Security Target - Common Criteria

Security Target - Common Criteria
bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223 PKI Card System Control Software
Security Target
bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223
PKI Card System Control Software
Security Target
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target
written in Japanese
Version: 1.02
Issued on: April 16, 2010
Created by: KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
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<Revision History>
Date
2009/12/21
Ver.
1.00
Division
Office Software
Development Div. 1
Approved
Checked
Created
Hirota
Nakajima
Yoshida
Initial Version.
Revision
2010/3/30
1.01
Office Software
Development Div. 1
Hirota
Nakajima
Yoshida
Deal with typos.
2010/4/16
1.02
Office Software
Development Div. 1
Hirota
Yokobori
Yoshida
Deal with typos.
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---- [ Contents ] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------1.
ST Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 6
1.1. ST Identification .............................................................................................................................6
1.2. TOE Identification ..........................................................................................................................6
1.3. TOE Overview ...............................................................................................................................6
1.3.1. TOE Type.......................................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.2. Usage of TOE and Main Security Functions..................................................................................................... 6
1.4. TOE Description ............................................................................................................................7
1.4.1. Roles of the TOE Users .................................................................................................................................... 7
1.4.2. Physical Scope of TOE ..................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.3. Logical Scope of TOE..................................................................................................................................... 11
2.
Conformance Claims ............................................................................................................. 14
2.1. CC Conformance Claim...............................................................................................................14
2.2. PP Claim......................................................................................................................................14
2.3. Package Claim ............................................................................................................................14
2.4. Reference ....................................................................................................................................14
3. Security Problem Definition.................................................................................................. 15
3.1. Protected Assets..........................................................................................................................15
3.2. Assumptions ................................................................................................................................15
3.3. Threats.........................................................................................................................................16
3.4. Organizational Security Policies ..................................................................................................17
4. Security Objectives................................................................................................................ 18
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE ..................................................................................................18
4.2. Security Objectives for the Operation Environment.....................................................................19
4.3. Security Objectives Rationale......................................................................................................21
4.3.1. Necessity ........................................................................................................................................................ 21
4.3.2. Sufficiency of Assumptions ............................................................................................................................. 22
4.3.3. Sufficiency of Threats ..................................................................................................................................... 23
4.3.4. Sufficiency of Organizational Security Policies............................................................................................... 23
5.
Extended Components Definition ........................................................................................ 25
5.1. Extended Function Component ...................................................................................................25
5.1.1. FAD_RIP.1 Definition ...................................................................................................................................... 25
5.1.2. FIT_CAP.1 Definition ...................................................................................................................................... 26
6.
IT Security Requirements...................................................................................................... 28
6.1. TOE Security Requirements ........................................................................................................28
6.1.1. TOE Security Function Requirements ............................................................................................................ 28
6.1.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements ......................................................................................................... 39
6.2. IT Security Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................39
6.2.1. Rationale for IT Security Functional Requirements ........................................................................................ 39
6.2.2. Rationale for IT Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................................ 48
7.
TOE Summary Specification ................................................................................................. 49
7.1. F.ADMIN (Administrator Function) ...............................................................................................49
7.1.1. Administrator Identification Authentication Function ....................................................................................... 49
7.1.2. Auto Logoff Function of Administrator Mode................................................................................................... 50
7.1.3. Function Supported in Administrator Mode .................................................................................................... 50
7.2. F.SERVICE (Service Mode Function) ..........................................................................................52
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7.2.1. Service Engineer Identification Authentication Function................................................................................. 52
7.2.2. Function Supported in Service Mode.............................................................................................................. 53
7.3. F.CARD-ID (IC card Identification Function) ................................................................................54
7.4. F.PRINT (Encryption Print Function)............................................................................................54
7.5. F.OVERWRITE-ALL (All Area Overwrite Deletion Function)........................................................54
7.6. F.CRYPTO (Encryption Key Generation Function) ......................................................................55
7.7. F.RESET (Authentication Failure Frequency Reset Function).....................................................55
7.8. F.S/MIME (S/MIME Encryption Processing Function) .................................................................56
7.9. F.SUPPORT-CRYPTO (ASIC Support Function).........................................................................56
7.10. F.SUPPORT-PKI (PKI Support Function) ..................................................................................57
7.11. F.FAX-CONTROL (FAX Unit Control Function)..........................................................................57
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---- [ List of Figures ] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Figure 1
Figure 2
An example of MFP’s use environments ..........................................................................8
Hardware composition relevant to TOE............................................................................9
---- [ List of Tables ] --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 1 Conformity of security objectives to assumptions, threats and organizational security
policies .....................................................................................................................................21
Table 2 Cryptographic Key Generation Relation of Standards-Algorithm-Key sizes..................29
Table 3 Cryptographic Operation Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic Operation.......29
Table 4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements...........................................................................39
Table 5 Conformity of IT Security Functional Requirements to Security Objectives .....................40
Table 6 Dependencies of IT Security Functional Requirements Components..............................46
Table 7 Names and Identifiers of TOE Security Function .............................................................49
Table 8 Characters and Number of Digits for Password .............................................................50
Table 9 Types and Methods of Overwrite Deletion of Overall Area ..............................................55
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1. ST Introduction
1.1. ST Reference
-ST Title
:
bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223 PKI Card System
-ST Version
:
1.02
-Created on
:
April 16, 2010
-Created by
:
KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. Eiichi Yoshida
Control Software Security Target
1.2. TOE Reference
-TOE Name
:
bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223 PKI Card System
Control Software
-TOE Version
:
A1UD0Y0-0100-G00-20
-TOE Type
:
Software
-Created by
:
KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
1.3. TOE Overview
This paragraph explains the TOE type and usage of TOE, main security functions and
operational environment of the TOE.
1.3.1. TOE Type
bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223 PKI Card System Control Software, which is
the TOE is an embedded software product installed in SSD on the MFP controller to control the
operation of the whole MFP.
1.3.2. Usage of TOE and Main Security Functions
bizhub 423, bizhub 363, bizhub 283 and bizhub 223 are digital multi-function products
provided by Konica Minolta Business Technologies, Inc. composed by selecting and combining
copy, print, scan and FAX functions. (Hereinafter all the products are referred to as "MFP".) TOE
is the "bizhub 423 / bizhub 363 / bizhub 283 / bizhub 223 PKI Card System Control Software"
that controls the entire operation of MFP, including the operation control processing and the
image data management triggered by the panel of the main body of MFP or through the network.
TOE supports the function to print the encryption print realized by using a special printer
driver and IC card by using exclusive driver (loadable driver) and the IC card that is used
generating that encryption print for a printer data transmitted to MFP from client PC among the
highly confidential document exchanged between MFP and client PC. Also, it provides the
protection function for scan image data transmitted by mail from MFP by S/MIME using
loadable driver and IC card. All are coordinated with IC card and TOE and realizes these
security functions.
Moreover, for the danger of illegally bringing out HDD, which stores image data temporarily in
MFP, TOE can encrypt all the data written in HDD including image data using ASIC
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(Application Specific Integrated Circuit). Besides, TOE has the function that deletes all the data
of HDD completely by deletion method compliant with various overwrite deletion standards and
the function that controls the access from the public line against the danger using Fax function
as a steppingstone to access internal network. So it contributes to the prevention of information
leakage of the organization that uses MFP.
1.4. TOE Description
1.4.1. Roles of the TOE Users
The roles of the personnel related to the use of the MFP with TOE are defined as follows.
z User
An MFP user who owns IC card. (In general, the employee in the office is assumed.)
z Administrator
An MFP user who manages the operations of MFP. Manages MFP’s mechanical operations
and users. (In general, it is assumed that the person elected from the employees in the office
plays this role.)
z Service engineers
A user who manages the maintenance for MFP. Performs the repair and adjustment of MFP.
(In general, the person-in-charge of the sales companies that performs the maintenance
service of MFP in cooperation with Konica Minolta Business Technologies, Inc. is assumed.)
z Responsible person of the organization that uses MFP
A responsible person of the organization that manages the office where the MFP is installed.
Assigns an administrator who manages the operation of MFP.
z Responsible person of the organization that manages the maintenance of MFP
A responsible person of the organization that manages the maintenance of MFP. Assigns
service engineers who manage the maintenance of MFP.
Besides this, though not a user of TOE, those who go in and out the office are assumed as
accessible persons to TOE.
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1.4.2. Physical Scope of TOE
1.4.2.1. Use Environment
Figure 1 shows a general environment in which the usage of MFP equipped with TOE is
expected. Moreover, the matters expected to occur in the use environment are listed below.
Office
IC Card
SMTP Server
TOE
DNS Server
Internet
Firewall
External Network
Intra-office LAN
IC Card
Public line
Client PC
MFP
Active Directory Server
IC Card reader
Figure 1
An example of MFP’s use environments
z An intra-office LAN exists as a network in the office.
z MFP is connected to the client PCs via the intra-office LAN, and has mutual data
communications.
z An IC card and an IC card reader of the client PC is used to transmit the encrypted print file
to MFP using the exclusive printer driver and decrypt the scan image data transmitted from
MFP.
z Active Directory is connected to an intra-office LAN and it is used to the authentication of IC
card.
z When a SMTP server is connected to the intra-office LAN, MFP can carry out data
communication with these servers, too. (The DNS service will be necessary when setting a
domain name of the SMTP server)
z When the intra-office LAN connects to an external network, measures such as connecting via
a firewall are taken, and an appropriate setup to block access requests to the MFP from the
external network is applied.
z The public line connected with MFP is used for communications by FAX.
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1.4.2.2. Operation Environment
MFP
MFP Controller
RS-232C
CPU
RAM
ASIC
Ethernet
USB
NVRAM
SSD
- Card reader
- TOE
HDD
- Message data
etc.
*FAX unit
Main/Sub
Power
Panel
Public line
Operator
Operator
Figure 2
-Scanner Unit
-Automatic
Document Feeder
Paper
Printer
Unit
Paper
Hardware composition relevant to TOE
Figure 2 shows the structure of the hardware environment in MFP that TOE needs for the
operation. The MFP controller is installed in the main body of MFP, and TOE exists in SSD on
the MFP controller, loaded into the main memory.
The following explains about the unique hardware on the MFP controller, the hardware having
the interfaces to the MFP controller, and the connection by using RS-232C, shown in Figure 2.
z SSD
A storage medium that stores the object code of "MFP Control Software" which is the TOE.
Additionally, stores the message data expressed in each country's language to display the
response to access through the panel and network.
z NVRAM
A nonvolatile memory. This memory medium stores various settings that MFP needs for
processing of TOE.
z ASIC
An integrated circuit for specific applications which implements an HDD encryption function
for enciphering the data written in HDD.
z HDD
A hard disk drive of 250GB in capacity. This is used not only for storing image data as files
but also as an area to save image data temporarily during extension conversion and so on.
Moreover, the loadable drivers for accessing an IC card are stored here.
z Main/sub power supply
Power switches for activating MFP
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z Panel
An exclusive control device for the operation of the MFP, equipped with a touch panel of a
liquid crystal monitor, ten-key, start key, stop key, screen switch key, etc.
z Scan Unit/ automatic manuscript feeder
A device that scans images and photos from paper and converts them into digital data.
z Printer Unit
A device to actually print the image data which were converted for printing when receives a
print request from the MFP controller.
z Ethernet
Supports 10BASE-T, 100BASE-TX and Gigabit Ethernet.
z USB
It can be connected with a card reader corresponded to IC card. A card reader is not
pre-installed in MFP as a standard according to the circumstances in sales, but sold as an
optional part. It is an essential component under this ST assumption.
z IC Card
An IC card that supports the standard specification of Common Access Card (CAC) and
Personal ID Verification (PIV)
z RS-232C
Serial connection using D-sub 9 pins connectors is usable. The maintenance function is usable
through this interface in the case of failure.
z FAX unit (* optional part)
A device that has a port of Fax public line and is used for communications for FAX-data
transmission via the public line. Is not pre-installed in MFP as a standard function according
to the circumstances in sales, but sold as an optional part. Fax unit is purchased when the
organization needs it, and the installation is not indispensable.
1.4.2.3. Guidance
z bizhub 423 / 363 / 283 / 223 for PKI Card System User’s Guide [Security Operations]
z bizhub 423 / 363 / 283 / 223 for PKI Card System
SERVICE MANUAL SECURITY
FUNCTION
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1.4.3. Logical Scope of TOE
Users use a variety of functions of TOE from the panel and a client PC via the network.
Hereafter, this section explains typical functions such as the basic function, the administrator
function manipulated by administrators, the service engineer function manipulated by service
engineers, and the function operated in the background without user's awareness.
1.4.3.1. Basic Function
In MFP, a series of functions for the office work concerning the image such as copy, print, scan,
and fax exists as basic functions, and TOE performs the core control in the operation of these
functions. It converts the raw data acquired from the external device of the MFP controller into
image files, and stores them in RAM and HDD. (For print image files from client PCs, multiple
types of conversion are applied.) These image files are converted into data to be printed or sent,
and transmitted to the device outside of the MFP controller concerned. In addition, various
functions are realized with IC card.
Operations of copy, print, scan, and FAX are managed by the unit of job, so that operation
priority can be changed, finishing of print jobs can be changed, and such operations can be
aborted, by giving directions from the panel.
The following is the functions related to the security in the basic function.
z Encryption Print Function
A print file is stored as standby status remaining encrypted when the encrypted print file,
which is generated from the exclusive printer driver of the client PC, is received.
Printing is performed by a print direction from the panel by decrypting an encrypted print file
through the PKI processing using IC card.
When printing is requested by a client PC, this function eliminates the possibility that other
users stole a glance at the printing of highly confidential data, or such data is slipped into the
other printings.
z Scan To Me Function
IC card owner can transmit scan images from MFP to own e-mail address through PKI
processing using IC card. Following two functions are usable.
¾
S/MIME Encryption Function
Scan image is encrypted as S/MIME mail data file when transmitting an image file
scanned by user to mail address.
This function eliminates the possibility that other users stole a glance at highly
confidential image on the communication.
¾
Digital Signature Function
Signature data is added to verify a mail sender and guarantee a mail data as S/MIME
mail data file, when transmitting image files scanned by a user to mail address. This
function eliminates the possibility to receive a falsified file erroneously on the
communication.
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1.4.3.2. Administrator Function
TOE provides the functions such as the management of various settings of the network, image
quality, etc in the administrator mode that only authenticated administrator can manipulate
from the panel.
The following shows the typical function related to the security.
z Operational setup of automatic system reset
¾ Setting of the function that logs out automatically when the setting time passed in an idle
state.
z Overwrite deletion function for the overall area of HDD
¾ There are data deletion methods conformed to various military standards (ex. Military
Standard of United States Department of Defense)
¾ When this function is started up, in conformity with a set method, the overwrite deletion is
executed for the overall area of HDD.
z Setup of the HDD encryption function
¾ Whether to activate or stop the function is selected.
¾ An encryption passphrase is registered or changed when the function is activated.
z Setup of encryption method applying to S/MIME process
z Setup of message digest method using signature applying to S/MIME process
z Setup of giving a signature applying to S/MIME process
z Setup of the authentication operation prohibition function
¾
Function to emphasize strength of authentication function when inputting various
passwords
¾
Suspending authentication for five seconds when inputting a password incorrectly and
¾
Above operating types can be set.
prohibiting authentication when failing it more than certain number of times.
1.4.3.3. Service Engineer Function
TOE provides a management function of administrator and a maintenance function, such as
adjusting the device for Scan/Print etc, within the service mode that only a service engineer can
operate. The following shows the typical functions related to security.
z Modification function of administrator password
The following is a set of operation setting functions of affecting functions especially to the
behavior of the security function (Setting data of administrator password, setting of HDD
encryption function etc.)
z Authentication setup of the service engineer with the CE 1 password.
¾ Whether to activate or stop the function is selected.
z Setup of a TOE update function via Internet
¾ Able to select permission or prohibition.
z Setup of maintenance function
1Abbreviation
of Customer Service engineer
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¾ Able to select permission or prohibition.
z The format function of HDD
¾ A physical format that initializes the HDD status is executable.
z Initialization function
¾ The various setting values that the user or the administrator has set and the data that the
user has stored are deleted.
1.4.3.4. Other Functions
TOE provides the functions that run background without awareness of the user and the
updating function of TOE. The following explains the major functions.
z
Encryption key generation function
Performs encryption/decryption by ASIC when writing data in HDD or reading data from
HDD. (TOE does not process the encryption and description itself.)
The operational setup of this function is performed by the administrator function. When
activated, TOE generates the encryption key by the encryption passphrase that was
entered on the panel.
z
Updating function of TOE
TOE facilitated with the function to update itself. As for the update means, there are a
method that downloads from FTP server through Ethernet (TOE update function via
Internet), and a method that performs the connection of external memory.
The standard is that MFP is not installed Fax unit and does not have a port of Fax public line,
so there is not the access to the internal network through MFP. TOE provides the following
function, provided that Fax unit is installed in MFP.
z
Fax unit control function
TOE prohibits access to the internal network, where MFP was connected to, from a port of
Fax public line through Fax unit.
TOE uses effectively security function of external entity as ASIC and IC card. The following
explains the major functions related to external entity.
z
Utilization of ASIC
ASIC, an external entity, activates a function to encrypt the data in HDD as a function to
protect unauthorized bring-out of data and so on when an encryption passphrase is set up.
z
Utilization of IC card
IC card, an external entity, activates functions to encrypt or sign as a function to protect a
data disclosed against the intention of a user when the encryption print or the E-mail
transmission is performed.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
This ST conforms to the following standards.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese Translation v1.0)
Part 2: Security functional components Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese Translation v1.0)
Part 3: Security assurance components Version 3.1 Revision 3 (Japanese Translation v1.0)
•
Security function requirement : Part 2 Extended
•
Security assurance requirement : Part 3 Conformant
2.2. PP Claim
There is no PP that is referenced by this ST.
2.3. Package Claim
This ST conforms to Package: EAL 3. There is no additional assurance component.
2.4. Reference
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:Introduction and
general model Version 3.1 Revision 3 CCMB-2009-07-001
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:Security functional
components Version 3.1 Revision 3 CCMB-2009-07-002
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:Security assurance
components Version 3.1 Revision 3 CCMB-2009-07-003
•
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Evaluation methodology Version 3.1 Revision 3 CCMB-2009-07-004
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3. Security Problem Definition
This chapter will describe the concept of protected assets, assumptions, threats, and
organizational security policies.
3.1. Protected Assets
Security concept of TOE is "the protection of data that can be disclosed against the intention of
the user".
As MFP is generally used, the following image file in available situation becomes the
protected assets.
•
Encrypted print file
An encrypted image file generated, sent and stored in MFP by using the exclusive printer
driver and IC card from client PC.
•
Scanned image file
An image file scanned on the spot by MFP. This assumes the operation of transmitting to
scanned user’s mail address by E-mail (S/MIME).
As for a image file of a job kept as a wait state by copy operation etc., and a image file of a job
kept that prints the remainder of copies becoming as a wait state for confirmation of the finish,
and other than the image file dealt with the above-mentioned is not intended to be protected in
the general use of MFP, so that it is not treated as the protected assets.
On the other hand, when the stored data have physically gone away from the jurisdiction of a
user, such as the use of MFP ended by the lease return or discard, or the case of a theft of HDD,
the user has concerns about leak possibility of every remaining data. Therefore, in this case, the
following data files become protected assets.
•
Encrypted Print File
•
Scanned Image File
•
On-memory Image File
¾ Image file of job in the wait state
•
Stored Image File
¾ Stored image files other than encrypted print file
•
HDD remaining Image File
¾ The file which remains in the HDD data area that is not deleted only by general
deletion operation (deletion of a file maintenance area)
•
Image-related File
¾
Temporary data file generated in image file processing
.
3.2. Assumptions
The present section identifies and describes the assumptions for the environment for using the
TOE.
A.ADMIN (Personnel conditions to be an administrator)
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Administrators, in the role given to them, will not carry out a malicious act during the series of
permitted operations given to them.
A.SERVICE (Personnel conditions to be a service engineer)
Service engineers, in the role given to them, will not carry out a malicious act during series of
permitted operations given to them.
A.NETWORK (Network connection conditions for MFP)
When the intra-office LAN where the MFP with the TOE will be installed is connected to an
external network, access from the external network to the MFP is not allowed.
A.SECRET (Operational condition about secret information)
Each password and encryption passphrase does not leak from each user in the use of TOE.
A.IC-CARD (Operational condition about IC card)
IC card is owned by rightful user in the use of TOE.
A.SETTING (Operational setting condition about security)
The following operation setting related to security is set when a user uses the TOE.
•
Prohibit authentication operation when failing the input of password consecutively constant
frequency.
•
Disable the use of the TOE update function via an internet.
•
Disable the use of the maintenance function.
•
Activate login authentication of service engineer.
•
Activate the HDD encryption function.
•
Disable the setting of administrator function excluding panel.
3.3. Threats
In this section, threats that are assumed during the use of the TOE and the environment for
using the TOE are identified and described.
T.DISCARD-MFP (Lease-return and discard of MFP)
When leased MFPs are returned or discarded MFPs are collected, encrypted print files,
scanned image files, on-memory image files, stored image files, HDD remaining image files,
image-related files, and highly confidential information such as the setup various passwords
can leak by the person with malicious intent when he/she analyzes the HDD or NVRAM in the
MFP.
T.BRING-OUT-STORAGE (Unauthorized bringing out HDD)
•
Encrypted print files, scanned image files, on-memory image files, stored image files,
HDD-remaining image files, image-related files, and various passwords which were set up
can leak by a malicious person or a user illegally when he/she brings out the files to analyze
the HDD in a MFP.
•
A person or a user with malicious intent illegally replaces the HDD in MFP. In the replaced
HDD, newly created files such as encrypted print files, scanned image files, on-memory
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image files, stored image files, HDD-remaining image files, image-related files, and various
passwords which were set up are accumulated. A person or a user with malicious intent
takes out to analyze the replaced HDD, so that such image files will leak.
3.4. Organizational Security Policies
In this ST, TOE security environment that corresponds to organizations and users such as file
encryption is demanded and only the mail added a digital signature is permitted to read is
assumed as the security measures in the intra-office LAN corresponding to the Protected Assets
considering the confidentiality. Moreover, although a stored data in a client PC and a server
existing in internal network or a general data flowing on internal network is not protected assets,
TOE security environment that corresponds to the organization that prohibit the access to
internal network via Fax public line of MFP is assumed. The security policies applied in the
organization that uses TOE are identified and described as follows.
P.COMMUNICATION-CRYPTO (Encryption communication of image file)
Highly confidential image file (encrypted print files, scanned image files) which transmitted or
received between IT equipment must be encrypted.
P.COMMUNICATION-SIGN (Signature of image file)
Digital signature must be added to a mail including highly confidential image files (scanned
image files).
P.DECRYPT-PRINT (Decryption of image file)
Highly confidential image files (encrypted print file) are permitted to print only to a user who
generated that files.
P.REJECT-LINE (Access prohibition from public line)
An access to internal network from public line via the port of Fax public line must be
prohibited.
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4. Security Objectives
In this chapter, in relation to the assumptions, the threats, and the organizational security
policy identified in Chapter 3, the required security objectives policy for the TOE and the
environment for the usage of the TOE are described by being divided into the categories of the
security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the environment, as follows.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
In this section, the security objectives for the TOE is identified and described.
O.DECRYPT-PRINT (Decryption of encrypted print file)
TOE permits only the IC card used for generating encrypted print files to print the concerned
encrypted print files.
O.OVERWRITE-ALL (Complete overwrite deletion)
TOE overwrites all the data regions of HDD in MFP with deletion data, and makes all image
data unable to restore. In addition, TOE provides a function to initialize settings such as the
highly confidential passwords on NVRAM (administrator password and encryption
passphrase) set by an administrator.
O.CRYPTO-KEY (Encryption key generation)
TOE generates an encryption key to encrypt and store all the data written in the HDD in the
MFP including image files.
O.MAIL-CRYPTO (The use and encryption of S/MIME)
TOE encrypts scanned images according to user’s demand for E-mail transmission of scanned
images.
O.MAIL-SIGN (The use and signature of S/MIME)
TOE generates message digest of E-mail data including encrypted scanned images required for
the digital signature process according to user’s demand for E-mail transmission of scanned
images.
O.CRYPTO-CAPABILITY (The support operation to utilize HDD encryption function)
TOE supports necessary mechanical operations to utilize the HDD encryption function by
ASIC.
O.PKI-CAPABILITY (The support operation to utilize PKI function)
TOE supports necessary mechanical operations for card reader and IC card using Active
Directory to utilize the encrypted print file function and the Scan To Me function, that is
realized in cooperation with the card reader and the IC card.
O.FAX-CONTROL (Fax unit control)
TOE provides the control function that prohibits an access to internal network which the MFP
concerned connects with, from public line via the port of Fax public line.
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4.2. Security Objectives for the Operation Environment
In this section, the security objectives for the environment, in the operation environment of the
usage of the TOE, is described.
OE.ADMIN (A reliable administrator)
The responsible person in the organization who uses MFP will assign a person who can
faithfully execute the given role during the operation of the MFP with TOE as an
administrator.
OE.SERVICE (The service engineer's guarantee)
•
The responsible person in the organization managing the maintenance of MFP educates a
service engineer in order to faithfully carry out the given role for the installation of the TOE,
the set up of TOE and the maintenance of the MFP with TOE.
•
The administrator observes the maintenance work of MFP with TOE by a service engineer.
OE.NETWORK (Network Environment in which the MFP is connected)
•
The responsible person in the organization who uses MFP carries out the measures for the
unauthorized access from the outside by setting up the equipment such as the firewall to
intercept the access from an external network to MFP with TOE.
OE.CARD-USER (Utilization of IC card)
The owner of IC card uses IC card and exclusive printer driver to encrypt encrypted print files
and uses only IC card to encrypt scanned image files.
OE.IC-CARD (Possessive conditions of IC card)
•
The responsible person in the organization who uses MFP gives the IC card issued to use for
the organization out to an appropriate user who is allowed to own that IC card.
•
The responsible person in the organization who uses MFP prohibits users from handing over
or renting the IC card to others, and keeps users informed about written report when losing.
OE.SECRET (Appropriate management of confidential information)
The administrator has the user implemented the following operation.
•
Set the value of eight-digits or more for the administrator password.
•
Should not set the value that can be guessed for the administrator password and encryption
passphrase.
•
Keep the administrator password and encryption passphrase confidential.
•
Change the administrator password and encryption passphrase appropriately.
The service engineer executes the following operation.
•
Should not set the value that can be guessed for the CE password.
•
Keep the CE password confidential.
•
The CE password should be properly changed.
•
Set the value of eight-digits or more when changing the administrator password.
•
When the service engineer changes the administrator password, make the administrator to
change it promptly.
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OE.SIGN (Persist of signature giving)
•
Owner of IC card must add the signature when transmitting highly confidential image data
to client PC from MFP.
•
Administrator sets up the setting of the method of giving a digital signature to compulsory
or arbitrarily adds the signature.
OE.SETTING-SECURITY (Operation setting of security)
The administrator and the service engineer make the following setting for TOE before a user
uses it.
•
Administrator makes “Valid” (Prohibit authentication
authentication operation prohibition function.
•
Service engineer makes “Invalid” the TOE update function via the internet.
•
Service engineer makes “Invalid” the maintenance function.
•
Service engineer makes “Valid” the service engineer authentication function.
•
Administrator makes “Valid” the HDD encryption function.
•
Administrator makes “Invalid” the setting from the administrator function via the network.
operation)
the
setting
of
OE.DRIVER (Utilization of exclusive printer driver)
The owner of IC card installs exclusive printer driver that satisfies the following
requirements to client PC.
•
Support the generation of random common key using for encrypting documents.
•
Support the encryption process of the common key using public key of IC card.
•
Support the encryption algorithm and key length that suit SP800-67.
OE.FAX-UNIT (Utilization of Fax unit)
The service engineer installs Fax unit which is the optional part on MFP and sets to utilize the
function of Fax unit.
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4.3. Security Objectives Rationale
4.3.1. Necessity
The correspondence between the assumptions, threats, and organizational security policy and
security objectives are shown in the following table. It shows that the security objectives
correspond to at least one assumption, threat or organizational security policy.
Table 1 Conformity of security objectives to assumptions, threats and organizational security policies
P.REJECT-LINE
P.DECRYPT-PRINT
P.COMMUNICATION-SIGN
P.COMMUNICATION-CRYPTO
T.BRING-OUT-STORAGE
T.DISCARD-MFP
A.SETTING
A.IC-CARD
A.SECRET
A.NETWORK
A.SERVICE
A.ADMIN
Organizational security policies
Assumptions
Treats
Security objectives
O.DECRYPT-PRINT
O.OVERWRITE-ALL
O.CRYPTO-KEY
O.MAIL-CRYPTO
O.MAIL-SIGN
O.CRYPTO-CAPABILITY
O.PKI-CAPABILITY
O.FAX-CONTROL
OE.ADMIN
OE.SERVICE
OE.CARD-USER
OE.IC-CARD
OE.NETWORK
OE.SECRET
OE.SIGN
OE.SETTING-SECURITY
OE.DRIVER
OE.FAX-UNIT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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4.3.2. Sufficiency of Assumptions
The security objectives for the assumptions are described as follows.
z A.ADMIN (Personnel Conditions to be an Administrator)
This condition assumes that administrators are not malicious.
With OE.ADMIN, the organization that uses the MFP assigns personnel who are reliable in
the organization that uses the MFP, so the reliability of the administrator is realized.
z A.SERVICE (Personnel Conditions to be a Service Engineer)
This condition assumes the service engineer are not malicious.
With OE.SERVICE, the organization that manages the maintenance of the MFP educates the
service engineer. Also the administrator needs to observe the maintenance of the MFP, so that
the reliability of service engineers is assured.
z A.NETWORK (Network Connection Conditions for the MFP)
This condition assumes that there are no access by an unspecified person from an external
network to the intra-office LAN.
OE.NETWORK regulates the unauthorized access prevention from external by the
installation of devices such as firewall in order to block access to the MFP from the external
networks, so that this condition is realized.
z A.SECRET (Operating condition concerning confidential information)
This condition assumes each password and encryption passphrase using for the use of TOE
should not be leaked by each user.
OE.SECRET regulates that the administrator executes the operation rule concerning the
administrator password and encryption passphrase. It also regulates that the service
engineer executes the operation rule concerning the CE password, and that the service
engineer makes the administrator to execute the operation rule concerning the administrator
password, so that this condition is realized.
z A.IC-CARD (Operating condition concerning IC Card)
This condition assumes IC card used for the use of TOE is managed properly and IC card
owner is the rightful user.
OE.IC-CARD regulates that the responsible person in the organization gives out and collects
the IC cards issued by reliable PKI environment properly. It also regulates that the
responsible person in the organization keeps the user informed about how to correspond when
expiring or losing the IC card, so that the unexpected user who the responsible person in the
organization does not intend must not own the activated IC card. This means that the owners
of IC cards are appropriate users and this condition is realized.
z A.SETTING (Operational setting condition concerning the security)
This condition assumes the following operation setting related to security is set for TOE when
a user uses it.
¾
Enable password lock
¾
Prohibit TOE update via the internet of service engineer
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Prohibit maintenance function of service engineer
¾
Enable service engineer authentication function
¾
Enable HDD encryption function
¾
Prohibit setting function by administrator function via the network
OE.SETTING-SECURITY regulates that settings described above is done for all items as
above, so that this condition is realized.
4.3.3. Sufficiency of Threats
The security objectives against threats are described as follows.
z T.DISCARD-MFP (Lease return and discard of MFP)
This threat assumes the possibility of leaking information from MFP collected from the user.
O.OVERWRITE-ALL is that TOE provides the function to overwrite data for the deletion of
all area of HDD and initializes the information of NVRAM, so that the possibility of the
threat is removed by executing this function before MFP is collected.
Accordingly, this threat is countered sufficiently.
z T.BRING-OUT-STORAGE (Unauthorized bringing out HDD)
This threat assumes the possibility that the image data in HDD leaks by being stolen from
the operational environment under MFP used or by installing the unauthorized HDD and
taking away with the data accumulated in it.
For the above, the possibility of the threat is reduced because O.CRYPTO-KEY assumes that
TOE generates an encryption key to encrypt the data written in the HDD, and a mechanical
operation
to
use
the
HDD
encryption
function
by
ASIC
is
supported
by
O.CRYPTO-CAPABILITY.
Accordingly, this threat is countered sufficiently.
4.3.4. Sufficiency of Organizational Security Policies
Security objective corresponding to organizational security policies is explained as follows.
z P.COMMUNICATION-CRYPTO (Encryption communication of image file)
This organizational security policy assumes highly confidential image file (encrypted print
files, scanned image files) which flows on network is encrypted to ensure the confidentiality.
O.MAIL-CRYPTO supports the function to encrypt scanned image files transmitted by mail
from MFP to user’s own client PC. OE.CARD-USER requires the use of IC card for
transmission to client PC from MFP and the use of IC card and exclusive printer driver for
transmission from client PC to MFP. In addition, OE.DRIVER demands to use the exclusive
printer driver keeping image data secure. Moreover, OE.IC-CARD requests IC card owner is
the rightful user.
Accordingly, this organizational security policy is sufficiently to achieve.
z P.COMMUNICATION-SIGN (Signature of image file)
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This organizational security policy assumes signature is added to highly confidential image
files (scanned image files) which flow by mail (S/MIME).
OE.SIGN supports the addition of signature on scanned image files transmitted by mail to
the client PC from MFP certainly. O.MAIL-SIGN and O.PKI-CAPABILITY supports the
function to add signature on scanned image files transmitted to user's own client PC from
MFP by mail by using IC card. Moreover, OE.IC-CARD requires that IC card owner is the
rightful user.
Accordingly, this organizational security policy is sufficiently to achieve.
z P.DECRYPT-PRINT (Decryption of image file)
This organizational security policy assumes only the user (IC card owner) who generated files
can perform the printing of encrypted print files.
By O.DECRYPT-PRINT, TOE allows the printing of encrypted print files only by IC card that
generated those encrypted print files. In addition, OE.IC-CARD demands to manage the IC
card owner appropriately.
O.PKI-CAPABILITY supports the mechanical operations to use IC card, which is external
entity, for the decryption process of encrypted print files.
Accordingly, this organizational security policy is sufficiently to achieve.
z P.REJECT-LINE (Access prohibition from public line)
This organizational security policy prohibits being accessed to a stored data in a client PC
and a server existing in internal network or a general data flowing on internal network from
public line via the port of Fax public line on Fax unit installed to MFP.
This means that communication, like illegal operation command, except image data which is
sent from public line network and forwarded to internal network via the port of Fax public
line of MFP is not forwarded to internal network, even though Fax unit is installed on MFP at
the request of the organization.
O.FAX-CONTROL prohibits the access to the data existing in internal network including a
general data from public line via the port of Fax public line.
Also, OE.FAX-UNIT is regulated to install Fax unit which is the optional part on MFP by
service engineer, so that O.FAX-CONTROL is supported.
Accordingly, this organizational security policy is achieved.
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5. Extended Components Definition
5.1. Extended Function Component
In this ST, three extended function components are defined. The necessity of each security
function requirement and the reason of the labeling definition are described.
z FAD_RIP.1
This is the security function requirement for the protection of the remaining information of
user data and TSF data.
¾ Necessity of extension
The regulation for the protection of the TSF data remaining information is necessary. But,
the security function requirement to explain the protection of the remaining information
exists only in FDP_RIP.1 for the user data. There is no security function requirement to
satisfy this requirement.
¾ Reason for applied class (FAD)
There is no requirement to explain both of the user data and the TSF data with no
distinction. Therefore, new Class was defined.
¾ Reason for applied family (RIP)
As this is the extension up to the TSF data by using the content explained by the relevant
family of FDP class, the same label of this family was applied.
z FIT_CAP.1
This is the security function requirement for regulating the necessary ability for TOE to use
effectively the security function of the external entity, IT environment.
¾ Necessity of extension
In case of TOE using the external security functions, the external security function to be
surely secure is important, but TOE ability to provide is very important in order to use
correctly the external security function. But, there is no concept as this requirement in the
security function requirements.
¾ Reason for applied class (FIT)
There is no such concept in CC part 2. Therefore, new Class was defined.
¾ Reason for applied family (CAP.1)
As similar to class, there is no such concept in CC part 2. Therefore, new Family was
defined.
5.1.1. FAD_RIP.1 Definition
z Class name
FAD: Protection of all data
Meaning of abbreviation: FAD (Functional requirement for All Data protection)
z Class behaviour
This class contains a family specifying the requirement related with the protection of the user
data and the TSF data with no distinction. One family exists here.
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- Residual Information Protection of All Data (FAD_RIP);
z Family behaviour
This family corresponds to the necessity never to access the deleted data or newly created
object and TSF data which should not set as accessible. This family requires the protection for
the information that was deleted or released logically but has a possibility to exist still in
TOE.
z Component leveling
FAD_RIP Residual Information Protection of All Data
1
FAD_RIP.1: "Residual Information Protection of All Data after the explicit deletion operation"
requires of TSF to assure that the subset of the defined object controlled by TSF cannot
utilize any remaining information of every resource under the allocation of resource or the
release of it.
Audit : FAD_RIP.1
The use of the user identification information with the explicit deletion operation
Management : FAD_RIP.1
No expected management activity
FAD_RIP.1
Residual Information Protection of All Data after the explicit deletion
operation
FAD_RIP.1
TSF shall ensure that the content of the information allocated to source before shall not be available
after the explicit deletion operation against the object and TSF data.: [assignment: list of object and list
of TSF data]
Hierarchical to
: No other components
Dependencies
: No dependencies
5.1.2. FIT_CAP.1 Definition
z Class name
FIT: Support for IT environment entity
Meaning of abbreviation: FIT (Functional requirement for IT environment support)
z Class behaviour
This class contains a family specifying the requirement related with the use of the security
service provided by IT environment entity. One family exists here.
- Use of IT environment entity (FIT_CAP);
z Family behaviour
This family corresponds to the capability definition for TOE at the use of security function of
IT environment entity.
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z Component leveling
FIT_CAP Capability of using IT environment entity
1
Meaning of abbreviation: CAP (CAPability of using IT environment)
FIT_CAP.1: "Capability of using security service of IT environment entity" corresponds to the
substantiation of capability needed to use the security function correctly provided by IT
environment entity.
Audit : FIT_CAP.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is included in the
PP/ST.
a) Minimal
Failure of operation for IT environment entity
b) Basic
Use all operation of IT environment entity (success, failure)
Management : FIT_CAP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT.
There is no management activity expected
FIT_CAP.1
Capability of using security service of IT environment entity
FIT_CAP.1
TSF shall provide the necessary capability to use the service for [assignment: security service provided
by IT environment entity]. : [assignment: necessary capability list for the operation of security service]
Hierarchical to
: No other components
Dependencies
: No dependencies
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6. IT Security Requirements
In this chapter, the TOE security requirements are described.
<Definition of Label>
The security function requirements required for the TOE are described. Those regulated in CC
Part 2 will be directly used for the functional requirements components, and the same labels will
be used as well. The new additional requirement, which is not described in CC part 2, is newly
established and identified with the label that doesn’t compete with CC part 2.
< Method of specifying security function requirement "Operation" >
In the following description, when items are indicated in "italic" and "bold," it means that they
are assigned or selected. When items are indicated in "italic" and "bold" with parenthesis right
after the underlined original sentences, it means that the underlined sentences are refined. A
number in the parentheses after a label means that the functional requirement is used
repeatedly.
<Method of clear indication of dependency>
The label in the parentheses "( )" in the dependent section indicates a label for the security
functional requirements used in this ST. When it is a dependency that is not required to be used
in this ST, it is described as "N/A" in the same parentheses.
6.1. TOE Security Requirements
6.1.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1.1. Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of standards] :
Listed in "Table2 Cryptographic key generation
Relation of Standards-Algorithm-Key sizes"
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] :
Listed in "Table2 Cryptographic key generation
Relation of Standards-Algorithm-Key sizes"
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] :
Listed in "Table2 Cryptographic key generation
Relation of Standards-Algorithm-Key sizes"
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 (FCS_COP.1 (only partial event)) , FCS_CKM.4 (N/A)
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Table 2
Cryptographic Key Generation
List of Standards
Security Target
Relation of Standards-Algorithm-Key sizes
Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm
FIPS 186-2
Pseudorandom number Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic Key sizes
- 128 bits
- 192 bits
- 168 bits
- 256 bits
Konica Minolta
Konica Minolta HDD Encryption Key Generation
Encryption
Algorithm
128 bits
specification standard
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operations
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of Cryptographic operations] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[assignment: list of standards] :
Listed in "Table3 Cryptographic operation
Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic operation"
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm] :
Listed in "Table3 Cryptographic operation
Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic operation"
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] :
Listed in "Table3 Cryptographic operation
Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic operation"
[assignment: list of cryptographic operation] :
Listed in "Table3 Cryptographic operation
Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic operation"
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
Table 3
:
:
No other components
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 (FCS_CKM.1 ( only a part of events)),
FCS_CKM.4 (N/A)
Cryptographic Operation Relation of Algorithm-Key sizes-Cryptographic Operation
List of
Cryptographic
Cryptographic
standards
algorithm
key sizes
FIPS PUB 197
AES
- 128 bits
Contents of Cryptographic operation
Encryption of S/MIME transmission data
- 192 bits
- 256 bits
SP800-67
3-Key-Triple-DES
- 168 bits
Encryption of S/MIME transmission data
Decryption of encrypted print file
FIPS 186-2
RSA
- 1024 bits
Encryption of common key (encryptographic
- 2048 bits
key) to encrypt S/MIME transmission data
- 3072 bits
- 4096 bits
FIPS 180-2
SHA-1
N/A
Generation of message digest
FIPS 180-2
SHA-256
N/A
Generation of message digest
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6.1.1.2. User Data Protection
Subset information flow control
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] on [assignment: list of subjects,
information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and from controlled subjects
covered by the SFP].
[assignment: list of subjects, information, and operations that cause controlled information to flow to and
from controlled subjects covered by the SFP] :
<Subject>
- Reception from Fax unit
<Information>
- Received data from public line
<Operation>
- Send to internal network
[assignment: information flow control SFP] :
Fax information flow control
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
FDP_IFF.1
:
:
No other components
FDP_IFF.1(FDP_IFF.1)
Simple security attributes
FDP_IFF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: information flow control SFP] based on the following types of
subject and information security attributes: [assignment: list of subjects and information controlled
under the indicated SFP, and for each, the security attributes].
[assignment: information flow control SFP] :
Fax information flow control
[assignment: list of subjects and information controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the
security attributes] :
<Subject>
- Reception from Fax unit
<Information>
- Received data from public line
<Security attribute>
- Image data attribute
- Data attribute except image data
FDP_IFF.1.2
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a
controlled operation if the following rules hold: [assignment: for each operation, the security
attribute-based relationship that must hold between subject and information security attributes].
[assignment: for each operation, the security attribute-based relationship that must hold between
subject and information security attributes] :
Does not send data except image data received from FAX unit to internal network.
FDP_IFF.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules].
[assignment: additional information flow control SFP rules] :
None
FDP_IFF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules,
based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise information flows] :
None
FDP_IFF.1.5
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [assignment: rules, based
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on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows].
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny information flows] :
None
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
FDP_IFC.1(FDP_IFC.1) , FMT_MSA.3 (N/A)
6.1.1.3. Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1[1]
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1[1]
The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events] :
-Authentication for accessing the service mode
-Re-authentication for changing the CE password.
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer
within [assignment: range of acceptable values]]
[assignment: range of acceptable values] : an administrator configurable positive integer within 1~5
FIA_AFL.1.2[1]
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed] :
Met
[assignment: list of actions] :
<Action when it is detected>
- Log off from the authentication status of the service mode if it is, and lock the authentication
function which uses the CE password.
- If it’s not under the authentication status, lock the authentication function which uses the CE
password.
<Operation for recovering the normal condition>
Perform the lock release function of CE authentication by specific operation.
(When time set in the release time setting of operation prohibition for CE authentication passed
from specific operation, the release process is performed.)
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
FIA_AFL.1[2]
:
:
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UAU.2[1])
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1[2]
The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events] :
-Authentication for accessing the administrator mode
-Re-authentication for changing the administrator password
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer
within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] :
[assignment: range of acceptable values] : an administrator configurable positive integer within 1~5
FIA_AFL.1.2[2]
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed] :
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Met
[assignment: list of actions]
:
<Action when it is detected>
- Log off from the authentication status of the administrator mode if it is, and lock the authentication
function which uses the administrator password.
- If it's not under the authentication status, lock the authentication function which uses the
administrator password.
<Operation for recovering the normal condition>
- Perform the boot process of the TOE. (Release process is performed after time set in the release time
setting of operation prohibition for Administrator authentication passed by the boot process.)
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UAU.2[2])
FIA_AFL.1[3]
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1[3]
The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator
configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: list of authentication events].
[assignment: list of authentication events] :
- Authentication for accessing the service mode from the panel
- Authentication for accessing the administrator mode from the panel
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer
within [assignment: range of acceptable values]] :
[assignment: positive integer number] : 1
FIA_AFL.1.2[3]
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met,
surpassed], the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
[selection: met, surpassed] :
Met
[assignment: list of actions] :
<Action when it is detected>
Deny the access of all input from the panel.
<Operation for recovering the normal condition>
Release automatically after 5 seconds passed.
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FIA_SOS.1[1]
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UAU.2[1], FIA_UAU.2[2])
Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1[1]
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (CE Password) meet [assignment: a defined
quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric] :
-Number of digits: 8-digits
-Character type: possible to choose from 93 or more characters
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
FIA_SOS.1[2]
:
:
No other components
No dependencies
Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1[2]
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (Administrator Password) meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric] :
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-Character type: possible to choose from 93 or more characters
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1[3]
Verification of secrets
FIA_SOS.1.1[3]
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (Encryption Passphrase) meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
[assignment: a defined quality metric] :
-Number of digits: 20-digits
-Character type: possible to choose from 83 or more characters
-Rule :
(1) Do not compose by only the same type of characters.
(2) Do not match the value after it changes with the current setting value when changing.
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FIA_UAU.2[1]
No other components
No dependencies
User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1[1]
The TSF shall require each user (Service Engineer) to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (Service Engineer).
Hierarchical to
:
FIA_UAU.1
Dependencies
:
FIA_UID.1 (FIA_UID.2[1])
FIA_UAU.2[2]
User authentication before any action
FIA_UAU.2.1[2]
The TSF shall require each user (Administrator) to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (Administrator).
Hierarchical to
: FIA_UAU.1
Dependencies
: FIA_UID.1 (FIA_UID.2[2])
FIA_UAU.6
Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the use under the conditions [assignment: list of conditions under which
re-authentication is required].
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
- When the service engineer modifies the CE password.
- When the administrator modifies the administrator password
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FIA_UAU.7
No other components
No dependencies
Protected authentication feedback
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [assignment: list of feedback] to the user while the authentication is in
progress.
[assignment: list of feedback] :
Display "*" every character data input.
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 (FIA_UAU.2[1], FIA_UAU.2[2])
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FIA_UID.2[1]
Security Target
User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1[1]
The TSF shall require each user (Service Engineer) to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (Service Engineer).
Hierarchical to
: FIA_UID.1
Dependencies
: No dependencies
FIA_UID.2[2]
User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1[2]
The TSF shall require each user (Administrator) to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (Administrator).
Hierarchical to
:
FIA_UID.1
Dependencies
:
No dependencies
FIA_UID.2[3]
User identification before any action
FIA_UID.2.1[3]
The TSF shall require each user (IC card of IC card owner) to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user (IC card of IC card owner).
Hierarchical to
: FIA_UID.1
Dependencies
: No dependencies
6.1.1.4. Security management
FMT_MOF.1[1]
Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1[1]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the
behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified
roles].
[assignment: list of functions] :
- TOE Update Function via Internet
- Maintenance Function
- HDD Format Function (Physical format)
- Initialization Function
[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] :
Enable
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Service Engineer
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
FMT_MOF.1[2]
:
:
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1), FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[1])
Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1[2]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: list of functions] :
- Complete Overwrite Deletion Function
- Management Function via Network
[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] :
Enable
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
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Administrator
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FMT_MOF.1[3]
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[2])
Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1[3]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the
behavior of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: list of functions] :
- Digital Signature Giving
- Authentication Operation Prohibition
- Encryption Function
[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of] :
disable
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Administrator
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FMT_MOF.1[4]
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[2])
Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1[4]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: determine the behaviour of, disable, enable, modify the
behaviour of] the functions [assignment: list of functions] to [assignment: the authorized identified
roles].
[assignment: list of functions] :
Service engineer Authentication Function
[selection: determine the behavior of, disable, enable, modify the behavior of]
:
Disable
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
:
Service engineer
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FMT_MTD.1[1]
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[1])
Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1[1]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear,
[assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized
identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data] :
- Panel Auto Log-off Time
- Authentication Failure Frequency Threshold
- S/MIME Encryption Strength (Encryption Algorithm)
- S/MIME Message Digest Method
- Release time of operation prohibition for Administrator Authentication
- Encryption Passphrase
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] :
Modify
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Administrator
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[2])
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FMT_MTD.1[2]
Security Target
Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1[2]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear,
[assignment: other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized
identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data] :
Administrator password
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] :
modify
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
- Administrator
- Service engineer
:
:
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1[3]
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[1], FMT_SMR.1[2])
Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1[3]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment:
other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data] :
- CE Password
- Release time of operation prohibition for CE Authentication
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] :
modify
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Service engineer
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FMT_MTD.1[4]
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[1])
Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1[4]
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment:
other operations]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: list of TSF data] :
- Encryption Passphrase
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] :
[assignment: other operations] : Registration
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Administrator
Hierarchical to
:
No other components
Dependencies
:
FMT_SMF.1 (FMT_SMF.1) , FMT_SMR.1 (FMT_SMR.1[2])
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [assignment: list of
security management functions to be provided by the TSF].
[assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF] :
- Modification function of administrator password by administrator
- Modification function of Release time of operation prohibition for Administrator authentication by
administrator
- Modification function of Panel Auto Log-off Time by administrator
- Modification function of authentication failure frequency threshold by administrator in the
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authentication operation prohibition function
- Modification function of S/MIME encryption strength by administrator
- Modification function of S/MIME message digest method by administrator
- Registration function of Encryption passphrase by administrator
- Modification function of Encryption passphrase by administrator
- Complete overwrite deletion function by administrator
- Digital signature giving function by administrator
- Authentication operation prohibition function for Administrator by administrator
- HDD Encryption setting function by administrator
- Management function via Network by administrator
- Modification function of CE password by service engineer- Modification function of administrator password by service engineer
- Modification function of Release time of operation prohibition for CE authentication by service
engineer
- Service engineer authentication setting function by service engineer
- TOE update function via Internet by service engineer
- Maintenance function by service engineer
- HDD format function by service engineer (physical format)
- Initialization function by service engineer
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FMT_SMR.1[1]
No other components
No dependencies
Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1[1]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Service Engineer
FMT_SMR.1.2[1]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to
: No other components
Dependencies
: FIA_UID.1 (FIA_UID.2[1])
FMT_SMR.1[2]
Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1[2]
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
[assignment: the authorized identified roles] :
Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2[2]
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to
: No other components
Dependencies
: FIA_UID.1 (FIA_UID.2[2])
6.1.1.5. TOE Access
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: time interval of user inactivity].
[assignment: time interval of user inactivity] :
Time decided from the final operation depending on the panel auto logoff time (1-9 minute/s) while a
administrator is operating on the panel
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
No dependencies
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6.1.1.6. Extension: Residual information protection of all data
Residual Information Protection of All Data after the explicit deletion
operation
FAD_RIP.1
FAD_RIP.1.1
TSF shall ensure that the content of the information allocated to source before shall not be available
after the explicit deletion operation against the object and TSF data.: [assignment: list of object and list
of TSF data].
[assignment : List of object and list of TSF data] :
<Objects>
-Encrypted print file
-Stored image file
-HDD remaining image file
-Image-related file
<TSF data>
-Encryption passphrase
-Administrator password
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
No dependencies
6.1.1.7. Extension: Capability of using IT environment entity
FIT_CAP.1[1]
Capability of using security service of IT environment entity
FIT_CAP.1.1[1]
TSF shall provide the necessary capability to use the service for [assignment: security service provided
by IT environment entity]. : [assignment: necessary capability list for the operation of security service]
[assignment: security service provided by IT environment entity] :
HDD encryption function achieved by ASIC
[assignment: necessary capability list for the operation of security service] :
Support function of the image files processing by HDD encryption function
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
FIT_CAP.1[2]
No other components
No dependencies
Capability of using security service of IT environment entity
FIT_CAP.1.1[2]
TSF shall provide the necessary capability to use the service for [assignment: security service provided
by IT environment entity]. : [assignment: necessary capability list for the operation of security service]
[assignment: security service provided by IT environment entity] :
Following functions achieved by IC card
(1) Decryption function of common key to encrypt the encrypted print file
(2) Message digest encryption function for signing the scanned image by S/MIME function
(3) Support function for using public key
[assignment: necessary capability list for the operation of security service] :
- Request function of transmission of encrypted common key for above (1) and of decryption process of
encrypted common key
- Request function of transmission of message digest for above (2) and of encryption process of message
digest
- Inquiring function of public key for above (3)
Hierarchical to
Dependencies
:
:
No other components
No dependencies
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6.1.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The TOE is a commercial office product that is used in a general office environment, and
therefore a TOE security assurance requirement that is required for EAL3 conformance, which
is a sufficient level as an assurance for commercial office products, is applied. The following table
summarizes the applied TOE security assurance requirements.
Table 4
TOE Security Assurance Requirements
TOE Security Assurance Requirements
ADV: Development
AGD: Guidance documents
Security architecture description
ADV_ARC.1
Functional specification with complete
ADV_FSP.3
summary
Architectural design
ADV_TDS.2
Operational user guidance
AGD_OPE.1
Preparative procedures
AGD_PRE.1
Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.3
Implementation
ALC: Life Cycle Support
ASE: Security Target Evaluation
ATE: Tests
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment
Component
representation
CM
ALC_CMS.3
coverage
Delivery procedures
ALC_DEL1
Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.1
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1
Conformance claims
ASE_CCL.1
Extended components definition
ASE_ECD.1
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2
Derived security requirements
ASE_REQ.2
Security problem definition
ASE_SPD.1
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.1
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2
Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VLA.2
6.2. IT Security Requirements Rationale
6.2.1. Rationale for IT Security Functional Requirements
6.2.1.1. Necessity
The correspondence between the security objectives and the IT security functional
requirements are shown in the following table. It shows that the IT security functional
requirements correspond to at least one security objective.
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Table 5
Security Target
Conformity of IT Security Functional Requirements to Security Objectives
set.admin
set.service
X
X
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FIA_AFL.1[1]
FIA_AFL.1[2]
FIA_AFL.1[3]
FIA_SOS.1[1]
FIA_SOS.1[2]
FIA_SOS.1[3]
FIA_UAU.2[1]
FIA_UAU.2[2]
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UID.2[1]
FIA_UID.2[2]
FIA_UID.2[3]
FMT_MOF.1[1]
FMT_MOF.1[2]
FMT_MOF.1[3]
FMT_MOF.1[4]
FMT_MTD.1[1]
FMT_MTD.1[2]
FMT_MTD.1[3]
FMT_MTD.1[4]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1[1]
FMT_SMR.1[2]
FTA_SSL.3
FAD_RIP.1
FIA_EID.1
FIT_CAP.1[1]
FIT_CAP.1[2]
X
X
* set.service
* set.admin
O.CRYPTO-CAPABILITY
X
X
Requirements
O.FAX-CONTROL
O.MAIL-SIGN
X
X
X
X
Functional
O.PKI-CAPABILITY
O.MAIL-CRYPTO
O.CHECK-HDD
O.CRYPTO-KEY
O.OVERWRITE-ALL
Security
O.DECRYPT-PRINT
Security Objectives
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Note) set.admin and set.service indicates the set of the requirements. And the security
objectives assumed to have the correspondence and presented by "X" also correspond to a
series of requirement set associated by * set.admin and * set.service shown in column.
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6.2.1.2. Sufficiency
The IT security functional requirements for the security objectives are described as follows.
z O.DECRYPT-PRINT (Decryption of encrypted print)
This security objective explains the policy for encrypted print files.
O.PKI-CAPABILITY provides an appropriate common key (encryption key) to decrypt
encrypted print files from the IC card and FCS_COP.1 performs the decryption process of
encrypted print files, when the printing operation of those files are performed by using the IC
card identified by O.PKI-CAPABILITY.
Therefore, this security objective is satisfied.
z O.OVERWRITE-ALL (Complete overwrite deletion)
This security objective regulates that it deletes all data areas of HDD and initializes the
concealed information of NVRAM that is set by the user, and requires various requirements
that relate to the deletion.
FAD_RIP.1 guarantees that these objective information not to be able to use the content of any
previous information by the deletion operation.
Therefore, this security objective is satisfied.
z O.CRYPTO-KEY (Encryption key generation)
This security objective regulates that the encryption key necessary to encrypt all the data
written in HDD by ASIC is generated, and needs various requirements that relate to the
encryption key generation.
Using Konica Minolta HDD encryption key generation algorism according to the Konica
Minolta encryption specification standard, FCS_CKM.1 generates an encryption key 128bits
long.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of this function requirement.
z O.MAIL-CRYPTO (Usage and encryption of S/MIME)
This security objective regulates that it encrypts when transmitting images scanned by using
MFP to the user's own mail address, and various requirements related to encryption are
necessary.
FCS_CKM.1 generates encryption keys (128bits, 168bits, 192bits or 256bits) by using
Pseudo-random number Generation Algorithm according to FIPS 186-2.
FCS_COP.1 encrypts the scanned images by using AES (encryption key: 128bits, 192bits or
256bits) of FIPS PUB 197. (It becomes transmission data of S/MIME). In addition, the same
requirement encrypts scanned images by using 3-Key-Triple-DES (encryption key: 168bits) of
SP800-67. (Similarly, it becomes transmission data of S/MIME.) FCS-COP.1 encrypts these
common keys (encryption keys) by RSA of FIPS 186-2 that is public key of S/MIME certificate
of each destination (1024bits, 2048bits, 3072bits or 4096bits) by using the IC card identified by
O.PKI-CAPABILITY. Also, FMT_MTD.1[1] limits the settings of encryption algorithm to
administrators.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of these function requirements.
<Necessary requirement to keep the administrator secure>
Æ refer to set.admin
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<Necessary requirement to keep the service engineer secure>
Æ refer to set.service
<Role and management function for each management>
As the role of doing these managements, FMT_SMR.1[1] maintains a service engineer and
FMT_SMR.1[2] maintains an administrator. In addition, FMT_SMF.1 specifies these
management functions.
z O.MAIL-SIGN (Usage and signature of S/MIME)
This security objective regulates that it generates the message digest assumed to give the
signature when transmitting images scanned by using MFP to user's own mail address by mail,
and various requirements related to the message digest are required.
FSC_COP.1 generates the message digest that is required for the signature process, by the
hash function regulated by FIPS 180-2 (SHA-1 or SHA-256), by using the IC card identified by
O.PKI-CAPABILITY. In addition, FMT_MTD.1[1] limits the setting of message digest method
to administrators.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of these function requirements.
<Necessary requirement to keep the administrator secure>
Æ refer to set.admin
<Necessary requirement to keep the service engineer secure>
Æ refer to set.service
<Role and controlling function for each management>
As the role of doing these managements, FMT_SMR.1[1] maintains a service engineer and
FMT_SMR.1[2] maintains an administrator. In addition, FMT_SMF.1 specifies these
management functions.
z O.CRYPTO-CAPABILITY (Support action to use the HDD encryption function)
This security objective regulates that TOE's support action for the data stored in HDD is
encrypted by ASIC that is the entity out of TOE, and needs various requirements that
regulates the support of external entity action.
Applying FIT_CAP.1[1], a support function to process all data in HDD through the HDD
encryption function implemented by ASIC is achieved for that HDD encryption function. In
addition, FIA_SOS.1[3] verifies the quality of the encryption passphrase used for the
encryption and FMT_MTD.1[1] and FMT_MTD.1[4] limits the settings to administrators.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of this function requirement.
<Necessary requirement to keep the administrator secure>
Æ refer to set.admin
<Necessary requirement to keep the service engineer secure>
Æ refer to set.service
<Role and controlling function for each management>
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As the role of doing these managements, FMT_SMR.1[1] maintains a service engineer and
FMT_SMR.1[2] maintains an administrator. In addition, FMT_SMF.1 specifies these
management functions.
z O.PKI-CAPABILITY (Support action to use the PKI function)
This security objective regulates that TOE supports the action of encrypting and giving
signature to images scanned by the IC card identified by FIA_UID.2[3] that is the entity out
of TOE, and the action of decrypting common key for decrypting the encrypted print files. Also,
it needs various requirements that regulates the support of external entity action.
Applying FIT_CAP.1[2], the support function to process scanned images and encrypted print
files by PKI function for the PKI function achieved by the IC card is realized.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of this function requirement.
z O. FAX-CONTROL (Fax unit control)
This security objective regulates to prohibit an access to internal network which the MFP
concerned connects with, from public line via the port of Fax public line.
This means that communication, like illegal operation command, except image data which is
sent from public line network and forwarded to internal network via MFP is not forwarded to
internal network, and various requirements related to the flow control of Fax unit are
necessary.
Applying FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1, the flow control not to send data, except the image data
which the reception function from a public line received, to internal network is achieved.
This security objective is satisfied by the completion of this function requirement.
¾ set.admin (Set of necessary requirement to keep administrator secure)
<Identification and Authentication of an administrator>
FIA_UID.2[2] and FIA_UAU.2[2] identifies and authenticates that the accessing user is an
administrator.
FIA_UAU.7 returns "*" for each character entered as feedback protected in the panel, and
supports the authentication.
FIA_AFL.1[3] refuses, in case of the failure authentication tried from the panel, all the input
receipts from the panel for five seconds in every failure. When the failure authentication
reaches upper limit (1-5 times) consecutively, FIA_AFL.1[2] logoffs if it is under
authentication, and locks all the authentication functions that use the administrator
password from then on. The release function is executed by starting TOE with turning OFF
and ON the power supply, so that the lock is released after the release time of operation
prohibition for administrator authentication passed.
FMT_MTD.1[1] permits only to the administrator the setting of the threshold of the
authentication failure frequency which is the trial frequency of the failure authentication in
the administrator authentication and change of the release time of operation prohibition for
administrator authentication.
<Management of session of identified and authenticated administrator>
The duration of session of the administrator who is identified and authenticated contributes
to reduce the chance of attacking associated with unnecessary session connection by ending
the session after the panel automatic logoff time elapses by FTA_SSL.3 if it logs in from the
panel. The change in the panel auto logoff time is limited to the administrator by
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Security Target
FMT_MTD.1[1].
<Management of administrator's authentication information>
FIA_SOS.1[2] verifies the quality of the administrator password. FMT_MTD.1[2] restricts the
change in the administrator password to the administrator and the service engineer. When
the administrator changes the administrator password, FIA_UAU.6 re-authenticates it. In
this re-authentication, when the failure authentication reaches the upper limit (1-5 times),
FIA_AFL.1[2] logoffs it if it is under authentication, and releases the authentication status of
the administrator from then on. The release function is executed by starting TOE with
turning OFF and ON the power supply, so that the lock is released after the release time of
operation prohibition for administrator authentication passed.
<Role and management function for each management>
FMT_SMR.1[1] have service engineer maintain the role to do these management, and
FMT_SMR.1[2] have the administrator do the same. Additionally, FMT_SMF.1 specifies
theses management functions and FMT_MOF.1[2] and FMT_MOF.1[3] manage those
behaviors.
¾ set.service (Set of necessary requirements to keep service engineer secure)
<Identification and Authentication of a service engineer>
FIA_UID.2[1] and FIA_UAU.2[1] identifies and authenticates that the accessing user is a
service engineer.
FIA_UAU.7 returns "*" every one character entered as the feedback protected in the panel,
and supports the authentication.
FIA_AFL.1[3] refuses all the input receipts from the panel for five seconds at each failure,
and when the failure authentication reaches the upper limit (1-5 times) consecutively,
FIA_AFL.1[1] logoffs it if it's under authentication, and locks all the authentication functions
to use the CE password. The CE authentication lock release function is executed and the
release time of operation prohibition for CE authentication passes, so that this lock status is
released.
FMT_MTD.1[1] permits only to the administrator the setting of the threshold of the
authentication failure frequency that is the trial frequency of the failure authentication in the
service engineer authentication. FMT_MTD.1[3] permits only to the service engineer the
setting of the release time of operation prohibition for CE authentication.
<Management of service engineer's authentication information>
FIA_SOS.1[1] verifies the quality of the CE password. FMT_MTD.1[3] restricts the change in
the CE password to the service engineer. Moreover, FIA_UAU.6 re-authenticates it. In this
re-authentication, when the failure authentication reaches the upper limit (1-5 times)
consecutively, FIA_AFL.1[1] releases the authentication status of the service engineer and
locks all the authentication functions to use the CE password. The CE authentication
function lock release function is executed and the release time of operation prohibition for CE
authentication passes, so that this lock status is released.
<Role and management function for each management>
FMT_SMR.1[1] maintains the role to do these managements as a service engineer. In addition,
FMT_SMF.1 specifies these management functions and FMT_MOF.1[1] and FMT_MOF.1[4]
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manage those behaviors.
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Security Target
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Security Target
6.2.1.3. Dependencies of IT Security Functional Requirements
The dependencies of the IT security functional requirements components are shown in the
following table. When a dependency regulated in CC Part 2 is not satisfied, the reason is
provided in the section for the "dependencies Relation in this ST."
Table 6
Dependencies of IT Security Functional Requirements Components
N/A : Not Applicable
Functional
Requirements
Component for
this ST
Dependencies on CC Part 2
Dependencies Relation in this ST
FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1 (only partial event)
The satisfied events: The generated key by the
Pseudo-random number Generation Algorithm
is operated.
<The reason not to fulfill partially FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1>
- The encryption operation is performed using the
key generated by the Konica Minolta HDD
encryption key generation algorithm in the IT
environment by FIT_CAP.1[1]. TSF only uses this
capability, and there is no necessity of the
distribution and encryption operation.
FCS_CKM.1
<The reason not to apply FCS_CKM.4>
- The key generated by the Pseudo-random number
Generation Algorithm is thought that exists in the
volatile storage area temporarily, but there is no
necessity to think about the cancellation since there
is no access from the outside and it is destroyed
automatically.
- The key generated by the Konica Minolta HDD
encryption key generation algorithm is stored
constantly since it is the stored data. In
addition, the arbitrary access to the storage
media is difficult and there is no necessity of
the cancellation of the encryption key.
FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.1 ( only a part of the phenomenon )
The satisfied events: The common key for
encrypting the S/MIME transmission data is
generated.
<The reason not to satisfy a part of the FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2>
- FIT_CAP.1[2] imports the common key that
decrypts the encrypted print file, and so there is no
necessity of the key generation or importing from
the outside.
- FIT_CAP.1[2] supports the public key that performs
the encryption of common key that encrypts the
S/MIME transmission data, and so there is no
necessity of the key generation or importing from
the outside.
- The message that is used for generating the
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Functional
Requirements
Component for
this ST
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.1
FIA_AFL.1[1]
FIA_AFL.1[2]
FIA_AFL.1[3]
FIA_SOS.1[1]
FIA_SOS.1[2]
FIA_SOS.1[3]
FIA_UAU.2[1]
FIA_UAU.2[2]
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UID.2[1]
FIA_UID.2[2]
FIA_UID.2[3]
FMT_MOF.1[1]
FMT_MOF.1[2]
FMT_MOF.1[3]
FMT_MOF.1[4]
FMT_MTD.1[1]
FMT_MTD.1[2]
FMT_MTD.1[3]
FMT_MTD.1[4]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1[1]
FMT_SMR.1[2]
Dependencies on CC Part 2
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFC.1,
FMT_MSA.3
Security Target
Dependencies Relation in this ST
message digest is the generated document data
itself, and so there is no necessity of key generation
or importing from the outside.
<The reason not apply FCS_CKM.4>
- The key that is used for the encryption of S/MIME
transmission data, the decryption of encrypted
print file and the generation of message digest is
thought that exists in the volatile storage area
temporarily, but there is no necessity to think about
the cancellation since there is no access from the
outside and it is destroyed automatically.
- The public key that performs the encryption of
common key that encrypts the S/MIME
transmission data is the public information, and so
there is no necessity of the encrypted key
cancellation.
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
None
None
None
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
None
FIA_UAU.1
<The reason not to apply FMT_MSA.3>
There is no necessity for applying this requirement
because the security attribute is initialized outside.
FIA_UAU.2[1]
FIA_UAU.2[2]
FIA_UAU.2[1], FIA_UAU.2[2]
N/A
N/A
N/A
FIA_UID.2[1]
FIA_UID.2[2]
N/A
FIA_UAU.2[1], FIA_UAU.2[2]
None
None
None
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
None
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
N/A
N/A
N/A
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[1]
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[2]
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[2]
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[1]
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[2]
FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1[1], FMT_SMR.1[2]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1[1]
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1[2]
N/A
FIA_UID.2[1]
FIA_UID.2[2]
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Functional
Requirements
Component for
this ST
FTA_SSL.3
FAD_RIP.1
FIT_CAP.1[1]
FIT_CAP.1[2]
Dependencies on CC Part 2
None
None
None
None
Security Target
Dependencies Relation in this ST
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
6.2.2. Rationale for IT Security Assurance Requirements
This TOE is installed and used in an environment where adequate security is maintained in
terms of the physical, personnel, and connectivity. Nonetheless, adequate effectiveness in the
environment where the TOE is used must be assured. As a general commercial office product,
the execution of tests based on function specifications and TOE design, and analysis of the
strength of function and a search for vulnerabilities are required. In addition, it is desirable that
it has a development environment control, a configuration management for the TOE and a
secure distribution procedure. And therefore, the selection of EAL3, which provides an adequate
assurance level, is reasonable.
The secure requirement dependency analysis is assumed to be appropriate because the
package EAL has been selected, therefore details are not discussed.
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7. TOE Summary Specification
The list of the TOE security function led from the TOE security function requirement is shown
in the following Table 7. The detailed specification is explained in the paragraphs described
below.
Table 7
Names and Identifiers of TOE Security Function
No.
TOE Security Function
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
F.ADMIN (Administrator function)
F.SERVICE (Service mode function)
F.CARD-ID (IC card identification function)
F.PRINT (Encryption print function)
F.OVERWRITE-ALL (All area overwrite deletion function)
F.CRYPTO (Encryption key generation function)
F.RESET (Authentication Failure Frequency Reset
function)
F.S/MIME (S/MIME encryption processing function)
F.SUPPORT-CRYPTO (Encryption board support function)
F.SUPPORT-PKI (PKI support function)
F.FAX-CONTROL (FAX Unit Control function)
7.8
7.9
7.10
7.11
Relationship with Logical Scope of
the TOE
Administrator function
Service engineer function
Basic function
Basic function
Administrator function
Other function
Administrator function,
Service engineer function
Basic function
Other function
Other function
Other function
7.1. F.ADMIN (Administrator Function)
F.ADMIN is a series of security function that administrator operates, such as an administrator
identification authentication function in an administrator mode accessing from a panel, and a
security management function that includes a change of an administrator password.
7.1.1. Administrator Identification Authentication Function
It identifies and authenticates the accessing user as the administrator in response to the
access request to the administrator mode.
z Provides the administrator authentication mechanism authenticating by the administrator
password that consists of the character shown in Table 8.
z Return "*" for each character as feedback for the entered administrator password.
z Resets the number of authentication failure when succeeding in the authentication.
z It does not accept the input from a panel for five seconds when failing in the authentication.
z Locks all the authentication functions to use the administrator password when detecting the
authentication failure that becomes 1-5 times consecutively in each authentication function
by using the administrator password. (Refuse the access to the administrator mode)
¾
The administrator specifies the failure frequency threshold by the unauthorized access
detected threshold setting function.
z F.RESET works, so that the lock of authentication function is released.
As
described
above,
FIA_AFL.1[2],
FIA_AFL.1[3],
FIA_UAU.2[2],
FIA_UAU.7
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and
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FIA_UID.2[2] are realized.
7.1.2. Auto Logoff Function of Administrator Mode
While accessing an administrator mode from a panel, if not accepting any operation during the
panel automatic logoff time, it logs off the administrator mode automatically.
As described above, FIA_SSL.3 is realized.
Table 8
Objectives
Characters and Number of Digits for Password
Number
2
Characters
of digits
- Administrator Password
(0 – 16)
Selectable from 93 or more characters in total
- CE Password
8
Selectable from 93 or more characters in total
- Encryption passphrase
20
Selectable from 83 or more characters in total
7.1.3. Function Supported in Administrator Mode
When a user is identified and authenticated as an administrator by the administrator
identification authentication function at the accessing request to the administrator mode, the
administrator authority is associated with the task substituting the user. In addition, the
following operations and the use of the functions are permitted.
7.1.3.1. Change of Administrator Password
When a user is re-authenticated as an administrator by the panel, the password is changed.
z Provides the administrator authentication mechanism that is re-authenticated by the
administrator password, which consists of the character shown in Table 8.
z Resets the number of authentication failure when succeeding in the re-authentication.
z Return "*" for each character as feedback for the entered administrator password in the
re-authentication by the access from the panel.
z When the authentication failure that becomes 1-5 times consecutively in each authentication
function by using the administrator password is detected, it logoffs the administrator mode
accessing from the panel, and locks all the authentication functions to use the administrator
password. (The access to the administrator mode is refused.)
¾
The administrator specifies the failure frequency threshold by the unauthorized access
detection threshold setting function.
z F.RESET works, so that the lock of the authentication function is released.
z Verify the new administrator password if it is composed of the characters and by the number
of digits, shown in the Table 8.
As described above, FIA_SOS.1[2], FIA_AFL.1[2], FIA_UAU.6, FIA_UAU.7, FMT_MTD.1[2],
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are realized.
2
Table 8 shows the minimum password space as the security specification. Therefore, although some excluded
characters are shown depending on the password type, the excluded characters are permitted to use if possible.
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7.1.3.2. Unauthorized Access Setup
z Setup of unauthorized access detection
Whether to activate or stop the authentication operation prohibition function is selected.
z Setup of unauthorized access detection threshold
The unauthorized access detection threshold in the authentication operation prohibition
function is set for 1-5 times.
z Setup of the release time of operation prohibition for Administrator Authentication
Set the the release time of operation prohibition for Administrator Authentication between
1-60 minutes.
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[3], FMT_MTD.1[1], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are
realized.
7.1.3.3. Setup of Auto Logoff Function
The panel auto logoff time which is the setting data of the auto logoff function should be set
within the following time range.
z panel auto logoff time
: 1 - 9 minutes
As described above, FMT_MTD.1[1], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are realized.
7.1.3.4. Operation Setup of HDD Encryption Function
<Operation Setting ON>
When turning it ON from OFF, it verifies that the encryption passphrase newly set satisfies the
following qualities, and F.CRYPTO is performed.
z It is composed of the characters and by the number of digits shown in Table 8.
z It shall not be composed of one kind of character.
As described above, FIA_SOS.1[3], FMT_MTD.1[3], FMT_MTD.1[4], FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1[2] are realized.
<Encryption Passphrase Change>
The encryption passphrase is changed. F.CRYPTO is performed when the newly setup encryption
passphrase satisfies quality requirements.
z Verify the encryption passphrase newly set if the following qualities are satisfied.
¾
It is composed of the characters and by the number of digits shown in Table 8.
¾
It shall not be composed of one kind of character.
¾
It shall not be matched with the current value.
As described above, FIA_SOS.1[3], FMT_MTD.1[1], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are
realized.
7.1.3.5. Setup of S/MIME Transmission Function
The functions related to the S/MIME function that the administrator operates, are as follows.
z Setup of Digital signature giving
Able to select the setting of digital signature giving when using the S/MIME function, from
“be always valid,” “select when the transmission” and “be always invalid.”
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z Modification of S/MIME Encryption Strength (Encryption Algorithm)
z Algorithm modification of method of S/MIME message digest
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[3], FMT_MTD.1[1], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are
realized.
7.1.3.6. Function Related to Password Initialization Function
The function that relates to the initialization of the password that the administrator operates is
as follows.
z All area overwrite deletion function
The settings of the administrator password is initialized to the values at factory shipment by
executing the overwrite deletion of all area
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[2], FMT_MTD.1[2], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are
realized.
7.1.3.7. Operation Setup Related to Security
The operation setup functions related to the security that the administrator operates, are as
follows.
z Valid and invalid setting of the administrator function from the network
By making the administrator function from the network valid, it can use the administrator
function via the network.
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[2], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[2] are realized.
7.2. F.SERVICE (Service Mode Function)
F.SERVICE is a series of security function that the service engineer operates, such as the
service engineer identification authentication function in service mode accessing from a panel,
and a security management function that includes a change in the CE password and the
administrator password.
7.2.1. Service Engineer Identification Authentication Function
It is identified and authenticated the accessing user as the service engineer in response to the
access request to the service mode from the panel.
z Provides the CE authentication mechanism that is authenticated by the CE password that
consists of the character shown in Table 8.
z Return "*" for each character as feedback for the entered CE password.
z Reset the number of the authentication failure when succeeding in the authentication.
z Not accept the input from the panel for five seconds when the authentication failed.
z When the authentication failure that becomes 1-5 times consecutively in each authentication
function by using the CE password is detected, it locks all the authentication functions to use
the CE password. (The access to the service mode is refused.)
¾
The administrator specifies the failure frequency threshold by the unauthorized access
detection threshold setting function.
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z Lock of authentication function is released with F.RESET function operated.
As
described
above,
FIA_AFL.1[1],
FIA_AFL.1[3],
FIA_UAU.2[1],
FIA_UAU.7
and
FIA_UID.2[1] are realized.
7.2.2. Function Supported in Service Mode
When a user is identified and authenticated as a service engineer by the service engineer
identification authentication function at the access request to the service mode, the use of the
following functions is permitted.
7.2.2.1. Change of CE password
When a user is re-authenticated as a service engineer and the new password satisfies
the quality, it is changed.
z
Provides the CE authentication mechanism that is re-authenticated by the CE password
z
Resets the authentication failure frequency when succeeding in the re-authentication.
z
Return "*" for each character as feedback for the entered service codes in the
that consists of the characters shown in Table 8.
re-authentication.
z
When the authentication failure that becomes 1-5 times consecutively in each
authentication function by using the CE password is detected, it logs off the service mode
accessing from the panel, and locks all the authentication functions to use the CE
password. (The access to the service mode is refused.)
¾
The administrator specifies the failure frequency threshold by the unauthorized
access detection threshold setting function.
z
F.RESET function unlocks the authentication function.
z
It verifies that the CE password newly set is composed of the characters and by the
number of digits, shown in the Table 8.
As
described
above,
FIA_AFL.1[1],
FIA_SOS.1[1],
FIA_UAU.6,
FIA_UAU.7,
FMT_MTD.1[3], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[1] are realized.
7.2.2.2. Change of Administrator Password
Change the administrator password.
As described above, FIA_SOS.1[2], FMT_MTD.1[2], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[1] are
realized.
7.2.2.3. Setup of the release time of operation prohibition for CE Authentication
Set the release time of operation prohibition for CE Authentication between 1 - 60
minutes.
As described above, FMT_MTD.1[3], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[1] are realized.
7.2.2.4. Setup of Service Engineer Authentication Function
Set the service engineer authentication function to valid or invalid.
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[4], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[1] are realized.
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7.2.2.5. Management of the function affecting the TSF data
The functions affecting the other TSF data that are operated by the service engineer are as
follows.
z
HDD format function (physical format)
Function to rewrite the entire disk in HDD with a regulated pattern including the signal
rows such as the track and sector information.
z
Initialization function
Function to reset every setting value written in NVRAM to the factory default.
z
Maintenance function
Function to perform the maintenance of breakdown etc. by connecting serial through
RC-232C
z
TOE update function via the internet
Function to download the TOE through Ethernet
As described above, FMT_MOF.1[1], FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1[1] are realized.
7.3. F.CARD-ID (IC card Identification Function)
F.CARD-ID is the function that MFP identifies the IC card connected to MFP before using
the encryption print function and Scan To Me function.
As described above, FIA_UID2[3] is realized.
7.4. F.PRINT (Encryption Print Function)
F.PRINT is a security function related to the encryption print function. It operates the
decryption process by the common key (encryption key) that is obtained by F.SUPPORT-PKI to
the print operation.
z
The common key (encryption key) (168 bits) to decrypt the encrypted print file is
decrypted by RSA that is regulated by the FIPS186-2.
As described above, FCS_COP.1 is realized.
7.5. F.OVERWRITE-ALL (All Area Overwrite Deletion Function)
F.OVERWRITE-ALL executes the overwrite deletion in the data area of HDD, and initializes
the settings such as passwords set in NVRAM as well. The object for the deletion or the
initialization is as follows.
<Object for the deletion: HDD>
z Encrypted print file
z Stored image file
z HDD remaining image file
z Image related file
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<Object for the initialization: NVRAM>
z Administrator Password
z Operation setting of HDD Encryption function (OFF) --- Encryption Passphrase is deleted.
The deletion methods such as the data overwritten in HDD and the written frequency is
executed according to the deletion method of overwrite area deletion function set by F.ADMIN
(Table 9). For the HDD encryption function, the encryption passphrase which was set is disabled
by turning off the operational setup.
As described above, FAD_RIP.1 is realized.
Table 9
Method
Mode:1
Mode:2
Mode:3
Mode:4
Mode:5
Mode:6
Mode:7
Mode:8
Types and Methods of Overwrite Deletion of Overall Area
Overwritten data type and their order
0x00
Random numbers Æ Random numbers Æ 0x00
0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ Random numbers Æ Verification
Random numbers Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF
0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF
0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ Random numbers
0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0xAA
0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0x00 Æ 0xFF Æ 0xAA Æ Verification
7.6. F.CRYPTO (Encryption Key Generation Function)
F.CRYPTO generates an encryption key to encrypt all data written in HDD by using the
Konica Minolta HDD encryption key generation algorithm (SHA-1) that is regulated by the
Konica Minolta encryption specification standard.
When the encryption passphrase is decided in the HDD encryption functional operation
setting to which the access is restricted in F.ADMIN, an encryption key 128bits long is generated
from the encryption passphrase by applying the Konica Minolta HDD encryption key generation
algorithm.
As described above, FCS_CKM.1 is realized.
7.7. F.RESET (Authentication Failure Frequency Reset Function)
F.RESET is a function that releases the lock by resetting the authentication failure frequency
when the account locks in the administrator authentication and CE authentication.
(1) CE Authentication function lock release processing function
The function is executed by the specific operation, and the lock is released by clearing the
failure frequency of the CE authentication to 0 after the release time of operation prohibition
for CE authentication.
As described above, FIA_AFL.1[1] is realized.
(2) Administrator authentication function lock release processing function
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The function is executed by OFF/ON of the main power supply, and the lock is released by
clearing the failure frequency of the administrator authentication to 0 after the release time of
operation prohibition for administrator authentication.
As described above, FIA_AFL.1[2] is realized.
7.8. F.S/MIME (S/MIME Encryption Processing Function)
F.S/MIME is a function to encrypt and sign the scanned image when transmitting the scanned
image to the user by S/MIME. The IC card generates the signature by F.SUPPORT-PKI, but this
generates the message digest using for the signature on this function.
<Encryption key generation>
z
The Common key (encryption key) is generated to encrypt the scanned image by the
pseudorandom number Generation Algorithm, which FIPS 186-2 provides. (Encryption key
length is 128bits, 168bits, 192bits or 256bits.)
As described above, FCS_CKM.1 is realized.
<Encryption of Scanned image >
z
Scanned image is encrypted by AES, which FIPS PUB 197 provides by using common key
(encryption key) (128bits, 192bits and 256bits).
z
Scanned image is encrypted by 3-Key-Triple-DES, which SP800-67 provides by using
common key (encryption key) (168bits).
As described above, FCS_COP.1 is realized.
<Encryption of Encryption key>
z
The common key (encryption key) to encrypt the scanned image is encrypted by RSA, which
FIPS 186-2 provides.
z
The key length of the common key used by F.SUPPORT-PKI in this case is 1024bits,
2048bits, 3072bits or 4096bits.
As described above, FCS_COP.1 is realized.
<Message Digest Generation>
z
The message digest for the scanned image is generated by the hash function, which FIPS
180-2 provides (SHA-1 or SHA-256).
As described above, FCS_COP.1 is realized.
7.9. F.SUPPORT-CRYPTO (ASIC Support Function)
F.SUPPORT-CRYPTO is the function that operates the HDD encryption function that utilizes
ASIC from TOE.
For all data written in HDD, an encryption key generated by F.CRYPTO is set in ASIC, and
encryption is performed by the ASIC. On the other hand, for the encrypted data read out of the
HDD, the encryption key generated by F.CRYPTO is set in ASIC in the same manner as above,
and decryption is performed by the ASIC.
As described above, FCS_CAP.1[1] is realized.
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7.10. F.SUPPORT-PKI (PKI Support Function)
F.SUPPORT-PKI is the function to operate the IC card identified by F.CARD-ID from TOE.
<Decryption process request>
z The encrypted common key (encryption key) is sent to IC card, the decryption processing of
the common key (encryption key) is done by IC card, and the common key (encryption key)
that is correctly decrypted is received.
<Signature process request>
z The message digest (hash value of the message) generated by F.S/MIME is sent to IC card,
the signature processing is done, and correct signature to the message digest is received.
<Public key obtain request>
z Inquiring to IC card is performed and public key (digital certificate) in the IC card is received.
As described above, FIT_CAP.1[2] is realized.
7.11. F.FAX-CONTROL (FAX Unit Control Function)
F.FAX-CONTROL is the function that prohibits an access to internal network connected to
MFP by TOE control.
TOE controls the function that transfer the data received from public line to internal LAN.
The prohibition of access (data forwarding except image data) from public line to internal
network is realized by TOE control.
As described above, FDP_IFC.1 and FDP_IFF.1 are realized.
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