Certification Report: 0892a_pdf

Certification Report: 0892a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
for
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Security IC with MRTD EAC/PACE Application
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC
from
MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.3,
10 February 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2
and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 14 April 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn -
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1
2
3
4
5
Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................16
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................29
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................30
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC was
conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed
on 11.04.2014. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
MaskTech International GmbH.
The product was developed by:
MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
4
Certification Report
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC has been included in the BSI
list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 16
90411 Nürnberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE /
P60D080PVC provided by MaskTech International GmbH and based on the P60D080PVC
secure dual-interface controller by NXP. It is an electronic travel document (Machine
Readable Travel Document – MRTD) representing a smart card programmed according to
ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [33] and additionally providing the
Extended Access Control according to the ICAO documents [34] and [35] and the
Technical Guideline TR-03110, Version 2.10 [37], respectively. The communication
between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE) according to the Protection Profile [8]. Additionally, Active
Authentication according to the ICAO Technical Report [36] is provided.
For CC evaluation the following applications of corresponding product are considered:
●
Passport Application (ePassport) containing the related user data (incl. biometric data)
as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); with this application the TOE is
intended to be used as a machine readable travel document (MRTD).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the following certified
Protection Profile:
●
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control,
Version 1.3, 10 February 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [7].
The Protection Profile above is strict conformant to the following Protection Profile. In
result, the TOE is also conformant to this PP.
●
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE
(PACE PP), Version 1.0, 2 November 2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [8].
Please
note
that
in
consistency
to
the
claimed
protection
profile
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 the security mechanisms Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment and Extended Access Control are in the focus of this evaluation
process. The further security mechanism Basic Access Control is subject of the separate
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0893-2014 [31].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed Issue
F.IC_CL
Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and
Crypto Library
F.Access_Control
Regulates all access by external entities to
operations of the TOE which are only executed
after this TSF allowed access
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed Issue
F.Identification_Authentication
Provides identification/authentication of the
user roles
F.Management
Provides management and administrative
functionalities
F.Crypto
Provides a high level interface to the used
algorithms and implements the used hash
algorithms
F.Verification
TOE internal functions to ensure correct
operation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE (for details refer to chapter
8 of this report):
●
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
●
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
●
the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
●
the ePassport Application, and
●
the associated guidance documentation.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW/SW
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE /
P60D080PVC
MTCOS Pro
Version 2.2
An initialised module, but without
hardware for the contactless
interface, consisting of the following:
ROM Mask:
(OEF ID) 2217
SW implemented in ROM
and EEPROM memory, chip
initialised and tested.
Delivery type:
Mob4, Mob6, sawn wafer,
PDM1.1 and contact based
module
1. Hardware Platform
NXP Smart Card Controller
P60D080/052/040PVC(y)
and
P60C080/052/040PVC(y),
including a cryptographic
library containing RSA, EC
and SHA-2
2. TOE Embedded Software
IC Embedded Software (the
operating system MTCOS
Pro 2.2, implemented in
ROM/EEPROM of the IC)
3. TOE Embedded
Applications
IC Embedded Software /
Part Application Software
(containing the MRTD
Application implemented in
the EEPROM of the IC)
2
DOC
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE /
P60D080PVC, User Guidance,
MaskTech International GmbH
Version 0.4,
20.02.2014 [11]
Document in electronic form
3
DOC
MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 1 –
File System and Related
Commands, MaskTech GmbH
Version 3.0,
27.07.2012 [12]
Document in electronic form
4
DOC
MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 2 –
Access Control Mechanisms and
Symmetric Cryptography, MaskTech
GmbH
Version 2.1,
03.06.2013 [13]
Document in electronic form
5
DOC
MTCOS Pro: Part 3 – Digital
Signature, MaskTech GmbH
Version 1.0,
22.05.2013 [14]
Document in electronic form
6
DOC
MTCOS Pro: Part 5 – Advanced
Security Mechanisms, Asymmetric
Cryptography, MaskTech GmbH
Version 2,
28.03.2013 [15]
Document in electronic form
7
DOC
MTCOS Std & Pro: Product
Specification – MTCOS Pro V2.2 on
NXP P60D080PVC, MaskTech
GmbH
Version 1.0,
21.10.2013 [16]
Document in electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by NXP with OEF ID 2217. The name of the
ROM file transferred from Masktech to NXP is mtcos_sp_v2.2_p60d080vc_p.hex.asc.
The commercial numbering of the TOE Embedded Software by NXP is as follows:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
●
Certification Report
Commercial Product Types:
• P60D080PA4/9C17220 (Mob4, contact less)
• P60D080PA6/9C17220 (Mob6, contact less)
• P60D080PU15/9C17220
(sawn wafer, 150 mu)
• P60D080PX30/9C17220 (PDM1.1, dual interface)
• P60D080PX80/9C17220 (contact based module)
●
Please note that the TOE is either delivered in Mob4, Mob6, sawn wafer, PDM1.1 and
contact based modules.
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD EAC/PACE PP [7]. The
Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility
respectively the inlay manufacturer as a secured transport to a specific person of contact
at the personalization site or inlay manufacturing site. The TOE itself will be delivered as
an initialized module but without hardware for contactless interface to the inlay
manufacturer, who securely delivers the inlay containing the pre-personalized MRTD to the
personalisation facility. The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not
part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery from the initialization facility. Furthermore,
the personalizer receives information about the personalization commands and process
requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the
procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the User's Guide [11] have
to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC/PACE PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact less chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy addresses the advanced security
methods for authentication and secure communication, whith are described in detail in the
Security Target [6] and [9].
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
●
OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document
●
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document: Travel document Authentication Key
●
OE.Active Auth Key Travel Document: Travel document Active Authentication Key
●
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data: Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
●
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by signature
●
OE.Personalization: Personalization of travel document
●
OE.Exam_Travel_Document: Examination of the physical part of the travel document
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●
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document: Protection of data from the logical travel document
●
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
●
OE.Terminal: Terminal operating
●
OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder obligations
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Dedicated
Software, and IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the MRTD
Application implemented in the EEPROM of the IC). While the IC Embedded software
contains the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2, the Part Application Software contains the
MRTD application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external
interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC,
the NXP P60D080PVC(y) or P60C080PVC(y) secure dual-interface controller. For details
concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC and its cryptographic libraries see the
evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013 [17] and
NSCIB-CC-12-36243 [41]. This chapter gives an overview of the subsystems of the TOE’s
Embedded Software and the corresponding TSF which were objects of this evaluation.
The security functions of the TOE are:
●
F.IC_CL
●
F.Access_Control
●
F.Identification_Authentication
●
F.Management
●
F.Crypto
●
F.Verification
According to the TOE design these security functions are enforced by the following
subsystems:
●
Application data (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication)
●
Operation System Kernel (supports the TSF F.Access_Control,
F.Identification_Authentication, F.Management, F.Crypto, F.Verification)
●
HAL (supports the TSF F.IC_CL, F.Crypto, F.Identification_Authentication, F.Verification)
●
Hardware (supports the TSF F.IC_CL)
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
7
Certification Report
IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences,
the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
●
testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
●
testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
●
testing APDU commands related to the Creation of Digital Signatures,
●
testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
●
penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
●
source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
●
testing the commands which are used to execute the EAC and PACE protocol,
●
side channel analysis for SHA,
●
fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
●
testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
●
testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms,
●
the certification chain verification during Terminal Authentication.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC consisting of
●
the NXP Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVC(y) and P60C080/052/040PVC(y),
available as contact less, contact based and dual interface module, 8
●
the cryptographic library containing RSA, EC and SHA-2
●
the IC embedded software,
●
a file system in the context of the ICAO application, and
Dual interface smart card P60Dxxxxxx is customized by the supplier to either contact less (Mob4, Mob6),
contact based, or dual interface (PDM1.1). The product variant P60 Cxxxxxxx does not posess a contact less
interface, therefore only contact based modules exist.
8
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●
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
the associated guidance documentation.
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2 and an
application layer, consisting of the ICAO application. The customer specific ROM mask is
labelled by NXP with OEF ID 2217. The name of the ROM file transferred from Masktech
to NXP is mtcos_sp_v2.2_p60d080vc_p.hex.asc.
Since an MRTD may have different file structures here the certified configuration of the
TOE is addressed. The TOE has 26 different variations due to a total of five layouts,
concretely the four layouts (LayoutA-80, LayoutB-80, LayoutE-40, and LayoutF-80) each
with six curves (BP-256-3DES, BP-256-AES, BP-512-AES, NIST-256-3DES,
NIST-256-AES and NIST-384-AES), and Layout0-80 with two curves (BP-256-AES and
NIST256-AES), whereby the identifier 3DES or AES determines the cryptographic
algorithm used for secure messaging with default Chip Authentication configuration. The
following table summarizes the possible curve settings for the layouts:
Curve setting
EC Curve
Default Chip
Authentication SM
configuration
BP-256-3DES
brainpoolP256r1
3DES
BP-256-AES
brainpoolP256r1
AES-128
BP-512-AES
brainpoolP512r1
AES-256
NIST-256-3DES
nistP256
3DES
NIST-256-AES
nistP256
AES-128
NIST-384-AES
nistP384
AES-192
Table 3: Possible curve settings for the layouts
Thus the TOE consists of the hardware applied with the following different initialisation /
pre-personalisation files:
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-NIST-0-0.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-BP-512-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-80-NIST-384-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-BP-512-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-256-AES.txt
18 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-80-NIST-384-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-BP-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-BP-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-BP-512-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-NIST-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-NIST-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutE-40-NIST-384-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-BP-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-BP-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-BP-512-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-NIST-256-3DES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-NIST-256-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-LayoutF-80-NIST-384-AES.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-NIST-0-0.txt
Certification Report
Note: The initialisation as well as pre-personalisation is done using one of the above listed
scripts except for Layout0 where the process is done using two scripts, e.g. the
initialisation
script
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-initscript-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt
and
Dummy-patch0v1-FSP-preperso-Layout0-80-BP-0-0.txt.
All files are maintained using the configuration management system Subversion. The
version numbers of the above mentioned scripts are:
●
Layout0-80-BP-0-0 Version: 12273 (init), Version: 12001 (prepers)
●
Layout0-80-NIST-0-0 Version: 12273 (init), Version: 11843 (prepers)
●
LayoutA Version: 12273
●
LayoutB Version: 12273
●
LayoutC Version: 12273
●
LayoutE Version: 12273
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [10] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
19 / 42
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
●
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
●
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36).
According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform
and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware
[17], [18]) have been applied in the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), Version 1.3.2,
05 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 [7]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The following table lists the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce
its security policy.
No
.
Purpose
1
Authenticity
2
Authentication
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Terminal
Authentication,
ECDSA-signature
verification using
SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 or SHA-512
(r1 curve type)
Standard of
Implementation
[43] (Digital
signatures),
[26] chapter 6,
[20] section 6.2
PACEv2 (Generic
Mapping)
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
[38] (PACEv2)
Key Size in
Bits
224 (BP and
NIST curves),
256 (BP and
NIST curves),
320 (BP curve),
384 (NIST
curve),
512 (BP curve)
|MRZ|=160
|Nonce|=128
Standard of
Application
Comments
[34], [37]
Verification of
certificates
(Terminal
Authentication),
FCS_COP.1/SI
G_VER
[33], [38]
-
20 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
No
.
Purpose
3
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Active Authentication,
RSA Signing
Certification Report
Standard of
Implementation
[45],
[20] section 6.1,
[27] Digital
Signature scheme
1, section 8
[22] (DES),
[47] section 6.2
(CBC)
Key Size in
Bits
1536
Standard of
Application
Comments
[34]
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA_AA
112
[33], [38]
Personalizationkey,
BIS-PACE-key
PACE, 1st step
(opt.)
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA
_ENC
PACE, 1st step
(opt.)
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA
_ENC
FCS_CKM.1/C
A_STATIC
4
Implicite
Authentication during
Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
5
Implicite
Authentication during
Secure Messaging,
AES in CBC mode
[21] (AES),
[47] section 6.2
(CBC)
128, 192, 256
[33], [38]
Chip Authentication,
ECC Key Pair
Generation
(r1 curve type)
[26] Annex B.4.2
(Candidate Testing)
[33], [37]
Chip Authentication,
Key derivation
ECDH - SHA-1,
SHA-256
Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in CBC
mode
[46],
[44] Part 3,
[20] chapter 6
224 (BP and
NIST curves),
256 (BP and
NIST curves),
320 (BP curve),
384 (NIST
curve),
512 (BP curve)
112, 128, 192,
256
[33], [37]
FCS_CKM.1.1/
CA
[22] (DES),
[47] section 6.2
(CBC)
112
[33], [38]
Secure Messaging,
AES in CBC mode
[21] (AES),
[47] section 6.2
(CBC)
128, 192, 256
[33], [38]
Secure Messaging,
Triple-DES in Retail
MAC mode (MAC
algorithm 3, Sequence
Message Counter,
padding mode 2)
Secure Messaging,
CMAC-AES
[22] (DES),
[23] section 6
(CMAC),
[25] algorithm 3
(Retail-MAC)
112
[33], [38]
FCS_COP.1/CA
_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA
_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA
_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_MAC
[21] (AES),
[23] section 6
(CMAC)
128, 192, 256
[19], [33]
Secure Messaging in
ENC MAC mode
established during
PACE
[38] (PACE)
additionally cf. lines
2, 4, 5, 8-11
-
[33], [34],
[38]
6
Key
Agreement
7
8
Confidentiality
9
10
Integrity
11
12
Trusted
Channel
FCS_COP.1/CA
_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PA
CE_MAC
FTP
ITC.1/PACE
21 / 42
Certification Report
No
.
Purpose
13
14
Cryptographic
Primitive
15
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Secure Messaging in
ENC MAC mode
established during
Chip Authentication
after PACE
PTG.2 Random
number generator
Standard of
Implementation
[38]
additionally cf. lines
2, 4-11
Key Size in
Bits
-
Standard of
Application
Comments
[34], [38]
FTP
ITC.1/PACE
FCS CKM.1/CA
[4] AIS 20/31
-
[19]
-
SHA-1, SHA-224,
SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
[20] chapter 6
-
[40]
Signature
Verification
Key Derivation
Table 4: Cryptographic algorithms used by the TOE
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to [19], [33], [34] and [37]
the algorithms are suitable for authenticity, authentication, key agreement, confidentiality
and integrity. An explicit validity period is not given.
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
22 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Certification Report
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAC
Extended Access Control
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC
Message Authentication Code
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP
Protection Profile
RNG
Random Number Generator
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
23 / 42
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
24 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Certification Report
13
Bibliography
[1]
[3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 9
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014, Version 1.0, 21.02.2014, Specification of
the Security Target MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC, MaskTech
International GmbH (confidential document)
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access
Control, Version 1.3, 10 February 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012
[8]
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with
PACE (PACE PP), Version 1.0, 02.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
[9]
Security Target - Public Version, BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014, Version 1.1, 21.02.2014,
Specification of the Security Target MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE /
P60D080PVC, MaskTech International GmbH (sanitised public document)
[10]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 02.04.2014, - Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) - MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC, SRC Security Research &
Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
[11]
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC, User Guidance, MaskTech
International GmbH, Version 0.4, 20.02.2014
[12]
MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 1 – File System and Related Commands, MaskTech
GmbH, Version 3.0, 27.07.2012
[13]
MTCOS Standard & Pro: Part 2 – Access Control Mechanisms and Symmetric
Cryptography, MaskTech GmbH, Version 2.1, 03.06.2013
[14]
MTCOS Pro: Part 3 – Digital Signature, MaskTech GmbH, Version 1.0, 22.05.2013
[2]
9
specifically
•
AIS 25, Version 8, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1)
and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
25 / 42
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
[15]
MTCOS Pro: Part 5 – Advanced Security Mechanisms, Asymmetric Cryptography,
MaskTech GmbH, Version 2.0, 28.03.2013
[16]
MTCOS Std & Pro: Product Specification – MTCOS Pro V2.2 on P60D080,
MaskTech GmbH, Version 1.0, 21.10.2013
[17]
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P60D080PVC and its major configurations P60D052PVC, P60D0400PVC,
P60C080PVC, P60C052PVC and P60C040PVC from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, Version 1.0, 24.06.2013, BSI, and
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report, BSI-DS-CC-0837-2013-MA-01, NXP
Smart Card Controller P60D080/052/040PVC(y) and P60C080/052/040PVC(y),
04.02.2014, BSI
[18]
ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0837, TOE P60x080/052/040PVC, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH –
Evaluation Body for IT Security, Version 5, 23.04.2013
[19]
Technical Guideline TR-03116-2, eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung, Part 2 –
Hoheitliche Ausweisdokumente, BSI, 21.03.2013
[20]
FIPS 180-2, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB
180-2, Secure Hash Standard, NIST, August 2002
[21]
FIPS 197, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES), U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 26.11.2001
[22]
FIPS 46-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46-3, DATA
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), NIST, 1999-10
[23]
NIST 800-38B, ISO 15946, Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
The CMAC Mode for Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, National
Institute of Standards and Technology, May 2005
[24]
TR-03111, Technical Guideline TR-03111: Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Version 1.11,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), 17.04.2009
[25]
ISO 9797-1:1999, Information technology – Security techniques – Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, ISO,
04.01.2005
[26]
FIPS 186-3, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-3, DIGITAL
SIGNATURE STANDARD (DSS), NIST, 2009-06
[27]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital
Signature Schemes Giving Message Recovery – Part 2: Integer factorization based
mechanisms, ISO/IEC, 2008-03
[28]
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 for HID Global Ireland Teoranta,
Pairc Tionscail naTulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland (Building B1, B2,
B3) of HID Global Ireland Teoranta, 19.09.2012, BSI
[29]
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0023-2013 for Inlay Production and Initialisation
of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., Bangkok,
Thailand, 18.12.2013, BSI
26 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Certification Report
[30]
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0011-2012 for Trueb AG, Locations Aarau and
Unterentfelden of Trueb AG, Switzerland, 05.06.2012, BSI
[31]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0893-2014 for MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE /
P60D080PVC (BAC) from MaskTech International GmbH, 04 April 2014, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[32]
Konfigurationsliste von MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC, Version
0.4, 21.02.2014, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)
[33]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Supplemental Access
Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, International Civil Aviation
Organization, Version 1.00, 11 November 2010
[34]
ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports.
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006
[35]
ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official
Travel Documents. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2008
[36]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October
01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[37]
Technical Guidelines TR-03110-1, TR-03110-2, and TR-03110-3: Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents, covering [38], [39], [40]
[38]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1,
Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[39]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 2 – Extended Access Control Version 2
(EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and
Restricted Identification (RI), version 2.10, BSI, 20.03.2012
[40]
Technical Guideline TR-03110-3: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Part 3 – Common Specifications, version 2.10, BSI,
20.03.2012
[41]
Certification
Report,
NSCIB-CC-12-36243,
Crypto
Library
P60x080/052/040PVC, Version 1, 29.07.2013, Brightsight BV
[42]
ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), Certification ID
NSCIB-CC-12-36243, Crypto Library V1.0 on P60x080/052/040PVC, Version 5.0,
24.07.2013, Brightsight BV
[43]
Information technology -- Security techniques -- Cryptographic techniques based on
elliptic curves -- Part 2: Digital signatures, ISO/IEC, 2002
[44]
ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002, Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment,
ISO/IEC, 2002
[45]
RSA Cryptography Standard, PKCS #1, v2.1, RSA Laboratories, 2002
[46]
Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, PKCS #3, v1.4, RSA Laboratories, 1993
V1.0
on
27 / 42
Certification Report
[47]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
NIST 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, NIST
Special Publication 800-38A, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2001
28 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
29 / 42
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
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Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
41
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0892-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC with PACE / P60D080PVC, (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 April 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany
(Development)
b)
HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co.
Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 [28] (External initialisation and
inlay manufacturing)
c)
SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd., 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon
Ban
Laen,
Amphor
Bang-Pa-In,
13160
Ayutthaya,
Thailand,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0023-2013 [29] (External initialisation and inlay manufacturing)
d)
Trueb AG, Switzerland, Hintere Bahnhofsstrasse 12, CH-5001 Aarau,
BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0011-2012 [30] (External initialisation and inlay manufacturing)
For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-2013 [17].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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