SICK sBot Speed CIP - KU Operating instructions

SICK sBot Speed CIP - KU Operating instructions

sBot Speed CIP – KU

Safety System

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S

Described product

sBot Speed CIP – KU

Manufacturer

SICK AG

Erwin-Sick-Str. 1

79183 Waldkirch

Germany

Legal information

This work is protected by copyright. Any rights derived from the copyright shall be reserved for SICK AG. Reproduction of this document or parts of this document is only permissible within the limits of the legal determination of Copyright Law. Any modifica‐ tion, abridgment or translation of this document is prohibited without the express writ‐ ten permission of SICK AG.

The trademarks stated in this document are the property of their respective owner.

© SICK AG. All rights reserved.

Original document

This document is an original document of SICK AG.

2 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

CONTENTS

Contents

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

1

About this document........................................................................

6

1.1

Purpose of this document........................................................................

6

1.2

Scope.........................................................................................................

6

1.3

Target groups of these operating instructions........................................

7

1.4

Symbols and document conventions......................................................

7

1.5

Terminology used......................................................................................

8

1.6

Further information...................................................................................

8

2

Safety information............................................................................

9

2.1

General safety note..................................................................................

9

2.2

Intended use.............................................................................................

9

2.3

Inappropriate use.....................................................................................

9

2.4

Requirements for the qualification of personnel....................................

9

2.5

Safe state of the safety outputs..............................................................

10

3

Product description........................................................................... 11

3.1

Design of the overall system....................................................................

11

3.2

Functionality..............................................................................................

11

3.3

Requirements for the application............................................................

12

3.4

Product characteristics............................................................................

12

3.4.1

Components.............................................................................

12

3.4.2

3.4.3

3.4.4

Human-robot interaction.........................................................

Functions of the safety system...............................................

Automated restart....................................................................

13

13

14

4

Project planning................................................................................ 17

4.1

Manufacturer of the overall system.........................................................

17

4.1.1

Reasonably foreseeable misuse.............................................

17

4.2

Operating entity of the overall system.....................................................

18

4.3

Design........................................................................................................ 18

4.3.1

4.3.2

4.3.3

Design of the access point to the hazardous area (exam‐ ple)............................................................................................

18

Position of the safety laser scanner.......................................

18

Protective field design.............................................................

21

4.3.3.1

Selecting the number of protective fields.............

21

4.3.4

4.3.5

4.3.6

4.3.3.2

Overlapping protective fields.................................. 23

4.3.3.3

Distance between the ends of protective fields

PF1 and PF2............................................................ 23

4.3.3.4

Minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and

PF2 to the hazardous area.....................................

24

4.3.3.5

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF3.................................................

29

Robot operating modes...........................................................

30

Warning signs for automated restart...................................... 30

Emergency stop pushbutton requirements............................ 30

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 3

CONTENTS

4

4.3.7

Requirements for the reset pushbutton and restart button.

31

4.4

Integrating the equipment into the electrical control.............................

31

4.4.1

Circuit diagram.........................................................................

31

4.5

Integration into the network.....................................................................

31

4.5.1

Interfaces.................................................................................

31

4.6

Testing plan...............................................................................................

33

5

Mounting............................................................................................. 34

5.1

For mounting the components................................................................. 34

6

Electrical installation........................................................................ 35

6.1

Electrical installation of the components................................................ 35

6.2

General requirements..............................................................................

35

6.3

Safety controller pin assignment.............................................................

35

7

Configuration..................................................................................... 38

7.1

Requirements for software and firmware...............................................

38

7.2

Pre-configured project files......................................................................

38

7.3

Overview of the software structure..........................................................

39

7.4

Opening project file................................................................................... 40

7.5

Connection overview................................................................................

41

7.6

Main module configuration......................................................................

41

7.6.1

Verifying the logic.....................................................................

41

7.6.2

Jump addresses.......................................................................

41

7.6.2.1

Finding source and destination jump addresses that belong together...............................................

41

7.6.3

7.6.4

7.6.5

7.6.6

In/out page..............................................................................

41

Emergency stop page..............................................................

42

Protective stop page................................................................

42

SafetyRatedMonitoredSpeed page.........................................

43

7.6.7

7.6.8

SafeSequenceMonitoring page............................................... 43

Robot safety signals page.......................................................

44

7.6.9

Non-secure robot signals page...............................................

45

7.7

Configuring the safety laser scanner....................................................... 45

7.7.1

7.7.2

Resolution of the safety laser scanner................................... 45

Field sets and cut-off paths....................................................

45

7.7.3

Configuring the safety system without protective field PF3..

46

7.8

Transfer configuration..............................................................................

46

8

Commissioning.................................................................................. 47

8.1

Safety.........................................................................................................

47

8.2

Overview of commissioning.....................................................................

47

8.3

Putting the robot controller into operation..............................................

48

8.3.1

8.3.2

8.3.3

Configuring the IP address of the robot controller on the smartPAD.................................................................................

48

Configuring the non-safe signals on the smartPAD............... 49

Preparing the project in KUKA.WorkVisual............................. 50

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

CONTENTS

8.3.4

8.3.5

8.3.6

Activate CIP Safety in KUKA.WorkVisual................................

51

Configuration of KUKA.SafeOperation...................................

51

Setting the IP addresses in KUKA.WorkVisual....................... 52

8.3.7

8.3.8

Configuring the EFI-pro gateway as a target (slave)..............

52

Defining the IO mapping in KUKA.WorkVisual.......................

53

8.3.9

Configuring the Submit interpreter.........................................

53

8.3.10

Transferring the settings to the robot controller....................

54

8.4

Configuring the safety network number in the robot controller............. 55

8.5

Check during commissioning and modifications....................................

55

9

Maintenance...................................................................................... 56

9.1

Maintenance of the components............................................................

56

10

Troubleshooting................................................................................. 57

10.1 Troubleshooting the components............................................................

57

10.2 Checking the network connection...........................................................

57

11

Operation............................................................................................ 58

11.1 Operating the components......................................................................

58

11.2 Regular thorough check...........................................................................

58

12

Technical data.................................................................................... 59

12.1 Data sheet.................................................................................................

59

12.2 Response time of safety system..............................................................

59

13

Ordering information........................................................................ 61

13.1 Scope of delivery....................................................................................... 61

13.2 Ordering information................................................................................. 61

14

Accessories........................................................................................ 62

14.1 Connectivity...............................................................................................

62

14.2 Emergency stop and reset pushbutton...................................................

63

15

Spare parts......................................................................................... 64

15.1 sBot Speed CIP spare parts.....................................................................

64

16

Annex.................................................................................................. 65

16.1 Checklists..................................................................................................

65

16.1.1

Checklist for initial commissioning and commissioning.......

65

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 5

1

ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

6

1

1.1

1.2

About this document

Purpose of this document

These operating instructions contain the information required during the life cycle of the safety system. This document describes:

• The individual components

• The project planning

• The mounting and electrical installation, insofar as special measures are neces‐ sary for the safety system

• The configuration

• The necessary thorough checks

• The commissioning

• The maintenance

• The troubleshooting

Scope

These operating instructions contain information regarding the sBot Speed CIP – KU safety system.

NOTICE

The operating instructions of the components also apply.

The relevant information must be made available to the employees for all work per‐ formed on the safety system.

The following documents contain additional information:

Table 1: Documents available from SICK

Document type Title

Operating instructions

Operating instructions

Operating instructions microScan3 EFI-pro

Flexi Soft modular safety con‐ troller hardware

Flexi Soft in the Flexi Soft

Designer software

Operating instructions

Operating instructions

Part number

8021911

8012999

8012998

Flexi Soft Gateways Hardware 8012662

Flexi Soft Gateways in the

Safety Designer configuration software

8018170

Table 2: Robot controller documents

Document type

Specification

Operating and programming instructions for system inte‐ grators

Mounting and operating instructions

Documentation

Title

KR C4, KR C4 CK

KUKA System Software 8.3

KUKA.SafeOperation 3.2 for

KUKA System Software 8.3

KR C4 EtherNet/IP 2.0 for

KUKA System Software 8.3

Part number

Spec KR C4 GI V17

KSS 8.3 SI V7

KST SafeOperation 3.2 V7

KR C4 EtherNet/IP 2.0 V2

This document is included with the following SICK part numbers (this document in all available language versions):

8024755

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

1

1.3

1.4

Target groups of these operating instructions

Some chapters of these operating instructions are intended for certain target groups.

However, the entire operating instructions are relevant for intended use of the product.

Table 3: Target groups and selected chapters of these operating instructions

Target group

Project developers (planners, developers, designers)

Installers

Electricians

Safety experts (such as CE authorized repre‐ sentatives, compliance officers, people who test and approve the application)

Operators

Maintenance personnel

Chapters of these operating instructions

"Project planning", page 17

"Configuration", page 38

"Technical data", page 59

"Mounting", page 34

"Electrical installation", page 35

"Project planning", page 17

"Configuration", page 38

"Commissioning", page 47

"Technical data", page 59

"Checklists", page 65

"Operation", page 58

"Troubleshooting", page 57

"Maintenance", page 56

"Troubleshooting", page 57

Symbols and document conventions

The following symbols and conventions are used in this document:

Safety notes and other notes

DANGER

Indicates a situation presenting imminent danger, which will lead to death or serious injuries if not prevented.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

WARNING

Indicates a situation presenting possible danger, which may lead to death or serious injuries if not prevented.

CAUTION

Indicates a situation presenting possible danger, which may lead to moderate or minor injuries if not prevented.

NOTICE

Indicates a situation presenting possible danger, which may lead to property damage if not prevented.

NOTE

Indicates useful tips and recommendations.

Instructions to action

b

The arrow denotes instructions to action.

1.

The sequence of instructions for action is numbered.

2.

Follow the order in which the numbered instructions are given.

The check mark denotes the result of an instruction.

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 7

1

ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

1.5

1.6

LED symbols

These symbols indicate the status of an LED: o

The LED is off.

Ö

The LED is flashing.

O

The LED is illuminated continuously.

Terminology used

Term

Safety System

Complete system

Safety controller

Robot controller

Explanation

Combination of safety controller, safety sen‐ sors and logic.

Combination of safety system, process con‐ troller, machine and all other actuators, sen‐ sors and switching elements that interact in the application.

Controller for safety applications which logi‐ cally evaluates signals from safety sensors, safety command devices and other sources and securely switches the actuators of the machine on and off via safety outputs.

Programmable controller that controls and monitors the actions of the robot.

Further information

www.sick.com

The following information is available via the Internet:

Operating instructions and mounting instructions of SICK components suitable for the safety system

Safety Designer configuration software

Guide for Safe Machinery (“Six steps to a safe machine”)

8 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

2

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

SAFETY INFORMATION

2

Safety information

General safety note

The information and tools will not fulfill the safety requirements for your application without further adjustments being made. The project planning provided by way of exam‐ ple is intended to serve as the basis to allow you to perform your own project planning and programming in line with your specific requirements. What this means is that the information and tools merely provide an example to demonstrate how a safety function can be taken care of.

When it comes to your own project planning and programming, you will need to rely on qualified staff given that it is your responsibility to ensure that the following require‐ ments are complied with at the very least: b

Carrying out a risk assessment b

Taking into account applicable standards b

Verifying and validating the safety functions.

Intended use

The safety system provides protection against mechanical hazards (crushing, shearing, impact) caused by movement of the robot arm by means of area safeguarding. The safety system can only be used in certain applications (

see "Requirements for the appli‐ cation", page 12

).

The safety system must only be used within the limits of the prescribed and specified technical data and operating conditions at all times.

Incorrect use, improper modification or manipulation of the safety system will invalidate any warranty from SICK; in addition, any responsibility and liability of SICK for damage and secondary damage caused by this is excluded.

Inappropriate use

The safety laser scanner works as an indirect protective measure and cannot provide protection from pieces thrown from application nor from emitted radiation. Transparent objects are not detected.

If necessary, you must take additional measures to provide protection against hazards that do not result from movement of the robot arm.

The safety system is not suitable for the following applications (this list is not exhaus‐ tive):

• Outdoors

• Underwater

• In explosion-hazardous areas

Requirements for the qualification of personnel

The safety system must be configured, installed, connected, commissioned, and ser‐ viced by qualified safety personnel only.

Integration

For integration, a person is considered qualified when he/she has expertise and experi‐ ence in the selection and use of protective devices on machines and is familiar with the relevant technical rules and national work safety regulations.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 9

2

SAFETY INFORMATION

2.5

Safe state of the safety outputs

If the safety outputs via the network are logic 0, this leads to robot downtime.

The safe state of the safety outputs is initiated in the following cases:

• PF2 protective field interruption

• Invalid sequence of the protective field interruption for automated restart

• Emergency stop pushbutton actuated

The following errors are recognized and also lead to the safety outputs via the network being logic 0:

• Internal error at the safety controller or one of its components

• Internal error on the safety laser scanner

• Connection between the safety controller and safety laser scanner interrupted

• Voltage supply of the safety controller or the safety laser scanner interrupted

10 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

3

3.1

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

3

Product description

Design of the overall system

Design of the overall system

The overall system comprises a total of three components:

• Safety system (from SICK)

• Robot

• Safety command devices

The safety system ends at all inputs and outputs that are not used to wire the compo‐ nents of the safety system.

The safety-related machine controller parts (SRP/CS) are distributed among the safety system and robot controller.

Overall system

Safety system Robot system

Safety laser scanner

EFI-pro

Safety controller Robot controller

3.2

Reset pushbutton

Restart pushbutton

Emergency stop pushbutton

Safety command devices

Figure 1: Construction of the entire system

Further topics

"Components", page 12

"Interfaces", page 31

Functionality

Overview

The safety system detects people in a monitored area. When a person approaches the robot, the safety system decreases the robot speed until it comes to a standstill.

Functionality

The safety laser scanner monitors the access area of the hazardous area with several protective fields. When a person approaches the robot, the protective fields are inter‐ rupted one after another.

The robot speed is reduced if the first protective field is interrupted. If the second pro‐ tective field is interrupted, the safety system triggers a protective stop.

If the person moves away from the robot, the protective fields become free again one after another. Restarting the robot is possible when all of the protective fields are free.

The safety system monitors the sequence in which each protective field is interrupted and becomes free again. A valid sequence leads to an automated restart.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 11

3

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

3.3

3.4

3.4.1

Complementary information

If a person approaches and then moves away from the robot, the protective fields must be interrupted and become free again in a specific sequence (safe sequence monitor‐ ing). In the event of a sequence error, it cannot be ensured that the person has left again. The safety system will switch to the safe state in this event. Automated robot restart is prevented.

Further topics

"Functions of the safety system", page 13

"Automated restart", page 14

Requirements for the application

The robot controller must be a KUKA type KR C4 and support the following options:

°

°

KUKA.SafeOperation

KUKA.EtherNet/IP ™ M/S

°

CONFIGURATION CIP Safety™

Robots and humans perform their work in the same workspace, but at different times (cooperation,

see "Human-robot interaction", page 13

).

The robot works at a fixed position.

Access to the hazardous area must be designed so that the protective fields of the safety laser scanner cover the entire access area of the hazardous area. A person cannot enter or reach into the hazardous area without interrupting the protective fields.

Bypassing the protective field (e.g. by reaching around or stepping over it) is not possible and this is ensured by additional measures as necessary.

The area to be monitored is free from all airborne particles or process residues in its operational status.

Product characteristics

Components

Components relevant for the safety system

Table 4: Hardware

Component Part of the safety system?

Yes

Included in scope of delivery

Yes Flexi Soft safety controller

• FX3-CPU0 main module

• Gateway FX3-GEPR0

• Expansion module FX3-XTIO

• FX3-MPL0 system plug microScan3 Core EFI-pro safety laser scanner

Emergency stop pushbutton

Reset pushbutton

Pushbutton for restart

Robot controller type KR C4

Yes

No

No

No

No

1)

Yes

No

No

No

No

1) The robot controller is not part of the SICK safety system. Safety-relevant functions for the entire system are however executed in the robot controller.

12 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

3

3.4.2

3.4.3

Table 5: Software

Name

Pre-configured project file for Safety Designer with the following components:

• Logic for safety controller

• Configuration file of the safety laser scan‐ ner

• Settings for network communication

Complete subsystems for SISTEMA

Circuit diagram (ePLAN)

KUKA.WorkVisual project file

1)

Availability

SICK provides you with a ZIP archive when you purchase the safety system.

1) You cannot use this project file to configure your robot controller. The project file serves as an example only, which you can use to understand certain settings.

Implementing all the safety functions for the application requires a complete system consisting of sensors, a controller, actuators, and control switches. This safety system comprises sensors and a controller only and is therefore only a subsystem. The user is responsible for the safe design of the complete system and all safety functions.

NOTE

All necessary components influence the parameters of the entire application that relate to safety technology. The components must therefore have an MTTFd value that is suit‐ able for the entire application and satisfies the necessary performance level. The nec‐ essary performance level results from the risk assessment. Subsystems for SISTEMA are available for evaluation of the achieved performance level under: www.sick.com

Further topics

"Emergency stop pushbutton requirements", page 30

"Requirements for the reset pushbutton and restart button", page 31

Human-robot interaction

This safety system is suitable for cooperative human-robot interaction.

Table 6: Types of human-robot interaction

Shared workspace

Different workspace

Application with sequential processing

Cooperation

(Not interactive)

Application with simultaneous processing

Collaboration

Coexistence

Cooperative human-robot interaction is characterized by the fact that tasks are being carried out in the same working area at different times.

Functions of the safety system

Function

Emergency stop

Trigger

Emergency stop pushbut‐ ton actuated

Description

Activates the emergency stop func‐ tion and triggers the robot stop. Cor‐ responds to stop category 1.

After resetting the emergency stop pushbutton and the safety system, the robot accepts a manual restart.

Expected frequency of safety func‐ tion request: 12 times per year

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 13

3

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

3.4.4

Function

Prevent unexpected restarting after an emer‐ gency stop

Trigger safety-rated moni‐ tored speed

Initiate a protective stop

Manual reset and manual restart

Automated reset and restart with safe sequence monitoring

Trigger

Reset pushbutton and restart button actuated

Description

Restarting the robot is also pre‐ vented after resetting the emergency stop pushbutton. The operator must manually reset the safety system and start the robot manually.

Protective field PF1 inter‐ rupted

Protective field PF2 inter‐ rupted

Protective field PF3 inter‐ rupted or error in sequence monitoring for automated restart

Activates robot speed decrease. Acti‐ vates the safe monitoring of the robot speed with a certain time delay.

Triggers the robot protective stop.

Corresponds to stop category 2.

Only possible when the safety system is in a safe state and all protective fields are free. Leads to robot restart.

Expected frequency of safety func‐ tion request: 365 times per year

(once daily)

see "Automated restart", page 14

In the event of an error in the sequence monitoring: Manual reset and manual restart

Automated restart

Important information

NOTE

The automated restart fulfills the requirements of ISO 10218.

Sequence for automated restart

Automated restart of the robot only occurs when one or several people approach and then move away from the robot so that only protective fields PF1 and PF2 are inter‐ rupted in doing so.

PF1 PF2 PF3

Figure 2: Movement path of a person for automated restart

14 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

3

In doing so, the protective fields are interrupted in a certain sequence and then approved again. This sequence is expected by the logic of the safety controller and cor‐ responds to the following signal image.

1

PF1

1

0

2

PF2

1

0

2 t

Figure 3: Signal image of a valid sequence for automated restart

1

2

Automated restart is triggered.

Signal states of the safety laser scanner’s safety outputs via the network.

Protective field free: signal state = logical 1

Protective field interrupted: signal state = logical 0

Complementary information

If the sequence is not complied with after protective field PF2 is interrupted, the safety outputs of the safety system switch to a safe state. Automated restart is prevented and manually resetting with manual restart is required. The sequence is invalid when, for example:

• The protective field PF1 becomes free at the same time as protective field PF2

(discrepancy PF1 / PF2).

• Protective field PF2 is interrupted without protective field PF1 having been inter‐ rupted prior to this.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 15

3

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

First logic cycle

INIT

Manual reset

↑PF1

NO PF

Trigger automatic restart

↓PF2

Manual reset

PF1 OUT

Error

↓PF1

↑PF1

PF1 IN

↓PF2

↓PF2

↑PF2

Discrepancy

PF1/PF2

PF2

INIT

NO PF

PF1 IN

PF2

PF1 OUT

Error

Figure 4: Block diagram for sequence monitoring

Protective field is interrupted.

Protective field becomes free.

Status after the first logic cycle of the safety controller

All protective fields are free and the safety system has been reset.

Protective field PF1 is interrupted. Protective field PF2 has not yet been interrupted.

Protective fields PF1 and PF2 are interrupted.

Protective field PF2 is free again, protective field PF1 is interrupted.

Error status due to invalid protective field interruption sequence

16 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

4

4.1

4.1.1

PROJECT PLANNING

4

Project planning

Manufacturer of the overall system

DANGER

Hazard due to lack of effectiveness of the protective device

The dangerous state of the overall system may not be stopped or not be stopped in a timely manner in the event of non-compliance.

b

Use of the safety system requires a risk assessment. Check whether additional protective measures are required.

b

Comply with the applicable national regulations derived from the application (e.g., work safety regulations, safety rules, or other relevant safety guidelines).

The safety system was developed under consideration of typical application cases. A partial safety function can be implemented with the safety system in these application cases. The manufacturer must check whether the safety system is suitable for its spe‐ cific application case (risk assessment).

If the thorough check shows that the safety system is not suitable for the specific appli‐ cation case, the safety system can be used as a basis for an individualized develop‐ ment suitable for the specific application case. This case will not be considered further in this document.

In any event, additional work is necessary for the safety system to be used, e.g. subse‐ quent configuration of the safety controller.

The manufacturer has the following duties: b

Executing a risk assessment.

b

Verifying and validating the safety functions.

b

Integrating the individual components in accordance with the appropriate stan‐ dards.

b

Please note that C standards have priority compared to statements about this safety system.

Reasonably foreseeable misuse

The manufacturer must take into account the reasonably foreseeable misuse, among other things, in the risk analysis. The following reasonably foreseeable misuse scenar‐ ios have been identified during development of this safety system:

Misuse by the manufacturer

• The application has hazards that cannot be protected against by an electro-sensi‐ tive optical protective device.

• The safety laser scanner works as an indirect protective measure and cannot pro‐ vide protection from pieces thrown from application nor from emitted radiation.

Transparent objects are not detected.

• Incorrect design of the field sets, e.g. protective fields are designed to be too small.

Misuse by the user/employee

• The user may not bring any stools, seats, ladders, or other objects into the moni‐ tored area with which the user can climb over the scanning field into the haz‐ ardous area.

• Transparent objects are not detected.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 17

4

PROJECT PLANNING

4.2

4.3

4.3.1

Operating entity of the overall system

DANGER

Hazard due to lack of effectiveness of the protective device

The dangerous state of the overall system may not be stopped or not be stopped in a timely manner in the event of non-compliance.

b

Changes to the electrical integration of the safety system in the machine control and changes to the mechanical mounting of the safety system necessitate a new risk assessment. The results of this risk assessment may require the entity operat‐ ing the machine to meet the obligations of a manufacturer.

b

Changes to the safety system’s configuration may impair the protective function.

The effectiveness of the safety system must be checked after any change to the configuration. The person carrying out the change is also responsible for maintain‐ ing the protective function of the safety system.

Design

Design of the access point to the hazardous area (example)

The access point to the hazardous area is monitored with several protective fields. The protective fields are interrupted in sequence when the hazardous area is approached.

For the configuration with 3 protective fields, the third protective field PF3 serves as presence detection immediately in front of the hazardous area.

1 2

4

PF1 PF2 PF3

3

4.3.2

1

2

3

4

Figure 5: Ideal design of the access to the hazardous area

Fixed physical guard, e.g. fencing

Robots to be protected

Protective fields of the safety laser scanner

Approach direction to hazardous area

Position of the safety laser scanner

Requirements for the position of the safety laser scanner

Position the safety laser scanner so that it meets all of the following criteria:

18 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PROJECT PLANNING

4

• The scan plane runs horizontally.

• The scan plane runs 300 mm above the floor. The risk assessment may indicate that a lower scan plane is necessary.

• The safety laser scanner must be mounted at the position at which the last config‐ ured protective field begins (for standard configuration: PF3, otherwise PF2).

1

PF1 PF2 PF3

2

Figure 6: Safety laser scanner positioned at the correct distance to the hazardous point

1

2

Protective field PF34 can be configured correctly.

Safety laser scanner

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PF1 PF2 PF3

1

2

Figure 7: Safety laser scanner placed with too great a distance to the hazardous point

1

2

Protective field PF3 cannot be configured according to the requirements of the safety system.

Safety laser scanner

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 19

4

PROJECT PLANNING

• The safety laser scanner can monitor the entire access area to the hazardous area. There are no areas that are not monitored where are person can be present

(e.g. in front of a physical guard).

1

PF1 PF2 PF3

2

Figure 8: Non-monitored area in the shadow of the physical guard

1

2

Non-monitored area

Safety laser scanner

Examples of possible positions of the safety laser scanner

PF1 PF2 PF3

1

Figure 9: Possible positions of the safety laser scanner when used with a physical guard

1

Safety laser scanner

20 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PROJECT PLANNING

4

1

PF1 PF2

PF3

4.3.3

4.3.3.1

Figure 10: Possible positions of the safety laser scanner when used without a physical guard

1

Safety laser scanner

Protective field design

Selecting the number of protective fields

Overview

The safety laser scanner monitors access to the hazardous area with several protective fields. Depending on the application and the risk assessment, you can configure the safety system with 3 or 2 protective fields. The configuration with 3 protective fields is the standard configuration.

Important information

DANGER

For the configuration with 2 protective fields, the safety system cannot reliably detect a person standing behind the protective device in all application cases.

The robot can possibly perform an automated start-up again, even though a person is in the hazardous area.

b

Only use the configuration with 2 protective fields if one of the following points can be guaranteed:

°

°

It is not possible to stand behind the protective device.

There is never more than one person in the safety laser scanner’s monitored area.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 21

4

PROJECT PLANNING

Configuration with 3 protective fields (standard)

PF1 PF2

PF3

Figure 11: Configuration with 3 protective fields

The safety system evaluates the following cases as a person standing behind the pro‐ tective device:

• There is an invalid protective field interruption sequence.

• The additional protective field PF3 is interrupted.

The safety system then switches to the safe state and must be manually reset.

Configuration with 2 protective fields

PF1 PF2

Figure 12: Configuration with 2 protective fields

The safety system evaluates the following cases as a person standing behind the pro‐ tective device:

22 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PROJECT PLANNING

4

• There is an invalid protective field interruption sequence.

The safety system then switches to the safe state and must be manually reset.

Complementary information

The configuration with 2 protective fields is not suitable for every application case for the following reason:

If 2 or more people are in the monitored area, someone standing behind the protective device does not always trigger an invalid sequence.

Example: One person is in protective field PF1. A second person approaches, passes through all protective fields, and steps into the hazardous area behind the protective device. The second person is no longer detected by the safety laser scanner. When the first person leaves again, protective field PF1 becomes free. This corresponds to a valid sequence for an automated restart, even though a person is in the hazardous area.

Further topics

"Automated restart", page 14

4.3.3.2

Overlapping protective fields

The safety laser scanner simultaneously monitors several protective fields (3 protective fields in the standard con‐ figuration). These protective fields partially overlap.

PF1 PF2 PF3 PF1 PF2 PF3 PF1 PF2 PF3

Figure 13: Position of protective field PF1 Figure 14: Position of protective field PF2 Figure 15: Position of protective field PF3

4.3.3.3

Distance between the ends of protective fields PF1 and PF2

Overview

Using sequence monitoring, the system can differentiate between a person leaving the hazardous area or entering into the hazardous area. So that the safety system can reli‐ ably determine this in every case, the protective fields PF1 and PF2 cannot end congru‐ ently at the edge of the hazardous area. If a person enters into the hazardous area, pro‐ tective field PF1 must first become free.

Distance between the ends of protective fields PF1 and PF2

The end of protective field PF1 must have a gap to the end of protective field PF2. The distance must correspond to at least the tolerance zone (TZ) of the safety laser scan‐ ner.

TZ of the microScan3 Core EFI-Pro safety laser scanner with protective field range of

5.5 m: 65 mm

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 23

4

PROJECT PLANNING

PF1 PF2

3

1

2

4.3.3.4

1

2

3

Figure 16: Distance between the ends of the protective fields

End of protective field PF2

End of protective field PF1

Distance between the end of protective field PF1 and end of protective field PF2

Minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and PF2 to the hazardous area

You must calculated the minimum distance to the hazardous area for each protective field PF1 and PF2. When doing so, protective field PF1 depends on the size of protec‐ tive field PF2. Therefore you must determine 3 dimensions.

1

2

3

4

PF1 PF2

24

1

2

3

Figure 17: Different distances for physical guards that can be reached over

Physical guard that can be reached over, e.g. table to place assembly item

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF2 (S

PF2

)

Difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area for protective fields

PF1 and PF2 (S

Diff

)

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PROJECT PLANNING

4

4

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF1 (S

PF1

)

1

4.3.3.4.1

PF1 PF2

2

3

4

1

2

3

Figure 18: Different distances for physical guards that cannot be reached over

4

Physical guards that cannot be reached over

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF2 (S

PF2

)

Difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area for protective fields

PF1 and PF2 (S

Diff

)

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF1 (S

PF1

)

Complementary information

Many applications do not have enough space to design the protective fields according to the following calculations. This case is considered further in the following chapter:

page 28

.

Further topics

"Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field

PF2", page 25

"Determining the difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area", page 27

"Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field

PF1", page 28

"Reducing protective field PF1 in case of limited space", page 28

Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field PF2

Overview

Interrupting the protective field PF2 triggers a robot protective stop. You must calculate the minimum distance of protective field PF2 so that the robot comes to a standstill in the event of a protective field interruption before the person reaches the hazardous area.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 25

4

PROJECT PLANNING

PF1 PF2

1

Figure 19: Minimum distance of the protective field PF2

1

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF2 (S

PF2

)

Approach

1.

Calculate the minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF2 according to ISO 13855.

S

PF2

= K × (t

Safety_system

+ t

Brake_time

+ t

Robot

) + C

Parameter

K t

Safetysystem t

Brake time

Description

Approach speed of a person. The approach speed is

1,600 mm/s according to EN ISO 10218-2.

Response time of safety system t

Robot

C

Delay time for activating the standstill monitoring on the robot

(in seconds).

Response time of the robot when an error arises during stand‐ still monitoring (e.g., standstill not reached after the delay time). Since the safety-rated monitored speed is activated at the time when the protective field is interrupted, you can take the corresponding speed limit into account when selecting the response time.

Supplement to protect against reaching over in millimeters

(mm)

C = 1,200 mm – (0.4 × protective field height (mm))

At a protective field height of 300 mm:

1,080 mm

Further topics

"Minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and PF2 to the hazardous area", page 24

"Response time of safety system", page 59

26 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

4.3.3.4.2

PROJECT PLANNING

4

Determining the difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area

Overview

The sequence for automated restart requires that protective field PF1 is interrupted before protective field PF2 when the hazardous area is approached. The minimum dis‐ tance to the hazardous area must therefore be greater for protective field PF1 than for protective field PF2.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PF1 PF2

1

Figure 20: Difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area

1

Difference between the minimum distances to the hazardous area between protective fields PF1 and PF2 (S

Diff

)

This difference is required for the following reasons:

Sequence for automated restart

Time window for activating the safety-rated monitored speed on the robot

Approach

1.

Calculate S

Diff

using the following formula:

S

Diff

= K × (t

Safety_system

+ t

Brake_time

)

Formula symbols

S

Diff

K t

Brake time t

Safetysystem

Description

Difference between the minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and PF2 to the hazardous area (mm)

Approach speed of a person

1,600 mm/s (EN ISO 10218-2)

Delay time for activating the standstill monitoring on the robot (in seconds).

Response time of safety system (in seconds)

Further topics

"Response time of safety system", page 59

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 27

4

PROJECT PLANNING

4.3.3.4.3

Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field PF1

4.3.3.4.4

PF1 PF2

1

Figure 21: Minimum distance of the protective field PF1

1

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF1 (S

PF1

)

Prerequisites

• S

PF2

is calculated.

• S

Diff

is determined.

Approach

1.

Calculate the minimum distance to the hazardous area with the following formula:

S

PF1

= S

PF2

+ S

Diff

Further topics

"Minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and PF2 to the hazardous area", page 24

Reducing protective field PF1 in case of limited space

Overview

If your application does not offer enough space for protective field PF1, you can reduce the size of protective field PF1. This influences protective field PF2 and the application behavior.

Important information

NOTE

The changes described here have no effect on the safety of the robot, but do affect the availability of the robot.

28 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

PROJECT PLANNING

4

4.3.3.5

Changes to the application and calculations

Changes to the application

The protective field PF1 is made smaller. This has the following effects:

• When the protective field PF2 is interrupted, it can no longer be assumed that the robot has already definitely activated the safety-rated monitored speed.

• Protective field PF2 must be designed to be larger.

• The robot stops earlier when the hazardous area is approached.

Table 7: Changes to the calculations for the minimum distances to the hazardous area

Dimension

S

PF2

Explanation

Safety-rated monitored speed is not definitely activated.

S

Diff

S

PF1

Changes in calculating

Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field PF2

Take the maximum speed of the robot into account when selecting the response time of the robot. Use this time to calculate the minimum distance to the hazardous area.

Determining the difference between the minimum distances to the haz‐ ardous area

Instead of the calculation, use the following value:

500 mm

Calculating the minimum distance to the hazardous area of the protective field PF1

No change to the formula

This value is a compromise between small footprint and robot availability.

In extreme cases, you can reduce the value down to 160 mm. In practice, a value < 500 mm significantly impairs the availability of the robot.

Further topics

see "Minimum distances of protective fields PF1 and PF2 to the hazardous area", page 24

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF3

Minimum distance to hazardous area

The protective field PF3 must be large enough that a person cannot step over the pro‐ tective field without interrupting it when doing so. SICK recommends a minimum size of

750 mm.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 29

4

PROJECT PLANNING

PF1 PF2

PF3

1

4.3.4

4.3.5

4.3.6

Figure 22: Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF3

1

Minimum distance to the hazardous area for protective field PF3

Complementary information

The value of 750 mm for the minimum size of the protective field PF3 has been derived from the ISO 13855 standard. In this standard, 750 mm is the minimum width for pres‐ sure sensitive mats/plates so that they cannot be stepped over. Since the scanning field of the safety laser scanner usually runs 300 mm over the floor, stepping over it is even more difficult than with a pressure sensitive mat/plate.

Robot operating modes

Selecting between the robot operating modes is not a part of this safety system. You must carry out selection of the operating mode and the safety functions in the manual operating mode via the robot controller. You can use the operating mode selector switch and the enabling device on the robot’s operating panel, for example.

This safety system takes the following operating modes into account:

• Automated

• Manual, reduced speed (signals for protective stop and safety-rated monitored speed are bypassed).

Warning signs for automated restart

The safety system has an automated restart function. You must place a corresponding warning sign on the application.

ISO 7010, warning sign W018

Emergency stop pushbutton requirements

Prerequisites

• The emergency stop pushbutton must be designed according to ISO 13850 and

IEC 60204.

• The emergency stop pushbuttons must be pressed and tested at least every

12 months.

30 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

4.4.1

4.5

4.5.1

4.3.7

4.4

PROJECT PLANNING

4

Requirements for the integration design

• At least one emergency stop pushbutton must be installed.

• The emergency stop pushbutton must be mounted outside the hazardous area.

Complementary information

The risk assessment can reveal that more than one emergency stop pushbutton is required. Especially in the case of applications in which users can step behind the pro‐ tective device, emergency stop pushbuttons are often required in the hazardous area.

Requirements for the reset pushbutton and restart button

Prerequisites

• The reset pushbutton and the restart button must be designed according to

EN 60204.

Requirements for the integration design

• The reset pushbutton and the restart button must be installed outside of the haz‐ ardous area.

• The reset pushbutton and the restart button must be installed outside of the pro‐ tective fields.

• From the position of the reset pushbutton and the restart button, there must be a complete view of the hazardous area.

Integrating the equipment into the electrical control

NOTE

Several safety functions are generally necessary in order to ensure a safe design for the entire application. This requires additional components that are not part of the safety system, such as switches, fuses, and contactors. The circuit diagrams contain informa‐ tion on wiring the safety system with additional components within an application.

Circuit diagram

A detailed circuit diagram is available as a PDF.

Integration into the network

Interfaces

Overview

The Flexi Soft safety controller is connected to the robot controller via 2 connections, which are both established via the same cable.

• Secure network: EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™

• Non-secure network: EtherNet/IP™

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 31

4

PROJECT PLANNING

32

Safety controller

CIP safety

Originator

Gateway

EtherNet/IP

TM

Target

Safety functions

Safety status

CIP safety

Target

Robot controller

Nonsafe functions

Nonsafe Status

EtherNet/IP TM

Originator

Figure 23: Network connections

Secure network EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™

Table 8: Network structure EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™

Component IP address

1

Flexi Soft

KR C4 microScan 3 Core EFI-pro

192.168.1.2

192.168.1.10

192.168.1.3

Role in the network

Originator

Target

Target

1 The IP addresses in this column are the already-set example values in the pre-configured project file. You can change the IP addresses to meet your requirements.

Table 9: Assemblies used EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™

Flexi Soft safety controller

163

162

Communication direction

Safety controller > robot con‐ troller

Robot controller > safety con‐ troller

Robot controller

904

776

Table 10: Output data and input data EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™

Safety function

Emergency stop

Safety controller out‐ put data

163: Bit 0.0

Robot controller input data

904: Bit 0.1

163: Bit 0.1

904: Bit 0.5

Safety function in the robot controller

NHE, external Emer‐ gency Stop

SHS2, Safety Stop 2 Initiate a protective stop

Trigger safety-rated monitored speed

163: Bit 0.2

904: Bit 2.1

VRED, Reduced axisspecific and Cartesian velocity

Non-secure network EtherNet/IP™

Table 11: Network structure EtherNet/IP™

Component

KR C4

Flexi Soft

IP address

192.168.1.10

192.168.1.2

Role in the network

Originator

Target

You need to map the EtherNet/IP bits to the corresponding inputs on the robot con‐ troller in the KUKA Engineering Tool WorkVisual.

Table 12: Mapping EtherNet/IP bits to the inputs on the robot controller

EtherNet/IP Bit I/Os > digital inputs Description

Bit 0.0

Bit 0.2

Bit 0.3

$IN[1]

$IN[2]

$IN[3]

MOVE_ENABLE

EXT_START

CONF_MESS

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

4.6

PROJECT PLANNING

4

EtherNet/IP Bit

Bit 0.4

Bit 0.1

I/Os > digital inputs

$IN[4]

$IN[140]

Description

VRED

DRIVES_ON

Testing plan

The manufacturer of the machine and the operating entity must define all required thor‐ ough checks. The definition must be based on the application conditions and the risk assessment.

The following tests must be planned:

A thorough check must be carried out during commissioning and following modifi‐ cations.

The check must detect if it is possible to enter the hazardous area without being detected.

The regular thorough checks of the safety system must fulfill certain minimum requirements. The minimum requirements for the thorough check of the safety system comply at least with the sum of the minimum requirements for the thor‐ ough check of the components of the safety system (see operating instructions of the components).

The check must detect if it is possible to enter the hazardous area without being detected. Such possibilities may exist due to modifications, manipulations or exter‐ nal influences.

In many cases, depending on the application conditions, the risk assessment can determine that further thorough checks are required.

The thorough checks must be carried out by qualified safety personnel or specially qual‐ ified and authorized personnel, and must be documented in a traceable manner.

The regular thorough checks serve to assess the effectiveness of the safety system and to identify defects as a result of changes or other influences (e.g., damage or manipula‐ tion).

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 33

5

MOUNTING

5

5.1

Mounting

For mounting the components

NOTE

Information is included in the operating instructions for the components.

34 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

6

6.1

6.2

6.3

ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION

6

Electrical installation

Electrical installation of the components

NOTE

Information is included in the operating instructions for the components.

General requirements

The manufacturer must take measures against failures resulting from the same cause.

The manufacturer must document this appropriately in SISTEMA. During the electrical installation, the following, for example, must be taken into consideration:

• Protection against overvoltage, overcurrent, etc. per the manufacturer instructions for the individual components

• Mechanical fastening of the wiring of the pushbutton for the hold to run device, e.g. with cable ties

• Measures for controlling the consequences of voltage failure, voltage fluctuations, overcurrent and undercurrent in the voltage supply of the robot controller

Safety controller pin assignment

Important information

NOTE

The gateway and safety laser scanner have 2 switched connections each. These allow for several connections, also with additional switches.

• Gateway > safety laser scanner > robot controller

• Gateway > robot controller

Gateway > safety laser scanner

• Gateway > switch

Safety laser scanner > switch

Robot controller > switch

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 35

6

ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION

Pin assignment

36

Table 13: Modules of the safety controller

Module 1 FX3-CPU0 main module

Module 2

Module 3

EFI-pro gateway

I/O module FX3-XTIO

Module 1 connections

Table 14: Module 1 connections

Connection

A1

A2

Function

+24 V DC supply voltage

0 V DC supply voltage

Module 2 connections

Table 15: Module 2 connections

Connection Function

Port 1

Port 2

Not assigned

1)

Network connection to safety laser scanner and robot

1)

The gateway has an internal switch. Both connections can be used for mains supply. In this document, it is assumed that port 2 is used for the connection.

Module 3 connections

Table 16: Module 3

Connection

I1

I2

Function

Emergency stop pushbutton

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

Connection

I3

I4

I5 … I8

Q1 … Q4

Function

Reset pushbutton

Restart button

Not assigned

ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION

6

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 37

7

CONFIGURATION

7

7.1

7.2

Configuration

Requirements for software and firmware

Table 17: SICK component versions

Software/firmware

Safety Designer

Firmware FX3-CPU0

Firmware FX3-GEPR

Firmware FX3-XTIO

Firmware microScan3 Core EFI-pro

Tested version

1.7.0.39

4.0

1.04.0

3.0

1.0

Table 18: Robot controller versions

Software/firmware

KUKA.SystemSoftware

KUKA.SafeOperation

Tested version

8.3

3.2

Table 19: Software versions of the robot manufacturer

Software Tested version

KUKA WorkVisual 4.0.29

Pre-configured project files

SICK provides you with the preconfigured project file in a ZIP archive when you pur‐ chase the safety system.

Checksum of the preconfigured project file:

In the delivery condition: 0xCFC93FEE

After you have linked the safety outputs in the logic editor: 0x2F8EFD70

38 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

7.3

CONFIGURATION

7

Overview of the software structure

Power up

Manual reset/restart

Normal operation

↓PF2

Manual reset/restart and PF1 free

↑PF1 ↓PF1

Manual reset

↓PF3

Sequence error

↑PF1 and

Sequence

OK

Safety-rated monitored speed

↓PF2

Protective stop

Figure 24: Software structure

Protective field becomes free.

Protective field is interrupted.

Manual reset/ restart

Emergency stop

Emergency stop device actuated

From every state

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 39

7

CONFIGURATION

All PFs free

Manual reset/restart

Normal operation

No

PF1 infringed?

Yes

Safety-rated monitored speed

Yes

No

PF1 free?

No

PF2 infringed?

Yes

Protective stop

Manual reset and restart

Yes PF3 infringed?

No

No Sequence ok?

Automatic restart

Yes

Yes

PF1 free

No

7.4

40

Figure 25: Software logic

Opening project file

1.

Start the Safety Designer.

2.

Click on Project .

3.

Click on Open .

4.

Select the project file.

5.

Click on Open .

The project file opens. The Settings view appears.

6.

Click on Configuration .

The device overview view opens.

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

CONFIGURATION

7

7.5

7.6

7.6.1

7.6.2

7.6.2.1

7.6.3

Double-click on a device to configure that device.

Connection overview

See Connections for a connection overview of the configured devices.

Depending on the version of configuration software used, the connection to the robot controller may be displayed as an “EFI-pro”-type connection. However, it is always an

EtherNet/IP TM – CIP Safety TM connection.

Main module configuration

Verifying the logic

Overview

There is no link in the logic editor between the logics and the outputs of the safety con‐ troller in the delivered state. If you transmit the logic to the safety controller in the deliv‐ ery condition, the safety outputs always remain in the safe state.

Approach

b

Check whether the logics in the safety requirements of the application are suffi‐ cient before outputs of the function blocks are linked to outputs of the safety con‐ troller.

Jump addresses

Jump addresses consist of a source jump address and a destination jump address. The destination jump address assumes the same value (HIGH or LOW) as the associated source jump address without a delay.

Among other things, jump addresses are used to connect the various pages of logic with each other.

Finding source and destination jump addresses that belong together

Approach

1.

Right-click on the source or destination jump address.

2.

Click Used on page .

A list of all pages containing elements of the jump address is displayed.

3.

Click on the desired page.

The desired page is displayed.

In/out page

Overview

This page contains all inputs and outputs that no longer interact with the robot con‐ troller.

• Cut-off path of the safety laser scanner

• Inputs and outputs for emergency stop pushbutton, reset pushbutton, and restart button on the XTIO expansion module

• Jump addresses for external signals

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 41

7

CONFIGURATION

7.6.4

7.6.5

Jump addresses for external safety signals

You can use the jump addresses for external safety signals to directly trigger the safety functions on the robot controller (e.g. via additional safety switches). The functionality of the safety system described in this document is not impeded by this. The safety func‐ tions with external safety signals are not a part of this safety system and are the responsibility of the manufacturer.

Table 20: Jump addresses for external safety signals

Jump address Description

EXTERNAL_ESTOP

EXTERNAL_STOP

EXTERNAL_VRED

Signal state LOW triggers the emergency stop on the robot controller.

Signal state LOW triggers the protective stop on the robot controller.

Signal state LOW triggers the safety-rated monitored speed on the robot controller (after the configured delay time).

To connect a jump address with an external safety signal, you must replace the corre‐ sponding Static 1 signal on the Routing n:n 4 function block with the safety signal.

Jump addresses for additional safety functions

You can use the status of the safety system for further safety functions via the jump addresses. The functionality of the safety system described in this document is not impeded by this. The additional safety functions are not a part of this safety system and are the responsibility of the manufacturer or integrator.

Table 21: Jump addresses for additional safety functions

Jump address Description

STATUS_ESTOP Status of the bit for the emergency stop

Signal state LOW means that the emergency stop has been triggered.

STATUS_STOP

STATUS_VRED

Status of the bit for the protective stop

Signal state LOW means that the protective stop has been triggered.

Status of the bit for the safety-rated monitored speed

Signal state LOW means that the safety-rated monitored speed has been triggered.

To use a jump address for further safety functions, you need to connect the associated output on the Routing n:n 5 function block with the desired output element for the safety function. You may need to expand the safety controller with an XTIO-type expansion module so that enough outputs are available for the additional safety function.

Emergency stop page

This page contains the logic for the emergency stop.

Table 22: Important elements on the emergency stop page

Element Description

IN_EMERGENCYSTOP

IN_RESET

Jump addresses that forward the signal of the emergency stop push‐ button.

Signal state LOW triggers the emergency stop on the robot controller.

Jump addresses that forward the signal of the reset pushbutton.

Press the reset pushbutton (Signal LOW-HIGH-LOW, HIGH = 100 ms …

30 s) to reset the Reset 1 function block.

Protective stop page

This page contains the logic for the protective stop.

42 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

7.6.6

7.6.7

CONFIGURATION

7

Table 23: Important elements on the protective stop page

Element

PF2_STOP

SequenceOK

PF3_RESET

IN_RESET

Description

Jump addresses that forward the signal for the protective field PF2.

Signal state LOW triggers the protective stop on the robot controller.

Jump addresses that forward the signal for a valid sequence for auto‐ mated restart.

Signal state LOW prevents the robot from restarting.

Jump addresses that forward the signal for the protective field PF3.

Signal state LOW triggers a protective stop on the robot controller and requires manually resetting the safety system.

Jump addresses that forward the signal of the reset pushbutton.

Press the reset pushbutton (Signal LOW-HIGH-LOW, HIGH = 100 ms …

30 s) to reset the Reset 2 function block, when protective field PF1

(jump address PF1_VRED ) is free at the same time.

SafetyRatedMonitoredSpeed page

This page forwards the signal from protective field PF1 to the jump address

ROBOT_VRED .

SafeSequenceMonitoring page

Overview

This page contains the logic for monitoring the sequence for automated restart.

Principle of operation

Table 24: Important elements on the SafeSequenceMonitoring page

Element

Safe Sequence Monitor‐ ing V1.0

SequenceOK

AutomaticRestart

Reset required

Description

Customized function block, password protected

Evaluates the signals of protective fields PF1 and PF2, among other things.

Jump addresses that forward the signal for a valid sequence for auto‐ mated restart.

Signal state LOW triggers the protective stop on the robot controller.

Output on function block

• HIGH = After resetting the safety system: Sequence for automated restart is valid. No error detected.

• LOW = Sequence for automated restart invalid or after switching on the safety controller (before resetting the safety system)

Safety state LOW leads to a safe state of the safety output via the network “Triggering protective stop”. The robot executes a protective stop. Automated restart is prevented.

Output on function block

When protective field PF1 becomes free and there is a valid sequence for automated restart, a HIGH signal is output for 500 ms via the out‐ put. This pulse triggers the automated restart.

Output on function block

If a manual reset is required, there is a pulsating signal (1 Hz) present at the output.

Further topics

"Automated restart", page 14

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 43

7

CONFIGURATION

7.6.8

Robot safety signals page

Overview

This page contains the logic and signals for the safety functions that are triggered on the robot controller.

Important information

NOTE

Some output elements have not yet been connected with the logic on this page. You must first check whether the logic of the safety system is sufficient for the require‐ ments of your application. Only then can you connect the output elements with the logic.

Important elements

Table 25: Important elements on the robot safety signals page

Element Description

ROBOT_EMG_STOP Jump address that forwards the logic for the emergency stop.

The logic forwards the signal to the bit 0.1 NHE (External Emergency

Stop) of the robot controller.

ROBOT_STOP

ROBOT_VRED

Jump address that forwards the logic for the protective stop.

The logic forwards the signal to the bit 0.5 SHS2 (Safety STOP 2) of the robot controller as long as the conditions for automated restart and manual restart have been fulfilled after manual resetting.

Jump address that forwards the signal for the safety-rated monitored speed.

The logic forwards the signal to the bit 2.1 VRED (Reduced axis-specific and cartesian velocity) of the robot controller.

Off-delay timer 3

KUKA KRC4:776.Bit 06

T1

Static 1

Function block that results in a delay in the activation of the safetyrated monitored speed.

Default value: 1,000 ms

You need to adjust this value for your application.

When the bit 2.1 VRED goes to the signal state LOW, the robot con‐ troller immediately begins to monitor the speed of the robot. The robot will, however, need a little time to reach the reduced speed. The moni‐ toring of the speed must therefore be activated after a certain delay.

Incoming signal from the robot controller. Switches to the signal state

HIGH as soon as “Manual, reduced speed” operating mode is selected.

In conjunction with the OR 11 function block, this signal results in a muting of the safety stop in the “Manual, reduced speed” operating mode.

Input element is logical 1. The following bits require a constant signal so that the robot can move:

• KUKA KRC4:904.Bit0.0 RES (Reserved 1)

• KUKA KRC4:904.Bit 0.2 BS (Operator safety)

• KUKA KRC4:904.Bit 0.4 SHS1 (Safety STOP 1)

• KUKA KRC4:904.Bit 1.1 SBH (safe operational stop)

• KUKA KRC4:904.Bit2.2 SSBH1 (safe operation stop axis group 1)

Non-connected output elements

Output element

To KUKA KRC4:904#2.Bit 0.1 ESTOP

Must be connected with:

Function block AND 5

Output Output 1

44 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

7.6.9

7.7

7.7.1

7.7.2

CONFIGURATION

7

Output element

To KUKA KRC4:904#2.Bit 0.5 SHS2

To KUKA KRC4:904#2.Bit 2.1 VRED

Must be connected with:

Function block OR 11

Output Output 1

Function block OR 14

Output Output 1

Non-secure robot signals page

This page contains the logic and signals for the non-secure functions that are triggered on the robot controller.

Table 26: Important elements on the non-secure robot signals page

Element

IN_RESTART

IN_RESET

AutoRestart

ROBOT_VRED

Static 1

Description

Jump address that forwards the signal for the restart button.

Forwarded to bit 0.2 EXT_START of the robot controller. Triggers pro‐ gram start on the robot controller.

Jump address that forwards the signal of the reset pushbutton.

Forwarded to bit 0.3 CONF_MESS and bit 0.1 DRIVES_ON. Triggers an error reset and activation of the drive.

Jump address that forwards the signal for the automated restart.

Forwarded to bit 0.2 EXT_START of the robot controller. Triggers pro‐ gram start on the robot controller.

Jump address that forwards the signal for the reduction of the override.

The reduction of the override reduces the speed of the robot.

Forwarded to bit 0.4 REDUCE_OVRD of the robot controller.

Input element is logical 1. The following bits require a constant signal so that the robot can move:

• Bit 0.0 MOVE_ENABLE

Configuring the safety laser scanner

Resolution of the safety laser scanner

You can find the settings for the resolution under Navigation > Configuration > Monitoring plane .

A resolution of 70 mm is configured for the safety laser scanner. You must check whether the resolution is suitable for your application.

You can find information on calculating the minimum resolution in the operating instructions 8021911.

Field sets and cut-off paths

You can find the settings for the field sets and cut-off paths under Navigation > Configura‐ tion > Monitoring cases .

3 field sets are configured for the safety laser scanner. One cut-off path is assigned to each field set.

Table 27: Field set allocation

Field set

VRED (PF1)

STOP (PF2)

RESET (PF3)

2

3

Cut-off path

1

2

3

Safety Output

1

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 45

7

CONFIGURATION

7.7.3

7.8

Configuring the safety system without protective field PF3

Approach

1.

In the Navigation , click on Configuration .

2.

Click on Monitoring cases .

3.

Under Field sets in the area Defined cut-off behaviour , click and hold the Always ON button.

4.

Drag and drop the Always ON button into the working range and over the RESET PF3 field set (under Cut-off path 3 ).

Protective field PF3 is no longer used. The corresponding input element in the logic editor of the main module acts like a static HIGH signal.

Transfer configuration

b

Transmit configuration to the Flexi Soft main module (see operating instructions

8013926).

46 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

8

8.1

8.2

COMMISSIONING

8

Commissioning

Safety

WARNING

Hazard due to lack of effectiveness of the protective device b

Before commissioning the machine, make sure that the machine is first checked and released by qualified safety personnel.

b

Only operate the machine with a perfectly functioning protective device.

DANGER

Dangerous state of the machine

During commissioning, the machine or the protective device may not yet behave as you have planned.

b

Make sure that there is no-one in the hazardous area during commissioning.

Before commissioning can be performed, project planning, mounting, electrical installa‐ tion and configuration must be completed in accordance with this document.

Overview of commissioning

Overview

This document gives an overview of the procedure when commissioning and the order of the configurations required for commissioning.

The configuration of the safety system is saved in a project file for the Safety Designer configuration software. The project file contains the configuration for the Flexi Soft safety controller and microScan3 Core EFI-pro safety laser scanner. So that the safety system can function as described in this document, you must also make the settings on the robot controller.

Prerequisites

• All cables connected (network and power)

• Safety Designer configuration software installed on the computer

Approach

1.

Connect safety controller, safety laser scanner, and robot controller to the power supply.

2.

Connect safety controller to the computer.

3.

Open the project file for the safety system with the Safety Designer configuration software.

"Opening project file", page 40

4.

Configure the IP address of the safety controller, safety laser scanner, and robot controller (customized element).

Table 28: Pre-set IP addresses

Device

FX3-CPU0 mS3 Core EFI-pro

KUKA KR C4

IP address

192.168.1.2

192.168.1.3

192.168.1.10

5.

Finish configuration of the logic of the safety controller.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 47

8

COMMISSIONING

8.3

8.3.1

Note: The connection to the safety controller must be disconnected when doing so.

"Robot safety signals page", page 44

6.

Transmit configuration to the safety controller (see operating instructions

8013926).

7.

Configure the protective fields for the safety laser scanner (see operating instruc‐ tions 8021911).

8.

Put the robot controller into operation.

"Putting the robot controller into operation", page 48

9.

Configure the Safety Network Number (SNN) via the configuration software.

"Configuring the safety network number in the robot controller", page 55

10. Ensure that all components in the entire system are connected to one another and data exchange is taking place (EtherNet/IP™ – CIP Safety™ and EtherNet/IP™).

see "Checking the network connection", page 57

11. Select Submit interpreter (sps.sub) to activate the reduction in speed of the robot.

To do so, select and start the SUB program via the Submit interpreter status indi‐ cator on the operating panel. The status indicator is green when the Submit inter‐ preter is running.

12. Optimize the delay time in the logic configuration of the safety controller as per the requirements of the application.

13. Verifying and validating the safety functions.

"Checklists", page 65

Putting the robot controller into operation

Important information

NOTE

• Only qualified personnel are allowed to perform commissioning of the robot con‐ troller.

• A regular brake test and adjustment referencing are required when using the

KUKA.SafeOperation software. These are not a part of this safety system and are the responsibility of the manufacturer or integrator

Configuring the IP address of the robot controller on the smartPAD

Approach

1.

Select Main menu > Commissioning > Network configuration > KLI .

2.

Perform the following settings:

Table 29: IP address settings

Field

IP address:

Subnet mask:

Value

192.168.1.10

255.255.255.0

Example:

48 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

COMMISSIONING

8

8.3.2

3.

Select Save and restart.

Configuring the non-safe signals on the smartPAD

Approach

1.

Perform the following settings:

Table 30: Configuration > In-/Outputs > Automated External

Input name Value

$EXT_START

$MOVE_ENABLE

2

1

$CONF_MESS

$DRIVES_ON

3

140

Example:

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 49

8

COMMISSIONING

8.3.3

Preparing the project in KUKA.WorkVisual

Approach

1.

Establish the connection to the robot controller via KUKA.WorkVisual and load the robot control project.

2.

Install the additional options KUKA.SafeOperation and KRC4 EthernetIP in the robot controller and in KUKA.WorkVisual. When installing these in KUKA.WorkVi‐ sual, you can use the kop files

1)

from the robot controller ( Extras > Option Package

Management ).

Example:

1)

50

KUKA Option package

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

COMMISSIONING

8

8.3.4

Activate CIP Safety in KUKA.WorkVisual

Approach

1.

Select EtherNet/IP Settings > Local safety slave .

2.

Perform the following settings:

Table 31: EtherNet/IP Settings, Local safety slave

Field Value

Active configuration: Activated

Outputs (T -> O) /

Inputs (O -> T) - Size:

8

Example:

8.3.5

3.

Click Apply to accept the changes.

Configuration of KUKA.SafeOperation

Overview

Configuring the safety parameters in KUKA.SafeOperation.

Important information

NOTE

If no mastering reference switch is connected during commissioning, it may not be pos‐ sible to move the robot. In this case, in KUKA.WorkVisual

select the Global Parameters option in the Common tab under Safety control . In the Mastering test input field, change the value to by bus interface .

Approach

1.

In KUKA.WorkVisual, click on Safety control .

2.

Select the Common tab.

3.

Select Global Parameters .

4.

Select the Local safety configuration tab.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 51

8

COMMISSIONING

5.

Activate Safe monitoring .

6.

In the Reduced cartesian velocity field, enter a value to suit the requirements of the application.

Example:

8.3.6

Setting the IP addresses in KUKA.WorkVisual

Approach

1.

Ensure a network connection to the robot controller exists and the IP address of the computer (IP source address) is in the subnet.

2.

Select EtherNet/IP > Communication settings > Scanner .

3.

Enter the following settings to specify the IP address of the EtherNet/IP originator

(master).

Table 32: Scanner IP address

Field Value

Scanner IP address: 192.168.1.10

Example:

8.3.7

52

Configuring the EFI-pro gateway as a target (slave)

Approach

1.

In the browser, go to http://www.sick.com/1069070 .

2.

Select Downloads > Software .

3.

Download the EDS file.

4.

In KUKA.WorkVisual, select the Hardware tab in the Project Structure area.

5.

Right-click on EtherNet/IP .

6.

Select Functions > Add EDS to library .

The EDS wizard opens

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

8.3.8

COMMISSIONING

8

7.

Import the desired EDS file using the EDS wizard.

8.

Right-click on EtherNet/IP .

9.

Select Add .

The DTM selection dialog opens.

10.

FX3-GEPR Select FX3-GEPR and click OK to confirm.

FX3-GEPR is added to the hardware configuration.

11. Double click on FX3-GEPR .

12. In the FX3-GEPR - Settings tab, select the Address setting tab.

13. In the field IP address: , enter the value 192.168.1.2

.

14. Select the Device properties tab.

15. In the Number: field, set the value 001 .

Defining the IO mapping in KUKA.WorkVisual

Approach

1.

Select the IO Mapping tab.

2.

In the window on the left, select Digital Inputs .

3.

In the Fieldbuses tab in the window on the right, select the gateway FX3-GEPR .

4.

Define the following mapping using drag & drop.

Table 33: Mapping network signals to digital inputs

Digital input

$IN[1]

$IN[2]

$IN[3]

$IN[4]

$IN[140]

Bit Input

0.0

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.1

Signal name (example)

MOVE_ENABLE

EXT_START

CONF_MESS

VRED

DRIVES_ON

Example:

8.3.9

Configuring the Submit interpreter

Overview

The Submit interpreter is used to reduce the speed of the robot depending on the signal at the 0.4 VRED input. Signal level HIGH activates the reduction of the speed.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 53

8

COMMISSIONING

Important information

NOTE

In the code example provided, the example values used for Override and Reduced speed are 40% and 10% respectively. You need to adjust these example values for your application. The Override value needs to be selected so that the speed limit configured in KUKA.SafeOperation is not exceeded.

Approach

1.

Open KUKA.WorkVisual.

2.

In the Workspace Selection area, switch to Programming and diagnosis .

3.

Open sps.sub.

4.

In the program code window, incorporate the following code under User PLC :

;---------------- Reduce Speed ----------------------------

; Reduce Override from 40% to 10% depending on the IN[4]

IF $IN[4]==TRUE THEN

$OV_PRO = 10

ELSE

$OV_PRO = 40

ENDIF

;----------------------------------------------------------

Example:

8.3.10

54

Transferring the settings to the robot controller

Approach

1.

In the Workspace Selection area in KUKA.WorkVisual, switch to Configuration and com‐ missioning .

2.

Click on the Deploy button.

The wizard opens.

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

8.4

8.5

COMMISSIONING

8

3.

Follow the steps in the wizard.

Configuring the safety network number in the robot controller

Overview

You cannot directly configure the Safety Network Number (SNN) via the user interface of the robot controller. The robot controller receives the Safety Network Number via a manual network service.

Prerequisites

The safety controller and robot controller must be switched on.

The safety controller and robot controller must be connected to the network.

Approach

1.

Open the project file in the Safety Designer configuration software.

2.

Click on Configuration .

3.

Double-click on device FX3-CPU0 .

4.

Click on Configuration .

5.

In the Navigation under GEPR , click on EtherNet/IP services .

6.

Click on the Services for 3rd party devices tab.

7.

In the Target IP address field, enter the IP address of the robot controller (example:

192.168.1.10).

8.

Click on Read from device .

0x08 Waiting for TUNID is displayed.

If Idle is displayed, you must first reset the status with the Safety reset on

192.168.1.10

button.

9.

Enter the desired network number in the Safety network number field, e.g.,

0004_0000_000A.

10. Click on Write TUNID on 192.168.1.10

.

11. Click on Read from device .

0x04 Executing is displayed.

Check during commissioning and modifications

The test is intended to ensure that the hazardous area is monitored by the protective device and that unprotected access to the hazardous area is prevented.

b

Carry out the checks according to the instructions from the manufacturer of the machine and from the operating entity.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 55

9

MAINTENANCE

9

9.1

Maintenance

Maintenance of the components

NOTE

Information is included in the operating instructions for the components.

56 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

10

10.1

10.2

TROUBLESHOOTING

10

Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting the components

NOTE

Information is included in the operating instructions for the components.

Checking the network connection

Approach

Check network connection in the safety controller.

1.

Connect computer with the safety controller via the network.

2.

Start the configuration software.

3.

Click Configuration .

4.

Double-click on safety controller.

5.

Click Configuration .

6.

In the Navigation under GEPR , click on Connection overview .

7.

Read off the connection status in the Connection Status column.

Existing connection are marked with the established entry.

Check the network connection in the robot controller.

8.

Select Main menu > Diagnosis > Diagnostic monitor .

9.

Select the CIP Safety module.

If a connection exists, it is displayed in the CIP Safety Supervisor Status line as

Executing .

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 57

11

OPERATION

11

11.1

11.2

Operation

Operating the components

NOTE

Information is included in the operating instructions for the components.

Regular thorough check

The test is intended to ensure that the hazardous area is monitored by the protective device and that unprotected access to the hazardous area is prevented.

b

Carry out the checks according to the instructions from the manufacturer of the machine and from the operating entity.

58 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

12

12.1

12.2

TECHNICAL DATA

12

Technical data

Data sheet

Table 34: Data sheet for sBot Speed CIP

Performance level d

SIL claim limit

Supply voltage V

S

Ambient operating temperature

Storage temperature

Air humidity

Permissible operating height

Safe state

2

24 V DC (16.8 V DC ... 30 V DC) (PELV)

1)

–10 °C … 50 °C

–25 °C … 70 °C

90% at 50 °C (EN 61131-2)

2,000 m

The safety outputs via the network are logic 0.

1) The external supply voltage must jumper a brief power failure of 20 ms as specified in IEC 60204-1. Suit‐ able power supply units are available as accessories from SICK.

Response time of safety system

Composite response time

The response time of the safety system t

SafetySystem

is calculated as follows t safetysystem

= t input

+ t logic

+ t output

1)

2) t input

Response time for the input of the gateway including the response time of the safety laser scanner via EFI-pro. Consists of:

• Response time of the safety laser scanner via EFI-pro

1)

• Network response time for data to the gateway main module

1)

1)

• 2 x internal update interval for data from the gateway to the

General supplement: +5 ms

Deduction when using a 2nd gateway: –4 ms 2)

2 × logic response time of the safety controller t logic t output

Response time for the output of the gateway. Consists of:

• 2 x internal update interval for data from the main module to the gateway

1)

• Network response time for data from the gateway to the robot controller 1)

• General supplement: +8 ms

• Deduction when using a 2nd gateway: –4 ms

2)

You can find the value in the Safety Designer report.

Only relevant if an additional gateway is integrated in the safety controller.

Complementary information

Changing the components of the safety system, the settings of the EFI-pro network, or the logic program of the safety controller can affect the response time of the safety sys‐ tem. You may have to recalculate the response time of the safety system.

You must also take into account other times when calculating the stopping time of the entire system. The following times are always relevant for the stopping time of the entire system:

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 59

12

TECHNICAL DATA

• Robot controller response time

• Response time of the robot

• Robot stopping/run-down time

60 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

13

13.1

13.2

ORDERING INFORMATION

13

Ordering information

Scope of delivery

Table 35: Hardware scope of delivery

Component

Flexi Soft main module FX3-CPU0

Flexi Soft Gateway FX3-GEPR0

Flexi Soft extension module FX3-XTIO

Flexi Soft system plug FX3-MPL0 microScan3 Core EFI-pro MICS3-ABAZ55ZA1P01 safety laser scanner

Quantity

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

Table 36: Software scope of delivery

Operating instructions

Circuit diagram

SISTEMA project file

Safety Designer project file

KUKA.WorkVisual project file

1)

Provided upon purchase of the software.

1) You cannot use this project file to configure your robot controller. The project file serves as an example only, which you can use to understand certain settings.

Ordering information

You must order the hardware and software separately.

Table 37: Hardware sBot Speed CIP ordering information

Description

Safety system sBot Speed CIP hardware package

Table 38: Software sBot Speed CIP – KU ordering information

Description

Safety system sBot Speed CIP – KU software package

Part number

1105347

Part number

1614144

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 61

14

ACCESSORIES

14

14.1

Accessories

Connectivity

1

Overview

The quantity and type of cables required for operation and configuration depends on the network structure.

Table 39: Cables required

Cable Network structure

Gateway > safety laser scanner > robot controller

Gateway > robot con‐ troller

Gateway > safety laser scanner

Gateway > switch

Safety laser scanner > switch

Cables for operation

Connecting cable,

M12, 4-pin, A-coding

1 ×

Ethernet cable, M12,

4-pin, D-coding on

RJ45

Ethernet cable, D-cod‐ ing on RJ45, D-coding on RJ45

1

Cables for configuration

2 ×

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

1 ×

2 ×

• You need at least one suitable cable.

• You can connect the safety system via the gateway, via the safety laser scanner, or via an optional switch. The type of cable therefore depends on which device you would like to use to configure the safety system.

• In any case, the configuration option of connecting the safety laser scanner via USB is very helpful for commissioning and diagnostics.

Suitable Suitable Suitable USB mini-B male con‐ nector, 3 m cable, USB

A male connector

Male connector, straight, 2 m cable,

RJ45 male connector

Ethernet cable, D-cod‐ ing on RJ45, D-coding on RJ45

1

Not suitable

Suitable

Suitable

Suitable

Suitable

Suitable

Not available from SICK

Connectivity for safety laser scanner supply

Table 40: Ordering information for connecting cable, M12, 4-pin, A-coding

Part

Female connector, angled, 5 m cable, flying leads

Female connector, angled, 10 m cable, flying leads

Female connector, angled, 20 m cable, flying leads

Female connector, straight, 5 m cable, flying leads

Type code Part number

DOL-1204W05MC75KM0 2079294

DOL-1204W10MC75KM0

DOL-1204W20MC75KM0

DOL-1204G05MC75KM0

2079295

2089704

2079291

62 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

14.2

ACCESSORIES

14

Part

Female connector, straight, 10 m cable, flying leads

Female connector, straight, 20 m cable, flying leads

Type code Part number

DOL-1204G10MC75KM0 2079292

DOL-1204G20MC75KM0 2089703

Connectivity for network connection

Cables for configuration

Table 41: Ordering information for configuration cables

Part

USB mini-B male connector, 3 m cable, USB A male connector

Male connector, straight, 2 m cable, RJ45 male connector

Emergency stop and reset pushbutton

Table 42: Emergency stop and reset pushbutton

Description

Emergency stop with reset pushbutton

Emergency stop pushbutton

Emergency stop pushbutton

Reset pushbutton

Type code

ES11-SC4D8

ES21-SA10E1

ES21-SB10E1

ER12-SB3C4

Part number

6042517

6047916

Part number

6051329

6036147

6041507

6051330

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 63

15

SPARE PARTS

15

15.1

Spare parts

sBot Speed CIP spare parts

Table 43: Ordering data for sBot Speed CIP spare parts

Product Type code

Flexi Soft safety controller main module

Flexi Soft safety controller expansion module -

I/O module (8 inputs, 4 outputs)

FX3-CPU000000

FX3-XTIO84002

Flexi Soft EFI-pro gateway safety controller

Flexi Soft safety controller system plug

FX3-GEPR00000

FX3-MPL000001 microScan3 core EFI-pro safety laser scanner MICS3-ABAZ55ZA1P01

Part number

1043783

1044125

1069070

1043700

1092538

64 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

16

16.1

16.1.1

ANNEX

16

Annex

Checklists

Checklist for initial commissioning and commissioning

Overview

This checklist should be retained and kept with the machine documentation to serve as reference during recurring thorough checks.

This checklist is not a substitute for initial commissioning or periodic thorough checks by qualified safety personnel.

Important information

NOTE

You can use the KUKA.DiagnoseSafety

option in the KUKA software to check the status of the safety inputs on the robots. You can install this option on the KR C4 controller. The option shows the current status and the diagnostics of the safety interface.

Test for emergency situation (emergency stop) safety function

Table 44: Test for emergency situation (emergency stop) safety function

Test sequence Expected result

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Press the emergency stop push‐ button.

The safety outputs via the network are

LOW. The robot stops.

Run the test sequence for every emer‐ gency stop pushbutton individually.

1.

Start the robot in the “Manual, reduced speed” operating mode.

2.

Press the emergency stop push‐ button.

The safety outputs via the network are

LOW. The robot stops.

Run the test sequence for every emer‐ gency stop pushbutton individually.

Note the designations of the tested emergency stop pushbuttons here.

Result OK?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Tests for “Preventing unexpected restart following an emergency stop” safety function

Table 45: Tests for “Preventing unexpected restart following an emergency stop” safety function

Test sequence Expected result Result OK?

Yes

No

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Press the emergency stop push‐ button.

3.

Reset the emergency stop push‐ button.

4.

Press the restart button.

The robot remains at a standstill. The machine can only be restarted with the restart button after the reset pushbut‐ ton has been pressed.

Run the test sequence for every emer‐ gency stop pushbutton individually.

Note the designations of the tested emergency stop pushbuttons here.

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 65

16

ANNEX

Tests for the “Protective stop” safety function

Table 46: Tests for the “Protective stop” safety function

Test sequence

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF2.

3.

With protective field PF2 inter‐ rupted, change to “Manual, reduced speed” operating mode.

4.

Actuate the enabling device.

5.

Press the restart button.

Expected result

The robot carries out a protective stop when protective field PF2 is inter‐ rupted.

The status of the SHS2 (Safety STOP 2) signal is LOW. Stop is active.

In the “Manual, reduced speed” oper‐ ating mode, the robot can also move when the enabling device is actuated while protective field PF2 is inter‐ rupted.

Result OK?

Yes

No

Note the settings for the safety-rated monitored speed function (in particular Brake time ) here:

Tests for “Triggering safety-rated monitored speed” safety function

Table 47: Tests for “Triggering safety-rated monitored speed” safety function

Test sequence

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF1.

3.

With protective field PF1 inter‐

4.

5.

rupted, change to “Manual, reduced speed” operating mode.

Actuate the enabling device.

Press the restart button.

Expected result

The robot reduces its speed.

The status of the VRED (Reduced axisspecific and cartesian velocity) signal is LOW in “Automated” operating mode and when protective field PF1 is inter‐ rupted. Reduced speed is active.

The status of the VRED (Reduced axisspecific and cartesian velocity) signal is HIGH in “Manual” operating mode, reduced speed.

In the “Manual, reduced speed” oper‐ ating mode, the robot can also move when the enabling device is actuated while protective field PF1 is inter‐ rupted.

Result OK?

Yes

No

Note the settings for the safety-rated monitored speed function (in particular Reduced cartesian velocity and Delay time ) here:

Tests for the “Automated reset and restart with safe sequence monitoring” safety function

Table 48: Tests for the “Automated reset and restart with safe sequence monitoring” safety func‐ tion

Test sequence Expected result Result OK?

Yes

No

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF1.

3.

Interrupt protective field PF2.

4.

Approve protective field PF2, but continue to interrupt protective field PF1.

5.

Approve protective field PF1.

If protective field PF1 is interrupted, the robot reduces its speed. If protec‐ tive field PF2 is interrupted, the robot stops. If protective field PF1 becomes free again, an automated restart takes place.

Yes

No

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF2 without having first interrupted protective field PF1.

The robot stops. Restarting is only pos‐ sible when all protective fields are free and the reset pushbutton has been actuated.

66 O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

ANNEX

16

Test sequence

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF1.

3.

Interrupt protective field PF2.

4.

Stand behind the protective fields or approve protective fields PF1 and PF2 at the same time.

1.

Open the configuration of the safety laser scanner in the con‐ figuration software.

2.

Connect the safety laser scanner with the computer and read out the current field sets.

3.

Determine the distance between the protective fields PF1 and PF2 at the transition to the hazardous area.

4.

Check the protective field dimen‐ sions.

Comments:

Expected result

The robot stops. Restarting is only pos‐ sible when all protective fields are free and the reset pushbutton has been actuated.

The protective fields of the safety laser scanner overlap as described in the corresponding chapter.

"Overlapping protective fields", page 23

Result OK?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Tests for “Manual reset and a manual restart” safety function

Table 49: Tests for “Manual reset and a manual restart” safety function

Test sequence

1.

Start the robot in “Automated” operating mode.

2.

Interrupt protective field PF3. If protective field PF3 is not config‐ ured, trigger a sequence error.

Continue to interrupt protective field PF1 when doing so.

3.

Actuate the reset pushbutton.

4.

Actuate the restart button.

5.

Approve protective field PF1.

6.

Actuate the restart button.

7.

Actuate the reset pushbutton.

8.

Actuate the restart button.

Comments:

Expected result

Restarting the robot is not possible as long as protective field PF1 is inter‐ rupted.

The robot cannot restart without reset‐ ting. After actuating the reset pushbut‐ ton and the restart button, the robot starts up.

After interrupting protective field PF3, manual resetting is still necessary even after a valid sequence,

Result OK?

Yes

No

8024758/2020-02-20 | SICK

Subject to change without notice

O P E R A T I N G I N S T R U C T I O N S | sBot Speed CIP – KU 67

Australia

Phone +61 (3) 9457 0600

1800 33 48 02 – tollfree

E-Mail [email protected]

Austria

Phone +43 (0) 2236 62288-0

E-Mail [email protected]

Belgium/Luxembourg

Phone +32 (0) 2 466 55 66

E-Mail [email protected]

Brazil

Phone +55 11 3215-4900

E-Mail [email protected]

Canada

Phone +1 905.771.1444

E-Mail [email protected]

Czech Republic

Phone +420 234 719 500

E-Mail [email protected]

Chile

Phone +56 (2) 2274 7430

E-Mail [email protected]

China

Phone +86 20 2882 3600

E-Mail [email protected]

Denmark

Phone +45 45 82 64 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Finland

Phone +358-9-25 15 800

E-Mail [email protected]

France

Phone +33 1 64 62 35 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Germany

Phone +49 (0) 2 11 53 010

E-Mail [email protected]

Greece

Phone +30 210 6825100

E-Mail [email protected]

Hong Kong

Phone +852 2153 6300

E-Mail [email protected]

Hungary

Phone +36 1 371 2680

E-Mail [email protected]

India

Phone +91-22-6119 8900

E-Mail [email protected]

Israel

Phone +972 97110 11

E-Mail [email protected]

Italy

Phone +39 02 27 43 41

E-Mail [email protected]

Japan

Phone +81 3 5309 2112

E-Mail [email protected]

Malaysia

Phone +603-8080 7425

E-Mail [email protected]

Mexico

Phone +52 (472) 748 9451

E-Mail [email protected]

Netherlands

Phone +31 (0) 30 229 25 44

E-Mail [email protected]

New Zealand

Phone +64 9 415 0459

0800 222 278 – tollfree

E-Mail [email protected]

Norway

Phone +47 67 81 50 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Poland

Phone +48 22 539 41 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Romania

Phone +40 356-17 11 20

E-Mail [email protected]

Russia

Phone +7 495 283 09 90

E-Mail [email protected]

Singapore

Phone +65 6744 3732

E-Mail [email protected]

Detailed addresses and further locations at www.sick.com

Slovakia

Phone +421 482 901 201

E-Mail [email protected]

Slovenia

Phone +386 591 78849

E-Mail [email protected]

South Africa

Phone +27 10 060 0550

E-Mail [email protected]

South Korea

Phone +82 2 786 6321/4

E-Mail [email protected]

Spain

Phone +34 93 480 31 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Sweden

Phone +46 10 110 10 00

E-Mail [email protected]

Switzerland

Phone +41 41 619 29 39

E-Mail [email protected]

Taiwan

Phone +886-2-2375-6288

E-Mail [email protected]

Thailand

Phone +66 2 645 0009

E-Mail [email protected]

Turkey

Phone +90 (216) 528 50 00

E-Mail [email protected]

United Arab Emirates

Phone +971 (0) 4 88 65 878

E-Mail [email protected]

United Kingdom

Phone +44 (0)17278 31121

E-Mail [email protected]

USA

Phone +1 800.325.7425

E-Mail [email protected]

Vietnam

Phone +65 6744 3732

E-Mail [email protected]

SICK AG | Waldkirch | Germany | www.sick.com

Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project