2012 Report to UN Security Council on North Korea Nuclear and Missile Programs

2012 Report to UN Security Council on North Korea Nuclear and Missile Programs
S/2012/422
United Nations
Security Council
Distr.: General
14 June 2012
Original: English
Note by the President of the Security Council
In paragraph 2 of resolution 1985 (2011), the Security Council requested the
Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) to provide a final
report to the Council with its findings and recommendations.
Accordingly, the President hereby circulates the report received from the Panel
of Experts (see annex).
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Annex
Letter dated 11 June 2012 from the Coordinator of the Panel of
Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed
to the President of the Security Council
On behalf of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874
(2009), I have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of
resolution 1985 (2011), the final report on its work (see enclosure).
The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) on 11 May 2012 and was considered by the
Committee on 11 June 2012.
I should be grateful if the present letter and its enclosure could be brought to
the attention of the members of the Security Council.
(Signed) John Everard
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
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Enclosure
Letter dated 11 May 2012 from the Panel of Experts established
pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the Chair of the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006)
The Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1874
(2009) has the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 2 of
Security Council resolution 1985 (2011), the final report on its work.
The Panel requests that this letter and its annex be brought to the attention of
the members of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1718 (2006).
(Signed) John Everard
Coordinator
Panel of Experts established pursuant to
Security Council resolution 1874 (2009)
(Signed) Katsuhisa Furukawa
Expert
(Signed) Erik Marzolf
Expert
(Signed) William J. Newcomb
Expert
(Signed) Duk Ho Moon
Expert
(Signed) Alexander Vilnin
Expert
(Signed) Xiaodong Xue
Expert
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Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 1874 (2009)
Summary
During the period under review the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
continued to reject and to violate Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009). On 13 April 2012, in the face of the resolutions and of widespread
international protest, it launched a rocket, following which the Security Council
adopted a presidential statement strongly condemning the launch. The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea responded by announcing that it will expand its nuclear
programmes and continue launching satellites.
Member States did not report to the Committee any violations involving
transfer of nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction-related or ballistic missile
items, nor did they report on freezes of assets of entities and individuals designated
by the Committee. They did report several other violations including illicit sales of
arms and related materiel and luxury goods. The Panel investigated these newly
reported incidents, previously reported incidents, and other possible violations.
These cases provide ample evidence that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
continues actively to defy the measures in the resolutions. They also illustrate
elaborate techniques to evade the vigilance of Member States. The Panel has studied
in particular several interceptions of proscribed goods shipped to and from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The implementation of the sanctions continues to face serious challenges. It
places burdens on Member States, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is
adept at exploiting weak points. Fewer than half of Member States have submitted
the required reports on their implementation of the resolutions to the Security
Council. Nevertheless, although the resolutions have not caused the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to halt its banned activities, they appear to have slowed
them and made illicit transactions significantly more difficult and expensive. On the
basis of its studies, the Panel makes a series of recommendations for the more
effective implementation of the measures in the resolutions.
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Contents
Page
Abbreviations and glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
I.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
II.
Background and political context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
III.
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
IV.
Panel of Experts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
V.
Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
A.
Nuclear programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
B.
Other existing weapons of mass destruction programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
C.
Ballistic missile and related programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
16
Analysis of the implementation of sanctions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
A.
Challenges to efforts to implement the measures in the resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
B.
Reports of Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
C.
Export- and import-related measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
D.
Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
36
E.
Financial measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
38
F.
Unintended impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
VII.
Designation of goods, entities and individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
VIII.
Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
41
I.
Map of main launch sites and nuclear complex, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea . . . .
45
II.
Imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
III.
Imagery of the fuel fabrication plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
IV.
Imagery of the 5-MWe reactor and light water reactor construction site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
V.
Imagery of Tongchang-ri (Sohae launch site) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
VI.
Imagery of Musudan-ri (Tonghae launch site) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50
VII.
Items designated by Member States as luxury goods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
51
VIII.
Excerpts from the FATF 40 Recommendations, February 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
58
IX.
Financial risks identified by the Department of the Treasury of the United States of America
59
X.
List of autonomous designations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
XI.
List of the Panel’s meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
71
VI.
Annexes
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Abbreviations and glossary
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FATF
Financial Action Task Force
HEU
highly enriched uranium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAN
implementation assistance notice (issued by the Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) to Member
States)
IMO
International Maritime Organization
INFCIRC
information circular (IAEA publication)
KCNA
Korea Central News Agency
LEU
low enriched uranium
LWR
light water reactor
MWe
megawatt-electrical
UF4
uranium tetraflouride
UF6
uranium hexafluoride
WCO
World Customs Organization
WFP
World Food Programme
WIPO
World Intellectual Property Organization
The following words and phrases are used in this report with the following specific
meanings:
6
“The Committee”
The Committee established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 1718 (2006)
“The resolutions”
Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)
“The sanctions”
The measures set out in the resolutions
“Interdiction”
The inspection, seizure and disposal of cargo as defined by
paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 of resolution 1874 (2009)
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I. Introduction
1.
The core mandate of the Panel of Experts is set out in paragraph 26 of
resolution 1874 (2009). In this report, as recommended by the Informal Working
Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions (S/2006/997), the
Panel considers certain areas of background to set the context for its work, followed
by a discussion and analysis of a number of incidents of non-compliance. It
examines implementation of the measures under different lights, drawing both on
those incidents and on other information. Finally it offers a series of recommendations
on how the resolutions might be more effectively implemented. The Panel has
respected the guidance on document lengths provided by the Under-SecretaryGeneral for Political Affairs.
2.
During the period under review, the Panel investigated numerous incidents of
non-compliance. The Panel incorporated lessons learned in its outreach activities to
Member States and also improved its understanding of the challenges they face. The
continuing commitment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to its
nuclear, ballistic missile and related programmes in defiance of Security Council
resolutions was underlined by the rocket launch on 13 April 2012 and the military
parade two days later.
3.
As this report is being finalized, analysts warn that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea has prepared for a further nuclear test. This deepens concerns
that the country is engaged in combining its uranium enrichment programme with its
growing ballistic missile programme. The Panel has not however found attempts
during the period under review at illicit procurement in support of the country’s
banned nuclear programmes.
II. Background and political context
4.
The political context, which remains volatile, affects sanctions implementation
and the Panel’s work. The main elements in this political context are the following:
(a) Kim Jong Il died in December 2011 and his third son Kim Jong Un (28 or
29) has since assumed a number of senior leadership positions. Most notably, he was
appointed first secretary of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party on 12 April 2012 and
first chairman of the National Defence Commission on 13 April 2012.
(b) The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has
continued to claim that it emphasizes economic development, including agriculture,
light industry to increase food and popular goods production, with the aim of
improving the people’s living standard, and that it considers that “the food problem
is a burning issue in building a thriving country”. 1 Nevertheless the country
continues to face serious economic problems, particularly due to chronic shortages
of food and fuel; United Nations agencies report that the food situation is dire in
areas outside Pyongyang. 2 In October 2011, upon her return from a visit to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the United Nations Under-SecretaryGeneral for Humanitarian Affairs declared that the country “remains a highly food
__________________
1
2
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“DPRK leading newspapers publish joint new year editorial”, KCNA, 1 January 2012.
“FAO/WFP crop and food security assessment mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea”, joint report published 25 November 2011.
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insecure country, with a population made increasingly vulnerable by continued
reliance upon unreliable food supplies”. 3
(c) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has also increased efforts to
boost trade and to attract foreign investment. Most recently, reflecting increased
business ties, China’s embassy in Pyongyang announced the joint establishment of
the Korea-China Chamber of Commerce Association in Pyongyang. The Government
of China has agreed to establish a free trade area on Hwanggumpyong and Wihwa
Islands, near Dandong. China and the Russian Federation are cooperating with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in promoting development in the Tuman
River area. China and the Russian Federation both announced plans to repair and
significantly expand port facilities at Rajin and also are taking steps to improve road
and rail connections to the port. A new cargo train between Rajin and Khasan is
scheduled to begin service in October 2012 with an initial annual capacity of
100,000 containers. This project dates back more than a decade but only in recent
years made progress. Originally the Republic of Korea was involved also, and the
rail line was conceived as part of a land bridge to reduce transport costs to European
markets. Escalation in tension on the Korean peninsula clouds the prospect of
significant near-term returns on investment. Another project that may be similarly
delayed is the laying of a natural gas pipeline across the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea to the Republic of Korea, even though the Russian Federation
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea signed a memorandum of
understanding on construction in September 2011.
(d) Efforts towards achieving the objectives of the resolutions continue to
face challenges. The six-party talks have not resumed. Understandings reached in
talks between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of
America led each to issue parallel statements on 29 February. The Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea indicated in its statement that it had agreed to “a
moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches, and uranium enrichment
activity at Yongbyon” and to “allow the IAEA to monitor the moratorium on
uranium enrichment while productive dialogues continue” while the United States
indicated in its statement that it would “move forward with [its] proposed package
of 240,000 metric tons of nutritional assistance along with the intensive monitoring
required for the delivery of such assistance”. 4
(e) On 16 March the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced that
it would launch a satellite using an Unha-3 carrier rocket between 12 and 16 April.
The United States stated that this launch would abrogate the deal of 29 February. 5
(f) On 13 April the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea launched a
rocket, and later announced that the satellite it was to carry had failed to enter orbit.
__________________
3
4
5
8
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Valerie Amos, Statement on the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, 21 October 2011; available from http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/
USG%20Amos%20Press%20Statement%20on%20DPRK,%2021%20October%202011%20
FINAL.pdf.
Victoria Nuland, “U.S.-DPRK bilateral discussions”, press statement, 29 February 2012; “DPRK
Foreign Ministry Spokesman on result of DPRK-U.S. talks”, KCNA, 29 February 2012.
“Such a missile launch would pose a threat to regional security and would also be inconsistent
with North Korea’s recent undertaking to refrain from long-range missile launches”. Victoria
Nuland, “North Korean announcement of missile launch”, press statement, 16 March 2012.
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On the basis of information released by the United States, 6 missile experts estimate
that the rocket disintegrated about two minutes into flight.
(g) On 16 April the Security Council adopted a presidential statement
(S/PRST/2012/13) strongly condemning this launch and adjusting the measures
imposed by resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Both the United States and
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stated respectively they would withdraw
from their undertakings under the deal of 29 February. 7
(h) Relations between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the
Republic of Korea remain extremely tense. Similarly, there have been no confirmed
official meetings between Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
over the past 12 months.
5.
In the long term it is unclear what effect this changing political context will
have on sanctions implementation, but in the short term the outlook is discouraging.
On 17 April the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea declared that the country continued to regard Security Council resolutions
1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) as illegitimate and “resolutely and totally reject the
unreasonable behaviour of the Security Council in violating the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s legitimate right to launch satellites”. 8 Further, in response to the
joint statement of the five permanent members of the Security Council urging the
country to refrain from any further provocative actions, 9 on 6 May 2012, the Foreign
Ministry of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea declared that the country,
“depending on its nuclear deterrence for self-defence, will firmly protect its
sovereignty and dynamically push forward the development of space for peaceful
purpose and the industry of nuclear energy …”. 10
6.
Many have expressed concern that the failed launch on 13 April may prompt
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to conduct a nuclear test to reassert its
prestige prompting further action by the Security Council. Some analysts report that
preparation is now well under way and that the country could conduct a test at any
time. 11 In future, continuing, and perhaps worsening, economic problems may also
__________________
6
7
8
9
10
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“Initial indications are that the first stage of the missile fell into the sea 165 km west of Seoul,
South Korea. The remaining stages were assessed to have failed and no debris fell on land. At no
time were the missile or the resultant debris a threat”. North American Aerospace Defense
Command, “NORAD and USNORTHCOM acknowledge missile launch”, 12 April 2012.
“A launch of this kind, which would abrogate our agreement, would call into question the
credibility of all the commitments that the DPRK has made to us, is making in general, including
the commitments that we have had with regard to the nutritional assistance.” State Department
daily press briefing, 16 March 2012. “As the United States violated the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea-United States agreement of 29 February through its undisguised hostile acts,
we will no longer be bound by it.” Letter dated 19 April 2012 from the Permanent Representative
of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President
of the Security Council (S/2012/239).
See S/2012/239.
Statement by the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Preparatory
Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, delivered by Ambassador Susan F. Burke, United States Special Representative
for nuclear non-proliferation, Vienna, 3 May 2012 (see NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).
“Anti-DPRK ‘Joint Statement’ of UNSC Rebuffed”, KCNA, 6 May 2012.
See for example “Analysts predict imminent North Korean nuclear test”, Jane’s Defence Weekly,
18 April 2012.
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affect the behaviour of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Hard currency
earnings are in themselves unable to cover the country’s import requirements. The
Panel notes concerns that the country’s continuing difficulties in meeting its foreign
exchange needs through legal exports may tempt it to expand illicit exports.
III. Methodology
7.
The mandate of the Panel of Experts is set out in paragraph 26 of resolution
1874 (2009). It was renewed by resolution 1928 (2010) and renewed and updated in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1985 (2011). The Panel is subject to direction by
the Committee.
8.
The Panel’s operating rules and procedures reflect the recommendations of the
Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions
(see S/2006/997). The Panel strives to maintain high evidentiary and methodological
standards, although it does not have the investigative power of a judicial body and
lacks subpoena powers. The Panel relies on two types of information in addition to the
members’ own first-hand and on-site observations, namely, information (sometimes
confidential) supplied by cooperating States and/or international organizations,
officials, journalists, and private individuals; and information found in the public
domain. In weighing the reliability of information, the Panel always keeps in mind
the identity and role of the sources providing it. In its work the Panel spares no
effort to ensure that its assertions and findings are corroborated by credible sources.
9.
The interactions of the Panel are inclusive, democratic and participatory.
Internal decisions have been taken jointly by the Experts and the Panel has always
attempted to reach consensus. In rare cases when consensus cannot be achieved on
substantive issues, the perspective of the majority is reflected and different view(s)
in the Panel are also reflected.
10. While observing the principles of objectivity, transparency and accountability
in and for its work, the Panel strives to ensure confidentiality. Information provided
to the Panel on a confidential or restricted basis is handled in a manner that both
respects this basis and is consistent with the responsibilities of the Panel.
11. The Panel continues to face unique challenges in the conduct of investigations
and drafting of reports. Specifically, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
vehemently rejects all aspects of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009);
consequently, the Panel has had no direct access to the State sanctioned. Moreover,
there is an almost complete lack of transparency from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea towards the international community. The Panel has encountered
significant difficulty in investigating potential violations that occurred before the
imposition of a reporting mechanism for cases of interdiction of prohibited cargo to
or from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (June 2009), as well as other
previous cases of suspicious activity.
IV. Panel of Experts
12. The Panel of Experts was initially appointed by the Secretary-General on
12 August 2009 in accordance with paragraph 26 of Security Council resolution
1874 (2009). Members for the period under consideration have been John Everard
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(United Kingdom) (Coordinator); Katsuhisa Furukawa (Japan, from October 2011);
George Lopez (United States of America, to July 2011); Erik Marzolf (France); Duk Ho
Moon (Republic of Korea); William J. Newcomb III (United States of America, from
September 2011); Alexander Vilnin (Russian Federation); Xiaodong Xue (China);
Takehiko Yamamoto (Japan, to September 2011). The Experts are supported by four
members of the Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch of the Department of
Political Affairs.
13. Since its final report of 2011, 12 the Panel has, as required by resolution 1985
(2011), provided a planned programme of work to the Committee on 6 July and
submitted a midterm report to the Security Council on 2 December. It has also
assisted the Committee at its request, including by preparing a draft IAN for
Member States on the sanction on luxury goods, which was issued by the Committee
as IAN 3 on 5 December 2011. 13
14. In pursuit of its mandate, the Panel has striven to gather, examine and analyse
information on incidents of non-compliance with resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009). Since May 2011, the Panel has received information from numerous
Member States and other interested parties. The Panel has also, at the invitation of
the relevant Member States, examined items seized following inspections of cargo
under paragraph 11 of resolution 1874 (2009).
15. The Panel continued to consult widely with States, relevant United Nations
bodies and other interested parties to gather other information regarding the
implementation of sanctions. Panel members have attended a variety of conferences
and seminars that proved to be valuable forums both to discuss implementation of
the measures in the resolutions and to extend the Panel’s network of contacts. A list
of its missions and meetings during the period under review is in annex XI.
16. The Panel has also been active in assisting the Committee’s outreach activities
and worked to raise both the quantity and quality of Member State implementation
reports. To this end it has interacted with regional groups of permanent missions to
the United Nations in New York: for example the Coordinator made a presentation
to the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States on 28 September. The Panel
established contacts with East African States at an International Institute for
Strategic Studies event in Nairobi on 23 and 24 May. The Panel is also working with
organizations such as the Central American Integration System, the Pacific Islands
Forum and the Caribbean Community to arrange outreach events in different
regions. During the seminars and conferences attended by the Panel, experts raised
awareness of the importance of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) and made
numerous presentations on their implementation, including the submission of
national implementation reports. The Panel intends to extend its outreach activities
to all remaining United Nations regional groups in New York and to contact latereporting Member States for consultations.
17. The Panel also works with bodies such as FATF and WCO to develop
understanding of the resolutions. It has been involved in FATF discussions on
developing recommendations as well as defining best practices for the relevant
__________________
12
13
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One Panel member, Xiaodong Xue, would like to disassociate himself from the 2011 report,
since he did not sign it despite his full participation in the drafting process. The report remains
an internal document of the Security Council.
Available from www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/pdf/implementation_assistance_notice_3.pdf.
11
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bodies, and with WCO it has discussed compiling useful elements for standards and
designing specific training programmes. The Panel considers that the work of such
bodies makes a valuable contribution to effective implementation of the resolutions.
18. Broadening the scope of its information sources, it has developed and used
extensively a relationship with the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, adopted the use of
specialized databases and tracking systems, and started to use specialized software
for network analyses. This has involved both acquisition of these systems and
training in their use.
19. In order to share information, to compare notes on good practice and to
achieve cost efficiencies (for example by organizing joint events) the Panel has
consulted frequently with other panels of experts and monitoring groups. This has
included panels based in New York and, when they visit New York, those that are
based elsewhere.
20. In all aspects of its work the Panel is conscious of the financial constraints
under which the United Nations works. Where possible it has used video- and
teleconferences and, when travel is required, it has sought to combine meetings
within regions, so as to minimize costs. Usually only one, two or three members
participate in a mission. The Panel has also sought where possible and appropriate
to combine events with other panels in order both to achieve savings, including for
participating Member States, and to maximize impact.
V. Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic
missile programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea
21. The Panel considers that an understanding of the current state of the nuclear,
other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is important both for anticipating possible
future attempts at illicit procurement and for being able better to assess the risk of
proliferation. To this end it offers the following brief survey of the recent
development of the country’s illicit programmes.
A.
Nuclear programmes
1.
Uranium enrichment programme
22. In two reports submitted in 2011, the Panel presented its understanding of the
uranium enrichment programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with
findings and recommendations. 14 The Panel has continued to focus on tracking the
country’s past procurement activities abroad and attempted to identify choke point
items required to sustain the illicit programme. 15
__________________
14
15
12
See the report of the Panel entitled “Assessing recent nuclear programme development in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (27 January 2011) and its final report of 2011 (12 June
2011).The report of January 2011 remains an internal document of the Committee.
The Panel consulted experts including David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and
International Security, and representatives of Oerlikon Leybold Vacuum, and studied reviews
and research papers on this.
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23. In October 2011, the Panel met IAEA representatives and was able to discuss
the uranium enrichment programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
The report on application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea published by IAEA in September 2011 16 was consistent with the Panel’s
understanding that a clandestine supply network had played a pivotal role in the
country’s uranium enrichment. IAEA, inter alia, stressed that the layout of the
centrifuge cascades and the size of the centrifuge casings in the uranium enrichment
workshop, 17 previously described by Siegfried Hecker, were broadly consistent with
what the network had provided to other countries. IAEA confirmed that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had attempted to procure from a wide range
of supply chains material and equipment required for uranium enrichment, such as
vacuum pumps, electronic equipment and dual-use, computer numerically
controlled, machine tools. This analysis does not conflict with the publicly available
information on the country’s illicit acquisition of proscribed items since the
1990s. 18 IAEA cannot confirm the configuration or operational status of the
enrichment facility observed by Dr. Hecker (see figures I and II), but made clear
that at least part of the UF6 provided to Libya in 2000 and 2001 very likely
originated in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, confirming the possibility
of operational UF6 production prior to 2001.
Figure I
Uranium enrichment centrifuge facilitya
Source: Niko Milonopoulos, Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert Carlin, “North Korea from 30,000
feet”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 January 2012.
a
Three-dimensional model of Building 4 (the new uranium enrichment centrifuge facility) in
the fuel fabrication plant, created using the latest satellite images.
__________________
16
17
18
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GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24 (2 September 2011).
See annexes I, II and III for the specific location of the uranium enrichment workshop.
David Albright provided the Panel with a table of “North Korea’s known illicit procurements for
its centrifuge programme in 2000s (excluding goods from Pakistan)” and watch lists, not
exhaustive, of 13 specialty items.
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Figure II
Schematic floor plan of the cascade hall at the uranium enrichment
centrifuge facilitya
Source: Niko Milonopoulos, Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert Carlin, “North Korea from 30,000
feet”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6 January 2012.
a
A rough schematic of the floor plan for the cascade hall at the uranium enrichment centrifuge
facility (Building 4) in Yongbyon, as at 12 November 2010.
24. Other than the statement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of
30 November 2011 that low enriched uranium for the provision of raw materials [for
the light water reactor] is progressing apace, there has been almost no new
information on the country’s uranium enrichment programme since Dr. Hecker’s
report. 19 The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not yet provided any
information to IAEA despite its obligations under its safeguards agreement
(INFCIRC/403). Uncertainties persist on the country’s uranium enrichment
programme, in particular on the existence of HEU stock, on the number of centrifuges
available to the country, their operational status, and their locations. The Panel notes
experts’ views that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may run one or more
parallel covert facilities capable of producing LEU or HEU in places other than
Yongbyon. The Panel also notes the chief engineer’s recognition of the existence of
a UF4 and UF6 conversion facility at Yongbyon, although Dr. Hecker was not
allowed to see it.
25. To expand a centrifuge programme would require significant quantities of
specialty items such as maraging steel 20 and high-strength aluminium tubes. Since
__________________
19
20
14
Siegfried Hecker, “A return trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex”, Center for
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010.
Maraging steel is used for some gas centrifuge manufacturing. Because of their extreme strength,
and consequent high specific strength, certain maraging steel alloys are among the few materials
suitable for high-speed rotors used in gas centrifuges. Maraging steel is also used in making
rockets and bomb casings. In 1997 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attempted to
acquire a large amount of maraging steel suitable for manufacturing centrifuge rotors. See Olli
Heinonen, “North Korea’s nuclear enrichment: capabilities and consequences”, 38 North,
22 June 2011; “The North Korean nuclear program in transition”, 38 North, 26 April 2012.
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May 2011, no attempts by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to import
these have been reported to the Committee or brought to the attention of the Panel.
It remains unclear whether this is because the country has succeeded in doing so
undetected, or stockpiled these items before sanctions were introduced, or is not
after all trying to procure them. During the Panel’s discussion with Member States
and analysts, there were suggestions that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
is itself able to produce maraging steel and even provided it to other countries. 21
The press has reported that the country was engaged in assisting both Iran (Islamic
Republic of) and the Syrian Arab Republic to build maraging steel production
facilities. 22 The Panel notes this conjecture but notes too that the production of
maraging steel is technically demanding, and it has no evidence that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea has acquired the relevant technologies. It therefore
doubts that, even if the country has gained the capability to produce maraging steel,
the product would be of a quality normally considered sufficient for use in
enrichment centrifuges. Independent experts however have indicated the possibility
that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could use materials of lower
parameters than those specified by the lists of designations in the resolutions for its
nuclear programmes, though at an operational cost. 23
26. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claims that its uranium enrichment
programme is for civilian purposes. The Security Council in its resolutions however
decided that it shall abandon all nuclear programmes, and the unveiled uranium
enrichment programme provides a possible second route to manufacturing nuclear
weapons, in addition to the existing plutonium production programme. The Panel
also notes concerns expressed by one analyst that the country could produce a
nuclear warhead for its medium-range missiles in a reasonably short time after it
produced sufficient HEU. Specifically the analyst suggested that the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, through its contacts with Abdul Qadeer Khan, probably
had ample access to designs for nuclear warheads, including the HEU-based one
developed for the Ghauri missile, a twin missile of Nodong. 24
2.
Light water reactor
27. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea announced in November 2010
that a prototype light water reactor was being built on the Yongbyon site, and in a
statement on 30 November 2011 claimed that construction of a light water reactor
__________________
21
22
23
24
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See also Leonard Spector, “North Korean nuclear test could trigger conflict in Middle East”,
Kyodo News, 19 April 2012; “Iran and the North Korean connection”, Strategypage,
14 December 2011.
See Clemens Wergin, “Syrien rüstet Raketen mit Nordkoreas Hilfe auf” (Syria equipping missiles
with North Korean assistance), Die Welt, 24 November 2011; Yossi Melman, “North Korea
supplying Syria, Iran with prohibited nuclear technology, report says”, Haaretz, 28 November
2011.
Olli Heinonen, former IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards, has told the Panel that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could use material and components below the precision
parameters specified in the Security Council resolutions.
Larry Niksch, “When North Korea mounts nuclear warheads on its missiles”, The Journal of
East Asian Affairs, vol. 25, No. 2 (fall/winter 2011). The Panel can neither confirm nor refute
this. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has neither demonstrated nor claimed such a
capability. See also Mary Beth Nikitin, “North Korea’s nuclear weapons: technical issues”, CRS
Report for Congress, 29 February 2012; “Technical perspective on North Korea’s nuclear test: a
conversation between Dr. Siegfried Hecker and Dr. Gi-Wook Shin”, Stanford University website,
10 October 2006.
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was “progressing apace”. Satellite imagery in annex IV shows construction under
way of a building consistent with such a facility. The Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea has said that it plans to use the light water reactor to generate electricity.
3.
Plutonium programme
28. It is likely that the two nuclear tests carried out by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, in 2006 and 2009, were of plutonium-based explosive devices. 25
The country’s total plutonium holdings are estimated to be 30 to 50 kg, enough for
six to eight nuclear bombs. The precise number would depend on the minimum
amount of plutonium needed for each device and on how much plutonium has
already been used in the two nuclear tests. Expert consensus holds that the 5-MWe
reactor and the radiochemical laboratory (reprocessing plant) at Yongbyon appear
dormant, but could be reactivated in future, and that the metal fuel rod fabrication
building (Building 4) has been converted.
4.
Other nuclear issues
29. The Panel notes concerns of the Government of the Republic of Korea and of
experts including Dr. Hecker that the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon do not comply
with international safety standards, and that they therefore present a risk of nuclear
accident.
30. The Panel notes a paper published in March 2012 concluding that it is possible
that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may have detonated low-yield
nuclear devices in April and May 2010. Two Member States have dismissed this and
the majority of independent experts remain unpersuaded. 26
31. The Panel is aware of no evidence to support the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea’s claim to have developed a nuclear fusion programme (described
in its final report of 2011, para. 66).
B.
Other existing weapons of mass destruction programmes
32. Less is known about chemical and biological weapons programmes than about
either the nuclear or the ballistic missile programmes. Since the Panel’s final report
of 2011 (see especially paras. 74-77), no new information related to these
programmes has come to the attention of the Panel.
C.
Ballistic missile and related programmes
33. A great variety of information is available concerning ballistic missiles and
related programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including
numerous photographs of various weapons systems and launch facilities, and data
__________________
25
26
16
Joshua Pollack, consultant specializing in nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, argues
that the 2009 test may well have been of a uranium-based device.
See Lars-Erik De Geer, “Radionuclide evidence for low-yield nuclear testing in North Korea in
April/May 2010”, Science & Global Security, vol. 20, No. 1 (2012). See also discussion about
this article in Geoff Brumfiel, “Isotopes hint at North Korean nuclear test”, Nature News,
3 February 2012 (available from www.nature.com/news/isotopes-hint-at-north-korean-nucleartest-1.9972).
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from prior flight tests. This shows substantive overlap between the country’s
ballistic missile and space launch programmes, such as use of the same technologies
and facilities.
34. As announced, on 13 April 2012 (local time) the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea launched a rocket called Unha-3 from the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,
the new launch site close to Tongchangdong (also known as Tongchang-ri; see map
in annex I for precise location and satellite imagery of the site in annex V) that the
Panel reported in May 2011 as completed or about to be completed (see final report
of 2011, para. 70). 27 The shape and dimensions of this three-stage rocket are
extremely similar to those of the previous Unha rocket launched on 5 April 2009.
This suggests that these two rockets are identical to a large extent (see figure III).
Like all previous multi-stage rockets launched by the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea in 1998, 2006 and 2009, the rocket failed. Analysts, on the basis of United
States and other official data, estimate that it failed about two minutes into flight,
before or during first and second stage separation.
Figure III
Comparison of Unha-2 (left) and Unha-3 (right)
Source: KCNA/AFP/Getty Images.
Source: PEDRO UGARTE/AFP/Getty Images.
35. On 16 April, the Security Council strongly condemned this launch and
underscored that this satellite launch, as well as any launch that uses ballistic
missile technology, even if characterized as satellite launch or space launch vehicle,
is a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009)
(S/PRST/2012/13).
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Since May 2011, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has laid train tracks to connect the
launch site and a nearby railroad station and installed a crane at the top of the launch tower.
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36. Reacting to this condemnation by the Security Council the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Korean Committee
for Space Technology declared that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will
continue to conduct satellite launches. 28 In that regard, the Panel notes that the
launch tower at the Sohae facility is much larger than the one at the Tonghae
facility 29 (see figure IV) and can accommodate much larger rockets than the one
launched on 13 April 2012; the Sohae launch tower is reported to be 50 m high.
Figure IV
Comparison of Tonghae (left) and Sohae (right) launch towers
Source: KCNA/AFP/Getty Images.
Source: Bobby Yip/Reuters.
37. Live broadcast of the military parade celebrating the centenary of Kim Il
Sung’s birth showed a considerable number of ballistic missiles. Alongside the
already known missiles — commonly identified as KN-02, Hwasongs, Nodong and
Musudan — the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea paraded a new road mobile
missile, called KN-08 by analysts, much larger than its other missiles. No fewer
than six examples of this new missile were observed during the parade. Missile
analysts express varying levels of doubts on the operational status of the Musudan
and newest KN-08, neither of which has yet been flight-tested. 30 Analysts debate
whether the KN-08s on display may have been mock-ups.
__________________
28
29
30
18
See S/2012/239; “DPRK’s satellites for peaceful purposes to continue orbiting space: KCST
spokesman”, KCNA, 19 April 2012; “Space conquest is inviolable sovereign right”, KCNA,
3 May 2012.
Close to Musudan-ri; see map in annex I for precise location and satellite imagery of the site in
annex VI.
Analysts assessed, however, that the Unha-2 tested in 2009 utilized the main engine of the
Musudan as second stage. In 2009 both first and second stages performed as expected by
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea engineers. The third stage failed.
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Figure V
KN-08 missile on 8-axle transporter erector launcher
Source: Bobby Yip/Reuters.
38. The newly revealed missile was carried by a new 8-axle transporter erector
launcher (see figure V), bigger and more sophisticated than previous transporter
erector launchers displayed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which
have had up to 6-axle configuration. An off-road mobile transporter erector launcher
of such dimensions needs very advanced features such as the ability to pivot wheels
in the front and back to assist steering, divided axle with differential gear to assist
off-road movement, and hydro-pneumatic suspension to handle sensitive payloads.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has not previously demonstrated its
capacity to build such a vehicle. The Panel will further examine this.
VI. Analysis of the implementation of sanctions
39. The Panel learns many concrete details from national implementation reports
as well as through exchanges with government officials. The Panel gathers additional
information on various aspects of implementation, such as political willingness, legal
infrastructure, and the responsibilities of and measures taken by different agencies.
The Panel equally learns from reports on incidents of non-compliance and through
its own investigations of alleged violations of the resolutions. On site examinations
of seized containers, goods and documents contribute greatly to its understanding of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s shipping and concealment techniques
that challenge Member States in implementing the resolutions. These techniques and
the challenges they pose are highlighted in the discussion of a variety of actual or
alleged violations investigated by the Panel.
A.
Challenges to efforts to implement the measures in the resolutions
40. Almost all Member States in contact with the Panel, even some of those that
have not yet submitted their national implementation reports, express political
support for the resolutions and willingness to implement them. Nevertheless overall
implementation of the sanctions leaves much to be desired. Fewer than half of
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Member States have submitted national implementation reports as required by the
resolutions, and fewer still have lists of luxury goods. 31 The Panel’s contacts with
Member States suggest that the reasons for this vary. Many Member States,
particularly those geographically and politically distant from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, simply do not see implementation of the resolutions as
a priority. Indeed, some Member States had not realized that anything was required
of them. In some cases too the Panel has detected a general distaste for
implementing sanctions regimes.
41. Many Member States say that they need to improve capacity to implement
sanctions. Some say they have difficulties in incorporating the lists of goods
prohibited by the resolutions into their own legal system, because of the technical
complexities of the lists. Other challenges include raising awareness among
different governmental agencies from top-level officials to lower and frontier law
enforcement officials; conducting technical analysis to find the use of specific goods
and their relation to prohibited lists; obtaining professional training for law
enforcement officials, as well as technical assistance; creating government outreach
to the private sector; and establishing enterprise internal compliance programmes.
42. Inspections, seizure and disposal present particular challenges. The Panel knows
of some instances in which Member States conducted inspections but have not yet
reported them (see paras. 63 and 68), and there are likely to be others. In most cases,
the Member States had to delay reporting to avoid compromising internal legal
proceedings. The Panel notes that since May 2011 some reports have been submitted
months after the inspection was conducted. While the Panel understands unavoidable
delays caused by legal and other constraints, the consequence is that information on
which the Committee and Panel depend for their work is sometimes badly dated.
43. Similarly, the Panel does not know if and how many Member States decided
against conducting inspections (in which case no reporting requirement arose) despite
indications of illicit cargo from or bound for the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. But the Panel notes that, while the Security Council calls upon States to
inspect cargo if there are reasonable grounds to believe that it may contain prohibited
items, for many Member States a preponderance of evidence is deemed essential
before deciding on inspection. The Panel’s informal contacts with Member States
indicate also that there are disincentives to conducting an inspection. First, a seizure
following an inspection may cause the Member State problems. There are concerns
that shippers may challenge such seizures in court. Secondly, after a seizure the
Member State is left with the problem of disposing of the seized goods. This
varies — the problems in disposing of seized luxury goods are usually less than those
in disposing of, for example, weaponry — but can involve cost and inconvenience,
and even danger. Sometimes commercial considerations, such as reluctance by large
ports to allow inspections to slow cargo flow, discourage inspections. There may
__________________
31
20
It is not an obligation for Member States to submit lists of luxury goods, but they are encouraged
to do so by IAN 3. So far, four Member States (Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation,
United States of America) have submitted such lists with their national implementation reports,
and another five (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland) refer to such lists
without attaching them. In addition the European Union has published a list covering its
27 member States. This list is also referred to by Monaco, Norway and San Marino in their
national implementation reports. See the illustrative list of items designated by Member States
as luxury goods as at 30 April 2012 in annex VII.
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also be other disincentives, including fear of political embarrassment, or through
pressure from other States not to seize the goods.
44. Moreover, it is almost impossible for Member States to implement the sanctions
on luxury goods unless they provide to their own law enforcement agencies lists of
the goods whose export to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea they ban. In
the absence of such lists law enforcement agencies usually cannot determine that the
law has been broken even if they discover a relevant shipment.
45. Member States could greatly improve the implementation of the sanctions
through quite simple actions. The Panel has found that even basic knowledge of the
sanctions is far from universal in national Customs services and that, even where
officials are aware of the sanctions, there are not always clear procedures in place
for implementing them. If Customs officers everywhere simply knew that cargoes to
and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea require extra vigilance, knew
what to do if they encounter one, and were prepared to challenge inadequate
documentation, then at least some violations could be avoided. Similarly, basic
vigilance on the part of financial officials, and a willingness to question transactions
involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is often effective in
improving the implementation of the sanctions.
46. Despite these difficulties, during the period under review, several Member
States have taken action under the resolutions, sometimes causing inconvenience to
their Governments when they conduct inspections.
B.
Reports of Member States
1.
National implementation reports
47. Both the resolutions require every Member State to report to the Security
Council on concrete measures taken to implement effectively the relevant provisions
of the resolutions. As at March 2012, however, only 93 Member States had done so
under either of the resolutions — 48 per cent of the United Nations membership.
This is shown in figures VI and VII. Figure VI also shows that there are
concentrations of late reporting in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and in
the Pacific. Figure VII shows that, after a rapid initial response to the resolutions,
the reporting rate has slowed to a trickle. Since May 2011 Andorra, Armenia, Brunei
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Montenegro, Norway, Panama, the
Republic of Moldova, San Marino and Turkmenistan have provided reports on their
implementation of resolution 1718 (2006) and/or resolution 1874 (2009).
48. The Panel remains concerned at this low rate and slow pace of reporting and has
worked to improve the figures. It remains concerned, further, not only at the quantity
but also at the quality of reports. Some Member States have clearly taken great care
over reports that provide detailed information while others report less extensive
information. Several Member States have told the Panel that the Committee’s IAN 2
has helped them in preparing their reports. The Panel stands ready to assist the
Committee in implementing paragraph 1 (b) of its new programme of work.
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Figure VI
Overview of reporting by Member States, by region
60
Number of States
50
1
17
40
30
49
22
20
42
30
10
11
13
5
3
0
Africa
Americas
Region
Asia
Europe
Oceania
Late-reporting States
States which have reported
Figure VII
Monthly submission of national implementation reports under resolutions 1718
(2006) and 1874 (2009)
40
Number of reports received
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
O
ct
-0
Fe 6
b07
Ju
n07
O
ct
-0
Fe 7
b08
Ju
n08
O
ct
-0
Fe 8
b09
Ju
n09
O
ct
-0
Fe 9
b10
Ju
n10
O
ct
-1
Fe 0
b11
Ju
n11
O
ct
-1
Fe 1
b12
0
22
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2.
Reports on inspection, seizure and disposal
49. Member States are required by paragraph 15 of resolution 1874 (2009) to
submit promptly to the Committee reports containing relevant details when they
conduct an inspection or seize and dispose of cargo.
50. Since May 2011, three Member States have provided such reports to the
Committee. 32 Two of these are related to the inspection and subsequent seizure of
shipments coming from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that were found
to contain items falling under the category of all arms and related materiel.
51. The third report, submitted in June 2011, relates to an attempt by the United
States to inspect a vessel, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas pursuant
to paragraph 12 of resolution 1874 (2009). The United States reported that it had
reasonable grounds to believe that the MV Light, 33 which departed the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea in May 2011, was transporting items prohibited by
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). With permission from Belize, the flag
State, on 26 May, a United States Navy ship hailed the MV Light and informed the
shipmaster of its intention to inspect. The shipmaster responded that it was a
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ship and that it refused to be boarded and
inspected. 34 The United States therefore requested the assistance of several other
Member States in the region, including inspecting the vessel should it enter one of
their ports. However, on 29 May, the MV Light changed course and returned to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
3.
Other reports on incidents of non-compliance
52. In resolutions 1874 (2009), 1928 (2010) and 1985 (2011) the Security Council
urged all States, relevant United Nations bodies, and other interested parties to
cooperate fully with the Committee and with the Panel, in particular by supplying
any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures imposed by
resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
53. Since May 2011, several Member States have voluntarily provided to the
Committee information on incidents of non-compliance unrelated to inspection,
seizure and disposal as defined by paragraphs 11 to 14 of resolution 1874 (2009). No
less than seven reports were provided by Japan, the United Kingdom and Germany.
The majority of these reports relate to instances in which prohibited items had been
successfully delivered to or by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
54. These valuable reports illustrate the importance of Member States providing to
the Committee and to the Panel information on illicit movements of goods whether
these are accomplished (when proscribed items are known to have been supplied to
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); attempted (when the export of
proscribed items to the country is stopped before the items actually enter into
international commerce); or denied (when acquisition or export permission is sought
but immediately denied by private companies or the relevant authorities).
__________________
32
33
34
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The Committee also received reports in response to requests for information made by the
Committee and the Panel of Experts on incidents of non-compliance previously reported. These
are not counted here.
IMO No. 8415433, currently named Victory 3 and flying the Sierra Leone flag.
The vessel also declared a false last port of call in China, claimed that its destination was
Bangladesh and that it was carrying a cargo of sodium sulfate, a common commercial chemical.
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55. During this mandate, several Member States briefed the Panel on incidents of
non-compliance which occurred before Member States were required to report on
inspection, seizure and disposal by resolution 1874 (2009).
C.
Export- and import-related measures
56. During the period under review, Member States provided to the Committee
compliance-related reports describing several new incidents of non-compliance, and
other such incidents came to the attention of the Panel through other sources. All
these new incidents prove that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continues
to reject and violate the sanctions. These new cases are described below, together
with updates on previous violations that the Panel continued to investigate during
this mandate (some of these cases were described in more detail in the Panel’s final
report of 2011). National implementation reports show that many Member States
have taken effective measures to prevent illicit transfers. Some have told the Panel
of their application of such techniques as due diligence and “know your customer”
rules, and of partnerships between national authorities and private sectors.
1.
Nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile-related transfers
57. The Panel confirmed information reported in its final report of 2011 (para. 83)
on a potential incident of non-compliance involving transfer of ballistic missilerelated items. This shipment was seized by a Member State in October 2007. The
Panel inspected the shipment and noted that it contained electrical and thermal
switches, rolls of different materials and small quantities of metallic alloys, as well
as Korean food and other items. 35 The Panel was also shown photographs of
130 blocks of solid double-base propellant that had been removed for safety reasons
(see figure VIII). It was confirmed by another Member State that 50 of the doublebase propellant blocks (6 cm in diameter and 13 cm in height) were usable for gas
generators to power Scud missile turbopumps and that the other items were dual-use
items having potential ballistic missile applications. This shipment originated in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was trans-shipped in Dalian (China), and
Port Kelang (Malaysia), and transited through other ports. It was en route to
Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic. According to the bill of lading, the consignor was
an entity of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea named Korea General Trading
Corporation and the consignee was Handasieh General Organization Engineering
Industries, a reported front company of the Scientific Studies and Research Centre
of the Syrian Arab Republic. 36 A Member State has stated however that the real
consignor was Korea Tangun Trading Company, an entity designated by the
Committee on 16 July 2009. During its inspection, the Panel saw that the items’
wrappings were marked “Tangun” in Korean.
__________________
35
36
24
The shipment contained food in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-labelled tins (see
figure IX) and DVDs of movies marketed by the Mokran Video Company or Korea Hana
Electronics of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and a personal letter, all in the
Korean language.
The Scientific Studies and Research Centre has been designated by the United States under
Executive Order 13382 for its suspected implication in Syrian weapon of mass destruction
programmes. See United States Department of the Treasury, notice HP-216 of 4 January 2007. In
addition, Japan has identified both the Scientific Studies and Research Centre and Handasieh as
entities of proliferation concern.
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Figure VIII
Double-base propellant block
Source: Authorities of the Member State that seized the cargo.
Figure IX
Sample of Korean food items found in the shipment
Source: Panel of Experts.
58. Recent media articles and academic papers have reported possible ongoing
missile cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and other
States, in particular Iran (Islamic Republic of) and the Syrian Arab Republic. The
Panel can neither confirm nor deny any of this information, but notes that this would
be consistent with reports of the long history of missile cooperation between the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and these countries and with the Panel’s
observations. As previously reported by the Panel, on 10 October 2010 the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea displayed a new warhead for its Nodong
missile, which presented a strong similarity in design with the Iranian Shahab-3
triconic warhead. The Panel observes that the Unha rockets also present significant
design similarities with Iranian space launch vehicles. The first stage of the Unha
strongly resembles the Simorgh unveiled by the Islamic Republic of Iran early in
2010. Released video footages of the Unha-3 confirmed previous estimates that both
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are constituted of a cluster of four Nodong/Shahab-3 motors. While the composition
of the Unha third stage cannot be determined with certainty, its width and shape also
suggest that it is similar to the upper stage of the Safir which successfully inserted a
small satellite into low-earth orbit in February 2009. 37 As indicated in the previous
paragraph, the Panel also observed that a shipment containing ballistic missilerelated items seized in 2007 contained Korean food and other items. This indicates a
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea presence at the destination. 38
59. The Panel notes that the President of Myanmar recently repeated previous
statements to the effect that Myanmar does not have nuclear or weapons cooperation
with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 39 But the Panel has also taken
note of a recent declaration by another high-ranking official suggesting that
Myanmar may have had other prohibited cooperation with the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea. The Speaker of Parliament, Thura Shwe Mann, recently said
“During my visit to North Korea as a general [in 2008], we signed a memorandum
of understanding on cooperating between the two armed forces. It was not on nuclear
cooperation as is being alleged ... We studied their air defence system, weapons
factories, aircraft and ships. Their armed forces are quite strong so we just agreed to
cooperate with them if necessary”. 40 It has been reported that the delegation also
visited a ballistic missile factory. The Panel is concerned that the activities under
that memorandum of understanding may be violating paragraph 8 (c) of resolution
1718 (2006). Member States have told the Panel that in May 2011 the MV Light was
heading to Myanmar 41 (as was the Kang Nam 1 in June 2009). The shipmaster’s
refusal to allow the inspection authorized by the flag State heightened suspicion that
the vessel was engaged in activity violating resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874
(2009). Additional information suggesting possible cooperation between the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar is in paragraph 91 below.
60. In 2007, Israel destroyed a building in Dair Alzour, Syrian Arab Republic, that
may have been built with the assistance of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. The Syrian Arab Republic has consistently maintained since May 2008 that
the destroyed building was a non-nuclear military installation and that it had no
nuclear-related cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In its
report of 24 May 2011 IAEA concludes “that the destroyed building was very likely
a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria”. 42 On the basis of that
__________________
37
38
39
40
41
42
26
Both are believed to be based on steering engines found on the R-27 missile, also known as the
SS-N-6.
This is not the first time that the Panel has observed food in a shipment. During its visit to
Brazzaville, the Panel visited the barracks used to house technicians from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea and saw numerous items that had been left behind. Many of these
items had been shipped from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in containers stuffed
with arms-related materiel.
See for example “Burma’s President gives his first foreign interview”, The Washington Post,
19 January 2012.
See “Myanmar denies working with North Korea on atomic weapons”, Reuters, 9 December
2011.
The MV Light’s master declared that its destination was Bangladesh and that it was carrying
sodium sulphate, a common commercial chemical. However, his declarations are subject to
caution as it is established that he also declared a false last port of call in China.
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”, report by the
Director General, 24 May 2011 (GOV/2011/30). Some experts have noted the similarity between
the destroyed building and the 5-MWe nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.
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report, the IAEA Board of Governors decided on 9 June 2011 to report the
non-compliance of the Syrian Arab Republic to the Security Council, 43 which
discussed this issue on 14 July 2011.
61. The Panel obtained additional information on a potential incident of
non-compliance reported in paragraph 81 of its final report of 2011. The Panel
confirmed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea imported two computer
numerically controlled lathes and one milling lathe from a country in the region.
The law enforcement authority of that country found out that a trading company,
owned by a national of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, functioned as an
intermediary in this transaction. This case was brought to court, where the company
was fined and its owner was sentenced to six months in jail.
62. The Panel learned also that an export control authority of the same country in
the region prevented an attempt by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to
procure a 5-axis computer numerically controlled machining centre that can be used
for missile-related applications from a local company through an intermediary late
in 2011. Subsequently, the authority revoked the company’s export licence for this
transaction.
63. The Panel still has no further information on the dual-use case in paragraph 82
of its final report of 2011.
Comment
64. No incidents of non-compliance involving the transfer to or from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of proscribed nuclear, other weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile items have been reported to the Committee
since May 2011. Nevertheless, investigations of previous incidents, of other
potential incidents of non-compliance and other information brought to the Panel’s
attention and discussed in this section, as well as in its previous reports, provide
extensive evidence that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued
actively to provide and acquire prohibited items well after the adoption of resolution
1718 (2006). The proliferation risk related to the country’s programmes continues.
2.
Arms and related materiel transfers
65. On 19 September 2011, a Member State informed the Committee that in
November 2009 it had discovered and seized four containers stuffed with items
falling into the category of “all arms and related materiel”. The shipment contained
13,000 protective coats (see figure X) that the Member State reported to have
military use for chemical protection, 23,600 gas indicator ampoules to detect
specific chemical substances (see figure XI), as well as other items. 44 During an
on-site examination of the cargo in January 2012, the Panel confirmed that some of
the items bore clear traces of manufacture in the Democratic People’s Republic of
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43
44
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“Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”, resolution
adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011 (GOV/2011/41).
Protective equipment and chemical detection or identification equipment specially designed or
modified for military use is listed as controlled goods on the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions
List (ML7.f.1 and ML7.g.); the same equipment not specially designed for military use is listed
in the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List (1.A.4.b and 1.A.4.c.3).
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Korea. Further, the Panel confirmed that the coats were identical to those seized in
October 2009 on board the MSC Rachele. 45
Figure X
Protective coats seized in October 2009 (left) and November 2009 (right)
Source: Panel of Experts.
66. The Panel concludes that these two shipments were linked and, considering the
absence of protective boots in the second shipment, that one or several other
shipments may have escaped seizure. As in the MSC Rachele case, the cargo
originated from Nampo, was trans-shipped through the port of Dalian (China),
transited through Jeddah (Saudi Arabia) and other ports, and was en route to
Lattakia, Syrian Arab Republic. The intended recipient of the goods was again
declared as the Environmental Study Centre in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian
Arab Republic had previously and repeatedly disavowed the shipment seized on the
MSC Rachele. However, in March 2012, it indicated that the second shipment of
suits and ampoules seized was for agricultural and laboratory use in the Syrian Arab
Republic. As previously indicated by the Panel, the Environmental Study Centre
appears to be linked with the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology,
an educational institution which provides training to Scientific Studies and Research
Centre engineers. 46
__________________
45
46
28
See paragraph 62 of the Panel’s final report of 2010 (S/2010/571).
Both the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology and the Scientific Studies and
Research Centre have been designated by the United States under Executive Order 13382 for
their suspected implication in Syrian weapons of mass destruction programmes. See United
States Department of the Treasury, notice HP-216 of 4 January 2007. In addition, Japan has
identified the Higher Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology and the Scientific Studies
and Research Centre as entities of proliferation concern.
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Figure XI
Set of gas indicator ampoules and gas mask seized in November 2009
Source: Panel of Experts.
67. In April 2012, France reported to the Committee that it had inspected and
seized in November 2010 an illicit shipment of arms-related materiel originating
from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and destined for the Syrian Arab
Republic. The shipment was seized on board the containership MV San Francisco
Bridge. It was declared as containing copper bars and plates. However, France’s
inspection of the cargo revealed that it contained brass discs and copper rods used to
manufacture artillery munitions (pellets and rods for crimping cartridges and driving
bands) and aluminium alloy tubes usable for making rockets. France concluded that
this shipment of goods used for the manufacturing of arms and ammunition was a
violation of resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009).
68. As indicated by the Panel in annex B to its previous final report, media articles
reported in May 2011 that a vessel travelling from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea had just been intercepted in the Indian Ocean by international
maritime forces, who found 15 tons of rockets and US$ 15 million worth of
explosives on board. 47 The reports further claimed that the vessel travelled via
Singapore and that it was now docked in an East African port. In discussions with
Member States the Panel received confirmation that several containers packed with
arms-related items had been inspected and seized at that time in an East African
port. The Panel continues to investigate this potential incident of non-compliance.
69. The Panel had obtained information from media sources about a seizure of
handguns, ammunition, narcotics and other illegal goods on board the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea-owned and flagged vessel Chong Chon Gang 48 in
Ukraine late in January 2010. 49 Responding to the Panel’s enquiries the Ukrainian
authorities confirmed the seizure of limited quantities of ammunition, narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, and other contraband goods. In the opinion of the
relevant Ukrainian agencies, the small quantities uncovered did not suggest
involvement of the authorities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
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47
48
49
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“NATO navy captures armament-filled ship, bound for Eritrea”, Gedab News, 5 May 2011.
IMO No. 7937317.
“Ukraine detains North Korea’s dry cargo ship with illegal goods”, Ukrinform, 3 February 2010.
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70. Since May 2011, the Panel has received five official communications from
Member States in response to previous or new requests for information regarding
the illicit shipment of arms and related materiel seized by Thailand in December
2009. The Panel still awaits responses from three other Member States and intends,
on the basis of new or expected information, to send additional requests for
information.
71. In October 2009 South Africa intercepted items on board the Westerhever that
the Republic of the Congo later confirmed were part of a contract with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to refurbish and upgrade armoured military
vehicles and other military equipment in the Republic of the Congo. During its visit
to Brazzaville in December 2011, the Panel viewed some of the military equipment
(see figure XII) and obtained useful documents detailing the role of entities and
individuals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. It also learned about
earlier deliveries made by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea before the
one impounded by South Africa. In 2008, at least two other shipments containing
arms-related materiel were delivered by sea, while a third was delivered by air. 50
The Panel is expecting additional information regarding these shipments and other
matters related to the contract with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The
Panel also hopes to visit South Africa to inspect the items seized before submitting a
final incident report to the Committee.
Figure XII
Tank and samples of arms-related materiel
Source: Panel of Experts.
72. The Panel has noted media reports that in October 2009 there was an illicit
transfer of heavy machine guns from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to
Burundi by a Seychelles-registered firm. The Panel has gathered information
regarding this and has confirmed many details of the contract between the
Seychelles-registered firm, called Cranford Trading, and Burundi, as well as of the
arms delivered. The Panel has confirmed that heavy machine guns were delivered.
However, because neither Burundi nor Seychelles has yet replied to its enquiries,
the Panel has not yet confirmed if or when these heavy machine guns were
transferred from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
__________________
50
30
The documents available to the Panel show that all three shipments either originated from or
were trans-shipped through China.
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73. On 21 November 2011 the United Kingdom notified the Committee that a
criminal prosecution had started in relation to the suspected supply of goods from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that are subject to trade controls. No
further official information on this case is yet available but the Panel notes informed
media comment that the goods concerned were weapons.
74. A Member State told the Panel that it had stopped the sale of 32 retired fighter
aircraft in 2009 because of the suspicion that they would be transferred to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The aircraft were later destroyed.
Comment
75. Resolution 1874 (2009) bans the transfer to and from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea of all arms and related materiel 51 except for the provision to the
country of small arms and light weapons, which can be supplied with five days’
advance notice to the Committee — although no Member State has ever done this.
Many Member States have provided the Panel with details of their implementation,
including domestic laws and regulations and arms export controls. Difficulties in
confirming that seized goods originate in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea are a recurring challenge, in which the Panel strives to be helpful. 52 In all
these cases the arms involved were old-fashioned, mostly of 1960s or 1970s types.
3.
Ban on luxury goods
Luxury goods cases reported by Japan
76. During the period under review the Panel examined both cases reported by
Japan to the Committee since May 2011 and cases previously brought to its
attention. These are discussed separately below.
77. On 6 July 2011 and 26 January and 2 May 2012, Japan reported to the
Committee a total of five violations of the ban on luxury goods. The Panel was
further informed of two other potential violations of the ban on luxury goods not yet
reported by Japan. According to Japan, all except (a) below involved trans-shipment
through, and/or intermediaries based in, China. These illegal exports of luxury
goods include:
(a) Three second-hand Mercedes Benz cars (valued at ¥7.23 million) 53 in
two shipments in September and December 2008, via the Republic of Korea. The
end user was Sang Myong 2 (a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea company).
Legal proceedings have been completed;
(b) Ten thousand rolls of tobacco and 12 bottles of sake (valued at ¥183,000)
in December 2008;
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51
52
53
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It is noted by one Panel member that there may be different opinions on how wide the scope of
the definition is.
The Panel has for example researched how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea stamps
its weapons.
Throughout this section, values are as declared by the shipper. These may either over- or
understate market value.
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(c)
2009;
A notebook-type computer 54 (valued at ¥105,800) by air on 26 March
(d) A total of five second-hand passenger vehicles (three Mercedes Benz
cars, one Lexus, and one GMC Safari, valued at ¥6,111,000) from Japan on 20 May
and on 10 June 2009;
(e) A total of 698 second-hand notebook-type computers in five shipments in
November 2008 and in February, March and June 2009, from Japan. These secondhand notebook-type computers were part of larger illicit shipments of a total of
7,196 computers. 55 The known end user of one of the shipments is the Pyongyang
Informatics Centre; 56
(f) Cosmetics (valued at about ¥200,000) in two shipments in February and
April 2010;
(g) Ten used notebook-type computers (valued at ¥100,000) in July and
December 2010.
78. Information from Japan confirmed many details of the additional five cases of
illegal shipments and attempted shipments of luxury goods from Japan to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea via Dalian that the Panel has been
investigating. Legal proceedings on these cases are completed. These illegal
shipments to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea included:
(a) Thirty-four second-hand pianos (valued at ¥2,681,515) in October 2008
and four second-hand Mercedes Benz cars (valued at ¥4,071,965) in December
2008, at the request of Korea Rungrado General Trading Corporation;
(b) Cosmetics (valued at approximately ¥160,000) in October 2008. The end
user was Shinfung Trading Corporation, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
company;
(c) Three second-hand pianos (valued at ¥600,000) in February 2009 (they
were first shipped to Busan and then to Dalian);
(d) A total of 673 cosmetic items of 21 different kinds (valued at ¥507,359)
in May 2009. The end user was Shinfung Trading Corporation;
(e) Twenty-two second-hand pianos (valued at
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in November 2008.
¥2,101,207)
to
the
Common elements in the Japanese cases
79. The information provided by Japan indicates that the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea has a record of active violations of the Japanese ban on luxury
goods under the resolutions. In these cases the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea repeatedly used false declarations of destinations and consignees, small
Japanese companies with previous records of transactions with the Democratic
__________________
54
55
56
32
Notebook computers are included in Japan’s list of banned luxury goods as portable information
devices.
Not all computers are defined as luxury goods by Japan.
Japan indicated to the Panel that the Pyongyang Informatics Centre was also the end user in a
previous illegal export of an inverter having nuclear applications, from Japan to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea through China by air, in 2003. The Pyongyang Informatics Centre is
also known as the Pyongyang Information Centre.
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People’s Republic of Korea, entities and individuals that have violated other aspects
of Japan’s export control regulations, ethnic Korean residents of Japan, middlemen,
and money-laundering techniques to disguise the relationship between transactions
and shipments. The following entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
figure frequently:
• Korea Rungrado General Trading Company (Pyongyang; aka Korea Rungrado
Jonsong Trading Company)
• Shinfung Trading Corporation (Pyongyang; aka Shinhung Trading)
• Sang Myong 2 (Pyongyang), whose parent company the Japanese authorities
assess to be Korea Sangmyong General Trading Corporation (Pyongyang).
80. According to Japan, in all but one case the entities and individuals involved in
Japan were introduced by end users in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
to middlemen in China, especially Dalian Global Unity Shipping Agency, who gave
specific instructions about the shipments and transactions. Most payments were
made in advance and either hand carried or wire-transferred to the consignors
through intermediaries in China in order to conceal their origins. Definitions of
luxury goods by Member States are not consistent. Chinese Customs officials told
the Panel that most of the above-mentioned goods were not considered luxury goods
by China.
European luxury goods cases
81. The Panel noted recurrent media reports about the acquisition by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of Swiss luxury watches. Switzerland, like
some European Union member States, uses a value threshold to distinguish between
ordinary and luxury watches. Although Switzerland sets its threshold far higher, it
nonetheless is below established prices for basic models marketed by commonly
identified producers of luxury watches. Visiting Switzerland the Panel learned that
hardly any watch sales to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are in the
luxury category. Since 2006, a few exports slightly above the threshold were noted;
quantities were small, suggestive of happenstance. The Panel concluded that any
luxury watches sold in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are most likely to
be sourced elsewhere. Industry officials pointed out that manufacturers had little
control over who purchased their watches once globally distributed.
82. The Panel recently visited Italy and obtained documents on a number of cases
previously reported by that country and discussed in the final report of 2011, namely
(a) interception of a shipment by air of electronic equipment for a one-thousand
person cinema hall; (b) interception of a similar shipment by air of high-end
equipment suitable for reproducing sound and images in performance halls;
(c) confiscation by port authorities of a shipment of liquor (cognac and whisky); and
(d) blocking of an attempt to airfreight a shipment of high-quality (€150 per pair)
United States-made tap-dancing shoes.
83. In both cases (a) and (b), the purchaser was Chong Song Company Ltd. of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which did not disclose its contact
information. Panel searches have found no listing for this company. The Security
Council in May 2012 designated the Green Pine Associated Corporation of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which frequently uses aliases, some of
which include the name Chongsong. In both cases (c) and (d) the purchasers in the
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea used the same small Italian company to
procure and ship the commodities (which apparently are outside its line of
business). The Italian company had a prior commercial relationship with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
84. The Panel obtained copies of contracts for the purchase of two yachts
concluded by the Austrian firm Schwartz Motorbootservice und Handel GmbH. It
also obtained associated financial records and copies of contracts transferring rights
and responsibility for making payments from the Austrian firm to a Chinese firm,
Complant International Transportation (Dalian) Company Ltd. Member States
provided information that Josef Schwartz, during questioning by Austrian police,
admitted to being aware of the triangulation that Complant was planning to carry
forward, with the intent of selling the ships, subsequently, to the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. He was convicted by an Austrian court of violating
applicable law of the European Union on restrictive measures against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea both for his attempt to export yachts and in
a related case of exporting luxury automobiles to the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, fined, and sentenced to a nine-month prison term (on parole for a period
of three years).
85. The Austrian court judgement records Schwartz’s purchase of eight S-class
Mercedes automobiles for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Chinese
firm Complant International is identified as a falsely declared end user for some of
these vehicles. Austrian authorities learned that Schwartz purchased the vehicles at
the order of Kwon Yong Rok, a citizen of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea and formerly long-term resident of Austria (he has since left). Numerous
media reports and several books have linked Kwon Yong Rok to Office 39 of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He was associated with Golden Star Bank
in Vienna (a subsidiary of Korea Daesong Bank, itself subordinated to Office 39) 57
before it was shuttered by regulators.
Mercedes Benz limousines in Pyongyang
86. On 15 April 2012, two customized Mercedes Benz limousines were displayed
during the military parade organized in Pyongyang celebrating the one hundredth
anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth. The vehicles appear to have features similar to
those found on recent models, in particular the S-class S600 series. A journalist has
told the Panel that he observed more than 10 Mercedes Benz E-class E350 series
cars in front of a Pyongyang gymnasium, on 16 April. 58 The Panel intends to collect
more information on these vehicles.
Transfer of computers and computer servers by the World Intellectual
Property Organization
87. The Panel notes press reports that WIPO has shipped computers and associated
computer servers to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, at an unspecified
date. Leaked WIPO documents allegedly relating to the transaction suggest that
WIPO Geneva headquarters authorized payment of US$ 52,638 to a supplier but that
this payment was blocked by Bank of America. They also suggest that WIPO
__________________
57
58
34
According to United States and European Union designations of Korea Daesong Bank.
Panel member’s telephone interview, on 8 May 2012, with a foreign journalist who visited
Pyongyang in mid-April 2012.
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received internal legal advice that the transaction was proper. The Panel intends to
collect more information about this case.
Comment
88. The implementation of the sanction on luxury goods remains deeply
problematic. Most Member States have not created the lists of luxury goods to be
banned under the sanction despite the Committee’s encouragement to them to
include these in their reports, so that it is unclear how or if the sanction is
implemented in their territories. Moreover, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea is able to exploit differences between such lists, where they exist, to avoid
bans in one Member State by shopping in another — and the Panel sees little
evidence of information-sharing between Member States on what might be included
in these lists. Pyongyang residents and visitors say that luxury cars are seen in
Pyongyang. They have also told the Panel that imported luxury goods, both
authentic and forgeries, including expensive liquors and cosmetics, are widely and
openly available there and perhaps elsewhere in the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea. While some Member States have reported seizure of luxury goods, many
reports of Member States show that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was
able to import these. All this indicates that the ban on luxury goods has not
disrupted effectively the supply of such goods either to the elite of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea or to the rising Pyongyang middle class.
89. The Committee’s IAN 3 of 5 December 2011 offers guidance on
implementation. But despite this Member States continue to tell the Panel that this
lack of coordination troubles them and to seek clarification from the Panel on the
scope of the sanction.
4.
Other cases of interest
90. On 21 December 2011 Germany notified the Committee that in 2009-2010 it
had investigated an alleged violation of the sanctions involving six powerful motors
for seagoing vessels. The authorities had concluded that there was no evidence of
any sanctions violation. No further information on this case is yet available.
91. Japan gave the Panel more information about illegal shipments of three
cylindrical grinding machines and an LCR meter 59 to Myanmar in 2008 as well as
about two attempted shipments of an automatic direct current magnetization
characteristic recorder to Myanmar via Malaysia in 2008 and 2009. 60 Japan has
informed the Panel that court documents show that an ethnic Korean resident in
Japan carried out these transactions, acting under instructions from the Beijing
Office of New East International Trading Ltd., a front company of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea based in Hong Kong (its Pyongyang office is designated
by Japan). The Panel plans to seek confirmation of this from China. Although the
consignee was declared as the Directorate of Myanmar Industrial Planning in the
Ministry of Industry II, the Japanese authorities found out that the real end user was
the Directorate of Defence Industries in Myanmar. Experts say that these items,
together with an item already in the individual’s possession, can be used together to
produce a gyroscope system for missiles. Furthermore, in 2008 the same individual
__________________
59
60
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An electric device to measure inductance (L), capacitance (C) and resistance (R).
Legal proceedings have been concluded in Japan. See also S/2010/571, para. 51, and the Panel’s
final report of 2011, para. 87.
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reportedly exported to the same Myanmar customer four large air-conditioning units
suitable for cooling hot, damp environments such as tunnels, at the request of two
companies, one of which was based in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. 61 Japan suspected that entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
helped the Myanmar military to acquire dual-use items from Japan.
92. Japan also told the Panel about two shipments and an attempted shipment of a
total of four power shovels in 2009, and about two attempted shipments of two
tanker trucks in 2007 and 2008. 62 Shinfung Trading Company, Ltd. and Korea
Paekho 7 Trading were involved in these transactions.
Comment
93. These cases provide useful information on the techniques used by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to circumvent the resolutions. In these
transactions, the country used the same techniques as it did when procuring
proscribed luxury goods from Japan (see paras. 79 and 80). It used an unwitting
trading company to file a false export declaration in Japan. Two entities involved in
these transactions were also involved in the illicit exports of luxury goods from
Japan to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The first Japanese case also
indicates the possibility that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea may act as
a middleman to facilitate the supply of dual-use goods to Myanmar.
D.
Interdiction
1.
Background: routes available to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
94. In order either to procure illicit items or to export them, the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea needs to move them by sea, air or land. The resolutions
call for suspected illicit cargoes to be inspected. Below we consider the
opportunities for and difficulties in achieving this. Geography imposes a special
burden on neighbouring States.
95. By sea. The majority of the inspections reported to the Committee involve
movements by sea. The Panel reported on the capabilities of the merchant fleet of
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in paragraphs 108 to 113 of its final
report of 2011 and has nothing to add in the present report. The Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea must know that its own vessels are watched, which may explain
why the MV Light was a Belize-flagged ship (see paras. 51 and 59). In almost all
cases reported to the Committee or brought to the attention of the Panel, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea trans-shipped illicit cargo on to vessels
operated by large international shipping companies. Because none of the
mainstream shipping companies calls at ports of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea, all containers to or from the country have to be processed through a
__________________
61
62
36
Two of these units were for 40,000 m3, and another two units were for 20,000 m3.
Legal proceedings on these cases have been concluded in Japan. See also annex B to S/2010/571
and annex B to the Panel’s final report of 2011 (confidential annexes made available separately
to the Security Council).
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neighbouring regional trans-shipment hub. Since 2006, the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea has progressively lost access to some of these ports. 63
96. By air. The Panel described the fleet of aircraft of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in paragraphs 114 to 118 of its final report of 2011, since when
the fleet has not greatly changed. Air Koryo is reported, from May to November
2011, to have operated regular flights to Kuwait City (why this latter service was
terminated after only six months is unclear). It has also opened a route to Kuala
Lumpur. The Panel has not learned of any new case involving transport by air that
occurred during the period under review, but it has learned of the transport by air of
prohibited arms-related items in 2008 (see para. 71). As in other instances involving
the shipment of items whose illicit nature is not obvious and which could escape
visual and cursory inspection, the items were shipped on regularly scheduled flights.
97. By land. During the period under review, some roads in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea leading to the border have been improved and there has
been some work on rail links. There has been an increase in cross-border road and
rail traffic. No inspection of a cargo being moved overland to or from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has ever been reported to the Committee.
2.
Challenges to interdiction
98. The cases described in the export- and import-related measures section above
reinforce the Panel’s conclusion in 2011 that interdiction of proscribed shipments
during the flow of international commerce is heavily reliant on (a) intelligence;
(b) information-sharing; (c) the cooperation of the ship or aircraft owner/operator
and relevant State authorities; and (d) inspection in subsequent ports of call. 64 The
Panel has been told informally that some of these inspections would not have been
conducted without active intelligence-sharing among Member States. In addition,
the Panel notes challenges in many Member States in coordination between
licensing and enforcement authorities which act on a different legal basis. Often
Customs data classification systems do not match those for export control,
generating confusion, and Customs declaration forms often provide insufficient data
regarding the end use/end user. An appropriate legal system must be set in place to
legitimize inspections. Moreover, cooperation in sanctions implementation between
the public and the private sector is not universally smooth. Furthermore, those who
stuff containers are required to provide to shipping companies only very scanty
information on their contents, making it easy to hide the real nature of the goods,
the real consignor and origin. Even well-equipped and highly experienced shipping
companies that appear highly motivated to observe the law have sometimes seemed
to agree to carry containers despite knowing almost nothing of what they contain.
99. Many Customs offices use an automated risk-management system to identify
potentially high-risk shipments. This system assesses threats based on such factors
as the consignor/consignee and goods classification. Often in the cases studied,
however, information used for risk assessment was either falsified or obscured,
which helped to prevent Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related cargoes
__________________
63
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Owing to the measures taken by neighbouring countries, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea has very limited access to ports of trans-shipment.
See the Panel’s final report of 2011, para. 134.
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from raising an alert in the system. The Panel continues to study instruments created
by international bodies such as WCO aimed at improving detection rates. 65
100. The new incidents of non-compliance reported to the Committee or brought to
the attention of the Panel confirm previous analysis by the Panel that the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea increasingly relies on the use of sealed
shipping containers for its illicit exports. The country follows techniques pioneered
by drug-trafficking organizations that integrate their logistics operations within the
global supply chain because those techniques represent the most cost-effective way
to circumvent well-resourced and coordinated surveillance. 66
101. The Panel’s consultations with ship operators and with the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime confirm the importance of screening containers before
they enter the flow of international commerce because the chances of illicit
shipments’ being detected by random and routine customs searches once they have
entered this flow are extremely limited. The United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime indicates that, of more than 500 million annual ship container movements,
fewer than 2 per cent are inspected.
102. The Panel observes that once an illicit cargo to or from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea enters the international flow of commerce, the chance of
being detected by random and routine Customs searches is low because of the
extensive use of false labelling and misdeclaration to hide the identity of the
consignor. The chances are further reduced if information on the origin of the cargo
in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is obscured or falsified in the first
foreign trans-shipment port because of the multiple layers of intermediaries
involved in onward shipments and numerous changes in documentation. (This
occurs frequently in cases relating to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea).
In some of the incidents studied, after trans-shipment in the first foreign port, no
elements would have permitted differentiation of containers originating from the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and stuffed with illicit items from the vast
amount of containers originating from the region.
E.
Financial measures
103. During the term covered by this report, no Member State has reported to the
Committee or conveyed to the Panel actions taken in accordance with paragraph 8 (d)
of resolution 1718 (2006) to freeze assets of designated entities. Nor has any Member
State communicated to the Committee or the Panel attempts to circumvent restrictions
on financial transactions specified in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of resolution 1874
(2009).
104. The Panel has worked closely with FATF in its development of its revised set
of recommendations, adopted in February 2012. Subsequently the Panel has begun
to work with FATF on implementation of the revised recommendations, particularly
new recommendation 7 on the financing of proliferation. (The texts of
recommendation 7, and new recommendation 2 which address appropriate
coordination among competent authorities at the policymaking and operation level,
__________________
65
66
38
Ibid., para. 136.
Hugh Griffiths and Michael Jenks, “Maritime transport and destabilizing commodity flows”,
SIPRI Policy Paper No. 32, January 2012.
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are provided in annex VIII). FATF has kept the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea on its Public Statement, a placement that obligates FATF members to take
exceptional measures in the conduct of financial transactions (see figure XIII and
also see annex IX for a related United States Treasury advisory on risks). The
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea early in 2012 approached FATF with a view
to changing this treatment but has not yet responded to an invitation to explore
identified deficiencies in financial regulations and FATF-recommended remedies.
105. Although the Security Council resolutions oblige Member States to report to
the Committee inspections of goods, there is no corresponding requirement to report
investigation of possible illicit movements of funds, and no Member State has ever
volunteered such a report. Some Member States, however, have provided
confidential financial information to the Panel, including on involvement of certain
banks and routing of funds, in the context of investigations into incidents of possible
violation of sanctions. The Panel consequently has become increasingly concerned
about the greater use by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of trade-based
money-laundering techniques by means of front companies it established or agents it
controls to fund illicit procurements and receive proceeds of sales of weapons and
weapons of mass destruction-related transfers. Protective due diligence procedures
normally employed by banks (enhanced due diligence is required in the case of
transactions where entities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are
identified parties) may fall short either because of the practised skill of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in concealing involvement with individuals,
firms and transactions or because of lack of transparency of beneficial owners due
to some Member States’ laws which shield such crucial information.
Figure 13
Extract from FATF Public Statement
High-risk and non-cooperative jurisdictions
FATF Public Statement - 16 February 2012
Paris, 16 February 2012 - The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard setting body for anti-money laundering
and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from money
laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF
identified jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the
international financial system.
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and
combating the financing of terrorism regime and the serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.
The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to
give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies and financial
institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective
counter-measures to protect their financial sectors from money laundering and financing of terrorism risks emanating from the
DPRK. Jurisdictions should also protect against correspondent relationships being used to bypass or evade counter-measures and
risk mitigation practices, and take into account ML/FT risks when considering requests by DPRK financial institutions to open
branches and subsidiaries in their jurisdiction.
The FATF acknowledges the latest outreach from DPRK to FATF and remains prepared to engage directly in assisting the DPRK
to address its AML/CFT deficiencies.
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106. Available information is inadequate for the Panel to draw a general conclusion
about the effectiveness of Member States’ implementation and enforcement of
financial restrictions imposed by the resolutions. Even so, the Panel suspects that
implementation of the ban on illicit movements of money is probably more robust
than implementation of the ban on illicit movements of goods because of
widespread implementation of FATF recommendations and its warnings about
significant money-laundering risks inherent in financial transactions with the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
F.
Unintended impact
107. The Panel has monitored for (a) possible unintended humanitarian impact and
(b) impact on diplomatic missions of the implementation of the sanctions.
108. On (a), it is aware of concerns that sanctions regimes in general may
unintentionally harm civil populations. In paragraph 172 of its final report of 2011
the Panel noted that its lack of access to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
prevents it from applying accepted methodologies to this problem. This problem
continues. It has consulted with non-governmental organizations operating in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and with WFP, but these contacts have
provided no evidence of any such unintended humanitarian impact of the sanctions
imposed by the resolutions. 67 It will continue to monitor this issue.
109. On (b), the Panel has discussed this issue with the Ambassadors to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of the Russian Federation (13 September
2011), the Federal Republic of Germany (9 December 2011) and the United
Kingdom (24 January 2012) as well as a senior official of another Member State.
The Russian Ambassador briefed the Committee on 12 September 2011. When he
spoke with the Panel the following day he detailed a number of ways in which
sanctions affected the work of some missions. These included especially the
inability to move money into or out of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
and the inability to import vehicles. The German Ambassador and the British
Ambassador both noted that the sanctions caused their missions no problems.
110. The Security Council has made clear in paragraph 21 of resolution 1874
(2009) that the ban on luxury goods and the assets freeze should be implemented
without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea. The Panel notes that bilateral sanctions imposed by
some Member States go further than the Security Council sanctions and cannot
exclude the possibility that it is these bilateral sanctions that have caused difficulty
to some missions. It may also be that some companies and banks have taken a
commercial decision to have no dealings with any entity in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (one contact from a non-governmental organization based in
Pyongyang said that her vehicle supplier had received an instruction from its head
office to refuse all deals with the country). The resolutions provide no mandate to
challenge such commercial decisions. The Panel stands ready to assist the
Committee with this issue.
__________________
67
40
In the seventh preambular paragraph of resolution 1874 (2009) it is underlined that the sanctions
are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences.
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VII. Designation of goods, entities and individuals
111. This report was prepared shortly after the Committee, as directed by the
Security Council in the statement by its President (S/PRST/2012/13), designated
three new entities and updated the lists of designated goods. This followed extensive
recommendations by Committee members and the recommendation by the Panel of
three additional designations of entities that emerged from its investigations. The
Panel therefore does not currently wish to suggest further designations but plans to
do so at an opportune moment.
112. Designated entities are known by numerous names. The proliferation of aliases
has shown how easily the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea can create these.
In fact it can probably create aliases for entities involved in illicit trade faster than
the Committee can designate them. Although it is easy for individuals to use false
passports and assume different names, biometric visa control systems can facilitate
efforts to reveal a passport holder’s real identity. Where biometric visa control
systems are used (they are not universal) designation of individuals may be more
effective than designation of entities.
113. A number of Member States and the European Union have designated
additional entities and individuals to supplement those designated by the Committee
(see annex X). Some of these entities and individuals play an important role in the
nuclear, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or in arms transfers to or from the country.
Reasons offered for autonomous designations appear to be based on a similar set of
criteria to that specified in the resolutions.
VIII. Recommendations
114. The Panel bases its recommendations on issues that have arisen from its work
during the period under review and on persistent problems. Thus some
recommendations echo those of 2011. They are focused on actions that, in the
Panel’s view, will significantly improve implementation of the sanctions. The
background to many of these recommendations is set out in the main body of this
report.
Recommendation 1
Member States that comply with the obligation to inspect, seize and dispose
have to bear all the costs of doing so and do not always have the necessary technical
expertise or support. They may incur storage and disposal costs and may find
themselves involved in litigation. This process in addition usually imposes a
considerable administrative burden.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should consider the
financial and technical challenges that inspections, seizure and disposal present
to Member States and explore possible solutions.
Recommendation 2
There are at present no clear guidelines on the disposal of items seized
following an inspection. The Panel recommends that this be clarified.
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The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should prepare an IAN
on the disposal of seized goods.
Recommendation 3
Despite the requirement to report “promptly”, sometimes Member States
provide reports long after inspections are conducted. These delays may result from
internal legal constraints or proceedings. Nevertheless it would be helpful if
Member States in these circumstances would notify the Committee of an inspection
pending a full report when possible.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should prepare an IAN
that recommends as best practice the submission of reports not later than three
months after an inspection. Where, for legal or other reasons, Member States
are unable to comply the Committee should invite them to submit notification
that an inspection was conducted, pending the provision of a full report when it
becomes possible.
Recommendation 4
Several Member States, with different legal traditions, have told the Panel that
they have been unable to report on inspections, or to report fully, because a report
might compromise legal proceedings following an inspection. The Panel believes
that a conference to allow an exchange of views between lawyers concerned,
including United Nations lawyers, might help to solve this problem. It stands ready
to help to arrange such an event. This problem may affect other sanctions regimes.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should arrange a
conference of Customs legal advisers and other appropriate judicial and lawenforcement authorities working in national administrations to discuss, and to
explore solutions to, the difficulties faced by Member States in reporting fully
without compromising legal proceedings.
Recommendation 5
Member States are required to report interdictions, but not to inform the
Committee when they, or an entity on their territory, prevent a violation, for
example by refusing an export licence, or turning down a suspect order. Information
on such cases would be valuable.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should issue an IAN
inviting Member States to inform the Committee when an attempted violation
comes to their attention that has been prevented short of an inspection.
Recommendation 6
Although Member States have been called upon to conduct inspections of
suspected illicit cargo to and from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since
the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006), they were not required to report on
inspections, seizure and disposal until the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009). The
Panel would find it very useful to know of inspections conducted in the interim in
order to expand its knowledge of relevant incidents of non-compliance and
understanding of circumvention techniques used by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
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Member States should provide to the Committee or the Panel any
information at their disposal on incidents of non-compliance and attempts to
evade sanctions that occurred after the adoption of resolution 1718 (2006) and
before the adoption of resolution 1874 (2009).
Recommendation 7
The FATF recommendation on targeted financial sanctions related to
proliferation requires countries to take measures to comply with Security Council
resolutions relating to “the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and its financing”. The focus of the recommendation is
on necessary and unique preventive measures to stop the flow of funds or other
assets to proliferators or proliferation. FATF calls upon countries to establish
necessary legal authority and to identify competent domestic authorities responsible
for implementation and enforcement. It notes that countries should require financial
institutions and designated non-financial business or professions to report to
competent authorities any “assets frozen or actions taken in compliance with the
prohibition requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including
attempted transactions …”.
The Committee should consider communicating to Member States that it
and the Panel are a competent authority in the light of implementation
responsibilities assigned by the Security Council in the resolutions and strongly
encourage Member States to notify the Committee and/or the Panel within 90
days about incidents of non-compliance or actions taken in compliance with
financial prohibitions specified in the resolutions, including attempted
transactions.
Recommendation 8
By paragraph 8 (d) of resolution 1718 (2006) Member States are required to
freeze the funds that are owned by [designated persons or entities] or by persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction and funds of persons or entities
providing support for the illicit programmes of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. The Panel’s contacts with Member States suggest that some are unclear on
the scope of the two phrases “persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their
direction” and “providing support for” and it recommends that this be clarified.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should prepare an IAN
clarifying the use of the phrases “providing support for” and “persons or
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction” in paragraph 8 (d) of
resolution 1718 (2006).
Recommendation 9
The Panel has worked both with individual Member States and with regional
groupings to raise awareness of the resolutions and of the sanctions, but the
administrative work involved in such outreach events is a significant drain on Panel
time. It would in any case be more efficient to use professionals experienced in
event management for such tasks.
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The Committee should direct the Panel to engage an organization or
organizations of its choosing to carry the administrative burden of arranging
outreach events and assist in its efforts to raise funds for this.
Recommendation 10
It is important that Member States feel that their efforts at implementation are
appreciated. At present the submission of a national implementation report to the
Security Council is not acknowledged. This sends the wrong signal; some Member
States have even asked the Panel whether all members of the Security Council
wholeheartedly support the resolutions.
The Committee should direct the Panel henceforth to respond to Member
States when they provide national implementation reports to the Security
Council.
Recommendation 11
The Panel in paragraph 87 above notes concerns over the delivery of
computers to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea by WIPO. It would be
prudent to invite relevant United Nations organizations and agencies to consult the
Committee on their Democratic People’s Republic of Korea-related activities as
some have.
The Committee, with the assistance of the Panel, should prepare a
communication to relevant United Nations organizations and agencies inviting
them to engage with the Committee regarding their activities in order to ensure
that they are consistent with the resolutions.
Recommendation 12
In paragraph 19 above the Panel notes its interactions with other panels. These
make clear that much could be gained by more formal and systematic
communication and cooperation between panels and similar groups, such as
monitoring groups. There have been occasions when Member States have hosted a
visit by one panel shortly before a visit by another, when it would have been in the
interests of all to combine the visits. Panels sometimes learn of useful conferences
attended by other panels only after they have ended.
The Security Council should invite the Coordinators of the various Panels
of Experts and similar groups to establish an inter-panel coordination
mechanism to exchange suggestions on best practice, travel plans and upcoming
activities of wider interest, so as to maximize the impact of panels’ work and to
secure best value for United Nations money.
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Annex I
Map of main launch sites and nuclear complex, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea
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Annex II
Imagery of the Yongbyon nuclear complex
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Annex III
Imagery of the fuel fabrication plant
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Annex IV
Imagery of the 5-MWe reactor and light water reactor
construction site
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Annex V
Imagery of Tongchang-ri (Sohae launch site)
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Annex VI
Imagery of Musudan-ri (Tonghae launch site)
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Annex VII
Items designated by Member States as luxury goodsa
Member States
Items
Australia
Canada
Live animals
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
New Zealand
Beef, fillets of
tunas, caviar
and caviar
substitutes
Caviar and its
substitutes,
chocolate,
crustaceans,
molluscs,
aquatic
invertebrates
and goods
containing
these species,
honey and its
derivatives,
tuna, toothfish,
salmon and
goods
containing
these species
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
United States
Pure-bred
horses
Caviar,
Crustaceans
(all), e.g. rock
lobsters,
abalone,
molluscs and
aquatic
invertebrates,
e.g. oyster in
any form
Gourmet foods
and
ingredients,
lobster
Caviar and
caviar
substitutes;
truffles and
preparations
thereof
Alcoholic
beverages
Wine, spirits
(all kinds)
Alcoholic
beverages
High-quality Alcoholic
beverages
wines
(including
sparkling
wines), spirits
and spirituous
beverages
Tobacco and
tobacco
products
Tobacco
products
Cigarettes
High-quality
cigars and
cigarillos
Cosmetics,
fashion
accessories
Perfume
Cosmetics
(all), perfumes
and toilet
waters
Tobacco
Make-up,
Luxury
perfumes
perfumes,
toilet waters
and cosmetics,
Alcoholic
beverages
Caviar and
caviar
substitutes
prepared from
fish eggs
Alcoholic
beverages
(wines, ethyl
alcohol,
spirituous
liquors and
other alcoholic
beverages)
Cognac, wines Wines and
spirits
and other
liquors for
more than
5,000 rubles
Tobacco
Cosmetics,
perfumes
Cosmetics
(perfumes,
cosmetics,
including
Perfumes for
more than
5,000 rubles
Wines and
spirits
Alcoholic
beverages
(wine, beer,
ales and
liquor)
Cigars
Cigars
Tobacco and
tobacco
products
Perfumes and
cosmetics
High-quality
perfumes,
high-quality
personal care
Cosmetics,
including
beauty and
make-up,
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Food items
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52
Member States
Items
Australia
Canada
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
New Zealand
including
beauty and
make-up
products
Apparel and
Apparel,
leather and fur clothing
accessories,
items
furs, leather
travel goods
Designer
clothing and
accessories,
furs
High-quality
garments,
clothing
accessories
and shoes
(regardless of
their material);
High-quality
leather,
saddlery and
travel goods,
handbags and
similar articles
Ceramic and
glass/
tableware
Drinking
glasses (lead
crystal)
Leather bags,
clothes and
others, fur
skins and
artificial fur
manufactures
Designer
clothing, deer
velvet, fur
products and
artificial fur
products,
leather bags
and clothes
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Bone china,
Drinking
Cutlery or
precious metal glasses of lead crystal
glassware
crystal
or plated or
clad with
precious
metal; highquality
tableware of
porcelain,
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
United States
foundations
and manicurerelated, and
pedicurerelated
products)
and beauty
products
perfumes and
toilet waters
Leather goods Fur production Fur products;
(trunks, suit- for more than leather bags
250,000 rubles and clothes
cases,
cosmetic
cases,
executive
cases,
briefcases,
satchels, and
other similar
bags,
handbags,
pockets or
other products
that may be
carried in
handbags,
clothing and
accessories),
fur items (fur
clothing,
accessories,
and other fur
products)
High-quality
apparel and
clothing
accessories,
high-quality
shoes, highquality leather
Apparel and
fashion items
(leather
articles, silk
articles, fur
skins and
artificial furs,
fashion
accessories:
leather travel
goods, vanity
cases,
binocular and
camera cases,
handbags,
wallets, silk
scarves,
designer
clothing:
leather apparel
and clothing
accessories)
Cutlery, gold,
silver or
platinum
plated
Tableware of
porcelain or
bone china,
items of lead
crystal
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Member States
Items
Australia
Canada
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
New Zealand
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
United States
china, stone or
earthenware or
fine pottery;
high-quality
lead crystal
glassware
Jewellery,
precious/
semi-precious
articles
Silver, gold,
jewellery,
precious and
semi-precious
stones
(including
diamonds and
pearls),
precious
metals
Jewellery,
gems,
precious
metals
Pearls,
precious and
semi-precious
stones, articles
of pearls,
jewellery, gold
or silversmith
articles
Jewellery,
precious
metals,
precious
metalwork
Jewellery,
precious
metals,
precious and
semi-precious
stones, and
articles made
from them
Pearls and
jewellery
(natural or
hatchery
pearls,
diamonds,
jewellery,
silver, gold,
gilded
products,
white gold,
white goldplated
products,
ornaments and
their
accessories,
products that
contain
jewellery)
Precious
Jewellery
made of gold, jewellery
platinum,
diamonds and
other precious
stones for
more than
50,000 rubles
Pearls,
precious and
semi-precious
stones,
jewellery and
silverware
Jewellery
(jewellery
with pearls,
gems,
precious and
semi-precious
stones
(including
diamonds,
sapphires,
rubies and
emeralds),
jewellery of
precious metal
or of metal
clad with
precious
metal) gems
and precious
metals (gold,
silver,
platinum,
diamonds,
precious and
semi-precious
stones
(including
sapphires,
rubies and
emeralds))
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54
Member States
Items
Electronic
items
Australia
Consumer
electronics
(televisions,
videos, DVD
players,
PDAs,
laptops, MP3
players — and
any other
relevant
exports),
electronic
entertainment/
software
Photographic/ Photographic
equipment
cinematic
items
Canada
Computers,
televisions and
other
electronic
devices
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
High-end
electronic
items for
domestic use;
high-end
electrical/
electronic or
optical
apparatus for
recording and
reproducing
sound and
images
Japan
Portable
information
devices,
audiovisual
instruments
and software
See electronic Camera and
items
cinematographic
instruments
New Zealand
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
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Computers,
audiovisual
equipment (for
example CD
players and
DVD players),
data or
software (for
example films,
music, or
both, recorded
or stored on
CDs or
DVDs), and
things on
which data or
software is or
may be
recorded or
stored, mobile
telephones,
portable
information
and media
devices (for
example,
personal
digital
assistants
(PDAs) and
MP3 players
or other digital
audio players)
Electronic
goods
(transmitter
products for
radio or
televisions,
television
cameras,
digital
cameras, and
videocassette
recorders,
monitors,
projectors, and
related
products
excluding
television
transmitter
products)
Cameras and
movie
equipment
Optical
instruments
(cameras,
movie cameras
and projectors
for movies)
Singapore
Plasma
televisions;
personal
digital musical
players
Switzerland
High-quality
consumer
electronic
devices
High-quality
electronic and
optical image
recording and
reproducing
equipment
United States
Electronic
items (flatscreen, plasma
or LCD panel
televisions or
other video
monitors or
receivers
(including
highdefinition
televisions),
and any
television
larger than
29 inches,
DVD players,
PDAs,
personal
digital music
players,
*computer
laptops)b
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Member States
Items
Clocks and
watches
Australia
Watches and
clocks
Canada
Watches
Musical
instruments
Vehicles,
aircraft,
vessels and
other
transport
equipment
Automobiles Private aircraft
and other
vehicles to
transport
people, yachts
and pleasure
craft
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
Luxury clocks Wristwatches
and other
and watches
and their parts watches
New Zealand
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
United States
Wristwatch for
Timepieces
(wristwatches, more than
50,000 rubles
pocket
watches, and
other wearable
timepieces)
High-quality
Watches of
watches and
metal clad
clocks
with a
precious metal
Luxury
watches
(wrist, pocket,
and other with
a case of
precious metal
or of metal
clad with
precious
metal)
Musical
instruments
High-quality
musical
instruments
Musical
instruments
Luxury cars;
luxury
motorboats
and yachts
Luxury
vehicles for
air, road and
water
transport as
well as parts
and
accessories to
Transportation
items (yachts
and other
aquatic
recreational
vehicles (such
as jet skis),
*luxury
automobiles
(and motor
vehicles):
automobiles
and other
motor vehicles
High-quality
musical
instruments
Musical
instruments
Musical
instruments
Musical
instruments
(pianos,
harpsichords,
and other
stringed
keyboard
instruments,
string
instruments,
wind
instruments,
electronic
musical
instruments)
Luxury
vehicles for
transport of
persons on
earth, air or
sea, as well as
their
accessories
and spare
parts
Motor cars,
motorcycles,
motorboats
yachts and
others
Cars,
motorcycles,
snowmobiles,
motorboats,
yachts,
aircraft, and
their parts and
accessories
Automobiles
(passenger
cars and other
vehicles,
motorcycles
and bicycles
or sidecars
with assistant
motors),
vessels
(yachts, other
vessels for
excursion or
exercise, boats
Motorcars for
more than
3,000,000
rubles
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Wristwatches
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56
Member States
Items
Australia
Canada
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
New Zealand
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Singapore
Switzerland
with paddles,
and canoes)
Sports items
Sports
equipment
Works of art, Works of art
collector pieces (all)
and antiques
Sporting
goods
Coins and
banknotes, not
being legal
tender; works
of art,
collectors’
pieces and
antiques
to transport
people [other
than public
transport]
including
station
wagons,
racing cars,
snowmobiles,
and
motorcycles,
personal
transportation
devices
[segways])
Recreational
and sports
equipment
Sporting
goods and
equipment
Articles and
equipment for
skiing, golf,
diving and
water sports
Works of art,
collectors’
pieces and
antiques
Works of art,
collectors’
pieces and
antiques
United States
Artwork and
curios
(collections
and
specimens,
curios)
Works of art,
collectors’
pieces and
antiques
Coin (other
than the legal
tender), works
of art,
collectors’
pieces and
antiques
Works of art
(including
painting,
original
sculptures and
statuary),
antiques
(more than
100 years
old), and
collectible
items,
including rare
coins and
stamps
12-37610
12-37610
Member States
Items
Other
a
b
Australia
Fountain pens,
carpets
Canada
European
Union, Monaco,
Norway, San
Marino
Japan
Hand-knotted Carpets,
carpets, hand- fountain pens
woven rugs
and tapestries;
articles and
equipment for
billiard,
automatic
bowling,
casino games
and games
operated by
coins or
banknotes
New Zealand
Carpets and
tapestries,
designer
furniture,
fountain pens
Russian
Republic of Korea Federation
Carpeting
goods
(carpeting
products and
other textile
carpets)
Singapore
Carpets
Switzerland
Handmade
carpets, handwoven
tapestries
United States
Designer
fountain pens,
rugs and
tapestries
As at 30 April 2012. Member States are invited to report to the Panel any required change or update.
United States luxury items list (provisional): categories of items with an asterisk will be exempted from the general denial if they are being imported by
legitimate organizations involved in humanitarian relief efforts, other internationally sanctioned efforts, or as items in the interest of the United States
Government.
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Annex VIII
Excerpts from the FATF 40 Recommendations,
February 2012
Recommendations on international standards on combating
money-laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation
The FATF Recommendations set out the essential measures that countries should have in place to: identify the
risks, and develop policies and domestic coordination; pursue money laundering, terrorist financing and the
financing of proliferation; apply preventive measures for the financial sector and other designated sectors;
establish powers and responsibilities for the competent authorities (e.g., investigative, law enforcement and
supervisory authorities) and other institutional measures; enhance the transparency and availability of beneficial
ownership information of legal persons and arrangements; and facilitate international cooperation.
Combating terrorist financing is a very significant challenge. An effective AML/CFT system, in general, is
important for addressing terrorist financing, and most measures previously focused on terrorist financing are now
integrated throughout the Recommendations, therefore obviating the need for the Special Recommendations.
However, there are some Recommendations that are unique to terrorist financing, which are set out in Section C
of the FATF Recommendations. These are: Recommendation 5 (the criminalisation of terrorist financing);
Recommendation 6 (targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism & terrorist financing); and Recommendation
8 (measures to prevent the misuse of non-profit organisations). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
is also a significant security concern, and in 2008 the FATF’s mandate was expanded to include dealing with the
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To combat this threat, the FATF has adopted a new
Recommendation (Recommendation 7) aimed at ensuring consistent and effective implementation of targeted
financial sanctions when these are called for by the United Nations Security Council.
Recommendation 2: National cooperation and coordination
Countries should have national AML/CFT policies, informed by the risks identified, which should be
regularly reviewed, and should designate an authority or have a coordination or other mechanism that is
responsible for such policies. Countries should ensure that policy-makers, the financial intelligence unit
(FIU), law enforcement authorities, supervisors and other relevant competent authorities, at the
policymaking and operational levels, have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to
cooperate, and, where appropriate, coordinate domestically with each other concerning the development
and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and the
financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Recommendation 7: Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation
Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with United Nations Security Council
resolutions relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and its financing. These resolutions require countries to freeze without delay the funds or
other assets of, and to ensure that no funds and other assets are made available, directly or indirectly, to
or for the benefit of, any person or entity designated by, or under the authority of, the United Nations
Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
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Annex IX
Financial risks identified by the Department of the Treasury
of the United States of America
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Annex X
List of autonomous designations 1
A.
Entities
Names
Designated by
Rationale
1
United States of
America
Facilitated financial weapons-related transactions – Dongbang Bank
for Green Pine Associated (entity designated by – Tongbang U’nhaeng
the 1718 Committee, 02.05.2012) and the
Reconnaissance General Bureau in a manner that – Tongbang Bank
circumvents sanctions.
PO Box 32, BEL Building,
Jonseung-Dung, Moranbong
District, Pyongyang, North
Korea
Trans Scientific Corp.
Owned or controlled by Alex H. T. Tsai, who
provided, or attempted to provide, financial,
technological or other support for, or goods or
services in support of KOMID (entity designated
by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
– 9F-1, No. 22, Hsin Yi Rd.,
Sec. 2, Taipei, Taiwan
Bank of East Land
European Union
2
Global Interface
Company Inc.
United States of
America
Alias(es)
Address(es)
– 1st Floor, No. 49, Lane 280,
Kuang Fu S. Road, Taipei,
Taiwan
Business Registration
Document Number: 12873346
(Taiwan)
3
Hesong Trading
Corporation
Australia
European Union
Subsidiary of KOMID (entity designated by the
1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
Pyongyang, North Korea
Ties to Korea Ryonbong General Corporation
(entity designated by the United Nations,
24.04.2009).
Route des Arsenaux 15,
Fribourg, FR 1700,
Switzerland; C.R. No. CH217.0.135.79-4 (Switzerland)
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the 1718
Committee, 24.04.2009).
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang
District, Pyongyang, North
Korea
Japan
United States of
America
4
Kohas AG
Australia
Japan
United States of
America
5
Korea Complex
Equipment Import
Corporation
Australia
European Union
Japan
United States of
America
__________________
12-37610
1
As at 30 April 2012. This list is for information only and does not necessarily reflect all of the autonomous designations made
by Member States. The entries are a compilation of those provided by Member States. Not all designating Member States
provide rationale. New entries to this list since 30 April 2011 are shaded for reference.
12-37610
Names
Designated by
Rationale
Alias(es)
Address(es)
6
United States of
America
Owned or controlled by Office 39 of the Korean
Workers’ Party.
– Choson Taesong Unhaeng
Segori-dong, Gyongheung St.,
Potonggang District,
Pyongyang, Korea, North
Korea Daesong
Bank
– Taesong Bank
European Union
SWIFT/BIC KDBK KP PY
(Korea, North);
Phone: 850 2 381 8221;
Phone: 850 2 18111 ext. 8221;
Fax: 850 2 381 4576;
Telex: 360230 and 37041 KDP
KP;
TGMS daesongbank;
E-mail: kdb@co.chesin.com
7
Korea Daesong
General Trading
Corporation
United States of
America
Owned or controlled by Office 39 of the Korean
Workers’ Party.
European Union
– Daesong Trading
– Daesong Trading Company
– Korea Daesong Trading
Company
– Korea Daesong Trading
Corporation
Pulgan Gori Dong 1,
Potonggang District,
Pyongyang City, Korea,
North;
Phone: 850 2 18111
8204/8208
Phone: 850 2 381 8208/4188
Fax : 850 2 381 4431/4432
E-mail:
daesong@co.chesin.com
8
Korea International Australia
Chemical Joint
European Union
Venture Company
Japan
United States of
America
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
– Choson International
Chemicals Joint Operation
Company
– Chosun International
Chemicals Joint Operation
Company
– Hamhung, South Hamgyong
Province, North Korea
– Man gyongdae-kuyok,
Pyongyang, North Korea
– Mangyungdae-gu,
Pyongyang, North Korea
– International Chemical Joint
Venture Corporation
– Korea International
Chemicals Joint Operation
Company
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– Korea International
Chemical Joint Venture
Corp.
Designated by
Rationale
9
Korea Kwangson
Banking Corp.
(KKBC)
United States of
America
Provide financial services in support of both
Tanchon Commercial Bank (entity designated by
the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009) and Korea
Hyoksin Trading Corporation (entity designated
by the 1718 Committee, 16.07.2009).
Jungson-dong, Sungri Street,
Central District, Pyongyang,
North Korea
Korea Kwangsong
Trading
Corporation
Australia
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang
District, Pyongyang, North
Korea
10
European Union
European Union
Alias(es)
Address(es)
Japan
United States of
America
11
Korea Pugang
Mining and
Machinery
Corporation ltd
European Union
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
12
Korea Pugang
Trading
Corporation
Australia
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
Japan
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang
District, Pyongyang, North
Korea
United States of
America
13
Korea Ryongwang/ Australia
Ryengwang Trading Japan
Corporation
United States of
America
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
Korean Ryengwang Trading
Corporation
Rakwon-dong, Pothonggang
District, Pyongyang, North
Korea
Subsidiary of Korea Ryonbong General
Corporation (entity designated by the United
Nations, 24.04.2009).
– Korea Ryenha Machinery
J/V Corporation;
– Central District, Pyongyang,
North Korea;
– Chosun Yunha Machinery
Joint Operation Company;
– Mangyungdae-gu,
Pyongyang, North Korea;
– Chosun Yunha Machinery
J.V. Corporation
– Mangyongdae District,
Pyongyang, North Korea
European Union
14
Korea Ryonha
Machinery Joint
Venture
Corporation
Australia
European Union
Japan
United States of
America
– Ryonha Machinery Joint
Venture Corporation
15
Korea Taesong
Trading Company
United States of
America
European Union
Subsidiary of KOMID (entity designated by the
1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
Pyongyang, North Korea
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Names
12-37610
12-37610
Names
Designated by
Rationale
16
Korea Tonghae
Shipping Company
Japan
Known to have been a major ship-owner of
DPRK vessels, engaging in export-import of
materials and transfers of passengers using their
ships, and associated with the illegal exports of
WMD-related goods and equipment and etc. from
Japan to the DPRK.
17
Moksong Trading
Corporation
United States of
America
Engaged in proliferation activities.
18
Munitions Industry
Department
United States of
America
Responsible for overseeing activities of the
Military Supplies Industry
DPRK’s military industries, including the Second Department
Economic Committee and KOMID (entity
designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
This includes overseeing the development of
DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missiles
programmes.
Pyongyang, North Korea
Controls a number of entities inside DPRK and
abroad through which it conducts numerous illicit
activities including the production, smuggling
and distribution of narcotics. Office 39 has also
been involved in the attempted procurement and
transfer to DPRK of luxury goods, particularly
the failed attempt to purchase two luxury yachts
(case reported to the 1718 Committee in July
2009).
– Second KWP Government
Building (Korean —
CH’O’NGSA), Chungso’ng,
Urban Town (Korean —
DONG), Chung Ward,
Pyongyang, North Korea
European Union
19
Office 39
United States of
America
European Union
Alias(es)
– Office #39
– Office No. 39
– Bureau 39
– Central Committee
– Third Floor Division 39
Address(es)
– Chung-Guyok (Central
District), Sosong Street,
Kyongrim-Dong,
Pyongyang, North Korea
– Changgwang Street,
Pyongyang, North Korea
Ponghwa Hospital
Japan
A special hospital which provides medical
services to high-ranking party members,
government officials and their families, known to
have been engaged in research of microbe and
associated with the illegal exports of WMDrelated goods and equipment from Japan to the
DPRK.
21
Pyongyang
Informatics Centre
Japan
– Pyongyang Information
Known to have been engaged in developing
Center
computer software programs for government
organizations, equipped with training facilities
for programmers, and associated with the illegal
export of WMD-related goods and equipment and
etc. from Japan to the DPRK.
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20
Designated by
Rationale
Alias(es)
Address(es)
22
United States of
America
Responsible for research and development of
DPRK/s advanced weapons systems, including
missiles and probably nuclear weapons. Uses a
number of subordinate organizations, including
Korean Tangun Trading Corporation (entity
designated by the 1718 Committee, 16.07.2009).
– 2nd Academy of Natural
Sciences
Pyongyang, North Korea
Second Academy of
Natural Sciences
European Union
– Che 2 Chayon Kwahak-Won
– Academy of Natural
Sciences
– Chayon Kwahak-Won
– National Defense Academy
– Kukpang Kwahak-Won
– Second Academy of Natural
Sciences Research Institute
(SANSRI)
23
Second Economic
Committee
United States of
America
European Union
24
Sino-Ki
United States of
America
Engaged in proliferation activities.
25
Sobaeku United
Corp.
European Union
State-owned company, involved in research into,
and the acquisition of, sensitive products and
equipment. It possesses several deposits of
natural graphite, which provide raw material for
two processing facilities which, inter alia,
produce graphite blocks that can be used in
missiles.
26
The Reconnaissance United States of
General Bureau
America
European Union
Kangdong, North Korea
The Second Economic Committee is responsible
for overseeing the production of DPRK’s ballistic
missile. It also directs the activities of KOMID
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
24.04.2009).
Sobaeksu United Corp.
Trades in conventional arms and controls the
– Chongch’al Ch’ongguk
DPRK conventional arms firm Green Pine
– RGB
Associated Corporation (entity designated by the
– KPA Unit 586
1718 Committee, 02.05.2012), which is
responsible for approximately half of the arms
and related materiel exported by the DPRK and
has taken over many of the activities of KOMID
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
24.04.2009).
– Hyongjesan-Guyok,
Pyongyang, North Korea
– Nungrado, Pyongyang,
North Korea
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Names
12-37610
12-37610
Names
Designated by
Rationale
27
Australia
Subsidiary of KOMID (entity designated by the
United Nations, 24.04.2009).
Pyongyang, North Korea
Subsidiary of Global Interface Company Inc. and
managed by Alex H. T. Tsai, who provided, or
attempted to provide, financial, technological or
other support for, or goods or services in support
of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718
Committee, 24.04.2009).
1F, No. 49, Lane 280, Kuang
Fu S. Road, Taipei, Taiwan
Tosong Technology
Trading
Corporation
European Union
Alias(es)
Address(es)
Japan
United States of
America
28
29
Trans Merits Co.
Ltd.
Yongbyon Nuclear
Research Centre
United States of
America
European Union
Business Registration
Document Number: 16316976
(Taiwan)
Research centre that has taken part in the
production of military-grade plutonium; centre
maintained by the General Bureau of Atomic
Energy (entity designated by the 1718
Committee, 16.07.2009).
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Individuals
Names
Designated by
Rationale
1
European Union
JANG Song-Taek
Member of the National Defence Commission.
Director of the Administrative Department of the
Korean Workers’ Party.
CHANG Song-taek
Alias(es)
Identifying information
Date of birth: 2.2.1946 or
06.02.1946 or 23.02.1946
(North Hamgyong province)
Passport number (as of 2006):
PS 736420617
2
CHON Chi Bu
European Union
Member of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
16.07.2009), former technical director of
Yongbyon.
3
CHU Kyu-Chang
European Union
JU Kyu-Chang
First Deputy Director of the Defence Industry
Department (ballistics programme), Korean
Workers’ Party, Member of the National Defence
Commission.
Date of birth: between 1928
and 1933
4
HYON Chol-hae
European Union
Deputy Director of the General Political
Department of the People’s Armed Forces
(military adviser to Kim Jong Il)
Year of birth: 1934
(Manchuria, China)
5
JON Il-chun
European Union
New Director of “Office 39” of the Central
Committee of the Workers’ Party, which is
involved in proliferation financing (replaced KIM
Tong-un).
Date of birth: 24.8.1941
6
JON Pyong-ho
European Union
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean
Workers’ Party, Head of the Central Committee’s
Military Supplies Industry Department
controlling the Second Economic Committee of
the Central Committee, member of the National
Defence Commission.
Year of birth: 1926
7
KIM Tong-myo’ng
United States of
America
Acts on behalf of Tanchon Commercial Bank
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
24.04.2009). Also played a role in managing
Amroggang Development Banking Corporation
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
02.05.2012)
European Union
8
KIM Tong-un
European Union
Former Director of “Office 39” of the Central
Committee of the Workers’ Party, which is
involved in proliferation financing.
Kim Tong Myong
Year of birth: 1964
Kim Chin-so’k
Kim Jin Sok
Year of birth: 1936
Passport number: 554410660
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B.
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12-37610
Names
Designated by
Rationale
Alias(es)
Identifying information
9
United States of
America
Chief of the Reconnaissance General Bureau
which trades in conventional arms and controls
the DPRK conventional arms firm Green Pine
Associated Corporation (entity designated by the
1718 Committee, 02.05.2012)responsible for
approximately half of the arms and related
materiel exported by the DPRK and has taken
over many of the activities of KOMID (entity
designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
Kim Yong-Chol Kim
Date of birth: circa 1947
Young-Chol Kim
Alt. date of birth: circa 1946
Young-Cheol Kim
Location: Pyongan-Pukto,
North Korea
KIM Yong-chol
European Union
Young-Chul
10
KIM Yong-chun
European Union
Young-chun
Deputy Chairman of the National Defence
Commission, Minister for the People’s Armed
Forces, special adviser to Kim Jong Il on nuclear
strategy.
Date of birth: 04.03.1935
11
O Kuk-Ryol
European Union
Deputy Chairman of the National Defence
Commission, supervising the acquisition abroad
of advanced technology for nuclear and ballistics
programmes.
Year of birth: 1931 (Jilin
Province, China)
12
PAEK Se-bong
European Union
Chairman of the Second Economic Committee
which is responsible for overseeing the
production of DPRK’s ballistic missile. It also
directs the activities of KOMID (entity
designated by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
Year of birth: 1946
13
PAK Jae-gyong
European Union
Deputy Director of the General Political
Department of the People’s Armed Forces and
Deputy Director of the Logistics Bureau of the
People’s Armed Forces (military adviser to Kim
Jong Il).
14
PAK To-Chun
European Union
Member of the National Security Council, in
charge of arms industry and reported as
commanding the office for nuclear energy
15
PYON Yong Rip
European Union
President of the Academy of Science involved in
weapons of mass destruction-related biological
research.
RYOM Yong
European Union
Director of the General Bureau of Atomic Energy
(entity designated by the 1718 Committee,
16.07.2009), in charge of international relations.
17
SO Sang-kuk
European Union
Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics, Kim
Il Sung University.
Year of birth: 1933
Passport number: 554410661
Date of birth: 09.03.1944
(Jagang, Rangrim)
Yong-Nip
Date of birth: 20.09.1929
Passport number: 645310121
(issued on 13.09.2005)
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16
Chae-Kyong
Designated by
Rationale
Alias(es)
Identifying information
18
United States of
America
Alex H. T. Tsai’s wife, who provided, or
attempted to provide, financial, technological or
other support for, or goods or services in support
of KOMID (entity designated by the 1718
Committee, 24.04.2009). Lu-Chi Su is an officer
in Global Interface Company Inc. and Trans
Merits Co. Ltd. and is directly involved in the
companies’ operations.
Lu-Chi Tsai Su
Date of birth: 08.08.1945
POB: Tainan, Taiwan
President of Kohas AG
STEIGER Jakob
19
SU Lu-chi
STEIGER Jacob
Australia
Passport Number: 131134049
(Taiwan)
Japan
Date of birth: 27 April 1941
(Altstatten, SG, Switzerland)
United States of
America
20
TSAI Alex H. T.
United States of
America
Hsein Tai Tsai
Provided, or attempted to provide, financial,
technological or other support for, or goods or
services in support of KOMID (entity designated
by the 1718 Committee, 24.04.2009).
Date of birth: 08.08.1945
(Tainan, Taiwan)
Passport Number: 131134049
(Taiwan)
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Names
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Annex XI
List of the Panel’s meetings
Below is a list of participation by the Panel in conferences, seminars, forums and
meetings during the reporting period, listed by document number of the report to the
Committee (which can be slightly different from date order).
Activities through reporting date
2011
Conference: The 12th International Export Control Conference, Singapore,
24-26 May 2011.
Meeting: Meetings with non-governmental experts, Beijing, 30 May-1 June 2011.
Seminar: Promoting the Global Instruments of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament:
The United Nations and the Nuclear Challenge, New York, 31 May 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Japan, Tokyo, 25-26 July 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, Seoul,
27 July-1 August 2011.
Forum: The Korean Global Forum 2011, Seoul, 31 August-2 September 2011.
Conference: The International Military Operations and Law Conference, Brisbane,
Australia, 5-8 September 2011.
Meeting: Intersessional meeting of the Financial Action Task Force, Paris,
7-9 September 2011.
Roundtable: Tracking North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles Sales: Implications for the
Missile Technology Control Regime, George Washington University, Elliot School
of International Affairs, Washington, D.C., 13 September 2011.
Forum: A Changing North Korea? A trip report, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 14 September 2011.
Seminar: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit — The Korean Twist, the Korea Economic
Institute, Washington, D.C., 28 September 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, Stanford University, California, United
States, 29 September 2011.
Seminar: The Evolution of Threat Reduction: From Cooperative to Coercive?,
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland Forum, Washington, D.C.,
29 September 2011.
Meeting: Meetings with Korea experts, University of California, Berkeley, United
States, 30 September 2011.
Meeting: Briefing on arms and ammunition, Washington, D.C., and Martinsburg,
West Virginia, United States, 5-6 October 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with United Kingdom officials, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, London, 10 October 2011.
Meeting: Meeting of the Non-Proliferation Directors Group, Paris, 11 October 2011.
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Seminar: Political Changes in 2012: Implications for Northeast Asian Regional
Security, Northeast Asia Future Forum, Washington, D.C., 22 September 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 13 October
2011.
Meeting: Meeting with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
Preparatory Commission, Vienna, 13-14 October 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna,
13-14 October 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with various experts on proliferation finance, Washington, D.C.,
17-19 October 2011.
Seminar: The Security & Strategic Trade Management Academy, Center for
International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens, United States,
19-21 October 2011.
Meeting: Financial Action Task Force, Working Group and Plenary Meetings, Paris,
23-28 October 2011.
Conference: Tenth United Nations — Republic of Korea Joint Conference on
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues, Jeju Island, Republic of Korea,
7-8 November 2011.
Meeting: Centre for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security, Seoul, 9 November
2011.
Meeting: Institute for Peace and Cooperation, Seoul, 10 November 2011.
Conference: 14th Meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific
Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the
Asia Pacific, Hanoi, 18-19 November 2011.
Conference: Annual Conference of the European Association for Forwarding
Transport Logistics and Customs Services, Brussels, 17 November 2011.
Meeting: Meeting with Japanese officials and experts on export control and the
Korean peninsula issues, Tokyo, 24 November-2 December 2011.
Conference: The 8th Asian Senior-Level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP VIII),
Tokyo, 1 December 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of France, Paris, 5-6 December 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Germany, Berlin, 7-8 December
2011.
Meeting: The 5th Annual Container Programme Meeting, organized by the World
Customs Organization and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Brussels,
5-7 December 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Austria, Vienna, 10-13 December
2011.
Conference: Challenges of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, organized by
Wilton Park, Steyning, United Kingdom, 12-16 December 2011.
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Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Switzerland, Berne,
14-16 December 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of the Republic of the Congo,
Brazzaville, 12-16 December 2011.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Canada, Ottawa, 19 December
2011.
2012
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Greece, Athens, 10-12 January
2012.
Meeting with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 13 January 2012.
Meeting: Financial Action Task Force Plenary, Paris, 9-13 January 2012.
Forum: DPRK Economic Forum at the US-Korea Institute, Johns Hopkins School of
International Advanced Studies, Washington, D.C., 19 January 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Japan, Tokyo, 30 January 2012.
Conference: Defence Exports Asia-Pacific Conference on Compliance with United
Nations Security Council resolutions banning arm trades with North Korea,
Singapore, 31 January-2 February 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Mongolia, Ulaanbattar,
15-16 February 2012.
Seminar: 19th Asian Export Control Seminar, Tokyo, 6-10 February 2012.
Meeting: Financial Action Task Force Plenary, Paris, 13-17 February 2012.
Seminar: Combating Destabilizing Arms Transfers via Air, organized by SIPRI
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), Kyiv, 1-2 March 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Greece, Athens, 5 March 2012.
Seminar: Seminar on the Control of Trade in Conventional Arms, organized by the
Thomas More Institute, Paris, 6-8 March 2012.
Meeting: Council for the Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific,
Sydney, Australia, 6-7 March 2012.
Meeting: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Regional Forum’s Inter-Sessional
Meeting on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Sydney, Australia, 8-9 March
2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Australia, Canberra, 13 March
2012.
Roundtable: North Korea, Sanctions Implementation and the Changing Situation, at
the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 14 March 2012.
Meeting with representatives of the Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 27 March 2012.
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Meeting with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The
Hague, 10 April 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of the United Kingdom, London,
10 April 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Italy, Rome, 11-13 April 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of the Republic of Korea, Seoul,
11-13 April 2012.
Seminar: Implementing Sanctions: Prospects and Problems, organized by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, 12-13 April 2012.
Conference: World Customs Organization Global AEO (Authorized Economic
Operator), Seoul, 17-19 April 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Guatemala, Guatemala City,
26-27 April 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of El Salvador, San Salvador, 30 April
2012.
Planned forthcoming activities
Conference: Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, organized
by the Government of Korea, Seoul, 17-18 May 2012.
Seminar: Implementing Sanctions: Prospects and Problems, organized by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nairobi, 23-24 May 2012.
Meeting: Consultations with the Government of Brazil, Brasilia, 1 June 2012.
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