at
Frame 40–Inspection–CANCELLED
2010-0024–Keel Beam Fastener Holes at Frame FR40
Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B737/250 Amdt 3–Forward Entry Door Forward
and Aft Side Intercostals
Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B767/255–Nacelle Strut and Wing Structure–
RR Engines
British Aerospace (Scottish Aviation) Twin
Pioneer Series Aeroplanes
AD/SA-TP/1–Wing Bracing Strut Internal V Brace in
AD/SA-TP/2–Hydraulic Valve–Strengthened Gland–
AD/SA-TP/3–Lift Strut Incorporating Multi Bolt
Attachment for Stabilising Strut–CANCELLED
AD/SA-TP/4–Stabiliser Strut SA.B3.20.334–
AD/SA-TP/5–Throttle and CSU Controls–
AD/SA-TP/6–Lift Strut Steel Fittings–CANCELLED
Pratt and Whitney Turbine Engines–PW600
CF-2010-02–Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) Fuel
Filter Bypass Valve Wear
CF-2010-03–Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) Fuel
Filter Bypass Valve Wear
Cessna 750 (Citation X) Series Aeroplanes
AD/CESSNA 750/3 Amdt 1–Auxiliary Power Unit Fire
Bottle Wiring
AD/CESSNA 750/6–Roll Feel and Centering Bungee
Part 39–Equipment
Propellers–Fixed Pitch
AD/PFP/17 Amdt 4–Hub Cracking–CANCELLED
Fire Protection Equipment
2009-0262R1–Fire Protection–Halon 1211 Fire
Eurocopter EC 225 Series Helicopters
2010-0030–Pilots and Co-Pilots Floor Attachment Screws
Part 39–Equipment
26 February–
Airbus Industrie A330 Series Aeroplanes
2010-0034 (Correction)–Landing Gear–Nose Landing
Gear (NLG) Main Fitting and Sliding Tube–Inspection
Airbus Industrie A380 Series Aeroplanes
2009-0113R1–Wings–Movable Flap Track Fairing
Number 4 (MFTF#4)–Inspection / Replacement
Beechcraft 300 Series Aeroplanes
2010-05-10–Pitot Heat Annunciation
Boeing 737 Series Aeroplanes
2010-05-13–Fuselage Skin Scribe Lines
Boeing 747 Series Aeroplanes
2010-05-03–Structures–Wing side of body joint,
Horizontal Stabiliser side of body joint, and Fuselage
circumferential splice–Inspection
2010-05-11–Installation of Closeout Panel and
Moisture Curtain
Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger)
Series Aeroplanes
AD/CL-600/54 Amdt 1–Overwing Emergency Exit
CF-2009-49R1–Wing Leading Edge Thermal
Switches and Wing Anti-Ice Duct Piccolo Tubes–
Airworthiness Limitation Tasks
CF-2010-04–Angle of Attack (AoA) Transducer–
Resolver Oil Contamination
CF-2009-02R1–Overwing Emergency Exit Placards
Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series
2010-0023–Engine and Main Gearbox Cowling
Pull-Out Section
29 January 2010–
11 February 2010 (Cont.)
Part 39–Rotorcraft
Part 39–Rotorcraft
associated manual of standards
(MOS) instead of an ad hoc
series of ADs will allow aircraft
operators to identify and comply
with requirements relevant to
their operation.
and the AD General series
Any competent engineer keeps a tidy workshop;
the best also review their toolkits from time to time,
checking they have the appropriate instruments for
the job. This is essentially what CASA is doing with
the new Civil Aviation Safety Regulations Part 90.
From May 1 2010, the Part 90 regulations, which govern additional
airworthiness requirements will replace a number of long-standing
general airworthiness directives. Specifically, Part 90 will replace the
current airworthiness directives (ADs) in the AD/GENERAL series that
require the incorporation of retroactive airworthiness standards.
It’s a change that will streamline airworthiness regulations and
harmonise them with international standards. Specifically, retroactive
airworthiness standards for air transport operations are being updated
to align more closely with the US Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR)
Parts 121/135 and European Joint Aviation Requirement (JAR) 26.
The change shifts these aspects of airworthiness from the
maintenance to the safety regulation sphere. This is significant
because compliance in these areas will no longer require a sign-off
from a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME).
Requiring a LAME to sign off periodic maintenance on aspects of
airworthiness that are not strictly maintenance related is an inefficient
use of the LAME’s time and the aircraft operator’s money. These
aspects will now be covered, just as stringently, but with less regulatory
burden, under safety regulation.
Having additional airworthiness requirements in Part 90 and its
While Part 90 is applicable to
all aircraft, (but not gliders and
balloons), in practice the burden
of compliance will be borne
mostly by aeroplanes engaged
in air transport operations. For
most of these the change in regulatory
burden will be light, because the introduction
of Part 90 is a transplant of requirements
from airworthiness directives, which means
the majority of aircraft already comply fully
with the Part 90 requirements. However,
in consultation with industry, CASA has
taken the opportunity to align some existing
requirements with international standards.
Operators of some older 20-30 seat aircraft
used in air transport operations will face
some additional retroactive airworthiness
requirements concerning floor proximity
escape path marking and toilet smoke
detectors. However, this rule does not become
effective until March 2012.
Additionally, all aircraft above 5700kg will
need to meet passenger seat flammability
requirements, but again, there is time to
plan compliance as this requirement doesn’t
become effective until 2016.
The airworthiness directives being replaced
by Part 90 evolved to accommodate a
range of exclusions. These were based on
alternate means of compliance, which
involved remedying the defect in question
with an approved repair different from the
one specified. All exclusions issued before
the effective date of Part 90 will remain
in force, providing the conditions of the
exclusion continue to be met and provisions
have been made for a similar exclusion
mechanism under Part 90. The effect of part
90 will be to make a difficult, but important
task, slightly easier.
A brief shining moment
Name withheld by request
A flash of light was the mysterious precursor to a horrifyingly
close encounter on an isolated runway.
Late afternoon light floods across the GAFA, the
great Australian emptiness.
I am over the Nullarbor Plain, and have just
intercepted the steel radial of the Trans
Continental rail line leading me at last to my
destination field.
I watch to see if I can see anything departing off
09, but see nothing. Making a wide downwind
for 09, I check the windsock and runways, and
do pre-landing checks, setting the aircraft up for
touchdown. After the turn to line up, I pull on full
flap and say and do my final ritual check. ‘Rich,
fine, green, down. Last chance’, touching the
mixture and pitch levers, and making sure there
are three green lights. No worries, conditions are
good and I’ve done this a thousand times before. I
plan to land on the keys so I can turn down 18 for
the fuel bowser.
Whether it was the subconscious memory of that
light flash, or just pure luck and/or outrageous
fortune, I have no idea. For some unknown
reason, I had eased up in the seat and pushed
the nose down a tad, a little to better see my
touchdown target perhaps? Slightly high for
the keys and 100 metres to go, … and about 50
metres beyond, to my absolute amazement, was
a person walking away from the threshold down
the centreline, pushing a paint machine!
A poke of power, a swerve off the centre line,
and he blurred as I passed, to make a rough
touchdown, near the 18 intersection. As I taxied
slowly down towards the bowser, it was difficult
to compose myself, with a turmoil of thoughts.
What if … I had chosen 18 and a slight cross
wind, easier for the bowser?
What if … I had decided to use 09, and some
downwind to save some time?
What if … I had not had that final peek? The end
result doesn’t bear thinking about.
There is no doubt in my mind, that it would
have been a fatal accident, with all its terrible
consequences. The guy that turned up at the
bowser was much more shaken than I was; he
would have been the victim.
How did the chain of circumstances come to this?
I didn’t spot him on or near the threshold during
my wide circuit. He had a hand-held radio in his
pocket, but the battery had gone flat, so he hadn’t
heard my radio calls.
Still in the descent and about 10 miles out, I see a
flash of light–from an aircraft windscreen?–that
appears to be about the western end of runway
27. I haven’t heard any radio calls from any
other aircraft, so I check I am on the right CTAF
frequency and repeat my inbound call. No reply.
‘What if …!’
He was walking away from the threshold, and
looking down at his line marking, so he couldn’t
have seen me anyway. And with the racket made
by the line marker’s engine, he hadn’t heard the
aircraft approach from behind either.
All was well that ended well, but it was as close
as either of us ever want to go.
For both of us it was an extremely salutary
lesson. No radio calls doesn’t mean there’s
nobody out there. And the impression
that it’s clear to land, doesn’t always
mean that it is, as others have
found to dreadful cost.
As flying will continue to
show: be prepared to expect
the unexpected.
turn e guy
mo owse up at
re s
he haken as mu
uld than h
the have I was
tim een
It still makes Bruce Ainsworth cringe to
think of how he allowed assumption to
override checking the facts on the ground.
In the 1970s I was employed to secure the observance
of various industrial laws – those applying to outback
cattle and sheep stations in the western third of Australia
included. As I had a PPL, using a light aircraft was the
obvious choice. On each journey I flew accompanied by
a CPL holder who had extensive aviation experience in
Australia and overseas, and a non-pilot colleague. Having
the extra pilot enabled me not to overburden myself with
work and flying. We split the flying, usually leg by leg.
The trips were lengthy, up to 14 days with a weekend
break along the track. They were also extensive – up to
6,000nm. Over a five and a half year period I visited some
200 stations using mainly Cessna 210s but also Cessna
182s, a Beechcraft 35 (Bonanza) and a Mooney M20E.
Naturally, using aircraft landing areas there were many
challenges. Short strips; rough surfaces; hot weather
operations; the risk of stock on the strip; the possibility of
horses pulling broken fencing wire onto the strip; willywillies in the circuit area (and on the ground after landing).
As a practice, I always phoned stations on the itinerary
a week or so before setting out in order to explain the
nature of our business and to get the OK to use their
strip. I also took the opportunity to get an update on strip
condition. If there was a pilot among the staff – and there
were quite a few in those days doing mill runs and some
stock spotting for the muster–the advice was pretty good.
Local knowledge is so important when venturing into a
new area. Advice, although well-meaning, from non-pilots
on the staff was inclined to be over optimistic about strip
condition and hazards.
As well my usual practice was to talk to a Royal Flying Doctor
Service pilot who had visited dozens of stations in the area
as part of her work. Her advice was very useful particularly
as to likely strip condition and approach hazards.
The occasion about which I write arose in the Pilbara.
I had not been able to raise anyone at the station concerned
– not unusual given the difficulties of contacting people
in the outback. I had written to the station manager and
notified the date and time of our planned arrival, but had
not received a reply. This was not unusual either as quite
often a station staff member would be waiting at the
strip at the appointed time even when there had been no
acknowledgement of my letter.
On lodging our flight plan at Port Hedland – we always
flew full reporting by the way – the Flight Service Officer
remarked: ‘there haven’t been many movements out of this
first station over the last few years’. ‘It should be OK,’ I said,
knowing that an elderly relative had recently completed a
five-day tour through the area (including this station) in a
Baron. If a Baron could get in and out our C210 should be
OK. ‘Oh well,’ said the FSO ‘look for washaways across the
strip, as there has been some heavy rain in that area lately’.
We departed Port Hedland at 0900 local time with three
stations on our itinerary, and aiming for an overnight
in Carnarvon.
Before 1000hrs we had the station homestead in sight
– we always navigated to homesteads, not strips, for
obvious reasons. We noticed that station staff members
were mustering cattle between the homestead and where
we expected the strip to be.
Now for the strip. It should be three nautical
miles to the southwest of the homestead.
After a few minutes searching we saw the
white corner markers. No windsock – not at
all unusual on the strips we needed to visit.
Which way is the dust from the mustering
blowing? Is there any smoke? Are there any
active windmills? How is the wind moving over
the dam? Which way are the trees moving?
Which way are the birds taking off? What are
the forecast local area winds? Mmm… there
is a definite southerly drift of about 10kts; we
will land to the north. Let’s do a practice run
first just to check the surface and the length
and to see if any stock are around.
Steady at 120kts to the right of the strip. ‘You
check the number of seconds we take from end
to end and I’ll concentrate on other features.’
Nineteen seconds at 120kts–that’s just over
3800 feet. For current temperature, wind and
surface we will need less than 2500 feet and
with a quarter less of the strip because of the
washaway we have over 2800 feet. There is
only low scrub at the southern end and small
trees at the northern end. We’ll land to the
north of the washaway.
Round out, power off, touchdown – good grief! The spinifex is as high
as the underside of the wings! It’s more open a bit to the right. Cancel
search and rescue, shut down.
Now what do we do? I attended to the business of the visit and the
others inspected the rest of the strip. Some 100 metres up the strip,
camouflaged by the spinifex, was a 20cm diameter log, obviously
washed there by the heavy rains spoken of by the FSO. We were going
to have to use the vehicle track on the strip for take-off. But we needed
to clear some encroaching spinifex first and fill in the washaway so we
had a safe length. A couple of star pickets helped us to do both. The
ground was so hard we had to be satisfied with patching the washaway
at three points – main wheels and nose wheel.
Two hours later we pushed the Centurion almost to the southern end of the
strip – with the tail just near the rear fence. Run up very carefully done,
brakes off, careful to guide the wheels over the repairs, 40kts, 10 degrees
of flap, lift off, climb out. An uneventful flight to Carnarvon followed
where regrettably we had to cancel the other two planned visits.
On returning to Perth I spoke to the elderly relative who had been to that
station in a Baron. ‘Oh no, we didn’t fly to that one; we went by bus from
the town where we stayed overnight’.
‘Assume’ in Roget’s Thesaurus refers to ‘belief’, ‘faith’, ‘hope’. None of
which are a substitute for careful checking.
Even though this incident was more than 30 years ago I still reflect on
it and wonder how I got myself into it when my planning was routinely
very thorough. There were other situations over those years which
were difficult, but all their variables had been covered off and so risk
was minimised. It still embarrasses me to reflect on it.
‘Assume’ in Roget’s
Thesaurus refers to
‘belief’, ‘faith’, ‘hope’. None
of which are a substitute
for careful checking.
‘There is a washaway right across the strip
about a quarter of the way down. It’s worse
on the eastern side where there is evidence
of station vehicles using the full length of
the strip rather than the track just outside
the eastern boundary. The track has much
more significant washaways through it (the
reason for the strip being used) but only one
washaway extends to the strip. There is also
some spinifex regrowth – not unusual in this
area and usually only about 10cm high and
fairly sparse – a little bumpy, but quite safe.
We climb to circuit height do the downwind checks, report: ‘circuit
area will call on the ground.’ We arrive short final for a short-field
landing as a precaution, keeping a watch for stock and the washaway.
Sometimes it’s important to listen to your doubts, even
when there seem to be perfectly good explanations for
something that just doesn’t feel right.
Name withheld by request
It was a special day. I had graduated with my private
pilot’s licence two weeks earlier and today I was to set off
from Moorabbin for a day trip to Phillip Island with my
first passengers. They were my six-year-old son Joseph
and a family friend called Beth.
I was aware of the possibilities for carelessness when
others (particularly loved ones) were present, so I had
done slow, careful nav. preparation for the trip in a Cessna
172. I also got Beth to take Joseph away for a bit while I
did the walk around. Everything seemed to be in order, so
we took some photos to commemorate the occasion and
prepared to depart.
I had done the vast majority of my training on the Cessna
152 and seen the nasty side of it (stall characteristics). I
guess you could say that I therefore felt relatively relaxed
in the 172.
As we taxied to the run-up area the steering felt a little stiff,
but I made it around the corners fine (I had always found
Cessnas hard to steer). I was also remembering my instructor
telling me not to put undue pressure on the 172 rudder pedals
on the ground as they (unlike the 152) were connected to the
nose wheel. This he said put a lot of pressure on the steering
linkages, particularly at low speed.
With run-ups safely done, we headed to the 35L threshold.
As we were taxiing, I tested the steering again and started
to feel uncomfortable with the tightness. Due to my low
hours on the 172, I had earlier assumed it had to do with
the greater weight, the linkages described earlier, or that
was just how a 172 felt ... I may have also ignored it due
to not wanting to appear incompetent in front of Joseph
and Beth!
By the time we reached the threshold, I had to act.
Mercifully, there was no-one behind me on the taxiway
(if there had been, I may have given in to temptation to
take off). I idled the engine, put the park brake on, and
told my passengers: ‘hold on for a second, I just have to
check something’.
They say in the CRM stuff that having discovered one
mistake, it’s important not to make another...
On exiting the aircraft (which I now know not to do when
the prop is spinning), I managed to knock the park brake
off with my knee. Mercifully again, I noticed the plane
moving fairly quickly, so I jumped back in and secured
the brake again (still not switching off though).
On exiting, I discovered the problem immediately.
There was a rudder lock faithfully secured to the vertical
stabiliser! In the wind provided by the prop, I unwound
the wing nut and brought the lock back into the cabin.
With this in mind, I put the stiffness in the steering to the
back of my mind.
...I put the stiffness in the
steering to the back of my mind.
My heart was beating hard the whole way over to Phillip Island
but thankfully it was an uneventful flight and I managed quite an
acceptable approach and landing. Likewise the return.
In the six months since, I have gone over the events of that day a
thousand times. Apart from the obvious (my complete stupidity at
missing the lock in the walk-around), I think that the Swiss cheese
model did explain part of my error.
I certainly now know that if I’m unsure about anything whatsoever,
there’s no shame in pulling off a taxiway, shutting down and getting
out for a (safe) closer look.
On recollection, the thing that scares me most of all (apart from
trying to land in a crosswind with negligible rudder authority) was the
possibility of the plane running off on me while I was outside, with
Beth and my precious son in the back. It doesn’t bear thinking about.
I guess that’s another reason that they get you to check the idle speed
during run-ups!
They say in the CRM stuff that
having discovered one mistake,
it’s important not to make
s a cross-hire
1 Th
hool. I had neve
from another sc
ck prior to that
our school’s
day, as none of
Cessnas had th
hite, the same
2 T
rtical stabiliser.
colour as the ve
o red tape on th
have caught my
xcuse though).
attention (no e
d at taking my
4 I was excite
was obviously
to my walk
not as attentive
uld have been.
alerted by the
5 I should have
rudder pedals
stiffness of the
n-up, but the
on taxi to the ru
rds about not
instructor’s wo
at low speed in
turning sharply
d my judgemen
the 172 cloude
N a m e w it h h
The pilot knew the wet conditions would require
additional attention. But it was the one thing he didn’t
check that could have killed him and his passengers.
The­previous w
the region had
some fairly s
av y
weather, with he
s over
rain and storm
t wo days.
eld by r
eque s
Flying skydivers was my first real flying job.
The responsibility of getting skydivers from
point A to point B and then allowing them to
fall to point C was something I really enjoyed–
and the tedium of going up and down to
10,000ft was yet to set in. So as I was driving
to the airstrip this day I was looking forward
to the challenges ahead.
The­ previous week the region had had some
fairly serious weather, with heavy rain and
storms over two days. Before I even got to the
field I knew I would have to be extra vigilant
with my pre-flight checks to ensure there was
no damage from the previous day’s weather.
I also knew to double-check there was no
water in the fuel, look for any leaks in the
cockpit and ensure the runway surface had
not deteriorated. Having completed my preflight, everything was looking good. I drained
a small amount of water from the fuel tanks,
the fuel drums were nice and dry and the
runway surface was intact with just a few
lumps and bumps, nothing serious. All things
were pointing to a nice day of flying with clear
skies and calm winds–which was good
as there were several ‘loads’ ready to be
taken up.
As I waited at the plane, the first load
of four skydivers walked over. After
the jumpers did their preparations and
practice exits, I strapped on my chute
and conducted the pre-start checklist.
Everyone boarded and sat down. There
was a five knot easterly blowing, so for
this first load I was going to be taking off
to the east. With only a few metres from
the parking bay to the runway threshold
the start up, taxi and run-up went quickly
and smoothly. Now lined up on the runway
I instructed the jumpers that take off was
imminent and they took their positions.
As the speed built, we were soon flying, but
because I was still below normal rotate speed
I pushed the nose down to give me some
more speed and keep the plane in ground
effect. With trees coming up quickly at the
end of the runway and my airspeed having
increased sufficiently, I started my climb-out
although slightly slower than usual. I still had
to apply slight forward pressure to keep the
plane climbing at a low enough angle, but the
problem was easing and at around 1000 ft the
plane was back to normal.
During the climb I started to think about
what had caused the sharp upward pitch.
Had the jumpers shifted their weight too far
aft when I applied power and changed the
aircraft’s centre of gravity, or was there an
elevator control problem? Either way, the
plane was now handling fine and I decided to
continue the flight.
With the recent rains, water had leaked into the
aircraft’s tail. The drain on the underside had
been blocked which gave the water nowhere
to go. When I applied power on take off, the
water rushed back and drastically changed
the aircraft’s centre of gravity, tipping it into
a nose-high attitude. It’s hard to estimate
exactly how much water was in the tail, but
from the climb profile I know it had to be a
lot, as I was having to keep constant forward
control pressure to keep the nose from rising.
It was a sobering lesson to remember
to check the plane’s tail and the drain
after any rain: something which never
had occurred to me on that day.
I learnt a lot from this flight. First;
I should have rejected the take off
as soon as the nose pitched up, as I
knew there had to be something wrong
for it to have done that. It was
all well and good to control
the plane and successfully
complete the flight, but if
there is a problem so early in
the take-off roll, stop the plane
and get it checked while still
on the ground. And secondly;
after any heavy rain make
sure you check absolutely
everything. With a lot of
ageing aircraft around,
water is bound to leak in
somewhere. Best find it while
safely on the ground and
rather than worry about it
when in the air.
As I applied power smoothly, I was careful to
watch the engine temps and pressures. I was
aware that if anything was amiss it would most
likely show itself on the first flight of the day,
but the engine sounded perfect, as the gauges
confirmed. But after just five to 10 metres of
take-off roll the nose suddenly started to pitch
upward; this caught me slightly off guard, as
I was not near rotate speed and the wind was
calm. I immediately applied forward pressure
to the yoke and wound on forward trim. It
eased the pitch-up but the nose wheel was still
off the ground.
A few minutes later, I received a radio call
from the other pilot who was on the ground at
the drop zone, letting me know that on take
off there had been a large amount of liquid
pouring out of the tail of the plane. This had
only stopped when I had turned downwind
at around 1000 ft. It was like a light bulb
switching on–straight away I was able to piece
it all together.
... on take
off there had
been a lar
of liquid
pouring ou
of the tail t
the plane.
The Australian
Chief Commissioner’s
Over the last few issues, I
have described the various
elements that go to make up
the independent ATSB. I am
pleased to announce that we
now have our full complement
of commissioners, following the
appointment of Carolyn Walsh as
the Bureau’s second part-time Commissioner. Ms Walsh
commenced her three-year term on 8 March, joining
Commissioner Noel Hart and myself.
Commissioner Walsh brings a wealth of experience in
transport safety. Most recently she was the CEO of the
Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator in
New South Wales.
As we have reviewed the work of the ATSB, it has
become clear that we need to balance two things in our
investigations: ensuring we focus on what is most likely
to improve safety, while covering as many occurrences as
possible. In aviation, we receive about 15,000 notifications
each year, of which we classify about 8,000 as safety
occurrences. In recent times, we have investigated about
80 of those each year.
To get as wide a coverage as possible, we have created
a new investigation team to focus on what may have
been previously unexamined flight safety occurrences.
This team looks at less-prioritised incidents and
produces short summary reports. These reports compile
information on the circumstances surrounding an
occurrence and what safety action may have been taken
or identified as a result of it.
I take great pleasure in announcing the release of the first
of these investigation reports, compiled in the publication
Level 5 Factual Investigations: 1 December 2009 to
30 March 2010. You can find the new publication on the
ATSB website <www.atsb.gov.au>.
Finally, I draw your attention to the report in this issue on
a go-around occurrence AO-2007-044. This report shows
that key safety issues can be identified and resolved
through investigation of occurrences where there has
been no accident. For this to work as it should, the ATSB
needs to receive as much information as possible on
safety occurrences. We would remind you all to remain
alert to your reporting responsibilities so that we can all
work together to improve safety.
Martin Dolan
Chief Commissioner
Dangers of inclement weather
n 24 February 2009, at 1417 Eastern Standard Time, a Piper
Aircraft PA28-180 Cherokee, registered VH-DAC, departed
Normanton Airport, Queensland on a visual flight rules private
flight to Mount Isa with the pilot as the sole occupant.
Before departing Normanton, the pilot informed his partner by
telephone of his planned arrival time for Mount Isa. When the aircraft
did not arrive as advised, it was reported missing by the partner. The
next evening, a search and rescue helicopter located the wreckage of the
aircraft 2.5 km east of the direct track from Normanton to Mount Isa,
in a Designated Remote Area. The crew of the helicopter confirmed that
the pilot had received fatal injuries from the accident.
The wreckage trail extended about 109 m from the aircraft’s initial
impact with a tree to the main wreckage. Examination of the wreckage
indicated a high-speed, approximately 20 º nose-down, right-bank
collision with terrain, implying that the aircraft was not in a state of
controlled flight at that time. The examination did not reveal any preexisting technical fault that may have contributed to the accident.
Satellite images recorded at 1430 on 24 February 2009, indicated that
showers and thunderstorms were present in the general area of the
accident site. The pilot was not qualified for instrument flight, and
was relatively inexperienced at flying in instrument meteorological
conditions (IMC). That represented a number of the risk factors in
the development of spatial disorientation. If the pilot inadvertently
entered IMC while attempting to avoid the weather in the area, and
manoeuvred at low level in those conditions in an effort to regain visual
meteorological conditions, he may have either experienced spatial
disorientation and then lost control of the aircraft, or inadvertently
descended into terrain.
A review of Airservices Australia recorded air traffic services automatic
voice recording data found no record of any radio transmissions by the
pilot during the flight. According to witnesses, the pilot appeared wellrested the night before the flight, and had eaten lunch while conducting
business in Normanton.
The investigation could not conclusively determine the reason for the
collision with terrain. The aircraft wreckage trail indicated a heading
away from Mount Isa, the reverse of the planned track. The lack of any
apparent technical problems supported the conclusion that the pilot
most likely manoeuvred the aircraft for operational reasons, such as in
the case of inclement weather. Although carrying a portable 406 MHz
frequency emergency locator transmitter (ELT) satisfied the regulatory
requirements, the unit was not utilised as the pilot did not survive the
impact. The carriage of a portable ELT may also have limitations in the
event of a survivable but disabling impact. ■
ATSB investigation report AO-2009-009 released on 1 March 2010, avaliable on the
Aviation Safety Investigator
Altered procedures complicate go-around event
n 21 July 2007, an Airbus Industrie A320-232 aircraft, registered
VH-VQT, was being operated
by Jetstar on a scheduled international
passenger service between Christchurch,
New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia.
Prior to their departure, the crew had
been informed that weather conditions at
Melbourne Airport meant that an instrument approach to the decision height for
the approach was likely.
The crew had planned
accordingly, and were
prepared to conduct a
missed approach, since
a number of aircraft had
already done so because
of the low visibility due
to fog.
The aircraft operator, however, had
changed the go-around procedure and
moved the positive confirmation of
flight mode to a much later position in
the procedure. The changed procedure
required that a call be made after a
positive rate of climb was obtained. In this
instance, due to the aircraft continuing
to descend, with the crew distracted by
unexpected warnings and a subsequent
increased workload, this call could not
be made by the flight crew, and so the
standard operating procedure in support
of the go-around effectively paused at that
point. As a result, the crew never obtained
positive confirmation of the aircraft’s
flight mode.
The operator had not conducted a risk
analysis of the change to the procedure.
Nor did it comply with the incident
reporting requirements of its safety
management system (SMS), which was
part of its operations manual, or with the
reporting requirements of the Transport
Safety Investigation Act 2003.
This incident highlighted the potential for
unintended consequences when changes
to standard operating procedures are
introduced without first conducting an
appropriate risk analysis.
The ATSB considered this
issue serious enough to
issue a Safety Advisory
Notice (AO-2007-044-SAN109), advising all aircraft
operators to consider the
safety implications of this
safety issue and to take
action where considered
As a result of this
occurrence, the aircraft
operator changed its
go-around procedure to
reflect that of the aircraft
manufacturer. It also
changed its SMS to require a formal
risk management process in support
of any proposal to change an aircraft
operating procedure. The operator is in
the process of reviewing its flight training
requirements, has invoked a number
of changes to its document control
procedures, and has revised the incident
reporting requirements of its SMS.
In addition, the aircraft manufacturer
has enhanced its published go-around
procedures to emphasise the critical
nature of the flight crew actions during a
go-around. ■
ATSB investigation report AO-2007-044 released
on 1 March 2010, avaliable on the website.
Upon reaching the
decision height on the
instrument approach into
Melbourne, the crew did
not have the prescribed
visual reference to
continue the approach to
land and commenced a
missed approach. During the initial part
of the approach, the pilot in command had
not correctly moved the thrust levers to
the ‘take-off/go-around’ position and so
the aircraft’s automated flight mode did
not transition correctly to the go-around
phase. The crew, however, were unaware
that the aircraft had not transitioned to
the expected flight modes. The aircraft
continued to descend towards the
runway, reaching a minimum recorded
height of 38 ft above the runway before it
responded to manual flight crew inputs
and began to climb away. After a second
missed approach, which was completed
within expected parameters, the aircraft
was diverted to Avalon Airport, where it
landed uneventfully.
The aircraft manufacturer had published
its go-around procedure with the
requirement to check and announce
the aircraft’s flight mode as part of the
initial actions of the go-around. That
requirement was included to ensure that
the crew could confirm the necessary
changes to the aircraft’s flight mode.
Investigation briefs
Preliminary report on
firebombing collision
Main landing gear wheel failure
White out conditions
ATSB Investigation AO-2009-006
ATSB Investigation AO-2009-077
ATSB Investigation AO-2009-075
On 6 February 2009 at approximately
1435 Australian Eastern Daylight-saving
Time, a Saab 340B aircraft, registered
VH-KDQ, landed at Sydney Airport
following a scheduled passenger service
from Orange, NSW.
On 9 December 2009, the pilot of a Bell
Helicopter Co. 206L-1 Longranger,
registered VH-MJO, was conducting a
visual flight rules flight at Dorrigo NSW,
the second such flight that day, with one
passenger on board.
On 8 December 2009 at about 1840 EDST,
an Aerospatiale AS350-B2 helicopter,
registered VH-NFO (NFO), and a
Kawasaki BK117 helicopter, registered
VH-LXC (LXC), were engaged in aerial
firebombing operations about 20 km
south-east of Orange Airport, NSW.
The pilots were the only occupants of
their helicopters. After the pilot of NFO
landed to refuel, he noticed damage to the
trailing edge of the helicopter’s vertical
fin. In addition, the plastic navigation
light cover on top of the vertical fin was
broken. The pilot reported the damage to
the pilot of LXC. Examination of LXC did
not reveal any apparent damage. There
were no injuries.
The pilots had been flying circuits to and
from two small dams, refilling at different
dams. The pilot of NFO completed his
refill first and informed the pilot of LXC
that he was departing. The pilot of LXC
subsequently reported that he was also
departing. The pilot of NFO recalled that
he thought LXC was at least ‘a couple
of hundred metres’ behind him as he
conducted his run and did not see LXC
at any time. As he initiated a water drop
from an altitude of about 100 ft, he felt
‘a slight jolt’ through the helicopter and
immediately rolled right. In his peripheral
vision, he saw a yellow object flash past
the left door and initially thought it was
a water bombing aeroplane that had not
reported its bombing run. He believed
that LXC had caught up during the run,
resulting in the collision.
The pilot of LXC recalled that when he
departed the dam, he turned towards the
fire. He did not see NFO but thought that
his turn placed him ahead of NFO by
about 300 m. He believed that NFO had
overtaken LXC close on the right side,
and that the collision occurred as NFO
turned sharply away from LXC.
The investigation is continuing.
The flight crew reported that during the
post-flight inspection, the aircraft’s left
outboard main landing gear tyre was
found to have deflated and the wheel
assembly had sustained noticeable
Failure to the rim had resulted in
deflation of the tyre. Further examination
by the operator’s maintenance staff
found that a section of the bead seat had
fractured. Both the brake assembly and
the wheel axle had also been damaged as
a result of the failure. No other damage
was sustained by the aircraft. The flight
crew reported that there was no prior
indication of the failure, as the aircraft
had handled normally during the landing
and taxiing phase of the flight.
During the investigation, it was found
that the particular wheel design was being
phased out due to recognised fatigue
problems identified at the bead seat area.
Both the manufacturer and the operator
were aware of the increased fatigue
susceptibility of the earlier wheel design,
and had established increased inspection
regimes for those wheels remaining in
In response to the occurrence, the
operator advised that to enable the
aircraft to be returned to service, the
entire main landing gear assembly was
replaced. The operator conducted a review
of its current wheel inspection practices
and schedules. The operator indicated
that all procedures used were found
satisfactory and compliant with the wheel
manufacturer’s guidelines.
The pilot later stated that, shortly after
takeoff, at approximately 1120 Eastern
Daylight-saving Time, while the
helicopter was in a high hover, he looked
inside the cockpit at his instruments for
a few seconds. When the pilot looked
outside again, the helicopter was in what
he described as ‘white out conditions’. The
pilot experienced a complete loss of visual
orientation with the surroundings due to
the helicopter being enveloped by cloud.
The pilot attempted to maintain a neutral
hover in the expectation of regaining
adequate visibility to land, however, the
helicopter was inadvertently moving to
the north at a slow speed. The pilot stated
that he then saw trees and a spur line
through the cloud and that the helicopter
appeared to be in a sideways crab motion
to the left. With limited visual reference,
the pilot attempted to land, however, the
helicopter impacted the ground with
significant vertical force and came to
rest on its right side As a result, the pilot
was seriously injured and the passenger
was fatally injured. The helicopter was
seriously damaged.
The duration of the flight, not
including start up and static hover, was
approximately 1 minute and 20 seconds.
During that time, the helicopter travelled
a distance of approximately 550 m.
The investigation is continuing.
Dark night flight
ATSB Investigation AO-2008-076
On 7 November 2008, a Piper Chieftain,
registered VH-OPC, was being operated
on a private flight under the instrument
flight rules from Moorabbin Airport, Vic.
to Port Macquarie via Bathurst, NSW. On
board the aircraft were the owner-pilot
and three passengers.
The aircraft departed Moorabbin Airport
at 1725 Eastern Daylight-saving Time and
arrived at Bathurst Airport at 1930. The
flight from Moorabbin to Bathurst was
conducted in accordance with the pilot’s
flight plan, and a review of recorded air
traffic control data and communications
did not reveal any problems during that
The aircraft descended at a steep angle
before impacting the ground at high
speed, consistent with uncontrolled
flight into terrain. Due to fire and impact
damage, and limited information about
the sequence of events after take-off, the
evidence available to the investigation was
Based on analysis of the available
information, an airworthiness issue was
considered unlikely to be a contributing
factor to this accident. The investigation
was unable to establish why the
aircraft collided with terrain; however,
pilot spatial disorientation or pilot
incapacitation could not be discounted.
Mustering helicopters collide
ATSB Investigation AO-2007-070
On 5 May 2009, two Robinson Helicopter
Company R22 Beta II helicopters,
registered VH-PHT and VH-HCB
collided midair about 15 km south-east of
Springvale Station, WA. Both helicopters
had departed the station just prior to
sunrise to conduct mustering operations.
On 29 December 2007, a Boeing Company
737-229 aircraft, registered VH-OBN, was
being operated on a scheduled passenger
service from Brisbane, Qld to Norfolk
Island. At 0352 Coordinated Universal
Time, due to poor weather, the flight crew
conducted a missed approach.
During the flap retraction, the flight crew
felt a high frequency vibration through
the airframe, while observing control
yoke deflection to the left. Due to the
vibration, the aircraft’s autopilot system
could not be engaged and controlled flight
was manually maintained with difficulty.
The flight crew elected to continue to the
designated alternate airport at Nouméa,
New Caledonia. Due to reserve fuel
concerns, the cabin crew prepared the
passengers for a possible ditching.
A post-flight engineering inspection
determined that the number-4 leading
edge slat, inboard main track had
failed. An examination identified
fatigue cracking that originated at the
intersection of diverging machining
marks at the fracture site. Further
inspection of the number-4 slat found
corrosion damage on the outboard
auxiliary track, with the inboard auxiliary
track adjacent to the failed main track
having failed in overload at the slat
The investigation also identified a number
of cabin safety issues during the diversion
flight, and poor passenger handling after
the subsequent landing at Nouméa.
As a result of this investigation, the
aircraft operator advised the ATSB of the
implementation of a number of safety
actions, including, the revision of flight
crew flight planning — alternate fuel load
provisions, the revision of cabin crew
equipment and procedures, a review of
company emergency response procedures.
Subsequent to this event, the original
operator’s air operator’s certificate
had been taken over by a different
organisation. The new organisation does
not use the aircraft type involved in this
occurrence. It has, however, reviewed
its operations to ensure that hazards
identified in this investigation are
mitigated appropriately.
ATSB Investigation AO-2009-018
The first helicopter departed to the east
in order to make radio contact with an
adjoining station prior to heading for
the mustering area. The other helicopter
departed about 10 minutes later and was
observed heading to the south-east, the
general direction of the muster.
The helicopters were due to refuel at about
0830 at a place to be arranged, depending
on the progress of the mustering
operation. When the pilots failed to
respond to radio calls from ground
personnel, a search helicopter departed
a nearby station and noticed a fire while
en route to Springvale Station. On arrival
overhead the fire, the pilot was able to
identify the remains of the two helicopters
and observed that the respective pilots
appeared to have sustained fatal injuries.
Both helicopters were seriously damaged
as a result of impact forces associated
with the midair collision, the impact
with terrain and post-impact fires. The
wreckage was scattered over an area of
about 260 m by 100 m.
The circumstances of the accident were
consistent with a midair collision while
the pilots were positioning to commence
the muster. The converging flight paths
of the helicopters, pilot fatigue and sun
glare from the rising sun are identified as
contributing safety factors.
After refuelling at Bathurst Airport, the
pilot departed for Port Macquarie in
dark-night conditions with light rain in
the area. About 2 minutes and 30 seconds
after the pilot reported he was airborne,
residents of Forest Grove to the north of
Bathurst Airport heard a sudden loud
noise from an aircraft at low altitude.
Shortly after, there was the sound of an
explosion and the glow of fire. The aircraft
was found to have impacted terrain,
resulting in serious damage to the aircraft.
The four occupants were fatally injured.
Leading edge device failure and
cabin safety issues
REPCON briefs
Australia’s voluntary confidential aviation reporting scheme
REPCON allows any person who has an
aviation safety concern to report it to the
ATSB confidentially. Unless permission
is provided by the person that personal
information is about (either the reporter
or any person referred to in the report)
that information will remain confidential.
The desired outcomes of the scheme are to
increase awareness of safety issues and to
encourage safety action by those who are
best placed to respond to safety concerns.
Before submitting a REPCON report, take
a little time to consider whether you have
other available and potentially suitable
options to report your safety concern. In
some cases, your own organisation may
have a confidential reporting system that
can assist you with assessing your safety
concern and taking relevant timely safety
action. You may also wish to consider
reporting directly to the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) if you are
concerned about deliberate breaches of
the safety regulations, particularly those
that have the potential to pose a serious
and imminent risk to life or health.
REPCON staff may be able to assist you
in making these decisions, so please don’t
hesitate to contact our staff to discuss
your options.
REPCON would like to hear from you if
you have experienced a ‘close call’ and
think others may benefit from the lessons
you have learnt. These reports can serve
as a powerful reminder that, despite
the best of intentions, well-trained and
well-meaning people are still capable of
making mistakes. The stories arising from
these reports may serve to reinforce the
message that we must remain vigilant to
ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and
REPCON has recently received several
concerns about transport security
matters. These reports are best sent direct
to the Office of Transport Security (OTS)
who have a 24 hour, seven day a week
point of contact and can respond quickly
to any transport security concerns that
are of a serious nature. Contact details for
the OTS 1300 307 288 or
If you wish to obtain advice or further
information, please contact REPCON on
1800 020 505.
Cabin crew duty times
Report narrative:
The reporter expressed safety concerns
about the operator’s cabin crew working
excessive duty times on long haul flight
operations. Cabin crew are in fear of
the consequences (i.e. losing their job)
if they speak up and remove themselves
from duty if they are fatigued. Even
after exceeding 20 hours duty time, the
majority of cabin crew are hopeful that
adrenalin would kick in if an emergency
occurred after an extreme tour of duty.
Cabin crew have been observed sleeping
in their seats while waiting for the aircraft
to be given a taxi clearance. In some
circumstances, duty times have been
up to 29 hours. The reporter expressed
concerns that cabin crew, by their nature,
are service orientated and therefore put
the passenger before their own wellbeing.
Reporter comment: As the operator is not
mature enough to cancel flights so that
cabin crew can operate with safe duty
times, there needs to be CASA regulations
to remove the decision from operators
and exhausted cabin crew.
Action taken by REPCON:
REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report. CASA provided the
following response:
CASA monitors the safety implications of
duty periods and does follow-up on specific
events that are reported. The operator has
voluntarily specified cabin crew duty times
in relevant procedures. Adherence to such
procedures is subject to CASA audit and
surveillance activity.
CASA is considering regulations for cabin
crew fatigue risk management systems
which will follow the introduction of fatigue
risk management system regulations for
flight crew. The flight crew regulations are
awaiting directions from the ICAO
[International Civil Aviation Organization]
group which will report in 2010.
Maintenance certification
Report narrative:
The reporter expressed safety concerns
about the certification of some
maintenance conducted on company
aircraft. The reporter believes that
maintenance was certified under the
direction of the maintenance contractor,
when a maintenance person was not
an authorised person to conduct such
maintenance for the maintenance
Action taken by REPCON:
REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report and CASA provided the
following response:
CASA has reviewed the report and
contacted the operator concerned who has
investigated the matter and is unable to
identify any known maintenance carried
out by company or contractor staff who are
not authorised. Without more specific information such as a date and aircraft registration the operator and CASA is unable to
investigate the matter further.
Noise level within the aircraft
Report narrative:
The reporter expressed safety concerns
about the noise level in a certain aircraft
type during takeoff and the inability to
clearly hear instructions in the cabin over
the intercom. On two separate flights,
the reporter was seated at the rear of
the aircraft and indicated that once the
engines were operating only about
10 per cent of the pre-takeoff safety brief
given by the flight attendant could be
heard, although on both flights when the
Othersb 25% (94)
flight crew addressed the cabin the words
were very clear and easy to understand.
The reporter believed that the difference
between the audibility of the flight
attendant as opposed to that of the flight
crew may possibly be the result of the
nature of the voice pick-up systems in the
two locations.
Reporter comment: In an emergency
situation it would almost be impossible to
hear the instructions issued by the flight
Action taken by REPCON:
REPCON supplied the operator with the
de-identified report and the operator
advised that it was not able to comment
on the specific instance, but there are
certain actions taken in relation to the PA
(Public Address) system. These include
specific maintenance tasks carried out at
certain checks. The PA is checked every
day, as a first flight of the day item. The
operator also has not identified any PA
issues during their cabin audits.
REPCON supplied CASA with the deidentified report and a version of the
operator’s response. CASA provided the
following response:
Charter 9% (2)
All 14% (3)
High capacity air
transport 27% (6)
Flight training 14% (3)
Sports aviation 18% (4)
General aviation 18% (4)
Reported issues Jan/Feb 2009
Runway incursion 5% (1)
Runway incursion 5% (1)
Collision avoidance 5% (1)
Incursion controlled airspace 5% (1)
Incursion controlled
5% (1) 5% (1)
Collision avoidance 5% (1)
Organisational safety
culture 5% (1)
Organisational safety
culture 5% (1)
Incorrect frequency 5% (1)
Procedure inaccuracies 5% (1)
rectifications and
qualifications 22% (5)
rectifications and
qualifications 22% (5)
VFR in IMC 17% (4)
Incorrect frequency 5% (1)
Cabin crew fatigue 9% (2)
VFR in IMC 17% (4)
Regulations 13% (3)
Cabin crew fatigue 9% (2)
Radio communicationschatter 9% (2)
Radio communicationschatter 9% (2)
Who is reporting to REPCON?
Regulations 13% (3)
Cabin crew 3% (12)
Cabin crew 3% (12)
Air Traffic controller 3% (12)
Air Traffic controller 3% (12)
Passengers 8% (29)
Passengers 8% (29)
Aircraft maintenance
personnel 23% (88)
Aircraft maintenance
personnel 23% (88)
Total 2008
Total 2009
Total 2010
Facilities maintenance
personnel/ground crew 1% (4)
Facilities maintenance
personnel/ground crew 1% (4)
Flight crew 37% (139)
Flight crew 37% (139)
Othersb 25% (94)
REPCON reports received
Total 2007
Othersb 25% (94)
a. 29 January 2007 to 28 February 2010
b. examples include residents, property owners, general public.
a. as of 18 March 2010
What is not a reportable safety concern?
Charter 9% (2)
How can I report to REPCON?
Charter 9% (2)
All 14% (3)
High capacity air
To avoid doubt, the following matters are not reportable safety concerns and
Reporters can submit a REPCON report onlinetransport
via the27%
All 14% (3) Reporters can also submit via a dedicated
are not guaranteed confidentiality:
transport 27% (6)
14% (3) number: 1800 020 505
(a) matters showing a serious and imminent threat to a person’sFlight
or life;
[email protected]
Sports aviation 18% (4)
(b) acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft;
Flight training 14% (3)
(c) industrial relations matters;
General aviation 18% (4) by facsimile: 02 6274 6461
Sports aviation 18% (4)
or by mail: Freepost 600, PO Box 600, Civic Square ACT 2608
(d) conduct that may constitute a serious crime.
General aviation 18% (4)
Note 1: REPCON is not an alternative to complying with reporting obligations
under the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003
(see <www.atsb.gov.au>).
Note 2: Submission of a report known by the reporter to be false or misleading
is an offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code.
How do I get further information on REPCON?
If you wish to obtain advice or further information on REPCON,
please visit the ATSB website at <www.atsb.gov.au> or call REPCON on
1800 020 505.
The functionality of the Public Address (PA)
system forms part of the daily maintenance
check. However, the maintenance check
does not assess the audibility of the PA
system during aircraft operations. CASA
has liaised with the operator regarding the
cabin crew monitoring audibility during
aircraft operations in order to improve the
clarity of cabin public address announcements.
REPCON Operation types Jan/Feb 2009
Don’t sweat
and forget.
What you drink strongly affects how you fly,
doctor and pilot, Ken Wishaw writes
For the majority of Australian pilots, be they commercial or
recreational, a lot of time is spent in hot conditions. Dehydration is an
often forgotten factor in flight safety and performance.
As a medical specialist, fluid physiology and management is a central
part of my practice every day, and as a flying instructor I meet a lot
of pilots who simply do not appreciate the hazards of dehydration,
or how to assess and manage their fluids. Those I have taught
about this matter say their performance is much better and
their flying much more enjoyable.
In temperate conditions a person normally loses about
500 ml to one litre of fluid per day through sweating. In hot
conditions, this can rise to as much as eight litres per day.
Additionally we lose water at high altitude from breathing
air with a low water content. Add to this the concentration
required to fly aircraft and meet schedules, diverting our
attention from thinking about thirst and hydration, and the scene
is set for trouble.
A deficit of over one litre (or two per cent) due to failure to replace
sweat losses can result in headaches, muscle cramps, dizziness and
visual disturbances.
But hydration is more than just taking enough water. In fact just
taking water may actually be harmful.
A few facts need to be understood as to why this is so.
Our blood and body fluids normally contain 135-150
millimoles (mmol) of sodium and 100 mmol of chloride
per litre.
What we lose in sweat depends partly on our genetic
makeup, but more importantly on whether we are
acclimatised. The more acclimatised we are the less
sodium and the more potassium we lose in our sweat.
Sodium losses for a person who is well acclimatised are
of the order of 5–30 mmol per litre. For someone who is not
acclimatised (say an office worker who flies one or two days a
week) sodium losses in sweat may be 40–100 mmol/litre.
Our bodies possess a very sophisticated sodium control
system. But it only works well if we are sufficiently
hydrated to produce reasonable amounts of urine,
and ingesting enough sodium and potassium which
the kidneys can chose to retain or discard. Most of
us readily excrete excess sodium and potassium
in our urine. Conversely we also have a specific
salt appetite. Pilots with low sodium levels often love
salty foods at the end of the day!
Ingestion of water to replace sweat losses will decrease the sodium
concentration in our blood, as we are not replacing the sodium
that we are losing. Severe acute decreases in blood sodium (say 10
per cent) may cause headaches, lethargy, apathy and confusion.
Severe acute decreases (over 15 per cent) may cause convulsions.
While this is extremely unlikely to occur in our situation, cases of
convulsions have been documented in top athletes who only use
water replacement. Suffice to say even the mild symptoms are highly
undesirable for a pilot!
Potassium losses may cause low blood pressure and weakness.
Small amounts of sodium and potassium in rehydration fluids increase
the rate at which the gut can absorb the fluid. Drinking only water,
apart from leaving you still dehydrated (because you haven’t absorbed
the fluid) can make you feel bloated and nauseous.
Pure water ingestion tends to shut off the thirst reflex, even when we
are dehydrated.
(As a crude way of appreciating of these figures, try tasting the
following solution; one level teaspoon of table salt, which is sodium
chloride, dissolved in a litre of water equals approximately100
Drinking only
water, apart
from leaving
you still
you haven’t
the fluid)
can make
you feel
bloated and
Taste is a critical factor in whether athletes drink adequately during
exercise. Some people love pure water, others loathe it.
High carbohydrate drinks such as energy drinks, fizzy drinks
and fruit juice contain 10–30 per cent carbohydrate.
Levels of carbohydrate over eight per cent inhibit
intestinal absorption of the fluid. None of these are
appropriate for rehydration during flight.
Athletic performance is severely degraded by
dehydration, and a lot of research has been
done into dehydration management. From this
the sports drinks have evolved. They are not
just commercial fads, but scientifically validated
drinks that will optimise rehydration, and minimise
electrolyte disturbance.
... They are
not just commercial
fads, but scientifically
validated drinks that will
optimise rehydration, and
minimise electrolyte
Sports drinks are not excessively high in sodium.
At recommended strengths they contain 10–25 mmol/
litre. They are also designed to replace potassium losses.
They do contain carbohydrate, but this is of the order of six per
cent which will not impede absorption or cause large fluctuations
in blood sugar levels.
Guiding principles (on the basis that you are essentially fit
and healthy) should therefore be
Do not take off already dehydrated. Remember ground
preparation is sweaty stuff.
On short flights in temperate conditions whether we drink water or
an electrolyte replacement is not critical.
On longer flights (say over two hours) we should be aiming to
replace what we are losing. Sports drinks are appropriate for this.
The subtle differences between the brands and flavours are not as
critical as what tastes good to you.
The carbohydrate (sugar) content is not harmful. Carbohydrate
ingestion could only lead to a problem if a large carbohydrate
load is taken at widely separated intervals, with the risk of insulin
over-secretion and low sugar levels occurring some hours later.
Daily continuous sipping of sports drinks may theoretically lead
to damage of tooth enamel. If you don’t want so much glucose,
then first mix the sports drink powder in a glass, then decant into
your drink container. As electrolytes dissolve faster than sugar, this
technique can leave most of the sugar behind.
Do not dilute the sports drink from the recommended formula.
Never take salt tablets, but if you have a desire for something salty,
your body is telling you something and salty food may be just what
you need.
Food will help contribute to electrolyte intake.
If you are on medication for high blood pressure you should discuss
this with your doctor; however, you are unlikely to have problems
provided that your electrolyte intake is not excessive.
Sports drink containers should be thoroughly cleaned every day.
Heavy coffee and tea drinkers are prone to severe headaches on
acute withdrawal. Recent studies have shown that caffeine is not
deleterious to sport performance and a small amount on the long
flying day before or after the flight is OK.
For the technically minded, or if you are undertaking long flying
you should meet these three criteria at the end of the flight.
1. Body weight loss should be less than two per cent.
2. Urine colour should be pale (drugs and B vitamins can alter this)
3. Urine volume should have exceeded 0.5 (ideally 1.0) ml per kilo
per hour. If you fly a small aircraft, you must have a plan to handle
the increased urine output. Deferring rehydration till after the
flight is not an option!
By way of personal research I undertook two flights on successive days
in a Super Dimona motor glider. Both days were very hot and dry, and
the seven hour tasks were identical.
On the first day I stuck to a water regime. By the end of the day I was
nauseous, bloated, had a severe headache and mild dizziness. I was so
impaired that I opted to let the other pilot (and aircraft owner!) do the
landing. My urine output was very poor, but I had gained weight during
the flight, meaning a lot of water was just sitting in my gut.
Rehydration with the correct fluids will improve your flying
performance, add to your enjoyment and make you a safer pilot.
For further reading on this subject there are excellent fact sheets at
About the author
Ken Wishaw is an anaesthetist on the
Sunshine Coast in Queensland. He was
Australia’s first full-time rescue helicopter
doctor, and co-founder of the CareFlight
Rescue Helicopter Service in Sydney. He
has been a member of the RAAF medical
reserve. He is an instructor at the Kingaroy
gliding club and the Pacific Soaring motorglider club at Caboolture.
Heavy coffee
and tea drinkers
are prone to severe
headaches on acute
The following day was identical except that I used a sports drink. At
the end of the day I had none of the effects of the previous day and a
far healthier urine output. The flight was far more enjoyable (and we
landed safely under my control).
Jeremy Clarkson, the flamboyantly controversial
host of cult TV motoring show, Top Gear, may
seem an unlikely source of safety advice, but
he’s dead right about low flying.
As Clarkson says, ‘Speed has never killed anyone. Suddenly becoming
stationary ... that’s what gets you.’
Too many pilots have discovered Clarkson’s dictum to their cost.
Low flying is what pilots do to show off to those unfortunates who
are confined to living on the ground. It’s seductive, glamorous and,
to use a euphemism, unforgiving. It’s also illegal. The regulations are
unambiguous. Except for initial climb, and landing approach, you
are not allowed to fly lower than 1000ft above ground level over a
populated area, or 500ft above ground level over any other area,
without approval from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA).
There are a few legitimate reasons for flying at low level, such as aerial
stock mustering, crop spraying and fire fighting. But CASA requires
pilots doing these activities to have special training and licence
endorsements. This is because of the distinct and intense hazards of
low flying. Even Clarkson might think twice about driving a car that
would crash if it went below a certain speed, had steering that could
be affected by wind gusts, and no brakes. But that is effectively what
an aeroplane flown at very low level becomes.
Malcolm Wardrop, CASA’s aviation safety advisor for South Australia,
is concerned by reports of low flying near Lake Eyre, which for the
second year in succession is set to become an attraction to tourists
and pilots as water flows create a temporary oasis.
CASA has already received complaints from people in South Australia’s
far north about low-flying aircraft, and the risk they pose to wildlife.
The practice is also a risk to human life, Wardrop says.
‘While it is true that you are not likely to meet a powerline over Lake
Eyre, there are two distinct hazards,’ he says.
The particular danger of low flight around Lake Eyre is bird strike.
‘Because the lake is filling from the Cooper, Darling and Warburton
Systems birds are following that water from all over northern and
eastern Australia,’ Wardrop says.
Many of them will be large birds, such as pelicans, cormorants and
herons, sometimes flying in large flocks.
‘Individual birds or small flocks are hard to see,’ Wardrop says,
‘because that’s how they’ve evolved. If you’re doing 80 knots or more
you just can’t spot them.’
‘And if you hit a flock, you’ll kill them,
but it’s likely they’ll also kill you and your
The other hazard, in common with low flying
anywhere, is the lack of reaction time it gives
the pilot.
Most sightseeing flights over the lake will
be operating at close to maximum take-off
weight because the incentive is to fill every
seat, Wardrop says.
But, ‘If the engine stops in a typical single
with a full load of passengers you’ll soon be
going down at about 1000 feet per minute,
maybe more ...
Low flight involves dangerous compromises
in aircraft configuration. Flying at 90kt, is a
relatively sedate cruise speed at altitude, but
near the ground equates to about 167km/h –
or 46 metres per second. Obstacles loom up
quickly at that rate.
To slow most aircraft below cruise speed
requires trimming to fly nose high, limiting
the pilot’s forward vision, making navigation
difficult and potentially putting the aircraft in
an unstable configuration.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau reports are
often dry neutral documents, appropriately
so given their function to report meticulously
and analyse. But the Bureau’s report on
avoidable low flying accidents, issued this
year, makes heartbreaking reading. The
waste and sadness of the cases of the German
tourists who encountered a powerline in the
vast emptiness of the Northern territory, or
the military helicopter pilot who swooped
low while flying his sister to her wedding,
leap off the page. All these people died; as
did everyone on a Piper Cherokee sightseeing
over Lake Eildon; the Auster pilot who hit
The insidious nature of complacency is one
theme of the report–in two cases, pilots were
killed after hitting wires they knew about.
But other factors are not as consistent. While
one pilot was known for a ‘history of a variety
of unsafe acts’, another’s eulogy was that
‘friends and colleagues said that he was a
careful pilot’.
All that can be said with any certainty is that
none of the dead pilots thought it would ever
happen to them.
with low flying
any where,
is the lack of
reaction time it
gives the pilot.
A recent Australian Transport Safety Bureau report
gave four reasons why low flying is unsafe:
There are more obstacles to avoid, many of which
are hard to see until it is too late (powerlines and
birds, for example)
Pilots have a higher workload because there are
more hazards to avoid
There may be turbulence and windshear that pilots
do not encounter at higher levels, and
There is very little time to recover control of the
aircraft if something goes wrong.
The ATSB concludes the two major hazards of low
flying are wirestrikes and pilots’ reduced opportunity
to recover their aircraft from a stall or loss of control.
ATSB Transport Safety Report Aviation Research and Analysis AR-2009-041
‘Even if you’re legal, at 500ft, that gives you
only 30 seconds to configure the aircraft for
landing, brief your passengers and maybe
make a radio call. At 250ft you have half that
time and at 100ft virtually no time at all;
you’re on the ground or in the water before
you know what’s happening.’
powerlines on his own property; the Cessna
172 pilot who crashed on Christmas morning;
and the agricultural pilot whose experience
did not save him from a fatal impact while
performing low-level aerobatics.
inty end of
eated on the gro
r is concluding
W hether th
manned aerial v
ert Wilson.
the fu
sential, writes F
The fact that the average age of a licensed aircraft maintenance
engineer (LAME) in Australia is in the mid 50s, and the average
commercial pilot is in their late 40s, attests that aviation has failed
to attract young people.
But youth is well-represented in the newest aviation sector – unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS). Young people who have grown up in a world
of game consoles, virtual reality, social networks, camera phones
and wireless broadband take to unmanned aviation with aplomb, the
organisers of Australia’s first civilian course in UAS say.
The Australian Unmanned Systems Academy is an initiative of V-TOL,
with partners including the Australian and International Training
Institute, University of Queensland and Ipswich City Council. The
course’s foundations are the existing basic aeronautical knowledge
(BAK), private pilot licence (PPL) and radiotelephony requirements for
private pilots.
Chief executive of the Academy, Frank Martin, says UAS pilots are
tending to come from a younger age group, which is more at ease with
the video and computer systems used on the autonomous aircraft.
Martin is also a squadron leader in the Australian Air Force cadets and
he speaks enthusiastically about how UAS training opens doors for
cadets into a new sector in aviation as well as offering an entry into the
engineering areas of robotics and mechatronics.
Qualified UAS pilots or engineers enter a
small, but growing industry. The civilian UAS
industry in Australia is estimated to turn over
about $20 million a year and employ about
150 people.
But while Martin speaks of a kind of
generational leap-frog between manned
and UAV aircraft pilots, he cautions that no
amount of knowledge in Windows-based
flight planning is a substitute for the centuryold skills of manned flight.
‘Before they can come into UAVs, we want
them to have some flying behind them; we
want them to have knowledge of aircraft
behind them; and they also need to know
about laws and licensing,’ Martin says.
Around the world, UAS operators are coming
to the same conclusion: some manned
flight experience is essential for a UAV pilot.
But … how much is that? The US Air Force
initially drew its UAS pilots from the ranks of
fast jet and large transport pilots, but found
itself facing a shortage, and criticism that
expensively-trained officers were being used
for basic ‘point-and-click’ missions.
It has set up a training scheme for UAS operators,
and is evaluating how much aviation experience
they need. We are trying to find the sweet spot,
where we don’t train too much and don’t train
too little,’ USAF chief of staff General Norton
Schwartz told Aviation Week.
The world’s first degree course in UAS
believes in pilot education as a foundation.
The University of North Dakota’s major in
unmanned aircraft systems began teaching
classes last year. It is built upon the aviation
department’s commercial aviation major and
includes courses in aviation safety, human
factors, and crew resource management as
they apply to unmanned aircraft operations.
The Queensland UAS academy will soon launch
an online training program, ‘Future Skies’,
expanding its reach to students and Air Force
cadets across Australia. It is also in talks with
the University of Queensland about joint
education projects.
Recognition that unmanned aircraft would
require skilled pilots is nothing new. The
Australian developed Jindivik target drone
required two pilots to land it, despite having a
degree of flight autonomy (it was controlled by
set commands rather than ‘stick and rudder’
radio control inputs.
However, UAS such as the Warrigal used by
the academy possess a degree of autonomy
undreamed of by the Jindivik’s designers.
Normal landing is a one-button operation and
the aircraft normally follows a GPS-derived
flight plan, automatically regulating its altitude
and position.
The alternative would have been that the Warrigal would have required
inspection, at least, and could have been written off,’ he said.
Managing director of UAS developer V-TOL Aerospace, Mark Xavier,
says the company, a partner of the academy, emphasises the
importance of broad aviation knowledge and piloting skills.
‘We want to put a case for UAVs operating amongst everyday society
without endangering anyone in the air or on the ground. To fly over
built-up areas or in proximity to air traffic will require a high-level of
operator training to make it acceptable.’
Most UAS flying is done using GPS-created flight plans, in a process
broadly similar to airline transport pilots making inputs into flight
management systems. The Warrigal pilot can also temporarily
override its autopilot with direct commands to turn or change altitude,
operating in effect a sort of digital fly-by-wire mode. The third method
of control is the most difficult – direct radio control, as used in model
aircraft. Academy trainees are taught all three methods.
Xavier says the pilot-centred approach to UAS is far from universal. He
recently observed how a UAV operator got his aircraft into trouble. ‘He
threw his hands up in the air and walked away,’ Xavier said.
‘In the eyes of a lot of militaries around the world you get a grunt to fly
a UAV, but where there’s no training, there’s no ability.’
The academy takes a different approach, Xavier says. ‘If our guys are
flying UAVs and something goes wrong, they’re more than capable of
flicking the switch and taking control.’
Martin says UAS is a dynamic field with more than enough to intrigue
the most ambitious budding aviation professional: ‘Remember the
old Flight of the Phoenix movie? I love that. There’s a part where the
designer [marooned in the desert in a crashed plane] talks about
designing model aircraft, and the others freak out, but he says how
model aircraft have to be more stringently built. That perception is
exactly where we are now. This industry’s not about to take over from
GA [general aviation] but it’s certainly going to extend it.’
But there’s no substitute for a pilot’s judgement.
Martin recounts how a student recently
aborted a landing of a Warrigal. ‘The approach
was high and fast and the student looked at
the aircraft, said “no”, and sent the aircraft
back to its rally point.’
Gavin Broadbent in the van-mounted flight deck of a Warrigal UAV
‘The whole emphasis of the academy is on
consistent training to a set standard. Students
can do a lot of training in Broome, or Katherine,
or wherever they are. But they need to come
to the Academy to do their flying and gain
their qualification,’ Martin says.
‘We were overjoyed because he was right,
and he had obtained that knowledge from
manned flying experience.’
1. If, after maintaining a flight planned heading of 330(m) in order
to track 322(m), you determined your position as 6 NM right of
track having travelled 45NM, you have experienced
(a) left drift.
(b) right drift.
(c) zero drift.
(d) some drift but the amount can not be determined from the
available information.
(c) hold off bank due to the slightly smaller angle of attack of
the outer wing.
(d) hold off bank due to the slightly greater angle of attack and
slightly higher speed of the outer wing.
2. In the above example the track error is approximately
(a) 8 degrees right.
(b) 8 degrees left.
7. (c) 6 degrees right.
(d) 6 degrees left.
(a) remains substantially constant until approaching supersonic
speeds when it rises.
At a non-towered aerodrome, listed in ERSA as having an
elevation of 300FT, the QNH is given by an AWIB as 1020 HPa.
When setting this QNH prior to departure, the altimeter reads
210FT. This means that the altimeter is reading
(b) remains substantially constant until approaching supersonic
speeds when it falls.
(c) increases was the square of speed.
(d) reduces with the square of speed.
(a) correctly but the actual elevation is higher than published.
(b) incorrectly because the QNH is incorrect.
(c) low but is within VFR tolerance.
8. With regard to control of a helicopter, moving the stationary
swash plate in a direction parallel to its axis
(d) low but is outside VFR tolerance.
(a) changes the collective pitch whereas tilting the plate via the
cyclic, controls roll and pitch.
4. If, at the above aerodrome, an accurate altimeter is set to 1013
HPa prior to departure and the altimeter reads 300FT, the
(b) changes the cyclic pitch whereas tilting the plate via the
collective, controls roll and pitch.
(a) pressure height is approximately 300FT.
(c) changes the collective pitch whereas tilting the plate via the
cyclic, controls roll and yaw.
(b) pressure height is approximately zero.
(c) the QNH is 1003 HPa.
(d) changes the cyclic pitch whereas tilting the plate via the
collective controls roll and pitch.
(d) the QNH is 1023 HPa.
5. In a piston engine, the mixture must be leaned at increased
altitude because as the aircraft climbs the
For a given aerofoil at a constant angle of attack, the drag
Operating a diaphragm type engine-driven fuel pump with the
fuel switched off (assuming upstream of the pump) will
(a) throttle must be opened further to maintain the same power
and this enriches the mixture.
(a) not potentially overstress the pump because a bypass valve
is fitted internally.
(b) throttle must be closed further to compensate for the
thinner air.
(b) not potentially overstress the pump unless fuel lubrication
is reduced.
(c) mass of air entering a cylinder is reduced but the mass of
fuel mixed with it increases therefore the mixture becomes
(c) potentially over-stresses the diaphragm which is being
actuated by the engine cam during the intake stroke.
(d) mass of air entering a cylinder is reduced but the mass of
fuel mixed with it remains approximately the same therefore
the mixture becomes richer.
6. During a climbing turn, it is theoretically necessary to
(d) potentially over-stresses the diaphragm during the delivery
10. When moist air is lifted over high terrain and precipitation
occurs, the cloud base in the lee of the terrain will
(a) be higher and the dewpoint of the air will be higher.
(a) hold on bank due to the slightly higher angle of attack of the
inner wing.
(b) be higher and the dewpoint of the air will be lower.
(b) hold on bank due to the slightly higher angle of attack of the
outer wing.
(d) lower and the dewpoint of the air will be lower.
(c) lower and the dewpoint of the air will be higher.
1. In a jet engine, factors likely to induce compressor stall are
(a) increased temperature margin.
(b) reduced temperature margin.
(c) reduced rotor speed and reduced mass flow of air.
(d) high rotor speed.
7. The role of a vortex generator fitted to a wing is to
(a) extend the lift curve so that the stall occurs at a higher
angle of attack.
(b) reduce the slope of the lift curve so that an asymmetric stall
is less likely.
(c) reduce the parasitic drag at cruising angles of attack by
energising the boundary layer.
(d) increase the lift/drag ratio at cruising angles of attack.
2. The function of a compressor surge bleed valve in a jet
engine is to
(a) control the flow of heated compressor air to the
8. The cam follower lever on an engine-driven diaphragm fuel
pump is actuated by the engine cam during the pump
(b) modulate the airflow to the active clearance control.
(a) intake stroke and fuel is delivered by the return action of the
cam follower lever.
(c) divert air from later compressor stages in order to increase
airflow through preceding stages.
(b) intake stroke and fuel is delivered at a pressure determined
by the diaphragm return spring.
(d) relieve an over-pressure situation in a compressor stage.
(c) delivery stroke and the fuel is delivered at a pressure
determined by the cam design.
3. A stationary plane surface which has direct or indirect contact
with a rotating surface, lying in a different plane and where
relative motion may occur between the two, is called
(a) a swash plate.
(b) a bearing support.
(c) an end bell.
(d) lap seal.
4. In a variable output hydraulic motor employing a swash plate,
positioning the swash plate parallel to the plane of rotation of
the rotor will result in
(b) maximum output with minimum torque.
(c) maximum output with maximum torque.
(d) minimum output with maximum torque.
5. An optical flat is a device for measuring surface
(a) finish by means of ultraviolet light.
(b) finish by means of monochromatic light.
(c) flatness by means of ultraviolet light.
(d) flatness by means of monochromatic light.
6. If, during cruise in an aircraft employing a constant speed
propeller, the nose is lowered and airspeed increased without
resetting the engine controls, the propeller governor fly
weights will tend to move
(a) outwards and the blade pitch will become finer.
(b) outwards and the blade pitch will become coarser.
(c) inwards and the blade pitch will become finer.
(d) inwards and the blade pitch will become coarser.
9. On an stabilator form of elevator, the trim surface, in addition
to the trimming function, also moves as
(a) a servo tab which assists and stabilizes the movement of the
main aerofoil.
(b) a servo tab which opposes and stabilizes the movement of
the main aerofoil.
(c) an anti-servo which assists and stabilises the movement of
the main aerofoil.
(d) an anti-servo which opposes and stabilises the movement of
the main aerofoil.
10. Bending a fixed rudder trim tab to the left would have the
effect in flight of applying
(a) left rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to
the left.
(b) left rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to
the right.
(c) right rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to
the left.
(d) right rudder which would correct a skid ball displacement to
the right.
(a) zero RPM output and torque.
(d) delivery stroke and the fuel is delivered at a pressure
determined by the diaphragm return spring.
Melbourne, VIC (YMML) ILS Runway 16
You are inbound to YMML from the north tracking via CANTY and
ARBEY on H119 (refer TAC 3 Melbourne) in a category B aircraft
equipped with:
• 2 VLOC (VOR/Localiser) receivers. Number 1 NAV can be coupled
to the Autopilot and has Flight Director (FD) capability with a
failure warning system.
• 1 radar altimeter
• 1 set of marker beacons
• 1 DME
• 1 enroute and approach approved GNSS
• 2 ADFs
You are qualified and current for all this equipment for instrument
approaches, but not ‘CAT II and III’. Part of the current ATIS. reads ...
expect ILS approach. Runway 16 wet. Wind 160/20 visibility (RVR)
900 metres rain. Cloud overcast 700...’
The following questions relate to this approach. (Plates dated
19 Nov 2009)
You select your DME to frequency 109.7, obtain a lock on and ident.
1. The correct approach plate to use is
(a) ILS Z RWY 16.
(b) ILS Y RWY 16.
(c) ILS X RWY 16.
(d) ILS Z or Y RWY 16 as the nav aids required are the same.
At 14 DME and therefore approaching the Bolinda NDB, the DME
on 109.7 fails. You now select 114.1, obtain a lock on and ident.
2. What DME distance do you expect to see at Bolinda (ignoring
slant) and which is the correct plate to use now?
(a) 11.8 DME and ILS Z RWY 16
(b) 11.8 DME and ILS Y RWY 16
(c) 12 DME and ILS Y RWY 16
(d) 11.6 DME and ILS Y RWY 16
3. If the DME were to fail completely, which of the following
is correct?
(a) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y, ILS
Z and ILS X plates.
(b) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y and
ILS Z plates only.
(c) GNSS may be used to replace the DME for fixes on ILS Y
plate alone.
(d) GNSS cannot be used to replace DME for fixes on any RWY
16 ILS approach plate, so a missed approach would be
required, or alternative procedure flown.
You consider the minima that can be used having regard to all the
aircraft’s equipment being serviceable except the DME. Assume a
P.E.C. of 50’.
4. The applicable minima are
(a) Category I 640’ DA./ 0.8km
(b) Category I 690’ DH./0.8km
(c) Category I 208’ DA./1.2km since no D.M.E. information
(d) Category I 208’ DH./0.8km
(e) Category I 258’ DH./0.8km
5. If the F.D. bars were to not activate and the autopilot not
couple, what will the minima now become?
(a) D.H. 208’/0.8km still if HIAL. operative
(b) D.H. 208’/1.2.km if HIAL. operative
(c) M.D.A. 690’/1.2km if HIAL. operative
(d) D.A. 640’/1.2km if HIAL. operative
6. Which of the following statements is correct concerning
Runway Visual Range (RVR) and Runway Visibility (RV)
in Australia?
(a) RVR is determined by a ground observer whereas RV is
determined by electronic means. Both expressed in metres.
(b) RVR and RV are interchangeable terms and expressed
in feet.
(c) RVR is determined by electronic means whereas RV
is determined by a ground observer. Both expressed
in metres.
(d) RVR and RV are interchangeable terms and expressed
in metres.
9. At the planning stage for this flight to YMML, if you
were aware that the glideslopes on NAVS 1 and 2 were
unserviceable, what alternate minima would you use?
(a) 1206ft ceiling/4.4km visibility
(b) 1206ft on QNH/4.4km visibility
(c) 700ft ceiling/2.5km visibility
(d) 700ft on QNH/2.5km visibility
10. If GNSS was being used to replace DME on a localiser
approach, where is the Final Approach Fix (FAF) and
what is the minima for landing RWY 16?
7. With regard to the ILS ‘X-Ray’ runway 16 approach plate,
which of the following is correct?
(a) 6 GNSS, MDA 1140, 2.4km
(a) ILS CAT II has a DH of 100 feet, CAT IIIa has a DH of 50 feet,
while CAT IIIb has a zero feet DH with an RVR of 75 metres.
All of these minimas are only available to operators with
suitably equipped and maintained aircraft together with
pilot certification.
(c) 5.7 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km
(b) 5.5 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km
(d) 6 GNSS, MDA 1140, 3.0km
(b) ILS CAT II and CAT IIIa and b decision heights must be
adjusted by the PEC applicable to the aircraft type or
the standard 50 feet. These minimas are only available
to operators with suitably equipped aircraft and
certified aircrew.
(c) ILS CAT II and CAT IIIa and b visibility minima are based on
RVR’s of 350, 200 and 75 metres respectively and not RV.
(d) Both (a) and (c) are correct.
8. In order to use category I minima the aircraft must have
duplicated ILS receivers, marker beacon receivers (or marker/
DME) and 2 ADF’s when part of the ILS such as YMML RWY 16.
True or false?
(a) true
(b) false
Invest wisely in your CIR training with
When it comes time for you to invest in your Command
Instrument Rating, you need to know your investment is
spent wisely. Peter Bini Advanced Flight Training has
been teaching and successfully producing quality pilots for
over 30 years.
With over 25,000 hours of flying experience, CFI Steve Pearce
and his team of instructors not only teach what is required, but
also ensure you benefit from their practical knowledge.
Invest in pearls of wisdom, not just the basics.
Call us for a tour of our facilities, aircraft, and meet our friendly staff.
Phone: 03 9580 5295 Email: [email protected]
Calendar 2010
Organiser & More info
10 May
10 May
11 May
12 May
12 May
13 May
13 May
13 May
12-13 May
14 May
15 May
17 May
17 May
18 May
18 May
18 May
19 May
19 May
20 May
20 May
20 May
21 May
24 May
24 May
25 May
25 May
25 May
25 May
26 May
26 May
27 May
27 May
27 May
27 May
31 May
31 May
31 May
31 May
1 Jun
1 Jun
1 Jun
2 Jun
2 Jun
2 Jun
3 Jun
3 Jun
NTA seminar
GAAP-Class D workshop
GAAP-Class D workshop
NTA seminar
Class D information night
NTA seminar
GAAP-Class D workshop
Class D information night
Professional Development Program
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
GAAP-Class D workshop
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
GAAP-Class D workshop
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
Class D information night
Class D information night
Class D information night
Class D information night
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
NTA seminar
Transition to Class D airspace
Implementation of new regulations
(CAR 166) regarding operations at
non-towered aerodromes
Australian and New Zealand Societies
of Air Safety Investigators conference
Aerial Agricultural Association of
Australia convention
Australian Centenary of Powered
Sunshine Coast
Port Hedland
Broken Hill
Mt Gambier
Hervey Bay
Coffs Harbour
Port Macquarie
Horn Island
Wagga Wagga
Albany Golf Club
Bankstown Travelodge
Bardon Conference Centre
All Seasons Karratha
Aero Club
All Seasons Port Hedland
Dingley International
Aero Club
CASA Flight Training & Testing Office [email protected]
Best Western Wine Country Motor Inn
Quality Hotel Apollo International
South West TAFE
Quality Hotel Mildura Grand
Mercure Hotel
AFA Club, Bull Creek
Musicians Club
Meteor Motel
CASA office, airport
Gagadju Crocodile Holiday Inn
Albert Park Motor Inn
The Mawson Centre
Commodore on the Park Motel
Quality Hotel Powerhouse
Conference Centre
West Tamworth League Club
Chifley Hotel
Novotel Coffs Harbour
Quality Hotel Burnett Riverside
Moorabbin Flight Training Academy
Moree Services Club
Twin Towns Services Club
City Gold Club
All Seasons Pavilion
Ramada Hotel & Suites
Convention & Function Centre
Explorers Inn
Cattleman’s Country Motor Inn
RSL club
Lismore Workers club
Rydges Lakeside hotel
Holiday Inn, Surfers Paradise,
Mia Mia, VIC
The Australian Aircraft Airworthiness
& Sustainment Conference
Brisbane Convention &
Exhibition Centre, QLD
Australian Society of Air Safety Investigators
Aerial Agricultural Association Australia
Australian Centenary of Powered Flight Mia Mia Inc.
Jill James secretary: M - 0418 388 919. E: [email protected]
AASC/Ageing Aircraft - chairman Richard Gauntlett
[email protected]
4-6 Jun
7-10 Jun
16-18 Jul
17-19 Aug
Please note: NTA seminar = Non-towered aerodrome information
session. For more information about the 3 June changes, go to
www.casa.gov.au and click on the 3 June link on the homepage.
Registration essential for workshops/seminars.
Casa events
Other organisations’ events
NTA Seminar
Class D information nights
Airfield l
The 2010/11 AOPA National Airfield Directory
is coming soon.
First published 20 years ago the National Airfield Directory is
the only comprehensive collation of places to land an aircraft
across Australia, be it your Beechcraft or your Boeing. It
gives vital information to aid safe, efficient flight planning by
aviators traversing the continent.
Log on to www.aopa.com.au and head to the
‘Information Centre’ to download your order form and send
it in to the office by post, email, or fax to secure your copy.
RRP $6 Owners and
of Aus
Flying Ops
1. (c) The planned drift was the
same as the track error.
IFR Operations
1 (a) YMML ILS plate ZULU
2. (a) 6 miles in 45 is approximately 8
in 60.
2 (c) YMML ILS plate YANKEE,
Note: answer (D) 11.6 distance is
from the threshold.
3. (c) At this level the VFR allowable
error is 100FT. (ENR 1.7)
3 (c) YMML ILS plate YANKEE Data
box alongside profile diagram
4. (a) The pressure height is the
distance from the 1013HPa
pressure level. In this example,
1013 is also the QNH.
4 (d) YMML ILS plate YANKEE. Note
PEC. is only applied to a decision
altitude (DA) and not a decision
height (DH) using the radar
5. (d)
6. (d) The outer wing traces a
slightly shallower upward spiral
than the inner wing.
7. (a)
8. (a)
9. (c) Potentially, diaphragm pumps
can be damaged by switching off
fuel to simulate an engine failure.
10. (b)
5 (b) AIP ENR 1.5-33 Para 8.1.
ZULU. Note: M.D.A. refers to nonprecision approaches.
6 (c) AIP GEN 2.2-20. AIP ENR
7 (d) AIP ENR 1.5.–26 Para 4.3 AIP
ENR 1.5-33 Para 9 YMML ILS
PLATE X-RAY. A PEC does not
apply to a decision height.
8 (b) AIP ENR 1.5-31 Para 6.2. This
is a common misconception. The
duplication requirement is at the
planning stage to use a SPECIAL
ALTN minima.
9 (a) YMML ILS plate YANKEE.
or ZULU. Special alternate not
applicable if a localiser only
approach has to be flown.
10 (d) YMML ILS plate YANKEE only.
1. (c).
2. (c).
3. (a).
4. (a).
5. (d).
6. (b).
7. (a).
8. (b).
9. (d).
10. (d).
Ph: 02 9791 9099 Email: [email protected] Web: www.aopa.com.au
The EAA 58th Annual International Airshow
and Convention Wittman Field, Oshkosh, U.S.A.
JULY 26TH – AUGUST 1ST 2010.
THE EXPRESS takes you from Australia to Wittman
Field Oshkosh USA, with only one stop for Customs and
Immigration in Los Angeles, departs July 26th arrives Oshkosh
the same day. THE EXPRESS is the only aircraft totally
chartered by Aviation Enthusiasts to take Aviation Enthusiasts
in a Boeing 747-400 directly into Oshkosh. THE EXPRESS
allows you to gain attractive rates for other internal air
travel within the USA, travel insurance, hotel/motel and car
hire plus other tours which can be arranged by Avtours
Australia. Avtours will arrange your return to Australia at
your leisure from the West Coast. Onward travel can also be
arranged to anywhere in the World. THE EXPRESS includes
6 nights accommodation at the University of Wisconsin
Oshkosh, Coach transfer to Chicago O’Hare Airport, shirt,
cap plus in-flight magazine with important local and airshow
information. Also gives the opportunity to be seated in
Business or Premium Economy at a small additional charge
with being one of the first in with your deposits.
PRICE: from $3995.00 ex Sydney twin share.
To secure your reservation a deposit of AUD$1500.00 per person is required payable to
For more information please contact:
Karene Tripodi,
Marya Phillips
Ph 0416 822 885
Ph. 1300 728 634
Email. [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
All of the above prices are subject to change.
Licence No. 2TA4424
110x165advertNov09.indd 1
16/10/09 7:18:31 PM
Does your training comply with CAO 20.11 and CAR 253*?
performance testing while monitoring physiological
parameters. Fully automated and instant video and
printed report for all students.
Safe and efficient normobaric hypoxia training is now
available at Australian centres. Individual or group
sessions for all flight personnel.
*knowledge of the effects of altitude
The GO2Altitude® normobaric hypoxia awareness
system incorporates complete educational package:
theoretical and practical hypoxia knowledge, cognitive
… essential aviation reading
Inside next issue
Our Feature looks at air crash investigation,
The Concorde crash­— 10 years on,
Wake turbulence: A roller coaster ride you never
want to take, and
More of the ever-popular quiz and readers’ close calls.
Swinburne’s Aviation courses. Brought to you in
conjunction with the biggest names in aviation.
If your aviation career is in a holding pattern, Swinburne’s aviation
qualification is the upgrade you need. Our courses are designed with
direction from major players within the industry. This means what
you learn here, is exactly what you need to further your career...
1300 AsK sWIN
CRICOS Provider: 00111D
There has never been a better time
to be with good people.
Good people to be with.
QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited ABN: 78 003 191 035, AFS Licence No 239545
Contact details for you and your broker:
Melbourne Ph: (03) 8602 9900 Sydney Ph: (02) 9375 4445
Ph: (07) 3031 8588 Adelaide Ph: (08) 8202 2200
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF