Crew Resource Management - Defense Technical Information Center
Rosearch and Development Service
Washington. DC 20591
Crew Resource Management:
An Introductory Handbook
COKI HF PROGRA
Advanced Aviation Concepts, Inc.
This document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service
Springfield, Virginia 22161
U S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes ro liability for its contents or use thereof.
The Uniicd States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the object of this report.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Pubtic reporting burden for this col iecion of informnation is to average,
1hour per response, incLuding the time for review ngi nttructions searching existing data sources, gathering and maitnaining the Oata needed, and coapLeting and reylew ng the aspect of this co
nforqmtion, intruding suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington
Segices Directorate for nformation Operations aqd
Reports, 1215 Jefferson
Do is HIghway Suite 1204, Ar
cotlection arrntdet. of informahion. Send comments regarding this burden es tiate or
other duc.n ret0704-01to.9Washintn
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE
. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Crew Resource Management:
An Introductory Handbook
Driskell, Richard J, Adams
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
147 East Lyman Avenue
Winter Park, FL 32789
Advanced Aviation Concepts, Inc.
10356 Sandy Run Road
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Department of Transportation
Federal Aviation Administration
Research and Development Service
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
This document is available to the public through the National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
Recent research findings suggest that crew resource management (CRM) training can result in significant improvements in flightcrew performance. The objectives of this handbook are to foster an understanding of the background and philosophy of CRM and to p-,ovide an overview of the development, implementation and evaluation of CRM training.
Currently, CRM programs have been implemented successfully at a number of airlines, large and small, civil and military. The variety of CRM training programs suggest that there are a number of ways to achieve effective CRM.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Crew Resource Management (CRM). Air Carrier Training, Flight Crew Performance, Air Carrier
Accident Prevention, Team Cooraination
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
16. PRICE CGOE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
Recent research findings suggest that crew resource management (CRM) training can result in significant improvements in flightcrew performance. The objectives of this handbook are to foster an understanding of the background and philosophy of
CRM and to provide an overview of the development, implementation and evaluation of CRM training. Currently, CRM programs have been implemented successfully at a number of airlines, large and small, civil and military. The variety of
training programs suggest that there are a number of ways to achieve effective
METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS
ENGLISH TO METRIC
1 inch (in.)
1 foot (ft)
30 centimeters (cm)
1 yard (yd) w0.9 meter(in)
METRIC TO ENGLISH
1 millimeter (mm) w0.04 inch (in)
1 centimeter (cm)
0.4 inch (in)
3.3 feet (ft)
1 m eter (m)
1 kilometer (km) u0.6 mile (mi)
I square inch (sq in, in
square centimeters (cm
square foot (sq ft. ft
1 square yard (sq yd. yd
0.8 square meter (m
1 square mile (sq mi, rni
2.6 square kilometers (kin
1 acre m0.4 hectares (he) u4,000 square meters
1 ounce (oz)
1 pound (Ib)
=.43 kilogram (kg)
I short ton -2,000 pounds (lb)
1 teaspoon (tsp)
1 tablespoon (tbsp) x
15 milliliters (ml)
1 fluid ounce (f
30 milliliters (ml)
0.24 liter (1)
1 pint (pt)
0.47 liter (1)
1 quart (qt)
1 gallon (gal)
3.8 liters (1) foot (cu
1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd
0.76 cubic meter
square centi meter (cm
0.16 squ are i nch (sq i n,: n
1 square meter
square kilometer (kn
I hectare (he)
-1.2 square yards (sq yd. yd')
1 gram (gr) =0.036 ounce (oz)
1 kilogram (kg)
=2.2 pounds (II)
1 tonne (t)
1.1 short tons
fluid ounce (fl oz)
1 liter (1)
2.1 pints (pt)
1 liter (1)
1.06 quarts (qt)
1 liter (1)
0.26 gallon (gal)
1 cubic meter (m]) .36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft3)
1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd])
TEMPE RATU RE
QUICK INC-H-CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 24 2
* QUICK FAHRENHEIlT-CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSION
.22* .4 14'
190 212' c
.30' .200 .100 00
300 40 so.
600 70 0 0 go
For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NBS Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and
Measures. Price S2.50. SD Catalog No. C1 3 10286. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
2. CRM SKILLS .
CRM Background and Philosophy .
Principles of Crew Resource Management
CRM Training .
Overview of the
Communication Processes and Decision-Making .
Team Building and Maintenance .............
Workload Management ...... ............
Stress M&nagement .
3. IMPLEMENTING CRM TRAINING
The Systems Approach to Training .
Developing CRM Training
Step 2: Implementing CRM Training
Step 3: Evaluating CRM Training o
A Final Note on CRM Training .
......... . ..
Chapter 1: Introduction
Safety! This concept is readily embraced by everyone in the aviation community from flight crews to support staff to management.
This was not always the case with Crew Resource Management (CRM). The concept of crew resource management has been both blessed and cursed by those in aviation.
It has been cursed because the emphasis on crew resource management is relatively new, and people often have a healthy, skeptical reaction to new ways of doing things.
But CRM is also blessed by many because of what it can accomplish.
Recent research findings suggest that crew resource management training can result in significant improvements in flightcrew performance.
Not surprisingly, a growing number of people in the aviation community, from airline management to flight crews themselves, have embraced crew resource management as an effective approach to reducing flight errors and increasiný, aviation safety.
CRM programs have been implemented successfully at a number of airlines, large and small, civilian and military.
Objectives of This Handbook
The objectives of this handbook are to foster an understanding of the background and philosophy of Crew Resource Management, and to provide an overview of the development, implementation, and evaluation of CRM training. This handbook is written for Part
135 and Part 121 carrier operators and management, and is designed to serve as a supplement to Advisory Circular 120-51 as revised, Crew Resource Management.
CRM Background and Philosophy
It is useful to distinguish between the philosophy of crew resource management and the implementation of crew resource management (CRM training). There is general agreement within the aviation community regarding the principles underlying CRM.
Most agree on key CRM concepts and the need to focus on crew skills and performance.
However, there is less consensus regarding how to implement CRM training. In fact, various training programs have appeared which meet the specific needs of individual users.
The variety of CRM training programs suggests that there are a number of ways to achieve effective crew resource management.
What follows is a brief history of crew resource management, a discussion of principles, and finally, an overview of CRM training.
We've been flying for over 90 years.
CRM now? The concept of crew resource management is not new.
Anyone who thinks that the Wright brothers did not make effective use of the resources at their disposal in 1903 at Kitty Hawk is certainly mistaken.
Similarly, military and civilian pilot training programs have touched on CRM topics for years. NASA's John Lauber recalls the saying that if an idea is new, it probably isn't good, and if it is good, it probably isn't new.
So, while the concepts underlying CRM are not new, what is new is the heightened emphasis on crew resource management as one key to increased aviation safety.
From the 1950s to the 1990s we have witnessed a steady decline in aviation accidents (see
This decline in aviation accidents has been attributed to better equipment, better training, and better operating procedures. However, this happy big picture of system safety masks some troubling data. As Figure 2 illustrates, as accidents related to equipment weaknesses have decreased, accidents attributed to human weaknesses have increased.
A comparison of
64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90
Total accident rate for commercial rmrA worldwide, 1959-1990.
(Excludes sabotage, mltay actlion, tubulence and evax'aton Injuries.)
Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggests two points.
First, Figure 1 indicates that after a sharp drop in the 1960s, accident rates have leveled off from 1970 through 1990.
Second, the trends in causes of accidents illustrated in Figure 2 show that human error has remained a major contributing factor in aviation accidents during these latter years.
2. Changes in accident causal factors over time. (International
Civil Aviation Organization, 1984)
Industry estimates of causal factors in air carrier accidents are shown in Figure 3.
By a conservative estimate, well over 60% of aircraft accidents have been attributed to crew-related actions. in brief, it seems that the "human factors" contribution to aviation accidents may be a difficult problem to solve.
Percent of Total Accidents with Known Causes
50 6o 70
1959 - 1990
Lust 10 years (1981 - 1990)
Figure 3. Primary causal factors for commercial aircraft accidents, worldwide, 1959-1990.
(Boeing Commercial Aiplane Group, 1991)
Concern with the factors underlying these accidents led NASA researchers in the 1970s to conduct a series of interviews with line piLots to investigate their perceptions of aviation mishaps. Charles Billings, George
Cooper, and John Lauber found that one mishap component consistently mentioned by pilots was inadequate training.
Even more interesting, these researchers found that it was not technical training that these pilots felt they lacked, but training in leadership, communication, and crew management.
In other words, traditional training had done an excellent job of imparting stick and rudder skills, but these pilots felt that they
needed more training in
A subsequent analysis of jet transport accidents between 1968 and 1976 revealed more than 60 that involved problems with crew coordination and decision making (Cooper,
White, & Lauber, 1979).
These preliminary results, coupled with a dogged determination to pursue answers to problems that line pilots had identified, encouraged NASA researchers to conduct further research and analysis. In one classic simulator study, B-747 flight crews were observed in a highly realistic simulated line trip from
York's Kennedy Airport to
London (see inset: New York to London Minas.
One Engine). During this tightly-scripted scenario, an oil pressure problem forced the crew to shut down an engine. The crew had to decide where to land the plane.
This decision was further complicated by a hydraulic system failure, bad weather, poor air traffic control, and a cabin crew member who demanded attention at the worst possible moments.
Researchers found that t.here was a wide variation in the performance of crews during this simulation.
Most problems arose
Because the scenario Involved a high gross takeoff weight, followed by an engine shutdown with a subsequent diversion, the crew needed to dump fuel to reduce the aircrafts weight to maximize landing weight. As In actual line operations, this was a very busy period. In one case, aftel the captain decided to dump fuel, the captain and the first officer togetner decided that 570,000 pounds was the correct target landing weight. They reached the deciskli without consulting the flight engineer or any aircraft documentation. The flight engineer then calculated a dump time of 4 minutes 30 seconds, which the captain accepted without comment even though it was approximately one-third the actual time required. Without prompting, the flight engineer recalculated the dump time to the nearly correct figure of 12 minutes.
Instead of dumping for 12 minutes, however, the flight engineer stepped after only 3 minutes, perhaps because he reverted to his original, erroneous estimate or because he misread the gross weight Indicator. Unsatisfied, he again started to recalculate, but the failure of the No. 3 hydraulic system interrupted him.
During the next eight minutes, the flight engineer was subjected to a high work load, but then noticed that the gross weight was too high and decided to refigure the fuel. During that time, he was interrupted further and did nothing more about the fuel until the captain, noticing the gross weight indicator it 647,000 pounds, decided to make an flight engineer rechecked the fuel as pat of the landing checklist and became concerned about the gross weight.
minute and a half rechecking calculations and announced that the aircraft's gross weight computer must be in error. Two minites later, the simulator lands at 172 knots with only 25 degrees of flap: a 1,000 foot-per-minute descent about 77,000 pounds over the correct weight, on a short, wet runway.
During the 32 minutes between the decision to dump fuel and the landing, the flight engineer was Interrupted 15 times while performing specific tasks tailoring the amrount of fuel to be dumped in relation to the conditions and length of the landing runway. Nine of the interruptions came directJy or indirectly from the captain, four from the cabin crew member, and two from equipment problems. The flight engineer was never able to complete and
his fuel calculatons and dump times without Interruption, either by
routine pad of standard operating procedure, or by a request from the captain orthe cabin crew member. He thus became overloodud and his work became fragmented. The captain failed to recognize the situation and so did nothing to reso',e it.
not from a lack of technical knowledge or skills, but from poor resource management.
Crews whose performance included a high rate of errors did a poor job of communicating, setting priorities, and sharing workload.
Crews making few errors did a better job of managing available resources.
In a subsequent analysis of the cockpit voice recordings from this study, Foushee and
(1981) found that those crews who communicated more and who acknowledged the exchange of information made fewer errors.
Is CNM Training Necessary?
Factors related to faulty crew performance account for well over half of air carrier accidents.
* Eastern Airlines, Lockheed L-1011, Miami, Florida, December 29, 1972.
United Airlines, DC-8, Portland, Oregon, December 28, 1978.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., BAC 1-11, Rochester, NY, July 9, 1978.
Air Florida, Boeing B-737, Washington, DC, January 13, 19R2.
Air Illinois, Hawker Siddley 748-2A, Pinckneyville, Illinois, October 11, 1983.
• Galaxy Airlines, Lockheed Electra-L-188C, Reno, Nevada, January 21, 1985.
Air Ontano, Fokker F-28, Dryden, Ontario, March 10, 1989
This early work by Lauber, Cooper, Foushee, and many others culminated in the first
NASA/Industry Workshop on Resource Management on the Flight Deock in 1979.
This event converged the efforts begun by the military and by commercial carriers in this area.
Subsequently, in the early 1980s, prograx• were developed and implemented by some air carriers, including United Airlines, KLMa,
Am, Trans Australia Airlines, and others.
Other events, such as the 1986 NABA/XAC
Workshop on Cockpit Resource Management
Training, and the biennial aviation psychology symposia organized by Dick Jensen at Ohio State University, provided
opportunities to review progress in
CR1M program development.
The FAA officially recognized the value of
CRM types of training during this period by allowing a LOFT training period to be used as an approved period of training which could be substituted for certain pilot's recurrent proficiency checks.
More recently, SFAR 58,
The Advanced Qualification Program (AQP), passed into law in 1990, has given greatly expanded latitude to air carriers with regard to training. One of the conditions of the
AQP training option is that CRM training be included. It is projected that CRM may one day be required in all formal aircrew certification requirements.
CRM concept has continued to evolve over the last decade, guided by extensive federal/'aniversity/industry research and by lessons learned from the implementation of
CRM programs at a growing number of airlines.
FAA Advisory Circular 120-51 as revised provides a contemporary statement of CRM concepts. This document underscores several recent developments in CRM:
CRM has come to embody the entire flight operations team, including the cabin crew, air traffic controllers, maintenance, and other groups that interact with the cockpit crew. A shift in terminology reflects this emphasis: Cockpit Resource
Management is now more appropriately termed Crew Resource Management.
A second recent initiative is the integration of CRM skills with traditioral technical flying skills. Whereas CRM programs stress the acquisition of crew-related skills, it is thought that these skills should ultimately be integrated with technical skills in the normal training and evaluation process.
In other words, both technical skills and
CRM skills interact to determine performance on the flightdeck.
Accordingly, these skills should be trained and evaluated together as part of the total training program.
CRM programs have been in place for a time sufficient to allow a body of research evaluating
CR14 training effectiveness to accumulate. The research results indicate clear evidence of positive changes in aircrew performance following the introduction of CRM.
This brief look at the background of CRM has necessitated the omission of many important contributions by many people.
However, it is noteworthy that CRM program development has been driven by input. from line pilots, not dreamed up in some ivory tower.
CRM has become widely accepted within the aviation community.
Principles of Crew Resource Management
CRM is defined as the effective utilization of all available resources--equipment and people--to achieve safe, efficient flight operations.
Resources include autopilots and other avionics systems: operating manuals;
CRM is the effective utilization of all available with the broader goal of crew coordination, resources-hardware, and people, including crew members, air traffic controllers, and others in the flight system.
Therefore, the concept of effective
CRM combines individual technical proficiency thus integrating all available resources to noftware, and achieve safe flight.
personnel-to achieve safe, efficient flight The following principles are fundamental to the CRM concept:
"* Effective performance depends on both technical proficiency and interpersonal skills.
" A primary focus of CRM is effective team coordination.
The team encompasses the flight crew (cockpit and cabin), dispatchers, air traffic controllers, maintenance and others.
"* CR1 focuses on crew members' attitudes and behaviors.
" Effective CRM involves the entire flight crew.
CRM is not simply a responsibility of the captain, nor should CRM training be viewed as captain's training.
All crewmembers are responsible for effective
management of the resources available to them.
" The acquisition of effective CRM skills requires the active participation of all crewmembers.
Effective resource management skills are not gained by passively listening to classroom lectures, but by active participation and practice, including the use of simulations such as
Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT).
CRM training should be blended into the total training curriculum, including initial, transition, upgrade, and recurrent training.
CRM training programs come in many forms.
Limited CRM training programs are now available off-the-shelf from various sources.
Specific organizations develop CRM programs to meet their own particular needs and corporate culture. Therefore, someone reviewing current CRM training programs is likely to find a variety of programs and program acronyms. These include:
"• Flight Operations Resource Management
Flight Deck Management (FDM),
Aircrew Resource Management (ARM),
Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT),
Flight Team Management (FTM).
This diversity reflects the difference in size, type of aircraft, mission, training facilities, equipment, and financial resources of operators. Accordingly, no single training program is likely to meet the requirements of all operators.
All CRM training programs are built on the principles outlined above.
Circular 120-51 as revised may serve to build a consensus on program content by suggesting basic CRM skills to be included in any program of instruction.
These skills are grouped into three clusters:
Communications and Decision Skills.
This cluster of skills includes behaviors related to communications and decisionmaking, including:
"• decision making
"* conflict resolution
2. Team Building and Maintenance Skills.
This cluster focuses on human interaction and team management skills including:
"* team management
3. Workload Management and Situational
This cluster reflects skills related to managing stress and workload, including:
"* mission planning
"* stress management
"* workload distribution
These skills will be examined more closely in the following chapter.
Crew resource management represents an approach to improving aviation safety that was born of real life experiences of airline pilots. They realized that technical skill
The overall goal of CRM alone was not enough to manage safely a is the blending of complex flight system.
CRM emphasizes the technical skillsand effective utilization of all resources human skillsto support available to the flight crew, including safe and efficient operation of aircra. equipment and people. In addition to other skills required for effective crew performance. The overall goal of
CR3 is the blending of technical skills and human skills
so as to support safe and efficient operation of aircraft.
Research and experience have both shown that the best
CR1 training is like other effective training - it will include three learning elements: awareness, practice, and reinforcement. CRM training should not follow any single outline, however.
It is most effective when it is developed to meet each user's unique set of needs.
Overview of the Handbook
Chapter 1 has introduced CRM.
The following three chapters provide suggestions and examples on what CRM is and how CRM training programs can be provided.
Chapter 2 presents an explanation of the basic CRM skills.
This explanation cites cases illustrating effective and ineffective utilization of these skills.
Chapter 3 provides guidance on developing, implementing and evaluating CRM training.
Chapter 4 provides a brief summary.
Following the text, a glossary is presented as a key to the terms used in
Finally, a bibliography is included to provide supplementary reference material.
Chapter 2: CRM Skills
There are many skills required to fly an airplane safely. Some of these are referred to as technical or "stick and rudder" skills.
Major categories of technical skills include:
Motor Skills: the physical control of aircraft systems, aircraft attitude, and navigation.
Procedural Skills: the execution of standard, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures.
Information Skills (Knowledge): the use of information required to conduct safe air operations in areas such as federal regulations, weather, and aircraft systems.
These skills constitute the technical proficiency of crewmembers.
As noted in
Chapter 1, these skills formed the primary basis for the selection and training of aviators for most of this century.
These skills are necessary for modern aircraft operations, but by themselves are not sufficient to ensure safe flight.
In other words, these individual technical skills must be paired with other crew-related skills to achieve safe flight operations.
For example, it is not enough that a crewmember possesses the appropriate technical knowledge; each crewmember must also have the skills necessary to receive and to transmit information efficiently in the crew setting--communication skills.
The "Right Stuf'" for crewmember who tends to ignore input from modern-day flight oper- others can be a hazard during normal flight, ations includes both and can be disastrous in emergency individual technical profi- conditions. Therefore, technical skills must ciency and crew resource be integrated with other crew-related skills, management skills, defined in Chapter 1 as CRM skills, to ensure safe flight.
CRM skills, those skills related to effective crew resource management, may be grouped into the following categories:
Prooesses and Decision Making: skills related to effective communications and crew decisions.
Team Building and Maintenance: skills related to leadership/followership and maintaining a supportive team environment.
Workload Management and Situational
Awareness: skills related to operational awareness, planning, and managing stress and workload.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the skills that determine flight performance.
Figure 4 indicates that both technical skills and CRM skills are necessary for effective flight performance.
This view is consistent with the recent initiative to integrate technical and CRM skills in flight operations and training.
Furthermore, each cluster of skills presented in Figure 4 is broken down into basic or primary-level skills. For example, specific skills that compose the Communications
Processes and Decision Making cluster include communication skills, assertiveness skills, and decision making skills. The three major
CRM skill clusters provide one convenient way to classify CRM skills. However, it is the primary-level skills that form the basis for
CRM skills within each of the three skill clusters are described in the following sections. Each skill will be described briefly. Synopses of NTSB accident reports will illustrate how skills can effect crew performance. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of selected CRM skills, and to demonstrate the importance of these skills to flight safety.
Communication Processes and Decision Making.
The first cluster of CRM skills includes those related to effective communication and decision making.
Three primary-level CRM skills within this cluster are described in the following: Communication, Assertiveness, and Decision Making.
One of the most significant variables relevant to crew performance is the information flow within the cockpit and between the cockpit and other sources.
The effective transfer of information is a complex
ess, and requires that information be conveyed when needed, transferred clearly, attended to by the receiver, understood and acknowledged by the receiver, and clarified if needed.
There are numerous opportunities for breakdown in this process.
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) was created in 1976 by NASA and the Federal
Aviation Administration to provide a data base for anonymous reports of aviation incidents. From the earliest months, it became obvious that common deficiencies in the exchange of flight information were frequently being noted in the reports to the
Billings & Reynard
(1 9 8 1 ) a n a l y z e d a l a r g e
rep ort ed t o th e A SRS , find ing th at ov e r 70 % o f the reports contained of error in the
the ASRS (filings
transfer of information.
One of the most common communication problems
(37% of the reported incidents) was failure to initiate the information transfer process. In most of these cases, the needed information almost always existed, but it was not made available to those who needed it.
Another common problem (37% of the incidents) was inaccurate, incomplete, ambiguous, or garbled messages.
Other problems included
the failure to transmit the message at the appropriate time (13%). In 11% of the cases, the message was either not received or was misunderstood. Only 3% of the information transfer problems were attributed to equipment failure.
Foushee and Manos (1981) also reviewed the
ASRS data base to examine incidents involving communications problems. They observed the following communication problems:
35% of the reports cited problems dealing with poor understanding and division of responsibilities. Often, the lack of appropriate acknowledgments and cross-checking was a factor.
16% were due to interference with pertinent cockpit communications by extraneous conversations between cockpit crewmembers or between cockpit crewmembers and cabin crew.
15% of the incidents were due to information which one or more crewmembers believed they had transferred, but due to interference or inadequacy of the message, was not transferred successfully.
* 12% reported a total lack of communication between crewmembers.
Within this category, there were numerous examples of crewmembers not communicating regarding errors even when they had access to the correct information.
10% of the communication problems cited were due to overconfidence or complacency. Often, crewmembers assumed that everyone else understood what was happening, when in fact, they did not.
This and related research suggests that:
Overall, there is a tendency for crews who communicate more often to perform better than crews who communicate less.
When more information regarding flight status is transferred, there are fewer errors related to system operation.
Crews who frequently acknowledge commands, inquiries and observations tend to make fewer errors.
In general, effective communication is supported by the following behaviors:
Convey information clearly, concisely, and in a timely manner.
Use standard terminology.
"* Advocate concerns and suggestions clearly and assertively.
Provide information as required.
"• Repeat information.
"• Ask for clarification when needed.
Resolve conflicts constructively.
The following accident summary illustrates the importance of these behaviors.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY -
On July 19, 19. at about 3pm local time, a DC-10 operated by United Airlines as flight 232, ailerons were slightly up, not damaged, and that the spoIlers were locked down. There s no movement of the primary flight control surfaces.
experienced a catastrophic fal'ure of the No. 2 tall mounted engine during cruise flight. Shortly after the engine failure, the
6. The captain directed the check airman to operate tWe crew noted that the hydraulic fluid pressure and quantity had throttles to free himself and the first officer to attempt to fallen to zero In all three redundant hydraulic systems. The engine failure precipitated damage that severed the three hydraulic systems, leaving the fllgnt control systems inoperative. Approximately one minute after the engine failure, the throttles, Even so, he said that the airplane had a the flight data recorder Indicated no further movement of the flight control surfaces, maintain command of the flight controls. The check airman advised that the No. 1 and No. 3 engine thrust levers could not be used symmetrically, so he used two hands to manipulate continuous tendency to turn right and it was difficult to maintain a stable pitch attitude.
The only means of control for the flight crew was from the operating wing mounted engines. The application of
7. The captain reported to the approach controlier that the flight had no elevator control, they might have to make a forced asymmetric power to these engine- changed the roll attitude, hence the heading. Increasing and decreasing power had a limited effect on the pitch altitude. The airplane tended to possible to control the pitch oscillations with any degree of landing and asked the controller for the ILS frequencj, heading to the runway and length of the runway. He then Instructed the second officer to start dumping fuel using the quick dump.
oscillate about the center of gravity In the pitch axis. It was not
8. The captain asked the senior flight attendant If everyone In the cabin was ready. She repo4ted In the affirmative and that precision. Moreover, becaue airspeed is primarily determined she observed damage
one wing. The captain sent the by pitch tnm configuration and power, there was no direct control of airspeed. The crew foatnd that despite their best efforts, the airplane would not maintain a stabilized flight condition. The airplane subsequently crashed during an second officer back to inspect the empennage visually,
9. The second officer returned and reported damage to the right and left horliz stabilizers. The captain replied
attempted landing at Sioux Gateway Airport, Iowa, There were what I thought." The captain then directed the fllghtcrew to
285 passengers and 11 crewmernbers onboard. One flight lock their shoulder harnesses and to put everything away.
attendant and 110 passengers were fatally injured.
10. Several seconds later, the controller alerted the
EVENT HISTORY - About 1 hour and 7 minutes after takeoff, crewmembers to a 3,400 foot tower obstruction located 5 miles the flight crew heard a loud bang or an explosion, followed by a to their right and asked how steep a right turn they could make.
shuddering of the airframe. The following sequence of events
The captain responded that they were trying to make
30 is In chronological order and is presented to summarize the type and variety of communications required. can't handle that steep of bank." The first officer stated, "were gonna have
1. The flight crew determined that the No. 2 aft (tall mounted) to try it straight ahead Al..." engine had failed. The captain called for the engine shutdown
The captain reported the runway in sight and thanked the checklist. While shutting down the engine, the second officer and quantity gauges indicated zero.
for his help. The stated that the runway the
(flight engineer) observed that the systems hydraulic pressure flight had lined up with was closed, but he added "thOtM work
2. The first officer advised that he could not control the sir, we're getting the equipment off the runway." The captain asked Its length and the controller reported 6,600
Twelve airplane as it en:ered a right descending turn. The captain took
seconds later the controller stated that Uwer was an open
control of the airplane and confirmed that it did not respond to flight control inputs. poblem.
3. The captain reduced thrust to the No. 1 engine and the airplane began to roll to a wings level attitude.
12. During the final 20 seconds befove touchdown, the airspeed averaged 215 knots, sink rate was 1.620 fet per
4. A flight attendant advised the captain thai a UAL DC-10 training check airman was seated In the passenger captain recalled getting a high sink rate alarm from the ground compartment and had volunteered his assistance.
The captain ground, the nose of the airplane began to pitch downward.
Immediately invited the airman into the cockpit. proximity warning system and that at 100 feet above the
First contact was made by the right wing tip followed by the
5. At the request of the captain, the check airman re-entered the passenger cabin and performed a visual inspection of the airplane's wings. He returned and reported that the inboerd right main landing gear. The airplane skidded to the right of the runway, ignited, cartwheeled aind came to rest in an inverted
18 i i .
The quality and efficiency of the crew communications in UAL flight 232 is one factor that minimized the loss of life in this catastrophe. Specific communications behaviors such as clarity (event #2), conciseness (event #5), timeliness (event #7) and acknowledgement (event #10) are represented in the event history.
A more intensive analysis of crew communication during this accident was performed by Predmore (1991), who broke down the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcript into the following communication categories:
The following chart represents the cockpit and radio communications from flight 232 during this emergency.
20 28 30 32 34 36 38 40 42 44 4648
Figure 6. Communications ofthe UAL flight 232 crew. (Predmore,
Figure 6 reveals that the crew maintained a remarkably high level of communication overall. A second important factor is the consistent level of acknowledgement evident during this event. It is important to note that the crew of United 232 had received prior CRM training.
Accident reports reveal a number of instances in which crewmembers failed to speak up even when they had critical flight information that might have averted a disaster.
In most cases, this hesitancy involved a copilot or flight engineer who failed to question a captain's actions or to express an opinion forcefully to the captain.
These types of incidents lead to the conclusion that crewmembers are often unwilling to state an opinion or to take a course of action, even when the operation of the airplane is clearly outside acceptable parameters.
NASA's H. Clayton Foushee reported an incident from the ASRS data base which illustrates this phenomenon.
This report described a situation in which air traffic control had instructed the aircraft to level off at 21,000 feet.
As the aircraft reached its assigned altitude, the copilot noticed that the captain was allowing the airplane to continue climbing.
The copilot alerted the captain, but not forcefully enough for the captain to hear.
The copilot tried again and pointed to the altimeter, at which point the captain stopped the climb and began descent back to the assigned altitude.
The copilot summed up the reasons for his actions as follows: t
The captain said he had misread hi altimeter and thought he was 1000 feet lower than he was. I believe the main factor Involved hem was my reluctance to correct the captain. This captain Is very approachabM" and I had no reason to hold back. It Is just a bad habit that
I think a lot of copilots have of double-checking everythvIng we say before we say anything to the captain. (Foushee, 1982, p. 1063)
Assertiveness involves the ability to request informetion from others, make decisions, and carry out a course of action in a consistent and forceful manner.
Assertive behavior includes:
Inquiry: inquiring about actions taken by others and asking for clarification when required.
believed to be a correc-. position and to advocate a course of action consistently and forcefully.
* Assertion: stating and maintaining a course of action until convinced otherwise by further information.
Crewmembers are often hesitant to speak up for several reasons:
Sometimes crewmembers fail to question others' behavior because they are hesitant to point out incompetent behavior and to embarrass a captain or crewmember.
(1985) cites one copilot's hesitancy to correct a captain: "He's slow to catch his airspeed and if I speak up every time he's ten knots low, it'll sound like an instructional ride, so since he usually catches it at ten, I'll speak up at fifteen." Others have expressed fear of causing animosity and possibly creating a reputation as that of someone who is
"difficult to work with."
Crewmembers sometimes hesitate to speak up because they perceive the captain as too intimidating.
This kind of captain sees himself as omnipotent, with the other crewmembers there only to serve his wishes, not to make any contributions to the decision-making process.
(1982) cites one extreme case:
Air traffic control had issued a speed restriction. The copilot acknowledged and waited for the captain to slow down.
Assuming that the captain hadn't heard the mescage, he repeated, "Approach said slow to
180." The captain's reply was,
I want." Air traffic control inquired as to why the aircraft had not been slowed, advised the crew that they had nearly collided with another aircraft, and issued a new clearance, which the captain also disregarded. Following a further advisory from the copilot, the captain responded by telling the copilot to
"just look out the damn window."
The status structure of the cockpit may contribute to non-assertiveness among crewmembers. The captain has authority in the cockpit and the responsibility for flight operations.
People are naturally hesitant to question those who have higher
status. Therefore, people tend to be deferential to those in command. Second, crewmembers may simply assume that, since the captain is in charge, that the captain
"knows what he is doing."
However, a lack of assertive behavior on the part of crewmembers may have disastrous consequences, as the following incident illustrates.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY - About 1815 Pacific Standard
Time on December 28,1978, United Airllnee Flight 173,.
DC--61 aircraft had delayed crashed Into a wooded southeast of the airport
during an approach to the Portland International Airport. The aircraft for one hour while the the flight attendants
time to prepare for the emergency, cockq"t procedures In the ewnt of
lending, rid the p
ure On captain would be using during the
8. AT 1802:44, the flight engineer advised, "We got about flightcrew coped with
landing gear malfunction
prepared three on the fel
thas It." The aircraft was about 5 the passengers for an emergency landing. nautical miles south of the airport on
a southwest heading.
The NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident was 9. At 1802:44, Poitland Approach asked Flight 173 for a status the failure of the capl',ln to monitor propedy the
fuel report. The first officer replied, "Yeah, we have indication our state and to properly respond to the crewmembers' advisories regarding fuel. Contributing to the accl'ent was the failure of crwnmembers either to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to assertively communicate their concens to the captain. land on two eight
the equipment standing by. Our Indications are the gear Is down and locked. We•ve
got our people prepared for an evacuation In the event
should become neoesaary."
The first problem faced by the captain was the unsafe landing gear indication during the initial
10. At 1803:14, Portland Approach
that Flight 173 advlae them when the approach would begin. The captain approach to Portland international Airport. This indication responded, "'heyve about finished
In the cabin. I'd guess followed
loud thump, an abnormal vibraton,
and an abnormal about another three, four, five rminutos." At this time, the aircraft yaw as the landing gear was lowered. aircraft was
bout 8 nautical miles south of the
1. At 1712:20, Portland Approach requested, "United one seven three, contact the tower, one one eight point sven."
11. At 1806:19, the first light attendant entered the cockpit.
The captain asked,
"How you doIng?" She responded, "Well, I
The flight responded, "Negative, we'll stay with you. We'll tay think w're ready." At this time, the aircraft was about 17 at five.
We'll maintain about
hundred and seventy knots. We aeutical miles south ofe a•kport.
Almost limultaneously the got a gear problem. We'll let you know."
2. At 1746:52. the first officer
the flight much fuel we g0t...?" The flight engineer r engineer. "How
, "FWe thousand." The first officer acknowledged the response.
advice to the flight engineer, *Batter get some crosafeeds open there."
12. At 1806:45, the fis offir told the captain, "We're going to
3. At 1748:00, the nautical miles first officer asked right, the feed pumps according to air traffic south
are starting control of the airport. the captain,"... what' the fuel show now... r The captain replied, "FIve." At 1749, lfter
partlalry unintelligible comment by the flight engineer concerning fuel pump lights, the captain stated,
to blink." At this point,
data, the aircraft was about 13
engine" The captain replied, "Why' at
1806, the first officer again stated, "We're losing an engine." Again the captain asked, 'Why'?" The firs officer responded, "Fuel."
13. At 1807:12. the captain called
requested, "Would like clearance for an approach into two eight
left, now." The aircraft was about
19 nautical miles south-southwest of the
turning left. This was the
4. About 1750:20, the captain asked the flight engineer to first request for an approach clearance from Flight 173.
"Give us a current card on weight. Figure
another fifteen 14. At 1813:21, the flight engineer stated, "We've lost two minutes." The first officer responded, "Fifteen minutes?" To which the captain replied, "Yeah, give us three or four engines, guys." At 1813:25, engines- one and two." he stated.
"We Just lost two thousand pounds on top of zero fuel weight." The flight engineer then said,
"Not enough. Fifteen minutes Is gonno really mun us low on fuel here,"
15. At 1813:38. the captain
"They're make Trotudlle." The first officer all
said, 'We going. We can't cant make
From 1752:17 to about 1753:30, the flight engineer talked to
16. At 1813:46, the captain told the first officer, "Okay.
Portland and discussed the aircraft's fuel state, the number of persons on board the aircraft
lending preopratlons at the
mayday." At 1813:50, the first officer celled Portlend
International Airport Tower and declared, "Portland Tower,
United one se three heavy,
6. At 1756:53, the first officer asked,
'How much fuel you got now?" The flight engineer responded tht 4,000
remained, 1,000 pounds in each toak are flaming out. We're going down. Wiere not going to be b• to make the
This was the last radio transmission from
7. From 1757:30 until 1800:50, the captain and the
office engaged In conversatlon which Included discussions of gi0ng
In this accident, the flight engineer was increasingly concerned about the critical fuel situation, making several observations to the captain that were not acknowledged. In its report, the NTSB stated:
Admittedly, the stature of a captain and his management style may exert subtle pressure on his crew to conform to his way of thinking. it may hinder interaction and adequate monitoring and force another crewmember to
yield his right to express an opinion. (NTSB, 1979)
Decision making is a topic that may at first glance seem to be an individual matter.
After all, the captain is the final authority and responsible for flight decisions.
However, aircrew decision making is a group process, and clearly illustrates the collective nature of crew resource management. There are a number of hardware, software, and human resources available in the cockpit, including other crewmembers,
ATC, dispatch, and various sources of information. The decision maker who does not rely on input from other crewmembers and from other flight team members outside the cockpit is more likely to make poor decisions.
Although decisions are certainly founded on aeronautical knowledge, flying skills, and experience, it is often difficult to describe how decisions are made in actual flying situations. It has generally been assumed that learning to make good decisions could be attained only through experience.
However, research has shown that aircrew decision making skills can be shaped through training.
The decision making process may be broken down into the following five steps:
Reoognizing or identifying the problem.
Does a problem exist that requires action?
2. Gathering information to assess the situation. This step requires determining what information is needed, who has the needed information, and whether the information is verified by other crewmembers and resources.
3. Identifying and evaluating alternative solutions. This step includes evaluating
the advantages as well as the risks associated with each alternative identified, and selecting the optimum alternative.
Implementing the decision. This step includes executing the decision and providing feedback on actions taken to crewmembers.
5. Reviewing consequences of the decision.
This step involves evaluating the consequences of the decision and revising the decision if consequences are not as anticipated.
Some decisions, especially those that must be made under extreme time pressure, must be seat-of-the-pants decisions. In these cases, there is very little time to gather all available information or to evaluate alternative solutions.
These situations call for intuitive decision making, which is based on gut reactions, or more specifically, is based on past experience and training.
However, these emergency situations are relatively rare. Most situations allow sufficient time to make a more deliberate or analytical decision.
This decision more closely follows the steps outlined above.
Analytical decision making uses the resources available to the decision maker and results in more informed decisions.
Team Building and Maintenance
Team Building and Maintenance skills include those skills related to fostering effective team performance.
The term "leadership" implies that this skill is relevant only to the captain.
There are two reasons why this is not true. First, a flightcrew is a team with a clearly designated leader: the captain. The captain as designated leader retains the authority and responsibility for flight operations.
However, there are times when other crewmembers must Flay functional leadership roles. A functional leader may carry out leadership duties for a specialized task on a temporary basis, such as a takeoff or
landing. In this case, the crewmember must direct task activities and serve as a functional leader to carry out that task.
Second, leadership would more properly be called leadership/followership.
Leadership is a reciprocal process, and there are behaviors that both a leader and a follower must apply to ensure effective performance.
For example, one leader behavior might be to provide direction for carrying out a task; correspondingly, one follower behavior might be to provide feedback on performance of the task. In other words, leader behaviors are less effective without complementary follower behaviors.
Leadership is not just "captain's" material.
All crewmembers must perform leadership duties in some situations.
Furthermore, leadership is not a one-way process, but requires both leader actions and effective crewmember responses.
Understanding the leadership role requires an understanding of what it is that leaders do.
Regulating Information Flow.
The leader must regulate, manage, and direct the flow of information, ideas, and suggestions within the cockpit crew and between the cockpit crew and outside sources. This function includes the following behaviors:
Communicating flight information
Asking for opinions, suggestions
Giving opinions, suggestions
"* Clarifying communication
2. Directing and Coordinating Crew
Activities. The leader must function as crew manager to provide orientation, coordination and direction for group performance.
This function includes:
Directing and coordinating crew activities
Monitoring and assessing crew performance
Providing planning and orientation
3. Motivating Crewmombers.
The leader must maintain a positive climate to encourage good crewmember relations and to invite full participation in crew activities. This function includes:
Creating proper climate
Maintaining an "open" cockpit atmosphere
Maintaining positive relations
Providing non-punitive critique and feedback
4. Decision-making. The leader is ultimately responsible for decisions.
This function includes:
Assuming responsibility for decision making
Gathering and evaluating information
Providing feedback on actions
The following excerpt from an NTSB accident report illustrates the errors that can occur when certain leadership and followership behaviors are applied poorly or not at all.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY - On October
1963, Air Illinois
Hawker Siddley 745-2A was being operated between Chicago, Illinois and the Southern Illinois Airport,
Carbondale, Illinois, with on Intermediate stop at
Illinois. At 2020 central dayiigh time (CDT), Flight 710 departed Springfield with seven peseengers and three genertor from the airplanes d.c. electrical system. AN subsequent attempts to restore the right generalor to the
airplanes d.c. distribution system were unsuccessful, and the airplane proceeded toward Carbondale relyng solely on ft betteft for d.o. electrical power.
EVET HISTR - The flight was about 45 minutes behind crewmembere on board. About 1.5 minutes later, Flight 710 schedule when it arrived at
Capitol Airport, Springfield, tIlinols.
called Springfiekd departure control and reported that It had experienced a slight electrical problem but that it wan continuing to its destination about 40 minutes way.
The fllghtcrew remained on board while the airplane was fueled. At 2011:44, when Flight 710 requested Its IFR clearance,
The flight toward Carbondale was conducted in instrument as opposed to the IFR flight plan of 9,000 feet stored
In the meteorological conditions. The cloud beses In the ares were at ARTCC computer. At 2019:40, Spdngfeld tow cleared
2,000 feet MSL with tops at
Visibility below the cloud bases was 1 mile in rain,
In the area.
Flight 710 for takeoff.
1. At 2021:14, Flight 710 contacted departure control and informed the controller that it was climbing through 1,500 fee.
The Cockpit Voice Roorder Vaript showed that shortly after takeoff, Flight 71's
left generator suffered
mechanical failure and that in respondin to the failure of the left generator, the first officer mistakenly Isolated the right
The departure controller advised the flight that he had t in radar contact, cleared it to climb to and malntain 5,0)0 fest, and cleered it to proceed direct to Carbondale after it receie
2. At 2021:34, Flight 710 Informed the departure controller that
Instructed her to brief the passengers that he had turned off the it had experienced a "slight electrical problem..." The controller excess lights because the airplane had experienced 'a bit of an electrical problem..." but that they were going to continue to
3. At 2022:10, the flight told departure control that "We'd like
8. At 2038:41 (17 minutes after the
Initial failure), the first to stay as low as we can," and then requested and was cleared officer told the captain, "Well, when we... started losing the left to maintain 3,000 feet. The controller asked the flight If he one I reached up and hit the right (isolate button) trying to could provide any assistance, and the flight responded, "We're
Isolate the right side because I assumed the problem was the doing okay, thanks." right side but they (the generators) both still went off."
4. At 2023:54, the first officer told the captain that "the left
(generator) is totally dead, the right (generator) is putting out
9. At 2044:59, in response to the captain's request, the first officer reported that the battery voltage was 20 volts. At voltage but I can't get a load on it." About 30 seconds later, he 2049:23, Kansas City center requested Flight 710 to change reported "zero voltage and amps on the left side, the right is putting out 27.5 volt; but I can't get it to come on the line." At radio frequencies. The flight acknowledged the request, which was the last radio communication from Flight 710.
2025:42, he told the captain that the battery power was going down "pretty fast."
At 2051:37, the first officer told the captain, "I don't know if we have enough juice to get out of this." At 2052:12, the
5. At 2027.24, the captain called Kansas City center and stated that he had an "unusual request." He asked clearance captain asked the first officer to "watch my altitude, I'm going to go down to twenty-four hundred (feet)." He then asked the first to descend to 2,000 feet "even If we have to go VFR." Healso officer
he had a flashlight and to have it ready. At 2053:18, asked the controller "to keep an eye on us If you can." The the first officer reported, "We're losing everything, ...down to controller told the flight that he could not clear ft to descend.
The captain thanked the controller and continued to maintain about thirteen volts," and at 2053:28, he told the captain the airplane was at 2,400 feet.
11. At 2054:00, the captain asked the first officer if he had any
6. At 2028:45, the captain said, "Beacons off... and Nav lights instruments. The first officer asked him to repeat, and at are off." At 2031:04, tVie first officer reminded the captain that
2054:16, the captain asked "Do you have any Instruments, do
Carbondale had a 2.000 foot ceiling and that the visibility was 2 you have a horizon (attitude director indicator)'?" Flight 710 miles with light rain and fog. There was no reply or crashed near Centralia, Illinois VORTAC located about 40 acknowledgement from the captain,
7. At 2033:07, the flight attendant came forward and the captain asked her if she could work with what she "had back there." The flight attendant reported that the only lights operating in the cabin were the reading lights, the lights by the lavatory, the baggage light and the entrance lights. The captain
This accident involved an HS-748-2A aircraft which experienced a generator failure at night. Proper procedures were not followed, causing disconnection of the second generator.
A series of poorly managed actions followed, including an attempt to make the destination on battery power alone.
Several behaviors related to leadership/followership are identifiable:
Poor monitoring and assessment of crew activities (Event 8)
Little feedback or acknowledgement of actions (Event 6,
Utilization of critical information unknown (Event 6)
Furthermore, a crucial error occurred when the co-pilot reminded the captain of IFR weather at the destination, got no response from the captain, and did not press the issue until it was too late.
This accident shows that it is sometimes difficult to apply vital team behaviors required in the cockpit such as leadership, planning, problem solving, delegating, motivating, and setting priorities.
This difficulty reinforces the importance of CRM training.
Workload Management and Situational Awareness
These skills reflect the extent to which crewmembers maintain awareness, prepare for contingencies, and manage workload and stress.
Workload management includes preparation, vigilance and avoidance of distractions and complacency.
Pilots interviewed about workload management offered the following tips:
Preparation - "Commit SOP' (Standard Operation Procedures), limitations and emergency procedures to memory, to free up mental capacity to deal with unforeseen events."
Planning - "Before each flight, I typically spend about one hour at home reviewing the route and airport information."
Vigilance - "Be especially vigilant when everything is going well." and "Never assume anything, but verify and cross-check all critical Information."
Complacency - "Avoid complacency. The minute you think something won't hurt you, it will."
Distractions - "Maintain a terrain awareness and a general knowledge of the topography over which you are flying."
(from Kelly, 1991)
Workload varies according to the phase of an operation, from the routine of preflight planning and enroute cruise to the high workload of a low visibility instrument approach. Either workload level can be dangerous.
Accidents often occur when workload demands exceed crew capabilities.
Figure 7 illustrates the phases of flight in which most accidents occur.
Note that takeoff, approach, and landing phases account for most aircraft accidents.
These phases are also periods of high crew workload.
If any distraction or irregularity occurs during these phases, an accident is much more likely to occur than at other times.
4.2% 12.9% 8.5%
Percent of Accidents
1 % 13%
Exposure - Percent of Flight Time
Figure 7. Percent of total commercial aircraft accidents by phase of flight, wortle,
1959-1990. (Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group, 1991)
Paradoxically, low workload can also be a hazard to safety. Crews may be less alert during long cruise segments.
These low workload periods are times when complacency, forgetfulness and drowsiness are most common.
Examination of the errors associated with low and high workloads reveals that performance follows a YERKES DODSON arousal curve like the one depicted in Figure 8.
The following accident emphasizes the relationship between arousal and performance.
Crucial elements identifiable in this excerpt include the importance of unbroken attention to instrument scan and the insidious role of distractions.
ACCIDENT SUMMARY - On December 29, 1972, an
Eastern Airlines Lockheed L-1 011 crashed In the Everglades
International Airport in Jamaica, New York to the Miami
Interntlonal Airport In Miami, Florida.
about 18 miles west-northwest of Miami International Airport
(MIA). There were no major mechanical problems, severe
1. At 2334:05, EAL 401 called the MIA tower and stated,
"Ah, tower, this Is Eastern. ah, four zero one, It looks like we're weather phenomena or crew Incapacitation. The flight diverted gonna have to circle, we don't have
light on our nose gear from its approach because the nose landing gear position yet."
Indicating system of the aircraft did not Indicato that the nose gear was locked In the down position. The aircraft climbed to
2. At 2334:14, the tower advised, "Eastern four oh one heavy, roger. pull up, climo straight ahead to two thusand, go back to
2,000 feet MSL and followed
approach control, one twenty eight sIx." the airport at that attitude. During that time the crew attempted to cowrect the malfunction and to determine whether or not the nose landing gear was extended. Unfortiunately, during that
3. At 2335:09. EAL 401 contacted MIA approach control and reported, "All right, ah, approach control, Eastern four zero period, woridoad management in terms of flying, navigating and one, we're right over the
here and climbing to two communicating was totally Ignored due to fixation on the relatively minor failure. thousand fest. in
two thousand feet and we've got to get
green light an our nose gear."
The flight was conducted In clear weather conditions with unrestricted visibility. However, the accident occurred In darkness with no moon. The flight was uneventful until the approach to MIA. The landing gear handle was placed In
"down* position during the preparation for landing,
4. At 2336:04, the captain Instructed the first officer, who was flyi the aircraft, to engage the autopilot.
The firs officer
the over the flying responsibilities. The removed the roms gear the captain took first officer succeefully light lens assembly, but It jammed green light, which Indicates to the crew that the landing gear is when he
to replace It.
fully extended and locked, failed to Illuminate. The captain 5. At 2337:01, the c4ptai Instructed the
officer to recycled the landing gear, but the green light still failed to illuminate. enter the forward electronics bay, below the flight deck. to check visually the alignment of the nose gear Indices.
The NatiotWl Transportation Safety Board determined that the 6. At 2337:48, approach omnol requested the flight to turn left probable cause of this accident was failure of the flight crew to to
heading of 270 degrees magnetic. EAL 401 monitor the flight Instruments during the final four minut" of flight, and to detect an unexpected descent soorn enough to prevent
Impact with the ground. Preoucupation with a
aocknowledged the request
flightcrew contiuod their
the nose gear position light Is
turned to the new heading.
from Its reainer, without success.
malfunction of the nose gear position Indicating system distracted the crsw's attention from the Instruments and allowed the descent to go unnoticed,
At 2338:34, th. captain alignment of the nose again
directed the desc•nd Into the forward electronics bay
officer to check the
EVENT HJISTR - Eastern Airlines Flight 401 was a scheduled passenger flight from the John F. Kennedy
7. At 2340:3e, a half.second C-chord, which indiceled
deviation of +/- 250 feet from the selected altitude, sounded In n; and that more that one scan on the display would be required to ve.-fy
deviation requiring controller action.
the cockpit. No crewmember commented on the C-chord. No
9. At 2342:05, the first officer said,
"We did something to pitch change to correct the
of satitude was recorded. A altitude," The captain's reply was "What?"
The first officer short time later, the second officer raised his
into the asked, "Were
still at two thousand, right?" The captain cockpit and stated, *1 cant see It. Ir pitch dark and I throw the
*Hey, where happening here?' little light, I get, sh, nothing." The flightcrew and an EAL maintenance specialist who was occupying the forward observer seat then discussed the operation of the nose wheelwell light. Afterward, the specialist went Into the electronics bay to assist the second officer.
10, At 2342:10, the first of six radio altimeter warning "beep" sounds began; they ceased immediately before the sound of initial ground Impact. The aircraft crashed while In
left bank of 28 degrees. The aircraft was destroyed. There were 163
passengers end s
crew of 13 aboard the aircraft. Ninety-four
8. At 2341:40, MIA approach control asked, "Eastern, sh, four
and five crew members received ftal Injuries. All oh one how are things comIng' slon% out there? This query was made a few seconds after the controller noted an altitude other occupants received Injuries which varied from minor to critical.
reading of 900 feet In the EAL alphanumeric block on his radar (NTSB,
1973) display. The controller later testified that momentary deviations
In altitude Information on the radar display were not
The distraction shown in this accident report was an operational one.
Ironically, the distraction itself was not serious. The crew's mismanagement of the distraction caused it to be fatal.
Distractions can also come from outside the cockpit in the form of traffic, weather, unexpected rerouting, etc. The keys to dealing with distractions in order to avoid catastrophic consequences lie in the crew's ability to focus on aircraft control and hazard avoidance.
The crew should be prepared to avoid distractions. The captain can fly the aircraft and delegate tasks that might interfere. Or vice-versa. While the distraction in the L-1011 accident demanded immediate attention, it was the captain's responsibility to set priorities and to delegate responsibilities or make work assignments. Tragically, the entire crew became absorbed in the distraction at the expense of aircraft control.
There are two types of stress that can degrade flight performance. One type has been called background stress. Background stressors are chronic stress factors that are in the background of our everyday activities.
They include job stress, stress to maintain schedules, fatigue, family stress, and the
stresses imposed by organizational requirements. Sometimes no single source of stress may seem very serious, but the combined or cumulative effects of stressors can lead to degraded performance. In other instances, major life stressors such as divorce or death cf a loved one can have ill effects on one's performance. Counseling on coping skills has proven effective in controlling background stressors.
A second type of stress is acute stress.
Acute stress is the overload that occurs in a high intensity event, such as an unfamiliar flight irregularity. This type of stress occurs all at once, and the results can be catastrophic. Acute stress results in several negative consequences:
"Tunnel vision", or the restriction of attention to only part of a task
Rigidity of response, or maintaining a single course of action even though conditions have changed
A tendency to scan alternatives less effectively during decision making, and
"Ballistic" decision making; making decisions without thinking through the consequences of a decision.
The intense time pressure, unfamiliarity, and overload inherent in acute stress conditions result in a narrowed view. In turn, awareness is reduced regarding the hazards of the task, and the resources available to meet those hazards.
Chapter 3: Implementing CRM Training
Early versions of CRM training were largely attempts to adapt existing training materials that had been developed for other purposes, such as management training.
But it became clear that a more complete method was needed.
The Systems Approach to Training
The systems approach to training has been used successfully in a variety of settings, including the military, airlines, and other industries. While the systems approach to training exists in many forms, it generally provides guidelines for training in three steps: DEVELOPING the training, IMPLEMENTING the training, and EVALUATING the training.
It is not a rigid rule book but rather a general process for building training programs.
What follows is a simplified scheme for CRM training, using the systems approach.
STEP 1: Developing CRM Training
Training program development activities may be grouped in three areas: (1) Needs
Assessment; (2) Setting Performance
Objectives; and (3) Preparing a Training
1. Needs Assessment
The first step in the development of a successful CRM training program is to assess the organization's training needs.
There are many ways to assess training needs, including surveys, reviews of incidents, and studies by special advisory committees.
The scope of the needs assessment depends on the specific organization's size and
A comprehensive needs assessment can help an organization identify training needs most vital to its operations and to arrange other needs by priority.
An organization may not be entirely receptive to the new training that it needs.
One useful tool for assessing an organization's attitudes toward CRM training is the "Cockpit
Management Attitudes Questionnaire", developed by Helmreich (1984).
Appendix) This questionnaire can provide useful readings on embedded attitudes toward training.
Further, this type of measurement encourages people to get involved in the development of the training program.
Training needs exist on at least three levels: the individual, the group, and the organization.
We have mentioned the individual in focusing on the group.
But we have said little about the organization.
Management support is the organizational culture supportive of CRM essential to effective training?
Is management on board?
CRM training, program has to be supported from the top of the organization to the bottom.
Therefore, some training program may be needed for management.
Management training may consist of distributing materials on crew-related incidents; posting information on CRM successes such as the United Airlines flight
232 story; or running a seminar for management describing the nature and value of a CRM program.
In any case, it is essential to build management support early in program development.
To assist in the assessment of needs, a set of practical questions can be asked.
A variety of answers are appropriate.
The specific answers depend on the unique characteristics of the user organization.
However, there have been some valuablo general lessons learned from the CRM training programs that have been implemented at various airlines.
Some of these lessons follow.
Who should develop the training?
Various people can and
Co develop CRM training programs. Programs can be bought off the shelf or developed from scratch.
They can be
developed by outside consultants or by in-house experts. Some sort of compromise among these options often provides the best approach.
Two hints have proven helpful in CRM program development. First, there are excellent models of CRM training available, including programs developed by several airlines and by the military aviation community. And many publications are available covering lessons learned over the last decade on building a successful CRM training program.
Second, most organizations have found that a team approach is effective in developing a
CRM training program. Many organizations do not have training specialists on staff. In this case, the design and development team should include both outside training consultants and in-house representatives.
In-house representatives should comprise a wide array of managers, flightcrew, check airmen, and instructors. This team approach avoids the pitfall of having an outside expert design a program in isolation--a program that later proves not to fit an organization's needs. Perhaps even more important, this team approach ensures that flightcrews are involved in the CRM training program from the beginning--a critical factor in securing acceptance and commitment by users.
Who should be trained? The CRM concept has evolved from an initial narrow focus on the cockpit crew. It has broadened to include all other groups who interact with tha
training Is cw cockpit crew and who are involved in training, andmayinclude decisions that affect flight safety.
These all groups that work with groups include cabin crewmembers, air traffic the cockpit crew and are controllers, dispatchers, maintenance people, involved in decisions customer service agents, and even specialized that impact flight safety. crisis teams such as bomb threat and hijack teams. Although CRM training has focused primarily on cockpit crewmembers, some airlines have begun to develop CRM training programs that include flight attendants, dispatchers, and maintenance people.
Central to the CRM concept is that CRM training is for the whole crew, not just for the individual; that while individual excellence is always desirable, teamwork is
the focus; and that a good blend of resources is the best bet for a safe flight.
What should be trained? Early CRM training programs borrowed heavily from management training practices. Conveniently, management training had traditionally dealt with topics like teamwork and leadership. Management concepts were often applied broadly to the aircrew setting, with varying degrees of success. One characteristic of more recent
CRM training programs is a shift from broad concepts to specific aircrew skills and behaviors. While no set curriculum is necessarily appropriate for all airlines, the
CRM primary-level skills identified in Figure
4 provide one useful framework for CRM training. These primary-level skills can be used in developing performance objectives later in Step 2: Setting Performance objectives.
How should training be introduced?
Machiavelli wrote in The Prince that "There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes."
Resistance to change can take many forms, from passive disinterest to outright sabotage. (The term sabotage, in fact, stems from the French sabot or shoe, referring to the wooden shoes thrown by workers into
The goal of successful machinery to jam gears).
Because people tune implementation is that out what they are not motivated to hear, many the new training a training program has beeA scuttled because
"disappears" into the of a lack of user acceptance. This problem organization: It becomes is sometimes called lack of "buy-in" or an accepted and routine
"sign-up." part of the normal training program. Usually, introducing change in an organization invites problems; but not always. Sometimes the need for change is so glaringly obvious that buy-in is almost automatic.
In the early 1900s, for example, statisticians at American Telephone and
Telegraph identified two powerful growth trends: telephone use and population growth.
Projecting these trends, they forecast that
by 1920 every female in the United States would have to be employed as a switchboard operator in order to meet demand.
Within two years, AT&T had developed the automatic switchboard. Everyone from overworked switchboard operators to impatient telephone customers welcomed the new system. And today, of course, the automatic telephone switchboard is one of the key elements of our so-called information age.
The trends in crew-related airline accidents
(shown in Figure 3) are almost as obvious.
And the consensus within the airline community strongly favors CRM training. But a program known to be beneficial will not necessarily be accepted. Even the best of programs may fail if the introduction of the training program is managed poorly.
People often become accustomed to doing things in a certain way, and resistance to change is normal. But some steps can be taken to promote acceptance of "new" training. Those steps are covered later in this chapter under
Where should training take place? Initial
CRM training can take place in any setting that is conducive to learning. Many organizations hold initial training in off-site facilities in order to avoid disruptions. However, the location of initial CRM training is less important than the process of bringing crew members together.
CRM focuses on orew interaction. And CRM training is most effective in groups large enough to include entire crew units. Later phases of training are most effective when trainees are broken out into crew units and trained in simulators or other cockpit mock-ups.
How much training is required? Initial CRM
CRM training must
training can be accomplished in as little as integrated Into the total two or three days. But continual CRM training program. training should become part of the total training program. CRM skills should be considered a major element of the overall
skills package that produces safe flight.
CRM training never really ends. More on continual training follows in this chapter under "Preparing a Training Plan."
2. Setting Performance Objectives.
The next step in the development of a CRM training program is to set performance objectives. Performance objeotives are the desired outcomes of training.
Performance objectives the question, What will trainees be able to specify what Is do at the end of a training session that they learned, could not do before training?
Objectives must be simple. It must be clear if they have been met at the end of training. Usable performance objectives include the specific behaviors desired and standards for measuring satisfactory performance. A performance objective for classroom training might be:
Given a written scenario describing accident No. xxx, crewmembers will be able to state in writing at least three barriers to communication present in this situation.
By expressing objectives in this manner, those people designing the training program are forced to identify exactly what each lesson should accomplish. Later these performance objectives serve as guidelines for the evaluation of training. The basic
CRM skills were discussed in Chapter 2, CRM
Skills, and can be used to develop CRM performance objectives.
There are different types of learning objectives. Trainees may learn:
Intellectual skills, such as problem solving
Factual information (knowledge)
Therefore, any one tral ng session or training module may have a mix of training objectives.
CRM depends upon support from the entire organization, not just the aircrew. The phrase "organizational shell" has been coined to describe the organizational culture in which flight crews operate. One aviation psychologist writes:
Imagine, If you will, a beautifully designed and professionally executed CRM program that helps crew members learn and practice precisely the skills that they need to operate well as a team in a demanding flight environment. Now place that program in an organization where lines of flight are badly constructed and constantly changing at the last minute, crews are poorly composed and short-lived, norms of conduct reinforce individual order giving and taking rather than team-level planning, excellent crew performance goes wholly unrecognized, and crews often are unable to obtain information, technical assistance, or material resources when they need them to proceed with the work.
To complete a good CRM course in an organization that has... an unsupportive organizational context is like getting all dressed up for a dance and having the ;ar break down halfway there.
Cockpit resource management simply cannot take root and thrive unless organizational conditions
also foster and support effective teamwork. (Hackman, 1987, p. 37)
The point is well made that performance objectives must be set for the organization as well as the individual.
3. Preparing a Training Plan.
The third step in the development of CRM training is preparing a training plan. A training plan provides a complete description of a course of instruction including
A training plan provides sequenced lessons.
Lesson details provide a a blueprint for
CRM description of training objectives, content, training development, methods, training aids, and other elements required for instruction.
A sample of an abbreviated training plan is shown on the following page.
A training plan identifies training objectives, provides an outline of course content, specifies training methods, and even provides an estimate of the time required for each topic.
A variety of training methods may be chosen to present course content.
Since people learn in a variety of ways--by listening, by seeing, by discussing, and by doing--it follows that there are a number of training methods available. Training methods include lectures, training tapes, seminars,
SAMPLE LESSON PLAN
Session Title: Communication Skills
Given a written scenario describing incident No. XXX, the crewmembers are able to state In writing three barriers to communication present in this situation.
2. Crewmembers acknowledge communications from others during role-play.
3. Crewmembers use standard terminology throughout a LOFT simulation.
Training method Time
A. Barriers to effective aircrew communication
Videotape demonstration 10 minutes
Lecture with viewgraphs 20 minutes
Verbal and nonverbal communica- tion
IA. Giving and receiving Classroom demonstration
Lecture with viewgraphs 20 communications minutes
Using standard terminology Role-play communications 20
A. How to recognize ineffective Role-play exercise with self 30 communication skills in self and instructor critique. minutes and others demonstrations, role-playing, and simulation.
In general, it is preferable to use a variety of training methods in order to enhance learning and to sustain the trainees' interest.
Lesson developers may find the following points helpful. First, education specialists have identified nine critical instructional events that support learning:
1. Gain the trainee's attention.
2. Describe the objectives of training.
3. Stimulate recall of prerequisite skills.
4. Present content to be learned.
5. Provide guidance and support.
6. Elicit the performance.
7. Provide feedback.
8. Assess performance.
9. Enhance retention and transfer.
(from Gagne, Briggs, & Wager, 1988)
Second, research shows that people remember about 10% of what they hear, 30% of what they see, and 50% of what they see and hear.
What you hear
What you see
What you see and hear
It follows that the more of the trainee's senses are involved, the greater the learning experience.
(hearing, seeing and feeling) is better than watching a training tape. A training videotape with a soundtrack is better than a training audio tape alone.
Third, it is always desirable to mix instructional methods and actively involve the learner.
More than young people, adults are known to respond to training that can be readily applied in their work. Instruction should not be limited to lectures and training tapes, for example. Role-playing, workshops and other practical exercises that
involve the trainee promote the sense that the training is relevant and useful.
Finally, all effective traininig, including
CRM training, comprises three essential components:
2. Practice and Feedback
3. Operational Reinforcement
Indootrination/Awareness. Initial training is conducted in a classroom setting with the goal of laying a foundation for skills acquisition. One goal of training at this stage is to convince the crewmember that
Initial training focuses on he or she can benefit personally from CRM introducing CRM skills training. This goal can be met by reviewing and fostering awareness data on crew-related accidents, by describing of the need for CRM crew coordination problems, by viewing training, videotapes of good and poor crew performance, and by assessing personal interaction styles.
A second goal is to establish common concepts and terms for CRM. Discussions, demonstrations, and role-playing in the
CPR1 skills are commonly used methods.
Practice and Feedback. Following initial classroom instruction, trainees are given the opportunity to apply the newly acquired CRM skills. The primary emphasis of CRM training at this stage is
Changes in knowledge and attitudes sometimes
Learning new are sufficient to effect changes in skills performance, but not always. Something more requires active practice is usually required. Practicing skills and and feedback. receiving feedback on performance are proven to be effective in completing the learning of desired behaviors.
Effective practice may be achieved through high, medium, or low fidelity sa.mulations.
Realistic high fidelity simulations may be achieved through blending CRM training into
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT).
LOFT provides the ideal setting for skills practice, because it presents a full-crew, full-mission scenario in which CRM skills can be evaluated along with technical skills.
CRM practice may range from full-mission simulation to role-playing using cockpit procedures trainers (CPTs) or even cruder cockpit mock-ups.
Feedback on performance may also be provided by a number of means. Videotape provides a clear and vivid record of performance, and is widely used. Replay, fast forward, slow motion, and freeze frame are some of the valuable videotaping functions that can be used during debriefings.
Under the guidance of a skilled instructor, the crew's critique of its own performance during debriefing can effectively build CRM skills. Other feedback valuable to the individual comes from a pilot's fellow crewmembers. And often the most lasting benefit to the pilot comes from his own self-assessment.
Each of these assessments is vastly improved by the use of videotaping and other audio-visual aids.
3. Operational Reinforcement.
All of ur have hit ourselves on the finger with a hammer.
We experienced what is known as one-trial learning. We immediately grasped the concept of hammer/finger interaction, and probably vowed immediate]y never to do that again.
However, the term "one-trial learning" is actually misleading.
If we never practice even a simple skill like hammering, we are more likely to hit our fingers again.
Sustaining the sophisticated skills of crew coordination requires continual repetition and reinforcement.
Studies have shown that
Behavior that is not the initial benefits of CRM traininq rehearsed and reinforced decays overtime. dissipate within a relatively short period if training is not reinforced over time.
Thus, part of recurrent training.
Since people tend to forget both facts and skills uver time, continual training should include refresher seminars reinforced by practice and feedback exercises such as LOFT.
•rA.jnWWthod selection may vary according to the component. of
ClI training being taught.
The purpoue of the indoctrination/ awareness component of CRM training is to provide concepts and terms for crew coordination problems, and to address CRM skills. Indoctrination/awareness commonly begins in a classroom setting.
instruction include lectures, seminars and guided discussions.
The purpose of the practice and feedback component of CRM training is to apply newly acquired CRM skills. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on exercises, demonstrations, role-playing, and simulations. Trainees are given an opportunity to try out these behaviors and to receive feedback on their performanca.
The purpose of operational reinforcement is to prevent the loss of CRM skills once they are acquired. CRM training must be included as a regular part of the recurrent training requirement. Continued reinforcement of CRM skills will require a mix of training methods, including seminars, active practice, and feedback.
The mission of CRM training is to promote changes in behaviors related to crew coordination in order to prevent accidents.
The bottom line is crew performance.
Performance starts with awareness of appropriate knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors.
But awareness is not enough.
Like the athlete with great potential, crewmembers need an opportunity to hone their performance through realistic learning experiences. The practice and feedback component of CRM training meets this need.
The best training method known for CRM practice and feedback is simulated line
LOFT provides realistic, operations using flight simulators.
Line full-mission simulation to Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) is the best enhance skill transfer. known of these programs.
LOFT blended with
CRM training provides several advantages:
"* It embeds CRM into the total training program.
It provides a full mission scenario in which crews are evaluated for both CRM skills and traditional technical skills.
It allows crew training in a full crew context.
It invites the use of video recording and playback during debriefing, providing an excellent means of evaluating performance.
It is accepted by most crewmembers and provides an effective means of reinforcing
If LOFT is not available, CRM practice and feedback can be accomplished with lower-level simulations. Realistic demonstrations, problem-solving scenarios, and role-playing exercises, complemented by audiovisual aids, can provide an effective means of reinforcing
CRM skills. Keys to effective practice include direct learner involvement, hands-on training experience, and immediate feedback with the opportunity for further practice.
STEP 2: Implementing CRM Training
It ir important to develop an implementation plan early in the training development process. Determine who should be involved in the implementation; anticipate user reactions and consider ways to overcome possible negative responses; and develop a timetable for implementation.
Finally, introduce the training carefully and deliberately.
Some organizations have tried out new training programs on test groups, then asked for input.
They have then revised the programs before implementing them on a widespread basis.
Seek participation. When a change occurs in a corporate setting, it is crucial to encourage buy-in and discourage resistance.
In the extreme, resistance can become
Getting key personnel outright rejection, sometimes called the Not involved in the design
Invented Here syndrome. Not Invented Here is and development of CRM most likely when people do not feel involved.
training is one way to
Get as many key people as possible involved enhance commitment. in the development of the CRM training.
As early as possible sign up the. opinion leaders within your organization and any other significant group such as the pilots' association..
Seek their participation early, and maintain their involvement while the CRM element is worked into the total training proqram.
Demonstrate program support.
In 1961, a major American corporation established a school for managers to teach a new approach to company operations.
The new approach was
based on an innovative marketing philosophy centered on customer needs. After completing the course, 85% of the management trainees left the company within a short time.
The reason? The company had not changed, and management had retained its habitual way of doing things. In this case, the corporate culture did not support the very change that upper management had tried to introduce.
This example illustrates that all levels in an organization must be on-board or a new program may quickly die for lack of support.
Thus, it is critical that CRM program support be conspicuous from top management through to line operations.
Similarly, the support of the pilots' association can provide a valuable program endorsement.
Communicate. Commitment can't be assumed; it must be earned.
Therefore, it is vital to communicate the reasons for a CRM program.
People need to know what CRM is and what it isn't, what it can accomplish, and why CRM training is important.
Communication can be accomplished through meetings, seminars, newsletters, and posters.
The following is a useful guide to effective communications.
The Seven Cs of Effective Communication
"* Credibility: The messenger must be seen as credible and competent by the receiver.
Context: The message should be delivered in a context that is comfortable to the receiver and invites his participation.
"* The message must be relevant and important to the receiver.
Clarity: The message must be clear and must be delivereci in terms the receiver will understand.
Jargon is to be avoided.
Continuity and consistency:
The message should be reinfcrced often and should be :onsistent from all voices within the organization.
Channels of communication should be familiar and relevant to the receiver.
"• Capability: The message should be suited to the capabilities of the receiver.
The most valuable guidance comes from the student, not from the instructor.
Monitor program implementation through feedback from CRM trainees.
Be prepared tc address their concerns, and to revise the program as appropriate.
The Key Role of Chech Airmen and Instructors
The success of any CRM training program rests on the skills of the people who administer the training. Thus, it is vital that check airmen and instructors be carefully chosen.
Although check airmen and instructors are often chosen for their proficiency in technical matters, proficiency in teaching and evaluating CRM skills is an additional credential, not always easily earned.
Check airmen and instructors are especially
Check airmen and important for two reasons.
First, they are instructors must
directly responsible for instruction, highly skilled in all areas observation, feedback, and program of CRM performance. evaluation. Second, they are in a strategic position to "sell" CRM and are likely to be opinion leaders within the organization.
Because of their high profile, any attitude short of conspicuous support on their part can undermine the entire CRM program, which depends upon voluntary buy-in at every level of the organization.
There are at least three ways to encourage check airmen and instructors to support CRM and to become proficient in CRM skills. For one, they can be given CRM training before anyone else. For another, they can be given more training than anyone else. Finally, check airmen and instructors can be signed up for the CRM program at an early point.
They can then provide input into the development of the CRM program and develop a sense of ownership of it. That sense of ownership, in turn, sets an example and encourages buy-in by others.
STEP 3: Evaluating CRM Training
Ex-Mayor Koch of New York was known for asking "How am I doing?" as he strolled New
This habit was not only good for public relations, but it also provided Koch with immediate feedback on his performance.
There are several rnasons why the question
"How are we doing?" needs to be asked continually during CRM training:
" To determine if the training meets oLjectives. For example:
After completing the training module on
Effective Communications, are trainees actually communicating any better?
" To determine if results from courses meet overall program goals. For example:
After mastering the Communication lesson objectives for individuals, are grews communicating any better?
"" To provide feedback to trainees.
"" To provide feedback to instructors.
Preparations for training program (CRM) evaluaticn should be made during the training design phase, while training objectives are
The consideration of how being set.
Objectives should be clear and training will be evaluated measurable. Objectives that are vague or should begin in the eauly difficult to measure invite trouble in stages of training design. evaluating the success of the program.
A clear plan for program evaluation should be developed early in the training design process because evaluation activities should begin before training is implemented.
As mentioned earlier, it is likely that a variety of outcomes will come from training, including changes in knowledge, attitudes, and behavior. It is appropriate to use multiple measures of effectiveness in evaluating training. As an example, researchers at the Naval Training Systems
Center have adopted the following measures of effectiveness for a Navy aircrew coordiijatiotraining program:
Tvog of Evaluation
1. Aircrew coordination is critical to flight safety (agree/disagree).
2. List four barriers to effectibe communication in the cockpit.
Trainee Reaction 1. This training was relevant to my flight performance.
1. List four barriers to effective communication in the cockpit.
Performance 1. Crew requests clarification of garbled communication during simulated exercise.
Organizational Outcome 1. Data on incidents invu4ving crew coordination.
Adapted from Cannon-Bowers et al. (1989).
Pro-training asmessment is done before training begins. its purpose is to provide a pre-training baseline measure of skills and attitudes.
This pre-training baseline is used as a reference against which post-training improvements are measured.
Trainee reaction measurements can be taken to assess trainees' reactions regarding training program relevance, content, methods, or other features. "Tho Cockpit Management Attitudes
Questionnaire" is one evaluation tool that is used to assess pre-training and post-training attitudes toward crew coordinat
i on (See
Tracking various reactions to CRM training is valuable for several reasons. First, negative reactions signal a lack of acceptance by users.
But they often point to specific areas where small adjustments may
make a big difference immediately.
Second, positive reactions probably point the way to further program improvemeats.
Third, other groups:
to the training program may provide valuable cues for improve!ments; groups like flight attendants, agents, mechanics, and dispatchers.
And finally, reactions tracked over time can reveal much about changes within the corporation.
Learning is measured against learning objectives, which are just the flip-side of training objectives.
The most familiar kind of measuremsnt is probably the question and
Evaluation can be used answer test. Answers may be oral or written.
to assess reactions to As an example, one objective might be that training, learning, trainees be able to describe barriers to changes in performance, communication in the cockpit.
Measurement and the degree to which might take the form of a simple question organizational goals art-, requiring the trainee to describe four met. barriers.
Performance is measured against performance objectives.
Typically, instructors receive special training in conducting performance evaluations, and then observe and rate crew performance against performance ubjectiveF.
during simulation exercises.
Organizational outcome measures include comparisons of data on crew-related accidents. Although increased safety is a simple enough ideal, attaining a valid measure of the effect of CRM training on safety is very difficult.
One reason is that it is difficult to analyze events that seldom occur--aviation accidents.
Another reason is that it is often difficult to measure whether changes in the accident rate are related to
CRM traininc or to other events, such as equipment upgrades or industry-wide changes.
The difficulty in using such comparisons to measure training program effectiveness points to the need for multiple measures.
Using multiple measures of training effectiveness
Multiple measures of effectiveness are useful penrits a comprehensive in documenting program successes and and informative training shortfalla.
For example, trainees may fail evaluation, because they have not learned the skills, do not clearly understand CRM concepts,
fail to see the t~i•,iiing as neaningful or relevant..
Using multiple measures of a program'e effectivaness allows the evaluator to isolate specific areas for program improvement.
Finally, evaluation should not be punitive.
The purpose of CRM training evaluation is to measure program effectiveness and to provide specific guidance for improvements to the program. Training evaluation should not be used to assess an individual's fitness for duty.
CRM skills are crew skills.
CRM evaluation should focus on crew or team performance.
Individual crewmemoers should receive clear feedback on their own performances, but the emphasis should remain on crew performance.
A Final Note on CRM Training
Setting up a CRM training pzogram is not as difficult as it might seem to the CRM newcomer. Using a systems approach the process c~an be broken into three steps:
Development, Implementation, and Evaluation.
Each of these steps can be further broken down into manageable units such as Needs
Assessment, Setting Performance Objectives, and Preparing a Training Plan. And these units can be further broken down as necessary.
rurthermore, good CRM training can be accomplished with a conservative budget by blending it with existing training, using existing resources.
A well-conceived CRM training package can blernd nicely writh existing training and meet with little resistance. While the CRM element is perceived as new, it is often treated as
stand-alone training product.
Over time, as the blending becomes complete,
CRM should become indistinguishable from other training.
At that point it has become
"seamless", or "invisible" to the trainees, the most desirable state.
Airlines that do not yet have CRM programs are in the enviable position of beiag able to build on the lessons learned from more than a decade of CRM program development. There is now a wealth of materials available to support CRM program development. Each developing CRM program can be custom-fitted to the unique needs of the organization while
drawing on the abundant resources already available.
Chapter 4: Summary
Commercial aviation is one of the safest forms of transportation, with a safety record that is excellent by any standards.
The number of commercial jet aircraft in service worldwide has climbed steadily over the past three decades to a total of 9,530 in 1990, while annual departures have increased to
13,298,000 for 1990 (Boeing, 1991).
Remarkably, over this same period, the total accident rate has declined from over 60 accidents per million departures to about 2.5
-- less than one twenty-fourth the accident rate in 19591 (see Figure 1) This fortunate trend can be attributed to advances in equipment technology, to a high level of individual technical proficiency, and to improved operating procedures.
Despite the record, one challenge has not been met: Breakdowns in crew performance have remained the primary factor in commercial jet accidents. Two out of three accidents are attributable to flightcrew error.
In the early years, when equipment reliability was the biggest problem, the aviation community responded with ingenuity and resolve. Engines and other aircraft components became more reliable, and related accidents declined. Today, with crew performance the most significaat threat to aviation safety, the industry has responded with an ambitious program to support effective crew coordination and performance:
Crew Resource Management training.
One aviation observer has projected that this industry focus on crew performance has the potential to double system safety.
Data on the effectiveness of existing CRM programs indicate that this challenge is being met.
ACTIVE LISTENING: the skill of hearing and understanding other people and checking the accuracy of one's understanding by communicating with the sender.
ACTIVE LEARNING: physically performing the essential movements or a skill or displaying behavior that has been taught (as opposed to passive learning, or simply listening to instruction).
ATTITUDE: a way of thinking or feeling; a mental disposition towards. something that determines that person's response.
BEHAVIOR: a person's observable responses to a stimulus.
COMMUNICATION: the transfer of information and/or messages between or among people by the use of words, letters, symbols, or nonverbal communication.
COMI*UNICATIONS PROCESS AND DECISION BEHAVIOR SKILLS: a cluster of
behaviors related to effective communications and decision making.
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: the effective utilization of all available resources--hardware, software and personnel--to achieve safe, efficient flight operations.
DECISION-MAKING: the process of selecting a course of action from available options, based on information available at the time.
FEEDBACK: response messages which clarify and ensure that meaning is transferred.
INDOCTRINATION/AWARENESS: the first phase in CRM training, which provides a conceptual framework for other phases. It typically consists of classroom instruction focusing on identification of
CRM skills and concepts.
INQUIRY/ASSERTION: the skill of actively seeking out relevant information and showing a concern for both self and others' rights.
LEADERSHIP: the ability to utilize appropriate interpersonal skills to motivate, manage, and direct crew activities to achieve a task.
LINE-ORIENTED FLIGHT TRAINING (LOFT%: a full miision simulation presented in real-time which is usually videotaped for later crew self-critique.
NEEDS ASSESSMENT: the process of determining where training is needed in an organization, what a trainee must learn in order to perform their Job effectively, and who needs training.
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: the larger organizational environment in which the flightcrew operates.
Structure, standards, and reward policies are part of organizational culture.
Management or organizational support for CRM training is a critical component of effective program implementation.
PASSIVE LEARNING: training that does not actively engage the trainee in the instructional process; the trainee is expected to passively "absorb" inetructional material.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVESt statements which describe the desired outcomes of training in specific, behavioral terms.
PLANNIWG: the ability to establish an appropriate course of action for self and others to accomplish a specific goal.
PRACTICE AND FEEDBACK: the second phase of CRM training, in which participants actively employ newly acquired CRM skills and receive feadback on their effectiveness.
REINFORCEMENT: the final phase of CRM training.
This phase is ongoing and involves ensuring that CRM becomes an inseparable part of the organization's culture by garnering top management support, identifying and reinforcing effective behavior in normal line operations, and instituting CRM training as a regular part of the recurrent training requirement.
ROLE-PLAYING: a training technique in which trainees are told to imagine themselves in the situations presented by the trainer.
Trainees are free to act out different behaviors and reactions as long as they stay "in role" throughout the session.
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: an active awareness of internal and external conditions that affect flight safety.
It includes a realization of current, past and future contingencies that may affect flight performance.
STRESS MANAGEMENT: any of a variety of techniques, methods, or general strategies which have been developed to help people cope with the adverse consequences of stress.
SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TRAINING: a systematic approach to training development which provides guidelines for training design, development of instructional activities, implementation, and evaluation of training.
TEAM BUILDING AND MAINTENANCE SKILLS: a cluster of CRM skills focusing on interpersonal relationships and effective team practices.
TEAM MANAGEMENT: command and leadership by the captain and supportive behavior by crewmembers.
TEAM REVIEW: skills involved in pro-mission planning and analysis, ongoing synthesis and evaluation of information, and post-mission debriefing.
TRAINING PLAN: an outline of what will take place during a training session, including training objectives, content, training methods, and training media.
USER ACCEPTANCE: the extent to which a training program is accepted and endorsed by users.
WORKLOAD MANAGEMENT AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS SKILLS: a cluster of CRM skills which reflect the extent to which crewmembers maintain awareness of the operational environment; anticipate contingencies; and plan and allocate activities that manage stress and workload.
The following references include documents cited in the text, plus other relevant articles and documents of general interest.
Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (1991).
Statistical sumiiary of commercial jet aircraft accidents, worldwide oDertions,
1259-1%9Q. Seattle, WA: Product Safety Organization, Boeing.
Billings, C. E.,
& Reynard, W. D. (1981).
Dimensions of the information transfer problem. In C.E. Billings & E.S.
Cheaney (Eds.), Information transfer problems in the aviation system (NASA Technical Paper No. 1875). Moffett
Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
Caunon-Bowers, J. A.,
Prince, C., Salas, E., Owens, J.
Morgan, B. B., & Gonos, G. H. (1989, November).
Datrmining aircrew coordination training effectiveness. Paper presented at the l1th annual meeting of the Interservice/Industry
Training Systems Conference, Ft. Worth, TX.
Foushee, H. C.
(1984). Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: Factors affecting group process and aircrew performance.
Psvchologist, 39, 885-893.
Foushee, H. C. (1982). The role of communications, socio-psychological, and personality factors in the maintenance of crew coordination. Ay.iation. Space. and
Environmental Medicine, 53, 1062-1066.
Foushee, H. C.,
& Manos, K. L. (1981). Information transfer within the cockpit: Problems in intracockpit communications.
In C. E. Billings & E. S. Cheaney (Eds.),
transfer problems in the aviation system (NASA TP-1875).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
Gagne, R. M., Briggs, L. J., & Wager, W. W. (1988).
Principles of instructional desian. New York: Holt.
Hackman, J. R. (1987).
Organizational influences. In H. W. Orlady
& H. C. Fousbee (Eds.), Cockpit resource management training: Proceedings of the NASA/MAC workshog (MSA
CP-2455) (pp. 23-39). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research
Helmreich, R. L. (1984).
Cockpit management attitudes.
Factors, 26, 583-589.
Helmreich, R. L., Chidester, T. R., Foushee, H. C., Gregorich,
S., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1989). How effective is cockpit resource management training? Issues in evaluating the impact of programs to enhance crew coordination (NASA/UT
Technical Report 89-2).
Helmreich, R. L., Chidester, T. R., Foushee, H. C., Gregorich, S.
E., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1989).
Critical issues in implementing and reinforcing cockpit resource management training
(NASA/UT Technical Report 89-5).
International Civil Aviation Organization (1984).
A prevention manual (1st. Ed.).
ICAO Doc 9422-AN/923.
Jensen, R. S. (1989). Aeronautical decision making-___cp it respurce management (DOT/FAA/PM-86/46).
Systems Control Technology.
Kelley, W. (1991).
Safety tips from the pros. Aviation Safety,
Lauber, J. K. (1984). Resource management in the cockpit.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1973).
Aircraft accident report:
Airlines. Inc. L-1011. N310EA Miami Florida
National Transportation Safety Board. (1979).
Aircraft accident report: United Airlines Flight 173. DC-8-61. N8082U
National Transportation Safety Board. (1984).
"report: Air Illinois HawkQe Siddley HS 748-2A. N748LL
(NTSB/AAr-84/10). Washington, DC.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1989).
Aircraft accident report: United Airlines B-737-200 structitral failure
(NTSB/AAR-89/03). Washington, DC.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1990a).
Aircraft accident report: United Airlines DC-10-10 engine explosion and landing at Sioux City Iowa (NTSB/AAR-90/06).
National Transportation Safety Board. (1990b).
Aircraft accident reoort: United Airlines B-747-122 cargo door failure and explosive decompression (NTSB/AAR-90/01).
Predmore, S. C. (1991). Xicrocoding of communications in accident analyse*: Crew coordination in United 811 and United 232. In
R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedings of the sixth annual international symposium on aviation Rsycholoav. Columbus,
OH: Ohio State University.
Ruffell Smith, H. P. (1979).
A simulator study of the interaction of pilot workload with errors. vigilance, and decisions
(NASA Technical Memorandum 78482). Moffett Field, CA:
NASA-Ames Research Center.
Books and Conference Proceedings
Cooper, G. E., White, M. D., & Laube.:, J. K. (Eds.). (1979).
Resource management on the flig deck (NASA Conference
Publication 2120). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research
Jensen, R. S. (Ed.).
(1987). Proceedings of the fourth annual international sympos.ium on aviation Rsychology. Columbus,
OH: Ohio State University.
Jensen, R. S. (Ed.).
(1989). Proceedings of the fifth anIual international svrmosium on aviation DsychologV. Columbus,
OH: Ohio State University.
Jensen, R. S. (Ed.).
(1991). Proceedings of the sixth annual international symposium on aviation Dsvchology. Columbus,
OH: Ohio State University.
Komich, J. N. (1985'.
An analysis of the dearth of assertiveness by subordinate crewmembers.
In R. S. Jensen and J. Adrion
(Eds.), Proceedings of the third symposium on aviation psychology (pp. 431-436).
Ohio State University, Columbus,
Orlady, H. W.,
& Foushee, H. C. (Eds.).
(1987). Cockpit resource management training (NASA Conference Publication 2455).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
Wiener, E. L., & Nagel, D. C. (Eds.). (1988).
Human factors in aviation. San Diego: Academic Press.
CRM Tr -ninc
Bruce, K. D., & Jensen, D. (1986). Cockpit management training at
"Žople Express. In Orlady, H.
& Foushee, H. C. (Eds.).
Lockit resource managementot_raining (NASA Conference
Publication 2455). Moffett Fiell, CA: NASA-Ames Research
& Morgan, A. (1986). Crew coordination concepts:
Continental Airlines CRM training. In Orlady,
Foushee, H. C. (Eds.).
C_,ckpit resource management training
(NASA Conference Publication 245!). Hoffett Field, CA:
NASA-Ames Research Center.
(1986). Introduction tc Trans Australia Airlines CRM training. In Orlady, H. W.,
& Foushee, H. C. (Eds.).
Cockpit resource management traininjg (NASA Conference
Publication 2455). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research
Scott-Milligan, F., & Wyness, B. (1986). CRM training and human factors training: what Air New Zealand is doing about it.
Orlady, H. W.,
& Foushee, H. C. (Eds.), CockDit resource management training (NASA Conference Publication 2455).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
(1986). Cockpit resource management at USAir. In
Orlady, H. W., & Foushee, H. C. (Eds.), Cockpit resource mnagement training (NASA Conference Publication 2455).
Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
Vandermark, M. J. (1989). A comprehensive crew management program for the America West Airlines pilots and attendants. In R.
S. Jensen (Ed.), Progeedings of The Fifth Annual Symposium on
Aviation Psychology (pp. 640-645). Columbus, OH: Ohio
Wilkinson, D. (1989). Cockpit resource management training - The
Qantas experience. In R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Proceedinas of The
Fifth Annual SVmposium on Aviation Psychology (pp. 456-461).
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University.
WiDson, T. (1989). Aircrew team management - The Australian experience. In R. S. Jensen (Ed.), Procedinas of The Fifth
Annual Symposium on Aviation
PsycijpL:y (pp. 4o2-467).
Columbus, OH: Ohio State University.
Yocum, M., & Monan, W. (1986). CRM training in corporate/regio,'.l
operations (Group V). In Orlady, H. W., & Fcushce, H. C.
(Eds.), gockpit resource management training (NASA
Conference Publication 2455). Moffett Fiold, CA: NASA-Ames
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project