European Network for Cyber Security
Commissioned by ElaadNL
EV Charging Systems
Security Requirements
Version 1.01 - August 2017
Contents
1
Introduction .................................................................................................... 3
1.1
Scope ...................................................................................................... 3
1.1.1
1.2
Architecture .............................................................................................. 4
1.3
How to Read the Requirements ................................................................... 6
1.3.1
2
3
Interoperability Requirements ............................................................... 4
Wording ............................................................................................. 7
1.4
Requirements Categories ........................................................................... 8
1.5
Stakeholders ............................................................................................ 8
EV Charging Security Requirements ................................................................... 9
2.1
Future-Proof Design ................................................................................... 9
2.2
Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols ......................................................10
2.3
Communication Security ...........................................................................14
2.4
System Hardening ....................................................................................19
2.5
Resilience ................................................................................................22
Support for Secure Operation ...........................................................................25
3.1
Access Control .........................................................................................25
3.1.1
3.2
User Authentication for the Authentication Terminal ...............................26
Logging ...................................................................................................28
4
Product Lifecycle and Governance .....................................................................31
5
Assurance ......................................................................................................35
6
Requirements for CPO and DSO Communication .................................................38
7
Glossary ........................................................................................................43
8
References .....................................................................................................48
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1 Introduction
This catalog describes security requirements for Electric Vehicle charging systems. Two
sets of requirements are included:
1. A set of requirement for the procurement of Charge Point. This set includes
requirements to make sure the Charge Point itself is secure (Section 2), that it has
all functionality needed to set up secure operational processes (Section 3), that its
Vendor takes measures to ensure its security throughout its lifecycle (Section 4),
and that measures are taken to assure that security measures have been
implemented well (Section 5).
2. A set of requirements for secure communications between the Charge Point
Operator (CPO) and Distribution System Operator (DSO). These requirements can
be used as part of the security requirements when new server systems are procured
or set up.
The definition of the requirements is based on the results of the Threat Assessment [2],
which identified the threats and possible attacks related to EV charging systems. Each
requirement is justified by one or more possible threats identified.
These requirements have been developed by the European Network for Cyber Security
(ENCS) for ElaadNL. ElaadNL intends to use and promote the requirements as the basis for
future development.
Questions regarding these requirements can be sent to: Harm.van.den.Brink@elaad.nl
1.1 Scope
The security requirements for the procurement of Charge Point cover the externally
reachable interfaces (see the architecture document [1]), that is:
1. the WAN interface,
2. the Maintenance interface, and
3. the User Authentication (UA) interface.
These interfaces are located on the Local Controller and Authentication terminal. For each
requirement it is indicated for which of these two devices it applies. In addition, the
requirements cover secure firmware updates for the EVSE.
The communication between the CPO and DSO concerns the CPO interface.
The requirements are device-specific and are set to be fulfilled by the vendor. The
requirements do not address operational security, for example operational requirements
for the Charge Point Operator or Distribution System Operators are not included. However,
the technical functionality needed for secure operations is included in the requirements,
and for selected requirements operational recommendations are given.
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1.1.1 Interoperability Requirements
The requirements are formulated in a technology and protocol independent manner. In this
way they can be applied to many different types of the devices included in the EV Charging
System. Charge Point Operators will choose different communication technologies and
protocols, and different software systems based on their particular situation. The
requirements in this document provide security for all possible choices.
Users of the requirements may want to complement these security requirements with
interoperability requirements. Some specific technologies may be required for integration
into a larger infrastructure.
Examples where interoperability requirements may be needed are:



The communication security requirements in section 2.3. To implement these
requirements, the devices need to use the same protocol as the software connecting
to it. Often protocols such as IPsec or TLS are used. Interoperability requirements
may be needed on the version and configuration of these protocols.
The logging requirements in section 3.2. More and more logging and event
information is being imported in Security Information and Event Management
(SIEM) systems. The SIEM may put particular requirements on the protocol used to
send the data and the format of the data.
The requirements for time synchronization in the logging requirements in section
3.2. Different technologies are available to provide this feature, such as NTP and
GPS. If a Charge Point Operator is already using one of these technologies, they
may require to use the same technology.
1.2 Architecture
Electric Vehicle charging systems are used to supply energy for charging Electric Vehicle.
The EV charging system groups multiple functions.
The EV Charging system is composed of Charge Points, Charge Point Operators and
Distribution System operators (DSOs).
The Charge Point plays the charging role in EV charging system by supplying energy from
the DSO to the Electric Vehicle.
The Charge Point has multiple other functions such as:




Providing and controlling the energy to the EV using the Electric Vehicle Supply
Equipment (EVSE) component
Collecting the measurements from the meter for each charge of an Electric Vehicle.
Identifying and authorizing EV users via user authentication component
Enabling remote capabilities (e.g. adjustment of the maximum energy allowed by
the Charge Point) to the Charge Point via the Local Controller component over WAN.
The Charge Point Operator’s (CPO) role is:


to give permission to the EV user to charge
to gather data, processes, and measurements
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




to send energy limits to control the energy flow allowed between the Charge Point
and the EV from the data given by the DSO.
To supply the connection to the CPO
To connect the CPO
To ensure power supply stability
To forecast… (not really done right now)
The DSO’s role is:


To forecast the available capacity
To ensure power supply stability
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the EV Charging Systems that are in scope of this
project.
Figure 1: EV Charging System Architecture.
The security requirements document [3] covers three areas (given by the grey boxes):
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1. The externally reachable interfaces on the Charge Point: the WAN interface, the
Maintenance interface, and the User Authentication (UA) interface. These interfaces
are located on the Local Controller and Authentication terminal.
2. The firmware updates on the EVSE. Requirements are included for the verification
of firmware signatures to allow secure firmware updates on the EVSE.
3. The communication between the CPO and DSO. This concerns the CPO and DSO
server systems. It is to be noted that sustainable energy producers that want to
control the energy load on the Electric Vehicle environment will have to comply to
the same requirements applicable to the DSO system.
All other components, shown in the white boxes, are out of the scope of these security
requirements.
Note in particular that the internal interfaces in the Charge Point are not covered by the
security requirements. This reflects the current situation in which most of these interfaces
use serial protocols with no security features. This exclusion of these interfaces implies
that the inside of the Charge Point is a trusted environment: anyone with physical access
to the internal systems can compromise the Charge Point. Physical security measures are
included in the requirements to prevent and detect unauthorized access to the Charge
Point internals.
The EV Charging System Architecture reference various items in the Graphic Legend:




An Entity represents a main part of the EV charging system.
A Device identifies the component included in the EV charging system. A device is
can contain Modules and can have Interfaces to communicate with other devices.
A Module identifies the physical part of the Device where important functionalities
are to be found.
An Interface defines the communication link between two Devices. The list of the
interfaces and the types of communication are defined below.
1.3 How to Read the Requirements
Each requirement is labelled with an identifier (Req.ID) and consists of the following five
items:




Device: The Device category defines a list of devices for which the Minimum
Requirement, Awarding Criteria and Recommended Assurance applies.
Minimum Requirement: A mandatory requirement is a compulsory function that
an entity, device, or module must perform. Statements in the requirements of this
document are compulsory for the vendor.
Awarding Criteria: Awarding Criteria are weighted and scored in the evaluation.
The weights and scores are not defined in this document but will be set by the
requesting organization.
Recommended Assurance: Recommended assurance provides guidance for
quality control. The vendor can see how the implementation of the requirement will
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be tested in a standard testing facility. Appendix A provides brief remarks and
references concerning the most common testing procedures.
Items may be left out for a particular requirement if they are not used.
The categories Minimum Requirement, Awarding Criteria, Recommended Assurance may
refer to Device. For each, Device listed in the category Device, the Minimum Requirement,
Awarding Criteria, and Recommended Assurance applies.
The CPO and DSO requirements in Section 6 are labelled with an identifier and an interface.
The following name are used as identifers:


Req.ID.CPO which stands for the CPO Server identified in the Architecture chapter
of this document or in the Architecture document [1]
Req.ID.DSO which stands for the DSO Server identified in the Architecture chapter
of this document or in the Architecture document [1]
After these five items, further clarification on the requirement is given. The clarification
can define certain terms, give examples of what is and is not allowed by the requirements,
or give a recommendation on implementing the requirement. A requirement does not have
to be implemented as in the recommendation, as long as the Vendor provides a good
justification on why their implementation meets the requirement (see requirement SUR.01
in Section 5).
The requirements use standard terminology from security and EV charging where possible.
If there is a possibility for confusion about a term, it will be defined in the clarification of
the first requirement where it is used, and printed in bold there. A glossary of terms is also
provided at the end of the document.
1.3.1 Wording
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [3]:

MUST This word, or the terms "REQUIRED" or "SHALL", mean that the definition
is an absolute requirement of the specification.

MUST NOT
This phrase, or the phrase "SHALL NOT", mean that the definition is
an absolute prohibition of the specification.

SHOULD This word, or the adjective "RECOMMENDED", mean that there may exist
valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full
implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different
course.

SHOULD NOT This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean that there
may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the particular behavior is
acceptable or even useful, but the full implications should be understood and the
case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described with this label.
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1.4 Requirements Categories
The requirements are divided in the following categories:









Future Proof Design (SFR): This category of requirements uses the SFR
identifier. These requirements aim at preventing lack of capabilities for future
security updates.
Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols (SPR): This category of requirements
uses the SPR identifier. There requirements aim at describing the cryptographic
algorithms, key lengths, pseudo random generator allowed to use.
Communication Security (SCR): This category of requirements uses the SCR
identifier. These requirements aim at defining the necessary security mechanisms
to implement for an end-to-end security for the EV Charging System.
System Hardening (SHR): This category of requirements uses the SHR identifier.
These requirements aim at providing hardening mechanisms for the Device.
Resilience (SRR): This category of requirements uses the SRR identifier. These
requirements aim at preventing issues due to misuse of the Device or the Interface.
Access Control (SAR): This category of requirements uses the SAR identifier.
These requirements aim at properly defining the Authorization mechanism on the
Device or on its Interface.
Logging (SLR): This category of requirements uses the SLR identifier. These
requirements aim at defining the detection mechanisms to put in place in order to
identify security issues that might occur on the Device or Interface.
Product Lifecycle and Governance (SDR): This category of requirements uses
the SDR identifier. These requirements aim at defining the processes used for
developing, manufacturing, and provisioning of the EV charging system Devices in
a secure way.
Assurance (SUR): This category of requirements uses the SUR identifier. These
requirements aim at describing the measures the Vendor should take to make sure
the EV charging system Devices will work securely.
1.5 Stakeholders
The stakeholders concerned with the procurement and product lifecycle of the EV charging
systems are Purchasers and Vendors.
This document uses the term Purchaser as replacement for charge point operator,
distribution system operator (DSO), utility, grid operator or similar. The term Vendor
stands for the party that sells the EV charging systems. The document does not distinguish
between a vendor and a manufacturer in case these are two separate entities. Ultimately,
the Vendor is held responsible for the security features of the product, i.e., the local
controller. In particular, the Vendor has to ensure that all components procured from a
supplier satisfy the requirements in this document.
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2 EV Charging Security Requirements
This section contains the technical requirements to keep the EV charging system secure.
Care has been taken to align these requirements with common standards and best
practices for security for devices used in the industrial control systems domain, such as
the IEC 60068-2-75 [4], the IEC 62351 series [11], and the IEC 62443 series (former ISA99) [10]. Moreover, the recommendations used for cryptographic algorithms are based on
recommendations documents, such as ENISA document on algorithms, parameters, and
key sizes [12] or BSI document [37].
2.1 Future-Proof Design
The requirements in this section concern future-proof designs for the EV charging system
Devices. Requirements are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier
with prefix “SFR.”.
SFR.01 Future-Proof Design
Device

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Device SHALL have sufficient reserves in memory and
computing power to allow updates to security functions that
security experts anticipate are necessary during the Device’s
lifecycle.
Recommended
Assurance

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.

Testing the performance of the Device for algorithms and
protocols anticipated for future use.
In this document a security function refers to any function on the Device that is needed
for it to be operated securely. Security functions include access control, authentication,
and encryption. All functions needed to implement the security requirements in this
document shall be considered as security functions.
There are several sources of expert forecasts on what security functions are needed in the
future. It is recommended that Vendors consult these sources when determining which
algorithms and protocols are needed in the future.
The ENISA documents on algorithms, parameters, and key sizes [12] marks some
algorithms as suitable for future use, while others are only suitable for legacy use. If legacy
algorithms are used by the Device, there should be sufficient resources to update it to an
algorithm in the same category suitable for future use.
Recommendations on which key sizes provide sufficient security in the future are available
from e.g. NIST [18], BIS [38], and ANSSI [38]. One way to show that sufficient
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computational resources are available, is to show that the Device can support the key sizes
required by these document at the end of the Device's lifecycle.
The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) classifies IPsec and IKEv2 options
in [15]; for each option BSI states a year until which the option is considered secure. The
label “2021+” means that the option is considered secure until the year 2021 and beyond.
SFR.02 Hardware Design
Minimum
Requirement
1. The RFID reader of the Device SHALL be easily and fully
replaceable in case new standards require changes of this part.
Recommended
Assurance

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.

Testing the performance of the Device for algorithms and
protocols anticipated for future use.
SFR.03 Remote Firmware Updates
Device

Local Controller
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Device SHALL support updating all security functions
through remote firmware updates.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance
This requirement does not forbid updates of security functions over the Maintenance
interface. Such a requirement would be operational and is left to the Charge Point
Operator to decide. SCR.03 details verification of the integrity of firmware updates.
2.2 Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols
The requirements in this section concern how to choose cryptographic tools and key
lengths. Requirements are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier
with prefix “SPR.”.
SPR.01 Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
Device

Local Controller

EVSE

Authentication Terminal
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Minimum
Requirements
1. For security functions, the Device SHALL use only cryptographic
algorithms for which a description is publicly available, and which
have been thoroughly reviewed by independent cryptographers.
2. For security functions the Device SHALL not use cryptographic
algorithms, protocols, and parameters if there are vulnerabilities
known for them.
3. If for a security function algorithms are available in [12], the
Device SHALL use one of these algorithms.
4. The Device SHALL use from [12] only those cryptographic
algorithms, and parameters considered suitable for legacy or
future use.
5. The Device SHALL use the algorithms in [12] implemented exactly
as they are described there without any modifications.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor can
be used to establish that only allowed cryptographic algorithms,
protocols, and parameters are used.

Functional security tests can be used to verify that the algorithms
are implemented as described in [12].

Cryptographic primitives can be certified with the
Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) [23].
Assurance
NIST
A cryptographic protocol is a protocol used for security functions, such as authentication
protecting confidentiality or integrity. Cryptographic protocols are implemented using
cryptographic algorithms, such as symmetric and asymmetric ciphers, and hash functions.
The cryptographic algorithms again depend on certain cryptographic parameters. The most
well-known example is the key size. If the key size for an algorithm is too small an
algorithm becomes vulnerable to brute-force attacks. Correct choices for other
cryptographic parameters, such as the initialization vector, are equally important for the
secure functioning of a protocol.
Vulnerabilities are considered known if they are in a public vulnerability database, or if an
advisory on them has been published. The ENISA report [12] provides a good overview of
the state-of-the-art for cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers, cryptographic hash
functions, stream ciphers, public-key primitives, and a key size analysis. The report is
updated annually to be in accordance with technical and scientific progress. When an
algorithm is marked as suitable for legacy use in this reports, it means that there are no
known vulnerabilities and the algorithm is considered good for current use. When it is
marked at suitable for future use, it is expected to remain secure for 10 to 50 years.
Some algorithms in [12] are not even allowed for legacy use, and are marked with an “X”
in the legacy column. Such algorithms are broken and considered insecure. They must not
be used on the Device for security functions.
Examples are:
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


The MD5 hash algorithm: an attacker can construct two distinct files with the same
MD5 hash value. In particular, it would be possible to produce a second firmware
image with different content but matching hash value.
The RC4 stream cipher: encryption can be broken due to biases in the key stream.
It is allowed to use algorithms for which vulnerabilities are known if they are not
used for security functions. For instance, cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) codes can
be used by the Device to detect accidental errors in the transmission of a message.
They should however not be used to check against deliberate modifications by
attackers (as required in SIR.02) as there are vulnerabilities known for them.
To interpret the requirement, it is important to distinguish between cryptographic protocols
and communication protocols, such as TLS, IPsec. Communication protocols usually use
several cryptographic protocols to implement their security features. Often they offer
different options for each feature. For instance, the TLS protocol allows both RSA and
(elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman for key exchange, and allows for different key sizes for each
protocol. If vulnerabilities are known for some of the cryptographic options allowed by a
communication protocol, it does not mean the communication protocol should not be used.
Instead, only secure options should be used, and others disabled.
For several communication protocols commonly used, there are vulnerabilities known for
all the cryptographic protocols used in older protocol versions. In that case the older
protocol version should not be used. Examples are:

All versions of SSL and TLS versions before 1.2 have known vulnerabilities. If the
Device uses TLS, it must use version 1.2 or greater.

SNMP versions before version 3 have known vulnerabilities.
Communication protocols with known vulnerabilities can be used if they are encapsulated
in other protocols that provide the security functions. The most common case is that
vulnerable protocols are encapsulated in secure network or transport layer protocols, such
as IPsec or TLS.
Many industrial protocols, such as Modbus, do not implement any security. Such protocols
should therefore always be encapsulated in secure lower layer protocols.
SPR.02 Cryptographic Random Number Generation
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device SHALL use a dedicated cryptographic pseudorandom number generator, as defined in FIPS 186-2 [24], FIPS
140-2 (Annex C) [26], AIS 20 [26], or AIS 31 [27], to generate
random numbers used for security functions. The Device SHALL
use the algorithms in [12] implemented exactly as they are
described there without any modifications.
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Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Proof of the implementation could be the reports of a
standardized test procedure such as the NIST Cryptographic
Algorithm Validation Program (CAVP) [23].

NIST SP 800-22 [35] provides a standardized test suite to look
for biases found in non-cryptographic random number generator
during a black-box test.
Random values are used for security function for instance in the generation of digital
signatures and cryptographic keys, or in authentication protocols.
The basic random number generators in many programming languages, such as the rand()
function in the C programming language, do not satisfy the requirements in the mentioned
standards. For Linux-based systems one can instead use /dev/random. The German BSI
recommends in [28] to use kernel versions starting from 2.6.21.5, 3.2, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7.
It is recommended to monitor vulnerabilities in implementations and update kernels
accordingly.
ENISA provides further requirements on pseudo-randomness generation in [12].
SPR.03 Key Management
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device MUST support remote updates of all credentials and
cryptographic keys.
2. The Device MUST support limiting the duration of a session to a
time length that is configurable by the purchaser.
Awarding Criteria
3. The Device SHOULD support establishing a fresh key for each
communication session.
4. The Device SHOULD support using different keys for different
services and applications.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Functional tests can be used to establish the functionality is
present on the Device.
Establishing a session key can only be done if the Device and the hosts it communicates
with use the same protocol. Hence, there may be interoperability requirements.
Because the Device supports key updates, it is possible to give each similar Device
individual keys. It is strongly recommended that this is done by Purchasers operating the
Device.
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Pre-shared keys are considered less secure than session keys. Attacks on cryptographic
algorithms often require a large amount of encrypted data. By using a session key, the
amount of data encrypted with one key is limited. Therefore, it is preferred that a fresh
key is generated for each session. In this context, a key should be considered fresh if it
was generated by a cryptographic random number generator (as defined in SPR.02) or a
cryptographic key exchange algorithm (such as Diffie-Hellman key exchange), and was not
used before.
Using TLS has the advantage that it allows different keys for different services and
applications, so that awarding criterion 4 is met.
SPR.04 Cryptographic Versioning
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device MUST implement version identifiers for the
communication protocol used which implement the security
functionalities.
2. The Device MUST be able to configure the minimum version of
the protocol that is allowed, and reject connections with older
protocol versions.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Functional tests can be used to establish the functionality is
present on the Device.
Cryptographic versioning of protocols is crucial to allow for updates of security in the field.
For instance, while a protocol is being updated with firmware updates, the CPO Server will
communicate with Charge Points with different protocol versions. The CPO Server needs
to be able to know which Charge Point uses which version, and which protocol version.
Otherwise this type of update is not possible.
Protocols such as TLS, IPSec, and SSH already implement this type of versioning.
2.3 Communication Security
The requirements in this section concern communication security for the EV charging
system Devices. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix “SCR.”.
The communication security only concerns the communication from devices in the Charge
Point with external systems. The communication interfaces within the Charge Points, such
as that between the Local Controller and the Authentication Terminal, typically rely on USB,
UART or serial connectivity. These communication channel are not required to be protected
by cryptographic measures. But requirement SHR.05 below does ask that the physical
perimeter of the Charge Point is protected.
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SCR.01 Confidentiality
Device

Minimum
1. The Device SHALL protect the confidentiality of communication on
the WAN interface by encrypting it using a protocol allowed by
SPR.01.
Requirements
Local Controller
2. The Device SHALL store passwords together with a salt using a
cryptographic hash function allowed by SPR.01.
Recommended

Assurance
This requirement is verified in a functional security test. The test
should in particular ensure that the allowed cryptographic
algorithms are supported and that disallowed algorithms are
rejected.
The default option for encryption in the OCPP protocol, used on the WAN interface, is to
use TLS. Using other solutions, such as VPNs, is also allowed, as long as they meet
requirement SCR.01.
Encryption on the Maintenance and Local Network interfaces is not required, as intercepting
traffic on them is not possible without local access in the Charge Point, and the value of
the information that can be captured in one Charge Point is low.
Special protection is required for passwords, because it should be the only truly confidential
information stored on the Role or Device. The requirements in this document are set up to
allow for different keys for each Device. If the Purchaser indeed uses different keys in
operations, attackers will benefit little from getting the keys out of the Device. They must
already compromise the Device to get the key, and they cannot use the keys on other
Devices.
It is still recommended to use different passwords for each Device. Attackers that
compromise the Device may still acquire passwords by capturing them when they are sent
to the Device. Using different passwords does require support from the tools used for
maintenance, and the central servers to remember the passwords. Engineers and
operators cannot be expected to remember passwords for hundreds of Devices.
The requirement does not apply to the Authentication Terminal. The architecture assumes
that the Authentication Terminal only communicates with external systems indirectly
through the Local Controller. The Local Controller is responsible for the security of these
communications.
SCR.02 Message Integrity
Device

Minimum
1. The Device SHALL verify the integrity of application layer
messages received on the WAN and Maintenance interface
using a message authentication algorithm allowed by SPR.01.
Requirements
Local Controller
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2. If the Device detects that a message has been modified or if it
cannot verify the integrity of the message, it SHALL reject or
drop the message.
3. The Device SHALL allow parties it communicates with on the
WAN interface or Maintenance to verify the integrity of
application layer messages it sends by using a message
authentication algorithm allowed by SPR.01.
Awarding
Criteria
4. The Device SHOULD verify the cryptographic integrity of
messages received on the Local Network interface.
5. The Device SHOULD allow parties it communicates with on the
Local Network interface to verify the integrity of application
layer messages it sends by using a message authentication
algorithm allowed by SPR.01.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Functional tests can be used to verify that the Device supports
the required functionality.

Carrying out a penetration test can be used to determine if the
Device verifies message integrity under all conditions.
Message integrity is usually verified using a message authentication code (MAC) or a block
cipher in authenticated encryption mode, such as Galois Counter Mode (GCM). Algorithms
for these are available in [12]. To be able to verify the integrity of an application layer
message, the entire message should be given as input to the message authentication
algorithm. No message fields should be left out.
The integrity of messages without application layer payload, such as acknowledgements,
does not have to be protected. Headers from lower layer protocols also do not have to be
protected. If these headers however include counters or information on the message’s
source, this information may still require integrity protection to meet requirements SCR.04
and SCR.05.
If IPsec is used to fulfil this requirement the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) should
use one of the authenticated cipher modes (AES-GCM or AES-CCM). Alternatively, the
Authentication Header (AH) should be configured using one of the allowed cryptographic
algorithms (see SPR.01).
This requirement concerns cryptographic message integrity. CRC checksums do not fulfil
the requirement. They are not allowed by requirement SPR.01.
A message is dropped if the Device does not send a reply. A message is rejected if the
Device replies with an error message or NACK.
On the Local Network interface message integrity checks are not a minimum requirement.
To exploit the lack of integrity checks, attackers also first need to have access to the
networks in the Charge Point.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
16
FINAL V1.01
This requirement does not apply to the Authentication Terminal, for the same reason as
for requirement SCR.01.
SCR.03 Firmware Integrity
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

EVSE

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device SHALL verify the integrity of firmware images
before they are applied.
2. The Device SHALL reject firmware updates if it detects the
firmware has been modified, or it cannot verify the firmware’s
integrity.
Recommended

Assurance
The functional requirement can be verified by testing the
implemented firmware-update functions.
Firmware integrity is usually verified by calculating a hash value of the firmware. Hash
functions are described in the ENISA document [12].
SCR.04 Message Freshness
Device

Minimum
1. The Device SHALL be able to detect replay attacks on the WAN
interface.
Requirements
Local Controller
2. If the Device detects that a message is replayed, it MUST reject
or drop the message.
Awarding
Criteria
3. The Device SHOULD be able to detect replay attacks all the
interfaces.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used to protect against replay attacks.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.
Assurance
To prevent replay attacks all messages should be secured by one of the following means:


By adding a counter.
By adding an authenticated nonce. It is essential that the nonce is authenticated
using a MAC algorithm.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
17
FINAL V1.01
VPN technologies such as IPsec need to explicitly enable replay protection in combination
with message authentication (SCR.02).
This requirement does not apply to the Authentication Terminal, for the same reason as
for requirement SCR.01.
SCR.05 Message Authentication
Device

Minimum
Requirements
1. The Device SHALL be able to determine that the source of a
message is a specific host in the EV Charging system.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used for message authentication.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.

Penetration tests can be used to ascertain that attackers cannot
bypass the authentication mechanisms.
Assurance
Local Controller
Authentication concerns being able to determine the source of a message. There are
different levels of detail possible here. The source can be a host in the network, such as
the CPO Server, or a user of the EV Charging System. The requirement only asks for the
first type of authentication, because the OCPP protocol does not support more fine-grained
authentication. The first type of authentication can be implemented for instance by using
server certificates within TLS.
This requirement is usually met by using message authentication code (MAC) or a block
cipher in authenticated encryption mode, as for requirement SCR.03. These algorithms
allow the Device to check that a message is sent by someone who has access to the key
used for them. Requirement SCR.05 puts restrictions on who can have the key. If preshared keys are used, different keys must be used for different roles or hosts. If session
keys are used, the protocol used to agree on the session key should check whether the
user making the request has a certain role or is in on a certain host.
This requirement does not apply to the Authentication Terminal, for the same reason as
for requirement SCR.01.
SCR.06 Non-Repudiation
Device

Local Controller

EVSE

Authentication Terminal
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Device SHALL support non-repudiation for firmware: when
it installs firmware, it SHALL be able to prove that the firmware
came from the Vendor.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used for non-repudiation.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.

Penetration tests can be used to ascertain that attackers cannot
bypass the non-repudiation mechanisms.
Assurance
Non-repudiation means that a sender of the firmware should not be able to deny that he
sent it. It is normally implemented using digital signatures. A hash value of the firmware
is calculated, and signed using public-key cryptography. The private key is kept by the
Vendor (see SDR.03). The public key for the validation of the signature can be installed on
the Device during the manufacturing process. SDR.08 defines Production Security &
Credential Provisioning. It is not needed to keep the public key secret. Measures should be
taken to make sure the correct key is installed however.
It is not necessary that the Purchaser establishes a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) at the
Central System for this purpose. The Vendor has to store the private firmware signing key
as express in the Section 4 Product Lifecycle and Governance.
2.4 System Hardening
The requirements in this section concern hardening of the EV charging system Devices.
Requirements are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix
“SHR.”.
SHR.01 Device Hardening
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device SHALL have all unneeded services and applications
removed, or disabled if removal is not possible.
2. The Device SHALL not use services or applications for security
functions if there are vulnerabilities known for them.
3. The Device SHALL use only communication protocols that are
needed to meet the functional requirements.
Recommended
Assurance

Vulnerability scanners can automatically check devices for known
vulnerabilities.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
19
FINAL V1.01

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance that
this requirement is adequately implemented.

If high-impact functions are disabled in the Device code, the
Purchaser can request a code review from the Vendor.
Examples of unused services and application that should be removed or disabled are:
Testing and debugging applications used for initialization or testing during the
production process.
Webservers used as graphical user interfaces (GUIs) or for maintenance purposes if
maintenance is normally done through a specialized application.

FTP servers used during installation.

Drivers for hardware that is not in the Device.

A telnet service when SSH is also available.

NTP or DNS servers if these are not used by other devices in the EV Charging
System.

Vulnerabilities are considered known if they are in a public vulnerability
database, or if an advisory on them has been published.
Webservers/GUIs are often prone to code injection, buffer overflows and other
vulnerabilities, they pose a high risk when directly accessible from a remote connection.
The OWASP list [30] provides a good overview of known web vulnerabilities.
SHR.02 Interface Minimization
Device
Minimum
Requirements

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device SHALL have any unneeded interfaces and ports
removed, or disabled if removal is not possible. In particular, all
hardware interfaces that are used for debugging MUST be
completely removed after production.
2. The Device SHALL not allow direct remote access to modules
apart from the local controller.
Recommended

Assurance
Carrying out a penetration test can provide assurance that this
design requirement is adequately implemented.
Redundant and unused ports could include

USB ports

Ethernet ports

Serial ports
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
Microcontrollers and processors are often equipped with hardware interfaces, such as
JTAG, and Serial Wire Debug. These interfaces allow programming or debugging of the
respective components and are required for example in the course of production. They
should be disabled in operational systems.
SHR.03 Account Hardening
Device

Minimum
1. The Device MUST NOT contain active default, guest and
anonymous accounts.
Requirements
Local Controller
2. The Device MUST not allow remote access to root accounts on
the Device.
3. The Device SHALL have Vendor-owned accounts removed where
feasible.
Awarding
Criteria
4. The Device SHOULD support enforcing a password policy that
only allows passwords of sufficient complexity.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance
that this design requirement is adequately implemented.
SHR.04 Security-enhancing features
Device
Awarding

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
Criteria
6. The Device SHOULD deploy security-enhancing features of the
underlying platform, implementation language and tool chain
when it enhances the Device security.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor on
which security enhancing features are used.

Functional tests can be used to verify that features are indeed
used.
Assurance
Examples of security-enhancing features are:


Compiler options that enhance security, such as adding checks to buffer overruns
to the code.
Secured boot process where the boot loader verifies the integrity of the firmware
at startup.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
21
FINAL V1.01



Use of a secure element such as a Hardware Security Module (HSM) and Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM).
Encryption of non-volatile memory.
Activation of read-out protection enabling functions of a microcontroller.
Whitelisting of programs and services to prevent that malware is executed on
the system.
The use of processor features that enhance security, such as ARM Trust Zones.
Using these features is not needed to meet the security requirements in this document.
They can however add an extra layer of defense.
SHR.05 Protection against Physical Manipulations
Minimum
Requirements
1. Physical manipulations
recognizable.
of
the
Charge
Point
SHALL
be
2. The Charge Point door SHALL provide sufficient protection
against physical manipulations.
3. The opening of the Charge Point door SHALL be recognized using
suitable means such as sensors. Any opening of the Charge Point
door SHALL generate an event in the security log.
4. The removal of any part of Charge Point SHALL generate an event
in the security log.
Awarding
Criteria
5. The vendor SHOULD provide design evidence ensuring that this
requirement is addressed.
Recommended

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance
that this design requirement is adequately implemented.

Analysis of the penetration test results.
Assurance
2.5 Resilience
The requirements in this section concern resilience of the EV charging system Devices and
the communication sent and received by the EV charging system Devices. Requirements
are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix “SRR.”.
SRR.01 Message Validity Verification
Device

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
Minimum
1. The Device SHALL verify the validity of all messages it receives.
Requirements
6. The Device SHALL reject or drop messages that are invalid or for
which the validity cannot be verified.
Recommended
Assurance

It is recommended to carry out fuzzing tests on all interfaces.

The Vendor should provide a detailed documentation of all
security tests.
A message is considered valid if it meets all protocol specifications, it makes sense for
the Device’s configuration, and it meets all requirements the Device has on data sizes.
Examples of validity checks include checks of syntax, data format, and value ranges.
The Device should also check if registers or data objects reference by a message exists,
and if the data fits into internal buffers allocated for it.
The requirement is valid for all network protocol layers, including the wireless protocols,
TCP/IP stack, and application layer protocols.
SRR.02 Fail-Secure Operation
Device
Minimum

Local Controller

Authentication Terminal
1. The Device SHALL be fail-secure, i.e., it SHALL be designed to
Requirements
fail in a manner that limits any security compromise of its own
operation and security compromise of other devices.
2. The Device SHALL not leak confidential information, such as keys
or credentials, on any interface during a failure.
3. The Device SHALL protect the integrity of security critical data
during failures.
4. The Device SHALL not allow access controls to be bypassed
remotely during failures.
5. The Device SHALL restore availability after software failures as
soon as possible.
Recommended
Assurance

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance of
the design robustness.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
23
FINAL V1.01
Point 5 can be addressed by implementing a watchdog functionality that allows the
device to maintain a secured operational state in case of a failure.
Examples for relevant failures are:

Integrity errors, e.g. of configurations or log files;

Failures during execution of cryptographic functions;

Failures during validation of login credentials;

Failures when entering data (wrong data format, wrong data length, invalid
commands etc.).
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
24
FINAL V1.01
3 Support for Secure Operation
The requirements in this section concern access control and logging of security events, two
services needed to securely operate the EV charging system Devices.
3.1 Access Control
The requirements in this section concern access control for the EV charging system
Devices. Requirements are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier
with prefix “SAR.”.
SAR.01 Access Control
Device

Minimum
1. On the WAN interface, the Device SHALL allow to restrict access
to certain hosts.
Requirements
Local Controller
2. On the Maintenance interface, the Device SHALL allow to set
access privileges to functions per role.
3. On the Maintenance interface, the Device SHALL only grant
access to configuration and firmware update functions if a user’s
role has the right privileges.
4. The Device SHALL allow new roles to be defined.
5. The Device SHALL allow to assign to each role individual security
credentials and keys.
Recommended

This requirement is verified in a functional security test. The test
should in particular ensure that each role has only the defined
and necessary privileges.

Penetration testing can be used to make sure that the access
controls cannot be circumvented by for instance privilege
escalation.
Assurance
The requirement on the WAN interface is more limited, because the commonly used OCPP
protocol does not support more fine-grained access control.
Separation of different roles is required on the Maintenance interface, to simplify
maintenance procedures. It allows for instance to set different privileges for engineers from
DSOs and from CPOs.
The requirement does not specify how users are assigned to roles. This can be arranged
for instance by having the maintenance tools or the Local Controller itself contact a central
authentication server.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
25
FINAL V1.01
SAR.02 User Authentication
Device

Awarding
1. The Device SHOULD authenticate the communication parties on
the WAN interface using a challenge-response protocol based on
either message authentication codes or public-key certificates.
Criteria
Local Controller
2. The Device SHOULD terminate the connection if the user
authentication fails.
3. The Device SHOULD authenticate the communication parties on
the Local Maintenance interface.
4. The Device SHOULD support blocking authentication requests,
either temporarily or permanently, from an account after a
number of failed login attempts. The number of failed login
attempts and the time the account is blocked SHOULD be
configurable.
Recommended

The implementation of user identification can be verified in a
functional security test.

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance that
this design requirement is adequately implemented.
Assurance
3.1.1 User Authentication for the Authentication Terminal
One area of special concern is how end-users, that is people who want to charge their car
at the Charge Point, authenticate themselves. It is assumed that they authenticate
themselves with a token, such as an RFID card. The Authentication Terminal uses the UA
interface to read and authenticate the end-user token. Once the end-user token has been
successfully authenticated, the Authentication Terminal forwards the end-user token ID to
the CPO for management of authorization of access to the EV services.
SCR.07 End User Authentication
Device

Minimum
1. The Device MUST support a cryptographic challenge-response
authentication protocol to authenticate the end-user token.
Requirements
Authentication Terminal
2. If the challenge-response protocol is used, the Device SHALL
only accept an end-user token ID as valid once the end-user
token has been successfully authenticated.
3. The Device MUST support UID identification.
4. The Device MUST support disabling the UID identification
mechanism remotely, if this is desired.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
26
FINAL V1.01
5. If a common master key is used in the authentication protocol
that is shared between all Charge Point, the Device SHALL store
it in a Secure Access Module.
Awarding
Criteria
2. The Device SHOULD rely on an internal Secure Access Module
(SAM) to manage keys involved in the authentication protocol.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor on
the authentication protocol.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the authentication
protocol is indeed implemented.

Penetration tests can be used to ascertain that attackers cannot
bypass the authentication protocol.
Assurance
The authentication between the AT and the end-user token consists in verifying that this
token is valid and has been issued by an authorized party. This allows to use the ID it
contains as the identity of the end-user.
The support for UID identification as an authentication mechanism is integrated for
supporting legacy tokens. It shall be however possible to disable this mechanism in the
future, if it is no longer desired to use UID identification mechanism.
A challenge-response authentication protocol prevents replay attacks.
Cryptographic algorithms and related key lengths used in the authentication protocol needs
to be comply with required stated in SPR.01. Also, challenge data used in the authentication
protocol needs to be using cryptographic randomness as in SPR.02.
With a challenge response protocol, authentication protocol between the AT and the enduser token can rely on 2 types of keys:


A diversified symmetric key. End-user tokens keys are obtained from a key
derivation algorithm from a common master key and the ID of the token.
Compromise of a specific token key only compromise this key, not all token keys.
However, Authentication Terminals have to have access and store the common
master key. A Secure Access Module (SAM) has to be used to securely store this
key and derive tokens keys according to their ID.
Asymmetric keys. End-user tokens store private keys to authenticate, whereas the
Authentication Terminal only has to store a public key. This requires more high-end
tokens and can introduce a delay in the duration of the authentication.
For token authentication, the stored credentials on the AT depend on the authentication
protocol. It may be a shared symmetric key, or a public key of the token.
Trust in the system also rely on the tamper protection of the end-user token, that prevents
unauthorized users to access or modify cryptographic keys and ID stored in the token.
Procurement of reliable, recent tokens and whose resistance to attacks has been evaluated,
for instance according to Common Criteria standard [19], is recommended.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
27
FINAL V1.01
The implementation of these security mechanisms is typically performed at the application
layer, and may vary. Developers shall however ensure that the underlying transport
protocol is compatible with security mechanisms such as challenge-response.
Typically, most RFID applications on cards should be compatible either with ISO 14443 or
ISO 15693 [40]. Other kinds of tokens may be used, such as smartphones, in what case
standards such as ISO 18092 [41] may be used. These standards do not define security
mechanisms, but allow the use of security mechanisms such as challenge-response,
through applicative protocols such as ISO 7816-3 and 7816-4 [42] [42](for smartcards)
or proprietary mechanisms such as Mifare [43], FeliCa [44], Calypso [45] or Cipurse [46].
Developers shall verify whether the cryptographic
authentication protocols comply with SPR.01.
mechanisms
offered
by
the
3.2 Logging
The requirements in this section concern logging of events. Requirements are grouped into
different items. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix “SLR.”.
SLR.01 Logging Security Events
Device

Local Controller
Minimum
1. The Device SHALL log security events in a locally stored log.
Requirements
2. The Device SHALL take measures to prevent that attackers can
modify, delete or overwrite the security log to hide their traces.
3. The Device SHALL support automatically sending log events to a
central logging server or SIEM.
4. The Device SHALL support synchronization with a centrally
maintained time.
Awarding
Criteria
5. The Device should allow remote monitoring of information about
the device status such as processor and memory usage.
6. The Device should store for each security event at least the
interface, the event type, a time stamp, and the user, role, or
process causing the event.
Recommended

The implementation of logging mechanisms can be verified in a
functional security test.

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance
that attackers cannot bypass detection mechanisms or modify
the security log.
Assurance
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
28
FINAL V1.01
In the requirements below security events are any events relevant to the secure
operation of the Device. Security events include at least the following:


User Activities:
o
Successful logins
o
Failed login attempts
Changes of security credentials
o


Unauthorized file access
Possible signs of attacks:
o
Resource exhaustion (DoS)
o
Messages whose integrity could not be verified
o
Invalid messages
o
Attempted replay attacks
o
Alarms on physical manipulations
Updates or changes:
o
Firmware Updates or patches
o
Configuration Changes
Common methods to export security events to a central
SNMP.
Syslog
allows
integration
with
many
Time synchronization is required to allow logs events
correlated. Different technologies are available for time
and GPS.
logging server are syslog and
different
SIEM
solutions.
from different devices to be
synchronization, such as NTP
SLR.02 Logging Security Events
Device

Minimum
1. The Device SHALL send the log security events to the Local
Requirements
Awarding
Authentication Terminal
Controller.

Criteria
The Device should send to the Local Controller for each security
event at least the interface, the event type, a time stamp, and
the user, role, or process causing the event.
Recommended

Assurance
The implementation of logging mechanisms can be verified in a
functional security test.

Carrying out a penetration test can provide further assurance
that attackers cannot bypass detection mechanisms or modify
the security log.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
29
FINAL V1.01
In the requirements below security events are any events relevant to the secure
operation of the Device. Security events include at least the following:


User Activities:
o
Successful logins
o
Failed login attempts
Changes of security credentials
o

Possible signs of attacks:
o

Unauthorized file access
Invalid transaction messages
Updates or changes:
o
Firmware Updates or patches
o
Configuration Changes
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
4 Product Lifecycle and Governance
The requirements in this section concern the processes used for developing,
manufacturing, and provisioning of the EV charging system Devices in a secure way.
Requirements are grouped into different items. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix
“SDR.”.
There will be no recommendation regarding quality assurance for the requirements in this
section. It is recommended that the Purchaser asks for documentation to verify the
implementation of the requirements.
All requirements hold for the complete contractually agreed lifecycle of the EV charging
system Devices. All requirements apply to the Vendor and suppliers. This includes in
particular Third-Party Suppliers.
SDR.01 Information Security Management System
Minimum
Requirements
Awarding
Criteria
1. The Vendor SHALL implement an information security management
system (ISMS) the scope of which includes at least all systems used
to develop, test, manufacture and provision the Devices and any
software and hardware tools needed for the maintenance of the
Device.
2. The Vendor SHOULD have regular audits of the ISMS performed by
an accredited external auditor.
3. The Vendors SHOULD provide a proof of the audit to the Purchaser
on request.
4. The Vendor SHOULD obtain an ISO 27001 certification for the ISMS.
5. The Vendor SHOULD make a proof of the certificate available on
request.
6. The Vendors SHOULD share their security policies with the
Purchaser.
Quality assurance certification schemes such as the ISO 9001 are not sufficient to
meet this requirement.
SDR.02 Configuration Management System
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL employ a configuration management
system for the administration of (changes of) hardware
configurations and source code of devices.
2. The Vendor SHALL ensure that the configuration management
system stores for each change an explanation, the author, the
parts changed, and the time at which it was made.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
Awarding
Criteria
3. The Vendor SHOULD allow the purchaser to audit the
configuration management system.
SDR.03 Secured Versioning
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL ensure that all released versions of
hardware and firmware of the Device are uniquely identifiable.
2. The Vendor SHALL provide to the Purchaser a cryptographic
hash value for each firmware version.
3. The Vendor SHALL be able to reproduce released versions
within the contractually agreed product lifecycle, with
traceability provided by the hash value(s) as identifier(s).
4. The Vendor SHALL version exchangeable hardware modules
separately.
5. The Vendor SHALL digitally sign each firmware update
supplied to the Purchaser.
6. The Vendor SHALL protect the firmware signing keys as highly
confidential data.
7. The Vendor SHALL report it to the Purchaser if a firmware
signing key is compromised.
SPR.01 gives references for allowed cryptographic hash functions, and digital signing
algorithms.
The ISMS required by SDR.01 is normally used to determine the measures needed
to protect the firmware signing key. Point 6 of this requirement means that a
compromise of the confidentiality of the key should be treated as a high impact event
in the ISMS.
SDR.04 Vulnerability Handling Process
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL have an established and documented
process to handle vulnerabilities.
2. The Vendor SHALL monitor information sources
vulnerabilities to determine if it has been affected.
on
3. The Vendor SHALL address vulnerabilities found by the Vendor
itself, the Purchaser or system integrator, or external security
researchers.
4. The Vendor SHALL disclose to the Purchaser all known
vulnerabilities on the Device as soon as possible.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
32
FINAL V1.01
5. The Vendor SHALL communicate
Purchaser in a secure manner.
vulnerabilities
to
the
6. The Vendor SHALL issue a recommendation on how to mitigate
a vulnerability as soon as possible.
7. The Vendor SHALL evaluate the criticality of a vulnerability
using established standards (such as CVSS [36]).
8. The Vendor SHALL prioritize fixing vulnerabilities based on the
potential impact to the Purchaser.
Standards are available to objectively assess the impact of vulnerabilities, such as
CVSS [36]. These can be used as an aid to prioritize fixing vulnerabilities. It is
however recommended that the Vendor also takes into account the specific design of
the Device, and how it is used by the Purchaser, when assessing the potential impact.
SDR.05 Security Updates and Patching
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL provide security updates or patches for the
Device to fix high impact vulnerabilities found during the
Device’s lifecycle.
2. The Vendor SHALL test all security updates and patches prior
to deployment.
Awarding
Criteria
3. The Vendor SHOULD provide documentation that all security
patches were tested and validated prior to deployment.
4. The Vendor SHOULD provide tools enabling batch updating of
Devices.
5. The Vendor SHOULD release a patch or firmware update for a
vulnerability no more than three months after it was reported
to the Vendor.
The Vendor is allowed to leave vulnerabilities with a low impact unpatched. The
impact is defined after a risk analysis of the vulnerability as specified in SDR.06. Of
course it is not recommended to do so. Low impact vulnerabilities should always be
disclosed to the Purchaser by requirement SDR.04.
SDR.06 Security Training and Awareness
Minimum
1. The Vendor SHALL provide security training for the personnel.
Requirements
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
2. The Vendor SHALL be able to document that the necessary
knowledge to securely develop and securely produce products
is in place.
3. The Vendor SHALL name a technical expert responsible for
security-related matters who acts as contact person for the
Purchaser.
4. The Vendor SHALL conduct a risk analysis of the firmware
design and the corresponding system architecture.
Awarding
Criteria
5. The
Vendor
SHOULD
provide
documented
professional
experience in the area of IT security or a security certification,
e.g., CISSP or CISM.
SDR.07 Production Security and Credential Provisioning
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL ensure secure provisioning of cryptographic
keys, passwords and initial security credentials during the
manufacturing process.
2. The Vendor SHALL ensure a secure production area to ensure
the secure initial provisioning of credentials and cryptographic
keys to the device.
3. The Vendor SHALL establish a secure hand-over process of the
provisioned information to the central systems of the
Purchaser.
Initial security credentials include passwords.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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5 Assurance
The requirements in this section concerns measures the Vendor should take to make sure
the EV charging system Devices will work securely. Requirements are grouped into
different items. Each item has a unique identifier with prefix “SUR.”.
SUR.01 Design Evidence
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL document all interfaces of the Device, including
the protocols and services used on each interface.
2. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that sufficient reserves
are available to update security functionality to meet requirement
SFR.01.
3. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that only cryptographic
algorithms, protocols, and parameters allowed by SPR.01 are used
for security functions, including a description of which algorithms,
protocols, and parameters are used for which functions.
4. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that cryptographic
random number generation is implemented according to
requirement SPR.02, including a description of which random
number generator is used.
5. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence of the authentication
protocol required in for SCR.01.
6. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that firmware
authenticity is protected as required in SCR.02, including a step-bystep description of the firmware update process.
7. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that unused interfaces
are disabled or removed to meet requirement SHR.02.
8. If interfaces or services or disabled and not removed, the Vendor
SHALL provide information on how they have been disabled.
9. If security-enhancing features as described in requirements SHR.03
are used, the SHALL provide design evidence on how they are used.
10. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence on how the Device has
been made fail-secure to meet requirement SRR.02, including a list
of all relevant failure types and their countermeasures.
11. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that user authentication
is implemented as required in SAR.01.
12. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence that security logging is
implemented as required in SLR.01.
13. The Vendor SHALL provide design evidence at a level of detail that
makes it easy to verify that the security requirements are
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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implemented, and to test that they are implemented on the Device
as described.
14. The Vendor SHALL allow verification of the design evidence by an
independent third party selected by the Purchaser.
This requirement stresses that the Vendor provides the Purchaser design evidence. Design
evidence consists of documents produced during the design and development processes
that explain how the security requirements have been implemented on the Device. The
requirements in this document are formulated in a technology independent manner. The
Vendor has different options to implement them. To allow the Purchaser to verify that the
requirements are implemented correctly, it is important that they understand which option
was chosen.
If design evidence is sensitive from a security or competitive viewpoint, the Vendor can
supply it under an NDA, as long as the NDA allows for verification of the design evidence
by the Purchaser or an independent third party.
SUR.02 Security Testing
Minimum
Requirements
1. The Vendor SHALL perform tests to verify that all the security
requirements in this document have been implemented correctly.
2. These Vendor SHALL test the complete functional scope of the
Device, including the communication chain between the Device and
all connected field devices and the central systems.
3. The Vendor SHALL test both regularly used as well as rarely used
functionalities of the Device.
4. The Vendor SHALL document the concepts and details of the
security tests in a comprehensible way.
5. The Vendor SHALL use vulnerability scanners to test each released
firmware version on known vulnerabilities.
6. The Vendor SHALL allow the Purchaser to contract an independent
test lab to perform a security tests on the Device.
Awarding
Criteria
7. The Vendor SHOULD conduct robustness tests, such as fuzzing or
flooding, on all protocols used by the device both on the application
layer and on lower protocol layers.
8. The Vendor SHOULD conduct design and code reviews and provide
the results to the Purchaser.
Examples of security tests to verify the requirements are given for each requirement under
quality assurance.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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SUR.03 Secure Coding Practices
Awarding
Criteria
1. The Vendor SHOULD establish and enforce secure coding practices
for the development of the Device following best practices.
2. The Vendor SHOULD establish an internal code review process that
takes security into account.
3. The Vendor SHOULD use automated code analysis tools to find
security vulnerabilities.
Examples of secure coding practices are the SEI CERT coding standards [34], available for
different languages, and the MISRA C software development guidelines for embedded
systems. [20]
SUR.04 Secure Audit Collaboration
Minimum
Requirement
1. If the Purchaser desires to perform an additional security audit, the
Vendor SHALL collaborate with an external testing party named by
the Purchaser
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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6 Requirements for CPO and DSO
Communication
The requirements in this section specify the measures that should be taken to secure
communication between the CPO and DSO Servers. The requirement numbering is
consistent with the requirements for the Charge Point in Section 2. See the requirements
there for additional comments on the possible implementation.
SCR.01.CPO Confidentiality
Minimum
Requirements
1. The CPO system SHALL protect the confidentiality of
communication by encrypting it using a protocol allowed by SPR.01
over the CPO interface.
2. The CPO system SHALL protect the confidentiality of
communication by encrypting it using a protocol allowed by SPR.01
over the WAN interface.
Recommended

Assurance
This requirement is verified in a functional security test. The test
should in particular ensure that the allowed cryptographic
algorithms are supported and that disallowed algorithms are
rejected.
SCR.01.DSO Confidentiality
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL protect the confidentiality of
communication by encrypting it using a protocol allowed by SPR.01
over the CPO interface.
Recommended

Assurance
This requirement is verified in a functional security test. The test
should in particular ensure that the allowed cryptographic
algorithms are supported and that disallowed algorithms are
rejected.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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SCR.02.CPO Message Integrity
Minimum
Requirements
1. The CPO system SHALL verify the integrity of application layer
messages received, using a message authentication algorithm
allowed by SPR.01 over the CPO interface.
2. If the CPO system detects that a message has been modified
or if it cannot verify the integrity of the message over the CPO
interface, it SHALL reject or drop the message.
3. The CPO system SHALL allow parties it communicates; to verify
the integrity of application layer messages it sends by using a
message authentication algorithm allowed by SPR.01 over the
CPO interface.
4. The CPO system SHALL verify the integrity of application layer
messages received, using a message authentication algorithm
allowed by SPR.01 over the WAN interface.
5. If the CPO system detects that a message has been modified
or if it cannot verify the integrity of the message over the WAN
interface, it SHALL reject or drop the message.
6. The CPO system SHALL allow parties it communicates; to verify
the integrity of application layer messages it sends by using a
message authentication algorithm allowed by SPR.01 over the
WAN interface.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Functional tests can be used to verify that the CPO system
supports the required functionality.

Carrying out a penetration test can be used to determine if the
CPO system verifies message integrity under all conditions.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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SCR.02.DSO Message Integrity
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL verify the integrity of application layer
messages received, using a message authentication algorithm
allowed by SPR.01 over the CPO interface.
2. If the DSO system detects that a message has been modified
or if it cannot verify the integrity of the message over the CPO
interface, it SHALL reject or drop the message.
3. The DSO system SHALL allow parties it communicates; to verify
the integrity of application layer messages it sends by using a
message authentication algorithm allowed by SPR.01.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor.
Assurance

Functional tests can be used to verify that the DSO system
supports the required functionality.

Carrying out a penetration test can be used to determine if the
DSO system verifies message integrity under all conditions.
SCR.04.CPO Message Freshness
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL be able to detect replay attacks over
the CPO interface.
2. If the DSO system detects that a message is replayed, it MUST
reject or drop the message.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used to protect against replay attacks.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.
Assurance
SCR.04.DSO Message Freshness
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL be able to detect replay attacks over
the CPO interface.
2. If the DSO system detects that a message is replayed, it MUST
reject or drop the message.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used to protect against replay attacks.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.
Assurance
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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SCR.05.CPO Message Authentication
Minimum
1. The CPO system SHALL be able to determine that the source of
a sensor reading request or control command is a specific host
in the EV Charging system.
Requirements
2. The CPO system SHALL be able to determine that the source of
a OCCP message is the DSO system.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used for message authentication.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.

Penetration tests can be used to ascertain that attackers cannot
bypass the authentication mechanisms.
Assurance
SCR.05.DSO Message Authentication
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL be able to determine that the source
of a OSCP message is the CPO system.
Recommended

Analysis of the design documentation provided by the Vendor
on the mechanisms used for message authentication.

Functional testing can be used to verify if the mechanisms are
indeed implemented.

Penetration tests can be used to ascertain that attackers cannot
bypass the authentication mechanisms.
Assurance
SRR.01.CPO Message Validity Verification
Minimum
Requirements
1. The CPO system SHALL verify the validity of all messages it
receives.
2. The CPO system SHALL reject or drop messages that are invalid
or for which the validity cannot be verified.
Recommended

It is recommended to carry out fuzzing tests on all interfaces.
Assurance

The Vendor should provide a detailed documentation of all
security tests.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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SRR.01.DSO Message Validity Verification
Minimum
Requirements
1. The DSO system SHALL verify the validity of all messages it
receives.
2. The DSO system SHALL reject or drop messages that are invalid
or for which the validity cannot be verified.
Recommended

It is recommended to carry out fuzzing tests on all interfaces.
Assurance

The Vendor should provide a detailed documentation of all
security tests.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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7 Glossary
This glossary serves as inventory of technical terms and abbreviations used in the
document. For detailed background information on cryptographic primitives or testing
procedures we refer to the referenced literature.
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard. Original name for this block
cipher was Rijndael named after its designers Vincent Rijmen
and Joan Daemen.
Application layer
OSI-Layer 5-7.
Authentication
When speaking about authentication one should distinguish
between user authentication (e.g., sender/receiver) and
message authentication.
Block cipher
Cryptographic primitive to encrypt/decrypt messages of fixed
block length. Example: AES encrypts blocks of 128 bits (16
bytes) at a time.
Block cipher Mode of
Operation
A mode of operation specifies how the message blocks are
processed by the block cipher. Using a block cipher in CBC or
CTR mode provides encryption only whereas using a block cipher
in CCM or GCM mode encrypts the plaintext and produces a
message authentication tag for the ciphertext.
Certificate
A digital certificate authenticates a public key or entity. See also
Public-Key Infrastructure.
Challenge-response
authentication
Mechanism to prove an entity’s identity to another entity. (e.g.
username/password)
Confidentiality
Only authorized entities may access confidential data. To protect
data from unauthorized access it can be encrypted. Then only
entities with access to the secret keys can access the data after
decrypting it.
Cryptographic
function
hash
Cryptographic hash functions should behave as one-way
functions. They must be preimage resistant, 2nd preimage
resistant, and collision-resistant. Changes in the input must
produce explicitly different results in the output. Example: SHA256. See also ENISA [12].
Cryptographic
A protocol used for security functions, such as authentication
protocol
protecting confidentiality or integrity.
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Cryptography
The ENISA Algorithms, Key Sizes and Parameters Report [12]
provides an overview of the current state of the art.
Data Integrity
See Integrity and Message authentication.
Design Evidence
Documents produced during the design and development
processes that explain how the security requirements have been
implemented on the Device.
Digital Signature
Authenticates the sender. In practice digital signatures are
implemented using elliptic curves (EC). See standards such as
[14][18] and [25][31] for the implementation of the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA).
EC
Elliptic Curve. See also ENISA [12].
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm.
Encryption
Using a cryptographic scheme the message is mapped to a
random-looking undecipherable string (ciphertext). Decryption
reverses the encryption process and can only be performed with
the corresponding decryption key. This decryption key is either
the same as the encryption key (symmetric cryptography) or the
private key in a public-key cryptosystem. The confidentiality of
the message can be guaranteed only while the keys are kept
secret.
End-User Token
An End-User Token is a device that includes a chip to store the
Unique Identification Number of the user. It is used combined
with a wireless technology such as RFID to authenticate the EV
User.
ENISA
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security.
EPRI
Electric Power Research Institute.
Fuzzing Test
A fuzzing test provides quality control of software used for
secure network communication. A fuzzing test generates a high
volume of mostly random data including malformated messages
and observes the reaction of the device/system under test. More
information on fuzzing is provided in [26][32].
GPRS
General Packet Radio Service.
GPS
Global Positioning System.
Hash function
Function that maps a message to a bit string of fixed length
(hash value). See also cryptographic hash function.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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Hash value
Output of a (cryptographic) hash function. The length is fixed in
the specs of the hash function.
ICS
Industrial Control System.
IETF
Internet Engineering Task Force.
Integrity
Data cannot be altered without authorization. See also message
authentication.
ISO 27001
ISO standard for information security. Current version at the
time of writing: ISO27001:2013.
Key material
The term ‘key material’ includes all cryptographic keys.
Examples: master key, symmetric session keys, private and
public keys (public-key cryptography).
LAN
Local Area Network.
LDAP
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol.
Maintenance
interface
See Deliverable D1.1 [1] on the reference architecture.
MAC
Message authentication code. Provides data integrity. Examples:
CMAC, GMAC. See also ENISA [12].
Message
authentication
Messages
should
be
protected
against
unauthorized
modifications. The message should always be sent together with
an authentication tag providing its authenticity. Such an
authentication tag can be the second output of an authenticated
cipher such as AES-CCM or AES-GCM or a message
authentication code.
Message Validity
A message is considered valid if it meets all protocol
specifications, it makes sense for the Device’s configuration,
and it meets all requirements the Device has on data sizes.
NESCOR
National Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource.
Program issued by the US organization EPRI. See [27][33].
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Nonce
A nonce is a unique randomly generated string which can be
used exactly once. Attachment of a nonce helps to prevent
replay attacks.
NTP
Network Time Protocol.
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OSI
Open Systems Interconnection. Reference model for network
communications.
Password
authentication
The user proves his/her identity using a password or PIN.
Penetration test
For a guideline refer to the EPRI program NESCOR, specifically
the “AMI Penetration Test Plan“.
Product lifecycle
The product lifecycle spans all stages of a product: starting from
the design through the development and production to delivery
and decommissioning.
The Purchaser and Vendor should agree on the length of the
product lifecycle.
Public-key
cryptography
Cryptographic scheme where a public key is published and
henceforth can be used for encryption of messages or
verification of digital signatures. Each public key has a
counterpart, the corresponding private key. This key must be
kept secret and is used for decryption or digital signing of
messages. Public-key primitives have a high computational
complexity for encryption and therefore are mostly used as part
of a hybrid encryption scheme where the public key is used to
communicate a common symmetric session key under which all
further communication is encrypted.
Certificates administered by a public-key infrastructure are used
to establish the authenticity of the public key. See also ENISA
[12].
The most popular public-key encryption scheme is RSA. Digital
signatures can be generated most efficiently with elliptic-curve
based (EC) mechanisms.
Public-key
infrastructure
System to generate, administer, and revoke certificates.
Replay attack
The attacker observes and captures data during a session with
the intention of resending it later and thus impersonating one
communication partner.
RFC
Requests for Comments. Published by the IETF.
Robustness test
A robustness test provides quality control by checking the design
stability/robustness of the system. The tests check in particular
the fault tolerance of the system.
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RSA
Public-key cryptosystem named after its inventors Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman.
Security Event
Any event relevant to the secure operation of the Device.
Security Function
Any function on the Device that is needed for it to be operated
securely, including access control, authentication, and
encryption.
Session key
Symmetric key with a limited lifetime.
Symmetric
cryptography
Sender and receiver hold the same key. Examples for symmetric
primitives are block ciphers or MACs.
User Authentication
Verification of the identity of the communication partners (e.g.,
user on the local controller). Moreover, verification that the
communication partners are still alive throughout a session. See
also password authentication and user authentication.
WAN
Wide Area Network.
WAN Interface
Remote connection to Central System. See Deliverable D1.1 [1]
for the Reference Architecture.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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8 References
[1]
European Network for Cyber Security. Reference Architecture for Secure EV
Charging Systems. Deliverable D1.1 in the EV Charging Project. Final
Version, April 2016.
[2]
European Network for Cyber Security. Reference Threat Assessment for
Secure EV Charging Systems. Deliverable D1.2 in the EV Charging Project.
Final Version, April 2016.
[3]
European Network for Cyber Security. Mapping of OCPP with analysis against
the Reference Requirement for Secure EV Charging System. Final Version,
April 2016
[4]
BDEW Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft e.V.,
Anforderungen an Sichere Steuerungs und Telekommunikationssysteme
(Requirements for Secure Control and Telecommunication Systems), v.01,
2008 (English and German).
[5]
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Cyber Security Procurement
Language for Control Systems. September 2009.
[6]
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) Standards.
http://www.nerc.com/pa/Stand/Pages/CIPStandards.aspx (last accessed on
17 January 2016)
[7]
IEG 60068-2-75:2014, Environmental testing - Part 2-75: Tests - Test Eh:
Hammer tests
[8]
IEC Technical Committee 23, “IEC 62196 ed2.0: Plugs, socket-outlets,
vehicle connectors and vehicle inlets - Conductive charging of electric
vehicles,” Geneva, 2011.
[9]
Open Charge Point Protocol SOAP 1.6, OCPP-S 1.6 Specification, 2015
[10]
IEC 62443 and ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security
Standards.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
[11]
IEC 62351. Power systems management and associated information
exchange – Data and communications security. Parts 1-8.
[12]
ENISA European Network and Information Security Agency, Algorithms, key
size and parameters report 2014, 2014. (last accessed on 17 January 2016)
[13]
reserved
[14]
Internet Engineering Task Force. RFC 7296: Internet Key Exchange Protocol
Version 2 (IKEv2), 2014. https://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7296.txt (last accessed
on 17 January 2016)
[15]
Internet Engineering Task Force. RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, 2008. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt (last
accessed on 17 January 2016)
[16]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. TR-02102-3:
Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen Teil 3 –
Verwendung von Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) und Internet Key
Exchange (IKEv2). Bonn, Germany. Version 2015-01.
[17]
Internet Engineering Task Force. RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites
with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM), 2008.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5289.txt (last accessed on 17 January 2016)
[18]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-57
Part 1 Rev. 3, Recommendation for Key Management, July 2012.
[19]
Common Criteria Evaluation methodology, September 2012, Version 3.1
revision 4, ref. CCMB-2012-09-004
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CEMV3.1R4.pdf
[20]
MISRA C software development guidelines for embedded systems,
http://www.misra.org.uk/
[21]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-38C:
Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation. The CCM mode for
authentication and confidentiality (including updates as of 07-20-2007).
2007.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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FINAL V1.01
[22]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-38D.
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) and GMAC. November 2007.
[23]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Cryptographic Algorithm
Validation Program. http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/ (last accessed on
17 January 2016)
[24]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Annex C: Approved Random
Number Generators for FIPS PUB 140-2 [25], February 2012.
[25]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS PUB 140-2, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001.
[26]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik: Anwendungshinweise
und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 20, Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren,
Version 3.0, Bonn, Germany, May 2013. (in German)
[27]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik: Anwendungshinweise
und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 31, Funktionalitätsklassen und
Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version
3.0, Bonn, Germany, May 2013. (in German)
[28]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. TR-02102-1:
Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen. Bonn,
Germany. Version 2015-01. (in German)
[29]
Internet Engineering Task Force. PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
Specification Version 2.0, 2000. http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt (last
accessed on 17 January 2016)
[30]
Open Web Application Security Project.
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Data_Validation (last accessed on 17
January 2016)
[31]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik. TR-03116, Part 3,
Kryptographische Vorgaben für Projekte der Bundesregierung – Intelligente
Messsysteme. In German. Annually adapted. Bonn, Deutschland, Date: 2014.
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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[32]
Ari Takanen, Jared DeMott, and Charlie Miller. Fuzzing for Software Security
Testing and Quality Assurance (1 ed.). Artech House, Inc., Norwood, MA,
USA, 2008.
[33]
Electric Power Research Institute. National Electric Sector Cybersecurity
Organization Resource. http://www.smartgrid.epri.com/nescor.aspx (last
accessed on 17 January 2016)
[34]
SEI CERT Coding Standards,
https://www.securecoding.cert.org/confluence/display/seccode/SEI+CERT+C
oding+Standards
[35]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-22
Rev. 1a, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number
Generators for Cryptographic Applications, April 2010.
[36]
National Institute of Standards and Technology. NISTIR 7946. CVSS
Implementation Guidance. April 2014.
[37]
BSI, „TR-02102-1 v2015-1: Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen,” 2015
[38]
ANSSI, „Mécanismes cryptographiques - Règles et recommandations, Rev
2.03,” 2014.
[39]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification Cards – Proximity Integrated Circuit Cards
[40]
ISO/IEC 15693 Identification Cards – Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards –
Vicinity Cards
[41]
ISO/IEC 18092 Near-Field Communication Interface
[42]
ISO/IEC 7816-3 Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 3: cards
with contacts - Electrical interface and transmission protocols
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Identification cards – Integrated circuit cards – Part 4:
organization, security and commands for interchange
[43]
Mifare (NXP) - https://www.mifare.net/en/
[44]
FeliCa (Sony) - http://www.sony.net/Products/felica/
EV CHARGING SYSTEM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
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[45]
Calypso (Innovatron) –
http://www.innovatron.fr/CalypsoFuncSpecification.pdf
[46]
Cipurse (OSPT alliance) - http://www.osptalliance.org/the_standard
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