Certification Report: 2011-15-INF-1098

Certification Report: 2011-15-INF-1098
MINISTERIO DE LA PRESIDENCIA
CENTRO NACIONAL DE INTELIGENCIA
CENTRO CRIPTOLÓGICO NACIONAL
ORGANISMO DE CERTIFICACIÓN
REF: 2011-15-INF-1098 v1
Created by: CERT8
Target: Expediente
Revised by: CALIDAD
Date: 17.12.2012
Approved by: TECNICO
CERTIFICATION REPORT
File:
2011-15 POLYMNIE LDS EAP applet
Applicant: B340709534 OBERTHUR TECHNOLOGIES
References:
[EXT-1369] Certification request of LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with
AA v2.2
[EXT-1919] Evaluation Technical Report of LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP
configuration with AA v2.2, version M4.
The product documentation referenced in the above documents.
Certification report of the product POLYMNIE, as requested in [EXT-1369] dated on
10-06-2011, and evaluated by the laboratory APPLUS-LGAI, as detailed in the
Evaluation Technical Report [EXT-1919] received on 26-10-2012.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................. 3 TOE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................................. 3 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................ 5 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................. 6 IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................................................................................. 7 SECURITY POLICIES ....................................................................................................................................... 7 ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT............................................................................ 8 CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS .................................................................................. 10 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY............................................................................... 13 ARCHITECTURE.............................................................................................................................................. 16 DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................................................................... 16 PRODUCT TESTING........................................................................................................................................ 17 PENETRATION TESTING............................................................................................................................. 18 EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ................................................................................................................. 18 EVALUATION RESULTS ................................................................................................................................ 19 COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE EVALUATION TEAM ....................................... 19 CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 20 GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................................ 20 BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................................................... 21 SECURITY TARGET........................................................................................................................................ 21 Página 2 de 22
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This document constitutes the Certification Report for the certification file of the
product LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2.
The TOE is composed of both an Integrated Circuit (IC), JavaCard platform and a
loaded applet providing secure data management following [ISO18013-1],
[ISO18013-2] and [ISO18013-3] EAP IDL specifications and Active Authentication.
The Target of Evaluation is therefore a composite TOE.
Developer/manufacturer: Oberthur Technologies.
Sponsor: Oberthur Technologies.
Certification Body: Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN) del Centro Nacional de
Inteligencia (CNI).
ITSEF: Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A..
Protection Profile: No conformance to any Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3, EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5.
Evaluation end date: 09/10/2012.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 (augmented
with ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures and AVA_VAN.5 Advanced
methodical vulnerability analysis) have been assigned a “PASS” verdict.
Consequently, the laboratory Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A. assigns the
“PASS” VERDICT to the whole evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied
for the EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria
version 3.1 revision 3 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation version 3.1 revision 3.
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2, a positive
resolution is proposed.
TOE SUMMARY
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following
components:
‐ An ID One Cosmo v7.0.1-n JavaCard platform including Global Platform
support and a cryptographic library,
‐ LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2
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The Logical Data Structure (LDS) application is a generic filesystem that can be
configured to match especially ICAO specifications for ePassports BAC and EAC
and ISO specifications for IDL BAP and EAP. The configuration in the scope of this
certification report is the IDL EAP specification of this application.
The main features provided by the LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with
AA v2.2 and present in the evaluation scope are summarized in the following table:
Feature
Embedded in the product
In the Certificate scope
BAC
Yes
Yes1
EAC
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
BAP
Yes
Yes1
EAP
Yes
Yes
Active Authentication
(DES, AES, RSA CRT and ECC)
Cryptosystem migration
(Algorithm change during
certificate verification
transaction)
The TOE in the scope of this Certification Report provides Basic Access Protection1
and Extended Access Protection according to [ISO18013-1][ISO18013-2]
[ISO18013-3] and Active Authentication mechanisms.
The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an
alternative to BAC. Indeed it is actually a generalization of BAC allowing usage of
extra algorithms and key length. It exists in 4 modes:
‐
‐
‐
‐
BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits,
BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits,
BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits.
Following Secure messaging is performed using the algorithm used in the selected
BAP mode.
Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [ISO18013-3] uses the term
“Keydoc” which refers to an equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE
as a random number or barcode.
__
1
BAC/BAP are included in the scope through an objective on the environment but these
configurations are specifically covered by other certification reports.
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The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be
implemented. It ensures that the TOE has not been substituted, by means of a
challenge-response protocol between the inspection system and the TOE. For this
purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication DES/AES key or RSA/ECC
Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 Secret/Public key is stored in the
Document Security Object and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital
signature. If any, the corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure
memory. Note that the access to DG15 is disabled if a secret key is stored. The TOE
supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication DES/AES key or
RSA/ECC Key pair.
The Extended Access Protection (EAP) extends EAC to allow a more flexible
protocol. It can protect up to 24 DGs (from 1 to 24) and is no more restricted to DG3
and 4. Note that a BAP must be performed prior to starting EAP.
Following secure messaging can be either in 3DES or AES taking into that the
algorithm used must be the same as the one used for BAP.
Some features of the product are put out of the evaluation scope and are therefore
not part of the TOE. Here is the complete list of those functionalities:
‐
Standard and biometric PIN management (therefore PIN associated
commands are out of scope).
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The product was evaluated with all the evidence required to fulfil the evaluation level
EAL4 and the evidences required by the additional components ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures and AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis, according to Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3.
Assurance Class
ADV: Development
AGD: Guidance documents
ALC: Life-cycle support
Assurance components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ASE: Security Target
evaluation
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
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Assurance Class
ATE: Tests
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Assurance components
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The product security functionality satisfies the following functional requirements,
according to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3:
Class
FAU: Security Audit
FCS: Cryptographic Support
FIA: Identification and
Authentication
FDP: User Data Protection
FMT: Security Management
FPT: Protection of the Security
Functions
Components
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FCS_CKM.1/Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
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Class
Components
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD Cryptographic Operation
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FCS: Cryptographic Support
FDP: User Data Protection
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT: Security Management
FCS: Cryptographic Support
Extended Access Protection
FCS_COP.1/EAP-SM Cryptographic Operation
FCS_CKM.1/EAP Cryptographic key generation
IDENTIFICATION
Product: LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2
Security Target: Polymnie Security Target EAP issue:7.
Protection Profile: No conformance to any Protection Profile is claimed.
Evaluation Level: Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 3 EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5.
SECURITY POLICIES
The use of the product LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2 shall
implement a set of security policies assuring the fulfilment of different standards and
security demands.
The detail of these policies is documented in the Security Target. In short, it
establishes the need of implementing organisational policies related to the following
aspects.
Policy 01: P.BAP-PP
The issuing organisations or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated
Basic Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to
DG24 if specified in EF.SOD as well as to the data groups Common and Security
Data. The MRD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the
"Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control" [PP-BAC] in order to ensure the confidentiality of
standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRD data.
Policy 02: P.Sensitive_Data
The highly sensitive reference data are sensitive private personal data of the MRD
holder. The highly sensitive reference data can be used only by inspection systems
which are authorized for this access at the time the MRD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing organisation
authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving organisations to manage the
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authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document Verifier
Certificate. The MRD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
Policy 03: P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely.
The MRD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least
the Personalization Agent Key.
Policy 04: P.Personalization
The issuing organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the highly sensitive reference data and
other data of the logical MRD with respect to the MRD holder. The personalization of
the MRD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing
organisation only.
Policy 05: P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
All the sensitive data are at least protected in integrity. The keys are protected in
both integrity and confidentiality.
Policy 06: P.Key_Function
All the cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they are protected
against probing and do not cause any information leakage that may be used by an
attacker.
ASSUMPTIONS AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The following assumptions are constraints to the conditions used to assure the
security properties and functionalities compiled by the security target. These
assumptions have been applied during the evaluation in order to determine if the
identified vulnerabilities can be exploited.
In order to assure the secure use of the TOE, it is necessary to start from these
assumptions for its operational environment. If this is not possible and any of them
could not be assumed, it would not be possible to assure the secure operation of the
TOE.
Assumption 01: A.MRD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRD and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized
use).
Assumption 02: A.MRD_Delivery
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Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
‐ Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
and storage,
‐ Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage,
‐ Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery
have got the required skill.
Assumption 03: A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRD with
respect to the MRD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip
Authentication Public Key if stored on the MRD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer
Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRD's chip). The Personalization Agent signs
the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization
Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
Assumption 04: A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving
organisation (i) examining an MRD presented by the holder and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the holder as MRD holder. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Organisation Signing CA Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing organisation, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Protocol [ISO18013-3]. The Basic
Inspection System reads the logical MRD under Basic Access Protocol and performs
the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System
implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRD's chip during inspection and establishes secure
messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The
Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing
organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving organisation to read the
highly sensitive reference data.
Assumption 05: A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving organisations or Organizations establish a public key
infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification
for the logical MRD. The issuing organisation runs a Certification Authority
(CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Organisation Signing CA Key
pair. The CA keeps the Organisation Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Organisation Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all
receiving organisations maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates
the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key to
the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv)
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uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security
Objects of the MRDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving organisations.
Assumption 06: A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving organisations or Organizations establish a public key
infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Protocol. The
Organisation Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended
Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys
encoding the access control rights. The Organisation Verifying Certification
Authorities of the issuing organisations or Organizations are signing the certificates
of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of
the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving organisations or Organizations.
The issuing organisations or Organizations distribute the public keys of their
Organisation Verifying Certification Authority to their MRD's chip.
CLARIFICATIONS ON NON-COVERED THREATS
The following threats do not suppose a risk for the product LDS EAC Java Applet in
EAP configuration with AA v2.2, although the agents implementing attacks have a
high attack potential according to the assurance level of EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
AVA_VAN.5 and always fulfilling the usage assumptions and the proper security
policies satisfaction.
For any other threat not included in this list, the evaluation results of the product
security properties and the associated certificate, do not guarantee any resistance.
The threats covered by the security properties of the TOE are categorized below.
Threat 01: T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the highly sensitive reference data through
the communication interface of the MRD's chip. The attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PPBAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and
the motivation (to get data stored on the MRD's chip) but differs from
those in the asset under the attack (highly sensitive reference data
vs. digital keydoc, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity
(i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the highly sensitive reference
data are stored only on the MRD's chip as private sensitive personal
data whereas the keydoc data and the portrait are visually readable
on the physical MRD as well.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access
Keys, being in possession of a legitimate MRD
Asset:
confidentiality of sensitive logical MRD (i.e. highly sensitive
reference) data
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Threat 02: T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRD or
any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on
an inspection system by means of the changed MRD holder's
identity or highly sensitive reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRD forgery. The
attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data
page of the passport book, in the printed keydoc and in the digital
keydoc to claim another identity of the holder. The attacker may alter
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may
alter the highly sensitive reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The
attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRDs to
create a new forged MRD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized
portrait and optional highly sensitive reference finger data read from
the logical MRD of a holder into another MRD's chip leaving their
digital keydoc unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical
MRD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRDs.
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRD data.
Threat 03: T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized
copy or reproduction of a genuine MRD's chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit MRD. This violates the authenticity of the MRD's chip
used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or
partially the data from a genuine MRD's chip and copy them on
another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRD's chip.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate MRDs
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRD data,
Threat 04: T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
"Operational Use" phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to
manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features
or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
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This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization
and the personalization in the operational organisation after delivery
to MRD holder.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRD.
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
Threat 05: T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or
caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in
processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission
but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters,
which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless
interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the
chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be
related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential
Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to
enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRD.
Asset:
confidentiality of logical MRD and TSF data.
Threat 06: T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRD's chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRD's chip
Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRD's
chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRD's
chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRD's chip Embedded
Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the highly sensitive reference
data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key
of the MRD'' chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRD's chip internals. Techniques
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commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data
and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry
or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRD.
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
Threat 07: T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRD's chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii)
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRD's chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRD's chip outside the
normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRD's chip
Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit
these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
MRD.
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FUNCTIONALITY
The product requires the cooperation from its operational environment to fulfil some
of the objectives of the defined security problem.
The security objectives declared for the TOE operational environment are
categorized below.
Environment objective 01: OE.MRD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used
through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE
and its manufacturing and test data.
Environment objective 02: OE.MRD_ Delivery
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Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
including the following objectives:
‐ non-disclosure of any security relevant information, o identification of the
element under delivery,
‐ meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
‐ physical protection to prevent external damage,
‐ secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
‐ traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o origin and shipment details,
o reception, reception acknowledgement,
o location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the
confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception
department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill,
training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully
in accordance with the above expectations.
Environment objective 03: OE.Personalization
The issuing organisation must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and
create biographical data for the MRD, (ii) enroll the highly sensitive reference data of
the MRD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRD for the holder together with the defined
physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of
these data.
Environment objective 04: OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing organisation must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Organisation
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Organisation Signing CA Private
Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and
(iii) distribute the Certificate of the Organisation Signing CA Public Key to
receiving organisations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing
organisation must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair
and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document
Security Objects of genuine MRD in a secure operational environment only and (iii)
distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving
organisations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data
in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 if stored in the LDS according to [ICAO_P1] and
[ISO18013-2].
Environment objective 05: OE.Auth_Key_MRD
The issuing organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to (i) generate the MRD's Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the
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Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data and (iii)
support inspection systems of receiving organisations or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRD's chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
Environment objective 06: OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to limit the access to highly sensitive reference data of MRD's holders to
authorized receiving organisations or Organizations. The Organisation Verifying
Certification Authority of the issuing organisation generates card verifiable Document
Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Environment objective 07: OE.BAP-PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing organisation, that the TOE is additionally
successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control" [PP-BAC].
This is necessary to cover the BAP mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of
standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRD data. Note that
due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation
and certification is a technically separated process.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
Environment objective 08: OE.Exam_MRD
The inspection system of the receiving organisation must examine the MRD
presented by the holder to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Organisation Signing CA Public Key
and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing organisation, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Protocol [ICAO_P1]. Additionally
General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD's chip.
Environment objective 09: OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving organisation uses the inspection system to
verify the holder as MRD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully
verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements
of the logical MRD before they are used. The receiving organisations must manage
the Organisation Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
Environment objective 10: OE.Prot_Logical_MRD
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The inspection system of the receiving organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRD. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure
messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Environment objective 11: OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving organisations or Organizations authorizes
Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for
access to highly sensitive reference data of the logical MRD. The Extended
Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRD's chip for access to the
highly sensitive reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
The details of the product operational environment (assumptions, threats and
organisational security policies) and the TOE security requirements are detailed in
the associated security target.
ARCHITECTURE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following
components:
‐ An ID One Cosmo v7.0.1-n JavaCard platform including Global Platform
support and a cryptographic library,
‐ An LDS applet providing both the BAP/EAP features loaded on the platform.
DOCUMENTS
The product includes the following documents that shall be distributed and made
available together to the users of the evaluated version.
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‐
‐
‐
Polymnie AGD_OPE ed.2
o Code: FQR 220 0437 Edition: 2 Date: 14/12/2011
o The current document aims at ensuring Common Criteria requirements
for the POLYMNIE project by fully describing the AGD_OPE.
Polymnie AGD_PRE ed.3
o Code: FQR 220 0406 Edition: 3 Date: 27/01/2012
o The current document aims at ensuring Common Criteria requirements
for the POLYMNIE project by fully describing the AGD_PRE.
LDS
EAC
V2.2
Java
Applet
SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENTS
SPECIFICATIONS SRS v edAB.
o Code: 067007 00 Edition: 7-AB Date: 26/01/2011
o This document defines the functional characteristics of the Oberthur
Technologies LDS EAC applet. It contains the full description of the
supported file structure elements, as well as the APDU commands
available during the personalization phase and the use phase.
PRODUCT TESTING
The evaluation has been performed according to the Composite Evaluation Scheme
as defined in the guides [COMP_JIL] and [COMP_CCRA] in order to assess that the
combination of the TOE with the underlying platform did not lead to any exploitable
vulnerability. The Java Card Platform and the microcontroller have already been
certified.
This evaluation has then taken into account the evaluation results and security
recommendations for the following platforms which are part of the evaluated
composite TOE:




ANSSI-CC-2011/64
ANSSI-CC-2010/40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
The developer has executed test for all the declared security functions. All the tests
have been performed by the developer in its premises, with a satisfactory result.
During the evaluation process it has been verified each unit test checking that the
security functionality that covers is been identified and also that the kind of test is
appropriate to the function that is intended to test.
All the tests have been developed using the testing scenario appropriate to the
established architecture in the security target. It has also been checked that the
obtained results during the tests fit or correspond to the previously estimated results.
To verify the results of the developer tests, the evaluation team has applied a
sampling strategy and concluded that the given information is complete and coherent
to reproduce tests and identify the functionality tested. Moreover, additional tests
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where proposed independently of the developer. These tests covered ePassport
EAP functionalities and tested the underlying RNG.
It has been checked that the obtained results conform to the expected results and in
the cases where a deviation in respect to the expected results was present, the
evaluator has confirmed that this variation neither represents any security problem
nor a decrease in the functional capacity of the product.
PENETRATION TESTING
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment, the evaluation team has devised attack scenarios for penetration tests
according to JIL supporting documents such as [JILAAPS]. Within these activities all
aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional testing
have been considered.
The implementation of the requirements of the provided platform’s ETR for
Composition and guidance, as well as of the security mechanisms of the applet in
general has been verified by the evaluation team. An appropriate test set was
devised to cover these potential vulnerabilities.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High has been
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target
when all measures required by the developer are applied.
EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
The TOE is defined by its name and version number LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP
configuration with AA v2.2.
The composite TOE includes:
‐
‐
‐
‐
the integrated circuit, IC NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD081V1A or
P5CD145V0A
the Java Card Platform ID One Cosmo v7.0.1-n masked in one of the above
ICs including Global Platform support and a cryptographic library,
the LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2
the associated guidance documentation.
The commercial version and internal version of the applet may be retrieved by
following the procedure below (see AGD_OPE ed.2):
1. Select the applet
2. Perform BAC or BAP if BAC/BAP is supported
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3. Send GET DATA command with the tag "DF66" to retrieve the commercial
version of the applet (see GET DATA in AGD_OPE). The applet shall return:
"DF66 0A 067007 02020100 000000"
4. Send GET DATA command with the tag "DF67" to retrieve the internal version
of the applet (see GET DATA).
a. The applet shall return: "DF67 0E 30 0C 04040A00060D
04040F00000E" if EAC package is loaded.
5. Send GET DATA command with the tag "DF63" to retrieve the EAC
configuration of the applet (see GET DATA).
a. The applet is configured in EAP if the BAC/BAP configuration byte
indicates BAP (001xxxxxb for BAP-1, 010xxxxxb for BAP-2, 011xxxxxb
for BAP-3, and 100xxxxxb for BAP-4.)
b. and the EAC package is loaded (see point 4).
EVALUATION RESULTS
The product LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2 has been
evaluated against the Security Target Polymnie Security Target EAP issue: 7.
All the assurance components required by the evaluation level EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2
+ AVA_VAN.5 have been assigned a “PASS” verdict. Consequently, the laboratory
Applus LGAI Technological Center S.A. assigns the “PASS” VERDICT to the whole
evaluation due all the evaluator actions are satisfied for the evaluation level EAL4 +
ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5, as defined by the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision
3 and the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
version 3.1 revision 3.
COMMENTS
&
RECOMMENDATIONS
EVALUATION TEAM
FROM
THE
Next, recommendations regarding the secure usage of the TOE are provided. These
have been collected along the evaluation process and are detailed to be considered
when using the product.
‐
The developer follows all the underlying platform security recommendations
and contributes with additional countermeasures to enforce the security of the
whole product. Therefore the LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with
AA, Version 2.2 fulfils the requirements of CC version 3.1 with an evaluation
assurance level EAL4 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5.
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CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the obtained evidences during the instruction of the certification request
of the product LDS EAC Java Applet in EAP configuration with AA v2.2, a positive
resolution is proposed.
Additionally, the Certification Body wants to remark to the TOE’s consuming
organizations the following:
‐
Oberthur’s Project Leader at Manilla’s facilities plays a key role in the security
procedures followed to generate the TOE. Project Leader at this facility
assures by following the security procedures that the generated TOE reflects
its implementation representation managed in the Configuration Management
System.
GLOSSARY
AA
Active Authentication
BAC
Basic Access Control
CC
Common Criteria
CCN
Centro Criptológico Nacional
CNI
Centro Nacional de Inteligencia
DG
Data Group
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
IDL
ISO compliant Driving Licence
LDS
Logical Data structure
MRTD
Machine readable Travel Document
MRZ
Machine readable Zone
OC
Organismo de Certificación
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target Of Evaluation
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following standards and documents have been used for the evaluation of the
product:
[CC_P1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CC_P3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Version 3.1, R3 Final, July 2009.
[JILCOMP] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices
version 1.2. Jan. 2012.
[CCCOMP] Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices
Version 1.0. Sept. 2007.
[JILAAPS] Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.7. March 2009.
[PP-EAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control, version 1.10. BSI-CC-PP-0056.
Version 1.10. March 2009.
[PP-BAC] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with “ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10, March
2009
[ICAO_P1] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 –
Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[ISO18013-1] Information Technology - Personal Identification – ISO Compliant
Driving Licence – Part 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC FDIS
18013-1:2005(E)
[ISO18013-2] Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant
Driving Licence — Part 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC FDIS 180132:2007(E)
[ISO18013-3] Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3:
Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC FDIS 180133:2008(E)
SECURITY TARGET
Along with the certification report, the complete security target for the evaluation is
stored and protected in the Certification Body premises. This document is identified
as:
‐
Polymnie Security Target EAP issue:7 – Document id.: FQR : 110 5695
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The public version of this document constitutes the ST Lite. The ST Lite has also
been evaluated for the needs of publication according to [CCDB-2006-04-004], and it
is published along with this certification report in the Certification Body and CCRA
websites. The ST Lite identifier is:
‐
Polymnie Security Target EAP Ed.2 – Document id.: FQR 110 6344 Ed2
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