© Copyright Ericsson AB 2007. All rights reserved.
No part of this document may be reproduced in any form without the written
permission of the copyright owner.
The contents of this document are subject to revision without notice due to continued
progress in methodology, design and manufacturing. Ericsson shall have no liability
for any error or damage of any kind resulting from the use of this document.
MX-ONE Architecture
LAN Configuration
Voice over IP Traffic
Traffic among Servers
Client Server Communication
Connection to PSTN and PLMN
Mobile Extension
Analog Connections
Platform Security
MX-ONE Telephony System
MX-ONE Messaging
Patch Management Policy
Antivirus Policy
IP Phones
Operation and Maintenance Security
Manager Telephony System
Manager Device
Manager Availability
Windows GUI
CLI-based Management of Telephony System
Event Logging
1 Introduction
Integration of voice services into an IS/IT data infrastructure raises several questions
and concerns as how to guarantee the same level of security, availability, and quality
of service as the classic circuit-switched telephony infrastructure.
This document provides an overview of the security mechanisms available to protect
the MX-ONE solution from threats that are typical of the IS/IT infrastructure. The
described measures are either enabled in the system by default, enabled during the
installation/configuration phase of the systems, or need to be enabled manually by
the system administrator.
The security measures available for the MX-ONE system are mainly based on the
following open standard technologies:
SSL (or TLS)
The Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS)
provides secure access to IP phones and web services and secure
signaling between IP phones and MX-ONE Telephony Servers.
Secure Shell (SSH) provides secure console-based access to IP
phones and the MX-ONE Telephony server
IP Security (IPSec) is used to protect the signaling messages
exchanged between LIMs (Telephony Servers).
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is used to protect the
media streams of the voice communication
Additionally, other mechanisms to protect the MX-ONE solution are based on the
Correct configuration of the corporate Local Area Network (LAN) infrastructure
Authentication and authorization of all users of the system, including endusers and administrators
Security mechanisms provided by the target operating systems (SuSe® Linux
and Microsoft Windows®) as well as hardening measures
Beside the security functions described in this document, there are a number of
general security aspects that need to be covered and taken care of by a system
administrator. Every organization must have a clearly defined IT security policy in
place, defining goals, assets, trust levels, processes, incident handling procedure, etc.
The security mechanisms available in the MX-ONE system must be covered by and
deployed according to this policy. An important security measure to be implemented
is to preserve physical security. Only authorized personnel shall have access to
server locations, since many data-exposure attacks can be mounted by having
physical access to a host. Further, the IT data infrastructure must have a solid
design, security mechanisms and protocols must be enabled and all components of
the whole system must be correctly configured and maintained.
2 MX-ONE Architecture
Figure 1
MX-ONE Architecture
The MX-ONE system comprises a number of components that communicate within an
existing IT infrastructure, see Figure 1. The following sections illustrate the
mechanisms that are available to protect MX-ONE from the architectural point of
2.1 LAN Configuration
The MX-ONE components communicate using the corporate LAN infrastructure,
usually based on IEEE 802.3 (Ethernet). This is typically an open environment, and
communication can be easily intercepted, eavesdropped, and hijacked if a number of
configuration measures are not taken when setting up the network.
It is recommended that the LAN connecting the system nodes is fully switched, to
avoid eavesdropping attacks that are extremely easy to perform in an Ethernet
infrastructure only equipped with hubs. An eavesdropping attack is more difficult to
carry out on a switched infrastructure, as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
messages need to be intercepted and answered. However, ARP attacks have become
quite frequent and software tools able to carry them out are widely available.
To make eavesdropping attacks more difficult to carry out, traffic on the LAN should
be grouped together depending on the node functions and on their trust level. This
can be achieved by the means of Virtual LANs (IEEE 802.1Q and port-based VLANs)
that allow separating the communication for example for server-to-server signaling,
server-to-client signaling, voice traffic, and so on, providing additional isolation and
making the system more robust against virus-based and network flooding attacks. In
particular, if Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic is grouped into a single VLAN,
and the nodes on such VLAN are strongly protected, a worm-based attack causing
network overload originated on a node located on another VLAN might only
marginally affect the VoIP LAN. As a completion, the use of VLAN should be
integrated with the use of different traffic priorities. Additionally, if the voice traffic
must cross IP core networks, it is recommended to make use of Layer 3 techniques
(such as DiffServ) to also provide traffic isolation when crossing Layer 3 devices.
The communication between the Telephony Server and the Media Gateway (valid for
both Media Gateway LIMs and Media Gateway Classic LIMs) must occur on the
corporate LAN, if full support of the available redundancy functions is needed. If
support of the redundancy functions is not needed, it is possible to use a dedicated
LAN segment to connect the Telephony Server to the Media Gateway. A possible
setup is the following:
1. One VLAN grouping the VoIP Servers (Telephony Server, Media Gateways)
2. One or several VLANs grouping the IP phones
3. One or several VLANs for data traffic
If traffic priorities are implemented in the network, the VLAN grouping the VoIP
servers shall have the highest priority and the VLAN used for data services shall have
the lowest priority. Usually, each VLAN is associated to an IP subnet. Hosts or
devices belonging to different VLANs can communicate only through a Layer 3 router.
This means that broadcast traffic is blocked across VLANs. Additionally, some routers
are enhanced with Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS), able to block
more advanced types of attacks.
All MX-ONE components (Telephony Servers, Media Gateway, IPLU boards, IP
telephones) support the use and configuration of VLANs and DiffServ.
2.2 Voice over IP Traffic
Attention to the security aspects of an IP telephony infrastructure is increasingly
growing by corporate Chief Information Officers (CIOs), IT administrators, and endusers. Voice over IP traffic (both signaling and media) must be protected from a
number of attacks, such as media streams eavesdropping, toll-fraud attacks,
signaling modification, and so on. For this reason, it is necessary to protect both the
VoIP signaling messages as well as the media streams.
The following security measures are supported in the MX-ONE Telephony System:
Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) to protect media streams
TLS to protect signaling messages
Support for a number of flexible security policies, in order to support
environment with different security requirements
TLS guarantees the signaling privacy when the SRTP keys are interchanged between
the parties.
The main principle for the security policy is that it directs if an extension is allowed to
register to the system or not. Once the extension is registered, the calls to any other
party is allowed from a security perspective.
Media Encryption
Support for SRTP is given in the IP phones (DBC 42x 02 and DBC 44x 01) and in the
Media Gateway Classic (IPLU/1 boards). SRTP support is not implemented in the
Media Gateway version 1 (BFJ 901 03), in the Operator Assistant media device, or in
Softphones like the ECC.
SRTP makes use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128 bits key to
protect the media streams. The encryption keys are exchanged according to the ITUT H.235.8 specification or to RFC 4568 for SIP. For a two-party phone call, four keys
will be needed to be exchanged between the two parties. Each party originating a
media stream will generate two keys, a Master Key and a Master Salt and send them
to the other party during the call control phase. These values are generated using
high-entropy pseudo-random number generators in the IP telephones and in the
Telephony Servers. The actual keys used by SRTP (one encryption key for each
direction, one integrity key for each direction) are being calculated using the
procedures defined by the SRTP specification. The signaling messages carrying the
encryption keys are encrypted by TLS before being sent.
H.323 Trunks
Media encryption using the SRTP protocol is supported for calls over H.323 trunks.
Unlike SRTP for extensions, here the H.323 signaling messages that carry the
encryption keys are not encrypted by TLS before being sent.
Gateway Calls
SRTP is available only in the Media Gateway Classic (IPLU/1 boards). SRTP support is
not implemented in the Media Gateway. This effects the GW calls made on a H.323
Trunk. Only GW calls via the IPLU board are media encrypted. In scenarios where
some calls may be through the IPLU and others through the Media Gateway, media
encryption is automatically disabled, for example, for Conference Calls.
Whenever there is a change in the Non-GW and GW conditions of the calls, the
media encryption of the new call depends upon whether the new call is over IPLU or
Media Gateway. Whenever pause and rerouting is executed the media encryption
capabilities are re-negotiated.
Non-Gateway Calls
For non-GW calls media encryption depends on the H.323 endpoints. The H.323
trunk is transparent in non-GW scenarios. An H.323 trunk does not decide on the
media encryption of the non-GW calls. However due to pause and rerouting if the call
condition changes to gateway then again the trunk decides about the media
Trunk Calls towards ASB501
ASB501 does not support media encryption. So if a trunk call is made between an
MX-ONE and an ASB501, media encryption is disabled in the MX-ONE during the
H245 negotiation. Hence calls towards an ASB501 are plain RTP calls.
Signaling Encryption
To enable support for TLS in Ericsson IP phones, see the Installation Instructions for
DBC 425, DBC 422, and DBC 420.
TLS Signalling
The primary goal of the TLS Protocol is to provide privacy and data integrity between
two communicating applications.
By use of asymmetric key encryption, parameters for the data transfer are
negotiated in a safe way. Each transferred data packet is encrypted. By adding a
modified message digest with each message (each data packet) the receiving
application can verify the data integrity.
TLS consists of two protocols (layers), the handshake layer and the record layer.
The Handshake layer allows the server and client to authenticate each other and to
negotiate for an encryption algorithm and keys before the application transmits or
receives its first byte of data. The Handshake layer performs this operation using the
certificates and asymmetric keys.
The Record layer provides connection security. Each record is encrypted using the
symmetric key established in the handshake. The symmetric key is a secret key
shared by the two parties.
Terminal Signaling Encryption and Decryption
Logon procedure
When the user presses the logon button the phone prompts the user to enter a
In case the user does not enter the password the RRQ (for H.323) or Register
(for SIP) is sent insecurely. If this registration is accepted or not depends on
the Security Policy set in the Telephony Server.
If the user enters the password the client (the IP extension) starts the TLS
negotiation. After the session keys are established the client sends the
encrypted RRQ or Register. The server decrypts it and checks whether the
correct password is received.
TLS and SRTP Interaction
TLS ensures signaling encryption and SRTP ensures media encryption.
The TLS procedures are exchanged with the Telephony Server only. Hence once an
extension is registered via TLS the signaling, will be encrypted until the extension is
logged off. If both TLS and SRTP is used end-to-end, a security icon is shown on the
telephone display.
Media encryption by SRTP depends on the Media Gateway and the IPLU of the Media
Gateway Classic. The Media Gateway has no support for SRTP. For each call SRTP
support is negotiated with the Telephony Server. Hence in case of extensions
registered towards the Media Gateway media encryption is not possible, but still the
signalling will be encrypted. Although an extension with both TLS and SRTP
capabilities is logged on, the media may not be encrypted.
The MX-ONE system includes support for HTTP digest authentication for the SIP
interface. Each time a SIP phone registers itself to the SIP Registrar, it will also be
required to authenticate itself.
Certificate Management
The certificates are used to authenticate the communicating parties in the handshake
Each server has a private key and a public key. A message that is encrypted with the
private key can only be decrypted with the public key. If a message is encrypted with
the public key it can only be decrypted by the owner of the private key.
The keys can be generated by different algorithms. For example, for large keys
generated with the RSA algorithm, no practical method has yet been found to
retrieve the encrypted data without access to the private (secret) key.
In order for the telephone to be able to authenticate the server, the telephone has a
certificate repository with a number of root and trusted certificates. These certificates
cannot be changed or increased in number.
The X.509 certificate has to be stored in each Telephony Server. The respective
signed certificate with the generated public key is sent by each party in the TLS
For further information, see the installation instructions for INSTALLING AND
Security Policies
Security policies have been defined to give flexibility in administration and to provide
sufficient system security. The administrator must be judicious in choosing the
security policy for the system. A security license is needed for assigning security
For the MX-ONE system three security policies, 1, 2, or 3, can be set for the system.
When no policy is set the system is open for all types of terminals that are defined
for the system.
1. In the ALL SECURE system policy only Secure Extensions are allowed to
register in the system. Both TLS and SRTP must be supported by the
2. In the ALL SECURE + EXC EXT policy the All Secure policy is modified by
giving a security exception to specified extension numbers. Users at these
numbers are allowed to logon insecurely.
3. In the ALL SECURE + EXC TYPE policy the All Secure policy is modified by
giving a security exception for the telephone type. This can be used, for
example, to enable softphones to use the system.
For further information on security policies, see the operational directions for VOIP
SECURITY and the command sec_policy.
2.3 Traffic among Servers
In a modern IS/IT infrastructure, servers are generally grouped together and located
in server farms. These locations need to be physically protected and only authorized
personnel should be allowed to access them. This means that traffic among servers
is likely to never leave the physical locations where servers are stored. Layer-2 and
Layer-3 network devices are also located in the same locations and contribute to
guarantee the physical separation of server traffic from other kind of network traffic.
As a further measure to protect server-to-server traffic, it is recommended to set up
a specific VLAN just for grouping servers, Section 2.1 LAN Configuration.
If servers are located at remote locations, it is highly recommended to set up a
Virtual Private Network (VPN) system, and firewalls to protect and monitor the
communication among them.
The LIMs composing the MX-ONE Telephony System communicate using a
proprietary inter-LIM signaling protocol, used for management messages, control
signals, and call control signals. This communication can be protected by the means
of IPSec, which is a suite of protocols for securing IP communications by
authenticating and/or encrypting each IP packet in a data stream. IPsec also includes
protocols for cryptographic key establishment.
The IPSec procedure can be divided into the following three steps:
1. IKE Phase 1
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) authenticates IPSec peers, performs Deffie
Helfman, and negotiates Security Association (SA) policy to set up a secure
channel. It can be performed in one of the following modes:
Aggressive mode
IKE SA values, the Diffie-Hellman public keys, and nonces are
exchanged in three messages. Aggressive mode is used by default in
MX-ONE installations. It is less resource demanding than main mode.
Main mode
IKE SA values, the Diffie-Hellman public keys and nonces are
exchanged in six messages, and the identities of both peers are
encrypted during negotiations. If the number of hosts exceeds a
threshold, the IKE negotiations may start to time out and this limits
the number of LIMs in the system. Therefore it is not recommended to
use main mode.
2. Note:
3. It is strongly recommended to use aggressive mode and not main mode.
5. IKE Phase 2
IKE negotiates and sets up IPSec SA parameters between the peers.
6. IPSec
IPSec protected data starts to flow between the peers.
The following two types of IPSec deployments are possible in a network:
Offers end-to-end encryption and/or authentication between the hosts in a
network. Each host will set up SAs (both inbound and outbound) to all other
hosts, which makes this type of deployment very resource demanding if the
number of hosts in the system increases, see Figure 2. It can be used in
systems with up to 18 LIMs.
Offers gateway-to-gateway encryption and/or authentication in a
geographically scattered network, see Figure 3. Dedicated hardware handles
securing of tunnels between the networks. The net-to-net solution lowers the
CPU overhead from individual LIMs. It is the recommended solution for MXONE systems with more than 18 LIMs.
Figure 2
IPSec host-to-host tunnels
Figure 3
IPSec net-to-net solution for larger MX-ONE systems
During the installation the system administrator will be asked if IPSec should
be set up on the Telephony servers. If host-to-host deployment is used IPSec
should be set up on the Telephony servers. If net-to-net deployment is used it
should not be configured on the Telephony servers, rather it should be left for
VPN gateways to establish the IPSec tunnels.
2.4 Client Server Communication
Generally, no assumption can be made as to the location of the clients
within the Intranet. This is a major difference compared to the serverto-server communication. For this reason, it is important to protect the
communication from the MX-ONE clients to the MX-ONE servers.
If the clients are used from the public Internet, the use of an IPSecbased VPN system is the best solution as it is not a recommended
practice to open the corporate firewall for all ports used by the Personal
Assistant clients.
2.5 Connection to PSTN and PLMN
The MX-ONE Telephony System can communicate with the Public
Switched Telephony Network (PSTN) or the Public Land Mobile Network
(PLMN) using the trunk interfaces. Such trunks are always located in the
Media Gateway or in the Media Gateway Classic.
To enhance the security of the system, ISDN signaling is always
terminated in the Media Gateway (or Media Gateway Classic).
Communication with the Telephony Server is done by internal signaling
protocols. Additionally, ISDN D-channel services are not implemented.
This means that for example X.25 over an ISDN D-channel is not
allowed and it is thus not possible to access the LAN from an external
Communication with MX-ONE Messaging is currently only supported via
IP networking. Communication through digital trunks is not supported.
2.6 Mobile Extension
When using the Mobile Extension feature, security of the system is
provided by mechanisms available in the mobile operator's network. It
is recommended that the user make use of a PIN code to protect access
to the phone and to prevent possible misuses of the system if the phone
is lost.
2.7 Analog Connections
The MX-ONE system supports the use of analog extensions. Only
telephony services are supported through such interfaces. Data
connections through Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) using a modem are
not possible to get access to the corporate LAN infrastructure.
3 Platform Security
The MX-ONE servers run on commercially available operating systems.
From a security point of view, this is both an advantage and a
disadvantage. The advantage is that these operating systems are being
used by millions of users and security vulnerabilities are quickly
discovered, announced and fixed. However the disadvantage is that
these operating systems are the preferred target of the malicious
crackers community.
3.1 MX-ONE Telephony System
MX-ONE Telephony Server
The MX-ONE Telephony Server runs on the Suse Linux Enterprise Server
(SLES) operating system, which is the enterprise version of the wellknown Linux distribution. One of the main advantages of this operating
system is the enhanced security features that it is equipped with. It is
worth mentioning that SLES is being evaluated for compliancy with the
Common Criteria Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) 4+.
The Telephony Server is the most relevant node in the system whose
security must be guaranteed to keep the system available. For this
reason, beside the already strict security features of the operating
system, a number of additional measures are enabled by default on the
Telephony Server to improve its security, its reliability, and its resiliency
to a number of malicious attacks.
Only needed packages of the operating system are installed on the
Telephony Server. The SLES operating system is extremely feature-rich
but the more features that are installed and enabled, the more are the
potential security breaches. To decrease the risk of security
vulnerabilities, the Telephony Server is delivered with only the
necessary operating system packages installed by default.
Another important security measure is to only enable services and
network ports that are necessary for the system's correct functioning.
As an example, well known insecure services, such as Telnet and FTP
are disabled by default. Additionally, the Linux packet filter IPTables has
been configured to block access to certain services that are needed for
the system but should not be reachable from the network interfaces
connected to the corporate LAN. IPTables is also able to block certain
kinds of attacks that have a well-known pattern and make use of certain
deficiencies of the TCP/IP protocol stack.
To manage the server using the Command Line Interface, SSH is the
preferred solution. SSH is enabled by default on the Telephony Server.
To increase security, direct root access is disabled by default. If a
system administrator needs to carry out tasks that need root access,
the administrator first needs to log on as a non-root administrator and
then require the system to be granted root privilege by performing a
second authentication procedure.
To guarantee the integrity of the system and detect possible
unauthorized or unwanted changes to the file system, the AIDE
(Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment) tool has been configured
on the Telephony Server. All relevant system files are being monitored
and changes are notified as soon as they are detected. The system
administrator can of course change the default settings to further
increase the security level by increasing the frequency when the tool
performs the integrity check of the file system.
The SLES operating system is equipped with a security tool named
Seccheck. This tool is installed and enabled by default on the Telephony
Server. Seccheck comprises three scripts that are run respectively each
day, each week and each month. If something is detected that might
indicate a security breach, a mail is sent to the root user with a
description of the problem.
File permissions have to be accurately set, especially for those files that
are relevant to the correct functioning of the system. The Linux
operating system allows the use of the Least Necessary Privilege
approach, the security golden rule that protects sensitive files of the
system and avoids misfunctioning due to wrong configuration actions
done by inexperienced users having accidentally gained access to the
MX-ONE Media Gateway
The Media Gateway runs on a Linux distribution known as Monta Vista
Linux Professional 2.1. It is an embedded version of the well-known
operating system equipped with real-time features and characterized by
a smaller memory footprint than other versions of the Linux operating
system, obtained by reducing the number of features, services, and
applications. This makes the operating system implicitly more secure
than other much more feature-rich distributions.
The Media Gateway Linux operating system includes support for
IPTables, the Linux built-in firewall. It is delivered to the customer with
the firewall correctly configured. In particular, all undesired traffic on
the network interfaces connected to the corporate network is blocked.
Examples of allowed traffic are Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
reply, signaling messages between the Media Gateway and the
Telephony Server, NFS traffic, and so on. RTP and RTCP streams (being
sent on random User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports) are directly
forwarded to the Digital Signal Processors (DSPs) by the network
processor and are never sent to the Linux kernel (and hence the IP
stack) running on the main processor.
3.2 MX-ONE Messaging
The MX-ONE Messaging server run on the Microsoft Windows Server
2003 operating system. This version of the well-known Windows
operating system is supplied with much stronger security than its
previous versions. For this reason, no further security measures are
performed beside the ones already enabled by default on the operating
3.3 Patch Management Policy
As the MX-ONE components run on commercially available operating
systems, vulnerabilities to these systems are discovered and fixed with
high frequency. It is necessary to make sure that the MX-ONE
components are always updated and equipped with all critical patches to
guarantee the highest level of security. On the other hand, Ericsson
must guarantee the availability of the MX-ONE servers. In the unlikely
event that a patch released by an operating system vendor should
conflict with the MX-ONE software, the installation of such patch without
prior testing would jeopardize the availability of the system.
To guarantee the availability of the MX-ONE system and hence the
customer's satisfaction, Ericsson recommends its customer not to
modify (by for example installing not approved software) the Ericsson
products without prior verification and approval from Ericsson.
Ericsson Enterprise has developed best practices as the management
and installation of security patches released by the operating system
vendors aiming to guarantee the highest level of security and the
correct functioning of the system.
MX-ONE Telephony Server
Ericsson constantly monitors updates released by the Operating System
supplier. Concerning the Linux OS, patches and updates fixing several
types of problems are released daily. Some of them address security
vulnerabilities that can be exploited to attack the system; such patches
and updates must be installed as soon as possible.
In order to allow customers to keep a high security level without
compromising the system's functionality, Ericsson tests all patches and
updates released by the OS suppliers that can be installed on the
Telephony System. In case one of these packages breaks the Telephony
System software preventing its correct functionality, Ericsson will
provide a hot fix solving the conflict, if deemed necessary by the nature
of the update. A fix will always be provided for all security-related
updates that conflict with the system functionality.
Ericsson will make all OS patches and updates including possible
conflict-fixing hot fixes available to customers regularly. Ericsson is
continuously working to decrease the time from the release date by the
OS supplier until the OS patches and updates are available, but it is
always guaranteed that the system functionality is not compromised.
MX-ONE Messaging
The MX-ONE Messaging server run on the Microsoft Windows 2003
server. Microsoft has developed an efficient way of managing and
classifying updates to their operating systems.
All updates released by Microsoft that are classified as Critical updates
can be installed on the above-mentioned products without prior explicit
approval from Ericsson Enterprise. In the unlikely event of a
malfunctioning caused by any of these updates, the customer should
contact Ericsson (or its service partner) immediately and a Service
Ticket with Priority A will be issued. This guarantees that the problem
will be solved with the highest priority.
All updates released by Microsoft that are classified as Recommended
updates should not be installed by the customer without prior approval
from Ericsson. Ericsson guarantees to verify these updates before the
release of the next service pack.
Occasionally, Microsoft releases service packs for their operating
systems. Service packs have a broad scope and address problems of
application compatibility, driver updates, reliability, security, and so on.
Since Microsoft service packs include a broad range of changes, Ericsson
Enterprise must thoroughly test all Computer Telephony Integration
(CTI) products running on each service pack before we can support
these service packs in the field. Therefore, before installing any new
Microsoft service pack, it is necessary to check that it has been fully
tested and qualified by Ericsson. Use of unqualified service packs may
prevent Ericsson Enterprise Technical Support from properly supporting
customer installation.
3.4 Antivirus Policy
Virus attacks on the IS/IT infrastructure are becoming increasingly
frequent. For this reason, a valid antivirus policy is a necessary aspect
of any valid security policy. The formulation of such a policy is a task
that must be carried out by the IS/IT system administrator. Ericsson
Enterprise, as a supplier of equipment that might be subject of a virus
attack, guarantees that their products do not contrast with antivirus
policies in force in the IT environment.
MX-ONE Telephony Server
The Telephony Server is based on the Linux OS, which has traditionally
only marginally been object of virus-related attacks. However, since
there is a slight possibility to be hit by a virus targeting the Linux OS, it
is possible to install antivirus software on the Telephony Server, if
Ericsson has tested the product Sophos Anti-Virus for Linux 6.1 to make
sure that it works correctly with the MX-ONE 3.1 Telephony Server
without affecting its functionality. For more information about Sophos
products, see If Sophos Anti-Virus for Linux is
used, disable the Sophos Anti-Virus GUI. To use this feature requires
local access to the Web GUI and this is not possible on a Telephony
server as there is no Linux GUI running on it. Other antivirus products
may also work on the Telephony Server but they have not been tested.
When installing an antivirus application containing more than antivirus,
all features except antivirus must be disabled. Features such as firewall
and integrity protection can safely be disabled in the antivirus
application since they are already covered by the hardening installed
with the Telephony Server application.
When deploying antivirus software, it is important to guarantee that the
virus definition files are always updated.
Ericsson does not provide any antivirus applications with MX-ONE.
MX-ONE Messaging
As a real-time system performing business-critical and
computationally-intensive functions, MX-ONE Messaging
cannot be expected to perform to specification if a third
party application periodically makes essential Central
Processor Unit (CPU), memory, and disk resources
unavailable. The preferred solution is naturally to schedule
virus scanning on a daily basis and during low server
activity. The selected time should not coincide with
scheduled daily maintenance or updates to the system.
Should a periodic scan not be acceptable, the virus
scanning software may have multiple configurations or
approaches for continuous or active scans.
All virus scan solutions including periodic, active and
continuous background scans of directories or disks may
significantly impede operating system resources, and
prevent Ericsson products from responding as specified. It
is the customer's responsibility to test the virus scanning
software in conjunction with Ericsson products during a
high load condition to assure correct system operation.
When configuring the virus scan software, the preferred
choice will be the one that uses the least amount of CPU
and generates the least amount of disk activity.
3.5 IP Phones
The IP phones for the MX-ONE system are based on a RealTime OS (RTOS) with strict control over which applications
are running on the phones and with limited privileges.
Additionally, only signed firmware can be uploaded on the
phones. For these reasons, it is unlikely that such a phone
can be infected by a virus or some other form of mal-ware.
The IP phones are endowed with an SSH server to perform
configuration and troubleshooting activities. The SSH
server public and private keys are hard-coded in the
phones and cannot be updated.
4 Operation and Maintenance Security
Management of the MX-ONE system is performed according
to the FCAPS paradigm. In particular, the following
mechanisms are available to manage the system:
Manager Telephony System: Web-based tool located
on the Telephony Server used for system-wide
Manager Device: a tool for remote software
maintenance in MX-ONE based on HP Radia
Manager Availability: an optional fault and
performance tool based on BMC® PATROL
Windows GUIs located on the MX-ONE Messaging
CLI-based management of the Telephony System
4.1 Manager Telephony System
The Manager Telephony System is a Web-based tool that
allows monitoring and configuration of a number of
relevant objects.
To protect access to this tool, SSL in server authentication
mode can be enabled during the installation procedure. The
administrator (client/Web browser) will be authenticated by
the means of username/password. It is assumed that the
Web server has a valid pair of RSA keys and a digital
certificate that can be verified by the client. This certificate
can either be a self-signed certificate or issued by a wellknown Certification Authority (CA). After successful
authentication, the administrator is mapped to one of four
possible administrator profiles, each of them holding
different access privileges. The following four profiles are
defined within Manager Telephony System:
System Administrator
Advanced Troubleshooter
For each operation requested by the administrator, the
access privileges are checked against the requested
privileges for that specific operation, thus implementing a
fine-grained access control policy. The system
administrator can configure the access privileges assigned
to each role.
4.2 Manager Device
Manager Device handles remote software upgrades of MXONE applications on the Telephony Server and MX-ONE
Messaging server. It is based on HP Radia, which is a part
of the HP OpenView Management Suite.
The Management Server can be setup to use SSL for
communication with Radia Clients and also to provide
HTTPS for access to the Management Portal from a web
browser. This is configured during installation time and
requires SSL/HTTPS port numbers to be configured and
certificate/key files provided. This certificate can be a
commercial certificate from any certificate vendor, a
certificate issued from a local Certification Authority (CA) or
self-signed certificate. The administrator (client/Web
browser) will be authenticated by the means of
username/password. It is possible to use a VPN for
communication between the Management Server and the
Managed System.
4.3 Manager Availability
The Manager Availability is an optional tool used for
advanced fault and performance management. It is based
on a number of agent-components installed on each
managed server, and on a set of server-side components.
Communication between the agents and the server side
components is based on BMC PATROL security level 2,
which provides integrity and confidentiality protection
based on SSL. The server-side components need to
authenticate to the agent by the means of a username and
a password, which are verified against the operating
systems of the managed servers. Credentials are sent
though the SSL connection.
The system administrator using Manager Availability
accesses the tool's Web-based interface. Communication
between the browser used by the system administrator and
the Web server are also protected by HTTPS.
4.4 Windows GUI
The Messaging server is running on the Microsoft Windows
Server 2003 operating system. All management operations
related to the operating system need to be carried out
through Windows-specific GUIs. Additionally, the Messaging
server is equipped with a proprietary GUI in order to carry
out system configuration activities. Access to these GUIs
requires physical access to the host where the tool is being
installed. Standard Windows security applies for controlling
access to the hosts.
It is possible to gain remote access to the host where the
Messaging Server is installed by making use of the
PcAnywhere tool, which has been tested for this purpose.
In this case, security features provided by the tool apply.
4.5 CLI-based Management of Telephony System
Most of the management operations necessary on the
Telephony System are carried out through a proprietary
Command Line Interface known as MD-shell. In order to
have access to this tool remotely, SSH shall be used to log
on to the system. It is obviously necessary to set up
authentication keys before being able to use SSH.
Protection Mechanism of the MD-Shell
The MD-shell is a console-based mechanism to manage the
MX-ONE Telephony Server. All possible management
operations can be performed by the means of this tool,
which makes it very powerful but also potentially
dangerous. It is built on top of the Linux bash shell, which
in turn is built on top of the operating system kernel.
It is necessary to guarantee that only authorized users
(administrators) can manage the system; additionally,
different groups of administrators might have different
privileges. The MX-ONE Telephony Server defines eight
different levels of user privileges for managing the system.
Each time a command is issued by an administrator, the
required privilege level to issue that command is checked
against the privilege level assigned to the administrator
issuing the command: if it is higher, the command is not
performed. The root user is automatically assigned the
highest privilege level, that is seven.
The mapping between different commands to access
privileges is stored in a configuration file that can only be
modified by the root user. Additionally, it contains the
mapping between Linux user groups and access privileges.
The following briefly describes which operations are entitled
to the different access privilege levels:
Level 0: Visualizing of non-sensitive system
Level 1: Some Unix non-sensitive commands, call
diversion, some operator-related operations
Level 2: Operations on analog, IP, and generic
extension, operations concerning abbreviated dialing
Level 3: Simple accounting operations, number
analysis, simple routing
Level 4: Logging-related and dump operations,
interception service, blocking operations,
configuration, traffic recording
Level 5: Inter-LIM signaling, Control system, LIM
Level 6: Advanced management operations
Level 7: Advanced troubleshooting; advanced
diagnostic tools; advanced configuration, systemcritical operations
4.6 SNMP
When monitoring the system with SNMP, it is only possible
to read data that is not considered sensitive. It is not
possible to set the value of a MIB II object.
5 Event Logging
All MX-ONE components log relevant events using tools
available on the target operating system and MX-ONE
specific tools or files.
The MX-ONE Telephony Systems has two main types of
logs. The actual telephony application makes use of the
common Linux logger known as Syslog. The MX-ONE
Manager Telephony System allows the administrator to
view relevant logs through its Web interface.
The MX-ONE Messaging is also equipped with a number of
tools to monitor and visualize information concerning
mailboxes, port usage, call handling statistics, network
activity report, subscribers' setup, and so on.
6 Definitions
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