Certification Report: 0329a

Certification Report: 0329a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
for
Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard
integrated circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43
from
Renesas Technology Corp.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard
integrated circuit version 02 with ACL
version 1.43
from
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
Renesas Technology Corp.
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card
specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1
(ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version
2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, 1.0 (BSI-PP-0002-2001)
Functionality:
PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficieny of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states) and
AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, March 28th, 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December
1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
Certification Report
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components
of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit
version 02 with ACL version 1.43 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard
integrated circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43 was conducted by TSystems GEI GmbH, Solution & Service Center Test Factory & Security. The T-
A-2
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Systems GEI GmbH, Solution & Service Center Test Factory & Security is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The vendor and distributor is Renesas Technology Corp. The sponsor and point
of contact is
Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.
Dukes Meadow Millboard Road
Bourne End
Buckinghamshire
SL8 5FH
UK
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on March 28th, 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
4
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22 and D-1 to D-4.
The product Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit
version 02 with ACL version 1.43 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
Renesas Technology Corp.
Secure MCU Dept.
MCU Business Unit
Standard Product Business Group
20-1 Jousuihon-cho 5-chome
Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588, Japan
A-4
Certification Report
B
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
3
2
Identification of the TOE
11
3
Security Policy
11
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
12
5
Architectural Information
13
6
Documentation
13
7
IT Product Testing
13
8
Evaluated Configuration
14
9
Results of the Evaluation
14
10 Comments/Recommendations
17
11 Annexes
17
12 Security Target
18
13 Definitions
18
14 Bibliography
20
B-2
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1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1)
smartcard integrated circuit (IC) version 02 with ACL version 1.43, produced in
Naka (Japan). The TOE consists of hardware, along with IC Dedicated Test
Software, some embedded software and reference and guidance documents.
The TOE is a hardware integrated circuit which can be used on a plastic
smartcard as hardware computing platform with the Advanced Cryptographic
Library (ACL) which provides cryptographic functions to the developer of
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The TOE is composed of a central processing unit, a system control logic,
security logic, volatile and non-volatile memories (240KBytes User ROM +
16KBytes Test ROM, 6 Kbytes RAM + 2 Kbytes Coprocessor RAM, EEPROM
32Kbytes + 8Kbytes), a 16Bit random number generator (RNG), a DES
coprocessor, a Modular Multiplication Coprocessor (MMC), two interval timers,
a Direct Memory Access Controller (DMAC), a watchdog timer (optional), a
Firewall Management Unit (FMU), two I/O lines and an Universal Asynchronous
Receiver Transmitter (UART).
The IC also provides protection features to resist leakage attacks, these include
bus encryption (which is always active), memory data encryption and the ability
of Smartcard Embedded Software to select noise generation and timing
disturbance.
Physical security of the IC is enhanced by the presence of passive and active
shielding over critical areas and by the use of design techniques that obscure
the function and operation of the physical layout.
The TOE includes the IC Dedicated Test Software which is integrated into a
TOE hardware. It is used for mode transition and testing during IC production
and is not available for users.
The ACL, the ROM and the IC Dedicated Test Software, which is implemented
on hardware, are part of the TOE. Apart from this the Smartcard Embedded
Software (e.g. an operating system) is not part of the TOE.
The Security Target [6] is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile [7]. With reference to this Protection Profile, the smartcard product
lifecycle is described in 7 phases. The development, production and operational
user environment are described in reference to these phases. TOE delivery is
defined at the end of phase 3 or phase 4.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [7] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g. cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [7] is augmented by an
additional policy, threats, assumptions and security objectives accordingly.
The IT product Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit
version 02 with ACL version 1.43 was evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH,
B-3
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Solution & Service Center Test Factory & Security. The evaluation was
completed on February 7th, 2006. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Solution &
Service Center Test Factory & Security is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 8
recognised by BSI.
The vendor and distributor is Renesas Technology Corp. The sponsor and point
of contact is
Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.
Dukes Meadow Millboard Road
Bourne End
Buckinghamshire
SL8 5FH
UK
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
Identifier
EAL4
TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+ ADV_IMP.2
Development – Implementation of the TSF
+ ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+ AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+ AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2. The source of this SFRs is the
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001 [PP, 7], the “Smartcard Integrated Circuit
Platform Augmentations” [PA, 17] or they are added in the Security Target [ST,
6]:
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-4
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Addressed issue
Security Functional
Requirement
Source from
PP, PA or added in
ST
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [3DES]
Cryptographic operation
PA
FCS_COP.1 [RSA]
Cryptographic operation
PA
FCS_COP.1 [SHA-1]
Cryptographic operation
PA
FCS_COP.1 [RIPEMD-160]
Cryptographic operation
PA
FCS_CKM.1 [RSA]
Cryptographic key generation
PA
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ITT.1 [HW]
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FDP_ITT.1 [ACL]
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FDP_IFC.1 [HW]
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_IFC.1 [ACL]
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ACC.1 [CRP]
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACC.1 [WPP]
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1 [CRP]
Security attribute based access
control
ST
FDP_ACF.1 [WPP]
Security attribute based access
control
ST
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security
Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of
secure state
PP
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain seperation
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
FPT_ITT.1 [HW]
Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
PP
FPT_ITT.1 [ACL]
Basic internal TSF data transfer
protection
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
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The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Addressed issue
Security Functional
Requirement
Source from
PP, PA or added in
ST
FAU
Security audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1 [TRNG]
Quality metric for random
numbers
PP
FCS_RND.1 [PRNG]
Quality metric for random
numbers
PP
PP
FMT
FMT_LIM.1
PP
FMT_LIM.2
PP
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST [6] chapter 5.1.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.HWProtect
HW protection
The TOE is protected from attacks on the operation of the IC
hardware. The protection includes high and low voltage, clock
frequency and temperature detection and detection of illegal
access and instruction. It also includes RNG failure detection,
shielding and memory layout scrambling, memory address
encryption and memory data encryption for ROM.
SF.LeakProtect
Leakage protection
The TOE hardware protects against leakage of information
from the IC. The protection features include data and address
bus encryption, noise generation, time disturbance and DES
protection.
SF.ACL-LeakProtect
ACL leakage protection
The ACL provides additional measures to protect against
leakage of information from the IC. The protection features
include scrambled copy/ compare/ XOR and secure RSA
operation and keyset generation, secure modular inversion
and secure multiply.
SF.RNG
Random Number Generator
The RNG is designed to produce random numbers for the
generation of cryptographic keys and for other critical uses.
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TOE Security Function
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Addressed issue
This RNG meets the requirements of application class P2 as
specified in [1, AIS31].
Moreover the ACL includes a function to access the HW RNG,
which automatically runs an online test of the HW RNG to
verify that its operation has not been compromised. This
function implements „Poker Test“ according to [2].
The TOE also includes the software implementations of a
pseudo random number generator (PRNG). This PRNG is
implemented according to the standard ANSI X9.31 Appendix
A and meets functionality class K3 as specified in the AIS20.
SF.DES
DES coprocessor
The TOE provides a hardware DES coprocessor that carries
out DES encryption and decryption in ECB mode and ACL
software functions to access this coprocessor for DES and
implement Triple-DES, according to the FIPS PUB 46-3
standard [10].
Moreover the ACL provides an interface function for the DES
coprocessor and in addition implements a triple DES function.
The DES and 3DES algorithm are implemented according to
FIPS PUB 46-3. Only 3DES has sufficient SOF to be claimed
as a SF and for use in the secure part of any Smartcard
Embedded Software.
SF.FMU
Firewall Management Unit
The FMU enables software to control addresses that can be
accessed to check that a target address used in any
instruction is within specified limits and if not to enter the reset
state or FMU interrupt. In addition the FMU may enforce a
policy controlled only by software executing in ROM, that the
TOE may not execute code either EEPROM or RAM or both.
SF.ESFunctions
SF.TestModeControl
The Smartcard Embedded Software developer can rely on the
following TOE functionality that has been specifically
evaluated as part of the TOE
•
Generation of non-maskable interrupt (the EWE interrupt)
when writing the EEPROM
•
CPU halt initiated by user software to stop executation
until an external reset is received
Test Mode Control
If the TOE has been set to user mode, test mode functions are
no longer accessible.
SF.EEPAccess
EEPROM Access
The TOE allows any page of EEPROM to have writes (or
erase) disallowed by setting the page to have a protect state.
If a write (or erase) is attempted to a protected page then it
will leave the page content unaltered. This protection is
permanent once set.
SF.Inject
Injection
B-7
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TOE Security Function
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Addressed issue
Each TOE is injected with data that uniquely identifies the
individual IC during manufacture. If specified for the
Smartcard Embedded Software included, then additional data
may also be injected during manufacture.
SF.MMCopro
The TOE provides coprocessor that carries out modular
multiplication. This forms the basis for software
implementation of algorithms such as RSA.
The ACL provides an implementation of the RSA and RSA
CRT algorithm using the hardware MMC. It also provides
secure generation of keys for the RSA and RSA CRT
algorithm using the hardware RNG and software PRNG.
The RSA and RSA CRT encryption, decryption and key
generation of the ACL clear all parts of the MMC of
intermediate results, keys and key parts immediately before
returning control of the calling environment.
SF.Hash
Hash functions
The ACL provides implementations of the hash functions
SHA-1 and RipeMD-160 according to the FIPS PUB 180-1
and ISO/IEC 10118-3:2003 respectively.
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed “high” (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 5.1.4].
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarized as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or process acting on behalf of
the human being.
With reference to the Protection Profile [7], the Security Target [6] defines socalled standard high level security concerns derived from considering the endusage phase (phase 7 of the lifecycle as described in the Security Target) as
follows:
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•
Manipulation of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE´s memories),
•
Disclosure of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE´s memories) and
•
Deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined by defining threats on a more
technical level for
•
Inherent information leakage
•
Physical probing
•
Physical manipulation
•
Malfunction due the Environmental Stress
•
Forced Information leakage
•
Abuse of Functionality
•
Deficiency of Random Numbers
Phase 1 and the phases from the TOE delivery up to the end of phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to the
TOE delivery is covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer/Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
development and production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Additionally, the Security Target defines the security concern about specific
attacks on the Smartcard Embedded Software the TOE is not able to detect or
to respond to. This concern is detailed in terms of the threats.
•
Inability of the TOE to detect an attack and
•
Inability of the Smartcard Embedded Software to respond to an attack
A specific additional security functionality for DES encryption and decryption
must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined
in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional threats and policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE cannot use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
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(Phase 3) or at the end of the IC packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus there are no special procedures for
generation or installation that are important for the secure use of the TOE. The
further production and delivery processes, like the Smartcard finishing process,
personalization and the delivery of the Smartcard to an enduser, have to be
organized in a way that excludes all posibilities of physical manipulation of the
TOE. There are no special security measures for the startup of the TOE besides
the requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined
operating conditions and the requirements on the software have to be applied
as described in the user documentation.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [7], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, phase 1 and the phases from TOE delivery up to the end of phase 6 are
covered by these assumptions from the PP.
The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software (phase 1) must ensure:
•
The apropriate „usage of hardware platform (A.Plat-Appl)“ while developing
this software in phase 1. Therefore it has to be ensured that the software
fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply the developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
•
The apropriate „treatment of the user data (A.Resp-Appl)“ while developing
this software in phase 1. The smartcard operating system and the smartcard
application software have to use security relevant user data (especially keys
and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the Security Policy
as defined for the specific application context of the environment does not
contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only appropriate secret keys
as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE have to be used to ensure
the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during packaging, finishing and personalization (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE delivery up to the end of phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to phase 7.
Following additional assumptions are defined in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
•
Date for injection/pre-personalization will be supplied from the various
bodies controlling the operations of the system in which the TOE will be
used. It is assumed that the generation, distribution, maintenance and
destruction of these data is adequately secure (A.InjDatSupp).
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1.7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1)
smartcard integrated circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
AE55C1 (HD65255C1)
02
Wafer or package module
1.4
Included in AE55C1 Test ROM
HW
Smartcard Integrated Circuit
2
SW
IC Dedicated Test Software
Test ROM software
3
SW
ACL (Advanced
Cryptographic Library)
1.43
Software module (this is
implemented in the Embedded
Software by the User)
4
DOC
Hardware Manual
1.0
Hardcopy
5
DOC
User Guidance
4.40
Hardcopy
6
DOC
Cryptographic Library
Manual
1.70
Hardcopy
7
DOC
Option List
1.3
Electronic data/ Hardcopy
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by HD65255C1 smartcard integrated circuit (short form
AE55C1), Version 02 (stored as a version number in the EEPROM) with ACL
version 1.43 produced in Naka (indicated by IC manufacturers ID number 4870
for Naka). The pre-personalization using the option list [11].
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery
procedures described in [9] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security function to be used
by the smartcard operating system and the smartcard application thus providing
an overall smartcard system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
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plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentification, protocols
and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide proctection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
•
Maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
•
Maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanism and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smartcard operating system and the application software stored in the user
ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test ROM
of the TOE (IC Dedicated Software) is used by the TOE manufacturer to check
the chip function before TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the
evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and
under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating systems software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smartcard applications need the security functions of the smartcard
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system and the smartcard
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smartcard application on top. These dependencies are expressed by
environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user
documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded
smartcard application software (i.e. smartcard operating system and
application). This was necessary as Renesas Technology Corp. is the TOE
developer and manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling
the embedded smartcard application software in its development and
production environment. For those aspects refer to chapter 9 of this report.
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Architectural Information
The Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit version 02
with ACL version 1.43 providing a hardware platform to a smartcard operating
system and smartcard application software. The top level block diagram and the
list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security
Target. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of
the Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit version 02 with
ACL version 1.43 is to be found in the Hardware Manual [12] and in the ACL
User Manual (ACLSM) [13].
For the implementation of the TOE security functions basically the components
CPU, EEPROM, ROM, RAM, system control registers, DES coprocessor,
Firewall Management Unit, a random number generator, the analog block with
security sensors, the random logic module for security logic and the ACL are
used. Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of
the whole circuitry.
The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of
the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
6
Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer (see also table 5 of this report)
•
Hardware Manual, Version 1.00, Hardcopy
•
User Guidance, Verison 4.40, Hardcopy
•
Cryptographic Library Manual, Version 1.70, Hardcopy
•
Option List, Version 1.3, Electronic data/ Hardcopy
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into five categories:
•
(i) tests which are performed in a simulation environment;
•
(ii) functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3) and in case TOE delivery is at the end of
phase 4, additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests are
done for every chip to check its correct functionality;
•
(iii) characterization tests, which were used to determine the behaviour of
the chip with respect to different operating conditions;
•
(iv) special verification tests for security functions which were done with
samples of the TOE and
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•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
(v) layout checks, tests that are executed to verify the correspondence
between the logic circuit data and the chip design data.
The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification and the high level design. Chips from
the production site in Naka (see Annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators could repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developer site, except
(v). The performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the
tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developer tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done.
Security features of the TOE realised by the specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
The evaluators gave evidence that the actual version of the TOE (Version 02
with IC manufacturer´s ID number 4870 for Naka) provides the security
functions as specified. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the
TOE security functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the
physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expert
know-how.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE identified by Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated
circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43, manufacturer´s ID number 4870 for
Naka. There is only one evaluated configuration of the TOE. This configuration
(all TSF are active and usable) has to be selected by the customer in the option
list at order. All information of how to use the TOE and ist security functions by
the software is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. However, some
evalution activities were performed in the test mode. For those cases, a rational
was provided why the results are also valid for the user mode.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
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The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body.
For smart card IC specific methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
Joint Interpretation Library - The application of CC to integrated circuits
(ii)
Joint Interpretation Library - Integrated Circuit Hardware Evaluation
Methodology, Vulnerability Assessment
(iii)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random
number generators
(iv)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic
random number generators
(see [4] AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 31) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage
ACM_SCP.2
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Fully defined external interface
ADV_FSP.2
PASS
Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_HLD.2
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Verdict
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Information correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.1
PASS
Informal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.1
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1
PASS
Well defined development tools
ALC_TAT.1
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: high-level design
ATE_DPT.1
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
CC Class AVA
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conform to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
•
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF.LeakProtect,
SF.ACL-LeakProtect,
SF.RNG and
SF.Hash.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
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This holds for the TOE Security Function SF.DES and for other usage of
encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the
TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Renesas AE55C1
(HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit version 02 with ACL version 1.43
produced in Naka (indicated by IC manufacturer´s ID number 4870 for Naka).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional evaluation results
To support the composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smartcard embedded software, additional evaluator actions were performed
during the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [16].
Therefore, refering to the life-cycle model for the TOE the interaction between
phase 1 and phase 2 is of importance and the interface between the smartcard
embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined.
10
Comments/Recommendations
1. The operational documentation [9], [12], [13] contains necessary information
about the usage of the TOE. For secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of
the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target has to be
taken into account. These requirements are stated in the guidance
document [9].
2. For evaluation of products or systems including the TOE as part or using the
TOE as a platform (e.g. smartcard operating systems or complete
smartcards), specific information resulting from this evalution is of
importance and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation.
3. The TOE software for random number postprocessing shall be implemented
by the embedded software developer as outlined in the guidance [9].
11
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
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Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [15] used for the evaluation performed.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
3DES
see Triple-DES
ACL
Advanced Cryptographic Library
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU
Central Processing Unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard
DMAC
Direct Memory Access Controller
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
FMU
Firewall Management Unit
HW
Hardware
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMC
Modular Multiplication Coprocessor
PP
Protection Profile
PRNG
Pseudo Random Number Generator
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann - a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
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SW
Software
TOE
Target of Evaluation
BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
AIS 20, Version 1, 02 Dezember 1999 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of deterministic random number generators
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July 2002
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July 2002
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-0329-2006, Version 12.0, 2 March 2006,
AE55C1 (HD65255C1) Version 02 with ACL version 1.43 Smartcard
Security Target, Renesas Technology Corp. (confidential document)
[7]
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001, Version v1.0, Smartcard IC
platform Protection Profile, July 2001, Eurosmart
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[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, March 22, 2006, Evaluation
Technical Report BSI-DSC-CC-0329 (confidential document)
[9]
Renesas 32-bit Smart Card Microcomputer AE-5 Series User Guidance
Manual, Rev. 4.40, Renesas Technology, 27 January 2006 (confidential
document)
[10]
FIPS PUB 46-3 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
Data Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed 25 Oct. 1999
[11]
Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for HD65255C1 [AE55C1]),
v.1.3, Renesas Technology Corp., 06 February 2006
[12]
AE55C1 Hardware Manual, Renesas Technology, Rev. 1.00, 15 March
2005
[13]
AE-5 Series Cryptographic Library, Renesas Technology, User´s Manual,
Rev. 1.70, 27 January 2006
[14]
FIPS PUB 180-1 Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
Secure Hash Standard, 17 April 1995
[15]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-0329-2006, Version 4.0, 30 January 2006,
AE55C1 (HD65255C1) Version 02 with ACL version 1.43 Smartcard
Security Target, Public Version, Renesas Technology Corp.
[16]
Evaluation Technical Report lite, Version 1.0, 22 March 2006, ETR-lite
for composition according to AIS36 (confidential document)
[17]
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, v1.0, Atmel,
Hitachi Europe, Infineon Technologies & Philips Semiconductors, March
2002
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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Certification Report
CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class
Class ACM: Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Class ADV: Development
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Class ALC: Life cycle support
Class ATE: Tests
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Administrator guidance
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
User guidance
Development security
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Covert channel analysis
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
Certification Report
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
EAL7
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Renesas AE55C1 (HD65255C1) smartcard integrated circuit
version 02 with ACL version 1.43 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999)
and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version
2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated March 28th, 2006, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Renesas Technology Corp. - Musashi site, 5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho,
Kodaira-shi, Tokyo, Japan (short name: Musashi)
b) Renesas Technology Corp. - Naka Site, 751 Horiguchi, Hitachinaka-shi,
Ibaraki Pref., Japan (short name: Naka), (wafer fab)
c) Dai Nippon Printing Co., Ltd., 2-2-1 Fukuoka, Fujimino-shi, Saitama
Pref., Japan (short name: DNP)
d) Hitachi ULSI Systems Co., Ltd. - Plaza site, 5-22-1 Jousuihon-cho,
Kodaira-shi, Tokyo, Japan
e) Renesas Technology Corp. - Kofu site, 4617 Kai-shi, Yamanashi Pref.,
Japan (short name: Kofu)
f) Renesas High Qualities, Inc., 4617 Kai-shi, Yamanashi Pref., Japan
(short name: RHQ)
g) Toyo Electronics Co., Ltd., 2781-1 Azahanatate, Shimosone, Nakamichicho, Higashiyasuhiro-gun, Yamanashi Pref., Japan (short name: Toyo)
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h) MTEX Matsumura Corp., 2-2-2 Kitamachi, Obanazawa-shi, Yamagata
Pref., Japan (short name: MTEX)
i) Renesas Technology Europe GmbH - Munich site, Dornbacher Straße 3,
85622 Feldkirchen bei München, Germany (short name: Munich)
The hardware part of the TOE produced at site (b) (Naka) is indicated by IC
manufacturer´s ID number 4870.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (Security Target BSI-DSZ-0329-2006,
Version 12.0, 2 March 2006, AE55C1 (HD65255C1) Version 02 with ACL
version 1.43 Smartcard Security Target, Renesas Technology Corp.
(confidential document)).
The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objectives for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 or 4 as stated in
the Security Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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