Security Target: anssi_cible_2015_78_LITE

Security Target: anssi_cible_2015_78_LITE
IDL full EAC v2
Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA
FQR No: 110 7639
FQR Issue: 5
IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security
curity Target EAC with BAP and AA
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Document Management
A. Identification
Business Unit - Department
ID R&D
Document type:
Document Title:
FQR
IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA
FQR No:
110 7639
FQR Issue:
5
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Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES
8
LIST OF TABLES 9
1
2
3
4
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
10
1.1
Purpose ................................................................................................
................................
.............................................. 10
1.2
Objective of the security target................................................................
............................................ 10
1.3
Security target identification ................................................................
............................................... 11
1.4
TOE technical identification ................................................................
................................................. 12
1.5
IC identification ................................................................................................
................................... 13
TOE OVERVIEW
14
2.1
Product overview
overvi ................................................................................................
................................ 14
2.2
TOE overview ................................................................................................
................................
...................................... 15
2.3
TOE usages ................................................................................................
................................
.......................................... 16
2.4
TOE definition ................................................................................................
..................................... 18
OE ARCHITECTURE
19
3.1
Integrated Circuit - NXP P60................................................................
................................................. 19
3.2
Low layer ................................................................................................
................................
............................................ 20
3.3
Tools modules ................................................................................................
..................................... 21
3.4
Applicative
e modules ................................................................
............................................................ 21
3.5
Operating System ................................................................................................
................................ 22
3.6
Application layer ................................................................................................
................................. 22
TOE LIFE CYCLE
24
4.1
Life cycle overview ..............................................................................................
.............................. 24
4.2
Phase 1 “Development”................................................................
“Development”
....................................................... 26
4.3
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”................................................................
..................................................... 26
4.4
Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” ................................................
................................
27
4.5
Phase 4 “Operational Use” ................................................................
.................................................. 28
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5
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
29
Common Criteria conformance ................................................................
............................................ 29
Overview of the SFR defined in this ST ................................................................
.................................... 29
Overview of the additional protocols ................................................................
...................................... 30
5.1.2.1 Active Authentication ................................................................................................
...................................... 30
5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase ................................................................................................
................................ 30
6
5.2
Protection Profile conformance ................................................................
........................................... 31
5.3
Rationale for the additions ................................................................
.................................................. 31
5.4
Non evaluated features ................................................................
....................................................... 31
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
DEF
6.1
6.1.1
6.1.2
Subjects ................................................................................................
................................
.............................................. 33
PP EAC subjects ................................................................................................
........................................ 33
Additional Subjects ................................................................................................
.................................. 35
6.2
Assets ................................................................................................
................................
................................................. 35
6.3
6.3.1
Threats ................................................................................................
................................
............................................... 37
Threats from the PP EAC ................................................................
.......................................................... 37
6.3.2
Threats for AA ................................................................................................
.......................................... 40
6.3.3
Threats for Note 6 ................................................................................................
.................................... 40
6.4
6.4.1
6.4.2
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
7
33
Organisational Security Policies ................................................................
........................................... 41
OSP from PP EAC ................................................................................................
...................................... 41
OSP for AA ................................................................................................
................................
................................................ 42
Assumptions ................................................................................................
................................
....................................... 42
Assumptions from PP EAC ................................................................
........................................................ 42
Assumptions for Active Authentication ................................................................
................................... 44
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
7.1
7.1.1
45
Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................
............................................ 45
SO from PP EAC ................................................................................................
........................................ 45
7.1.2
SO for AA ................................................................................................
................................
.................................................. 47
7.1.3
SO for Note 6 ................................................................................................
................................
............................................ 47
7.2
7.2.1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment............................................
................................
48
OE from PP EAC ................................................................................................
........................................ 48
7.2.1.1 Issuing Organization ................................................................................................
........................................ 48
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7.2.1.2 Receiving Organization ................................................................................................
.................................... 50
7.2.2
8
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
52
8.1
8.1.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.....................................................
................................
52
Extended components FAU_SAS.1................................................................
........................................... 52
8.2
8.2.1
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ 52
Extended component FCS_RND.1 ................................................................
............................................ 52
8.3
8.3.1
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity .................................
................................ 52
Extended component FIA_API.1 ................................................................
.............................................. 52
8.4
8.4.1
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ........................... 53
Extended component FMT_LIM.1................................................................
............................................ 53
8.4.2
8.5
8.5.1
9
OE for AA ................................................................................................
................................
.................................................. 51
Extended component FMT_LIM.2................................................................
............................................ 53
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation .........................................................
................................
54
Extended component FPT_EMS.1 ................................................................
............................................ 54
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
9.1
9.1.1
9.1.2
55
Security Functional Requirements................................................................
........................................ 55
Global SFR ................................................................................................
................................
................................................ 55
Product configuration SFR ................................................................
....................................................... 57
9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code ................................................................................................
................................... 57
9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization ................................................................
................................................ 61
9.1.3
Active Authentication SFR ................................................................
........................................................ 68
9.1.4
Basic Access Protection SFR ................................................................
..................................................... 70
9.1.5
Chip Authentication SFR................................................................
........................................................... 75
9.1.6
Terminal Authentication SFR ................................................................
................................................... 81
9.1.7
Extended Access Control SFR ................................................................
................................................... 83
9.2
10
Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................
........................................ 86
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
SPECIFIC
10.1
87
TOE Summary Specification ................................................................
................................................. 87
11
RATIONALES
91
12
REFERENCES
92
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13
ACRONYMS
INDEX 96
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - ID-One
One Native eDoc Overview
Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview
Figure 4: Smartcard product life--cycle for the TOE
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15
15
24
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List of tables
Table 1 - General Identification
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
Table 3 - Chip Identification
Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview
Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
Table 10 - Additional SFR
Table 11 - User Data
Table 12 - TSF Data
Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage
Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage
Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage
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11
12
13
15
20
25
25
29
30
36
36
91
91
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IDL full EAC v2 – Public Security
curity Target EAC with BAP and AA
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target EAC with BAP and AA of the
IDL full EAC v2 product on NXP components from P60 family.
1.2 Objective of the security target
This security target describes the security needs for IDL full EAC v2 product. The product is based on
PP EAC
AC and adds requirements for prepersonalization and personalization.
This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5 augmented as
defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing
the environment in which it operates.
The objectives of this Security Target are:
- To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart
card life cycle.
- To describe the security environment
environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and
the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the
platform active phases.
- To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE
(and its documentation) during the product active phases.
- To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the
TOE assurance requirements
uirements and the security requirements for the environment.
- To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.
- To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the
TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security
environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
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1.3 Security target identification
Title:
Editor:
CC version:
Security target EAC with BAP
Oberthur Technologies
3.1 revision 4
EAL5 augmented with:
EAL:
-
ALC_DVS.
ALC_DVS.2
-
AVA_VAN.5
PP(s):
ST Reference:
ITSEF:
Certification Body:
Evaluation scheme:
BSI-CC-PP
PP-056 [R12]
FQR 110 7246
72 Issue 7
LETI
ANSSI
FR
Table 1 - General Identification
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1.4 TOE technical identification
Product name:
ID--One ePass Full EAC v2
Commercial name of
the TOE 1:
ID--One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG IDL configuration
configuration EAC with BAP and AA
Commercial name of
the TOE 2:
ID--One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA IDL configuration
configuration EAC with BAP and AA
‘6C14
6C14’ (P60D080 VC)
‘6014
6014’ (P60D080 VG)
IC type
‘6A15
6A15’ (P60D144 VA)
‘6019
6019’ (P60C080 VG)
‘6A20
6A20’ (P60C144 VA)
Additional code 1
Mandatory generic
‘C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098
C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098
6F7A738
6F7A738’
Identification:
Additional code 2
Optional DBI
‘B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606
B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606
532F51C2
532F51C2’
Identification:
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
Nota Bene
- The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size
- The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key
- An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the
Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the
evaluation.
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1.5 IC identification
IC Reference:
TOE 1:
TOE 2:
Communication
protocol:
Memory:
Chip Manufacturer:
NXP P60 chips
NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19]
EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2
NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18]
EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1
Contact, Contactless and Dual
ROM
NXP Semiconductors
Table 3 - Chip Identification
Nota Bene
TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two
NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family.
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2 TOE OVERVIEW
2.1 Product overview
The product ID-One
One Native eDoc is a multi-applicative native software, embeddable in contact
and/or contact-less
less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be
configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the
product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical
Data Structure as specified in [R2].
[R2]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic
Access Control [R11],, Supplementary Access Control [R17],, Active Authentication [R39], Extended
Access Control ([R12] and [R13]),
[R13] the Basic Access Protection [R9] and Extended Access Protection
(compliant to [R9]).
It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, MRTD,
MRTD eID and eSign.
Moreover, further configuration may also be done
done to each type of application to serve use cases
other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.
This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification.
The ID-One Native eDoc architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture:
pictu
Application
layer
Block 1:
MRTD - IDL
Block 2:
eID
Block 3:
eSign
Block 4:
Dauth
Operating System
Applicative modules
Tools modules
Platform
layer
Low layer
NXP P60
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Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview
2.2 TOE overview
The TOE described in this security target is the EAC with BAP and AA TOE of the product, a subset of
the Block 1 MRTD - IDL.
The block 1 of the ID-One
One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications:
Applications
PP
Targeted EAL
MRTD
BAC with CA and AA
[R11]
EAC with AA
[R12]
EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAC with PACE and AA
PACE with CA,
PACE_CAM and AA
[R13]
[R14]
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
IDL
BAP
X
EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAC and BAP
PACE
X
X
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PACE and EAC
X
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview
Block 1:
MRTD & IDL
MRTD BAC
MRTD EAC
MRTD EAC with
PACE
MRTD PACE
IDL BAP
IDL EAC
with BAP
IDL PACE
IDL PACE & EAC
Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview
The EAC with BAP TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the operating
system that creates the MF / DF required for the EAC with BAP configuration.
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The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle.
The TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification.
Nota bene
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
- Extended Access Control with Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication
- Basic Access Protection
- Active Authentication
- Prepersonalization phase (in particular with Additional code loading)
- Personalization phase
Nevertheless, the TOE can embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this
TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs.
2.3 TOE usages
Organisation issues MRDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming associated
rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRD configuration, verifying
authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRD to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The MRD in context of this security
securit target contains:
- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the card
- A separate data summary keydoc) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine Readable Zone (keydoc area)
- And data elements stored on
o the TOE’s chip for dual, contact and contact-less
contact
machine
reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
- The possession of a valid MRD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on
the biographical data page and
- The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored
in the MRD.
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When holder has been authenticated the issuing Organization can performed extra authentications
in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as “visa
information”…
The issuing Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRDs.
MRDs The receiving
Organization trusts a genuine MRD of an issuing Organization.
The MRD can be viewed as the combination:
- A physical MRD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRD
holder
o The biographical data on the biographical data page of the Driving Licence Document
Do
o The printed data in the Machine-Readable
Machine
Zone (keydoc)keydoc
keydoc area
are that identifies
the device
o The printed portrait
- A logical MRD as data of the MRD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO and extended in [R7], [R8], [R9] on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contact or contact-less
contact less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRD holder
o The digital Machine Readable
R
Zone Data (keydoc data, DG1)
o The digitized portraits
o The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
o The other data according to LDS (up toDG64)
to
o The Document security object
The issuing Organization implements security features of the MRD to maintain the authenticity and
integrity of the MRD and its data. The MRD as the physical device and the MRD’s chip is uniquely
identified by the document number.
The physical MRD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark
watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRD’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding
of the MRD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing Organization and the security features of the MRD’s chip.
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2.4 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact, contactless and dual integrated circuit chip of machine
readable documents (MRD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and
providing the following features:
- Basic Access Protection
- Active Authentication
- Extended Access Control
The TOE comprises at least:
- Circuitry
ircuitry of the MRD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
- IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
- IC Embedded Software (operating
(opera
system)
- MRD application
- Associated
sociated guidance documentation
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3 OE ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components:
Application
layer
Block 1: MRTD & IDL
BAC
EAC
EAC w
PACE
IDL BAP
IDL PACE
eDoc Application
PACE
IDL BAP &
EAC
IDL PACE &
EAC
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
Resident Application
Operating System
Applicative modules
Tools modules
Platform
layer
Low layer
Figure 3 - TOE architecture
3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60
The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification.
Identification
More information on the chips are given in the related security targets.
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3.2 Low layer
The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip
featuress from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer
multi
design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
- EEPROM management
nt including secure data processing,
- Other memories management,
- Transaction management,
- APDU protocol management,
- Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
- Error processing,
- Advanced securities activation.
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed
developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to
provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Cryptographic Feature
Embedded
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384
384 and SHA-512
SHA
bits
RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits):
bits)
- signature/verification
- key pair generation
RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits):
bits)
- signature/verification
- key pair generation
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits :
- signature/verification (ECDSA)
- key agreement (ECDH)
- key pair generation
3DES with 112 bits key size
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes
Random Generator compliant AIS31
Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 :
- key agreement
- key generation
Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves
Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library
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More information is available in complete ST.
ST
3.3 Tools modules
The tools modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product:
- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4
7816 and ISO/IEC 7816-9.
9. It is also compliant with ICAO
recommendations [R2].
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R20] and as described in annex E of [R41].
- PIN
N and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of [R40] and B.6 of [R41]
- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH
DH and generation.
- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and
Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard
More information is available in complete ST.
3.4 Applicative modules
The applicative modules provide IDL full EAC v2 product:
- Chip Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in [R40], an
ephemeral-static
static Diffie-Hellman
Diffie Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure
communication and unilateral authentication of the IDL chip.
- Terminal Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in [R40], a
two move challenge-response
response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the
terminal.
- PACE Protocol ass specified in [R17], a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman
Hellman key agreement
protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based
password based authentication of
the IDL chip and the terminal.
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data
object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). For applications already defined by normative
documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access
condition rules.
- Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image
Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring
of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of
patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TOE and outside the
scope of this present certification.
More information is available in complete ST.
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3.5 Operating System
This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization
pre personalization and personalization phases in order to
configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK,
LSK),
SK), File management including data reading and writing or additional
dditional code loading.
loading It can be
addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive
non
commands, using
sing SCP02 or SCP03.
SCP03
More information is available in complete ST.
3.6 Application layer
Two kinds of dispatcher are available on the top of the product: the resident application that is used
for Personalization Phase and for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc application that is
used during the Use Phase of MRD Applications.
The application layer also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access
Control,, Basic Access Protection, Extended Access Control or Active Authentication.
Authentication
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key
ey from the optically read KEYDOC of the MRD. The protocol for Basic
Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2
11770 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is
also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the
transmitted data.
The inspection system:
- Reads
eads the printed data in the KEYDOC (for MRD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from KEYDOC data.
After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private
te communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC.
Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length.
l
It
exists in 4 modes:
BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits,
BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits,
BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits.
Following Secure messaging is performed using the algorithm used in the selected BAP mode.
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Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R8] uses the term “Keydoc” which refers to an
equivalent
ivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode.
The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the latest security features and ensures a strong and
mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric
data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG7 and DG8.. In particular, the authentication steps
ensures a strong secure channel able to provide
provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read
and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal
comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps may be performed either with elliptic
curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.
This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication.
The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that
the TOE has not been “cloned”,
oned”, by means of a challenge-response
challenge response protocol between the Inspection
System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key
pair. A hash representation of Data Group containing the Verification Public Key and attributes
(algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD) and therefore authenticated by the
issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory.
The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.
More information is available in complete ST.
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4 TOE LIFE CYCLE
4.1 Life cycle overview
Software development
Phase 1
ALC phase
Patch development
Phase 2
IC photomask
fabrication
IC database
construction
Phase 3
IC manufacturing
IC testing
TOE delivery point
Phase 4
Card printing
Micromodule
Phase 5
Testing
Embedding
Prepersonalization
AGD PRE
AGD phase
Testing
Testing
Phase 6
Personalization
Smartcard
product
Application
End of life
Smartcard
End of life
AGD OPE
Phase 7
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
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The TOE life-cycle
cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle
life cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE
life-cycle
cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Additional codes are identified in §1.5.
§
The table below presents the TOE role:
Roles
Subject
IC developer
IC manufacturer
NXP Semiconductors
NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer
Oberthur Technologies
Manufacturer
NXP Semiconductors
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle [R10],, the Protection
Pr
Profile lifecycle in phases,
ses, the TOE delivery point and the
coverage:
Steps
Step 1
Phase
Development
Subject
Covered by
Sites
Oberthur Technologies
ALC R&D sites
Pessac and
Colombes
Step 2
Development
NXP Semiconductors
IC certification
IC certification
Step 3
Manufacturing
NXP Semiconductors
TOE delivery point
MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
IC certification
IC certification
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Manufacturing
AGD_PRE
Manufacturing
MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
AGD_PRE
Personalization
Operational Use
Personalization Agent
End user
AGD_PRE
AGD_OPE
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
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4.2 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the
the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the IDL application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
th Embedded
Software in the non-volatile
volatile non-programmable
non programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC
manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
non volatile programmable memories, the eIDL
e
application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.
4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the document’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the document’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile
non
non-programmable memoriess (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the
chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery
process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the
Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile
volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer add initialization
data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).
TOE delivery point
(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless
interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source
code in the non-volatile
volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eIDL
e
application, and
(iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization
pre
Data.
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The pre-personalised
personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier
Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent.
Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Agent
Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6
[R45].
The additional code loading process is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via
the Command LOAD SECURE:
- Additional code generation
- MSK authentication
- LSK derivation
- Memory area definition
- Loading of the additional code
- Secure activation of the additional code
The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during
durin
Prepersonalization.
Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification.
Identification
Additional code generation
The additional code is generated by Oberthur Technologies:: developped, compiled, ciphered and
signed. After generation, it is sent to the MRD
MRD manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE.
Loading of the additional code
The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself
to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur
Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it.
Identification of the TOE
After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data
to reflects the presence of the additional code.
4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document
holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data
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(i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the
visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User
Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The
step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of
(i) the digital KEYDOC data (EF.DG1), (ii)
(ii the digitized portrait (EF.DG6),
), and (iii) the Document
security object. The signing of the Document security object
object by the Document signer finalizes the
personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised
travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
travel document holder
lder for operational use.
4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
Organisation
rganisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing Organization but they
can never be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of
an issuing Organisation. All production,
production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up
to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under
AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact,
P.Manufac
P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE
delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
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5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R42],
[R43] and [R44].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC
Conformance rationale
Part 1
Strict conformance
Part 2
Part 3
Conformance to the extended1 part:
- FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
- FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
- FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
- FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with:
- ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
- AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
analysis
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
5.1.1
Overview of the SFR defined in this ST
SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requirements:
Requirements
- SFR (/Global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)
- SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading
- SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases
- SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication
- SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication
- SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication
- SFR (/BAC and /BAP)) that are dedicated for Basic Access Protection
SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control
1
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP and in this Security Target
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The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.
SFR from the PP
FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1
; FCS_COP.1/SYM ; FCS_COP.1/MAC ; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
/SIG_VER ;
FCS_RND.1; FIA_UID.1; FIA_UAU.1; FIA_UAU.4 ; FIA_UAU.5; FIA_UAU.6 ; FIA_API.1 ; FDP_ACC.1 ; FDP_ACF.1 ;
FDP_UCT.1 ; FDP_UIT.1 ; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_SMR.1;
FMT_SMR.1 FMT_LIM.1; FMT_LIM.2 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ;
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI ; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ; FMT_MTD.1/DATE ; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ;
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1 ; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_TST.1; FPT_PHP.3
Table 9 -SFR from the PP
Section
Additional SFR
MP
FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ;
FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ;
FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
MP Add code
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ;
FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code
CS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code
Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ;
FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
Table 10 - Additional SFR
5.1.2
5.1.2.1
Overview of the additional protocols
Active Authentication
The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the
related on-card
card generation of RSA and ECC keys.
It implies the following addition to the standard PP:
- Additional Threats: § 6.3.2 Threats for AA
- Additional Objective: § 7.1.2 SO for AA
- Additional OE: § 7.2.2 OE for AA
5.1.2.2
Prepersonalization phase
The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following
elements.
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This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as
personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following addition has been
performed:
- Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 Threats for Note 6
- Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 SO for Note 6
The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45].
5.2 Protection Profile conformance
The Security Target is based on the following
foll
PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:
-
Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control [R12].
For consistency reasons, editorial modifications have been performed:
- BAC replaced by BAP
- MRTD replaced by MRD
- “DG1 to DG16“ replaced by “DG1 to DG24”
- State replaced by organization
- MRZ replaced by keydoc
- Reference to EF.COM for access control rules (which specifies which DG is protected by BAP
or EAP)
- DG2 replaced by DG6
- DG3 replaced by DG7
- DG4 replaced by DG8
- DG15 replaced by DG13
5.3 Rationale for the additions
The rationales are available
le in the complete ST.
5.4 Non evaluated features
Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs:
- Standard and biometric PIN management
- File system management
- PACE
- DBI
The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any
combination of application.
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6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
DEF
6.1 Subjects
6.1.1
PP EAC
AC subjects
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit
circuit and the MRD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRD’s
’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE
during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer
and MRD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Manuf
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing Organization to personalize the MRD for the holder by
some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic
biogr
data in
the MRD,, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical
MRD for the holder as defined for global,
global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2].
Application Note
Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRD.
The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public
public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Link
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Organization with respect to
the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection
Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for
the sensitive data of the MRD in the limits provided by the issuing Organizations
Organization or Organizations in
the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
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Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface
or through the contactless interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving Organization (i) examining an
MRD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRD
holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication
with the MRD’s
’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
(iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading
the MRD or other parts of the Driving Licence book providing this information. The General
Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the
th General
Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the
issuing Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving Organization to read the
sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes
attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection
System Certificates.
MRD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRD for whom the issuing Organization personalized the MRD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRD to the inspection
inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRD without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive
biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG7,
EF.
EF.DG8) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRD.
Application Note
- Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRD)) is not considered by
this PP since this can only be averted by the BAP mechanism
echanism using the “weak” Document
Basic Access Keys that is covered by [25]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user
data EF.DG1, EF.DG6,, EF.DG5 to EF.DG24
EF.DG as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
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-
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using
a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRD.. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful
attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.2
Additional Subjects
IC Developer
Developer of the IC.
TOE Developer
Developer of part of the TOE source code.
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRD manufacturer as
described in [R11].
6.2 Assets
Logical MRD data
The logical MRD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.DG (with different security needs) and
the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE.
The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and
EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRD holder. The Chip Authentication
ication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is
used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRD.
The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active Authentication EF.DG13
EF.
(see below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG7&4.
EF.
&4. The other one (and associated keys) are described
and managed in the related BAP Security Target.
The Active Authentication Public Key Info in EF.DG13
EF.
is used by the inspection system
sys
for Active
Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRD.
MRD
All these data may be sorted out in two different categories.
If they are specific to the user, they are User data,
If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.
User Data
Description
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User Data
Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
Sensitive biometric reference data
Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture
Active Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG13 (AAPK)
Chip Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG14 (CAPK)
Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to an Active Authentication
Contains public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to an the Chip Authentication Protocol
Table 11 - User Data
TSF Data
Description
TOE_ID
Prepersonalizer reference
authentication data
Personalization Agent reference
authentication Data
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Active Authentication private key
(AAK)
Chip Authentication private key
(CAK)
Session keys for the secure channel
Life Cycle State
Additional Code
Public Key CVCA
Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization
Agent
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between
b
the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Private key the chip uses to perform an Active Authentication
Private key the chip uses to perform a Chip Authentication
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Additional code to be loaded on the initial TOE during
prepersonalization by the Prepersonalizer. The loading of the
additional code on the initial TOE constitures the final TOE
Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent
memory
CVCA Certificate
All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,
…) stored in persistent memory
Current date
Current date of the travel document
Table 12 - TSF Data
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Authenticity of the MRD's chip
The authenticity of the MRD's
's chip personalized by the issuing Organization for the MRD holder is
used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRD.
6.3 Threats
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
env
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf [R11])) are averted by the mechanisms
described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with high attack potential thus these are
not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing the movement of the MRD by
identifying remotely the MRD’s
’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat of imitating the inspection
system to read the logical MRD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the KEYDOC or who does not know the
physical MRD in advance.
6.3.1
Threats from the PP EAC
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRD's
's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat
T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to
get data stored on the MRD's
's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive
biometric reference data vs. digital KEYDOC,, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e.
knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the
sensitive biometric reference data are stored only
o
on the MRD's
's chip as private sensitive personal
data whereas the KEYDOC data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRD (i.e. biometric reference) data
T.Forgery
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Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRD holder"s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack
scenarios of MRD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data page
of the Driving Licence book, in the printed KEYDOC and in the digital KEYDOC to claim another
identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to
overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker
attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat
automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRDs to create a new forged MRD,, e.g. the attacker writes the
digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRD of a traveler
into another MRD’s
’s chip leaving their digital KEYDOC unchanged to claim the identity of the holder
this MRD.. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical
log
MRD to another contactless
chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRD data.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRD's
MRD chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRD.
MRD This violates the
authenticity of the MRD's
's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRD. The
attackerr may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRD's
's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRD's
MRD chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRD data
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
"Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
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Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage
us
in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes
changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation)
n) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even
for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
Analy (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRD’s
’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRD’s
’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRD’s
’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRD’s
chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRD’s
’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused
focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of
the MRD’s
’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification
of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRD’s
’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite.
pre requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRD’s
MRD chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features
featur or
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functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRD’s
’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRD’s
’s chip Embedded
Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRD.
Asset: confidentiality
dentiality and authenticity of logical MRD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
6.3.2
Threats for AA
T.Counterfeit
6.3.3
Threats for Note 6
T.Unauthorized_Load
Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled
with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being
bein in
possession of a legitimate MRD
Asset: Logical MRD data
T.Bad_Activation
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is
different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in
possession of a legitimate MRD,
MRD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be
load
Asset: Logical MRD data
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional
code identification.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate
legitimat MRD
Asset: TOE_ID
Application Note
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This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7.
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
6.4.1
OSP from PP EAC
P.BAC-PP
The issuing Organizationss or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection
Systems have read access to logical MRD data DG1, DG6, DG5 to DG24 the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] as
well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRD is successfully evaluated and
certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with "DRIVING
DRIVING LICENCE Application", Basic Access Control" [R11] in order to ensure the
confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRD data.
Application note:The
The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[R2] is addressed by the [R11] (cf. P.BAC-PP).
PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than
EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist
attacks with high attack potential
potentia (cf. [R11]).
). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference
data in EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance
re
the protection of EF.DG7 and EF.DG8
EF.
on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG6
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG24 are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in
technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates.
cates.
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG7)
(EF.
and iris image(s) (EF.DG8)) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing Organization authorizes the Document
Doc
Verifiers of the receiving Organizations
Organizations to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRD's
's chip shall protect the confidentiality
and integrity of the sensitive private personal
personal data even during transmission to the Extended
Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-persona
personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
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P.Personalization
The issuing Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRD with
respect to the MRD holder. The personalization of the MRD for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing Organization only.
6.4.2
OSP for AA
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39].
[R39]
6.5 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment
environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
6.5.1
Assumptions from PP EAC
A.MRD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used duringg all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to
its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are
are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
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The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRD with respect to the MRD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if
stored on the MRD’s
’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored
stor on the MRD’s
chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent
bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving Organization (i)
examining an MRD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as MRD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
global interoperability (i) includes the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing Organization, and
(ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the
logical MRD underr Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical
MRD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity
authenticity of the MRD's
chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection
System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving Organization to read the sensitive
biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving Organizations
Organization or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for
for the logical MRD. The issuing
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the
Country Signing CA Key pair.
r. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving Organizations
Organization
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands
over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the MRDs.
s. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document
Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving Organizations and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
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The issuing and receiving Organizations
Organizations or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure
infrastr
for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities,
the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and
certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing Organizations
Organizations or Organizations are signing the certificates of
the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended
Inspection Systems of the receiving Organizations
Organization or Organizations. The issuing Organizations
Organization or
Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their
MRD's chip.
6.5.2
Assumptions for Active Authentication
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the TOE
during Active Authentication.
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7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
JECTIVES
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
7.1.1
SO from PP EAC
E
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24,, the Document security object
according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents
Agent only. The
logical MRD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.DG and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agentss if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG24
EF.DG are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's
's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing.
wr
The TOE must ensure thee integrity of the logical MRD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication data.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG7
(EF.
and
EF.DG8)) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization
of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict
non strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing
Organization.. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
potential
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization
Pre Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
"Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRD". The storage of the PrePre Personalization
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data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.CA_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRD’s
’s chip as issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Chip Authentication as
defined in [R39].. The authenticity proof provided by the MRD’s
’s chip shall be protected against
attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to:
to
- (i) Disclose critical User Data
- (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software
- (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded
coded IC Embedded Software
- (iv) Bypass, deactivate,
tivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRD's chip:
- Byy measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found
ound by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines and
- Byy forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- Byy a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection
ection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRD's
's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhancedenhanced
basic attack potential by means of
- Measuring
easuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- Measuring
easuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state
solid
physics
ysics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation
anipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled
ontrolled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering
engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
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OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic)
fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
7.1.2
SO for AA
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRD’s chip as
issued by the identified issuing Organization by means of the Active Authentication as defined in
[R2].. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRD’s chip shall be protected against attacks
with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity
integrity of the logical MRD stored on the MRD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.
Authentication
7.1.3
SO for Note 6
OT.Secure_Load_ACode
The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded
Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be
loaded
oaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to
be assembled with the Initial TOE.
During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
OT.Secure_AC_Activation
Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the
same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the
Final TOE shall be completed before activation.
If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case
of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain
in its initial state or fail secure.
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OT.TOE_Identification
The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to
store Identification Data in its non-volatile
non volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After
Atomic
omic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows
identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial
TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection
Systems to verify the authenticity.
authenticity
7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1
7.2.1.1
OE from PP EAC
Issuing Organization
The issuing Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
OE.MRD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
- Non-disclosure
disclosure of any security relevant
releva information
- Identification
dentification of the element under delivery
- Meet
eet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment)
- Physical
hysical protection to prevent external damage
- Secure
ecure storage and handling procedures (including rejectd
reje
TOE"s)
- Traceability
aceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o Origin
rigin and shipment details
o Reception,
eception, reception acknowledgement
o Location
ocation material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance
non conformance to the confidentiality convention) and
highlight all non-conformance
conformance to this process.
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Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing
d
with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the
procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agentss acting on behalf of the
th issuing
Organization:
- (i) Establish
stablish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRD
- (ii) Enroll
nroll the biometric reference data of the MRD holder i.e. the
he portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or thee encoded iris image(s)
- (iii) Personalize the MRD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing Organization must:
- (i) Generate
enerate a cryptographic secure
secu Country Signing CA Key Pair
- (ii) Ensure
nsure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure
re operational environment
environ
- (iii) Distribute
istribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving Organizations
Organization
and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing Organization must:
- (i) Generate
enerate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys
- (ii) Sign
ign Document Security Objects of genuine MRD in a secure operational
perational environment
only
- (iii) Distribute
istribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving Organizations
Organization
and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.DG if stored in the LDS according to [R2].
OE.Auth_Key_MRD
The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
to
- (i) Generate the MRD'ss Chip Authentication Key Pair
- (ii) Sign
ign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication
Authentica
Public Key
data in EF.DG14
- (iii) Support
upport inspection systems of receiving Organizationss or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRD's
MRD chip used for genuine MRD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the
access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRD's holders to authorized receiving Organizations
Organization
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or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing Organization generates
card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC-PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing Organization,, that the TOE is additionally successfully evaluated
and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Readabl Travel
Document with "DRIVING
DRIVING LICENCE Application", Basic Access Control" [R11].. This is necessary to
cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard
standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential
the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
7.2.1.2
Receiving Organization
The receiving Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRD
The inspection system of the receiving Organization must examine the MRD presented by the
traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRD.
MRD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability:
interoperability
- (i) Includes
ncludes the Country Signing Public Key and the
the Document Signer Public Key of each
issuing Organization
- (ii) Implements
mplements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving Organization uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of
Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRD before they are used.
The receiving Organizationss and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
s
OE.Prot_Logical_MRD
The inspection system of the receiving Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the
data read from the logical MRD.. The receiving Organization examining the logical MRD being under
Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the
transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
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OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving Organizations
Organizations or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data
of the logical MRD.. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRD's chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
7.2.2
OE for AA
OE.Exam_MRD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication protocol
to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRD,
Logical_MRD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active
Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification
fication by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the
verification by Active Authentication,
Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the
MRD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing Organization has to establish
establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication
cation Public Key data in EF.DG13
EF.DG1 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving
Organizationss to verify the authenticity of the MRD’s chip used for genuine MRD by certification of
the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
Object
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8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
8.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.1
Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [R11].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies:: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [R11]
8.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.2.1
Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [R11]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined
efined quality metric].
Dependencies:: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R11]
8.3
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity
8.3.1
Extended component FIA_API.1
Description: see [R12]
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FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies:: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R12]
8.4
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
8.4.1
Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: see [R11]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy
policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [R11]
8.4.2
Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [R11]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
availabilit
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
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Rationale: See [R11]
8.5
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.5.1
Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: see [R11]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R11]
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9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
REQUIREMENT
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE
configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:
- Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization
Personalization described in the Passport
Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code.
- Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- BAP SFR that cover the Basic Access Protection
- CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication
Authentic
Protocol
TA SFR that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication
Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control)
- EAC SFR that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA
and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another)
9.1.1
Global SFR
This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are
embedded on the product.
FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
none
FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
1. The requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R37]
and
2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation.
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FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks
FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks
FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.
FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.
FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
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FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- At reset
- Before any cryptographic operation
- When accessing a DG or any EF
- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command
FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
9.1.2
Product configuration SFR
This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the
compliance to Note 6.
9.1.2.1
SFR for additional code
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code
_Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure that Additional code identification stored audit
records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: failure and attack.
attack
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Application Note:
Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by
the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the
signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected
protected in integrity through the
TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature.
FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code
/MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys
keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data
entered - AES 128 ECB
Key length (bits)
Standards
128
None
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code
/MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code
/MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with
LSK_LOAD) and signature verification
AES
128
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code
/MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code
/MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
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Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
3DES Retail MAC
112
[R35]
AES CMAC
128,, 192 or 256
[R35]
Secure Messaging MAC
FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code
/MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control SFP to
receive user data in a manner protected from modification errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by the TOE developer
has occurred.
Application Note
Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering
change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the
card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer.
This SFR control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code
/MP_Add_code Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the [list of TSF data] to
[authorized identified roles]:
Activate
List of TSF data
Authorised role
Additional code
TOE developer
Application note
The Activation of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the
LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the TOE developer.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ
KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code
_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to
[authorized identified roles]:
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TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
LSK
None
FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code
/MP_Add_code Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. TOE developper
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code
/MP_Add_code TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. LSK
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. LSK
FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially
ditorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the TOE Developer and
Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:
1. Additional code loading
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9.1.2.2
Manufacturing
turing and Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256
256
None
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
3DES in CBC mode
112
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC mode
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
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FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES
/MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – MAC
3DES RMAC
112
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES
/MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Secure Messaging MAC
AES
Key length
(bits)
128, 192 and 256
Standard
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES
/MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)
3DES
Key length
(bits)
112
Standard
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES
/MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
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Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)
AES
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Hashing
SHA256
None
[R27]
FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on all subjects and all
objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF
and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access
acc
control SFP.
Application Note
This SFR enforces access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional
code loading but not only.
FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF
SF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control to objects based on
the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS).
(AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS)
FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
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FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none..
FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
Application Note
This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional code loading
but not only.
FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
none
Application Note
This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any
security requirements preliminary to this action.
FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to receive user data in
a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
disclosure
Application note
For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted.
This SFR control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
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FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access
ccess Control SFP to receive user
data in a manner protected from modification errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP
/MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
authentication of
1. Prepersonalizer
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer.
Personalizer
FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single-use
Single
authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES
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FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single-use
Single
authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple
tiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed
claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key
FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to
phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer.
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF
TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
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FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall
hall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:
1. Personalization Agent key storage
2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA
INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
Prepersonalizer
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS
INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Agent
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ
KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
MSK
Personalization Agent Keys
None
None
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
MSK
IC manufacturer (created by the developer)
Personalization Agent Keys
None
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FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
9.1.3
Active Authentication SFR
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FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation
Algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with
SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512
1024 to 4096 with a step
of 256 bits
[R25]
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation
Algo
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384,
512
Key length
(bits)
192 to 521 over prime
field curves
Standard
[R25] [R26]
[R27] [R28]
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP when importing
user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
none
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ
KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to none.
FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions
functi
behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active
Authentication to Personalization Agent.
Agent
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The
T TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization
Agent.
9.1.4
Basic Access Protection SFR
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FCS_CKM.1/BAC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
112
[R2]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_AUTH The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Symmetric authentication, encryption and decryption
3DES
112
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
ngth
(bits)
Standard
Hashing
SHA1
None
[R27]
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FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_ENC The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging (BAP) – encryption and
decryption
3DES in CBC mode
112
[R35][R32]
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAC_MAC The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging MAC
Retail MAC
112
[R32]
FDP_UCT.1/BAC Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Protection SFP to transmit and receive
r
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/BAC Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Protection SFP to transmit and receive
r
user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred
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FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_RE
KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
Document Access Keys
None
FMT_LIM.1/BAC Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2/BAC Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FPT_TST.1/BAC TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/BAC The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When performing a BAPauthentication
BAP
FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
integ
of
stored TSF executable code.
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FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE
/BAC_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE
/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the [list of TSF data] to
[authorized identified roles]:
Write
List of TSF data
Authorised role
Document Basic Access Keys
Personalization Agent
FCS_CKM.1/BAP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm - AES
128, 192 and 256
[R7]
FCS_COP.1/BAP Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAP The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Encryption and decryption
AES
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/BAP-SM
SM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/BAP-SM The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
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Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure messaging – message authentication code
AES in CBC
mode
128, 192 and
256
[R35]
9.1.5
Chip Authentication SFR
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to [R39] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES
ES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographicc key generation algorithm
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman
Diffie
key derivation
protocol compliant to PKCS#3
Key length (bits)
Standards
112
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES
/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length (bits)
Standards
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman
Diffie
key derivation
protocol compliant to PKCS#3
128, 192, 256
[R2]
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FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES
/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to
ISO 15946
Key length (bits)
Standards
112
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES
/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length (bits)
Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to
ISO 15946
128, 192, 256
[R2]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1
None
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES
/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
Standards
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SHA1 and SHA256
(bits)
None
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES CBC mode
112
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES
/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic algorithm
AES
Key length
(bits)
128, 192 and 256
Standards
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
3DES Retail MAC
Key length
(bits)
112
Standards
[R39]
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FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES
/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES CMAC
128, 192 and 256
[R39]
FIA_UAU.1/CA Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow:
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
auth
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC
ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed
claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide
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1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC
ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate
re
the user under the conditions each command sent to
the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system
FIA_UID.1/CA Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated
mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
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FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When performing the Chip Authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK
AK to Personalization
Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ
KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to none.
FDP_UCT.1/CA Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication
protocol.
FDP_UIT.1/CA Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification,, deletion, insertion and replay errors
after Chip Authentication protocol
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion,
ion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication
protocol
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9.1.6
Terminal Authentication SFR
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512
Key length
(bits)
None
Standards
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC
/TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
None
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
/TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic algorithm
RSA coupled with SHA
Key length
(bits)
From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256
Standards
[R39]
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FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC
/TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
[standard]
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
ECC coupled with SHA
From 192 to 521
[R39]
FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use
use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD
TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When using the CVCA Root key
- When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ
- When performing a Terminal authentication
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FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Country Verifying
ing Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
4. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI
TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
9.1.7
Extended Access Control SFR
FDP_ACC.1/EAC Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRTD
FDP_ACF.1/EAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
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1. Subjects
a. Personalization Agent
b. Extended Inspection System
S
c. Terminal
2. Objects
a. Data EF.DG1 to EF.DG6 and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD
b. Data EF.DG7 and EF.DG8 of the logical MRD
c. Data in EF.COM
d. Data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes
a. Authentication status of terminals
b. Terminal Authorization
FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. The successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of
the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD
2. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read access to DG7 (Fingerprint) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG7 of the
logical MRD
3. The successfully authenticated EIS with the read accedd to DG8 (Iris) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG8 of the logical MRD
FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none..
FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG7
EF.
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG8
EF.
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG7
EF.
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not
n allowed to read data in the EF.DG8
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG24
EF.DG of the logical MRD
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as
as Extended Inspection System is not allowed
to read any of the EF.DG7 to EF..DG8 of the logical MRD
Application Note:
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Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG6
and EF.DG9 to EF.DG24 of the logical MRD. According to P.BAC-PP this security features of the MRD
are not subject off this protection profile. For more information on the associated DG, please refer to
table 3 of the ISO 18013-3.
FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC
/EAC [Editiorally Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted
ccepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access
Control.
Refinement:
The Certificate chain is valid if and only if:
1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
correct with the public key of the
Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date
of the TOE
2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the
Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is
not before the Current Date of the TOE
3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Certification Authority can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the
Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date
Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure
value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder
Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a
secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC
ENC mode
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed
claimed identity according to the
1. 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol
and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism
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FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG7 and EF.DG8)
EF.
) to be disclosed (not available for BAC)
FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that
tha in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
enforced
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, and AVA.VAN.5.
AVA.VAN.5
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10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
SPECIFIC
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval.
Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access
conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
- BA keys
- Chip Authentication keys
- Active Authentication private key
- Personalization Agent keys
- MSK and LSK
- CVCA keys
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
- It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
- It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
- The terminal can read user data (except DG7 & DG8),, the Document Security Object,
EF.CVA, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel
- When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG7 & DG8
provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel
In the personalization phase
- The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated
by the TOE (using its authentication keys)
- The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique
identifier is called (PUPI)
It ensures as well that no other
er part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates
authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are
fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization
phase to be set to “1”.
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It ensures as well the CPLC
LC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it
is not possible to load an additional code or change the personalizer authentication keys in
personalization phase..
Regarding the file structure
In the operational use:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update
any system files. However
- The application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs
- The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application
according to the authentication mechanism described in [R39]
In the personalization phase
- The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the
data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys)
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [R39]. (if it
is activated
ctivated by the personnalizer).
BAP mechanism
This security functionality
ity ensures the BAP is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the
TOE is personalized with the Triple DES Document Basic Access keys the Personalization Agent
loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities
functi
ensures the session keys are destroyed at the end of each BAP
BA session.
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly
cor
performed. In particular:
- It handles
es the certificate verification
- The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date
da of the
incoming certificate)
- The
he signature verification (in the certificate or in the
the challenge/response mechanism)
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication
authentication keys & Root CVCA
key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this
security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4].
This security functionalities ensures the session
session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each
successful Chip Authentication step.
The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS
(the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures
countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes
more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
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Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization
Personnalization Agent, demands
an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure
Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Messag
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnal
P ersonnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of prepre
initializing the product and loading additional
additio code if needed. This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This
TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that
th the TOE gets backk to a secure state when
- an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures
ures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality,
confidentiality authenticity & integrity of the communication
between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAP authentication, a secure channel is established
establishe
based on Triple DES or AES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES/AES
/AES algorithms.
This security functionality
unctionality ensures
- No commands were inserted,
inserted modified nor deleted within the data flow
- The data exchanged remain confidential
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
destroyed
This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.
This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or
Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity
inte
on the TSF data:
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-
Before the TSF data usage
The additional code integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card
The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured
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11 RATIONALES
Threats
Security Objectives
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
T.Forgery
OE.Exam_MRD
Exam_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD_AA, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
Auth_Verif
OT.CA_Proof
Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRD, OE.Exam_MRD, OT.AA_Proof,
T.Counterfeit
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif, OT.Data_Int_AA
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Abuse
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func,
OE.Personalization
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Phys
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Unauthorized_Load
OT.Secure _Load_ACode
T.Bad_Activation
OT.Secure _AC_Activation
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery
OT.TOE_Identification
Table 13- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage
OSP
Security Objectives
P.BAC-PP
OE.BAC-PP
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
P.Manufact
OT.Identification
P.Personalization
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OT.Identification OE.Personalization
P.Activ_Auth
OT.AA_Proof
Table 14 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage
Assumptions
OE
A.MRD_Manufact
OE.MRD_Manufact
_Manufact
A.MRD_Delivery
OE.MRD__ Delivery
A.Pers_Agent
OE.Personalization
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRD
OE.Prot_Logical_
A.Signature_PKI
OE.Exam_MRD, OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.
, OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
A.Auth_PKI
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Exam_MRD_AA
_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRD_AA
Table 15 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage
The other rationales are available in the complete ST.
ST
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12 REFERENCES
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only
Read
Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical
Travel Documents, Specifications
Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with
biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R4]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel
Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
2004
[R5]
Advanced
ed Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[R6]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts
from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth
ifth Edition – 2003
IDL specifications
[R7]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part
1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013-1:2005
18013
[R8]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant
liant Driving Licence — Part
2: Machine-readable
readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013-2:2008
18013
[R9]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part
3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009
18013
Protection Profiles
[R10]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035
0035 15/06/2007
[R11]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSIPP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R12]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control –
BSI-PP-0056
0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R13]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control
with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012
[R14]
MRTD with PACE – PP-0068v2
PP
[R15]
E-passport:
passport: adaptation and interpretation
in
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R16]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02,
2009/02, 1/12/2009
of
e-passport
passport
Protection
Profiles,
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[R17]
Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine
Machine Readable Travel Documents
– version v1.01
Chips References
[R18]
Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013-MA-02 - NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60x144/080
144/080PVA/PVA(Y/B)
PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0
[R19]
Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-v2-2014 - NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software
Standards
[R20]
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013
:2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R21]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
[R22]
ISO/IEC 15946-1.
1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[R23]
ISO/IEC 15946-2.
2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniquess based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[R24]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[R25]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002
2002 - Information technology - Security
ecurity techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
hash
[R26]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman
Hellman Key-Agreement
Key Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[R27]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2
2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224),
SHA 224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[R28]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998:
X9.62 1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
T
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
[R29]
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key
Public key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
[R30]
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories
Laboratories Technical
Note, 2002
[R31]
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
[R32]
FIPS 46-3
3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[R33]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999
1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
[R34]
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
[R35]
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
[R36]
ISO/IEC 11770-2.
2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management –
part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
Misc
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[R37]
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version
Ve
1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[R38]
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport
e
PP_courtesy translation-draft
draft v0.1
[R39]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1
TR
– version 2.10 March 2012
[R40]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2
TR
– version 2.10 March 2012
[R41]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-3
T
– version 2.10 March 2012
CC
[R42]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2012-09-001,
CCMB
001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
[R43]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security
security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002,
CCMB
002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R44]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003,
CCMB
version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R45]
ANSSI-CC note 6 – v0.91
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13 ACRONYMS
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OCR
OS
PKI
PP
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4
Card personalization life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Optical Character Recognition
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security function
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INDEX
A
A.BAC-Keys ....................................................
.................... 40
A.Insp_Sys......................................................
...................... 39
A.Insp_Sys_AA ...............................................
................................
40
A.Insp_Sys_CA ...............................................
................................
40
A.MRTD_Delivery ..........................................
................................
39
A.MRTD_Manufact ........................................
................................
39
A.Pers_Agent .................................................
................................
39
Access__Control__in__reading ..................... 71
Access__Control__in__writing ...................... 71
Active__Authentication.................................
................................ 71
Attacker .........................................................
......................... 34
Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip ....... 35
B
BAC__mechanism..........................................
................................
71
F
FAU_SAS.1/MP ..............................................
................................
59
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ........................... 52
FCS_CKM.1/BAC ............................................
................................
61
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES ...................... 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ........................ 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES .................. 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES .................... 67
FCS_CKM.1/MP .............................................
................................
54
FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ........................... 52
FCS_CKM.4/Global ........................................
................................
50
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA ......................................
................................
60
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA ..................................
................................ 60
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH ..................................
................................ 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC ....................................
................................ 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC ...................................
................................ 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA ....................................
................................ 62
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES .................... 68
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ...................... 68
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES ..................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES ....................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES .................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES ...................... 67
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES
.1/MP_AUTH_3DES ........................ 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES .......................... 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES........................... 54
FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code ................... 52
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES ............................. 54
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES ......................... 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code ................. 52
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES............................ 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA .....................................
................................ 56
FCS_RND.1/Global ........................................
................................
50
FDP_ACC.1/BAC ............................................
................................
64
FDP_ACC.2/MP .............................................
................................
56
FDP_ACF.1/BAC ............................................
................................
64
FDP_ACF.2/MP................................
.............................................. 56
FDP_DAU.1/AA .............................................
................................
60
FDP_ITC.1/AA................................................
................................
61
FDP_ITC.1/CA ................................................
................................
68
FDP_ITC.1/MP ...............................................
................................
56
FDP_UCT.1/BAC ......................................
................................
62, 70
FDP_UCT.1/MP .............................................
................................
57
FDP_UIT.1/BAC .............................................
................................
63
FDP_UIT.1/CA ...............................................
................................
70
FDP_UIT.1/MP ..............................................
................................
57
FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ............................ 53
FIA_AFL.1/BAC ..............................................
................................
65
FIA_AFL.1/MP ...............................................
................................
57
FIA_API.1/CA.................................................
................................
66
FIA_UAU.1/BAC ............................................
................................
65
FIA_UAU.1/CA...............................................
................................
68
FIA_UAU.1/MP..............................................
................................
57
FIA_UAU.4/BAC ............................................
................................
65
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES ...................................
................................ 58
FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES .....................................
................................ 58
FIA_UAU.5/BAC ............................................
................................
65
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES ....................................
................................ 68
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES ...................................
................................ 58
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ............................... 58, 69
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FIA_UAU.6/BAC .............................................
................................
65
FIA_UAU.6/CA ...............................................
................................
69
FIA_UID.1/BAC................................
............................................... 65
FIA_UID.1/CA .................................................
................................
69
FIA_UID.1/MP................................................
................................
57
FMT_LIM.1/BAC ............................................
................................
63
FMT_LIM.1/Global.........................................
................................
50
FMT_LIM.2/BAC ............................................
................................
63
FMT_LIM.2/Global.........................................
................................
50
FMT_MOF.1/AA.............................................
................................
61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ .......................... 61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE ........................ 61
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ ........................ 63
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE ...................... 63
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ .......................... 70
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ........................ 70
FMT_MTD.1/MP ............................................
................................
58
FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ......................... 53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS .............................. 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA ............................ 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ......................... 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ....... 53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE ....................... 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code ..... 53
FMT_SMF.1/MP.............................................
................................
59
FMT_SMR.1/BAC ...........................................
................................
64
FMT_SMR.1/MP ............................................
................................
59
FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code .......................... 53
FPT_EMS.1/AA...............................................
................................
61
FPT_EMS.1/CA ...............................................
................................
69
FPT_EMS.1/Global .........................................
................................
51
FPT_EMS.1/MP ..............................................
................................
60
FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code ........................... 53
FPT_FLS.1/Global...........................................
................................
51
FPT_PHP.3/Global .........................................
................................
51
FPT_TST.1/BAC ..............................................
................................
63
FPT_TST.1/Global ....................................
................................ 51, 69
FTP_ITC.1/MP..............................................
................................
58
FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code .......................... 54
I
IC_developer.................................................
................................
34
Inspection_System........................................
................................
33
L
Logical__MRTD__data .................................. 34
M
Manufacturer................................................
................................
33
MRTD_Holder ...............................................
................................
34
O
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD .....................................
................................ 45
OE.BAC-Keys .................................................
................................
44
OE.Exam_MRTD ...........................31,
........................... 44, 45, 46
OE.MRTD___Delivery ...................................
................................ 43
OE.MRTD_Manufact .....................................
................................ 43
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign .......................................
................................
44
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif ................................. 44
OE.Personalization ........................................
................................
44
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................. 45
OT.AA_Proof .................................................
................................
42
OT.AC_Pers ...................................................
................................
41
OT.CA_Proof .................................................
................................
42
OT.Data_Conf ...............................................
................................
41
OT.Data_Int................................
................................................... 41
OT.Data_Int_AA ............................................
................................
42
OT.Data_Int_CA ............................................
................................
42
OT.Identification ...........................................
................................
41
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func .....................................
................................ 41
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak ..........................................
................................
41
OT.Prot_Malfunction ....................................
................................ 42
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper .................................. 42
OT.Secure_AC_Activation ............................. 43
OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................... 43
OT.TOE_Identification .................................. 43
P
P.Activ_Auth .................................................
................................
39
P.Chip_Auth ..................................................
................................
39
FTP_ITC.1/PP................................
............................................... 70
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P.Manufact ....................................................
.................... 38
P.Personal_Data ............................................
................................
38
P.Personalization ...........................................
................................
38
Personalisation__Agent__Authentication .... 72
Personalization_Agent ..................................
................................ 33
Physical__protection .....................................
................................ 72
Prepersonalizer .............................................
................................
34
S
Safe__state__management .......................... 72
Secure__Messaging .......................................
................................
72
Self__tests .....................................................
..................... 72
Software_developer ......................................
................................
34
T
T.Abuse-Func .................................................
................................
36
T.Bad_Activation ...........................................
................................
38
T.Chip_ID .......................................................
....................... 36
T.Counterfeit ...........................................
................................
37, 38
T.Eavesdropping ............................................
................................
36
T.Forgery........................................................
........................ 36
T.Information_Leakage .................................
................................ 36
T.Malfunction ................................................
................................
37
T.Phys-Tamper...............................................
................................
37
T.Skimming ....................................................
.................... 36
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery ....................... 38
T.Unauthorized_load .....................................
................................ 38
Terminal ........................................................
........................ 33
Traveler..........................................................
.......................... 34
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