state led innovative mechanisms to access serviced land

state led innovative mechanisms to access serviced land
STATE LED INNOVATIVE MECHANISMS TO ACCESS
SERVICED LAND IN INDIA
Rejeet Mathews, Madhav Pai, Tintu Sebastian and Souhardhya Chakraborty
The World Resources Institute, India,
[email protected]; [email protected]
Paper prepared for presentation at the
“2016 WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON LAND AND POVERTY”
The World Bank - Washington DC, March 14-18, 2016
Copyright 2016 by author(s). All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies of this
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice
appears on all such copies.
ABSTRACT
Land in India has been governed and managed over centuries by a plethora of negotiated conditions and
legislation under nobility, community, colonial presidencies, provinces, princely states and independent
government. A uniform national legislation took shape under the erstwhile British rule and evolved into
the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. The 1894 Act underwent comprehensive revision recently in the year
2013, and is currently the subject of intense debate and discussion across stakeholders groups.
While the debate continues on the use of a uniform national law, various Indian States have been
labouring away on their own unique and contextual alternatives to access planned and serviced land for
various public purposes. This phenomenon is not recent as States too are enabled by the Constitution to
legislate on subjects such as land and urban development. Six unique State led mechanisms have been
documented in this paper, which are often regionally confined in their use and do not always have holistic
legislations. Learnings, advantages and disadvantages garnered in this paper will enable stakeholders
across States who are seeking alternative mechanisms to make more informed choices, use alternatives
appropriate to context and effect appropriate amendments to legislation in rapidly urbanising Indian
States.
KEY WORDS
Alternatives, diversity, land acquisition, partnership models, serviced land
This paper highlights learnings, findings and analysis that are part of WRI India’s forthcoming
publication on ‘Alternatives to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India’
2
List of Abbreviations
AR
Accommodation Reservation
ASR
Annual Statement of Rates
AUDA
Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority
BDA
Bangalore Development Authority
BUA
Built Up Area
CIDCO
City and Industrial Development Corporation
CoI
Constitution of India
CRS
Cluster Redevelopment Scheme
DP
Development Plan
DR
Development Rights
DRC
Development Rights Certificate
DTCP
Directorate of Town and Country Planning Department
EIC
East India Company
EWS
Economically Weaker Section
FSI
Floor Space Index
GLD
Guided Land Development
GTPUD Act
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act
Ha
Hectares
HDRUA Act
Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act
HUDA
Haryana Urban Development Authority
IT
Information Technology
ITES
Information Technology Enabled Service
JDM
Joint Development Model
LAA
Land Acquisition Act
LP/R
Land Pooling/Readjustment
LPS
Land Pooling Scheme
MCGM
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai
MHADA
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority
MMRDA
Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority
MRTP Act
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act
NAINA
Navi Mumbai Airport Influence Notified Area Scheme
NMIA
Navi Mumbai International Airport
OSCDC
Off Site City Development Charges
3
PPP
Public Private Partnership
PRR
Peripheral Ring Road
RFCTLARR
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act
TDR
Transfer of Development Rights
TPS
Town Planning Scheme
UDPFI
Urban Development Plans Formulation and Implementation
ULCA
Urban Land Ceiling Act
URP
Urban Renewal Plan
URS
Urban Renewal Scheme
WRI
World Resources Institute
4
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION: INTEREST IN INNOVATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO ACCESS PLANNED AND
SERVICED LAND ....................................................................................................................................... 6
a) Rapid Urbanisation is Fuelling a Rampant Need for Serviced Land ................................................... 6
b) The Search for Alternative Mechanisms ............................................................................................... 6
c) Scope, Intent and Methodology............................................................................................................ 7
II. A BACKGROUND TO LAND MANAGEMENT IN INDIA ................................................................ 8
a) Brief Historical Account: Pre British India........................................................................................ 10
b) Brief Historical Account: British India .............................................................................................. 10
c) Brief Historical Account: Post Independent India.............................................................................. 11
III. SIX UNIQUE STATE LED MECHANISMS TO ACCESS LAND FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES ....... 15
a) Town Planning Scheme (Ahmedabad, Gujarat) ................................................................................. 18
b) Land Pooling Scheme (Amravati, Andhra Pradesh) .......................................................................... 22
c) Navi Mumbai Airport Influence Notified Area Scheme (Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra) ...................... 25
d) Joint Development Model (Haryana) ................................................................................................. 28
e) Accommodation Reservation and Transfer of Development Rights (Mumbai, Maharashtra) ........... 31
f) Cluster Redevelopment Scheme (Mumbai, Maharashtra) ................................................................... 34
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 38
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: ...................................................................................................................... 41
References ................................................................................................................................................... 43
List of Figures & Boxes .......................................................................................................................... 51
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................................... 51
5
I. INTRODUCTION: INTEREST IN INNOVATIVE ALTERNATIVES TO
ACCESS PLANNED AND SERVICED LAND
a) Rapid Urbanisation is Fuelling a Rampant Need for Serviced Land
Individual states in India in a post liberalisation environment are competing to attract more business and
provide better infrastructure services to citizens. India is one of the fastest growing economies of the
world, but yet it ranks lower than its BRICS counterparts in the ‘Doing Business’ report of the World
Bank (2014). While referring to issues related to land, parameters such as its availability, allotment,
obtaining construction permits and automation of property registration were assessed. The KPMG -CII
survey (2014) reveals that at a pan India level, the lack of an effective process has made land acquisition a
complex and time consuming procedure making the business environment less attractive to investors. The
need to urbanise, industrialise and create more jobs is a top priority and accessing land for developmental
purposes is critical to support this structural transformation in a country which is still largely rural. While
the demand for planned and serviced land is soaring rapidly, at the supply end project affected people and
farmers are resentful due to factors such as involuntary displacement, loss of livelihood, inadequate
compensation and no benefits from land value increments post development.
b) The Search for Alternative Mechanisms
With multiple challenges (shown in the box 1) arising out of the compulsory acquisition of land, several
cities and states in India have begun to explore more market friendly and socially equitable methods to
access land for public purposes.
Box 1: Challenges of compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes in India
1. Disputes and litigations over compensation for the acquired land;
2. Weak financial capacity of the government institutions resulting in delayed payment of
compensations ;
3. Displacement of landowners and loss of livelihood for the landless project affected families;
4. Non-participatory with inadequate provisions for participating in decision making process;
5. Original landowners do not accrue the benefits of increased land value of developed land
parcels;
6. Transfer or Auction of land acquired for public purposes to private players for non-public
purposes.
6
Empowered by constitution to legislate on land, cities and States have developed an array of innovative
alternatives to access land for public purposes. The land locked city of Mumbai for example resorted to
the using ‘Transferable Development Rights’ as a non-monetary compensation in lieu of the land
surrendered free of cost, rather than acquisition due to prohibitive costs. Mumbai’s Draft Development
Plan 2034 explicitly states ‘With the introduction of RFCTLARR Act 2013, the value of compensation of
land to the private owner has increased up to twice the prevailing Ready Reckoner price 1 for land, making
land acquisition by the public authority extremely challenging.’ Similarly, the city of Bangalore too has
seen rising land acquisition cost overruns as a major deterrent to complete its ambitious Peripheral Ring
Road (PRR) project. With media referring to the PRR as a pipe dream, the Bangalore Development
Authority (BDA) is toying with the idea of awarding Transferable Development Rights (TDR) instead of
land acquisition costs. Several such examples exploring alternatives have come up in recent times such as
using the Town Planning Scheme (TPS) for the flagship Dholera Special Investment Region in Gujarat
and using the Land Pooling Mechanism for Amravati, the greenfield capital of the newly bifurcated State
of Andhra Pradesh. These mechanisms enables consolidation of land parcels under different ownerships
for various public purposes as proposed in the Development Plan and as a compensation for surrendered
land, landowners get a percentage of the developed land. These indicative trends point towards a growing
demand to explore alternatives to meet developmental needs.
c) Scope, Intent and Methodology
This paper limits its scope to collation, documentation and comparative review of alternative mechanisms
of accessing planned and serviced land for public purposes as practiced by several states in India. While
the national act for land acquisition is used by central government agencies such as defence, railways,
irrigation etc., State and local agencies have in addition to using the national act, used alternative
mechanisms to varying degrees depending on the State or city.
The intent of this paper is not to provide a view point on whether a uniform code of law is better or worse
off than having multiple locally contextual laws to access land. The intent is that in an environment where
States are looking at innovative alternatives to access land, this paper would provide insights to enable
informed decision making, contextual legislative amendments and the appropriate use of alternative
mechanisms to access land. Hence the paper would be of interest to the government agencies and
departments, private developers and academicians who are involved in the process of land procurement
and development for public purposes
1
Ready Reckoner rates are the prices of land, residential properties, and commercial properties for any
given area defined and published by government each year. It is revised from time to time whenever govt
feels that there is a need for prices revision
7
The paper does not focus on aspects of land governance such as land tenure rights, regulations, land
information system, land valuation methods, taxations etc.
Taking into account the influence expanse of various mechanisms, their popularity and the accessibility to
information on various approaches, six alternative mechanisms were chosen to be assessed. The method
consisted of a detailed assessment of all acts, legislation and other statutory documents for all the six
alternative mechanisms which were assembled from various government websites.
Secondary data collection, literature reviews of technical papers, newspapers, journals etc were analyzed
and referred to. Expert discussions and learnings from a workshop session titled ‘Land Management for
Smart Cities’ as part of the Connect Karo Conference conducted by WRI-EMBARQ India in 2015 have
also been referred to. Post the detailed documentation of 6 cases, a qualitative evaluation based on the
evaluation parameters that were derived through literature studies was done to compare and contrast the
cases and understand relative advantages and disadvantages.
II. A BACKGROUND TO LAND MANAGEMENT IN INDIA
In the continuing struggle to find a balance between acquiring land for developmental activities and the
need to protect the interests of those impacted by the acquisition of the land, a historical account gives
valuable insights and an evidential base for contemplation and analysis of current and future trends. A
timeline graphic (Figure 1) is presented for a quick summary. The emergence of several state led
alternatives across cities and States are also noted.
8
•
•
•
Earliest
known
forms
of
intermediaries emerged in the
form of officers and sub officers
assigned to extract taxes and
govern select regions – iqtadari
and jagirdari systems
These intermediaries
accumulated significant political
and economic resources
•
•
•
•
1757: East India Company Rule : Three revenue
collection systems: landlord, individual and
community
1824: Bengal Resolution: First modern
land
acquisition law in India, but regionally confined
1857: Act VI: First land acquisition law applicable to
whole of India (some regions exempted)
1894: After amendments Act VI becomes the Land
Acquisition Act (LAA)
1898: First Improvement Trust set up in Bombay for
the city’s improvement.
nd
Start of the 2
millennium
•
•
Landownership shared among
the individual, king and
community
King supreme authority; could
grant and confiscate land/
property
•
•
•
1639: Advent of East India Company:
Established Madras Presidency
1688: Established Bombay Presidency
1699: Established Bengal Presidency
The Navi Mumbai Airport Influence
Notified Area (NAINA) Scheme introduced
by CIDCO – follows principles of land
pooling
LAA 1894 repealed and replaced by Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013
Amaravati, the capital of the recently
bifurcated state of Andhra Pradesh, to be
developed through land pooling
1965: Urban Land Policy Committee
suggested, for the first time policy
interventions in urban land market
1915: The Bombay
Town Planning Act,
1915 introduced Town
Planning Scheme (TPS)
in India
1935: The
Government of India
Act, 1935 makes
land a Central and
State subject
1947: Independence
1993:
Magarpatta
township- land pooling
and development carried
out by the landowning
farmer community
2014
2015: Delhi approves
land pooling policy
1900
1700
1600
1949: Kumarappa
Committee Report
1992
2009: Cluster Redevelopment
Scheme introduced in Greater
Mumbai
1966: The use of TPS formalised in
Maharashtra in Independent India
1975: The use of Joint Development Model
formalised in Haryana
1976: The use of TPS formalised in Gujarat
1977: Guided land development (GLD)
introduced in Bombay, Maharashtra
1988: GLD endorsed by the Tamil Nadu Urban
Development Project – I
1991: Accommodation Reservation & TDR
introduced in Bombay
1950: The Constitution
formalises acquisition and
requisition of land as State
and Central subjects
1948:
Indian
Independence
(Adaptation of Central Acts and
Ordinances) Order - Adopted the
British governance systems,
which included land governance
systems.
Figure 1: Timeline tracing history of Accessing Land in India
Image Source: WRI India’s forthcoming publication on ‘Alternatives to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India’9
a) Brief Historical Account: Pre British India
In the Indian context the pre British era witnessed the rule of kings and emperors who had supreme
powers and control rights over land without any significance given to any formal rights and its use.
Typically land ownership was shared between the individual, community and the king. While it was the
king’s duty to protect the lands from internal and external threats, the individuals and communities in turn
had to pay up taxes which were used for the development of the kingdom and strengthening of the army.
The king exercised authority to assign regional officers for governing part of the kingdom and also could
procure land for welfare of the kingdom or confiscate land in case of certain offenses.
Overtime, the land assigned to such regional officers came to be known as iqta and the regional officers
as iqtadar. Often the iqtadar would be connected to the individual through a chain of junior officers and
intermediaries. Under the Mughals, the iqtadari system evolved into the jagirdari system. Unlike the
iqtadari system the jagirdari system was not hereditary, and the jagirdars’ position was not secure, ie, they
could be removed from their position. In a way, the assigned land was governed by the officers under the
King’s rule and its governance included land appropriation either for public welfare or a punishment for
defaulting tax payment. With the decline of the Mughal rule the regional officers and intermediaries
gathered enough clout to become de facto chiefs and landlords over small fiefdoms. At the same time the
process of colonisation of India gathered momentum under the East India Company (EIC).
b) Brief Historical Account: British India
The East India Company on its arrival in India understood and carried forward the prevailing systems of
governance with suitable modifications such as:
• Transformed the jagirdari system into the zamindari 2 system, and introduced new tax realisation
systems such as the mahalwari 3 and ryotwari 4 systems for the rural areas;
• Introduced municipal bodies and improvement trusts for the urban areas, and
• Enacted legislation pertaining to formal land governance and procurement.
The tax realization systems in rural areas functioned in conjunction with the existing village panchayats,
but the power wielded by these panchayats were most likely controlled by the de facto chiefs, powerful
peasants and landlords. Due to the warring and fractious nature of the various Indian kingdoms, common
2
In the zamindari system, the tax from the peasant/tiller was realised by the British through a middleman
or landlord, locally known as the zamindar. It is also known as the landlord system.
3
In the mahalwari system, the tax was realised through the village Panchayat or the community (mahal)
as whole. It is also known as the community system.
4
In the ryotwari system, the Company dealt directly with the peasant (ryot or raiyat) for tax realisation. It
is also called the individual system.
10
land procurement legislation for entire India was absent and there were multiple legislations/rules for
different parts of India. Possibly, this affected land acquisition for the various commercial needs 5 of the
1
British, which in turn affected the consolidation of their dominion over India. The first legislation for the
land procurement thus was formulated, the Bengal Resolution of 1824, applicable to the Bengal
Presidency under the Company (Law Commission of India, 1958). This was followed by similar
legislations in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies in 1839 and 1852 respectively. Consequently, Act VI
of 1857 became the first land procurement legislation that encompassed the lands of the entire country,
exempting princely states under British patronage. Act VI repealed all previous provincial legislation, and
after subsequent amendments became the Land Acquisition Act (LAA), 1894. The LAA used the doctrine
of eminent domain to acquire land, specified generalized provisions for the entire country and brought all
lands under the undisputed authority of the Central British Government.
Before the 20th century the focus on town planning was limited as the country was predominantly rural.
However with the increasing population growth and urbanisation, urban issues of water supply, sewerage
and sanitation cropped up and the British government felt that towns should be planned better. Thus the
improvement trust were set up which acquired land under the provision of LAA, 1894 and carried out
large scale demolitions to create better infrastructure provisions in the town. The unpopular mechanisms
of acquiring land by the improvement trusts created resentment among the landowners. In 1915, the first
town planning Act named the Bombay Town Planning was enacted, which introduced town planning
scheme as an alternative way to acquire land for public purposes by the government. The Government of
India Act, 1919 established diarchy 6 and paved the way for State enactments on land. Eventually the
British, through the Government of India Act, 1935 officially established a federal structure of
governance in India.
c) Brief Historical Account: Post Independent India
After Independence, through the Indian Independence (Adaptation of Central Acts and Ordinances) Order
of 1948 the British system of land governance, where both the Center and State had power to legislate on
land, was adopted and has continued ever since. Immediately after Independence, the J C Kumarappa
Committee was appointed to look into addressing the problems of land (Deshpande, 2003). India's land
5
Examples: building infrastructure networks, carrying out mining and quarrying, setting up plantation
farms and associated industries like cotton, jute, dye etc.
6
A system where in the Central and Regional governments are joint heads of a Region, unlike federalism
wherein the Regional government is the head of a Region. In both cases the Central government is the
head of the country.
11
policy after independence was dominated by legislative efforts to address the challenges identified by the
Kumarappa Committee which included:
• Small numbers of land holders possessed a large share of the land;
• High density of tenant cultivators present, many of whom had insecure tenancy, and exploitative
production relations;
• Common practice of leasing out of land;
• Presence of rent seeking intermediaries;
• Different land revenue and ownership systems across regions;
• Poorly shaped land records giving rise to rampant litigation.
The following two decades’ land policies were driven by the findings (given above) and the
recommendations of Kumarappa Committee Report which included abolition of intermediaries, tenancy
reforms, and land ceiling reforms. While several issues highlighted by the Kumarappa Committee are still
prevalent today, the main challenges (as shown in box 2) in accessing land include hold out problems,
administrative inefficiencies, high transaction costs and under valuation of land and compensation.
12
Box 4: Key Challenges of land supply in India
Hold out Problems: Land owners might ‘hold out’ onto his/her land by protesting or litigation with
the expectation that at a later stage they would receive higher compensation for the land that is
proposed for acquisition. A completely different scenario with same outcome would be when a
private developer procures large tracts of land and holds onto it with the expectation that the land
values would further increase, after which the land is released by the developer (Morris & Pandey,
2007).
Administrative inefficiencies: Institutions with overlapping responsibilities, limited devolution of
powers to the local bodies from the State governments, limited use of technology are some of the
factors that cause administrative inefficiencies which influence the delivery of land for public
purposes.
High transaction costs: Stamp duty in India on average is 9 to 10%, and in some States it is around
14.5% of the total transaction cost. Globally average stamp duty as per cent of total transaction cost
ranges between 1% and 2%. To avoid the high taxes, a lot of transactions go unreported or under
reported. This brings in informality in the market, and further, under reporting means that in case of
acquisition the compensation would be paid according to the under reported transaction value
(Morris & Pandey, 2007)
Under valuation and low compensation for land acquired: Lands which are intended for acquisition
are often valued at a lower rate than the market value of land without taking into account the post
developmental value of the land. This results in payment of low compensation to the landowners and
post developmental benefits are gained only by the acquiring agency, leaving out the landowners.
d) Constitutional Powers of the Centre and the States in India
The Constitution of India (CoI) guides the federal nature of governance on different ‘matters’7. The
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution gives three lists, detailing responsibilities that vest with:
i. The Union List - The Union/Center
ii. The State List - The States
iii. The Concurrent List - Both the Centre and States
7
The different subjects or topics are referred to as ‘matters’ in the Constitution. For eg, land acquisition
and requisition is a matter.
13
'Acquisition and Requisition of Property' is listed as item 42 of the Concurrent List, thus allowing States
to supplement the Central legislation, the applicability of which is restricted within the State boundary.
Article 254 (1) of the Constitution gives the principle on which inconsistencies if any, among the State
and the Central legislation can be reconciled, wherein the Central legislation gains supremacy. This
means if a State frames a legislation which goes against the essence of the Central legislation then the
provisions of the State legislation which are inconsistent shall not be valid. But, Article 254 (2) of the CoI
allows the States to continue with their ‘inconsistent’ legislation, subject to the President’s decision,
recommendation and discretion. This is important because it can be interpreted that through Article 254
(2) the CoI recognizes India’s diversity, and accepts that the approach of ‘one for all’ might not be
feasible. However, the final say remains with the Centre as the proviso to Article 254 (2) empowers the
Centre to “enact a law at any time with respect to the same matter, including a law adding to, amending,
varying or repealing the law so made by the State”. The emphasis in this proviso is on the phrase ‘same
matter’, implying the Centre’s power to amend or repeal the inconsistent State legislation is restricted to
the fact that the subject matter of the concerned State legislation should fall within the Concurrent List.
Interestingly, there are State legislations whose subject matters are not related to land acquisition per se,
but they do contain provisions for land procurement. The provisions of Article 254 cannot be used for
such State legislation (Law Commission of India, 1958).
Other options of achieving consistency are (i) the Centre can request States to conform to the Central
legislation, and (ii) the States, under Article 252 of the CoI, can request the Centre to amend their
respective laws (Law Commission of India, 1958).
14
III. SIX UNIQUE STATE LED MECHANISMS TO ACCESS LAND FOR
PUBLIC PURPOSES
While the national act for land acquisition enabled development of large scale infrastructure networks in
the country, several State agencies used alternative mechanisms to supply serviced land to support its
growing population. These State led alternatives include mechanisms that use land readjustment, land
pooling, leveraging resources of the private sector and other non-monetary compensation such as the
grant of development rights, and other urban renewal incentives. The alternative mechanisms that have
arisen from State legislation or through government orders are the ones (listed in box 3) discussed here.
Box 6 : Six alternative mechanisms for accessing land for public purposes
•
Town Planning Scheme - Employs a land readjustment technique
•
Land Pooling Scheme - Employs a land pooling technique
•
Joint Development Model - Employs a public private partnership method
•
NAINA Scheme - Employs a land pooling cum eminent domain technique
•
Accommodation Reservation and Transferable Development Rights - Employs a built
up area in lieu of land lost for public purpose technique
•
Cluster Redevelopment Scheme - Employs a built up area and redeveloped building in
lieu of urban renewal technique
When a particular type of alternative mechanism for accessing land is used in more than one city or State,
thereby following a slightly differing legislation, the most extensive, successful and currently used
variation is discussed. A table presenting a qualitative comparative analysis of these 6 mechanisms is
presented followed by a detailed description of each mechanism
15
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Land Accessing Mechanisms
Source: WRI India’s forthcoming publication on ‘Alternatives to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India
Public
purpose
TPS
Broadly
defined
LPS
Broadly
defined
NAINA
Scheme
Broadly
defined
JDM
Lacks
clarity
TDR
Broadly
and AR
defined
Procurement
process
Detailed and robust
Detailed and robust
Coercive and refers
to the Central
legislation to
achieve smoothness
Lacks details on
government roles
and responsibilities.
Negotiations can be
coercive
Detailed and
favourable for areas
of land scarcity
CRS
Broadly
defined
Efficiency in achieving
objectives
Procurement is efficient
but prolonged time
taken for project
implementation is a
drawback
Recognition of rights
Individual and group rights of
owners recognized. Unclear on
the recognition of the rights of
the landless and subject to the
discretion of the authority.
Compensation
Land valuation
Developed land
The value of land on the date of
declaration of intention to
prepare a scheme is deemed to
be the market value of the land
Includes: (i)
developed land to the
owners, and (ii)
monetary assistance to
the affected, including
the landless
Includes: (i)
Developed land
and/or TDR, and (ii)
monetary assistance
Yet to be tested.
However, procurement
has been completed in
record time.
Individual and group rights of
owners along with rights of
landless are recognized
Yet to be realised, as
the scheme is still in the
evolving stage
Rights of owners having less
than 10 hectare land and nonparticipants poorly recognized
Inefficient for
controlling haphazard
growth
Poorly defined
Highly efficient in
Individual and group rights of
As per the Ready Reckoner
providing the necessary
owners are recognized.
rates given in the Annual
infrastructure in cases
Recognition of rights of landless
of brownfield
not clear, and is subject to the
Maharashtra. The date of
re/development.
discretion of the authority
consideration for such value is
Prolonged time is a
Recognizes the right of anyone
the date of notification or
limiting factor for
occupying a building which is to
project delivery.
be redeveloped
Not applicable
Transferable DR
Redeveloped property
The value of land on the date of
declaration of intention to
prepare a scheme is deemed to
be the market value of the land
Through evaluation of land
prices in the surrounding areas.
Negotiation
Statement of Rates,
declaration of the Development
Plan.
16
Approach
Jurisdiction
of courts
Feasibility studies
TPS
No clear mandate
LPS
Mandates ‘surveys to achieve
spatio economic development
and social justice’
NAINA
Scheme
JDM
Master
plan
mandated
Unclear but
people can
approach
court
Mandates making of a ‘detailed
report’ comprising of expected
population, requirement of
amenities and proposed
amenities with reference to
prevailing planning standards.
Mandates ‘conducting
feasibility analysis, and impact
assessment covering the
complete spectrum of project
cycle’
TDR
and AR
No clear mandate
CRS
Mandates an Impact Assessment
Study
Grievance redressal
Mandates setting up a
Board of Appeal to
address grievances
and conflicts
No separate or clear
grievance redressal
body. A Tribunal
looks into matters of
unauthorised
construction
Sharing of benefits
Skill
development of
affected
Restrictions on land
procurement
Through betterment
levy and sale of
plots
Not offered
No restrictions
Through betterment
levy and sale of
plots
Offers skill
development
training
No restrictions
(i) Minimum 10 hectare
land required, and (ii)
multi crop agricultural
land restricted from
acquisition
Sale of plots and
BUA
No separate or clear
grievance redressal
body
Not offered
Sale of BUA
(i) agricultural lands, (ii)
disputed lands, and (iii)
less than 100 acres
restricted from
procurement
In AR/TDR as per master
plan mandates
In CRS, a minimum of
4000 sqmts is prescribed
17
a) Town Planning Scheme (Ahmedabad, Gujarat)
Background
Town Planning Scheme (TPS) is the predominant urban expansion scheme practiced in the State of
Gujarat to manage new growth predominantly in its major city. The scheme is applied on land that is
(a) in the course of development (b) likely to be used for building purposes and (c) already built upon
(Government of Gujarat, 1976). Having been introduced in the Bombay Presidency that included parts
of today’s Gujarat and Maharashtra, in the initial decades it enabled planned urban developments in
parts of Maharashtra as well. However, by 1980s TPS fell out of use in Maharashtra (Deuskar,
2011).whereas it gained popularity in Gujarat. The TPS traditionally reconstituted land in the range of
1 to 2 sqkm, but more recent innovations show capability to reconstitute upto 100 sqkms at a time.
Land Pooling Scheme (LPS) described in the subsequent section have resemblance to TPS, however
there is a difference in the way land is consolidated for reconstitution.
Process and Timeline
TPS of Gujarat is a two-step process that constitutes a city wide Development Plan (DP) that
designates the new areas to be opened up for development and many neighborhood wide TPS to
implement DP proposals (Patel & Ballaney, 2015). In TPS, which is envisaged as a joint venture
scheme, the government authority temporarily brings together a group of land owners who voluntarily
pool their land. Such plots after deducting land required for roads and other public amenities are
properly reconstituted and distributed back to the owners by the government authority. The Gujarat
Town Planning and Urban Development (GTPUD) Act 1976, its subsequent amendments and the
GTPUD Rules specify in detail the process of TPS which include three phases of the scheme viz. the
draft scheme, preliminary scheme and the final scheme. In the first phase, the authority after declaring
its intention to prepare TPS, calls for a meeting of landowners to elicit their opinions and suggestions.
The draft scheme contains a draft plan with a base map having all the survey details and location of
proposed roads, social amenities, plots delineated for sale as well as tabulation of ownership details,
original plot sizes, plot values etc. At the draft stage, the authority tabulates the increment in land
values and contribution to be made by landowners for the land value increments as betterment levies.
The sanctioned draft scheme is divided into preliminary and final schemes, which deals with the
physical and financial aspects of the final scheme respectively. Consultations are held at various stages
of the scheme to elicit public opinions and suggestions. The Act allows a total of four years and one
month from the initial declaration of intention to the sanction of the final scheme (Deuskar, 2011).
18
TPS as a Mechanism to Implement Development Plan (DP) Proposals
TPS is considered as a potentially acceptable alternative for implementing DP reservation by various
development authorities in Gujarat. As mandated by the GTPUD Act 1976, DP reserves land for
public purposes such as physical infrastructure, social amenities and recreational amenities etc.
Designated land reservations in the TPS (in percentage)
Affordable housing
10
Sale by authroity for residential,commercial or
industrial use depending upon the nature of
development
15
Social infrastructure such as schools,dispensary,fire
brigade, public utility space
5
Parks, playgrounds,gardens and open spaces
5
Roads
15
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Figure 2: Land Use Reservations in the Town Planning Scheme, Gujarat
Data source: GTPUD Act 1976; Image source: WRI India’s forthcoming publication on ‘Alternatives
to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India’
The GTPUD Act allows up to 50% of land pooled for public purposes as illustrated in the Figure 2 and
the remaining land is returned as reconstituted final plots to the landowners.
Compensation and Land Valuation through Prescribed Formats
In TPS, as a compensation for the surrendered land, the landowners get back a percentage of land as a
reconstituted plot, with better road networks and other infrastructure amenities. During the draft TPS
stage, the appropriate authority tabulates in the forms as mandated by the Act the ownership details,
plot sizes, value of original plots based on the market value of the land. The tabulation further captures
details such as final plot size, increments in land value and the contributions to be made by the
landowners for the land value increments accrued. The final plot values are estimated variably to
reflect the locational advantages and disadvantages of the plot. The land owners are entitled to pay
betterment levies at the rate of half the increase in land values of the final plots and the government is
19
entitled to pay compensation for the land surrendered. The difference between the two amounts is
calculated, and the balance is paid in the direction required (Deuskar, 2011)
Advantages of TPS
• TPS is a win-win proposition for both the government and the landowners, as the land value
increments post the developments are shared by both parties;
• The legal framework for TPS provides a fairly robust process with built in mechanisms for
tabulation of plot details, its cost and compensation as well as provision for raising objections and
suggestions at various stages;
• While the legal frameworks do not specify some of the positive aspects of the TPS, the on ground
practice of TPS strives to ensure that owners receive reconstituted plots within their original sites
and great efforts are taken to ensure the same to a maximum number of people;
• Granting of solatium is not explicitly mentioned in the Act, but certain exemptions such as
reduction in betterment levy is granted if plots are occupied for religious or charitable activities;
• The provision to start implementing road networks at the draft stage expedites planned
development of the area even prior to agreements on compensations and betterment levies etc.
being finalized;
• Conflicts among the affected and complaints against the officials are resolved through a Board of
Appeal in which the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court or the District Judge acts as the
President 8;
• Landowners benefitting differentially are also differentially burdened with betterment levies as
the final plot values are varied by some amount to reflect the locational advantages and
disadvantages (Deuskar, 2011);
• As TP scheme sits within the larger framework of the Development Plan, it has a comprehensive
approach to accessing land and also serves as a revenue source to the development authorities.
Disadvantages
• While there is mandate to assign land for Economically Weaker Section (EWS) housing, it does
not have any provision for rehabilitation of the landless Project Affected People (PAP) and does
not explicitly mention if reserved land for such affordable housing will be disbursed to such PAP.
The TPS legislation, for example does not specify if EWS segments or landless laborers when
present at project site, would be accommodated within the same scheme on completion. There are
8
Appeals against the President are addressed by the State Government in consultation with the High
Court
20
also instances, where the land reserved for low-income housing was illegally diverted to other
uses (Deuskar, 2011);
• Administrative and procedural delays and public appeasements, delay the implementation of TPS
within the stipulated time period and hence betterment levies charged at the beginning of TPS do
not meet the cost of infrastructure provisions. With powers vested in the State government to
approve and sanction the three stages of TPS, the process has become far too centralised and time
consuming;
• The village settlements that fall within the TPS, are not upgraded or provided with services in the
process of land developments, as they are often left isolated with a road built around it or with
roads within it connecting to the surrounding new road networks;
•
Intermediaries tap the benefits of land value increase: It is observed that owners of the land at the
urban fringes are not necessarily the poor rural farmers that TP schemes appear to benefit.
Officials, planners and developers in Ahmedabad believe that in many cases the real owners are
speculative land assemblers, developers, business people and even politicians and bureaucrats
(Deuskar, 2011);
• Assets generated by the local authority through TPS are not comprehensively documented and are
not managed in an appropriate manner (Ballaney, 2008).
Outcomes and Presence in Other States of India
Over 120 TP schemes were prepared in Mumbai (Bombay) such as in areas of Bandra, Mahim, Juhu
and Andheri and other towns covering over 100 sqkms in Maharashtra during the period between
1915 and 1985.
It is reported by Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority (AUDA) that
Ahmedabad is the first city in India to have 90% of the Development Plan implemented through TPS
and the sale of land obtained through TPS has become an important source of income for AUDA
(Deuskar, 2011). More than 80% of the land for the ring road of Ahmedabad, Gujarat was acquired
using TPS (Deuskar, 2011)
Most recently TPS has been proposed by the Dholera Special Investment Regional Development
Authority (DSIRDA) of Gujarat for implementation of 422 sqkms reservations proposed in the
development plan.
While TP schemes are mostly associated with Gujarat today, they are used to lesser degree in States
such as Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Odisha. In the variation of TP scheme adopted in Kerala,
betterment levies were not charged by the authority and different proportions of lands were given up
by the landowners to the development authority (Deuskar, 2011). Variations in the land appropriation
together with higher degree of participation of the landowners from the initiation of schemes and
21
strict time schedules enforced on the authority as well as the landowners were the reasons for the
timely completion and the success of the scheme in Kerala.
b) Land Pooling Scheme (Amravati, Andhra Pradesh)
Background
With the bifurcation of the new state of Andhra Pradesh, the government of State decided to set up a
Greenfield capital named Amravati, between Vijayawada and Guntur cities on the banks of the river
Krishna. The cabinet sub-committee constituted for the capital city formation decided to take up the
proposal through a land pooling scheme. Using the powers conferred through the Andhra Pradesh
Capital Region Development Authority Act, 2014, the government formulated rules for the land
pooling scheme which is known as the Andhra Pradesh Capital City Land Pooling Scheme
(Formulation and Implementation) Rules, 2015. In this land assembling technique, land is legally
consolidated before reconstitution and redistribution to the original landowners, whereas land is only
notionally consolidated in TPS (Deuskar, 2011). While TPS strives to allocate final reconstituted plots
to owners where they lost it, this is not the case in LPS as land could be allocated elsewhere within a 5
km radius of the original land.
Process and Timeline
In this LPS, land parcels owned by individuals or group of owners are legally consolidated by transfer
of ownership rights to the Authority, which later transfers the ownership of a part of the land back to
the land owners for undertaking of development for such areas (Municipal Administration & Urban
Development (M2) Department, Govt of Andhra Pradesh, 2015). In the LPS, after the land pooling
area is finalised considering the objections and suggestions received from the landowners, the
authority prepares the draft land pooling scheme. The ownership rights from the willing land owners is
transferred to the authority after the final notification of scheme and the reconstituted plots are
transferred to the landowners through issue of land pooling ownership certificates initially. The land
pooling rules framed for the capital city, allows a total of 315 days from the notification on intention to
prepare the LPS till the physical marking of roads and other amenities on the land surrendered through
the scheme. Post the completion of the scheme, the authority hands over the physical possession of
reconstituted plots to the landowners through drawing of lots in the presence of at least one third of the
land owners.
22
Land Pooling Scheme as a Technique to Implement Capital City Master Plan
Similar to the TPS of Gujarat, LPS also functions within the frameworks of a master plan. The master
plan prepared for capital city reserves land for physical infrastructure, social amenities, community
facilities and services, recreational needs, industrial use, conservation areas, green belts and such other
purposes that may be directed by the State Government to be included as public purpose. The
competent authority prepares the draft land pooling scheme in accordance with the sanctioned
development plans that designates lands for various uses as shown in the Figure 3 and in consultation
with the land owners within the prescribed time framework
Reservation of Land Uses in the LPS (in percentage)
5
Affordable housing for the poor
5
Social infrastructure (eg: schools,health and
community facilities)
30
Roads and Utility services
10
Parks, playgrounds,gardens and open spaces
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Figure 3: Designation of land uses in the LPS for Amravati, Andhra Pradesh
Data Source: Andhra Pradesh Capital City Land Pooling Scheme (Formulation and
Implementation) Rules, 2015 Image source: WRI India’s forthcoming publication on
‘Alternatives to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India’
Compensation and Rehabilitation Strategies in LPS
As compensation to the land surrendered the landowners gets reconstituted land based on the type of
land and its ownership status. For instance for every acre of land surrendered landowners possessing
patta 9 land in return get 25% of land in case of dry land and 27% in case of wet land. Whereas in case
of assigned land, the landowner get 19% of land in case of dry land and 21% in case of wet land.
Families residing in the areas under LPS are entitled to get monetary benefits such as one time
agriculture loan waiver and interest free loans for a fixed amount to all poor families for selfemployment.
9
Patta is a revenue record to establish legal ownership
23
The scheme also offers skill development programmes for the affected families and pension of two
thousand five hundred rupees per month per family for a period of ten years to all landless families
through a capital region social security fund (Municipal Administration & Urban Development (M2)
Department, Govt of Andhra Pradesh, 2015).
Advantages
•
The mechanism has detailed provisions explaining the entire process which lays stress on
completing the process in an efficient, systematic, participatory and time bound manner;
•
The legislative framework for the scheme has provisions to seek consent from interested parties
or landowners to participate in the scheme and solicit suggestions and objections from the
landowners at various stages of the scheme;
•
The scheme upholds individual rights, group tenure rights and rights of the landless and offers
compensations to the landless families as well and ensures that reconstituted plots are in
proximity to the original land or within 5 kms radius of original plot.
•
Scheme mentions annuity payment to religious institutions or charitable trusts under the purview
of endowment department in cases where original lands belong to such institutions.
Disadvantages
•
While the process is systematically described in the supporting legislations, the provision for
addressing the grievances is weak as there is no dedicated grievance redressal mechanisms and
one has to approach the court in case of conflicting issues.
•
The scheme does not restrict fertile agriculture lands from being taken up for the capital city
development.
Outcome and Miscellaneous Facts about LPS
As per the scheduled timeline in the LPS rules of Andhra Pradesh Capital City, the government could
build a land bank of about 33,000 acres (Shankaran, 2015) using Land Pooling Scheme in less than a
year. While this land assembling process for capital city formation of Andhra Pradesh is the largest
experiment of land pooling scheme in the country, its effectiveness and consequences on ground is yet
to be realized.
In the international context, around 10,254 Land Pooling/Readjustment (LP/R) projects covering
about 20% of the Japan’s total urbanised areas were implemented (Ansari, 2002). In Korea, during
1960-82, LP/R accounted for 95% of total supply of urban land (Ansari, 2002).
24
Another interesting land pooling scheme which gained popularity in India is the Magarpatta Township
in Pune, Maharashtra. This privately owned and managed township covering over 430 acres of
agriculture land is owned by 120 farmer families and is developed by themselves through a
participatory land pooling mechanisms.
c) Navi Mumbai Airport Influence Notified Area Scheme (Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra)
Background
CIDCO, a special planning authority appointed by the government of Maharashtra, having
experimented various development models for its own townships with varying degree of success,
evolved a new scheme for its proposed greenfield airport influence area in Navi Mumbai. While the
land for the core airport area would be compulsorily acquired, the land in Navi Mumbai Airport
Influence Notified Area (NAINA) would be developed through a participatory model referred as the
NAINA scheme or 60:40 voluntary participation model. NAINA, demarcated at a radial distance of
about 25 sqkms around the proposed Navi Mumbai International Airport (NMIA) covers 561 sqkms.
The project area would contain gaothans10, areas upto 200 m of gaothans, special township projects
and rental housing, and projects segregated by large swathes of land under various zones of Mumbai
Metropolitan Regional Plan (City and Industrial Development Corporation, 2014)
Process and Timeline
In the NAINA scheme, post the preparation of the development plan, CIDCO, intimates the
landowners about the NAINA scheme for aggregating lands of minimum 7.5 Ha. For areas within the
urban villages 11 and within 200 meters of the urban villages, the minimum land area for aggregation is
4 Ha. Landowners who are willing to participate in the NAINA scheme surrender 40% of the land free
of cost to CIDCO. In case of NAINA- Scheme having areas between 7.5 ha and less than 10 ha, 50%
land will have to be surrendered to authority (CIDCO, 2014-2034). The authority grants an outline
development permission after verification of ownership details of the landowners surrendering the
land and then grants a final development permission after verifying detailed layout plan, building
plans, infrastructure availability, project report etc. The landowners carry out developments on the
land component in their possession as per the stipulated norms of CIDCO and plots could be sold in
the open market, whereas CIDCO develops all reservations on the land surrendered. Development of
individual plots that is the Non-NAINA scheme developments gets Floor Space Index (FSI) of 0.5 and
10
11
Gaothans are village sites
Urban villages are areas of 200 m around existing inhabited gaothans
25
the land for infrastructure developments will be acquired compulsory using the provisions of
RFCTLARR Act, 2013.The authority collects Off Site City Development Charges (OSCDC) from
such non-participating landowners only and development charges from all (as per the MRTP Act of
1966) which serves as the main source of funds for city and peripheral level infrastructure.
NAINA Scheme as a Mechanism to Implement Reservations of Interim Development Plan: Prior
to assembling land using NAINA scheme , the authority prepares an interim development plan that
designates land for reservations such as social facilities and public utilities , open spaces, growth
centers and road networks. Such land designated for various uses in the detailed development plan
published as interim development plans will be notified for compulsory acquisition or will be
assembled through NAINA Scheme.
Salient features of NAINA scheme are as follows (City and Industrial Development Corporation,
2014):
•
Permissible FSI is 1.7 for a land aggregation of 7.5 Ha, and 2 for land aggregation between 7.5
and 10Ha and higher FSI for land area above 10 Ha;
•
In case of non-participating land owners, maximum permissible FSI is 0.5 FSI and no additional
FSI on payment of premium or any other means ;
•
To accommodate inclusive housing (i.e. Economically Weaker Section/Low Income Housing), all
developments on land admeasuring 4000 sqm or more should provide 20% of the plots or land
parcels for inclusive housing (CIDCO, 2014-2034). Such plots should be sold to the authority as
per prelevant Annual Schedule of Rates 12. Whereas in case of NAINA-Schemes in Urban
Villages, the requirement is 10% of the plots or land parcels for inclusive housing.
•
In case of land acquisition of more than 40% from any landowners, they are given option of TDR
or monetary compensation;
•
Reservations within the NAINA cluster shall be flexible (excluding roads) and will be allowed to
be adjusted in the cluster for those who participate in the ‘NAINA Scheme’.
•
Sale permission for plots and apartments within the layout, only after ensuring that all internal
infrastructure is completed as per CIDCO’s specification and only after issuance of occupancy
certificate by the concerned officer.
12
Annual Schedule of Rates are prepared for assessing Market Value of the properties for the purpose of Stamp
Duty by the Stamps and Registeration Department of Maharashtra State
26
Advantages
•
Unlike the other State led mechanisms, landowners are incentivized through additional FSI free
of cost for providing affordable housing components, which are to be sold to the authority at a
pre-determined rate;
•
NAINA scheme has an integrated approach to development by including gaothans, development
in 200 meters around gaothans termed as urban villages through separate regulations and norms.
Additionally, the authority has framed separate criteria and regulations for integrating the
government approved special township projects and rental housing schemes of Mumbai
Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA);
•
It is a win-win proposition, as the post development benefits are shared between the government
and landowners. The landowners losing over 40% of land are given options to choose
compensation which includes either monetary compensations or TDR;
•
Developments carried out need to adhere to overall development plan and has to include
provision of physical and social infrastructure development mandated in the schemes.
Disadvantages
•
Participation of affected people in formulation and implementation of plans is not clearly defined
in the scheme and resettlement strategies for the landless PAPs are not reflected in the scheme;
•
City and peripheral level infrastructure development depends heavily on the flow of the OSCDC
and development charges;
•
The scheme does not have a conflict redressal mechanism to address issues that crop up during
the development process.
Excepted Outcome and Miscellaneous Facts about NAINA Scheme
CIDCO since its establishment has adopted different models of development for different
projects based on the terms granted by the government, market situation and political
environment of the region (City and Industrial Development Corporation).Having
experimented various development models for its own townships with varying degree of
success and also after studying various land development models across the country, NAINA
scheme was evolved after undergoing rigorous scrutiny based on inputs from various
stakeholders . However, the concept of NAINA scheme is yet to be tested on ground with
regard to its applicability and acceptability by the landowners and developers in NAINA
(CIDCO, 2014 - 2034)
27
With the affordable housing component integrated into the scheme, several developers expect the
NAINA Township to be one of the biggest suppliers of affordable housing in Navi Mumbai
(Srivastava, 2014)Due to lack of participatory process in the Scheme, NAINA pilot project received
strong objections from the people residing in 23 villages as the proposals were not informed to the
PAPs ( (Anvekar, 2014).
d) Joint Development Model (Haryana)
Background
Some States have encouraged PPP initiatives for land assembly and development, such as Noida and
Greater Noida in Uttar Pradesh, Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh and Gurgaon in Haryana (Expert
Committee, Ministry of Home Affairs, Union of India, 2014). Significant among them is the Joint
Development Model (JDM) of Haryana, as commonly termed, which has a State wide coverage and
enabled through Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas (HDRUA) Act, 1975. The
HDRUA Act, 1975 was formulated to regulate ill-planned and haphazard urban growth in or around
towns of Haryana, and permits private developers a formal entry into the process of urban
development in the State (Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas, 1975). This
legislative act unique to Haryana State, allows private developers in collaboration with the Haryana
Urban Development Authority (HUDA) to carry out large scale land development works that exceed
the limits set in the Urban Land Ceiling Act (ULCA) in the designated urban areas of the State
(PADCO,Inc, 1991)).
Process and Timeline
The Directorate of Town and Country Planning (DTCP), Haryana, has divided the entire State into
different potential zones such as hyper potential zone (which includes urban areas in and around
Gurgaon), high potential zone, medium potential zone and low potential zone for granting license to
private developers. HUDA acts as a facilitator and issues licenses for converting the land into a colony
to the private developer who are then referred to as the ‘colonizer’. The private developer obtains
contiguous land of specified minimum area in the different potential zones from the landowners
directly at negotiated market prices and applies for a license to colonize. The authority enquires about
matters related to land such as its extent, location, title etc and the conformity of the development
scheme to those in the neighboring areas. On payment of stipulated bank guarantee amount which is
based on the type of development works, the authority grants license to the colonizer. The trunk
infrastructure amenities will be developed by the authority using the external development charges
28
paid by the colonizer. Normally, the plotted development process by a developer takes one to three
years from issuance of a license to disposal of plots (PADCO, Inc, 1991).
Link between the Colony and the Land Use Plan and its Reservations
The land chosen to be converted to a colony has to be in conformity with the land use plan and the
permissible uses as defined in the zoning regulations of the published development plan (Department
of Town and Country Planning, Haryana). Social facilities such as schools, hospitals, community
centers and other community buildings has to be constructed free of cost by the private developer or
hand over the land free of cost to the government. Additionally the private developer has to reserve
land for roads, open spaces and such common facilities, which varies from a minimum of 20% of the
gross land area, in case of low density eco- friendly colony to 45% in case of plotted or group housing
colony development. The private developers have to maintain roads, open spaces, public parks and
public health services for five years from the date of issue of completion certificate unless such
facilities are transferred to the government free of cost.
Resource Mobilisation and Incentives to Private Developers
The developer deposits infrastructure development charges, which is to be used for stimulating socioeconomic growth and development of major infrastructure projects in Haryana. The HDRUA Act
stipulates that the private developer, making a net profit above 15% after the completion of the project
period, has to deposit the surplus amount in the State government treasury or spend this money for
further facilities. The private developer makes profit through sale of plots/flats in the open market.
Development Criteria in JDM
To ensure affordable housing, the colonizer has to sell 25% of plot in case of plotted colony
development on a no profit no loss basis at a price determined by the director of the authority.
Secondly, the colonizer has to reserve 15% of the total developed residential plots/proposed to be
developed for allotment to economically weaker sections (EWS) in case of development of a group
housing and 20% in case of plotted colony development. Around 8000 plots for EWS were developed
in Gurgaon using this model (Rao, 2012). In order to ensure the upkeep and maintenance of the group
housing colony, for a period of 5 years from the period of completion, the authority keeps 1/5th of the
bank guarantee amount unreleased. The act states that the colonizer has to deposit 30% of the amount
collected from the plot-holders within a period of 10 days of its realization in a separate account which
will be released only on satisfactory completion of internal infrastructure amenities.
29
Advantages
•
Negotiated land purchases prove beneficial to the landowners, as the land otherwise would have
been acquired through compulsory acquisition at low compensation rates;
•
Provision of housing for the economically weaker sections is integrated into the development of
group housing and plotted colony development;
•
The model ensures that adequate educational, health, recreational and cultural amenities as per the
norms and standards provided in the development plan of the area is provided by the
owner/private developer;
•
By bringing in private developers in urban development works, the financial burden of
developing infrastructure amenities are transferred from the authority to the private developers;
•
Government as well as the private developer shares the post development benefits;
•
Private developers though guided by profit motives, develop their land for which the license is
issued within the stipulated time framework.
Disadvantages
•
The restrictions on size of land aggregation and development may restrict planned expansion of
urban areas and promote haphazard growth. The relative smallness in the minimum size required
for land assembly encourages growth of small dispersed colonies at random locations (Souro D,
2006);
•
Private developers guided by the profit maximization motives have built their colonies at
locations where they could assemble land from the market through negotiations with local
landowners (Souro D, 2006);
•
The model can lead to speculatory transactions, due to the absence of regulatory frameworks and
a pre-defined procedure for land assembly. Being a land development model only, the mechanism
does not have provisions for skill development or other compensation strategies;
•
The original landowners do not gain the benefits of land value increment, and the landless project
affected families are left out in the process as their rights are not recognized;
•
While there was a surge in housing stock supply in the region, there was no perceptible increase
in the affordable housing segment. Builders contravened the norms and the population in this
segment had to rely on informal alternates (Bedi, 2014). The corrupt nexus between developers
and officials resulted in EWS land lots or dwelling units being sometimes led away from the
target group, to the richer groups (Souro D, 2006)
•
There is no internal grievance redressal system for the mechanism and it lacks public
participation in the development of the colonies;
30
•
While there are provisions in the Act and rules to ensure the execution of the development works
by the private developers, there are no clauses in the Act to ensure the implementation of external
development works by the authority.
Outcomes of JDM
Using this joint development model, HUDA developed serviced plots on 51% of residential areas that
was proposed to be developed for Gurgaon Township, whereas remaining 49% were reserved for
private developments. The external infrastructure amenities, which were to be developed by HUDA,
were delayed or ignored, whereas areas within the layout were provided with high quality
infrastructure amenities. Private developers managed to obtain licenses to build residential colonies at
the locations where they were able to assemble land from market through negotiations with the
landowners, and such development did not necessarily match the phases of development of the city
according to the master plan (Bedi, 2014)
e) Accommodation Reservation and Transfer of Development Rights (Mumbai, Maharashtra)
Background
Limited availability of land and the exorbitant costs attached to it and the limited financial resources
available with the public agencies, necessitated Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM)
to introduce Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) and Accommodation Reservation (AR)
mechanisms for land assembly. These mechanisms were introduced in Mumbai with the view to
incentivize private owners to provide built space for designated public purposes or make available
land for public spaces respectively. These mechanisms were introduced through an amendment in the
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (MRTP) Act 1996. Later, incentive FSI with TDR were
also used for many planning objectives such as redevelopment of slums, redevelopment of rent
controlled chawls, promoting schools, hospitals, star hotels and buildings for IT and ITES (Phatak,
2013).
Process
Under Accommodation Reservation, the landowner hands over built up plot reservations at his cost as
per the prescribed designs and specification to the authority free of cost. In return he avails
Development Rights in the form of FSI, equivalent to the area of the construction/development done
by him. The constructed built up amenity has to be developed semi-detached to the structures of other
permissible development proposed by the owner on the remaining parcel of land. The operation and
31
maintenance of such developed amenities shall be entrusted to an appropriate agency as per the
prescribed guidelines by the Commissioner (Development Plan for Greater Mumbai-2034)
In the TDR mechanism, the development potential of the plot is separated from the land itself and
made available to the landowner in the form of a Development Right, which an owner may use or
transfer to another person (Urban Development Department, Maharashtra, 1991). In lieu of the land
surrendered free of cost and free from all impediments, the landowner gets the development rights
certificate (DRC) which can be used in any land use zone within the limits of FSI. The only difference
between TDR and AR is in the form the land is surrendered to the concerned authority. After
submitting the application for DRC along with the required documents and paying the scrutiny fees
and legal charges, legal department of MCGM does a scrutiny of the ownership tiles. After joint
measurement and receipt of title clearance certificate from the legal department, the concerned
authority of MCGM issues letter of intent to the landowners with a list of compliances. The landowner
receives DRC after he complies with all the requirements. In case land owners does not come forward
to surrender land, the concerned department has the right to acquire land using the provisions of
compulsory acquisition through central Land Acquisition Act (Negi, 2012).
AR and TDR as Instruments for realization of Public Amenities in Brownfield Context
The Development Plan as per MRTP Act, 1966 designates land for public purposes such as physical
infrastructure facilities ,transport and communication, social facilities, public entertainment facilities,
community facilities and transport facilities, industries etc. While acquisition of land remained a
challenge most of the amenities designated as public purpose were realized through AR and TDR in
Greater Mumbai. TDR mechanism is also used for procuring land reserved for nalla widening,
heritage buildings, redevelopment of cessed buildings, urban renewal schemes, built up area for transit
tenements etc.
Compensation Mechanisms
The landowner gets a transferable DR instead of direct monetary compensation for the land
surrendered under the TDR and AR policies. The BUA for the purpose of FSI credit in the form of a
DRC shall be equal to the gross area of the reserved plot to be surrendered and will proportionately
increase or decrease according to the permissible FSI of the zone from where the TDR has originated.
However, in specific cases, after considering the merits, where development plan roads/reservations
are proposed in No Development Zones, the commissioner with prior approval of the Government
shall grant FSI for such road land/reserved land equivalent to that of the adjoining zone (Urban
32
Development Department, Maharashtra, 1991). The land value is determined as per the Ready
Reckoner rates given in the Annual Statement of Rates, maintained by the Inspector General of
Registration and Controller of Stamps, Government of Maharashtra. The date of consideration for such
value is the date of notification or declaration of the Development Plan.
The information on the utilisation of TDR in the form of the DR, DP reservations to be surrendered
and areas for utilisation of the TDR on receiving plots is published in advance from time to time in a
phased annual programme by the authority in charge. The commissioner maintains a register of all
transactions related to the grant or utilisation of DR.
Advantages
•
TDR scheme allows full potential development on the sites with high development potential
(such as those sites with better infrastructure, proximity, and site characteristics) while preserving
those sites which either need to be preserved or have poor site characteristics and infrastructure
(Nallathiga, 2009);
•
The mechanism is efficient in providing the necessary infrastructure services to a heavily
congested area, wherein TDR is offered to a private entity for building the infrastructure;
•
The mechanism enables supply of BUA free of cost for resettlement of transit tenements and
affordable housing tenements in Greater Mumbai
Disadvantages
•
There is no separate grievance redressal system in place, as the appeals and complaints are being
dealt by the State government or an officer appointed by the State government;
•
The land owners are expected to agree to transfer their DR from high value area to a low value
area without any weightage for the price differential (Phatak V. K., 2000). This would mean that
landowners would in certain cases get development rights on a land parcel of lesser market value
than the land they had surrendered to the authority;
•
AR is likely to fail in contexts, where the land prices are not high or are less than the construction
cost;
•
Low accountability and transparency in the process: The process does not mandate any public
participation and hence the decisions and information on the use of TDR details are not easily
accessible to the general public;
•
Absorptive capacity and appropriate physical infrastructure provisions in the zones that receives
additional FSI through TDR are not assessed;
33
•
While AR has benefitted MCGM in obtaining built public amenities, the actual ‘quality and
design’ of public goods amenities has been inconsistent (Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai). Similarly, due to lack of monitoring of application of TDR, implementation of
reservations of DP has remained partial in the city of Greater Mumbai.
Outcome of AR and TDR in Mumbai
By using the concept of TDR, MCGM was able to acquire about 9 lakh sq.m of space reserved for
public purpose by the year 2000 without paying any cash compensation (Nallathiga, 2009).An
assessment of status of implementation of reservations in the DP 1991 reveals that between 25 to 40%
of the total reservations were implemented across the Wards in Greater Mumbai, while most of the
reservations were realized through the application of AR and TDR (MCGM, 2006)
f) Cluster Redevelopment Scheme (Mumbai, Maharashtra)
Background
Many of the buildings in the city of Mumbai were in dilapidated conditions and the landlords lacked
incentives to spend on repairs due to the archaic laws that prevented them from earning market-linked
rents (Acharya, 2013). Taking into account the need for reconstruction of such buildings, a clause on
redevelopment of cessed 13 buildings were introduced in the Development Control Regulations of
Greater Mumbai in 1991. Later in 2009, a cluster redevelopment scheme (CRS) that provided FSI
incentives to private development for redevelopment of cluster of old buildings was included in the
DCR. CRS is applicable for the redevelopment of clusters of cessed buildings, government/semigovernment buildings of at least 30 years old and slum areas that are notified in the island city of
Mumbai.
Process
CRS or Urban Renewal Scheme (URS) refer to any scheme for the development of a cluster of
buildings and structures over a minimum area of 4000 sqm in the Island City of Mumbai, bounding by
existing distinguishing physical boundaries and accessible by an existing or proposed DP road which
is at least 18 meter wide (Urban Development Department, Maharashtra, 2014). Redevelopment of
clusters is to be undertaken by Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Authority (MHADA) or
the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) or jointly with landowners, cooperative
13
Residential buildings constructed prior to 1960s in Maharashtra are called cessed buildings as the
government collects tax or cess from the residents or tenants of the buildings
34
housing societies or through promoters. If the promoter undertakes the scheme, after the approval of
the commissioner of the government, the promoter has to choose clusters as identified in the DP or
URP. The process mandates consent of at least 70% of the eligible tenants and the landlord. The
promoter submits urban renewal scheme proposals and undertakes the redevelopment programme in
phases. During the construction phase, eligible tenants are provided accommodation in transit camps
or in rental accommodations. The incentive to the promoter is the additional saleable FSI, which is
based on the ratio of land rate and rate of construction as per the annual schedule of rates.
CRS follows a Macro Level Plan with a Mandatory Impact Assessment Study: Similar to other land
assembling techniques it functions within the framework of a Development Plan (DP) or an Urban
Renewal Plan (URP) or an urban renewal scheme which might not be shown in the DP or for which an
URP is not prepared. The DCR mandates an impact assessment study to assess the impact of the scheme
on the city and the sector level infrastructure and amenities, traffic etc., prior to preparing the scheme. To
ensure that the reservations made in the DP are implemented through the scheme, there is an appointed
High Power Committee. The regulations also specify that the promoter has to hand over BUA area equal
to 30% of the zonal permissible FSI to the authority free of cost and free of FSI ,to ensure development of
health facilities under the scheme.
Land Assembling and Compensation Mechanism:
The scheme provides incentive FSI over and above the rehabilitation FSI to developers to cross-subsidise
the cost of rehabilitation tenants free in new and structurally safe houses (Mehta, 2011).The promoter of
the scheme pools land belonging to various categories of land holders including public land through the
following methods (Urban Development Department,Maharashtra, 2014)
•
Purchase of land belonging to state government or MCGM or MHADA or agency under state
government;
•
Exchange of such land with a suitable land of equivalent value as per land rates in the Annual
Statement of Rates (ASR);
•
Procurement of DR over such land;
•
Transfer of all land included in the CRS to a legal entity;
•
Acquisition of land, provided that promoter purchases rights over at least 70% of the land
comprised in the URC and there are dangerous buildings on the balance land contained in the
CRS.
Different percentage of incentive FSI for various ranges of amalgamated plots are used for the cluster
development. The incentive FSI admissible is based on the ratio of the land rate (LR) in Rs/sqm of the
35
land included in the URC as per the ASR and Rate of Construction (RC) in Rs/sqm applicable to the area
as per ASR (Urban Development Department, Maharashtra, 1991). CRS get an FSI of 4 and each eligible
tenant get carpet area equivalent to the area occupied by such tenant in the old building. Each eligible
slum dweller get a carpet area of 25 sqm in the scheme.
Advantages
•
The scheme facilitates rehabilitation of eligible tenants in better housing facilities as well as
development of public amenities such as open spaces and wider road networks on land which
otherwise remain non-accessible for public purposes;
•
The mechanism ensures that consent is obtained prior to proceeding with CRS and also mandates
a feasibility study to assess its impacts in advance;
•
The mechanisms issues provisions for upholding the rights of landless, pavement dwellers and
other EWS, and there are separate CRS guidelines for the redevelopment of slums. However, the
slums, pavement dwellers might be relocated elsewhere within the administrative boundary.
•
The scheme ensures that the eligible candidates are rehabilitated in the same redeveloped building
which they were using prior to redevelopment;
•
Reasonable opportunities are provided to promoters of the scheme to appeal against the decision
of the high power committee constituted for the URS ;
•
Post development profits are as: (i) the developer receives a percentage of BUA which can be
sold in the open market, (ii) the affected receive redeveloped housing and infrastructure, (iii) the
government receives BUA which can either be used for EWS housing, government housing or
sold for affordable housing.
Disadvantages
•
Mechanisms to prevent malpractices while obtaining the 70% consent is not clear, as there is a
possibility that the consent might be obtained through coercion;
•
Though the scheme requires consent of the tenants prior to the initiation of the process, there is no
scope for tenants to participate in the planning and implementation of the scheme;
•
The regulations for the CRS does not mention if the details of the scheme are publically shared
and do not provide time estimate for the process;
•
There is no separate grievance redressal system in place, with the appeals and complaints being
dealt by the State government or an officer appointed by the State government and hence fares
poor on transparency;
36
Outcome and Miscellaneous Facts of CRS
According to a newspaper article in 2009, at least 15 developers have lined up 35-40 projects to be
submitted to BMC for approval (Nandy, 2009). One Avighna Park in Parel is the first cluster
redevelopment project approved by BMC that is to be developed on a 6.5 acres of land for which the land
has been acquired in 2006 (Balakrishnan, 2013). Bhendi Bazaar, one of the dense location in the Island
city of Mumbai is taken up under URS and is expected to create more open spaces for parks, parking and
other amenities in the city (The Hindu, 2015). Recently Maharashtra announced extension of CRS to Navi
Mumbai, taking into account the prevailing unauthorised construction in the Gaothan areas with narrow
roads and poor public amenities
37
IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The history, culture, political economy and legislative legacy of India reveals that it will be difficult to
identify a single model that can be applied uniformly or accepted by all stakeholders across varied
contexts. The conclusions that can be drawn from a comparative assessment of the six documented
mechanisms are:
a) Broadly defined public Purpose
Mechanisms such as TPS, LPS, AR and TDR have explicitly stated all physical and social
infrastructure, amenities, national welfare, conservation of heritage and affordable housing as public
purposes. Whereas Joint Development Model of Haryana has a much broader definition and mentions
that areas need to be delineated for uses such as residential, industrial or Cyber Park purposes. Though
the term public purpose is not mentioned in the Joint Development Model of Haryana, the private
developers are mandated to develop physical and social infrastructure amenities as mandated by the
HDRUA Act within the development.
b) Recognition of Rights
While assessing the ownership details of the land for calculating the compensations, TPS, TDR and
AR recognizes individual and group rights of landowners, with less clarity on the rights of the landless
project affected families. Whereas LPS in addition to recognizing individual and group rights, also
considers the landless project affected families for arriving at compensations. In JDM, since the
developer purchases the land through market negotiations from the landowners, the mechanism does
not consider rights of the landless project affected families and owners do not benefit in post
development benefits.
c) Intermediaries Cash in on Knowledge Asymmetry
Legislations supporting LPS and TPS have detailed provisions with people’s participation at various
stages and notification processes. However irrespective of having such detailed process, speculatory
behaviour is evident in all the mechanisms with intermediaries usually tapping into the benefits of land
value increase.
d) Benefits Targeted at the Economically Weaker Section Often do not Percolate
While most mechanisms have provisions for affordable housing within their legislations, the
certainty of the EWS receiving these benefits is not built in. No mechanism details out who the
beneficiaries should be, how they are identified, details of disbursement etc. In certain cases land
38
assigned for affordable housing was diverted to other uses and there has not been any substantial
increase in the supply of affordable housing stocks for the EWS or the landless project affected
people.
e) Disjointed Development Patterns despite a Holistic Macro Spatial Plan
•
While all state led mechanisms are guided by a master plan and help to implement a larger
Development Plan, mechanisms like the JDM do not necessarily link the land development
carried out by the private developers with the phases of the city’s spatial plan. Hence, vast
patches of undeveloped land lie in between privately developed colonies and the rest of the
developed city, as seen in Gurgaon. Connectivity of these colonies by major arterials carrying the
utility trunk lines also gets delayed. Irregularities in spatial integrity can be attributed to the lack
of integration in the institutional arrangement for urban development process in Haryana. Despite
having a master plan for the development of capital city at Amravati, through LPS, vast tracts of
agricultural land are notified for procurement. TPS has not been inclusive to include village
settlements in the planned developments and master plans do not have provisions to include the
same in the TPS. However NAINA scheme has an integrated approach to development by
including village settlement areas into their development through separate norms and regulations.
•
Lack of zonal level plan and a feasibility study to assess the requisite absorptive capacity and
infrastructure facilities in the receiving areas of TDR has resulted in haphazard development of
built up areas in the receiving zones.
f) Efficiency in achieving the objectives of procurement:
•
Procedural Delays Affect the Success Rate of State Led Mechanisms
Gujarat has constantly amended its Town Planning Act enabling the success of the TPS such as
enabling the authority to undertake road development prior to the approval of the final scheme
and the reservation of land for cost recovery by the authority. However efficiency of the scheme
depends on the time taken for the land transactions as well as the development pace of the project.
While most of the mechanisms have a time bound process described, it was only the land pooling
scheme of Amaravati, which could complete the land acquisition process in less than a year’s
time. In addition to having well-defined rules for LPS, the supporting political economy of the
State played a significant role in the timely completion of the acquisition of lands. Whereas
delays at various stages of the TP scheme in some cases took over 20 years to complete and the
limited working capital available with authority has affected adversely the implementation of
various projects under TP scheme;
39
•
State Led Mechanisms are often Regionally Confined and Rely on Market Demand for Land
State led mechanisms are often confined to the areas or cities where the market demand for land
is high, as the financial feasibility of these mechanisms heavily rely on market demand for
serviced land. This leads to disjointed developments as seen in the city of Gurgaon in Haryana.
Mechanisms that are purely market growth driven will therefore not be suitable in distant rural
contexts, across geographies and income groups.
While it is difficult to come up with a single model for accessing land for public purposes, the
comparative assessment of various mechanism reveals that mechanisms such as TPS and LPS that have a
strong legally backing have a more holistic approach than the other mechanisms. TPS, LPS and CRS
ensures that developed land and its value increments are shared between the landowners and the land
acquiring agencies. While TPS has the advantage of having independent grievance redressal system, LPS
scheme of Amravati stands out because of its provisions to recognize the rights of the landless as well as
the time limits set for every stages of the process. In addition to these, automatic land use conversions and
skill development programmes for the affected are the other provisions that are unique to LPS. While TPS
took over 100 years to scale up from 1 sqkm to a 100 sqkms at a time, through LPS of Amravati, the
authority could assemble more than 130 sqkms in less than a year. However, the on ground impact of LPS
is yet to be assessed, as it is ongoing project for the development of Greenfield capital city at Amravati.
Despite being non holistic in approach, JDM of Haryana provided serviced land in Gurgaon and there has
been a spurt in investment post the enactment of HDRUA Act that allowed PPP model of land
development in the State. Mechanisms such as TDR, AR and CRS have evolved based on the contextual
need of Mumbai, where the land was scare and land prices were exorbitantly high. However the success
of these mechanisms largely depends on the market demand for land and built up space in a brownfield
context. Cluster redevelopment approach proved to be suitable in circumstances where there were no
proper approach roads or access to plots, as it involves amalgamation of several plots for organized
redevelopment.
WRI India’s forthcoming publication on ‘Alternatives to Access Planned and Serviced Land in India’ will
provide additional learnings, findings and analysis on State led mechanisms to access land for public
purposes in India.
40
V. RECOMMENDATIONS:
a) Identify Contextually Suitable and Holistic Alternative Mechanisms
•
Taking into account the local context, political economy and institutional framework, each city
could identify its own mechanism for accessing and developing land based on its land
development objects and current shortcomings in the land delivery mechanisms (Bertaud, 2010)
•
In addition to having a legal and regulatory framework which is considered as the cornerstone of
a land policy, mechanisms should also have a coordinated institutional structure with welldefined roles and responsibilities, and simplified and transparent procedures;
•
Laws and regulations that restrict recycling of obsolete government land should be made viable
for developments such as affordable housing, thereby minimizing the quantity of land estimated
for public purposes.
•
Development Rights and Floor Space Index that are linked to TDR and CRS in brownfield
developments have to be used appropriately without creating scarcity of lands and distortions in
the land markets.
b) Replicability of State Led Mechanisms possible through Legislative Amendments and Incentives
•
With the Maharashtra Town and Country Planning Act being the source of Town and Country
Planning Acts across most States of India, the frameworks of TPS are already embedded in many
State Acts. Amendments to ensure timely completion, cost recovery to recover costs through the
sale of land by the authority accommodating the needs of the landless project affected people
could be considered;
•
Incorporating firm limits in the contract of the development authorities as well as private
developers as experimented in case of Kerala could be explored to overcome the procedural
delays in the TP Scheme of Gujarat. In order to have less conflict, acquisition policies need to be
clear enough to define the specific purpose for which the government is acquiring land and also
need to be transparent, effective, efficient and fair procedures with public participation (Basnet,
2012). The specific purpose for which the land is acquired should be open for public discussion to
ensure that it is a genuine public purpose. As found in most of the State’s town and country
planning Act, it is also necessary to include provisions to return the undeveloped land to the
original owners if the intended public purposes is not developed within a stipulated timeframe.
•
While the Haryana Joint Development model was a very successful public and private
partnership, the externalities of exclusion of economically weaker sections needs to be addressed.
Making necessary improvements in contractual obligations could help to ensure better
compliance while bringing in much needed private capital to fund public infrastructure.
41
•
As an alternative strategy to address the issue of non-integration of development with spatial
plans, the planning sectors in the master plan could be contracted out to the private developers for
land acquisition, layout planning and development of city wide amenities and utilities (Souro D,
2006). Suitable contracts binding the private developers to ensure equity in their developments
will need to be formulated.
c) Accruing the Benefits of the National Land Acquisition Act to State Mechanisms
•
The RFCTLARR Act of 2013 brought in several changes such as rehabilitation schemes for
landless livelihood losers in form of subsistence allowance, employment opportunities and
provision of infrastructure amenities and basic amenities in the villages where the displaced
families are rehabilitated. Adapting and integrating such provisions provided in the central Act, to
the state led mechanisms would make them more equitable.
d) Macro Level Plans to guide Large Scale Land Acquisition Processes
•
Land acquisition strategies should be guided by a larger city level spatial plan such as master plan
or development plan and the institutional framework for it should ensure integration of the two
processes. The residential, commercial neighbourhoods, streets and public spaces that gets laid
out through a TPS or a JDM should not be just to accommodate and support, but also provide a
sustainable neighbourhood for future populations (Deuskar, 2011).
e) Exploring a Hybrid Mechanisms for Unique Urban Conditions to Access Land
•
As State led mechanisms are specific to the type of land they accesses such as brownfield
redevelopment, retrofitting, urban periphery and greenfield, a hybrid land policy that employs
different mechanisms based on contextual needs could be the answer to the several States in India
looking for alternatives to access land for public and developmental purposes
•
Acquiring/pooling only the required amount of land, avoiding irrigated multi cropped land,
including land owners as well as livelihood losers in benefits sharing and skill development
programmes for employment opportunities are some of the aspects that would reduce conflicts
while procuring land for public purposes;
42
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List of Figures & Boxes
Figure 1: Timeline tracing history of accessing land in India ....................................................................... 9
Figure 2: Land Use Reservations in the Town Planning Scheme, Gujarat ................................................. 19
Figure 3: Designation of land uses in the LPS for Amravati, Andhra Pradesh........................................... 23
Box 1: Challenges of compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes in India ..................................... 6
Box 2: Key Challenges of land supply in India .......................................................................................... 13
Box 3 : Six alternative mechanisms for accessing land for public purposes .............................................. 15
List of Tables
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Different Mechanisms .......................................................................... 16
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