Security Target: st_vid10336
IBM DB2 Version 9.7
Enterprise Server Edition
for Linux, Unix, and Windows
Security Target
Revision 1.0
August 3, 2009
Prepared for:
IBM Canada, Ltd.
3600 Steeles Avenue East
Markham, Ontario L3R 9Z7
Canada
Prepared By:
Science Applications International Corporation
7125 Columbia Gateway Drive, Suite 300
Columbia, MD 21046
IBM DB2 Version 9.7 Enterprise Server Edition for Linux, Unix, and Windows Security Target
August 3, 2009
Revision 1.0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................5
1.1
SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................5
1.2
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .................................................................................................................................5
1.3
CONVENTIONS, TERMINOLOGY, ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................6
1.3.1
Conventions ...........................................................................................................................................6
1.3.2
Acronyms ...............................................................................................................................................7
1.4
SECURITY TARGET OVERVIEW AND ORGANIZATION ......................................................................................7
2.
TOE DESCRIPTION ..........................................................................................................................................8
2.1
PRODUCT TYPE...............................................................................................................................................9
2.2
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................................................................9
2.2.1
DRDA Protocol Handler .......................................................................................................................9
2.2.2
SQL Processing ................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.2.1 SQL Manager ................................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.2.2 SQL Compiler .................................................................................................................................. 11
2.2.2.3 SQL Runtime ................................................................................................................................... 11
2.2.3
Non-SQL Processing............................................................................................................................ 11
2.2.4
Optional Features ................................................................................................................................ 11
2.2.4.1 Database Partitioning Feature (DPF) ............................................................................................... 11
2.2.4.2 Trusted Contexts .............................................................................................................................. 11
2.2.4.3 SSL Client Connections ................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.4.4 Authentication Servers ..................................................................................................................... 12
2.2.4.5 User Credential Encryption.............................................................................................................. 12
2.3
PRODUCT FEATURES..................................................................................................................................... 12
2.4
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TOE BOUNDARY ................................................................................................. 13
2.4.1
Physical Boundaries ............................................................................................................................ 13
2.4.2
Logical Boundaries .............................................................................................................................. 13
2.4.2.1 Security Audit .................................................................................................................................. 14
2.4.2.2 Access Control ................................................................................................................................. 14
2.4.2.3 Identification & Authentication ....................................................................................................... 14
2.4.2.4 Security Management ...................................................................................................................... 15
2.4.2.5 TOE Protection ................................................................................................................................ 15
2.5
TOE DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................................ 15
3.
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................................... 17
3.1
SECURE USAGE ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................................................................................... 17
3.1.1
Personnel Assumptions ........................................................................................................................ 17
3.1.2
Physical Assumptions .......................................................................................................................... 17
3.1.3
Connectivity Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 17
3.2
THREATS ...................................................................................................................................................... 18
3.3
ORGANIZATION SECURITY POLICIES ............................................................................................................ 18
4.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 19
4.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE........................................................................................................... 19
4.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ................................................................... 19
4.2.1
Ojectives for the use of the TOE in its operational environment ......................................................... 19
4.2.2
Objectives for TOE-supporting components in the operational environment...................................... 20
5.
IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................................. 22
5.1
EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ......................................................................................................... 22
5.2
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 22
5.2.1
Security audit (FAU) ............................................................................................................................ 23
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5.2.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1) ............................................................................................. 23
5.2.1.2 User identity association (FAU_GEN.2) ........................................................................................ 23
5.2.1.3 Audit review (FAU_SAR.1) ........................................................................................................... 23
5.2.1.4 Restricted audit review (FAU_SAR.2) ........................................................................................... 24
5.2.1.5 Selectable audit review (FAU_SAR.3) ........................................................................................... 24
5.2.1.6 Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1) ......................................................................................................... 24
5.2.1.7 Action in case of possible audit data loss (FAU_STG.3) ............................................................... 24
5.2.1.8 Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG.4) ................................................................................... 24
5.2.2
User data protection (FDP) ................................................................................................................. 24
5.2.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1) .............................................................................................. 24
5.2.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) .................................................................... 24
5.2.2.3 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1) ............................................................................... 25
5.2.2.4 Hierarchical security attributes (FDP_IFF.2) .................................................................................. 25
5.2.2.5 Full residual information protection (FDP_RIP.2) ......................................................................... 26
5.2.2.6 Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1) .......................................................................................................... 26
5.2.3
Identification and authentication (FIA) ............................................................................................... 26
5.2.3.1 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1) ........................................................................................... 26
5.2.3.2 User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU_EXP.2) ............................................................ 26
5.2.3.3 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2) ........................................................................ 27
5.2.3.4 User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1) ................................................................................................ 27
5.2.4
Security management (FMT) ............................................................................................................... 27
5.2.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1) ........................................................ 27
5.2.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1a) ....................................................................... 27
5.2.4.3 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1b)....................................................................... 28
5.2.4.4 Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3a) ................................................................................. 28
5.2.4.5 Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3b)................................................................................. 28
5.2.4.6 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1a) .................................................................................... 28
5.2.4.7 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1b) .................................................................................... 28
5.2.4.8 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1c) .................................................................................... 28
5.2.4.9 Revocation (FMT_REV.1) ............................................................................................................. 28
5.2.4.10
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) ............................................................ 28
5.2.4.11
Security roles (FMT_SMR.1) ..................................................................................................... 29
5.2.5
Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................ 29
5.2.5.1 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM_EXP.1) ...................................................................................... 29
5.2.6
Trusted path/channels (FTP) ............................................................................................................... 29
5.2.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1).......................................................................................... 29
5.3
TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................... 29
5.3.1
Development (ADV) ............................................................................................................................. 30
5.3.1.1 Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1) ........................................................................... 30
5.3.1.2 Complete functional specification (ADV_FSP.4)........................................................................... 30
5.3.1.3 Implementation representation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1) ............................................................. 30
5.3.1.4 Basic modular design (ADV_TDS.3) ............................................................................................. 31
5.3.2
Guidance documents (AGD) ................................................................................................................ 31
5.3.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1) ...................................................................................... 31
5.3.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1) ........................................................................................... 31
5.3.3
Life-cycle support (ALC) ..................................................................................................................... 32
5.3.3.1 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation (ALC_CMC.4) ................................. 32
5.3.3.2 Problem tracking CM coverage (ALC_CMS.4) ............................................................................. 32
5.3.3.3 Delivery procedures (ALC_DEL.1) ................................................................................................ 32
5.3.3.4 Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1) ......................................................................... 32
5.3.3.5 Basic flaw remediation (ALC_FLR.1) ............................................................................................ 33
5.3.3.6 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1) ....................................................................... 33
5.3.3.7 Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1) ............................................................................. 33
5.3.4
Tests (ATE) .......................................................................................................................................... 33
5.3.4.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2) .............................................................................................. 33
5.3.4.2 Testing: security enforcing modules (ATE_DPT.2) ....................................................................... 34
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5.3.4.3 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1) ................................................................................................... 34
5.3.4.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.2) ................................................................................... 34
5.3.5
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) ........................................................................................................... 34
5.3.5.1 Focused vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.3) .............................................................................. 34
6.
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .............................................................................................................. 35
6.1
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS.......................................................................................................................... 35
6.1.1
Security Audit....................................................................................................................................... 35
6.1.2
Access Control ..................................................................................................................................... 37
6.1.3
Identification & Authentication ........................................................................................................... 40
6.1.4
Security Management .......................................................................................................................... 41
6.1.5
TOE Protection .................................................................................................................................... 45
7.
PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ............................................................................................................... 47
8.
RATIONALE ..................................................................................................................................................... 48
8.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE.............................................................................................................. 48
8.1.1
Complete Coverage - Threats .............................................................................................................. 48
8.1.2
Complete Coverage - Policy ................................................................................................................ 48
8.1.3
Complete Coverage - Environmental Assumptions.............................................................................. 50
8.2
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ........................................................................................................ 51
8.2.1
Internal Consistency of Requirements ................................................................................................. 51
8.2.2
Complete Coverage - Objectives ......................................................................................................... 52
8.3
ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .................................................................................................... 54
8.4
REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCY RATIONALE .................................................................................................... 55
8.5
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ...................................................................................................... 56
8.5.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.2 User authentication before any action ................................................................... 56
8.5.2
FPT_STM_EXP.1 Reliable time stamps .............................................................................................. 57
8.6
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE................................................................................................ 57
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 TOE Functional Security Requirements ......................................................................................................... 22
Table 2 Auditable Events for the TOE ........................................................................................................................ 23
Table 3 Assurance Requirements (EAL 4 augmented) ................................................................................................ 29
Table 4 Mapping of Organizational Security Policies to Security Objectives ............................................................. 48
Table 5 Mapping of Environmental Assumptions to Non-IT Security Objectives ...................................................... 50
Table 6 Security Requirements Supporting Other Requirements ................................................................................ 52
Table 7 Mapping of Security Objectives to Functional Components .......................................................................... 52
Table 8 TOE Security Functional Requirement Dependencies ................................................................................... 55
Table 9 Security Function to TOE SFR Mapping ....................................................................................................... 57
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 TOE Security Environment .............................................................................................................................8
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1. Security Target Introduction
This Security Target (ST) describes the IT security requirements for the IBM DB2 Enterprise Server Edition
Version 9.7 for Linux, Unix, and Windows; herein collectively referred to as DB2. DB2 is a Relational Database
Management System (RDBMS) developed by IBM Canada, Ltd., 3600 Steeles Avenue East, Markham, Ontario
L3R 9Z7, Canada and sold by IBM Corporation, Route 100, Somers, NY, USA 10589.
DB2 has historically been developed with a goal of fulfilling the C2 requirements of the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC; also known as the “Orange Book”). The Common Criteria (CC) for Information
Technology Security Evaluation eventually replaced the TCSEC and the C2 TCSEC requirements have been recast
in the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP). As a result, the security environment, security objectives, and
security requirements are derived largely from the CAPP. However, since DB2 is a RDBMS and not a complete
Operating System, some of the requirements have been assigned to the operational environment (i.e., underlying
operating system) and conformance cannot, therefore, be claimed in this ST. At this point, a number of subsequent
versions of DB2 have been successfully evaluated using the CC.
Note that while there are DBMS-specific PPs, conformance cannot be achieved due to certain requirements that
could be met by few if any current DBMS products. Or particular note are the requirements dictating that the DBMS
must be able to limit the number of concurrent connections a given user can have; the DBMS must store and retrieve
date/time information associated with sessions, and the DBMS must be able to restrict sessions based user/group
identity, time of day and day of week.
1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification
ST Title – IBM DB2 Version 9.7 Enterprise Server Edition for Linux, Unix, and Windows Security Target
ST Version – Revision 1.0
ST Date – August 3, 2009
TOE Identification – IBM DB2 Enterprise Server Edition Version 9.7 for Linux, Unix, and Windows

The TOE can optionally be configured with or without the IBM Base Warehouse Feature for DB2 9.7
license option.
 The TOE can optionally be configured to trust other servers using Trusted Contexts.
 The TOE can optionally be configured to utilize SSL when connecting with Java-based clients.
 The TOE can alternately be configured to utilize authentication services of its underlying operating
system, an external LDAP server, or an external KDC server.
 While the TOE can be configured to use DES to protect authentication credentials, that mechanism has
not been subject to evaluation and as such should not be solely relied upon as an adequate means of
protection. Note that DES is considered a weak algorithm and is no longer FIPS approved.
 While the TOE can be installed using a non-root install option, that configuration does not include all the
features available to DB2 and has not been subject to evaluation. As such, this evaluation applies only to
a normal (root) installation of DB2.
 While users can employ user defined function (UDF) options to encrypt and decrypt data, this mechanism
has not been subject to evaluation and as such should not be solely relied upon as an adequate means of
protection.
CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 2,
September 2007.
1.2 Conformance Claims
This TOE conforms to the following CC specifications:
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Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional
requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007.
Part 2 extended
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance
requirements, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007.
Part 3 conformant
Package Conformance:
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) augmented with ALC_FLR.1
1.3 Conventions, Terminology, Acronyms
This section specifies the formatting information used in the ST.
1.3.1 Conventions
The following conventions have been applied in this document:
All requirements in this ST are reproduced relative to the requirements defined in CC v3.1r2.
Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be
applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.
o
Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,
iteration is indicated by a letter placed at the end of the component identifier. For example
FDP_ACC.1a and FDP_ACC.1b indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the FDP_ACC.1
requirement, a and b.
o
Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using
bold and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [assignment]). Note that in cases where a selection
operation is combined with an assignment operation and the assignment is null, the assignment
operation is simply deleted leaving only the completed selection to identify the combination of
operations. Alternately, if the assignment is not null the assignment is identified with embedded
brackets which are bolded and italicized (e.g., [[selected-assignment]]).
o
Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated
using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (e.g., [selection]).
o
Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,
and strike-through, for deletions (e.g., “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).
Extended requirements (i.e., those not taken from the CC) are identified by „_EXP‟ appearing as an element
of the requirement label. Note that the extended requirements are also identified in Section 8.5.
Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as
captions.
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1.3.2 Acronyms
CC
Common Criteria
CM
Configuration Management
DAC
Discretionary Access Control
DDL
Data Definition Language
DML
Data Manipulation Language
DRDA
Distributed Relational Database Architecture
IBM
International Business Machines
LBAC
Label Based Access Control
OS
Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
RDBMS
Relational Database Management System
SQL
Structured Query Language
ST
Security Target
TCSEC
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
TSF
TOE Security Features
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TOE
Target Of Evaluation
1.4 Security Target Overview and Organization
The DB2 Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Database System offering a wide range of database related services. This
ST describes the DB2 TOE, intended environments, security objectives, security requirements (for the TOE),
security functions, and all necessary rationale. This information is organized into the following additional sections:
TOE Description (Section 2)
Security (Section 3)
Security Objectives (Section 4)
IT Security Requirements (Section 5)
TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)
Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)
Rationale (Section 8)
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2. TOE Description
DB2 is a relational database management system (RDBMS) provided by IBM. As a RDBMS, DB2 supports the
Structured Query Language (SQL) interface from a client that is connected to the database server. From the client,
commands can be entered interactively or through an executing program to the database server to create databases,
database tables, and to store and retrieve information from tables. DB2 can be installed on a number of possible
operating environments.
Local Client
Remote Client
Shared Memory
Host OS
DB2 Instance (TOE)
DRDA
Application Server
SQL Processing
Compiler
Manager
Runtime
Non-SQL
Processing
Create Database
Utilities
Some APIs
TCP/IP
OS Utilities
Buffering
Drivers
Memory
management
File support
OS Utilities
System info
User/group
services
Access to LDAP
or Kerberos
services
Figure 1 TOE Security Environment
The configuration in which the DB2 application is evaluated is described in Figure 1 TOE Security Environment.
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The TOE for the DB2 configuration includes all components within the lightly shaded box entitled “DB2 Instance”
And the TOE includes one or more such instances. For the purposes of this ST, the TOE is at least one partition, but
can be distributed across a number of logically (i.e., on the same underlying machine) or physically (i.e., on different
underlying machines) separate partitions. This latter feature is known as Database Partitioning Feature (DPF). From
the user perspective, there is effectively no difference, while the distributed partitions work in concert to answer user
queries. In relation to the figure above, a „DB2 Instance‟ may actually be distributed across multiple DB2 partitions
acting together to form that logical view.
The Host Operating System (OS), inside the darkly shaded box, is part of the TOE‟s operational environment (i.e., it
is not part of the product or TOE). Similarly, an LDAP or KDC server (not pictured) could be configured to provide
authentication services and those servers also would be in the TOE‟s operational environment. The DB2 software is
tightly linked to the OS and in some cases, security functions are allocated to the OS (or other authentication
servers), as appropriate. For the purposes of this ST, the OS is AIX 6, Linux RHEL 5 update 2, Linux SLES 10 with
SP2, Microsoft Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition with SP2, or Solaris 10. Any standard-compliant LDAP or
KDC server can also be used in conjunction with the TOE.
The clients, inside the unshaded boxes, are client applications either operating in the context of the host OS using
shared memory to communicate with the TOE or in the context of some other OS using a network connection tom
communicate with the TOE. While the transport may differ, the application layer communication is the same in
either case.
2.1 Product Type
DB2 is a multi-user RDBMS that operates in the context of a hosting operating system and allows authorized users 1
to create and manage databases.
DB2 operates as a set of applications (e.g., servers) in an operational environment consisting of all software residing
on the host platform(s) but not part of the DB2 TOE. For the purposes of this discussion it is referred to as the Host
OS (refer to Figure 1 TOE Security Environment). The operational environment, including the Host OS and
optionally an LDAP or KDC authentication server, provides fundamental supporting mechanisms to the TOE. In
particular, it supplies a trusted authentication mechanism and utilities to manage system resources and I/O channels.
2.2 Product Description
This section describes the basic functions performed within DB2. These functions are depicted as individual blocks
within the DB2 Instance (TOE) box in Figure 1 TOE Security Environment. DB2 is implemented using the concept
of a DB2 instance where an instance is a complete environment dictating what can be done to data and managing the
system resources assigned to it. A DB2 instance has one or more databases under its control that cannot be directly
accessed by any other instance.
DB2 implements a Discretionary Access Control (DAC) security policy by default. This permits a confidential
security mechanism to ensure data is protected against unauthorized or accidental disclosure or destruction. Auditing
is supported at the DB2 instance level meaning that all modules within the TOE are capable of creating audit events.
Review and analysis of the audit logs is restricted to users with appropriate authority or privilege; system
administrator authority for instance level audit logs, security administrator for database-specific audit logs, or
execute privilege to available audit functions granted by a security administrator.
2.2.1 DRDA Protocol Handler
The DRDA Application Server (AS) module within DB2 allows for DB2 to act as an Application Server within the
Distributed Relational Database Architecture (DRDA). DRDA is an OpenGroup standard used in the management
of distributed data. The DB2 DRDA AS module architecture provides support for one or more DRDA Application
Requestors (DRDA AR), commonly referred to as clients, to access a specific DB2 instance or DB2 database and
issue SQL and non-SQL requests against that object. Upon initiation of communication between a client and the
1
The term authorized user is used to generally refer to a user authorized (e.g., by access permissions) to perform a
corresponding function depending on the context in which the term is used.
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DB2 DRDA AS module, a common "security mechanism" is negotiated. This mechanism may be one of a number
of different security protocols; for the purpose of this TOE, the only allowed security mechanism is the "Userid,
Password" mechanism as described in the DRDA standard. If validation of the password fails, the DRDA AS
terminates conversation with the client that provided the failed password. If the password is authenticated, a DRDA
session, or connection, is established and the client may begin to pass requests to DB2 for processing. These
requests are of two general types: SQL requests, which are handled by the DB2 SQL Processing module, and nonSQL requests, which are handled by the DB2 Non-SQL Processing module. The DRDA AS module identifies the
type of request and passes it to the appropriate module for further processing.
2.2.2 SQL Processing
The DB2 SQL Processing module is responsible for the analysis and execution of client requests related to the
processing of Structured Query Language (SQL) statements. DB2 supports the ANSI/ISO SQL2 standard for all
types of SQL statements including:
Data Definition Language (DDL) statements that create, alter, drop, rename, or transfer ownership of
database objects.
Data Manipulation Language (DML) statements that are used to query or modify the data contained within
database objects. Modification can occur in one of three ways: row insertion, row deletion, or row
modification via column updates. These statements include SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE
SQL statements.
GRANT and REVOKE statements that are used to control the access to database authorities as well as
privileges on database objects
Transaction control statements that are use to manage the integrity of the database with respect to any
modification made by a client. These statements include, among others, the ROLLBACK and COMMIT
SQL statements..
Miscellaneous statements used to perform a number of different actions on database objects or on the
connection environment.
The DB2 SQL Processing module is comprised of three distinct components: the SQL Manager, the SQL Compiler,
and the SQL Runtime components. The responsibilities of these components as they relate to the processing of SQL
statements is described in the following sections.
2.2.2.1 SQL Manager
The SQL Manager is responsible for accepting SQL requests from the client, validating them, and then coordinating
any subsequent processing of the request to ensure it is properly answered. The SQL Manager can accept SQL
requests related to static or dynamic SQL statements. Static SQL statements have their contents made known to DB2
prior to the request arriving from the client through a process called "binding" which results in the statement being
compiled by the SQL Compiler and the resultant information being stored in the DB2 system catalogs for later use.
Dynamic SQL statements are unknown to DB2 until the request arrives at which time they are compiled by the SQL
Compiler. The information produced by the SQL compiler contains the executable form of the statement, referred to
as a section, a list of the required privileges for any client wishing to run the section as well as a list of the database
objects upon which the section is dependent for its execution integrity.
The SQL Manager processes SQL requests from a client by matching the request to a specific SQL statement. Once
the statement has been identified and its related information acquired, either from the DB2 system catalogs or the
SQL Compiler, the SQL Manager then enforces the discretionary access control policy by ensuring that the required
privileges for the section are held by the primary authorization name (a specific user identifier), or by any relevant
secondary authorization names (the identifiers for any relevant groups to which the primary authorization name
belongs and roles to which any other authorization name belongs2), associated with the request from the client. If the
privileges are held, then the section is passed to the SQL Runtime component for execution.
2
Note that users, groups, and other roles can be assigned to roles. As such, role hierarchies are supported.
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2.2.2.2 SQL Compiler
The SQL Compiler is responsible for analyzing an SQL statement and producing an efficient executable form of that
statement, called a “section”, as well as additional information about that section such as its object dependencies and
required privileges. The SQL Compiler parses an SQL statement into an internal representation, or model, of the
statement that is then used to analyze the scope and intent of the statement. Additional information is added to the
internal model, where appropriate, from the DB2 system catalogs in order to properly represent the full extent of the
statement‟s use of any database objects. Once complete, the internal model is then analyzed and optimized in order
to produce the most efficient plan to satisfy the statement. The SQL Compiler then generates an executable form of
the statement using the internal DB2 constructs and operators used by the SQL Runtime component.
2.2.2.3 SQL Runtime
The SQL Runtime component is responsible for the actual execution of the section related to the request and the
production of any response to the client required by the request. The success or failure of the actual execution as
well as any additional response is given back to the SQL Manager for return to the client.
2.2.3 Non-SQL Processing
The DB2 Non-SQL Processing module is responsible for the analysis and execution of all those client requests not
concerned with SQL statements. Such requests are used to invoke a number of Application Program Interfaces
(APIs) and utilities provided by DB2 that do not use SQL statements to perform their specified actions. There exist a
number of these APIs and utilities at both the DB2 Instance level as well as at the individual database level within a
DB2 instance. Each API and utility provided by DB2 has an assigned privilege or authority requirement as defined
by DB2. The DB2 Non-SQL Processing module enforces the discretionary access control policy for these non-SQL
requests by ensuring that the required privilege or authority is held by either the primary authorization name, or
secondary authorization names where applicable, of the requestor.
2.2.4 Optional Features
DB2 includes some additional security-relevant features that are enabled only when an applicable feature is
configured. Since these features are not necessary available in every product configuration, they are considered
optional.
2.2.4.1 Database Partitioning Feature (DPF)
DB2 includes an optional data partitioning feature (DPF). This feature allows DB2 to be instantiated across multiple
partitions (on the same or separate machines) for the purpose of scalability (e.g., more computational and storage
resources). The overall security mechanisms remain the same, though processing may be spread across the partitions
internally. Note that this feature is included within the IBM Base Warehouse Feature for DB2 9.7 which can
optionally be purchased as a license option in addition to the base DB2 product.
2.2.4.2 Trusted Contexts
DB2 9.7 includes a „trusted context‟ feature. Trusted contexts are defined by database objects that provide a
specification for a trust relationship between the database and an external entity. The trust relationship is based on
three attributes: an authorization name, a data stream encryption attribute (indicating whether the connection must
be made across an encrypted channel – provided by the TOE‟s operational environment), and an IP address (or
addresses). The user associated with any connection that matches the definition of a trusted context object is
considered „trusted‟ by the database.
Users trusted in this manner (e.g., „trusted servers‟) can be configured such that they are allowed to modify some of
the security attributes associated with their database connections. Specifically, they can be configured such that the
„user‟ associated with an existing connection to be changed depending on the DB2 configuration, this may or may
not require authentication of the this user identity.
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An additional feature of trusted contexts is role inheritance. A trusted context can define a default database role 3 to
be granted to trusted context users or alternately a specific database role to be assigned to specific users associated
with the trusted context. In either case, the trusted context user will be associated with the defined database role
which could be in addition to any database roles assigned to that user (i.e., authorization name) directly.
This function is intended for multi-tier environments where the middle tier, typically an application server, might
already perform authentication of end users. Trusted contexts provide a mechanism for the database to trust the
middle tier and effectively establish connections on behalf of end users without necessarily supplying the credentials
(password) of the end user to the database. Only a user with SECADM authority can configure this feature and as
such it can be configured or not at the discretion of a DB2 security administrator.
2.2.4.3 SSL Client Connections
DB2 supports the use of SSL for java-based clients. As such, users of DB2 can choose to enable that feature though
it is not necessary particularly when other means of client communication protection are configured in the operating
environment of the TOE.
This feature is implemented using the IBM Global Security Kit (GSKit), which needs to be installed in conjunction
with the DB2 product. The GSKit cryptographic services are utilized by the TOE in order to facilitate secure SSL
client connections. The installation documentation for the TOE provides instructions for obtaining and installing the
CC/FIPS certified version of the GSKit.
2.2.4.4 Authentication Servers
While DB2 requires that an authentication server is configured, users of DB2 can alternately configure DB2 to use
authentication services of its underlying operating system, an externally available LDAP server, or an externally
available KDC server. In each case DB2 relies upon that server for appropriate authentication services for its users.
2.2.4.5 User Credential Encryption
DB2 supports the ability to require that user IDs and passwords are encrypted by associated clients. By default this
feature is not enabled, but can be enabled in environments where there may not be other protections adequate to
protect the authentication information of users. For example, where an enterprise network may not be adequately
protected or secure distributed operating system authentication mechanisms (such as within an operating system
domain) may not be available. In this regard, DB2 supports the use of DES and AES-256. Given that DES is not a
strong algorithm, involving only 56-bit keys and is no longer FIPS approved, AES-256 should be considered the
preferred means of protection.
The AES-256 user ID and password protection feature is implemented using another IBM product -- the IBM
Crypto for C (ICC) version 1.4.5 library linked with the TOE. Note that ICC v1.4.5 has been FIPS certified
(certificate number 775), albeit in conjunction with earlier versions of the operating systems currently hosting DB2.
2.3 Product Features
The DB2 TOE offers the following features:
Able to manage large volumes of data;
Provides query and update ability via ANSI standard SQL;
Provides rollback capability to preserve data integrity;
Runs on multiple operating system and hardware platforms;
3
The term „database role‟ should not be confused with „security role‟. Database roles are a DB2-implemented
construct similar in function to groups where privileges and authorities can be assigned to database roles to simplify
their management when assigned to users. Security roles are used to represent the notion of security-relevant user
roles to distinguish administrators and users with lesser authorities.
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DB2 provides support for both local and remote DB2 clients.
2.4 Security Environment TOE Boundary
The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries.
2.4.1 Physical Boundaries
DB2 is physically a software application instantiated within the context of a host operating system, specifically IBM
DB2 Enterprise Server Edition Version 9.7 for Linux, Unix, and Windows (with or without the IBM Base
Warehouse Feature for DB2 9.7 license option). While DB2 can alternately be installed using a non-root install
option, that configuration limits the functions of DB2 and has not been subject to evaluation.
As an application, the interfaces of DB2 are primarily logical in nature. The physical boundaries of the TOE are
essentially the interfaces implemented by DB2. These interfaces can be divided into two general categories:
interfaces to clients and interfaces to the hosting operational environment.
DB2 interacts with clients using the DRDA standard described previously. However, while the product is shipped
with libraries and programs that expose other APIs (command line, ODBC, JDBC, etc.), the libraries and programs
simply serve to convert their exposed APIs to DRDA flows to the DB2 server. With the exception of those tools
and utilities identified in the TOE‟s guidance documentation, these libraries and programs are not security relevant
(i.e., outside the TSF) and hence have not been specifically analyzed as part of the evaluation.
DB2 interacts with its operational environment using hardware instructions, operating system calls, and network
protocols, just like all other applications. DB2 uses services of the hosting operational environment to instantiate
itself as a set of executing processes, to store and retrieve data, to interact with remote clients, and to authenticate
users.
The following components are required in the operational environment:



Hosting OS: AIX 6, Linux RHEL 5 update 2, Linux SLES 10 with SP2, Microsoft Windows Server 2003
Enterprise Edition with SP2, or Solaris 10.
Authentication server (when not using the services of the hosting OS): Any standard-compliant
LDAP or KDC server.
IBM Global Security Kit
2.4.2 Logical Boundaries
The logical boundaries of DB2 are realized in the security functions that it implements.
Note that the following subsections represent the security functions of DB2 that have been subject to evaluation.
While the entire DB2 product is included within the TOE (except for a non-root install configuration as indicated
above), not all functions shipped with the product have been subject to evaluation. In addition to non-security
functions, the following security-related functions have not been subject to evaluation (i.e., there are no
corresponding security claims):



DES: While the TOE can be configured to use DES to protect authentication credentials, this mechanism
has not been subject to evaluation and as such should not be solely relied upon as an adequate means of
protection.
Data encryption functions (ENCRYPT, DECRYPT_BIN, DECRYPT_CHAR, and GETHINT) 4:
While users can employ these functions to encrypt and decrypt data, they have not been subject to
evaluation and as such should not be solely relied upon as an adequate means of protection.
Unfenced routines: Fenced routines execute in processes separate from the DB2 server, while unfenced
routines share the DB2 server process (see section 6.1.5). Given that the DB2 server must protect itself
(e.g., from tampering) and its ability to do so is limited when users can create routines that execute within
4
Note that this is intended to address the functions shipped with the product, but any such functions developed by
end users would also not be included within the scope of evaluation.
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
the same operating system process, unfenced routines are excluded from the evaluated configuration of
the TOE.
CLIENT authentication: The TOE supports a number of authentication configurations. While for the
most part the TOE administrator can choose the configuration that best fits their specific environment, the
configuration whereby the client is trusted to authenticate the user is excluded from the evaluated
configuration. The evaluation address the configuration where the DB2 server is responsible to ensure
that users are authenticated, although it relies on other configured components to do so.
2.4.2.1 Security Audit
DB2 records security relevant events that occur within its scope of control. These events are associated with
individual users for individual accountability and can be accessed only by authorized administrators 5.
The audit log files, for DB2 instances and databases, are stored in files in the TOE‟s operational environment (i.e.,
underlying OS) configured during installation and the audit configuration file (db2audit.cfg) is located in each
instance‟s security subdirectory. In addition to relying on the underlying OS to store and protect audit data stored in
files, DB2 relies on the OS to provide reliable time information to record in its audit records.
2.4.2.2 Access Control
DB2 associates privileges and authorities with each individual user, group of users, and database role. These
privileges and authorities are associated with operations that can be performed on the objects (e.g., database) that are
implemented by DB2. DB2 uses identities, privileges, authorities, and access control lists associated with users,
groups, roles, and objects to determine whether specific operations will be allowed when attempted by client users.
Note that while the term „security roles‟ is used in this ST to distinguish authorized administrators from nonadministrator users, DB2 implements this concept using a variety of authorities and privileges. DB2 implements a
number of authorities - SYSADM, SYSCTRL, SYSMON, SYSMAINT, DBADM, SECADM, SQLADM,
WLMADM, ACCESSCTRL, and DATAACCESS – of which SYSADM, SECADM, ACCESSCTRL, and
DATAACCESS are particularly security relevant. SYSADM authority makes a user a system administrator that can
utilizes most utility functions and is designed to manage and maintain DB2 instances. SECADM authority makes a
user a security administrator with responsibility for security management and has primary control over access to
security-relevant functions, audit, the Label-Based Access Control (LBAC) policy and role assignments. DBADM
authority makes a user a database administrator and provides some management functions for a given database, but
does not grant access to the data nor the ability to control access to objects within the database. Those functions are
assigned to the DATAACCESS and ACCESSCTRL authorities, respectively. References to the „user‟ security role
are implemented in DB2 as any combination of lesser privileges (such as having the UPDATE or INSERT privilege
on a specific database table). The other authorities grant various monitoring and tuning capabilities related to DB2,
but do not serve to offer access to user data, for example.
In addition to using privileges and authorities to control access, DB2 implements a LBAC mechanism. The DB2
security administrator can grant (or revoke) security labels and exemptions to (or from) users as well as create and
drop LBAC security objects in order to define LBAC polices for specific database tables. Once a table is configured
with a LBAC policy (i.e., the table is LBAC protected relative to either rows or columns), users must additionally
satisfy the LBAC access rules in order to access or modify the applicable table rows or columns.
2.4.2.3 Identification & Authentication
DB2 requires all users to be identified and authenticated before allowing them access to DB2 resources. The TOE‟s
operational environment (i.e., host operating system, LDAP server, or KDC server) performs the actual
authentication and association of users with groups and passes the result to DB2. DB2 subsequently enforces the
result returned by the TOE‟s operational environment and uses the user identity and group memberships (i.e., list of
groups) returned by the TOE‟s operational environment, along with its own associations of users, groups, and other
5
The term authorized administrator is used to generally refer to an administrator authorized (e.g., by authority or
privilege) to perform a corresponding function depending on the context in which the term is used.
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database roles with database roles, to associate privileges, authorities, and security labels and exemptions with the
authenticated user.
Note that the association between users and groups is managed within the TOE‟s operational environment.
Operational environment user and group identities are uniquely mapped in the TOE and when a user accesses the
TOE, the operational environment provides the user and all group identities associated with that user. However,
database roles are defined within the TOE where users, groups, and other database roles can be associated with
specific database roles.
Note that servers defined as trusted via the trusted context feature must be authenticated like all other users.
However, they have the ability to use alternate identities, without further authentication, in accordance with their
definition in the TOE. They could be configured so that they can use only a specific set of identities or alternately so
that they can use any identity known to the TOE.
2.4.2.4 Security Management
DB2 includes the security roles of system administrator, security administrator, and user (with various combinations
of authorities and privileges), implemented using DB2 authorities and privileges, and allows individual users to be
assigned to those security roles by virtue of group assignments in the TOE‟s operational environment. Management
of the DB2 TOE, including the ability to select and review audit records, is restricted to appropriate administrators
based on authorities and privileges. Management of DB2 objects, including management of security labels, as well
as database roles and audit policies is restricted to those users that are assigned the appropriate privileges to do so.
Note that the users trusted by virtue of a trusted context configuration could have the ability to assert alternate
identities without requiring authentication by the TOE. While not a security role per se, this feature has been subject
to evaluation.
2.4.2.5 TOE Protection
DB2 communicates between DPF instances, when so configured, and also with clients that can be remote from the
DB2 server. DB2 implements SSL, using a separate GSKit product in the TOE‟s operational environment for
cryptographic services, which is available only to java-based clients. Otherwise, DB2 relies upon its operational
environment to ensure adequate communication protections. In the case of DPF instances a dedicated network can
be configured to be used exclusively by DB2. In the case of remote clients, if all the hosts on the applicable network
are not adequately trusted, IPSec or other host- or network-based protection mechanisms could be configured to
protect any otherwise insecure network traffic.
As summarized in section 2.2.4.5, DB2 also provides the optional feature to require that user IDs and passwords are
encrypted by the associated user clients in order to offer more protection for user authentication data.
Note that DB2 also depends on its operational environment to provide a reliable source of time information.
2.4.2.5.1 Additional Architecture-based Protections
DB2 executes within processes provided and protected by the hosting operational environment. However, it is
designed to not share its process space with non-TOE entities in order to ensure that TSF resources are protected.
DB2 has been designed so that each of its interfaces performs the necessary access checks before allowing access to
DB2 resources.
2.5 TOE Documentation
IBM provides administrator and user guidance on how to utilize the TOE security functions and warnings to
authorized administrators and users about actions that can compromise the security of the TOE. The installation and
generation procedures, included in the administrator guidance, describe the steps necessary to install DB2 in
accordance with the evaluated configuration.
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IBM also provides delivery documentation and procedures to identify the TOE, allow detection of unauthorized
modifications of the TOE and installation and generation instructions at start-up. IBM‟s delivery procedures
describe the electronic and non-electronic procedures to be used to detect modification to the TOE.
All of the administrator and user guidance is documented in:
IBM DB2 Common Criteria Certification: Administration and User Documentation
IBM DB2 Common Criteria Certification: Installing DB2 Enterprise Server Edition
IBM DB2 Delivery Procedures document
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3. Security Problem Definition
Since DB2 was developed based largely on the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) C2 security
requirements, the security environment has been modeled after that specified in the Controlled Access Protection
Profile (CAPP), which is the successor to TCSEC C2 in the context of the Common Criteria (CC). Note, however,
that since DB2 is a database system and not an operating system, some additional assumptions and security
objectives have been assigned to the operational environment of the TOE.
3.1 Secure Usage Assumptions
The usage assumptions are organized in three categories: personnel (assumptions about administrators and users of
the system as well as any threat agents), physical (assumptions about the physical location of the TOE or any
attached peripheral devices), and connectivity (assumptions about other IT systems that are necessary for the secure
operation of the TOE).
3.1.1 Personnel Assumptions
It is assumed that the following personnel conditions will exist:
A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM
The administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the administrator documentation.
A.COOP
Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the TOE
and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment.
A.CLEARANCE
Procedures exist for granting users authorization for access to specific security levels. It is further assumed the TOE
administrators will be cleared to the highest security level processed by the TOE.
3.1.2 Physical Assumptions
The TOE is intended for application in areas that have physical control and monitoring. It is assumed that the
following physical conditions will exist:
A.LOCATE
The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent
unauthorized physical access.
A.PROTECT
The hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification.
3.1.3 Connectivity Assumptions
It is assumed that the following connectivity conditions exist:
A.CONNECT
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All connections to peripheral devices reside within the controlled access facilities. The TOE only addresses security
concerns related to the manipulation of the TOE through its authorized access points. Internal communication paths,
including networks, to access points and between TOE instances are assumed to be adequately protected.
A.PLATFORM
The operational environment underlying the TOE is assumed to fulfill the objectives for the TOE-supporting
components in the operational environment described in this ST.
3.2 Threats
All TOE and environment security objectives have been derived from the statement of Organizational Security
Policy or Secure Usage Assumptions found in the following sections. Therefore, there is no statement of the explicit
threats countered by the TOE.
3.3 Organization Security Policies
An Organizational Security Policy is a set of rules or procedures imposed by an organization upon its operations to
protect its sensitive data. Although some of the organizational security policies described below are drawn from the
CAPP they apply to many non-DoD environments.
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS
Only those users who have been authorized to access the information within the TOE may access the TOE.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The TOE must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the information in protected resources to those
authorized users which have a “need to know” for that information.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the TOE can be held be accountable for their actions within the TOE.
P.CLASSIFICATION
The system must be able to limit the access to information based on sensitivity, as represented by a label, of the
information contained in objects, and the formal clearance of users, as represented by subjects, to access that
information. The access rules enforced prevent a subject from accessing information which is of higher sensitivity
than it is operating at.
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4. Security Objectives
This section defines the security objectives of the TSF and its supporting environment. Security objectives,
categorized as either applying to the TOE or its environment, reflect the stated intent to comply with any
assumptions and organizational security policies identified. All of the identified assumptions and organizational
security policies are addressed under one of the categories below.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
O.AUTHORIZATION
The TSF must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the TOE and its resources.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
The TSF must control access to resources based on identity of users. The TSF must allow authorized users to specify
which users may access which resources.
O.MANDATORY_ACCESS
The TSF must be able to control access to resources based upon the sensitivity and categories of the information
being accessed and the clearance of the subject attempting to access that information.
O.AUDITING
The TSF must be able to record the security relevant actions of users of the TOE. The TSF must be able to present
this information only to authorized administrators.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TSF must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not released when the resource is
recycled.
O.ROLLBACK
The TSF must ensure that operations performed on information contained in a protected resource can be undone
before the results have been committed.
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of TOE security.
O.ENFORCEMENT
The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that ensures that the organizational policies are enforced in
the target environment.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
The TOE is assumed to be complete and self-contained and, as such, is not dependent upon any other products to
perform properly. However, certain objectives with respect to the general operating environment must be met. The
following are the security objectives for the environment:
4.2.1 Ojectives for the use of the TOE in its operational environment
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE
Appropriate guidance documentation must be provided to enable administrators to install, manage, and operate the
TOE in a manner that maintains IT security objectives.
O.ADMINISTRATORS
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Administrators of the TOE and its operational Environment must not be careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and
must follow the instructions provided in the administrator guidance documentation.
O.ASSIGN
One or more competent individuals must be assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
O.COOP
Authorized users must possess the appropriate authorization to access at least some of the information managed by
the TOE and must act in a cooperative manner in a benign environment.
O.INSTALL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a manner,
which maintains IT security objectives.
O.PHYSICAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the physical TOE and its associated operational
environment critical to security policy are protected from attack, which might compromise IT security objectives.
O.CREDEN
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access credentials, such as passwords or other authentication
information, are protected by the users in a manner that maintains IT security objectives and that credentials (e.g.,
clearances) are assigned appropriately, including ensuring that administrators are cleared to the highest security level
processed by the TOE.
O.PLATFORM
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the components underlying the TOE fulfill the objectives for its
operational environment described in this ST.
4.2.2 Objectives for TOE-supporting components in the operational environment
OE.AUTHORIZATION
The TOE‟s operational environment must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the operational
environment and its resources. The operational environment must support the TOE by ensuring that users are
adequately authenticated on the TOE‟s behalf.
OE.AUDITING
The TOE‟s operational environment must be able to record the security relevant actions of users of the operational
environment.
OE.CRYPTO
The TOE‟s operational environment must provide cryptographic services suitable to allow the TOE to establish
secure SSL connections.
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TOE‟s operational environment must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource that may be
assigned to the TOE is not released when the resource is recycled.
OE.MANAGE
The TOE‟s operational environment must provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized
administrators that are responsible for the management of operational environment security, including security
relevant support for the TOE.
OE.ENFORCEMENT
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The TOE‟s operational environment must be designed and implemented in a manner that ensures that it can protect
the operational Environment of the TOE. The TOE‟s operational environment must provide a reliable time source
and secure audit storage for the use of both the TOE and its operational Environment.
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5. IT Security Requirements
The following sections define the security functional and assurance requirements for the TOE and its operational
environment. The security functional requirements have been drawn largely from the Controlled Access Protection
Profile (CAPP) and the security assurance requirements have been drawn from EAL 4, as defined in the CC Part 3,
augmented with ALC_FLR.1.
5.1 Extended Components Definition
This Security Target includes two extended security functional requirements (FIA_UAU_EXP.2 and
FPT_STM_EXP.1) and no extended security assurance requirements. See Sections 8.5, 5.2.3.2, and 5.2.5.1 for the
component descriptions and rationale.
5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
This section specifies the security functional requirements that are applicable to the TOE.
Table 1 TOE Functional Security Requirements
Requirement Class
FAU: Security audit
FDP: User data protection
FIA: Identification and authentication
FMT: Security management
FPT: Protection of the TSF
FTP: Trusted path/channels
Requirement Component
FAU_GEN.1: Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2: User identity association
FAU_SAR.1: Audit review
FAU_SAR.2: Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3: Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1: Selective audit
FAU_STG.3: Action in case of possible audit data loss
FAU_STG.4: Prevention of audit data loss
FDP_ACC.1: Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1: Subset information flow control
FDP_IFF.2: Hierarchical security attributes
FDP_RIP.2: Full residual information protection
FDP_ROL.1: Basic rollback
FIA_ATD.1: User attribute definition
FIA_UAU_EXP.2: User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2: User identification before any action
FIA_USB.1: User-subject binding
FMT_MOF.1: Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MSA.1a: Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1b: Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3a: Static attribute initialization
FMT_MSA.3b: Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1a: Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1b: Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1c: Management of TSF data
FMT_REV.1: Revocation
FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1: Security roles
FPT_STM_EXP.1: Reliable time stamps
FTP_ITC.1: Inter-TSF trusted channel
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5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)
5.2.1.1 Audit data generation (FAU_GEN.1)
FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a)
Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b)
All auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
c)
[the audit events identified in Table 2 Auditable Events].
FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a)
Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b)
For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [the additional details identified in Table 2
Auditable Events].
Table 2 Auditable Events for the TOE
Component
Event
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SEL.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.
2
FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1a
FMT_MSA.1b
FMT_MTD.1a
FMT_MTD.1b
FMT_MTD.1c
FMT_REV.1
FMT_SMF.1
Additional Details
Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions
Reading of information from the audit records
Unsuccessful attempts to read information from the audit
records.
All modifications to the audit configuration that occur while the
audit collection functions are operating
All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the
SFP.
All requests to perform an operation on an object covered by the
SFP.
All use of the authentication mechanism
All use of the user identification mechanism, including the
identity provided during successful attempts
Success and failure of binding user security attributes to a
subject (e.g. success and failure to create a subject)
All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the TSF
All modifications of the values of security attributes
All modifications of the values of security attributes
All modifications to the values of TSF data
All modifications to the values of TSF data
All modifications to the values of TSF data
All modifications to the values of TSF data
Use of the management functions
Object name
Object name
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
Command issued
5.2.1.2 User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)
FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each
auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.2.1.3 Audit review (FAU_SAR.1)
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [system administrators, security administrators, or users granted
privilege to execute audit routines] with the capability to read and archive [audit information
as specified in the table below] from the audit records.
Role
Audit Information
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System Administrator
Security Administrator
User granted privilege to
execute audit routines
FAU_SAR.1.2
All audit data for the DB2 instance
All audit data for the databases to
which they are assigned
All audit data for the databases to
which they have been granted access
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
5.2.1.4 Restricted audit review (FAU_SAR.2)
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have been
granted explicit read-access.
5.2.1.5 Selectable audit review (FAU_SAR.3)
FAU_SAR.3.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to apply [searches] of audit data based on [user identity].
5.2.1.6 Selective audit (FAU_SEL.1)
FAU_SEL.1.1
The TSF shall be able to select the set of audited events from the set of all auditable events based
on the following attributes:
a)
[event type, user identity,]
b)
[group membership, database role, database instance, database table, authority, and
success and/or failure].
5.2.1.7 Action in case of possible audit data loss (FAU_STG.3)
FAU_STG.3.1
The TSF shall [write an entry in a separate administrator log] if the audit trail exceeds [the
available space allocated to the audit log].
5.2.1.8 Prevention of audit data loss (FAU_STG.4)
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [‘ignore audited events’ or ‘prevent audited events, except those taken by the
authorised user with special rights’] and [no other action] if the audit trail is full.
Application Note: The system administrator must choose to configure DB2 to either discard audit events or to
effectively stop once the audit trail is full.
5.2.2 User data protection (FDP)
5.2.2.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] on [user attempts to create,
destroy or otherwise access databases, schemas, table spaces, tables, views, packages,
procedures, functions, and methods].
5.2.2.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] to objects based on the
following: [subject and object attributes as defined in the table below].
Controlled entity
Subjects
User
Security attributes
Authorization names and
authorities
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Objects
Access control list6
Database
Table space
Schema
Table
View
Package
Procedure
Function
Method
FDP_ACF.1.2
FDP_ACF.1.3
FDP_ACF.1.4
Access control list
Owner
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects
and controlled objects is allowed: [a subject must have an authorization name that is assigned
the privilege (per the access control list) corresponding to the requested operation of the
target object in order to succeed in performing the requested operation].
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [
1)
a subject that is assigned the DATAACCESS authority to a database can access
objects of that database as allowed by the authority regardless of privileges (per the
access control list) and
2)
a subject that has an authorization name that is the owner of the applicable object
can access the object regardless of privileges (per the access control list)].
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the [no rules].
5.2.2.3 Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)
FDP_IFC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [LBAC SFP] on [user read and write operations on LBAC
protected database tables].
5.2.2.4 Hierarchical security attributes (FDP_IFF.2)
FDP_IFF.2.1
The TSF shall enforce the [LBAC SFP] based on the following types of subject and information
security attributes: [user security labels and database table column or row security labels].
Application Note:
Note that security labels consist of zero (0) or more of each of the three (3) available component types (array, set,
and tree), but must include at least one component.
 Array – represents an ordered set; any element in the set is ranked higher than subsequent elements in the
set.
 Set – represents an unordered set; there is no defined relationship among the elements in the set and there
order is not important.
 Tree – represents a hierarchy and is used to represent organizational charts and to identify departments
within an organization that owns the applicable data. An element of a tree that is higher than another
element in the tree hierarchy is considered an ancestor.
FDP_IFF.2.2
6
The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information
via a controlled operation if the following rules, based on the ordering relationships between
security attributes hold: [
1) in order to read a LBAC protected column or row in a database table:
a) the array components of the user’s security label must be greater than or
equal to the array components of the object’s security label,
b) the set components of the user’s security label must include the set
components of the object’s security label, and
Access control lists assign privileges to users via authorization names.
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FDP_IFF.2.3
FDP_IFF.2.4
FDP_IFF.2.5
FDP_IFF.2.6
c) the tree components of the user’s security label must include at least one
of the elements in the tree components of the object’s security label (or the
ancestor of one such element) and
2) in order to write a LBAC protected column or row in a database table:
a) the array components of the user’s security label must be equal to the
array components of the object’s security label,
b) the set components of the user’s security label must include the set
components of the object’s security label, and
c) the tree components of the user’s security label must include at least one
of the elements in the tree components of the object’s security label (or the
ancestor of one such element) and
3) the Discretionary Access Control Policy rules must be satisfied in every case].
The TSF shall enforce the [rule that only a security administrator can change security labels
on users and an appropriately privileged user can change security labels on columns or rows
of LBAC protected tables].
The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [a user with
the appropriate corresponding exemption can ignore the read array, read set, read tree,
write array (to lower array values), write array (to higher array values), write set, or write
tree check].
The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [none].
The TSF shall enforce the following relationships for any two valid information flow control
security attributes: a) There exists an ordering function that, given two valid security attributes,
determines if the security attributes are equal, if one security attribute is greater than the other, or
if the security attributes are incomparable; and b) There exists a 'least upper bound' in the set of
security attributes, such that, given any two valid security attributes, there is a valid security
attribute that is greater than or equal to the two valid security attributes; and c) There exists a
'greatest lower bound' in the set of security attributes, such that, given any two valid security
attributes, there is a valid security attribute that is not greater than the two valid security attributes.
5.2.2.5 Full residual information protection (FDP_RIP.2)
FDP_RIP.2.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable
upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.
5.2.2.6 Basic rollback (FDP_ROL.1)
FDP_ROL.1.1
FDP_ROL.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy and LBAC SFP] to permit the
rollback of the [operations that can be expressed as SQL] on the [databases, schemas, tables
spaces, tables, views, packages, procedures, functions, and methods].
The TSF shall permit operations to be rolled back within the [set of uncommitted statements].
5.2.3 Identification and authentication (FIA)
5.2.3.1 User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
[authorization names, authorities, database roles, security labels, exemptions, and in the case
of trusted contexts the trusted context object including a list of authorized authorization
names, database roles, encryption attribute, and IP addresses].
5.2.3.2 User authentication before any action (FIA_UAU_EXP.2)
FIA_UAU_EXP.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated using support from its
environment before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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5.2.3.3 User identification before any action (FIA_UID.2)
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified itself before allowing any other TSFmediated actions on behalf of that user.
5.2.3.4 User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1)
FIA_USB.1.1
FIA_USB.1.2
FIA_USB.1.3
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of
that user: [authorization name, authorities, database roles, security labels, exemptions, and in
the case of trusted contexts the trusted context object and IP address of the trusted user
connection].
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of users: [when user is successfully identified and authenticated,
authorization names associated with the user, the user’s groups, and the roles to which those
user, groups, or other roles belong are assigned to the session as are authorities, security
labels, and exemptions associated with those authorization names; additionally, in the case of
trusted contexts if the trusted context definition defines a database role for the authorization
name, that database role is assigned to the resulting session ELSE if the trusted context
definition defines a default database role, that database role is assigned to the resulting
session].
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [once a session is created its attributes do
not change except as follows:
a user in the trusted context role can change the authorization name of any of its
connections to any authorization name authorized for that trusted context
–
depending on TOE configuration a password could be required for
authentication of the new authorization name AND
–
once the authorization name is changed FIA_USB.1.2 is applied to
the connection as though it is an initial association (including the
association of authorities, roles, security labels, and exemptions
associated with the new authorization name) AND
–
if the trusted context definition defines a database role for the new
authorization name, that database role is assigned to the resulting
session ELSE if the trusted context definition defines a default
database role, that database role is assigned to the resulting
session].
5.2.4 Security management (FMT)
5.2.4.1 Management of security functions behaviour (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [LBAC SFP] to [the
security administrator].
5.2.4.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1a)
FMT_MSA.1a.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] to restrict the ability to
[modify] the security attributes [specifically, access control attributes, associated with a
protected object and database role assignments] to [users authorized by the Discretionary
Access Control rules and users with the ACCESSCTRL authority for the applicable
database].
Application Note:
Note that the Discretionary Access Control rules encompass authorities. While access control attributes and role
assignments can be granted and revoked by users with appropriate privileges, users with the ACCESSCTRL
authority can always change access privileges within their assigned database and security administrators can always
grant and revoke database roles.
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5.2.4.3 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1b)
FMT_MSA.1b.1 The TSF shall enforce the [LBAC SFP] to restrict the ability to [[assign]] the security attributes
[security labels] to [users authorized by the LBAC Rules].
Application Note:
Note that the LBAC policy allows users to assign labels to objects depending on their privileges, but labels can be
granted or revoked t and from users only by a security administrator.
5.2.4.4 Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3a)
FMT_MSA.3a.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Discretionary Access Control Policy] to provide [restrictive] default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP Discretionary Access Control
Policy.
FMT_MSA.3a.2 The TSF shall allow the [no role] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values
when an object or information is created.
5.2.4.5 Static attribute initialization (FMT_MSA.3b)
FMT_MSA.3b.1 The TSF shall enforce the [LBAC SFP] to provide [[no]] default values for security attributes that
are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3b.2 The TSF shall allow the [users authorized by the LBAC Rules] to specify alternative initial
values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
5.2.4.6 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1a)
FMT_MTD.1a.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [delete and [create]] the [audit trail] to [system
administrators].
5.2.4.7 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1b)
FMT_MTD.1b.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify and [observe]] the [set of audited events] to
[security and system administrators].
5.2.4.8 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1c)
FMT_MTD.1c.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [[create and drop]] the [roles] to [security administrators].
5.2.4.9 Revocation (FMT_REV.1)
FMT_REV.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to revoke [Discretionary Access Control and LBAC security
attributes] associated with the [objects] under the control of the TSF to [users authorised to
modify the Discretionary Access Control security attributes by the Discretionary Access
Control policy (including those granted the ACCESSCTRL authority for the applicable
database and security administrators for the applicable database) and security
administrators in the case of LBAC security attributes].
Application Note:
Note that the Discretionary Access Control rules encompass authorities. While access control attributes can be
granted and revoked by users with appropriate privileges, users with the ACCESSCTRL authority can always
change access privileges within their assign database as can security administrators who can also grant and revoke
database roles.
FMT_REV.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the rules [the access rights associated with an object shall be enforced
when an access check is made].
5.2.4.10 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [
start and stop auditing;
select audited events;
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create, delete, and review the audit trail;
create and drop LBAC policies and labels;
grant and revoke LBAC security labels and exemptions;
create, drop, grant, and revoke database roles; and
grant and revoke DAC access attributes].
5.2.4.11 Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [system administrator, security administrator, and user
(authorized by the DAC or LBAC rules, with ACCESSCTRL authority, or granted privilege
to execute audit routines)].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
5.2.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)
5.2.5.1 Reliable time stamps (FPT_STM_EXP.1)
FPT_STM_EXP.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps based on information provided by
its environment for its own use.
5.2.6 Trusted path/channels (FTP)
5.2.6.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1.1
FTP_ITC.1.2
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product that
is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
The TSF shall permit [another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [no required functions].
5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for the TOE are the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as
specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria, augmented with ALC_FLR.1 as indicated in bold the following table.
No operations are applied to the assurance components.
Table 3 Assurance Requirements (EAL 4 augmented)
Requirement Class
ADV: Development
AGD: Guidance documents
ALC: Life-cycle support
Requirement Component
ADV_ARC.1: Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.4: Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1: Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3: Basic modular design
AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.4: Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4: Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1: Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1: Identification of security measures
ALC_FLR.1: Basic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1: Developer defined life-cycle model
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Requirement Class
ATE: Tests
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Requirement Component
ALC_TAT.1: Well-defined development tools
ATE_COV.2: Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.2: Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_FUN.1: Functional testing
ATE_IND.2: Independent testing - sample
AVA_VAN.3: Focused vulnerability analysis
5.3.1 Development (ADV)
5.3.1.1 Security architecture description (ADV_ARC.1)
ADV_ARC.1.1d The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features of the TSF cannot
be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2d The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to protect itself from
tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3d The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
ADV_ARC.1.1c The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail commensurate with the
description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions described in the TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2c The security architecture description shall describe the security domains maintained by the TSF
consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3c The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF initialisation process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4c The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5c The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents bypass of the SFRenforcing functionality.
ADV_ARC.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.1.2 Complete functional specification (ADV_FSP.4)
ADV_FSP.4.1d
ADV_FSP.4.2d
ADV_FSP.4.1c
ADV_FSP.4.2c
ADV_FSP.4.3c
ADV_FSP.4.4c
ADV_FSP.4.5c
The developer shall provide a functional specification.
The developer shall provide a tracing from the functional specification to the SFRs.
The functional specification shall completely represent the TSF.
The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all TSFI.
The functional specification shall identify and describe all parameters associated with each TSFI.
The functional specification shall describe all actions associated with each TSFI.
The functional specification shall describe all direct error messages that may result from an
invocation of each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.4.6c The tracing shall demonstrate that the SFRs trace to TSFIs in the functional specification.
ADV_FSP.4.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.4.2e The evaluator shall determine that the functional specification is an accurate and complete
instantiation of the SFRs.
5.3.1.3 Implementation representation of the TSF (ADV_IMP.1)
ADV_IMP.1.1d The developer shall make available the implementation representation for the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.1.2d The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the
implementation representation.
ADV_IMP.1.1c The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail such that the TSF can
be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.1.2c The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the development personnel.
ADV_IMP.1.3c The mapping between the TOE design description and the sample of the implementation
representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
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ADV_IMP.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that, for the selected sample of the implementation representation, the
information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
5.3.1.4 Basic modular design (ADV_TDS.3)
ADV_TDS.3.1d The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.3.2d The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification to the lowest
level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
ADV_TDS.3.1c The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.3.2c The design shall describe the TSF in terms of modules.
ADV_TDS.3.3c The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.3.4c The design shall provide a description of each subsystem of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.3.5c The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.3.6c The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.3.7c The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing module in terms of its purpose and interaction with
other modules.
ADV_TDS.3.8c The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing module in terms of its SFR-related interfaces, return
values from those interfaces, interaction with and called interfaces to other modules.
ADV_TDS.3.9c The design shall describe each SFR-supporting or SFR-non-interfering module in terms of its
purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.3.10c The mapping shall demonstrate that all behaviour described in the TOE design is mapped to the
TSFIs that invoke it.
ADV_TDS.3.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ADV_TDS.3.2e The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete instantiation of all
security functional requirements.
5.3.2 Guidance documents (AGD)
5.3.2.1 Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
AGD_OPE.1.1d The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
AGD_OPE.1.1c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and
privileges that should be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate
warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the available interfaces
provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3c The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the available functions and
interfaces, in particular all security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure
values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4c The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present each type of securityrelevant event relative to the user-accessible functions that need to be performed, including
changing the security characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5c The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of operation of the TOE (including
operation following failure or operational error), their consequences and implications for
maintaining secure operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6c The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the security measures to be
followed in order to fulfil the security objectives for the operational environment as described in
the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7c The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
AGD_OPE.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.2.2 Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
AGD_PRE.1.1d The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
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AGD_PRE.1.1c The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure acceptance of the
delivered TOE in accordance with the developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2c The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for secure installation of the TOE
and for the secure preparation of the operational environment in accordance with the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_PRE.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2e The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the TOE can be prepared
securely for operation.
5.3.3 Life-cycle support (ALC)
5.3.3.1 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation (ALC_CMC.4)
ALC_CMC.4.1d The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2d The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.1c The TOE shall be labelled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2c The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify the configuration
items.
ALC_CMC.4.3c The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4c The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only authorised changes are made to
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.5c The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated means.
ALC_CMC.4.6c The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7c The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the development of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8c The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or newly created configuration
items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9c The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being maintained under the CM
system.
ALC_CMC.4.10c
The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in accordance with
the CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.2 Problem tracking CM coverage (ALC_CMS.4)
ALC_CMS.4.1d The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
ALC_CMS.4.1c The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the evaluation evidence required
by the SARs; the parts that comprise the TOE; the implementation representation; and security
flaw reports and resolution status.
ALC_CMS.4.2c The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.4.3c For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall indicate the developer of the
item.
ALC_CMS.4.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.3 Delivery procedures (ALC_DEL.1)
ALC_DEL.1.1d The developer shall document procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2d The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
ALC_DEL.1.1c The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security
when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.4 Identification of security measures (ALC_DVS.1)
ALC_DVS.1.1d The developer shall produce development security documentation.
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ALC_DVS.1.1c The development security documentation shall describe all the physical, procedural, personnel,
and other security measures that are necessary to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE design and implementation in its development environment.
ALC_DVS.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.1.2e The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
5.3.3.5 Basic flaw remediation (ALC_FLR.1)
ALC_FLR.1.1d The developer shall document flaw remediation procedures addressed to TOE developers.
ALC_FLR.1.1c The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the procedures used to track all
reported security flaws in each release of the TOE.
ALC_FLR.1.2c The flaw remediation procedures shall require that a description of the nature and effect of each
security flaw be provided, as well as the status of finding a correction to that flaw.
ALC_FLR.1.3c The flaw remediation procedures shall require that corrective actions be identified for each of the
security flaws.
ALC_FLR.1.4c The flaw remediation procedures documentation shall describe the methods used to provide flaw
information, corrections and guidance on corrective actions to TOE users.
ALC_FLR.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.6 Developer defined life-cycle model (ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_LCD.1.1d The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the development and maintenance of
the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2d The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
ALC_LCD.1.1c The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to develop and maintain the
TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2c The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the development and
maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.3.7 Well-defined development tools (ALC_TAT.1)
ALC_TAT.1.1d The developer shall identify each development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.1.2d The developer shall document the selected implementation-dependent options of each
development tool.
ALC_TAT.1.1c Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.1.2c The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all
statements as well as all conventions and directives used in the implementation.
ALC_TAT.1.3c The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define the meaning of all
implementation-dependent options.
ALC_TAT.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4 Tests (ATE)
5.3.4.1 Analysis of coverage (ATE_COV.2)
ATE_COV.2.1d The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
ATE_COV.2.1c The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the test
documentation and the TSFIs in the functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2c The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the functional specification
have been tested.
ATE_COV.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
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5.3.4.2 Testing: security enforcing modules (ATE_DPT.2)
ATE_DPT.2.1d The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
ATE_DPT.2.1c The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence between the tests in the
test documentation and the TSF subsystems and SFR-enforcing modules in the TOE design.
ATE_DPT.2.2c The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF subsystems in the TOE design
have been tested.
ATE_DPT.2.3c The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that the SFR-enforcing modules in the TOE
design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4.3 Functional testing (ATE_FUN.1)
ATE_FUN.1.1d
ATE_FUN.1.2d
ATE_FUN.1.1c
ATE_FUN.1.2c
The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
The developer shall provide test documentation.
The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and actual test results.
The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the scenarios for performing
each test. These scenarios shall include any ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3c The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a successful execution of the
tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4c The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
ATE_FUN.1.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
5.3.4.4 Independent testing - sample (ATE_IND.2)
ATE_IND.2.1d The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
ATE_IND.2.1c The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2c The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that were used in the
developer's functional testing of the TSF.
ATE_IND.2.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2e The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to verify the developer test
results.
ATE_IND.2.3e The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as specified.
5.3.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.3.5.1 Focused vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN.3)
AVA_VAN.3.1d The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1c The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.3.1e The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.3.2e The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.3e The evaluator shall perform an independent vulnerability analysis of the TOE using the guidance
documentation, functional specification, TOE design, security architecture description and
implementation representation to identify potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.3.4e The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Enhanced-Basic
attack potential.
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6. TOE Summary Specification
This chapter describes the security functions and associated assurance measures.
6.1 TOE Security Functions
6.1.1 Security Audit
The DB2 audit facility acts both at an instance level, recording all instance level activities, and at the database level
for database specific activities. The audit log files, for instances and databases, are stored in file locations configured
during installation and the audit configuration file (db2audit.cfg) is located in each instance‟s security subdirectory.
Users of the audit facility administrator tool, db2audit, must have SYSADM authority/privileges (i.e., they must be a
system administrator). The audit facility must be stopped and started explicitly, within the context of an instance, by
a system administrator using db2audit which will perform its function only if the user has the SYSADM authority.
When starting, the audit facility uses the instance‟s existing audit configuration information. Since the audit facility
is independent of the DB2 server (i.e., it runs in a separate OS-provided process), it will remain active even if the
corresponding instance is stopped. In fact, when the instance is stopped, an audit record may be generated in the
instance‟s audit log.
System administrators using the audit facility tool can control the following actions within the audit facility:
Start recording auditable events within the DB2 instance.
Stop recording auditable events within the DB2 instance.
Flush any pending audit records from the instance and write them to the audit log.
Configure the behavior of the audit facility, including selecting the categories of the auditable events to be
recorded.
Configure whether the audit facility should prevent auditable events or ignore auditable events in the event
that the audit log becomes full.
Request a description of the current audit configuration.
Extract audit records by formatting and copying them from the audit log to a flat file or ASCII delimited
files. Extraction is done in preparation for analysis of log records.
Archive the current audit log for either an individual database or the instance to a new location for
archiving and later extraction. The current timestamp will be appended to the filename. All records that
are currently being written to the audit log will complete before the log is archived to ensure full records
are not split apart. All records that are created while the archive is in progress will be written to the current
audit log, and not the archived log, once the archive has finished.
Note that these commands serve to manipulate the audit service directly, manage the audit configuration file, and
manage the audit log as applicable.
When a DB2 instance records audit records, they contain the following information although some of the audit
categories will contain more:
Timestamp – date and time of the audit event
Category – general type for the audit event
Audit Event – specific audit event identifier
Event Correlator – correlation identifier for the operation audited (Can be used to associate multiple records
resulting from a single event.)
Event Status – success or failure of the event. Unsuccessful audit events are represented by a SQLCODE.
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User ID – user identifier associated with the audit event
Authorization ID – authorization identifier (or name) associated with the audit record
In addition, object names associated with access and information flow decisions and the specific commands issued
to perform security management functions are identified in applicable audit records.
DB2 provides the system administrator (for instance level audit logs), security administrator (for database level audit
logs), or a user granted, by a security administrator, execute privilege to the applicable audit routines (for database
level audit logs) with a capability to search the audit records by user identity in order to ensure accountability of
actions to the appropriate individual. To achieve this, audit records can be extracted, by the authorized user, in
ASCII format and loaded into a DB2 relational table for a rich set of query capabilities.
The system administrator can configure DB2 to audit any or all of the available audit categories for instance level
auditing:
Audit (AUDIT) – Generates records when audit settings are changed or when the audit log is accessed.
Statement Execution (EXECUTE) – Generates records of just the SQL statement that is being executed.
Note that the CONTEXT audit category can be used to audit the use of statements, but it captures much
more information which may not be necessary for a given application.
Authorization Checking (CHECKING) – Generates records during authorization checking of attempts to
access, transfer, or manipulate DB2 objects or functions.
Object Maintenance (OBJMAINT) – Generates records when creating or dropping data objects.
Security Maintenance (SECMAINT) – Generates records when granting or revoking: object or database
privileges or authorities, database roles, security labels, or (LBAC) exemptions, or transfer ownership of
objects Records are also generated when the database manager security configuration parameters
SYSADM_GROUP, SYSCTRL_GROUP, SYSMON_GROUP, or SYSMAINT_GROUP are modified.
System Administration (SYSADMIN) – Generates records when operations requiring SYSADM,
SYSMAINT, or SYSCTRL authority are performed.
User Validation (VALIDATE) – Generates records when authenticating users or retrieving system security
information.
Operation Context (CONTEXT) – Generates records to show the operation context when a database
operation is performed. This category allows for better interpretation of the audit log file. When used with
the log's event correlator field, a group of events can be associated back to a single database operation. For
example, an SQL statement for dynamic SQL, a package identifier for static SQL, or an indicator of the
type of operation being performed, such as CONNECT, can provide needed context when analyzing audit
results.
In addition, the security administrator (i.e., SECADM) can configure DB2 to make use of audit policies to audit
events based on categories - identifying whether they should never or always be audited or just when they succeed
or fail. The audit policies can be associated with specific users, groups of users, database roles, authorities
(SYSADM, SYSCTRL, SYSMAINT, SYSMON, DBADM, SECADM, SQLADM, WLMADM, DATAACCESS,
and ACCESSCTRL), database tables, and database instances so that audit selection can be fined-tuned to target the
success and/or failure of specific events, user, groups, database roles, authorities, database tables, and database
instances at the discretion of the security administrator.
DB2 does not provide any ability within the TOE to modify the audit records. Due to role restrictions, DB2 offers
functions allowing only a system administrator or user granted execute privilege, by a security administrator, on the
applicable audit routine to delete stored audit records. Should the audit trail exceed a pre-defined limit (the available
space on the file system containing the audit log) a message is inserted in the administrator‟s log, which is not part
of the audit log. Furthermore, a system administrator can configure DB2 to stop auditing or stop the current SQL
statement or other auditable event (effectively preventing auditable events) when the audit trail becomes full.
The Security Audit security function satisfies the following security requirements:
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FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation – DB2 fulfills this requirement by generating the necessary events
associated with each of its security functions (and security functional requirements) and by including the
date and time, event type, user and authorization identities, and results in each event along with object
names and security management commands where applicable.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association – DB2 fulfills this requirement by including the applicable user
identity in each audit record.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review – DB2 fulfills this requirement by providing interfaces to the system
administrator, applicable security administrator, and users granted execute access to the applicable audit
routines for the review and archival of audit records.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review – DB2 fulfills this requirement by ensuring that the user is a system
administrator or security administrator (per their role) or alternately has been granted execute privilege to
the applicable audit routines before allowing access to the audit records associated with their role or
privileges.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review – DB2 fulfills this requirement by providing search capabilities that
can be realized by first exporting the audit trail and then importing back into a database where arbitrary
queries could be made.
FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing system and security (see above)
administrators to configure DB2 to audit any or all of the available audit categories as well as successful
and/or failed events, specific user identities, groups, database roles, authorities, database tables, and
database instances.
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss – DB2 fulfills this requirement by writing a record in
the administrator log indicating when the audit trail is full.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing a system
administrator to configure DB2 to either simply throw away new audit events (i.e., stop auditing) or to stop
processing auditable SQL commands when the audit trail becomes full.
6.1.2 Access Control
Authorization (see Section 6.1.3) is the process whereby DB2 obtains information about an authenticated DB2 user,
indicating the database operations that user may perform, and what data objects may be accessed. With each user
request, there may be more than one authorization check, depending on the objects and operations involved.
DB2 logically associates access control lists and an „owner‟7 with each object using tables and configuration files to
record the access permissions associated with each authorization name. The authorization name of an authenticated
user, and those of groups and database roles to which the user belongs, are compared with access control list entries
to find matches. Based on this comparison, DB2 identifies available permissions that indicate whether to allow the
requested access.
There are two types of permissions managed by DB2: privileges and authority levels. A privilege defines a single
permission for an authorization name, enabling a user to create or access database resources. Privileges are stored in
the database catalogs. Authority levels provide a method of grouping privileges and control over higher-level
database manager maintenance and utility operations. Database-specific authorities are stored in the database
catalogs. Both privileges and database authorities can be associated with group and database role memberships.
System authorities are associated with group memberships, and are stored in the database manager configuration file
for a given instance.
Groups and database roles provide convenient means of performing authorization for a collection of users without
having to grant or revoke privileges for each user individually. Unless otherwise specified, group and database role
authorization names can be used anywhere that authorization names are used for authorization purposes. In general,
group membership is considered for dynamic SQL and non-database object authorizations (such as instance level
7
Note that a owner is associated only with the following database objects: Schema, Table, View, Package,
Procedure, Function, and Method.
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commands and utilities), but while group membership is not considered for static SQL database role membership is
applicable. The exception to this general case occurs when privileges are granted to PUBLIC: these are considered
when static SQL is processed.
Information about each database is automatically maintained in a set of views called the system catalog, which is
created when the database is generated. This system catalog describes tables, columns, indexes, programs,
privileges, and other objects and some of their attributes.
DB2 supports a number of Specific Privileges. They are:
Database privileges, which involve actions on a database as a whole.
Schema privileges, which involve actions on schemas in a database.
Table space privileges, which involve actions on table spaces
Table and view privileges, which involve actions on tables or views in a database.
Package privileges, which involve actions on packages.
Procedure, function, and method privileges, which involve actions on routines such as functions,
procedures and methods.
In order for a user to access (including create and destroy) any of the objects mentioned in conjunction with the
privileges identified above (i.e., databases, schemas, table spaces, tables, views, packages, procedures, functions, or
methods), the user must be assigned the privilege corresponding with the action they are attempting to perform.
Otherwise, the operation will be denied.
Note that authorities can be used to access objects without explicitly having the necessary privilege. The
ACCESSCTLR authority, for example, permits the user to change access permissions on objects within the
applicable database. Similarly, the DATAACCESS authority permits access to the data stored within objects of the
applicable database. Furthermore, an object owner is not subject the privilege restrictions on the objects they
defined (i.e., created).
Authorized administrators (i.e., users granted applicable authorities and privileges) have the ability to grant
authorities, privileges, and database roles (associated with their specific administrative role) to other users, groups,
and database roles. The administrator may optionally grant a privilege to a user WITH GRANT OPTION. Nonadministrator users who hold a privilege WITH GRANT OPTION have the ability to grant that privilege to (but not
to revoke that privilege from) other non-administrator users. The administrator may optionally grant a database role
to a user WITH ADMIN OPTION. This option would grant the user the authority to grant the database role to other
users.
In addition to controlling access using permissions, when a LBAC is properly configured, security administrators
can define LBAC security labels and authorized users can assign LBAC policies to tables. Once a LBAC policy is
assigned to a table (the notion of „protecting‟ a table), if the table contains a column of type
„DB2SECURITYLABEL‟ the table is protected with row level granularity, also if the table has a column protected
with a security label (per the table definition) the table is protected with column level granularity. Subsequently,
when a user attempts to create, modify, or otherwise access data in the table their access is restricted, in addition to
the Discretionary Access Control rules, based on the security label associated with their session, the security label(s)
associated with the table, and the LBAC access rules. Hence, the requested access to specific rows or columns is
subject to the LBAC constraints. Note that if a table is protected with both column- and row-level granularity, first
the column check must succeed and then each applicable row check must succeed.
Note that when a new row is introduced in a table, if the table is protected with row level granularity, the user may
specify a security label for that row in accordance with the LBAC rules. If they do not explicitly specify a security
label, the user‟s security label is used.
LBAC labels have zero (0) or more of each of the three available component types (but must always have at least
one component):
Array – represents an ordered set; any element in the set is ranked higher than subsequent elements in the
set.
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Set – represents an unordered set; there is no defined relationship among the elements in the set and there
order is not important.
Tree – represents a hierarchy and is used to represent organizational charts and to identify departments
within an organization that owns the applicable data.
There are two sets of three rules that determine the allowed access based on LBAC labels:
Read Access Rules apply when data is retrieved. Data is retrieved during SELECT, UPDATE, and
DELETE operations.
DB2LBACREADARRAY – Each array component of the user‟s security label must be greater
than or equal to the corresponding array component of the data (row or column) security label.
DB2LBACREADTREE – Each tree component of the user‟s security label must include at least
one of the elements in the corresponding tree component of the data (row or column) security label
(or the ancestor of one such element).
DB2LBACREADSET – Each set component of the user‟s security label must include the
corresponding set component of the data (row or column) security label.
Write Access Rules apply for INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE operations.
DB2LBACWRITEARRAY – Each array component of the user‟s security label must be equal to
the corresponding array component of the data (row or column) security label.
DB2LBACWRITETREE – Each tree component of the user‟s security label must include at least
one of the corresponding elements in the tree component of the data (row or column) security label
(or the ancestor of one such element).
DB2LBACWRITESET – Each set component of the user‟s security label must include the
corresponding set component of the data (row or column) security label.
In addition to the rules cited above, DB2 offers specific exemptions that can be assigned to users to bypass one or
more of the read and write rules summarized above.
Inappropriate reuse of data in allocated resources is prevented by allowing data to be read only after it has been
written thereby allocating resources. This prevents the leakage of information from an authorized user to one that
does not have the proper access privileges.
In order to protect against inadvertent database operations, a user can rollback the statements (i.e., operations that
can be expressed as SQL) they have issued as long as they haven‟t been committed. The user can only roll back all
of the statements that have occurred since the last time they were committed.
The Access Control security function satisfies the following security requirements:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – DB2 fulfills this requirement by associating privileges with all
operations applicable to each identified DB2 object and requiring that a user have the privilege or authority,
directly or indirectly through group or database role membership, when attempting to perform the
corresponding operation.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – DB2 fulfills this requirement by associating
privileges with all operations applicable to each identified DB2 object and requiring that a user have the
privilege or authority when attempting to perform the corresponding operation.
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing tables to be
assigned LBAC policies that will control subsequent read and write operations.
FDP_IFF.2 Hierarchical security attributes – DB2 fulfills this requirements by enforcing the LBAC
information flows rules as summarized above.
FDP_RIP.2 Full residual information protection – DB2 fulfills this requirement by ensuring that data can
only be read after it has first been written.
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FDP_ROL.1 Basic Rollback – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing users to rollback any uncommitted
statements in the reverse order that they occurred.
6.1.3 Identification & Authentication
If a user attempts to access DB2 without a user ID and password while logged on to the DB2 host operating system
(i.e., operational environment), DB2 will derive an authorization name (“authid”) from the user ID of the user‟s host
process. This is based on the assumption that the host has already identified and authenticated the user. An authid is
the name DB2 uses to identify users, groups, and database roles.
When a user attempts to access DB2 remotely (i.e., while not logged onto the DB2 host operating system), they must
provide a user identity and password. The user identity and password are provided to the DB2 host operating
system, configured LDAP server, or configured KDC server (using Kerberos) – depending on the TOE
configuration - for authentication. If the configured authentication server determines that the user identity exists and
the password is valid8, it will respond to DB2 with the authenticated user identity and any applicable group
memberships. Otherwise, it will return a failed result that will cause DB2 to reject the request.
Once authenticated:
The user must be identified to DB2 using a SQL authorization name or authorization ID (authid). This
name can be the same as the user ID, or a mapped value. For example, DB2 authids are usually derived by
transforming the user ID to all uppercase letters. If the resulting authid fails to follow any DB2 naming
conventions (e.g., allowed characters or size), then DB2 will reject the access request. Note that the DB2
name requirements vary depending on the underlying authentication server (operating system, LDAP, or
Kerberos). This is necessary to make sure that the names are uniquely mapped. These restrictions are fully
explained in the administrator guidance.
A list of groups to which the user belongs is obtained. Groups are DB2 host operating system constructs
that must also map to DB2 authorization names. This mapping is done in a method similar to that used for
user IDs. However, any groups that fail to follow DB2 naming conventions will be ignored, but the access
attempt will not be rejected on this basis.
Once the user identity and groups are established, DB2 will examine its role configuration and assign the
roles associated with the user identity, all groups, and other roles (in a potentially hierarchical manner) the
user is a member of to the resulting user session.
If an authid is resolved for the user, it becomes the initial user identity used, for example, to enforce the DAC Policy
(i.e., the initial “session authorization id”). The authid for the user is used to determine the security label and any
LBAC-related exemptions for the session. Authids derived from group and database role memberships are also used
for access control. Once the identification and authentication process successfully yields one or more authids, DB2
instantiates a session with those authids for DB2 to allow mediated DB2 operations. Furthermore, DB2 associates
specific authorities with the authids available to the user – this is also known as “Authorization.”
Trusted users defined by trusted context objects are handled a little differently. Initially they connect essentially like
any other client. They must be identified an authenticated as indicated above, but they are additionally identified by
their associated trusted context object. A trusted context object can be associated with a user only if they satisfy the
conditions defined within the trusted context object (i.e., authorization name, encryption attribute, and IP address).
After connecting, trusted users can change the authorization name of any of their connections to any other
authorization name that is authorized within the trusted context object associated with that trusted user. If no such
list is defined, then the trusted user cannot change authorization names. In either case, the TOE can be configured to
require a password in which case the password must allow the TOE to ensure the new authorization name is
successfully authenticated (using the configured user authentication mechanism) or the change will fail. If the
authorization name is not valid, the change will simply fail and the connection will remain unchanged.
8
Note that in addition to the password being correct, it must also not be expired. Additionally, some authentication
servers (e.g., host operating systems) have additional identification and authentication conditions that can cause
additional authentication failures (account locked, time of day restrictions, workstation restrictions, etc.).
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Once the authorization name is changed on a connection, the connection is treated as though the user just
authenticated – see Once authenticated, above. As such, the connection will subsequently be associated with the
new authorization name and the security attributes (including authorizations, roles, security labels, and exemptions)
associated with that authorization name.
In addition, the trusted context object can define a default role and also define specific roles for any of its defined
authorization names. During initial trusted context connection and also during subsequent authorization name
changes within a trusted context, if the applicable authorization name has a database role defined within the trusted
context object that database role will be assigned to the session. Otherwise, if there is a default database role defined
within the trusted context object that database role will be assigned to the session. If neither are defined, then no
additional database role will be assigned to the session.
Note that DB2 includes a set session authorization which allows users with that authorization to change their session
identity. This authorization can be granted only by a Security Administrator who is instructed not to grant this
authority to any non-administrative users and administrative users are expected not to use this function in the
evaluated configuration.
The Identification & Authentication security function satisfies the following security requirements:
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition – DB2 fulfills this requirement by maintaining a correspondence
between authids, authorities, security labels, and exemptions associated with users.
FIA_UAU_EXP.2 User authentication before any action – DB2 fulfills this requirement by rejecting
access to DB2 resources when the user cannot be authenticated using support from its operational
environment. Note that requirements are also instantiated in its operational environment such that it
similarly protects itself and ensures appropriate strength of this mechanism.
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action – DB2 fulfills this requirement by rejecting access to
DB2 resources when the user cannot be identified.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding – DB2 fulfills this requirement by associating authids as well as
authorities, security labels, and exemptions with user sessions. While in most cases users cannot change
their identities, trusted contexts allow associated trusted users to change their connection identity to other
users in accordance with their trusted context definition.
6.1.4 Security Management
All access control to objects subject to the Discretionary Access Control (DAC) security policy as well as to TSF
data and functions are controlled using authorities and privileges. DB2 defines a number of authorities and
privileges, which allow authorized users and administrators to perform specific functions or access specific
resources. These authorities and privileges are assigned to objects using DB2 tables and configuration files (i.e.,
access control lists) that are similarly controlled with authorities and privileges. Members of the “user” role are most
directly subject to the DAC policy and prevented from modifying the behavior of the TSF.
Privileges enable users to create, modify, or access database resources. Authority levels provide a method of
grouping privileges and higher-level database manager maintenance and utility operations. Together, these act to
control access to the database manager and its database objects. Users can access (including attribute modification
and revocation) only those objects for which they have the appropriate authorization, that is, the required privilege
or authority. Note that every object that can be created in DB2 will be assigned a default set of security attributes;
however, the specific value of the attributes may vary from object to object. However, the default security attributes
are predefined by DB2 and cannot be modified by any user. Note that of all of the protected DB2 objects, only
databases assign default privileges to users other than the creator (e.g., public). Even so, other users have only
limited access to the database. Once another user connects to the database, they can create tables, packages, and
schemas within it. Given that databases don‟t actually store information, but rather store other objects that contain
information and those do not grant any access by default, the overall default access is considered ‟restrictive‟.
LBAC security attributes (i.e., security labels) for users can only be assigned and modified by a user with SECADM
authority (i.e., a security administrator) and only when the TOE has been properly configured with LBAC. Note that
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generally LBAC policies (i.e., LBAC protection applied a table) are not assigned to objects by default, but rather
must be explicitly assigned to each applicable object (i.e., table). The exception to this is when a new row is added
to a labeled table. In that case, the new role will be assigned the security label of the user adding the row unless that
subject explicitly provides a label in accordance with the LBAC policy rules. DB2 provides the administrator
functions to create and drop LBAC policies and labels and to grant and revoke security labels and exemptions to
users and to create security policies and security labels (and security label components) that can be used to control
access (i.e., protect) to either rows or columns within the table. Once a table is protected, access and modification to
specific rows or columns is based on the user security label, security labels within the table, and the LBAC access
rules.
DB2 allows users with SECADM authority to create and drop database roles. Database roles are similar to groups,
except that they are defined and managed within DB2 rather than its underlying operating system. Users with
SECADM authority can grant and revoke roles without restriction. Roles can be granted with an admin option that
allows the granted user to also grant and revoke that role, but without the admin option.
For privileges associated with a user identity or with a group or database role membership, the privilege may be
revoked from the user. In some cases, specifically when the privilege is granted via group membership, the change
in privilege may not be immediately effective. To make the change effective immediately, any existing database
connections associated with the user may be “forced” (disconnected) by a system administrator. Changes to
privileges granted directly to a user or via a database role membership are effective immediately after the change.
Changes to access rights associated with an object are not effective until the next access check that would normally
be required.9
As described in Section 6.1.1, Security Audit, DB2 provides system administrators with the functions necessary to
start and stop the audit security function, as well as the tools necessary to create and delete audit files and to
configure the audit security function to control specifically which auditable events will be audited and also to export
and subsequently review the collected audit records. Note that system administrator, security administrators, and
user granted execute to the audit review and extract functions can access audit data. Furthermore, DB2 allows
security administrators to define audit policies to fine tune the audit selection function.
In addition to system administrators, security administrators, and other users, DB2 recognizes trusted users defined
by trusted context objects. Trusted users have the unique ability to change their identity outside the scope of TOE
authentication. This is addressed in the user-subject binding rules, but otherwise such users a treated like other users
albeit with a special privilege.
The following is a summary of the authorities defined within DB2:
SYSADM (System Administrator)
A user with SYSADM authority is not considered a database administrator and has no inherent privilege in
the database. Users with system administrator authority have sufficient authority to run most DB2 utility
programs, issue database manager commands, maintain database partition groups, table spaces, and
bufferpools. Any SYSADM user requiring data access must be granted explicit privileges. By default, the
database creator, who must hold SYSADM or SYSCTRL authority, will be granted DBADM,
DATAACCESS, ACCESSCTRL, and SECADM during database creation and those authorities can be
subsequently revoked by an authorized user. This role is assigned to a user via membership in the operating
system SYSADM_GROUP.
SECADM (Security Administrator)
The SECADM authority is required to perform database security administration and essentially has full
control of database security. The security administrator may create, drop, and alter (where applicable) roles,
audit, trusted contexts, security labels, security label components, and security policies. In addition, the
9
Note that when a user creates a package with static data manipulation statements, authorization checks are made to
ensure the user is allowed to perform all of the included statements. Subsequently, when a user executes the
package, the only authorization check is whether they are authorized to execute the package – the included
statements execute based on the authorities of the user that created the package. However, if any revoke operations
affect any statements in any defined package, the affected packages are invalidated and are no longer available for
execution. Packages already being executed at that time would complete, but would then no longer be accessible.
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authority allows a user to grant and revoke all database authorities/privileges. The SECADM authority does
not allow a security administrator to access data, however it is possible for the user to obtain
DATAACCESS indirectly by granting the authority to one of their groups or roles.
DBADM (Database Administrator)
The DBADM authority is intended to allow management of a database, but the authority can be limited
depending on whether ACCESSCTRL or DATAACCESS are also granted. DBADM authority no longer
inherently grants additional database level authorities to the applicable authorization id. However, the
following authorities will are available to the database administrator as long as the user holds DBADM
authority, but will be lost if the authority is revoked
BINDADD
CONNECT
CREATETAB
CREATE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE
CREATE_NOT_FENCED_ROUTINE
IMPLICIT_SCHEMA
QUIESCE_CONNECT
LOAD
Access Control Authority (ACCESSCTRL)
The ACCESSCTRL authority provides the holder with the ability to issue the following grant and revoke
statements on the database, global variables, indices, packages, routines, schemas, sequences, servers,
tables, views, nicknames, table spaces, workloads, and XSR objects in the context of the database where
they have been assigned this authority.
Note that in DB2 product versions prior to v9.7 ACCESSCTRL authority was held implicitly by all
database administrators. In order to preserve existing DB2 behaviour, the GRANT DBADM syntax
provides two new options: WITH ACCESSCTRL and WITHOUT ACCCESSCTRL. When only GRANT
DBADM is specified, this is considered equivalent to GRANT DBADM WITH ACCESSCTRL. Users
who wish to grant database administrator without ACCESSCTRL authority must explcitly state GRANT
DBADM WITHOUT ACCESSCTRL in the SQL syntax.
Data Access Authority (DATAACCESS)
The DATAACCESS authority allows the database administrator to be restricted from accessing data in the
database tables. Users with this authority can issue the database load statement; issue the select, insert,
updated, and delete statmenets on tables, views, and nicknames; and, execute packages and routines (except
further restricted audit routine).
Note that, like ACCESSCTRL, DATAACCESS authority was previosuly held implicitly by all database
administrators. In order to preserve existing DB2 behaviour, the GRANT DBADM syntax provides two
new options: WITH DATAACCESS and WITHOUT DATAACCESS. When only GRANT DBADM is
specified, this is considered equivalent to GRANT DBADM WITH DATAACCESS. Users who wish to
grant database administrator without DATAACCESS authority must explcitly state GRANT DBADM
WITHOUT DATAACCESS in the SQL syntax.
System Control (SYSCTRL)
The SYSCTRL authority level provides control over operations that affect system resources. For example,
a user with SYSCTRL authority can create, update, start, stop, or drop a database. This user can also start
or stop an instance, but cannot access table data. Users with SYSCTRL authority also have SYSMON
authority. This role is assigned to a user via membership in the operating system SYSCTRL_GROUP.
System Monitor (SYSMON)
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SYSMON provides the authority required to use the database system monitor. It operates at the instance level.
This role is explicitly assigned to a user via membership in the operating system SYSMON_GROUP.
System Maintenance (SYSMAINT)
The SYSMAINT authority level provides the authority required to perform maintenance operations on all
databases associated with an instance. A user with SYSMAINT authority can update the database
configuration, backup a database or table space, restore an existing database, and monitor a database. Like
SYSCTRL, SYSMAINT does not provide access to table data. Users with SYSMAINT authority also have
SYSMON authority. This role is assigned to a user via membership in the operating system
SYSMAINT_GROUP.
The following additional authorities are considered not security relevant in the context of this Security Target:
SQLADM (SQL Administrator)
The SQLADM authority offers the ability to perform the following actions:
CREATE EVENT MONITOR
DROP EVENT MONITOR
SET EVENT MONITOR STATE
FLUSH EVENT MONITOR
EXPLAIN
FLUSH OPTIMIZATION PROFILE CACHE
FLUSH PACKAGE CACHE
PREPARE
REORG INDEXES/TABLE
RUNSTATS
WLMADM (Workload Manager Administrator)
The WLMADM authority offers the ability to issue grant and revoke statements for workload 10 privileges
and to perform the following actions:
ALTER: service class, threshold, work action set, work class set, workload
COMMENT: service class,threshold,work action set, work class set, workload
CREATE: service class, threshold, work action set, work class set, workload
DROP: service class, threshold, work action set, work class set, workload
GRANT: workload privileges
REVOKE: workload privileges
EXECUTE: privilege on workload management routines
The Security Management security function satisfies the following security requirements:
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour – DB2 fulfills this requirement by restricting the
abilities to create and drop LBAC security labels, label components and policies as well as to grant and
revoke security policies and LBAC exemptions to the security administrator.
FMT_MSA.1a Management of Security Attributes – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only users
with the appropriate privilege to modify the Discretionary Access Control security attributes of any DB2
object, including database role assignments.
FMT_MSA.1b Management of Security Attributes – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only LBAC
security attributes of rows and columns within DB2 tables to be assigned according to the LBAC access
rules.
10
Note that workloads are not considered to be security relevant objects for the purpose of this evaluation.
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FMT_MSA.3a Static Attribute Initialization – DB2 fulfills this requirement by ensuring that objects are
assigned restrictive default security attributes when created.
FMT_MSA.3b Static Attribute Initialization – DB2 fulfills this requirement by not assigning LBAC security
policies to (i.e., „protecting‟) tables by default; the LBAC policy on a given table must be explicitly
assigned. However, once a table is protected rows added to the label will be labeled by default with the
user‟s security label unless they explicitly provide a security label in accordance with the LBAC policy
rules.
FMT_MTD.1a Management of TSF data – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only system
administrators to start the audit service (thereby creating an audit trail) or delete audit records.
FMT_MTD.1b Management of TSF data – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only system and
security administrators to define and access the audit selection criteria (at a broad level for system
administrators and via audit policies for security administrators).
FMT_MTD.1c Management of TSF data – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only security
administrators to create database roles.
FMT_REV.1 Revocation – DB2 fulfills this requirement by allowing only users with the appropriate
privilege or authority to modify (including revoke) the security attributes of any DB2 object.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions – DB2 fulfills this requirement by providing
functions that allow an authorized administrator to start and stop the audit function; select audited events;
create, delete, and review the audit trail; create LBAC policies and labels; grant and revoke LBAC security
labels and exemptions; create, drop, grant, and revoke database roles; and grant and revoke DAC access
attributes.
FMT_SMR.1 Security Management Roles – DB2 fulfills this requirement by defining system, security, and
database administrator and user roles. The user role can perform security management functions as allowed
by the DAC and LBAC rules, ACCESSCTRL authority (if held), and available privileges to access audit
data. There is also a trusted context role which serves to differentiate trusted users from other TOE clients.
6.1.5 TOE Protection
DB2 is designed to operate within a set of processes provided by the hosting operating system. DB2 does not
support the ability to share its processes with non-TOE entities. Note that DB2 supports both „fenced‟ and
„unfenced‟ routines. Fenced routines execute in their own process distinct from that of the DB2 server, while
unfenced routines share the process with the DB2 server. Given that such routines are created by users and as such
cannot be subject to evaluation, the evaluated configuration does not include any provisions for unfenced routines
(i.e., they are not included in the evaluated configuration of the TOE).
Furthermore, DB2 is designed in a manner that ensures that its interfaces do not offer unauthorized users any
functions that might be used to corrupt, or otherwise inappropriately access, the TSF. As is the case with many
application-only TOEs such as DB2, its protection mechanisms could be bypassed through the underlying
environment should the assumptions (e.g., A.Platform) and objectives (e.g., OE.ENFORCEMENT) for its
environment not be fulfilled. Note that determination of fulfillment of those assumptions and objectives is not within
the scope of the TOE.
DB2 has been designed to implement a number of DB2-specific objects and functions. Each DB2 object and
function is available via interfaces provided by DB2, and each interface has been carefully designed to ensure that it
only provides appropriate capabilities or access after necessary security checks have been made and approved.
DB2 has been designed to collect current time information from its hosting operating system in a correct and
consistent manner. Once it has been collected, DB2 ensures that it is not corrupted as it is being used by the DB2
TSF, thereby ensuring that it remains reliable.
DB2 utilizes the IBM Global Security Kit (GSKit), which offers several cryptographic functions. In particular, when
appropriately configured, DB2 can use the functions of GSKit to establish SSL connections initiated by java-based
clients. These connections serve to protect all network communication of sensitive user credentials and user data
between the client and DB2 server.
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As summarized in section 2.2.4.5, DB2 also provides the optional feature to require that user IDs and passwords are
encrypted by the associated user clients in order to offer more protection for user authentication data. As indicated in
that section, the AES-256 user ID and password protection feature is implemented using the IBM Crypto for C
(ICC) version 1.4.5 library linked with the TOE. Note that ICC v1.4.5 has been FIPS certified (certificate number
775), albeit in conjunction with earlier versions of the operating systems currently hosting DB2.
The TOE Protection security function satisfies the following security requirements:
FPT_STM_EXP.1 Reliable Time Stamps – DB2 fulfills this requirement by consistently collecting time
information from its operational environment and then by protecting it while it is being used. Note that a
similar requirement is levied on the operational environment to ensure that it also has access reliable
timestamps.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel – DB2 fulfills this requirement by being able to establish a secure
SSL connection between itself and java-based clients at the request of the client.
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7. Protection Profile Claims
There are no Protection Profile claims in this Security Target.
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8. Rationale
This section includes the rationale for the functional and assurance requirements specified for the TOE. The
rationale is based on specified objectives, threats, assumptions, and policies.
8.1 Security Objectives Rationale
This section provides a rationale for the existence of each threat, policy statement, security objective, and
component that comprise the protection profile.
8.1.1 Complete Coverage - Threats
The TOE security objectives have been derived exclusively from statements of organizational security policy, and
therefore, there are no explicitly defined threats countered by this profile.
8.1.2 Complete Coverage - Policy
This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the Organizational Security Policy by both the IT and
Non-IT security objectives. The following table shows this objective to policy mapping, and the table is followed by
a discussion of the coverage for each Security Policy.
Table 4 Mapping of Organizational Security Policies to Security Objectives
Organizational Security Policy
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS
Security Objectives
O.AUTHORIZATION
OE.AUTHORIZATION
O.MANAGE
OE.MANAGE
O.ENFORCEMENT
OE.ENFORCEMENT
OE.CRYPTO
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
O.ROLLBACK
O.MANAGE
OE.MANAGE
O.ENFORCEMENT
OE.ENFORCEMENT
OE.CRYPTO
O.AUDITING
OE.AUDITING
O.MANAGE
OE.MANAGE
O.ENFORCEMENT
OE.ENFORCEMENT
OE.CRYPTO
O.MANDATORY_ACCESS
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
O.MANAGE
O.ENFORCEMENT
OE.CRYPTO
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
P.CLASSIFICATION
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The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each statement of organizational security
policy:
P.AUTHORIZED_USERS
Only those users who have been authorized to access the information within the TOE may access the TOE.
This policy is primarily realized by the O.AUTHORIZATION and OE.AUTHORIZATION objectives. The
O.AUTHORIZATION and OE.AUTHORIZATION objectives require that the TOE and its operational environment
provide access only to authorized users. The O.MANAGE and OE.MANAGE objectives support this policy by
requiring that an authorized administrator is able to manage the functions. The O.ENFORCEMENT and
OE.ENFORCEMENT objectives ensure that functions are invoked and operate correctly. The OE.CRYPTO
objective helps to protect sensitive data from disclosure when sent between remote clients and the TOE.
P.NEED_TO_KNOW
The TOE must limit the access to, modification of, and destruction of the information in protected resources to those
authorized users which have a “need to know” for that information.
This policy is primarily realized by the O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS objective, which allows authorized users to
control access to resources based on user identities. The O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION and
OE.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION objectives ensure that information will not be given to users that do not have a
need-to-know when resources are reused. The O.MANAGE and OE.MANAGE objectives support this policy by
requiring that an authorized administrator is able to manage the functions. The O.ENFORCEMENT and
OE.ENFORCEMENT objectives ensure that functions are invoked and operate correctly. The O.ROLLBACK
objective ensures that any inadvertent operations performed on protected resources can be undone. The
OE.CRYPTO objective helps to protect sensitive data from disclosure when sent between remote clients and the
TOE.
P.ACCOUNTABILITY
The users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the TOE.
This policy is primarily realized by the O.AUDITING and OE.AUDITING objectives by requiring that actions can
be recorded in an audit trail. The O.MANAGE and OE.MANAGE objectives support this policy by requiring that an
authorized administrator is able to manage the functions. The O.ENFORCEMENT and OE.ENFORCEMENT
objectives ensure that functions are invoked and operate correctly. The OE.CRYPTO objective helps to protect
sensitive data from disclosure when sent between remote clients and the TOE. Note that while user can be held
accountability when audit records are recorded, the TOE only must be able to record audit events. This feature is
configurable and, at the discretion of the administrator, selectively audits user activity. Furthermore, the TOE could
experience a failure, such as disk space exhaustion, that might prevent audit events from being recorded, but under
normal circumstances the TOE will record the events selected by the administrator.
P.CLASSIFICATION
The system must be able to limit the access to information based on sensitivity, as represented by a label, of the
information contained in objects, and the formal clearance of users, as represented by subjects, to access that
information. The access rules enforced prevent a subject from accessing information which is of higher sensitivity
than it is operating at.
This policy is implemented by the O.MANDATORY_ACCESS objective. The O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
objective ensures that information will not given to users which do not have a cleared access, when resources are
reused. The O.MANAGE supports this policy by requiring authorized administrator be able to manage the functions
and O.ENFORCEMENT ensures that functions are invoked and operate correctly. The OE.CRYPTO objective helps
to protect sensitive data from disclosure when sent between remote clients and the TOE.
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8.1.3 Complete Coverage - Environmental Assumptions
This section provides evidence demonstrating coverage of the Non-IT security objectives by the environmental
assumptions. The following table shows this assumption to objective mapping.
Table 5 Mapping of Environmental Assumptions to Non-IT Security Objectives
Environmental
Assumptions
A.MANAGE
Non-IT Security Objectives
O.ASSIGN
O.INSTALL
O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE
O.ADMINISTRATORS
O.INSTALL
O.PHYSICAL
A.NO_EVIL_ADM
A.LOCATE
A.PROTECT
A.CONNECT
A.COOP
O.COOP
O.CREDEN
O.PLATFORM
O.CREDEN
A.PLATFORM
A.CLEARANCE
A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and the security of the information it
contains.
This is addressed by O.ASSIGN, which ensures that competent individuals are assigned to manage the TOE and the
security of its information, and by O.INSTALL, which ensures that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed and
operated in a manner that maintains IT security.
A.NO_EVIL_ADM
The administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the
instructions provided by the administrator documentation.
This is primarily addressed by O.ADMINISTRATORS, which ensures that Administrators of the TOE and its
operational must not be careless, willfully negligent or hostile, and must follow the instructions provided in the
administrator guidance documentation. The O.ADMIN_GUIDANCE objective ensures that administrators receive
guidance documentation enabling them to install, manage, and operate the TOE securely. This assumption is also
addressed by O.INSTALL, which ensures that the TOE is delivered, installed, managed and operated in a manner
that maintains IT security.
A.LOCATE
The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access facilities, which will prevent
unauthorized physical access.
This is addressed by O.PHYSICAL which addresses those parts of the TOE which are critical to security policy are
protected from physical attack.
A.PROTECT
The hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical
modification.
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This is addressed by O.PHYSICAL which addresses those parts of the TOE which are critical to security policy are
protected from physical attack.
A.CONNECT
All connections to peripheral devices reside within the controlled access facilities. The TOE only addresses security
concerns related to the manipulation of the TOE through its authorized access points. Internal communication
paths, including networks, to access points and between TOE instances are assumed to be adequately protected.
This is addressed by O.PHYSICAL which ensures that those parts of the physical TOE and its associated
operational environment critical to security policy are protected from attack that might compromise IT security
objectives.
A.COOP
Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the
TOE and are expected to act in a cooperating manner in a benign environment.
This is addressed by O.COOP, which ensures that authorized users possess the appropriate authorization to access at
least some of the information managed by the TOE and act in a cooperative manner in a benign environment. This
is also addressed by O.CREDEN that states that those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access
credentials such as passwords or other authentication information are protected by the users in a manner that
maintains IT security objectives.
A.PLATFORM
The Environment underlying the TOE is assumed to fulfill the objectives for the TOE-supporting components in the
operational environment described in this ST.
This is addressed by O.PLATFORM that basically reiterates the assumption to expect the Environment to provide a
suitable and effective environment for the operation of the TOE.
A.CLEARANCE
Procedures exist for granting users authorization for access to specific security levels. It is further assumed the TOE
administrators will be cleared to the highest security level processed by the TOE.
This is addressed by O.CREDEN that states that credentials such as clearances, perhaps represented by security
labels, must be associated with user appropriately.
8.2 Security Requirements Rationale
This section provides evidence supporting the combined internal consistency and completeness of the requirements
in this Security Target.
8.2.1 Internal Consistency of Requirements
This section describes the mutual support and internal consistency of the components selected for this Security
Target. These properties are discussed for both functional and assurance components.
The functional components were selected from pre-defined CC components. Assignment, selection, and refinement
operations were carried out among components using consistent computer security terminology. This helps to avoid
the ambiguity associated with interpretations of meanings of terms between related components. Multiple
instantiation of components was used to clearly state the required functionality that must exist in the TOE.
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Each security functional requirement in the ST was selected to avoid conflicts with other security functional
requirements in the ST.
The IT security functional requirements form a mutually supportive whole. Table 8 in Section 8.2.2 maps the
functional components to security objectives. Table 9 in Section 8.4 demonstrates that the TOE security functional
requirement dependencies have been satisfied.
Additionally, Section 5 of the ST contains several security requirements that support other requirements, as detailed
in the following table.
Table 6 Security Requirements Supporting Other Requirements
Security functional requirement
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_STG.4
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1
FAU_STG.1
Effect
Detect attempts to bypass or
tamper with other security
functional requirements
Prevent other security
functional requirements from
being bypassed
Prevent other security
functional requirements from
being tampered with
8.2.2 Complete Coverage - Objectives
This section demonstrates that the functional components selected for this Security Target provide complete
coverage of the defined IT security objectives. The mapping of components to IT security objectives is depicted in
the following table.
Table 7 Mapping of Security Objectives to Functional Components
Security Objective
O.AUTHORIZATION
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
O.MANDATORY_ACCESS
O.AUDITING
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Functional Component
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.2
FIA_UID.2
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MSA.1a
FMT_MSA.3a
FMT_MTD.1c
FMT_REV.1
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.2
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1b
FMT_MSA.3b
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
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Security Objective
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
O.ROLLBACK
O.MANAGE
O.ENFORCEMENT
Functional Component
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.4
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MTD.1a
FMT_MTD.1b
FMT_SMF.1
FPT_STM_EXP.1
FDP_RIP.2
FDP_ROL.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.4
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FTP_ITC.1
ADV_ARC.1
The following discussion provides detailed evidence of coverage for each security objective:
O.AUTHORIZATION
The TSF must ensure that only authorized users gain access to the TOE and its resources.
Users must be identified [FIA_UID.2], authenticated [FIA_UAU_EXP.2], and associated with available
authorities and privileges [FIA_ATD.1] before they can access the TOE and the resources it protects.
O.DISCRETIONARY_ACCESS
The TSF must control access to resources based on identity of users. The TSF must allow authorized users to specify
which users may access which resources.
Discretionary access control must have a defined scope of control [FDP_ACC.1]. The rules of the DAC
policy must be defined [FDP_ACF.1]. The security attributes of objects used to enforce the DAC policy
must be defined [FDP_ACF.1]. Authorized users must be able to control who has access to objects
[FMT_MSA.1a and FMT_MTD.1c] and be able to revoke that access [FMT_REV.1]. Default protection
must be available from an object’s creation [FMT_MSA.3a].
O.MANDATORY_ACCESS
The TSF must be able to control access to resources based upon the sensitivity and categories of the information
being accessed and the clearance of the subject attempting to access that information.
Mandatory access control attributes and rules must be definable [FDP_IFF.2] and must have a definable
scope of control [FDP_IFC.1]. Finally, if the MAC policy is to be enforced, it is required that it can be
enabled and that attributes be associated with each object [FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1b, FMT_MSA.3b],
and that the binding between processes and the attributes of the user on whose behalf they operate be
correct and unforgable [FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1].
O.AUDITING
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The TSF must be able to record the security relevant actions of users of the TOE. The TSF must be able to present
this information only to authorized administrators.
Security-relevant actions must be defined, auditable [FAU_GEN.1], and capable of being associated with
individual users [FAU_GEN.2, FIA_USB.1]. The audit trail must be protected so that only authorized
users may access it [FAU_SAR.2]. The TSF must provide the capability to audit specific types of actions
[FAU_SEL.1] and the actions of individual users [FAU_SAR.3, FIA_USB.1]. The audit facility must have
some defined behavior if the audit trail becomes full [FAU_STG.4]. The time stamp associated must be
reliable [FPT_STM_EXP.1a]. An authorized administrator must be able to review [FAU_SAR.1], manage
[FAU_STG.3, FMT_SMF.1], and protect [FMT_MTD.1a, FMT_MTD.1b] the audit trail.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
The TSF must ensure that any information contained in a protected resource is not released when the resource is
recycled.
Residual information associated with defined objects in the TOE must be inaccessible during reuse of the
object containing the residual information [FDP_RIP.2].
O.ROLLBACK
The TSF must ensure that operations performed on information contained in a protected resource can be undone
before the results have been committed.
The TOE must provide a mechanism to undo any operation that can be expressed as SQL performed on
a protected resources so long as it has not yet been committed [FDP_ROL.1].
O.MANAGE
The TSF must provide all the functions and facilities necessary to support the authorized administrators that are
responsible for the management of TOE security.
The TSF must provide for an authorized administrator to manage the TOE [FMT_SMR.1]. The
administrator must be able to review and manage the audit trail [FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.3, FAU_SEL.1,
FAU_STG.3, FAU_STG.4, FMT_SMF.1] along with all other security functions of the TOE [FMT_SMF.1].
O.ENFORCEMENT
The TSF must be designed and implemented in a manner that ensures that the organizational policies are enforced
in the target environment.
The TSF must make and enforce the decisions of its security policies [ADV_ARC.1]. The TSF must
protect itself from interference that would prevent it from performing its functions [ADV_ARC.1]. The
correctness of this objective is further met through the assurance requirements defined in this Security
Target. This objective provides global support to other security objectives for the TOE by protecting the
parts of the TOE, which implement policies and ensures that policies are enforced. The TSF must be able
to protect network communication that might otherwise allow one of its policies to be subverted
[FTP_ITC.1].
8.3 Assurance Requirements Rationale
The TOE was developed based on the C2 requirements of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC). Those requirements have been reproduced in the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) using
Common Criteria conventions. While the CAPP demands only EAL 3, this Security Target claims EAL 4
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augmented with ALC_FLR.1. This added assurance is intended to provide consumers more confidence in the
security features of the TOE so that the product may be used in a wider variety of environments.
8.4 Requirement Dependency Rationale
The following table shows the security functional and assurance requirement dependencies that exist based on the
security functional and assurance requirements (and iterations thereof) included in this Security Target. As indicated
in the following table all of the dependencies are satisfied with the exception of those of FAU_STG.1,
FIA_UAU_EXP.2, and FPT_STM_EXP.1. The TOE is a software application that is dependent upon its host
operating system to provide secure audit storage and a reliable source of time (see OE.ENFORCEMENT) and
authenticate users on behalf of the TOE (see OE.AUTHENTICATION).
Note that in the left column TOE security functional requirements are identified normally and assurance
requirements are underlined.
Table 8 TOE Security Functional Requirement Dependencies
ST Requirement
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.4
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.2
FDP_RIP.2
FDP_ROL.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.2
FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1a
FMT_MSA.1b
FMT_MTD.1a
FMT_MTD.1 b
FMT_MTD.1a
FMT_MTD.1b
FMT_MTD.1 c
FMT_REV.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_STM_EXP.1
FTP_ITC.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
CC Dependencies
FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.1 and FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1 and FMT_MTD.1
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3
FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFC.1 and FMT_MSA.3
none
(FDP_ACF.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
none
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
none
FIA_ATD.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 and
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 and
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
none
FIA_UID.1
FPT_STM.1
none
ADV_FSP.1 and ADV_TDS.1
ADV_TDS.1
55
ST Dependencies
FPT_STM_EXP.1
FAU_GEN.1 and FIA_UID.2
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1 and FMT_MTD.1
Not satisfied, see rationale above.
Not satisfied, see rationale above.
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3a
FDP_IFF.2
FDP_IFC.1 and FMT_MSA.3b
none
FDP_ACF.1 and FDP_IFC.1
none
FIA_UID.2
Not satisfied, see rationale above.
none
FIA_ATD.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 and
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1 and
FDP_IFC.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 and FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
none
FIA_UID.2
Not satisfied, see rationale above.
none
ADV_FSP.4 and ADV_TDS.3
ADV_TDS.3
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ST Requirement
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_FLR.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.2
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA_VAN.3
CC Dependencies
ADV_TDS.3 and ALC_TAT.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_FSP.1
none
ALC_CMS.1 and ALC_DVS.1 and
ALC_LCD.1
none
none
none
none
none
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_FSP.2 and ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1 and ADV_TDS.3 and
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_COV.1
ADV_FSP.2 and AGD_OPE.1 and
AGD_PRE.1 and ATE_COV.1 and
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1 and ADV_FSP.2 and
ADV_TDS.3 and ADV_IMP.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1
ST Dependencies
ADV_TDS.3 and ALC_TAT.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_FSP.4
none
ALC_CMS.4 and ALC_DVS.1 and
ALC_LCD.1
none
none
none
none
none
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_FSP.4 and ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1 and ADV_TDS.3 and
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_COV.2
ADV_FSP.4 and AGD_OPE.1 and
AGD_PRE.1 and ATE_COV.2 and
ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.1 and ADV_FSP.4 and
ADV_TDS.3 and ADV_IMP.1 and
AGD_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1
8.5 Extended Requirements Rationale
This Security Target contains two extended requirements: FIA_UAU_EXP.2 and FPT_STM_EXP.1. Each of these
requirements is based on the CC versions of FIA_UAU.2 and FPT_STM.1, except that these extended versions
specifically allow the environment of the TOE to perform some aspect of the requirement which is not allowed in
the original requirements. In the case of FIA_UAU_EXP.2, the authentication function while the TOE enforces
restrictions on services until its environment confirms the authenticity of applicable users. In the case of
FPT_STM_EXP.1, the environment of the TOE provides timestamps that are subsequently collected, protected, and
used by the TOE. Note that the functions implied by these requirements are completely fulfilled by a combination of
the TOE and its environment and as such should be considered to satisfy any dependencies levied by other
requirements on FIA_UAU.2 or FPT_STM.1.
Both FIA_UAU_EXP.2 and FPT_STM_EXP.1 share the same functional requirement class and family as their CCdefined counterparts. They also share the same dependencies as well as being dependent upon instances of their CC
counterparts (FIA_UAU.1 and FPT_STM.1, respectively), but are not hierarchical to any CC-defined requirements.
They are otherwise completely defined below:
8.5.1 FIA_UAU_EXP.2 User authentication before any action
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
Audit:
Minimal:
Basic:
Unsuccessful use of the authentication mechanism.
All use of the authentication mechanism.
Management: There are no management activities foreseen.
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FIA_UAU_EXP.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated using support from its
environment before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
8.5.2 FPT_STM_EXP.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FPT_STM.1
Audit: None.
Management: There are no management activities foreseen.
FPT_STM_EXP.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps based on information provided by
its environment for its own use.
8.6 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
The following table describes the association between the TOE Security Functions and the TOE Security Functional
Requirements. This table in conjunction with rationale provided in Section 6.1 demonstrates that the TOE Security
Functional Requirements are satisfied.
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.3
FAU_STG.4
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.1
FDP_IFF.2
FDP_RIP.2
FDP_ROL.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU_EXP.2
FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1a
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
57
Protection of the TSF
Security management
Identification and
authentication
User data protection
Security audit
Table 9 Security Function to TOE SFR Mapping
Protection of the TSF
Security management
Identification and
authentication
User data protection
Security audit
IBM DB2 Version 9.7 Enterprise Server Edition for Linux, Unix, and Windows Security Target
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Revision 1.0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.1b
FMT_MSA.3a
FMT_MSA.3b
FMT_MTD.1a
FMT_MTD.1b
FMT_MTD.1c
FMT_REV.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_STM_EXP.1
FTP_ITC.1
X
X
58
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