Certification Report: 0349a

Certification Report: 0349a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
for
Philips Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q,
including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx,
each with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.23
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Philips Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q,
including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx,
each with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Functionality:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 / augmented by:
Assurance Package:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 28. March 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions
of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance
families are relevant.
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3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each
with specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004, BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Philips Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages
OM95xx, each with specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TSystems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The T-Systems GEI GmbH,
Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business
Line Identification, P.O. Box 54 02 40, D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 28. March 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28 and D1 to D-4.
The product Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each
with specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
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Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
P.O. Box 54 02 40
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
2
Identification of the TOE
13
3
Security Policy
15
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
16
5
Architectural Information
16
6
Documentation
18
7
IT Product Testing
18
8
Evaluated Configuration
19
9
Results of the Evaluation
20
10 Comments/Recommendations
23
11 Annexes
23
12 Security Target
24
13 Definitions
24
14 Bibliography
25
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Philips Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages
OM95xx, each with specific IC Dedicated Software. They provide a hardware
platform for a smart card to run smart card applications executed by a smart
card operating system.
The evaluation was performed as a re-evaluation process based on BSI-DSZCC-0227-2004,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005
and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006.
Compared to BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004 the TOE was re-evaluated because of
technical and yield improvements. Compared to BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006 the
TOE was re-evaluated because of changes on top layers for modified module
packaging requirements. Additional package types (MOB4 and complete
passport inlay) and the relevant production sites were included in the evaluation
process. For production sites, results from BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 were reused. The additional production steps do not influence the configuration of the
TOE itself. The Security Target was updated.
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore (see part D,
Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023Q.
The TOE is the Philips chip P5CT072V0Q resp. P5CD072V0Q and
P5CD036V0Q composed of a processing unit, security components, I/O ports,
volatile and non-volatile memories (4608 Bytes RAM, 160 KBytes ApplicationROM, 72 KBytes EEPROM), a Triple-DES, an AES and a FameXE coprocessor and a Random number generator. Also two 16-bit Timers, an
Interrupt Module, a Memory Management Unit, an UART for ISO 7816
Interface, a USB interface and an ISO 14443 contactless interface are
implemented.
The USB interface, the ISO 14443 contactless interface and the AES
coprocessor can be deactivated before TOE delivery. In addition the available
EEPROM size can be configured. These possible technical configurations result
in the following product configurations:
P5CT072V0Q
P5CD072V0Q
P5CD036V0Q
USB interface
Enabled
Disabled
Disabled
Contact-less
interface
Enabled
Enabled
Enabled
EEPROM
72 kBytes
72 kBytes
36 kBytes
AES
coprocessor
Enabled
Disabled
Disabled
Table 1: Configurations of the TOE
For all major configurations the customer can select (by using the order form
e.g. [17] for the P5CT072) minor configurations as outlined in the Security
Target [7], chp. 2.2.5. Security Target [7], chp. 2.3 outlines the packages
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relevant for the TOE. The package type does not influence the security
functionality of the TOE. It does only define which pads are connected in the
package and for what purpose the chip (with the appropriate package) can be
used.
The TOE also includes Philips proprietary IC Dedicated Software stored on the
chip and used for testing purposes during production only. It does not provide
additional services in the operational phase of the TOE. The smart card
operating system and the application stored in the Application-ROM and in the
EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of two parts: the Boot ROM
Software being executed after each reset of the TOE and the Mifare Operating
System.
The TOE provides a platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage, including smart cards and portable data banks. Several security
features independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will
be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and confidentiality of
stored data. This includes for example measures for memory protection and
sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
[9]. With reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is
described in seven phases and the development, production and operational
user environment are described and referenced to these phases. The
assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile are used.
The IT products Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q each with specific IC Dedicated Software
were evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6] by T-Systems GEI
GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was completed on 03. March
2006. T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF) 8 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification.
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 5 augmented (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following
table shows the augmented assurance components.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Certification Report
Requirement
Identifier
EAL5
TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states
+: AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 2: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from
PP or added
in ST
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [DES]
Cryptographic operation
ST
FCS_COP.1 [AES]
Cryptographic operation
ST
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 [MEM]
Subset access control
ST
9
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1 [MEM]
Security Attribute based access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1 [SFR]
Security Attribute based access control
ST
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1 [MEM]
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.1 [SFR]
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.3 [MEM]
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_MSA.3 [SFR]
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions (see also [4, ST
AIS 32, Int065])
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
PP
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
FDP_ACC.1 [SFR]
9
[SFR] here means Special Function Register
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Certification Report
Security Functional
Requirement
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Source from
PP or added
in ST
Identifier
FPT_SEP.1 [PP]
TSF domain separation
PP
FPT_SEP.1 [CONF]
TSF domain separation
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from
PP or added
in ST
FAU
Security audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
PP
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
PP
PP
PP
Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the ITEnvironment of the TOE as dependencies derive from the security functional
requirements for cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) and for Management of
security attributes (FMT_MSA.1) as well as for Static attribute initialisation
(FMT_MSA.3)
Security
Requirement
Functional
Addressed issue
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FDP_ITC.1
Import of user data without security attributes
FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the Security Target chapter
5.2.1.
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Certification Report
Additionally security objectives for the TOE environment are outlined by only
Non-IT security requirements for the TOE environment, i.e. for (i) Design and
Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (ii) Protection during
Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation and (iii) Cipher Schemes (iv) Test of
Random Numbers and (v) Check of initialisation data. For details refer to the
Security Target, chapter 5.2.2.
The developers of Smartcard Embedded Software must take care of these
requirements for the environment of the TOE.
The Security Functional Requirements for the TOE are implemented by the
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
F.RNG
Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES
Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.HW_AES
AES Co-Processor
F.OPC
Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY
Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG
Logical Protection
F.COMP
Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC
Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC
Special Function Register Access Control
Table 6: TOE Security Functions
F.RNG: Random Number Generator
The random number generator continuously produces random numbers
with a length of one byte. The TOE implements the F.RNG by means of a
physical hardware random number generator working stable within the
limits guaranteed by F.OPC (operational conditions). The TSF provides a
hardware test functionality that can be used by the Smart Card
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware implementing the
random number generator.
F.HW_DES: Triple-DES Co-Processor
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) of the
Data Encryption Standard (DES). F.HW_DES is a modular basic
cryptographic function which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 46-3 [13] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB
46-3.
F.HW_AES: AES Co-processor
The TOE provides the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm of
the Advanced Encryption Standard. F.HW_AES is a modular basic
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cryptographic function which provides the AES algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 197 [16] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the AES algorithm with three different key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bit.
F.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions
The function F.OPC ensures the correct operation of the TOE (functions
offered by the micro controller including the standard CPU as well as the
Triple-DES co-processor, AES co-processor, the arithmetic co-processor,
the memories, registers, I/O interface and the other system peripherals)
during the execution of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Smart
Card Embedded Software. This includes all specific security features of
the TOE which are able to provide an active response.
F.OPC filters the power supply and the clock input. It also monitors the
power supply, the frequency of the clock, the temperature of the chip and
the high voltage for the write process to the EEPROM by means of
sensors. In addition, light sensors are provided to detect specific attacks
and the specific range of the stack pointer is controlled.
Before TOE delivery the Test Mode is disabled. In all other modes except
the Test Mode the TOE enables the sensors automatically when
operated. Furthermore the TOE prevents that the Smart Card Embedded
Software disables the sensors.
F.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation
The function F.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (i) the
hardware, (ii) the IC Dedicated Software in the ROM, (iii) the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the ROM and the EEPROM, (iv) the application
data in the EEPROM and RAM including the configuration data in the
security row. It also protects User Data or TSF data against disclosure by
physical probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.
F.LOG: Logical Protection
The function F.LOG implements measures to limit or eliminate the
information that might be contained in the shape and amplitude of signals
or in the time between events found by measuring such signals. This
comprises the power consumption and signals on the other pads that are
not intended by the terminal or the Smart Card Embedded Software.
Thereby this security function prevents the disclosure of User Data or
TSF data stored and/or processed in the smart card IC through the
measurement of the power consumption and subsequent complex signal
processing. The protection of the TOE comprises different features within
the design that support the other security functions.
The Triple-DES co-processor includes special features to prevent
SPA/DPA analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption
and ensures that the calculation time is independent from any key and
plain/cipher text.
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The AES co-processor includes special features to prevent SPA/DPA
analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures
that the calculation time is with respect to the key length independent
from any plain/cipher text.
The FameXE co-processor provides measures to prevent timing attacks
on basic modular function. In addition special features are included to
provide limitations of the capability for the analysis of shape and
amplitude of the power consumption. Of course the FameXE does not
realise an algorithm on its own and algorithm-specific leakage
countermeasures have to be added for the FameXE.
Additional features that can be configured by the Smartcard Embedded
Software comprise (i) the FameXE HIGHSEC mode and (ii) several clock
configurations to support resistance against leakage attacks.
The behaviour of F.LOG is supported by different features realised in the
functions F.OPC and F.PHY.
F.COMP: Protection of Mode Control
The function F.COMP provides a control of the CPU mode for (i) Boot
Mode, (ii) Test Mode and (iii) Mifare Mode. This includes the protection of
electronic fuses stored in a protected memory area, the so-called
“Security Row”, and the possibility to store initialisation or prepersonalisation data in the so-called “FabKey Area”.
The control of the CPU mode according to Boot Mode, Test Mode and
Mifare Mode prevents the abuse of test functions after TOE delivery.
Additionally it also ensures that features used at boot time to configure
the TOE can not be abused.
F.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test
personnel during phase 3 with the capability to store the identification
and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the EEPROM. The security function F.COMP
maintains the security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test Mode
and in the other modes. It also enforces the separation between the
security domains of subjects regarding the IC Dedicated Software and
the Smart Card Embedded Software.
F.MEM_ACC: Access control for code and data memory
F.MEM_ACC controls access of any subject (program code comprising
processor instructions) to the memories of the TOE through the Memory
Management Unit (MMU). Memory access is based on virtual addresses
that are mapped to physical addresses. The CPU always uses virtual
addresses. The Memory Management Unit performs the translation from
virtual to physical addresses and the physical addresses are provided
from the MMU to the memory interfaces to access the memories. The
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access control is performed in two ways (i) Partition of the memories and
(ii) Segmentation of the memory in the User Mode.
In addition F.MEM_ACC permanently checks whether the selected
addresses are within the boundary of the physical implemented memory
range. Access violations (i.e. access to forbidden memory addresses in
User Mode) and accesses outside the boundary of the physical
implemented memory range are notified by raising an exception.
F.SFR_ACC: Access control for Special Function Registers (SFRs)
The function F.SFR_ACC controls access to the Special Function
Registers and the switch between the CPU modes.
The TSF implements the access control to the Special Function
Registers as specified in the Access Control Policy and the Security
Functional Requirements FDP_ACC.1[SFR] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR].
F.SFR_ACC used information provided by F.MEM_ACC in order to
determine access to the Special Function Registers related to hardware
components. Access to all other Special Function Registers is predefined and cannot be changed.
Only two modes are available to the Smart Card Embedded Software,
the System Mode and the User Mode. The combination of F.SFR_ACC
and F.COMP ensures that the other CPU modes are not available for the
Smart Card Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes
fulfilled by the IC Dedicated Software. In addition F.MEM_ACC provides
separation of the memories and access control information.
The availability of the TSF F.HW_AES depends on the chosen configuration.
For P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q the AES co-processor is disabled and
thus the TSF F.HW_AES and the AES-related part of F.LOG is not available.
As the Test Mode is disabled before TOE delivery, all TOE Security Functions
are applicable from TOE delivery at the end of phase 4 to phase 7.
For more details please refer to the Security Target, chapter 6.1
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target, chapter 6.1, SOF Claim. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target and can be summarised as follows.
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So called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
•
manipulation of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
•
disclosure of user data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
•
deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target by defining threats on a more technical level for
•
Inherent Information Leakage,
•
Physical Probing,
•
Physical Manipulation,
•
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
•
Forced Information Leakage,
•
Abuse of Functionality and
•
Deficiency of Random Numbers.
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
developer / manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Because there is a specific security component which is not derived from
threats the developer must apply the Policy P.Add-Components (Additional
Specific Security Components) for Triple-DES encryption and decryption, AES
encryption and decryption, Area based Memory Access Control, Memory
separation for different software parts (including IC Dedicated Software and
Smart Card Embedded Software), Special Function Register Access Control
and Protection of configuration data.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q,
P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each with specific IC
Dedicated Software distinguish between five different CPU modes: Boot Mode,
Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode and User Mode.
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Available for the developer of the Smart Card Embedded Software are the
System Mode, the User Mode and the Mifare Mode.
The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test
Mode. The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip
manufacturing process. At this point in time the operating system software is
already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the Test Mode is
disabled.
The derivates of the TOE as outlined in table 1 have identical hardware and IC
Dedicated Software. Due to the configuration of the P5CD072V0Q and
P5CD036V0Q the AES co-processor is disabled and thus the TSF F.HW_AES
and the AES-related part of F.LOG is not available. These configurations are
done before TOE delivery.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the integration into a smart card, personalisation and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no
special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the requirement
that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions
and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as described in
the user documentation [11] and chapter 10 of this report.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile BSI-PP0002-2001 [9], the assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile
are valid for the Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle
defined in the Security Target, phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to
the end of phase 6 are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (phase 1) must ensure:
•
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
•
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
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Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions shall be implemented (if applicable) in the
smart card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to
leakage attacks (A.Key-Function).
•
The Smart Card Embedded Software must provide a function to check
initialisation data. The data is defined by the customer and injected by
the TOE Manufacturer into the non-volatile memory to provide the
possibility for TOE identification and for traceability (A.Check-Init)
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q,
P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each with
specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
1
HW
Philips Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q,
P5CD036V0Q
each with specific IC
Dedicated Software
V0Q
T023Q.gds2_2
0050609
(GDS2 File)
Embedded
into
specific
module
packages
including OM95xx
(see ST)
48
10 June 2005
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_48.lst)
(dice include reference
T023Q and specific
EEPROM coding, see
below)
2
SW
Test ROM Software (the IC
dedicated test software)
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No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
3
SW
Boot ROM Software (part of
the IC Dedicated Support
Software)
1.11
11 Nov. 2005
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_48.lst)
4
SW
Mifare Operating System
(part of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
1.18
8 June 2005
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_48.lst)
5
DOC
Data Sheet,
P5CT072V0P/V0Q,
SmartMX, Secure Triple
Interface Smart Card
Controller
2.0
14 Sept. 2005
Electronic
document [12]
Data Sheet,
P5CD072V0P/V0Q,
SmartMX, Secure Dual
Interface PKI Smart Card
Controller
2.0
14 Sept. 2005
Electronic
document [18]
Data Sheet,
P5CD036V0P/V0Q,
SmartMX, Secure Dual
Interface PKI Smart Card
Controller
2.0
14 Sept. 2005
Electronic
document [19]
6
DOC
Instruction Set SmartMXFamily
1.0
9 May 2003
Electronic
document [15]
7
DOC
Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual for the
P5CT072V0P and
P5CT072V0Q
1.1
13 Jan. 2006
Electronic
document [11]
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q
resp. P5CD036V0Q Secure Smart Card Controller and their specific GDS-file. A
so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip
during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate
T023Q is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the
guidance documentation [11]. This nameplate identifies Version V0Q of the
hardware, but does not identify specifically the TOE configurations. For
identification of a specific configuration, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the
EEPROM can be used (see [12], [18], [19] chapter 6.9.8):
•
The value 11 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CT072.
•
The value 15 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CD072.
•
The value 0F hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CD036.
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Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 5 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the
Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from Philips to their customers (to phase 5 of the life
cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the
different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
•
the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site Philips
Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Stresemannallee
101, 22529 Hamburg – Germany (see part D, annex A of this report) as a
wafer or
•
the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site, Philips
Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (see part D, annex A of this report) as a module or
•
the TOE is sent by Philips to the customer protected by special ordering,
secured transport and tracking measures. Additionally, a FabKey
according to the defined FabKey-procedures has to be used to support
the secure delivery and the identification of the TOE
as described [11].
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery
procedures described in [11] have to be followed.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the Test ROM Software, Boot ROM Software and Mifare
Operating System are implemented into a specific ROM mask for a TOE IC.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus
providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will
implement symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and
AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support
secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation
of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
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•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips before TOE Delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
and IC packaging process into modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At
these specific points in time the ROM part of the operating system software is
already stored in the ROM of the chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition, the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by
environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user
documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Philips Semiconductors GmbH Business Line
Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and responsible for
specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card application software in its
development and production environment. For those aspects refer to chapter 9
of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023Q.
5
Architectural Information
The Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q,
P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each with specific IC
Dedicated Software are integrated circuits (IC) providing a hardware platform to
a smart card operating system and Smart Card Embedded Software. A top level
block diagram including an overview of subsystems can be found within the
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TOE description of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and
the complete instruction set of the Philips Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q can be found in the Data
Sheets [12], [18], [19] and Instruction Set SmartMX-Family [15].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES CoProcessor, FameXE Co-Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power
Module with Security Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a
Memory Management Unit and provides different CPU modes in order to
separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for
physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the security functions of
the TOE.
The Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and
P5CD036V0Q each with specific IC Dedicated Software provide different levels
of access control to the SFR with the different CPU modes and additional –
configurable – access control to Special Function Registers in the leastprivileged CPU Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular
arithmetic functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during
the start up to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in
the Boot Mode that is not accessible after the start up is finished.
For the P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q, the Mifare Operating
System supports the functions to exchange data in the contactless mode with
other Mifare components. The Mifare Operating System is executed in the
Mifare Mode to ensure a strict separation between IC Dedicated Support
Software and Smart Card Embedded Software. Based on the partitioning of the
memories the Mifare Operating System is not able to access the Smart Card
Embedded Software and the data stored in the EEPROM area that is not
reserved for the Mifare Operating System. In the same way the access to the
program and the data of the Mifare Operating System is denied for the Smart
Card Embedded Software. A limited memory area for the data exchange
(between Smart Card Embedded Software and Mifare Operating System) and
the access to components of the hardware (by the Mifare Operating System)
must be configured by the Smart Card Embedded Software.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of
the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
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Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
For all, Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q,
P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each with specific IC
Dedicated Software
•
The Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11],
•
Instruction set [15]
•
The ETR-lite [10] and
For each derivate
•
The Data Sheet [12] for the P5CT072V0Q
•
The Data Sheet [18] for the P5CD072V0Q
•
The Data Sheet [19] for the P5CD036V0Q
Additional guidance as outlined in chapter 10 of this report has to be followed.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
The ETR-lite is intended to provide the results of the platform evaluation for the
TOE in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as
defined in AIS 36 [4].
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following
categories:
1.
technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the
technology against the specification and to get the technology
parameters used in simulations of the circuitry;
2.
tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools
for the analogue parts and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3.
regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based
on special software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4.
regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software
and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the
TOE and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5.
characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
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- used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters
- special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE and which include also layout tests by automatic
means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the
layout;
6.
functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its
correct functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 4).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the
library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator
or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement,
augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. The tests of the
developer were repeated by sampling, by repetition of complete regression
tests and by software routines developed by the evaluators and computed on
samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer tests repeated by
the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment was
varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in
design data and on the final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides
the Security Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm
the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis
results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions
using bespoke equipment and expert know how. The penetration tests
considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not
modify the TOE physically (i.e. side channel testing).
Where the evaluator used chips of the version P5CT072V0P for testing, a
rationale was given why the tests were fully applicable for the version
P5CT072V0Q, too.
Chips from IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore were used for tests.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each
with specific IC Dedicated Software all with the nameplates T023Q and specific
EEPROM coding as outlined above.
There are major configuration options, denoted by different product names. All
of them uses the same hardware but are differently configured as outlined
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above by deactivating/activating specific modules on the chip. All major
configurations of the TOE support further minor configuration options as
outlined in the Security Target chapter 2.2.5 All TSF are active and usable.
Information on how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
The Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and
P5CD036V0Q distinguish between five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test
Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode and User Mode.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the
evaluation was mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all
evaluation activities performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the System Mode and User Mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii)
ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
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Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.3
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.3
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.3
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Modularity
ADV_INT.1
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.2
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.3
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.2
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment
Verdict
ATE_IND.2
CC Class AVA
PASS
PASS
Covert channel analysis
AVA_CCA.1
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSIPP-0002-2001 [9]
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
•
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function: F.RNG (random number generator), according to AIS 31
Functionality class P2 High, F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to
the leakage attacks especially for F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-processor)
by SPA/DPA countermeasures. F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing
to the leakage attacks especially for F.HW_AES (AES Co-processor) by
SPA/DPA countermeasures together with the guidance given in
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11]. The scheme
interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Coprocessor) used for Triple-DES encryption and decryption and the TOE Security
Function F.HW_AES (AES Co-processor) used for AES encryption and
decryption.
For P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q the AES co-processor is disabled and
thus the TSF F.HW_AES and the AES-related part of F.LOG is not available.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable for chips from the IC fabrication
SSMC in Singapore (see part D, Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip
identifier) T023Q and the firmware and software versions as indicated above.
The evaluation results cannot be extended to further versions/derivates of the
TOE and/or another production sites without any extra investigations.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during the
TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [10] according to
[4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between the smart card embedded software
developer and the developer of the TOE was examined in detail.
10
Comments/Recommendations
The operational documentation guidance [11], Data Sheets [12], [18] and [19],
Instruction set [15] contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE to
be considered by the smart card Embedded Software developer. Additionally,
for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target has to be taken into account.
Philips will also provide either the Security Target [6] or [7] to customers.
Besides the further requirements to follow the instructions in the user guidance
documents and to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment
in the Security Target, the evaluators have no additional recommendations,
directions or requirements for the developer of the Smartcard Embedded
Software for the TOE.
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or using the
TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems or complete
smart cards), the ETR-lite for composition [10] resulting from this evaluation is
of importance and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation according to AIS
36. In addition, Philips Semiconductors is able to provide a customer product
related configuration list based on the general configuration list provided for the
evaluation [14].
11
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
IT
Information Technology
PP
Protection Profile
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
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[4]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE specifically
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0349, Version 1.1, 13 January 2006,
Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q
Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors (confidential
document)
[7]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0349, Version 1.2, 13 January 2006,
Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0Q, P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q
Secure Smart Card Controller, Philips Semiconductors (sanitised public
document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Philips P5CT072V0Q Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.0, 3. March 2006 (confidential document)
[9]
Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-00022001
[10]
ETR-lite for Composition, according to AIS 36, Version 1.1, 3. March
2006 for Philips P5CT072V0Q Secure Smart Card Controller
(confidential document)
[11]
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CT072V0P and
P5CT072V0Q, Version 1.1, Philips Semiconductors, 13 January 2006
(confidential document)
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[12]
Data Sheet, P5CT072V0P/V0Q, SmartMX, Secure Triple Interface Smart
Card Controller, Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors,
Revision 2.0, September 14th, 2005 (confidential document)
[13]
FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 25
Oct. 1999
[14]
Configuration List for the P5CT072V0P/Q, BSI-DSZ-CC-0348/0349,
Version 1.2, Philips Semiconductors, February 9th, 2006 (confidential
document)
[15]
Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Objective Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 1.0, 9 May
2003
[16]
FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 26 Nov. 2001
[17]
Order Entry Form, P5CT072, Release 2.3, Date: 16.08.2005, Philips
Semiconductors Hamburg
[18]
Data Sheet, P5CD072V0P/V0Q, SmartMX, Secure Dual Interface PKI
Smart Card Controller, Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors,
Revision 2.0, September 14th, 2005
[19]
Data Sheet, P5CD036V0P/V0Q, SmartMX, Secure Dual Interface PKI
Smart Card Controller, Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors,
Revision 2.0, September 14th, 2005
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class
Class ACM: Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Class ADV: Development
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Class ALC: Life cycle support
Class ATE: Tests
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Administrator guidance
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
User guidance
Development security
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Covert channel analysis
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0349-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Philips Secure Smart Card Controller P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q, P5CD036V0Q, including specific Inlay Packages OM95xx, each
with specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999)
and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version
2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 28. March 2006, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.3),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification (BU ID),
Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development
center)
b) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Assembly and Test Organisation
Hamburg Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany (assembly,
test, delivery)
c) Philips Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi
Bangkok 10210, Thailand (assembly, delivery)
d) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document
Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria (delivery)
e) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris
Drive 1, Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
f) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099, Singapore (mask shop)
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g) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd.,
Science-Based Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask
shop)
h) Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based
Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (wafer bumping)
i) Sokymat GmbH, In den Weiden 4b, D-99099 Erfurt (inlay assembly)
j) Aontec Teoranta, Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann, Co.
Galway (inlay assembly)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by
the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023Q.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0349,
Version 1.1, 13 January 2006, Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0Q,
P5CD072V0Q and P5CD036V0Q Secure Smart Card Controller [6]. The
evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security objectives for
the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 as
stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
D-4
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