Atlanta Game Rules
Atlanta Game Rules
Table of Contents
Terrain and Map Notes
Union Special Rules
Confederate Special Rules
Other Special Rules
Historical Scenario: Action of July 22, 1864
Minor Variants
Historical Scenario: Action of July 20, 1864
Minor Variants
Extended Scenario: Action of July 20 to July 22
Minor Variants
Historical Notes
(not yet included)
Designer's Notes
(currently a separate document)
Union Player's Notes (not yet included)
Confederate Player's Notes (not yet included)
Union Personality Sheet
Confederate Personality Sheets
Atlanta is a map, units, and some special rules that might be useful when combined with The
Gamers’ CWB system and rules. Originally this was intended to be a game in the series, but the series
has ended (as of 2010). The maps and these rules were developed in 1991-1993, and may not be
compatible in some ways with the more recent editions of the CWB rules. There may also be better
more recent rules for some things like fortifications that are not present in the early series games.
The Atlanta game in its basic format portrays the battle of July 22, 1864. General Hood, who
had recently replaced General Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee, made his second
attack on the armies of General Sherman, this time a daring blow which fell on the nearly unguarded
flank of the Army of Tennessee. In a battle which easily could have been a Federal disaster had
dispositions or timing been somewhat different, Hood was repulsed with heavy losses in the second of
three Union victories that sapped the strength of the Confederate army. This game allows players to
recreate this battle in its historical setting, or explore a number of "what if?" situations which may lead
to decisively different outcomes.
Atlanta can be played as a one map scenario covering the action of July 22. There is also a two
map scenario also covering the approach of the Union Army of the Tennessee on the 20th, and actions
around Bald Hill on the 21st when some hard fighting took place while Hood redeployed his forces.
The game is designed to be linked to the Peachtree Creek game which covers actions to the West of
that portrayed in this game, including the battle of Ezra Church.
1.1 Map Designations
The hex numbering system is used to identify individual hexes on the map. The principal map
for Atlanta is identified as map A, with map B used for the longer scenario. Maps C and D are
portrayed in the Peachtree Creek game. The four maps A, B, C, and D correspond to the SE, NE, NW,
and SW quadrants respectively of the City of Atlanta and the country just to the North. Partial hexes to
the left of the first column (1.xx) are considered column 0 (numbered 0.xx) should reference to them be
necessary, with xx corresponding to the row.
1.2 Confederate Atlanta Entrenchments
The red hex sides are the Confederate entrenchments protecting Atlanta. As fortifications
constructed earlier to protect Atlanta, they are counted as Trenches (similar in effect to "sunken road"
benefits). In addition, any attacker attempting to move adjacent to an entrenched enemy unit must pass
a morale check due to the troops' reluctance to attack such works. A similar morale check and an
additional movement point is required to cross an entrenchment hex side into close combat, representing
the effect of an abatis (absent in the case of a sunken road). Thus, a unit advancing from two hexes
away must pass two morale checks and expend at least four movement points to close assault a unit
defending behind such entrenchments. Note that this provision applies specifically to the Atlanta
entrenchments, not to breastworks the player may construct under the provision of the series optional
The line of works on the NE side of Atlanta from hex A4.27 to A1.33, connecting to the inner
works, were constructed July 21 when the Confederate forces fell back after the battle of Peachtree
Creek. On 22 July they are counted as breastworks rather than trenches. For scenarios starting earlier,
those works are not present. Works on the North side of Decatur are also treated as breastworks rather
than trenches.
Units in the Atlanta entrenchments may "double-extend" to cover 5 hexes instead of just 3. This
reflects the much thinner manning necessary to hold such works, especially if abundant artillery was
available. Both Hood and Johnston intended to use the Atlanta defenses as a way of holding off a large
part of the Union army with a small force while acting elsewhere with the remainder.
1.3 Union Breastworks
The purple hex sides on the SW map are Union breastworks applicable to the 22 July scenario
only. They give the normal breastworks benefit given on page 33 of the series rules (part 4 of "The Use
of Breastworks" optional rule).
1.4 Woods adjacent to breastworks and entrenchments
Ignore woods in all hexes immediately in front of breastworks or entrenchments. It is assumed
that the woods would be cut down to form abatis and lumber for strengthening the works, as well as to
provide a clear field of fire. Woods on map A to be ignored for the July 22 scenario are in a lighter
green. (Oops! This was lost in the .pdf version.)
1.5 Map Edges
The roads that exit the edges of the mapboard are treated as if connected along the map edge by a
path along which a unit moving in column expends one movement point per hex. This reflects off-map
roads which can be used by the forces on the mapboard, or for the conveyance of orders. Such a path is
blocked by the presence of an enemy unit on the map edge. Units moving in accordance with this
provision may not enter the map except at a hex where a road enters the map (although they may leave
anywhere). They may not engage in combat with units on the board while in this mode of movement.
All map edge half-hexes are playable. Units forced off of the map by combat results are not
eliminated, but placed in column on there next turn, and may re-enter the map in accordance with map
edge provisions above.
1.6 City hexes
The only urban hexes in the game are on map "A": those of Atlanta, near the West map edge, and
Decatur, in the Northeast Corner. These hexes are indicated by a grey overlay over the basic color.
These hexes act as blocking terrain with respect to line of sight rules.
1.7 Bridges, Streams, and Peachtree Creek
Primary roads are assumed to have bridges over all streams. Fords are assumed to exist
wherever a minor road crosses a stream. Peachtree Creek is fordable in places. The Northerners
were very apt at improvising the crossing of creeks in absence of bridges and fords. They
accomplished this in several places on July 19 in spite of a storm-filled Peachtree Creek. On the
map B, all Peachtree Creek stream hex sides can possibly be crossed by an unshaken infantry or
cavalry unit by expending its entire turn's movement allowance. Once such a move is made by a
unit expending all of its movement points in place, roll a single die. A result of 1 or 2 indicates
that the unit has found a crossing site. (A die roll of 1 is required if either hex is swamp, and no
crossing exists if both are swamp.) The unit is then moved to the opposite side, and is put in
"disorganized" status. Once a unit crosses, others of the same division must cross at that same
spot (or not at all). on the following turns. Following units may cross in column formation, and
are put in a morale state one worse than before they cross. They may be in shaken status and still
cross. Units from other divisions within the Corps may also cross at that same spot. (It may be
helpful to record the crossing spots.) The same hex side cannot be checked two turns in a row,
or by more than one unit. (The recordkeeping to keep a list of hexsides proved not to have fords
is considered not worthwhile, but players could do this if they wish a more detailed treatment of
this issue.) Artillery and Supply may not cross creeks in this manner at all. Note that some
bridges where primary roads cross streams are indicated as absent, others present.
1.8 Bridge destruction, repair
Bridges may be destroyed by the Confederate player, and thus indicated by placing a marker.
Destruction is automatic during the night if desired for any bridge within 2 hexes of a Confederate unit
not in possession of a Union unit. During the day, the bridge must be adjacent to a Confederate unit and
the other end in an unoccupied zone of control, with the unit immobile and not firing for the entire turn.
Bridges are considered rebuilt after midnight if hexes at both ends have previously been secured by
Union units. Also, at other times, if both ends of a destroyed bridge are in Union hands, and a Union
infantry brigade is present in one of the adjacent hexes, and no Confederate unit is within 2 hexes, a die
roll may be made each turn for bridge repair. The units doing the repair must be in line formation, and
may not take fire or perform any other action during the turn. A roll of 1 is needed to repair the bridge.
(A particularly quick repair would indicate that the original destruction of the bridge was incompletely
accomplished, contrary to what the Confederate commander may have thought.)
In other respects the terrain conforms (or is intended to conform) to the conventions of other
Brigade Series games.
2.1 Command peculiarities
2.1a Union Army Structure
The Union command structure has an extra layer of command compared to most games of the
series except for Bloody Road South, which portrays the Battle of the Wilderness in which Grant's
command structure was similar to Sherman's in this game. Sherman commands three armies, each of
which has its own commander, although in the case of Schoefield, the Army of the Ohio is synonymous
with the 23rd Corps.
2.1b Issuing Orders
In the game in general, orders originate with the player representing Sherman, giving orders
(using the Order Log) directly to his army commanders, who (using their own command points) must in
turn issue orders to their subordinates. Sherman can also issue orders directly to corps or even divisions
or brigades. (Historically he did very little of that with his infantry. However, an exception occurred in
this battle when he ordered Schoefield to send three individual brigades to various points to protect the
Union rear.) Such orders to individual divisions and brigades can be written (as with orders to corps) if
coming from an army commander, or in person as for "division goals" when coming from a corps
commander. Note that subordinate army commanders (McPherson and Thomas) may only issue orders
that carry out the intent of Sherman's orders, unless initiative is rolled, just as units subordinate to a
Corps must comply with the orders under which the Corps is operating.
2.1c Army of the Ohio
Schoefield counts as a Corps commander, and the Army of the Ohio is in practical terms just a
glorified name for the 23rd Corps. He does not issue written orders. (Optionally, another corps may be
attached to the Army of the Ohio, in which case Schoefield issues orders as do the other army
commanders. His orders to himself (in the role of 23rd corps commander) go through the usual
acceptance proceedure to reflect delays in implementing the orders. (Historically, Sherman often
attached another corps to Schoefield's command.)
2.1d Division Goals to Brigades
Infantry corps commanders may, but infantry division commanders may not, give division
(brigade) goals to individual infantry brigades. This allows the historical actions of this sort that
occurred during the actual battle, such as that of Logan who, as 15th Corps commander, sent an
individual brigade (Wagelin's) to fill the gap between 16th and 17th Corps on McPherson's orders.
Cavalry division commanders may give individual brigades division (brigade) goals as is normal under
the standard rules. Brigades cannot, however, be attached to other divisions or corps. They must be
issued commands individually until they are returned to their divisions (by another order). Note that
issuing such goals to brigades can fragment the army's command, due to the difficulties of getting them
under command again.
2.1e Command of Cavalry
Sherman gives orders to Cavalry divisions individually, as there was no effective Cavalry corps
organization. (Union cavalry units are present in this battle only under optional rules)
2.1f Thomas
General "Slow Trot" Thomas has a rating of 3 for initiative and dealing with subordinates, but is
-2 (to a 1) for receiving and acting on orders from Sherman. This is intended to reflect the difficulty his
superiors sometimes found in getting him moving. This applies only to the optional rule providing for
the entry of the Army of the Cumberland, since neither Thomas nor any of his army is present for the
historical Atlanta scenario.
2.1g Dodge
Dodge, commander of the 16th Corps, made a practice during the battle of giving orders to
individual brigades and regiments. This allows 16th Corps to disregard normal rules for division
integrity. Units so ordered about must, however, stay within 4 hexes of either Dodge or the division
commander. In effect, 16th Corps is a three brigade division. Sweeny took issue with this practice and
was dismissed later after the battle. (Optionally, simply play the corps with Sweeny and Fuller removed
from the map, since Dodge was superceding their roles.)
2.1h Sprague
Another 16th corps peculiarity in this game is the detached brigade 2/4/16 is given a
brigade commander marker, Sprague, who commands his brigade and associated XVI and
Cavalry artillery, and the Army of the Tennessee trains North of the Decatur area. In this
capacity he is treated as a detached division commander who takes orders from McPherson or
Sherman but not Dodge. If 2/4/16 is reattached to 16th Corps on the orders of Sherman,
McPherson, or at the initiative of Dodge, then the Sprague marker is removed from the game.
The presence of the Sprague marker allows initiative roll by the Union player to move either offboard or toward the rest of the Army. (This rule is being left in place pending playtesting of
other provisions for treating Sprague's problem. If 2/4/16 and the accompanying artillery are
simply made an independent brigade, there is no constraint to guard the trains.)
2.1i 23rd Corps brigade attachments
Two brigades of the 23rd Corps, nominally of 1/23, were attached to the other divisions of that Corps,
and operate in all ways as elements of the respective divisions to which they are attached, even to the
consideration of wrecked division status.
2.1j Initiative
Individual brigades have no initiative rating, and do not exercise initiative in the usual sense. An
exception made for 2/4/16 (Sprague) is noted above (if that rule remains). Any detached brigade may
make an initiative roll using a rating of 1, but the order given if initiative is achieved must be either a
retreat or rejoining the unit's parent command.
In this game the subordinate army commanders may make initiative rolls. A successful initiative
roll allows them to give themselves orders that are different from those previously received from
Sherman (if any). They still must act through the issuing of orders to subordinates.
There are no Union Anti-initiative ratings except the special case already mentioned for Thomas.
2.2 Command Succession
If Sherman is killed or wounded, General Thomas replaces him, appearing at the Howard House
(or the nearest free hex to the East if occupied) two turns later. McPherson is next in succession.
Beyond that, whoever is senior in the Army of Tennessee takes command of forces on the board, but
Army of the Cumberland units (which may have entered under Sherman's orders if the optional rule for
their entry was invoked) move no farther and assume a defensive posture wherever they are unless the
commanders involved make successful initiative rolls. (One should not get both Sherman and Thomas
killed; the assumption is that this would shatter coordination between the armies.)
Succession within the Army of the Tennessee goes to Logan then Blair then Dodge. Logan is
succeeded by M.L. Smith then Woods, Blair by Leggett, and Dodge by Fuller. Palmer, Newton, and
Stanley are next in succession for 14th, 20th and 4th corps respectively.
2.3 Army Designations
Union leaders are marked with their army designation, "Cmb" for corps commanders of the
Army of the Cumberland, "Tn" for the Army of the Tennessee. (Schoefield is effectively both Army of
the Ohio commander and 23rd Corps commander.) Division commanders have their division, corps,
and army designated, with the army as "C", "T", or "O" for Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio
respectively. Brigades do not have the army designation due to lack of space on the counter, but this is
not a problem since corps designations are unique, unlike those in August Fury.
2.4 Supply
The Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Cumberland supply trains can resupply any corps
supply trains in their respective armies. There is no Army of the Ohio supply trains; the 23rd Corps
supply trains can be replenished from the Army of the Cumberland supply. Cavalry units can be
resupplied by either Army supply unit. (Their carbine ammunition would not normally be available
from the infantry corps supply trains.)
2.5 Plus weapon units
All Union Cavalry units are all considered to have "plus" "+" weapons, including Wilder's
brigade (3/2/Cav). Wilder's brigade actually has the Henry repeaters, which are better than the "+"
carbines. The additional advantage is reflected by the unit having higher firepower ratings per strength
point than others. All "+" units become low in ammunition on a fire roll of 10 as well as 11 or 12,
reflecting the fact that the higher rate of fire decreases the time before a unit runs low on ammunition.
Wilder's brigade (3/2/Cav) is not actually cavalry, but mounted infantry. These troops operate as
cavalry in all respects except that they may not use the cavalry charge close assault mode, which would
be a poor use for this unit anyway. (Actually, I did not see cavalry charge in the 2cd ed, revised rules.)
2.6a Detachment Marker
A single special detachment marker has been included for the Union forces, to represent a
detachment of smaller than brigade size that is too far from the parent brigade to be represented by
extended lines. It may be used only by a brigade that is detached from its division. Strength is allocated
to the detachment marker just as to extended lines markers. The detachment must stay within 4
movement points of the parent command's marker (just as for division integrity). The detachment may
extend lines, allowing the parent unit to have some forces in up to 6 different hexes. The detachment
functions for purposes of combat as an extended line. For example, if the detachment routs, so does the
parent command. Only one detachment marker is included, as only one unit may use this provision at a
time. It is expected that most players will use the detachment for purposes of rear area security,
specifically to allow Sprague to more adequately protect the trains. (Without the detachment feature,
Sprague can be outflanked and overrun. This gives him at least the option to "circle the wagons" and
provide a thin all-around defense. This rule needs to be reviewed to see if it is really necessary. I
suspect we can get along without it.)
3.1 Hood or Johnston
The Confederate force may be commanded by either Johnston or Hood. If Johnston is left in
command, the President's concern is primarily the state of the Army, with retention of Atlanta being of
secondary importance. This (will) affects the victory conditions to give more importance to casualties
than to terrain. Johnston is credited with a rating of 2, somewhat superior to Hood's, in part due to his
better working relationship with his subordinates. he also has a higher than usual "panic roll", which in
his case is less a matter of panic than a preference to give up some more terrain and fight under better
conditions elsewhere, an attitude characteristic of his campaign prior to his relief. With Johnston in
command, Hood commands his own (Cheatham's) corps with a rating of 3; Cheatham stays with his
division which would otherwise be commanded by Maney, and also reverts to a 2 rating as a division
If the Confederate player chooses to hold Atlanta as top priority, Hood has relieved Johnston.
The low rating given Hood in this capacity, 1, reflects his difficulties with army command in the period
portrayed, in no small part due to difficulties in relations with his subordinates, especially Hardee. Hood
suffers still from wounds received earlier in the war, and hence has restricted mobility: 6 movement
points rather than 12. Optionally, the players may agree also to restrict him as Army commander to the
bounds of Atlanta as marked by the fortifications, as he did not venture out to the scene of the fighting
due to both mobility difficulties mentioned and an inclination to put excessive trust in the initiative of
his subordinates. If Hood is in command, Hardee assumes a -1 anti-initiative posture. A choice of Hood
as commander puts a priority on the aggressive defense of Atlanta, rewarding geographic victory
conditions more highly than casualties. Hood is extremely unlikely to "panic" even in the face of severe
losses. In addition, Hood's preference for the attack is well understood by his subordinates, who are
reluctant to stop a fruitless attack as they might otherwise. Therefore the attack stopage table is used
with a "bonus" of one to continue the attack, or a bonus of 2 if the order was strongly worded (a Force 2
order). (A roll of 2 always causes attack stoppage, however.)
It is assumed that, whichever priority (and corresponding army commander) is selected by the
Confederate player, the results of the Battle of Peachtree Creek would be pretty much the same, and thus
the initial conditions for the Atlanta (July 22cd) game are unchanged. This may not be fair, since
Johnston would not have suffered the chaos of change of command and attendant difficulties as did
Hood. If players wish to assume otherwise, they may change the initial losses assigned to certain
Confederate units.
In fairness to Hood, the deep flanking attack made by Hardee was his plan, one that Johnston
would have been unlikely to order. Thus, if Johnston is in command the scenario could (optionally)
open with Hardee's command deployed anywhere within 8 hexes of the Atlanta entrenchments, at least 4
hexes from the nearest Union unit, instead of the setup given in the scenario for July 22.
3.2 Command peculiarities
The corps commanded (temporarily) by Stewart, along with Jackson's division of cavalry,
constitute the Army of Mississippi. In practice, Stewart's corps is treated just like any other, and on 26
July it was redesignated as "Stewart's Corps" officially. Jackson's division is an independent command
under the direct control of the Army of Tennessee commander, though it can be attached to one or
another corps. It can draw supplies from any corps supply train. The Georgia state militia is also an
independent command, which cannot be attached to a corps. It has its own artillery, but can draw
supplies from any corps supply train.
3.3 Corps Attack Stoppage and Divisional Goals
Individual divisions operating under divisional goals will likely be used for at least some of the units in
Hardee's Corps, given the virtual impossibility of Hardee staying within the required number of
movement points as the attack progresses. The normal handling of such a division for purposes of attack
stoppage is to treat it as a corps of one division (and a commander), so that if the division is wrecked or
its commander is killed or wounded, a roll is made on the '3' column rather than '1' column of the Corps
Attack Stopage table. Loss of both the commander and a wrecked division requires use of the '4'
column. Optionally, players may wish to consider treating an attack stoppage determination just as for a
corps, but counting brigades as divisions.
3.4 Command Succession
If the Army of Tennessee commander is killed or wounded, Hardee takes command, followed by
Hood, Stewart, and Cheatham in that order. Within Hardee's corps, the order of succession is Walker,
Cleburne, Bate, Maney. For Cheatham's (Hood's), it is Stevenson, Clayton, Brown. For Stewart's,
succession is to Loring, French, then Walthall. Command of the Cavalry Corps goes to Martin, then
Humes, then Kelly. These are immediate battlefield substitutions; very likely other assignments would
be substituted given time, just as Stewart later replaced Loring in command of the Army of Mississippi
after General Polk's death.
3.5 Artillery Peculiarities
The Army of Tennessee had an artillery reserve of 36 guns which operate as normal
artillery and can be given orders by the Army commander in the form of division goals, or can
operate as would Corps artillery within command radius of the Army of Tennessee HQ. The
reserve artillery can be commanded as a whole as well. The procedure is the same as for giving
a "divisoin goal" to an individual artillery unit, but applies to all or some portion of the reserve
artillery units within the 4 movement point command radius of any one of the units. Thus, these
units can be thought of as a single "division". These units may also be assigned to the corps, as
was actually done before the end of July. One battery, Anderson's, normally operated with the
Georgia militia during the campaign. Hence, it is separated and marked "Ga Mil" although it is
actually part of the Reserve, and is considered part of the militia for practical purposes.
In addition, there were batteries without horses manned mostly by Georgia state troops,
marked "Atlanta" in the counter mix. These units are restricted to the Atlanta inner defenses, and
may be moved normally only during the night (using mules), one per turn. Should their
movement become necessary at other times, they can be credited with 1 movement point for
being manhandled, without the need to limber up (since that option is not available to these
units.) All of these guns were successfully evacuated from Atlanta when the city fell. Where
normally 3 guns make up a point of artillery, these units have 4 per point to reflect somewhat
less experience. (These are normally used only with Peachtree Creek. They may be added to
the Confederate forces for play balance.)
The Confederate artillery operated with fewer men per gun and considerably less
ammunition supplies than did the Union. Therefore, the "out of ammunition" condition on a roll
of 11 or 12 applies to Confederate artillery as well as infantry. Confederate artillery that runs out
of ammunition is allowed to fire only at ranges of 2 or less. (This reflects the fact that grapeshot
would likely still be available if the battery runs out of ammunition while firing offensively at
longer ranges.) Ammunition is automatically replenished if the artillery is within 2 hexes of the
Corps supply wagon or the Army trains during the resupply phase. (In fact, batteries did run out
of ammunition and had to withdraw for that reason.)
Confederates artillery units are at most 4 points in this game (one battalion of 12 guns).
Players may optionally restrict Confederate artillery to 4 points firing from a hex to reflect this, if
necessary to prevent an ahistorical reorganization from being implemented by a particularly
competitive Confederate player.
4.1 Breastworks and Entrenchments
By this time of the war, troops of both armies had gained an appreciation for the protection
afforded by breastworks and entrenchments. The optional rule in the series rules for breastworks and
entrenchments should be used for scenarios of longer than one day. For the July 22 scenario, the battle
was fluid enough that only the breastworks marked on the map should be used.
Optionally, players may consider any hex containing unlimbered artillery as also having
breastworks. The assumption is that if there has been enough time for artillery to unlimber, troops in the
vicinity will have had some time to throw up some crude protection. (This rule duplicates a similar
optional rule in Bloody Road South.) If players feel that this is too generous, it could be restricted to
hexes in or adjacent to woods. This optional rule provides some breastworks effect with a minimum of
4.2 Commander Initiative
When a unit is confronted with a circumstance to which its current orders could not possibly
pertain, initiative rolls are made with a +1 modifier This is increased to +2 if enemy units are within 6
hexes of the commander. To apply, the commander must have a line of sight to the enemy units, or they
must be within 6 hexes of and be within line of sight of some subordinate commander. This case above
specifically applies to the 22 July scenario, where Union units find Confederates attacking from a most
unexpected direction.
Any unit not under orders receives a +1 initiative benefit. This is cumulative with the above
bonuses, and any anti-initiative penalties.
4.3 Artillery Bombardment Limits (optional rule):
Over periods longer than a few hours, artillery generally would not bombard constantly during
most Civil War actions. In fact, if there wasn't much going on, the gunners would gradually stop
In the absence of enemy infantry or cavalry action (fire or movement) within range of an artillery
unit of the corps, or enemy artillery response, artillery automatically stop shooting. For Confederates,
this provision is absolute. For Union, a player desiring to keep firing must pass an initiative roll (for this
purpose only) by the corps commander if he does not currently have offensive orders. If you want
artillery to bombard before starting an attack with infantry, that would require a separate order (and
coordination). Whether artillery shoots or not under the provision of this rule is decided on a corps
basis. The intent of this rule is to both reflect the tendency to stop shooting, and avoid having to track
artillery ammunition. (Particularly competitive players will sometimes bombard whenever there is any
chance for a favorable result if ammunition is not quite restricted.) During the course of the Atlanta
campaign, Union artillery did bombard the city of Atlanta more or less continuously. Much of this
damage was inflicted on civilians and structures that do not play a direct role in the game. The effect is
reflected in victory points for positions, such as Bald Hill, from which such bombardment can be made.
4.4 Artillery Ammunition Limits
In all scenarios, artillery ammunition is unlimited for both sides. The Union forces had a period
of several days just prior to the opening of the campaign portrayed during which they assembled a
considerable amount of supplies on the East side of the Chattahoochie river. The Confederates are
operating in close proximity to their depot in Atlanta, and are thus better supplied than in most other
campaigns. If optional rule 4.3 above is not used, players may optionally restrict artillery to 100 points
total plus 50 per day of the scenario, if necessary to discourage unnecessary bombardment, with this
limit not applying to firing on targets within 2 hexes.
4.5 Status and Panic Rolls
Status and Panic rolls may be ignored in short (1 day) scenarios, since the commander's reaction
to the battle "panic" would more than likely take place during the night turns. A case can be made that
in 1864 you just did not have major army commanders who would panic in the sense of precipitate
flight. In this game, the result of a "panic roll" is generally an orderly withdrawal, preferably during the
night if the army can hold out until then. See personality sheets for more details.
5.0 Scenarios
5.1 Historical Battle of Atlanta of July 22 1864
This scenario restricts the players pretty much to the kinds of mistakes made in
disposition of troops in the historical battle. It portrays only the battle of 22 July from the time
of Hood's attack. The actual development of the attack is up to the Confederate player, however.
First turn: 12:00AM July 22 1864
Last Turn: 7:00PM July 22 1864
Scenario Length: 15 turns
The Confederates move first
5.1a Union Information:
5.1a.1 Unit setup
Sherman and Schofield: in hex 11.35 with West HQ and Ohio HQ
3/23, 3/23b(3), and 1/1/23 is placed within 2 hexes of 11.35
2/23, 2/23b(4), and 2/1/23 is placed within 2 hexes of 12.31
23rd supply:
Logan, 15HQ:
15 supply:
1/3/17, 3/17bb(2):
3/3/17, 3/17ba(4):
3/4/17, 4/17db(2):
Blair, 17HQ:
17 supply:
1/2/16, :
29.18 in line (en route to XVII)
2/2/16, 2/16b(2), Dodge,Sweeny 16HQ:
28.17 in line,limbered
2/16db(2) limbered
1/4/16, Fuller:
25.17 in line
22.15, limbered (en route to XVII corps)
16 supply:
Tenn HQ, McPherson: 31.25
2/4/16, 4/16db(1),2/Cavb(2),Sprague within 8 hexes of 49.35
5.1a.2 Formations and Orders
All units of 23rd, 15th and 17th (except the 16b(2) in 22.15) are in line, behind
breastworks. Units may be set up with lines extended into adjacent hexes. 1/4/16 and the
accompanying artillery 16b(1) and 2/Cavb(2) is in line, unentrenched. All Union units have
orders to defend in place, except 16th Corps which is ordered to march to the left flank of 17th
Corps and assume a defensive posture there, extending the line to the South to protect the Army's
flank. Sprague with 2/4/16 and the artillery is to protect the Army of Tennessee trains, which are
off the board to the North. (Union defensive works printed on map A are available during this
5.1a.3 Previous Losses
A few Union units took losses on previous days:
1/3/17 -4
1/4/17 -1
3/4/17 -2
Leader loss: Gresham (use replacement)
(These losses are taken into account on the special loss sheet for just the action of July 22 if
5.1a.4 Special rules for initial turns
Federal leaders and units may take no action (and no initiative roll) the first turn if no
gunfire is heard (units in combat) or enemy units are sighted outside the Atlanta defenses as
provided in the next paragraph. Sherman, MacPherson, and Schoefield remain their starting
hex(es) unless threatened with attack. Sherman does not take any action until 1:00 (and then
only if guns are heard by then), when he may begin sending orders to Schoefield or MacPherson.
An exception is made for the 16th Corps, which at 1:00PM must proceed with its orders to march
along the road to a position on the left of 17th Corps and assume a defensive posture there. For
purposes of determining sighting, units farther away than 6 hexes are considered out of sight.
Before gunfire is heard, division leaders who see (have line of sight to) Confederate units
or who have a brigade in sight of Confederates outside the Atlanta defenses may exercise
initiative during the Initiative part of the Union player turn with the bonuses indicated in the
game specific rules: +2. Corps commanders who have line of sight to Confederate units outside
the Atlanta defenses, or who have a division commander who has exercised initiative may
themselves exercise initiative with a successful roll in like manner. (This is in exception to the
general rule that prohibits multiple initiative rolls applicable to the same unit.) As an exception
to the general initiative failure rule, if the 16th Corps is in motion (under its original orders) and
Dodge fails his initiative roll, 16th Corps may still assume a defensive posture in place, allowing
artillery to unlimber and units to extend into adjacent hexes and face as desired. (In contrast, a
successful 16th corps initiative roll allows movement of units to redeploy as desired). Note that
Dodge will not even get this roll unless enemy units have been sighted.) Other than as provided
above, the Union leaders may not exercise initiative until after gunfire is heard. After gunfire is
heard, the initial initiative reactions are made with +1 to the die roll. (This applies to the first
attempt by a leader to gain initiative, and applies on all initiative attempts until either one is
successful or the leader accepts orders from a superior.) Any turn following a Confederate
infantry attack allows a Corps commander (Blair or Dodge) to dispose his corps as necessary for
defense, regardless of prior orders. The 16th Corps was taking a break for lunch, and does not
actually resume marching in accordance with its orders until 1:00PM, assuming Confederates
have not yet been encountered. Its infantry units are in line formation to reflect that the troops
would have ample time to form in line given the open country the Confederates had to cross in
the historical setup. (Possibly the artillery should start unlimbered too.)
Sprague must defend the Army of Tennessee trains in Decatur as given in his initial
orders, unless he succeeds in rolling for initiative. A successful initiative roll allows him to
withdraw off the map, should he so choose, or rejoin his corps. (In fact, the 400 wagons were
spread out along roads to the north.)
5.1b Confederate Information:
5.1b.1 Unit Setup
Cheatham's Corps: Inside Atlanta defenses, 7:17 and North
Georgia Militia (1st,2cd brigades): Inside Atlanta defenses, 7:16 and South
Reserve Artillery:
Inside the Atlanta defenses
Cleburne's division: 29.02 to 32.04
Walker's division:
33.05 to 36.06
Bate's division:
37.09 to 39.11
Maney's division:
41.15 to 42.17 Enters turn 1 at 29.01 in line formation.
Wkr/M/H (Maney's brigade) is ordered to reinforce Bate's division.
(Note the optional rule in 3.1 that these units of Hardee's corps be deployed anywhere
within 10 hexes of Atlanta but not within 4 of Union units if Johnston is in command.)
Cavalry corps:42:18 to 45.26 (Iverson's and Kelly's divisions, plus Williams's and Featherston's
brigades, attached) The artillery and supply wagons are not
present; they are presumed to be off map within the Atlanta
defenses or with Hume.
Hardee's artillery:
1 battalion (4 points) of artillery are set up along the road from
37.09 to 29.01 in a hex not occupied by another unit. A second
battalion (4 points) enters on turn 2 at 29.01 The remainder is left
within the Atlanta defenses but restricted to the Atlanta defenses
until within command range of Hardee or until such time as Hood
(Or Johnston) should order it to rejoin Hardee. (He may do so only
after hearing the sound of the guns.)
Hardee's wagons:
Enter at 29.01 on turn 3 (1:00PM)
Supply, headquarters, and artillery: Set up with or adjacent to units of the same command,
except for Hardee's Corps and cavalry as mentioned above.
Optional: allow the cavalry supply wagons to enter on turn 4,
rather than leaving them in Atlanta.
5.1b.2 Formations and Orders
Hardee's Corps starts in line formation, with no more than one unit per hex, all positioned
on the road. Division commanders may be with any brigade of their division. (With 2cd edition
rules it is no longer necessary to be within 4m.p. of the leader. To better reflect the command
difficulties, an alternative to the 1st edition provision is to disallow the use of all minor roads and
trails on turns 1-4 (12:00 to 1:30) when the units of Hardee's Corps are traversing this terrain for
the first time. This would apply to both movement and leader radius.)
Other infantry units are in line formation. Cavalry may be in line or mounted formation.
Artillery is unlimbered except that (of Hardee's command) outside the Atlanta defenses.
Hardee begins the game with orders to attack the Union Army of the Tennessee in the
rear. The order is not particularly strongly worded (Force 1), for purposes of the special rules
about Hood. Cheatham is standing by to attack on order from the Army of Tennessee
commander. Wheeler is to capture the Union trains at or north of Decatur. Hood is rated a zero
in issuing his first attack order to forces inside Atlanta. This reflects his lack of intelligence
concerning the progress of Hardee's Corps, and thus allows for a somewhat greater chance of
missed coordination.
5.1b.3 Special command provisions for Wheeler, Reserve Artillery
If the Union force guarding the trains (Sprague) withdraws off of the map, Wheeler will
automatically leaves the map by the same road in pursuit unless he succeeds in an initiative roll.
If he fails, roll a die to see how many brigades he is willing to detach for purposes other than
pursuing the trains. He goes with the majority of his brigades. If he remains on the map, the
brigades exiting, if more than one, must be under the command of a division commander (or
two). If he leaves the map he may continue rolling for initiative. A successful initiative roll
allows him to reenter the map on that turn with his forces at the hex where he had departed.
(Note: destruction or capture of the trains would have made it more difficult for the Army of the
Tennessee to march farther around the Confederate right flank.)
Hardee may issue an order (written by the player) to Wheeler after his corps has become
engaged. If when his order arrives at Wheeler the latter has received no further order from the
Army commander, then he will consider obeying Hardee's order. Roll for acceptance, counting
Hardee as a zero. A result of D2 results in Wheeler disregarding the order. Historically, Hardee
ordered Wheeler to reinforce him. Wheeler did so, and blamed this order for his failure to secure
the wagons. (Optionally, Hardee issues an order to Wheeler to come to his support if he rolls
attack stoppage or has two wrecked divisions, whether the Army commander (the player) wants
him to or not.)
The reserve artillery starts in the Atlanta defenses, and is not attached to any unit. It may
be given orders only by Hood, until he gives orders to attach it to some Corps (or, possibly, to
G.W. Smith as had been done on the 20th).
5.1b.4 Special First Turn Movement
The Confederate infantry and leaders in Hardee's Corps (except Maney) may take one additional
turn of movement to start the game, with the restriction that the infantry remain in line formation.
This preceeds the first turn. Cheatham's corps may not be given an order to advance until after
the battle has openned: gunfire is heard. (Note that it is in the interest of the Confederate player
not to expose his units to line-of-sight rules allowing Union initiative until he is ready to attack.)
5.1b.5 Previous Losses
Confederates units took losses on the previous two days of fighting:
Porter -2
Wright -2
Strahl -1
Vaughan -1
If Jackson's brigade is in play, one of the losses for Gist's brigade is taken in Jackson's instead.
(These losses are taken into account on the special loss sheet for just the action of July 22 if
available) In addition, the Confederate player makes straggler rolls for all units of Hardee's
corps to reflect losses on the long night march. Two rolls on the 1/2-1 table are made for each
brigade except those of Cleburne's division, which use the 1 1/2 table, and Maney's, which uses
one roll from each table. In the actual battle, Hardee was missing about a third of his men due to
5.1c Victory Conditions
The Confederate objective is to crush the Union Army of Tennessee and hurl the Yankees
back over Peachtree Creek (just off the Northern edge of map A). The Union objective is to
maintain the Army of Tennessee South of the railroad, and keep posession of Bald Hill (hex
17.19) while inflicting more losses than they suffer. Both sides would like to end the game in
possession of the Army of the Tennessee trains. The following victory point schedule can be
used by those so desiring a numerical method of rating the outcome:
5.1c.1 For Terrain:
Union forces inside the outer defenses
Union forces inside the new defenses NE of Atlanta (1.33 to 4.27)*
Union forces inside the inner defenses*
Count the largest of these
Union Forces inside Atlanta built up zone
Confederate forces cleared from Atlanta hexes
Union forces cutting the Georgia Railroad
Hex 49.35 (Decatur)
Hex 15.32 (crossroads, Hill from which bombardment possible)
Hex 19.26 (Strategic crossroads)
Hex 17.19 (Dominating height, bombardment possible)**
Hex 18.14 (Bald Hill, from which bombardment is possible)**
Hexes 11.21, 13.18, 16.14 (all of which allow bombardment)**
Score 5 for the first, 3 for second, and 1 for each additional
Hex 42.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 29.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 9.01 (Exit hex to south)***
*** Take the largest of these
Maximums for map (above list): 136 (56 not counting benefits for the Atlanta new defenses and
victory credits for points further toward the city.)
Historical terrain victory points: 36
5.1c.2 For Casualties:
Per Confederate casualty or gun point lost
Per Union casualty or gun point lost
5.1c.3 For wrecked units:
(subtract for Union, add for Confederate)
Per wrecked brigade
Per wrecked division
Per wrecked corps (except 2,3,3 for 16th, 17th,and 23rd respectively)
5.1c.4 Other:
For every unwrecked Confederate cavalry brigade that exits the North
edge of Map
A East of 45.35 inclusive, on turn 2 (12:30) or earlier
As above, for cavalry exiting East of 45.35 from turn 3 to turn 4(1:30)
For Confederate cavalry exiting the North edge on turn 6 (2:30) or earlier, except for
cases above.
These numbers are not to include units that exited and subsequently
For any Union infantry brigade of "A" strength sent off the North edge of the map to help
guard the trains prior to turn 5 (2:00), or the exit of three or more Confederate cavalry
brigades (whichever comes last). This may be credited only to the extent points are
granted for cavalry above. Once ordered off, the unit does not reenter. For brigades of
other strengths, scale accordingly (e.g. 3 for AB, 1 for B). Count wrecked brigades at
half value.
5.1c.5 Ratings:
CSA Massive victory: less than -75
CSA Major victory
-75 to -25
CSA Minor victory
-25 to 0
0 to 25
USA Minor victory
26 to 50
USA Major victory
51 to 100
USA Massive victory 101 or more
5.1c.6 Comments
Note that the Confederates gave up considerable territory North of Atlanta (and VP's) in
order to set the stage for this counterattack, which is reflected in the relatively low numbers the
Union player needs for victory. The Georgia railroad had already been lost, so is not reflected in
these victory point totals even though it would be considered in the Campaign scenario.
The historical outcome, with about 30 Union losses (including artillery) and 60
Confederate, would give the Union about 66 victory points. This is a major Union victory, but
the Confederate attack did prevent further Union flanking moves to the East of Atlanta and did
not result in the abandonment of Atlanta or the complete loss of units due to surrounding, etc,
any of which which would have been a massive Union victory. The victory conditions apply to a
Hood in command rather than a "Johnston in Command" variant, since this attack plan was
Hood's own and somewhat out of character for Johnston. Players may modify the above by
reducing terrain victory points by a factor of two and increasing Confederate casualty and
wrecked unit victory points by a factor of two if Johnston is commanding.
5.1d.1 No Covington Raid:
Historically, Sherman sent Garrard's cavalry division on a raid to Covington, so it was
not present to guard MacPherson's flank and rear on July 22cd. This variant provides for the
cavalry remaining present, on the board and available for operations. If desired, after
Confederate placement and initial orders are written, a roll is made, and on 1 or 2 there is no
Covington raid. The following changes are made:
2/4/16 and 2/16b(1) is with 16th Corps, in hex 2617.
2/Cav/C is positioned within 8 hexes of hex 49.35
The Confederate player receives 10 victory points
Use of this variant is to the more advantage of the Union player than the 10 victory points would
suggest. In fact, the use of this unit on the board would have been much more helpful, but of
course Sherman made the 10v.p. Covington raid not knowing the attack was coming.
5.1d.2 Variation in the location of 16th Corps:
The Confederates had no idea where this corps actually was, and should not have the
advantage of precise knowledge in the game. Likewise, the Union army was very fortunate that
it was, almost by accident, in an ideal location to thwart Hardee's attack. Sherman had ordered
that the corps be used to tear up the railroad between Decatur and Atlanta. MacPherson had, at
his own initiative, ordered the corps to take a position on his army's flank due to some concern
over the possibility of an attack there. Under this rule the following procedure is taken:
After the initial Confederate movement away from the starting positions on the first turn,
a die is rolled to determine the actual location of the 16th Corps:
In position as given in the basic set-up
Positioned along the same road as given in the basic setup, but somewhat farther
to the East, in hexes 34.19, 33.19, and 32.18 (plus 31.19 if there is no Covington Raid)
for the infantry units that would normally be in hexes 25.17 to 29.18 respectively.
Artillery is placed with units of the appropriate division.
Positioned along the same road somewhat farther West, in
hexes 25.17,
24.16, and 23.16 (and 22.15 if no Covington raid)
Positioned along the road to the Howard house, in hexes 34.25,
and 34.23 (and 34.22 if no Covington raid)
Positioned along the railroad hexes tearing up track: Each unit is in extended line
in both directions along the tracks. Units are centered in hexes 46.30, 43.29, and 40.28
(and 37.28 if no Covington raid)
Extended along the railroad as for 5, but centered in hexes
34.26, 31.25,
and 28.26 (and 25.27 if no Covington raid).
16th Corps units that are in the woods are set up in column formation. Those in the open
are set up in line formation. If attacked in the woods by surprise, the units would not have had
time to organize a line. Units in column to which an enemy unit moves adjacent must make a
morale roll. Any result of shaken or worse leaves the unit in column. Other results allow it to be
deployed into line, facing toward the enemy unit.
5.1d.3 Variable Confederate deployment:
The Confederate player may vary the placement of forces within the assigned areas for
Hardee's corps, and may attach one division from Cheatham's Corps to Hardee if desired, in
which case the game starts one half hour later. Regardless of the option taken, Cleburne's
division must be the last one (Southernmost) along the road of Hardee's command.
Alternatively, Cleburne may be left with Cheatham, in which case the attack is ready two hours
earlier. (Cleburne had been fighting around Bald Hill on the previous day after coming to
Cheatham's assistance just after the Peachtree Creek engagement. His disengagement was part
of the reason the attack did not take place in the morning as Hood was expecting. If Cleburne
remains in Atlanta, he takes no straggler rolls. The attached division from Cheatham, if any,
takes the usual two straggler rolls per unit for the night march.)
5.1d.4 Sherman asks Thomas to send help:
Starting with the 1:30 turn, Sherman can send a message to Thomas to send help. The
message takes 1 turn to get from the edge of the board to Thomas, plus another turn or two to get
to the edge, depending on where Sherman is. (Optionally, Sherman can leave the board, taking a
full off-board turn to get to Thomas to deliver his orders in person, then a turn to get back.
While off board, he cannot send orders except to Thomas in person. This action, which could be
seen by posterity as similar to Rosecrans's at Chikamauga if the Union loses, carries a 5 point
penalty.) After Thomas decides to accept the orders, he sends a message to 4th Corps to move to
the assistance of the Army of Tennessee. The turn after that order is accepted, 4th Corps may
enter the board at hex 16.36 or any hex further to the West. (Alternatively, wait one or more
extra turns and enter 10, 20, etc hexes farther to the East.) Entry hexes must be specified when
Thomas's orders are written, though Thomas or the Corps commander can use initiative to
change them. If Thomas was ordered to send two corps, 20th Corps enters as early as two turns
later (assuming both start at the same time). The units appear in single column at the entry hex,
with each delayed a number of movement points corresponding to the cost of entering the entry
hex plus the delay of the previous unit. (This is as if the units were lined up along the road or in
similar terrain to that entered by the first unit.) For each corps, enter one division per turn. The
corps supply trains enter with the last division. Thomas and his HQ enters with XX Corps. The
Army of the Cumberland trains do not enter. If XX Corps uses an entry farther to the West than
that of IV Corps, it enters two turns later. Otherwise, it enters on the turn after the third division
of IV Corps.
When a Corps is set in motion by this rule, the Confederate player must be told.
For each corps that enters, The Confederate commander may send for a division from
Stewart's Corps. He may so order on the turn after the Corps is set in motion. Determine which
division enters randomly. Assume the request for a division takes one turn to get to Stewart, and
Stewart delivers his orders to the division commander the next turn in person. The unit enters on
the West map edge the next turn following. Stewart and his HQ enters with the second of his
divisions. Stewart's units leave their artillery behind
Historically, Sherman did not ask Thomas for help, saying in his memoirs he was sure
that the Army of Tennessee could handle the attack, and that the men of that army would have
been "jealous" if help had been sent. He writes in his memoirs that he did urge Thomas to attack
if he thought advantage could be obtained, which Thomas declined to do.
Some units took losses in the earlier action:
1/2/IV (Kimbal)
3/2/XX (Ireland)
1/1/XX (Knipe)
1/3/XX (Harrison)
3/1/XX (Robinson) -3
2/3/XX (Coburn)
1/2/XX (Candy)
3/3/XX (Wood)
2/2/XX (Jones)
The Confederate units which took losses in earlier action are:
Loring's Division:
Featherston -3
Adams -1
French's Division:
Walthall's Division:
Note that if Sherman (or Hood) wants the reinforcements to enter and attack, a complex
order is required. If they are to enter and defend, the order will generally be a simple one. Of
course, the units may be brought onto the board using a simple order, then an attack order given
Exercising this option costs the Union player 10 victory points per corps. Bringing in
divisions from Stewart's corps costs the Confederate player 5 victory points per division.
5.1d.5 Cavalry action not played:
This rule allows the scenario to be simplified by the removal of forces which in fact had
little effect on the historical battle. Wheeler's command and the Union forces around Decatur are
removed from play. In addition, Sherman must, at his first opportunity, order one or two
brigades (roll low or high with a die) from the Army of the Ohio toward Decatur to render
assistance. Upon receipt of such orders, these brigades are removed from play. (Actually, one,
Reilly's, went to Decatur and two (Cameron's and Barter's with Cox) were sent to guard the rear
along the railroad on the left of the 16th Corps.
5.1d.6 Historical Opening Attack:
This variant starts the game at 12:30PM with Hardee's troops in their positions at the time
at which the attack was launched. The preliminary maneuvers to these positions is omitted,
along with the opportunities for the Confederates to make different dispositions and errors. The
special first turn command and initiative rules do not apply. Initial positions are as given earlier,
with the exception of Hardee's troops as follows:
Fny 32:17, Lws 32:16, Tlr 32:15
Gst 27:13, Mer 28:13, Stv 29:14
(Walker killed, replacement used)
Gvn 24:08, Lry 25:09, Polk 25:08, Gby 26:08
In column, 41:15 to 42:16
Hb(4) 26:07, Hdb(2) 33:16, Hb(2) on one of the main roads, at
least 8
hexes from the nearest enemy unit.
Leaders are set up on any unit of their command
5.1d.7 Optional units:
The following units may be added to the forces on the board, perhaps to adjust play
balance. They were actually not present for the battle.
3/4/16,16db(2)Deploys with the rest of the 16th Corps (on the next available hex at the head of
the column) This unit actually arrived in early August.
Jkn/W/H This brigade is added to Walker's division, and the strength of Gst/W/H is reduced by
4 and the break point shifted 2 to the right. (Jackson was sent to Savannah with 2
regiments earlier in July, and the rest of his brigade was incorporated into Gist's
Roddy's cavalry brigade, dismounted, was on its way from Alabama to Atlanta
and helped Wheeler destroy McCook's raiding party at the end of July. Use of this unit
supposes that it arrived earlier. It may be used as an independent brigade inside the
Atlanta defenses, or attached to an infantry division. It likely could not have been
mounted, due to the lack of horses. Players assuming otherwise can attach it as an
independent brigade to Wheeler's Corps.
3/GaMil, 4/GaMil, G/GaMil At the time of this battle, the Georgia militia was organizing in
Atlanta. As late as the 21st, G.W. Smith had only 2000 effectives (presumably the 1st
and 2cd brigades, which had been operating in the field for some time). Some or all of
these units can be added under the assumption that the militia began assembling
somewhat sooner, or that the units not mentioned by G.W. Smith were present in the
Atlanta defenses, but not with him. The militia never numbered more than 5000 (50
points total), according to Smith.
Atlanta militia artillery
The guns without horses available in Atlanta, used in the defenses.
Some of these could have been available on the East side of the city.
Polk/C/H: This small brigade could already have been incorporated into Granbury's brigade by
22 July instead of later. Players wishing to do so may eliminate the unit, and add its
strength to Granbury's brigade, which becomes:
Granbury B 13 AB
S.D. Lee
Lee arrived in time for Ezra Church on July 28, and could have come earlier. If
he does, he takes command of Cheatham's Corps (Hood's previously), and Cheatham
resumes command of his own division (Maney's).
5.1d.8 Hidden Confederate deployment within Atlanta:
The Confederate player notes the position of artillery and various infantry divisions and
their commanders within the Atlanta defenses on paper. The division commanders are not
required to be within the usual 8 movement points of their Corps commander as long as they are
hidden and immobile. Such units are revealed when they first move or fire, and are played
normally thereafter. Optionally, just the Georgia militia could be hidden.
5.1d.9 Free deployment in Atlanta Defenses:
Units that start within the Atlanta defenses may be freely placed within the defenses
rather than restricted as given in the setup rules.
5.1d.10 Free deployment of Union units within each Corps (except the 16th corps):
With this rule, the Union player must cover the same hexes as in the initial setup with
units of the same corps, but may assign units differently. A variation on this is to allow the
positions to be moved forward or back as much as one hex. This would reflect adjustments made
on local commander initiative the morning of July 22 after the Confederate withdrawal into the
inner Atlanta defenses was discovered.
5.1d.11. Hearing the guns:
Peculiar acoustics on the battlefield prevented Hood from hearing the fighting as
Hardee's Corps engaged Dodge. This was in part responsible for missed coordination between
Cheatham and Hardee. To represent the possibility of combat not being heard or misinterpreted,
the following rule is offered for the early turns of the scenario. Each time a combat roll is made,
roll a die. On a roll of 1 the combat is heard by Sherman, and he can begin responding to events.
On a roll of 6 it is heard by Hood, who is then free to consider giving offensive orders to forces
within the Atlanta defenses. Such rolls are no longer necessary when both have heard the
5.1d.12 Die rolls for movements of Hardee's Corps
After one or two playings of this scenario, the Confederate player is likely to become
unrealistically clever in managing Hardee's Corps. This rule is recommended for use to
determine the movements of the corps in order to represent the fact that the Confederates were
familiar with neither the terrain nor where they might find the Union forces. This rule may be
quite interesting in combination with the variable deployment of the 16th Corps.
General restrictions are that brigades may not stack or extend lines until the instant they
come within sight of enemy troops. At least one brigade in each division must move to its
maximum extent in the direction of the enemy (generally NW). In addition, two dice are rolled
for every movement phase for each division of Hardee's corps. To each the division
commander's rating is added, plus one if Hardee is stacked with the division commander. The
following tables are consulted:
First die roll
Movement Constraints:
Brigades march in line directly NW. The division must stay in an overall
formation where all brigades are adjacent to neighbors of the division on their
flanks. Thus, each brigade will have another in the hex either South or SW of it,
and another adjacent to the N or NE, except the end units.
Brigades march in line abreast as above, but not necessarily directly NW.
At least two of the brigades march ahead in line formation, without
entering each other's path of march, and must end movement within 2 hexes of
each other. The other brigades may follow in either line or column, or may march
in line independently.
As desired, but units in column must follow (and not get ahead
of) units in line formation.
Second die roll
Movement allowance
"Impenetrable forest" encountered. No unit may move into a
forest hex. An initiative roll (with bonus of 2)may be immediately made to allow
the division to move back to the road (using column if desired). (If the initiative
roll is made and failed, the division does not move.)
Normal, but count forest hexes as 3 m.p. vice 2.
Move 4 m.p., plus 2 (optional) with a normal straggler roll.
Move 5 m.p., plus 2 (optional) with a normal straggler roll
Normal (6m.p.) movement
Move 6 m.p., plus 2 (optional) with a normal straggler roll
During the movement phase, these rolls are made for each division just prior to the
movement of that division. The divisions may be moved in any order, and may be moved before
or after other units on the board.
The results of these tables do not supercede normal command and control restrictions. A
division can easily put itself in a position where its movement will be affected by the game
Command and Control restrictions.
Movement for each division reverts to normal at the instant when some unit of the
division comes within sight of an enemy unit, and is within 6 hexes of that enemy unit. (Other
units of the division must expend the same number of movement points as the sighting unit
subject to the restrictions.) Alternatively, the restrictions can also be dropped when the first
firing occurs between units of Hardee's corps and Union units. (Units could then march in
reference to the sound of the guns.)
(The above method of constraining movement may be useful in scenarios designed by the
gamer where units must approach an enemy whose location is unknown through difficult terrain.
Specifically, the Ezra Church scenario could be played with Union units not hidden, but the
above method used to constrain the movement of S.D. Lee's corps.)
5.1d.13 1/23 as a separate division
Let 1/23 be a separate division with its own commander (use a replacement leader). Its
starting position is midway between those of 2/23 and 3/23. It is considered wrecked when both
brigades are wrecked. 2/23 and 3/23 are now considered wrecked when two brigades are
5.2 Action of 20 July
This scenario portrays the action of July 20 on the right flank of the Confederate Army between Atlanta
and Decatur. The Confederates are trying to hold and delay McPherson and Schoefield while Stewart
and Hardee make a decisive attack against Thomas at Peachtree Creek, off the West edge of the map.
The Union player seeks to attack and seize Atlanta (or at least points close enough to allow
bombardment) and, in so doing, prevent a successful Confederate concentration against Thomas.
This scenario is played on both maps A (SE) and B (NE). The Union forces set up first, and
Union orders written for the first turn. Confederate forces are then set up, and orders written.
First turn: 7:00AM July 20 1864
Last Turn: 7:00PM July 20 1864
Confederate player moves first (but skip on first turn)
5.2a Union Information:
5.2a.1 Setup and reinforcements
Army of Tennessee less 16th Corps, 17db(2), and the Army of the Tennessee Supply Trains:
Within 5 hexes of A49.34 (B49.00)
16th Corps
Within 3 hexes of B43.07
Army of the Ohio (23rd Corps)
Within 3 hexes of B35.11
1/4, 1/4b(4)
Within 3 hexes of B14.27
Within 5 hexes of A49.29
3/4, 3/4b,supply,4HQ,Howard
Enters at B5.36 at 12:00PM
5.2a.2 Orders
The Army of Tennessee is to advance on Atlanta approximately along and South of the Decatur
road. The Army of the Ohio (just the 23rd Corps) is to advance on Atlanta North of the Railroad. 4th
Corps is to advance on Atlanta, maintaining communication with the Army of the Ohio and the
remainder of the Army of the Cumberland (at the Western edge of the map). 1/4 is initially without
orders, but may be sent orders by Howard (off board) that arrive at 10:00AM. Orders from Sherman are
delayed one turn to reach the North edge of the map B at 05.36. Changes to the orders of 4th Corps, the
Army of the Ohio, and the Army of the Tennessee must be either be initiated by the player in the role of
Sherman (with the mentioned delays) or by initiative.
At the beginning of the game, McPherson has accepted orders, but has not issued orders to his
Corps commanders. Schoefield is in a D1 state on acceptance of his orders. Howard begins the game
with accepted orders.
Garrard is ordered to screen Decatur and Union communications to the North from threats to the
South. These defensive orders require that Garrard remain East of hex column 40.xx until Noon, and
30.xx thereafter. Any change to these orders costs 10 victory points. Garrard accepts orders only from
Sherman (the player).
5.2b Confederate Information:
5.2b.1 Setup and orders
Georgia Militia (1st and 2cd brigades and one battery (GaMilb(1)):
Anywhere inside the inner Atlanta defenses
Reserve Artillery 2b(4), 1b(3)
Anywhere inside the inner Atlanta defenses
Cavalry Corps (Iverson's and Kelly's divisions, plus Williams's brigade, with Cavb(2):
Anywhere south of Peachtree Creek and Peavine Creek,
but West of hex column 40.xx
Clayton's division of Cheatham's Corps:
South of Peachtree Creek, on Map B, West of column 12.xx
Brown's division of Cheatham's Corps:
On map B, West of 28.xx, south of Peachtree Creek
Stevenson's division of Cheatham's Corps:
On map A, West of 36.xx
Cheatham's artillery: In any of the above areas for Cheatham's divisions
Cheatham, HQ, Supply:
On map B, north of hex row xx.05 inclusive, within the
areas for Clayton or Brown.
All of the above units are deployed no closer than 5 hexes to any Union unit.
Cheatham begins with initial (force 1) orders to defend Atlanta against Union forces approaching
from the NorthEast, and prevent their juncture south of Peachtree Creek with Union forces to the West.
The divisions, individual brigades, and artillery units of Cheatham's Corps may be given initial accepted
divisional orders consistent with Cheatham's. Artillery may be assigned to specific divisions, and
commanded as an element of that division. (However, the division commander must be stacked with an
infantry unit of the division, and cannot use the attached artillery as a convenient parking place.) Note
that while Cheatham's overall mission is defensive, he is not precluded from the use of counterattacks.
Under his defensive orders, his HQ may not be moved once placed without orders from Hood (the
player) or initiative by Cheatham. Orders from Hood take one turn to reach the West map edge, plus
whatever time is needed to reach Cheatham (or any other leader) from the edge.
Wheeler has force 1 orders to delay the Union approach to Atlanta from the Northeast and East,
with his primary responsibility being to the East. (Some of his units may be distributed so as to screen
approaches to Cheatham's positions.) Wheeler's divisions and (as desired) individual brigades may
begin the game with accepted division orders. The independent brigades, if not under their own orders,
must be within 8 m.p. of Wheeler's HQ to be in command. They count as divisions for purposes of
Wheeler's attack stoppage calculations, should a need for that check arise.
G.W. Smith has command of both his division of Georgia militia and the reserve artillery. He is
to defend the inner Atlanta defenses. This order is forcefully worded (Force 2).
5.2b.2 Reinforcements
Ferguson's brigade (of Jackson's division) arrives at 12:00PM anywhere on the West edge of
Map A with orders to report to Wheeler.
Cleburne's division and Hb(4) arrive from West map edge of map A or map B at 3:00PM or
later. Each turn starting at 3:00PM, roll a die. On 1, Cleburne enters. At 6:00PM or later a die roll of 1
or 2 brings Cleburne in. He enters with accepted orders given by the player the turn before or earlier.
Thus, the player may write orders for Cleburne as early as 2:30 (but may revise them later.) Should he
enter without orders, he joins G.W. Smith in defending inside the Atlanta defenses.
5.2c Special provisions:
5.2c.1 Bridges: All bridges over the South branch of Peachtree Creek below (West of) B40.15 are
considered destroyed. The North branch bridges are intact.
5.2c.2 Supplies: The Confederate corps supply wagons may be replenished by exiting the West map
edge within the built up city of Atlanta, waiting a turn off map, and then reentering in a full status. This
represents getting more supplies from the depot. They may move beyond the usual 8m.p. command
radius of the corps without a "division goal" in order to do so. They need not be empty in order to be
sent back to be refilled.
The Army of Tennessee trains have not yet arrived, and do not appear in this scenario. Thus, the
Union supply wagons in this scenario may not be refilled.
5.2c Victory Conditions:
5.2c.1 For terrain:
Map B
Union forces inside the outer defenses
Maximum for map: 2
Map A
Union forces inside the outer defenses
Union forces inside the inner defenses
Union Forces inside Atlanta built up zone
Confederate forces cleared from Atlanta hexes
Hex 15.32 (crossroads, Hill from which bombardment possible)
Hex 19.26 (Strategic crossroads)
Hex 17.19 (Dominating height, bombardment possible)**
Hex 18.14 (Bald Hill, from which bombardment is possible)**
Hexes 11.21, 13.18, 16.14 (all of which allow bombardment)**
Score 5 for the first, 3 for second, and 1 for each additional
Hex 42.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 29.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 9.01 (Exit hex to south)***
*** Take the largest of these
Maximums for map: 124 (44 not counting Atlanta inner defenses in)
5.2c.2 For losses:
For each Confederate infantry, cavalry, or gun loss
For each Union infantry, cavalry, or gun loss
For each corps supply unit lost
5.2c.3 For wrecked units:
(subtract for Union, add for Confederate)
Per wrecked brigade
Per wrecked division
Per wrecked corps (except 2,3,3 for XVI,XVII,and XXIII respectively)
5.2c.4 Other Modifications:
-1 for each turn of delay after 4:00PM until Cleburne enters
5.2c.5 Results:
Suggested Victory point schedule:
CSA Massive victory: less than -20
CSA Major victory
-19 to -1
CSA Minor victory
0 to 10
10 to 19
USA Minor victory
20 to 29
USA Major victory
30 to 50
USA Massive victory 51 or more
5.2d Variants
5.2d.1 Confederate breastworks:
All units of Cheatham's Corps begin the game with breastworks. (If the version of Maps B and
A show the outer Confederate works, these are present and considered to be permanent breastworks. A
final decision has not yet been made on whether to include these works on the map.)
5.2d.2 Optional units:
The units 3/4/16, Rdy/Cv, 3/Ga Mil, 4/Ga Mil, G GaMil, and/or the Atlanta Militia Artillery may
be added to those available. See 5.1d.8 for details. Other units may also be taken by one side or the
5.2d.3 Hidden Confederate deployment:
All Confederate units begin in a hidden status. They are revealed when they first move, fire, or
when a Union unit comes within 3m.p. or into a position having a line of sight to the unit's location and
within 6 hexes. The Confederate player writes down all unit locations at the beginning of the game.
When units are placed, lines may be extended as desired, and facing may be chosen.
5.2d.4 Free Confederate deployment:
Any Confederate unit may be set up in any of the areas detailed for particular units. Cheatham's
orders are to defend Atlanta from the NorthEast and East.
5.3 Three Day Action of 20-22 July
This scenario portrays the action of July 20 to 22 on the right flank of the Confederate Army between
Atlanta and Decatur. During this period the Confederates may be pursuing any one of a number of
different objectives: cover a retreat from Atlanta, merely hold the city against attack, protect the railroad
to Decatur, hold and delay while supporting an attack elsewhere(on the first day, as was the case), or (as
in the historical scenario) attempt a decisive counterattack, or a combination of these. During this
period, Sherman was unsure of the Confederate response, especially after the defeat at Peachtree Creek
when he had at least some thought that the Confederates were abandoning Atlanta, which set the stage
for the suprise of Hood's attack on the 22cd. Likewise, the Union player may be seeking one of three
different objectives. He may seek to attack and seize Atlanta (or at least points close enough to allow
bombardment), outflank Atlanta on the East by seizing exit hexes on the South edge, or maximize threat
with an economy of force while either Schoefield, Hooker, or both cooperate with Thomas on the
Western side of Atlanta.
This scenario is played on both maps A and B, which extend north of Peachtree Creek. The
Union forces set up first, and Union orders written for the first turn. Confederate forces are then set up,
with initial orders to Defend and delay the Union approach to Atlanta from the East.
First turn: 7:00AM July 20 1864
Last Turn: 7:00PM July 22 1864
Confederate player moves first (but skip on first turn)
5.3a Union Information:
Same as 5.2a, with the following addition:
5.3a.3 Faked units
The presence of the Army of the Ohio, 16th Corps, and 4th Corps units may be real or faked.
They can also be retained hidden off board until an opportune moment (but their entrance must be
ordered, as is usual, with the order having to reach the entry hex.) This allows uncertainty in
Confederate knowledge of Union deployment and strategy. Individual divisions of any of the three
commands (and a proportional share of Corps artillery) may be faked or used or detached (with 4th
corps units attached to the Army of the Ohio.) Faked units move and get orders like real ones, and are
revealed as faked only if within line of sight to an enemy unit within 6 hexes.
5.3b Confederate Information:
Same as 5.2b with the following additions:
Hardee arrives at 10:00PM 20 July at the West edge of map A and may at 11:00PM or
subsequently be given orders.
The remainder of Hardee's Corps (less Hb) may arrive from the West edge of Map A at 2:00AM
21 July given acceptance of an order to do so at 11:00PM 20 July (or delayed from that time if the order
acceptance is delayed).
The arrival of Hardee's corps is optional in the following sense. At midnight, the Confederate
player may issue an order for Hardee to arrive and participate in the battle. He may opt not to do so, but
may still bring on Hardee's counters and move his column in response to "faked" orders contrived to
alarm the Union player. The faked orders must be written and accepted as usual, allowing the pretense
to be sustained realistically. The Confederate may also order up only part of Hardee's command, but
have another division not ordered still accompany the command. Thus, the faked division could lead an
actual column. Faked units are revealed when within line of sight and within 6 hexes of a Union unit
other than a lone leader. Note that the Union player, upon finding that one unit is faked, has no
assurance that others, even in the same force, are not.
Cleburne may be delayed to enter with Hardee's corps if he is not needed earlier, meaning that
the Confederates get credit for that division being available for the Peachtree Creek battle. The decision
must be made on whether to enter Cleburne at 5:00PM July 20.
Should Hardee's Corps (other than Cleburne's division) enter, the Confederate player is
committed to a counterattack of some sort, and will fail to achieve victory unless a significant dent is
made in the Union force. On the other hand, if neither Hardee nor Cleburne enters, the Confederates
need only to hold the Union outside Atlanta and away from the road exit at SE 19.20 to be considered to
have waged a successful delaying action while decisive results are sought elsewhere. If Cleburne enters,
the Confederates should avoid giving up Bald Hill and the road south.
5.2c Victory Conditions:
The following victory point schedule applies to the three day scenario under the basic Union "Take
Atlanta" vs Confederate "Counterattack" options:
5.2c.1 For terrain:
Map B
Union forces on the South side of the South fork of Peachtree Creek
Union forces inside the outer defenses
Maximum for map: 4
Map A
Union forces inside the outer defenses
Union forces inside the inner defenses
Union Forces inside Atlanta built up zone
Confederate forces cleared from Atlanta hexes
Union forces cutting the Georgia Railroad
Hex 49.35 (Decatur)
Hex 15.32 (crossroads, Hill from which bombardment possible)
Hex 19.26 (Strategic crossroads)
Hex 17.19 (Dominating height, bombardment possible)**
Hex 18.14 (Bald Hill, from which bombardment is possible)**
Hexes 11.21, 13.18, 16.14 (all of which allow bombardment)**
Score 5 for the first, 3 for second, and 1 for each additional
Hex 42.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 29.01 (Exit hex to south)***
Hex 9.01 (Exit hex to south)***
*** Take the largest of these
Maximums for map: 140 (60 not counting Atlanta inner defenses in)
5.2c.2 For losses:
For each Confederate infantry, cavalry, or gun loss
For each Union infantry, cavalry, or gun loss
5.2c.3 For wrecked units:
(subtract for Union, add for Confederate)
Per wrecked brigade
Per wrecked division
Per wrecked corps (except 2,3,3 for XVI,XVII,and XXIII respectively)
5.2c.4 Modifications
+10 for each division of 23rd or 4th corps not in play on July 22
+ 5 for each division of 23rd or 4th corps not in play on July 21
+ 5 for each division of 23rd or 4th corps not in play on July 20
Note: the above victory points are available only if an "Economy of force" goal is sought.
- 4 For each division of 4th Corps still on the map on July 21
- 10 For each division of 4th Corps still on the map on July 22
Note: these above victory points apply unless the "Take Atlanta" option is selected, in which
case the penalties are halved.
For "Flank to East" option, victory points for the south edge of map A are doubled, and points
for objectives inside the outer Atlanta defenses are halved. Loss of the Army of Tennessee supply train
loses 10 points, and each corps supply unit loses 2 points.
For "Take Atlanta", victory points for the south edge are halved, and those for objectives inside
the outer Atlanta defenses are doubled.
For "Economy of force", if one corps is sent off the West edge of map B prior to the 22cd, 20
victory points are granted. If it leaves prior to the 21st or never enters, this award increases to 30 points.
(Any unit that does not enter (and thus earns victory points) must be preplanned; the unit then is not
available for the scenario.)
If objective is to cover the abandonment of Atlanta, terrain victory points awarded to the Union
are halved if acquired on the 22cd. Losses to Confederates and Confederate wrecked units count double.
Hardee's Corps does not enter (except as faked units), though Cleburne may be brought in at a cost of 10
victory points.
If the counterattack option is selected, wrecked units and casualties count double, and there is a
bonus of 20 victory points for the Union.
If Johnston is in command, all terrain victory points are halved (possibly again, if his intent is to
abandon Atlanta). Points for Confederate casualties are doubled.
5.2c.5 Results:
Suggested Victory point schedule:
CSA Massive victory: less than -75
CSA Major victory
-75 to -26
CSA Minor victory
-25 to 0
0 to 25
USA Minor victory
26 to 50
USA Major victory
51 to 100
USA Massive victory 101 or more
(note: this victory point section is preliminary, and will need some tuning to ensure that all of
the Union objective vs Confederate objective combinations make sense.)
5.3d Variants
The same variants as for 5.2 are available, with the following additions:
5.3d1 Covington raid
See 5.1d1 for details. Garrard's cavalry is removed from the map at noon, 21 July.
5.3d.2 Sherman asks Thomas to send help:
See 5.1d.5 for details. Units arrive on the West edge of map B, North of Peachtree Creek on the
20th. Sherman may not exercise this option unless two or more corps are wrecked.
5.3d.3 Optional units:
See 5.1d.8 for details.
5.2d.4 Extended Movement:
The extended movement rules of Operations #2, pp9-11 very well suit this and any other
scenario of more than one day. (Either the rule should be copied from Operations #2 to here or, perhaps,
by publication date it will be in the revised standard ruled.)
5.2d.5 Weather
During this phase of the actual Atlanta Campaign, the weather was clear most of the time. There
were violent thunderstorms the morning of 19 July. For players wishing to play weather, roll a single
die each day on the first turn of daylight. The following table is used, and the results apply to the entire
Die Roll
Previous Turn:Clear
On a day with rain, movement of all units is reduced by 1/3 of each unit's movement points, all
fire combat is one column left for wet ammunition, and visibility is limited to 6 hexes. Initiative rolls
have one subtracted, and orders cost an additional two command points. In addition, movement point
costs for wagons and artillery are doubled on other than primary roads.
A turn of storms starts like rain, but every turn gets an additional die roll:
1,2: A roll of 1 or 2 brings an intense thunderstorm. No combat is possible, and movement is
limited to one third of the normal movement points. Two is subtracted from initiative die rolls, and
command points are halved. All movement causes stragglers, and no stragglers can be recovered.
6: The weather clears and remains clear for the rest of the day.
Union Personality Sheet
Sherman is rightfully recognized as one of the great leaders of the War Between the
States. His strategic insight was best displayed in the burning of Atlanta, his March to the Sea,
and other activities in which he prosecuted the war against civilians as well as the Confederate
military, thus ushering in the modern mode of warfare. On an operational level, he succeeded in
outmaneuvering General Joe Johnston in the campaign leading up to the battles around Atlanta,
with comparatively little of the bloodletting that saw Grant advance to Petersburg. He was good
at coordinating a multitude of activities, a justification for his high command rating in this game.
Tactically, he was somewhat less successful. His advance was thwarted by a considerably
smaller force at Missionary Ridge. He never managed a successful attack during his campaign
against Johnston; those successes resulted from maneuver. He was caught by surprize by
Confederate offensives in all of the battles around Atlanta depicted by this game and Peachtree
Creek: at Peachtree Creek (July 20), Atlanta (July 22), and Ezra Church (July 28). In all cases
the caution of subordinates was the primary cause of Union victory. Later at Jonesboro his
overwhelming force would fail to destroy the remains of two corps of the Confederate Army.
Whatever else you can say about Sherman, he never really had to make a serious panic
roll. His problems in Kentucky might suggest the roll would be higher than one would assume
based on his command rating. How would he have held up under real adversity? Grant had to
pass serious gut checks at Shiloh and in the Wilderness that Sherman always managed to avoid
when he was the senior commander on the field.
Panic Rolls:
# of wrecked divisions =
7-10 11-13 14-16 17-19
Status of 2
Status of 1
Modifiers: +1 to the roll if either MacPherson or Thomas is lost.
On Panic:
If Sherman panics by exactly rolling the required number above, he freezes in place for a
day, as if his force qualifies as wrecked. If the roll is higher than the number given above,
Sherman determines that he must fall back across the Chattahoochie. He immediately issues
orders to that effect to all of his armies. Commanders are not inhibited from using initiative.
Panic demands: Sherman can make one panic demand upon Hood, or three upon Johnston. In
multiple day scenarios, one (Hood) or two (Johnston) is added for each additional two days.
Confederate Personality Sheets
Johnston is cautious and prefers the defensive. His campaign in Virginia in 1862 as well
as the earlier part of the Atlanta campaign saw Johnston willing to give up territory and withdraw
when faced with enemy superiority and maneuver. He never fought a successful offensive battle
prior to the situation portrayed in this game, the action at Seven Pines being an inconclusive
draw. It is the doubt over whether Johnston will be willing to fight, and his poor relationship
with Jefferson Davis, that led to his relief just prior to the game situation portrayed.
Given earlier opportunities, Johnston did not panic, but could be induced to withdraw.
He always did so in an organized fashion. In Johnston's case, the "panic" roll is mis-named.
Johnston was ready to yield territory to preserve the strength of his army, and may well have
done so at Atlanta had the battle not gone well. The panic roll merely gives Johnston the
conviction that another retreat, to a more defensible position farther south, is needed. Johnston's
strengths are adequately represented by the relatively high ratings as army commander. His
weakness (at least as far as Jefferson Davis) was concerned was his supposed willingness to give
up Atlanta without a fight.
Panic Rolls:
# of wrecked divisions =
Status of 2
Status of 1
Modifiers: +1 to the roll if Union forces occupy Decatur
+1 if Union troops penetrate the Atlanta outer defenses
+1 in addition if the inner defenses are penetrated
+3 to the roll if Union forces occupy exit hexes on the South edge
SW or SE map, or cut the Macon & Western railway
of the
On Panic:
Johnston begins an orderly withdrawal from Atlanta within 12 hours, preferably at night.
Orders are issued and executed normally.
Panic Demands: One in single day scenarios, two in three day scenarios, and three in five day
At the time Hood took command, he was a hero associated not only with Lee's victories
in Northern Virginia, but he also led the attacking corps at Chikamaugua which precipitated the
rout of the Union right wing, and offered a fleeting opportunity for a decisive Confederate
success in the West. However, Hood had been seriously wounded at Gettysburg and again at
Chikamauga. He suffered reduced mobility and from the effects of pain medication. Perhaps
more important, he brought to the Army of Tennessee a vision for how an army ought to work
gained from the days of glory with Lee. The preference for the offense, and a willingness to
leave initiative to subordinates may have worked for Lee with Jackson and Longstreet against the
likes of Pope, but it would not work well for Hood. This approach to portraying Hood is best
managed by requiring Hood to stay within the Atlanta defenses and issue orders by aid or in
Hood has been characterized as rash, and in this campaign had severe difficulties with
subordinates, especially Hardee. This is reflected in his relatively low rating, especially when
compared with his much higher ratings in earlier games. However, Hood was not put in
command for his superior command rating, but because Jefferson Davis considered the defense
of Atlanta politically important enough to risk a new commander in order to assure that it would
be defended. Thus, Hood's strength is an extremely good panic roll, as well as a better chance at
retaining Army effectiveness (in the sense of his willingness to take the offensive).
Panic Rolls:
# of wrecked divisions =
Status of 2
Status of 1
On Panic:
Hood determines reluctantly that his army can do no more to defend Atlanta, and issues
orders to withdraw from the map off either the South or East map edge (but South of the Decatur
Railroad). The orders are executed normally.
Panic Demands: One in single day scenarios, plus one additional per day in longer scenarios.
(Sherman found Hood unpredictable, and is thus is assumed to be less likely to maintain
confidence if things start to go wrong.)
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