Security Target: st_vid10672
Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900 Series,
5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500
Series, and 12900 Series Switches Security
Target
Version 1.0
4 March 2016
Prepared for:
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
11445 Compaq Center Drive West
Houston, Texas 77070
Prepared by:
Leidos Inc (formerly Science Applications International Corporation)
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive, Columbia, Maryland 21046
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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................4
1.1
SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................4
1.2
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .................................................................................................................................5
1.3
CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................6
1.3.1
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................7
2.
TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................................................8
2.1
TOE OVERVIEW ...........................................................................................................................................9
2.1.1
5900 Series Switches ............................................................................................................................. 9
2.1.2
5920 Series Switches ............................................................................................................................. 9
2.1.3
5930 Series Switches ........................................................................................................................... 10
2.1.4
10500 Series Switches ......................................................................................................................... 10
2.1.5
12500 Series Switches ......................................................................................................................... 11
2.1.6
12900 Series Switches ......................................................................................................................... 11
2.2
TOE ARCHITECTURE .................................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.1
Modular Design ................................................................................................................................... 13
2.2.2
Intelligent Resilient Framework .......................................................................................................... 14
2.2.3
Multitenant Device Context ................................................................................................................. 14
2.2.4
Physical Boundaries ............................................................................................................................. 14
2.2.5
Logical Boundaries .............................................................................................................................. 16
2.3
TOE DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................................ 17
3.
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................................... 18
4.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 19
4.1
5.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT........................................................................................... 19
IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................................. 20
5.1
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 20
5.2
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 21
5.2.1
Security Audit (FAU) .......................................................................................................................... 22
5.2.2
Cryptographic Support (FCS) .............................................................................................................. 23
5.2.3
User Data Protection (FDP) ................................................................................................................. 25
5.2.4
Identification and Authentication (FIA) .............................................................................................. 26
5.2.5
Security Management (FMT) .............................................................................................................. 26
5.2.6
Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................ 27
5.2.7
TOE Access (FTA) .............................................................................................................................. 27
5.2.8
Trusted path/channels (FTP) ................................................................................................................ 28
5.3
6.
TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................... 29
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .............................................................................................................. 29
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
SECURITY AUDIT .......................................................................................................................................... 29
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ........................................................................................................................... 30
USER DATA PROTECTION ............................................................................................................................. 38
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ...................................................................................................... 39
SECURITY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................. 39
PROTECTION OF THE TSF ............................................................................................................................. 40
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TOE ACCESS ................................................................................................................................................ 41
TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS .......................................................................................................................... 42
7.
PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ............................................................................................................... 43
8.
RATIONALE ..................................................................................................................................................... 44
8.1
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................ 44
APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTATION FOR HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE 5900, 5920, 5930, 10500,
12500, AND 12900 SWITCHES ............................................................................................................................... 46
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Series and Devices .................................................................................................................................5
Table 2 TOE Series, Devices, and CPUs .................................................................................................................. 16
Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components ..................................................................................................... 21
Table 4: Auditable Events ......................................................................................................................................... 23
Table 5: Assurance Components .............................................................................................................................. 29
Table 6: Cryptographic Functions ........................................................................................................................... 31
Table 7: NIST SP800-56B Conformance ................................................................................................................. 32
Table 8: Key/CSP Zeroization Summary ................................................................................................................ 36
Table 9 SFR Protection Profile Sources .................................................................................................................. 43
Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping ....................................................................................... 45
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST
conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900, 5920, 5930, 10500,
12500, and 12900 Series Switches provided by Hewlett Packard Enterprise. Each device in the TOE is a stand-alone
gigabit Ethernet switch that implements network layers 2 and 3 switching, service and routing operations.
The focus of the evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the Protection Profile for Network
Devices (NDPP). The only capabilities covered by the evaluation are those specified in the aforementioned
Protection Profile, all other capabilities are not covered in the evaluation. The security functionality specified in
[NDPP], includes protection of communications with remote administrators and trusted IT entities, identification
and authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, ability to verify the source and integrity of
updates to the TOE, and specifies NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms.
The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

TOE Description (Section 2)

Security Problem Definition (Section 3)

Security Objectives (Section 4)

IT Security Requirements (Section 5)

TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)

Rationale (Section 8).
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and
12900 Series Switches Security Target
ST Version – Version 1.0
ST Date – 16 February 2016
TOE Identification – Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900 Series, 5920 Series, and 5930 Series running Comware
V7.1.045 Release 2423, 10500 Series running Comware V7.1.045 Release 7170, 12500 Series Switches running
Comware 7.1.045, Release 7376, and 12900 Series running Comware 7.1.045 Release 1138 P02.
On November 1, 2015, Hewlett-Packard became two separate companies: Hewlett Packard Enterprise and HP Inc.
The network products are part of the new Hewlett Packard Enterprise. The former HP network switches and routers
are undergoing product rebranding. The rebranding is not complete in the documentation and on the websites. The
TOE maybe referred to with the suffix “HP”, “HP FlexFabric”, “HPE” or “HPE FlexFabric”. For the purpose of this
evaluation, these name variations are used interchangeably and refer to the same product.
Product Series
Specific Devices
HP 5900
HP 5900AF-48XG-4QSFP+ Switch (JG772A)
HP 5900AF-48XGT-4QSFP+ Switch (JG336A)
HP 5900AF-48G-4XG-2QSFP+ Switch (JG510A)
HP FlexFabric 5900CP-48XG-4QSFP + Switch (JG838A)
HP 5920
HP 5920AF-24XG Switch (JG296A)
HP 5930
HP FlexFabric 5930-32QSFP+Switch (JG726A)
HP FlexFabric 5930-4Slot Switch (JH179A)
HP FlexFabric 5930 2QSFP+ 2-slot Switch (JH178A)
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HP 10500
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HP 10504 Switch Chassis (JC613A)
HP 10508 Switch Chassis (JC612A)
HP 10508-V Switch Chassis (JC611A)
HP 10512 Switch Chassis (JC748A)
Each chassis requires a compatible Main Processing Unit. The
following are included in the evaluated configuration:



HP 12500
HP 12900
HP 10500 Type A Main Processing Unit with Comware v7
Operating System (JG496A)
HP 10500 Type D Main Processing Unit with Comware v7
Operating System (JH198A)
HP 10500 Type D TAA-compliant Main Processing Unit
with Comware v7 Operating System (JH206A)
HP 12504 (AC) Switch Chassis (JC654A)
HP 12504 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC655A)
HP 12508 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF421C)
HP 12508E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG782A)
HP 12508 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC652A)
HP 12508E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG783A)
HP 12518 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF430C)
HP 12518E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG784A)
HP 12518 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC653A)
HP 12518E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG785A)
Each chassis requires one of the following:

HP 12500 Type A Main Processing Unit with Comware v7
Operating System (JG497A)

HP 12500,LSTM5MRPNC,Management and Route
Unit,With OAM Module,JC072B,Overseas Version
(JC072B)

HP FlexFabric 12500E,LSTM5MRPNE1,Management and
Route Process Unit,JG802A,Overseas Version (JG802A)
HP FlexFabric 12910 Switch AC Chassis with 12910 Main Processing
Unit (JG621A)
HP FlexFabric 12916 Switch AC Chassis with 12916 Main Processing
Unit (JG634A)
Table 1 TOE Series and Devices
TOE Developer – Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Evaluation Sponsor – Hewlett Packard Enterprise
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3,
July 2009
1.2 Conformance Claims
This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012, as
amended by Errata #3 dated 3 November 2014, and including the following optional SFRs:
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1; FCS_SSH_EXT.1; and FIA_PSK_EXT.1. The following NIAP Technical Decisions
apply to this PP and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation:
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
TD0004: FCS_TLS_EXT Man-in-the-Middle Test - This Technical Decision removes the
FCS_TLS_EXT man-in-the-middle tests for the NDPP (FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1, Test 2), pending
development of new TLS requirements and assurance activities and identification of suitable test
tools.

TD0005: FPT_ITT Test 3 Resolution - This Technical Decision removes the need to perform
Test 3 associated with FPT_ITT.1 in NDPP, consistent with the test requirements for FTP_ITC.1
and FTP_TRP.1.

TD0011: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 Clarification - The SFR requires that the SSH transport
implementation use specific encryption algorithms. The TD clarifies that the restrictions must be
implemented by the TOE and cannot be reliant upon configuration of the SSH client.

TD0012: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 - Algorithms not identified in FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 must not be
allowed; other cipher suites (such as 3DES-CBC) must be disabled in evaluated configurations.
The Assurance Activities associated with this requirement must verify that connection attempts
with algorithms not listed in FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 are denied. The NDPP was updated via errata to
reflect this decision.

TD0017: NDPP Audit Shutdown - This Technical Decision allows for the use of a startup audit
record to indicate audit shutdown in the event of an uncontrolled shutdown.

TD0026: FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - This Technical Decision allows for the administrator following
TOE guidance to reject an illegitimate update detected by the TOE, in addition to the TOE
rejecting the update automatically (during testing).

TD0032: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 – The SFR was rewritten to conditionally require password-based
authentication.
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009.


Part 2 Extended
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 3, July 2009.

Part 3 Conformant
1.3 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:

Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o
Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example
FDP_ACC.1(1) and FDP_ACC.1(2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the
FDP_ACC.1 requirement, (1) and (2).
o
Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that an assignment within a
selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (e.g., [[selectedassignment]]).
o
Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o
Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,
and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”). Note that
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‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any explicit
identification.

The NDPP uses an additional convention – the ‘case’ – which defines parts of an SFR that apply only when
corresponding selections are made or some other identified conditions exist. Only the applicable cases are
identified in this ST and they are identified using bold text.

Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
1.3.1 Abbreviations and Acronyms
AAA
ACL
AES
CBC
CC
CM
CLI
DH
FIPS
GbE
HMAC
IP
IPsec
IRF
ISSU
IT
LACP
MDC
MPLS
NDPP
OAA
OSPF
PP
QoS
RADIUS
RSA
RTC
SA
SAR
SFP
SFR
SHA
SSH
ST
TACACS+
TOE
TRILL
TSF
VLAN
Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
Access Control List
Advanced Encryption Standard
Cipher-Block Chaining
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Configuration Management
Command Line Interface
Diffie-Hellman
Federal Information Processing Standard
Gigabit Ethernet
Hashed Message Authentication Code
Internet Protocol
Internet Protocol Security
Intelligent Resilient Framework
In Service Software Upgrades
Information Technology
Link Aggregation Control Protocol
Multitenant device context
Multiprotocol Label Switching
Protection Profile for Network Devices
Open Application Architecture
Open Shortest Path First
Protection Profile
Quality of Service
Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)
Real-Time Clock
Security Association
Security Assurance Requirement
Small Form-factor Pluggable
Security Functional Requirement
Secure Hash Algorithm
Secure Shell
Security Target
Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus
Target of Evaluation
Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links
TOE Security Functions
Virtual Local Area Network
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2. TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900, 5920, 5930, 10500, 12500 and 12900
Series Switches. The 5900 Series devices in the evaluated configuration are as follows:

HP 5900AF-48XG-4QSFP+ switch (JG772A),

HP 5900AF-48XGT-4QSFP+ Switch (JG336A),

HP 5900AF-48G-4XG-2QSFP+ Switch (JG510A),

HP FlexFabric 5900CP-48XG-4QSFP + Switch (JG838A).
The 5920 Series device in the evaluated configuration is the HP 5920AF-24XG switch (JG296A).
The 5930 Series device in the evaluated configuration are as follows,

HP FlexFabric 5930-32QSFP+Switch (JG726A),

HP FlexFabric 5930-4Slot Switch (JH179A),

HP FlexFabric 5930 2QSFP+ 2-slot Switch (JH178A).
The 10500 Series devices in the evaluated configuration are as follows:

HP 10504 switch chassis (JC613A),

HP 10508 Switch Chassis (JC612A),

HP 10508-V Switch Chassis (JC611A),

HP 10512 Switch Chassis (JC748A).
Each 10500 device must have one of the following Main Processing Units:

HP 10500 Type A Main Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating System (JG496A)

HP 10500 Type D Main Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating System (JH198A)

HP 10500 Type D TAA-compliant Main Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating System (JH206A)
The 12500 Series devices in the evaluated configuration are as follows, each with the HP 12500 Type A Main
Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating System (JG497A) :

HP 12504 (AC) switch chassis (JC654A),

HP 12504 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC655A),

HP 12508 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF421C),

HP 12508E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG782A),

HP 12508 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC652A),

HP 12508E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG783A),

HP 12518 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF430C),

HP 12518E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG784A),

HP 12518 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC653A),

HP 12518E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG785A).
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Each chassis requires one of the following:

HP 12500 Type A Main Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating System (JG497A)

HP 12500,LSTM5MRPNC,Management and Route Unit,With OAM Module,JC072B, Overseas Version
(JC072B)
HP FlexFabric 12500E, LSTM5MRPNE1, Management and Route Process Unit, JG802A, Overseas
Version (JG802A)
The 12900 Series devices in the evaluated configuration are as follows, each with the HP 12900 Main Processing
Unit:

HP FlexFabric 12910 Switch AC Chassis with 12910 Main Processing Unit (JG621A)

HP FlexFabric 12916 Switch AC Chassis with 12916 Main Processing Unit (JG634A)
Each series of switches included in the TOE comprises a set of distinct devices (as identified in Section 1.1), which
vary primarily according to power delivery, performance, and port density.
The 5900, 5920 and the 5930 switches have a fixed number of ports. In the evaluated configuration, they can be
deployed as a single 5900 or 5920 Series device or alternately as a group of up to four 5900, 5920 or 5930 Series
devices connected using the Hewlett Packard Enterprise Intelligent Resilient Framework (IRF) technology to
effectively form a logical switch device, allowing up to four switches to be grouped together to form a single logical
switch device.
The IRF technology requires that devices be directly connected to one another using an IRF stack utilizing one or
more dedicated Ethernet connections that are used to coordinate the overall logical switch configuration and also to
forward applicable network traffic as necessary between attached devices.
The 10500, 12500, and 12900 Series support plug-in modules, which provide additional functionality (e.g., various
numbers and types of network connection ports), and security blades, which offer additional advanced security
functions (e.g., firewall). With the exception of pluggable security blades, all of the available optional plug-in
modules extend the physically available ports and do not otherwise affect any of the claimed security functions (see
below). The security blades offer additional advanced (e.g., firewall) security functions and are intended to be
addressed in an alternate evaluation. As with the 5900, 5920, and 5930 Series, a 10500, 12500, or 12900 Series
switch can be deployed as a single device or alternately as a group of devices connected using IRF technology to
effectively form a logical switch device. For the 10500, 12500, and 12900 Series devices, the IRF technology does
not require that switches be co-located and can be part of a disaster recovery system. Switches can be attached using
standard Link Aggregation Control (LACP) for automatic load balancing and high availability.
2.1 TOE Overview
The various switches comprising the TOE are all gigabit Ethernet switch appliances that consist of hardware and
software components. While the physical form factor of each distinct series is substantially different, the underlying
hardware shares a similar architecture. The software shares a common code base of a modular nature, with only the
modules applicable for the specific hardware installed.
2.1.1 5900 Series Switches
The HP 5900 series comprises high-density 10 gigabit Ethernet (10GbE), ultra-low latency, top-of-rack switches,
suited for deployment at the server access layer of a large enterprise data center or for deployment at the data center
core layer of medium-sized enterprises. They provide 48 high-density 10GbE ports and IPv6 support with full layer
2 and layer 3 features. The HP IRF is also supported, allowing up to four 5900AF switches to be grouped together
and managed as a single switch with a single IP address.
2.1.2 5920 Series Switches
The HP 5920 series comprises a high-density 10 gigabit Ethernet (10GbE), and ultra-deep packet buffering that
provides up to a 3.6 GB packet buffer to reduce network congestion. The top-of-rack switch is suited for
deployments at the server access layer of large enterprise data centers. The switch provides 24 high-density 10GbE
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ports and IPv6 support with full layer 2 and layer 3 features. The HP IRF is also supported, allowing up to four
5920AF switches to be grouped together and managed as a single switch with a single IP address.
2.1.3 5930 Series Switches
The HP 5930 series comprises a high-density 40 gigabit Ethernet (40GbE), top-of-rack switch, suited for
deployments at the server access layer of large enterprise data centers. The switch provides 32 high-density 40GbE
ports and IPv6 support with full layer 2 and layer 3 features. The Hewlett Packard Enterprise IRF is also supported,
allowing up to four 5930 switches to be grouped together and managed as a single switch with a single IP address.
The 5930 series supports the following optional modules, which extend the physically available ports and do not
otherwise affect any of the claimed security functions:





HPE 5930 24-port SFP+ and 2-port QSFP+ Module (JH180A)
HPE 5930 24-port SFP+ and 2-port QSFP+ with MacSec Module (JH181A)
HPE 5930 24-port 10GBASE-T and 2-port QSFP+ with MacSec Module (JH182A)
HPE 5930 8-port QSFP+ Module (JH183A)
HPE 5930 24-port Converged Port and 2-port QSFP+ Module (JH184A)
2.1.4 10500 Series Switches
The HP 10500 series comprises gigabit Ethernet switches designed for enterprise campus core networks that provide
10GbE/40GbE port density. They support layer 2 switching, select layer 3 services, static layer 3 routing and
provide dual IP stack to transition from IPv4 to IPv6. The Hewlett Packard Enterprise IRF is also supported,
allowing up to four 10500 switches to be grouped together and managed as a single switch with a single IP address.
The 10500 series supports the following optional modules, which extend the physically available ports and do not
otherwise affect any of the claimed security functions:




























HP 10500 16-port GbE SFP/8-port GbE Combo/2-port 10GbE XFP SE Module (JC617A)
HP 10500 48-port Gig-T SE Module (JC618A)
HP 10500 48-port GbE SFP SE Module (JC619A)
HP 10500 4-port 10GbE XFP SE Module (JC620A)
HP 10500 16-port GbE SFP/8-port GbE Combo/2-port 10GbE XFP EA Module (JC621A)
HP 10500 48-port GbE SFP EA Module (JC622A)
HP 10500 48-port Gig-T EA Module (JC623A)
HP 10500 4-port 10GbE XFP EA Module (JC624A)
HP 10500 48-port GbE SFP EB Module (JC625A)
HP 10500 16-port GbE SFP/8-port GbE Combo/2-port 10GbE XFP EB Module (JC626A)
HP 10500 4-port 10GbE XFP EB Module (JC627A)
HP 10500 16-port 10GbE SFP+ SC Module (JC628A)
HP 10500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ EB Module (JC629A)
HP 10500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ EA Module (JC630A)
HP 10500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ SE Module (JC631A)
HP 10500 32-port 10GbE SFP+ SF Module (JC755A)
HP 10500 48-port 10GbE SFP+ SF Module (JC756A)
HP 10500 4-port 40GbE QSFP+ SF Module (JC757A)
HP 10500 16-port GbE SFP / 8-port GbE Combo SE Module (JC763A)
HP 10500 8-port 40GbE QSFP+ SF Module (JG392A)
HP 10500 4-port 40GbE CFP SF Module (JG396A)
HP 10508/10508-V 640Gbps Type A Fabric Module (JC616A)
HP 10504 320Gbps Type A Fabric Module (JC615A)
HP 10512 960Gbps Type B Fabric Module (JC749A)
HP 10512 2.88Tbps Type D Fabric Module (JC750A)
HP 10504 640Gbps Type B Fabric Module (JC751A)
HP 10504 960Gbps Type D Fabric Module (JC752A)
HP 10508 640Gbps Type B Fabric Module (JC753A)
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HP 10508 1.92Tbps Type D Fabric Module (JC754A).
2.1.5 12500 Series Switches
The HP 12500 series comprises routing switches with capacity for the network core or the data center and support
IRF technology, allowing up to four 12500 switches to be grouped together and managed as a single switch with a
single IP address. The 12500 series is intended for organizations contemplating large-scale data center or campus
consolidations, business continuity and disaster recovery sites, metropolitan area network deployments, and other
applications requiring a robust, high-performance switching platform. The 12500 series supports the following
optional modules, which extend available network connectivity and do not otherwise affect any of the claimed
security functions:


















HPE FlexFabric 12500 4-port 100GbE CFP FD Module (JG786A)
HPE FlexFabric 12500 4-port 100GbE CFP FG Module (JG788A)
HPE FlexFabric 12500 16-port 40GbE QSFP+ FD Module (JG790A)
HPE FlexFabric 12500 48-port 1/10GbE SFP+ FD Module (JG796A)
HPE FlexFabric 12500 40-port 1/10GbE SFP+ FD Module (JG792A)
HPE FlexFabric 12500 40-port 1/10GbE SFP+ FG Module (JG794A)
HPE 12500 16-port 10GbE SFP+ LEB Module (JC782A)
HPE 12500 16-port 10GbE SFP+ LEC Module (JC783A)
HPE 12500 32-port 10GbE SFP+ REB Module (JC064B)
HPE 12500 32-port 10GbE SFP+ REC Module (JC476B)
HPE 12500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ LEB Module (JC780A)
HPE 12500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ LEC Module (JC781A)
HPE 12500 8-port 10GbE SFP+ LEF Module (JC659A)
HPE 12500 48-port Gig-T LEB Module (JC074B)J
HPE 12500 48-port Gig-T LEC Module (JC065B)
HPE 12500 48-port GbE SFP LEB Module (JC075B)
HPE 12500 48-port GbE SFP LEC Module (JC069B)
HPE 12500 48-port GbE SFP LEF Module (JC660A)
2.1.6 12900 Series Switches
The HP 12900 series comprises routing switches to support virtualized data centers and the evolving needs of
private and public cloud deployments with capacity for the network core or the data center and support IRF
technology, allowing two or more switches perform as a single L2 switch and L3 router. The HP 12916 supports a
maximum of 768 Gigabit Ethernet ports or 768 1/10GbE ports or 384 40GbE ports or 64 100GbE ports, or a
combination of the three. The HP 12910 supports a maximum of 480 Gigabit Ethernet ports or 480 1/10GbE ports
or 240 40GbE ports or 40 100GbE ports, or a combination of the three. The 12900 series supports the following
optional modules, which extend available network connectivity and do not otherwise affect any of the claimed
security functions:
 HP 12900 48-port 1/10GbE SFP+ FC Module (JG888A)
 HP 12900 24-port 40GbE QSFP+ FC Module (JG889A)
 HP 12900 48-port 1/10GbE SFP+ EC Module (JG626A)
 HP 12900 12-port 40GbE QSFP+ EC Module (JG857A)
 HP 12900 4-port 100GbE CFP EC Module (JG858A)
 HP 12900 48-port GbE SFP EB Module (JG855A)
 HP 12900 48-port 10/100/1000BASE-T EB Module (JG856A)
 HP 12900 48-port 10GbE SFP+ EA Module (JG624A)
 HP 12900 16-port 40GbE QSFP+ EA Module (JG625A)
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2.2 TOE Architecture
The various switches comprising the TOE share a common software code base, called Comware. Comware is
special purpose appliance system software that implements various networking technologies, including: IPv4/IPv6
dual-stacks; a data link layer; layer 2 and 3 routing; Ethernet switching; VLANs; IRF routing; and Quality of
Service (QoS). The evaluated version of Comware is V7.1. It should be noted that although Comware can run on a
variety of underlying architectures, including VxWorks, Linux, pSOS and Windows, the only underlying
architecture found in the evaluated configuration is Linux. The TOE supports both IPv4 and IPv6 networks;
however, IPv6 was not tested as part of this evaluation.
Comware V7.1 implements full modularization and multi-process applications, and provides the following benefits:

Full modularization—Brings improvements in system availability, virtualization, multi-core multi-CPU
applications, distributed computing, and dynamic loading and upgrading.

Openness—Comware V7.1 is a generic, open system based on Linux.

Improved operations—Comware V7.1 improves some detailed operations. For example, it uses
preemptive scheduling to improve real-time performance.
Comware V7.1 optimizes the following functions:

Virtualization—Supports N:1 virtualization.

In Service Support Updates (ISSU)—Supports ISSU for line cards.

Auxiliary CPU and OAA—Improves scalability for devices.
In addition, Comware V7.1 supports IETF industry standard TRILL (Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links).
TRILL provides support for VLANs and is a link state routing protocol running over layer 2 that enables loop free
large Layer 2 networks with multi-path support. TRILL and the optimization functions are not security relevant and
not covered by the evaluation but can be included in the evaluated configuration as they do not affect any of the
claimed security functions.
Comware V7.1 comprises four planes: management; control; data; and infrastructure.
Figure 1: Comware V7.1 Architecture

Infrastructure—the infrastructure plane provides basic Linux services and Comware support functions.
Basic Linux services comprise basic Linux functions, C language library functions, data structure
operations, and standard algorithms. Comware support functions provide software and service
infrastructure for Comware processes, including all basic functions.
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
Data—the data plane provides data forwarding for local packets and received IPv4 and IPv6 packets at
different layers.

Control—the control plane comprises all routing, signaling, and control protocols, such as MPLS, OSPF,
and security control protocols. It generates forwarding tables for the data plane.

Management—the management plane provides a management interface for operators to configure,
monitor, and manage Comware V7.1. The management interface comprises a Command Line Interface
(CLI) accessed using SSH.
The Comware V7.1 software is further decomposed into subsystems designed to implement applicable functions.
For example, there are subsystems dedicated to the security management interface. There are also subsystems
dedicated to the IPv4 and IPv6 network stacks as well as the applicable network protocols and forwarding, routing,
etc.
From a security perspective, the TOE implements NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms that support the IPsec
and SSH protocols as well as digital signature services that support the secure update capabilities of the TOE.
Otherwise, the TOE implements various network switching protocols and functions.
The various TOE devices include the same security functions. The salient differences between the devices are the
available ports and port adapters, primarily representing differences in numbers, types, and speeds of available
network connections.
2.2.1 Modular Design
Comware V7.1 implements full modularization based on Linux. All software features run independent processes in
different spaces. A failed process does not affect other processes. Preemptive scheduling used by Linux threads
enables Comware V7.1 to provide high-speed services. In addition, Linux supports multi-core, multi-CPU, and
Symmetrical Multi-Processing (SMP) technologies, which can maximize multi-CPU performance.
The modular design makes Comware V7.1 totally different from earlier versions.
Figure 2: Comware V7.1 Module Design

Process isolation—the modular design isolates processes to improve system availability. Each process can
be managed separately. This refined management method enhances system stability and performance.

Multi-core support—Comware V7.1 supports multi-core CPU and SMP technologies besides multi-core
support at the data plane. The modular design enables concurrent running of threads through direct Linux
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scheduling, which can maximize multi-CPU performance. More CPUs improve performance for the whole
system to implement faster route convergence and less recovery time.
Comware V7.1 allows a group of processes to run on a dedicated CPU set to ensure enough resources for
key services. The thread preemptive scheduling and priority marking mechanisms enable real-time services
to fast respond to requests even when the CPU system is busy.
The multi-core CPU replaces auxiliary CPUs to complete related tasks, simplifying software operations.

On-demand operation—the modular design enables a process to load only needed functions to complete a
task. Unused functions do not occupy any system resources and thus will not be attacked. This mechanism
improves both system performance and security.

Modular upgrading—the modular design allows upgrades to a single feature or additions of new features
without affecting other services.

Simplified software tailoring—Comware V7.1 software processes are independent of one another. This
makes software tailoring much easier, without the need of re-compiling.

Open interfaces—Comware V7.1 provides APIs through dynamic Link Library for users to develop their
own applications. This method is more flexible than OAA.
2.2.2 Intelligent Resilient Framework
As indicated above, multiple devices in the evaluated configuration can be deployed as an IRF group. Each device in
the IRF group is directly connected to the other IRF group members using an IRF stack utilizing dedicated network
connections. One device in the group is designated as master and should that device fail a voting procedure ensues
to elect a new master among the remaining IRF group members.
All devices in the group share the same configuration, which is shared across the IRF connections when the group is
formed and later when configuration changes occur. Management of the IRF group can occur via any of the IRF
group members by an authorized administrator.
Once configured, the IRF group acts as a single, logical switch with a common configuration and will act to receive
and forward network traffic in accordance with that common configuration. When necessary, network traffic is
forwarded through the IRF connection in order to get the network traffic to and from the applicable physical
network connections used to attach other network peers or clients.
Note that the IRF connections are not secured (e.g., using encryption) by the TOE, so the IRF group members must
be collocated and the IRF connections need to be as protected as the IRF group devices themselves. The IRF is
excluded from the evaluation.
2.2.3 Multitenant Device Context
Multitenant device context (MDC) is a 1:N virtualization technology. It virtualizes the data plane, control plane, and
management plane of a physical device to create multiple logical devices called MDCs. MDCs use the same kernel,
but their data is separated. Each MDC has its own interfaces and CPU resources. Rebooting an MDC does not affect
the configuration or service of any other MDC.
The modular design of Comware V7.1 enables each MDC to run its own control protocol processes on a separate
control plane. A process failure of an MDC does not affect other MDCs.
Note that since this technology is not covered in the NDPP, MDC was not subject to evaluation.
2.2.4 Physical Boundaries
A TOE device in the 5900 Series, 5920 or 5930 Series is a physical network rack-mountable appliance with a fixed
number of 10GbE ports (48 for the 5900 series switch, and 24 for the 5920 series switch). The table of applicable
series and devices along with their CPU’s is provided below.
A TOE device in the 10500 Series or 12500 Series is a physical network rack-mountable chassis (or IRF connected
group of chassis) that supports modules that provide a range of network ports varying in number, form factor
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(copper or fiber), and performance (1 – 10 Gb). The table of applicable series and devices along with their CPU’s is
provided below.
The TOE device in the 12900 Series is a physical network rack-mountable chassis (or IRF connected group of
chassis) that supports modules that provide a range of network ports varying in number, form factor (copper or
fiber), and performance (1GbE – 100 GbE). The table of applicable series and devices along with their CPU’s is
provided below.
Product
Series
CPU
Specific Devices
HP 5900
HP 5900AF-48XG-4QSFP+ Switch (JG772A)
HP 5900AF-48XGT-4QSFP+ Switch (JG336A)
HP 5900AF-48G-4XG-2QSFP+ Switch (JG510A)
HP FlexFabric 5900CP-48XG-4QSFP + Switch
(JG838A)
Broadcom XLS408, 1.2GHz, MIPS
HP 5920
HP 5920AF-24XG Switch (JG296A)
Broadcom XLS408, 1.2GHz, MIPS
HP 5930
HP FlexFabric 5930-32QSFP+Switch (JG726A)
HP FlexFabric 5930-4Slot Switch (JH179A)
HP FlexFabric 5930 2QSFP+ 2-slot Switch (JH178A)
Broadcom XLP108AQ, 1GHz
HP 10500
HP 10504 Switch Chassis (JC613A)
HP 10508 Switch Chassis (JC612A)
HP 10508-V Switch Chassis (JC611A)
HP 10512 Switch Chassis (JC748A)
Each chassis requires a compatible Main Processing
Unit. The following are included in the evaluated
configuration:
Broadcom XLP316, 1.2GHz, MIPS



HP 12500
HP 12900
HP 10500 Type A Main Processing Unit with
Comware v7 Operating System (JG496A)
HP 10500 Type D Main Processing Unit with
Comware v7 Operating System (JH198A)
HP 10500 Type D TAA-compliant Main
Processing Unit with Comware v7 Operating
System (JH206A)
HP 12504 (AC) Switch Chassis ( JC654A)
HP 12504 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC655A)
HP 12508 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF421C)
Freescale MPC8548, 1.5 GHz, PowerPC
HP 12508E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG782A)
HP 12508 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC652A)
HP 12508E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG783A)
HP 12518 (AC) Switch Chassis (JF430C)
HP 12518E (AC) Switch Chassis (JG784A)
HP 12518 (DC) Switch Chassis (JC653A)
HP 12518E (DC) Switch Chassis (JG785A)
Freescale MPC P5040, 1.8 GHz,
PowerPC
HP FlexFabric 12910 Switch AC Chassis with 12910
Main Processing Unit (JG621A)
Broadcom XLP316, 1.2GHz, MIPS
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HP FlexFabric 12916 Switch AC Chassis with 12916
Main Processing Unit (JG634A)
Table 2 TOE Series, Devices, and CPUs
The TOE can be configured to use the following components in its operational environment:

syslog server—to receive audit records when the TOE is configured to deliver them to an external log
server.

RADIUS and TACACS servers—the TOE can be configured to use external authentication servers.

Management Workstation—the TOE supports remote access to the CLI over SSHv2. As such, an
administrator requires an SSHv2 client to access the CLI remotely.
2.2.5 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:
 Security audit
 Cryptographic support
 User data protection
 Identification and authentication
 Security management
 Protection of the TSF
 TOE access
 Trusted path/channels.
2.2.5.1 Security Audit
The TOE is able to generate audit records of security relevant events. The TOE can be configured to store the audit
records locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to send the audit records to a designated
log server.
2.2.5.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms that provide key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level
cryptographic protocols, including IPsec and SSHv2. Note that to be in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must
be configured in FIPS mode, which ensures the TOE uses only FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended
cryptographic algorithms.
2.2.5.3 User Data Protection
The TOE performs network switching and routing functions, passing network traffic among its various physical and
logical network connections. While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic
forwarding, the TOE ensures that it does not inadvertently reuse data found in network traffic.
2.2.5.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE requires administrators to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security
management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console and a network
accessible interface (SSHv2) for interactive administrator sessions.
The TOE supports on device definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. Additionally, the TOE can
be configured to use the services of trusted RADIUS and TACACS servers in the operational environment to
support, for example, centralized user administration. The TOE supports the use of text-based pre-shared keys for
IKE peer authentication.
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2.2.5.5 Security Management
The TOE provides a CLI to access its security management functions. Security management commands are limited
to administrators and are available only after they have provided acceptable user identification and authentication
data to the TOE.
2.2.5.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security
features.
It protects data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an
administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (e.g.,
for log accountability).
The TOE uses cryptographic means to protect communication with remote administrators. When the TOE is
configured to use the services of a Syslog server or authentication servers in the operational environment, the
communication between the TOE and the operational environment component is protected using encryption.
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes
mechanisms so that the TOE itself can be updated while ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or
other unexpected changes in the TOE.
2.2.5.7 TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to authentication when accessing
the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity
timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated.
2.2.5.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access. Using SSHv2, both
integrity and disclosure protection is ensured.
The TOE protects communication with external IT entities, including audit and authentication servers, using IPsec
connections, which prevent unintended disclosure or modification of data.
2.3 TOE Documentation
There are numerous documents that provide information and guidance for the deployment of the TOE. In particular,
there are four Common Criteria specific guides that reference the security-related guidance material for all products
evaluated:

Preparative Procedures for CC NDPP Evaluated HPE 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500
Series, 12500 Series, and 12900 Series Switch Modules based on Comware V7.1, V1.01, dated 2/16/2016

Command Reference for CC Supplement, Revision 1.05, dated 1/22/2016

Configuration Guide for CC Supplement, Revision 1.6, dated 1/22/2016

Comware V7 Platform System Log Messages, Revision 1.00, dated 4/21/2014.
The links in Appendix A for each series can be used to find the full set of documentation for each of the evaluated
switch series. Note that only the documents listed above were examined during the course of the evaluation, and are
the approved documents for configuring and using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.
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3. Security Problem Definition
This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational policies,
threat statements, and assumption) from the NDPP.
In general, the NDPP has presented a Security Problem Definition appropriate for network infrastructure devices,
such as switches, and as such is applicable to the Hewlett Packard Enterprise TOE.
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4. Security Objectives
Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the
NDPP. The NDPP security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives
characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.
In general, the NDPP has presented a Security Objectives appropriate for network infrastructure devices, such as
switches, and as such are applicable to the Hewlett Packard Enterprise TOE.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Environment
OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE
There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,
compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other
than those services necessary for the operation, administration
and support of the TOE.
OE.PHYSICAL
Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE
and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.
OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN
TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all
administrator guidance in a trusted manner.
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5. IT Security Requirements
This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
that serve to represent the security functional claims for the Target of Evaluation (TOE) and to scope the evaluation
effort.
The SFRs have all been drawn from the Protection Profile (PP): Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version
1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP), as amended by Errata #3. As a result, refinements and operations already performed in
that PP are not identified (e.g., highlighted) here, rather the requirements have been copied from that PP and any
residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, the NDPP made a number of refinements and
completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC and that PP should be consulted to identify those changes
if necessary.
The SARs are the set of SARs specified in NDPP.
5.1 Extended Requirements
All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDPP. The NDPP defines the following
extended SFRs and since they are not redefined in this ST, the NDPP should be consulted for more information in
regard to those CC extensions.

FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication

FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking.
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5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Hewlett Packard Enterprise Switches.
Requirement Class
Requirement Component
FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
FAU: Security audit
FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage
FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH
FDP: User data protection
FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
FIA: Identification and
authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
FMT: Security management
FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all
symmetric keys)
FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update
FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA: TOE access
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP: Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1: Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path
Table 3: TOE Security Functional Components
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5.2.1 Security Audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
c) All administrative actions;
d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4.
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the
functional components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column
three of Table 4.
Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1
None.
FAU_GEN.2
None.
FAU_STG_EXT.1
None.
FCS_CKM.1
None.
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
None.
FCS_COP.1(1)
None.
FCS_COP.1(2)
None.
FCS_COP.1(3)
None.
FCS_COP.1(4)
None.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
Failure to establish an IPsec SA.
Establishment/Termination of an IPsec
SA.
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
None.
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH session.
Establishment/Termination of an SSH
session.
FDP_RIP.2
None.
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
None.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
All use of the authentication mechanism.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
All use of the authentication and
authentication mechanism.
Provided user identity, origin of the
attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7
None.
FMT_MTD.1
None.
FMT_SMF.1
None.
FMT_SMR.2
None.
FPT_APW_EXT.1
None.
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
None.
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Reason for failure.
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
address) for both successes and
failures.
Reason for failure
Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP
address) for both successes and
failures.
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Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional Audit Record Contents
FPT_STM.1
Changes to the time.
The old and new values for the time.
Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP
address).
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Initiation of update.
No additional information.
FPT_TST_EXT.1
None.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
Any attempts at unlocking of an
interactive session.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.3
The termination of a remote session by
the session locking mechanism.
No additional information.
FTA_SSL.4
The termination of an interactive session.
No additional information.
FTA_TAB.1
None.
FTP_ITC.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failure of the trusted channel functions.
Identification of the initiator and
target of failed trusted channels
establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1
Initiation of the trusted channel.
Termination of the trusted channel.
Failures of the trusted path functions.
Identification of the claimed user
identity.
Table 4: Auditable Events
5.2.1.2 User Identity Association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to
associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 External Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1)
FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall be able to [transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity]
using a trusted channel implementing the [IPsec] protocol.
5.2.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)
5.2.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1.1
Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key
establishment in accordance with [
o
NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic
curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256,
P-384 and [P-521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard”)
o
NIST Special Publication 800-56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key
Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography' for RSA-based
key establishment schemes]
and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key
strength of 112 bits.
5.2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Zeroization (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs when
no longer required.
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5.2.2.3 Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) (FCS_COP.1(1))
FCS_COP.1.1(1)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform [encryption and decryption] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [AES operating in [CBC, GCM, [CTR]]] and
cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:
 FIPS PUB 197, ‘Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)’
 [NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D].
5.2.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) (FCS_COP.1(2))
FCS_COP.1.1(2)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with
a[
(1) RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with a key size (modulus) of 2048
bits or greater or
(2) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with a key size of 256
bits or greater]
that meets the following:
[Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-2 or FIPS PUB 186-3, 'Digital Signature Standard'.
Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
 FIPS PUB 186-3, 'Digital Signature Standard'
 The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] (as
defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard”).]
5.2.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) (FCS_COP.1(3))
FCS_COP.1.1(3)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message
digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-3, ‘Secure
Hash Standard.’
5.2.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) (FCS_COP.1(4))
FCS_COP.1.1(4)
Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA512], key size [160, 256, 384, 512], and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits
that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, ‘The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication
Code’, and FIPS Pub 180-3, ‘Secure Hash Standard.’
5.2.2.7 Explicit: IPSEC (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4
The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.
The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode, transport mode].
The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is
otherwise unmatched, and discards it.
The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using [the
cryptographic algorithms


FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5
AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA)-based HMAC,
AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash Algorithm
(SHA)-based HMAC,
AES-GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106,
AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106,


].
The TSF shall implement the protocol: [IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409,
RFC 4109, [no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers], and [RFC 4868 for hash
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functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal
as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the
cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and
[no other algorithm].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on [number of
packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24
hours for Phase 11 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 22 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be
established based on [number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the
time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP),
and [24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP) (IKEv2 only),
and 20 (384-bit Random ECP (IKEv2 only))].
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the [RSA,
ECDSA (IKEv2 only)] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.
5.2.2.8 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with
[NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)]] seeded by an entropy
source that accumulated entropy from [a software-based noise source].
The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least
equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.
5.2.2.9 Explicit: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6
FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7
The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253,
4254, and [5656].
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following
authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based] 3.
The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes
in an SSH transport connection are dropped.
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following
encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [AEAD_AES_128_GCM,
AEAD_AES_256_GCM].
The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [SSH_RSA, ecdsasha2-nistp256] and [ecdsa-sha2-nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s).
The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is
[hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512].
The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdhsha2-nistp384] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.
5.2.3 User Data Protection (FDP)
5.2.3.1 Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2)
FDP_RIP.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
1
That is, IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges in IKEv2.
That is, CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange in IKEv2.
3
Marked as a selection per NIAP Technical Decision TD0032 (https://www.niapccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_td.cfm?td_id=34)
2
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5.2.4 Identification and Authentication (FIA)
5.2.4.1 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1)
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2
FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.
The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:
 are 22 characters and [[lengths from 15 to 128 characters]];
 composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and
special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and
“)”).
The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [[the bit representation
of the ASCII coding of the entered characters as the key]] and be able to [use no other
pre-shared keys].
5.2.4.2 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for
administrative passwords:
1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower
case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”,
“%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [“'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”, “=”,
“>”, “[”, “\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”]];
2. Minimum password length shall settable by the Security Administrator, and
support passwords of 15 characters or greater;
5.2.4.3 Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the
authentication is in progress at the local console.
5.2.4.4 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [[and access to
external RADIUS and TACACS]] to perform administrative user authentication.
5.2.4.5 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to
initiate the identification and authentication process:
 Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;
 [[network switching services]].
The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
administrative user.
5.2.5 Security Management (FMT)
5.2.5.1 Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data) (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to the Security Administrators.
5.2.5.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
 Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
 Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using the [digital signature]
capability prior to installing those updates; [
 Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality].
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5.2.5.3 Restrictions on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)
FMT_SMR.2.1
FMT_SMR.2.2
FMT_SMR.2.3
The TSF shall maintain the roles:
 Authorized Administrator.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
The TSF shall ensure that the conditions
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;
 Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely;
are satisfied.
5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.6.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1)
FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.
The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.
5.2.6.2 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric key, and private keys.
5.2.6.3 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
5.2.6.4 TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate
the correct operation of the TSF.
5.2.6.5 Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current version of
the TOE firmware/software.
The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE
firmware/software.
The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a
[digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.
5.2.7 TOE Access (FTA)
5.2.7.1 TSF-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.3)
FTA_SSL.3.1
Refinement: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security
Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.
5.2.7.2 User-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.4)
FTA_SSL.4.1
The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own
interactive session.
5.2.7.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security
Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.
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5.2.7.4 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)
FTA_TAB.1.1
Refinement: Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a
Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding
use of the TOE.
5.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.2.8.1 Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1
FTP_ITC.1.2
FTP_ITC.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall use [IPsec] to provide a trusted communication channel
between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit
server, [[authentication server]] that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the
channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.
The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via
the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transmitting audit
records to an audit server, and external authentication functions].
5.2.8.2 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)
FTP_TRP.1.1
FTP_TRP.1.2
FTP_TRP.1.3
Refinement: The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication path between
itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths
and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated
data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.
Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via
the trusted path.
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication
and all remote administrative actions.
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5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference from the NDPP.
Requirement Class
Requirement Component
ADV: Development
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
AGD: Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC: Life-cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
Table 5: Assurance Components
Consequently, the assurance activities specified in NDPP apply to the TOE evaluation.
6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions:








Security audit
Cryptographic support
User data protection
Identification and authentication
Security management
Protection of the TSF
TOE access
Trusted path/channels.
6.1 Security Audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate log records for a wide range of security relevant and other events as they
occur. The events that can cause an audit record to be logged include starting and stopping the audit function, any
use of an administrator command via the CLI interface, as well as all of the events identified in Table 4 (which
corresponds to the audit events specified in NDPP). Note that the only protocol (i.e., IPsec, SSH) failures auditable
by the TOE are authentication failures for user-level connections.
The generated audit records identify the date and time, the nature or type of the triggering event, an indication of
whether the event succeeded, failed or had some other outcome, and the identity of the agent (e.g. user) responsible
for the event (e.g., user or network host). The logged audit records also include event-specific content that includes
at least all of the content required in Table 4.
The TOE includes an internal log implementation that can be used to store and review audit records locally. The
maximum storage space reserved for the local log file can be configured to a range between 1 and 10MB. When the
local log storage is full, the TOE will overwrite the oldest records with new records. Only users with the role
network-admin, network-operator, or level-15 can access the local audit trail. Alternately, the TOE can be
configured to send generated audit records to an external Syslog server using IPsec.
Note that audit records are not buffered for transmission to the syslog server. If the connection to the syslog server
goes down, generated audit records are not queued and will not be transmitted to the syslog server when the
connection is re-established. However, audit records will still be delivered to any other configured audit
destinations, such as the log buffer and local log file. Therefore, the administrator is advised to ensure additional
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audit destinations are configured so that generated audit records will still be available for review in the event of loss
of connectivity to the syslog server. In addition, multiple log servers can be configured to provide redundancy.
The Security Audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FAU_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events include starting and stopping the audit
function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in Table 4. Furthermore, each audit
record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event, responsible subject/user, as well as the
additional event-specific content indicated in Table 4.

FAU_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific administrator or
network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.

FAU_STG_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external Syslog server and
can be configured to use IPsec for communication with the Syslog server.
6.2 Cryptographic Support
The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms providing supporting cryptographic functions. The
following functions have been certified in accordance with the identified standards.
Functions
Asymmetric key generation
 ECC key pair generation(NIST
curves P-256, P-384 and P-521)
 RSA key generation (key size 2048
bits)
Encryption/Decryption
 AES CBC, CTR, and GCM (128,
256 bits)
Cryptographic signature services
 RSA Digital Signature Algorithm
(rDSA) (modulus 2048)
 ECDSA (NIST curves P-256, P-384
and P-521)
Cryptographic hashing
 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 224,
256, 384 and 512 bits)
Keyed-hash message authentication
 HMAC-SHA-1 (block size 512 bits,
key size 160 bits and digest size 160
bits)
 HMAC-SHA-256 (block size 512
bits, key Size 256 bits and digest
size 256 bits)
 HMAC-SHA-384 (block size 1024
bits, key Size 384 bits and digest
size 384 bits)
 HMAC-SHA-512 (block size 1024
bits, key Size 512 bits and digest
size 512 bits)
Random bit generation
 CTR_DRBG (AES) with one
independent software-based noise
source of 256 of non-determinism
Standards
Certificates
NIST Special Publication 800-56A
#834
NIST Special Publication 800-56B
#1969
FIPS PUB 197
NIST SP 800-38A
NIST SP 800-38D
Firmware: #3855
Kernel: #3854
FIPS PUB 186-2
FIPS PUB 186-3
Firmware:
#1969 (RSA),
#834(ECDSA)
FIPS Pub 180-3
Firmware: #3177
Kernel: #3176
FIPS Pub 198-1
FIPS Pub 180-3
Firmware: #3177
Kernel: #3176
FIPS Pub 198-1
FIPS Pub 180-3
Firmware: #2503
Kernel: #2502
NIST Special Publication 800-90
Firmware: #1094
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Table 6: Cryptographic Functions
The TOE implements a random number generator for RSA key establishment schemes and for elliptic curve-based
key establishment (conformant to NIST SP 800-56B and to NIST SP 800-56A). The following table demonstrates
that the TSF complies with 800-56B. The table identifies the sections in 800-56B that are implemented by the TSF;
and the “should”, “should not”, and “shall not” conditions from the publication along with an indication of whether
the TOE conforms to those conditions with deviations rationalized. Key establishment is among the identified
sections.
NIST SP800-56B
Section Reference
5.6
5.8
“should”, “should not”, or
“shall not”
should
shall not
Implemented
accordingly?
yes
no
5.9
5.9
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.1
6.2.3
6.5.1
6.5.2
6.5.2.1
6.6
7.1.2
7.2.1.3
7.2.1.3
7.2.2.3
shall not (first occurrence)
shall not (second occurrence)
should not
should (first occurrence)
should (second occurrence)
should (third occurrence)
should (fourth occurrence)
shall not (first occurrence)
shall not (second occurrence)
should
should
should
should
shall not
should
should
should not
should (first occurrence)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
7.2.2.3
should (second occurrence)
no
7.2.2.3
should (third occurrence)
no
7.2.2.3
should (fourth occurrence)
no
7.2.2.3
should not
no
7.2.2.3
shall not
no
7.2.3.3
should (first occurrence)
no
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Rationale for deviation
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-OAEP is not supported. The
device supports RSA-PKCS1
Padding
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
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NIST SP800-56B
Section Reference
7.2.3.3
7.2.3.3
7.2.3.3
7.2.3.3
7.2.3.3
8
8.3.2
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
“should”, “should not”, or
“shall not”
should (second occurrence)
should (third occurrence)
should (fourth occurrence)
should (fifth occurrence)
should not
should
should not
Implemented
accordingly?
no
no
no
no
no
yes
yes
Rationale for deviation
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported
Table 7: NIST SP800-56B Conformance
The TOE uses a software-based deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) that complies with NIST SP 800-90,
using CTR_DRBG (AES). The entropy used to seed the DRBG is a 256-bit value obtained from the Comware
entropy source. The design architecture of the Comware entropy source is the same as the architecture of the Linux
kernel entropy pool. The noise sources for the Comware entropy pool include interrupt, process scheduling and
memory allocation.
The TOE is designed to zeroize secret and private cryptographic keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) when
they are no longer required by the TOE. The following table identifies the applicable secret and private
cryptographic keys and CSPs, and summarizes how and when they are deleted. Also note that where identified
zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when deleted from FLASH, the previous value is overwritten once with zeroes; 2)
when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten completely with the new value; and, 3) the
zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with zeroes.
#
Key/
CSP Name
Generation/
Algorithm
Key Size
Description
Storage
Zeroization
Public key management
CSP1-1
RSA private key
CTR_DRBG
(AES)/RSA
CSP1-2
ECDSA private
key
CTR_DRBG(AE
S)/ECDSA
2048 bits
Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself
and also used in IPsec
and SSH negotiations.
FLASH
(cipher text /
AES-CTR
256)
Using CLI command
“public-key local
destroy rsa …” to
zeroize.
NIST P256,
P384, P521
Identity certificates for the
security appliance itself
and also used in IPsec,
SSH and SSL.
FLASH
(cipher text
/AES-CTR
256)
Using CLI command
“public-key local
destroy ecdsa …” to
zeroize.
Peer public keys
exist in a FLASH
start-up
configuration file.
Public keys of peers to
validate the digital
signature
FLASH(plain
text)
Public keys of peers to
validate the digital
signature
FLASH (plain
text)
RSA:1024 ~
2048 bits
CSP1-3
RSA Public keys
RSA
CSP1-4
ECDSA Public
keys
ECDSA
Note: 192 –
bit keys are
not used in
the
evaluated
configuration
NIST P256,
P384, P521
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Using CLI
commands “undo
public-key peer
“ and “save” to
zeroize the public
keys.
Peer public keys
exist in a FLASH
start-up
configuration file.
Using CLI
commands “undo
public-key peer
“ and “save” to
zeroize the public
keys.
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#
Key/
CSP Name
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
Generation/
Algorithm
Key Size
Description
Storage
Zeroization
IPsec
CSP2-1
IPsec
authentication
keys
Generated using
IKE protocol
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/SHA38
4/SHA512+DH).
Algorithms:
HMAC-SHA1-96
HMAC-SHA256-128
HMAC-SHA384-192
HMAC-SHA512-256
160 bits
256 bits
384 bits
512 bits
AES-GMAC:
128, 256 bits
Used for authenticating
the IPsec traffic
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IPsec
session.
Used for encrypting the
IPsec traffic
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IPsec
session.
Manually configured key
used for authenticating
the IPsec traffic.
FLASH
(cipher text /
AES-CTR
256) and
RAM (plain
text)
Keys will be
zeroized using CLI
commands “undo
sa hex-key
authentication …”
and “ save”,
Manually configured key
used for encrypting the
IPsec traffic.
FLASH
(cipher text /
AES-CTR
256) and
RAM (plain
text)
Keys will be
zeroized using CLI
commands “undo
sa hex-key
encryption …” and
“ save”,
Entered by the CryptoOfficer in plain text form
and used for
authentication during IKE
FLASH
(cipher text/
AES-CTR
256) and
RAM (plain)
Keys will be
zeroized using CLI
commands “undo
pre-shared-key …”
and “ save”,
private key used for
IKE protocol during
the handshake
RAM(plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
handshake finishing
Note: GMAC
is not used
in any of the
evaluated
mechanisms
AES-GMAC
CSP2-2
CSP2-3
IPsec encryption
keys
IPsec
authentication
keys
Generated using
IKE protocol
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/SHA38
4/SHA512+DH).
Algorithms:
AES-CBC, AESGCM
HMAC-SHA1-96
HMAC-SHA256-128
HMAC-SHA384-192
HMAC-SHA512-256
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
Note: 192 –
bit keys are
not used in
the
evaluated
configuration
160 bits
256 bits
384 bits
512 bits
128 bits
192 bits
256 bits
CSP2-4
IPsec encryption
keys
AES
Note: 192 –
bit keys are
not used in
the
evaluated
configuration
IKEv1
CSP3-1
IKE pre-shared
keys
CSP3-2
IKE RSA
Authentication
private Key
Shared Secret
15 ~ 128
bytes
RSA
RSA: 2048
bits
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CSP3-3
CSP3-4
CSP3-5
Key/
CSP Name
IKE DiffieHellman Key
Pairs
IKE Integrity key
IKE Encryption
Key
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
Generation/
Algorithm
CTR_DRBG
(AES) / DH
Generated using
IKE
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/SHA38
4/SHA512+DH).
Algorithms:
HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA256
HMAC-SHA384,
HMAC-SHA512
Generated using
IKE
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/SHA38
4/SHA512+DH).
Algorithms: AES
Key Size
2048 bits
160 bits
256 bits
Description
Storage
Zeroization
RAM (plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
handshake finishing
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IKE
session.
Used for encrypting IKE
negotiations
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IKE
session.
Entered by the CryptoOfficer in plain text form
and used for
authentication during IKE
FLASH(ciphe
r text/ AESCTR 256)
and RAM
(plain)
Keys will be
zeroized using CLI
commands “undo
pre-shared-key …”
and “ save”,
Key agreement for IKE
Used for integrity test of
IKE negotiations
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Note: 192 –
bit keys are
not used in
the
evaluated
configuration
IKEv2
CSP4-1
IKE pre-shared
keys
Shared Secret
15 ~ 128
bytes
CSP4-2
IKE RSA
Authentication
private Key
RSA
ECDSA
RSA:2048
bits
ECDSA:P256, P-384,
P-521
private key used for
IKE protocol during
the handshake
RAM(plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
handshake finishing
CSP4-3
IKE DiffieHellman Key
Pairs
CTR_DRBG
(AES) /
DH,ECDH
DH:2048
bits
ECDH:P256, P-384
Key agreement for IKE
RAM (plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
handshake finishing
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IKE
session.
CSP4-4
IKE Integrity key
Generated using
IKE
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+DH/ECD
H + HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/HMACSHA384).
160 bits
256 bits
384 bits
Used for integrity test of
IKE negotiations
Algorithms:
HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA256128
HMAC-SHA384192
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CSP4-5
Key/
CSP Name
IKE Encryption
Key
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
Generation/
Algorithm
Generated using
IKE
(CTR_DRBG
(AES)+DH/ECD
H + HMACSHA1/HMACSHA256/HMACSHA384).
Algorithms: AES
Key Size
Description
Storage
Zeroization
128 bits,
192 bits,
256 bits
Note: 192 –
bit keys are
not used in
the
evaluated
configuration
Used for encrypting IKE
negotiations
RAM (plain
text)
Zeroized upon
deleting the IKE
session.
private key used for
SSH protocol during
handshake
RAM(plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
finishing
handshake.
SSH
CSP5-1
SSH
Private key
RSA
ECDSA
RSA:2048
bits
ECDSA: P256, P-384
CSP5-2
SSH DiffieHellman Key
Pairs
CTR_DRBG
(AES) /
DH/ECDH
DH: 2048
bits
ECDH: P256, P-384
Key agreement for SSH
sessions.
RAM (plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized upon
finishing
handshake.
128 bits,
256 bits
Key used for encrypting
SSH session.
RAM (plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized when SSH
session terminated.
Key used for
authenticating SSH
session.
RAM (plain
text)
Automatically
zeroized when SSH
session terminated.
15 ~ 63
bytes
Critical security
parameters used to
authenticate the
administrator login.
FLASH
(hashed
text/SHA512) and
RAM (plain)
15 ~ 63
bytes
Critical security
parameters used to
authenticate privilege
promoting.
FLASH
(hashed
text/SHA512) and
RAM (plain)
CSP5-3
SSH Session
encryption key
Generated using
the SSH
protocol(CTR_D
RBG(AES)+SHA
1+DH)
Algorithms:
AES-CBC, AESGCM
Generated using
the SSH
protocol(CTR_D
RBG(AES)+SHA
1+DH)
CSP5-4
SSH Session
authentication
key
Algorithms:
HMAC-SHA1,
HMAC-SHA196, hmacsha256, hmacsha512
SHA1: 160
bits
AES-GCM:
128 bits, 256
bits
AES-GCM
AAA
CSP6-1
CSP6-2
User Passwords
Super password
Secret
Secret
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
Use CLI command
“password” to set
new password, or
use CLI command
“undo localuser …” to zeroize
the password and
delete user account.
Use CLI command
“undo super
password” to
zeroize the super
password.
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CSP6-3
CSP6-4
Key/
CSP Name
RADIUS shared
secret keys
TACACS+
shared secret
keys
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
Generation/
Algorithm
Shared Secret
Shared Secret
Key Size
15 ~ 64
bytes
15~255
bytes
Description
Storage
Zeroization
Keys will be
zeroized using
following
commands:
Used for authenticating
the RADIUS server to the
security appliance and
vice versa. Entered by the
Security administrator in
plain text form and stored
in cipher text form.
FLASH
(cipher text/
AES-CTR
256) and
RAM (plain)
Used for authenticating
the TACACS+ server to
the security appliance and
vice versa. Entered by the
Security administrator in
plain text form and stored
in cipher text form.
FLASH
(cipher text/
AES-CTR
256) and
RAM (plain)
Input to the DRBG
that determines the
internal state of the
DRBG
RAM
(plaintext)
Automatically
zeroized when
DRBG initialized
RAM
(plaintext)
Resetting or
rebooting the
security appliance
RAM
(plaintext)
Resetting or
rebooting the
security appliance
“undo primary
authentication”,
““undo primary
accounting”,
“undo secondary
authentication”,
““undo secondary
accounting”.
Keys will be
zeroized using
following
commands:
“undo primary
authentication”,
““undo primary
accounting”,
““undo primary
authorization”,
“undo secondary
authentication”,
““undo secondary
accounting”,
““undo secondary
authorization”.
Random Bits Generation
CSP7-1
CSP7-2
CSP7-3
DRBG seed
Entropy /
SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
DRBG V
SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
DRBG Key
SP 800‐90
CTR_DRBG
256 bits
128 bits
256 bits
Generated by entropy
source via the
CTR_DRBG
derivation function
Generated by entropy
source via the
CTR_DRBG
derivation function
Table 8: Key/CSP Zeroization Summary
These supporting cryptographic functions are included to support the IPsec, IKE, and SSHv2 (RFCs 4251, 4252,
4253, 4254, and 5656) secure communication protocols. The TOE implements SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 224, 256, 384 and 512 bits) in accordance with FIPS Pub 180-3 for cryptographic
hashing.
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The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CBC, GCM) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1,
HMAC-SHA-1-96, hmac-sha2-256, or hmac-sha2-512. The TOE supports public key algorithms RSA, ecdsa-sha2nistp256, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384. It supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and with ecdhsha2-nistp384 key exchange methods. While DES and 3DES (CBC), HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-MD5-96, as well as
diffie-hellman-group-1 and diffie-hellman-exchange are all implemented, they are disabled while the TOE is
operating in CC/FIPS mode.
SSHv2 connections are rekeyed prior to reaching 228 packets; the default authentication timeout period is 90 seconds
allowing clients to retry only 3 times; both public-key and password based authentication can be configured; and
packets are limited to 256K bytes. Note that the TOE manages a packet counter for each SSH session so that it can
initiate a new key exchange when the 228 packet limit is reached. Whenever the timeout period or authentication
retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session resources. As
SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is
checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full
(256K bytes) the packet will be dropped.
The TOE includes an implementation of IPsec in accordance with RFC 4301. The TOE’s implementation of IPsec
supports both tunnel mode and transport mode. Furthermore, ESP mode “confidentiality only” is disabled by
default. The TOE implements the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) IPsec protocol, as defined by RFC 4303,
supporting AES-CBC-128 and AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) with HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA256; and AES-GCM-128, and AES-GCM-256 (both specified by 4106). The TOE implements both versions 1 and
2 of Internet Key Exchange (IKEv1, IKEv2).
IKEv1 is implemented as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, and 4109, and 4868 and supports use of AES-CBC128 and AES-CBC-256 to encrypt IKEv1 payloads. Note that the TOE supports both main and aggressive modes,
though aggressive mode is disabled in CC/FIPS mode. HMAC SHA-1 (key size 160 bits), HMAC SHA-256 (key
size 256 bits), HMAC SHA-384 (key size 384 bits) and HMAC-512 (key size 512 bits) are used in support of the
IPsec protocol ESP (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4). IKE authentication keys are generated using the HMAC algorithms.
The keys are used for authenticating IKE negotiations and IPsec traffic authentications and subsequent traffic
encryption. HMAC SHA for IPsec key authentication and encryption can be generated by using IKE commands.
The TOE’s implementation of IKEv2 conforms with RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as
specified in section 2.23), 4307, and 4868 for hash functions. IKEv2 supports the same algorithms as for IKEv1
described above. Table 8 sections IPsec and IKEv2 identify HMAC support for key generation, authentication, and
integrity. The TOE supports the 128-bit and 256-bit AES for both IKE_SA and CHILD_SAs.
The TOE provides mechanisms to implement an IPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) and to process packets to
satisfy the behavior of DISCARD, BYPASS and PROTECT packet processing as described in RFC 4301. This is
achieved through the administrator configuring appropriately specified access control lists (ACLs). The
administrator first establishes an IPsec Policy containing a Security ACL to match traffic to be encrypted
(PROTECTed) and applies it to the outbound interface. The Security ACL contains one or more rules, which are
ordered based on a numeric index from lowest to highest. The TOE compares packets in turn against each rule in the
Security ACL to determine if the packet matches the rule. Packets can be matched based on protocol (e.g., TCP,
UDP), source IP address and destination IP address. As soon as a match is found, the packet is handled based on the
action specified in the rule—either permit, which equates to PROTECT, or deny, which equates to BYPASS.
Traffic matching a deny rule or not matching any rule in the Security ACL is passed on to the next stage of
processing. Note that multiple IPsec Policies can be assigned to an interface as a policy group. In this case, each
policy in the group has its own priority number that is unique within the policy group. Each policy is considered in
turn, starting at the lowest number policy (which has highest priority) and proceeding in turn with increasing policy
numbers until a match is found or until all policies have been examined. To cater for packets that match a deny rule
or do not match any of the IPsec Policies, the administrator needs to configure further ACLs and bind them to the
outbound interface using the packet-filter command. These ACLs specify permit/deny rules to implement
BYPASS/DISCARD behavior. As with the Security ACL, the TOE compares packets against rules in the Firewall
ACL based on protocol, source IP address and destination IP address. The rules in the Firewall ACL can be ordered
in the same fashion as in a Security ACL. In the Firewall ACL, a permit rule equates to BYPASS, and a deny rule
equates to DISCARD. By default, the packet filter permits packets that do not match any ACL rule to pass through
the TOE. In the evaluated configuration, an administrator changes this action to deny.
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IKEv1 and IKEv2 SA lifetime and volume limits can be configured by an authorized administrator. IKEv1 SA
lifetimes can be limited to 24 hours (any value between 60 and 604,800 seconds) for phase 1 and 8 hours any value
from 180 to 604,800 seconds) for phase 2 and also to as little as 2.5 MB (any value between 2,560 and
4,294,967,295 KB) of traffic for phase 2. IKEv2_SA lifetime can be limited to 24 hours (actually any value between
120 and 86,400 seconds). CHILD_SA lifetimes can be limited to 8 hours (actually any value from 180 to 604,800
seconds). Volume can be limited to as little as 2.5 MB (actually any value between 2,560 and 4,294,967,295 KB).
The IKEv1 protocols implemented by the TOE include DH Groups 2 (1024-bit MODP), 5 (1536-bit MODP), 14
(2048-bit MODP), and 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), and use RSA (aka rDSA) peer authentication.
However, when the TOE is operating in FIPS mode, only DH Groups 14 and 24 are supported. In the IKEv1 phase
1 and phase 2 exchanges, the TOE and peer will agree on the best DH group both can support. When the TOE
initiates IKE negotiation, the DH group is sent in order according to the peer’s configuration. When the TOE
receives an IKE proposal, it will select the first match and the negotiation will fail if there is no match. During
IKEv1 phase 1 authentication is based on a verifiable signature as described in RFC2409. The IKEv2 protocol
implemented by the TOE includes DH 14 (2048-bit MODP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit
Random ECP), and 20 (384-bit Random ECP) using RSA and ECDSA peer authentication. In the IKE_SA_INIT
and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges, the TOE and peer will agree on the best DH group both can support. When
the TOE initiates IKE negotiation, the DH group is sent in order according to the peer’s configuration. When the
TOE receives an IKE proposal, it will select the first match and the negotiation will fail if there is no match.
The TOE can be configured to use pre-shared keys with a given peer. When a pre-shared key is configured, IKE
peer authentication will be performed using the configured pre-shared key, provided that the peer also has the preshared key. Text-based pre-shared keys used for IKE can be constructed of essentially any alphabetic character
(upper and lower case), numerals, and special characters (e.g., “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and “)”)
and can be anywhere from 15 to 128 characters in length (e.g., 22 characters). In this case, the TOE uses the bit
representation of the underlying ASCII characters of the text-based pre-shared key as the key for IKE peer
authentication. The TOE requires suitable keys to be entered by an authorized administrator.
The Cryptographic Support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FCS_CKM.1: See Table 7 above.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: See Table 8 above.

FCS_COP.1(1): See Table 6 above.

FCS_COP.1(2): See Table 6Table 6 above.

FCS_COP.1(3): See Table 6 above.

FCS_COP.1(4): See Table 6 above.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: The TOE supports IPsec cryptographic network communication protection.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: See Table 6 above.

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator sessions as
indicated above.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: The TOE supports pre-shared keys for IPsec peer authentication.
6.3 User Data Protection
The TOE is designed to ensure its own internal integrity as well as to protect user data from potential, unintended
reuse by clearing resources (e.g., memory) as they are allocated to create objects used in the implementation of the
TOE operations. Note that volatile memory is the primary resource involved in normal TOE execution while its
persistent storage is based on non-volatile flash memory.
When a network packet is sent, the buffer used by the packet is recalled and managed by the buffer pool. After that,
if a new packet acquires a buffer from the buffer pool, the new packet data will be used to overwrite any previous
data in the buffer. If an allocated buffer exceeds the size of the packet, the additional space will be overwritten
(padded) with zeroes.
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The User Data Protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FDP_RIP.2: The TOE always overwrites resources when allocated for use in objects.
6.4 Identification and Authentication
The TOE is designed to require users to be identified and authenticated before they can access any of the TOE
functions. Note that the normal switching of network traffic is not considered accessing TOE functions in this
regard.
In the evaluated configuration, users can connect to the TOE CLI via a local console or remotely using SSHv2. For
each session, the user is required to log in prior to successfully establishing a session through which TOE functions
can be exercised. Note that the only capabilities allowed prior to users authenticating are the display of the warning
banner before authentication, and network switching services.
In order to log in using password authentication, the user must provide an identity and also authentication data (e.g.,
password or RSA public key used in conjunction with an SSH session) that matches the provided identity. Users can
be defined locally within the TOE with a user identity, password or public key authentication data, and user role.
Alternatively, users can be defined within an external RADIUS or TACACS server configured to be used by the
TOE, each of which also define the user’s role in the TOE. Note that only password-based authentication is
supported for users defined in an external authentication server. Locally defined users are authenticated directly by
the TOE, while remotely defined users are authenticated by the external server and the result is enforced by the
TOE. In either case, any resulting session is dependent upon successful authentication and established sessions are
associated with the privilege level/role (see Section 6.5) assigned to the user.
When logging in the TOE will not echo passwords so that passwords are not inadvertently displayed to the user and
any other users that might be able to view the login display.
Note also that should a console user have their session terminated (e.g., due to inactivity), they are required to
successfully authenticate, by reentering their identity and authentication data, in order to establish a new session.
Passwords can be composed of upper and lower case letters, numbers and special characters, including blank space
and ~`[email protected]#$%^&*()_+-={}|[]\:”;’<>,./. Also, new passwords have to satisfy a configurable minimum password
length. The administrator can specify a minimum password length of 15 to 32 characters.
The Identification and Authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE implements a set of password composition constraints as described above.

FIA_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE can be configured to use external RADIUS and TACACS authentication
servers.

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: The TOE only displays the warning banner and allows for network switching services
prior to a user being identified and authenticated.
6.5 Security Management
The TOE controls user access to commands and resources based on user role. Users are given permission to access a
set of commands and resources based on their user role. The TOE includes pre-defined user roles, of which only the
user roles: network-admin and level-15, are considered instances of the ‘Security Administrator’ as defined in the
NDPP. These Security Administrator roles are capable of managing the security functions of the TOE since they
allow for security relevant configuration. These capabilities include changing the user permission settings including
user-role, authentication-mode, protocol, and setting the authentication password in user interface view.
The other roles represent logical subsets of those security management roles, but do not offer any security relevant
configuration management capabilities. The other roles are limited to the ability to change a user’s own password,
non-security relevant functions and review of information. For example, the roles: network-operator, level-1 and
level-9 can display the configuration and status of the TOE. The local audit log can only be accessed by those with
the network-admin, network-operator, or level-15 role.
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The TOE offers a CLI providing a range of security management functions for use by an authorized administrator.
Among these functions are those necessary to manage all aspects of the cryptographic functions of the TOE, those
necessary to enable or disable the network services offered by the TOE, and the functions necessary to review the
TOE versions, update the TOE components, and also to verify the validity of those updates.
The Security Management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FMT_MTD.1: The TOE restricts the access to manage TSF data that can affect the security functions of the
TOE to Security Administrators.

FMT_SMF.1: The TOE includes the functions necessary to enable/disable available network services, to
manage the cryptomodule and associated functions, and to manage and verify updates of the TOE software
and firmware.

FMT_SMR.2: The TOE includes pre-define roles network-admin and level-15 admin that correspond to the
required ‘Security Administrator’.
6.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components to a large extent. Secure
communication with third-party peers is addressed in section 6.8.
While the administrative interface is function rich, the TOE is designed specifically to prevent access to locallystored cryptographically protected passwords and also, while cryptographic keys can be entered, the TOE does not
disclose any keys stored in the TOE. In the evaluated configuration (i.e., with FIPS mode enabled), the TOE protects
user passwords either by saving a SHA-512 hash of the password (for user accounts password that existed before
FIPS mode was enabled) or by encrypting the password using AES in CTR mode (for user accounts password
entered after FIPS mode was enabled). See Table 8: Key/CSP Zeroization Summary for more information about
stored keys and passwords; note that while some keys and passwords occur in plain text in RAM, that is only while
they are in use and are not accessible by any user from RAM.
The TOE is a hardware appliance where all of the switch models except the 5900 series and 5930 series include a
hardware-based real-time clock (RTC). A RTC is a battery-powered clock that is included in a microchip in a
computer motherboard. If a switch has a hardware RTC, when it startups, the device gets the time from the hardware
RTC and synchronizes it to the CPU. When the device is powered off, the RTC still keeps track of the current time.
Since the 5900 series and 5930 series models do not have a hardware RTC, the time is maintained by adding up the
CPU ticks to the default time of the system. The TOE’s embedded OS manages the time/clock and exposes
administrator clock-related functions. The time/clock is used for audit record time stamps, measuring session
activity for termination, and for cryptographic operations based on time/date.
The TOE includes a number of built in diagnostic tests that are run during start-up to determine whether the TOE is
operating properly. An administrator can configure the TOE to reboot or to stop, with errors displayed, when an
error is encountered. The built-in self-tests include basic read-write memory (i.e., each memory location is written
with a non-zero value and read to ensure it is stored as expected), flash read, software checksum tests, and device
detection tests.
The TOE is designed to support upgrades to the boot ROM program and system boot file as well as to support
software hotfixes. The TOE provides interfaces so that an administrator can query the current boot ROM program or
system boot file versions as well as to identify any installed patches. The Basic BootROM and extended BootROM
menus provide access to the BootROM program. Basic BootROM can be accessed by pressing CTRL+D while the
device is booting. Note that this can only be performed while accessing the network device through the Serial
Console. Extended BootROM menu can be accessed by pressing CTRL+B while the device is booting. Both the
boot ROM program and system boot file can be upgraded via the Boot ROM menu or the command line interface,
but a reboot is required in each case. Hotfixes, which can affect only the system boot file, can be installed via the
command line interface and do not require a reboot to become effective.
The TOE includes a validity checking function that can be enabled when upgrading the boot ROM program, while
system boot files and software patches are always validated prior to installation. In each case, the upgrade version
will be checked to ensure it is appropriate and the upgrade file will be verified using an embedded (Hewlett Packard
Enterprise authorized) digital signature verified against a configured pair of hard-coded keys embedded in the TOE.
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If the version is incorrect or the signature cannot be verified, the upgrade will not proceed to protect the integrity of
the TOE. More specifically, each update includes a header and data. The header includes a SHA-256 secure hash of
the data that is signed (using rDSA/RSA 2048) by Hewlett Packard Enterprise. In order to verify the data, the TOE
generates its own SHA-256 secure hash of the update data, compares it with the signed hash in the update header to
ensure they match, and verifies the hash signature using its configured public key.
The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FPT_APW_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain text
password. Note that passwords are stored in cryptographically protected form within the TOE FLASH.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored
cryptographic key.

FPT_STM.1: The 5920, 10500, 12500, and 12900 switches each have their own hardware RTC. The time
on a 5900 series and 5930 series models are maintained by adding up the CPU ticks to the default time of
the system.

FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes a number of power-on diagnostics that will serve to ensure the TOE
is functioning properly. The tests include ensure memory and flash can be accessed as expected, to ensure
that software checksums are correct, and also to test the presence and function of plugged devices.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE provides functions to query and upgrade the versions of the boot ROM
program and system boot file (including installing hotfixes). Digital signatures are used to ensure the
integrity of each upgrade prior to performing the upgrade; this checking is optional for the boot ROM
program since special circumstances might require those checks to be disabled.
6.7 TOE Access
The TOE can be configured to display administrator-configured advisory banners. A login banner can be configured
to display warning information along with login prompts. The banner will be displayed when accessing the TOE via
the console or SSH interfaces.
The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set an interactive session timeout value (any integer value in
minutes and also optionally in seconds, with 0 disabling the timeout) – the default timeout is 10 minutes. A remote
session that is inactive (i.e., no commands issuing from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be
terminated. A local session that is similarly inactive for the defined timeout period will be terminated. The user will
be required to re-enter their user id and their password so they can establish a new session once a session is
terminated. If the user id and password match those of the user that was locked, the session is reconnected with the
console and normal input/output can again occur for that user.
An authorized administrator can set an inactivity time limit for IPsec SA. Time limits can be set globally or per
IPsec policy (ipsec sa idle-time and sa idle-time, respectively).
The TOE Access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured
period of time.

FTA_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user sessions as
directed by the user.

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an administratorconfigured period of time.

FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banners before
establishing an administrative user session.
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6.8 Trusted Path/Channels
The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external Syslog server. The TOE uses IPsec to protect
communications between itself and components in the operational environment including Syslog and authentication
servers (RADIUS and TACACS).
To support secure remote administration, the TOE includes an implementation of SSHv2. An administrator with an
appropriate SSHv2-capable client can establish secure remote connections with the TOE. The TOE supports both
public key-based and password-based client authentication for the SSH trusted path. To successfully establish an
interactive administrative session, the administrator must be able to provide acceptable user credentials (e.g., user id
and password), after which they will be able to issue commands within their assigned authorizations.
All of the secure protocols are supported by NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE
implementation.
The Trusted Path/Channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FTP_ITC.1: The TOE can be configured to use IPsec to protect authentication operations, exported audit
records, and time information transmitted between the TOE and external servers from inappropriate
disclosure or modification.

FTP_TRP.1: The TOE provides SSH to support secure remote administration. Administrators can initiate a
remote session that is secured from disclosure and modification using NIST-validated cryptographic
operations, and all remote security management functions require the use of this secure channel.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP), as amended
by Errata #3 – with the optional SSH, IPsec and pre-shared key requirements.
The TOE includes Ethernet switch devices. As such, the TOE is a network device making the NDPP claim valid and
applicable.
As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the NDPP has been
included by reference into this ST.
As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the NDPP have been included by
reference into this ST.
The following table identifies all the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced
from the NDPP and operations completed as appropriate.
Requirement Class
Requirement Component
Source
FAU: Security audit
FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage
FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)
FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization
FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)
FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)
FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)
FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message
authentication)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC
FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit
Generation)
FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH
FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management
FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition
FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication
FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles
FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all
symmetric keys)
FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords
FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing
FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update
FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination
FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking
FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners
FTP_ITC.1: Trusted Channel
FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path
Table 9 SFR Protection Profile Sources
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
FCS: Cryptographic
support
FDP: User data
protection
FIA: Identification
and authentication
FMT: Security
management
FPT: Protection of
the TSF
FTA: TOE access
FTP: Trusted
path/channels
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
NDPP
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8. Rationale
This security target includes by reference the NDPP Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security
Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the NDPP assumptions. NDPP security
functional requirements have been reproduced with the protection profile operations completed. Operations on the
security requirements follow NDPP application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, NDPP rationale
applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale
required for the security target.
8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each
description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding
security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance
requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required
security functionality.
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_STG_EXT.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM_EXT.4
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(3)
FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1
FCS_RBG_EXT.1
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
FDP_RIP.2
FIA_PMG_EXT.1
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.2
FPT_APW_EXT.1
Trusted path/channels
TOE access
Protection of the TSF
Security management
Identification and
authentication
User data protection
Cryptographic support
Security audit
This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security
functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to
provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all
necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements
Mapping demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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Trusted path/channels
TOE access
Protection of the TSF
Security management
Identification and
authentication
User data protection
Cryptographic support
Version 1.0, 2/16/2016
Security audit
Security Target
X
X
X
X
FPT_SKP_EXT.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_TST_EXT.1
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.4
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
FTA_TAB.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping
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Appendix A: Documentation for Hewlett Packard Enterprise 5900, 5920,
5930, 10500, 12500, and 12900 Switches
This Appendix provides a list of the product documentation used during the evaluation of each HP
5900/5920/5930/10500/12500 Series switch product family.
The following documents for the HPE 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900
Series Switch Modules can be found under the General Reference and Setup and Install sections of the HPE 5900 Series,
5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900 Series Switch documentation page on the HPE Web
site. The links are provided below.





HPE Switch Series ACL and QoS Command Reference
HPE Switch Series Layer 3 - IP Services Command Reference
HPE Switch Series Fundamentals Command Reference
HPE Switch Series Security Command Reference
HPE Switch Series Network Management and Monitoring Command Reference
The following documents for the HPE 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930 Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900
Series Switch Modules can be found under the Setup and Install section of the HPE 5900 Series, 5920 Series, 5930
Series, 10500 Series, 12500 Series, and 12900 Series Switch Modules documentation page on the HPE Web site. The
links are provided below.
 HPE Switch Series ACL and QoS Configuration Guide
 HPE Switch Series Layer 3 - IP Services Configuration Guide
 HPE Switch Series Fundamentals Configuration Guide
 HPE Switch Series Security Configuration Guide
 HPE Switch Series Network Management and Monitoring Configuration Guide
Product Family
HPE 5900 series
HPE 5920 series
HPE 5930 series
HPE 10500 series
HPE 12500 series
HPE 12900 series
HPE Website Link to Module Information
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=52
21896#manuals
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=52
21896#manuals
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=66
04154#manuals
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=51
17468#manuals
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=41
77453#manuals
http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=54
43167#manuals
Hewlett Packard Enterprise
46
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