Certification Report: KECS-CR-13-04 KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KWKCK9(eng)

Certification Report: KECS-CR-13-04 KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KWKCK9(eng)
KECS-CR-13-04
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0435-2013
2013. 1. 28
IT Security Certification Center
History of Creation and Revision
No.
Date
Revised
Description
Pages
Certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1
00
2013.01.28
-
S3CT9KW/KC/K9
- First documentation
Certification Report
Page 2
This document is the certification report for KCOS e-Passport Version
2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 of KOMSCO.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association. (TTA)
Certification Report
Page 3
Table of Contents
1.
Executive Summary ............................................................................................. 5
2.
Identification......................................................................................................... 6
3.
Security Policy ..................................................................................................... 8
4.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ............................................................ 9
5.
Architectural Information .................................................................................. 10
6.
Documentation ................................................................................................... 11
7.
TOE Testing ........................................................................................................ 12
8.
Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................... 13
9.
Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 14
9.1
Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................ 14
9.2
Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ...................................................... 15
9.3
Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)................................................. 16
9.4
Development Evaluation (ADV) .............................................................. 16
9.5
Test Evaluation (ATE) ............................................................................. 17
9.6
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .............................................................. 18
9.7
Evaluation Result Summary ................................................................... 18
10. Recommendations ............................................................................................. 20
11. Security Target ................................................................................................... 21
12. Acronyms and Glossary .................................................................................... 21
13. Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 25
Certification Report
Page 4
1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL5+ evaluation of KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9
with reference to the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result and its soundness and
conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD chip) and embedded software (IC chip operating system(COS) and the
application of machine readable travel documents(MRTD application)) including Logical
Data Structure (LDS) according to the ICAO documents [5]. The TOE provides Basic
Access Control (BAC), Supplemental Access Control (SAC), Active Authentication (AA),
and Extended Access Control (EAC) defined in the ICAO‟s Machine Readable Travel
Documents, DOC 9303 Part 1 Volume 2, 6th edition, August 2006 [5], the BSI‟s
Advanced Security Mechanisms Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended
Access Control V1.11, February 2008 [6] and the ICAO MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access Control for
Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.01, November 2010 [12].
The TOE KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 is composed of the following
components:

IC chip S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Revision 2 provided by Samsung
Electronics, see ANSSI-CC-2012/70, and

Embedded software KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 provided by KOMSCO.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on December 28, 2012. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [7] and the Security Target (ST)
[8][9].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) ePassport Protection Profile
V2.1, June 10, 2012, KECS-PP-0163a-2009 [10]. All Security Assurance Requirements
(SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component in CC Part 3, and the
TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL5 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC
Certification Report
Page 5
Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon both
functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the Extended
Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in the ST.
Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE in the Personalization and
Operational Use phase.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Certification Report
Page 6
Type
Identifier
HW/SW
Samsung
Release
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/ Revision 2
S3CT9K9
16-bit
RISC
Delivery Form
IC Chip Module
(Note:
The
SW
is
Microcontroller for Smart Card,
contained in ROM and
Revision 2 with optional secure
EEPROM, but without
RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including
passport booklet and
specific IC Dedicated Software
the inlay embedded in
Secure RSA/ECC Library
V2.2
the passport booklet.),
TRNG Library
V2.0
Patch Code
SW
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1
Release 2
DOC
Operational User Guidance : EPS- V1.3
Softcopy or Hardcopy
03-QT-OPE-1.3
Preparative Procedures Guidance : V1.3
EPS-03-QT-PRE-1.3
[Table 1] TOE identification
The TOE is finalized at step ⑤ of the Phase 2(Manufacturing) according to the
ePassport PP [10]. After the TOE finalization, the ePassport manufacturer (i.e., inlay
and e-Cover manufacturer) embeds the TOE into the passport booklet. The inlay
production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE.
The Personalization Agency can only access the MRTD using the securely delivered
personalization key set. The personalization key set and the Guidance documents are
securely delivered (through PGP or directly from the SW developer to the
Personalization Agency).
Though the certified IC chip which is a component of the TOE provides Contact
interfaces and Contactless interfaces (Type A/Type B), the Contact and Type A
Contactless interfaces are not used by the TOE. Thus, the TOE provides Type B
Contactless interface only.
For details on the MRTD chips, the IC dedicated software and the crypto libraries, see
the documentation under ANSSI-CC-2012/70 [11].
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Certification Report
Page 7
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(September 1, 2009)
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9
- K2.1.02.01.SS.1420.02(S3CT9KW)
- K2.1.02.01.SS.140C.02(S3CT9KC)
- K2.1.02.01.SS.1409.02(S3CT9K9)

K2.1 : KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1

02 : Release number (2

01 : Patch version (1 Patch)

SS.140C.02 : IC chip identifier (Samsung S3CT9KC
nd
Masking)
st
Revision 2)
Common Criteria
Common
Criteria
for
Information
Technology
Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~
CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
EAL
EAL5+
(augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)
Developer
KOMSCO
Sponsor
KOMSCO
Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Completion Date of
December 28, 2012
Evaluation
Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [8][9] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the ePassport PP [10],
and the TOE complies security policies defined in the ePassport PP [10] by security
objectives and security requirements based on the ICAO document [5], EAC
specification [6], and SAC specification [12]. Thus the TOE provides security features
BAC and EAC(EAC-CA, EAC-TA) defined in the ePassport PP [10], SAC defined in the
Certification Report
Page 8
SAC specification [12] and AA.
Additionally, the TOE provides security features for Personalization Agent to protect
initialization data and ePassport identity data (during pre-personalization and
personalization phase):

Personalization Agent authentication, ensures only authorized entity can
access to the TOE during pre-personalization and personalization phase

Secure
messaging,
ensures
transmitted
data
to
be
protected
from
unauthorized disclosure and modification during pre-personalization and
personalization phase.
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as Security sensors/detectors, Active Shields against physical attacks,
Synthesizable glue logic, Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel
attacks, Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support, Secure coprocessor
for RSA and ECC Asymmetric Cryptographic Support, and a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG), that meet the “standard” level of ANSSI requirements and AIS31.
For more details refer to the Security Target Lite for the IC chip [13].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [8][9], chapter 3.3):

The Inspection System verifies the Security Object of Document (SOD) after
verifying validity of the certificate chain for PA in order to verify for forgery and
corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE. For this, the DS
certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically. The Inspection System shall
securely hold the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS
certificate and shall provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate, the DV
certificate and the IS certificate in the EAC-TA.

The Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms of PA, AA, SAC,
BAC and EAC according to the ICAO document [5], EAC specification [6] and
SAC specification [12] on the basis of the verifying policy of the ePassport for
the ePassport holder. Also, after session termination, the Inspection System
shall securely destroy all information, such as the BAC/SAC session key, the
Certification Report
Page 9
EAC session key and session information, etc., used in communication with
the TOE.

The seed for BAC authentication key takes the sufficient MRZ entropy to
ensure the secure BAC authentication key.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
ePassport Manufacturing Security, Procedures for ePassport Holder Confirmation,
Interoperability for ePassport, etc. Details can be found in the ST [8][9], chapter 3.1, 3.2
and 4.3.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified contactless MRTD chip and the embedded software
(i.e., COS and MRTD application).
[Figure 2] Scope of the TOE

MRTD chip provides security features such as Security sensors/detectors,
Active Shields against physical attacks, Synthesizable glue logic, Dedicated
Certification Report
Page 10
hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks, Secure DES and AES
Symmetric Cryptography support, Secure coprocessor for RSA and ECC
Asymmetric Cryptographic Support, and a True Random Number Generator
(TRNG).

COS, which processes commands and manages files according to ISO/IEC
7816-4, 8, and 9 [20], executes MRTD application and provides functions for
management of MRTD application data. The COS is contained in ROM.

MRTD Application provides BAC, SAC, AA, and EAC according to the ICAO
document [5], EAC Specification [6] and SAC specification [12]. It also
provides additional security mechanisms for personalization agent such as
authentication and personalization of ePassport. The MRTD Application is
contained in ROM.

MRTD Application Data is consisting of User Data such as ePassport identity
data and TSF Data such as BAC session Key. The MRTD Application Data is
contained in EEPROM. Also, Patch Code is contained in EEPROM.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [8][9].
6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier
KCOS
Release
e-Passport
Version
2.1
S3CT9KW/KC/K9 V1.3
Date
DEC 12, 2012
Operational User Guidance V1.3(EPS-03-QT-OPE-1.3)
Inspection
KCOS
e-Passport
Version
2.1
S3CT9KW/KC/K9 V1.3
DEC 12, 2012
Preparative Procedures Guidance V1.3(EPS-03-QT-PRE1.3)
[Table 3] Documentation
Certification Report
Page 11
7. TOE Testing
The developer‟s testing was performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform,
COS, and MRTD application.
Tests for the TOE are:

Standard and Security Mechanisms Test : Layer 6~7 MRTD Application
Protocol & Data Test (Security and Command Test, Logical Data Structure
Tests, etc.), which tests MRTD application according to Standard Test
Specifications (the ICAO Technical Report RF Protocol and Application Test
Standard, BSI TR-03105, BSI TR-03110, etc.),

Operational Mode Test : Additional features test which are not defined in the
ICAO document [5], EAC specification [6] and SAC specification [12] such as
pre-personalization, personalization and inspection, Positive and Negative Test
for APDUs in each TOE life cycle(8 phases), life cycle state change,

Other Test : Tests for secure operation of the TOE such as initialization,
residual information removal, anti-Tearing.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results according to the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSFI behaves
as described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and modules
(including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results according to the assurance
component ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests according to the
assurance component ATE_FUN.1.
The evaluator performed all the developer‟s tests, and conducted independent testing
based upon test cases devised by the evaluator. The TOE and test configuration are
identical to the developer‟s tests. The tests cover preparative procedures, according to
the guidance. Some tests were performed by design and source code analysis to verify
fulfillment of the requirements of the underlying platform to the COS and MRTD
Application. The implementation of the requirements of the platform‟s ETR and
guidance as well as of the MRTD security mechanisms was verified by the evaluators.
Also, the evaluator conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised by
the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities. These
test cases cover testing APDU commands, perturbation attacks, observation attacks
Certification Report
Page 12
such as SPA/DPA and SEMA/DEMA, fault injection attacks, and so on. No exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing high attack potential were found from
penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [7].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9. The TOE is composite
product consisting of the following components:

IC chips : S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 2 with optional secure RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including
specific IC Dedicated Software (ANSSI-CC-2012/70)
 Embedded software : KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU following:

Command APDU : 80F4000034

Part of Response APDU : 4B 21 02 01 140C 4250 02 9000 or 4B 21 02 01
1409 4250 02 9000 or 4B 21 02 01 1420 4250 02 9000

4B : K (KCOS)

21 : TOE Version (Version 2.1)

02 : Release number (2nd Masking)

01 : Patch version (1st Patch)

140C : IC chip identifier (S3CT9KW : 1420, S3CT9KC : 140C, S3CT9K9 :
1409)

4250 : IC Manufacturer (Samsung)

02 : IC Chip Version (Revision 2)
 9000 : Response APDU Status Word
The TOE provides Type B contactless interface only.
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
Certification Report
Page 13
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [7] which references
Work Package Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [15], [16], [17], [18]. Also the
evaluation facility utilized German scheme‟s Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance
Class for EAL5+ and EAL6 [14] under confirmation of the CB.
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL5 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
Certification Report
Page 14
ST of the IC chip according to the CCRA supporting document Composite Product
Evaluation [15].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results,
and implementation standards have been applied. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ALC_TAT.2.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws, development tools and related
information, and the evaluation evidence. These configuration items are controlled in
accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_CMS.5.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Additionally,
sufficiency of the measures as applied is intended be justified. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.2.
The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Certification Report
Page 15
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing and SFR-supporting
modules and enough information about the SFR-non-interfering modules for the
evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented; as
such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.4.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.5.
Certification Report
Page 16
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.2.
The TSF internal is well-structured such that the likelihood of flaws is reduced and that
maintenance can be more readily performed without the introduction of flaws.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_INT.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description), and TSF internals description (which describes evidence of the structure
of the design and implementation of the TSF). In addition, there is a security
architecture description (which describes the architectural properties of the TSF to
explain how its security enforcement cannot be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and modules against the TOE design
and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ATE_DPT.3.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
Certification Report
Page 17
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing High attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE.Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.5.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [15].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don‟t allow attackers possessing High attack potential to violate the
SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
ASE
ASE_INT.1
Assurance
Assurance
Component
Class
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.1E
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E
PASS
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_CCL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
Certification Report
Page 18
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
ALC
AGD
ADV
AVA
Assurance
Component
Class
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_OBJ.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E
PASS
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_REQ.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E
PASS
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_LCD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_TAT.2
ALC_TAT.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_CMS.5.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_DVS.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_DVS.2.2E
PASS
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DEL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E
PASS
PASS
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_TDS.4.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_TDS.4.2E
PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.5.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.5.2E
PASS
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_IMP.2
ADV_IMP.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_INT.2
ADV_INT.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_INT.2.2E
PASS
ATE_COV.2
ATE_COV.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_DPT.3.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2
ATE_IND.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E
PASS
ATE_IND.2.3E
PASS
AVA_VAN.5.1E
PASS
ADV_FSP.5
ATE
Assurance
AVA_VAN.5
Certification Report
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Page 19
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
AVA_VAN.5.2E
PASS
AVA_VAN.5.3E
PASS
AVA_VAN.5.4E
PASS
Assurance
Assurance
Component
Class
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:

The Guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security recommendations
have to be considered. All aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Organizational
Security Policies in the ST [8][9] not covered by the TOE itself need to be
fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The TOE can be configured in a way that it deactivates EAC by excluding DG3
and DG4 from the ePassport. Though it depends on the policy of the
Personalization Agents whether they activate EAC or not, it is strongly
recommended that the Personalization Agent activates EAC by including DG3
and DG4 because the evaluated TOE configuration includes EAC.

When secure messaging is not applied during personalization phase according
to the policy of the Personalization Agent, it is strongly recommended that the
physical, procedural and personal security measures are in place in order to
ensure
confidentiality
and
integrity
of
the
transmitted
data
during
personalization phase.

It has to be ensured that MRZ data which are used to derive BAC
authentication keys provides sufficient entropy to withstand related attacks.

The TOE supports both SAC and BAC to ensure global interoperability. Thus,
the Inspection System SHOULD use SAC instead of BAC.
Certification Report
Page 20
11. Security Target
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 Security Target V1.5, DEC 12, 2012 [8]
is included in this report by reference. For the purpose of publication, it is provided as
sanitized version [9] according to the CCRA supporting document ST sanitising for
publication [19].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
CC
Common Criteria
DG
Data Group
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
IS
Inspection System
BIS
BAC/SAC supporting Inspection System
EIS
EAC supporting Inspection System
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ
Machine Readable Zone
PP
Protection Profile
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
AA
The security mechanism with which the MRTD chip
(Active Authentication)
demonstrates its genuine to the IS by signing random
number transmitted from the IS and the IS verifies
genuine of the MRTD chip through verification with the
signed values
BAC
The security mechanism that implements the symmetric
(Basic Access Control)
key‐based entity authentication protocol for mutual
authentication of the MRTD chip and the IS (BIS) and
Certification Report
Page 21
the symmetric key‐based key distribution protocol to
generate the session keys necessary in establishing the
secure messaging for the MRTD chip and the IS
SAC
The security mechanism is supplementary to BAC. The
(Supplemental Access
SAC performs mutual authentication for the MRTD chip
Control)
and the IS (BIS) to access control of personal data of the
ePassport holder and establishes the secure messaging
for the MRTD chip and the IS
CSCA
The root CA that generates and issues the CSCA
(Country Signing
certificate and the DV certificate by securely generating
Certification Authority)
the digital signature key in the PA‐PKI to support the PA
security mechanisms
CSCA Certificate
The certificate to demonstrate validity of the digital
signature verification key for the digital signature
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA by signature on
the digital signature verification key with digital signature
generation key of the PA‐PKI root CA
CVCA
The root CA that generates and issues the CVCA
(Country Verifying
certificate, the CVCA link certificate and the DV
Certification Authority)
certificate by securely generating digital signature key in
the EAC‐PKI to support the EAC security mechanisms
CVCA Certificate
The certificate that includes digital signature value by the
EAC‐PKI root CA with digital signature generation key of
the EAC‐PKI root CA on the digital signature verification
key in order to demonstrate validity of the CVCA link
certificate and the DV certificate
CVCA Link Certificate
The certificate that includes digital signature value that
the EAC‐PKI root CA with the digital signature
generation key that corresponds to the previous CVCA
certificate after generating a new CVCA certificate before
expiring the valid date of the CVCA certificate
DS(Document Signer)
The certificate of the Personalization agent signed with
Certificate
the digital signature generation key of the PA‐PKI root
CA used by the IS to verify the SOD of the PA security
mechanism
DV
Certification Report
The CA(Certification Authority) that generates and
Page 22
(Document Verifier)
issues the IS certificate
DV Certificate
The certificate that includes digital signature value on the
digital signature verification key of the IS with the digital
signature generation key of the DV in order to
demonstrate validity of the digital signature verification
key of the IS
EAC (Extended Access
The security mechanisms consisted with the EAC‐CA for
Control)
chip
authentication and
the EAC‐TA for
the IS
authentication in order to enable only the EAC
supporting Inspection System (EIS) to read the biometric
data of the ePassport holder for access control to the
biometric data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip
EAC‐CA
The
security
mechanism
to
implement
the
(EAC‐chip Authentication)
Ephemeral‐Static DH key distribution protocol (PKCS#3,
ANSI X.42, etc.) to enable the MRTD chip authentication
by the EIS through key checking for the EAC chip
authentication public key and private key of the MRTD
chip and temporary public key and private key of the EIS
EAC‐TA
The security mechanism that the EIS transmits values
(EAC‐terminal
digital signature with the digital signature generation key
Authentication)
of its own to the temporary public key used in the
EAC‐CA and the MRTD chip by using the IS certificate,
verifies the digital signature. This security mechanism
implements challenge‐response authentication protocol
based on digital signature through which the MRTD chip
authenticates the EIS.
ePassport
The passport embedded the contactless IC chip in which
identity and other data of the ePassport holder stored
according to the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and the International Standard Organization
(ISO)
ePassport identity data
Including personal data of the ePassport holder and
biometric data of the ePassport holder
IS
As an information system that implements optical MRZ
(Inspection System)
reading function and the security mechanisms (PA, BAC,
Certification Report
Page 23
EAC and AA, etc.) to support the ePassport inspection,
the IS consists with a terminal that establishes the RF
communication with the MRTD chip and the system that
transmits commands to the MRTD chip through this
terminal and processes responses for the commands
IS Certificate
Certificate used by the MRTD chip to verify the digital
signature transmitted by the IS in the EAC‐TA. The DV
performs a digital signature on the digital signature
verification key of the EIS with the digital signature
generation key
LDS
Logical data structure defined in the ICAO document in
(Logical Data Structure)
order to store the user data in the MRTD chip
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document, e.g. passport, visa
or official document of identity accepted for travel
purposes
MRTD Application
Program for loaded in the MRTD chip that is
programmed by the LDS of the ICAO document and
provides security mechanisms of BAC, PA and EAC, etc.
MRTD Chip
The contactless IC chip that includes the MRTD
application and the IC chip operating system necessary
in operation of the MRTD application and that supports
communications protocol by ISO/IEC 14443
PA
The security mechanism to demonstrate that identity
(Passive Authentication)
data recorded in the ePassport has not been forgery and
corruption as the IS with the DS certificate verifies the
digital signature in the SOD and hash value of user data
according to read‐right of the ePassport access control
policy
Personalization agent
The agent receives the ePassport identity data from the
Reception organization and generates the SOD by
digital signature on the data. After recording them in the
MRTD chip, the personalization agent generates TSF
data and stores it in the secure memory of the MRTD
chip. The agent also operates PA‐PKI and/ or EAC‐PKI
SOD
The SOD refers to the ePassport identity data and the
(Document Security Object)
ePassport
Certification Report
authentication
data
recorded
in
the
Page 24
Personalization phase by the Personalization agent that
is signed by the Personalization agent with the digital
signature generation key. The SOD is an object
implemented with signed data type of „RFC 3369
cryptographic message syntax, 2002.8‟ and encoded
with DER method
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-001 ~ CCMB-2009-07-003, July 2009
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 3, CCMB-2009-07-004, July 2009
[3]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (September 1,
2009)
[4]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5]
Doc9303 “Machine Readable Travel Documents” Part1 “Machine Readable
Passports” Volume 2 “Specification for Electronically Enabled Passports with
Biometric Identification Capability” Sixth Edition, International Civil Aviation
Organization(ICAO), August 2006
[6]
Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents-Extended Access Control(EAC), Version1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamtfür Sicherheitinder Informationstechnik(BSI), February 2008
[7]
TTA-CCE-12-006 KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 Evaluation
Technical Report V1.3, January 15, 2013
[8]
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 Security Target V1.5,
December 12, 2012 (Confidential Version)
[9]
KCOS e-Passport Version 2.1 S3CT9KW/KC/K9 Security Target Lite V1.0,
January 17, 2013 (Sanitized Version)
[10]
ePassport Protection Profile V2.1, June 10, 2012, KECS-PP-0163a-2009
Certification Report
Page 25
[11]
Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2012/70 – Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/
S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 with optional
secure RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including specific IC Dedicated Software,
October 12, 2012, ANSSI
[12]
ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT,
Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version
1.01, November 2010
[13]
Security Target Lite of Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional secure RSA and ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated Software Version 2.2, September 26, 2012
[14]
Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 34, Version 3,
BSI, March 9, 2009
[15]
Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.0
Revision 1, CCDB-2007-09-01, September 2007
[16]
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcard Version 2.7 Revision 1, CCDB2009-03-001, March 2009
[17]
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB2009-03-002, March 2009
[18]
Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.0 Revision 1,
CCDB-2009-03-003, September 2009
[19]
ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[20]
ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[21]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
Certification Report
Page 26
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertisement