Final Report on Cessna 172P registration B

Final Report on Cessna 172P registration B
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT 2/2015
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION
Civil Aviation Department
The Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Report on the accident to Cessna 172P
Registration B-HRH operated by the
Hong Kong Aviation Club Limited
at Shek Kong Airfield, Hong Kong
on 28 September 2013
Hong Kong
March 2015
In accordance with Annex 13 to the ICAO Convention on International Civil Aviation and
the Hong Kong Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents) Regulations, the sole objective
of this investigation is the prevention of aircraft accidents. It is not the purpose of this
activity to apportion blame or liability.
Intentionally Left Blank
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………..……...
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT…………….…
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION………………………...................
SYNOPSIS…………………………………………………….………………..
i
iii
v
vii
1. FACTUAL INFORMATION
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
History of Flight………………………………………….……..
Injuries to Persons………………………………………………
Damage to Aircraft……………………………………………..
Other Damage……….………………………………………….
Personnel Information ………………………………….………
Aircraft Information ……………………………………………
Meteorological Information ……………..……………………..
Aids to Navigation ……………………………………………..
Communications ……….……………………………...………..
Aerodrome Information ……………………………….………..
Flight Recorders………...………………………………………
Wreckage and Impact Information………………………...........
Fire………………………………………………………...........
Survival Aspects……………......................................................
Tests and Research……………………………………………...
Organisation and Management Information……………….….
Additional Information……………………………………….…
Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques…………………..
2. ANALYSIS
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
1
4
4
4
4
5
6
7
7
7
8
8
10
10
10
10
11
13
14
Aircraft Loading ………………………………………………..
Aircraft Handling Technique ………………..…..………...........
Airport Environment – the obstacles …………………………...
Nose wheel fork fracture………………………………………..
Human Factors………………………………………………….
Training conducted by the HKAC …………….……………….
i
14
14
16
18
19
20
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1
3.2
3.3
21
Findings……………………..…………………………………..
Causes ………………………….…………………………….....
Contributing Factors…………………………………………….
4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
21
22
22
23
5. APPENDICES
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5
Picture of the Fuel Dip Stick …………………………...
Local Shek Kong area map …………………………….
The Aircraft layout and wreckage position…………….
The wreckage photos……………………………………
The nose wheel damage………………………………...
ii
25
26
27
28
33
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE REPORT
AGL
ATC
AMSL
CAD
CG
°C,F,M,T
ELT
Ft
ft/min
GFO
Above Ground Level
Air Traffic Control
Above Mean Sea Level
Civil Aviation Department
Centre of Gravity
Degree Celsius, Fahrenheit, magnetic, true
Emergency Locator Transmitter
Feet
feet per minute
General Flying Order of the HKAC
HKAC
hPa
Hrs
IFR
Kg
KCAS
KIAS
kt(s)
Km
Lbs
M
METAR
MHz
m/s
NOTAM
QNH
POH
PPL
USG
UTC
VFR
Hong Kong Aviation Club Limited
hectopascal (equivalent unit to mb)
hours (clock time as in 12:00 hrs)
Instrument Flight Rules
kilogram(s)
knots calibrated airspeed
Knots indicated airspeed
knot(s)
kilometre(s)
Pounds
metre(s)
a timed aerodrome meteorological report
Megahertz
Meter per second
Notice to Airmen
pressure setting to indicate elevation above mean sea level
Pilot’s Operating Handbook
Private Pilot's Licence
U.S. Gallons
Co-ordinated Universal Time
Visual Flight Rules
iii
Notes :
1.
When abbreviations are used in this report, the full term is used in the first
instance followed by the abbreviation in brackets.
2.
All times in this Report are in Hong Kong Local Time, which is eight hours ahead
of the Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).
iv
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION DIVISION
CIVIL AVIATION DEPARTMENT
HONG KONG
Aircraft Accident Report 2/2015
Registered Owner:
Hong Kong Aviation Club Limited
Operator:
Hong Kong Aviation Club Limited
Aircraft Type:
Cessna 172P
Nationality / Registration:
B-HRH
Place of Accident:
Shek Kong Airfield, Yuen Long
New Territories, Hong Kong
Latitude:
Longitude:
Date and Time:
22° 26.2’ N
114° 04.8’ E
28 September 2013 at 10:00
v
Intentionally Left Blank
vi
SYNOPSIS
On 28 September 2013, a Cessna C172P aircraft registration B-HRH of the Hong Kong
Aviation Club Limited (“HKAC”), took-off from Runway 11 of Shek Kong Airfield at
around 09:30 hour (hr) and departed to the New Town via the Kadoorie Gap. Due to
haze and smog, the pilot decided to terminate the flight and returned to Shek Kong
Airfield via the Fire Station Gap.
During the landing phase, the aircraft floated in the flare maneuver and bounced upon
touch down. The aircraft then touched down again on the runway with a slight nose down
attitude, resulted in a more significant bounce.
After the significant bounce, the pilot elected to go-around. The pilot applied full
engine power and followed by retracting the flap from 30° to 0° directly. The aircraft
sank during the flap retraction. At the same time, the aircraft veered off to the left and
eventually landed on the grass area to the northern side of the runway. It stopped in an
upside down position, at approximately 760 meters (m) from threshold Runway 11 and
22 m abeam the runway edge.
The nose wheel fork of the aircraft was sheared off. There were also significant damages
to its wings, empennage, propellers and engine mounts. There was no fuel leakage, nor
fire. The on-board Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) was activated. Two
passengers had minor injuries. The pilot and the passengers evacuated from the aircraft
without any assistance.
The Chief Inspector of Accidents (“CIA”) ordered an Inspector’s Investigation into the
accident in accordance with the Hong Kong Civil Aviation (Investigation of Accidents)
Regulations (Laws of Hong Kong, Chapter 448B). The fundamental purpose of this
investigation is to determine the circumstances and causes of the accident with a view to
the preservation of life and the avoidance of accident in future, it is not the purpose of
this activity to apportion blame or liability.
It was concluded that the accident was caused by non-adherence to the balked landing
procedures which subsequently led to the loss of control of the aircraft.
The investigation team has made two safety recommendations.
vii
Intentionally Left Blank
viii
1.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
1.1
History of Flight
1.1.1
Pre-flight Preparation
1.1.1.1
The pilot stated that he carried out the flight preparation which included
aircraft loading calculation, checking the weather reports and forecast,
checking the Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) and filing of the flight notification
to Air Traffic Control Center. The forecast and reported weather were
within the limits for operations under Visual Flight Rules (VFR). The pilot
conducted the preflight check as per the HKAC procedures. He also
checked the actual fuel content with the fuel stick (Appendix 1) and
performed fuel contamination check before the flight.
1.1.1.2
According to the loading record compiled by the pilot, the fuel loaded on
board the aircraft was 35 US Gallon (USG). However, after the accident, a
total of 38.3 USG fuel was drained from the aircraft. According to the
Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH), the unusable fuel of the aircraft was 3
USG.
1.1.1.3
The latest Aircraft Weight and Center of Gravity Schedule was attached to the
POH and a copy of the Schedule was also kept inside an information folder
specific for the aircraft B-HRH. The aircraft basic weight was extracted
from the information folder for loading calculation.
1.1.1.4
An Addendum to Weight and Centre of Gravity Schedule was also attached to
the Schedule. The Addendum indicated an installation of Emergency
Locator Transmitter (ELT) on the aircraft which resulted in a change of
aircraft Basic Weight of additional 3.4 lbs and a change of moment arm of 0.2
inches further aft of datum.
1.1.1.5
The calculated take-off weight recorded on the load sheet was 2277.4 lbs and
the Centre of Gravity (C. G.) was 42.654 inches aft of datum which were
within the maximum take-off weight limits of 2400 pounds (lbs) and the C. G.
Envelope for take-off. The weights of all passengers were obtained the
night before.
1
1.1.1.6
Flight briefing and safety briefing to the passengers were carried out by the
pilot. As described by the passengers, the briefings also included the plan to
return to Shek Kong Airfield when encountering poor weather, the use of
safety harness, life-jacket and evacuation in case of emergency situation.
1.1.1.7
Flight notification was filed for one hour flight duration with 3 hours
endurance, with the Shek Kong Airfield as both the airfield of departure and
landing.
1.1.2
Departure, Climb and Cruise Phases
1.1.2.1
The departure from Shek Kong Airfield and climb out via Kadoorie Gap were
uneventful (Appendix 2 for local map). The visibility was reported at 7 km.
The aircraft took-off at approximately 0930 hour local time from Runway 11.
1.1.2.2
After airborne and as described by the pilot and passengers, the general area
was covered with haze and smog which would not be ideal for the purpose of
the flight. Subsequently, the pilot decided to return to Shek Kong Airfield as
per the pre-flight briefing (see paragraph 1.1.1).
1.1.2.3
Having informed his passengers of the decision, the pilot flew back to Shek
Kong Airfield via the Fire Station Gap (see Appendix 2). A helicopter pilot
on the ground also noticed on the radio that the Cessna aircraft reported 1,700
feet (ft) Above Mean Sea Level (AMSL) over the Fire Station Gap. The
normal return route is 2,000 ft AMSL.
1.1.3
Descent, Approach and Landing Phases
1.1.3.1
As described by the pilot, he flew the aircraft onto downwind leg at the
normal circuit altitude for approach to land on Runway 11 which was the
same runway used for departure.
1.1.3.2
The pilot reported that the approach was normal and stable with normal flap
setting at 30° and at a normal approach speed of 65 kts. The aircraft floated
during flare and bounced upon the first touch down onto the runway. The
second touchdown on the runway resulted in a more significant bounce.
The pilot recalled that the nose attitude was “a bit low” before the second
bounce which might have caused the nose wheel touching down before the
2
main landing wheels.
1.1.3.3
The pilot decided to execute go-around procedures as a result of the second
bounce on the runway. Full engine power was applied and the engine
responded normal when throttle was advanced to the full forward position
according to the pilot’s description during the interview right after the
accident. The flap was then selected directly from 30° to 0°.
1.1.3.4
During the interview, the pilot did not recall the airspeed during the
go-around maneuver nor did he recall any speed he aimed at for flap
retraction to 0° position. He described that his attention was drawn to the
obstacles ahead and then he decided to retract the flap from 30° to 0°. He had
also applied a gentle push on the control column in order to arrest the pitch up
tendency of the aircraft with full engine power up. He noticed the aircraft
did not climb but sank instead once the flap was retracted. A warning sound,
appeared to be stall warning, was heard by the pilot when the aircraft started
to sink. In the subsequent interview, he expressed that he should have
retracted the flap in stages, as he had been taught throughout his training,
instead of directly from 30° to 0°.
1.1.3.5
He also recalled that he did not use the rudder to counter the inherent
tendency of aircraft yaw with the propeller driven aircraft. The aircraft
drifted to the North side of the runway during the maneuver.
1.1.4
The landing impact to the northern side of Runway 11 (see Appendix 3 for
airfield layout).
1.1.4.1
According to a witness on the ground, the aircraft made a strange maneuver
just before its impact on to the grass area on the northern side of the runway.
Its nose attitude was very high with slight left wing down. It then rolled to
the right and landed on the grass with an upside down position. The aircraft
came to a stop quickly and somersaulted after the impact onto the grass area.
1.1.4.2
Inside the aircraft, the pilot closed the engine throttle and cut off the fuel with
the mixture lever upon touch down. Subsequently, he heard two loud
“bang” noises coming from the underneath of the aircraft before the aircraft
came to a stop and somersaulted in a gentle manner.
3
1.1.4.3
The pilot switched off the Master Switch and confirmed that all passengers
were fine and then ordered an evacuation. According to passengers’
description, the evacuation was carried out orderly and followed the pre-flight
briefing conducted by the pilot.
Emergency calls were made according to the HKAC Emergency Plan.
1.2
Injuries to Persons
Injuries
Fatal
Serious
Minor/none
Crew
-
Passengers
-
1
3
Others
-
Remarks: Two passengers who seated in the front right hand and rear left
hand side, suffered minor bruise and scratches. Both of them chose not to
take further detail medical examination.
1.3
Damages to Aircraft
The aircraft sustained substantial structural damages (See Appendix 4).
More details are stipulated in paragraph 1.12.
1.4
Other Damages
A small section of the runway boundary fence of Shek Kong Airfield abeam
the runway was deformed with the left wing of the aircraft resting on it.
1.5
Personnel Information
Pilot
Licence
:
Private Pilot's Licence (Aeroplanes)
issued on 21 May 2009
Aircraft rating
:
All single engine aeroplanes
(landplanes) of which the maximum
4
total weight authorized does not
exceed 5700 kg
Medical certificate
:
4 September 2013
Flying Experience
:
Annual Flight Review
(AFR)
:
151 hours
(Total all types included 47 hours on
Cessna 172 )
Last conducted on 6 July 2013.
Remark: The HKAC required every
club member to be checked out once
every year by its flying instructors.
This check out flight has been referred
as Annual Flight Review (AFR) and it
was stipulated in the General Flying
Order No. 14.
Certificate of Experience
:
Last Flown
6 July 2013 (valid to 5 August 2014)
31 August 2013
Passengers
Three and none of them has any experience in light aircraft flying.
1.6
Aircraft Information
1.6.1
Aircraft and Engine
Manufacturer:
Cessna Aircraft Company
Type:
C172P
Aircraft serial number:
17274935
Year of manufacture:
1981
Nationality /
Registration Mark:
Hong Kong, China / B-HRH
Certificate of
Issued on 4 July 1995 in the ownership of Hong
Registration:
Kong Aviation Club Limited
Certificate of
Issued on 22 February 2013 in the Transport
5
Airworthiness:
Category (Passenger) and valid until 28 February
2014
Engine:
One Avco Lycoming O-320-D2J piston engine
Maximum Approved
Gross Weight:
2,400 lbs
Total airframe hours:
6,614 hours
1.6.2
Airworthiness and Maintenance of Aircraft
1.6.2.1
The most recent scheduled maintenance check was a 50-hour Inspection
carried out on 6 September 2013. At the time of that inspection, the
airframe had accumulated 6595.8 flight hours.
The engine had
accumulated 1969.8 flight hours since overhaul.
1.6.2.2
A review of the aircraft records indicated that the aircraft had no outstanding
defects prior to the accident flight. The aircraft was fully serviceable in all
respects.
1.6.3
Fuel
20.6 USG (78 litres) of AVGAS fuel was uplifted prior to the accident flight.
There was no record of fuel remaining before the uplift. 38 USG of fuel
was drained from the aircraft after the accident.
1.7
Meteorological Information
According to the Hong Kong Observatory data, the general Hong Kong
weather conditions between 09:30 hrs and 10:00 hrs were recorded as below.
Wind direction and
speed:
035°/ 7 kts (recorded at 10:00 hrs. at Shek Kong)
Visibility:
7 km to 11 km
Temperature:
26.4 Degree Celsius (°C)
Dew point:
21.5 °C
6
QNH (Mean Sea Level
Pressure):
1010 Hecto Pascal (hPa)
Relative Humidity:
74 percent (%)
There was no record of cloud base height but the general condition was
cloudy with light rain patches. 0.5 millimeter (mm) of rainfall was recorded
around that period in Shek Kong.
1.8
Aids to Navigation
The flight was operated under VFR in Visual Meteorological Condition
(VMC). Navigation was accomplished by visual reference to ground
features.
1.9
Communications
1.9.1
It was a standard practice in Shek Kong Airfield that radio blind calls made
on VHF frequency 123.6 MHz. The pilot of B-HRH maintained a listening
watch on traffic and transmitted blind on radio while he operated within the
Shek Kong Airfield area.
1.9.2
The Shek Kong Airfield radio communications were also monitored by Flight
Operations Co-ordinator of the HKAC Briefing Office at Shek Kong. VHF
communications between the aircraft and Briefing Office had been checked
and radio watch monitoring was maintained.
1.10
Aerodrome Information
1.10.1
Shek Kong Airfield is a single runway military airfield operated by the
People Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China.
Members of HKAC have been given permission to operate in the airfield
during weekends subject to PLA operations.
1.10.2
The PLA does not provide any Aerodrome Control service for the HKAC
operations at Shek Kong Airfield. Pilots are required to monitor the radio
and make “blind” calls inside the traffic zone of the Shek Kong Airfield.
7
1.10.3
Obstacles had been notified via the NOTAM on 28 September 2013. They
were cranes, 145 ft Above Ground Level (AGL), located 383 m from the
Departure End of Runway 11, UTM GRID KK004838 as per the NOTAM.
1.11
Flight Recorders
The aircraft was not fitted with any flight recorder and there is no
requirement for this class of aircraft to be so fitted.
1.12
Wreckage and Impact information (Appendix 4)
1.12.1
General
1.12.1.1
The wreckage was located on the northern side of the runway boundary fence
of Shek Kong Airfield, approximately 760 m from the threshold of Runway
11 and 22 m abeam the runway edge. The aircraft remained intact except
the nose wheel and part of its mounting which were found approximately 2 m
behind the wreckage.
1.12.1.2
A crater, 0.2 m long x 0.3 m wide x 0.25 m depth, was found 3.5 m behind
the wreckage while debris of right hand wing tip fairing was also rested 8.5 m
from the left hand runway boundary fence and 3 m behind the
aforementioned crater.
1.12.1.3
Two wheel marks caused by the nose wheel, 35 m long and the right hand
main wheel, 30 m long, were observed behind the main wreckage. The depth
of the nose wheel mark was deeper than that of the right hand main wheel
mark.
1.12.2
Wings
1.12.2.1
The wings suffered from impact damage on the upper and bottom surfaces of
both wings. The left-hand wing at the wing root area was severely damaged.
Part of the left-hand wing trailing edge, near the wing root, was also twisted
and detached from the aircraft.
1.12.3
Fuselage
8
1.12.3.1
The fuselage did not have any deformation. The front windshield and the rear
cabin windows were found cracked. Left hand door was slightly distorted
and had some scratch marks on the exterior of the door. The vertical fin was
crushed and one-third of the fin was found bent 45 degrees to the right hand
side. The engine nose fairing and the exhaust pipe had crush damages.
1.12.4
Flight Controls
1.12.4.1
The left hand flap was crushed and around one-third of the left hand flap was
bent downward. The rudder was crushed and about ⅓ of the upper section
of the rudder was found bent towards the right hand side. The rudder
control pedals were in neutral position.
1.12.5
Landing Gears
1.12.5.1
The nose wheel was detached from the nose gear at the wheel fork. On the
detached nose wheel, the right hand side of the nose fork was slightly
distorted. A large amount of mud was found trapped between the distorted
nose fork and the nose wheel. The nose gear oleo and the undetached part
of the nose fork were surrounded by the mud.
1.12.5.2
There were no damage on both main landing gear and wheels.
1.12.6
Engine
1.12.6.1
The engine remained intact and secured to the aircraft structure. The engine
mounts trusses were deformed to the right hand, offsetting the engine
alignment about 15 degrees from the centreline.
1.12.7
Propellers
1.12.7.1
Both propeller blades exhibited impact damage and were bent rearward.
Local damages were found on the propeller tips. The propeller spinner was
also collapsed. There was no propeller ground mark observed.
The left hand
wheel, frontal area of the brake and leading edge of the left hand landing gear
strut were heavily contaminated with mud. Only a small amount of mud
was found on the left hand main wheel.
9
1.13
Fire
There was no fire.
1.14
Survival Aspects
1.14.1
All persons on board the aircraft survived and were able to evacuate from the
aircraft on their own without any assistance. The seats and harness were all
intact and in good condition.
1.14.2
The ELT was found activated during the evacuation and the signal had been
received by Air Traffic Control at 10:00 hrs local time. The location
received from the COSPAS-SARSAT was within the specified tolerance of
the ELT equipment installed on the aircraft.
1.15
Tests and Research
Detailed inspection and microscopic inspection were employed to determine
the failure of the nose wheel fork. The fractured surface of the failed nose
wheel fork did not identify any premature failure. The microscopic
inspection revealed that the unit failed as a result of brittle failure due to
overload.
1.16
Organizational and Management Information
1.16.1
The Hong Kong Aviation Club (HKAC) operated from two bases, namely
Kai Tak and Shek Kong Airfield. Majority of its flying activities took place
at Shek Kong Airfield which included helicopters and aeroplanes flight
training for Private Pilot's Licence.
1.16.2
The day-to-day operations were managed by its operations staff under the
direction of the Chief Flying Instructor who was also the President of the
HKAC at the time of the accident.
1.16.3
The HKAC’s Engineering Department also maintained its own aircraft and
members’ aircraft. It had two licenced aircraft engineers and several
technicians.
10
1.17
Additional Information
1.17.1
HKAC provided Private Pilot's Licence (PPL) training to the pilot of the
accident aircraft.
1.17.1.1
This pilot started his PPL training on 26 May 2007 and obtained his PPL on
21 May 2009.
1.17.1.2
During the period of his PPL training, he had flown with 14 instructors and
accumulated 15.7 hours of solo flying and 56.8 hours of flying under
instructions. Only one instructor had made a comment about the pilot’s
control of the aircraft drift during take-off (27 October 2007). That
instructor never again conducted training with the pilot after that exercise.
There were no other recorded instructor’s comments on the pilot’s rudder
control.
1.17.1.3
Go-around training had been conducted in a number of times during the
pilot’s PPL training. There were no records of any deficiency regarding the
pilot’s use of rudder and flap retraction procedure during the go-around
maneuver.
1.17.1.4
The pilot met the requirement of five hours of flying experience within 13
months as stipulated in the CAD document, CAD54 and had a valid
Certificate of Experience.
1.17.1.5
The pilot’s most recent flight on the same type of aircraft (Cessna 172) was
conducted on 31 August 2013. In the preceding six months before the
accident, the pilot flew one to three sorties per month on various types of
aircraft including the Cessna 172 aircraft. The pilot had maintained a fairly
regular flying practice.
1.17.1.6
Nevertheless, the pilot expressed during the interview that he had been
commented many times on his insufficient rudder control during application
of engine power. Instructors’ interviews were conducted but it was not able
to verify the remarks made by the pilot.
11
1.17.2
HKAC Instructors Meeting Records
1.17.2.1
The most recent HKAC instructors’ meeting was held on 2 May 2013.
Meeting minutes before 2 May 2013 could not be retrieved.
1.17.2.2
The meeting minutes on 2 May 2013 recorded that student allocation with
“mix-and-match” approach and flying with different instructors was not
conducive to good training. HKAC had planned to assign one instructor as
the primary instructor with another one as backup. It was noted that some
instructors were assigned as both primary and secondary instructors for
another group of students at the same time.
1.17.2.3
The meeting minutes also highlighted the obstacles restrictions on the use of
Shek Kong Airfield, Runway 11. It specifically mentioned that full engine
power must be applied before the “color change point” (i.e. an apparent line
on the runway due to the change of color of the runway surface and was an
indication of half of the runway length) during touch-and-go maneuver on
Runway 11. However, such information was not published in the General
Flying Order (GFO) of the HKAC at the time of accident.
1.17.3
Other PPL Training Records
1.17.3.1
A further inspection of eight other HKAC pilots’ training records revealed
similar cases of “ad-hoc” instructor assignment. Only one of those cases
showed that one instructor has conducted the instructional flying throughout
the student PPL training.
1.17.3.2
In all other seven cases, each student was trained by six to 13 different
instructors throughout his/her PPL training.
1.17.4
Balked Landing Procedures
1.17.4.1
Balked landing procedures were described in page 4-20 of the POH, but the
Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) did not contain such procedures. The
POH was placed on board the aircraft whereas the QRH was the pilot’s
personal copy. The procedures were copied below:
12
1.17.4.2
“In a balked landing (go-around) climb, reduce the flap setting to 20°
immediately after full power is applied. If obstacles must be cleared during
the go-around climb, reduce the wing flap setting to 100 and maintain a safe
airspeed until the obstacles are cleared… After clearing the obstacles, the
flap may be retracted as the airplane accelerate to the normal flap-up climb
speed.”
1.17.4.3
During the interview with the pilot of the accident flight, he was unable to
describe the above procedure and unable to point out where this procedure
was located. However, he was aware that he should have raised the flaps
initially to 20° after reaching 200 ft above ground, subsequently retraction to
0° in stages. He also recalled a target speed of 55 knots being taught by his
instructors for go-around maneuver.
1.18
Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques
1.18.1
A trial flight was conducted on 5 October 2013 to verify the performance of
obstacles clearance. (See 2.3.1)
13
2.
ANALYSIS
2.1
Aircraft Loading
2.1.1
There were 38.3 USG drained from the aircraft after the accident but the load
sheet recorded only indicated 35 USG before the flight began. There was
also an error of 3.4 lbs in the aircraft Basic Weight in the load sheet due to
the unaccounted ELT modification. The discrepancy in fuel loading could
have been due to unclear fuel stick markings (see picture Appendix 1).
2.1.2
The load sheet prepared by the pilot indicated that the aircraft weight
(including passenger and fuel) and C.G. were within the operating limits.
2.1.3
The actual loading condition was re-calculated, taking into the considerations
of the fuel consumed in the 30 minutes flight, the 38.3 USG drained from the
aircraft after accident and the unaccounted ELT installation of 3.4 lbs, the
aircraft should still be operated within the operating limits in take-off and
landing.
2.1.4
The incorrect loading calculated by the pilot was not a contributing factor in
this accident. The fuel dip stick was used only specific on this aircraft
(marked with the registration mark of the aircraft).
2.2
Aircraft Handling Technique and knowledge
2.2.1
General
2.2.1.1
The analysis was based on the interviews of HKAC instructors, the pilot of
the accident aircraft and the eyewitness on the ground, review of the pilot’s
training records and examination of post impact marks on the ground.
2.2.1.2
It was established that the aircraft veered to left was due to no rudder input
during the application of full engine power (see 2.2.3).
2.2.1.3
The aircraft sank instead of climb was a result of loss of lift due to premature
flap retraction to 0° and non-adherence to the balked landing procedure as
described by the POH.
14
2.2.2
Pilot’s proficiency
The HKAC had the requirement of AFR. The AFR was a standardization
flight conducted by the instructors of the HKAC. It aims to maintain the
flying standards and enhance the overall safety standards of its flying
members. After the pilot had obtained his PPL, there was no record related
to the unusual application of rudder and flap found in the pilot’s Flying
Instruction Record (training record on different type of aircraft and AFR).
2.2.3
Aircraft veered to the north side of the airfield
2.2.3.1
The left yawing of a single-engined aeroplane when applying full engine
power was due to the gyroscopic effect of the engine and the propellers’ slip
stream effect. The correct use of rudder would have prevented the aeroplane
from yawing to the left (to north in this case) of the runway. The application
of rudder is a basic flying skill that every PPL holder should have acquired on
a single-engine propeller driven aircraft. Inadequate application of rudder is
a common problem of most student pilots, and even for some inexperienced
pilots.
2.2.3.2
The pilot recalled that he did not apply rudder and had been commented
many times of not using sufficient rudder by instructors. Such comment of
insufficient rudder application was not able to be confirmed by the pilot’s
instructors since the training had been conducted some years ago (between
2007 and 2009).
2.2.3.3
From the pilot’s PPL training records, there was one comment on the pilot’s
ability to maintain center-line of runway during take-off at the very early
stage of his PPL training which was not uncommon. There was no further
record indicating the presence of such deficiency. There was also no record
of such deficiency in any subsequent AFR after the pilot had gained his PPL.
2.2.3.4
The pilot had been tested to the PPL standards which indicated that he had
demonstrated adequate level of proficiency in rudder control.
2.2.3.5
The fact that the pilot did not apply rudder input during the balked landing
maneuver could have been contributed by other factors.
15
2.2.4
Premature flap retraction to 0° position during balked landing maneuver
2.2.4.1
The flap retraction directly from 30° to 0° with no attention to maintain the
minimum safety speed during balked landing maneuver had led to significant
loss of lift. The aircraft descent in a high pitch up attitude as described by
eye-witness on ground indicated that the aircraft was in a stall situation.
The pilot also noticed that the stall warning was activated when the aircraft
descended onto the grass area to the north of the Runway 11. The aircraft
subsequently stalled when the effective Angle of Attack (AoA) exceeded the
Critical AoA. Stall warning signal was heard by the pilot. As the aircraft
stalled at a very low level, any stall recovery action would be too late to
prevent its impact onto the ground.
2.2.4.2
The pilot was aware that the flap retraction procedures should have been
carried out progressively in stages. That is, initially to 20° flap then 10° flap.
He, however, could not identify where the procedures was described in the
POH. Neither could he recall the actual aircraft speed during the balked
landing maneuver and the minimum safety speed.
2.2.4.3
Go-around maneuver was practiced throughout every student’s PPL training
and subsequent opportunities were given during the Practice Forced Landing
(PFL) in the AFR. The required manoeuver is the same as the balked
landing procedure.
2.2.4.4
The pilot was aware that the two cranes were located beyond the end of the
runway as described by NOTAM and was confident that the aircraft should
have sufficient performance to climb out of the obstacles. During the
post-accident interview, he expressed that he should have waited for
sufficient height before retraction of flap. He also understood that the
aircraft wings could be stalled by retracting the flap to 0° during that moment
without sufficient airspeed. He explained that he was hoping to expedite the
climb out of the obstacles by retracting the flap to 0° as the cranes appeared
to be very close to him. Human factors issues were analyzed in Section 2.5.
2.3
Airport Environment – the obstacles
2.3.1
The aircraft performance analysis
16
2.3.1.1
The investigation team used a Cessna 152 aircraft and conducted a trial flight
on 5 October 2013 to verify the performance of obstacles clearance. The
results indicated that the obstacles clearance was not a problem to the flight
path of the HKAC aircraft.
2.3.1.2
During a touch and go trial, the Cessna 152 aircraft (less well performed than
a C172 aircraft) was kept on the runway at about 50 KIAS (rotation speed)
until the change in colour of the tarmac on the runway (approximately half
way down and beyond the point where the pilot execute the balked landing)
before full throttle was applied and rotation was commenced. It was found
that with 0° flaps, and at 60 KIAS, the aircraft was able to climb to a height
of over 300 feet AMSL at the first obstacle. This was repeated with 10°
flaps and at 54 KIAS (best angle of climb), the result was similar.
2.3.1.3
To test obstacle clearance on a balked landing, the aircraft with full flaps was
flown over the runway at about 5 feet and minimum speed until the change in
colour of the tarmac on the runway before full power was applied and the
flaps were retracted in stages to the 10 degree position. At a speed of 54
KIAS under a best angle of climb, the aircraft was able to climb to a height of
over 300 feet AMSL at the first obstacle.
2.3.2
The development around Shek Kong Airfield
The Shek Kong Airfield is a military airfield. Operational safety for civilian
operations relies on individual operator to monitor the obstacle environment
in the vicinity of the airfield.
2.3.3
Assessment of obstacles clearance
2.3.3.1
The HKAC instructors’ meeting minutes on 2 May 2013 had also discussed
the obstacles issue but the analyses of such information were not published
and disseminated among the HKAC members. Assessment of obstacles
clearance had been relied on the pilot-in-command.
2.3.3.2
The information of two cranes which the pilot perceived as obstacle threat
was published in the NOTAM and the pilot was aware of them.
2.3.3.3
Further interviews of instructors revealed that the HKAC’s standard practice
17
of a “Touch and Go” maneuver was to execute before the runway “colour
change point” to ensure sufficient clearance for climbing out of obstacles on
the Runway 11. The pilot was fully acquainted with such practice as well.
2.3.3.4
From the ground marks found on the grass area and the wreckage position, it
indicated that the balked landing maneuver was executed in time before the
“colour change point”. There would have been sufficient clearance over the
cranes.
2.4
Nose Wheel Fork fracture (see Appendix 5)
2.4.1
Nose wheel position and the rudder position were in neutral position.
2.4.2
There were significant amount of mud found between the right hand side of
the nose wheel and the nose wheel fork. There was much less amount of
mud on the left side. Both main landing gear wheels collected more mud
debris on the right hand side as compared to the left hand side. The
evidence indicated that the aircraft was side-slipping and ploughing into the
soil on the grass area before somersault.
2.4.3
Nose wheel was almost jammed by the mud and could hardly be rotated.
Both main landing gear wheels and brakes were in good conditions.
2.4.4
Two wheel marks behind the wreckage revealed that the aircraft landed on
the grass area with two wheels on ground. Those marks matched with the
layout of the nose wheel and the right hand main landing gear wheel.
2.4.5
The nose wheel mark exhibited a deeper mark than the right hand main
landing gear wheel mark. This indicated that the nose wheel sustained a
heavier load than the right hand main landing gear wheel as the majority of
the aircraft loading was taken by the nose wheel. This coincided with
ground witness that the aircraft landed on the grass with a nose down and
right wing down attitude.
2.4.6
The depth of the nose wheel mark increased towards the wreckage indicated
that the nose gear was ploughing through into the soil until the aircraft was
bogged down and overstressed the nose wheel fork, causing it fracture.
18
2.4.7
The microscopic inspection of the fracture surfaces of the nose wheel fork
confirmed that it was fractured in overload condition.
2.4.8
The collapsed nose gear served as a pivoting point when the aircraft
continued its forward motion of inertia. The remaining damages of the
aircraft were considered consequential to the aircraft impact to the ground,
the subsequent overturn and crushing against the runway boundary fence.
2.5
Human Factors
2.5.1
During interviews, the pilot expressed his concern on the obstacle clearance
during the balked landing maneuver.
2.5.2
The pilot’s intention was to clear obstacles as quickly as possible. However,
his unrecognized action of flap retraction directly to 0° without paying
attention to the minimum safety speed was not in accordance with the POH,
and had resulted in an opposite outcome. Similarly, the pilot’s attention to
the correct technique in the application of rudder might have been distracted
by his concern of the obstacle clearance.
2.5.3
The pilot’s perceived imminent threat of the obstacles ahead might have
caused a lapse in the manual flying skill of applying rudder and a mistake in
following the correct procedure of balked landing maneuver.
2.5.4
The pilot had been trained and tested to execute go-around maneuver during
his PPL training and also AFR after he acquired his PPL. The situations of
a balked landing in this accident were different from a prepared normal
practice go-around during training and testing.
2.5.5
A go-around maneuver is referred to a maneuver executed before aircraft
touch down thus more distant away from and higher above the obstacles.
The balked landing was executed in an unplanned condition after the aircraft
had already touched down on the runway. The obstacles presented to the
pilot as a much closer and higher objects during the balked landing than
during a normal go-around maneuver.
2.5.6
Such psychological effect could have been overcome when appropriate
training could be provided in a similar situation.
19
2.6
Training conducted by the HKAC
2.6.1
There were 14 changes of instructors during the pilot’s PPL training from 26
May 2007 to 21 May 2009. An examination of seven other PPL training
cases found a similar situation of six to thirteen instructors change.
2.6.2
The HKAC had utilized AFR to conduct go-around procedure during Practice
Forced Landing (PFL) – a practice of making a safe landing other than a
designated airfield in case of engine failure. Go-around procedure is an
anticipated procedure after the completion of PFL and also a maneuver
executed well above any obstacles in concern.
2.6.3
The obstacles perception presented to a pilot during go-around practice in a
PFL was not compatible with that during balked landing at Shek Kong
Airfield in terms of projected distance and height of obstacles.
2.6.4
There was no other laid down requirement of practice go-around or balked
landing procedures at Shek Kong Airfield. Practices of such procedures are
at the discretion of the individual pilot and instructor.
20
3.
CONCLUSIONS
3.1
Findings
3.1.1
The aircraft had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness and was maintained and
certified in accordance with the regulatory requirements.
3.1.2
The aircraft was serviceable for the proposed flight.
3.1.3
The mechanical failure of the nose wheel fork was due to overload as a
consequence of the aircraft stall upon its impact on the grass area in a nose
down attitude and ploughed into the mud.
3.1.4
The aircraft was operating within its weight limits and C.G. limits.
3.1.5
There were published obstacles at the end of the Runway 11 take-off path.
The climb performance of the aircraft type was verified and should be able to
gain sufficient clearance over the obstacles.
3.1.6
The pilot was properly licensed to conduct the flight.
3.1.7
The flight was uneventful until the go-around after bounced landings on the
runway.
3.1.8
The engine responded normal during the balked landing maneuver. The
aircraft experienced loss of lift during the flap retraction directly from 30° to
0° position and subsequently stalled during descent.
3.1.9
The aircraft veered to the north side of the runway as a result of no rudder
input during the application of full engine power in a balked landing
maneuver.
3.1.10
There was sufficient information of obstacles published in the NOTAM for
evaluation of obstacles clearance. The HKAC conducted the obstacles
assessment but no advice or detail of the assessment was published.
21
3.1.11
The pilot was trained to execute procedures in go-around maneuver
procedure which was the same technique required for balked landing. There
were no additional training or checking on balked landing maneuver after he
had obtained his PPL.
3.2
Causes
3.2.1
Balked landing procedures as described in the Pilot’s Operating Handbook
(POH) was not followed, resulted in loss of lift, uncontrolled descent and
subsequent stall at low altitude. (2.2.4)
3.2.2
There was a lapse in basic flying skills on rudder usage, resulted in veering
off to the northern side of the runway. (2.2.3)
3.3
Contributing Factors
3.3.1
The perceived obstacles threat diverted the pilot’s attention to execute the
correct procedures and basic handling skills. (2.2, 2.5, 2.6)
3.3.2
The results of the obstacles assessment were not published and the
importance to follow the published balked landing procedures as in the POH
was not highlighted. (2.3)
3.3.3
The balked landing procedure has not been properly practiced. (2.6)
22
4
SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1
Recommendation 2015-4
The HKAC should review and revise its training programme to include the
execution of an unplanned balked landing maneuver in Shek Kong Airfield
with special attention to its surrounding development. (3.2.1, 3.2.2)
4.2
Recommendation 2015-5
The HKAC should take up a proactive role in the assessment of the changes
in obstacle environment in the vicinity of Shek Kong Airfield and provide
advice to its members in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary concerns.
(3.3.2)
***
23
Intentionally Left Blank
24
Appendix 1: Picture of the Fuel Dip Stick
(Page 1 of 1)
25
Appendix 2: Local Shek Kong area map
(Page 1 of 1)
FIRE STATION GAP
KADOORIE GAP
Shek Kong Airfield
26
Appendix 3: The Aircraft layout and wreckage position
27
(Page 1 of 1)
Appendix 4: The wreckage photos
(Page 1 of 5)
The aircraft B-HRH (front left view)
The aircraft B-HRH (rear right view)
28
Appendix 4: The wreckage photos
(Page 2 of 5)
The markings on ground – front wheel and right main wheel
The right Wing
29
Appendix 4: The wreckage photos
(Page 3 of 5)
The left wing
The nose landing gear
30
Appendix 4: The wreckage photos
(Page 4 of 5)
The nose wheel
The left wheel
31
Appendix 4: The wreckage photos
(Page 5 of 5)
The right wheel
The engine and propeller
32
Appendix 5: The nose wheel damage
(Page 1 of 1)
The nose landing gear damage
The nose wheel damage (view from behind – right hand side with mud)
33
Intentionally Left Blank
34
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertising