‘Reaping the whirlwind’ Aerial agriculture and mustering Jul-Aug 2011 Issue 81 iFar away … so close Remote tower technology i Volcanic fallout Australian flights cancelled ‘Passengers behaving badly’ Bad manners and dangerous acts AUSTRALIAN AIR PILOTS MUTUAL BENEFIT FUND YOUR LOSS OF LICENCE FUND PROVIDING SUPPORT AND PEACE OF MIND TO AUSTRALIA’’” S ’ COMMERCIAL PILOTS The Australian Air Pilots Mutual Beneﬁt Fund is the loss of licence fund that exists solely to assist its members. For 50 years, we’ve been providing Australian commercial pilots with the peace of mind that they will be ﬁnancially supported in the event their Australian Class One Medical Certiﬁcate is suspended or cancelled. We’re different to other loss of licence providers: s $ESIGNEDFORPILOTSANDRUNBYPILOTSnWEUNDERSTAND the unique working conditions in which pilots operate. s 9OURLEVELOFBENElTISDETERMINEDBYTHECONTRIBUTION SCALENOTBYYOURSALARYORINCOMEnTHEMAXIMUMLEVEL available is $550,000. s #OMPETITIVECOSTSnMOSTPILOTSCANOBTAINREIMBURSEMENT under their award or agreement from their employer. s "ENElTPAYMENTSTOMEMBERSARENOTREDUCEDTOA percentage of your salary, or reduced should you be capable of any employment whilst your Class One is suspended. s #OVERTHATSTAYSWITHYOUTHROUGHOUTYOURCAREER nFUNDMEMBERSCANRETAINMEMBERSHIPEVENWHEN they change employers. Join the fund that offers competitive cover designed for Australian commercial pilots. For more information or to download an application form, visit www.aapmbf.com.au or call +61 3 9928 4500. This information is of a general nature only. It does not take into account your personal circumstances and is not intended to be relied upon as speciﬁc ﬁnancial advice. You should read the Product Disclosure Statement (available at www.aapmbf.com.au) before deciding whether to become a member of the Fund. No responsibility for loss by any person acting, or not acting, as a result of this advertisement will be accepted. Trustee: Austair Pilots Pty Ltd AFSL 344259 AAPMBF CELEBRATING 50 YEARS OF SERVING OUR MEMBERS ISSUE NO. 81, Jul-Aug 2011 DIRECTOR OF AVIATION SAFETY, CASA John McCormick MANAGER, SAFETY PROMOTION Gail Sambidge-Mitchell EDITOR, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Margo Marchbank WRITER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Robert Wilson SUB-EDITOR, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Joanna Pagan DESIGNER, FLIGHT SAFETY AUSTRALIA Fiona Scheidel ADVERTISING SALES P: 131 757 or E: email@example.com CORRESPONDENCE Flight Safety Australia GPO Box 2005 Canberra ACT 2601 P: 131 757 F: 02 6217 1950 E: firstname.lastname@example.org W: www.casa.gov.au CHANGED YOUR ADDRESS? To change your address online, go to http://casa.gov.au/change For address change enquiries, call CASA on 1300 737 032 DISTRIBUTION Bi-monthly to 87,558 aviation licence holders, cabin crew and industry personnel in Australia and internationally. CONTRIBUTIONS Stories and photos are welcome. Please discuss your ideas with editorial staff before submission. 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CONTENTS Features 8 'Reaping the whirlwind' The risks of agricultural and mustering ﬂying, and how operators manage them 14 'Stockhorse of the sky: the Robinson R22' A study of the cattle-chasing ‘copter found some reassuring results 20 'Passengers behaving badly' Boorish at best, an aviation hazard at worst 24 'Far away, so close' The air trafﬁc controllers of the future may not even be at the airport 28 'Volcanic fallout extends its reach' Suddenly it’s Australia’s problem 31 'Birthday blues' Take a closer look at your ageing aircraft 44 'Sea Change: the offshore evolution' Offshore helicopter aviation is inﬂuencing rotary-wing operations on land 58 'War and remembrance, fog and death' The needless tragedy of last year’s Polish presidential plane crash 62 'By the numbers' Is your transponder set correctly? Warning: This educational publication does not replace ERSA, AIP, airworthiness regulatory documents, manufacturers’ advice, or NOTAMs. Operational information in Flight Safety Australia should only be used in conjunction with current operational documents. Regulars Information contained herein is subject to change. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. 2 Flight Bytes–aviation safety news 16 ATC Notes–news from Airservices Australia 18 Accident reports–International 19 Accident reports–Australian 31 Airworthiness pull-out section © Copyright 2011, Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia. Copyright for the ATSB and ATC supplements rests with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau and Airservices Australia respectively – these supplements are written, edited and designed independently of CASA. All requests for permission to reproduce any articles should be directed to FSA editorial (see correspondence details above). 34 SDRs 39 Directives Registered–Print Post: 381667-00644. ISSN 1325-5002. 46 Close Calls Main cover photo: myloupe.com Cover design: Fiona Scheidel ʹͲͳͲǦ ʹͲͳͳ ͺǡͷͷͺ 46 Down and dirty 48 Shear luck 50 A weighty problem This magazine is printed on paper from sustainably managed forests and controlled sources Recognised in Australia through the Australian Forestry Standard 52 66 70 71 ATSB supplement Av Quiz Calendar Quiz answers Flight Safety Australia: winner of the international Flight Safety Foundation’s 2010 Cecil A. Brownlow Award for aviation safety journalism. Upcoming conferences July 26 - 28 Australian Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment Conference Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre October 26 - 27 Safeskies biennial International Aviation Safety Conference, Hyatt Hotel Canberra October 26 - 27 National Chief Flying Instructor Conference, Hyatt Hotel Canberra AERIAL APPLICATION PILOTS MANUAL UPDATE CASA JOINS THE TWITTERVERSE SUSTAIN YOUR OLD PLANE Owners and operators of ageing CASA is now tweeting. Access all our aircraft – and that’s most of them latest information quickly and easily – should make a diary note of the on Twitter by going to @CASABrieﬁng. Australian Aircraft Airworthiness and Follow CASA on Twitter and stay in Sustainment Conference. touch with all things aviation. This includes news, updates to our website, It’s at the Brisbane Convention and the release of new documents and Exhibition Centre from 26-28 July. The The new edition will be launched publications, new safety promotion conference brings together engineers, at the 4As Conference in Adelaide products, seminars and workshops operators, maintainers, managers and in mid-June, and printed copies of and other activities. scientists to discuss all aspects of the manual will be sent out to 4As aircraft sustainment. Among the topics members as soon as possible in the CASA does not release news and are ﬂeet management, avionics and new ﬁnancial year. Extra copies information solely on Twitter. However, wiring, mechanical systems, structures can be purchased via the AAAA it is a quick and easy way to keep website www.aerialag.com.au and up-to-date with new information from and corrosion, ageing materials, spares, logistics and crashworthiness. a downloadable .pdf version will be CASA. available on the members’ section of For more information visit: the site. www.ageingaircraft.com.au/aasc As this issue of Flight Safety Australia goes to print CASA is collaborating with the Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia (AAAA) to produce a revised and updated third edition of this essential resource for all aerial application and agricultural pilots. ARE YOU RECEIVING HELINEWS ASIA-PACIFIC? Informing and entertaining pilots for over 20 years. SUBSCRIBE ONLINE NOW TO RECEIVE YOUR 3 FREE ISSUES! Ð www.helinews.com.au/subscriptions 34961_5 FSA JUL-AUG 2011 2 SAFESKIES 2011 The award-winning Safeskies biennial International Aviation Safety Conference is recognised globally as a highly informative event at which aviation professionals gather to exchange ideas on current and developing air safety issues. This year’s conference, with the theme Future growth: Future challenges, will be held on Wednesday 26 and Thursday 27 October at the Hyatt Hotel in Canberra. Speakers and attendees will include national and international representatives from airlines, the military, general aviation and airports, industry associations, safety and professional bodies, government regulators and safety investigators, air trafﬁc management and other service providers and the aerospace industry. A highlight promises to be the Sir Reginald Ansett Memorial Lecture and Safeskies conference dinner on Tuesday, 25 October, at Parliament House in Canberra, which will feature a joint presentation by Australian astronauts, husband and wife, Dr Andy Thomas and Dr Shannon Walker. 3 For bookings and more information visit: www.safeskiesaustralia.org $HURSODQHDQG+HOLFRSWHU7KHRU\([SHUWV ũ Ũ ř ɨɯŠŪ I ŜŜŜ Š ŨŠ řŜŜŜ ºŠ )XOO\$FFUHGLWHG572 $FFRPPRGDWLRQ$UUDQJHG ([SHULHQFHGIULHQGO\DQGSURIHVVLRQDOVWDII ,QQRYDWLYHWUDLQLQJWRSDVVWKH&$6$&\EHU([DPV (QKDQFH\RXUDYLDWLRQFDUHHUZLWKRQHFDOOWRXV ZZZDIWFRPDXF\EHUH[DPV ŜŜ Ŝ śſ ɥ ɮ ƀ ɬ ɫ ɫ ɯ ɮ ɮ ɮ ɥ $GYDQFHG)OLJKW7KHRU\ :DUUHQ0F,YRUDQG1DWKDQ+LJJLQV$YLDWLRQ7KHRU\6SHFLDOLVWV FLIGHT BYTES $73/7+(25< ATLANTIC YIELDS AIR FRANCE DETAILS CALLING ALL CFIs CLARIFICATION ON CASA is holding the second National CARBY ICING Chief Flying Instructor Conference in conjunction with Safeskies in Canberra on 26 - 27 October 2011. This is a ‘must-attend’ for leading CFIs. It’s a perfect opportunity to gain an insight into latest trends, network with other aviation professionals and contribute to the development of aviation safety material. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 4 The main theme for this year’s conference is ‘Threat and Error Management’ (TEM). Flying schools have given CASA feedback that they would welcome additional guidance material and tools for integrating TEM into their ﬂying training curriculum and guidance on assessing it effectively at ﬂight test stage. The conference will include a workshop at which attendees will develop material for CASA to incorporate in safety education resources for the ﬂying training sector. The second theme is an exploration of generational learning styles. An interactive session will include a case study on how ﬂying schools can engage more effectively with new generations of students: the Gen Ys and Gen Zs. There will also be updates from CASA on ﬂying training and testing, and the new ﬂight crew licensing and ﬂying training regulations. As several readers have pointed out, the article in Flight Safety Australia May/June 2011 should have been more accurate about latent heat and the instrumentation of Robinson helicopters. Latent heat is not lost but added in the transformation from a liquid to a gas. In the case of a carburettor, this extra heat is taken from the air ﬂowing through it. This is why the air ﬂowing through a carburettor cools, often to the point of ice formation. Details of what happened in the ﬁnal few minutes of Air France Flight 447 are emerging after its ﬂight data and cockpit voice recorders were raised from 4000m beneath the sea. The Airbus A330 ﬂying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris crashed on 1 June 2009, killing all 228 on board. But the mystery surrounding the ﬂight has, if anything, deepened with the revelation that the pilot ﬂying pulled back on the side-stick, despite the stall warning sounding. The French Bureau of Investigation and Analysis (BEA) Robinson helicopter pilots familiar released an update to the investigation with their panels would have realised in late May. Among its ﬁndings were that carburettor heat is added to keep that: the carburettor air temperature gauge There was an inconsistency needle out of the yellow arc, rather between the speeds displayed on than in it, and that manifold pressure the left side and the integrated on a helicopter or constant-speed prop standby instrument system. This is not a reliable indication of icing. It’s lasted for less than one minute. also worth adding that in its Safety Notice 25 Robinson recommends full carburettor heat on the R22 whenever manifold pressure is at 18 inches or less and on the R44 whenever there is visible moisture. Thanks to those who pointed this out and for their generous comments that these mistakes did not negate the important message of the story – it doesn’t need to be a freezing cold day for there to be a danger of carburettor ice. After the autopilot disengagement the airplane climbed to 38,000ft, the stall warning was triggered and the aeroplane stalled, The inputs made by the pilot ﬂying were mainly nose-up, The descent lasted 3 min and 30 seconds, during which the aeroplane remained stalled. The angle of attack increased and remained above 35 degrees, The engines were operating and always responded to crew commands, Cabri G2 Now available in Australia! The Cabri G2 is a brand new type of helicopter that will revolutionise the aircraft industry. Ph: 02 9708 6666 Web: www.guimbal.com.au The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, a roll angle of 5.3 degrees left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min. The BSc degree in aeronautics with a major in UAS operations includes courses in the systems of unmanned aircraft, UAS ground systems, UAS communications and telemetry, and UAS remote sensing. The major The BEA is continuing to analyse curriculum also includes aviation the accident in preparation for its safety, human factors, and crew ﬁnal report. resource management relating to UA operations. UNMANNED SECTOR GROWS BY DEGREES The Commission is committed to supporting better compliance with international safety standards whenever possible and has therefore mandated the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to carry out technical assistance missions to support the competent authorities of various states in their efforts to enhance safety and address any safety concerns. In Australia, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is charged with the effective safety regulation of air operations. Australia does not have a black list, but CASA's International Operations branch has developed a risk matrix, in accordance with ICAO standards. 5 FLIGHT BYTES Students use a ScanEagle simulator, The University of North Dakota recently progressing from basic ﬂight operations celebrated the graduation of the ﬁrst to advanced sensor techniques and unmanned aircraft systems operations emergency procedures, and ﬁnally to degree students in America. mission-related UAS employment and operational techniques. All the UAS graduates are enjoying great interest from potential employers, and EU BLACK LIST UPDATED some are already working in the ﬁeld, The European Commission has which is expected to explode when the updated the list of carriers banned Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) from operating in the European Union opens airspace to civilian applications. (EU). Newly-added are all airlines from ‘We may see it open up in the next few Mozambique, and two Boeing 767s months for law enforcement agencies,’ belonging to Air Madagascar – the only said UAS chief pilot Mark Hastings, ‘but long-haul aircraft the airline operates. it probably won’t be until 2015 that we Four all-cargo carriers from Indonesia see it open to commercial applications, and one from Ukraine have been such as patrolling oil pipelines.’ removed from the list, but 269 carriers are still banned from operating in the EU. Twenty-one countries are subject to blanket bans of all their registered aircraft. In other cases, speciﬁc airlines are blacklisted but the country is not, and some airlines can only operate into the EU with restrictions such as using speciﬁcally approved aircraft, or undergoing special inspections. organised, and that the process The matrix: (a) applies entry control standards to complies with regulations for paperless an applicant for a foreign aircraft operation. AOC, and Fleet managers, jet librarians and (b) determines the level of surveillance ﬂight dispatchers are provided with a required for an operator of foreign console that allows them to drag and aircraft conducting commercial air drop electronic copies of their manuals, documents, and notices into online operations in Australia. routing folders that transfer the correct The risk matrix is one of many tools documents to the correct aircraft. used to assist the International Operations branch with their regulatory Documents and emails can be sent to oversight of foreign operators. Some one plane, all planes of the same type, foreign operators require enhanced the entire ﬂeet, or to special libraries surveillance based on a risk assessment customised for the ﬂeet. Pilots are automatically notiﬁed that documents and historical data. are waiting for them. By pressing one For more information: button, all the documents are retrieved http://ec.europa.eu/transport/ and organised in the appropriate air-ban/list_en.htm folders, and an audit trail is generated. NO PAPER IN NEW FLIGHT BAG Canadian company On-Board Data Systems recently announced the release of Aviation Docs, a paperless ﬂight deck solution for business jet ﬂeet operators to securely and selectively route all documents, emails and ﬂight plans to their pilots’ Apple iPads and some Windows-based devices anywhere in the world. Pilots can now use electronic features, such as search, hyperlink and annotation support, to create an economical and reliable electronic ﬂight bag. For a number of years CASA has offered a document library, updated several times a year, on CD-ROM to the aviation industry. The CD contained aviation legislation and other information such as airworthiness bulletins, manuals and forms. Recently CASA surveyed subscribers to the CD document library to ﬁnd out how they used the service and to evaluate its continuing value for subscribers. Feedback from these users shows that the CD version of the document library has outlived its usefulness, so it will be discontinued. The CD-ROM subscribers received in April 2011 is the last to be offered An ‘instant aircraft switch’ feature by CASA. allows the pilot to select which aircraft they are ﬂying from a list, and the All the aviation legislation and document library switches instantly to supporting material is freely available that aircraft, allowing one iPad to be on the internet, and can be accessed used on a number of aircraft. Ground through CASA’s web site. The aviation Console also makes sure that ﬂight bags legislation itself resides on the ofﬁcial always have the latest information by Commonwealth legislation web site, allowing ﬂight plans to be automatically Comlaw, but can be accessed using emailed to the document library. links on the CASA website under the OBDS provides training material ‘regulations and policy’ button on and customer support to help ease the front page. All CASA’s manuals the transition to paperless cockpits. and forms are available in electronic Aviation Docs apps are available free format, online, free-of-charge, on of charge to subscribers to the OBDS CASA’s website. The system simpliﬁes the task of Aviation document service. ensuring that all electronic documents, ﬂight manuals, training manuals, For more information: www.obds.com revisions and ﬂight plans are in the or www.aviationdocs.aero pilots' hands, up-to-date, and well 05 : ;6 *2 1< 3@ FSA JUL-AUG 2011 6 CD DOCUMENT SERVICE NO LONGER NEEDED -69:(3,-09:;9;<9)05, >0;/(09*6505(<:;9(30( Those requiring paper copies of the aviation legislation can purchase some of it from the Airservices Australia online store at >/@7<9*/(:,;/,9;<9)05,-964/,30-30;,! ;(2,(+=(5;(.,6-/,30-30;,»:,(93@:36;: -(*;!*<99,5;9796+<*;0653,(+;04,4(@ -(*;!*<99,5;/,30-30;,9:36;3,(+;04,1<5, 46:;,?7,90,5*,++0:;90)<;69:05*, -<33(<:;9(3(:0(55,;>692*6=,9(., 3(9.,:;05=,5;69@6-96)05:65/,30*67;,9: 3(9.,:;05=,5;69@6-96)05:65:7(9,7(9;: 3(9.,:;46:;,?7,90,5*,+:,9=0*,:<7769;;,(4 (<;/690:,+9633:96@*,99:,9=0*,*,5;9, 7O! ^^^OLSPÅP[LJVTH\ 9VIPUZVU:HSLZ (N\Z[H>LZ[SHUK:HSLZ in January 2011). Ms Borschmann was a passionate and dedicated educator and aviator and the program is a testament to her commitment to the future of aviation. The program has produced 53 GFPT holders and 35 PPLs and is an exciting example of the diverse curriculum choices available at the College. http://web.stkevins.vic.edu.au/ The Hamilton and Alexandra College, Hamilton, Vic About 20 students have gained their junior pilot’s licences since the Hamilton and Alexandra College aviation program began in 1998. In 2000, the school signed a memorandum of understanding with RMIT University’s Aviation Aerospace Engineering Faculty, with students receiving preferred entry to RMIT aviation courses and unit accreditation to various aviation courses worldwide. The course involves 20 hours of ﬂying, with at least ﬁve hours of solo ﬂight. www.hamiltoncollege.vic.edu.au/ Check out our website at www.bobtait.com.au BAK & PPL Coming soon! Bob Tait’s Aviation Theory School’s Online CPL Performance Course. * * * * * * Virtual classroom presentation. Audio/visual lessons. e-textbooks plus hardcopy text. Heaps of new questions. Worked solutions. and much more. Keep an eye on our website for details. All CPL Subjects plus IREX Home Study and Full-Time Courses available Hangar N Wirraway Drive, Redcliffe Aerodrome QLD 4021 PO Box 2018 Redcliffe North Post Office, QLD 4020 Ph 07 3204 0965 Fax 07 3204 1902 Web www.bobtait.com.au Email firstname.lastname@example.org 7 FLIGHT BYTES w w w.a i r s er v ic e s au s t r a l i a .c om / MORE AVIATION HIGH store, or you can contact them on SCHOOLS 1300 306 630. The following aviation high schools Eligible subscribers who have already did not make it into the article in the paid for the CASA CD document May-June issue but we are happy to library service will receive an rectify their omission. appropriate refund. Pro-rata refunds The Essington School, Darwin, NT will be provided to subscribers who The Essington School, in Darwin, is made payments receipted by CASA entering its eleventh year of using after July 2010, as these existing its Year 10 ‘Learn to Fly’ program subscribers received a partial to encourage students to develop subscription service. Full refunds will conﬁdence and a belief that with the also be provided to those subscribers right training and experiences there who made payments receipted after is nothing they cannot do. Nationally October 2010, when CASA ceased accredited gliding instructors, Gavin accepting new subscriptions to the Wrigley and Reg Moore, provide a service. Refunds will be processed program of theory lessons on the against the credit card nominated ground and hands-on ﬂying lessons by the subscriber in their original in a European-built, single-engine application. Subscribers who paid powered glider. via EFT, cheque or money order will www.essington.nt.edu.au/ be contacted to obtain the correct client banking details. The pro-rata St Kevin’s College, Toorak, Vic refund rates will be provided on The Aviation program at St Kevin’s College was founded in 2005 by Julie www.casa.gov.au Borschmann (who unfortunately died 2EAP).'THE WHIRLWIND FSA JUL-AUG 2011 8 Can ﬂying for agriculture be made safer, or will lowlevel spraying and mustering always take their human toll? Flight Safety Australia talks with experts and old hands who say encouraging trends are emerging. It’s a tough life, and sometimes a short life, on the farm. Statistically, agriculture is a dangerous game, even when a farmer’s feet are on the ground. Tractors, quad bikes, drowning and ute accidents are the most common causes of death for agricultural workers, according to research group Farmsafe. Together with miscellaneous causes they kill about 90 people in farm accidents in an average year, costing the Australian economy about $651 million, Farmsafe found. Agricultural ﬂying follows a similar trend. Flying on the farm, whether for aerial application or mustering, is one of the more dangerous things you can do in an aircraft. In the ten years between 1999 and 2008, aerial agriculture averaged 174.4 accidents per million hours ﬂown, according to Australian Transport Safety Bureau ﬁgures. Over those ten years, aerial mustering averaged 72.8 accidents for every million hours ﬂown. For fatal accidents, the rates were 7.06 per million ‘agricultural’ hours ﬂown and 4.85 for aerial mustering. Over these same ten years - 1999 to 2008 there were 13 deaths and 18 serious injuries from crashes in aerial agriculture, which doesn’t sound like much until you consider there are only about 300 active agricultural pilots in Australia. Likewise, the ﬁve mustering deaths over the period came from an even smaller pool of active pilots. It’s not a route to building hours, as some pilots perceive instructing to be. The combination of stability and experience in the core group of agricultural pilots means that safety programs can be effective. We don’t accept that aerial agriculture has to have inherently poor safety. That’s why we continue to develop and reﬁne safety systems. Since our ﬁrst ag pilot safety course in 1998 there’s been a long-term decline in accident rates.’ Chief executive of the Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia, Phil Hurst, says agricultural pilots ﬂy in a different environment to private pilots. All agricultural ﬂying is low level, which under most circumstances is prohibited in private aviation. Hurst winces when he hears the mainstream media describe an aerial application pilot as a ‘crop duster’. Few outside the agricultural aviation industry realise how tightly regulated and professionally stringent it is, he says. Although the small number of agricultural pilots makes the ﬁgures volatile, the trend is unmistakable, and correlates to the introduction of the safety course, Hurst says. ‘The two issues that drive the Association are chemicals and safety. Aerial application pilots have to be trained in the safe handling and application of agricultural chemicals, and safe ﬂying goes hand-in-hand with that. The two issues reinforce each other. All our pilots have to complete 15 education units over three years as part of the professional pilots program that provides ongoing currency for the Spraysafe qualiﬁcation,’ says Hurst. This continual career development is the hallmark of a profession, he adds, noting that the AAAA dates from 1958, only about ten years after the ﬁrst agricultural aviation in Australia. ‘The thing about agricultural ﬂying is that people who go into it tend to stay. ‘In the 80s and 90s there were about seven or eight fatal accidents a year; this century the rate has been down to two, although it’s been higher recently as the volume of work has increased. But the rates per hours ﬂown tell a similar story: a downward trend with occasional blips up because the total numbers involved are small. Meanwhile, the Association is continuing its strong emphasis on safety education and training. ‘We’re rewriting the Aerial Application Pilots Manual to be launched at our annual convention, and we’ve also begun a take-offs, turns and wires education program to address the three main causes of crashes.’ It’s a role the AAAA has to take on, Hurst says, because safety regulation, by its very nature, is a minimum standard. No matter how stringent, it is a ﬂoor rather than a ceiling. ‘The point is; no agricultural pilot should ever be complacent enough to say “I meet the regulations so all’s right with my world.”’ He acknowledges that newer, larger and more crashworthy aircraft take some credit for fewer deaths in agricultural ﬂying. And helmets. ‘If you hit the same wire in an old Pawnee or in a modern turbine aircraft there’s no doubt you’d be better off in the newer one, particularly if you’re wearing a helmet, Wearing a helmet is one of the few measures a pilot can take to reduce the consequences of a crash rather than its likelihood,’ Hurst reminds us. 9 REAPING THE WHIRLWIND The crash and death rates for aerial agriculture and mustering are close to those of a class of pilot some professional aviators look down upon: PPL-licensed private and business ﬂyers. Their crash and death rates are 60 accidents per million hours and about 20 fatal accidents per million hours. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 10 Wire strike has been a hazard for as long as pilots have been ﬂying in agriculture (See Flight Safety Australia March/April 2011 for an in-depth look at this subject). The AAAA runs a wire risk management training course for aerial application pilots, highlighting the hazards, and promoting safety techniques, the foremost of which is thorough ﬂight planning after a pre-treatment survey, says Hurst. ‘These days a lot of guys are using Google Earth to spot wires that haven’t been mentioned. They also use it to look for hazards over a wider radius.’ As techniques for dealing with existing hazards are reﬁned, new hazards emerge. Wind farms are the latest concern for the AAAA. ‘The big turbines aren’t the problem: anyone can see them, but there are monitoring towers built before construction that can be just under 85m high – we think they should be reportable and marked at that level,’ Hurst says. 0ASSINGMUSTER Aerial mustering is the locating, rounding up and movement of animals using an aircraft. Fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft are used to locate and round up stock such as cattle, sheep, buffalo and camels. However, helicopter mustering has become an essential feature of cattle stations in northern Australia, reducing the time needed to muster stock from two weeks on horseback to one day. ‘Helicopters are part of the trend of capital replacing labour that has characterised the Territory’s beef industry since the 1960s,’ says Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association executive director, Luke Bowen. With stocking rates on NT cattle stations that can be as low as one animal per square kilometre, there’s no other economic way of large-scale mustering,’ Bowen says. ‘While ﬁxed-wing aircraft have the advantage of lower operating costs, helicopters are invaluable in wooded country where stock have more natural cover and are difﬁcult to spot from the ground.’ Mustering, by deﬁnition, is low-level ﬂying. Its hazards include vulnerability to wind shear, bank-angle illusions in crosswinds near the ground, and the inherent danger of being only a few seconds away from impact in the case of an emergency or pilot distraction. Helicopters have many advantages for mustering, including the ability to move stock at their own pace. ‘With ﬁxed-wing you’re making a series of passes but with a helicopter you can stay with the mob,’ says Pastoralists and Graziers’ Association of Western Australia policy director, Zac Zaklan. Mustering can be done (and under CAO 29.10 is allowed to be done) by helicopter, aeroplane or gyroplane, but helicopters are the most commonly used mustering aircraft. When helicopters are used, there are the added issues of managing power reserve and avoiding rotor blade overpitching, both of which are more critical in the high ambient temperatures of northern Australia. Dust from rotor downwash reducing visibility is another distinct hazard of helicopter mustering. But slowing down to a scrub bull’s walking pace exposes helicopter musterers to a dangerous phase of ﬂight - the shaded part of the height/velocity curve, the set of speed and altitude combinations from which a helicopter cannot auto-rotate safely. An ATSB study that examined how Robinson R22 helicopters were used in mustering found Katherine-based helicopter company owner, Clinton Brisk, says well-trained mustering pilots operate away from the shaded curve as much as possible, but brief excursions into it are unavoidable in mustering. ‘You try to maintain airspeed, or use a low hover where you can, and make a practice of regularly scanning your engine gauges. Sometimes you’ve got wind, which can help, but you’ve also got to consider the terrain. In many areas you are likely to damage the helicopter in an auto, even if you’re on the good side of the curve, because it’s based on ﬂat ground.’ CASA, which generally forbids low ﬂying, has a series of requirements for pilots seeking a licence approval for aerial stock mustering. They are less stringent than the requirements for aerial application, requiring only 100 hours of command time, and allow for private pilot licence holders to do their own mustering. Brisk says this informal, do-it-yourself, mustering sector brings safety challenges with it. While he started his mustering career under the mentorship of experienced pilots, others don’t have that advantage. ‘These days we see stockmen coming into aviation. They’re very good stockmen, but they haven’t had the depth of experience in aviation that the ﬁrst generation of musterers had. They’re basically let loose on their own property under their own direction. They don’t have the beneﬁt of other people’s experience, as I had.’ There is a clear trend towards training jackaroos as pilots in both the paid and informal mustering sectors.‘It’s an easier transition because you have to have stock knowledge,’ says Zaklan. Brisk says mustering has been isolated from the rest of aviation. ‘There were a few basic airmanship rules applied and that was about it. You were out in the middle of nowhere doing a stockman’s job.’ The isolation of the bush can also be isolation from legal safety requirements and best practice, he says. ‘When you’ve got a guy mustering on his own property in an R22 he’s not going to sit up at night reading the civil aviation regulations.’ He came to this insight after his helicopter business grew to include tourism, agricultural and offshore operations, and says mustering could beneﬁt from the polish and professionalism seen in those areas. ‘For example: When I do a mustering approval these days, I tell the pilots to set themselves an altitude they’re going to ﬂy at. I never did this until I got into this other world.’ However, he feels that former mustering pilots can be among the best of any who take hold of cyclic and collective. ‘From what I hear, they are able to pick up IFR quite easily. I was talking with an offshore pilot who told me pilots who hadn’t been mustering wouldn’t have a clue where the wind is coming from half the time, whereas the ex-mustering pilots always know. It deﬁnitely gives you a higher level of stick and rudder skills.’ Brisk wants to see support and ongoing training and education for mustering pilots. ‘Don’t get me wrong, I think they get a buzz out of being an aviator, I think they value it and want to ﬂy skilfully and safely. But I think they need assistance in achieving the goal of ALARP - [risk] as low as reasonably practicable,’ he says. 11 REAPING THE WHIRLWIND airspeeds below 50kt accounted for 45.9 per cent of aerial mustering ﬂights. If those speeds were ﬂown at altitudes below 225ft, an R22 at full weight on a standard day (two big assumptions, admittedly) would be on the deadly side of the ‘dead man’s curve’. A loss of engine power would, inevitably, be followed by a hard impact with the ground, regardless of what the pilot did. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 12 Apart from CASA’s regulatory requirements and the wisdom passed down in the few ﬂight training schools specialising in mustering, there is little to guide mustering pilots towards that goal of ALARP. The mustering industry lacks a central store of knowledge and a lobby group. It has no equivalent to the Aerial Agricultural Association of Australia. Of the pastoral associations in states with signiﬁcant aerial mustering only the Pastoralists and Graziers Association of Western Australia (PGAWA) has a code of conduct for the activity. The Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association and Agforce Queensland only mention the topic in occupational health and safety guides concerning safety near aircraft. ‘It’s not about ﬂying. We can’t regulate how people do things. It's about the interface between ground and air,’ says PGAWA executive ofﬁcer, Ian Randles. The code, which will be published soon in a revised version, with new advice on helicopter mustering, has two themes, Randles explains. ‘It’s pitched at the pilot who’s in command of the aerial decisions. On the other side it’s for how people on the ground can best help pilots do their job.’ Sections include a guide to mustering techniques for the private ﬁxed-wing pilot; the responsibilities of the mustering pilot to ground staff and the station owner; air law regarding ﬂight time, maintenance and carrying passengers; and human factors, including fatigue, nutrition, hydration and the side-effects of medication. Randles emphasises that the code contains much which may be considered common sense but that it is important for this to be written down and stored. ‘People make a lot of assumptions about prior knowledge,’ he says. ‘The code of practice is to put some simple guidance down on paper – for the day the station manager is sick or away.’ The lack of professional association and control in the mustering industry means there is little opportunity for even the most safetyconscious pastoralist to assess the safety and professionalism of a mustering contractor. The decision often comes down to two factors: word-of-mouth reputation, or impact on the hip pocket. There have been acknowledged instances where pastoralists have instructed their mustering contractors to improve their safety practices, but more often the pressure runs in the other direction, industry observers say. Established contractors say the bill for a Robinson R22 in mustering work is about $440 an hour wet. A mustering contract that is signiﬁcantly lower than this ﬁgure should attract some hard questions about operational practices and standards. ‘It could be a loss-leading quote to attract business, but over the long term you’ve got to cover your costs. R22s have lifed components that have to be replaced, and you’ve got to wonder about a really cheap contract – is that where it’s saving the money?’ one operator said. Meanwhile cultural changes on the ground are starting to have a subtle effect on mustering’s safety culture. A little-appreciated fact, Randles says, is that some mining companies now have signiﬁcant pastoral holdings. While miners often buy up properties near their mine works as a means of avoiding neighbourhood disputes, they often continue to work these properties, he says, but do so under the stringent safety culture of the minerals industry. ‘On those properties you’ll see jackeroos wearing helmets on quad bikes, motorbikes and horses, and wearing seat belts in vehicles. Not doing so is grounds for dismissal.’ Heytesbury Cattle Company runs beef cattle on northern Australian stations, including Victoria River Downs in the Northern Territory. Its chief executive, Paul Holmes à Court, says: Holmes à Court says it’s inconceivable that mustering will be able to go against the grain of this increased emphasis on safety. ‘We use a contractor, Helimuster, and we hold them to the same standards of safety as the rest of our operation.’ The issue of whether to take mustering operations in-house raises fundamental safety questions about mixing aviation with other pastoral activities. Holmes à Court ﬁrmly believes aviation should be left to the specialists. ‘There are pastoralists who have the experience and resources to use their aircraft in mustering. It makes sense for them, but it’s not for us. I know just enough of aviation to know that unless you’re serious about it you shouldn’t do it. However, cattlemen and pilots agree that mustering can, and should, be a relatively sedate activity. ‘Most mustering is passive except when there’s a camera around,’ says helicopter instructor, Ray Cronin, who is one of a minority of instructors teaching mustering techniques. Bowen says a low-stress stock handling mentality now pervades the industry. ‘It teaches people to use different tools, helicopters, motorbikes. horses and dogs to maximise the wellbeing of the animals.’ ‘One result, Bowen says is that helicopters are used more strategically than they originally were. ‘You don’t often get cattle being yarded by helicopter.’ Low-stress mustering by helicopter sees the machines ﬂying slowly some distance from the mob, moving them on while staying out of the animals’ ﬂight zone. Holmes à Court says: ‘A helicopter at 400ft doesn’t make much of a picture, but that’s how it is most of the time.’ ‘In the old days when we were doing portable yard work, it was a different game,’ explains Clinton Brisk. ‘The biggest problem we have now is glazing cylinders, because we’re off the power all day. When I go for fuel or on the ferry ﬂight I’ll ﬂy at max continuous power to try and heat the engine.’ Bowen says low-stress handling has been practised by enlightened and proﬁtable pastoralists for many years, but has come to the fore as a stated philosophy in recent times. Its advantages include cattle arriving at markets in better condition, and fewer workplace injuries on horses, motorcycles, vehicles and aircraft. ‘It’s a process that began with the brucellosis and tuberculosis eradication program which required fencing of properties,’ he says. ‘With more fencing and improved practices, there are fewer untamed cattle and the handling has become easier.’ 13 REAPING THE WHIRLWIND ‘We take the safety of our employees very seriously and that extends to everything we do with vehicles, horses and machines.’ After initial resistance, safety is now an accepted part of Heytesbury’s operations. ‘I see a generational change. The young jackaroos come from a world where safety is taken very seriously and for them it's natural to wear a helmet or a seat belt.’ That’s our position on mustering – it’s an activity that requires high levels of experience and airmanship that only come from doing it full-time.’ !%2)!,34/#+ -534%2).'/0%2!4)/.3 From Civil Aviation Order 29.10 ‘For a pilot to conduct aerial stock mustering activities, he or she must have the following qualiﬁcations: If conducting private operations, a private pilot’s licence. 14 If conducting commercial aerial work operations, a commercial pilot’s licence. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 A minimum of 100 hours as pilot in command, including at least 50 hours of command in the aircraft type for which the approval is sought. A minimum of ﬁve hours dual instruction, covering aircraft handling and low ﬂying. A minimum of 10 hours operational training in aerial stock mustering operations in the preceding 90 days. Five hours experience in the type of aircraft to be used for aerial mustering operations.’ Further information www.farmsafe.org.au T.H. McCosker and A.R. Eggington, Cattle mustering efﬁciency using helicopters in a monsoonal savanna woodland. The Rangeland Journal, Volume 8 number 2, August 1986, pp91-96 CSIRO Publishing, www.publish.csiro.au (http://www.rcs.au.com/data/Reference%20 Material/Muster%20with%20Helicopter.pdf ) Australian Transport Safety Bureau: — Aviation occurrence statistics 1999-2009 — Wirestrikes involving known wires: A manageable aerial agriculture hazard www.atsb.gov.au 34/#+(/23%/&4(%3+9 Helicopter mustering dates back to 1968, when exmilitary pilots pioneered the activity in Bell 47 and Hiller UH-12 helicopters. These were superseded in the 1980s by the Robinson R22, which offered unbeatable advantages in fuel consumption and purchase price. There are now 489 R22s on the Australian register. A survey by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics found that 62 per cent of R22 hours ﬂown were in mustering. The next largest category was ﬂying training, with 13 per cent. While the small size of the R22 and its light lowinertia rotor suggest fragility to some eyes its safety record has, on the whole, been impressive. Its accident rate is the lowest of the four most common light utility helicopters in Australia, the ATSB found in its 2003 mustering study. The R22’s accident rate for aerial work operations was 14 per 100,000 hours, which was considerably better than the accident rate for private ﬂying (76 accidents per 100,000 hours) or aerial agriculture operations (55 accidents per 100,000 hours) The R22 also has a good reputation for crashworthiness, despite its small size. ‘I’ve seen R22 pilots walk away from crashes that I thought would have seriously hurt them, or worse’, says Katherine-based helicopter company owner Clinton Brisk. ‘There’s crashworthiness in the structure, in the skids and in the seats – if you remember never to stow anything hard underneath them.’ 4(%2/").3/.2 In 2007, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau published a study of R22s in mustering operations to ﬁnd out what sort of forces were acting on the helicopter’s airframe. The report found that ﬁve stresses were higher than those measured by Robinson in its certiﬁcation ﬂights. Tail rotor drive shaft torque was 2.38 times the certiﬁcation ﬁgure but Robinson replied that: Our present calculated service life (including all safety factors) is approximately 44,000 hours. The results ‘highlight the importance of handling technique, and especially good engine management,’ the study said. The study also found some more good news for musterers: ‘the abrupt manoeuvring associated with aerial mustering produced relatively small stresses, whereas the peak stresses found during certiﬁcation occurred during high-speed ﬂight, which is uncommon in mustering operations.’ 15 REAPING THE WHIRLWIND The study found, ‘mustering operations can involve large and sudden power changes that apply very high loads on the helicopter’s drive system, and these may exceed the limits set during the certiﬁcation process.’ Adding the mustering data reduces this life to approximately 34,000 hours. Calculated service lives of more than 25,000 hours are considered unlimited. Therefore, although the manoeuvre in question imposes some additional fatigue damage, it does not affect part life. $7& Notes What’s your designation? I ncluding the correct ICAO aircraft type designator for the aircraft you’re flying in flight plans is vital to ensure that the Eurocat air traffic services system is using accurate information, can process your flight plan and display information to ATC. FSA S JU JJUL-AUG L AUG 2011 L- 16 Airservices records show that some pilots are routinely flight planning using incorrect designators. For example, one turboprop operator flight planned using an incorrect designator 170 times over a month and a half, while two operators of light singles flight planned incorrectly 125 times each over the same p period. A very common error is planning the Piper PA-28 family (Cherokee, Warrior, Archer, Arrow etc) as ‘PA28’. This is incorrect. The correct ICAO designators should be either ‘P28A’, ‘P28B’, ‘P28R’ or ‘P28T’. Some military types are also frequently planned incorrectly. For example, the correct designator for the AP-3C Orion is ‘P3’; the Pilatus PC-9A is ‘PC9’; and the C-17A Globemaster is ‘C17’. When NAIPS detects the use of an incorrect aircraft type designator or a registration/aircraft type mismatch, it will generate an error message to pilots. Pilots need to address the error by checking and confirming aircraft registration and confirming that the correct ICAO aircraft type designator has been used. If you are certain that the designator used is correct, or are unable to identifyy the cause of the error, yyou can click the ‘submit’ button (or in the case of NAIPS for Windows select ‘To ignore the errors, please resubmit’). Other common designator errors include: Importantly, you should also contact the Briefing Office to advise the circumstances of the error. More information about this is contained in AIC H03/10 Aircraft Type Designator Issues: Flight Notification. t Beech King Air 200s being planned as ‘B200’ rather than t the correct ICAO designator ‘BE20’ (other variants of the ve different designators) King Air family have The list of correct ICAO aircraft type p designators is available on the Airservices website link gi ggiven ven in i ERSA GEN FPRR 1 or FPR-1 at h ttp://ww www.icao.int/anb/ais/8 /8643/ 3 in nde dex. x.cf cm http://www.icao.int/anb/ais/8643/index.cfm JetRangerrs planned pllanned as ‘B206’ when the correct p t Bell 206 JetRangers designator is ‘B06’ designator Pl lea ease se cche heck ck that you’re using ng tthe he ccor orrrect des d esig igna n torr fo forr yo yyour our Please check correct designator aai irc rcra raft ft type. type ty pee. If it’s in nco corr rrec rec e t, t you ou m ayy aalso lso ls o ne need ed tto o am amen end d th the aircraft incorrect, may amend data da ta ssto tore r d in i flig ight p lann la nnin ng sy syst s em emss. stored flight planning systems. ‘LR LR R 35 3 ’ wh hen they should bee ‘LJ35’. ‘L t Learjet 35s planned as ‘LR35’ when To T oh hel help elp p us gget et yyou o tto ou o yo yyour our de d destination, stin st in nat atio ion n, ma make ke su ssure urre you kn u know ow yyour yo ur desi ur d de esi sign gnat attio ion too o! designation too! Future directions – Pre-Flight Brieﬁng, Flightwatch High Frequency (HF) Services and Sartime Service A irservices provides a pre-flight briefing service, domestic and international NOTAM services and a Flightwatch High Frequency (HF) in-flight briefing and ATC relay service. Pre-flight briefing is largely automated by the National Aeronautical Information Processing System (NAIPS), which is also the system that manages the NOTAM database. 17 ATC NOTES These services, and the management of the Centralised Sartime Database (CENSAR), have for the past 10 years been delivered by Flight Information Officers of the Australian Flight Information Centre (AusFIC) in Brisbane. As a component of Airservices Air Traffic Management (ATM) 5 Year Services Plan, services currently provided by AusFIC will be integrated with like-type work areas in respective air traffic control service delivery environments. Integration will be largely seamless for industry with principally the same people, interfaces, and systems delivering the service. The Briefing Office, NOTAM Office, and the ATS Message Handling System will physically relocate to the National Operations Centre (NOC) in Canberra. Flightwatch High Frequency (HF) services and CENSAR will be integrated with like-type services in the Brisbane Air Traffic Services Centre (ATSC). followed by CENSAR. The Briefing Office and NOTAM Office will be moved to the NOC by mid to late 2012, with no interruption or changes to services. Planning is currently underway to relocate Flightwatch HF services into the Brisbane ATSC by last quarter 2011, Above: Airservices National Operations Centre Canberra. International Accidents/Incidents 10 April 2011 - 13 June 2011 Date Aircraft Location 10 Apr Cessna 310R near McComb-Pike 3 County Airport Missouri, USA Destroyed Aircraft crashed four miles from runway on approach at 4.30am local time. 11 Apr Airbus A380 John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City, USA Minor Ground collision: Airbus's wing collided with tail of CRJ701ER regional jet, spinning the smaller aircraft through 90 degrees. 14 Apr Piper PA-32-260 near Haifa Airport, 4 Cherokee Six Israel Destroyed Training aircraft reported engine problems soon after take-off, then hit trees and crashed while attempting to land. 24 Apr Yakovlev Yak52TD near Fontenay2 Tresigny Aerodrome, France Destroyed Russian training warbird crashed on approach. 27 Apr Robinson R22 Beta II Arawata Saddle, about 50 km NW of Wanaka, South Island, New Zealand 2 Destroyed Helicopter did not return from training ﬂight. Search found both occupants dead at scene of wreckage. 30 Apr Eurocopter AS 350B3 Ecureuil Luguthang, near 5 India-China border, India Destroyed Helicopter was carrying chief minister of north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. Wreckage and bodies found at altitude of 4900m. 7 May Xian MA6 near KaimanaUtarom Airport, Indonesia 25 Destroyed Chinese-made regional airliner crashed into the sea on approach, about 800m south-west of the runway threshold. Conditions were rainy, with 2km visibility. 13 May Hal Chetak Sirohi district, Rajasthan, India 4 Written off Indian Border Security Force helicopter crashed in hilly area. 15 May DH-82A Tiger Moth near Moor Crichel, Dorset, Uniited Kingdom 1 Written off Privately-owned vintage biplane was performing aerobatics. Witnesses described the engine stopping and the aircraft 'spiralling' to the ground. Both people on board were seriously injured; passenger died overnight in hospital. 16 May Piper PA-34-200 near Sao Paulo, Seneca I Brazil 4 Destroyed Aero club aircraft used for training lost contact with ATC about 11pm local time and collided with Morro do Cristo, a mountain near Sao Paulo. 18 May Saab 340A 22 Destroyed Aircraft thought to have departed from en route phase of ﬂight. People living near crash site saw aircraft ﬂying low, then heard sound of crash. All on board were killed. Aircraft ﬁrst ﬂew in 1985. 18 May Boeing 707-321 Port HuenemePoint Mugu Naval Air Station, California, USA 0 Destroyed Tanker on contract to US military ran off runway on take-off and caught ﬁre. 22 May Cessna 210M Centurion Hosea Kutako International Airport, Namibia 1 None Pilot, aged 21, killed by propeller, which apparently hit his head when he swung it during pre-ﬂight inspection. 6 Jun Antonov 26 near Libreville Airport, Gabon 0 Written off During approach, the pilot reported problems with the hydraulic system and announced that the ﬂight would perform a go-around. Soon after, the aircraft crashed into the sea. The aeroplane came to rest submerged, with the top of the tail sticking out of the water. Crew of three and one passenger escaped. 12 Jun American Blimp near Reichelsheim Corporation Airﬁeld, Germany A-60+ 1 Destroyed Airship was ﬂying to display advertisement at a music festival. Three reporters were on board to take aerial shots of the event. When the airship returned to the airﬁeld, it was damaged during landing and caught ﬁre. Pilot advised passengers to jump to safety from low altitude. All three passengers survived. Loss of weight then caused the airship to ascend quickly before the pilot could escape. The airship crashed and burnt completely, killing the Australian pilot. 13 Jun Boeing B-17G 0 Written off WWII-vintage bomber Liberty Belle force-landed, wheels down, in cornﬁeld after pilot reported engine ﬁre. All seven on board escaped but ﬁre destroyed aircraft. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 18 near Prahuaniyeu, Argentina Near Aurora Municipal Airport, Illinois, USA Fatalities Damage 0 Description Notes: compiled from information supplied by the Aviation Safety Network (see www.aviation-safety.net/database/) and reproduced with permission. While every effort is made to ensure accuracy, neither the Aviation Safety Network nor Flight Safety Australia make any representations about its accuracy, as information is based on preliminary reports only. For further information refer to final reports of the relevant official aircraft accident investigation organisation. Information on injuries is not always available. Australian Accidents/Incidents 17 March 2011 - 27 May 2011 Date 17 Mar 22 Mar 25 Mar Aircraft American Champion 8GCBC Beech 76 Duchess Location Kojonup (ALA), 321°M 34km, WA Injuries Nil Damage Serious Lismore Aerodrome, NSW Nil Serious Geraldton Minor Aerodrome, WNW M 90km (East Wallabi Island), WA Piper PA-32Rnear Moree Fatal 301T Aerodrome, NSW Cessna A188B/A1 Ingham (ALA), Qld Nil Serious Northam (ALA), WA near Maitland (ALA), NSW Serious Minor 2 Apr Kavanagh Balloon E-210 Robinson R44 Serious Minor 18 Apr Cessna 152 Nil Serious 18 Apr Eagle DW-1 Cessnock (ALA), NSW Ingham (ALA), Qld Serious Unknown 22 Apr Cessna U206G 30 Mar 31 Mar 2 Apr Gove Aerodrome, NT Piper PA-28R-200 near Bunbury (ALA), WA Serious Serious Serious Nil Serious near Moruya Aerodrome (Lilli Pilli), NSW Grumman near Middlemount American G-164B Aerodrome, Qld Fatal Serious Nil Serious 26 Apr Beech A36 Bonanza Nil Serious 30 Apr Robinson R44 Nil Serious 30 Apr Aerospatiale AS.350BA Robinson R22 Beta Robinson R22 Beta Eurocopter AS.350B3 Amateur-built Cavalier SA102.5 Nil Serious Nil Serious Fatal Serious Bankstown Aerodrome, NSW Caboolture (ALA), 290°M 33km (Archer Falls), Qld near Tully (ALA), Qld Minor Serious Nil Unknown Nil Serious Springsure (ALA), Qld Serious Serious 24 Apr 25 Apr 7 May 9 May 13 May 15 May Robinson R44 23 May Cessna U206G 27 May PZL M-18B Geraldton Aerodrome, WNW M 90km (East Wallabi Island), WA Kilmore (VFR), 120°M 4km, Vic Ballera Aerodrome, E M 11km, Qld Fitzroy Crossing, WA Julia Creek, Qld The aircraft collided with terrain. Four people suffered fatal injuries and two were seriously injured. The investigation is continuing. During agricultural spraying operations, the aircraft struck a power line and hit terrain. The balloon landed heavily near power lines. The investigation is continuing. During take-off, the helicopter struck and severed a power line, resulting in third degree electrical burns to a three-year-old child. The investigation is continuing. The aircraft landed heavily, resulting in the nose landing gear collapsing. The aircraft was seriously damaged. It was reported that the agricultural aircraft collided with terrain. The investigation is continuing. The aircraft landed heavily, resulting in serious damage. During the approach, the engine failed. During the subsequent forced landing, the aircraft sustained serious damage. The pilot had forgotten to change fuel tanks. The helicopter crashed into the sea. The investigation is continuing. During agricultural operations, the aircraft performance degraded. The pilot applied maximum continuous power and dumped the load, but the aircraft struck trees and came to rest on a creek bank. The aircraft landed short of the runway and struck raised terrain. The investigation is continuing. The helicopter was engaged on aerial survey operations when it impacted a farm dam at low speed. The investigation is continuing. While conducting aerial work the helicopter sustained a tail rotor strike and landed heavily. The investigation is continuing. During mustering operations, the helicopter landed hard, resulting in serious damage. During mustering operations, the helicopter impacted terrain. The investigation is continuing. During air transit, the helicopter impacted terrain and was destroyed by ﬁre. The investigation is continuing. The aircraft encountered wind shear during approach, stalled at 20ft AGL and landed heavily. During the cruise, the engine began to lose power. As the aircraft would not maintain height, the pilot conducted a forced landing in a paddock. The operator reported that the power loss was due to fuel starvation. It was reported that during spraying operations, the aircraft collided with terrain. Text courtesy of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). Disclaimer – information on accidents is the result of a cooperative effort between the ATSB and the Australian aviation industry. Data quality and consistency depend on the efforts of industry where no follow-up action is undertaken by the ATSB. The ATSB accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person or corporation resulting from the use of these data. Please note that descriptions are based on preliminary reports, and should not be interpreted as findings by the ATSB. The data do not include sports aviation accidents. 19 ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS 22 Apr Cessna 172N/A1 Description During the landing roll, the aircraft encountered a tailwind. The pilot attempted to conduct a go-around, but there was insufﬁcient lift and the aircraft collided with a fence. During a touch-and-go landing, the pilot inadvertently retracted the landing gear, resulting in the nose sliding along the ground and both propellers striking the ground. During a go-around, the aircraft clipped a sand dune and landed in two feet of water. The investigation is continuing. Passengers behaving badly FSA JUL-AUG 2011 20 Back when jets were noisy, passengers were quiet, or so the old hands in the cabin say. In the era when turbojets on Boeing 707s screamed and spewed black smoke people used to dress up to ﬂy and the notion of unseemly behaviour on such a special occasion was unthinkable (although admittedly, many passengers were also spewing clouds of smoke) Contrast this far-off era with the tube-train reality of catching a ﬂight in 2011. A passenger waiting in the Qantas Club lounge in Perth for a ﬂight to Karratha is obviously somewhat ‘tired and emotional.’ Staff ask whether he has had anything to drink and he denies it. ‘Maybe we could organise a ﬂight for you tomorrow sir?’ ‘No, I want to get on this ﬂight!’ The ground crew and their manager are keen to continue with a conciliatory approach, but security has been called and once they turn up the situation escalates, ending with the Australian Federal Police arriving and the passenger having to be muscled away by ‘two huge ofﬁcers’. If this passenger had made it on to the ﬂight and continued to be aggressive how would the cabin crew have handled him? The customer often feels that anything goes once the ticket is paid for, and the holiday begins in the bar as soon as check-in is completed. It is a sad but irrefutable fact that, nowadays, many customers believe that the customer is always right!’ As the cost of air travel has fallen, so too has the standard of passenger behaviour, says the conventional wisdom, but does the evidence support it? The Australian Ofﬁce of Transport Security says there were 7.2 ‘disruptive person’ incidents per million passengers carried in Australia in 2010. This deﬁnition of ‘disruptive person’ incidents covers inappropriate comments, intoxication, smoking, altercations and other unruly behaviour by passengers. In their 1999 paper on disruptive passengers, Roy Humphreyson and Nick Kotsapas argued, ‘In the past, travel by air was the privilege of the well-off and often the better educated. The introduction of cheap mass air travel has opened up the market to many people who would otherwise have travelled by train or coach. This, combined with the stresses associated with airports and ﬂying, pushes some individuals over the top. American passengers are almost saintly by comparison, with the number of serious air rage incidents reported to the US Federal Aviation Authority falling steadily since 2004, when there were 304. In 2010, there were just 92 incidents reported on board aircraft, or about one per six million passengers carried. ‘When they smoke in the bathroom, abuse crew, call crew names and say they are going to get their families. That's pretty much what I mean,’ said Dave, cabin crew trainer. By that measure Australians are about twelve times as likely to disgrace themselves on a plane as Americans. ‘Passengers expect instant gratiﬁcation and there are just not enough consequences for abusive behaviour’, says Jo Justo of the Australian Services Union. ‘The advent of check-in machines has meant that many ground crew are now wearing duress alarms under their collars because they no longer have a counter to protect them from frustrated and abusive passengers.’ According to Humphreyson and Kotsapas, ‘The crew needs a clear understanding of company policy and a ﬁrm belief that the company will back them in implementing that policy. The increasing tendency for cabin crew to operate under marketing rather than operations can lead to divided loyalties.’ However, cabin staff told Flight Safety Australia that lack of support from airline management makes the problem worse. ‘The simple fact is people don’t care any more,’ a domestic cabin crew member with a major Australian airline said. ‘They don’t want to do as they are told. They don’t want to consider us as safety professionals. The company puts an emphasis on service, allowing passengers to make themselves comfortable and enjoy the ﬂight, but at the cost of safety, as our directions are rarely adhered to upon ﬁrst request.’ 21 Cabin crew can’t escape from violence and if physical violence does occur, it may be difﬁcult for the victim/s to take legal action because of inconsistencies in international law. The International Transport Workers’ Federation knows of instances where passengers who have been restrained following assaults on crew have sued the carriers concerned, but the airline and crew members have been unable to take legal action because of jurisdictional issues. A partial explanation for the lower air rage rate in the US might be how seriously it is taken in law. After 9/11, the US Congress not only introduced increased security measures, but also a federal law prohibiting ‘airport rage’: An individual who assaults an air carrier employee who has security duties within the airport, or interferes with the performance of the duties of the employee or lessens the ability of the employee to perform those duties, shall be ﬁned, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. If the individual used a dangerous weapon in committing the assault or interference, the individual may be imprisoned for any term of years or life imprisonment. There is no similar single law in Australia, although it is (technically) an offence to board an aircraft while drunk. Linda White, the Federal Secretary of the Australian Services Union, says governments and the industry must adopt a zero tolerance attitude to disruptive behaviour and adopt all possible measures to minimise the risk. CABIN CREW Cabin crew members and trainers contacted for this story were not surprised by these statistics. The numbers bear out their experiences of increasing rudeness, aggression and assault in the sky. Another cabin attendant agreed. ‘I can honestly say most cabin crew feel they do not have the full support of management. They are very keen to keep the customer satisfaction and business, but less willing to support the cabin crew who are attempting to adhere to policies and procedures. We are put in a difﬁcult position, where most crew want to do what's right, and safe, and follow procedure, but face retribution and disciplinary action if passengers make complaints. I wish more CASA representatives ﬂew more often, almost like air marshals, to be able to give warnings and maybe even ﬁnes to those who refuse to comply.’ ‘We have to ask our governments and politicians how they would like it if there was violence in their workplace. The parliament is a public place, like an airport. Members of the public who threaten or assault our politicians in parliament have police swarming everywhere, but air rage bullies can often walk free, and can sometimes even be uplifted or upgraded, instead of being banned! ‘It is also ironic that if someone jokingly, although wrongly, says, “I should blow this place up”, or “I’ve got a bomb in my bag”, the reaction is immediate; people start appearing from everywhere, and rightfully so. However, if someone pushes you, abuses you, punches you, threatens you or stalks you, the response is often much more muted.’ Identifying potential offenders is far from easy, however. Ground and cabin crew need well-developed judgement skills when faced with a passenger whose speech is slurred, who seems unsteady on their feet, or is exhibiting unusual behaviour: Are they disabled, terriﬁed of ﬂying, or under the inﬂuence of alcohol or drugs? FSA JUL-AUG 2011 22 Many airlines now provide verbal and physical self-defence training, but conciliation and negotiation skills are emphasised because crew members would obviously much rather defuse a situation than have to put a passenger in handcuffs, make a diversionary landing, or call the police to meet the plane. If the industry and regulators want to curb bad behaviour they cannot put their head in the sand when it comes to causal factors, such as alcohol and drugs; smoking policies and prohibitions, cabin baggage disputes, poor communication about delays and other service issues, the aircraft environment, unrealistic expectations of the ﬂying experience, or fear of ﬂying. Whatever its cause, disruptive behaviour can jeopardise the safety of the ﬂight and risk the lives of everyone on board. There has not yet been an air disaster caused by disruptive passenger behaviour, but many in the aviation industry believe that it may only be a matter of time. There should be no part of the industry in any country in which seriously disruptive passenger behaviour is allowed to go unchallenged. Ofﬁce of Transport Safety ‘disruptive person on aircraft events’ 2008-2010 Events per million departing passengers 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2008 2009 2010 Dirty deeds ‘Our plane landed during a severe storm and the air bridge could not be rolled over because of the risk of lightning strike. A passenger next to me was punching the ceiling because he was not allowed off the plane!’ Business traveller ‘A woman attacked cabin crew and threatened fellow passengers because she and her companions were refused any more alcohol. It turned out that she and her companions were US forces personnel on their way to drug and alcohol rehabilitation.’ Flight attendant In Australia, captains have the legal power of arrest, but as they are unable to leave the ﬂight deck, the cabin crew act as their deputies to physically restrain disruptive passengers. Obviously, the captain must be informed, and appropriate documentation submitted. On a ﬂight with only one cabin attendant, the crew member stopped to attend to a passenger who had collapsed (and unfortunately died) and was thoroughly abused by a female passenger for not attending to her. Flight attendant As far as following instructions are concerned, most people have adopted a ‘me ﬁrst’ attitude and refuse to stay seated once the plane has landed. On one ﬂight, the pilot cruised up to the gate and then put on the brakes really hard. Anyone standing—and that should have been no one—was thrown forward and hit the carpet. An excellent strategy which should be used more often! Frequent ﬂyer Relevant regulations: CAR 309 Arrest of passengers CAR 256AA Disorderly behaviour/alcohol 23 CAR 138, CAR 215(9) Compliance with instructions Civil Aviation Act Section 24 Interference with aircraft or equipment. CABIN CREW FLEXIBLE ONLINE LEARNING The Master of Aviation Management produces graduates with the knowledge, skill and vision to master the challenges of changing management practice in the aviation industry. Our Masters degree will build your critical thinking and analytical skills, and allow you to create a personalised program that will be relevant across aviation and the general transportation industry – and it’s 100% online! So if you’re looking for that career edge but wish to maintain the balance in your life – The choice is simple! B5895 To ﬁnd out more go to www.GradSchool.com.au DESIGNED FOR LIFE FSA JUL-AUG 2011 24 )DUDZD\VRFORVH Photo: Saab Systems 25 The day’s last ﬂight touched down as the blazing outback sun was hovering over the horizon like a welding torch. Heat rippled over the runway as the whine of the idling jet interrupted the desert stillness as it taxied towards the demountable building that served as a terminal. The controller who had guided the plane through the last phase of its journey contacted the pilots a ﬁnal time to sign off with the traditional pleasantries of aviation. Then she turned off the screens, walked down the stairs and emerged into a bustling street in a part of the city renowned for its vibrant nightlife. This could be a picture of air trafﬁc control in remote and regional Australia ten years from now, if a joint project between Saab Systems and Airservices Australia lives up to its early promise. Remote tower technology, originally developed in Sweden, is under consideration for directing air trafﬁc at Australia’s far-ﬂung aerodromes. Saab developed the system with Sweden’s airways provider, Luftfartsverket, (LFV), as partner. After live testing it was launched in Sweden in 2009. Remote tower technology allows for air trafﬁc at several small and medium-sized airports to be managed and controlled from a single air trafﬁc control centre, reducing costs and at the same time increasing efﬁciency and safety, its developers say. Saab says the technology can introduce new features, such as object tracking and alerting, infrared vision and image enhancement, to improve the controller’s situational awareness. An on-site controller looking through a window would see an aircraft with the aid of binoculars, but a controller viewing the same scene remotely could see the image magniﬁed on the screen with the aircraft’s type, registration, altitude and airspeed displayed and could be alerted by predictive software if it was in danger of collision with other aircraft in the vicinity. The videos shown on the screen could be recorded for use in safety investigations, or training, further enhancing safety, Saab says. In March 2010, Airservices Australia signed memorandums of understanding with LFV and Saab to explore using remote towers in Australia. New Zealand’s Airways Corporation joined the partnership in December 2010. Airservices and Saab signed a contract in June for a trial of the system. The Airservices trial will take place in Alice Springs, Airservices general manager of air trafﬁc control, Jason Harﬁeld, told the March 2011 ATC Global conference in the Netherlands. ‘The drivers for the adoption of remote tower technology are slightly different in Australia to those in Europe,’ Harﬁeld told the conference. ‘We are not required to provide control tower services for all RPT aircraft, as are some European air navigation service providers,’ he said, going on to explain that many Australian regional airports dealt with a roughly equal mix of IFR and VFR trafﬁc and that Alice Springs handled, on average, only 65 aircraft movements a day. FAR AWAY, SO CLOSE New camera, computer and communication technologies mean the controller in the tower of the future may no longer be at the airport. Another signiﬁcant issue was that the price of a data connection between the aerodrome and the control site would be different in Australia, Harﬁeld said. ‘Fortunately, data communications costs have been reducing over time and we expect them to continue to do so.’ He quoted OECD data from 2009, which found that Australian broadband communications costs were amongst the highest in the world; nearly double those of the United Kingdom and Sweden, although not as high as in Norway. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 26 Harﬁeld said the driver for remote tower technology in Australia was the ability to provide services to several aerodromes from a single location. This would become important as the minerals boom brought larger aircraft and more trafﬁc to formerly sleepy outback aerodromes. He gave the example of Karratha, in Western Australia, where the control tower reopened last year to cope with increased ﬂy-in-ﬂy-out trafﬁc associated with mining. Describing Karratha’s isolation, hot weather and high rents to his European audience he concluded: ‘Attracting controllers to work in such arduous conditions over a long period will become more challenging as time goes on … we can locate the remote tower centre in much more lifestyle-beneﬁcial areas.’ However Harﬁeld acknowledged that distinctive Australian conditions meant the system would need development to work as well here as it had in the Swedish trials. The mix of VFR and IFR trafﬁc meant Australian controllers often relied on visual separation in the circuit area. ‘Our remote tower technology solution must provide enough ﬁdelity to ensure our controllers are comfortable to use visual separation, as well as meet any regulatory requirements.’ Another contrast with Europe was that large areas of Australia did not have radar surveillance coverage. ‘This issue, along with the use of visual separation I mentioned before, requires Airservices to carefully evaluate the visual component of the available technology above all others,’ he said. Australia also has distinctive climatic conditions to consider. ‘In comparison with the snow, fog and lowtemperature issues that LFV will face with their remote tower at Sundsvall, we will have to deal with heat, dust and very occasionally, heavy rain at our site in Alice Springs. We may not have to melt the snow off the camera housing but we probably will have to blow the dust off the camera windows,’ he told the conference. Photos: Jan Goosen Airservices stresses that during the Australian trials there will be no change to existing air trafﬁc control arrangements. Any decision to introduce the technology to non-controlled aerodromes would involve industry consultation, safety assessments and regulatory approval from the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), Airservices says. ‘We intend to work closely with CASA to ensure that they understand the technology and Airservices’ approach to its use in Australia,’ Harﬁeld said. ‘Such a leading-edge technology will take a considerable amount of thought and discussion before gaining regulatory approval for its use.’ CASA air trafﬁc services specialist, Jan Goosen visited Sweden last year to inspect the Saab/LFVsystem. He was impressed by the clear view of the aerodrome surroundings from the remote tower which were unobstructed by building support columns, as they are in most control towers. The augmented reality display that projected radar position information onto the visual displays also impressed him. ‘Aircraft beyond normal view can be projected on the display as a labelled radar track, and aircraft within view can be tagged with a label including call sign and other relevant information,’ he says. ‘This means controllers gain a earlier awareness of aircraft in the vicinity of the aerodrome than is possible by optical means alone. This is a signiﬁcant situational awareness beneﬁt.’ Goosen noted some challenges and teething problems. Ambient lighting had to be kept low for the projectors to display well, which made for a less-than-ideal working environment, he found. Later versions will use LCD display screens that should overcome this. Controllers who participated in the trial told him it could be difﬁcult to judge relative distance and/or position between aircraft when they had to provide visual separation instructions. The use of a 270-degree display of a 360-degree view was an unknown factor. The trial suite had a 360-degree display but Goosen says the proposed 270-degree display ‘will obviously have distortion issues that will need to be overcome.’ Goosen also spoke with the LFV about their view of remote tower technology. ‘LFV does not consider a remote tower to be the direct equivalent of a conventional control tower. Rather, remote tower technology is a type of aerodrome control that ﬁts between AFIS and a manned control tower. ‘This is a fair assessment of the potential of the system. Remote technology could provide an extra tool in the kit for aerodrome operations risk management,’ he concluded. ',67$17&286,16 Remote tower concepts are also being developed in at least two other locations. Germany’s air trafﬁc management provider, the Deutsche Flugsicherung (DFS), plans to install a ‘distant aerodrome control service’, or virtual control tower visual in its Munich tower to enable controllers to manage trafﬁc using a new third runway if it goes ahead. Munich’s proposed new runway, 26R/08L, would be north of the two existing parallel runways, and would not be visible from the existing control tower. Instead of building a supplementary tower the DFS proposes using high- resolution video cameras linked to the existing tower to watch the activity on the new runway. In 2009, London Heathrow Airport commissioned an emergency remote control tower that was speciﬁed to be able to handle 75 per cent of a normal day’s trafﬁc. The system, which is at an undisclosed location away from the airport, is ready to be deployed if ﬁre, failure, damage, disaster or attack disables the main control tower, Flight International reported. FAR AWAY, SO CLOSE ‘This issue may be overcome by the availability of radar information on a plan position indicator (the controller has a bird’s eye view of aircraft relative positions) and by technique (more reliance on the pilot to see and then follow/avoid),’ Goosen says. 27 Volcanic fallout continues Volcanoes remind us that this was a small planet even before the invention of the jet airliner. As this issue of Flight Safety Australia went to press, airline ﬂights in Australia had been cancelled because of a volcanic eruption in Chile. Ash from the Puehuye-Córdon Caulle massif blew westwards around the globe to disrupt air travel half a world away. Flights were cancelled in locations as far apart as Hobart, Perth and Darwin. At the time of writing Qantas, Jetstar and Tiger Airways remained grounded but Virgin Australia had resumed ﬂying. Across the Tasman Sea, Air New Zealand services continued without interruption, although at changed ﬂight levels to avoid the ash cloud. A Qantas spokeswoman said that airline’s reason for stopping ﬂying was that there was insufﬁcient data on the density of the ash cloud. At the time of writing, 283 ﬂights had been cancelled and the eruption was continuing. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 28 Volcanic ash had been back in the air, and in the minds of aviation professionals, since May, after Iceland’s most active volcano, Grimsvötn, erupted. The eruption produced an ash cloud raising renewed concerns that there would be a return of the ﬂight chaos experienced in April 2010. The eruption caused the cancellation of 1600 ﬂights in Europe (of the 90,000 scheduled from 23–25 May). Some transatlantic ﬂights were also delayed, and US President, Barack Obama, had to cut his state visit to Ireland a day short as a precaution against Air Force One being grounded by the ash. Grimsvötn’s ash plume billowed to 56,000ft (17,000m), almost twice as high as that of Eyjafjallajökull the previous year, which reached 29,500ft (9000m). But geologists say Grímsvötn was not the towering threat to aviation it appeared, because its ash had a lower silica content—about 50 per cent—than the 63 per cent silica ash that had spewed from Eyjafjallajökull in 2010. Silica is glass and silica ash is, in effect, broken glass. The basalt-based ash emitted from Grimsvötn was also coarser than the smaller, more abrasive particles emitted from Eyjafjallajökull. As heavier particles, they were less likely to drift a long way in a cloud. However, particles of ash from Grímsvötn were found as far away as Aberdeen in Scotland. European authorities took a slightly different approach to Grímsvötn than they had for Eyjafjallajökull the previous year. Flights were cancelled in Britain, Sweden, Denmark and northern Germany, but several European countries adopted a different basis for airspace closure. All European countries recognised three levels of ash concentration: low, from zero to 0.002 grams per cubic metre; medium: 0.002 to 0.004 g/m3; and high, more than 0.004 g/m3. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland retained blanket bans on ﬂying in areas of high ash concentration. France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom allowed ﬂight in ‘temporary danger areas’ of high ash concentration by operators who had submitted a strategic risk assessment and had it approved. The assessment was to include information from tests, as well as information from consultations between the operators and aircraft manufacturers. British Airways, and low-cost airline, Ryanair, both conducted test ﬂights into the highconcentration areas and said, after engineering inspection of the aircraft, that they had found no evidence of ash. Ryanair’s outspoken chief executive, Tony O’Leary, described the Grimsvötn ash cloud as mythical. He told the British Daily Telegraph: ‘For 50 years the airlines have been telling the public that ﬂying is some super-sexual experience and is more complicated than brain surgery. We've been blowing up that bull for 20 years. It's no different from a bus or a train.’ However, the UK Civil Aviation Authority said the Ryanair test ﬂight had not entered the high-concentration ‘red zone’. Others were even more forthright. ‘Unfortunately, the speed of the scientiﬁc process is nothing in comparison to that of a certain Irishman’s tongue, but the evidence is beginning to come together that the plume crossed the northern part of the UK yesterday as predicted,’ geologist and post-doctoral student in volcanology at the University of Edinburgh, John A. Stevenson, blogged. According to the Bureau of Meteorology’s Northern Territory regional director, Andrew Tupper, ‘My impression was that the Europeans did a better job this time than last year.’ ‘I think the warning system worked well. The ﬁrst motivation is to save lives and now there‘s the reﬁnement of making aviation run as smoothly as it can.’ ‘We’re still learning from the Eyjafjallajökull eruption,’ he says. ‘There was a very large database collected by aircraft that ﬂew in the plume, and matching that against the concentrations of ash we think they ﬂew through is quite a large job.’ A volcanic eruption in Bali in January this year saw Jetstar and Virgin Blue cancel ﬂights to and from the island. ‘There are in the order of 150 active volcanoes in the countries immediately to our north, and airlines routinely ﬂy around areas of potential activity. All routes to Japan, for example, pass over areas where there are active volcanoes. Our experience is that most airlines treat the threat seriously and plan accordingly using our advice.’ The Asia-Paciﬁc has different volcanic and weather conditions to the north Atlantic, Tupper says. ‘One difference in the tropics is that volcanic clouds don’t tend to linger. You don’t see that situation as at Heathrow last year with a cloud that just won’t go away.’ ‘Our focus has been much more on making sure we know about eruptions that are going to happen, rather than in Europe where they have air trafﬁc management issues.’ The nightmare volcanic ash scenario in this part of the world would not be an ash cloud hanging for days over Asia or northern Australia, but the more acute problem of an aircraft encountering ash from an unmonitored and unreported eruption, Tupper says. ICAO’s volcanic ash task force will hold its second meeting in Montreal in July this year. A July conference of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics in Melbourne is also afﬁliated with the ICAO task force. The four groups set up in the task force’s ﬁrst meeting will report their ﬁndings on four areas: air trafﬁc management; airworthiness; warning systems and scientiﬁc issues, including development of remote sensing technology; and modelling of ash drift. 29 Tupper says this region’s distinctive volcanic, technological and climate conditions will require a tailored volcanic ash policy. ‘If you’re modelling ash concentration and you tune it too heavily to a particular eruption you might get a nasty surprise in a subsequent eruption. If you’re assuming a system’s going to work because it’s worked in Europe, in the most technologically advanced parts of the world, you may ﬁnd that it’s inappropriate in the developing world.’ ‘The European system was brought in very quickly. Now we have to work out whether it’s the best system for the rest of the world, or whether we can do even better.’ Civil Aviation Safety Authority ofﬁce of airspace regulation operations manager, Graeme Rogers, says: ‘Although there are only two active volcanoes within Australian territory - on the sub-Antarctic islands, Heard and McDonald - CASA takes a very close interest in volcanic ash issues because of the potential of so many active areas to our near north to impact upon Australian aviation. ‘CASA is also anxious that there is a standard approach to airspace regulation in relation to volcanic ash issues. Through the ofﬁce of airspace regulation, CASA is endeavouring to provide assistance in developing appropriate procedures for the region.’ ‘To this end, the authority is actively involved in the ICAO deliberations on these issues and will be participating in a workshop associated with the July meeting of the volcanic ash task force.’ Rogers says all parties in aviation have learned many lessons from the recent volcanic events. ‘The July conference will be an important chance to review the recent situation and build on what we can learn from it.’ VOLCANIC FALLOUT Volcanic ash is a major potential concern in the region north of Australia, and there have been major incidents in this region, he says. ‘The most recent case of an aircraft engine failure caused by ash in an aircraft engine was over Papua New Guinea in 2006, and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 produced more aircraft ash encounters than any other eruption,’ Tupper says. 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Plus, our Bachelor of Aviation Management and Master of Aviation Management can help get your career off the tarmac and in full flight. To find out more, visit griffith.edu.au/aviation A Top 10 Australian Research University* *Based on fields of research at the 4-digit level in the Excellence in Research for Australia 2010 National Report. CRICOS 00233E | juniorGU28742 FSA JUL-AUG 2011 For further information and pricing please contact us ‘There is still no cure for the common birthday,’ lamented John Glenn. But as an astronaut who ﬁrst orbited the Earth in 1962 aged 30, and then again in 1998, at 77, he is a case in point. There is more to ageing than having had lots of birthdays. What the team has discovered, and emphasised in meetings with aircraft operators, is that ageing affects every part of an aircraft. When Glenn returned to space after 36 years he engaged a personal trainer to prepare him for the trip, results of which revealed that his bone and muscle loss was no worse than astronauts half his age, and his heart rate was slightly lower. Then there are the variables that affect the ageing process: van Dijk runs through a list that includes hours, cycles, pressurisation cycles (in applicable aircraft), operating environment, storage environment, loading, accident damage, pilot handling style and maintenance standards. The difference between age and birthday count has become very clear to CASA’s ageing aircraft management team as they investigate Australia’s aircraft ﬂeet. With little discernable change in the low rate of new aircraft acquisitions over the last three decades, ageing aircraft are here to stay. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found the average ﬁxed-wing aircraft (single- or multiengined under 5700kg) is now approaching 40 years old. ‘The sad fact is every aircraft on the Australian register is ageing – it’s just that the newer ones haven’t been exposed to the processes of ageing for as long,’ CASA’s ageing aircraft management plan project manager, Pieter van Dijk, says. ‘Ageing is more than just an airframe issue. It affects systems and parts including avionics, electrical systems, fuel systems, hydraulic systems, pneumatic systems, ﬂight controls, seats, windows, doors, and even locks.’ Consultant and presenter at CASA’s series of ageing aircraft seminars, Dr Bob Holdsworth, elaborates. He says cumulative stress is a major – and poorly understood – issue in the ageing aircraft debate. He pithily sums up the relationship between stress and metal fatigue: ‘Metal has a memory. Metal never forgets,’ Holdsworth says. ‘It always remembers what‘s been done to it. ’Metal fatigue imposed early in an aircraft’s life is cumulative and will catch up with it many years later, Holdsworth adds. According to van Dijk, ‘there’s no simple deﬁnition of an ageing aircraft, and no one-size-ﬁts-all solution. But there are some general conditions. If an aircraft is: more than several years old; has ﬂown a signiﬁcant number of hours and cycles (take-offs and landings); has 31 AIRWORTHINESS Since late last year, CASA’s ageing aircraft management project team has been emphasising, on our website and in meetings around Australia, that working out an aircraft’s effective age is a subtle calculation. Those which are young in years may be old in health and vice versa. Among the factors which must be considered are usage, maintenance and climate. PULL-OUT SECTION A survey completed as part of CASA’s Ageing Aircraft Management Plan (AAMP) reveals a simple message for pilots and aircraft: ‘Take a closer look’. PULL-OUT SECTION FSA JUL-AUG 2011 32 been operated in a corrosive environment such as in the dust, over the sea, or along the coast, and is not supported by a continuing airworthiness program that takes account of ageing aircraft issues, it is more than likely that it has ageing-related problems that will need to be addressed.’ Under this broader, multifaceted deﬁnition of ageing, a newer aircraft that has led a hard life in a harsh environment can be ‘older’ than one made many years earlier that has had fewer ﬂight hours, avoided heavy loads and abrupt manoeuvres, and been stored under cover in a dry environment. This expanded deﬁnition also catches some relatively young medium- and high-capacity aircraft in its net, some of which had worrying combinations of ageing aircraft symptoms, van Dijk says. ‘We’ve seen pressurised aircraft which weren’t that chronologically old, but had many thousands of hours, vague histories in far-ﬂung parts of the world and in a couple of cases had been written-off and subsequently rebuilt, with repairs on their repairs. The consequences of ageing-related failure in pressurised aircraft are of great concern because structural failure can literally be explosive.’ An important message not all aircraft owners appreciate is that they, and not their LAME/s, are responsible for their aircraft’s airworthiness. ‘At some meetings owners would say, “But doesn’t the LAME take care of that?’ The answer is no. The aircraft owner/ registered operator has the responsibility to keep the aircraft airworthy. The buck stops with them.’ The practical implication of this is that owners/ registered operators of older aircraft should think carefully about what maintenance regime and commitment is appropriate to keep their aircraft ﬂying safely, van Dijk says. The CASA maintenance schedule, which is in Schedule 5 of the CARs, is widely misunderstood. Many think it replaces and relaxes the manufacturer’s maintenance schedule. In fact, CASA recommends owners and operators study manufacturer’s maintenance schedules, ‘as it is considered that these are generally more appropriate for the maintenance of the aeroplane.’ [CAAP 42B-1 (0)] In other words, CASA regards Schedule 5 as a minimum maintenance standard, which should be supplemented with relevant information, checks and techniques for each individual aircraft type. ‘Schedule 5 is aircraft maintenance 101,’ van Dijk says. ‘It says to check for engine oil level, missing rivets and inspect the internal structures and spars; basic stuff. It doesn’t give advice on how to inspect the hidden parts of an aircraft for corrosion and fatigue damage, which can only be subtly apparent to the eye.’ But as some general aviation aircraft enter their ﬁfth decade in service, even following the manufacturer’s guidelines may not be enough to keep them ﬂying safely. ‘Some manufacturers’ systems of maintenance are good, and meet or exceed what we would consider as the necessary maintenance standard for an ageing aircraft, but in many cases they do not,’ van Dijk says. ‘A manufacturer’s system of maintenance, written perhaps in the 1950s or the 60s is based on what was known about airframes, fatigue and systems back then,’ he says. ‘In the 1960s the manufacturer would have expected their aircraft to be in use for 20 years, at most, and those assumptions are built into what they say in guidance.’ Disturbingly, in many cases, such documentation has not been updated since this time to reﬂect the growing understanding of how best to manage the issue of ageing. Some of the most important aspects are the principal structural elements. You need to look at as many of the key structural elements in toto as possible, such as the main spar and longerons. Then there are the control cables and avionics wiring, so that you’re not going to get an in-ﬂight failure or ﬁre. At the moment maintenance Schedule 5 may not necessarily provide anywhere near that level of thoroughness. This stuff can kill you. None of this is to say that older aircraft cannot be safely maintained, van Dijk stresses. But it has quickly become apparent to the project ‘There’s nothing unsafe about having an ageing aircraft as long as you give it the additional attention it needs,’ van Dijk says ‘Providing it is looked after properly – and it will need more maintenance as time goes by – it is likely to then be as safe as on the day it was made.’ That doesn’t mean an older aircraft is as good as a new one, however. ‘You should be aware that it will never have the same level of safety features and safety performance as a newer, certiﬁcated aircraft does,’ van Dijk says. ‘We’re talking about features such as fuel tank ﬂammability reduction, use of shoulder harnesses, a higher degree of crashworthiness in seating, ballistic recovery parachutes and, in a few cases, airbagequipped seat belts. Even in long-running types such as the Cessna 172, you’d be better off in any survivable crash in the latest version than in an older one, even if both aircraft had identical time.’ At the other extreme, one of the worst things the team has seen is evidence of a new structural component, required by a manufacturer’s supplemental inspection document (SID) program, ﬁtted to a corroded surrounding structure in a wing, totally negating the intent of the SID. What’s probably happened is that an owner has said to a LAME ‘I am paying for the SID program installation and nothing else. But implementing that SID program is pointless if the owner chooses to ignore the existing surrounding structural integrity of aircraft. It was penny-wise and pound-foolish in the worst possible way.’ Another very useful resource, particularly for smaller GA aircraft is the network of type clubs and associations. ‘The depth of knowledge those guys have is very impressive indeed,’ van Dijk says, citing examples where type clubs have commissioned manufacturing runs of spare parts no longer available from the manufacturer. ‘CASA fully supports the continued operation of ageing aircraft, as long as it can be done safely,’ van Dijk says. ‘What it comes down to is the importance of taking a closer look at your aircraft’. Safe keeping: aircraft storage in the desert Few things affect the condition of an aircraft more than environment. As if to emphasise the point, Alice Springs Airport, in the dry air of central Australia announced in May that it would partner with Asia Paciﬁc Aircraft Storage to build Australia’s ﬁrst aircraft storage and recycling facility. The press release was too polite to use the word ‘bone yard’, but the intention is to construct a similar facility to American storage parks in Tucson, Arizona, and Victorville, California. Asia Paciﬁc Aircraft Storage managing director, Tom Vincent, said, ‘Alice Springs Airport offers the ideal conditions for such an operation to be effective.’ The APAS website adds: ‘The facility beneﬁts from an arid desert environment characterised by an average year-round humidity of approximately 25 per cent, outside Australia’s cyclone zone, low rainfall, and low-lying, in situ vegetation that provides additional dust suppression.’ 33 AIRWORTHINESS ‘There are some people out there in industry who really understand this well,’ van Dijk says. ‘There are engineers who are rebuilding ageing aircraft and making them better than they were when new. Often they remove signiﬁcant weight by upgrading to modern avionics and taking the opportunity to replace the ageing wiring at the same time. They and their customers clearly understand that if you’re going to operate an ageing aircraft it should be a new ageing aircraft. Customers tend to ﬂock to these revitalised aircraft. ‘It could be that that this store of knowledge deserves a place in the formal airworthiness system. Meanwhile, the type club would be the ﬁrst place for an owner to go to for information or expertise on how to maintain an aircraft.’ PULL-OUT SECTION team that maintenance needs to become more comprehensive and more targeted as an aircraft ages, and may even need to exceed current regulatory and manufacturers’ standards. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS 1 April 2011 – 31 May 2011 Note: Similar occurrence figures not included in this edition AIRCRAFT ABOVE 5700KG Airbus A320212 Rear cabin oxygen bottle incorrect part. SDR 510012692 LH and RH rear cabin oxygen bottles and masks incompatible. Mask could not be fitted to bottles. Investigation found oxygen bottles PNo 9700C1ABF23A. Mask PNo 289-601-248. P/No: 9700C1ABF23A. PULL-OUT SECTION Airbus A320232 Flaps locked at zero degrees and would not deploy. SDR 510012599 Flaps would not deploy and were locked at zero degrees configuration. Investigation continuing. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 34 Airbus A321231 Pitot probe quick disconnect blocked. SDR 510012717 No. 1 pitot probe quick disconnect blocked by a piece of insulation blanket. Investigation continuing. P/No: 1QF23S64A. Airbus A330303 APU generator failed. SDR 510012842 APU generator failed. Two large holes approximately 25.4mm (1in) square were found in the generator case with cracking between the holes. Heavy contamination of generator scavenge filter. Loss of APU oil. Investigation continuing. P/No: BA4104. Airbus A380842 Air conditioning pack hose burst. SDR 510012673 No. 2 air conditioning pack hose burst. Damage to pneumatic crossover duct heat shield, leak detectors and wiring insulation in air conditioning bay. Investigation continuing. P/No: L0003040100000. Airbus A380842 GPS system failed. SDR 510012844 Auto-land failed during flare/touchdown. Investigation continuing. Airbus A380842 Hydraulic ‘green’ system leaking. SDR 510012667 Loss of all ‘green’ hydraulic system fluid. Investigation continuing. BAC 146300 Lower cargo door leaking from upper release catches. SDR 510012407 Loss of pressurisation. Investigation found leaking from lower cargo door upper release catches. No sealant was found at attachment to door inner face skin. Inner catch o-ring seals deteriorated. Several small leaks also found at main upper cargo door and entrance doors. Beech 1900C Vertical stabiliser rear spar angle corroded. SDR 510012460 Vertical stabiliser rear spar LH and RH boom angles PNo 101-640010-9 and PNo 101-640010-10 corroded. P/No: 10164001010. Beech 1900C Wing bonded panel partially delaminated. SDR 510012505 RH wing bonded panel partially disbonded in flight. P/No: 1141200601. TSN: 30,170 hours/38,428 cycles. Boeing 717200 Hydraulic pump ‘V’ band clamp failed. SDR 510012421 LH engine driven hydraulic pump ‘V’ band clamp failed allowing pump to separate from accessory gearbox. Pump splines damaged. Gearbox drive splines showed signs of fretting. Investigation continuing. P/No: 24974. Boeing 737476 Elevator control rod bearing seized. SDR 510012558 RH elevator control rod aft bearings seized. Found during inspection iaw EI 737-27-108 R1. P/No: 654518614. Boeing 737476 Elevator hinge plate bushing missing. SDR 510012596 RH elevator No. 3 hinge outboard attachment plate bushing missing. Bearing worn beyond limits. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 Wing flap track attachment bolts missing. SDR 510012729 No. 3 flap track aft attachment bolts (2off) missing. Track loose. Investigation continuing. P/No: 113A92182. Boeing 737476 Engine bleed air tripped off. SDR 510012449 RH bleed air tripped off in cruise. Investigation found No. 2 engine fan air valve failed. Boeing 7378BK Wing fuel tank access panel leaking. SDR 510012542 (photo below) LH wing fuel tank access panels No. 5 and No. 6 leaking due to dome nut cracking. Panels P/No 112N6101-2 and PNo 65033095-2 (532CB and 532DB). P/No: 112N61012. Boeing 737476 Main landing gear tyre punctured by FOD. SDR 510012595 Main landing gear No. 4 tyre punctured by Foreign Object Damage causing an approximately 50.8mm (2in) cut through the tread. Investigation found the FOD was a thrust reverser bumper which had separated from another aircraft. See SDR 510012593. P/No: 6558256262. TSN: 29,496 hours. TSO: 172 hours. Boeing 737476 PCU reaction link bearing corroded. SDR 510012801 RH aileron power control unit (PCU) reaction link lower bearing rusted. Aileron spring cartridge bearing also rusted and ‘notchy’. Boeing 73776Q Autopilot TAT sensor failed. SDR 510012606 Autopilot system total air temperature (TAT) sensor failed. P/No: 102AH2AG. TSN: 14,414 hours/7,805 cycles. Boeing 7377BK Flap system locked. SDR 510012572 Flaps locked at position 1 during approach. Investigation could find nil faults. Boeing 7377Q8 Angle of attack sensor unserviceable. SDR 510012656 LH angle of attack sensor faulty. P/No: 0861FL1. TSN: 20,902 hours/14,749 cycles. Boeing 7377Q8 Wing fuel tank access panel anchor nut dome cracked/leaking. SDR 510012782 RH wing fuel tank access panel 632FB leaking due to a cracked anchor nut dome. Boeing 737838 APU bleed air system fumes. SDR 510012800 Burnt rubber smell in cabin. Initial investigation found slight APU oil leak into bleed air system. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 Engine failed to go to idle when thrust levers moved. SDR 510012762 No. 2 engine failed to go to idle when thrust levers moved to idle position. No. 2 fluctuating up to 0.7 per cent. Investigation continuing. Boeing 737838 First officer’s pitot/static probe suspect faulty. SDR 510012458 First officer's pitot/static probe suspect faulty due to nil pitot heat. Investigation found open circuit on pins 41 - 15. Boeing 737838 Horizontal stabiliser trailing edge panel delaminated. SDR 510012454 Upper horizontal stabiliser inboard trailing edge panel delaminated. Area of delamination approximately 228.6mm by 330.2mm (9in by 13in). During repair, the area of disbond was found to be more than initially thought. Investigation continuing. P/No: 185A17011. Boeing 737838 Integrated standby flight display failed. SDR 510012859 Integrated Standby Flight Display (ISFD) failed. Investigation continuing. P/No: C16221KA02. TSN: 12,970 hours. TSO: 12,970 hours. Boeing 737838 Standby rudder PCU leaking. SDR 510012834 Standby rudder power control unit (PCU) leaking. Investigation continuing. P/No: 3812001001. TSN: 26,490 hours. TSO: 26,490 hours. Boeing 7378FE Engine IDG unserviceable. SDR 510012498 No. 1 engine integrated drive generator (IDG) failed. P/No: 761574B. TSN: 29,532 hours/15,195 cycles. TSO: 17,129 hours/7,237 cycles. Boeing 7378FE Rudder Main power control unit leaking. SDR 510012846 Rudder main power control unit (MPCU) leaking beyond limits from rod dynamic seal. Investigation continuing. P/No: 4193001003. TSN: 28,924 hours/16,620 cycles. Boeing 7378FE Wheel well fire detector unserviceable. SDR 510012403 RH wheel well fire warning loop kinked in one radius and had low resistance giving false fire indication. P/No: 0490010110D. Boeing 737BBJ Display electronic unit unserviceable. SDR 510012545 No. 1 display electronic unit (DEU) failed. P/No: 4081600930. Boeing 737BBJ Flight management computer failed. SDR 510012576 Dual flight management computer (FMC) failure. Investigation continuing. Boeing 747438 Control display unit failed. SDR 510012679 RH control display unit (CDU) screen blank with strong electrical burning smell. P/No: 4058650904. Boeing 747438 Wing inboard trailing edge flap damaged - bird strike. SDR 510012442 RH wing inboard trailing edge mid flap damaged by bird strike in area of leading edge. Hole approximately 127mm by 127mm (5in by 5in) at WBL 300. Investigation could find no further damage. Boeing 747438 Wing landing gear trunnion bearing nut loose. SDR 510012843 RH wing landing gear trunnion forward spherical bearing retaining nut loose and lock bolts sheared. Investigation continuing. Boeing 767336 Galley drain line heater ribbon burnt. SDR 510012794 Galley drain line heater ribbon burnt in half. Investigation continuing. P/No: 11552977. Boeing 767336 Wingtip navigation light smoking. SDR 510012592 LH wingtip navigation light smoking. Light was a newly fitted item. Investigation found earth bonding lead burnt in half and light reflector short circuiting to live lamp post. Investigation continuing. P/No: 3015885. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Boeing 767338ER Hydraulic LCCA filter housing o-ring split/leaking. SDR 510012682 Lateral central control Actuator (LCCA) filter housing o-ring seal split and leaking. Investigation continuing. P/No: NAS1611029. 83260310-103. The skin pin was found to be rusted and it is suspected that it had been lying in the housing since the aircraft was manufactured before eventually jamming the linkage. Foreign object damage (FOD). Boeing 767338ER Over-wing escape slide bottle incorrectly assembled. SDR 510012693 LH over-wing escape slide bottle inflation trigger cable incorrectly assembled. Cable ball was installed behind the retainer spring of the pull force increase mechanism. P/No: 130104237. Embraer ERJ170100 Forward passenger door escape slide incorrect operation. SDR 510012786 Forward passenger door escape slide failed to deploy correctly during test. P/No: 4A40305. Bombardier DHC8402 Pilot’s outboard brake cable incorrectly routed. SDR 510012481 Pilot's outboard brake cable incorrectly routed under the cable keeper on the stick pusher quadrant. Bombardier DHC8402 Rear emergency door lock sensor failed. SDR 510012631 LH rear emergency door lock sensor failed. P/No: 41020101. Bombardier DHC8315 Engine torque signal conditioner failed. SDR 510012610 No. 1 engine torque signal conditioner failed. P/No: MM0316. TSN: 21,092 hours/20,084 cycles. Bombardier DHC8402 Starter-generator cooling fan separated. SDR 510012797 No. 2 starter-generator cooling fan failed and separated from unit. Bombardier DHC8315 GPS wiring removal incorrect procedure. SDR 510012675 When old GPS system removed from the aircraft, removal of the associated wiring not carried out in accordance with Australian Avionics EO 1288 Part 2. Some wiring was cut, but not capped, while some wires were still connected to other operating systems and remained live. CASA C212EE Horizontal stabiliser flange bracket cracked. SDR 510012581 LH horizontal stabiliser flange bracket cracked. P/No: 21223100081. TSN: 1,798 hours/1,144 cycles. Bombardier DHC8315 Nose landing gear door sequence valve bolts sheared. SDR 510012550 Nose landing gear door sequence valve bolts sheared. Loss of No. 2 system hydraulic fluid. TSN: 22,657 hours/22,198 cycles. Bombardier DHC8315 Stall warning computer faulty. SDR 510012474 No. 2 stall warning system dual computer failed. TSN: 12,763 hours/13,331 cycles. Bombardier DHC8402 Elevator PCU centring spring broken. SDR 510012766 Elevator power control unit (PCU) centring spring broken. TSN: 10,613 hours/12,179 cycles. Bombardier DHC8402 Fuel tank probe FOD. SDR 510012630 RH fuel tank No. 3 probe suspected damaged by FOD. Part was a Hilock fastener and was found in the fuel tank adjacent to the probe. Investigation found signs that the part had been lodged in the probe assembly. Bombardier DHC8402 Galley urn terminal loose/burnt. SDR 510012472 No. 2 galley urn connector loose/burnt. Bombardier DHC8402 Generator failed. SDR 510012755 No. 2 AC generator failed. TSN: 8,922 hours/10,386 cycles. Bombardier DHC8402 Nose landing gear alternate release linkage jammed - FOD. SDR 510012388 (photo following) Nose landing gear alternate release linkage jammed. Investigation found an aircraft skin pin (Cleco pin) jamming the release tripping arm P/No Embraer EMB120 Aileron trim system seized. SDR 510012677 Aileron trim system solidly locked preventing movement of trim wheel. Investigation continuing. Embraer EMB120 Engine starter-generator incorrectly fitted. SDR 510012712 No. 2 engine starter-generator separated from engine during start. Investigation found startergenerator had been incorrectly reinstalled following maintenance on previous day. P/No: 2308013B. TSO: 995 hours/547cycles/10 months. Embraer EMB120 Main wheel inner hub cracked. SDR 510012395 RH inboard main wheel inner hub cracked along flange. Crack length approximately 254mm (10in). Tyre bead was still seated and tyre was still inflated. P/No: 314461. Embraer EMB120 Nose landing gear steering bearing incorrect part. SDR 510012711 Nose landing gear lower steering member fitted with incorrect bearing. Aircraft was last overhauled in USA. P/No: 19829. TSN: 32,015 cycles. TSO: 2,414 cycles/65 months. Embraer EMB120 Rear pressure bulkhead outflow valve faulty. SDR 510012685 Rear pressure bulkhead outflow valve prevented from correct operation due to insulation blanket separation. Embraer EMB120 Rudder actuator unserviceable. SDR 510012875 Rudder actuator unserviceable. Suspect internal leak. P/No: 3081401003. Embraer ERJ170100 APU fuel line leaking. SDR 510012489 APU fuel feed line leaking from swaged fitting located at forward bulkhead/firewall at Frame 100. P/No: A95481. Embraer ERJ190100 Hydraulic pump pressure line worn. SDR 510012425 No. 2 engine driven hydraulic pump pressure line chafed by ‘P’ clip in upper aft area of RH pylon. Wear depth approximately 0.2286mm (0.009in) which is beyond limits. P/No: 19005170401. Embraer ERJ190100 Multi function display unserviceable. SDR 510012776 No. 1 multi-function display (MFD) unit unserviceable. P/No: 7037620813. TSN: 7,075 hours/4,740 cycles. Embraer ERJ190100 Pitot/static/AOA sensor suspect faulty. SDR 510012720 Integrated pitot/static/AOA sensor suspect faulty. P/No: 2015G2H2H8A. TSN: 2,943 hours/1,735 cycles. Embraer ERJ190100 Primary actuator control electronic unserviceable. SDR 510012598 No. 2 primary actuator control electronic (PACE) unserviceable. P/No: 7028273822. TSN: 8,188 hours/5,670 cycles. Fokker F27MK50 Wing skin corroded. SDR 510012828 LH centre wing lower skin contained exfoliation corrosion located in area forward of panel 923AB and adjacent to anchor plate screw. Area of corrosion approximately 15mm (0.59in) to 25mm (0.98in), with a maximum depth of 1.8mm (0.071in). Fokker F28MK0100 APU unit seized. SDR 510012674 While investigating defect SDR 510012647 (damage to rear of aircraft and failure of duct seal), it was found that the APU had seized. Investigation continuing. P/No: 38005142. TSO: 119 hours/116 cycles. Fokker F28MK0100 Cargo bay fire extinguisher cartridge discharged. SDR 510012698 Cargo bay No. 2 forward fire extinguisher cartridge fired. Suspect cartridge had been fitted in a fired condition. Investigation also found cartridge had incorrect serial number. Found during inspection iaw MCN 2620-2110B. 35 AIRWORTHINESS Bombardier DHC8315 Master caution light triggered intermittently. SDR 510012518 Master caution light illuminating intermittently with no accompanying caution light. Investigation found master caution triggered intermittently by a blank module filter. TSN: 23,653 hours. Dornier DO328100 Fuselage inboard overwing panel separated. SDR 510012529 RH top fuselage inboard over-wing panel separated in flight. Investigation continuing. P/No: 001A538A0120101. Embraer ERJ190100 Brake assembly hose quick coupling failed. SDR 510012559 (photo below) No. 2 brake assembly outboard hose quick disconnect coupling failed and sprayed fluid on to hot brakes. P/No: 2000A0529K01. PULL-OUT SECTION Bombardier BD7001A10 Microwave oven fire. SDR 510012570 Smoke from microwave oven when operated. Door opened and then closed again automatically restarting the oven. Flames could then be observed in the oven. Investigation found the source of the smoke and flames was a plastic packet of wet towels in the oven for heating. Halon fire extinguisher discharged to extinguish the fire. TSN: 350 hours/112 cycles. Embraer ERJ170100 Emergency door escape slide internal shaft sheared. SDR 510012583 R2 door emergency escape slide deployed when door opened. Door assist cylinder did not fire. Investigation found flex-ball assembly internal shaft had sheared. P/No: 17084631401. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Fokker F28MK0100 Engine fuel shut-off valve incorrectly routed. SDR 510012696 RH engine fuel shut-off valve cable incorrectly routed. Cable was rubbing on No. 1 hydraulic system flexible line. Cable outer sheath worn through. P/No: 189770004. Fokker F28MK0100 Nose landing gear downlock plunger contaminated. SDR 510012641 Nose landing gear downlock plunger contaminated with excessive grease causing the plunger to seize. TSN: 27,510 hours/20,889 cycles. PULL-OUT SECTION Fokker F28MK0100 Passenger door escape slide bottle empty. SDR 510012831 Passenger door escape slide nitrogen bottle empty. Investigation continuing. TSN: 52 hours/30 cycles. TSO: 52 hours/30 cycles. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 36 Beech B200C Aircraft fuel system relief valve incorrectly fitted. SDR 510012620 RH nacelle tank pressure relief valve fitted in reverse with the flow arrow pointing in the wrong direction. P/No: 10138901131. TSN: 1,254 hours/1,545 landings/27 months. Cessna 441 Wing upper spar cap inner angle corroded. SDR 510012526 RH wing upper spar cap inner angle contained exfoliation corrosion in area between CWS34 and CWS45. LH wing inspected with exfoliation corrosion also found. P/No: 572216525. TSN: 11,079 hours/10,570 cycles. Cessna 150E Main landing gear stub axle failed. SDR 510012571 (photo below) LH main landing gear stub axle failed in area located beneath brake caliper attachment plate. Investigation found axle had been cracked for some time. P/No: 0541124. TSN: 8,448 hours. Cessna 550 Main landing gear brake disc cracked. SDR 510012855 (photo below) RH main landing gear brake disc cracked causing brakes to lock. Fokker F28MK0100 Rudder flutter damper shafts sheared. SDR 510012515 LH and RH rudder flutter damper rotating shafts sheared. Investigation continuing. Fokker F28MK1000 Stall warning computer unserviceable. SDR 510012787 Stall warning computer unserviceable. P/No: EASPC8503403. Lear 45 Cabin inverter failed. SDR 510012633 Cabin sidewall power outlet inverter failed. Investigation found unit had burnt out with soot evident in the area of the cooling fan. P/No: 100201021029. TSN: 62 months. TSO: 1 month. Lear 60 Aircraft fuel tank contaminated/ corroded. SDR 510012821 (photo below) Inspection of wing fuel tanks found microbiological contamination. Following removal of the contamination, corrosion was found between tank stringers and ribs. Cessna 208B Engine emergency power lever rubber cover poor design. SDR 510012429 Emergency power lever quadrant rubber cover obscures emergency power lever gates. Improved power lever quadrant is described in CAB06-3. Cessna 208 Float water rudder cable pulley corroded. SDR 510012525 Float water rudder cable pulley assembly corroded. Cable ball had pulled through bracket. Suspected to be caused by a combination of dissimilar metals and saltwater environment. P/No: 8A08000043. TSN: 1,946 hours. Cessna 402C Elevator control cable separated. SDR 510012394 Elevator control cable failed. Found during SIDS inspection. P/No: 52000841. Cessna 402C Hydraulic reservoir sight glass cracked. SDR 510012737 Hydraulic reservoir sight glass cracked. Two replacement sight tubes also cracked after two days. P/No: P610053. Lear 60 Engine starter-generator clamp bolts failed. SDR 510012431 LH and RH engine starter generator clamp bolts both snapped in smooth shank area of the bolt. LH starter had moved slightly forward. TSN: 610 hours/279 cycles. Saab SF340B Nose landing gear strut to drag brace pin fractured. SDR 510012619 Nose landing gear strut to drag brace attachment pin failed. The end of the pin complete with nut and cotter pin separated. P/No: AIR129698. TSN: 26,315 cycles/26,315 landings. TSO: 11,652 cycles/11,652 landings. AIRCRAFT BELOW 5700kg Beech 200 Wing skin cracked. SDR 510012852 LH wing skin cracked in areas adjacent to three of the upper forward wing attachment fitting screws. P/No: 0001101091557200010230. TSN: 12,187 hours/14,632 cycles. Beech 58 Nose landing gear wheel bead failed. SDR 510012803 Nose landing gear wheel bead failed allowing nose wheel to separate from rim. P/No: 3680025. Cessna 404 Aircraft fuel indicator out of calibration. SDR 510012690 Fuel quantity gauges over-reading. LH tank gauge reading in excess of 100 pounds when tank was virtually empty (4-5 litres left). Boost pump unserviceable due to running dry. RH tank had approximately 40 litres but gauge still reading 100 pounds. Cessna 404 Elevator and aileron trim control stop blocks missing. SDR 510012649 Elevator and aileron trim control system stop blocks missing. P/No: 51152141. Cessna 404 Elevators jammed at full ‘nose up’ – elevator horns transposed. SDR 510012384 Elevators jammed when moved to full ‘nose up’. Investigation found LH and RH elevator horns transposed causing horns to foul on the fork end of the elevator pushrod tube P/No 5815144-16. Investigation also found aft elevator cables P/No 5815103-5 (LH) and P/No 5815103-6 (RH) worn beyond limits with several broken strands. Aileron cables found over-tensioned. P/No: 581514534. Cessna 441 Cabin door locks out of adjustment. SDR 510012716 Cabin door locks out of adjustment. Loss of cabin pressurisation due to flexing of door. Cessna R172K Engine foam air filter element split. SDR 510012566 Engine foam air filter element split. Filter had been split for some time. Replacement filter element also split after approximately 40 minutes operation. P/No: BA24. TSN: 28 hours. Cirrus SR22 Wing aileron hinge loose. SDR 510012734 LH outboard aileron hinge loose. Further investigation found two attachment bolts threadbound. AN-3-10A bolts had been installed. Correct bolt AN3-6A. Aircraft being reassembled after delivery from manufacturer. P/No: 16817003. TSN: 1 hour/3 months Diamond DA42 Main landing gear actuator cracked. SDR 510012377 (photo below) RH main landing gear actuator failed at end bearing support. Evidence of corrosion cracking. P/No: D6090290701 (X1100060000001). TSN: 564 hours. Gulfstream 500S Main landing gear trunnion failed. SDR 510012837 LH main landing gear trunnion failed at retraction cylinder attachment point. P/No: ED12402. TSO: 505 hours/441 cycles/441 landings/6 months. Kavanagh B400 Balloon burner load frame cracked. SDR 510012539 Balloon burner load frame cracked adjacent to inner join. During weld repair, hairline cracks were found on other welds at the join. P/No: LF148. TSN: 1,261 hours. Partenavia P68B Rudder upper hinge bracket cracked and corroded. SDR 510012763 (photo following) Rudder upper hinge fitting failed due to intergranular corrosion. Hinge spread apart allowing the hinge bolt to detach. Investigation also found a fatigue crack beneath the hinge on the rudder spar that had been previously repaired. P/No: 68340451. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Bell 206B3 Cabin roof beam web cracked. SDR 510012430 (photo below) Cabin roof beam web P/No 206-031-200-016 cracked through. Crack length 105mm (4.13in). Stiffener P/No 206-031-106-131 also cracked. P/No: 206031200016. TSN: 13,582 hours/370 months. PISTON ENGINES Continental GTSIO520M Engine oil pressure relief valve faulty. SDR 510012410 RH engine oil pressure relief valve faulty. Fluctuating pressure affecting governor and preventing accurate RPM setting. TSO: 949 hours. Continental IO240B Engine stalled. SDR 510012623 Engine stalled when pulled back to idle. Suspect caused by low inertia in lightweight propeller. Manufacturer has increased idle speed. P/No: IO240. TSN: 3,602 hours. Reims F406 Rudder jammed during taxi. SDR 510012415 Rudder jammed during taxi. Rudder pedals then became free again after engine shut down. Investigation found the rate gyro and yaw damper unserviceable. Eurocopter BK117C1 Tail rotor servo hydraulic line leaking. SDR 510012490 Tail rotor servo input pressure supply line leaking. Loss of No. 1 hydraulic system hydraulic fluid. P/No: 112043031. Eurocopter EC120B Engine input flange hole worn. SDR 510012688 (photo below) Engine input flange assembly worn by incorrectly fitted bearing. P/No: C632A2181101. Swearingen SA227AC Rudder control cable frayed – incorrect routing. SDR 510012427 Rudder control cable badly frayed. Cable had been incorrectly routed over the cable keeper instead of the pulley. Cable is located under floor. P/No: 2770001069. TSN: 50 hours. TSO: 50 hours. Swearingen SA227DC Brake pedal pushrods contacting clevis springs. SDR 510012635 RH brake pedal pushrods contacting clevis springs when brakes operated at full rudder deflection. Pushrods had been fitted 19 days previously. P/No: 3272006003. 37 McDonnell Douglas 369D Tail rotor fork elastomeric bearing worn. SDR 510012700 Tail rotor fork elastomeric bearing worn beyond limits. P/No: 369A1724. Continental IO520C Engine cylinder cracked. SDR 510012509 (photo below) RH engine No. 2 cylinder cracked between spark plug hole and exhaust valve. P/No: AEC631397. TSN: 576 hours/67 months. McDonnell Douglas 369E Main rotor transmission ring gear failed. SDR 510012654 Main rotor transmission output ring gear failed. Metal contamination of transmission. P/No: 369D2512711. TSN: 577 hours. Swearingen SA227DC Pneumatic de-ice tubing broken. SDR 510012706 LH and RH airframe pneumatic de-ice tubing broken and leaking. Tubing was deteriorated in area located forward of aileron where tubing exposed to direct sunlight. P/No: 2787000147. TSN: 13,223 hours/12,875cycles/204 months. McDonnell Douglas 369F Fuselage skin cracked. SDR 510012617 Fuselage skin cracked in area of upper engine bay at FS 145. Crack length 139.7mm (5.5in). Tecnam P2006 Wing leading edge ribs damaged. SDR 510012504 (photo below) LH and RH wing leading edge ribs damaged due to contact with fuel tube. Nil damage to fuel tube. P/No: 2611320. TSN: 266 hours. Robinson R44 Tail rotor pitch control bearing dry and rough. SDR 510012549 Tail rotor pitch control bearings dry and slightly ‘notchy’. Dust coming from bearing seal. P/No: C0311. TSN: 982 hours/20 months. Robinson R44 Main rotor head teeter bearing worn. SDR 510012574 Main rotor head teeter bearing worn through. P/No: C6483. TSN: 2,165 hours. Schweizer 269C Main rotor blade leading edge tip debonded. SDR 510012426 Main rotor blade tip leading edge abrasion strip debonding on lower surface. Approximate area of debonding 1sqcm (0.155sqin). Two blades affected. Nil corrosion evident. P/No: 269A11851. TSN: 3,454 hours. ROTORCRAFT Schweizer 269C Main rotor blade pitch bearing brinelled. SDR 510012758 Main rotor blade pitch bearing set brinelled. Found during inspection iaw 269C-1 HMI 8.26. P/No: 269A1231. TSN: 579 hours. Agusta Westland AW139 Tail Rotor rigging tool incorrect part. SDR 510012396 Tail rotor actuator GAG tool suspect incorrect part. Tool length 38mm (1.496in) where maintenance manual quoted 44.5mm (1.75in). P/No: 3G6705G02731. Schweizer 269C Tail rotor gearbox shaft splined adaptor teeth damaged. SDR 510012760 Tail rotor gearbox input shaft splined adaptor teeth chipped. P/No: 269A6030005. TSN: 579 hours. Continental IO550P Engine cylinder fuel nozzle broken. SDR 510012796 No. 1 cylinder fuel nozzle cracked and broken. Suspect manufacturing error. Bore appears to be drilled offset. P/No: 6570681234. Continental TSIO520N Engine connecting rod cracked. SDR 510012626 No. 3, No. 5 and No. 6 connecting rods cracked in little end bushings. Found during engine disassembly. P/No: 655005. TSO: 415 hours. Continental TSIO520N Engine crankshaft oil transfer tube loose unserviceable. SDR 510012627 Crankshaft oil transfer tube loose and connecting rod bearings damaged. Found during engine disassembly. P/No: 649898. TSO: 1,354 hours. Jabiru JABIRU2200 Engine cylinder cracked. SDR 510012863 No. 4 cylinder cracked and leaking oil. TSN: 679 hours. TSO: 4 hours. Jabiru JABIRU3300 Engine cylinder exhaust valve broken. SDR 510012561 No. 6 cylinder exhaust valve failed. Severe internal damage to engine. AIRWORTHINESS Swearingen SA227AT Flap up hydraulic tube failed. SDR 510012587 Flap up hydraulic tube failed in area adjacent to hydraulic power pack. Tube is located in LH nacelle. Loss of hydraulic fluid and pressure. P/No: 2781032135. PULL-OUT SECTION Piper PA44180 Nose landing gear drag brace cracked. SDR 510012809 Nose landing gear drag brace cracked. P/No: 86280003. TSN: 5,384 hours. Continental IO520C Engine connecting rod failed. SDR 510012715 (photo below) Two forward connecting rods failed at big end. Crankshaft holed. SELECTED SERVICE DIFFICULTY REPORTS ... CONT Lycoming IGSO480A1E6 Engine cylinder piston failed. SDR 510012775 LH engine No. 6 cylinder piston badly melted and holed due to detonation. Suspect caused by excessively lean mixture. TSN: 288 hours/119 cycles/119 landings/6 months. PULL-OUT SECTION Lycoming IO540E1B5 Engine base studs failed. SDR 510012742 (photo below) LH engine No. 2 cylinder base studs failed. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 38 Garrett TPE3315251K FCU under speed faulty. SDR 510012428 RH engine fuel control unit under speed governor failed. P/No: 89352832. TSO: 890 hours/660 cycles. GE CF3410E Engine FADEC unserviceable. SDR 510012400 No. 2 engine Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) unserviceable. P/No: 114E7099G2. TSN: 1,682 hours/1,086 cycles. GE CF680C2 Engine thrust reverser electromechanical brake failed test. SDR 510012533 No. 4 engine thrust reverser electro-mechanical brake failed holding torque check due to uncommanded voltage. Investigation found thrust reverser central data unit (CDU) switch pack pins closed circuit and deploy switch not activating with thrust reverser in stowed position. Lycoming IO540K1A5 Engine fuel pump drive shaft failed. SDR 510012503 Engine driven fuel pump drive shaft failed. Investigation found evidence of a pre-existing crack in the shaft. Unit had been rebuilt approximately 21.5 hours previously. P/No: 201F5003R. TSN: 21 hours. GE CF680E1 Engine accessory drive shaft/ starter gear-shaft worn. SDR 510012669 (photo below) Accessory drive horizontal driveshaft/starter gear-shaft splines badly worn. P/No: 9312M99P03. TSN: 25,041 hours. TSO: 8,554 hours. Lycoming O540E4C5 Engine cylinder pushrod tube retainer spring broken. SDR 510012501 No. 2 cylinder pushrod tube retainer spring broken. Further investigation found the retainers broken in the other five cylinders. It was noticed that the retainers were much less thick than normal. P/No: LW14995. TSN: 311 hours. Lycoming TIO540J2BD Engine cylinder studs cracked. SDR 510012811 LH engine cylinder attachment studs P/No 38-13 and P/No 50-15 cracked and failed allowing cylinder assembly to become loose and allow oil leakage. P/No: 3813. TSO: 937 hours. PWA PW150A Engine failed to start. SDR 510012471 LH engine failed to start. Initial investigation found hot section damage which prevented engine rotation. Investigation continuing. PWA PW206C Engine exhaust extension ‘V’ band coupling broken. SDR 510012768 LH engine exhaust extension ‘V’ band coupling fractured through spot weld. Suspect manufacturing fault. Damage to LH engine starter/generator cable insulation. P/No: A117A1052. TSN: 52 hours. Rolls Royce BR700715A130 Engine HP turbine blades failed. SDR 510012643 LH engine stage 1 high-pressure turbine blades failed. Downstream damage also evident. Fire bottles discharged. Aircraft inspected for overweight landing. During hard/overweight landing inspection a fuel leak was found at the LH rear spar in the area of the main landing gear trunnion caused by defective. P/No: FW64379. TSN: 3,481 hours/2,116 cycles. Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine failed. SDR 510012826 No. 4 engine failed. Investigation continuing. Lycoming O320E2D Engine carburettor float porous. SDR 510012379 Carburettor float faulty. Float filled with fuel and sank, causing the engine to flood and stop. P/No: 30804. TSN: 140 hours. Lycoming O360E1A6 Engine cylinder fuel primer line broken. SDR 510012750 No. 3 cylinder fuel primer line broken at primer nozzle. Small fire at start-up, which self extinguished with minimal damage. TSO: 2,225 hours. PWA PW150A Engine FADEC failed. SDR 510012850 RH engine full authority digital engine control (FADEC) failed. P/No: 8193007009. TSN: 10,985 hours/12,741 cycles. Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine low power. SDR 510012765 No. 3 engine low take-off power. Investigation continuing. GE CF680E1 Engine low-pressure turbine case cracked. SDR 510012694 RH engine low pressure turbine (LPT) case cracked between 1 o'clock and 2 o'clock positions approximately 139.7mm (5.5in) aft of the case forward flange. IAE V2533A5 Engine fuel tube worn. SDR 510012806 (photo below) RH engine fuel tube chafed by VSV actuator to bellcrank link bolt. P/No: 6A2145. Rolls Royce RB211524G Engine tailpipe metal contamination. SDR 510012752 No. 4 engine EGT rose to 850 degrees. N1 vibration at 3.5. Engine shutdown. Initial investigation found metal in the tailpipe. Investigation continuing. Rolls Royce TRENT97284 Engine uncommanded thrust increase. SDR 510012773 No. 1 engine uncommanded thrust increase. Investigation continuing. PROPELLERS Hamilton Standard 14SF7 Propeller blade cracked. SDR 510012819 LH propeller No. 1 blade cracked at blade root. P/No: SFA13M1R0AD. TSO: 2,911 hours/2,246 cycles/35 months. McCauley 3FF32C501 Propeller blade latch pin sheared. SDR 510012582 LH propeller went into full feather during shutdown. Investigation found latch pins had sheared. Aircraft had recently complied with AD/Prop/2. Numerous similar problems shortly after compliance with AD/Prop/2. TSO: 1,583 hours. Unknown make/model Engine tappets surface pitted. SDR 510012761 (photo below) Tappets contained surface pitting on face. Metal contamination of engine. P/No: 15B26064. TSN: 245 hours. COMPONENTS IAE V2527A5 Engine turbine disc corroded in blade slot fir trees. SDR 510012701 First stage turbine disc corroded in blade slot fir trees. P/No: 2A5001. TSN: 19,695 hours/11,717 cycles. TSO: 19,695 hours/11,717 cycles. TURBINE ENGINES Garrett TPE33111U Engine surged/flamed out. SDR 510012769 RH engine surged and then flamed out. Scavenge pump gear not rotating. Investigation continuing. PWA PW119C Engine ECU sense line contaminated. SDR 510012853 LH engine control unit (ECU) suspect faulty. Investigation found salt contamination of the P1.8 sense line. ECU replaced due to suspect salt contamination of unit. P/No: 8111804004. BF Goodrich Co 313571 Main wheel faulty. SDR 510012637 Wheel removed from aircraft as serviceable for fitting to another aircraft. During receipt inspection it was found that the wheel tie bolts and nuts were the incorrect part number. The installed bolts were AN bolts instead of MS21250-05022. The nuts were single hex instead of 42FLW524 (12 point). Nil evidence also of NDI inspection as required at tyre change. P/No: 313571. Kavanaugh BalloonsKBS34 Burner valve cracked. SDR 510012817 Balloon burner coil cracked. TSN: 486 hours. APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 10 March - 24 March 2011 Rotorcraft Eurocopter AS 332 (Super Puma) Series helicopters 2011-0044-E - Doors - Cabin sliding and plugging Doors - limitation Eurocopter EC 225 Series helicopters 2011-0044-E - Doors - Cabin sliding and plugging Doors - limitation Below 5700kgs Tecnam P2006T Series aeroplanes Above 5700kgs Airbus Industrie A380 Series aeroplanes 2011-0036 (Correction) - fire protection, nacelles/ pylons - wing pylon interface/double-wall fuel pipe assembly - inspection/modification 2011-0041-E - Flight controls - aileron and elevator servo controls - electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) and aircraft flight manual (AFM) changes/installation prohibition AMD Falcon 50 and 900 Series aeroplanes 2011-0049 - Fuel - fuel quantity sensor identification/replacement 2011-06-05 - Main Slat track downstop assembly Boeing 747 Series aeroplanes 2011-05-11 - Hangar Fitting and Bulkhead of Forward Engine Mount 2011-06-03 - Fuel System Motor Operated Valve Actuator Boeing 777 Series aeroplanes 2011-05-12 - Horizontal Stabilizer Jackscrew Fitting Karon Lined Bushing Inspection and Replacement Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series aeroplanes CF-2011-04 - Cracking of the outer wing fuel access panel British Aerospace BAe 146 Series aeroplanes 2011-0048 (Correction) - Time limits/Maintenance checks - airworthiness limitations - amendment/ implementation British Aerospace BAe 3100 (Jetstream) Series aeroplanes 2011-0016 (Correction) - Landing gear - main landing gear to wing fitting - inspection/repair/replacement Dornier 328 Series aeroplanes Rolls-Royce Turbine Engines - RB211 Series 2011-0050 - Engine - right-hand (RH) fuel manifold assembly - cleaning/replacement equipment Radio Communication and Navigation Equipment 2011-0043 - Mode-S Transponder Control Panels – Modification 25 March - 7 April 2011 Rotorcraft Bell Helicopter Textron and Agusta 212 Series helicopters 2011-08-01 - Main rotor - hub inboard strap fitting Below 5700kgs Aerospatiale (Socata) TBM 700 Series aeroplanes Cessna 180, 182 and Wren 460 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 180/71 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Cessna 185 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 185/41 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Cessna 188 (Agwagon) Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 188/41 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED 2011-0051 - Hydraulic power - hydraulic quantity abnormal procedure - airplane flight manual change 2011-0046 - Time limits/maintenance checks maintenance requirements - implementation 2011-0062 - Engine - engine air intake cowl assembly - piccolo tube - inspection Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series aeroplanes AD/ATR 42/22 - Vertical stabilizer - fin tip upper closure rib - CANCELLED Boeing 737 Series aeroplanes AD/B737/307 Amdt 3 - main slat track downstop assembly - CANCELLED 2011-08-51 - Cracking in the lower skin between body stations (BS) 664 and 727 Gulfstream (Grumman) G1159 and G-IV Series aeroplanes AD/G1159/52 - avionics standard communication bus 8 April - 21 April 2011 Eurocopter AS 350 (Ecureuil) Series helicopters Cessna 206 Series aeroplanes 2011-0072 - Equipment and furnishings - emergency flotation gear attachment brackets - inspection/ replacement AD/CESSNA 206/42 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Cessna 207 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 207/30 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Cessna 210 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 210/59 - Installation of fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Eurocopter AS 355 (Twin Ecureuil) Series helicopters 2011-0072 - Equipment and furnishings - emergency flotation gear attachment brackets - inspection/ replacement Embraer EMB-500 (Phenom 100) Series aeroplanes Above 5700kgs Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series aeroplanes 2009-10-01R3 - ADS sensors 2011-0069 - Landing gear - Main landing gear (MLG) Gulfstream (Rockwell) 112 Series aeroplanes door actuator - monitoring/inspection Airbus Industrie A330 Series aeroplanes 2011-07-13 - Elevator spar cracking Gulfstream (Rockwell) 114 Series aeroplanes 2011-0073 - Fire Protection - Fire Detection Unit (FDU) 2011-07-13 - Elevator spar cracking Pacific Aerospace 750XL Series aeroplanes DCA/750XL/14 - Rudder pedal assembly - inspection and repair 2011-06-10 - Turbine inlet temperature system 2011-0061-E - Landing gear - emergency accumulator for landing gear extension - inspection/replacement Tecnam P2006T Series aeroplanes 2011-0063-E - Landing gear - emergency accumulator for landing gear extension - inspection/replacement Above 5700kgs Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series aeroplanes 2007-0065R2 (Correction) - Landing gear - extension and retraction selector valves - inspection/ replacement 39 Rotorcraft Bell Helicopter Textron and Agusta 212 Series helicopters AD/CESSNA 205/19 - Fuel system water drainage placard - CANCELLED Tecnam P92, P96, and P2002 Series aeroplanes Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series aeroplanes Airbus Industrie A330 Series aeroplanes 2011-0068-E - Rotors - Main rotor hub inboard strap fitting - identification/inspection/replacement Fokker F27 Series aeroplanes 2011-0047 - Standard practices - Electrical wiring interconnection system - Instructions of continued airworthiness 2011-0055 - Navigation - nose landing gear glide slope antenna harnesses - replacement 2011-0056 - Electrical and electronic common installation - pressure seal screws - replacement 2011-0058 - Pneumatic - pylon bleed duct inspection/replacement Cessna 205 (210-5) Series aeroplanes Piper PA-46 (Malibu) Series aeroplanes Fokker F28 Series aeroplanes Airbus Industrie A380 Series aeroplanes 2011-0060 (Correction) - Flight controls - elevator trim Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series aeroplanes AD/F100/54 - time limits/maintenance checks tab elevator - identification/replacement maintenance requirements - CANCELLED 2009-0194R1 (Correction) - wings - lower inner panel - inspection/repair/modification 2011-0045 - Standard practices - Electrical wiring interconnection system - Instructions of continued airworthiness replacement -inspection/replacement British Aerospace BAe 146 Series aeroplanes 2011-0065 - Fire protection - baggage bay fire bottles wiring looms Embraer ERJ-170 Series aeroplanes 2011-04-01 - Airworthiness limitation section (ALS) - changes Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series aeroplanes 2011-0064 - rear fuselage lap joint Piston Engines Rotax piston engines 2011-0067-E - Ignition - magneto flywheel hub washer - replacement Turbine Engines AlliedSignal (Lycoming) Turbine Engines LTS 101 Series 2011-08-06 - power turbine rotors AIRWORTHINESS Boeing 737 Series aeroplanes AD/CF6/72 - Long fixed core exhaust nozzles CANCELLED 2011-07-01 - Long fixed core exhaust nozzles PULL-OUT SECTION 2010-0022 - Oil - oil vent line - modification 2010-0121-E - Stabilizers - stabilator trim mechanical actuator Seeger ring - replacement 2010-0129 - Landing Gear - nose landing gear (NLG) hydraulic actuator - modification 2010-0143 - Landing Gear - nose landing gear (NLG) steering assembly - inspection 2011-0042 - Landing gear - landing gear hydraulic actuators - modification 2011-0054 - Electric and electronic common Turbine Engines installation - terminal modules - identification/ General Electric Turbine Engines - CF6 Series APPROVED AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES ... CONT 22 April - 5 May 2011 Below 5700kgs Cessna 170, 172, F172, FR172 and 175 Series aeroplanes 2011-06-02 - Prevention of interruption of electrical power to the FADEC PULL-OUT SECTION 2011-0058R1 - Pneumatic - pylon bleed duct inspection/replacement Cessna 180, 182 and Wren 460 Series aeroplanes AD/PA-28/35 Amdt 2 - Main landing gear torque links Piper PA-32 (Cherokee Six) Series aeroplanes Cessna 185 Series aeroplanes AD/PA-32/24 Amdt 2 - Main landing gear torque links AD/CESSNA 185/43 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Above 5700kgs Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series aeroplanes AD/A320/202 Amdt 1 - Main landing gear door actuator - CANCELLED Airbus Industrie A330 Series aeroplanes 2010-0103R1 - Electric and electronic common installation - cable loom installation - modification Boeing 747 Series aeroplanes 2011-09-14 - Left and right access doors of the spring beam mid-pivot bolt assembly for no.1 strut Boeing 777 Series aeroplanes FSA JUL-AUG 2011 Airbus Industrie A380 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 177/29 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism AD/CESSNA 180/72 Amdt 2 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Piper PA-28 Series aeroplanes 40 Cessna 177 Series aeroplanes 2011-09-05 - Prevention of potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks 2011-09-11 - Strut disconnect assembly - inspection 2011-09-15 - To prevent potential ignition sources inside fuel tanks Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series aeroplanes CF-2011-07 - Roll control system - aileron stiffness Bombardier (Boeing Canada/De Havilland) DHC-8 Series aeroplanes CF-2011-06 - Airstair door - blocked water drainage path Embraer ERJ-170 Series aeroplanes 2011-05-01 - Air management system (ams) controller processor modules 2005-09-03R3 - Low pressure check valves Embraer ERJ-190 Series aeroplanes 2006-11-01R6 - Low pressure check valves 2011-05-02 - Air management system (AMS) controller processor modules 6 May - 19 May 2011 Rotorcraft Agusta AB139 and AW139 Series helicopters 2011-0081 - Tail rotor - tail rotor blades - inspection Eurocopter BO 105 Series helicopters 2011-0091 - Main rotor drive - main gearbox inspection Below 5700kgs Cessna 150, F150, 152 & F152 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 150/40 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 170, 172, F172, FR172 and 175 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 170/53 Amdt 2 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-06-02 (Correction) - Prevention of interruption of electrical power to the FADEC 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 188 (Agwagon) Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 188/42 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 190 and 195 Series aeroplanes Avions de Transport Regional ATR 42 Series aeroplanes AD/ATR 42/28 - Barrel - swinging lever hinge Boeing 747 Series aeroplanes AD/B747/392 Amdt 1 - Fuselage Upper Lobe Doubler 2011-10-02 - Thrust reverser control system modification Bombardier BD-700 Series aeroplanes CF-2011-10 - Oxygen supply system - deformation of the pressure regulator on the oxygen cylinder and regulator assembly Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) Series aeroplanes CF-2011-08 - Air-driven generator electrical power feeder cable - potential failure due to corrosion AD/CESSNA 190/5 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Embraer ERJ-170 Series aeroplanes Cessna 205 (210-5) Series aeroplanes Embraer ERJ-190 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 205/20 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 206 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 206/46 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 207 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 207/31 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism AD/ERJ-170/9 Amdt 1 - Low stage engine bleed check valve - CANCELLED 2006-11-01R6 (Correction) - Low pressure check valves Fokker F27 Series aeroplanes 2011-0083 - Electrical power - Electrical power center (EPC) and battery relay panel - inspection/adjustment Fokker F28 Series aeroplanes 2011-0083 - Electrical power - Electrical power center (EPC) and battery relay panel - inspection/adjustment Fokker F50 (F27 Mk 50) Series aeroplanes 2011-0083 - Electrical power - Electrical power center (EPC) and battery relay panel - inspection/adjustment Cessna 210 Series aeroplanes Fokker F100 (F28 Mk 100) Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 210/60 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism 2011-0083 - Electrical power - Electrical power center (EPC) and battery relay panel - inspection/adjustment Saab SF340 Series aeroplanes Cessna T303 Series aeroplanes 2011-0078 - Flight controls - Elevator pushrod assembly - Identification /inspection/replacement AD/CESSNA 303/6 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 336 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 336/13 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Cessna 337 Series aeroplanes AD/CESSNA 337/27 Amdt 1 - Seat adjustment mechanism - CANCELLED 2011-10-09 - Seat adjustment mechanism Embraer EMB-500 (Phenom 100) Series aeroplanes 2011-05-03 - Replacement of Angle of Attack Sensors Above 5700kgs Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series aeroplanes AD/A320/201 - Cargo loading system fixed YZ latches - CANCELLED 2011-0077 - Equipment/furnishings - Cargo loading system fixed YZ latches attachment points modification Piston Engines Rotax Piston Engines 2011-0082 - Engine fuel & control - Fuel pressure regulator - identification/replacement Thielert Piston Engines 2011-0087-E - Engine - Friction disk - replacement Turbine Engines Rolls-Royce Turbine Engines - RB211 Series AD/RB211/42 - Front combustion liner head section CANCELLED 2009-0187R2 - Engine - Front combustion liner head section -inspection/replacement 2011-0080 - Engine - Front combustion liner head section - Inspection/replacement Equipment Oxygen Systems 2011-0090 - Oxygen - Oxygen Mask Regulator Inflatable Harness - Identification/Replacement Propellers - Variable Pitch - Hamilton Standard 2011-04-02 (Correction) - Propeller model 247F - blade removal from service Australian Aircraft Airworthiness & Sustainment Conference 26 - 28 July 2011 With sponsorship from both CASA and the RAAF, a major focus of the conference is maximising the interaction between the civilian and military aerospace communities for the ultimate benefit of all fleets. As usual there will be guest representatives from our sister AA&S conference in the US. PULL-OUT SECTION The AA&S Conference will cover all aspects of sustainment, including fleet management, avionics & wiring systems, mechanical systems, structures & corrosion, propulsion, publications, supportability of software, workforce capability, ageing materials, spares, logistics, supply chain design, support equipment, knowledge retention, crashworthiness, condition monitoring, obsolescence, and unmanned aerial systems. 41 Please see website for key dates and registration details. Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre 26 - 28 July > Your aircraft is ageing – find out why and how > You alone as the owner, are responsible for its maintenance and airworthiness > Find out how to operate it safely, to protect you and your passengers Take a closer look: How: Attend a CASA airworthiness and ageing aircraft seminar When: A Saturday between June and November 2011 Where: You tell us Time: 9am to 12pm, followed by a sausage sizzle Register your club or group’s interest now! Bookings limited (minimum numbers apply). Contact Wendy McIntosh P: 131 757 E: firstname.lastname@example.org AIRWORTHINESS www.ageingaircraft.com.au/aasc Tool control at a glance Organisation t5PPMUSBZToNPSFUIBOQBDLBHJOH BCVJMUJOTUPSBHFTZTUFN t4UBOEBSEGPBNLJUToBMMUIFNBUFSJBMT SJBMTT BOEUPPMTJOBOFBTZUPVTFLJU Visibility FSA JUL-AUG 2011 42 t$PMPVSDPOUSPMoIJHIWJTJCJMJUZ DPMPVSTGPSTQFDJBMOFFET t8BMMNPVOUFEUPPMDPOUSPMCPBSET oTUBOEBSEBOEDVTUPNUPNFFU ZPVSOFFET t1SPGSFTTJPOBMMZFOHJOFFSFEGPBN DVUMBZPVUT Security t5PPMDIJUToDBSEBOESFBEFSTZTUFN t1PDLFUCBEHFToNBSLBOEJEFOUJGZGPBNLJUT t5SVF'JU7JSUVBM*OWFOUPSZoDPNQVUFSBJEFE UPPMMBZPVUT t,FZMFTTDPOUSPMoDBSETOPULFZToGPSCFUUFS TFDVSJUZBOEDPOUSPM Trackability t-BTFSUPPMFOHSBWJOHoUPNBUDI ZPVSJEFOUJåDBUJPOTZTUFN t4QFDJBMJTFELJUToCPYFTUPCBHTUP NBUDIZPVSOFFET Accountability t#BSDPEFSFBEFSToCFUUFSBDDFTTDPOUSPM t5VSOLFZMJTUTUPMBZPVUToDPNQVUFS BTTJTUFEGPSTQFFEBOEBDDVSBDZ t4PGUXBSFDPOUSPMBOESFQPSUJOHoUIF VMUJNBUFPODPOUSPMBOESFDPSELFFQJOH Tool Control System Phone: 1800 811 480 Web: www.snapontools.com.au/industrial 7KHù&DELQù&UHZùVHFWLRQùIOLHVùDJDLQ« RXUùFROOHDJXHV" 'Rù\RXùKDYHùDùUHDOOLIHùH[SHULHQFHùWRùVKDUHùZLWKù\ +DYHù\RXùEHHQùLQYROYHGùLQùDQùHPHUJHQF\"ù LRQ" +RZùKDYHù\RXùKDQGOHGùDùFKDOOHQJLQJùLQIOLJKWùVLWXDW ù 'Rù\RXùKDYHùDQ\ùVXJJHVWLRQVùRQùPDNLQJùIO\LQJùVDIHU" :KDWùDUHùWKHùLVVXHVùWKDWùPDWWHUùWRù\RX"ù 43 ,IZHSXEOLVK\RXUVWRU\\RXZLOOUHFHLYH 3OHDVHHPDLOXVRQIVD#FDVDJRYDXZLWK¶&DELQFUHZVWRU\·LQWKHVXEMHFWOLQHDQGLQFOXGH\RXUFRQWDFWGHWDLOV Z .+)*6#('6;4#+0+0)00170%'/'0661#.. .;+0)%*11.5n'0'4#.8+#6+102'4#6145 You can now own the most advanced “Airline Quality Standard”, 6 DOF-Full Motion Synthetic Flight Trainer in its category for only $99* per day. Realistically Replicates Actual Flight Conditions CASA Approved 14#1/2.+/'06#4;'56 .+)*6X%106#%6 Nick +61 (0) 412 552 772 Phone +61 3 9337 4857 Level 1, 30 Amis Crescent East Keilor VIC 3033, Australia JNP CORPORATION www.jnpcorporation.com *Based on $230k ex GST Commercial Hire Purchase with $10k deposit over 60 months with a 50% balloon. Subject to credit approval with pricing correct at the time of writing. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 $UWLFOHVVKRXOGEHQRPRUHWKDQZRUGVORQJDQGPD\EHHGLWHGIRUFODULW\FRQWHQWDQGOHQJWK'HWDLOVRIDXWKRUFRPSDQ\DQGRUVSHFL¿FÀLJKW FDQEHNHSWFRQ¿GHQWLDOLIUHTXHVWHG3OHDVHGRQRWVXEPLWDUWLFOHVUHJDUGLQJHYHQWVWKDWDUHWKHVXEMHFWRIDFXUUHQWRI¿FLDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ SEA CHANGE Offshore aviation’s evolution The high standards required for helicopter ﬂying to oil and gas rigs are starting to permeate the rest of the industry as the minerals boom extends the safety culture of offshore drilling into aviation. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 44 For civilian ﬁxed-wing pilots, high-capacity RPT is the top of the tree. Flying the Boeing or Airbus heavy metal for a major airline is aviation par excellence, with training, management and safety systems an order of magnitude above those of general aviation, as safety statistics clearly show. For rotary-wing pilots the pinnacle is a helipad, far from shore. There are no helicopter airlines, but offshore ﬂying occupies the same exalted niche in the rotary wing world. One reason for its strong reputation is the dangerous business of its customers. Offshore helicopter ﬂying to supply oil and gas ﬁelds, is no stranger to the high safety standards of the resources industry. The result, says Bristow Helicopters managing pilot, Marc Newmann, is a sector that has evolved into the rotary wing world’s equivalent of regular public transport (RPT) operations. Oil companies have high reliability expectations that translate into high safety standards, Newmann says, and the offshore helicopter industry has been shaped by this unique combination of stringent standards and educated customers. ‘In the helicopter industry you have to look at offshore as being the top, as RPT is for ﬁxed wing. That implies very much higher standards,’ he says. ‘Some offshore oil and gas aviation standards are considerably higher than regulatory requirements,’ he says. ‘Because helicopter transport is so central to their operations, oil and gas companies take intense interest in operational matters, wanting to know the precise reasons for any delays and breaches and what is being done to prevent them recurring.’ The ﬂip side, he says is a willingness to spend on keeping operations running smoothly. ‘For example, if we have a ﬂight crew that’s coming up to their duty hours limit because things have been busy, we can let the client know and they’ll often agree to bringing up a standby crew,’ he says. There’s also a unique operational environment. ‘We ﬂy a lot of IFR with night helideck approaches, which we must train for every 90 days. That’s our own requirement and that of the oil companies. We also ﬂy day rig radar approaches in IMC. ‘A lot of rigs are ﬂoaters, not even ﬁxed to the seabed; or we could be landing on the back of an LNG tanker doing 18 knots at night in a heaving swell. It’s not pleasurable, I can tell you.’ There is also a strong emphasis on recurrent simulator training. Crews ﬂying the EC225 or AS332 Super Pumas go to Aberdeen, in Scotland, once a year to ﬂy the type simulator. The downside is the difﬁculty in producing sufﬁciently skilled and qualiﬁed pilots and engineers, whom Bristow also trains to well beyond regulatory requirements. ‘We have a stringent training regime and the guys we employ we can’t just get off the street. It can take up to eight months before a pilot can come online,’ Newmann says. As Bristow and other offshore operators tend to retain their highly trained pilots the effect on the industry as a whole is more one of leading by example than a pilot production line, he says. Not everyone agrees that the offshore environment is uniquely tough. Heliwest’s David Grimes, who was an offshore pilot for nine years, says, ‘Flying onshore is far more difﬁcult than ﬂying offshore; there’s no doubt. The logistics of going to a platform and back are easier than ﬂying to outback locations, ﬁnding them, having to move fuel, and pick up from unknown landing sites in heat, and dust.’ But Grimes and Newman both say the high standards of the oil and gas industries set the tone for offshore ﬂying. ‘It’s a different mindset going from onshore to offshore in that you’re dealing with the oil and gas companies and they have different set of rules that you have to play by,’ Grimes says. They also agree that the two sectors are becoming closer. ‘BHP’s aviation standards don’t delineate between offshore and offshore - they must be met,’ Newmann says. And Grimes agrees. ‘We ﬂy two pilots onshore in the Squirrel, as they do offshore. The rules are all aligning now.’ As a 23-year-veteran of offshore ﬂying, Newmann has seen several booms and busts, which he says are a normal part of the oil and gas business cycle. The current peak has been more of an incremental increase than a boom, and growth has been manageable for Bristow, he says. His prediction is that the company will ride out any future slowdown in the industry by diversifying into other operations. If and when it does so, it will bring to those areas the high operational standards it has developed in oil and gas operations. But he doesn’t see a swift end to the current busy times. Developments such as the Browse Basin gas ﬁeld north of Broome promise plenty of offshore aviation demand. 45 SEA CHANGE Constant training is the key to safe operations in these conditions. ‘At some of our bases there’s more training done than revenue ﬂying,’ Newmann says. If they’re on the Sikorsky S76, they go to Florida, and those ﬂying the Agusta Westland AW139 go to Italy. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 46 It was the mid 80s, and I was working as a mustering pilot on a group of Barkly Tableland cattle stations. I had about 2500 hours at that point, all station ﬂying with lots of mustering, so half my life was spent below 200ft. One of the planes was a 1963 Cessna 172. It had about 6000 hours on the clock and had obviously had a fairly hard life, but it was fairly reliable, if a bit underpowered, and we got along OK. We were mustering cattle from a huge area onto a large plain and the ground crew were moving them along in the direction of the next yard. It was a good day: the cattle were working well; the thermals weren’t shaking the proverbial out of me; everything was going ﬁne as I worked a mob out of the timbered area. ¸]ac `c¸ ¸ I did a quick check of the engine gauges, something I had trained myself to do very regularly, because if I have an engine problem, I want to know about it sooner rather than later. Fuel, fuel, temperature, pressure, it takes 1-2 seconds every 5-10 minutes. On this occasion it was fuel, fuel, temp, ‘Holy @#$%, no oil pressure!’. Not low, none! Craig Commens on a mustering incident What followed was the longest ﬁve minutes of my life. I lost all interest in the cattle, pointed the old girl towards the open country and cut the throttle to 1900 rpm. I ﬁgured that if I didn’t ﬂog it, it might last a bit longer, and then I started looking for the thinnest patch of trees to crash into. I was under no illusions here, I knew that the engine was going to seize, I was going down in the trees and it was going to be ugly. I was about 50ft above the trees, but decided to get to the open country as quick as possible, without trying to climb, as I ﬁgured that would need more power and kill the engine more quickly. 47 The pressure gauge was still below zero and my crash site was constantly changing. I knew I would only have 20-30 seconds from the engine seizing to impact. This eventuality had never been mentioned in any of my training, so I was making it up as I went along. I really didn’t want to be on the news that night. After what seemed like an eternity, I got to the point where if the engine seized, I’d be able to clear the trees and land on the open country. Even though it was very rough and I knew that the nose wheel would be torn out on touchdown and I’d probably nose over, I was happy with that because it was survivable. I did wonder how much unrestrained gear I had behind the back seat though. After another eternity, which was all of about two minutes, I got to within gliding distance of the track behind the cattle. So I shut the engine down and had an uneventful landing. I ﬁgured I might even be able to salvage the engine. After I rolled to a stop I just sat there for a minute sucking in a few deep breaths. It was about then that I realised why the Pope kisses the ground when he gets out of a plane. While I was kissing the ground I noticed that the whole underside of the fuselage was covered in oil. I pulled out the dipstick revealing a half-litre of oil in the sump. I felt sick in the guts. How close had I come to ending up in the trees? One of the ground crew turned up with the usual question, ‘What do you need?’, but he didn’t have a cold beer on him. I removed the top cowl and quickly found the problem. The oil line that ran from the engine to the oil pressure gauge had fractured and it was pumping all the oil out. Even though this oil line is in the top of the engine bay, there wasn’t one speck of oil on the windscreen. The line was repaired, the oil was replaced, and we lived to ﬁght another day. The wash-up: The oil line failure was fatigue resulting from the hard life the plane had led. I saved my own skin because of the way I had trained myself to check the gauges regularly. It had been drummed into me as a student pilot, but I had fortunately added to it. Losing an engine at 10,000ft and at 50ft are worlds apart. The way I saw it, I was my own keeper. How many revs would have been left in the engine if I’d been another couple of minutes checking the gauges is something I don’t want to think about. CLOSE CALLS On this occasion it was fuel, fuel, temp, ‘Holy @#$%, no oil pressure!’. Not low, none! 6KHDUOXFN 48 FSAJUL-AUG 2011 E\*DU\%URZQ The day was clear, as crystal clear as if it had been swept clean. ‘Swept’ was a word that would have much greater meaning by the time we hit the parking bay. The sector was Sydney to Maroochydore (now Sunshine Coast), with perfect weather on a beautiful winter’s day. It doesn't come much better, and with a TAF and ATIS to match, with wind calm, CAVOK and no reported NOTAMs what could go wrong? Clearing with Brisbane approach via the steps we passed to Maroochy tower and inside the zone, with no reported trafﬁc and the runway across the windshield, we requested and received tracking to a left base for runway 18. The landing brief was pretty standard with regards to manoeuvring and in the event of a go-round etc., so with speed set for Vref, margin of 5kt for a calm surface wind, we were through to gear and ﬁnal ﬂap. With gear down we rolled onto ﬁnal and with the satisfaction that I had nailed the VASI, I took ﬁnal ﬂap, set the thrust and the aircraft started slowing to Vref with about 4nm to touchdown. With a ‘cleared to land’, the checklist was complete. The sight picture was perfect on the VASI, with no drift and runway aligned, literally as though we were on the proverbial rails with not the slightest ripple of turbulence, but something wasn’t quite right. I was increasing the thrust (manual) but the setting seemed higher than usual and I was became aware there was a perceptible slowing in the sight picture, I recall looking at the weight data and mentally rechecking my bug speed but, looking ahead at a limp windsock, no alarm bell rang and I never thought of, or even had time to voice, the ‘W’ word. Without as much as a ﬂicker, the airspeed plummeted, instantly losing 20-plus knots. Gone was our measly margin of ﬁve knots and a good percentage of the stall margin as well. The bottom fell out from underneath us. I don’t recall at what height this happened, 4ft or 500ft; all the procedural words - take off, go-around - were gone, replaced by something much more pithy. The thrust levers had been instantly slammed against the stops, and probably thanks to the higher approach spool, the engines responded rapidly and gave all they had. ,WZDVWKHSHUIHFW ZLQGVKHDUVXFNHUWUDS DQG,KDGIDOOHQLQWRLW As luck would have it, it was nothing more. The wheels touched smoothly on the runway just inside the threshold with full ﬂap, pitched for a go-round with max thrust and a strange ‘what's wrong with this picture?’ moment, as it wasn't something I'd seen in the simulator. With the nose-wheel high in the air and the column in my stomach, any brake application or relaxation would have dropped the nose-wheel heavily to the tarmac, so I had to overcome an overwhelming desire to apply the brakes to bring this nightmare to an end. There was no need, as there was enough runway ahead to ﬁnesse the nose-wheel down and slow for taxiing to the parking bay. Stunned? We were gobsmacked; there is no other word for it. It had all happened in an instant. Clues? The forecast, NOTAMs and ATIS gave a nil report, there had been no recent trafﬁc to give a heads-up, and the windsock was limp. The thrust setting wasn't necessarily unusual for the heavy weight and the perceived slowing wasn't immediately apparent to me, probably because I was pilot ﬂying. The low-level airstream sweeping across the airport was aligned to the runway, so there was no indication there either. Complacent? I don't think so. A perfect day and a good approach do not make for a slack attitude, and when the blade dropped the levers had been instantly ﬁre-walled, but from that point on there was little to do but ride it out and touch down on or off the runway. It was the perfect wind-shear sucker trap and I had fallen into it. There were some strange looks from some of the passengers on disembarkation, and a raised eyebrow, from a crew member ﬂying as a passenger, over a shared experience. Sometimes you can be lucky. CLOSE CALLS But the aircraft was heavy (every seat was full), and sluggish, and with the nose being raised further to keep on-slope (failing) and ﬂying (just) we were seriously on the back side of the power curve. There was nothing to trade, and what remained of the approach became a prolonged ﬂare with max power. 49 YLRD "XFJHIUZQSPCMFN YSDU Name witheld by request YMTG FSA JUL-AUG 2011 50 A number of years ago, I had occasion to ﬂy a Cessna 210 from Mt Gambier in the lower southeast of South Australia, to Lightning Ridge in northern New South Wales. As it happened I had a friend, who, along with three other friends, needed to get to Dubbo for a two-day Apex convention. It was therefore ideal for me to ﬂy them there and continue to Lightning Ridge, returning on Sunday afternoon to pick them up and ﬂy home. Although I was very familiar with the Cessna 210 and quite current at the time, I still carefully checked the pilot’s operating handbook to conﬁrm we would meet weight and balance limitations. We were able to take full fuel, provided everybody limited themselves to a small bag. This wasn’t a problem, as there were just two nights away for us all, and we met before dawn on the Friday morning for an unhurried and on-time departure. Everybody had cooperated with my request and the aircraft was quite happy as we climbed into the cool early morning air, bound for sunny Dubbo. As I had topped the tanks, we had sufﬁcient fuel to get us there without an intermediate stop. As I helped my passengers unload their bags and get into the taxi at Dubbo, I arranged to meet them again on Sunday afternoon for the return journey. I then refuelled and departed for my weekend in Lightning Ridge. At the appointed time on Sunday, I pulled up to the apron and had just ﬁnished refuelling for the next leg when my passengers arrived and walked out to the aircraft. As they had been involved in the loading process just a couple of days earlier, I left them to pack their gear while I went to the brieﬁng ofﬁce to lodge a ﬂight plan. By the time I returned to the aircraft, they were all sitting comfortably in a jovial mood after a big lunch and a few drinks. I noted, without really thinking much of it at the time that the tail of the aircraft seemed to be quite close to the ground – much lower than I would have expected. As I prepared for departure, I had checked the windsock and planned which runway I would use. After I completed the start checks without incident, and with everything functioning as it should, I taxied for departure, making contact with ﬂight service to open my ﬂight plan. It soon became evident that the wind had changed: I was now taxiing for the wrong runway. I contemplated changing to the reciprocal runway, but as there was no trafﬁc, and the tailwind would only be around three to ﬁve knots, I decided to save the fuel and depart downwind. It would also allow for a simple left turn of 100 degrees or so to set course, rather than an overhead departure, saving further time and fuel. Checks completed, I lined up and applied take-off power. To say that the aircraft performance was surprising would be an understatement – the engine was clearly performing normally, but the Cessna seemed reluctant to move. By the time we had covered half the available runway, the airspeed indicator was barely registering 50 knots, and as I pulled tentatively on the control column, the stall warning immediately began sounding. We continued for another several hundred feet along the runway before the airspeed was sufﬁcient to become airborne, but the aeroplane clearly was not happy to ﬂy yet. By now I had passed my point of decision (or indecision) and was committed to take-off, but as we passed over the airport boundary fence, the aircraft was barely 20 feet high, and gaining at an alarmingly slow rate. We were three miles from the airport before I felt able to turn left and set course, and it was another 25 minutes before we levelled off at 8,500 feet. Clearly, there was something amiss, and once I felt under some semblance of control, I turned to my passengers and asked them if they had packed anything else in the aircraft today, that hadn’t been with us when we arrived two days ago. Of course, I couldn’t be too hard on them, as it was my responsibility to ensure the aircraft was loaded in accordance with the POH, and I had essentially abdicated that responsibility when I left them to it. The remainder of the trip to Mt Gambier was uneventful, but not without concern and much soul-searching and contemplation of ‘what-ifs?’ We landed with the aircraft still in balance, but it had been a full hour in cruise before I felt the aircraft was ﬁnally under its maximum take-off weight and performing as it should be. 1. Whenever planning a trip that is approaching the limit of the aircraft’s range, you need to consider weight and balance limitations very carefully. Although I did it for the outbound trip, I failed to ensure that all remained the same for the return leg. 2. When I noticed the tail-low stance of the aircraft at Dubbo, I should have asked and found out just what was where, and whether anything extra had been added. I shouldn’t have expected non-ﬂiers to understand the requirements for safe ﬂight. Although they can help you load the aircraft, they should never be left to do that task unsupervised. Also, do not forget that they can (and will) put one or two additional things on board if they ﬁnd room. The untrained normally use volume as a measure for whether or not an aircraft is able to take the item/s. We know otherwise. 3. I should not have accepted the tailwind, even though it was only a few knots. The extra fuel burned for taxi would have been far less of a problem than the extended take-off run, and I threw away the added safety factors by committing to a longer take-off run. There was no trafﬁc or operational reason to conduct a downwind take-off. 4. Having noticed the sluggish performance of the aircraft in the ﬁrst part of the take-off, I should have aborted then and returned to the apron for a closer look. 5. I should have held ﬁrm to a point of go/no go. Instead, I continued past that point, hoping that the aircraft would accelerate sufﬁciently. Thank goodness it did – I had no backup plan! 51 CLOSE CALLS Rather sheepishly, my front-seat passenger admitted that they had purchased some souvenirs and a few cans of beer, and bottles of wine. As I was clearly not satisﬁed with that answer, he elaborated and listed the additional load as being two full slabs of beer and a dozen bottles of wine. They had all also purchased a jacket as the Friday had been unusually cool and nobody had packed one, because I told them to limit their baggage. Of course they had all had a big lunch too, so that added more weight. Now I knew why the aircraft was so reluctant to climb, but I was concerned that we might well have a problem with centre of gravity, as the 210 tended to become tail heavy as the fuel was used. As a precaution, I had my (now) very apologetic passengers move as much of their booze forward and under their seats as they could. I also promised that it would be thrown overboard if it looked as if I was going to have any further problems with the aircraft (or them). As with most incidents and accidents, there was a chain of events that led up to the situation, and any one of them could have been changed to break that chain. The Australian Turning safety issues into action The ATSB recently released a research report that examines the safety issues—and the resulting actions—we identiﬁed across the aviation sector during 2009–10. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 52 From our investigations, we uncovered 46 safety issues in the aviation industry (a safety issue is a factor that could adversely affect the safety of future operations). The report also shows that operators, manufacturers and the regulator undertook 60 safety actions to deal with these issues. The ATSB was satisﬁed with these actions, only making one recommendation for further safety action. This is a positive sign. It shows that industry is taking safety seriously and is committed to improving safety when becoming aware of unacceptable risks. It also means that by working together, the ATSB along with other transport safety bodies and industry are making a real difference to transport safety. While these actions represent a positive safety outcome, we continue to see pilots—particularly general aviation pilots—dying in recurring types of aviation accidents. Tragically, many of these accidents could have been avoided through basic risk management strategies. In this edition of Flight Safety Australia, we feature two articles that offer techniques on avoiding accidents involving wirestrikes and partial power loss. I encourage all general aviation pilots to read these articles and seriously review the strategies that can help make ﬂying safer. Martin Dolan Chief Commissioner Kokoda crash prompts major safety improvements ATSB investigation report AO-2011-016 E xtensive safety improvements have taken place in PNG aviation as a result of the PNG Accident Investigation Commission’s (AIC) investigation into the fatal aircraft accident near Kokoda. The ATSB provided investigator support, information and technical advice and facilities support to the investigation, following a request for assistance from the AIC. On 11 August 2009, a de Havilland Canada DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft, registered P2 MCB, with two pilots and 11 passengers on board, was en route to Kokoda airstrip after taking off from Port Moresby. Prior to the accident the crew were manoeuvring the aircraft within the Kokoda Gap, probably in an attempt to maintain visual flight in reported cloudy conditions. Witnesses at Misima village stated that they heard an aircraft fly near their village, but that they could not see the aircraft as the area was covered by cloud. They reported that, shortly after, there was a loud bang above their village and the sound of the aircraft stopped. The aircraft crashed on the eastern slope of the Kokoda Gap at about 5,780 ft above mean sea level in heavily-timbered jungle about 11 km south-east of Kokoda airstrip. It was destroyed on impact, and there were no survivors. The investigation concluded that the accident was probably the result of an otherwise airworthy aircraft being unintentionally flown into terrain, with little or no awareness by the crew of the impending collision. As a result of the investigation, the AIC issued a safety recommendation in respect of the installation of cockpit voice recorders (CVR) in PNG aircraft with a seating capacity of 18 or more passengers. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority of PNG (CASA PNG) intends legislating to require the installation of CVRs in turbine-powered aircraft with seating for more than nine passengers. CASA PNG has also established a principal medical officer position and has advised of action to move responsibility for the administration of the PNG mandatory occurrence notification system to the AIC PNG. The aircraft operator has taken extensive proactive safety action in response to the risk of inadvertent flight into cloud while employing visual flight procedures. Q Aviation Safety Investigator Managing Partial Power-Loss F From 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2010, there were 242 occurrences (nine of which were fatal) reported to the ATSB involving singleengine aircraft sustaining a partial engine power loss after takeoff1 and 75 occurrences (none of which were fatal) reported as sustaining an engine failure after takeoff. Partial engine power loss occurs when the engine is providing less power than commanded by the pilot, but more power 1 Partial power loss occurrences include those where a total engine failure was preceded by a partial power loss. than idle thrust. This kind of power loss is actually more complex than a complete failure, and it can be much harder to stay ahead of the aircraft. The pilot is thrust into a situation where the engine is still providing some power, but it may be unreliable, and the power level might be difficult to access. As a result, pilots are uncertain about the capabilities of their vehicle, and what their options are – a situation that has led to loss of aircraft control. And because it’s not a substantial part of flight training, pilots don’t tend to think about it beforehand. Compared to the spectre of total loss of power, they don’t muse about how they would react in such a scenario. And, as a result, when it does happen, it can turn into disaster very easily. The first way to combat a partial powerloss is simply to think about it before it happens. Just by acknowledging the possibility, and establishing different strategies that you might employ, you’re giving yourself an advantage. Establishing procedures, however, offers a far greater advantage. By planning for this ahead of time, you reduce your mental workload, and you have greater confidence. Many of the causes of partial power loss after takeoff events could have been identified, thereby preventing the partial power loss during pre-flight checks. Aircraft physical inspection, engine run ups and on takeoff engine checks are vital barriers that can serve to prevent the possibility of partial power-loss. Many instances of partial power-loss have been found to be fuel-related and spark plug related. If, however, despite these precautions, you still experience a partial power-loss, then you need to respond immediately. And taking no action is not an option in these circumstances. Most fatal and serious injury accidents resulting from partial power loss after takeoff are avoidable. The first priority is to maintain control. You might be turning back to the aerodrome or conducting a forced landing, but as long as you are maintaining glidespeed and no more than a moderate bank angle, you retain some modicum of control, and arriving at the ground in a controlled flight rather than after a stall and or spin could make all the difference. Partial Power-loss is a complicated issue, and the ATSB’s publication, Managing Partial Power-Loss After Takeoff in Single-Engine Aircraft examines it indepth, breaking it down into the same sequence of events as if conducting a flight. The information booklet is available for free on the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au Q 53 ATSB or a pilot, losing engine power after takeoff ranks with the worst things that can happen in a single engine aircraft. Understandably. You can easily imagine a situation – say, on mid upwind over a factory or approaching powerlines and trees – where you’d give anything for even a bit of power. And yet a new ATSB research report shows that partial-engine power-loss actually causes more fatalities than a complete engine failure. Managing Partial Power-Loss After Takeoff in Single-Engine Aircraft is the newest information booklet in the ATSB’s ‘Avoidable Accidents’ series. It came about after a spate of fatal accidents where witnesses reported that the engine had not failed fully. Such power-losses are a largely unexplored topic, and not just in research, but in training scenarios as well. This is despite the fact that partial power loss events occur three times more frequently than complete engine failures during takeoff and initial climb. Pre-ﬂight: Check your electrical power supply A pilot who took off without power to the aircraft’s primary flight instruments likely became disoriented and lost control of the aircraft, according to an ATSB report. On 9 April 2008, a Fairchild Industries Inc. SA227-AC (Metro III) aircraft, registered VH-OZA took off from Sydney on a late night freight charter flight to Brisbane. Shortly after, the aircraft turned right despite being instructed by air traffic control to turn left. The pilot reported that he had a ‘slight technical fault’ but no other transmissions were received. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 54 Radar data showed the aircraft turning right and then left, followed by a descent and climb, a second right turn and a second descent at over 10,000 feet per minute before the aircraft disappeared from the radar. A search operation found a small amount of aircraft wreckage floating in the ocean. The pilot likely died in the accident. The aircraft was destroyed. Cockpit voice recorder on the ocean ﬂoor There was no evidence of a midair breakup of the aircraft. Both of the aircraft’s on-board flight recorders were recovered from the ocean floor, but they only contained data from a previous flight—not the accident flight. The ATSB investigation found that the pilot took off without any alternating current electrical power to the aircraft’s primary flight instruments. This included the pilot’s artificial horizon and both flight recorders. Without a primary attitude reference during night takeoff, it is likely that the pilot became disoriented and lost control of the aircraft. The investigation identified that the pilot’s Metro III endorsement training As a result of the accident and audits by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the operator has taken action to improve its safety and training operations. This includes: t rewriting their operations manual t retraining pilots to meet the operator’s endorsement training requirements t establishing a new safety committee. The ATSB’s investigation report Loss of control – Fairchild Metro III, VH-OZA, 19 km SE Sydney, NSW, 9 April 2008 is available at www.atsb.gov.au Q Pilots urged: ‘stay focused around powerlines’ A gricultural pilots are being reminded of the dangers associated with flying near wires following the SFDFOUrelease of an ATSB booklet. The booklet, released in association with the Aerial Agriculture Association of Australia, highlights recent wirestrike accidents that occurred while pilots were conducting spraying activities. Importantly, the report provides ways for pilots to minimise the risk of striking a powerline while conducting aerial operations. Flight data recorder, popularly referred to as the ‘black box’ had not been conducted in accordance with the operator’s approved training and checking manual. The booklet provides methods for pilots to minimise the risk of striking wires while conducting aerial operations. These are: t setting client expectations so that they are clear that safety comes first t conducting an aerial reconnaissance before spraying and extra aerial reconnaissance before the cleanup run t reassessing the risks when plans change t avoiding unnecessary distractions and refocussing when distracted ATSB General Manager of Strategic Capability, Mr Julian Walsh, said that in the majority of wirestrike accidents the pilots had known of the powerlines before they struck them. t keeping vigilance limitations in mind ‘Typically, pilots have been working around the same wires in the hours before a wirestrike accident,’ Mr Walsh says. t having a systematic approach to safely managing wires. ‘Due to a change of spraying plans or a clean-up run once a paddock has been sprayed, the pilot’s focus is temporarily shifted away from the task of identifying the location of wires.’ t actively looking for wires t managing operational pressures including not accepting tasks that are beyond your personal minimums The report also highlights the role of landholders and utility owners in contributing to safety. This includes installing markers on wires, particularly where regular low-level flying takes place. Q Report conﬁrms Qantas A380 engine failure event sequence A n interim ATSB investigation report has confirmed the sequence of events that led to the 4 November 2010 uncontained engine failure on board a Qantas A380 aircraft over Batam Island, Indonesia. The report also sets out how, as a result of the investigation to date, Rolls-Royce, affected airlines and safety regulators have taken action to ensure the continued safe operation of A380 aircraft. The report highlights how the intermediate pressure turbine disc in the aircraft’s No. 2 engine had been weakened by an oil fire. As a result, the disc separated from its shaft, increased its rotation speed and broke into several parts. Sections of the fractured disc and other engine components penetrated the aircraft’s left wing and a number of other areas on the aircraft, resulting in significant structural and systems damage. The report also shows how some of the extensive flight data recovered in the first stage of the investigation has been used to program a simulation of how the aircraft handled following the accident. This has helped investigators to understand better the aircraft’s handling and performance. The simulation was part of a broader exercise to understand the extent and consequences of the airframe and systems damage to the aircraft and the consequences for flight crew workload. The findings from this continuing work will provide valuable safety lessons for future operations. The ATSB will continue to work with international safety agencies and other organisations to gather and compile the large amount of complex factual information required to complete the t testing and analysing the black-coloured soot residue found in the left wing fuel tank t analysing the flight simulation test data t continuing to review the quality control and quality assurance system affecting the engine design and manufacturing process t reviewing the aircraft’s maintenance, including engine workshop visits. The aircraft is currently in Singapore awaiting repair. Given the highly complex nature of this investigation, the final ATSB report is expected to be released in May 2012. A copy of the interim factual report is available on the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au. Q 55 Fact sheet for General Aviation Pilots T he Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has issued a fact sheet reminding pilots of the risks associated with operations in uncontrolled airspace. This warning comes as the result of a significant increase in reports of situations involving near miss incidents. The ATSB has received many notifications from pilots reporting how they have suddenly realised that another aircraft is flying dangerously close to them in uncontrolled airspace. The fact sheet notes that, surprisingly, just as many near miss incidents are reported for en route aircraft as those in airspace close to airports. ‘Near airports, planes are operating in closer quarters,’ explains Martin Dolan, Chief Commissioner of the ATSB, ‘so you might expect to hear about aircraft getting too close to each other, but it’s surprising that there are just as many reports from aircraft that are up there cruising along, going from one place to another.’ In response, the fact sheet describes the factors that increase the chance of these dangerous situations. The core recommendation on how to avoid other aircraft when outside controlled airspace is to ensure that pilots are aware of each other in plenty of time, using whatever systems are available. ‘This may sound like an obvious message,’ says Dolan, ‘but our figures are indicating that it’s not always happening – that pilots aren’t always advertising their presence, when in fact they could be.’ In fact, there were twice as many near-miss notifications where pilots had no prior warning of other aircraft in their vicinity, compared with situations when a pilot received an alert by radio, or from a traffic avoidance system like TCAS. There are a number of specific strategies in the fact sheet to help pilots announce their presence in uncontrolled airspace more effectively. Hopefully, this may help cut down the number of situations where pilots suddenly find that another aircraft has come too close. Q ATSB The oil fire that weakened the disc was due to a manufacturing defect in an oil feed pipe. That defect resulted in fatigue cracking in the pipe, so that oil sprayed into an engine cavity where it ignited because of the high air temperature. investigation. Included in this work will be: Close ﬂying highlighted in ATSB bulletin ATSB investigation AB-2010-040 The ATSB has released its latest bulletin of short investigations, covering a variety of occurrences. Among them, it highlights five instances of aircraft coming too close to each other. ‘Two of those occurrences were ‘breakdowns of separation,’ taking place in airspace that was under the control of Air Traffic Control officers, which has carefully defined separation standards to keep aircraft a set distance apart. Several safety actions have come out of these occurrences, including the establishment of an awareness program for Air Traffic Controllers, and a systemic review by Airservices Australia. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 56 Mr Joe Hattley, the ATSB’s Assistant General Manager of Aviation Safety Investigations says the investigations bulletin provides a useful resource for the aviation industry to help improve safety. ‘The bulletin covers a range of the ATSB’s shorter investigations and highlights valuable safety lessons for pilots, operators and safety managers,’ Mr Hattley says. Other investigations covered in the bulletin included a depressurisation event, two instances of total power loss and a situation in which fumes and smoke appeared in an aircraft’s cockpit. As a result of a wirestrike, an aircraft operator will annotate powerline information onto their topographic survey plans. Released quarterly, the bulletin provides a summary of the less-complex factual investigations conducted by the ATSB. The results, which are based on information supplied by organisations or individuals involved in the occurrence, detail the facts behind the event, as well as any safety actions undertaken or identified. The bulletin also highlights important safety messages for the broader aviation community, drawing on earlier ATSB investigations and research. Aviation Short Investigation Bulletin: First Quarter 2011 is available on the ATSB website at www.atsb.gov.au Q Bushﬁre ﬁghting now safer ATSB investigation AO-2009-077 NSW’s bush fire operating procedures have been improved following the ATSB’s investigation into a fatal helicopter accident. On 9 December 2009, the pilot of a Bell Helicopter 206L-1 LongRanger, registered VH-MJO, was flying a fire-fighting support flight under visual flight rules (VFR) in the Dorrigo area, NSW. Shortly after takeoff, low cloud came in and the pilot lost all visual reference with the horizon and the ground. The pilot became disoriented and the helicopter crashed into the ground. The passenger died and the pilot was seriously injured. The accident showed how quickly a pilot can lose situational awareness and aircraft control when all visual reference with their surroundings is lost. Pilots should err on the side of caution when considering visual operations in marginal weather conditions, especially when conditions can change rapidly. The ATSB’s investigation found that the helicopter landing area was occasionally subjected to rapidly moving fog or low cloud that increased the safety risk of flights under VFR. The National Parks and Wildlife Service closed the helicopter landing site at the Dorrigo Rainforest Centre shortly after the accident. Following the accident, the National Parks and Wildlife Service, the NSW Rural Fire Service and other NSW fire-fighting authorities conducted a full review of the Fire Agencies Bush Fire Aviation Standard Operating Procedures. A number of safety actions have been initiated as a result of the review, including: t developing guidelines for helicopter landing areas that are regularly used during bush fire operations t identifying potential hazards for each helicopter landing area t compiling a Bush Fire Helicopter Landing Area directory t conducting a full audit of the helicopter operator before awarding them any further contract work. The investigation report is available at www.atsb.gov.au Q Turbulences catches pilot off-guard ATSB investigation AO-2010-008 An incident at Canberra Airport in which an aircraft experienced severe turbulence has reinforced the potential safety benefits of the formation of a national airport safety group. On 31 January, 2010 a Grumman Traveller AA-5 aircraft was flown on a private flight from Temora to Canberra. The pilot reported that, during the final approach to the runway at about 150 ft above the ground, the aircraft experienced severe turbulence. This resulted in a loss of control, causing an uncommanded roll to the right. The pilot rapidly regained control, and landed. The ATSB determined that the wind conditions on the day and the position of two buildings about 220 m and 290 m upwind from runway 12 at Canberra probably combined to produce the turbulence. There were no standard criteria for assessing the potential local wind effect of aerodrome building developments on aviation operations, and no national building codes for aerodrome developments that address the phenomena of building-induced turbulence. The airport operator had commissioned pre-construction assessments of the two buildings that concluded that the buildings would not result in adverse wind effects. This conclusion was based partially on the assessment that use of runway 12 was unlikely in northerly wind conditions. However, operations to that runway remained possible in those conditions, and there was no alert to affected pilots about possible risk. Subsequent to this occurrence, the National Airports Safety Advisory Group was established. Its role is to examine airport planning issues, including the potential for building-induced local wind effects on aircraft operations. The group will also develop a set of universal guidelines and policy material. Airservices Australia is also progressing the installation of wind shear detection technologies at several airports, which may include Canberra Airport. The investigation report is available at www.atsb.gov.au Q REPCON briefs Australia’s voluntary conﬁdential aviation reporting scheme REPCON allows any person who has an aviation safety concern to report it to the ATSB confidentially. All personal information regarding any individual (either the reporter or any person referred to in the report) remains strictly confidential, unless permission is given by the subject of the information. The goals of the scheme are to increase awareness of safety issues and to encourage safety action by those best placed to respond to safety concerns. REPCON would like to hear from you if you have experienced a ‘close call’ and think others may benefit from the lessons you have learnt. These reports can serve as a powerful reminder that, despite the best of intentions, well-trained people are still capable of making mistakes. The stories arising from these reports may serve to reinforce the message that we must remain vigilant to ensure the ongoing safety of ourselves and others. Testing of instruments in IFR aircraft The reporter believes that CASA is aware of the problem with this airworthiness directive and some CASA staff agree that the airworthiness directive needs to be changed to remove option 1. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied CASA with the de-identified report. The following is a version of the response that CASA provided: CASA published Airworthiness Bulletin (AWB) 31-004 in February 2008. This t 8IFOBOPQFSBUPSFMFDUTUPVTFPQUJPO 1 in AD/INST/9 for the testing of pressure altimeters to Federal Aviation Regulation Part 43 Appendix E they must also ensure that the requirements of CAR 41 are met. t $"3 TUBUFTUIBUABQFSTPO must not use a class B aircraft in an operation if there is not a maintenance schedule for the aircraft that includes the provision for the maintenance of all aircraft components from time to time included in, or fitted to, the aircraft’. t &MFDUJOHUPVTFPQUJPOJOUIF"% instead of option 2 does not remove the requirement to ensure the serviceability of all other aircraft instruments and instrument systems as per CAR 41. Operation without a ﬂight attendant Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns that a company aircraft operated two sectors without a flight attendant onboard; there were approximately 10 passengers on board. Action taken by REPCON: REPCON supplied the operator with the de-identified report. The following is a This subject has already been addressed with CASA. All actions have been accepted by CASA and this issue has been closed out accordingly. REPCON supplied CASA with the de-identified report and a version of the operator’s response. The following is a version of the response that CASA provided: CASA has reviewed the report and contacted the operator concerned. CASA is aware of the issue and is satisfied that the matter has been addressed. 57 What is not a reportable safety concern? To avoid doubt, the following matters are not reportable safety concerns and are not guaranteed conﬁdentiality: a) matters showing a serious and imminent threat to a person’s health or life; b) aircraft; c) industrial relations matters; d) conduct that may constitute a serious crime. Note: REPCON is not an alternative to complying with reporting obligations under the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 (see www.atsb.gov.au). Submission of a report known by the reporter to be false or misleading is an offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code. How can I report to REPCON? Online: www.atsb.gov.au/voluntary.aspx Telephone: 1800 020 505 Email: email@example.com Facsimile: 02 6274 6461 Mail: Freepost 600 PO Box 600, Civic Square ACT 2608 ATSB Report narrative: The reporter expressed safety concerns that CASA Airworthiness Directive (AD/INST/9), testing requirements for instruments in IFR aircraft allows operator’s to elect to carry out one of two options for the periodic testing of flight instruments on IFR aircraft. The reporter believes that most operators would elect the first option as it is less labour intensive, despite needing to be carried out every 2 years, as opposed to 3 years with option 2, but only checks the pressure altimeters and not the whole system. Option 1 does not confirm that the whole system is operational and airworthy. Latent defects may remain undetected until that part of the system is needed (in an emergency) or the system fails. AWB addresses the concerns raised in this REPCON report concerning the two options presented in AD/INST/9 for the testing of flight instruments. The AWB also explains the relationship between the AD and Civil Aviation Regulations (CAR) 1988 i.e.: version of the response provided by the operator: War and remembrance, fog and death FSA JUL-AUG 2011 58 On 10 April 2010, a Polish Air Force Tupolev Tu-154M struck trees short of the runway and crashed to destruction while attempting to land at Smolensk, Russia, in fog. All 96 occupants were killed. By Macarthur Job It was always going to be a sombre occasion. The ﬂight, from Warsaw to the former military airbase of Smolensk North Airport, was taking Polish dignitaries to attend the 70th anniversary commemoration of the massacre of Polish army ofﬁcers at Katyn, a short distance west of Smolensk, during World War II. The delegation included the Polish president and his wife, the deputy foreign minister, 12 members of parliament, the chief of the Polish General Staff and senior military ofﬁcers, the president of the national bank, senior clergy, and relatives of victims of the massacre. The three-engined Russian-built Tu-154M (‘the Russian 727’) was one of two aircraft of its type operated by the Polish Air Force as VIP transports. The ﬂight crew comprised the captain, co-pilot, navigator and ﬂight engineer. Also on board were a security ofﬁcer and three ﬂight attendants to attend to the 88 passengers. All were Polish. Russian authorities had offered to provide a navigator, but this was declined. The Tu-154M was manufactured in June 1990 and had ﬂown 5150 hours, 140 since its last overhaul in December 2009. The investigation found no failure of the aircraft’s systems and engines, and the accident was unrelated to any technical problem. Even so, the aircraft’s airworthiness certiﬁcate had expired nearly three weeks before the accident. A different captain was originally to command the ﬂight but was replaced ﬁve days before because of a ‘service necessity’. The investigation found serious shortcomings both in the training and the makeup of the crew. Responsible for their own training on Tu-154M aircraft, as well as for maintaining and upgrading their skills, they did not undergo regular simulator training. The captain lacked command experience, having logged only 530 hours as a captain. After being promoted to this status, instead of undergoing formal command training under supervision, he alternated as co-pilot and captain as circumstances required. Three days before the accident he had ﬂown to the same Smolensk airport as a co-pilot. The co-pilot, navigator and ﬂight engineer had even less experience. Apart from the captain, none of the crew had ﬂown to Smolensk before. There were other shortcomings in the organisation of the VIP ﬂight. Crew members had conducted their own pre-ﬂight brieﬁng the day before, with senior staff playing no part. No records were kept of the brieﬁng, or of crew readiness. Furthermore, the crew did not have to complete navigation data for their destination airport. Their approach charts were out of date, and a NOTAM listing information on the unserviceability of some navigation aids was not provided to them. No technical ﬂight was conducted beforehand to check the facilities at the destination for receiving the VIP Tu-154M and its high level passengers. Ofﬁcers responsible for the ﬂight’s management, as well as the captain, thus violated Polish aviation regulations requiring crews to have pertinent data. A smaller Polish Air Force three-engined jet, a Yak-40, carrying support staff and journalists to cover the anniversary, left for Smolensk two hours before the VIP ﬂight, but requests for clearances and information on the readiness of the airport in respect of either ﬂight were not sent. Consequently, when the YAK-40 ﬁrst contacted Smolensk ATC at 08.50am, they had no information on the aircraft. The forecast provided to the Yak-40 contained no information about deterioration in the weather. But by the time the Yak was approaching to land at 0915, conditions were rapidly worsening, with visibility decreasing from 4km at 0900 to only 1500m when the Yak touched down. The Tupolev took off at 0927. About this time visibility at Smolensk had reduced to 1000m in mist and smoke, and the sky was overcast by stratus cloud with a base of 100m (330ft). Thus, by the time the Tupolev departed, the destination weather was already below the minimums for a twin locator approach under guidance from ground radar. Fifteen minutes later, another observation showed the beginning of fog. Analysis of the cockpit voice recording revealed that the cockpit door was open during the entire descent and approach and that from time to time there were unauthorised people in the cockpit. The investigation also found the aircraft’s weight at the time of its approach exceeded the maximum landing weight for the conditions. At 1014, when the Tupolev was descending through 7500m, (24,600ft) Minsk Control informed the crew of fog, with only 400m visibility at their destination. After contacting Moscow Control at 1022 the aircraft was cleared for further descent to 3600m (11,800ft) and instructed to contact Smolensk Airport ATC. The captain was now speaking in Russian, his second language. After clarifying the aircraft’s remaining fuel, the Smolensk controller twice informed the crew that the weather was foggy, and unsuitable for landing. The crew also contacted the Yak-40 on the ground at Smolensk. After colourfully describing the bad weather, the Yak crew said they had been lucky to land ‘at the last moment’. They added, ‘you could try, of course.’ The Tupolev crew decided on a ‘trial’ approach, the captain informing the controller, ‘If it’s possible we'll try an approach. But if there’s no weather we'll go around.’ A senior ofﬁcer in the ATC operations building asked the crew, ‘After the trial approach, will you have enough fuel for your alternate?’ The crew replied: ‘We have enough – request further descent please’, and the controller cleared the aircraft accordingly. The crew did not advise their selected approach system and did not request radar vectoring. The controllers interpreted this as meaning the crew would be using on-board equipment. 59 WAR & REMEMBRANCE During the pre-ﬂight brieﬁng, the navigator signed for weather information including TAFs and actual weather at Warsaw, Vitebsk and Minsk. The forecast and actual weather for the destination were not provided, and the forecast for Vitebsk had expired. At 1009 the navigator reported they were ready for descent. Minsk Control then cleared them to descend to 3900m (12,800ft). War and remembrance, fog and death 60 This was the beginning of the chain of events that led to the disaster. Analysing the crew’s motivation, the investigation noted that in August 2008, one of the Polish VIP aircraft was ﬂying the President and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Force to Tbilisi in Georgia. The weather was deteriorating and the captain judged it was not possible to continue safely. Despite the orders of both the President and the Deputy Commander-in-Chief to continue, the aircraft landed at Gyandj in Azerbaijan. The President and his entourage were obliged to continue to Tbilisi by road. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 That captain was never again included in crews for presidential ﬂights. The captain and the co-pilot of the Tupolev on 10 April had been co-pilot and navigator respectively on the aborted Tbilisi ﬂight. He and the crew discussed the worsening weather with each other and with the President’s director of protocol, who had entered the cockpit. The discussion ended with the captain remarking, ‘... if we don't land, he'll give me trouble’. But the captain had not made any approaches in complex weather for over ﬁve months and in Tu-l54 aircraft he had made only six NDB approaches, all of them in straightforward meteorological conditions. He was thus under considerable stress. Meanwhile, the ATC personnel and their senior ofﬁcers were sure the aircraft would divert. The weather was not expected to improve and the Tu-154M’s remaining fuel did not allow a prolonged stay in the holding pattern. At 1027 the crew contacted the pilots of the Yak-40 again and were informed that a Russian IL-76 aircraft had left for an alternate after two unsuccessful approaches. The Tu-154M crew then set the airﬁeld pressure (QFE) on their altimeters, the navigator expressing regret there was no ILS system available. The crew reported they were maintaining 1500m (4900ft), and the controller cleared them for further descent to 500m (1640ft). At this stage the director of protocol, still in the cockpit said, ‘So far there's no President's decision on what to do next.’ The crew replied that they had been cleared down to circling height, and as they approached the base turn, the captain said: ‘We'll make an approach – in case of failure we'll go around.’ As the aircraft reached the base turn, the controller warned them to be ready to go around from a height of 100m (330ft). The captain replied: ‘yes sir!’ Despite two more weather warnings from the Yak-40, the Tu-154M continued the approach. As the crew conﬁgured the aircraft for landing, another voice on the CVR revealed a second visitor to the cockpit. He was later identiﬁed as the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Force. He made no comment on the handling of the aircraft, and though fully aware of the conditions, took no measures to terminate the approach. A word from him that a successful approach was not possible could have made all the difference to the captain’s attitude. As it was, his presence could only have added to the captain’s stress. The crew did not achieve a stable descent, the rate increasing excessively after the aircraft diverged above the glide path. Passing the outer marker, the aircraft was 120m (400ft) above the glide path, and the crew’s efforts to correct the proﬁle resulted in a rate of descent almost double the desired rate. This high rate of descent was maintained throughout the rest of the approach. Seconds after 1040, the ﬁrst ‘terrain ahead’ warning sounded in stentorian English for six seconds, but there was no reaction by the crew. A few seconds later the navigator reported their height as 300m (980ft). But he was now monitoring the aircraft’s height on the radio altimeters and the terrain along the ﬂight path is as much as 80m (260ft) lower than the Runway 26 threshold. The second ‘terrain ahead’ warning sounded with the aircraft about 180m (600ft) above the runway threshold. Half a minute later, when the aircraft reached the decision height of 100m, (330ft) there was no reaction by the captain. The Commander-in-Chief’s indifference to the extremely hazardous situation that was developing probably inﬂuenced the captain to risk descending below decision height, in the hope of making visual contact. Although crew members called out ‘descent height’ three times, the captain made no response. But a few seconds before 1041, at 30m (100ft) on the radio altimeter, the control column was abruptly pulled back, overpowering the autopilot, and the throttles were simultaneously pushed fully open. Evidently at that moment the captain had caught sight of the trees in front of the aircraft and reacted instinctively. It was too late. The aircraft passed through the upper branches of a tree 10m above the ground, but more than 10m below the elevation of the runway. Seconds later, and 245m further along the up-sloping ground, the port wing hit a more substantial tree, tearing off the outer wing. The aircraft rolled and ploughed violently into the ground upside down, breaking apart as its wreckage slid to a stop 130m further on. There was no substantial ﬁre, but all on board died instantly from high-impact forces estimated at 100G. Cause The investigation concluded that the immediate cause of the accident was the failure of the crew to divert to an alternate aerodrome when cloud and fog were substantially lower than the minimum descent height, as well as their lack of response to ‘terrain ahead’ warnings. Comment Photo: Russian Interstate Aviation Bureau (MAK) One can only marvel at the utter lack of rigour in the planning, preparation and conduct of this VIP ﬂight, carrying not only the Polish president but also numerous other leading ﬁgures of the country’s political, military and commercial life. Also difﬁcult to comprehend is the lack of responsibility manifested by senior personnel aboard the aircraft, who could have terminated the well-nigh impossible approach. 61 WAR & REMEMBRANCE Just before passing the middle marker, and simultaneously with the warning that the aircraft had reached the target height of 60m (200ft) the crew had set on the radio altimeter, the co-pilot called, ‘go around’. At that moment the aircraft’s actual height was only 10-15m (30-50ft) above the runway. The investigation believed that the co-pilot tried to initiate a go around but did not complete it. The control column had been pulled back, but not enough to overpower the autopilot. 0 10 01 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 FSA JUL-AUG 2011 62 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 10 By the numbers: is your transponder set correctly? 1 1 1 10 01 0 1 11 10 1 1 1 10 0 1 0 10 1 0 0 1 11 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 Airservices Australia is continuing its rollout of Mode S secondary 0 surveillance radars (SSR) to replace the older Mode A/C-based SSR 0 systems, currently at capital city locations, and in the future at the enroute radar stations. With this rollout, it is critical that pilots and 0 operators whose aircraft are installed with Mode S and automatic 1 dependent surveillance–broadcast (ADS-B) transponders enter their aircraft’s ﬂight identiﬁcation (FLTID) and aircraft address 0 (ICAO 24 bit binary code) in their aircraft’s transponder/s correctly. 0 0 What to enter into the aircraft’s Mode S 1 transponder/s? 0 The AIP uses the term ‘aircraft identiﬁcation’ rather than ‘ﬂight ID’ specifying transponder requirements. ‘Aircraft identiﬁcation’ 1 when is the approved ICAO terminology for this feature of Mode S; 0 however, ‘ﬂight ID’ is the term avionics manufacturers and pilots 1 typically use. Airline aircraft will have cockpit controls, which will need to be set for each ﬂight to enter the FLTID. That may also be the case for some general aviation aircraft, whilst others may have the FLTID set at installation of the transponder, so that it does not need to be changed for each ﬂight. Pilots should determine whether the ATC transponder in their aircraft has been set up to ask for ‘ﬂight ID’ at each power up, or whether it always uses a pre-programmed Flight ID1. It is important to enter the FLTID and the ICAO aircraft address correctly. If you enter either of these incorrectly, ATC may not be able to see your aircraft, or the ATC computers may confuse it with another aircraft. You could also affect the detection of your aircraft by the trafﬁc collision avoidance system (TCAS) of other aircraft. The codes are ﬂight-critical information, so enter them carefully. 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Correct entry of FLTID and aircraft address in an aircraft’s Mode S/ADS-B transponder Flight Identification (FLTID) The ﬂight identiﬁcation (FLTID) is the equivalent of the aircraft callsign and is included in both mode S SSR and ADS-B transmissions. The FLTID is up to seven characters long, and may be set by the ﬂight crew via a cockpit interface, or in the case of general aviation aircraft, at the time of installation or power on of the transponder. When transmitted by the aircraft transponder following either a Mode-S radar interrogation or by ADS-B squitter, FLTID enables ATC to identify each individual aircraft on a controller’s display screen, and to correlate a radar or ADS-B track with the submitted ﬂight plan information ﬁled by the pilot or operator. Correlation between an aircraft’s FLTID and the radiotelephony callsign improves situational awareness and communication between pilots and ATC. For the Airservices ATC system to positively correlate an aircraft FLTID to a ﬂight plan, the FLTID must exactly match the aircraft identiﬁcation (ACID) entered in Item 7 of the ﬂight notiﬁcation. 1 The Garmin GTX33/330 transponders should never be set to ‘SAME AS TAIL’ in Australian registered aircraft because the product does not convert the 24-bit code to an Australian registration-based ﬂight ID, as it does for US-registered aircraft. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 The aircraft identiﬁcation you enter in the ﬂight notiﬁcation and the transponder should be no more than seven characters. Airline aircraft providing scheduled ﬂight services must use the three-letter ICAO airline code used in ﬂight plans, not the two-letter IATA codes. The ICAO threeletter designator for the aircraft operator is followed by the ﬂight number (i.e. QFA511 for Qantas ﬂight 511). Do not add any zeros, dashes or spaces if the aircraft identiﬁcation is fewer than seven characters. General aviation aircraft, or other aircraft not operating under an ICAO ﬂight designator must transmit the aircraft registration mark. For VH-registered aircraft operating wholly in Australian territorial airspace, enter only the three letters of the registration mark; for example, ABC; and do not include the VH nationality mark. However, for those ﬂights where the aircraft is operating to an overseas destination, you should include the VH, followed immediately by the three letters of the registration mark. In almost all cases, the ICAO aircraft address is set at installation and pilots should not change it. For ease of entry, many transponders use the six-character (hexadecimal) or eight-character (octal) equivalent form of the ICAO 24-bit code. These shorter, six or eightcharacter, forms of the code are used to reduce the risk of error when entering the codes into the transponder. Once it is set correctly, the aircraft address should not need to be changed, unless the aircraft subsequently changes ownership and registration. However, new aircraft arriving from overseas to be sold in Australia often have the original FLTID and aircraft address in the transponder from the country of origin; for example, a USA-issued code, and not the correct Australian code. Owners should check for that on delivery of an aircraft from overseas. Conversion charts for entry of ICAO aircraft address There are conversion charts available on the internet which can be used to convert the ICAO 24-bit aircraft addresses to the equivalent hexadecimal or octal formats. For example, initial entry to a transponder such as the widely used Garmin GTX330 requires entry in hexadecimal, while some other types of transponders may use the octal format. For RA-Aus registered aircraft, enter the allocated registration in full (e.g. 551875). For non-airline foreign registered aircraft, enter the full nationality and registration marks without any zeros, dashes or spaces (e.g. ZKABC). ICAO aircraft address The ICAO aircraft address for each aircraft is issued by CASA, or the Recreational Aircraft Association of Australia (RA-Aus), when it is registered. The ICAO aircraft address is a unique code that identiﬁes each individual airframe worldwide. 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 63 BY THE NUMBERS 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 Aircraft address conversion table – binary to hexadecimal In using the binary to hexadecimal chart below, the 24 binary bits of the ICAO aircraft address are split into three groups of 8 bits. Then each 8-bit binary group is looked up in the table and converted. The three converted groups are then reassembled in the same sequence into the corresponding hexadecimal format. For example: Bin Hex 01010000 50 01010001 51 01010010 52 01010011 53 01010100 54 Bin Hex 01010101 55 01110000 70 01010110 56 01110001 71 01010111 57 01110010 72 ICAO aircraft 24-bit address 011111001000000101100101 Split into three groups of 8 bits 01111100 10000001 01100101 01011000 58 01110011 73 Look up the table 7C 01011001 59 01110100 74 Aircraft hexadecimal address 7C8165 01011010 5A 01110101 75 01011011 5B 01110110 76 Hex 01011100 5C 01110111 77 00100000 20 01011101 5D 01111000 78 00100001 21 01011110 5E 01111001 79 01011111 5F 01111010 7A 01111011 7B Bin Hex 01111100 7C 01100000 60 01111101 7D 01100001 61 01111110 7E 01100010 62 01111111 7F 01100011 63 01100100 64 Bin Hex 01100101 65 10000000 80 01100110 66 10000001 81 82 Bin FSA JUL-AUG 2011 64 Bin Hex 00010000 10 00010001 11 00010010 12 00010011 13 00010100 14 00010101 15 00010110 16 00010111 17 00011000 18 00011001 19 00011010 1A 00011011 1B 00011100 1C 00011101 1D Hex 00011110 1E 00000000 00 00011111 1F 00000001 01 Bin 00000010 02 00000011 03 00000100 04 00000101 05 00000110 06 00000111 07 00001000 08 00001001 09 00001010 0A 00001011 0B 00001100 0C 00001101 0D 00001110 0E 00001111 0F 81 00100010 22 00100011 23 00100100 24 00100101 25 00100110 26 00100111 27 00101000 28 00101001 29 00101010 2A 00101011 2B 00101100 2C 00101101 2D 00101110 2E 00101111 65 2F Bin Hex 00110000 30 00110001 31 00110010 32 00110011 33 00110100 34 00110101 35 00110110 36 00110111 37 00111000 38 00111001 39 00111010 3A 00111011 3B 00111100 3C 00111101 3D 00111110 3E 00111111 3F 01100111 67 10000010 Hex 01101000 68 10000011 83 01000000 40 01101001 69 10000100 84 01000001 41 01101010 6A 10000101 85 01000010 42 01101011 6B 10000110 86 01000011 43 01101100 6C 10000111 87 01000100 44 01101101 6D 10001000 88 89 Bin 01000101 45 01101110 6E 10001001 01000110 46 01101111 6F 10001010 8A 8B 01000111 47 10001011 01001000 48 10001100 8C 01001001 49 10001101 8D 01001010 4A 10001110 8E 01001011 4B 10001111 8F 01001100 4C 01001101 4D 01001110 4E 01001111 4F 0 1 0 1 01 0 1 1 0 1 00 10 10 01 10 00 00 01 10 01 00 01 10 01 10 01 Hex 10110000 B0 10110001 B1 10110010 B2 10110011 B3 10110100 B4 10110101 B5 10110110 B6 10110111 B7 1 0 1 0 Bin Hex 10111000 B8 10010000 90 10111001 B9 Bin Hex 10010001 91 10111010 BA 11100000 E0 10010010 92 10111011 BB 11100001 E1 10010011 93 10111100 BC 11100010 E2 10010100 94 10111101 BD 11100011 E3 10010101 95 10111110 BE 11100100 E4 10010110 96 10111111 BF 11100101 E5 10010111 97 11100110 E6 10011000 98 Bin 11100111 E7 10011001 99 11000000 C0 11101000 E8 10011010 9A 11000001 C1 11101001 E9 EA Hex 10011011 9B 11000010 C2 11101010 10011100 9C 11000011 C3 11101011 EB 10011101 9D 11000100 C4 11101100 EC 10011110 9E 11000101 C5 11101101 ED 10011111 9F 11000110 C6 11101110 EE 11000111 C7 11101111 EF 11001000 C8 11001001 C9 01 10 11 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 Bin Hex 11110000 F0 11110001 F1 11110010 F2 11110011 F3 11110100 F4 11110101 F5 11110110 F6 11110111 F7 11111000 F8 11111001 F9 11111010 FA 11111011 FB 11111100 FC 11111101 FD 11111110 FE 11111111 FF 65 BY THE NUMBERS 0 1 01 10 11 00 11 00 11 01 11 11 11 10 11 00 11 0 1 Bin 11001010 CA CB 11001100 CC 11001101 CD 11001110 CE 11001111 CF Bin Hex 11010000 D0 11010001 D1 For example: 11010010 D2 ICAO aircraft 24-bit address 011111001000000101100101 11010011 D3 Split into 8 groups of 3 bits 011 111 001 000 000 101 100 101 11010100 D4 Look up the table 3 11010101 D5 11010110 D6 Aircraft octal address 37100545 11010111 D7 11011000 D8 11011001 D9 11011010 DA 11011011 DB 11011100 DC 10101101 0 1 1 0 Hex 1 A0 0 A1 A21 A30 A4 1 A5 A61 A7 1 A8 A91 AA 1 AB 0 AC 1 AD 11001011 11011101 DD 10101110 AE 11011110 DE 10101111 AF 11011111 DF Bin 10100000 10100001 10100010 10100011 10100100 10100101 10100110 10100111 10101000 10101001 10101010 10101011 10101100 Aircraft address conversion table – binary to octal groups In using the binary to octal chart below, the 24 binary bits of the ICAO aircraft address are split left to right into eight groups of three bits each. Then each three-bit binary group is looked up and converted. The eight converted groups are then reassembled in the same sequence into the corresponding octal format. 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 7 1 0 Binary group 000 0 5 4 5 Octal group 0 001 1 010 2 011 3 100 4 101 5 110 6 111 7 1. An aerodrome frequency response unit (AFRU) will broadcast an announcement after the end of an aircraft transmission (of more than two seconds duration): 6. (a) lift from the aft part of the rotor disc compared to the forward part. (a) after every ﬁfth transmission. (b) lift from the forward part of the rotor disc compared to the aft part. (b) after every tenth transmission. (c) when there has been no transmission for more than 90 seconds. (c) phase lag at the aft part of the rotor disc compared to the forward part. (d) when there has been no transmission for more than ﬁve minutes. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 66 2. 3. If an aircraft is on a heading of 330(m) and the ADF bearing is 050 relative, the (m) track to the NDB is: (d) phase lag at the forward part of the rotor disc compared to the aft part. 7. (a) diminishes with increasing airspeed. (b) 080 (b) increases with increasing airspeed. (c) 280 (c) does not vary with forward speed. (d) 020 (d) only results from a crosswind. At a towered aerodrome, runway guard lights (RGLs) on standard taxiways, refer to ﬂashing: 8. If an aircraft has a stall speed in straight and level ﬂight of 41 KIAS, the stall speed at the same weight during a turn at a 60º angle of bank will be approximately: (a) 58 KIAS. (b) red lights at either side of the holding point mark which are extinguished with a clearance to enter the runway. (b) 51 KIAS. (c) yellow lights at either side of the holding point mark which remain on regardless of a clearance to enter the runway. (d) 44 KIAS. (d) yellow lights at either side of the holding point mark which are extinguished with a clearance to enter the runway. At a towered aerodrome, stop bar lights are: (a) always red and do not ﬂash, whereas runway guard lights (RGLs) are always ﬂashing yellow. (b) always red and ﬂashing, whereas runway guard lights (RGLs) are always steady yellow. (c) always ﬂashing red. (d) the only lights which are distributed across the taxiway. 5. On a helicopter moving forward, transverse ﬂow effect: (a) 050 (a) red lights at either side of the holding point mark which remain on regardless of a clearance to enter the runway. 4. On a helicopter moving forward, transverse ﬂow lift refers to the effect of greater: For ﬂight notiﬁcation via the NAIPS system, if a common name is entered for a signiﬁcant point, the system will: (a) assume that this means the aerodrome of that name. (b) assume that this means the navigational waypoint associated with that name. (c) ignore the location. (d) request clariﬁcation. (c) 47 KIAS. 9. In order to provide power for anti-icing, an electrically heated propeller requires (a) DC power. (b) AC power. (c) brushes and slip rings. (d) brushes and a commutator. 10. A magneto impulse coupling produces: (a) a retarded spark and requires battery power only for starting. (b) a retarded spark and does not require battery power. (c) an advanced spark and requires battery power for starting. (d) an advanced spark and does not require battery power. 1. The tripping of a differential pressure indicator (DPI) associated with an oil ﬁlter occurs when the: 8. (a) downstream pressure reduces below a pre-set amount. (b) the ﬂow rate through the ﬁlter reduces below a pre-set amount. (a) slowly reduces, because the terminal voltage of the battery approaches the charger output voltage. (c) the upstream pressure exceeds a pre-set amount. (b) slowly reduces, because the terminal voltage of the battery reduces. (d) the pressure drop across the ﬁlter element exceeds a pre-set amount. 2. (b) DC at twice the frequency of the applied voltage. (c) AC at the same frequency as the applied voltage. (d) AC at twice the frequency of the applied voltage. For silver soldering, an oxyacetylene ﬂame should be: (a) oxidising. (b) strongly oxidising. (c) neutral. (d) reducing. 4. (c) slowly increases, because the battery internal resistance increases. If an AC voltage is applied across a resistor, the resulting current through the resistor will be: (a) DC at the same frequency as the applied voltage. 3. As a general principle, as the charge state of a battery increases the charging current from a constant voltage battery charger: Acetylene is normally: (a) stable, but will tend to become unstable at pressures above about 15psi. (d) slowly reduces, because the battery internal resistance reduces. 9. A twin-spool turbo prop engine is easier to start because, during start mode, the starter-generator only has to drive the: (a) power turbine. (b) high-pressure turbine and compressor. (c) compressor turbine. (d) low-pressure turbine and compressor. 10. The purpose of a localiser is to: 67 (a) indicate a ﬁxed distance from the runway threshold. (b) align the aircraft with the runway extended centre line. (c) indicate the distance from the runway touch-down markers. (d) deﬁne a pre-determined approach angle to the runway. (b) stable up to a pressure of 30psi. (d) unstable unless the pressure exceeds 40psi. 5. A squib in an aircraft ﬁre protection system is: (a) a heat detector employing eutectic solder. (b) a device for releasing stored extinguishant. (c) an extinguisher bottle that fails to ﬁre. (d) a heat detector using a bimetallic disc. 6. A possible source of windscreen cracking in a dual element, electrically-heated windscreen is the strong temperature gradient across the screen during operation due to: (a) an open circuit in one element during parallel operation. (b) an open circuit in one element during series operation. (c) a short circuit in one element during parallel operation. (d) a short circuit in one element during series operation. 7. The purpose of an eductor in a pneumatic de-icer system is to provide a: (a) high pressure to deﬂate the boots. (b) high pressure to inﬂate the boots. (c) low pressure only until the boots are deﬂated. (d) low pressure to deﬂate the boots and hold them as close as possible to the aerofoil proﬁle. QUIZ (c) unstable, but will tend to become stable if stored under pressure. Albury NDB or VOR RWY 07 approach You are tracking along W696 between Eildon Weir (ELW) and Wangaratta (WGT) (Refer ERC L2) at A070, then ﬂight planned to Albury (YMAY) along W465. Now passing 17 GPS AY with no RAIM warnings active, you consider further descent, noting also with a further check on the AY VOR that there is only the Morse identiﬁer. 3. (a) The route LSALT of 4200 The date is 20 August, and your estimate overhead WGT is 1030Z. (b) The MSA of 5400 You are in a BE55 Baron (Category B) equipped with TSO'd GPS, VOR, 1 R.M.I. (ADF) and one ﬁxed card ADF. You are endorsed and current on all these nav aids for approaches. You copy the AY ATIS, noting the time when AY TWR closes, to gain the surface conditions. The ATIS indicates a wind of 060/15 with a cloud base of broken at 1900 and with a visibility of 8km in rain showers. (c) The MSA of 3400 (d) The sector C DME or GPS arrival step of 4500 4. FSA JUL-AUG 2011 (b) ‘Albury trafﬁc (aircraft registration), altitude, inbound, Albury.’ (c) ‘Albury Tower (aircraft registration), 17 GPS AY on the 225 radial (altitude) received (ATIS) request clearance.’ The following questions relate to the descent and this approach (plate dated 10 March 2011): 1. At what distance can you expect to copy the ATIS and on what frequency? Now approaching 14 GPS you consider a lead in to join the arc. (a) 60nm on AY NDB 236 5. What would be an approximate initial heading to turn onto to join this arc? (b) 60nm on AY VOR 115.6 (a) 315°M (c) 90nm on 120.6 (b) 135°M (d) 90nm on AY VOR 115.6 (c) 245°M, the lead radial (d) 065°M, the reciprocal of the lead radial since you are inbound You pass overhead WGT at 1030 having planned top of descent. 2. Which of the following would be the content of your inbound call? (a) ‘Albury trafﬁc (aircraft registration) an IFR Baron, 17 miles southwest passing (altitude) inbound for the (approach description) estimating AY at (time) Albury.’ Based on this information, you elect to conduct the RWY 07 VOR/ DME via the 12 arc. 68 What height may you now descend to? What height may you initially descend to along this track? (a) The sector C DME or GPS arrival altitude of 5000. (b) The route LSALT of 4200 (c) The MSA of 3400 Established on the arc at 3400, and with a current heading of 355°M you consider the lead radial. 6. (d) The MSA of 5400 If you have already pre-set the VOR ﬁnal track of 075 for the intercept, what would you expect the ADF (RMI) and ADF (ﬁxed card) to read respectively at this lead radial/bearing? (a) RMI 265, ﬁxed card 090R (b) RMI 085, ﬁxed card 270R (c) RMI 065, ﬁxed card 090R (d) RMI 065, ﬁxed card 070R 7. What altitude can you now descend to passing this lead radial? (a) You must remain at 3400 until past 12 GPS on the ﬁnal approach track of 075. (b) 3000 but only when within half scale of the 075 track. (c) 3000 (d) 2240 8. Your single navigation display is an H.S.I that can be selected to ‘VLOC’ or ‘GPS’. It must be selected to ‘VLOC’ for the ﬁnal approach. True or false? (a) True (b) False Passing the ﬁnal approach ﬁx, you descend to the MDA. Note that no telephone coverage is available. 9. What is this MDA for landing on RWY 07? (a) 2050ft on AWIS QNH, visibility 2.4km (b) 1800 since no ATIS or AWIS QNH, visibility 5.0km (c) 1700 on AWIS QNH, visibility 5.0km (d) 1950 on ATIS QNH, visibility 2.4km You land and vacate RWY 07. Post-landing checks are completed. 10. Whom will you contact to cancel the SARWATCH? (a) AY TWR 124.2, since there is no SMC (b) It is cancelled automatically at a controlled aerodrome (c) ML Centre on 125.2 in the circuit, since VHF contact is unavailable on the ground. (d) ML Centre on 125.2, since VHF contact is available on the ground. 69 QUIZ CALENDAR 2011 07 JULY 5 5 6 6 6 7 19 20 20 20 - 21 24 26 - 28 27 27 AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar Certification Flight Testing Seminar AvSafety Seminar Australian Aircraft Airworthiness and Sustainment Conference AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar Temora, NSW Maryborough, Qld Forbes, NSW Bundaberg, Qld Tyabb, Vic Port Augusta, SA Hamilton, Vic Camden, NSW Warracknabeal, Vic Brisbane, Qld Gawler, SA Brisbane, Qld Coober Pedy, SA Karratha, WA www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.ageingaircraft.com.au/aasc www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar Approved Testing Officer PD Program AvSafety Seminar Wide Bay Australia International Airshow Jindabyne, NSW Canberra, ACT Taree, NSW Port Macquarie, NSW Murwillumbah, NSW Broken Hill, NSW Deniliquin, NSW Lismore, NSW Richmond, NSW Wangaratta, Vic Mackay, Qld Wollongong, NSW Gympie, Qld Ayr, Qld Ceduna, SA Bunbury, WA Bankstown, NSW Townsville, Qld Bundaberg, Qld Aerial Firefighting Forum Melbourne, Vic AvSafety Seminar Strathalbyn, SA www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au www.widebayairshow.com.au/ e: firstname.lastname@example.org www.tangentlink.com/aerial-firefighting-australia/ www.casa.gov.au AFAC and Bushfire CRC Annual Conference Darling Harbour, NSW www.afac.com.au AvSafety Seminar AvSafety Seminar Scone, NSW Gove, NT www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au Coolum, Qld Salt Lake City, USA Brisbane, Qld Moorabbin, Vic www.raaa.com.au/convention.html www.isasi.org/isasi2011.html www.casa.gov.au www.casa.gov.au 08 AUGUST FSA JUL-AUG 2011 70 2 3 3 4 10 10 10 11 13 15 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 - 18 18 19 - 21 25 27 29 Aug - 1 Sept 31 31 09 SEPTEMBER 7-9 12 - 15 14 - 15 28 - 29 Regional Aviation Association (RAAA) Convention ISASI 2011 Conference Approved Testing Officer PD Program Approved Testing Officer PD Program KEY CASA events Other organisations' events AUSTRALIAN ON SALE EARLY JULY Become an AOPA member and start receiving your free copies of the Australian Pilot magazine among other beneﬁts! Join online today at www.aopa.com.au Phone 02 9791 9099 s Email email@example.com s Web www.aopa.com.au 71 QUIZ ANSWERS IFR OPERATIONS 1. (d) GEN-3.4 – 8. 2. (d) 330 + 050 = 020. 3. (c) Airservices 16/05/2011 Safety Bulletin. AD 1.1-26. 4. (a) 5. (b) ERSA GEN –PF- 4 para. 6.2. 6. (b) 7. (a) 8. (a) 9. (c) and can use either AC or DC. 10. (b) only the ‘shower of sparks’ system requires bus power. 1. (d) AIP GEN 1.5-7 Para 2.2b Approach plate 2. (b) ERC 2 AIP ENR 1.5-2 Para 1.4 3. (c) AIP ENR 1.5-14 Para 2.2.1 Note that your inbound track is along the dividing line (225 radial) for the sector MSA. 4. (a) After 1030Z AY TWR closes (ERSA FAC A-14). The absence of the ATIS confirms this. So AY is now a CTAF. AIP ENR 1.1-75 Para 46.1 and 1.1-43 Para 20.1-12 5. (a) A 90° turn to your inbound track is suggested using a rule of thumb for anticipating the turn of 1 per cent of your groundspeed e.g. 130kt. Thus 1.3nm prior to the 12DME arc, start the turn. This works quite well at rate one. 6. (d) RMI shows magnetic track to the station, hence the L.R. of 245-180 = 065. Fixed card based on HDG thus 355 to 065 = 070R. 7. (c) Approach plate 8. (a) AIP GEN 1.5-15 Para 184.108.40.206b AIP ENR 1.5-13 Para 2.1.1 The GPS is used to replace DME i.e. distance information only, not track guidance. 9. (b) Approach plate. Note that outside TWR hours there is no AWIS so the 100' reduction cannot be applied. AIP ENR 1.5-30 Para 5.3.1.c and 5.3.2 refer 10. (d) Outside TWR hours thus: ML CEN 125.2 ERSA FAC A-14 Note: Answer (b) is correct during TWR hours. MAINTENANCE 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. (d) (c) (c) (a) (b) (a) (d) (a) (b) (b) QUIZ ANSWERS FLYING OPS NO ONE IS MORE QUALIFIED TO KEEP YOU QUALIFIED. We have an unrivalled 40-year reputation, having trained 100s of pilots With SA’s widest range of aircraft for training, your employment chances are greatly improved We are SA’s leading Multi-Engine Instrument Rating training provider We have ATOs on staff, authorised for all licences and ratings Our costs are always keen and competitive Quite simply - there is no ﬂight training service in South Australia better equipped than Air South. For more information and a full price list, contact Air South on (08) 8234 3244 or visit www.airsouth.com.au FSA JUL-AUG 2011 72 ever had a CLOSE CALL? $500 Write to us about an aviation incident or accident that you’ve been involved in. If we publish your story, you will receive Write about a real-life incident that you’ve been involved in, and send it to us via email: firstname.lastname@example.org. Clearly mark your submission in the subject ﬁeld as ‘CLOSE CALL’. Articles should be between 450 and 1,400 words. If preferred, your identity will be kept conﬁdential. Please do not submit articles regarding events that are the subject of a current ofﬁcial investigation. Submissions may be edited for clarity, length and reader focus. flightsafety … essential aviation reading INSIDE SEPT - OCT 2011 Here comes the judge: The trend towards criminalising air accidents Cabin series continues Hotting up: Aerial ﬁreﬁghters prepare for bushﬁre season And … more close calls slipperyﬁsh_as_1009 Training done from our newly refurbished facilities at Adelaide Airport, with the controlled airspace procedures of an international airport 7HOOLQJXV LWZDVD ELJELUG LVQ W HQRXJK Report ALL wildlife strikes. The more comprehensive the data pilots and others provide, the more effectively the risks can be managed. Bat/Flying Fox Black Kite Masked Lapwing/Plover Galah White Ibis Hare Report all wildlife strikes to ATSB | www.atsb.gov.au | 1800 011 034 www.casa.gov.au | 131 757 ;OLYLOHZUL]LYILLUHIL[[LY[PTL [VIL^P[ONVVKWLVWSL *RRGSHRSOHWREHZLWK 8),0UZ\YHUJL(\Z[YHSPH3PTP[LK()5! (-:3PJLUJL5V *VU[HJ[KL[HPSZMVY`V\HUK`V\YIYVRLY! 4LSIV\YUL7O! :`KUL`7O! )YPZIHUL7O! (KLSHPKL7O!
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