Certification Report: 0541a_pdf

Certification Report: 0541a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
for
Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01
from
Renesas Electronics Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.35
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Security Controller
Renesas RS45C integrated circuit
version 01
from
Renesas Electronics Corporation
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the Electronics of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn,14 July 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information Electronics products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 34
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................19
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
6 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
A Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
7 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
●
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom.
●
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3, AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 was conducted
by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 9 July 2010. The T-Systems
GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
6
Information Electronics Security Evaluation Facility
8 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Renesas Electronics Europe
Ltd.
The product was developed by: Renesas Electronics Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Renesas Electronics Corporation
Secure MCU Design Dept.
5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho
Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588
Japan
9 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 34
Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01
manufactured in Naka (Japan), see chapter 2. The RS45C is an integrated circuit (IC)
providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application
software.
The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications, including high speed
security authentication, data encryption or electronic signature. Several security features
independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to
ensure proper operation and integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for
example measures for memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow
operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0, BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.HWProtect
Protection from attacks on the operation of the
hardware
Protection against leakage of information from
the IC
SF.LeakProtect
SF.RNG
Random Number Generator
SF.DES
DES Coprocessor
SF.ESFunction
Embedded Software Functions
SF.TestModeControl
Test Mode Control
SF.Inject
Data injection
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapters 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Renesas RS45C
integrated circuit version 01 manufactured in Naka (Japan), see chapter 2. For details refer
to chapter 8.
12 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW
Renesas RS45C integrated
circuit
version 01
Wafer or modules
2
SW
IC Dedicated Test Software
Version 2080
Included in the TOEs ROM
3
SW
RNG on-line test software
1.30
Provided as a hardcopy in [13])
4
SW
DES Library for RS-4 as IC
Dedicated Support Software
Electronic data / Hardcopy
consists of
RS4_LL.lib,
Ver. 3268
RS4_LL.txt,
Ver. 3268
and RS4_LL.h
Ver. 3292
5
DOC
RS45C Hardware Manual,
Renesas Technology Corp.
[12]
Rev. 1.0,
12 June, 2009
Electronic data / Hardcopy
6
DOC
RS-4 Series User Guidance
Manual, Renesas
Technology Corp. [13]
Revision 1.30,
6 August, 2009
Electronic data / Hardcopy
7
DOC
Option List for Smart Card
Version 1.1,
Microcomputer (for RS45C), 29 June 2009
Renesas Technology Corp.
[14]
Electronic data / Hardcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by RS45C version 01 (stored as version number in the EEPROM),
produced in Naka (indicated by chip manufacturing site code ‘T‘ for Naka). The prepersonalisation data are injected into the EEPROM as specified by the customer using the
option list.
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery procedures
described in the guidance manuals have to be followed. The Option Lists are used by the
user for ordering the device and for verifying the product received.
13 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
The version number is indicated in EEPROM address H'400014. The value for this TOE is
“01”. The chip manufacturer site code is indicated in address H'400016. The value for this
TOE is “T” for Naka.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of
appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical
probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
●
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
●
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
●
Usage of Hardware Platform
●
Treatment of User Data
●
Protection during product manufactoring
●
Injected Data Support
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8] chapter 4.2.
5
Architectural Information
The Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 is an integrated circuit (IC) providing a
hardware platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software.
The top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE
description of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the complete
instruction set of the Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 is to be found in the
Hardware Manual [12].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components RS-4
Series CPU, EEPROM, System Control Registers, DES coprocessor, a Random Number
Generator, the analog block with security sensors and the random logic module for
14 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
security logic are used. Security measures for physical protection are realized within the
layout of the whole circuitry.
The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing purposes during
production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by
disabling before TOE delivery.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
1. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE,
2. Characterisation and verification tests to release the hardware platform for
production including tests with different operating conditions as well as special
verification tests for security features of the hardware,
3. Functional tests at the end of the production process using IC Dedicated Test
Software. These tests are executed for every chip to check its correct functionality
as a last step of phase 3,
4. Design tool checks (layout versus schematic), and
5. Verification tests carried out to verify the functionality and quality of the related
property (statistical tests, side-channel analysis, FIB tests etc.).
The developer tests cover all TSFIs as identified in the functional specification as well as in
the test documentation.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer. A test protocol of the tests
provided by the developer was verified. The tests of the developer are repeated by
sampling. In addition the evaluators performed independent tests to supplement, augment
and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the evaluators comprise
special tests and examination of the hardware platform using open samples.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the TOE
Security Functionality as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Functions. The tests for the hardware platform
comprise the use of bespoke equipment and expert knowledge. The penetration tests
considered both the physical tampering of the hardware platform and attacks which do not
modify the hardware platform physically. Also the support of attacks by reverse
engineering was considered. The test of the hardware platform comprises attacks that
must be averted by the combination of the hardware platform and the Security IC
15 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Embedded Software as well as attacks against the hardware platform directly. In addition
side channel analysis was performed for the DES/3DES co-processor.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The RS45C can be delivered with or without the optional modules of the hardware. These
modules are the Watchdog Timer (WDT), the EEPROM protect bit mode function, and the
Modular Multiplication Coprocessor. Although those modules could add further features for
the implementation of a secure application, the security of the TOE is not decreased when
they were disabled by the ordered product. Note that the TOE is equipped with these
modules, however their functionality can be made available to the user by settings in test
ROM. The availability of the modules can not be modified in the user mode. There is only
one name and configuration for the TOE.
Except for the availability of the modules selected by the user, the RS45C has only one
configuration. The RS45C is tested during the evaluation along with the optional modules.
Beside the functionality of the optional devices are enabled/disabled in the test mode,
there are no other differences. Since the optional modules are not security functionalities
and non of the security functions depends on the functions of the optional modules, the
availability of the optional modules does not effect the security of the TOE.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the Electronics of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits
●
Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack Potential
to Smartcards
●
Supporting Document - Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
16 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile Version 1.0,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [1]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
●
The TOE Security Function SF.DES (DES Coprocessor).
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities
with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against
attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for
these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate
for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE achieves
a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
17 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Electronics Security Evaluation
CPU
Central processing unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FMU
Firewall Management Unit
HW
Hardware
IC
Integrate circuit
IT
Information Technology
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
18 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
TOE Security Functional Requirements
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
SW
Software
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functions
WTD
Watchdog Timer
Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Electronics Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Electronics Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
19 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0541, Revision 3287, 29 September 2009, RS45C
Version 01 Security Target, Renesas Electronics Corporation (confidential
document)
[7]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-CC-PP-0035, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007,
Eurosmart
[8]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0541, Version 1.0, 4 June 2010, RS45C Version 01
Security Target, Renesas Electronics Corporation (sanitised public document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 5. July 2010, Renesas RS45C integrated
circuit version 01, T-Systems GEI GmbH, (confidential document)
[10]
ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product Renesas RS45C
integrated circuit version 01, Version 1.0, 5 July 2010, ETR for composition, TSystems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[11]
Configuration list for the TOE, Revision 4203, 30 June 2010, RS45C Configuration
list (confidential document)
[12]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, RS45C Hardware Manual, Rev. 1.0, Renesas
Technology Corp., 12 June, 2009
[13]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, RS-4 Series User Guidance Manual,
Revision 1.30, Renesas Technology Corp., 6 August, 2009
[14]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer
(for RS45C), Version 1.1, Renesas Technology Corp., 29 June 2009
8
specifically
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 6, 07 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 5, 17 May 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
20 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
21 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
22 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV: Development
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
23 / 34
Certification Report
Assurance Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
24 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
25 / 34
Certification Report
Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
26 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
27 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
28 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
29 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
This page is intentionally left blank
30 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
31 / 34
Certification Report
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
This page is intentionally left blank.
32 / 34
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Renesas RS45C integrated circuit version 01 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the Electronics of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 .
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 14 July 2010, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Renesas Electronics Corporation, 5-20-1, Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi, Tokyo
187-8588, Japan (development site)
b)
Renesas Electronics Europe Ltd., Dukes Meadow, Millboard Road, Bourne
End, Buckinghamshire, SL8 5FH, U.K. (preparation of evaluation deliverables
and development and test site for DES library for RS4))
c)
Renesas Electronics Corporation Naka Factory, 751 Horiguchi, Hitachinakashi, Ibaraki 312-0034, Japan (semiconductor factory)
d)
Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd., 2-2-1 Fukuoka, Fujimino-shi, Saitama 356-8507,
Japan (mask shop)
e)
Renesas Electronics Corporation – Kofu site, 4617 Nishiyahata, Kai-shi,
Yamanashi 400-0117, Japan (test center)
f)
Toyo Electronics Co., Ltd., 2781-1, Shimosone-cho, Kofu-shi, Yamanashi, 4001508, Japan (test center)
g)
Renesas Musashi Engineering Service Co., Ltd., 5-22-1 Jousuihon-cho,
Kodaira-shi, Tokyo 187-8522, Japan (ROM handling)
h)
MTEX Matsumura Corp., 2-2-2 Kitamachi, Obanazawa-shi, Yamagata 9994231, Japan (module assembly)
i)
The Apollo Electronics Co., Ltd., 610 Shimoimasuwa, Minami-alps-shi,
Yamanashi, 400-0212, Japan (back grinding)
j)
Enzan Factory Co., Ltd., 276 Enzanshimoozo, Koshu-shi, Yamanashi, 4040043, Japan (wafer dicing)
k)
Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH, Karl-Hammerschmidt-Str. 42, 85609
Aschheim-Dornach, Germany (development and test site for DES library for
RS4)
33 / 34
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0541-2010
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] ). The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
34 / 34
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertisement