aircraft serious incident investigation report

aircraft serious incident investigation report
AI2011-6
AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION REPORT
QATAR AIRWAYS
A7BAE
September 30, 2011
Japan Transport Safety Board
The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance
with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board (and with Annex 13 to the
Convention on International Civil Aviation) is to prevent future accidents and incidents. It is not the
purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.
Norihiro Goto
Chairman,
Japan Transport Safety Board
Note:
This report is a translation of the Japanese original investigation report. The text in Japanese shall
prevail in the interpretation of the report.
AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT
INVESTIGATION REPORT
QATAR AIRWAYS
BOEING 777-300, A7BAE
ABOUT AN ALTITUDE OF 1,000 FT, 3.8 NM NORTHEAST OF
RUNWAY 24R, KANSAI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, JAPAN
AT ABOUT 21:55 JST, AUGUST 30, 2010
September 16, 2011
Adopted by the Japan Transport Safety Board
Chairman Norihiro Goto
Member
Shinsuke Endoh
Member
Toshiyuki Ishikawa
Member
Sadao Tamura
Member
Yuki Shuto
Member
Toshiaki Shinagawa
1. PROCESS
AND
PROGRESS
OF
THE
AIRCRAFT
SERIOUS
INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
1.1
Summary of the Serious Incident
The occurrence covered by this report falls under the category of “Attempted landing on a closed
runway” as stipulated in Clause 2, Article 166-4 of the Civil Aeronautics Regulations of Japan, and
is classified as a serious incident.
On August 30 (Monday), 2010, a Boeing 777-300, registered A7BAE, operated by Qatar Airways,
took off from Narita International Airport at 20:59 Japan Standard Time (JST: UTC+ 9hr, unless
otherwise stated all times are indicated in JST using a 24-hour clock). At about 21:55, when the
aircraft was approaching Kansai International Airport, it attempted to land on runway 24R, which
was closed. Thereafter, the aircraft made a go-around and touched down on runway 24L at 22:07.
There were 124 people on board, including the Captain, 16 crewmembers, and 107 passengers
but no one was injured.
1.2
1.2.1
Outline of the Serious Incident Investigation
Investigation Organization
On August 31, 2010, the Japan Transport Safety Board designated an investigator-in-charge and
two other investigators to investigate this serious incident.
1.2.2
Representative from Foreign Authorities
This serious incident was notified to the United States of America, as the State of Design and
Manufacture of the aircraft involved in the serious incident, and Qatar, as the State of Registry and
the Operator of the aircraft, but they did not designate their accredited representatives.
1.2.3
Implementation of the Investigation
August 31 and September 1, 2010: Aircraft examination and interviews
1.2.4
Comments from the Parties Relevant to the Cause of the Serious Incident
Comments were invited from the parties relevant to the cause of the serious incident.
1.2.5
Comments from the Related States
Comments on the draft report were invited from the related States.
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2. FACTUAL INFORMATION
2.1
History of the Flight
On August 30, 2010, the Boeing 777-300, registered A7BAE (hereinafter referred to as “the
Aircraft”), operated as the regular flight 803 by Qatar Airways (hereinafter referred to as “the
Company”), took off from Narita International Airport for Kansai International Airport (hereinafter
referred to “the Airport”).
The flight plan was outlined below:
Flight rules:
Instrument flight rules (IFR)
Departure aerodrome:
Narita International Airport
Estimated off-block time:
20:50
Cruising speed:
501 kt
Cruising altitude:
FL320
Route:
(Omitted)–DINAH (Position reporting point)–GBE (Gobo
VOR/DME)–EDDIE (Position reporting point)
Destination aerodrome:
Kansai International Airport
Total estimated elapsed time:
47 minutes
Fuel load expressed in endurance: 2 h and 8 min
Persons on board:
124
At the time of the serious incident, the Captain sat in the left seat as PM (pilot monitoring: pilot
mainly in charge of duties other than flying) and the First Officer sat in the right seat as PF (pilot
flying: pilot mainly in charge of flying).
The flight history of the Aircraft up to the time of the serious incident is outlined below according
to the air traffic control communications records, records of the digital flight data recorder
(hereinafter referred to as “the DFDR”), records of the cockpit voice recorder (hereinafter referred
to as “the CVR”), records of light on/off operation of approach related lighting systems, as well as
the statements of the flight crewmembers, air traffic controllers (hereinafter referred to as
“controller(s)”), and a member of staff in charge of operations and maintenance of airport lighting
systems (hereinafter referred to as “lighting staff”) of Kansai International Airport Co., Ltd. (KIAC).
2.1.1
History of the Flight Based on Air Traffic Control Communications Records, DFDR
Records, CVR Records, and Records of Light On/Off Operation of Approach Related
Lighting Systems.
Around 21:33: The flight crewmembers started landing briefing. At that point, the flight
planned to carry out an ILS (Instrument Landing System) approach for runway
24L (hereinafter referred to as “24L”).
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21:48:22:
The Radar Approach Control Facility of Kansai Airport (hereinafter referred to
as “the Approach”) informed the Aircraft that visual approach was available and
requested it to express its intention.
21:48:39:
The Aircraft responded to the Approach that it would accept the visual approach.
21:49:34:
The Approach instructed the Aircraft to fly heading of 100° and started to vector
the Aircraft to downwind leg, and the Aircraft followed the instructions.
21:50:25:
The Aircraft reported to the Approach that the runway was in sight.
21:50:34:
The Approach cleared the Aircraft for a visual approach and instructed the
Aircraft to contact the Aerodrome Control Tower of Kansai Airport (hereinafter
referred to as “the Tower”), and the Aircraft read back the instructions.
21:51:19:
The First Officer suggested a traffic pattern would be width of 4 to 5 nm from
the runway to the Captain, and the Captain accepted the suggestion.
21:52:20:
The Aircraft reported to the Tower that it had entered the downwind leg.
21:52:37
The precision approach lighting system (hereinafter referred to as “PALS”1), the
sequenced flashing lights (hereinafter referred to as “SFL”2), and the precision
approach path indicator (hereinafter referred to as “PAPI” 3 ) of runway 24R
(hereinafter referred to as “24R”) were turned on.
21:53:11:
The SFL of 24R was turned off.
21:53:35:
The autopilot of the Aircraft was set to vertical speed (V/S) mode with a descent
rate of 200 ft/min (hereinafter referred to as “fpm”) selected.
21:53:46:
A descent rate of 500 fpm was selected for the Aircraft.
21:53:55:
A descent rate of 700 fpm was selected for the Aircraft.
21:54:22:
A descent rate of 900 fpm was selected for the Aircraft.
21:54:33:
The Captain said, "Three reds, one white."
21:54:35:
A descent rate of 500 fpm was selected for the Aircraft.
21:54:42:
The Tower cleared the Aircraft to land on 24L and the Aircraft read back the
clearance to land on 24L.
21:54:50:
The autopilot of the Aircraft was disconnected manually.
21:55:08:
The First Officer as PF instructed the Captain to perform landing checklist, and
the Captain performed it.
21:55:11:
The Tower pointed out that the Aircraft was approaching 24R, and asked
whether it was possible to make a left turn to approach 24L.
Precision Approach Lighting System (PALS): A lighting system installed on the approach end of an airport
runway that accepts precision approaches for instrument landing.
2 Sequenced Flashing Lights (SFL): A series of flashing lights that flash twice a second in sequence in the approach
direction of an airport runway to the runway end.
3 Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI): A visual aid that provides guidance information to help a pilot acquire
and maintain the correct approach (with red, red, white, and white lights in a row) to an aerodrome or an airport. It
is generally located on one or both sides of the runway.
1
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The Aircraft reported to the Tower that the Aircraft would make a go-around
because the Aircraft was unable to approach 24L.
21:56:14:
2.1.2
(1)
The PALS and PAPI on 24R were turned off.
Statements of Flight Crewmembers
Captain
The Captain learned from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (hereinafter
referred to as “ATIS”4) that the runway to be used was 24L and that 24R was closed. Just
before LILAC (position reporting point), as the Aircraft was heading for MAYAH (position
reporting point) from Awaji VOR/DME (AJE), the Approach advised him that a visual
approach was available and asked his intention. The First Officer told him that the first
officer could accept if he trusted the First Officer and he answered that he could accept
visual approach.
The Approach gave him instructions about magnetic heading. The navigation display
(hereinafter referred to as “ND”5) indicated that the Aircraft was 10 nm away from the
runway. The Aircraft approached the Airport on the instructed magnetic heading and
entered the downwind leg at a width of approximately 5 nm from the runway. A visual
approach to the Airport is very difficult at night due to a lack of light in the vicinity.
Therefore, he asked the First Officer whether the First Officer would be all right. The First
Officer told him OK. He could only see a little light outside on the First Officer’s side.
When the Aircraft entered the base turn from the downwind leg, the First Officer
instructed him Flaps 30. Since it was still early, he decided to set the landing flaps at the
turning final. He was performing the final checks mainly by looking the instruments,
thinking about the go-around procedure for the visual approach and so on. He had to do
many things in a short period of time. The ND was set to 24L. The First Officer was
making a turn with the autopilot turned off because overshooting resulted during the final
approach. By this point, the flaps were set to landing position. The First Officer and he saw
the PAPI for the final approach and thought that the runway that the Aircraft was
approaching was 24L.
When the First Officer aligned the Aircraft onto the final approach course, they saw the
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS): A continuous broadcast of airport area information necessary to
aircraft taking off or landing, such as weather information including the temperature, wind direction, wind velocity,
and visibility of the area, which runways are active, available approaches, available navigational aid facilities, and
any other information required by the pilots.
5 Navigation Display (ND): A cockpit display showing images created by a symbol generator according to
navigational data stored in the flight management system (FMS) on airports, runways, navigational aid facilities
(e.g., VHF omnidirectional radio range (VOR) systems and distance measuring equipment (DME)), airways, and
flight routes. The ND also displays the wind direction and wind velocity in and around the airport where the
aircraft is approaching or departing, the distance to the next destination, and expected arrival time at the
destination. The ND also allows the overlapped display of a meteorological radar image.
4
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ILS settings preselected for the ND, and noticed from the ILS reading that they were
approaching the wrong runway. They had already realized that they were on the wrong
approach before the Tower pointed it out to them. At an altitude of approximately 800 ft
and a distance of approximately 3 nm to the final approach course, the Tower asked them
whether they could get to 24L. However, they were unable to land on 24L, and so they
made a go-around. Then, they had landed by a visual approach again in accordance with
the instructions of the magnetic heading and altitude.
He was perfectly familiar with the Airport, but he had never previously made a visual
approach at night, and he was not able to give proper instructions to the First Officer.
When he looked outside after the First Officer turned off the Autopilot, it was dark, and
there were no visual references to the surface landmarks.
He did not see the two runways and the approach lights on 24L in the final approach
course. He does not think that First Officer had any experience of making a visual
approach to the Airport at night either.
(2)
First Officer
The First Officer had approached the Airport in the afternoon of the previous day for the
first time as PM. He was unfamiliar with the Airport, and so he was grateful for the early
descent instructions. When the Aircraft was flying for MAYAH for ILS approach to 24L, at
an altitude of approximately 4,000 ft and a distance of 10 to 15 nm to MAYAH, the
Approach asked them that a visual approach was available, and requested to express their
intentions. After talking with the Captain, they decided to accept the suggestion. He was
the PF, and he saw the runway on his side. The Approach gave them instruction to proceed
to the downwind leg, and he reconfirmed their intention to make a visual approach.
A normal downwind leg has a width of 2.5 nm, but he set it to 4 to 5 nm because he wanted
to approach with a margin secured.
He reduced speed after entering the downwind leg, and set the flaps to 5 abeam the
touchdown point. Then he extended landing gears, set the flaps to 20, and began the base
turn. Because of the margin on the downwind width, when the Aircraft had turned 90°, he
returned it to the horizontal. After checking the ND, he started a right turn. At that time,
the Captain was communicating with a controller.
While the Aircraft was turning right, the outside was dark, which confused him, but he
saw the runway and the PAPI. At that point, the Aircraft seemed to be overshooting so he
turned off the autopilot before starting the approach. When the Aircraft was stabilized, he
noticed that the ILS reading on the ND was abnormal. Almost simultaneously, the
controller pointed out them that the Aircraft was approaching the wrong runway. Because
they had made the base turn 5 nm from the runway, approximately 3 nm of the final
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approach remained. However, it would have been difficult to touch down on 24L, and so he
made a go-around.
From the NOTAM6 and ATIS, I knew that 24R was closed.
2.1.3
(1)
Statements of Controllers
The Tower
The Aircraft was on a visual approach to 24L. The preceding aircraft was approximately 3
nm to the final approach course. Therefore, the Tower instructed the Aircraft to continue
approach. The preceding aircraft landed and two departure aircraft taxied out. He was
sure that the first departure aircraft would take off safely in good time, and issued a
departure clearance to the departure aircraft. At the same time when the departure
aircraft took off, he cleared the Aircraft, was turning the base leg to land. After confirming
that the departure aircraft had lifted off, he checked the position of the Aircraft, and saw
that it was clearly approaching to 24R not 24L. Therefore, he asked the Aircraft if they
proceeded to 24R and they could leave turn runway 24L approach. The Aircraft answered
him Yes, but then, immediately afterwards, unable, they went around. He instructed the
Aircraft to fly heading 240, maintain 2,000. The departure aircraft was still at
approximately 1,800 to 1,900 ft. He provided the visual separation between them, and
when departure aircraft was above 3,000 ft, he had the Aircraft contact the Departure
Control.
It is for the Approach to decide whether ILS approach or visual approach. It is his
understanding that if a runway is closed, SFL, PALS, and PAPI should be off, but it is not
important whether the runway edge lights are off or not. Later, he heard that the PALS
(24L) were turned on.
(2)
Coordinator
Regarding the operation of airport lighting systems during maintenance work, based on a
condition that the approach related lighting systems on closed runway are turned off,
controllers usually allow lighting staff to omit prior notification on lighting-up to them. In
such case, they leave the timing of lighting-up to the discretion of the lighting staff.
However, the lighting staff occasionally turns on the approach lights during inspections,
etc. Therefore, controllers pay attention to the movements of all aircraft to ensure that
they do not approach the wrong runway. Controllers on site were informed that lighting
staff was allowed to omit the prior notification stipulated in an agreement (to be described
in 2.9.6).
Notice to Airman (NOTAM): Information issued for safety air navigation by the Civil Aviation Bureau to parties
concerned with aviation. NOTAMs includes temporal ones and emergency ones concerning airports, air navigation
aid facilities, changes in operation-related job systems, and dangers in the sky such as military exercises.
6
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2.1.4
Statements of Lighting Staff
The Lighting Staffs conduct light checks (inspections of lighting systems) on 06R/24L and
06L/24R on a daily basis regardless of the runways are closed or open. Usually, they check
06L/24R and 06R/24L between 21:00 and 00:00 and between 00:00 to 03:00, respectively.
They notify to the Tower on the operation of the lights in each direction before turning the
lights on and off. Similarly, they notify to the Tower on the operation of the lights before
turning the lights on and off when they conduct maintenance or inspection work. There is
a hotline (a direct telephone line connecting the Tower and the Power Distribution
Monitoring Room) independently on the side of the control panel on each runway.
They started the light checks of the day with the 06L side and they moved to the 24R side.
They turned on the PALS, SFL, and PAPI on 24R at 21:52. They turned off the SFL at
21:54 and the PAPI and PALS at 21:56. All the approach related lighting systems on 24R
were off in all periods other than the above-mentioned ones.
At the time, the rights to control all the lights on 06L/24R had been transferred from the
Tower to the Power Distribution Monitoring Room. Even when they have the control rights,
the rules require that they get approval from the Tower over the hotline before turning on
approach lighting systems or the like. On that day, however, at the time they received the
control rights, the Tower said that they were allowed to omit the prior notification of
turning on the lights. This is not to say that the omission of the prior notification has
become usual. In some cases, they will contact the Tower immediately before turning on
the lights to obtain permission.
The onsite workers said that they were completely unaware that the Aircraft made the
go-around. The runway edge lights are useful for preventing accidents during night work.
Therefore, the lights are always turned on regardless of whether the runways are open or
closed. Furthermore, the marine lights (blinking lights) on the piers for the approach
lighting systems are always on for the safe navigation of ships regardless of whether the
runways are open or closed.
There is an agreement between the Kansai International Airport Office of the Osaka Civil
Aviation Bureau (hereinafter referred to as “Kansai Airport Office”) and KIAC. The
agreement stipulates that the approach related lights are turned off during runway is
closed and the lights are turned on with approval from the Tower if necessary for
inspection purposes.
This serious incident occurred at an altitude of approximately 1,000 ft, approximately 3.8
nm northeast of the approach end of 24R at Kansai International Airport at around 21:55.
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(See Figure 1―Estimated Flight Route-1; Figure 2―Estimated Flight Route-2; Figure
3―Lighting Arrangement; Figure 4―Three Angle of BOEING 777-300; Figure 5―DFDR
Records; Photo 1―Serous Incident Aircraft; Attachment: ATC , CVR and DFDR Records)
2.2
Damage to the Aircraft
There was no damage to the Aircraft.
2.3
Information on Pilots and Crewmembers Pilot
2.3.1
Personnel Information
(1)
Captain, Male, Age 47
Airline transport pilot certificate(Airplane)
April 16, 2009
Type rating for BOEING 777
Class 1 aviation medical certificate
Term of validity
May 31, 2011
Total flight time
11,000 h 00 min
Flight time in the last 30 days
82 h 00 min
Total flight time on the type of aircraft
Flight time in the last 30 days
(2)
910 h 00 min
82 h 00 min
First Officer, Male, Age 30
Airline transport pilot certificate(Airplane)
August 14, 2010
Type rating for BOEING 777
Class 1 aviation medical certificate
Term of validity
February 28, 2011
Total flight time
4,247 h 17 min
Flight time in the last 30 days
54 h 42 min
Total flight time on the type of aircraft
Flight time in the last 30 days
2.3.2
172 h 12 min
54 h 42 min
Captain and First Officer’s Experience in Landing to the Airport
(1)
The Captain landed at the Airport six times between 2006 and 2008. In 2010, he landed at
the Airport in the afternoon of the day before the serious incident as PF.
(2)
The First Officer landed at the Airport once in the afternoon of the day before of the serious
incident as PM .
2.4
Aircraft Information
Type
BOEING 777-300
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Serial number
36104
Date of manufacture
February 23, 2009
Certificate of airworthiness
195
Term of validity
Valid until the aviation authority invalidates the certificate
Total flight time
7,593 h 07 min
Flight time since last periodical check (C check on August 1, 2010)
464 h 37 min
2.5
Meteorological Information
Aeronautical weather observations for the Airport around the time of the serious incident were
as follows:
21:30
Wind direction 160°; Wind velocity 6 kt; Visibility 40 km
Cloud
Amount FEW (1/8 to 2/8); Type: Cumulus; Cloud base: 1,000 ft
Amount BKN (5/8 to 7/8); Type: Unknown; Cloud base: Unknown
Temperature: 29°C; Dew point: 24°C
Altimeter setting (QNH) 29.90 inHg
22:00
Wind direction 180°; Wind velocity 8 kt; Visibility 40 km
Cloud
Amount FEW (1/8 to 2/8); Type: Cumulus; Cloud base: 1,000 ft
Cloud
BKN (5/8 to 7/8); Type: Unknown; Cloud base: Unknown
Temperature: 29°C; Dew point: 24°C
Altimeter setting (QNH): 29.90 inHg
2.6
Information on Communication
At the time of this serious incident, the communication of the Aircraft communicated with the
Approach and Tower normally. (see Attachment ATC , CVR and DFDR Records).
2.7
2.7.1
Information on the Airport and Ground Facilities
Overview of the Airport
The Airport has two runways, i.e., 06R/24L (runway A) with a length of 3,500 m and a width of
60 m on the east side of the Tower and terminal building and 06L/24R (runway B) with a length of
4,000 m and a width of 60 m located 2,303 m away to the west side across the Tower and Terminal
building. When the serious incident occurred, runway B was closed for maintenance.
2.7.2
(1)
Aerodrome Lighting Conditions
24L side
The PALS, SFL, PAPI, runway touchdown zone lights, runway edge lights, and runway
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centerline lights were lit normally.
(2)
24R side
The SFL was lit between 21:52 and 21:53 and the PALS and PAPI were lit between 21:52
and 21:56.
The runway edge lights and runway touchdown zone lights were turned on in order to
secure safety for the maintenance work but the runway centerline lights were turned off.
2.8
Information on DFDR and DVR
The Aircraft was equipped with U.S. Honeywell-made DFDR (parts number 980-4700-042) and
CVR (parts number 980-6022-001)
Records at the time of the serious incident were retained in the DFDR and CVR. The time was
determined by collating the recorded VHF transmission keying signals on the DFDR and the time
log of ATC communications.
2.9
Additional Information
2.9.1
Information on Navigation Equipment
According to the DFDR records, an ILS frequency of 24L was selected at the time of the serious
incident.
2.9.2
ATC(Air Traffic Control) Standard Procedure
ATC Standard procedure IV, Air Traffic Service Manual III of the Civil Aviation Bureau of the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (hereinafter referred to as “the Civil
Aviation Bureau”) specify the following rules on visual approaches.
(Excerpt)
8-1
Visual Approach (Control System Standards IV-8-3)
Application
(1)
A radar approach control facility may apply aircraft to make a visual approach under
the following conditions if the height obtained by adding the ceiling and field elevation
is 500 ft or more higher than the minimum vectoring altitude and the ground visibility
is 5 km or longer.
Issuance Timing of Approach Permit
(Omitted)
(3)
A radar approach control facility shall apply arriving aircraft to make a visual
approach after notifying the aircraft with vector instructions to the traffic pattern of
the landing runway and descend to the minimum vectoring altitude under the
following conditions.
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* Cleared for visual approach runway (number).
2.9.3
Description of Aeronautical Information Publication
ENR1.6-6 1.9 Visual Approach in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) issued by the
Civil Aviation Bureau describes as follows.
(Excerpt)
1.9.1
A visual approach is an approach by an IFR aircraft under control of the radar
approach control facility wherein the aircraft deviating the prescribed instrument
approach procedure, and proceed to the destination airport by visual reference to
the surface.
1.9.2
Visual approach will be approved by the radar approach control facility as one
method to expedite the traffic flow when the arriving aircraft has the destination
airport or notified preceding aircraft in sight, can maintain the visual reference to
the terrain, can fly maintaining VMC (Visual Meteorological Condition) after the
approach clearance was issued. (Omitted)
2.9.4
(1)
Company’s Operation Manual
Approach Procedure
The manual describes the following approach procedure.
777 Flight Crew Operation Manual
Approach Procedure
The Approach Procedure is normally started at transition level.
Complete the Approach Procedure before:
• The initial approach fix, or
• The start of radar vectors to the final approach course, or
• The start of a visual approach
When Flaps 1 is selected, PM will cycle SEAT BELT sign, to notify cabin
crew/supernumeraries that landing is imminent.
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Pilot Flying
Pilot Monitoring
At or above 10,000 feet AAL.
Set the LANDING, TAXI, RUNWAY
TURNOFF light switches to ON (if
applicable)
At transition level, set and crosscheck the altimeters.
Update changes to the arrival and approach procedures as needed, Update
changes to the RNP as needed.
Update the approach briefing as
needed.
Call "APPROACH CHECKLIST."
Do the APPROACH checklist.
(2)
Traffic Pattern
The manual describes standard traffic pattern as follows.
777 Flight Crew Operations Manual
Visual Traffic Pattern
(3)
Approach Briefing
The manual describing the approach briefing is as follows:
777 Flight Crew Operations Manual
The descent and approach briefing should contain, but not be limited to, the following list
of items which should be reviewed, where practical and appropriate for the arrival
conditions.
• Aircraft Status -Review the aircraft STATUS• ATIS -Review and discuss runway in use (type of approach)• NOTAMs -Review and discuss enroute and terminal NOTAMs.• Approach -Review and discuss the intended use of automation for the approach type.
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Review and discuss runway length, width and slope, approach and runway lighting, any
other expected visual references, and intended runway exit.(4)
Information on the Airport
The Company provides the flight crewmembers with the following information.
(Excerpt)
Operation Manual PART C Route and Aerodrome Instructions and Information (Airfield
Briefings Category A airfields)
6.4.46 OSAKA (RJBB)-JAPAN
6.4.46.2 General Warning, Cautions and Notes
Caution: Visibility is often poor in haze/smog.
Caution: Low level windshear and turbulence in strong winds.
Caution: Pay particular attention that you position for the correct RWY if flying a visual
approach to RWY 24 side.
2.9.5
Instructions of the Civil Aviation Bureau on Lighting Systems on Closed Runway
Following the incident of allowing an aircraft to land on a closed runway at Tokyo International
Airport on April 29, 2005, the Director-General of the Engineering Department of the Civil Aviation
Bureau gave the following instructions on the extinction of the lighting systems on closed runways
on May 13, 2005.
(Excerpt)
2.
Complete Extinction of Lights on Closed Runways
At the time of closing a runway, the air traffic controller shall turn off the precision
approach path indicator and approach lighting system of the runway. The aerodrome
lighting staff in charge shall communicate with the air traffic controller and confirm the
extinction of the lights.
2.9.6
Agreement on Lighting Systems between Kansai Airport Office and KIAC
Following the instructions described in 2.9.5, the Kansai Airport Office and KIAC reached an
agreement on May 19, 2005 concerning the partial extinction of airport lighting systems of Kansai
International Airport at the time of runway closure (hereinafter referred to as “the Agreement”).
When the Agreement was reached, the Airport was operating with a single runway. (Excerpt)
1.
The air traffic controller shall turn off the precision approach path indicator and
approach lighting system (including the flashing lights) on the runway, and notify the
aerodrome lighting staff of the extinction of the lights.
2.
The aerodrome lighting staff shall inquire to the air traffic controller about the closure
of the runway if the extinction of the lights specified in 1. cannot be confirmed at the
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closing time of the runway.
3.
The aerodrome lighting staff shall request the air traffic controller to turn on the lights
specified in 1. only if it is necessary for the purpose of work on the runway. If the
aerodrome lighting staff has the control rights of the airway lighting console, the staff
shall notify the air traffic controller before turning on the lights.
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3. ANALYSIS
3.1
Qualifications of Flight Crew
Both Captain and First Officer held valid airman competence certificates and valid aviation
medical certificates.
3.2
Airworthiness Certificate
The Aircraft had a valid airworthiness certificate and had been maintained and inspected as
prescribed.
3.3
Relation to Meteorological Conditions
It is considered highly probable that the meteorological conditions at the time of the accident had
no relation to the occurrence of the serious incident.
3.4
3.4.1
(1)
Visual Approach Situations
Piloting Analysis
Based on the statements in 2.1.2, it is considered highly probable that the Captain and
First Officer were aware that 24R was closed.
(2)
As described in 2.9.4 (2), standard traffic pattern has a width of 2 nm. Based on the
statements in 2.1.2 (2), it is considered probable that the First Officer tried to have leeway
to approach and decided to take a 4 to 5 nm wide traffic pattern. However, it is considered
probable that the First Officer had to navigate while paying much greater attention than
usual to timing corrections to descending and flap control because the traffic pattern was
wider than usual.
(3)
According to the DFDR records, the autopilot was switched to V/S mode when the Aircraft
started the base turn (21:53:35). Then, the Aircraft started descending. It is considered
probable that the First Officer tried to descent slowly at the rate of 200 fpm because the
runway was invisible at that point and there was no reference object visible on the sea.
It is considered probable that the First Officer then increased the rate of descent to 500,
700, and 900 fpm gradually in order to adjust the Aircraft to the appropriate approach
angle of the runway as it became visible. As described in 2.1.1, the Captain uttered, "Three
reds one white." It is considered highly probable that the PAPI lamps were lit red, red, red,
and white (i.e., the approach altitude was slightly low) then, when the First Officer judged
from the PAPI that the rate of descent was slightly high, that the First Officer selected the
rate to 500 fpm from 900 fpm.
(4)
It is considered probable that the First Officer then turned off the autopilot and entered
- 15 -
24R, which was closed at that time, because there was a little overshooting for the entrance
to the final approach course of the runway that he assumed to be 24L.
(5)
The First Officer took the traffic pattern wider than the standard width specified in 2.9.4
(2) in order to have leeway to fly. It is considered probable that this was not the direct
cause of the false recognition of the runway. However, the traffic pattern was made above
the sea, the visual approach was made at night with limited visual reference objects visible,
and the downwind leg was close to the standard traffic pattern for 24R. Therefore, it is
considered probable that, after the runway once became invisible in the downwind leg,
when the Aircraft made the base turn, the First Officer saw a runway and a PAPI close to
the position where they were normally seen, assumed it was the right runway, and entered
24R mistakenly.
3.4.2 Roles and Cooperation of Flight Crew
(1)
According to the statements in 2.1.2 (1), the Captain considered that the visual approach at
night was difficult and asked the First Officer whether it would be all right and he did not
agree when the First Officer instructed him “Flaps 30”. From these, it is considered
somewhat likely that the Captain was distracted by the First Officer’s maneuvering which
he felt unsure about, and could not play the role as PM sufficiently well, and that his
checking did not function properly.
(2)
Communication gap between the Captain and First Officer is less likely on the timing of
maneuvering of flap and gear, descent and so on if the traffic pattern is approximately 2
nm as described in 2.9.4 (2). It is considered somewhat likely that the wider traffic patter
taken made it difficult for the Captain and First Officer to share common perceptions.
(3)
As described in 2.9.3, a visual approach is an approach by an IFR (Instrument Flight
Rules) aircraft proceeding to the destination airport by visual references to the surface. It
is considered highly probable that it was not easy for the Captain or First Officer to
recognize the runway (24L) located beyond the bright lights around the terminal building
while the Aircraft was in the traffic pattern, and that the runway (24R) located in the front
was easier to see. However, the Captain and the First Officer were aware that 24R, which
is one of the two runways of the Airport, was closed as described in 3.4.1 (1). There was a
good visibility. The PAPI, PALS and SFL on the 24L, where the Aircraft was supposed to
touch down, were lit. Therefore, it is considered probable that the false recognition of the
runway would have been avoided if the Captain and the First Officer had recognized the
two runways in a wider field of vision.
(4)
According to the description in 2.1.2 (1), the Captain stated, “The ND was set to 24L.”
Therefore, it is considered probable that the Captain would have noticed it earlier that the
- 16 -
Aircraft was approaching 24R if the Captain as PM had checked the position of the Aircraft
with visual references to the surface landmarks and the display of the ND. The traffic
pattern of the Airport was not set for the FMS (Flight Management System) on the Aircraft.
Therefore, no autopilot guidance to 24L would have been possible even if the ILS frequency
had been set to 24L.
(5)
From the above, it is considered probable that the visual recognition of the runway (24L)
was insufficient because neither the Captain nor First Officer played their roles as PM and
PF appropriately and they did not complement each other sufficiently.
3.4.3
Experience in Landing at the Airport
As described in 2.3.2, the Captain and the First Officer landed at the Airport on the day before
the serious incident as PF and PM respectively. But it was the Captain’s first landing in the last
two years and the First Officer as PF landed at the Airport for the first time. And it was the first
visual approach to the Airport at night for both the Captain and the First Officer. It is considered
probable that their landing experiences at the Airport was not sufficient. With consideration of the
circumstance, it would have been desirable for them to take a standard traffic pattern or make an
ILS approach as originally planned instead of the visual approach.
3.4.4
Information on the Airport
According to the Company’s information on the Airport as described in 2.9.4 (4), flight
crewmembers are to pay particular attention that they position for the correct runway if flying a
visual approach to runway 24 side. It is considered probable that identification of the runway by the
Captain and the First Officer was inadequate.
3.5
(1)
Operation of Airport Lighting Systems
As described in 2.9.6, the lighting staff shall notify controller before turning on the PALS
and PAPI. According to the statements in 2.1.4, the rights to control the lighting console
including the operation of the PALS and PAPI had been transferred from the Tower to the
lighting staff at the time of the serious incident. Furthermore, the lighting staff was
allowed to omit the prior notification to controllers. Therefore, it is considered highly
probable that the lighting staff turned on the lights without notifying to controllers in
advance.
(2)
As described in 2.7.2, the PALS and PAPI on 24R were turned on when the Aircraft was
flying in the downwind leg in the traffic pattern. It is considered probable that the PAPI
was on while there were no visual references on the sea was a contributing factor that the
Captain and the First Officer to take 24R as 24L.
- 17 -
(3)
According to the statements in 2.1.3 (2), controllers pay attention to the movements of all
aircraft when the rights to control the lights of the PALS and PAPI had been transferred to
the lighting staff and that the prior notification was allowed to omit. The extinction of the
approach-related lighting systems on the closed runway, however, is an effective measure
to prevent wrong approaches. Therefore, the lighting systems should have been controlled
in accordance with the Agreement without omitting the prior notification.
(4)
As described in 2.9.6, the Agreement was reached in 2005, when the Airport was operating
with a single runway, as safety measures on the Controller side following the incident that
occurred at Tokyo International Airport. In those days, since only a single runway was
used, there were no landing aircraft when the runway was closed, which eliminated the
necessity for prior notification. Therefore, it is considered probable that the Agreement had
not always been observed by controllers who sometimes allowed omitting the prior
notification. After the completion of the second runway provided for the Airport, there was
a possible situation that a runway is in operation and the other one is closed and not in
operation, which caused a possibility of wrong approaches. Under these situational changes,
there was a need to keep controllers informed about the purpose of the Agreement
thoroughly.
3.6
Controller’s Response to the Incident
As described in 2.1.1, it is considered highly probable that, when the Aircraft entered the final
approach course to 24R which the flight crewmembers of the Aircraft assumed to be 24L, the Tower
realized early enough that the Aircraft was approaching to the closed runway and then asked
clarification of which contributed to the prevention of the Aircraft landing on the closed runway.
- 18 -
4.
PROBABLE CAUSES
It is considered highly probable that the serious incident occurred because the Captain and the
First Officer assumed 24R to be 24L and approached 24R by mistake after the Aircraft received a
landing clearance to 24L while the Aircraft was conducting visual approach to the Airport.
It is considered probable that the Captain and the First Officer assumed 24R to be 24L because
their visual recognition of the runway was insufficient and the PALS and PAPI on 24R were turned
on. It is considered probable that the traffic pattern they flew was close to the standard traffic
pattern for 24R contributed to the occurrence.
- 19 -
5.
ACTIONS TAKEN
5.1
Arrangements of Kansai Airport Office
The Kansai Airport Office took the following safety measures after the occurrence of the serious
incident:
The Kansai Airport Office informed the controllers at the Airport with respect to reaffirming the
extinction of the approach lighting system and the precision approach path indicator on closed
runways and thoroughgoing observance of the Agreement with the lighting staff. With regard to the
thoroughgoing observance of the Agreement with the Aerodrome Lighting Department, in
particular, the Kansai Airport Office reminded the controllers of the Airport that prior notification
of turning on the lights includes coordination when the rights to control lighting systems are
transferred to the lighting staff. Kansai Airport Office also reminded the controllers that they
should notify the lighting staff of the possibility and period of lighting with consideration of the
traffic condition of the Airport, pay attention to the visual approaches, and reconsider the
importance of external observance.
Furthermore, with regard to the turning on the lights on closed runways, in case the rights to
control the lighting systems are transferred to the lighting staff, the description specified in the
Agreement was revised from “notify the air traffic controller before turning on the lights” to
“coordinate with the air traffic controller before turning on the lights” and “the air traffic controllers
select an appropriate period” regarding controllers’ response when they are asked to allow turning
on the lighting systems on closed runway.
5.2
Arrangements of Air Traffic Control Division, Air Traffic Services Department of Civil
Aviation Bureau
The Air Traffic Control Division, Air Traffic Services Department of Civil Aviation Bureau
instructed the Tokyo and Osaka Regional Civil Aviation Bureaus through an intra-office memo on
the lighting control of closed runways that the controller in charge should determine the lighting of
the precision approach path indicator and approach lighting systems on closed runways for a proper
period with consideration of the air traffic condition of the airport as a result of the possible
functional problems in the safety measures issued in 2005.
5.3
Arrangements of KIAC
In response to the notification on the lighting control of closed runways issued by the Osaka
Regional Civil Aviation Bureau, the KIAC reminded the staff in charge reaffirming the strict
sharing of aerodrome information on closed runways, the Agreement on the partial extinction of
airport lighting systems on closed runways at Kansai International Airport, and a written
- 20 -
confirmation on the operation of airport lighting systems.
- 21 -
Figure 1
Estimated Flight Route -1
Kansai
International
Airport
Narita
International
Airport
N
Kobe Airport
MAYAH
ILS RWY 24L
21:50:34 APP:
..cleared visual
approach,..
21:48:22 APP:
..visual approach is
available. Request
intention.
See Fig2
KN
LILAC
21:49:38
about 4800ft
Commence descent
about 7,000ft
Kansai International Airport
Flight route
after go-around
AJE
0
- 22 -
10km
Figure 2
N
Estimated Flight Route -2
Altitude shows Radio Height.
21:53:17 1690ft
FLAP 20
.
t3
u
o
Ab
- 23 -
21:52:05 2350ft
FLAP 1
21:55:24
740ft
L
24
R
24
1km
4km
21:57:00
21:56:14 2070ft
PAPI and PALS of 24R: turn off
l
na
Fi
24
L
24L
Ru
06
R
0
21:55:11 810ft
TWR: Are you proceed 24R?
21:55:28 760ft
QTR: We go around
l
na
Fi
L
24
-B
ay
w
n
06
L
Wind 190/10
(Reported by
TWR at 21:54:42)
21:54:53 960ft
FLAP 30
24
R
nm
.8
t2
nm
.0
ou
t4
Ab
ou
Ab
2
ut
o
Ab
nm
m
fro
21:54:50 1000ft
A/P OFF
m
9n
24R
Ru
21:54:33 1200ft
CAP: three reds one white
21:53:11 1690ft
24R SFL: turn off
nd
wi
n
w
Do
21:52:37 to 21:53:11 SFL: ON
21:52:37 to 21:56:14 PAPI, PALS: ON
21:54:22 SEL-V/S
About -900ft/min
About 5.6nm KNE
21:53:09 1680ft
Gear Lever Down
21:52:37 1790ft
FLAP 5
PAPI, PALS and
SFL of 24R: turn on
21:53:55 SEL-V/S
About -700ft/min
se
Ba
21:53:46 SEL-V/S
About -500ft/min
21:53:35 1690ft
ALT to V/S mode
SEL-V/S about -200ft/min
- 23 -
ay
w
n
SFL, PAPI, PALS: ON
A KNE
Kansai International Airport
1:25,000 Scale Topographic Map by Geographical Survey Institute
Figure 3
Lighting Arrangements
PALS
PAPI
SFL
- 24 -
24R
24L
PALS
SFL
PAPI
- 24 -
AIP
Figure 4
Three Angle View of Boeing 777-300
Unit : m
- 25 -
Figure 5
DFDR Records
(ft)
= base =
Pressure Altitude / Radio Height
= downwind =
FLCH mode
(flight level change)
V/S mode
ALT mode
TOGA
-200
-500
-500
-600
-700
LILAC
CAP: “three-reds one-white”
- 26 -
21:54:50
21:54:33
21:49:38
-900
Go-around
A/P OFF manually
Photo 1
Serious Incident Aircraft
- 27 -
Attachment
JST
ATC , CVR and DFDR Records
Origin
Contents
From AJE to LILAC in decending
21:48:22
21:48:27
21:48:29
21:48:34
21:48:39
21:48:44
APP
Qatari-803, visual approach is available. Request intention.
CAP
F/O
APP2
QR803
APP
You do..you accept all you do..
I can accept that if you --- trust me --Qatari-803, visual approach runway 24L is available. Request intention.
Ah, we can accept visual approach, Qatari-803.
Qatari-803, descend and maintain three-thousand. Expect visual
approach runway 24L.
21:48:50 QR803
21:49:34 APP
21:49:41 QR803
Descend three-thousand, expect approach 24L, Qatari-803.
Qatari-803, turn..fly heading..one-zero-zero, vector to right downwind.
Fly heading one-hundred, vector for right downwind, Qatari-803.
21:50:15 APP
Qatari-803, No.1 traffic 12 o'clock..13miles, Boeing 737, 3 miles on final
runway 24L. Report traffic insight.
21:50:25 QR803
We have the traffic and runway insight, we call you established
in..proper downwind for runway 24L, Qatari-803.
21:50:34 APP
Qatari-803, cleared visual approach, runway 24L, follow the traffic,
contact Kansai Tower 118 decimal 2.
21:50:41 QR803
Cleared for visual approach 24L, Tower 1182, good night. Thank you,
ma'am.
21:50:47 APP
21:50:53 QR803
Thanks.
Tower, good evening, Qatari-803, ah..on heading one-hundred, establish
on the right downwind for runway 24..24L.
21:51:05 TWR
21:51:08 QR803
Qatari-803, Kansai Tower, report right downwind.
Call you right downwind 24L, Qatari-803.
21:51:15 F/O
Let me get about 5 miles of turn --- downwind heading --- would be nice
2 and half or 3 miles of downwind.
21:51:19
CAP
Yeah, yeah. 5 you start to --- 5 or 4. It's better than..OK, so that we're..
21:51:58
21:52:20 QR803
21:52:26 TWR
21:52:30 QR803
Twenty-five hundred. (Automatic Altitude Callout)
21:53:38
21:53:39
21:53:43
21:53:44
21:53:52
21:53:58
21:54:02
Flaps 30, please.
Speed check, we leave them for the last turn, it's better be..
OK. You can leave --- the short while ---..
We leave them for.. just before.. before the last turn, OK?
Qatari-803 is on right base for ruway 24L.
Qatari-803, roger. Continue approach. Traffic now departing.
Continue approach, Qatari-803.
F/O
CAP
F/O
CAP
QR803
TWR
QR803
We established on the right downwind, runway 24L, Qatari-803.
Qatari-803, roger. Report turnig base.
Report turning base, Qatari-803.
-28-
21:54:33 CAP
---.. OK.. Do you have two and halfs? Track, ..you have --- three reds
one white.
21:54:42 TWR
Qatari-803, Airbus 320 rolling. Runway 24L. Cleared to land, wind 190
at 10.
21:54:48
21:54:50
21:54:50
21:54:53
21:54:54
21:54:55
21:54:56
21:55:00
21:55:02
21:55:08
21:55:08
21:55:11
Cleared to land, .. 24L, Qatari-803.
21:55:19
21:55:21
21:55:22
21:55:23
21:55:28
21:55:31
21:55:32
21:55:40
21:55:43
21:55:44
QR803
One thousand. (Automatic Altitude Callout)
Sound (Autopilot off)
F/O
CAP
F/O
CAP
F/O
CAP
F/O
CAP
TWR
Flaps 30, please.
So, you have the flaps.
Sorry, autopilot's coming out. Just to try turn a little.
Yes, check that for the FDs ON --- mind, OK?
OK, and set --- thirty please.
Yes, so, yes coming. Speed brakes will arm.
And landing checks ready.
And landing checklist is.. completed.
Qatari-803, are you proceed 24R and can you left turn runway 24L
approach?
QR803
Yes, 803, yes.
F/O
CAP
TWR
QR803
Sorry I.. check..
Yes, just lev..level off.
Qatari-803, left break runway 24-Lima.
803 unable. We go around.
F/O
TWR
QR803
TWR
Yeah.
Qatari-803, roger. Fly heading 240, heading 240, maintain two-thousand.
240 and maintain two-thousand ft, Qatari-803.
Affirm.
F/O
Go-around, flaps.. 20 please.
CAP
F/O
APP
APP2
TWR
QR803
Blank line
---
Captain
First Officer
Kansai Approach (120.25MHz)
Kansai Approach (120.25MHz) other Controller
Kansai Tower (118.2MHz)
Qatar Airways-803 (Captain spoke)
Other aircraft speaking
It was not clearly to hear.
Remarks
*The time was corrected by the time tone using ATC records.
*CVR Records were only described related parts.
-29-
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