A National Approach to Closed Circuit Television

A National Approach to Closed Circuit Television
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A National Approach to Closed
Circuit Television
National Code of Practice for CCTV
Systems for Mass Passenger Transport
for Counter-Terrorism
Agreed by the Transport and Infrastructure Senior Officials
Committee
March 2012
CCTV Rewrite Working Group (2011-2012)
The original edition of the National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass
Passenger Transport Sector for Counter-Terrorism (the Code) was published on 14 July
2006. The Code was reviewed in 2010-20111. The Review recommended that:
•
Governments agree to develop a revised version of the Code, under the Standing
Committee on Transport (SCOT) leadership and in consultation with the
National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), that includes the proposed
changes identified in this Review.
•
Governments agree to inform the NCTC CCTV Working Group of the findings
from this Review, including the development of a national approach to the use of
CCTV for counter-terrorism.
These recommendations and the proposed changes identified in the Review are reflected
in this updated version of the Code. The March 2012 version of the Code supersedes
the 14 July 2006 version.
All Australian Governments were represented or had input into the review and
subsequent rewrite working groups through the lead agencies listed below.
Commonwealth
Department of Infrastructure & Transport
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
Australian Customs & Border Protection Services
Australian Federal Police
New South Wales
Transport for NSW
New South Wales Police Force
RailCorp
Victoria
Department of Transport
Victoria Police
Queensland
Department of Transport & Main Roads
1
SCOT Security SSC, March 2011. CCTV Code of Practice’ Review 2010-11: Monitoring and Review of
the Code.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Western Australia
Public Transport Authority
South Australia
Department of Planning, Transport& Infrastructure
South Australia Police
Tasmania
Department of Infrastructure
Northern Territory
Northern Territory Transport Group, Department of Lands & Planning
Australian Capital Territory
Justice & Community Safety Directorate
Local Government
Australian Local Government Association
In addition, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) was consulted
regarding law enforcement and evidentiary elements. National ICT Australia Ltd
(NICTA) provided advice on technological advances and trends in relation to CCTV.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Important Terms
ALGA
Australian Local Government Association
ASIO
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ATC
Australian Transport Council (now redundant – replaced by
SCOTI)
CCTV
Closed-circuit television
COAG
Council of Australian Governments
CT
Counter-terrorism
DOT
Department of Transport
IGA
Intergovernmental Agreement on Surface Transport Security
Interoperability
The ability of CCTV system components to operate together on
the same network and the ability to share video between
networks or jurisdictions.
IPP
Information Privacy Principle
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
NCTC
National Counter-Terrorism Committee
NICTA
National ICT (Information & Communications Technology)
Australia
NIFS
National Institute of Forensic Science
NSTSS
National Surface Transport Security Strategy
OTS
Office of Transport Security
PIA
Privacy Impact Analysis
PIC
Privacy Impact Checklist
SCOT
Standing Committee on Transport (now redundant – replaced by
TISOC)
SCOTI
Standing Council on Transport & Infrastructure (replaced ATC)
SISTO
Security-identified surface transport operations
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Security SSC
Security Standing Sub-Committee (now redundant – replaced by
TSC)
TSC
Transport Security Committee (replaced Security SSC)
TISOC
Transport & Infrastructure Senior Officials Committee (replaced
SCOT)
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Contents
CCTV Rewrite Working Group (2011-2012)
2
Important Terms
4
Part A
Introduction and Context
9
Section 1
A National Approach
10
1.1
Introduction
10
1.2
A Risk-based Approach
10
1.3
Security Context
11
1.4
Related Information Technology Issues
14
1.5
Broad Contextual Considerations
14
Outline of the National Code
15
2.1
Background
15
2.2
Objective
16
2.3
Code Framework
17
2.4
Planning
17
2.5
Wider Application of the Code
19
2.6
Jurisdiction Policy Relevant to the Code
19
Part B
Performance Guidance
20
Section 3
Guidelines for CCTV Systems and Technology for
Counter-Terrorism Purposes
21
3.1
Forms and Uses of CCTV Systems
21
3.2
System Components
21
3.3
System Monitoring
22
3.4
CCTV for Counter-Terrorism Purposes
22
Section 2
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Section 4
Recommended CCTV System Guidelines to meet
Operational Objectives
24
4.1
Applying the Code
24
4.2
Determining the Transport Security Priority
25
4.3
Determining Operational Objectives
26
4.4
CCTV System Performance Criteria
26
Part C
Legal and Procedural Aspects
37
Section 5
Legal Issues and Accountability
38
5.1
Purpose of this Section
38
5.2
Legal Context
38
5.3
Onus on Owner/Operators to Report Incidents and Suspicious
Activity to Assist Counter-Terrorism
39
5.4
Privacy
40
5.5
Compliance with Privacy Principles
40
5.6
Evidence-Handling Procedures
41
5.7
Jurisdictional Capabilities for Reviewing Mass CCTV Product 43
5.8
Registers of CCTV Systems
43
5.9
Related Legislation and Standards
43
5.10
Safety in Design
44
5.11
Legal Advice
45
Monitoring and Review of the Code
46
Review
46
Part D
Appendixes
47
Appendix A
Technical Acronyms
48
Appendix B
New Technologies
50
Appendix C
Bibliography
56
Section 6
6.1
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Appendix D
Appendix E
Appendix F
Recommended Security Functions, Operational
Objectives and Transport Security Priorities
59
Recommended CCTV Performance and Storage
Criteria
66
Code Background, Objectives, Development and
Application
71
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Part A
Introduction and Context
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Section 1
A National Approach
1.1 Introduction
The Code has been developed by Australian Governments as a guide to future
investments in CCTV. It is not mandatory.
The Code is not designed as a uniform, ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescription or specification.
It supplements other guidance material, the application of which is determined by each
jurisdiction’s transport security risk assessments and legislation.
For more localised advice, those in the transport sector (‘owner/operators’) who plan to
install or upgrade CCTV systems should engage in the first instance with their
respective jurisdiction transport security regulatory authority, then with lawenforcement authorities and other stakeholders. Being key agencies in transport
security and counter-terrorism, their input in planning and execution is essential.
1.2 A Risk-based Approach
The Code provides a voluntary, risk-based approach to planning and implementing
CCTV and allows each jurisdiction to determine and apply its own CCTV requirements
for counter-terrorism purposes, taking into account its own priorities for the application
of resources to wider counter-terrorism initiatives. How these elements are balanced
will depend on perceived risk within the particular operating environment and be
informed by existing counter-terrorism arrangements, plans and capabilities specific to
each jurisdiction. This is essential, because transport systems are large and complex—
no single, universal standard of CCTV implementation would be rational or affordable.
In doing so, the Code defines core performance criteria for four operational objectives
(‘monitor’, ‘detect’, ‘recognise’, ‘identify’) across three priority-graded ‘transport
security priority areas’ for upgrades and enhancement of CCTV systems. Determining
the priority grading (‘Priority 1’, ‘Priority 2’, ‘Priority 3’) is risk-based. Priority would
typically be assigned on the basis of the assessed vulnerability of people within the
system, more than critical assets. In this way, the application of the Code will not only
provide an effective counter-terrorism tool, primarily in response to a terrorist incident,
but should also improve the general security of mass passenger transport.
To conform to good risk management practice, owner/operators should conform with
the relevant standard, AS/NZS ISO 31000—2009: Risk Management—Principles and
Guidelines and other handbooks (refer to Appendix C—Bibliography).
One critical element of an effective risk assessment is defining the current internal and
external context, which characterises internal circumstances that have a security bearing
and the nature of the security environment itself. Context statements may be subject to
rapid and unexpected change due to variations in the international and national security
environments. Seeking current information is critical to the formulation of a credible
risk assessment, which in turn is a critical element of a defensible business case for
recommended security risk treatments, including CCTV.
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The following is an example of a high-level context statement.
Transport systems continue to be attractive targets for terrorists seeking to
inflict mass casualties, economic damage, instil fear and create spectacular
media imagery. Transport systems are inherently vulnerable to terrorist attack,
as they are open systems that gather large numbers of people at predictable
times in predictable places.
Transport security encompasses aviation, air cargo supply chain, maritime
(including offshore oil and gas) and mass passenger transport systems such as
road, rail, trams and ferries. Transport security is a common usage term that
belies the complexity of roles, responsibilities and relationships in the aviation,
air cargo supply chain, maritime and mass transit sectors. Industry is at the core
of these sectors. Clustering around industry, in a multi-agency and multijurisdictional domain, are border security, regulatory, law enforcement and
intelligence agencies from the Commonwealth and States and Territories2.
This generic statement would require further localised detail. Of relevance to CCTV,
this might include considerations relevant to the attack planning and surveillance modus
operandi of terrorists, as well as post-attack evidentiary requirements.
Organisations undertaking risk assessments may seek current information on broad
terrorist threat from the Office of Transport Security and State and Territory Police
counter-terrorism units for more localised threat information. Owner/operators are also
advised to seek information and guidance throughout their CCTV implementation
planning from their jurisdiction transport security regulatory authority.
1.3 Security Context
The threat of terrorism in Australia is real and enduring. It has become a persistent and
permanent feature of Australia’s security environment. The terrorist threat from people
born or raised in Australia, who have become influenced by the violent jihadist
message, has increased in recent times. A number of Australians are known to subscribe
to this message, some of whom might be prepared to engage in violence. Many of these
individuals were born in Australia and they come from a wide range of ethnic
backgrounds. The pool of those committed to violent extremism in Australia is not static
—over time some move away from extremism while others become extreme.
These terrorists share ideology and broad strategic objectives with transnational cells,
but add a different element of complexity to security considerations as a result of their
local knowledge and community connections.
Counter-terrorism operations in Australia have resulted in a number of people being
prosecuted and convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. From 2001 to
2010, four mass casualty attacks within Australia were disrupted only because of the
work of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Australians and Australian interests
2
Commonwealth Department of Infrastructure and Transport. Viewed on 4 November 2011 at
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/index.aspx
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have been attacked overseas (including the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, and the 2004
and 2007 attacks against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta).
In the Australian context, a terrorist attack could be conducted by a transnational
terrorist cell, local extremists acting independently, or a collaborative effort between the
two. The September 2001 attacks against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in
the United States were carried out by a transnational terrorist cell, directly linked to alQa’ida. In European locations such as London, Frankfurt, Copenhagen and Stockholm,
domestically based groups or individuals have planned or undertaken attacks inspired
by the ideology and activities of al-Qa’ida.
1.3.1 Terrorist Threat to Mass Passenger Transport Operations
In selecting a target for attack, terrorists may focus on symbolic and iconic locations,
and causing mass casualties or economic damage. Other objectives include the desire to
make a symbolic statement that resonates with extremists and the target population, and
generates public anxiety and spectacular media imagery.
Terrorists are inventive, their tactics and targets evolve, and they take account of
vulnerabilities, opportunity and likelihood of success when selecting targets and attack
methods.
Mass passenger transport operations fulfil many terrorist targeting criteria. Public
transport concentrates people in large numbers, in accessible places, at regular and
predictable times. These characteristics apply to bus, rail, ferry and intermodal
operations. An attack against transport operations, particularly during peak times, could
achieve terrorist objectives by causing mass casualties and economic damage, as well as
generating widespread media interest and imagery.
Despite mitigation measures put in place to strengthen the security of the sector, mass
transport operations are likely to remain a preferred target for terrorist groups. As well
as meeting terrorist strategic objectives, mass passenger transport operations are, by
their nature, open to the public, allowing terrorists to access a potential target as a
member of the travelling public, to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance and attack
planning, and to execute the attack.
1.3.2 Terrorist Intelligence and Attack-planning Activities
Terrorist planners can conduct extensive research as part of their target selection. This
can involve obtaining photographs, plans and maps, undertaking physical or video
reconnaissance, testing security countermeasures, conducting attack ‘dry runs’ and
planning escape routes.
•
The 7 July 2005 London bombers used dry runs to simulate an attack, to expose
strengths and weaknesses in their planning, and to tailor their plan to the
operating environment.
Terrorist attack planning can be difficult to detect as activities may occur out of
sequence, take place over varying timescales and be compartmentalised. However,
terrorists require information to conduct their operations—representing to varying
degrees, an intelligence capability within each terrorist group or cell, which is designed
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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to support their attack-planning activities, target-assessment and related missions. The
presumption that terrorist organisations undertake surveillance and reconnaissance—
supported by research and other activities—to support this intelligence mission is based
on reporting of its use in actual attack-planning, alongside its existence in written
training material and doctrine devoted to instructing terrorist personnel in how to
conduct terrorist intelligence activities.
It is this process involving reconnaissance around and surveillance of or inside their
potential targets that, when observed, provide indicators of attack planning and other
terrorist activities. The process by which a terrorist collects information on a potential
target is matched, ideally, by a counter-process in which the defender (or counterterrorist) attempts to degrade the terrorist’s intelligence picture of their target; at the
same time, the counter-terrorist attempts to learn everything that they can about the
terrorist—their identity, capability and intentions. Overall, the terrorist’s intelligencecollection task can be encapsulated in the term “intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance” —or ISR; it therefore follows that a key task for the counter-terrorist is
undermining terrorist ISR—or counter-ISR.
The ability to counter terrorist ISR is premised upon the detection and resolution of
apparently suspicious activities that may indicate terrorist ISR. The detection and
interdiction of terrorist ISR may be relatively easy around hardened targets with strong,
obstructive protective security regimes. But it is an entirely different challenge around
large, complex infrastructures such as public transport, whose open nature contributes to
their vulnerability to attack. It is for this reason that the preventive security measures
and mechanisms instituted within and around these environments must—by the very
nature of the business these infrastructures support—be far less obstructive or intrusive
than may be desired solely from a protective security perspective. Therefore, preventive
security in such open environments must be intelligence-led, and rely heavily on human
factors to support the detection and resolution of suspicious activities, in combination
with other security measures such as CCTV.
1.3.3 The Role of CCTV
In the context of preventative security, CCTV’s utility extends beyond the traditional
post-evidentiary purposes. CCTV plays a central role in countering terrorist ISR, both
actively and passively. In terms of the former, it provides the best live portal into the
transport environment from a single terminal, and can be used most effectively in
identifying suspicious activities as a trigger for follow-up investigation and resolution;
in its most advanced form, it is not only used proactively – to identify suspicious
activities as they occur (as opposed to forensically or reactively once an incident or
activity has already occurred and is being investigated)—but also serves as a potent tool
to deter or shape the terrorist’s activities. In terms of the latter, its placement and
presence serves as a passive dissuader to terrorists conducting ISR and attack
planning—in case after case, terrorists have identified CCTV as something that they
both do not like and wish to avoid, highlighting its positioning (and even capabilities
where known) in their intelligence reports and target-folders. For these reasons, CCTV
—and its sophisticated use—is central to any preventive security regime, especially one
predicated on the human factors necessary to detect and resolve suspicious activities.
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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In the Australian transport sector, overall, CCTV is heavily observed but largely triggerdriven—in other words, being used to respond to on-going or completed incidents,
rather than used proactively to identify suspicious activities and behaviours, essential
for counter-ISR. This would appear to be down to a combination of limited staff
resources to monitor CCTV cameras—especially in the larger control rooms—
limitations in the training of CCTV operators, very limited take-up of `smart’ software
to increase the efficacy of CCTV, and, in some cases, the failure of organisations to
appreciate the possibilities that CCTV presents for preventive security that goes beyond
a reactive or forensic use.
As with other security measures, the extent to which CCTV is applied needs to be
proportionate to the risk. Security elements such as active monitoring and use of `smart’
software can be scaled up or down as the risk changes.
1.4 Related Information Technology Issues
In addition to the above context, agencies and owner/operators should be aware of the
degree to which information systems (including in the transport sector) are open to
abuse. This has implications in counter-terrorism. Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA), as well as CCTV data communications, are more frequently
occurring over non-dedicated IP networks, which may be more vulnerable to attack than
dedicated or ‘air-gapped’ networks.
1.5 Broad Contextual Considerations
1.5.1
Pace of Change
Although in very broad terms the modus operandi of terrorists is not changing rapidly, it
is important for jurisdictions and owner/operators to be aware of the rate of
technological change in CCTV and related applications, including resolution,
communications, software and storage. Owner/operators and jurisdictions need to
ensure that strategic purpose drives CCTV implementation, not, as can be the case, the
attractiveness of an emerging technology.
Furthermore, as elements of security design are being impacted by rapid technological
change, the place of CCTV in the mix of counter-terrorism and broad security measures
will change. The role and capability of the best-planned CCTV system will be
superseded in time.
For these reasons, owner/operators and jurisdictions need to keep their CCTV measures
under review, to ensure that the impact of changes in the security and technological
contexts are properly informing their understanding of risk and, in turn, are being
reflected in the purpose and the nature of their systems.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Section 2
Outline of the National Code
2.1 Background
Australia’s national mass passenger transport security arrangements are primarily
framed by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Surface Transport Security (the IGA),
signed by the Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments in 2005, which
aims to implement nationally-consistent protective security planning and preventive
measures in the surface transport system. Under the agreement, the States and
Territories aim to ensure that appropriate action is taken by security identified surface
transport operators within their jurisdictions with respect to surface transport security.
The Commonwealth Government regulates security for aviation, ports and shipping
consistent with international agreements. State and Territory Governments regulate
security in other transport sectors, in particular mass transport, including road, rail and
ferry.
Consistent with the IGA, the National Surface Transport Security Strategy (the NSTSS)
provides a framework for Australian Governments to work collaboratively to improve
security capabilities and resilience across surface transport sectors, including mass
passenger transport. In recent years, all Australian Governments have invested heavily
in additional security measures and capabilities for the mass passenger transport sectors,
including in CCTV. It is accepted that collaboration between jurisdictions (and between
agencies and operators) can play a critical part in better security outcomes in general.
This extends to the planning, design and operation of CCTV systems.
The significant role of CCTV in investigations of past major terrorist attacks has
highlighted CCTV as an important element of counter-terrorism strategies and
arrangements. Although the transport sector has made significant investment in CCTV,
such systems have generally been designed and used to assist transport operational
outcomes and passenger safety. Accordingly, such systems have widely varying levels
of coverage, resolution, capability, technical quality and accessibility, which may not be
suitable for counter-terrorism purposes.
In September 2005, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Special Meeting
on Counter-Terrorism agreed to the development of ‘a national, risk-based approach to
enhancing the use of closed-circuit television for counter-terrorism purposes’, including
the development of this Code for the mass passenger transport sector. The Code was
designed to allow each jurisdiction to determine its own CCTV requirements ‘having
regard to the use of CCTV for local counter-terrorism purposes’ Drafting of the Code
was informed by expertise regarding technological aspects of CCTV systems and other
critical elements such as law enforcement, counter-terrorism, mass passenger transport,
and legal and legislative considerations.
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Ongoing management of the Code is the responsibility of the then-Australian Transport
Council (ATC)3 in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee
(NCTC).
In accordance with the ‘Review’ provisions of the Code, in February 2011, the thenStanding Committee on Transport (SCOT) Security Standing Sub-Committee (SSC)4
completed a Review of the Code, which was led by Victoria (Department of Transport)
with membership from jurisdictions and appropriate agencies. As with the Code itself,
the Review was directed to jurisdictions with the responsibility for developing and
implementing CCTV system projects for the mass passenger transport sector.
The Review concluded that the Code was functional and that it should be revised to
reflect a range of recommended amendments. In March 2011, SCOT endorsed the
Review Group’s recommendation that Governments agree to develop a revised version
of the Code, under SCOT leadership and in consultation with the NCTC, which includes
the proposed changes identified in the Review, in particular regarding:
•
•
•
•
The impact of new technologies and applications of CCTV systems for security
purposes
Changing terrorism risks [as they relate to CCTV]
The effectiveness of application and utility of the Code in guiding CCTV systems
implementation and
Legal and privacy aspects.
2.2 Objective
The objective of the Code is to define a nationally-consistent framework to enhance the
capacity of CCTV in Australian mass passenger transport systems to contribute to
counter-terrorism outcomes. In doing so, the Code provides owner/operators (which
may include security-identified transport operators and security-regulated transport
areas and government agencies) with a non-mandatory functional standard and set of
performance criteria regarding risk-based implementation of CCTV in the counterterrorism context.
The Code provides a framework by which CCTV product of an appropriate functional
standard and value is readily available to, and usable by, law enforcement, national
security and other relevant agencies, specifically for counter-terrorism purposes.
Although video analytics that enable automated surveillance and pre-event response
continue to evolve, CCTV in the counter-terrorism context largely continues to be a
post-event analysis and response tool. Law enforcement and national security
requirements in relation to CCTV coverage following an event will necessarily be
rigorous. For this reason, forensic and evidentiary requirements should always be key
considerations for owner/operators in planning for new or upgrading CCTV systems.
3
SCOT is now known as TISOC (Transport & Infrastructure Senior Officials Committee) and the ATC
as SCOTI (Standing Council on Transport & Infrastructure). The Security Standing Sub-Committee is
now known as the TSC (Transport Security Committee).
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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The Code reflects current and anticipated counter-terrorism priorities regarding
preparedness, prevention, response, investigation and recovery, in line with the National
Counter-Terrorism Plan. It also reflects NCTC priorities regarding the use of CCTV
data for evidentiary purposes.
2.3 Code Framework
The Code outlines levels of CCTV system performance that correlate with the security
and operational profile of particular transport services. The methodology retains
flexibility and avoids arbitrarily defining innumerable combinations of individual
standards to meet all possible circumstances or technologies. Appendix A defines
technical acronyms used in this document. Appendix B includes information on
emerging CCTV technologies. Appendix C lists relevant technical standards that
should generally be applied to CCTV systems, where appropriate.
The Code recommends some broad standards for security-identified transport operators
and security-regulated transport areas where their risk assessments determine them to be
appropriate. Section 4 and Appendixes D and E provide further details.
Also, where appropriate, the Code offers performance criteria for CCTV for the routine
monitoring of identified ‘at-risk’ environments, for the resolution of suspicious activity
and actual incidents, and for investigation purposes, while ensuring the fulfilment of
privacy obligations.
Key to the effectiveness of the framework defined in the Code, owner/operators of
CCTV systems need to be familiar with their environments and fully cognisant of the
system specifications and operating procedures applicable in their particular situations.
They need also to be aware of the range of legal obligations that relate to CCTV and
surveillance in general. The Code provides guidance on these elements.
The use of CCTV technology for counter-terrorism purposes must balance the security
benefits against the Australian community’s expectations of privacy and civil liberties.
Appropriate legal and legislative arrangements are necessary to ensure that CCTV can
be used to help protect the community, while maintaining appropriate safeguards
against abuse and unnecessary erosion of privacy. Section 5 addresses legal issues and
accountability. Section 6 outlines ongoing management of the Code.
2.4 Planning
Effective planning is the obligation of the owner/operator and is essential in design and
implementation.
CCTV and the associated analytics are evolving rapidly in sophistication and
application. A properly informed (evidence-based) definition of purpose is critical in
planning an effective, ‘fit-for-purpose’ CCTV system or upgrade. Purpose in turn needs
to be informed by detailed familiarity with the relevant elements of the internal and
external operational and security contexts.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Early in planning, owner/operators need to engage with the relevant transport security
regulatory authority and inform themselves of all security policy and other
considerations (legal) to their CCTV requirements. These authorities are typically,
though not always, located within a jurisdiction’s Transport or Infrastructure portfolio.
Defining a purpose and effectively planning a CCTV implementation will be informed
by, but will not necessarily be limited to:
•
security and operational risk
•
other planned or existing security measures
•
available technology
•
interoperability
•
maintenance
•
cost
•
evidentiary, privacy and other legal considerations.
Effective planning is inclusive of the operational and security context of the
owner/operator. This means that planning needs not only to be informed by a wellfounded awareness of terrorist risk. It also needs to include all related stakeholders, or
those organisations that bear some relationship to the owner/operator and who might
impact or benefit (or be impacted or benefited by) the owner/operator’s planned CCTV
implementation. They may include other transport operators, or local government, retail
outlets, host building management, or law enforcement and national security
organisations. Consultations within the stakeholder community also need to occur early
in planning. The transport security regulatory authority may be able to help identify
related stakeholders.
2.4.1 Interoperability
It is likely that the planning or execution of a terrorist or other security attack will leave
traces within more than one owner/operator’s system and that relevant data will exist on
more than one CCTV system. For example, piecing together events leading up to and
following an attack in an airport or surface transport hub will likely require analysis of
the data outputs of many distinct systems within the target facility and possibly
neighbouring facilities or the adjacent public domain. These systems may deliver
differing resolution outputs and require system-specific proprietary software to read.
This can hamper data sharing, potentially impacting the effectiveness of response
operations or, more likely, post-response evidence collection.
Interoperability needs to be addressed early in planning and included in consultations
with transport security regulatory authorities and other stakeholders, in particular law
enforcement authorities and neighbouring owner/operators or operations. This will
assist in defining CCTV technical and system design criteria that will optimise data
sharing with relevant stakeholders.
Legal provisions relating to lawfully sharing private data also need to be complied with
and allowed for in planning. As indicated in Section 2.4.3, owner/operators are obliged
to inform themselves of the legal implications of their CCTV measures.
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
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Dealing with these issues is an ongoing focus of many owner/operators and
jurisdictions.
The work done by some jurisdictions in developing ‘Precinct
Committees’ and ‘Precinct Action Plans’ represents good practice that may be relevant
to owner/operators in planning.
For an effective response to terrorism, data sharing and exchange of images need to be
routine activity, not limited to times of emergency. This is an ongoing responsibility of
government (please refer to Section 4.4.7).
2.4.2 Maintenance
Owner/operators need to budget for whole-of-system maintenance in their initial
planning and subsequent implementation. CCTV can be seen as a system involving the
collection, communication and management of video data. Any system is only as
functional as its least-functional element. The most advanced high-resolution camera
may be compromised by a dirty lens; an ill-maintained power supply has the potential to
cause system failure. Provision needs to be made for planned maintenance of all system
elements.
2.4.3 Legal Framework
Planning also needs to be informed by legal frameworks that are relevant to CCTV.
These will typically include, but not necessarily be limited to, provisions regarding
admissibility of evidence, the exercise of emergency powers, the right to privacy,
workplace relations, freedom of information and constraints and powers in relation to
surveillance in general.
Some of these elements are the same or similar across the jurisdictions, others are not
the same. All may change through time. Owner/operators need to be cognisant of their
legal obligations. Good practice is to seek advice from the relevant jurisdiction
transport security regulatory authority and legal policy portfolio; and to do so early in
planning.
2.5 Wider Application of the Code
While the Code is specific to counter-terrorism in the mass passenger sector, CCTV
systems are used in many other places and circumstances. In applying the Code, it is
advisable to consider including in design other beneficial outcomes such as public
safety, law enforcement, operational and broad security. In addition, the Code could be
applied to improve the capacity of CCTV systems to contribute to counter-terrorism
outcomes in other places (outside of the transport sector) where large numbers of people
gather. Adaptations for such application will need to take into account context, specific
risk assessments and physical circumstances.
2.6 Jurisdiction Policy Relevant to the Code
Each jurisdiction has legislation and policy relevant to the use of CCTV. These change
through time. Owner/operators need to inform themselves of these critical elements
early in planning. In the first instance, advice on relevant regulatory arrangements and
policy should be sought from their jurisdiction transport security regulatory authority.
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Part B
Performance Guidance
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Section 3
Guidelines for CCTV Systems and
Technology for Counter-Terrorism Purposes
3.1 Forms and Uses of CCTV Systems
CCTV is by definition a television system that transmits images within a closed system.
Images are available only to people directly connected to the transmission system or
given access rights to a closed user group within an information and communications
technology network.
CCTV systems are installed in open public areas, such as streets; in privately-owned or
government-owned spaces that are generally accessible by members of the public; in
commercial premises (such as retail premises, cash-handling facilities and bars); in
security-sensitive workplaces (such as critical infrastructure); and in private spaces
(including staff or accommodation areas).
Mass transit CCTV networks should use high-quality CCTV cameras. These are
installed in and around public transport (such as hubs, terminals, stations, stopping
points, trains, trams, buses, monorails, ferries and car parks), and critical areas (power
or fuel sources, control rooms etc.) according to the environment and the transport
operator’s needs. Major airports or other large transport precincts also have CCTV
systems, with coverage appropriate to the operational, safety or enforcement purposes
of the precinct owners, tenants or government.
The intended uses of the CCTV system influence the installation locations and the type
of technology used. For example, CCTV equipment installed for law enforcement or
evidentiary or safety purposes is likely to be installed in locations different from those
used by a public transport operator for traffic flow monitoring, and it will generally be
designed to meet higher performance and technical specifications.
3.2 System Components
CCTV systems consist of cameras, monitors, recorders, interconnecting hardware and
support infrastructure. Images may be transmitted via wired or wireless technologies in
digital or analogue form. New installations are usually digital, but may incorporate
analogue cameras or legacy analogue equipment interfaces. With the exception of
legacy equipment and specialist CCTV keyboards, most system components draw on
technology used by the information and communication technology (ICT) industry,
including image storage and processing, and interconnecting IP network hardware.
Images are usually recorded on hard disk or solid-state disk technology. Some CCTV
operators do not record imagery, because it would not be cost-effective or practical, or
because real-time monitoring meets their operational needs.
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3.3 System Monitoring
CCTV can be monitored in three ways:
• Active. In some crime-prevention tasks, trained personnel use cameras actively to
conduct surveillance of areas in support of law enforcement or security officers on
the ground. Similarly, transport control personnel use CCTV systems to manage
signals or controls to balance passenger and vehicle flows and automated responses
to highlight exception-event triggers. Historically, the active use of CCTV has
mostly been in operational functions; more recently, active use for crime prevention
has increased.
• Passive. More traditionally, CCTV camera systems are used passively. An
employee merely monitors a small number of television screens showing a selection
of available CCTV footage (often in conjunction with, or incidental to, other duties).
• Recording. CCTV systems may record images whether they are monitored or not.
Such records may be accessed and used for intelligence, investigative or evidentiary
purposes. How much is retained, and for how long, are determined by needs, costeffectiveness and practical limitations. Traditionally, transport operators retain
records for only a limited time.
In some environments, all cameras in a CCTV system are monitored; more commonly,
in large systems, no more than a small proportion of cameras, if any, are monitored live.
In the latter cases, imagery is only examined when required—either live or from
recordings.
Some CCTV systems can be supervised by personnel in monitoring centres, which can
be designed for transport operational, security or policing functions, or a combination of
these. Monitoring in centres may be general or selective. Selective monitoring may be
to detect events of interest, in response to reports of incidents, or in response to security
or operational alarms. Alarms may be triggered by switches or detectors, or by the
automated processing of CCTV imagery.
In simpler or dispersed CCTV systems that do not use monitoring centres, the same
functions are performed by people watching monitors in their work locations, as an
incidental part of their duties.
3.4 CCTV for Counter-Terrorism Purposes
The Code addresses the four main uses of CCTV in counter-terrorism:
• monitoring, surveillance, deterrence and intelligence gathering
• assessment and response to a possible incident
• assessment and response following an actual incident
• forensic and evidentiary analysis after an incident.
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The extensive use of CCTV in the transport sector is generally designed to aid
operational management, to deter or detect wilful damage, theft or minor assault, and
for border control purposes.
Most original systems were not designed for
counter-terrorism. CCTV systems in the sector vary widely in their coverage,
resolution, capabilities and technical quality.
Current and potential owner/operators of CCTV imagery obtained in or around transport
infrastructure include: law enforcement agencies; emergency services; national security
and intelligence services; government infrastructure agencies; mass transit operators;
other critical infrastructure operators; municipal councils; courts and parties to
litigation; private venue operators; and security monitoring companies. The processes
for managing these owner/operators’ access to CCTV imagery and associated data are
subject to information privacy legislation and, in some areas, codes of practice. This is
particularly relevant where law enforcement requires CCTV data to be shared between
jurisdictions.
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Section 4
Recommended CCTV System
Guidelines to meet Operational
Objectives
4.1 Applying the Code
Application of the Code begins with a risk assessment and site evaluation of the
transport service. Tables are then used to link security operational objectives to
determine the recommended recorded imagery output, leading to selection from within a
range of recommended CCTV performance criteria.
Existing CCTV systems can then be assessed against the performance criteria, or new
systems can be designed to comply with the criteria.
In more detail, the process involves:
1. Determining a transport security priority (Priority 1—the highest priority,
Priority 2, Priority 3, Not Applicable) for the transport service through a risk
assessment for the purpose of this Code.
2. For each transport security priority, recommending operational objectives
(Monitor, Detect, Recognise or Identify4) in relation to people, objects or vehicles
for typical areas within the infrastructure:
–
Monitor
Monitor/observe the flow of traffic or movement of
people generally—not individual figures.
–
Detect
Detect the presence of a person without needing to recognise or
identify them.
–
Recognise
Recognise somebody who is known to the user, or determine
that somebody is not known; monitor or track an individual
person, object or vehicle.
–
Identify
Capture enough detail to identify a person, object or vehicle
beyond reasonable doubt.
3. For each operational objective, setting recommended performance criteria for
CCTV systems5.
4
These definitions are informed by the UK Home Office document, CCTV Operational Requirements
Manual, 2009, which is generally considered to represent international good practice. In particular the
descriptors “monitor”, “detect”, “recognise”, “identify” are consistent with the UK Home Office
approach, as are the intent and meaning of their respective definitions.
It should be noted that the UK Home Office document was preceded by several years by the relevant
Australian Standard (AS 4806.2–2006: Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—Part 2: Application
Guidelines), which provided guidance along similar lines and is still in force.
5
The relationship between sector-specific security functions and operational objectives is detailed at
Appendix D, Tables D1, D2, D3 and D4.
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Using this methodology avoids the need to define arbitrary, technology-specific
standards for all the possible combinations of cameras, recording and transmission
systems, image resolution, lighting, and IT networks.
4.2 Determining the Transport Security Priority
The Code recommends the grading of types of transport through transport security risk
assessments for each transport service and/or for critical parts of the service. This will
determine the transport security priority (Priority 1—the highest priority, Priority 2,
Priority 3, Not Applicable).
The transport security priority should be informed by:
• available current threat information
• jurisdictional and national priorities
• local security issues and circumstances
• a security risk assessment conducted by the owner/operator.
Transport security priority ratings should not be confused with national alert levels or
threat assessment levels, which are inputs to the security risk assessment process.
The transport security priority provides guidance on where and how extensively
investment in CCTV should be prioritised for particular transport modes or parts of
transport systems.
For example, the Code may be applied (at any of the three transport security priority
levels) to one or more of:
• security-identified surface transport operations (SISTOs) determined by
jurisdictions under the Intergovernmental Agreement on Surface Transport Security
• transport areas identified as being ‘critical infrastructure’, as defined in the National
Counter-Terrorism Committee National Guidelines for Protecting Critical
Infrastructure from Terrorism
• mass passenger transport systems that have been assessed by the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) as being at a given threat assessment level (of, for
example, ‘medium’ or higher)
• transport facilities subject to security regulation within the jurisdiction (for example,
under the Commonwealth Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 or the Victorian
Terrorism (Community Protection) Act 2003).
Specific warnings of terrorist attacks are unlikely, so vulnerability-based assessments
should be used in risk assessments in addition to intelligence-based threat assessments
provided by government. This will allow prioritisation to include broad consideration of
such factors as terrorist capacity and typical actions, asset significance, and the possible
consequences and impact of potential attacks. The vulnerability of the whole transport
system should be taken into account in determining the relative transport security
priority for each area.
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Where the transport security priority is assessed to be ‘Not Applicable’, elements of the
Code may provide an appropriate benchmark for the selective application of some
aspects of CCTV systems, such as coverage of key areas, evidentiary requirements or
operational procedures.
4.3 Determining Operational Objectives
The applicable security functions to be fulfilled should be identified for each securityassessed site. These are explained in Table D.1 in Appendix D and relate to operational
objectives, which are in Tables D.2 to D.4. The CCTV performance criteria
recommended for each operational objective are shown in the tables in Appendix E, in
particular Tables E1, E2 and E3. Operational objectives should be determined for each
camera within a CCTV system.
4.4 CCTV System Performance Criteria
4.4.1 General Principles
Mass passenger transport systems are vulnerable to terrorist attack. CCTV contributes
to the application of ‘security-in-depth’ principles to such systems and should be
combined with other appropriate security measures.
The value of CCTV lies in its ability to record what happens and to provide live images
for prevention, response, investigation and evidentiary purposes. The underlying
requirement of authorities responding to a terrorist incident is to know what has
happened and who did it. Secondary benefits include the identification of suspicious
behaviour or objects before an incident takes place. The performance criteria in this
Code relate to the recorded image product rather than camera or transmission
performance.
Ideally, CCTV systems across a mass passenger transport system would capture images
that could be used to identify people within the system and to record images of all
activity taking place across the system. After assessing identified risks, it is not usually
appropriate to implement CCTV systems of such magnitude. However, for counterterrorism purposes, the aim should still be to capture images to identify all people
within the system, and to record activity at key locations identified by an appropriate
risk assessment. Operational objectives can be identified that will aid the appropriate
placement of cameras and selection of appropriate image quality and capture rates.
Once a high-quality image with enough detail to identify a person has been captured,
other images can be captured that will allow for recognition of that person in other areas
of the system. This will support the principal aim of providing investigators with
information that helps determine what has happened and who was involved.
The combination of three levels of transport security priority with four operational
objectives allows for up to 12 levels of CCTV performance criteria, to cater for the
wide range of security circumstances across transport systems.
The performance criteria for image size are included in Table E.1 in Appendix E. The
criteria for image resolution and image capture rates are described in Section 4.4.2, and
a reference example for image resolution is given in Table E.2 in Appendix E.
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4.4.2 Image Capture Rates
The rate at which images are captured and stored is one determinant of the amount of
storage media required in a CCTV system. As such, intelligent design processes that
focus on issues such as camera numbers and location, environmental lighting, target
speed across fields-of-view and camera shutter speeds should be applied using
appropriate frame capture rates to ensure the operational objective of each camera is
achieved.
Image capture rates should also be determined, consistent with the operational
objective, to ensure that:
• a monitoring officer can make an informed decision about what is happening within
view of the camera
• recorded images are suitable for analysis by investigators and the courts and show
what actually happened consistent with the nature of the threat.
Issues to consider include:
• recording mode (continuous recording, recording in response to activity detection,
recording triggered by an alarm device or by software, time-based recording
schedules) to ensure a record of any relevant activity within the field-of-view
• allocation of limited recording resources to areas of higher risk or priority
• network and storage capacity for future frame rate increases
• retention of recordings.
Image quality is of paramount importance. While required image capture rates can vary
significantly depending on the operational objective for a particular camera, high
capture rates should not be sought at the expense of image quality. Users must be
careful to ensure that the chosen frame rate captures the required information and
permits video analytics processing to operate correctly, if implemented.
4.4.3 Image Resolution
Resolution is the measure of detail and clarity of a still or video image. It is not a
measure of the size of the image. In an end-to-end CCTV system, video image
resolution is determined by the:
Image Capture:
• dome/window optical quality and cleanliness
• the quality of the camera lens
• lens focus
• type, intensity and arrangement of lighting
• the type and quality of the camera
• camera electronic shutter speed
• target velocity
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• type and profile of digital video compression
• transmission system capabilities
• recording and display system capabilities.
Image Display/Replay:
• the resolution of the display device
• the scaling of the image for display
• transcoding of images for export to removable media or remote access
• transmission system capabilities
• recording and display system capabilities.
Digital video compression occurs at the camera, recorder or intermediate box and is
called ‘encoding’. Decompression for display usually occurs at a PC attached to the
display monitor and is called ‘decoding’. Together, the compression-decompression
software is known as the ‘codec’, which generally uses standards-based algorithms (e.g.
MPEG4, H.264, JPEG 2000) with a range of settings that govern the video image’s size,
rate and resolution. These settings are limited by the processing requirements of the
codec and the capacity of the network available to transmit and store the video data.
Objectives of the codec settings are to: minimise the required processing power,
maximise the image quality and minimise the resulting data volume.
Standard
’profiles’ have been established that attempt to optimise aspects of all three objectives.
Manufacturers may make further adjustments, allow users to adjust the settings, or
provide automatic functions to optimise the configuration depending on dynamic
conditions such as time of day, external alarm or movement in the camera field-of-view
and network and system load.
Codecs providing high compression ratios and low data rates may require more
powerful processors or produce low-quality images.
As processor power, data
bandwidth, storage capacity and camera quality all influence the cost of the design, the
resulting digital video quality is also directly linked to cost.
In a post-incident review, the resolution of the recorded video will be considered most
important. At that point, the resolution will have been affected by all the components
forming the CCTV system. Video exported for review by external organisations may
include a software copy of the native system codec to help ensure image replay is at
optimum quality.
Various objective test charts available from industry (for example, the RETMA,
IEEE-208, ViDi Labs and the draft National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS),
Electronic Evidence Specialist Advisory Group draft chart) use patterns of converging
lines to enable the visual measurement or rating, in horizontal TV lines, of the
resolution of a complete CCTV system. Test-pattern generators can also be used to
measure visually the resolution performance of a digital video recorder separately in
systems with analogue camera inputs. The Australian Standard AS 4806.2—2006:
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—Part 2: Application Guidelines gives further details
of objective testing techniques for resolution using test charts and test-pattern generators
for analogue and Standard Definition digital systems.
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To establish a rating scale of resolution performance that could be used to set standards
for the Code against the operational objectives of monitor, detect, recognise and
identify, user instructions for the particular test chart or test pattern generator selected
should be reviewed. Table E.2 in Appendix E gives parameters, using the ViDi Labs
and draft NIFS test charts, for the video resolution required for monitoring behaviour,
detecting an incident, recognising people or vehicles, and capturing facial detail or
reading number plates for the purpose of identification. To aid interpretation of
Table E.2, an example of the layout of the ViDi Labs and draft NIFS test charts are in
Figures E.4 and E.5.
CCTV systems to which this Code applies should achieve resolution results equal to or
better than those indicated in Table E.2. By configuring various alternative test charts
and pattern generators in accordance with their manufacturers’ recommendations,
objective testing can be carried out using manufacturer-designed parameters to identify
levels of resolution acceptable for all operational objectives.
Regardless of the objective testing technique applied, evaluation through observation
should be carried out at commissioning, and regularly audited, to confirm that the
relevant operational objectives are being met. Evaluation should also consider
performance under night-time lighting conditions.
4.4.4 Intelligent Software
A range of products are available to automate CCTV systems by analysing images using
computer programs. The benefits of these products include a reduced reliance on live
monitoring of systems by personnel. There can also be significant savings in recorded
vision storage, as systems can be configured to record only specific incidents or events
in areas with infrequent activity. Software designed to record or alert when movement
or specific types of events are detected can assist in detecting suspect incidents,
provided they are configured appropriately.
Intelligent software or ‘video analytics’ can also be used to avoid recording any
irrelevant activity needlessly (for example, by interpreting the entry of pedestrians into
train tunnels as an abnormal event and recording it, but not recording the routine entry
of trains).
Using intelligent software in conjunction with CCTV for counter-terrorism purposes
requires caution. Software designed to record specific actions (such as ‘left objects’,
‘removed objects’, or movement direction counter to pedestrian flow) will not record all
activity within the view of the camera and therefore might not record an actual terrorist
incident or preparations for it. While intelligent software has a role in CCTV networks,
it should generally be used to complement or reduce the requirement for live monitoring
and unnecessary recording at key locations, but not to replace them.
Appendix B summarises possible technological solutions, in particular Tables B.1 and
B.2.
4.4.5 System Guidelines to Meet Operational Objectives
The design of the CCTV system should be guided by the performance criteria for each
operational objective, and for each of the nominated areas indicated in Tables D.2 to
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D.4 in Appendix D for the respective mode of mass passenger transport. Where the
tables do not define an operational objective, the operator should be informed by the
risk assessment and a comparison with similar contexts, or by the requirements or
guidance of the security regulator.
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For each transport security priority rating (Priority 1—the highest priority, Priority 2,
Priority 3), the Code recommends typical areas within transport services for setting
operational objectives that lead to performance criteria for CCTV systems
commensurate with the risk.
4.4.6 Data Networks for Digital Video Systems
Most data distribution networks use cabled Ethernet with RJ45-connected unshielded
twisted pair cables, optical fibre cables, or local wireless transmission, with a series of
network protocols complying with the ‘TCP/IP model’. This is often referred to
generically as an ‘IP network’.
IP networks are divided into Local Area Networks (LANs) and the Wide Area Network
(WAN)6. Design of a network to transmit video data requires an understanding of how
much data is involved, its source, destination, sensitivity, required availability and the
consequence of delays or losses. This will dictate the design of the LANs, the WAN
and the interface between them. Some considerations that need to be made in planning
Data Networks for digital CCTV systems are included in Appendix B.
While in simpler IP networks the components can be ‘plug-and-play’, more complex
video systems require networks that adequately consider the CCTV data demands.
Input from IT professionals should be sought early in the planning process.
4.4.7 Performance and Interoperability
Interoperability refers to both the ability of CCTV system components to operate
together on the same network and on the ability to share video between networks or
jurisdictions. This is outlined previously at Section 2.4.1.
At the procedural level, it is important to identify other parties with which
interoperability may be desirable or beneficial. Establishing these arrangements is a
critically important element of planning for a CCTV implementation and should include
agreed procedures for interoperability and the technical means by which it will occur.
At the technical level, interoperability relies on the manufacturer’s interpretation and
implementation of relevant standards. Analogue video interoperability needed few
standards and variables. Digital CCTV systems rely on far more, many of which are
optional or whose detailed implementation varies from one manufacturer to the next.
Standards for digitising and encoding video streams are well-established though video
conferencing, broadcast and entertainment markets, with most CCTV systems able to
accept video images from equipment produced by multiple manufacturers. While this
provides digital CCTV interoperability at the same level as an analogue system, digital
systems have far greater interconnectivity, far more capabilities and, therefore, far more
functions and variables requiring a common interface.
The Open Network Video Interface Forum (ONVIF) has emerged as the primary
industry body driving CCTV interoperability standards, offering highly detailed
6
Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) arrangements offered by some carriers provide cost and bandwidth
advantages over a WAN, but without the same geographic coverage.
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specifications for functions supported by, and communications between, video
transmitters, displays, recorders and video analytics devices. The specifications include
provision for metadata streams with elements for analytics, control and events.
While uptake of standards is increasing, ONVIF compliance does not mandate
implementation of all provisions of the specifications and therefore does not guarantee
that devices will be interoperable across their full functional range. Transport operators
must ensure that specific requirements for interoperability are well-understood,
justifiable and clearly specified when procuring CCTV equipment. Over-specification
will limit the availability of compliant equipment, while under-specification may result
in equipment that does not meet interoperability requirements. It is recommended that
interoperability capabilities are fully demonstrated prior to committing to a specific
product.
4.4.8 Storage Periods for Images and Other Data
It is recommended that video images are stored for 31 days in accordance with
Australian Standard 4806.1–2006: Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—Management
and Operation.
4.4.9 System Protection and Redundancy
In applying this Code, CCTV systems should be configured, installed and operated to
provide reasonable protection from natural hazards and human interference in the
relevant environment, and to provide redundancy and reliability of operation consistent
with the assessed risks. This includes consideration of:
• system architecture to achieve prudent redundancy of networks and recorded
imagery
• selection of components for resilience and suitability for the environment
• redundancy of electricity supply to key components, with preference for backup
power and surge protection
• redundancy of communications and transmission paths
• adequate operational management and maintenance arrangements to support system
availability and reliability relevant to CCTV networks
• lighting.
All recorders, database servers and workstations should be time-synchronised,
preferably to a Stratum 1 time source. Clear understanding is required as to how the
system deals with daylight-saving changes and the potentially duplicate or missing
video timestamps.
All field equipment should be rated for the industrial environment and require minimal
maintenance. Restart following restoration of power after a failure should be automatic,
with all devices returning to a known defined state or to the state prior to the power
failure.
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WAN connections should have suitable resilience to ensure post-incident access to
imagery. This might be in the form of path diversity and self-recovery.
System configurations need to provide adequate security and privacy safeguards.
Remote connections through the CCTV network to workstations outside controlled
areas should be secured by firewall or similar at both ends (the CCTV network and the
remote site). Wireless links should include security mechanisms to limit the risk of
unauthorised access to or interruption of the network.
4.4.10 Camera Positioning and Features
Operational needs will dictate the choice, number and positioning of cameras. A basic
network of fixed cameras ensures that all activity is captured at some level. Additional
pan–tilt–zoom cameras allow close-up monitoring in real time.
In selecting and installing cameras, consideration should be given to the physical
environment and the features that may be required in cameras or supporting
infrastructure. Such considerations should include, but not be limited to:
•
placement of cameras at strategic ‘choke’ points to provide continuous coverage at
transport hubs, such as all entry/exit points and escalators or stairways
•
the placement, density and types of cameras to meet the operational objectives
•
cameras used to monitor traffic flows in and around mass passenger transport sites
•
the combination of numbers of fixed-aim cameras and the image capture rates of
cameras for all monitoring purposes (which should enable the movements of a
person or vehicle to be clearly evident, and should be of a standard accepted by the
courts)
•
the preventive functions of the CCTV system (which aid specific identification, in
areas of interest, of all individuals and the detection of abandoned packages, bags,
vehicles etc.)
•
where possible, camera placement should ensure at least one identify-grade view of
each person
•
locating cameras in respect to privacy issues
•
locating cameras in respect to their susceptibility to theft, tampering and vandalism
•
siting cameras so that people normally approach them through that camera’s fieldof-view
•
installing cameras so that each is covered by another camera’s field-of-view
•
the use of cameras with greater low-light sensitivity in areas where artificial lighting
is limited
•
the use of housings incorporating measures to mitigate against the easy
determination of the camera’s field-of-view
•
the use of housings incorporating measures to mitigate against the effects of extreme
weather or grime
•
back-up power supplies for cameras and CCTV systems
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•
incorporation of pan-tilt-zoom cameras that will allow staff to control cameras to
follow and ‘close in’ on persons, objects or vehicles
•
positioning cameras to enable any selected video analytics detection technologies to
operate correctly
•
positioning cameras to enable economical periodic maintenance
•
siting cameras and selection of suitable camera technology for the lighting
conditions.
Thermal imaging cameras, which can sense body heat and operate without any lighting,
should be considered for emergency coverage of locations that rely permanently on
artificial lighting, such as tunnels and underground facilities, where the additional cost
may be warranted.
Megapixel cameras have higher resolutions and may permit area coverage with fewer
cameras. Megapixel camera lenses must provide increased optical quality to enable the
full resolution of the camera to be achieved. Unlike good quality optical zoom lenses,
the use of digital zoom reduces image resolution and its use must always be considered
in line with resolution requirements required to meet the operational objectives.
4.4.11 Imagery Recording Equipment
Imagery recording systems (recorders and storage devices) should be in lockable
enclosures to protect against unauthorised access or vandalism, suitably mounted, and
protected from vibration, shock, dust, water, electromagnetic interference, and
disconnection or loss of power.
Imagery should be stored securely to protect it from blast, fire, smoke, chemical or other
damage during a terrorist attack on the area covered by the CCTV system. Storage
devices for mobile systems (on vehicles) should be reasonably well-protected from
wilful damage and unauthorised access. In fixed systems, consideration should be given
to offsite video data backup.
Section 4.4.8 recommends 31 days storage. When the recording system reaches
capacity, it should automatically overwrite from the beginning of the pre-recorded
material. Overwrite protection of security identified material should cause that material
to be retained during this process.
Hard disk drives and other storage media should not need regular routine maintenance,
such as defragmentation, to remain functional. Multi-disk arrays are preferred for video
storage to improve system reliability through redundancy. In the event of failure, the
array should provide clear indication of which disk has failed and permit ‘hot swap’ of
the failed unit without power down or loss of data. Consideration should be given to the
use of RAID-6 configuration in larger systems to provide fault tolerance for multiple
drive failures.
Removable media, including hard disk drives, should be indelibly marked with a unique
identification number to enable recognition in legal proceedings. Mechanisms for
export of video data from the CCTV system in industry-standard format should be
available and clearly understood, including options that may affect the resolution,
integrity and accessibility for third-party replay. System design should consider
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bandwidth, storage and processing requirements associated with video image export and
must ensure all other system functions proceed uninterrupted during the export process.
Removable media should be housed in suitable protective enclosures for transportation,
to protect them from rough handling, dropping, or unauthorised access.
4.4.12 Monitoring, Reviewing and Archiving
CCTV monitoring centres should be in secure locations where they are unlikely to
suffer from criminal attack or from damage during a terrorist attack on the transport
service being covered by the CCTV system. Australian Standard AS 2201.2–2004:
Intruder Alarm Systems—Monitoring Centres specifies requirements and a grading
convention for monitoring centres and the operations, equipment and staff necessary to
monitor intruder alarm systems. The standard is a useful guide to security and design
features that should be considered for high-security monitoring facilities.
Recommended options for retrieval and viewing of stored images are via:
• a high-bandwidth communications link from the location, either continuously or as
required and/or
• export to removable media (CD, DVD, BD or USB HDD).
A user-friendly interface should allow reviewing (at user-selectable playback speeds)
and archiving of images to high-capacity medium, such as DVD/BD. Recorded images
should be exportable in file formats that allow viewing in a range of common desktop
applications. Off-line reviewing equipment should be able to view imagery from other
CCTV systems without requiring proprietary formats. The equipment should be able to
display onto common display(s), in synchrony, those selected from all of the video
streams recorded at a particular location, whether or not an alarm mode has been
activated.
Reviewing software should have a user-friendly graphical interface that allows
searching by time, date, camera identifier, location or vehicle identifier, normal/alarm
condition etc.
4.4.13 Operating Procedures
Controlled system management and operating procedure documents should be
developed and implemented to meet the principles identified in this Code, including:
• operational objectives
• technical operating requirements
• training requirements and proficiency accreditation
• fault rectification and preventive maintenance
• security of hardware, software, communications and imagery
• system integrity
• redundancy
• adequate documentation of the system (location, coverage), available to operators
and law enforcement agencies
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• change management
• disaster recovery.
4.4.14 Maintenance Procedures
It is recommended that planning for CCTV systems includes maintenance contracts
with service-level agreements and/or defined periodic maintenance tasks. Maintenance
must include cleaning of camera housings or domes at intervals matched with the
environmental conditions.
Formal procedures for fault reporting should enable operators to describe the nature of a
problem and maintenance staff to report the cause and remedial action required.
Maintenance documentation should include task intervals and details. Records should
include confirmation of all tasks carried out, with provision for comment by
maintenance staff regarding deterioration or other issues requiring attention.
Most digital CCTV systems and data networks provide facilities for remote electronic
access to equipment to enable status, condition and fault analysis to be conducted from
a central location. System design should consider what information is available
remotely that may be usefully presented to assist in system management, cost-effective
maintenance and reduced down-time.
Maintenance procedures should ensure periodic verification of CCTV system
performance in accordance with the design objectives.
4.4.15 Relevant Standards
The Code is not designed as a uniform, ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescription or specification. It
supplements other guidance material, the application of which is determined by each
jurisdiction’s transport security risk assessments and legislation.
The Code is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of relevant industry technical,
safety and procedural guidelines, including but not confined to those listed in
Appendix C.
The standards are not prescriptive beyond a certain level of detail and can be applied to
suit individual circumstances. They require some expertise to be implemented properly,
and are not a substitute for employing suitably experienced and qualified personnel.
Rather, the standards help qualified personnel ensure that their work complies with
national or international norms. A given situation may warrant measures substantially
beyond the baselines prescribed in a standard.
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Part C
Legal and Procedural Aspects
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Section 5
Legal Issues and Accountability
5.1 Purpose of this Section
The purpose of this section is to provide information and guidance on the legal aspects
of CCTV, in particular the coordination of owner/operator activities, information
sharing between jurisdictions, seizure and use of data under emergency powers,
management of CCTV data for evidentiary purposes, and privacy.
5.2 Legal Context
5.2.1 Responsibilities
Australian Governments are responsible for determining the legal implications of using
CCTV for counter-terrorism purposes and in applying the Code. This includes the
assessment of legal frameworks (including privacy, workplace relations and
surveillance legislation associated with the collection of personal information). At
COAG’s Special Meeting in September 2005, all governments agreed to identify
necessary legislative schemes to ensure consistent implementation of the Code.
Compliance with privacy-related legal safeguards on the use of CCTV is needed to
ensure that the impact of any proposed legislative amendments on existing privacy
provisions is minimised.
Other legal considerations may arise from time to time and may be specific to particular
jurisdictions. Care is necessary to ensure that the legal implications of CCTV
implementation are understood and have been considered in planning. Owner/operators
are obliged to inform themselves of all legal implications and, in the first instance, are
well-advised to consult with their jurisdiction’s transport security regulatory authority.
It is the responsibility of the owner/operator to ensure that its CCTV installation is
compliant with relevant Commonwealth, State and Territory law and Local Government
bylaws. Owner/operators are also obliged to inform themselves of the penalties for noncompliance.
This will assist in deterring unauthorised use of the system and supporting compliance
with legislation. Policy and procedures should then be tailored to outline use of the
system in accordance with relevant legislation7.
This should also include simple and easily implemented principles, such as:
• People are entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy when in public places.
• Owners and designers of CCTV systems in public places should act responsibly and
consider the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals.
• Owners and designers of CCTV systems in public places should take reasonable
steps to inform people of the use of those devices.
7
Western Australia, 2009. Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) Guidelines.
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• Public place surveillance should be for a legitimate purpose related to the activities
of the organisation conducting it.
• Public place surveillance should be proportional to its legitimate purpose.
• Reasonable steps should be taken to protect information gathered through public
place surveillance from misuse or inappropriate disclosure.8
5.2.2 Legal and Procedural Issues for Ongoing Consideration
In applying the Code, owner/operators may need to consider several legal and
procedural issues. These include:
• privacy, including personal information and images
• access to CCTV imagery through freedom of information and other legal
mechanisms
• lawful disclosure
• signage, telling the public where CCTV is in use
• protection of information
• permitted uses of images
• automated image recognition or data matching
• ensuring that timely and complete investigations are made of significant incidents,
and there is a process for police to obtain data recorded by CCTV systems in public
areas by using formal requests without warrant
• retention and disposal of information (which is connected with operational
requirements and storage capacity)
• complaints resolution
• registers or databases of CCTV systems
• strategic land-use planning and development controls
• workplace safety.
Owner/operators will also need to address aspects related to incident response, such as
how CCTV images from a variety of sources may be collected and stored promptly for
future access, and mechanisms to best allow the exchange of data during and after
incidents.
5.3 Onus on Owner/Operators to Report Incidents and
Suspicious Activity to Assist Counter-Terrorism
To assist with the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, owner/operators of
CCTV systems should put in place procedures and training for system monitoring that
provides that any suspicious activity detected by their personnel is recorded and
promptly reported to police (or other appropriate agency).
8
The Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2010. Surveillance in Public Places Final Report 18.
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5.4 Privacy
When installing CCTV systems, owner/operators must comply with the law pertaining
to the management of personal information, which is generally defined as:
information or an opinion… , whether true or not, and whether recorded
in a material form or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent,
or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion.9
The objective of information privacy law is to provide a legally binding framework for
the responsible, open and accountable collection, storage, use and disclosure of personal
information.
As most CCTV systems will capture personal information, this has clear implications
for CCTV data, as well as for the use of databases against which recognition technology
can compare CCTV footage. As with all elements of the law, owner/operators are
obliged to inform themselves of, and to comply with, privacy provisions.
5.5 Compliance with Privacy Principles
Owner/operators are encouraged to follow the established good practice of undertaking
a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) in relation to their existing and planned CCTV
implementations. It is particularly important that this be done at an early stage in
planning for new implementations. To determine whether a PIA should be undertaken,
a Privacy Impact Checklist (PIC) should be completed. This covers a range of
questions in relation to the 11 Information Privacy Principles (IPPs).
Further information is available through the Office of the Australian Information
Commissioner at http://www.privacy.gov.au, or its successor10.
In addition, the privacy law provisions are very similar across all jurisdictions and
owner/operators may contact their jurisdiction transport security regulatory authority for
additional local advice.
To aid compliance with privacy principles in operating a CCTV system,
owner/operators should implement an ‘operations manual’.
This needs to reflect
privacy provisions and might include, but not necessarily be limited to:
• setting system objectives and permitted uses of imagery
9
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner. Privacy Impact Assessment Guide. Viewed on
November 2011 at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/index.php?option=com_icedoc&view=types&element=guidelines&fullsumma
ry=6590&Itemid=1021
10
Guidance on Completing a PIA. Viewed on 4 November 2011 at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/index.php?option=com_icedoc&view=types&element=guidelines&fullsumma
ry=6590&Itemid=1021
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• setting minimum technical specifications
• community consultation approaches
• defining key agency/organisation roles
• installation and trials
• camera locations and system configuration
• management of liability
• staffing and control mechanisms
• means and circumstances of police access to, and control of, CCTV equipment or
imagery
• permissible uses of CCTV imagery (e.g. planning consideration may need to include
the needs of third-party providers in upgrading systems where access to footage may
be required)
• permissible means/procedures for releasing CCTV imagery
• archival and document retention methods, including destruction
• permissible uses of any related surveillance technologies (such as number plate
recognition, facial recognition or behavioural monitoring)
• complaints handling and resolution
• monitoring and assessment
• audit and compliance monitoring.
5.6 Evidence-Handling Procedures
5.6.1 Emergency Access to Data
Access to CCTV data may lawfully be required by relevant State or Territory or
Commonwealth law enforcement authorities under warrant for counter-terrorism or
other law enforcement purposes. It is good practice for owner/operators to maintain upto-date awareness of requirements under emergency powers and their jurisdictions’
evidentiary requirements through awareness training of relevant staff. Advice on
emergency provisions regarding CCTV data and related evidentiary requirements
should be sought from the jurisdiction police service.
Law enforcement authorities prefer real-time or near real-time access to CCTV systems
in areas of high transport security risk for counter-terrorism purposes. Some transport
facilities, such as major airports, have a standing law enforcement presence for which
monitoring facilities are, or could be, provided.
The provision of such data should be subject to a formal agreement between the CCTV
owner/operator and the agencies, addressing the intended and permissible use of
imagery, and information security and privacy controls and accountabilities.
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5.6.2 Evidentiary Responsibilities
CCTV systems should be designed and implemented to ensure that the imagery
recovered from recording media could not reasonably be alleged to have been altered
from the original view of a particular camera at a known point in time. The
admissibility of evidence can be improved by using appropriate technologies (such as
system access controls, electronic watermarks, image labelling, encryption and
logging), and by strict procedures (such as for physical access, storage, media labelling,
training and custody/possession). Strict adherence to data management that is
consistent with provision of a clear chain of evidence is critical. Courts may also
require information on system configuration, camera location and operation, video
extraction, labelling, storage, handling and transportation.
In addition, owner/operators need to maintain adequate processes, mechanisms and
capabilities regarding system and data integrity and not be entirely reliant on third-party
suppliers or installers. This includes capabilities regarding proper recording and
registering consistent with the jurisdiction evidentiary requirements.
Forensic handling of imagery by law enforcement authorities and other agencies should
be consistent with authoritative guidance at least equivalent to the 2004 Australasian
Guidelines for Digital Imaging Processes—prepared by the Electronic Evidence
Specialist Advisory Group under the auspices of the Senior Managers Australian and
New Zealand Forensic Laboratories.
Those guidelines advise:
The development and adoption of methods of best practice with respect to the
gathering and presentation of any evidence is essential to ensuring that such
evidence is accepted by the courts. It is also essential that the methods
employed are constantly reviewed and improved to keep pace with the ongoing
advances in technology.
This is particularly so with respect to digital imaging, given that its associated
technologies permit digital images to be easily duplicated, manipulated,
contaminated, or altered. It is self-evident that digital imaging is assuming an
ever-increasing importance within the judicial process today and this situation
will no doubt continue well into the future. In light of this, it is imperative for
forensic science practitioners and agencies to be able to validate the origin and
integrity of not only the digital images themselves, but also the image capture
and handling procedures employed in the gathering, processing and analysing
of this type of evidence, especially when digital visual images are to be used for
evidentiary purposes.
In turn, management and handling of CCTV data by owner/operators needs to be
consistent with jurisdictional evidence-handling procedures.
5.6.3 Advice on Jurisdictional Practices
Additional advice should be sought from the jurisdiction police service and the transport
security regulator on these matters early in planning for a new or upgraded CCTV
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system. This advice should include, but not necessarily be limited to, the proper
procedures for the capture, transmission, storage, retention, disclosure, protection and
disposal of imagery and to enhance admissibility in court proceedings.
5.7 Jurisdictional Capabilities for Reviewing Mass CCTV
Product
Owner/operators should prepare a plan for ensuring a timely response to the need to
review large quantities of CCTV product after a major incident.
During a major counter-terrorism investigation involving mass passenger transport
CCTV systems, police and other agencies may need to access, review, analyse, store
and present evidence from substantial volumes (potentially petabytes (1015)) of digital
imagery, numerous analogue tapes, or both. As a priority, police and relevant agencies
should ensure that they have assessed the potential requirements and resource
implications of such an investigation, including the identification of suitable
accommodation, equipment, personnel and funding.
This might be in the form of a non-linear video editing suite with the ability to import
and synchronise video from multiple sources to frame accuracy, with tools for real-time
synchronised replay, image enhancement and automated post-event analysis and
enhancement. Not all owner/operators will possess such equipment, but it should be
available within a short timeframe for video upload and analysis.
5.8 Registers of CCTV Systems
It is good practice for jurisdiction authorities to compile and maintain a register of
CCTV systems in mass passenger transport systems, identifying their capability and
scope for counter-terrorism purposes. A cooperative, voluntary ‘partnership’ approach
between police and CCTV operators without legislative formalities is the preferred
approach.
This would require owner/operators of CCTV systems to provide government with
adequate information on their systems to maintain the register. Where maintaining
jurisdiction-wide registers is not possible, up-to-date registers of points-of-contact in
other jurisdictions should be maintained.
5.9 Related Legislation and Standards
This Code is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of:
• Relevant legislation involving:
–
CCTV and other security systems, practices and licensing
–
CCTV devices
–
information privacy
–
admissibility of evidence
–
transport safety and security
–
police and emergency services.
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• Relevant industry technical, safety and procedural guidelines, including the
Australian Standards 4806 series relating to CCTV, and Standards Australia’s
Handbook 171 Guidelines on the Management of IT Evidence (see Appendix C for
further information about standards).
As noted, the Code is not designed as a uniform, ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescription or
specification, but supplements other guidance material determined by each jurisdiction.
Owners and operators of CCTV systems need to take into account local legal
requirements and prepare specifications and operating procedures appropriate to their
specific situations.
5.10 Safety in Design
CCTV design should be informed by safety-in-design principles, in particular public
safety and the safety of those who will have to install, maintain, upgrade and
decommission the system. Important information on safety-in-design principles may be
accessed via the Safe Work Australia website11.
The Australian Safety and Compensation Council has provided guidance on principles
of safety in design, as follows:
Principle 1: Persons with Control—persons who make decisions affecting the
design of products, facilities or processes are able to promote health and safety
at the source.
Principle 2: Product Lifecycle—safe design applies to every stage in the
lifecycle from conception through to disposal. It involves eliminating hazards or
minimising risks as early in the lifecycle as possible.
Principle 3: Systematic Risk Management—the application of hazard
identification, risk assessment and risk control processes to achieve safe design.
Principle 4: Safe Design Knowledge and Capability—should be either
demonstrated or acquired by persons with control over design.
Principle 5: Information Transfer—effective communication and documentation
of design and risk control information between all persons involved in the
phases of the lifecycle is essential for the safe design approach.12
11
http://safeworkaustralia.gov.auor its successor.
12
Australian Safety and Compensation Council, 2006. Guidance on the Principles of Safe Design for
Work.
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5.11 Legal Advice
Owner/operators considering CCTV implementation are well-advised to seek
professional legal advice regarding compliance with relevant Commonwealth, State and
Territory legal frameworks and Local Government bylaws.
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Section 6
Monitoring and Review of the Code
The ongoing management of the Code, including its review in no less than three years,
will be the responsibility of the Transport & Infrastructure Senior Officials Committee
(TISOC), in consultation with the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC),
reporting to the Standing Council on Transport & Infrastructure (SCOTI).
This edition of the Code was published in March 2012, following the first review, and
reflects the review findings and recommendations. The ongoing monitoring and review
mechanisms to gauge the Code’s effectiveness and to modify it over time will include:
• Evaluating the impact of new technologies and applications of CCTV systems for
security purposes
• Evaluating changing terrorism risks [as they relate to CCTV]
• Monitoring the effectiveness of application and utility of the Code in guiding CCTV
systems implementation and
• Monitoring legal and privacy aspects.
6.1 Review
This Code provides non-binding guidance regarding the use of rapidly advancing
technologies to deal with a dynamic range of threats and risks in complex environments.
It aims to develop a national operational model to guide risk-based prioritisation of
CCTV performance objectives for counter-terrorism.
The changing environment in terms of technology and security threat and risk
necessitates regular review of the Code. Further review in no less than three years, will
be the responsibility of the SCOTI in consultation with Australian Governments and the
NCTC.
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Part D
Appendixes
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Appendix A Technical Acronyms
ANPR
Automatic number plate recognition
BD
Blu-ray Disk
CCTV
closed-circuit television
CD
Compact Disk
2D
2-dimensional
3D
3-dimensional
DVD
Digital Versatile (or video) Disk
DVR
Digital Video Recorder
FoV
field-of-view
3G
3rd-generation mobile telecommunications
4G
4th-generation mobile telecommunications
H.264
a common standard for video compression
ICT
Information & Communication Technology
IEEE
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
IEEE-208
IEEE Std 208—1995 is a target measured in horizontal and
vertical TV lines
i-LIDS
Image Library for Intelligent Detection Systems
IP
Internet Protocol
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems
IT
Information Technology
HDD
Hard Disk Drive
JPEG
Joint Photographic Experts Group; and a commonly used
reference in relation to ‘lossy’ compression for digital
photography
JPEG 2000
Compression using wavelet in lieu of discrete cosine
transformation
LAN
Local Area Network
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MAN
Metropolitan Area Network
M-JPEG
Motion JPEG—video formats where each video frame or
interlaced field of a digital video sequence is separately
compressed as a JPEG image
MP
Megapixels
MPEG
Moving Picture Experts Group; and a commonly used reference in
relation to audio and video (AV) compression
MPEG-4
Compression of AV digital data to enable network distribution of
data
ONVIF
Open Network Video Interface Forum
PC
personal computer
PTZ
pan-tilt-zoom camera
RAID
Redundant Array of Independent Disks
R&D
Research & Development
RETMA
Radio Electronics Television Manufacturers Association
SCADA
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
USB
Universal Serial Bus
UTP
Unshielded Twisted Pair cable (Cat-5, 6 & 7)
VLAN
Virtual Local Area Network
WAN
Wide Area Network
WiMAX
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
WLAN
Wireless Local Area Network
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Appendix B New Technologies
General Comment
Introduction of new technology introduces features that distinguish the new product
from the competitors. Commercialising new technology may involve developing new
methods to house, mount, power, communicate, integrate, display, control and store
information associated with the device. As new technology often precedes associated
standards, this can lead to manufacturers taking differing implementation approaches.
Early adopters of new technology therefore face the possibility of unproven site-specific
performance, implementation-specific faults or errors, incompatibility with other
equipment, rapid obsolescence, small installed knowledge base and ties to a
manufacturer-unique product.
In determining the requirement for CCTV capability based on new technology, it is
essential to consider the availability and breadth of relevant local support, the suitability
of the technology for implementation in the method intended, operability by existing
staff under existing procedures, and interoperability with existing equipment.
Intelligent Surveillance
Intelligent Surveillance software or ‘video analytics’ allows the interpretation of
imagery to:
• identify particular events, such as leaving an unattended bag or suspicious behaviour
• recognise inappropriate motion, or movement in an inappropriate location
• recognise car registration numbers and match them to a database
• recognise that an image of a person is very similar to a reference image.
This technology may assist in meeting operational objectives in support of counterterrorism in mass passenger transport environments.
These systems may assist in providing automated real-time and post-event system
capabilities, such as:
• better capability to recognise suspicious behaviour, activity or objects and alert
those monitoring
• better ability to identify individuals in a crowd, in poor lighting and when
individuals are partly obscured
• better ability to track individuals in crowds and on ‘handover’ between systems or
cameras
• better CCTV data retrieval and analysis.
Real-time image processing technology in the CCTV industry has been available for
over 20 years. The ability of a machine to automatically identify, classify and highlight
video content potentially of interest to the user offers significant advantages in the
effectiveness of video surveillance in mass passenger transport environments. The
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performance of this technology is critically dependent upon its ability to be configured
for site-specific conditions, including:
• environmental influences (wind, rain, fog)
• lighting conditions (including target illumination, glare, contrast, shadows,
backlighting etc.)
• target distance and direction
• camera position and performance
• non-target related movement in the field-of-view
• movement of the camera.
Without appropriate configuration for site-specific conditions, incorrect targeting will
occur, resulting in: nuisance alarms, missed targets or false identification.
Manufacturer’s claims with regards to the reliability and capability of CCTV image
processing technology will assume limits in site-specific conditions that may or may not
apply to every site and camera. Large-scale deployment of the technology should
always be preceded by extended duration site-specific evaluation under the conditions
expected in the final installation.
Systems may be designed to permit progressive rollout, with simpler proven or less
critical functions, such as movement-activated recording or people-counting
implemented initially, and more complex functions trialled selectively in important or
controlled areas. Note that camera position with respect to the target may vary for each
analysis function and requires advance consideration where progressive rollout is
planned.
The UK Home Office provides a library of video images that can be used to test
intelligent surveillance systems and also offers an independent testing service for these
systems (limited detection scenarios only). Products that have been passed by this
organisation are granted ‘i-LIDS’ certification and may be more reliable in conditions
similar to the test environment.
High-Resolution Cameras
Following the consumer digital camera technology trend, CCTV cameras are
increasingly available with large format image sensors allowing capture of video images
with extremely high resolutions. Analogue equivalent images are about 0.3 megapixels
(MP), high definition home movie images are up to about 2MP, and single sensor
CCTV cameras are available with resolutions over 16MP and multi-sensor cameras with
over 50MP.
Large
image
sizes
require
higher
capacity
processors
for
image
compression/decompression, bandwidth for image transmission and hard disk storage.
Very high resolution cameras require special handling of the large video data streams,
are less likely to provide 25 images per second and may not facilitate interoperability
with equipment from other vendors.
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Operators considering implementation of high resolution cameras should balance the
potential for reduced camera numbers against cost, functionality and interoperability
requirements.
Data Networks
Digital data network technology is well-established but continually evolving. Network
design should take into account CCTV-specific requirements including:
• the size of the video data stream for each camera/encoder
• the variability of the stream size
• how many different versions of the stream are sent and under what conditions
• if separate streams are sent for each recorder and monitor, or if one stream is shared
among all
• if all streams go through a central point such as a recorder or server, or if streams are
sent directly from the camera/encoder
• the maximum number of simultaneous streams (in and out) that can be
accommodated by the recorder or video analytics processor
• the maximum number of streams that can be processed simultaneously for display
on one display device
• how the system deals with requirements for different video rate/resolution on
various monitors, recorders or remote access devices
• what happens when video data is delayed, lost or contains errors.
An organisation’s operational requirements, commercial arrangements, site conditions,
existing infrastructure and risk management strategies may also dictate aspects of
network design, including:
• compatibility with corporate networks
• network path or device redundancy
• power distribution and backup
• environmental ratings
• existing cables, cable pathways, local or wide-area data network availability
• network physical and data security.
Numerous technical standards address these issues, identifying requirements and
mechanisms for network design, including:
• maximum cable lengths
• cable data bandwidths (10/100/1,000/10,000 Mbps)
• logical separation of data on a physical network (VLANs)
• prioritising which data gets sent or discarded first (Quality of Service)
• power to devices over the copper data cable (Power over Ethernet)
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• broadband Wireless Access (WiMAX)
• mobile Broadband (3G, 4G)
• one-to-one or one-to-many destinations (uni/multicasting)
• wireless connectivity (WLANs)
• security (protection, authentication, authorisation, encryption)
• management (status monitoring, fault investigation, remote configuration etc.).
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
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Table B.1
Technologies for Real-time Situational Awareness
Application /
requirement
Features/problems
Facial
recognition
•
Requires high resolution and extensive database capability
•
Current face-in-a-crowd technology has low reliability
•
Requires significant R&D and testing in real environment
Unattended
item
recognition
•
Current technology requires extensive configuration for individual
environments, and can have high false-alarm rate
•
Further R&D required to reduce false-alarm rate and improve analysis
of video motion and events
Tripwire
•
Current technology with multiple established vendors
•
Requires appropriate camera position and lighting
•
Devices that detect environmental variations such as infra-red,
pressure, light/heat, smoke and/or respond to intruder alarm interfaces
(intelligent and dumb)
•
Integrated in logic-based video analysis and subsequent event
management
•
Further R&D would see ultimate solution based on video analysis, not
external components
•
Read vehicle number plates and highlight targets of interest
•
Requires specific camera position and target illumination
•
Established and proven technology
•
Detects the extended presence of an individual in one place
External
stimulus event
triggering
Number plate
recognition
Loitering
•
Affected by proximity to the camera, lighting and crowd conditions
•
Requires site-specific evaluation
•
Detects when someone has fallen over
•
Affected by proximity to the camera, lighting and crowd conditions
•
Requires site-specific evaluation
•
Detects contra-directional traffic flow
•
Affected by proximity to the camera, lighting and crowd conditions
•
Requires site-specific evaluation
Gait analysis
•
Differences in walking style used to biometrically identify individuals
Camera status
monitoring
•
Automatic detection of camera basic image function
•
Image is in focus, image is adequately lit, camera has not been
obscured or blinded by torchlight
Thermal
imagery
•
Provides high-contrast images at long distances in no-light conditions
•
Cannot identify a person or vehicle
•
Specialist camera, fixed lens and lower resolution
•
Detection relies on obstruction of natural passive terahertz radiation
•
Low resolution and frame rate requires closely defined camera and
target positions to be effective. Few commercial products.
•
Alternative to backscatter x-ray. Should be supplemented with visual
images.
‘Man down’
Directional
motion
Terahertz
cameras
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Table B.2
Technologies for Post-event Forensic Analysis
Application /
requirement
Features/problems
Automated
person
identification
•
Currently requires significant human effort to search
•
Significant R&D is required to efficiently and accurately search
archived footage with low false-alarm rate
Automated
event search
•
Needs to be tailored to specific application/event
•
Possibly high false-alarm rate
•
Can be applied to face matching or to pattern/movement matching
•
Significant R&D needed for full reliability
Video
parameter
enhancement
•
Manipulation of various image components and temporal or spatial
processing to enhance an existing photograph/video segment
•
Significant R&D for full reliability (limited by quality of original
information—requires high frame rate)
3D image
analysis
•
Development of 3D scenarios from multiple 2D images
•
Applications need to be enhanced for counter-terrorism work
•
Significant R&D required
•
Collection, analysis and meaningful combination of CCTV (and other)
imagery from disparate systems (e.g. shops, supermarkets, chemists,
liquor stores etc.) to form a ‘combined’ view of an event from imagery
originally recorded for other purposes
•
Disclosure and privacy regulations need to be considered
•
Significant R&D for full reliability (problems include different formats,
quality etc.)
•
Use of thermal imaging and fluorescent analysis tools (and
surveillance systems) integrated with or separate from ‘normal’ CCTV
applications for extra security and/or coverage
•
Currently very expensive. Needs to be developed, especially for
counter-terrorism applications
Automatic
event
reconstruction
Non-visible
spectrum
analysis
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Appendix C Bibliography
Relevant Standards
The Code is not designed as a uniform, ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescription or specification.
It supplements other guidance material that is applicable according to a jurisdiction’s
transport security risk assessments and legislation.
The Code is to be read in conjunction with the provisions of relevant industry technical,
safety and procedural guidelines, including, but not confined to:
• AS 2201.2–2004: Intruder Alarm Systems—Monitoring Centres.
• AS 2834–1995: Computer Accommodation.
• AS 4806.1–2006: Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—Part 1: Management and
Operation Code of Practice.
• AS 4806.2–2006: Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—Part 2: Application
Guidelines.
• AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799—2006: Information Technology—Security Techniques—
Code of Practice for Information Security Management.
• AS/NZS ISO/IEC 27001–2006: Information Technology—Security Techniques—
Information Security Management Systems—Requirements.
• AS/NZS ISO 31000–2009: Risk Management—Principles and Guidelines.
• HB 171–2003: Guidelines for the Management of IT Evidence.
• HB 231—2004: Information Security Risk Management Guidelines.
• HB 221–2004: Business Continuity Management.
Standards are usually guidelines; they require some expertise to be implemented
properly. They are not a substitute for employing suitably experienced and qualified
personnel, but help those personnel to ensure that their work complies with national or
international norms. A given situation may warrant measures substantially beyond the
baselines prescribed in a standard.
Other Potentially Useful Reference Documents
• Attorney General’s Department (NSW), 2000. NSW Government Policy Statement
and Guidelines for the Establishment and Implementation of Closed-Circuit
Television (CCTV) in Public Places.
• British Standard BS8495–2007: Image Export for Evidence.
• Crime Prevention & Community Safety Council (TAS), 2008 Policing
Requirements for Closed-Circuit Television.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
56
• Department of Justice (VIC), 2011. Guide to Developing CCTV for Public Safety in
Victoria.
• Department of Transport & Main Roads (QLD), March 2008. Recommended
Guidelines for the Installation and Use of Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) in
Queensland Buses—PT 406/03.08.
• Home Office Scientific Development Branch, 2009. CCTV Operational
Requirements Manual. Downloaded on 14 December 2011 from
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/ManagingTheRisk/28_09_CCT
V_OR_Manual2835.pdf.
• National Institute of Forensic Science, Electronic Evidence Specialist Advisory
Group, 2011. CCTV Test Chart (draft).
• Office of Crime Prevention (WA), 2009. Western Australia Closed-Circuit
Television (CCTV) Guidelines.
• QLD State Archives, October 2010. Managing Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)
Records—Guideline for Queensland Public Authorities.
• ViDi Labs, 2011. CCTV Test Chart. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.vidilabs.com/
Policy Guidelines
• Australian Safety & Compensation Council, 2011. Guidance on the Principles of
Safe Design for Work. Downloaded on 15 December 2011 from
http://safeworkaustralia.gov.au/AboutSafeWorkAustralia/WhatWeDo/Publications/
Documents/154/GuidanceOnThePrinciplesOfSafeDesign_2006_PDF.pdf
• Council of Australian Governments, 3 June 2005. Intergovernmental Agreement on
Surface Transport Security. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.coag.gov.au/intergov_agreements/docs/transport_security.pdf
• Council of Australian Governments, 14 July 2006. A National Approach to ClosedCircuit Television. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2006-0714/docs/cctv_code_practice.pdf
• National Institute of Forensic Science, 2004. Australasian Guidelines for Digital
Imaging Processes. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.nifs.com.au/2004%20Digital%20Imaging%20Guidelines.pdf .
• Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, 2011. Privacy Impact
Assessment Guide. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.privacy.gov.au/index.php?option=com_icedoc&view=types&element=g
uidelines&fullsummary=6590&Itemid=1021
• Safe Work Australia, 2011. Safe Design Resources. Downloaded on 15 December
2011 from
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http://safeworkaustralia.gov.au/safetyinyourworkplace/safedesign/Resources/Pages/
SafeDesignresources.aspx
• Standing Committee on Transport Security Standing Sub-Committee, March 2011.
CCTV Code of Practice Review 2010-11: Monitoring and Review of the Code.
• The Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2011. Surveillance in Public Places Final
Report. Downloaded on 4 November 2011 from
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/justlib/law+reform/home/compl
eted+projects/surveillance+in+public+places/lawreform++surveillance+in+public+places+-+final+report
Legal Framework
The legislative framework relevant to a great many elements of society, including the
implementation of CCTV systems, changes through time. It consists of a range of
primary and delegated legislation in all jurisdictions. It is not possible to detail an
exhaustive list of ‘current’ legislation.
It is the obligation of agencies and owner/operators to inform themselves of their
respective legal obligations in relation to CCTV. In the first instance, advice should be
sought from the jurisdiction transport security regulatory authority. Professional legal
advice may also be sought.
Breaches of the law, for example in respect of privacy, can result in substantial
penalties. Agencies and owner/operators are strongly advised to inform themselves.
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Appendix D Recommended Security Functions,
Operational Objectives and
Transport Security Priorities
Table D.1 summarises the relationships between the various security functions that can
be performed by CCTV systems and the four operational objectives (Monitor, Detect,
Recognise and Identify).
Tables D.2, D.3 and D.4 recommend operational objectives for typical areas within
transport modes for each transport security priority. Supplementary capability may
include portable CCTV when circumstances require increased intensity of coverage, or
to meet police operational objectives.
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Table D.1
Relationship of Security Functions to Operational Objectives
Security function
Description: Operational Objectives
Deter
Providing a visible deterrent to potential offenders by the presence of
a monitored CCTV system with appropriate signage and advertising
Detect
Detecting suspicious activity through live monitoring of a CCTV
system by:
Respond
•
conducting an ‘electronic security patrol’, discreetly monitoring
many locations in a short time
•
verifying that an incident is occurring, after a report or alarm
Through live monitoring of the system, aiding the response to an
incident by:
•
Investigate
Reassure
community
monitoring the incident from a safe location (e.g. a secure
monitoring centre) and providing information about the incident,
including:
•
the location, nature and extent of the incident
•
the immediate response required (fire, police, ambulance)
•
safe entrance locations
•
safe evacuation paths
•
recognising a suspect moving in or through an area and tracking
their movement
•
operating cameras to identify a suspect (e.g. in a hostage
incident) as is ‘known’ or ‘not known’ Responding authorities with
direct access to live CCTV will manage the response to the
incident. This may include monitoring the incident/response,
recognising and identifying people present, and helping to
manage the incident.
Investigators reviewing recorded CCTV product after an incident to
find out what happened and who was involved. This will include:
•
views before, during and after the incident with enough detail to
recognise those present, and what happened, to a required
evidentiary standard
•
images to identify all people present (e.g. victims, witnesses and
suspects)
Providing reassurance to the members of the community who will
recognise that CCTV is a valuable security risk treatment
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Table D.2
Operational Objectives for Buses, Ferries, Interchanges and
Terminals
Location
Area
Operational Objectives
Priority 1
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 2
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 3
transport
security
priority
areas
Interchanges and terminals
Public access areas
Car parks
Non-public access
areas
Stabling yards
Depots
Maintenance areas
Maintenance
dockyards
•
Public entry/exit at
strategic choke
points
Identify
Recognise
Monitor
•
Passenger waiting
areas
Detect
Detect
Not defined
•
Platforms, wharves
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Public access areas
(general)
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
•
Baggage handling
areas
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
(vehicles)
Identify
Recognise
Not defined
•
Open-air car parks
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Enclosed car parks
(vehicles)
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit to critical
areas (restricted
access/security
areas)
Identify
Recognise
Monitor
•
Entry/exit to
non-critical areas
(restricted
access/security
areas)
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Baggage handling
areas
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
•
Major plant rooms,
fuel storage, power
facilities
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points to
site
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Location of rolling
stock/fleet
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
On-board (mobile) CCTV—buses/ ferries
Mass transit
buses/ferries
•
Passenger areas
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
Identify
Recognise
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Other buses/ferries
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Table D.3
Location
Operational Objectives for Trains, Trams, Stations, Stops,
Interchanges and Terminals
a
Area
Operational Objectives
Priority 1
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 2
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 3
transport
security
priority
areas
Areas
Public access areas
Car parks
b
Non-public access
b
areas
Operational areas
b
•
Public entry/exit
at strategic
‘choke’ points
Identify
Recognise
Monitor
•
Passenger
waiting areas
Detect
Detect
Not defined
•
Platforms,
lounges
Recognise
Monitor
Monitor
•
Public access
areas (general)
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
(vehicles)
Identify
Recognise
Not defined
•
Open-air car
parks
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Enclosed car
parks (vehicles)
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
All adjacent car
parks—entry/exit
points for
vehicles
Identify
Recognise
(vehicles)
Not defined
•
Entry/exit to
critical areas—
restricted
access/security
areas
Identify
Recognise
Monitor
•
Entry/exit to
non-critical areas
—restricted
access/security
areas
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Traffic/operations
control rooms—
entry/exit points
Identify
Identify
Recognise
•
Operational area
entry/exit points
Identify
Monitor
Not defined
•
Major plant
rooms, fuel
storage/power
facilities
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Baggage
handling areas(4)
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
continued…
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Location
a
Area
Stabling yards
Depots
b
Maintenance areas
Operational Objectives
Priority 1
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 2
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 3
transport
security
priority
areas
•
Perimeter
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Location of rolling
stock/fleet
Monitor
Monitor
Not defined
On-board (mobile) CCTV—trains
Mass transit trains
Other trains
•
Passenger areas
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
b
On-board (mobile) CCTV—trams
Mass transit trams
Other trams
a
b
b
•
Passenger areas
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Entry/exit points
Monitor
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
b
Security regulated areas, such as airports or ports, aircraft or vessels, may have different requirements set by the
relevant security regulator (for example the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services).
Subject to the specific needs identified in the risk assessment.
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Table D.4
Location
Operational Objectives for Aviation Areas, Airports and Aircraft
Area
Operational Objectives
Priority 1
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 2
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 3
transport
security
priority
areas
Areas, airports and terminals
Car parks
(public and
staff)
Landside
(public access
areas)
Airside (sterile
areas)
•
Entry/exit points (vehicles)
Identify
Identify
Not defined
•
Open-air car parks
(persons)
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Enclosed car parks
(pedestrian access/exit
points)
Recognise
Monitor
Not defined
•
Public entry/exit (strategic
'choke' points)
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Passenger check-in
counters
Recognise
Detect
Monitor
•
Passenger screening
points
Identify
Recognise
Recognise
•
Passenger waiting
areas/lounges
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Public access areas
(general)
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Departure/arrival gates
Identify
Recognise
Not defined
•
Baggage carousels
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Restricted (non-critical)
access areas (entry/exit)
Recognise
Detect
Monitor
•
Immigration/Customs
screening points
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Passenger waiting
areas/lounges
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Public access areas
(general)
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Departure/arrival/transit
gates
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Baggage carousels
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Restricted (critical) access
areas (entry/exit)
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Staff/crew entry/exit points
Identify
Identify
Identify
continued…
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Location
Operational
areas
Area
Operational Objectives
Priority 1
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 2
transport
security
priority
areas
Priority 3
transport
security
priority
areas
•
Vehicle entry/exit points
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Staff/crew entry/exit points
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Air traffic control / security
control rooms—entry/exits
Identify
Identify
Identify
•
Major plant rooms
Power facilities
Aircraft catering facilities
(entry/exit points)
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Baggage handling areas
(airside)
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Cargo handling areas
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Maintenance areas—
entry/exit points
Recognise
Detect
Not defined
•
Aircraft—stand-off bays
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
•
Fuel storage facilities
Detect
Monitor
Not defined
On-board (mobile) aircraft
Passenger jets
(international
a
and domestic)
Not defined by this Code.
Refer to the Department of Transport and Regional Services for advice.
Light
passenger
aircraft
a
Not defined
Not defined
Not defined
Security regulated areas, such as airports or ports, aircraft or vessels, may have different requirements set by the
relevant security regulator (for example, the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services).
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Appendix E Recommended CCTV Performance
and Storage Criteria
As indicated at Section 4.1, the definitions detailed in this Appendix are informed by the
UK Home Office document CCTV Operational Requirements Manual and by the
relevant Australian Standard, AS 4806.2—2006: Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV)—
Part 2: Application Guidelines. Of specific relevance to this Appendix are Section 3.1
(Figure 4) of the UK manual and Figure 5 of the Australian Standard.
Table E.1
Operational
Objective
a
Performance Criteria for each Operational Objective
CCTV Performance Criteria
Monitoring viewed image resolution
(lines)
Monitor
20
Detect
40
Recognise
200
Identify
400
a
As video images can now be presented in a number of display formats with resolutions varying from less, to far
greater than a standard PAL monitor, the “% of screen height” has been replaced with the equivalent “lines of
resolution”. In order to achieve the required Operational Objective, this number of lines must be able to be resolved
‘end-to-end’ by the CCTV system, e.g. with a scaled test chart that emulates the target size and distance from the
camera, as viewed in replay on the intended display device in the required display format (i.e. split screen/full
screen).
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Table E.2
Resolution Criteria
ViDi Labs Test Chart (Figure E.4)
Operational
Objective
Field-of-view
width at test
chart plane
Resolution
a
requirement
Test chart
location
Resolution
requirement
Monitor
Chart at full
width on the
display device
Distinguish "Level 3"
(Red text) Vertical
Bars
-
-
Detect
Chart at full
width on the
display device
Distinguish "Level 2"
(Green text ) Vertical
Bars
-
-
Recognise
Chart at half
width on the
display device
Distinguish ‘C’ or
higher level Tilted
Bars
Actual distance to
target face
Distinguish
vertical lines at
8 mm marker
Identify
Chart at full
width on the
b
display device
Capture facial detail
sufficient to identify
an individual
Actual distance to
target
face/number plate
Distinguish
vertical lines at
4 mm marker
(Face)
(Number
plate)
a
b
c
NIFS Test Chart (DRAFT)
c
(Figure E.5)
Read 5% size
number plate
Distinguish
vertical lines at
2.94 mm
marker
Use chart indicator details relevant to image type and format (SD/720HD/1080HD).
Representing person occupying 100% of the picture height with face at 15%.
Converging lines chart superimposed on a full-size face (15% of 1.6 m = 240 mm).
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Table E.3
a
b
Live Viewing and Recording Criteria
Transport Security
Priority Rating
Functionality
Live Viewing
a
Requirement
Recording
b
Requirement
Priority 1 locations
Live viewing
Routine live monitoring
of selected cameras
Recording of all
cameras. Capability to
review recordings in
response to a report of
an incident or an alarm
event
Priority 2 locations
Verify—incident
or alarm
Live viewing in
response to a report of
an incident or an alarm
event—other live
viewing optional at
operator discretion
Recording of all
cameras where
practicable. Capability
to review recordings in
response to a report of
an incident or an alarm
event
Priority 3 locations
Record only
Live viewing optional at
operator discretion
Recording of all
cameras where
practicable. Capability
to review recordings in
response to a report of
an incident or an alarm
event
Live viewing: live observation by operators in (near) real time of CCTV monitors showing selected camera views.
Recording includes either continuous recording, activity detection or event triggered recording, on any form of
storage device that can later be replayed as video imagery.
Recording time requirement of 24 hours × seven days/week—includes either continuous recording, or recording
activated in response to an alarm device or imagery processing to ensure a record of any relevant activity within the
camera field-of-view.
Recording time requirement for on-vehicle CCTV (train/tram/bus/ferry)—recording while operational.
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Figure E.4
Example of CCTV Test Chart
Prepared by V. Damjanovski © 2010 (www.vidilabs.com)
The CCTV test chart is produced in an A3 format, and comes on a hard foam board. It is
printed on a special proof paper with minimum light reflection and high colour stability.
The same chart comes in the book, CCTV Test Chart, in a smaller (A4) format.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
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Figure E.5
CCTV Test Chart (DRAFT)
Prepared by National Institute of Forensic Science, Electronic Evidence Specialist Advisory Group, 2011.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
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Appendix F Code Background, Objectives,
Development and Application
Background
The Special Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting on CounterTerrorism in September 2005 advised in its communiqué that:
COAG discussed the significant role that closed-circuit television (CCTV)
played in the identification of the perpetrators of the July 2005 terrorist attacks
in London and its potential to assist police counter-terrorism investigations.
COAG noted that jurisdictions already have extensive CCTV networks across
transport, public spaces and major facilities. COAG agreed that each
jurisdiction would undertake and share across governments a review of the
functionality, location, coverage and operability of mass passenger transport
sector CCTV systems. This will be a first step towards a broader consideration
of the use of CCTV in support of counter-terrorism arrangements.
COAG also agreed to a national risk-based approach to enhancing the use of
CCTV for counter-terrorism purposes, including the development of a National
Code of Practice for CCTV systems for the mass passenger transport sector.
The Code will set a policy framework, objectives, protocols and minimum
requirements for the use of CCTV systems to enhance counter-terrorism
arrangements so that future investment is based on appropriate risk analysis. It
will also contain agreed requirements for fixed and mobile CCTV systems, and
national guidelines for the collection, storage, access, use, privacy, disclosure,
protection and retention of CCTV information.
The Code will allow each jurisdiction to determine its own CCTV requirements
having regard to the use of CCTV for local counter-terrorism purposes.
COAG further agreed that a COAG Working Group, to be chaired by Victoria,
would be established to develop the Code that will involve consultation with
private industry. The Working Group will make an initial report to COAG in
February 2006 with the draft Code.
COAG agreed to identify necessary legislative measures to ensure consistent
implementation of the Code, to encourage business and industry to comply with
the Code, and to work cooperatively in research, development, trial and
evaluation of new CCTV technologies.
The COAG CCTV Working Group also facilitated arrangements for parallel and
interrelated work on these matters, which are managed separately, through coordination
by the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC).
Closed-Circuit Television in the Mass Transport Sector
CCTV has established uses in industry and in the community for a range of purposes,
such as public safety, crime prevention or investigation, industry operational functions,
and improving productivity.
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Sector for Counter-Terrorism, March 2012.
71
All levels of government have some involvement in aspects of CCTV that affect
transport:
• States and Territories have extensive CCTV systems in place for the operational
management of transport infrastructure. In some cities, local governments,
shopping centres and sports centres manage street and public space CCTV systems
as a deterrent to criminal behaviour.
• Most jurisdictions have legislation regulating some aspects of CCTV usage for
privacy reasons. Some have regulations for the use of CCTV in certain types of
premises, such as casinos, or for liquor licensing.
• The Commonwealth regulates the security of airports and maritime industry
participants (that fall within the Commonwealth’s jurisdiction) consistent with
international standards. The Commonwealth also manages CCTV systems for
customs and other purposes.
Objectives
National Policy and Security: the Value of Being Prepared
In December 2005, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee noted that the national
counter-terrorism alert level remained at ‘Medium’, which means that a terrorist attack
could occur in Australia. Reasonable measures to prevent, mitigate and manage such a
risk are essential. Mass passenger systems generally, and mass transit systems in
particular, are highly vulnerable to terrorist attack. The only way to guarantee their
complete security would be to stop and close them, but a careful risk-management
approach can substantially reduce the potential for, or the impact of, terrorist acts, and
put in place effective means to respond to any acts that do occur.
While preventive measures are important, the possibility of successful terrorist attacks
must be considered. As shown overseas, successful attacks can result in a high casualty
rate, significant short-term disruption and high-profile international media coverage.
There is no data with which to define a statistically credible or predictable range of
probability or impact. However, probability and impact can be described by reference
to actual terrorist incidents, or changes in the assessed risk, in other western societies.
It has been observed that:
• Terrorist incidents generate substantial additional costs to a community, in both the
public and private sectors.
• The short and long-term burdens on health systems created by terrorist incidents are
substantial because of the characteristically severe injuries (extensive burns, eye
damage, loss of limbs), physical and emotional trauma, and likely high mortality
rates among the initial survivors. Other people affected by the consequences of
terrorist acts, including through significant relationships, can also show high levels
of emotional stress or psychological impact, and may need professional assistance
for several years.
• Sustained reduction in total inbound travel has been estimated for New York after
the September 2001 attacks, representing a substantial direct and indirect economic
impact.
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Conversely, improved counter-terrorism arrangements generate benefits to the
community. These are unable to be easily quantified or monetised, but are nevertheless
real and important.
Because of the difficulty in meaningfully and reliably quantifying the risk or the impact
of a future terrorist attack, or the non-monetary benefits of CCTV, it would be
inappropriate to use a cost–benefit analysis as the primary evaluation tool for
investment decisions about CCTV systems for counter-terrorism arrangements.
Similarly, a cost–benefit analysis is unable to quantify community members’
expectations for their protection from terrorist attacks as they go about their business.
Development
Principles for Formulation
Some principles that were adopted in the formulation of the Code were the need to:
• define the Code in ways that, over time, are technology neutral and functionally
relevant and that specify practical outcomes
• ensure that law enforcement, national security and other relevant agencies have
timely access to evidentiary-standard material, enabling an effective operational
response consistent with national expectations
• adopt and implement protocols and minimum requirements for the collection,
storage, access, use, disclosure, protection and retention of information across
governments and industry, while ensuring that the privacy of personal information is
appropriately protected
• develop a nationally-consistent approach to CCTV systems, which can be updated to
accommodate new requirements and developing technologies
• efficiently and economically adopt and maximise the security benefits of emerging
CCTV technologies, such as facial, behavioural and automatic number plate
recognition
• utilise available technological solutions (such as planning tools for the placement of
cameras) to ensure effective and efficient CCTV systems for counter-terrorism
purposes
• ensure that future investment is based on appropriate risk analysis and prioritisation
• ensure that an appropriate risk-based balance is struck between the utility of CCTV
as a counter-terrorism tool and the significant privacy and civil liberties issues
entailed in its use.
Application
A Risk-based Approach
Resource commitments for CCTV initiatives by governments and transport operators
are subject to determination and prioritisation along with broader requirements for
counter-terrorism. A risk-based approach should be taken in the application of the
Code.
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Expected Benefits
Application of the Code will enhance the potential of CCTV systems in the mass
passenger transport sector to:
• Assist in the response to a terrorist attack to:
–
improve the situational awareness of transport operators, police and emergency
services to enable more rapid and effective response
–
improve the timely capacity to investigate criminal acts to enable prompt
apprehension of the offenders and their associates and to prevent further acts by
any of them
–
improve the availability and forensic value of CCTV imagery for investigations
and in court proceedings.
• Contribute indirectly to counter-terrorism arrangements in order to:
–
reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack on mass passenger transport systems
–
improve the detection of suspicious incidents to enable more rapid and effective
response to such incidents
–
increase and retain public and staff confidence in surface transport security and
safety, and so promote use of public transport, both before and after any incident
or media speculation.
The potential benefits of adopting a nationally-consistent approach to CCTV systems
also include:
• consistency of data quality, ensuring evidentiary-standard product
• consistency of operating standards and protocols
• capacity for upgrades as new technology becomes available
• consistency and compatibility of data formats, facilitating exchange between
jurisdictions
• capacity to develop and maintain a national pool of technical expertise for
interpretation and analysis, especially for major incidents requiring a national
response.
A National Approach to Closed-Circuit Television—National Code of Practice for CCTV Systems for the Mass Passenger Transport
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