Frank Abagnale Check Fraud Bulletin
Check Fraud
Identity Theft
Holder in
Due Course
and
Check 21
Volume 7
Inside this Issue
•
Check Fraud—A National Epidemic
1
•
Identity Theft
2
•
Check Fraud Prevention—Best Practices
4
•
Check 21 & Check Fraud
6
•
A Primer on Laser Printing
7
•
Check Security Features
8
•
High Security Checks
10
•
Holder in Due Course
14
•
Cyber Crime
16
•
Preventing Embezzlement
17
FRANKLY SPEAKING . . .
T
he fastest growing financial
crimes in America today are
check fraud and identity theft.
The Nilson Report estimates check
fraud losses to be about $20 billion a year.
The American Bankers Association has stated
check fraud is growing 25 percent per year.
Check fraud gangs are hardworking and
creative. They constantly try new techniques
to beat the banking system and steal money.
Historically, the banks have been liable for
these losses. However, changes in the
Uniform Commercial Code now share the loss
with the depositor.
The Federal Trade Commission reported
that nearly 15 million Americans have been
victims of identity theft, costing consumers $5
billion and banks and businesses $56 billion
every year. Because this crime is so simple to
commit, I believe identity theft will become one
of the most profitable criminal activities in
history.
There are endless opportunities for a
criminal to obtain the necessary information to
commit identity theft. Let me illustrate just
two, beginning with your visit to a doctor. As a
new patient, the receptionist asks you to
complete a form that asks for your name,
address, phone number, and your employer’s
name, address and phone, and your health
history. They copy your insurance card, which
www.supercheck.net
CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
includes your Social Security number. Your
co-pay is paid with a check drawn on your
bank account. You have just provided enough
information for someone to become you.
Another example. You walk into an
upscale department store to make a purchase.
You take your selection to the cashier and
write a check. On that check is your name,
address and home phone number, the name of
your bank and its address, and your bank
account number. The cashier asks for your
driver’s license. In nine states, the license
number is your Social Security number. The
cashier memorizes the birth date on your
license, and then asks for
your work phone number,
which will give them the
name and address of your
employer. Once again, a thief
has sufficient information to
apply for credit in your name.
I am 59. As a teenager I
did things that today, as a
husband and father, an
educator and consultant, I am
not proud of. But, recounting
one youthful experience may
be illustrative.
In my youth, when I
wanted to establish a new identity (so that I
could open a bank account and pass bad
checks), I would go to the Department of Vital
Records (in any city I was in). I would ask to
see the death records for 1948, the year I was
born. Every fifth or sixth entry was an infant
who had died at birth. I would write down the
death information and later apply for a birth
certificate in that name. I would fill out a
form, pay $10, and obtain a legitimate birth
certificate. I would go to the DMV and get a
license with my picture, my description, and
somebody else’s name. I had 50 legitimate
driver’s licenses.
Now, 40 years later, you can buy a CD
ROM with birth and death records, and can
apply for a new birth certificate
by mail. There are Web sites
that sell Social Security
numbers for $49.95. Their
advertisements claim that they
can tell you anything about
anybody. I researched these
companies—all you provide is
someone’s name, address and
DOB—and they will tell you
everything you want to know,
including spouse and children’s names.
For the identity theft victim, the nightmare
has just begun. On average, it costs a victim
$1,173 and 175 man-hours to get their credit
report straightened out. Fixing the problem is
not as simple as saying “…that wasn’t me.”
You must prove you did not apply for that loan.
To fix things, you must first convince the credit
card or finance company. Then, you must
convince all three credit bureaus. In most
cases, the credit bureaus refuse to delete the
dispute from your credit files. Instead, they
put an asterisk and say, “Customer disputes
this Visa charge, claims they were a victim of
identity theft.” The result is that
anyone accessing your credit
report, whether a potential
employer or a company
considering granting you credit,
may question whether you were
really a victim or if you were just
ripping somebody off.
I am personally concerned
about identity theft. A few years
ago, I subscribed to a service
that notifies me each time my
credit report is accessed.
Privacy Guard
(www.privacyguard.com/frank)
provides me with the contact information of
any company that obtained my credit report,
as well as the means to correct false data.
I consider their annual fee money well spent.
This publication was written to help
individuals and companies learn how to reduce
their risk of check fraud, identity theft and
embezzlement. I hope you find it useful.
Because there was not space to cover every
scam, I have included references to various
agencies and organizations with useful
products or information. I have written three
books, The Art of the Steal, The Real U Guide
to Identity Theft and Stealing Your Life that
cover numerous scams and solutions in detail.
For individuals concerned about check fraud,
I designed the Supercheck, a high-security
personal check with 12 safety features. I also
designed the SuperBusinessCheck and
SAFEChecks for companies and organizations
that want extremely secure checks.
See Pages 10 through 13.
Sincerely,
GREG LITSTER, EDITOR
CHECK FRAUD–A NATIONAL EPIDEMIC
M
ark Twain wrote in 1897,
“…the report of my death
was an exaggeration.” So,
too, was the predicted
demise of the paper check in 1973. Now, 35
years later, not only are checks still being
used, but they represent the largest category
of non-cash payment instruments. Not
surprisingly, check fraud – the paper check’s
evil twin – is the most dominant method of
fraudulent payments, and produces the
greatest losses. Check fraud continues to be
one of America’s fastest growing and least
prosecuted financial crimes, and every
checking account holder, company, and
organization is at risk of becoming a victim.
In the Payments Fraud and Control
Survey released by the Association of Financial
Professionals (AFP) in March 2005, 55% of
the organizations who responded confirmed
that they had been a victim of payments fraud.
The vast majority – 94% – indicated they
were victims of check fraud. This was true
whether the organization was large or small.
In the AFP survey, only 7% of the
companies reporting a fraud attempt did not
lose money. In other words, 93% of those
reporting a fraud attempt did lose money.
This data supports Mr. Abagnale’s conclusion:
“Prevention is the only viable course of
action.”
The Nilson Report indicates that annual
check fraud losses now exceed $20 billion, up
from $5 billion in 1993. BankInfoSecurity.com
stated in November 2007 that while reported
check fraud cases decreased between 2003
and 2006, the average loss per case
increased 57%, from $1,098 to $1,727.
RISK MANAGEMENT
These statistics show that financial
institutions and checking account holders face
© FRANK W. ABAGNALE 2008
a substantial shared risk from check fraud.
Executives must answer “How do we assess
our risk? How much financial exposure are we
willing to assume? What real and hidden costs
will we bear if we become victims of check
fraud? How might our image and reputation be
damaged? How much are we willing to spend
to reduce our risk?”
holder have failed to exercise ordinary care, a
loss may be allocated based on the extent that
each party’s failure contributed to the loss. The
internal controls used by a company when
issuing checks will be questioned to determine
negligence. Since banks are not required to
physically examine every check, companies
may be held liable for all or a substantial
portion of a loss even if the bank did not
review the signature on the fraudulent check.
STOP PAYMENTS AND HOLDER
IN DUE COURSE
Placing a Stop Payment on a check does
not end your liability to pay the check. Holder
in Due Course trumps Stop Payments and
Positive Pay exception items. See Page 14,
Robert J. Triffin vs. Cigna Insurance Co.
Further, a company can be held liable for
counterfeit items that look virtually identical to
its original checks. See Page 14, Robert J.
Triffin vs. Somerset Valley Bank and
Hauser Contracting Co.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
REVISIONS SHIFT LIABILITY
The legal basis for liability in check fraud
losses is found in the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), which was revised in 1993. The
UCC now places responsibility for check fraud
losses on both the bank and its customers.
Responsibility for check issuers and paying
banks falls under the term “ordinary care.”
Ordinary care requires account holders to
follow “reasonable commercial standards”
prevailing in their area and for their industry or
business. Under Sections 3-403(a) and 4401(a), a bank can charge items against a
customer’s account only if they are “properly
payable” and the check is signed with an
authorized signature. If a signature is forged,
the account holder may still be liable if one of
the following exceptions applies:
First, if account holders’ own failures
contributed to a forged or altered check, they
may be restricted from seeking restitution from
the bank. Section 4-406 requires customers
to reconcile their bank statements within a
reasonable time and report unauthorized
checks immediately. Typically, this means
reconciling bank statements as soon as they
are received, and always within 30 days of the
bank statements being mailed.
Second, the concept of “comparative
negligence” in Sections 3-406(b) and 4-406(e)
can also shift liability from the bank to the
check issuer. If both the bank and the account
READ BANK CONTRACTS
Read your bank contracts to understand
your liability for fraud losses under the revised
Uniform Commercial Code. This specifically
includes the small print on signature cards
and disclosure statements. It is clear from
recent court cases involving fraudulent checks
that a bank’s intentions must be stated clearly
to prevail in a check fraud case against a
customer. Accordingly, banks are re-writing
their signature card agreements to include
new provisions and requirements in their
disclosure statements. For a summary of the
revised UCC, visit www.FraudTips.net.
REMOTELY CREATED CHECKS
Remotely created checks (RCC), also
referred to as “demand drafts”, “preauthorized
drafts,” or “telephone checks” are created by
the payee on the authority of the account
holder on which the check is drawn. In place
of a signature, the check bears a statement in
the signature area that the account holder
authorized the check. They serve a useful
purpose in that consumers can pay bills and
avoid late charges, or purchase goods over the
phone. Because remotely created checks are
vulnerable to fraud, in most states the bank
that accepts a fraudulent RCC is liable for any
losses. Read more at www.FraudTips.net and
click on Remotely Created Checks.
Page 1 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
IDENTITY THEFT IS ON THE RISE
I
dentity theft has grown
exponentially over the past few
years, spurred by the financial
rewards, the relative ease of
committing the crime, and the low
probability of being caught. According to the
Federal Trade Commission, nearly 15 million
Americans are victimized each year,
costing consumers $5 billion, and
banks and corporations $56 billion
every year. To clean up one’s credit
report and associated complications
requires an average of $1173 and
175 hours.
Stealing wallets or purses was
once the primary method to obtain
another person’s personal information.
Today, “dumpster diving,” combined
with Internet Web sites and search
engines, help criminals identify and
exploit their victims.
Criminals gain access to
individuals’ credit reports by posing as
potential landlords, employers or loan officers.
They “shoulder surf” at checkout lines and
videotape transactions at ATM machines to
capture PIN numbers. They steal mail from
mailboxes for bank or credit card statements
and newly issued credit cards, and “dumpster
dive” in trash bins for credit card and loan
applications that have not been shredded.
After combining key pieces of individuals’
identities, they are able to impersonate their
victims, obtain loans and steal the money.
Identity thieves are very brazen. In one
incident, the identity thief took out a life
insurance policy on his victim. In another
incident, an identity thief was arrested after
two victims living in the same apartment
complex struck up a conversation about their
travails. This coincidental conversation
ultimately led the police to arrest a person that
worked in the business office of the complex
and had access to the rental applications and
credit reports of present and past tenants.
Contrary to popular belief, even people
with bad credit can be victims of identity theft.
Generally, victims of banking and credit
card fraud will be liable for no more than the
first $50 of the loss. However, the victim must
notify financial institutions within two days of
learning of the loss to avoid being responsible
for the fraudulent activity.
Even though victims are usually not
responsible for paying their imposters’ bills,
their credit report is always left in shambles.
It takes months or even years to regain their
financial health. In the meantime, they have
difficulty writing checks, obtaining loans and
housing, and even getting a job. Victims of
identity theft seldom find help from the legal
authorities as they untangle the web of
deception created by their imposter.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Consider these recommendations to
reduce your potential risk of identity theft:
Social Security Number
1. Guard your Social Security number
vigilantly. It is the key to your credit report and
is the criminals’ prime target.
2. Do not print your SSN on your checks.
3. Order your Social Security Earnings
and Benefits Statement once a year and look
for employers you didn’t work for. Someone
may be using your identity for a job.
4. Monitor your credit report. It contains
your SSN, present and past employers, a
listing of all account numbers, including those
that have been closed, and your credit score.
After applying for a loan, credit card, rental, or
anything else that requires a credit report,
request that your SSN on the application be
truncated or completely obliterated, and your
original credit report be shredded once a
decision has been made. (A lender or rental
manager needs to retain only your name and
credit score to justify his/her decision.)
Internet / Computers
5. Make sure your computer is protected
with Internet security software that is updated
regularly. See Cyber Crime, Page 16.
6. Do not download anything from the
Internet that you did not solicit. Activate the
pop-up blocker on your computer.
Page 2 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
7. Shop only on secure websites. The
web address should begin with https://. It
must have the “s” or it is not a secure site.
You can also look for a padlock or key in the
bottom right corner of your screen.
8. Avoid using a debit card when
shopping online. Credit cards have a
maximum liability of $50 for
fraudulent charges; debit cards can
go up to $500 or more.
9. Use a real password. While
it is easier for you to have one that is
simple, it is also easier for crooks.
10. When possible, choose to
have a second-level password on an
account. Choose a password that is
more difficult than your mother’s
maiden name.
11. Never leave your laptop
anywhere you wouldn’t leave your
baby….in the car, in a gym bag, at a
restaurant. According to
Amitron.org, stolen laptops and computers
account for nearly 40% of security breaches.
12. Before donating your computer to a
recycling center, completely wipe out all
confidential information. This requires special
software, and more than just reformatting.
Credit Cards
13. Shred old bank and credit card
statements, “junk mail” credit card offers and
old tax returns. Use a crosscut shredder.
Crosscut shredders cost more than regular
shredders but are superior. When Iranian
students in Tehran stormed the US embassy in
1979, the embassy staff had shredded their
most important documents; however, they
used a regular shredder. The enterprising
students hired carpet weavers and
reconstructed the shredded documents.
14. Never give your credit card number
or personal information over the phone unless
you initiated the call and trust that company.
15. When you are shopping or dining, be
aware of how salespeople or waiters handle
your card. Make sure they do not have a
chance to copy your card.
16. Examine the charges on your credit
card when your statement arrives. Also, keep
track of the billing cycles of your cards. If a
statement doesn’t arrive when it should, it
could mean that a thief has changed the
mailing address on your account.
17. Minimize the number of credit cards
you own to reduce the opportunity for a
criminal to steal a card.
18. Carry extra credit cards or other
identity documents only when needed.
19. Shred the card on unused credit card
accounts. If you close the account, it may
lower your credit score because of reduced
credit availability.
20. Put a fraud alert tag on your credit
report, which will limit a thief’s ability to open
accounts in your name.
Checks
21. Use high security checks like those
shown on Pages 10 – 11. Criminals “wash”
ordinary checks in chemicals, dissolving what
you wrote without leaving evidence. After the
check is dry, forgers insert new data. High
security checks react to chemicals, showing
that they have been washed.
22. Do not mail checks from home. They
can be stolen from your mailbox, chemically
washed and re-used. Go to the post office.
23. When writing manual checks, use the
uni-ball® 207 gel pen. Its ink will not dissolve
in chemicals.
Miscellaneous
24. Be highly suspicious of unsolicited
emails or letters that say you won money.
25. Remove your name from the
marketing lists of the three credit reporting
bureaus to reduce pre-approved credit offers.
26. Add your name to the Name Deletion
List of the Direct Marketing Association
(www.dmachoice/consumerassistance.php).
27. Subscribe to Privacy Guard or
another similar service to alert you if your
credit history is being requested.
28. Avoid ATMs that are not connected to
a bank or a reputable business. Shield the
keypad when entering your PIN.
29. Protect your incoming mail by picking
it up ASAP. If you will be away for a period of
time, have your mail held at the post office.
30. Keep your purse or wallet in a locked
drawer at work. Find out how the company
protects your personal information, and who
has access to your direct deposit information.
31. Photocopy and retain the contents of
your wallet. Copy both sides of each license
and credit card so you have the account
numbers, expiration dates and phone numbers
if your wallet or purse is stolen.
32. Keep Social Security cards, birth
certificates and passports in a locked box.
33. Read the privacy policies of the
companies with whom you do business.
Opt out of having your information shared.
34. Protect a dead relative. Contact the
credit bureaus and put a “deceased” alert on
the person’s reports. Send copies of the death
certificate to institutions where the person had
an account.
ALL THE RESOURCES YOU NEED.
ALL IN ONE PLACE.
SOMETHING FOR NOTHING
RESOURCES
“There’s no such thing as a free lunch.”
If something seems too good to be true, it
isn’t. Thousands of people have been burned
by the “lottery” scam, which works like this:
The “target” is emailed that he/she has won a
prize, and that the first check will be sent
soon. Follow up emails explain that taxes
must be pre-paid on the winnings, but a
partial payment greater than the taxes owed is
being sent. The person is instructed to deposit
the check, wire transfer payment for the taxes,
and keep the balance. Final payment is
promised upon receipt of the taxes. Of
course, the first check is bogus and is
returned unpaid and charged back to the
person’s account. The person is liable to
his/her bank for the check’s face value, most
of which is gone. This scam has many
variations, but they all offer something for
nothing. Moral: If something seems too good
to be true, it isn’t. Google “Lottery scams.”
Even though you may take every possible
precaution, identity theft can still happen to you.
Consider these suggestions:
• Report the crime to the police immediately
and get a copy of the police report.
• Keep a record of all conversations with
authorities, lending and financial institutions,
including names, dates, and time of day.
• Call your credit card issuers immediately,
and follow up with a letter and the police
report.
• Notify your bank immediately.
• Call the fraud units of credit reporting
agencies to place a fraud alert on your name
and SSN.
• Equifax:
1-800-525-6285
www.equifax.com
• Experian:
1-888-397-3742
www.experian.com
• TransUnion:
1-800-680-7289
www.transunion.com
• Federal Trade Commission:
1-877-IDTHEFT (877-438-4338)
www.consumer.gov/idtheft
• Privacy Guard:
1-866-482-7363
www.privacyguard.com/frank
• Privacy Rights Clearinghouse:
1-619-298-3396
www.privacyrights.org
• Fight Identity Theft:
[email protected]
www.fightidentitytheft.com
• Identity Theft Resource Center:
1-858-693-7935
www.idtheftcenter.org
• National White Collar Crime Center:
1-800-221-4424
www.nw3c.org
• Social Security Administration
1-800-269-0271
www.socialsecurity.gov
• U.S. Postal Service:
1-800-275-8777
www.usps.com/postalinspectors
© FRANK W. ABAGNALE 2008
Page 3 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CHECK FRAUD PREVENTION–BEST PRACTICES
W
hen fighting check fraud,
nothing is 100 percent.
No feature or program can
completely eliminate check
fraud, and no prevention system is foolproof.
However, specific practices can discourage a
criminal from attempting fraud, and can thwart
his counterfeiting efforts. The following are
recommendations for reducing risk.
daily to identify unauthorized items. The
account holder downloads the list of checks
from the bank and compares them to the
issued check file. Suspect checks must be
researched and the bank notified of items to
be returned. While Reverse Positive Pay
provides timely information on a small scale,
for larger operations it is not a worthy
substitute for Positive Pay.
POSITIVE PAY
POSITIVE PAY
IS NOT FOOLPROOF
One of the most effective check fraud
prevention tool is Positive Pay, an automated
Positive Pay and Reverse Positive Pay
check-matching service that is unparalleled in
monitor the check number and dollar amount.
detecting most bogus checks. It is offered
Several banks have developed Payee Positive
through the Cash Management Department of
Pay (PPP) that also compares the payee name.
many banks. To use this service, the check
PPP identifies the payee line by X,Y
issuer transmits to the
coordinates on the
bank a file containing
face of the check,
information about the
and uses optical
“Positive Pay is the best product
checks it has issued.
character recognition
in 25 years to deal with the
Positive Pay compares
software to interpret
problem of forged, altered and
the account number,
and match the
the check number,
characters.
counterfeit checks.”
dollar amount and
Matching the payee
— Frank W. Abagnale
sometimes payee
name, check number
name on checks
and dollar amount
presented for payment against the list of
will stop most check fraud attempts, but it is
checks issued and authorized by the company.
still not 100 percent effective because of
All the components of the check must match
added Payees above the X, Y field. A Secure
exactly or it becomes an “exception item.” The
Name Font stops added Payees. See Page 7.
bank contacts the customer to determine each
exception item’s authenticity. If the check is
ACH FILTER OR BLOCK
fraudulent or has been altered, the bank will
Forgers have learned that Positive Pay
return the check unpaid, and the fraud is
doesn’t
monitor electronic “checks,” also
foiled. For Positive Pay to be effective, the
known
as
Automated Clearing House (ACH)
customer must send the data to the bank
debits.
Files
containing ACH debits are
before the checks are released.
created
by
an
organization or company and
Because revisions in the UCC impose
submitted
to
its
bank. The bank processes the
liability for check fraud losses on both the
file
through
the
Federal
Reserve System and
bank and its customer, it is in everyone’s
posts
the
ACH
debit
against
the designated
interest to help prevent losses. When a
accounts.
Because
paperless
transactions
company uses high security checks with
pose
substantial
financial
risk,
most banks are
Positive Pay, the risk and liability for check
careful
to
thoroughly
screen
any
company that
fraud are substantially reduced. Many banks
wants
to
send
ACH
debits.
However,
some
charge a modest fee for Positive Pay, which
dishonest
individuals
still
get
through
the
should be regarded as an “insurance
screening
process
and
victimize
others.
Banks
premium” to help prevent check fraud losses.
have liability for allowing these lapses.
To prevent electronic check fraud, ask
REVERSE POSITIVE PAY
your bank to place an ACH block or filter on
For organizations or individuals with
your accounts. An ACH block rejects all ACH
relatively small check volume, Reverse Positive
debits. For many organizations, a block is not
Pay should be considered. This service allows
feasible because legitimate ACH debits would
an account holder to review in-clearing checks
be rejected. In this case, use an ACH filter.
Page 4 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
In the electronic debit world, each ACH
originator has a unique identifying number. An
ACH filter allows debits only from preauthorized
originators or in preauthorized dollar amounts.
If your bank does not offer a filter, open up a
new account exclusively for authorized ACH
debits, and restrict who has knowledge of that
account number. ACH block all other accounts.
PREVENTING ADDED PAYEES
Adding a new payee name is a major
scam used by sophisticated forgery rings.
They understand the limitations of Positive Pay
and simply add a new payee name above or
beside the original name. To help prevent
added payee names, insert a row of asterisks
above the payee name, or use a Secure Name
Font (see example Page 7). To help prevent
altered payees, use high security checks like
SAFEChecks or the SuperBusinessCheck,
and good quality toner to keep the asterisks
and Secure Name Font from being removed.
HIGH SECURITY CHECKS
Check fraud prevention begins with high
security checks. Checks are the first line of
defense, and help prevent altered payee
names or dollar amounts. There is substantial
evidence that high security checks motivate
criminals to seek softer targets.
High security checks should contain at
least ten (10) safety features. More is better.
Pages 10 through 13 show high security
checks designed by Frank Abagnale. Many
check manufacturers claim their checks are
secure because they include a printed padlock
icon. The padlock icon does not make a
check secure, since only three safety features
are required to use the icon.
Some legal experts suggest that the
failure of a business to use adequate security
features to protect its checks constitutes
negligence. By using high security checks, a
company can legally demonstrate that care
has been taken to protect its checks.
CHECK WASHING
Washing a check in chemicals is a
common method used by criminals to alter a
check. The check is soaked in solvents to
dissolve the ink or toner. The original data is
replaced with false information. When a check
reacts to many chemicals, the “washing” can
be detected when the check dries. To defend
against washing, use checks that are reactive
to many chemicals. Chemically reactive
checks become spotted or stained when
soaked in chemicals. A Chemical Wash
Detection Box on the back of the check warns
recipients to look for evidence of chemical
washing. See Page 13.
PROMPT RECONCILIATION
The revised UCC requires an organization
to exercise “reasonable promptness” in
examining its monthly statements, and
specifically cites 30 days from the date of
mailing from the bank. Carefully read your
bank’s disclosure agreement that details
the length of time you have to report
discrepancies on the bank statement.
Some banks have shortened the reporting
timeframe to less than 30 days. Failure to
reconcile promptly is an invitation for
employees to embezzle because they
know their actions will not be discovered
for a long time. The people issuing
checks should not be the same people
who reconcile the accounts.
If you are unable to reconcile on
time, hire an outside reconciliation service
provider or accountant and have the bank
statements mailed to them directly.
REPEATER RULE
The repeater rule limits a bank’s liability.
If a bank customer does not report a forged
signature, and the same thief forges a
signature on additional checks paid more than
30 days after the first statement containing
the forged check was made available to the
customer, the bank has no liability on the
subsequent forged checks so long as it acted
in good faith and was not negligent.
The one-year rule is another important
guide. Bank customers are obligated to
discover and report a forged signature on a
check within one year, or less if the bank has
shortened the one-year rule. If the customer
fails to make the discovery and report it to the
bank within one year, they are barred from
making any claim for recovery against the bank.
This applies even if the bank was negligent.
ALTERATIONS
Forgers and dishonest employees can
easily erase words printed in small type and
cover their erasures with a larger type font.
Prevent erasure alterations by printing checks
using a 12 or 14 point font for the payee
name, dollar amount, city, state and zip code.
See Page 7 on Laser Printing.
MULTIPLE CHECK COLORS
Some companies with multiple divisions
or branches use a single bank account against
which all checks pay. To differentiate
locations, they use different check colors for
each branch. This is not a good practice.
When many colors of checks pay against an
account, spotting counterfeit checks by color
becomes an impossible task. A bank’s Sight
Review department cannot be expected to
identify a fraudulent or chemically washed
item when many colors are used. Use a
maximum of two colors in the same account,
and find other ways to differentiate locations.
MANUALLY ISSUED CHECKS
Every organization occasionally issues
manual checks. Some are typed on a selfcorrecting typewriter. These typewriters use
ribbons that are black and shiny. These black
shiny ribbons are made of polymer, a form of
plastic. Plastic is typed onto a check.
Forgers can alter manually issued checks
with ordinary translucent tape. They simply
lay tape over the letters to be removed, rub
the tape firmly and lift off the tape. The typed
letters are now on the tape, not on the check.
Then they type in another payee name and
dollar amount and cash the check, with the
original signature!
When issuing manual checks, use a
“single strike” fabric ribbon, which uses ink,
not polymer. They can be found in the catalog
of major office supply stores. Single strike
ribbons maximize the ink driven into the fibers
of the paper by the typewriter.
CHECK STOCK CONTROLS
Check stock must be kept in a secure,
locked area. Change locks or combinations
frequently to ensure they have not been
compromised by unauthorized individuals.
Keep check boxes sealed until they are
needed. Inspect the checks when received to
confirm accuracy, and then re-tape the boxes.
Write or sign across the tape and the box to
provide evidence of tampering. Conduct
physical inventory audits to account for every
check. Audits should be conducted on a
regular and frequent basis by two persons,
including someone not directly responsible for
the actual check printing. When checks are
printed, every check should be accounted for,
including voided, jammed and cancelled
checks, and those used to align the printer.
ANNUAL REPORTS AND
CORRESPONDENCE
Annual reports should not contain the
actual signatures of the executive officers.
Forgers scan and reproduce those
signatures on checks, purchase orders,
letters of credit, etc.
When possible, do not include
account numbers in correspondence.
Credit applications sent to a new supplier
should include the name and phone
number of the company’s account officer
at the bank, but not the bank account
number. Nor should an authorized signer
on the account sign the correspondence.
You have no control over who handles this
information once it is mailed or faxed, and
it could be used to commit fraud.
WIRE TRANSFERS
Forgers obtain bank account information
by posing as customers requesting wiring
instructions. Wire instructions contain all the
information necessary to draft against a bank
account. To avoid giving out primary account
numbers, open a separate account that is
used exclusively for incoming credits, such as
ACH credits and wire transfers. Place the new
account on “no check activity” status and
make it a “zero balance account” (ZBA).
These two parameters will automatically route
incoming funds into the appropriate operating
account at the end of the business day, and
prevent unauthorized checks from paying.
A WEST COAST BANK
CHECK FRAUD ATTEMPTS/LOSSES
3500
Introduction of
- high security checks
- Positive Pay
- customer education
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
1991
Attempts
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Losses
Check fraud attempts and losses fell by 95% over three years
after a West Coast bank educated its customers and introduced
high security checks and Positive Pay.
Page 5 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CHECK 21 & CHECK FRAUD
C
heck Clearing for the 21st Century
Act, aka “Check 21” was passed
into law October 28, 2004.
Check 21 allows banks to 1)
convert original paper checks into electronic
images; 2) truncate the original check; 3)
process the images electronically; and 4) create
“substitute checks” for delivery to banks that do
not accept checks electronically. The legislation
does not require a bank to create or accept an
electronic check image, nor does it give an
electronic image the legal equivalence of an
original paper check.
Check 21 does give legal equivalence to a
“properly prepared substitute check.” A
substitute check, also known as an image
replacement document (IRD), is a new
negotiable instrument that is a paper reproduction of an electronic image of an original paper
check. A substitute check 1) contains an image
of the front and back of the original check; 2)
bears a MICR line containing all the information
of the original MICR line; 3) conforms to industry
standards for substitute checks; and 4) is
suitable for automated processing just like the
original check. To be properly prepared, the
substitute check must accurately represent all
the information on the front and back of the
original check, and bears a legend that states
“This is a legal copy of your check. You can use
it the same way you would use the original
check.” While Check 21 does not mandate that
any check be imaged and truncated, all checks
are eligible for conversion to a substitute check.
WARRANTIES AND INDEMNITY
Check 21 does not require a bank to
convert and truncate paper checks. It is
voluntary. A bank that chooses to convert a
paper check into an electronic image and
substitute check provides two warranties and an
indemnity that travel with the substitute check.
The two warranties are 1) that the substitute
check is properly prepared, and 2) that no bank
will be asked to make payment on a check that
has already paid (no double debit).
The Indemnity is very powerful, and gives
banks and companies a clear defensive strategy
against losses caused by substitute checks. It
may also deter banks and companies eager to
convert high-dollar checks. The warranties and
indemnity continue for one year from the date
the injured party first learns of the loss .
The Final Rule issued by the Federal
Reserve Board states, a bank “that transfers,
1
presents, or returns a substitute check…shall
indemnify the recipient and any subsequent
recipient…for any loss incurred by any recipient
of a substitute check if that loss occurred due to
the receipt of a substitute check instead of the
original check.” It goes on to say that if a loss
“…results in whole or in part from the
indemnified party’s negligence or failure to act in
good faith, then the indemnity amount …shall
be reduced in proportion to the amount of
negligence or bad faith attributable to the
indemnified party.” The indemnity would not
cover a loss that was not ultimately directly
traceable to the receipt of a substitute check
instead of the original check.
The Fed gives this example. “A paying
bank makes payment based on a substitute
check that was derived from a fraudulent
original cashier’s check. The amount and other
characteristics of the original cashier’s check are
such that, had the original check been
presented instead, the paying bank would have
inspected the original check for security
features and likely would have detected the
fraud and returned the original check before its
midnight deadline. The security features the
bank would have inspected were security
features that did not survive the imaging
process. Under these circumstances, the paying
bank could assert an indemnity claim against
the bank that presented the substitute check.
“By contrast with the previous example, the
indemnity would not apply if the characteristics of
the presented substitute check were such that
the bank’s security policies and procedures
would not have detected the fraud even if the
original had been presented. For example, if the
check was under the threshold amount the bank
has established for examining security features,
the bank likely would not have caught the error
and accordingly would have suffered a loss even
if it had received the original check.”
2
3
REMOTE DEPOSIT CAPTURE
Remote Deposit Capture is a service that
allows a business to scan, image and transmit
to its bank the checks it normally would deposit.
While the technology is exciting, you must
understand your risk. Under the law, an
organization that images and converts a check
issues the warranties and indemnity, and may
be held liable for any Check 21 loss. The statute
of limitations in the law for these types of losses
is one year after the injured party discovers the
financial loss.
Page 6 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CHECK SAFETY FEATURES
The purpose of safety features is to thwart
criminals trying to alter or replicate checks.
The minimum number of safety features a check
should have is 10, and more is better. The best
safety features are fourdrinier (true) watermarks
in the paper, thermochromatic ink, and paper or
ink that is reactive to at least 15 chemicals.
These safety features cannot be imaged and
replicated, and are the best!
When an individual or organization uses high
security checks that include these safety features,
they are positioned for a built-in indemnity claim
against the converting bank, as allowed under
Check 21. This assumes that their bank has a
Sight Review threshold such that the original
check would have been physically examined.
CHECK 21 FRAUD STRATEGIES
In a Check 21 world, the strategies are
straightforward. 1) Every bank should offer
Positive Pay at an affordable price, and every
company and organization should use the
service. Most banks charge for Positive Pay;
consider the fee an insurance premium. For
useful information about Positive Pay, visit
PositivePay.net and SafePay123.com.
2) Make large dollar payments electronically.
3) Every company, organization and individual
should use high security checks with 10 or more
safety features. The checks should include a
true watermark, thermochromatic ink and 16+
chemical sensitivity. The Supercheck, the
SuperBusinessCheck, and SAFEChecks
(See Pages 10-13) were designed by Frank
Abagnale with these and many additional safety
features so prudent individuals, companies and
organizations could enjoy maximum security
with a controlled check. Visit Supercheck.net
and SafeChecks.com to request a sample.
4) Avoid using laser checks that can be
purchased by multiple people entirely blank
because the stock is not controlled.
5) Banks should lower their Sight Review
thresholds and re-train inspectors, and
encourage their customers to use high security
checks and Positive Pay.
1
Visit www.FraudTips.net for a copy of the Act, and the
Federal Reserve Board’s Final Rule governing Check 21
issued July 26, 2004. Read Page 67(c) Jurisdiction.
2
The Fed’s Final Rule, page 58, Substitute Check
Indemnity.
3
ibid., pages 99-100, Substitute Check Indemnity.
Frank Abagnale has co-authored a white paper on Check
21 and image survivable safety features. Downloaded it
at www.FraudTips.net under Check 21.
A PRIMER ON LASER PRINTING
M
SECURE NUMBER FONTS
any companies and
organizations print checks
on a laser printer. This
technology is highly efficient,
but proper controls must be in place or laser
printing can invite disaster.
checks may be liable for the resulting losses.
See Page 14 Robert J. Triffin v. Somerset
Valley Bank and Hauser Contracting
Company.
TONER ANCHORAGE, TONER,
PRINTERS
is a new, state-of-the-art encrypted
barcode that is laser printed on the face of a
check. The barcode contains all the critical
information on a check – payee name, dollar
amount, check number, routing and account
numbers, and issue date. The barcode can be
“read” using Optical Character Recognition
(OCR) technology and compared with the
printed information on the check. If the
printed data does not match the barcode, the
check can be rejected. This technology is
image survivable. Some software providers
also include Secure Name and Number Fonts.
To prevent laser checks from being easily
altered, the toner must bond properly to the paper.
This requires check stock with toner anchorage,
good quality toner, and a hot laser printer.
Toner anchorage is an invisible chemical
coating applied to the face of check paper.
When the check passes through a hot laser
printer, the toner melds with the toner
anchorage and binds onto the paper. Without
toner anchorage, the toner can easily be
scraped off, or lifted off the check with tape.
High quality toner should be used because
poor quality toner does not meld properly with
the toner anchorage. Also, if the printer is not
hot enough, the toner and anchorage will not
meld sufficiently. The fuser heat setting can be
adjusted on most laser printers through the
front panel; hotter is better.
IMAGE SURVIVABLE
“SECURE SEAL” TECHNOLOGY
I MAGE S URVIVABLE
S ECURE S EAL
T ECHNOLOGY
prevent the dollar amount on the check
from being altered without detection. Some
fonts have the dollar amount image reversed
out, with the name of the number spelled inside
the number symbol. Although Positive Pay
makes this feature redundant, it is a strong
visual deterrent to criminals.
SECURE NUMBER FONTS
PASSWORD PROTECTION
is critical for every system. A company
has more exposure from dishonest employees
than from a hacker. At least two levels of
authority (passwords) should be required to
print checks, add new vendors, and add or
change employees and pay rates. Employee
passwords should be changed from time to
time, and audit procedures must ensure that
passwords are never shared.
STRING OF ASTERISKS
T ONER A NCHORAGE
SECURE NAME FONTS
BLANK CHECK STOCK
that is not customized for each customer
should be avoided. If a printer or computer
company will sell you entirely blank checks,
they may be selling the identical checks to
others, who, in effect, have your check stock!
Ensure that your check stock is not available
entirely blank to others. It should be uniquely
customized in some way for each user.
Recent court cases have shown using
plain checks may contribute to the alteration
or replication of a check. Issuers of such
help prevent added or altered payee
name. In many cases, altering the Payee
name allows the forger to circumvent Positive
Pay. A Secure Name Font uses a unique
image or screened dot pattern in a large font
size to print the payee name. This makes it
extremely difficult to remove or change the
payee name without leaving evidence.
S ECURE N AME F ONT
placed above the payee line can prevent
added payee names. Forgers often add a new
payee name above or after the original payee
name. To prevent these alterations, insert a
string of asterisks above and after the original
payee name. (Do not use asterisks when using
Payee Positive Pay. The asterisks cause false
positives.) Asterisks can be pre-printed on the
checks by the check vendor.
SEQUENCED INVENTORY
CONTROL NUMBERS
are numbers printed in sequence on the
back of non-pre-numbered laser checks. The
control number is completely independent of
the check number printed on the face of the
check. Numbering is essential on laser
checks that are not pre-numbered because
they assist in tracking each sheet and in
maintaining compliance with auditors. Insist
that your check manufacturer print a
sequenced control number on the back of
each unnumbered check, and keep a log of
every check run.
Page 7 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CHECK SECURITY FEATURES
I
n response to the alarming growth
of check fraud, the check printing
industry has developed many new
security features. The best features are
illustrated here. While nothing is 100%,
combining ten or more security features into a
check will deter or expose most check fraud
attempts.
reappears when the temperature cools to
78°F. Thermo ink’s reaction to temperature
changes cannot be replicated on a color copier
or laser printer.
THERMOCHROMATIC INK
CONTROLLED CHECK STOCK
are high security checks that are printed
on controlled paper. The check manufacturer
does not allow the checks to be sold entirely
blank without it first being customized. Ask
your check printer for their written policy about
blank check stock. If there is none, the check
stock may not be controlled.
are patented designs developed to protect
a document from being duplicated. When
copied or scanned, words such as “COPY” or
“VOID” become visible on the photocopy,
making it non-negotiable. This feature can be
circumvented by high-end color copiers.
C OPY V OID
PANTOGRAPHS
CONTROLLED PAPER
is manufactured with many built-in
security features, such as a true watermark,
visible and invisible (UV light-sensitive) fibers,
and multi-chemical sensitivity. To keep the
paper out of the hands of forgers, the paper
manufacturers have written agreements that
restrict the paper’s use and distribution. Ask
for and read the written agreement. If there is
none, the paper may not be controlled.
COPY VOID PANTOGRAPHS
EXPLICIT WARNING BANDS
are printed messages that call attention
to the security features found on the check.
These bands should instruct the recipient to
inspect a document before accepting it, not
merely list features, and may discourage
criminals from attempting the fraud.
EXPLICIT WARNING BANDS
LAID LINES
are unevenly spaced parallel lines on the
back of the check. They make it difficult to
physically cut and paste dollar amounts and
payee names without detection.
L AID L INES
FOURDRINIER WATERMARKS
are faint designs pressed into the paper
while it is being manufactured. When held to
the light, these true watermarks are easily
visible from either side of the paper for instant
authentication. Copiers and scanners are not
capable of replicating dual-tone Fourdrinier
(true) watermarks.
F OURDRINIER
WATERMARKS
MULTI-CHEMICAL REACTIVE
PAPERS
produce a stain or speckles or the word
“VOID” in multiple languages when activated
with ink eradicator-class chemicals, making it
extremely difficult to chemically alter a check
without detection. Checks should be reactive
to at least 15 chemicals.
M ULTICHEMICAL
R EACTIVE PAPERS
THERMOCHROMATIC INKS
react to changes in temperature. Some
thermo inks begin to fade away at 80°F and
disappear completely at 90°F. The ink then
Page 8 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
PRISMATIC PRINTING
is a multicolored printed background with
gradations that are difficult to accurately
reproduce on many color copiers.
P RISMATIC P RINTING
IMAGE SURVIVABLE
SECURE SEAL
is an encrypted barcode that is laser
printed on the face of the check. The barcode
contains all the critical information found on
the check. See Page 7.
I MAGE S URVIVABLE
S ECURE S EAL
HOLOGRAMS
are multicolored three-dimensional
images that appear in a reflective material
when viewed at an angle. They are an
excellent but expensive defense against
counterfeiting in a controlled environment.
Holograms are usually not cost-effective on
checks, but are valuable in settings such as
retail stores where a salesperson or attendant
visually reviews each item before acceptance.
Holograms enhance admission passes, gift
certificates and identification cards.
H OLOGRAMS
HIGH-RESOLUTION BORDERS
M ICROPRINTING
DUAL IMAGE NUMBERING
creates a red halo around the serial
number or in the MICR line of a check. The
special red ink also bleeds through to the back
of the document so it can be verified for
authenticity. Color copiers cannot accurately
replicate these images back-to-back.
D UAL I MAGE
N UMBERING
are intricately designed borders that are
difficult to duplicate. They are ideal for covert
security as the design distorts when copied.
H IGH -R ESOLUTION
B ORDERS
ARTIFICIAL WATERMARKS
ULTRAVIOLET LIGHTSENSITIVE INK AND FIBERS
Ultraviolet light-sensitive ink and fibers can
be seen under ultraviolet light (black light) and
serve as a useful authentication tool.
U LTRAVIOLET L IGHTS ENSITIVE I NK AND
F IBERS
are subdued representations of a logo or
word printed on the paper. These marks can
be viewed while holding the document at a
45º angle. Customized artificial watermarks
are superior to generics. Copiers and
scanners capture images at 90º angles and
cannot see these marks. However, to the
untrained eye, their appearance can be
replicated by using a 3% print screen.
A RTIFICIAL
WATERMARKS
MICROPRINTING
is printing so small that it appears as a
solid line or pattern to the naked eye. Under
magnification, a word or phrase appears. This
level of detail cannot be replicated by most
copiers or desktop scanners.
HIGH SECURITY CHECKS
help deter check fraud attempts by
making the criminal’s task of altering or
replicating an original check more difficult.
They also establish the basis for an
indemnity claim charge-back under Check
21’s indemnity provision. See Page 6.
High-security checks should have
at least ten (10) safety features.
Among the best safety features are a
controlled paper, a true watermark,
thermochromatic ink, and toner
anchorage on laser checks.
Frank Abagnale designed the
Supercheck, the SuperBusinessCheck
and SAFEChecks to help consumers,
businesses and organizations have access
to high security checks at affordable
prices. See Pages 10-13.
Page 9 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
SAFECHECKS
S
AFEChecks were
designed by Frank
Abagnale with 12
security features, and
are virtually impossible to
replicate accurately using
desktop publishing tools or a
color copier. SAFEChecks are
printed on controlled, truewatermarked security paper. To
prevent unauthorized use,
checks are never sold blank
without first being customized
for each specific customer.
SAFEChecks
P.O. Box 8372
Van Nuys, CA 91409-8372
(800) 755-2265
12 SAFETY FEATURES
Covert Security Features
Controlled Paper Stock
Fluorescent Fibers – Become visible under ultraviolet light.
Chemical Reactivity – to 85 chemicals.
Toner Anchorage on Laser Checks
Copy Void Pantograph
AVAILABLE STYLES
LASER - TOP
LEGAL LASER - TOP
VOUCHER - 2
PART
LASER - MIDDLE
LEGAL LASER SECOND PANEL
VOUCHER - 3
Overt Security Features
Thermochromatic Ink – The pink lock and key icons fade away when warmed above 90º and
reappear at 78º. This reaction cannot be replicated on images created by a color copier.
Fourdrinier (True) Watermark – The true watermark is visible from either side when the
check is held toward a light source. It cannot be color copied or scanned.
Explicit Warning Bands
Chemical Wash Detection Box – See Figure 2 on page 13.
Sequenced Inventory Control Numbers
Microprinting
Laid Lines
LASER - BOTTOM
CONTINUOUS
LEGAL LASER PANELS 2 & 4
PART
VOUCHER - 4
CONTINUOUS
PART
-3
-1
PART
PART
NOT USING
POSITIVE PAY?
You should! Talk to
your banker ASAP!
Visit
PositivePay.net
SafePay123.com
Page 10 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CONTINUOUS
-2
PART
CONTINUOUS
-4
PART
MORE FRAUD
PREVENTION
TIPS
Visit
FraudTips.net
Supercheck.net
ABAGNALE SUPERBUSINESSCHECK
T
he SuperBusinessCheck is the most secure business check
in the world. Designed by Frank Abagnale with 16 security
features, the check is virtually impossible to replicate or alter
without leaving evidence. The SuperBusinessCheck is printed
on very tightly controlled, true-watermarked security paper. For your
protection, checks are never sold blank without first being customized
for each specific customer. Available styles are shown below. Pricing
can be found on the Web at SAFEChecks.com or Supercheck.net.
16 SAFETY FEATURES
COVERT SECURITY FEATURES
Controlled Paper Stock
Fluorescent Ink
Fluorescent Fibers
Chemical Sensitivity
Toner Anchorage
Copy Void Pantograph
Microprinting
Chemical Reactive Ink
OVERT SECURITY FEATURES
Thermochromatic Ink
Fourdrinier (True) Watermark
High-Resolution Border
Prismatic Printing
Explicit Warning Bands
Chemical Wash Detection Box
Sequenced Inventory Control Numbers
Laid Lines
“After years of designing checks for
Fortune 500 companies and major
banks, I designed the Supercheck, the
SuperBusinessCheck and SafeChecks
to help consumers, medium and small
businesses, and organizations protect
their checking accounts.”
SuperBusinessCheck
P.O. Box 8372
Van Nuys, CA 91409-8372
(800) 755-2265
AVAILABLE STYLES
LASER - TOP
LASER - MIDDLE
LASER - BOTTOM
LASER
3-ON-A-SHEET
LEGAL LASER - TOP
LEGAL LASER SECOND PANEL
3-ON-A-PAGE
SECURE ORDERING PROCEDURES
To prevent unauthorized persons from ordering checks on your account, SAFEChecks verifies all new check orders with
your bank. We confirm that the name, address and account number on the order form match the data on file with the
bank. Check orders are shipped to the address on file with the bank. Reorders with a change of address are re-confirmed with the bank. Our Secure Ordering Procedures are in place for your protection, and we are unparalleled in the
check printing industry.
Page 11 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
PLEASE PHOTOCOPY THIS FORM TO ORDER CHECKS
Download a price list at SAFEChecks.com
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
How did you hear about us?
Seminar by Frank Abagnale
CUSTOMER NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NUMBER
To be printed on checks
For file information (not printed on checks)
Seminar by
(800) 755-2265
Fax (800) 615-2265
Other
Please send a voided original check with this
completed form. We will call you to confirm receipt.
BANK NAME AND ADDRESS
To be printed on checks
Phone (
For file information (not printed on checks)
)
Account Number
Ship-To Address (if different from address on checks)
Routing / Transit:
Bank Fraction:
Bank Representative
Bank Representative's Phone #
Attention:
Check Starting Number
Quantity
Text to be printed above signature lines
Check this
Custom Logo - Camera-ready art or electronic file (diskette
box for two
or e-mail) is required. Send to: [email protected]
signature lines
JPG, EPS, PSD, TIFF & BMP are acceptable formats
Shipping Instructions:
Standard Turnaround (ships in 5-7 business days)
Overnight UPS
Two-day UPS
Ground UPS
Other:
RUSH (RUSH FEE APPLIES) Date you must receive checks
LASER CHECKS
8
1/
2
X 11 Frank Abagnale's SuperBusinessCheck (one color design only)
81/2 X 14 Frank Abagnale's SuperBusinessCheck (one color design only)
Top Check
Top Check
Middle Check
Check in 2nd Panel
Bottom Check
3 Laser Checks per Sheet
81/2 X 11
81/2 X 14
Top Check
Blue
Green
Top Check
Blue
Green
Middle Check
Blue
Green
Check in 2nd Panel
Blue
Green
Bottom Check
Blue
Green
Check in 2nd & 4th Panels
Blue
Green
How are your laser checks placed in the printer?
Red
Plum
Face Up
Face Down
Software Name
Version #
CONTINUOUS CHECKS
Single
Blue
Green
Duplicate
Blue
Green
Triplicate
Blue
Green
Quadruplicate
Blue
Green
Software Name
PRESSURE SEAL
Check:
Top
Bottom
Pressure seal checks are custom designed. Call (800) 755-2265 ext. 3306.
Red
THREE-ON-A-PAGE HANDWRITTEN CHECKS
Version #
SECURE ORDERING PROCEDURES
To prevent unauthorized persons from ordering checks on your
account, all new check orders are verified with your bank. We
confirm that the name, address and account number on the order
form match the information on file with the bank. Check orders
are shipped to the address on file with the bank. Reorders with
a change of address are re-confirmed with the bank.
Prepared by (print):
Red
Single Stub (General Check) Frank Abagnale's SuperBusinessCheck
Three-on-a-Page Binder
VOUCHER CHECKS
Duplicate
Blue
Green
Triplicate
Blue
Green
Quadruplicate
Blue
Green
Phone Number:
Date:
Red
ABAGNALE SUPERCHECK
T
he Supercheck is a high security personal check designed
by Frank Abagnale to help consumers protect their checking
accounts. The Supercheck contains 12 security features, is
reactive to 85 chemicals, is Check 21 compatible, and is nearly
impossible to replicate or to alter without leaving evidence. It is
“the check for people with something to lose.”
“The check for people with something to lose”
STYLES
12 SAFETY FEATURES
Controlled Paper Stock
Fourdrinier (True) Watermark
Thermochromatic Ink
Chemical Sensitivity
Explicit Warning Bands
Prismatic Printing
Chemical Wash Detection Box
High-Resolution Border
Laid Lines
Fluorescent Fibers
Fluorescent Ink
Microprinting
PLEASE PHOTOCOPY THIS FORM TO ORDER CHECKS
CHECK ORDER FORM AND INFORMATION
Our Secure Ordering Procedures are unmatched in the check printing industry. For your protection, we
verify that the name, account number, and mailing address match the information on file with your financial institution. Checks are shipped to the address on file or directly to your financial institution. Reorders
with a change of address are re-verified with your financial institution.
We need all three (3) items below
to complete your order:
Please mail to:
Delivery Times:
1. Completed ORDER FORM
2. VOIDED CHECK (indicate any changes
on the face)
3. VOIDED DEPOSIT SLIP
SAFEChecks
P.O. Box 8372
Van Nuys, CA 91409-8372
Allow 3 weeks for delivery.
Expedited service is available.
Call (800) 755-2265 ext 3304
Check
Start #
ORDER SUMMARY
Wallet Supercheck Duplicate
SubTotal
Single - $29.95 per box of 150
California residents
add sales tax
Duplicate - $32.95 per box of 125
Email Address
TOTAL
PAYMENT OPTIONS:
_____Debit this checking account
Primary Telephone (We do not give or sell your information to anyone.)
Total
(price + s/h)
Wallet Supercheck Single
Shipping/Handling - $2.00 per box
Name
# of
Boxes
_____Check or Money Order enclosed
(made payable to SAFEChecks)
_____Bill my credit card: _____MasterCard
_____Visa
Alternate phone where you can be reached
Please mail checks to the:
____Address on checks (this address must be on file with the financial institution)
____Financial institution ________________________________________________________________
Branch Address
City
State
Zip
____Other __________________________________________________________________________
Address must be on file with bank
Credit Card Account Number / Expiration Date
Security Code
Cardholder Name
Authorized Signature
Billing address of credit card if different from address on checks
Page 13 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
COURT CASES
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Holder in Due Course (HIDC) is part of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) that significantly impacts an organization’s liability for check
fraud and the checks it issues. After learning about HIDC, prudent
companies are often motivated to use high security checks and change
check disbursement procedures to protect themselves. Anyone
responsible for check disbursements or fraud prevention should
understand this law. Following is a brief description of Holder in Due
Course, and three Federal Appellate Court rulings.
In simple terms, a Holder in Due Course is anyone who accepts a
check for payment. On the face of the check there is no evidence of
forgery or alteration, nor does the recipient have knowledge of any fraud
related to the check. Under these conditions, the recipient is an HIDC
and is entitled to be paid for the check. The statute of limitations under
the UCC for an HIDC to sue the check’s maker for its face value is 10
years from the issue date, or three years from the date the check was
first deposited and returned unpaid, whichever comes first. An HIDC can
assign, sell, give, or otherwise transfer its rights to another party, who
assumes the same legal rights as the original Holder.
The following three Federal Appellate Court cases illustrate the
far-reaching power of Holder in Due Course.
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN V. CIGNA INSURANCE
Issue: Placing A Stop Payment Does Not Eliminate Your Obligation To Pay A Check
In July 1993, Cigna Insurance issued James Mills a Worker’s
Compensation check for $484. Mills falsely claimed he did not receive it
due to an address change, and requested a replacement. Cigna placed
a stop payment on the initial check and issued a new check. Mills
nevertheless cashed the first check at Sun’s Market (Sun). Sun then
presented the check for payment through its bank.
Cigna’s bank dishonored the check, stamped it “Stop Payment,” and
returned the check to Sun’s bank. Had Sun filed an HIDC claim against
Cigna as the issuer of the check, Sun would have been entitled to be
paid because of its status as a Holder in Due Course. Apparently Sun
either did not know about HIDC or chose not to pursue it, because they
merely pinned the check on a bulletin board in the store, for two years.
Robert Triffin bought the check from Sun, assumed its HIDC rights,
and filed this lawsuit in August 1995, over two years after the check was
returned unpaid (statute of limitations is three years). The Court ruled in
favor of Robert Triffin, and ordered Cigna to pay him $484, plus interest.
Recommendation: Cause a check to “expire” before replacing it,
or you may be held liable for both checks. Print an expiration statement
on the check face such as, “THIS CHECK EXPIRES AND IS VOID 20 DAYS
FROM ISSUE DATE.” If a check is lost, wait 20 + 2 days from the initial
issue date before reissuing. Many companies print “VOID AFTER 90
DAYS” but cannot reasonably wait that long before re-issuing a check. A
party that accepts an expired check has no legal basis to sue as an HIDC
if the check is returned unpaid.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, A-163-00T5
lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/appellate/a0163-00.opn.html
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN V. SOMERSET VALLEY BANK AND HAUSER CONTRACTING CO.
Issue: You May Be Held Responsible For Checks You Did Not Issue or Authorize
Hauser Contracting Co. used ADP for payroll services. A thief
obtained check stock that looked identical to ADP’s checks and created
80 counterfeit payroll checks totaling nearly $25,000 that were identical
to Hauser Contracting Co.’s.
A retailer who knew Mr. Hauser became suspicious and called him.
Somerset Valley Bank also called. Mr. Hauser reviewed the in-clearing
checks, which looked just like his, and confirmed the checks were
unauthorized and the payees were not his employees. The bank
returned the checks marked as “Stolen Check - Do Not Present Again.”
Mr. Triffin bought 18 of these checks totalling $8800 from four
check cashing agencies, claimed HIDC status, and sued both Mr. Hauser
and his bank for negligence for not safeguarding the payroll checks and
facsimile stamp. Because the counterfeit and authentic checks looked
identical, the lower court ruled for Triffin. Hauser appealed, but the
Federal Appellate Court upheld the lower court. The Court said the
counterfeit check met the definition of a negotiable instrument, and
because the check and signature were identical to an authentic check,
the check cashing agency could not have known it was not authentic.
Recommendation: Use a controlled check stock, which means
using checks that are uniquely designed or customized for your
organization and are not available blank to others. SAFEChecks and the
SuperBusinessCheck are controlled check stocks.
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, A-163-00T5
lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/appellate/a0163-00.opn.html
ROBERT J. TRIFFIN V. POMERANTZ STAFFING SERVICES, LLC
Issue: High Security Checks May Protect You From Some Holder in Due Course Claims
Pomerantz Staffing Services used high security checks that
included heat sensitive (thermochromatic) ink on the back and a warning
banner on the face that said, “THE BACK OF THIS CHECK HAS HEAT
SENSITIVE INK TO CONFIRM AUTHENTICITY.” Someone made copies of
Page 14 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
Pomerantz’s checks, but without the thermo ink on the back. They
cashed 18 checks totaling $7000 at Friendly Check Cashing Company.
Friendly’s cashiers failed to heed the warning on the check face, and did
not look for the thermo ink on the back. All 18 checks were returned
unpaid, likely caught by Positive Pay.
Mr. Triffin bought the checks, claimed Holder in Due Course status,
and sued Pomerantz. Pomerantz counter-sued and won! The judge
correctly asserted that if Friendly had looked for the thermo ink as
instructed, they could have determined the checks were counterfeit.
Because they were provided a means to verify authenticity and failed to
do so, they were not an HIDC and had no rights to transfer to Mr. Triffin.
This case illustrates the value of check security features, a properly
worded warning band, and a controlled check stock. Pomerantz was
protected by his checks.
Recommendation: Use high security checks with overt and covert
security features, including explicitly worded warning bands. Such
security features will also help prevent other kinds of check fraud. The
SuperBusinessCheck is a properly designed high security check with
16 security features.
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/appellate/a2002-02.opn.html
Visit www.fraudtips.net for an in-depth article, Holder in
Due Course and Check Fraud, written by Frank Abagnale and
Greg Litster. Click on Holder in Due Course.
FACSIMILE SIGNATURES MAY INVITE FRAUD LOSSES
Arkwright Mutual Ins. Co. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South)
Original Case No. 96-2969-CIV-GOLD; (SD Fla. 1999)
Appeal Case 2000 WL 679165,41; Rep.2d 726 (11th Circuit 2000)
In another victory for banks, the Florida 11th Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld NationsBank’s (now Bank of America) interpretation of its carefully
worded Deposit Agreement. This agreement effectively shifted the burden
of responsibility from the bank to its customer in cases of forgery. The
phrase “purporting to bear the facsimile signature” saved NationsBank
over $4 million in losses resulting from forged checks.
Florida Power and Light (FPL), a customer of NationsBank, used a
facsimile machine to sign most of its corporate checks, nearly 20,000
each month. Unfortunately, 27 fake checks were cashed over a twomonth period in 1993, totaling $4,387,057. They bore exact replicas of
the facsimile signature and used actual serial numbers from real FPL
checks that had been voided or cancelled.
Because all of the counterfeit checks were over the $25,000 Sight
Review threshold established by NationsBank, each one was sent to the
“signature control department” and visually compared with the authorized
signatures. The fake checks appeared authentic and signatures were
identical to the signature card, and therefore were paid “in good faith.”
When FPL discovered the counterfeits, they contacted
NationsBank, which in turn contacted its upstream
collecting banks. However, because the 24-hour
rescission period had long since passed,
NationsBank was denied its request for
reimbursement. It therefore refused to credit FPL
for the loss.
Arkwright Mutual Insurance, who insured FPL
against commercial crime, reimbursed the
company. It then sued NationsBank. Arkwright
claimed that the checks were not “properly payable”
because nothing in the contracts between the two had
authorized NationsBank to pay checks with forged
facsimile signatures.
NationsBank disputed this, pointing out that FPL had agreed to a
provision in its Deposit Agreement that said, “If your items are signed using
any facsimile signature or non-manual form of signature, you acknowledge
that it is solely for your benefit and convenience. You accept sole
responsibility for maintaining security over any device affixing the signature.
Such signature will be effective as your signature regardless of whether the
person affixing it was authorized to do so.”
As part of the Deposit Agreement contract, FPL had passed a
resolution authorizing NationsBank to pay checks for $500,000 or less
“when bearing or purporting to bear” selected facsimile signatures.
This is extremely significant. Banks are bound by the regulations of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which has historically placed the
responsibility for detecting forgery on the bank. However, the UCC also
specifically allows a bank and its customers to alter, through contractual
agreement, the liability for fraud losses.
“The effect of the provisions of this chapter (4-103) may be varied
by agreement, but the parties cannot disclaim a bank’s responsibility for
its lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or limit the
measure of damages for the lack of failure. However, the parties may
determine by agreement the standards by which the bank’s responsibility
is to be measured, if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”
In other words, the parties may set their own ground rules as long as
it is not overly one-sided.
The Official Comments to Chapter 4-103 expand on this idea:
“…In view of the technical complexity in the field of bank
collections, the enormous number of items handled by banks, the
certainty that there will be variations from the normal in each day’s
work in each bank, the certainty of changing conditions and
the possibility of developing improved methods of collection
to speed the process, it would be unwise to freeze the
present methods of operation by mandatory rules.
This section, therefore, permits within wide limits
variation of the effects of provisions of this Article by
agreement…[Subsection [1]] confers blanket
power to vary all provisions of this Article by
agreements of the ordinary kind.”
The Florida court granted summary
judgment to NationsBank, agreeing that these two
contractual agreements shifted the liability for the
forged checks to Florida Power and Light.
Clearly, the courts are upholding the freedom-of-contract language
between a bank and its customers, requiring a company to abide by the
agreements it has signed. These legal precedents should encourage
banks to be precise when drafting documents outlining customer
responsibilities with respect to fraud, and customers to read, fully
understand, and agree to “the fine print.”
Conclusion: Implement fraud prevention measures such as Positive
Pay and highly secure controlled check stock, which would have caught
the forged checks and stymied the forger.
Page 15 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
TIMELY ACCOUNT RECONCILIATION IS
ESSENTIAL
Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, NA
579NM2d 247, 35 UCC
Rep.2d 221 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)
Do you reconcile your bank accounts on a
timely basis? A Wisconsin man learned too late
that his bank had shortened the timeframe to report
unauthorized items, and it cost him $130,000.
UCC 4-406 requires an account holder to
exercise “reasonable promptness” in examining
monthly statements and reporting unauthorized
signatures or alterations. Under the revised UCC,
now adopted by all states except New York and
South Carolina, “reasonable promptness” is
considered 30 days. Subsection (f) sets a one-year
outside limit for reporting discrepancies or errors
“without regard to care or lack of care of either the
customer or the bank.”
UCC 4-103 allows for contractual
amendments of the UCC rules, provided the bank
does not try to disclaim its own negligence. Many
banks throughout the country have shortened the
one-year timeframe for reporting discrepancies, and
in light of the following Wisconsin case, many more
are likely to do so.
In Borowski v. Firstar Bank Milwaukee, the
account holder, Borowski, maintained two checking
accounts with Firstar Bank (now US Bank)—his
personal account and an account for his father’s
estate. Borowski alleged that his fiancè stole
$100,000 from the estate account and $50,000
from his personal account, using forged checks,
unauthorized telephone transfers, and forged
handwritten notes requesting cashier’s checks that
were left in the bank’s night depository box. When
the monthly statements and $20,000 in cashier’s
checks were sent to Borowski, his fiancè
intercepted them. When Borowski discovered his
loss of both money and faith, he sued the bank to
get his money back. (We presume he also called
off the marriage, thus mitigating future financial
outlays for wedding expenses, divorce attorney fees,
and alimony.)
In court, the bank moved for summary
judgment based on the signature card agreements
on the two accounts. The personal account
agreement required that the bank be notified “. . .
of any unauthorized or altered item shown on your
statement within fourteen (14) days of the
statement date.” The estate account required
notification “. . . of an unauthorized signature or
alteration on an item within 14 days after we send
or make available to you your statement and items
or copies of the items.” The bank argued that these
two specific provisions completely barred
Borowski’s claims. For his part, Borowski
acknowledged that he had not reviewed the
statements because his fiancè intercepted them
and then lied to cover their receipt. But he argued
that the bank was negligent in the handling of his
accounts.
The court ruled in favor of the bank. It found
that Borowski’s failure to reconcile on a timely basis
because of the deception of his betrothed was
irrelevant as long as the bank had mailed them to
the customer’s proper address. The burden of
receipt falls upon the customer. The issue of alleged
bank negligence was deemed irrelevant because the
shortened timeframe to report errors was an
allowable contractual variation of the one-year rule,
which the bank had made part of the signature card
agreement. The court did rule in favor of Borowski
regarding the $20,000 in cashier’s checks that were
issued on the basis of fraudulent hand-written notes,
because the bank failed to make those notes
available with the bank statement.
The Abagnale Supercheck
The Abagnale Supercheck, America’s first
high security check made for individuals,
and the uni-ball® 207TM are perfect
companions to fight check fraud. The
Supercheck is reactive to 85 different
chemicals, and the uni-ball® 207TM’s gel
ink is virtually impossible to dissolve by
chemicals. Together they thwart check
washing, one of the most common methods
used by criminals to alter checks. See Page
13 and visit
“The check for people with something to lose”
supercheck.net
uni-ball® 207™ Gel Pen
The uni-ball® 207™ pen uses specially formulated gel inks with color pigments that are nearly impossible
to chemically “wash.” It retails for under $2, is retractable and refillable, and images perfectly. It can be
found at most office supply stores.
Page 16 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
CYBER CRIME PROTECTION
Recently, a Midwestern company’s computer
system became infected with a virus that tracked
keystrokes. The hacker was able to decipher the
log-on keystrokes to the company’s bank, logged
on, and sent $160,000 in ACH credits to various
bank accounts. The money was sent overseas.
The company was shocked when its bank denied
liability for the loss because the log-on was
authentic. A bank is not responsible for the
integrity of a customer’s computer.
External Threats: Guard against hackers by
using a firewall device, and anti-spyware and
anti-virus software. When evaluating products,
read the reviews in PC Magazine (pcmag.com)
and CNET Networks (cnet.com). Read both
because they critique differently. Small
companies might consider the Cisco Pix® 501
($250 new or $100 on Ebay) or Barracuda
firewalls, and Webroot.com anti-spyware for
home or office. For virus protection, Norton and
McAfee are highly rated programs, but can slow
down an older computer. Look at Kaspersky,
which is highly rated but is not a resource hog.
Update for new threats weekly.
Internal Threats: According to the Association
of Certified Fraud Examiners, over 85% of
intellectual property theft is committed by
insiders. Know your employees. Do background
checks on IT, finance, mailroom and temporary
employees, and the cleaning crew.
Facebook.com, MySpace.com, Zabasearch.com
and Zoominfo.com are great on-line resources for
personal information. Other ideas:
• Put into writing an Internet usage policy, and
monitor employees. Legally, employees must
be told their computer activities are monitored.
• Disable an employee’s remote access to the
computer system during vacation so internal
scams cannot be perpetuated.
• Disable a terminated employee’s computer
access and voice mail immediately.
• Sanitize internal data. Delete the middle
eight digits of any SSNs in the system.
• Allow customer and company data to be
viewed but not copied.
• Configure the computer system activity log
to capture all transactions, including those
allowed by permission, not just failed log-on
attempts.
• Change the firewall and all system
passwords from the factory defaults.
• Seal over plug-in slots for thumb drives to
prevent data from being copied and taken.
• “Free” wireless access sites, e.g. airports or
libraries, often have overlapping wireless
sites set up nearby. These free sites can
have “sniffers” looking for passwords.
PREVENTING EMBEZZLEMENT
“If you make it easy for people to steal from you, they will.”
F
or the past 25 years, the
accounting firm KPMG
International has surveyed the
top 1000 firms in the United
States, asking them to rank the crimes
that hurt their company the most. KPMG does
not ask how many dollars were lost, only the
ranking of the types of crime.
Since the survey began, embezzlement
has ranked Number 1 among these firms.
Check fraud did not make the list until 10
years ago, when it ranked ninth. Today, check
fraud ranks Number 2.
- Frank W. Abagnale
embezzlement, and controls over those
functions are needed to prevent payments to
ghost employees or vendors. Corporations are
totally responsible for any unauthorized
payments made by a dishonest employee.
Prevent ghost employees and improperly
altered pay rates by restricting access to the
personnel master file records. Adding new
employees or changing pay rates should
require supervisory approval and supporting
documentation.
To help identify and reduce exposure to
fraud in the accounts payables area, engage
an accounts payable audit firm with the
experience to properly audit this area. The
better firms provide a detailed review of a
company’s disbursement procedures as part
of their audit, which is generally conducted
on a no-fee contingency basis.
VENDOR MASTER FILE
Under the revised Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC), employers have sole responsibility
for the actions of their employees. Employers
are in a far better position to avoid losses by
carefully selecting and supervising their
employees, and by adopting other internal
fraud prevention measures. By strictly
following basic internal financial controls,
companies can prevent or substantially reduce
their risk of embezzlement.
HIRING PRACTICES
Use hiring procedures that keep people
with questionable backgrounds out of your
organization. Check all references. Confirm
employment dates and look for time gaps in a
résumé. When filling positions in sensitive
areas, conduct complete background checks.
Use bonded temporaries in financial functions.
Establish internal controls to prevent the
theft of incoming or outgoing checks. Many
crime victims have traced the theft to their own
mail rooms! Mail room personnel must have
clean backgrounds. Bonding makes sense.
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE AND
PAYROLL CONTROLS
The payroll and accounts payable
functions are particularly vulnerable to
Access to the master vendor file should
be tightly restricted. Changing vendor
records or adding new vendors should require
supervisory approval and supporting
documentation. Someone independent of the
buying and payment processing functions
should review all new supplier entries. The
review should always include a telephone call
to the new supplier using a phone number
obtained from an external directory source
such as 411. Verify the name, address, and
Federal tax ID number.
Payroll controls should ensure that only
legitimate employees can be added to the
system and that the rate of pay cannot be
changed without supervisor approval and
supporting documentation.
VENDOR PAYMENTS
Checks should always be mailed directly
to the vendor or payee, and not returned to the
requesting operating unit, department, division,
or branch office. Returning checks to the
requester is open invitation for fraud because
of the risk of alteration.
Mailed checks returned by the Post Office
as undeliverable should not be returned to the
person who processed them. Someone
independent from the disbursement process
should handle these exceptions and
investigate the reason for their return. A
separate post office box should be established
for returned checks. Replace your company
name and address on disbursement envelopes
with a simple post office box number.
AUDITS
Conduct periodic surprise audits of the
various check control functions. Audits should
test the overall system to ensure that it is
secure and functioning as it should.
Independent, experienced individuals trained in
software systems and theft detection should
conduct these audits.
Create audit trails by restricting access to
the master file records. Most computer
systems can create an audit trail of all
changes made to the master file records,
including who made them and who approved
them. Someone independent should regularly
print and review a report detailing the
changes. This report is sometimes referred to
as an “access matrix.” The access matrix
should list each person with system access
and the person’s level of access by module.
Comparing the access authority of each
employee should be part of this review.
Determine a standard “access profile” for each
employee position and restrict the master file
records to these persons. Immediately delete
the names of employees who are terminated
or have their positions modified, and
investigate any suspicious activity.
SEPARATE FINANCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Make sure separate groups of people are
responsible for the accounts payable, accounts
receivable, and banking functions. Divide
financial responsibilities to ensure that the
people adding new vendors to the master
vendor file are not approving vendor invoices
for payment. The people issuing checks
should not reconcile the account. If duties are
not separated, a dishonest employee could
issue a check to him or herself or to a coconspirator, remove the check from the bank
statement, and adjust accounting records to
hide the embezzlement. Receipts and
deposits must balance each day, and separate
people should perform these duties to prevent
forged endorsements on stolen checks.
Page 17 • CHECK FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT, VOLUME 7
Frank W. Abagnale
Frank W. Abagnale is one of the world’s most respected authorities on the subjects of forgery,
embezzlement and secure documents. For over 30 years he has lectured to and consulted with
hundreds of financial institutions, corporations and government agencies around the world.
Mr. Abagnale has been associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for over 30 years.
He lectures extensively at the FBI Academy and for the field offices of the FBI. More than
14,000 financial institutions, corporations and law enforcement agencies use his fraud
prevention materials. In 1998, he was selected as a distinguished member of “Pinnacle 400” by
CNN Financial News. He is also the author and subject of Catch Me If You Can, a Steven
Spielberg movie that starred Tom Hanks and Leonardo DiCaprio.
Mr. Abagnale believes that the punishment for fraud and the recovery of stolen funds
are so rare, prevention is the only viable course of action.
S
America’s Premier Check Fraud Specialists
S
Checks offered by
were designed by Frank Abagnale. As a former master forger,
Mr. Abagnale’s experience designing checks is unsurpassed. The story of Frank Abagnale and the
origin of SAFEChecks follows.
SAFEChecks began in 1994 as a division of a California business bank. In the early 1990s, the
bank experienced an enormous number of fraudulent checks paying against its customers’
accounts. Over a three-year period, the bank saw altered and counterfeit checks increase from
$90,000 to over $3,000,000. Many of these checks were perfect replications of authentic checks.
Greg Litster, then Senior Vice President and head of the bank’s Financial Services Division, summoned
the bank’s primary check vendors and made a simple request: “Provide our business customers with checks
that forgers cannot replicate or alter.” These vendors included some of the largest check printers in the nation, yet none of them
offered a high-security check.
With fraud losses mounting, Mr. Litster hired Frank Abagnale to assist the bank in its fight against forgers. Mr. Abagnale helped the
bank strengthen its internal controls, and in 1994, at the bank’s request, designed a new, high security business check. That check
became SAFEChecks. Over the next three years the bank caused its corporate customers to use SAFEChecks, and fraud attempts
and losses began to drop immediately. By the end of 1996, check fraud attempts fell to $120,000, a 95 percent decrease from 1993
levels. Mr. Litster acquired the SAFEChecks operation from the bank in 1997, and is its president.
SAFEChecks offers high-security checks, including the Supercheck, the SuperBusinessCheck, and SAFEChecks business checks.
SAFEChecks also offers Positive Pay file transmission software (see SafePay123.com), and MICR laser check printing systems
with a Secure Name and Number font to help prevent altered payee names and dollar amounts.
S
America’s Premier Check Fraud Specialists
(800) 755-2265
safechecks.com
8934 Eton Avenue
Canoga Park, CA 91304
(800) 755-2265
Fax (800) 615-2265
[email protected]
This brochure is provided for informational purposes only. SAFEChecks and the author, Frank W. Abagnale, assume no responsibility or liability for
the specific applicability of the information provided. If you have legal questions regarding the enclosed material, please consult an attorney.
Mr. Abagnale has no financial interest in SAFEChecks.
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