Certification Report: KECS-CR-14-53 XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KWS3CT9KCS3CT9K9(eng)

Certification Report: KECS-CR-14-53 XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KWS3CT9KCS3CT9K9(eng)
KECS-CR-14-53
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Certification Report
Certification No.: KECS-ISIS-0533-2014
2014. 9. 19
IT Security Certification Center
History of Creation and Revision
No.
Date
Revised
Description
Pages
Certification report for XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on
00
2014.09.19
-
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
- First documentation
Certification Report
Page 2
This document is the certification report for XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1
on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 of LG CNS.
The Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
The Evaluation Facility
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
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Table of Contents
1.
Executive Summary ............................................................................................. 5
2.
Identification......................................................................................................... 6
3.
Security Policy ..................................................................................................... 8
4.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope ............................................................ 9
5.
Architectural Information .................................................................................. 10
6.
Documentation ................................................................................................... 13
7.
TOE Testing ........................................................................................................ 13
8.
Evaluated Configuration .................................................................................... 14
9.
Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................. 15
9.1
Security Target Evaluation (ASE)............................................................ 15
9.2
Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC) ...................................................... 16
9.3
Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)................................................. 17
9.4
Development Evaluation (ADV) .............................................................. 17
9.5
Test Evaluation (ATE) ............................................................................. 18
9.6
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA) .............................................................. 19
9.7
Evaluation Result Summary ................................................................... 19
10. Recommendations ............................................................................................. 21
11. Security Target ................................................................................................... 22
12. Acronyms and Glossary .................................................................................... 22
13. Bibliography ....................................................................................................... 23
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1. Executive Summary
This report describes the certification result drawn by the certification body on the
results of the EAL4+ evaluation of LG CNS XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 with reference to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation (“CC” hereinafter) [1]. It describes the evaluation result
and its soundness and conformity.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite product which is consisting of the
certified integrated circuit chip and embedded software (Native operating system
(NOS), Global Platform, and Java Card Platform) in accordance with the Java Card
2.2.2 [6], [7], [8], the Global Platform Card Specification [9], and the Visa Global
Platform Card Specification [10]. The TOE provides Java Card Platforms with Open
Configuration for multiple applications by allowing them to be loaded and deleted,
cryptographic services to be used by applications installed on the Java Card Platform.
Additionally, the TOE provides native APIs for data group creation and access
(supporting development of e-Passport in accordance with “ICAO Doc 9303” and
Driving License in accordance with “ISO/IEC 18013”), and native APIs for data integrity
verification of secure transaction.
The TOE XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 is composed
of the following components:

IC chip S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Revision 2 provided by Samsung
Electronics, see ANSSI-CC-2012/70 (ANSSI-CC-2012/70-S01, surveillance
report, April 14, 2014), and
 Embedded software XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 provided by LG CNS.
The evaluation of the TOE has been carried out by Telecommunications Technology
Association (TTA) and completed on August 22, 2014. This report grounds on the
evaluation technical report (ETR) TTA had submitted [11] and the Security Target (ST)
[12][13].
The ST is based on the certified Protection Profile (PP) Smart Card Open Platform
Protection Profile V2.2, December 20, 2010, KECS-PP-0097a-2008 [5]. All Security
Assurance Requirements (SARs) in the ST are based only upon assurance component
in CC Part 3, and the TOE satisfies the SARs of Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4
augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.4. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is
CC Part 3 conformant. The Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) are based upon
both functional components in CC Part 2 and a newly defined component in the
Extended Component Definition chapter of the ST, and the TOE satisfies the SFRs in
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the ST. Therefore the ST and the resulting TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
[Figure 1] shows the operational environment of the TOE.
[Figure 1] Operational environment of the TOE
Certification Validity: The certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the
government of Republic of Korea or by any other organization that recognizes or gives
effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the government of
Republic of Korea or by any other organization recognizes or gives effect to the
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification
The TOE is composite product consisting of the following components and related
guidance documents.
Type
Identifier
HW/SW
Samsung
Certification Report
Release
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/ Revision 2
Delivery Form
IC Chip Module
Page 6
Type
Identifier
Release
S3CT9K9
16-bit
RISC
Delivery Form
(Note:
Microcontroller for Smart Card,
The
SW
is
contained in ROM)
Revision 2 with optional secure
RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including
specific IC Dedicated Software
SW
Secure RSA/ECC Library
V2.2
TRNG Library
V2.0
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1
Masking
Version 1
DOC
XSmart
OpenPlatform
V1.1
on V1.2
Softcopy
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
User’s Guide for Management
[Table 1] TOE identification
Those parts that constitute smart card open platform of the TOE are masked on the
ROM area, while the other parts that constitute factory initialization of the TOE are
masked on the EEPROM area.
The TOE is finalized by “IC Manufacturer” at the Manufacturing Phase (ROM masking
and packaging) in accordance with the Smart Card Open Platform PP [5] and the
Security Target [12]. After the TOE finalization, the “Card Manufacturer” initializes the
TOE and embeds the TOE into the smart card. The card production including the
application of the antenna is not part of the TOE. After the Manufacturing Phase, TOE
can be issued by “Card issuer” with applications and associated personalization data.
The certified IC chip S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 which is a component of the TOE
provides Secure RSA-CRT Asymmetric Cryptography and the TOE utilizes it for a few
native APIs. However, it is out of certification scope. For more details refer to the
Security Target [13]. And for details on the IC chips, the IC dedicated software and the
crypto libraries, see the documentation under ANSSI-CC-2012/70 [14].
[Table 2] summarizes additional information for scheme, developer, sponsor, evaluation
facility, certification body, etc..
Scheme
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security
(August 8, 2013)
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Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security
(November 1, 2012)
TOE
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
(Masking Version: 1)


Common Criteria
ROM images

XSMART_OPEN110_KW_m01.rom

XSMART_OPEN110_KC_m01.rom

XSMART_OPEN110_K9_m01.rom
EEPROM images

XSMART_OPEN110_KW_m01.eep

XSMART_OPEN110_KC_m01.eep
 XSMART_OPEN110_K9_m01.eep
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09003, September 2012
EAL
EAL4+
(augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.4)
Developer
LG CNS
Sponsor
LG CNS
Evaluation
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)
Facility
Completion Date
August 22, 2014
of Evaluation
Certification Body
IT Security Certification Center
[Table 2] Additional identification information
3. Security Policy
The ST [12][13] for the TOE claims demonstrable conformance to the Smart Card
Open Platform PP [5], and the TOE complies security policies defined in the PP [5] by
security objectives and security requirements based on Java Card 2.2.2 [6], [7], [8] and
GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9]. Thus the TOE provides security features defined
in the Smart Card Open Platform PP [5] as follows.
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
The TOE ensures the Java Package, Java Applet and Java Card Runtime
Environment to be protected from bypassing the applet firewall policy.

The TOE ensures that each Security Domain of GlobalPlatform to be protected
from unauthorized access and modification.

The TOE ensures the Card Manager to be protected from enforced deletion.

The TOE ensures the unauthorized entity cannot access to the TSFI through
the bypassing life cycle state of the card or the application defined in
GlobalPlatform Card Specification [9].

The TOE ensures cryptography related APIs in the scope of certification have a
resistance against side channel and perturbation attacks performed by an
attacker possessing Moderate attack potential.

The TOE’s Secure Channel features (e.g. SCP02) ensure transmitted data to
be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

The TOE ensures safe data recovery or deletion (atomic operation) when
abnormal event (e.g. tearing at installation procedure) is occurred.

The TOE ensures the TSF data stored in the memory is protected against
unauthorized modification

The TOE ensures the installation of post-issuance application. It does not
address card management issues in the broad sense, but only those security
aspects of the installation procedure that are related applet execution. (referred
to Java Card Protection Profile - Open Configuration, May 2012, Version 3.0)
Furthermore, the TOE is composite product based on the certified IC chip, the TOE
utilizes and therefore provides some security features covered by the IC chip
certification such as security sensors/detectors, active shields against physical attacks,
synthesizable glue logic, dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel
attacks, Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support, Secure coprocessor
for RSA and ECC (with SHA) Asymmetric Cryptographic Support, and a True Random
Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31-compliant Random Number Generation. For
more details refer to the Security Target Lite for the IC chip [15].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the operational
environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used (for the detailed
and precise definition of the assumption refer to the ST [12], chapter 3.3, and the ST
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[13], chapter 4.3.):

There shall be a secure channel between the application installed in the TOE
and the CAD (Card Acceptance Devices).

The application which is installed in the manner of approved procedure (e.g.
bytecode verification before loading and installation) shall not include malicious
code

At all of phases from the manufacturing to the use of the TOE, the training is
provided to each role (such as manufacturer, issuer and cardholder) according
to related regulations. And the TOE is handled in the secure manner when
repairing and replacing due to the breakdown.

During operation of the TOE, the TSF data handled in outside of the TOE is
managed securely.
Furthermore, some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not
covered by the TOE itself, thus these aspects are addressed by the TOE environment:
TOE user training, bytecode verification and secure manufacturing and management,
etc.. Details can be found in the ST [12], chapter 3.1, 3.2 and 4.3, and the ST [13],
chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 5.3.
5. Architectural Information
[Figure 2] show the physical scope of the TOE. The TOE is the composite product
which is consisting of the certified IC chip and the embedded software.
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[Figure 2] Scope of the TOE

The Global Platform controls the life cycle of the TOE and applets, and
provides key and applet management functions of TOE with administrator
authority in the TOE user mode. The TOE manages applets through applet
load, installation, and deletion functions and life cycle management function of
Card Manager. The TOE enforces the security policy for the card issuer, and
provides the security services as the secure channel management during data
transaction and data access, and PIN management for card holder verification.

The JCRE is responsible for the resource management for the java applet
running, the selected applet management, the communication with CAD and
the security of the applet. And the JCRE performs execution of applets using
the JCVM. The JCRE includes the frameworks related to the APDU routing,
ISO communication protocol, JCVM and the classes for handling. The TOE
provides the firewall access control through the JCRE. By isolating a single
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applet within the given space through the mechanism of firewall between
applets, it prevents data from being leaked out by other applets and provides
protection against attacks.

The JCVM executes the CAP file as entity of the applet. It performs bytecode
execution, memory allocation management, object management, security
features and etc.. The JCVM is bytecode interpreter based on Java Card
specification. The Java Card applet’s methods are converted to bytecode can
be performed on the JCVM. TOE can execute the applet independent from the
hardware through the JCVM.

The JCAPI is the set of classes provides for development of application in
accordance with Java Card specification. The JCAPI provides primary APIs
and extended API packages, and it is the upper layer JCRE, provides the
interfaces for cryptographic functions and basic functions to the application.

The Global Platform API is Java Card interfaces for Global Platform functions.
It provides access to the OPEN, services for the application such as cardholder
verification, personalization, security services and Card Content Management
service such as card locking, application life cycle state update.

The Native Operating System is hardware abstraction layer. It is responsible
for operating system to execute the JCVM and the JCRE, and includes low
level I/O function, memory management function, low level transaction and
crypto functions. The TOE provides Native APIs for data group creation and
access, and provides native APIs for data integrity verification of secure
transaction.

Cryptographic Library belongs to the TOE hardware, and it has been certified
along with the IC chips. The primary crypto functions are implemented in the
Native Operating System, and they utilize certified cryptographic libraries
implemented in the certified IC chip. The IC chip provides security features
such as security sensors/detectors, active shields against physical attacks,
synthesizable glue logic, dedicated hardware mechanisms against sidechannel attacks, secure DES and AES symmetric cryptographic support,
secure coprocessor for RSA and ECC asymmetric cryptographic support, and
a true random number generator (TRNG) for AIS31-compliant random number
generation.
For the detailed description is referred to the ST [12][13].
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6. Documentation
The following documentation is evaluated and provided with the TOE by the developer
to the customer.
Identifier
Release
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/ V1.2
Date
August 17, 2014
S3CT9K9 User’s Guide for Management
[Table 3] Documentation
7. TOE Testing
The developer took a testing approach based on the component of the TOE and the
respective specification of each component. Physically, the embedded software is not
separated, but logically, it can be divided into GlobalPlatform, Java Card, and Native
Operating System.
The developer conducted 987 test cases related to the TSFI and module interface, and
cryptographic functions as described below:

Automated tools testing, which tests the security functionality and module
interfaces through the scenario-based scripts using automated tools for the
smartcard standards (ISO/IEC 7816 [23], ISO/IEC 14443 [24]), GlobalPlatform
[9]/Visa GlobalPlatform [10], and Java Card 2.2.2 [6], [7], [8],

Tearing testing, which tests secure operation of the TOE under the
environmental stress,

Chip testing, which tests features such as cryptographic operation and security
register provided by IC chip, and

Native API testing, which tests native APIs for data group creation and access
(supporting development of e-Passport in accordance with “ICAO Doc 9303”
and Driving License in accordance with “ISO/IEC 18013”), and native APIs for
data integrity verification of secure transaction using in-house testing tools.
The developer tested all the TSF and analyzed testing results in accordance with the
assurance component ATE_COV.2. This means that the developer tested all the TSFI
defined for each life cycle state of the TOE, and demonstrated that the TSF behaves as
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described in the functional specification.
The developer tested both subsystems (including their interactions) and SFR-enforcing
modules (including their interfaces), and analyzed testing results in accordance with
the assurance component ATE_DPT.2.
The evaluator performed all the developer’s tests listed in this report chapter 7, and
conducted independent testing based upon test cases devised by the evaluator.
Also, the evaluator had conducted penetration testing based upon test cases devised
by the evaluator resulting from the independent search for potential vulnerabilities.
These test cases cover testing APDU commands, perturbation attacks, observation
attacks such as SPA/DPA and SEMA/DEMA, fault injection attacks, and so on. No
exploitable vulnerabilities by attackers possessing less than High attack potential were
found from penetration testing.
The evaluator confirmed that all the actual testing results correspond to the expected
testing results. The evaluator testing effort, the testing approach, configuration, depth,
and results are summarized in the ETR [11].
8. Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 and the
TOE is composite product consisting of the following components:

IC chips: S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Revision 2 with optional secure RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including specific
IC Dedicated Software (ANSSI-CC-2012/70)

Embedded software: XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1
The TOE is identified by the name, version and release number. The TOE identification
information is provided by the command-response APDU following:

ATR (Historical Byte): XSMARTOPEN110 (XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1)

3B8D800158534D4152544F50454E31313029

Command APDU (GET_DATA): 80CA9F7F

Response APDU: 9F7F2A4250140C425140620111410600041C710A4D42524115

‘1420’ or ‘140C’ or ‘1409’: S3CT9KW / S3CT9KC / S3CT9K9 (IC chip identifier)

‘0111’: TOE Version (V1.1) and Masking Version (m01)
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
Command APDU (GET_DATA): 80CA005A

Response APDU: 5A060210022C01029000

‘02’: IC Chip Revision Number (revision 2)

‘022C’: RSA/ECC Library Version (V2.2)

‘02’: TRNG Version (2.0)

Command APDU (GET_DATA): 80CA0056

Response APDU: 5602AD9B9000

‘AD9B’: ROM Code Checksum
And the guidance documents listed in this report chapter 6, [Table 3] were evaluated
with the TOE.
9. Results of the Evaluation
The evaluation facility provided the evaluation result in the ETR [1] which references
Work Package Reports for each assurance requirement and Observation Reports.
The evaluation result was based on the CC [1] and CEM [2], and CCRA supporting
documents for the Smartcard and similar device [16], [17], [18], [19], [20] and [21].
As a result of the evaluation, the verdict PASS is assigned to all assurance
components of EAL4 augmented by ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.4.
9.1 Security Target Evaluation (ASE)
The ST Introduction correctly identifies the ST and the TOE, and describes the TOE in
a narrative way at three levels of abstraction (TOE reference, TOE overview and TOE
description), and these three descriptions are consistent with each other. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_INT.1.
The Conformance Claim properly describes how the ST and the TOE conform to the
CC and how the ST conforms to PPs and packages. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_CCL.1.
The Security Problem Definition clearly defines the security problem intended to be
addressed by the TOE and its operational environment. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ASE_SPD.1.
The Security Objectives adequately and completely address the security problem
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definition and the division of this problem between the TOE and its operational
environment is clearly defined. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_OBJ.2.
The Extended Components Definition has been clearly and unambiguously defined,
and it is necessary. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ASE_ECD.1.
The Security Requirements is defined clearly and unambiguously, and it is internally
consistent and the SFRs meet the security objectives of the TOE. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ASE_REQ.2.
The TOE Summary Specification addresses all SFRs, and it is consistent with other
narrative descriptions of the TOE. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ASE_TSS.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the ST of the composite TOE does not contradict the
ST of the IC chip according to the CCRA supporting document Composite Product
Evaluation [16].
Thus, the ST is sound and internally consistent, and suitable to be used as the basis
for the TOE evaluation.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ASE.
9.2 Life Cycle Support Evaluation (ALC)
The developer has used a documented model of the TOE life-cycle. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_LCD.1.
The developer has used well-defined development tools (e.g. programming languages
or computer-aided design (CAD) systems) that yield consistent and predictable results.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_TAT.1.
The developer has clearly identified the TOE and its associated configuration items,
and the ability to modify these items is properly controlled by automated tools, thus
making the CM system less susceptible to human error or negligence. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMC.4.
The configuration list includes the TOE, the parts that comprise the TOE, the TOE
implementation representation, security flaws and the evaluation evidence. These
configuration items are controlled in accordance with CM capabilities. Therefore the
verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_CMS.4.
The developer's security controls on the development environment are adequate to
provide the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and implementation that is
necessary to ensure that secure operation of the TOE is not compromised. Therefore
the verdict PASS is assigned to ALC_DVS.1.
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The delivery documentation describes all procedures used to maintain security of the
TOE when distributing the TOE to the user. Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to
ALC_DEL.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the correct version of the embedded software is
installed onto/into the correct version of the underlying IC chip, and the delivery
procedures of IC chip and embedded software developers are compatible with the
acceptance procedure of the composite product integrator according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [16].
Thus, the security procedures that the developer uses during the development and
maintenance of the TOE are adequate. These procedures include the life-cycle model
used by the developer, the configuration management, the security measures used
throughout TOE development, the tools used by the developer throughout the life-cycle
of the TOE, the handling of security flaws, and the delivery activity.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ALC.
9.3 Guidance Documents Evaluation (AGD)
The procedures and steps for the secure preparation of the TOE have been
documented and result in a secure configuration. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to AGD_PRE.1.
The operational user guidance describes for each user role the security functionality
and interfaces provided by the TSF, provides instructions and guidelines for the secure
use of the TOE, addresses secure procedures for all modes of operation, facilitates
prevention and detection of insecure TOE states, or it is misleading or unreasonable.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AGD_OPE.1.
Thus, the guidance documents are adequately describing the user can handle the TOE
in a secure manner. The guidance documents take into account the various types of
users (e.g. those who accept, install, administrate or operate the TOE) whose incorrect
actions could adversely affect the security of the TOE or of their own data.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AGD.
9.4 Development Evaluation (ADV)
The TOE design provides a description of the TOE in terms of subsystems sufficient to
determine the TSF boundary, and provides a description of the TSF internals in terms
of modules. It provides a detailed description of the SFR-enforcing modules and
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enough information about the SFR-supporting and the SFR-non-interfering modules for
the evaluator to determine that the SFRs are completely and accurately implemented;
as such, the TOE design provides an explanation of the implementation representation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_TDS.3.
The developer has completely described all of the TSFI in a manner such that the
evaluator was able to determine whether the TSFI are completely and accurately
described, and appears to implement the security functional requirements of the ST.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ADV_FSP.4.
The TSF is structured such that it cannot be tampered with or bypassed, and TSFs that
provide security domains isolate those domains from each other. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ADV_ARC.1.
The implementation representation is sufficient to satisfy the functional requirements of
the ST and is a correct realisation of the low-level design. Therefore the verdict PASS
is assigned to ADV_IMP.1.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that the requirements on the embedded software,
imposed by the IC chip, are fulfilled in the composite product according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [16].
Thus, the design documentation is adequate to understand how the TSF meets the
SFRs and how the implementation of these SFRs cannot be tampered with or
bypassed. Design documentation consists of a functional specification (which
describes the interfaces of the TSF), a TOE design description (which describes the
architecture of the TSF in terms of how it works in order to perform the functions
related to the SFRs being claimed), an implementation description (a source code level
description). In addition, there is a security architecture description (which describes
the architectural properties of the TSF to explain how its security enforcement cannot
be compromised or bypassed).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ADV.
9.5 Test Evaluation (ATE)
The developer has tested all of the TSFIs, and that the developer's test coverage
evidence shows correspondence between the tests identified in the test documentation
and the TSFIs described in the functional specification. Therefore the verdict PASS is
assigned to ATE_COV.2.
The developer has tested all the TSF subsystems and the SFR-enforcing modules
against the TOE design and the security architecture description. Therefore the verdict
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PASS is assigned to ATE_DPT.2.
The developer correctly performed and documented the tests in the test documentation.
Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to ATE_FUN.1.
By independently testing a subset of the TSF, the evaluator confirmed that the TOE
behaves as specified in the design documentation, and had confidence in the
developer's test results by performing all of the developer's tests. Therefore the verdict
PASS is assigned to ATE_IND.2.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that composite product as a whole exhibits the properties
necessary to satisfy the functional requirements of its ST according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [16].
Thus, the TOE behaves as described in the ST and as specified in the evaluation
evidence (described in the ADV class).
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class ATE.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)
By penetrating testing, the evaluator confirmed that there are no exploitable
vulnerabilities by attackers possessing Moderate attack potential in the operational
environment of the TOE.Therefore the verdict PASS is assigned to AVA_VAN.4.
Also, the evaluator confirmed that there is no exploitability of flaws or weakness in the
composite TOE as a whole in the intended environment according to the CCRA
supporting document Composite Product Evaluation [16].
Thus, potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and
anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or
quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security
mechanisms), don’t allow attackers possessing less than High attack potential to
violate the SFRs.
The verdict PASS is assigned to the assurance class AVA.
9.7 Evaluation Result Summary
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
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Assurance
Assurance
Component
Class
Page 19
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
ASE
ALC
AGD
ADV
ASE_INT.1
Assurance
Component
Class
PASS
PASS
ASE_INT.1.1E
PASS
ASE_INT.1.2E
PASS
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_CCL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_OBJ.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_ECD.1.2E
PASS
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_REQ.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ASE_TSS.1.2E
PASS
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_LCD.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_TAT.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_CMS.4.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_DVS.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ALC_DVS.1.2E
PASS
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DEL.1.1E
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1.1E
PASS
PASS
AGD_PRE.1.2E
PASS
PASS
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_TDS.3.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_TDS.3.2E
PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.4.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_FSP.4.2E
PASS
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_COV.2
ATE_COV.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_DPT.2
ATE_DPT.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2
ATE_IND.2.1E
PASS
PASS
ATE_IND.2.2E
PASS
ADV_FSP.4
ATE
Assurance
Certification Report
PASS
PASS
PASS
PASS
Page 20
Verdict
Assurance
Assurance
Class
Component
Evaluator
Action
Elements
Evaluator
Action
Elements
AVA
AVA_VAN.4
ATE_IND.2.3E
PASS
AVA_VAN.4.1E
PASS
AVA_VAN.4.2E
PASS
AVA_VAN.4.3E
PASS
AVA_VAN.4.4E
PASS
Assurance
Assurance
Component
Class
PASS
PASS
[Table 4] Evaluation Result Summary
10. Recommendations
The TOE security functionality can be ensured only in the evaluated TOE operational
environment with the evaluated TOE configuration, thus the TOE shall be operated by
complying with the followings:

As the TOE is composite product which is consisting of IC chip and smart card
open platform, the TOE is finalized by “IC Manufacturer” at the Manufacturing
Phase. And only the delivery procedures for the finalized TOE to card
manufacturer are in the scope of the certification. Thus, the TOE user including
card manufacturer shall establish the secure delivery and acceptance
processes after the Manufacturing Phase.

As the TOE can be composed with one of S3CT9KW, S3CT9KC and S3CT9K9,
the TOE user is recommended to check the product identification information
right after acceptance of the TOE while referring to the User’s Guide for
Management provided with the product after acquisition of the TOE.

It is recommended that the TOE user shall verify the checksum value of ROM
code referring to the User’s Guide for Management.

As the cryptographic functions out of the certification scope are not satisfied
with assurance level of EAL4+, the TOE user shall not utilize them to protect
important asset.

The application provider shall verify application installed on the TOE whether
there is malicious code in it or not.
Certification Report
Page 21

It is recommended that the TOE user shall consider security measures to
manage the TSF data securely when the TSF data is processed in outside of
the TOE.
11. Security Target
The XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Security Target
V1.8, September 16, 2014 [12] is included in this report by reference. For the purpose
of publication, it is provided as sanitized version [13] in accordance with the CCRA
supporting document ST sanitising for publication [22].
12. Acronyms and Glossary
API
Application Programming Interface
ATR
Answer To Reset
CAD
Card Acceptance Device
CC
Common Criteria
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
JCRE
Java Card Runtime Environment
NOS
Native Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
ST
Security Target
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFR
Security Function Requirement
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
TSFI
TSF Interface
Applet Firewall
The mechanism that prevents unauthorized accesses to
objects in contexts other than currently active context
Application Provider
Entity that owns an application and is responsible for the
application's behavior
Atomic Operation
Certification Report
An operation that either completes in its entirety or no
Page 22
part of the operation completes at all
Bytecode
Machine-independent code generated by the compiler
and executed by the Java virtual machine
CAD
The device where the card is inserted, and which is used
to communicate with the card
CAP file
The CAP file is produced by the Converter and is the
standard file format for the binary compatibility of the
Java Card platform
Card Issuer
Entity that owns the card and is ultimately responsible
for the behavior of the card
Card Manager
Generic term for the 3 card management entities of a
GlobalPlatform card i.e. the OPEN, Issuer Security
Domain and the Cardholder Verification Method Services
provider
Cardholder
The end user of a card
Context
A context is an object-space partition associated to a
package. Applets within the same Java technologybased package belong to the same context
Issuer Security Domain
On-card entity providing support for the control, security,
and communication requirements of the Card Issuer
JCRE
The runtime environment under which Java programs in
a smart card are executed
JCVM
The embedded interpreter of bytecodes
Life Cycle State
A specific state within the Life Cycle of the card or of
Card Content
Package
A package is a namespace within the Java programming
language that may contain classes and interfaces
SCP02
A secure communication protocol and set of security
services
13. Bibliography
The certification body has used following documents to produce this report.
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1
Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-001 ~ CCMB-2012-09-003, September 2012
Certification Report
Page 23
Part 1: Introduction and general model
Part 2: Security functional components
Part 3: Security assurance components
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1 Revision 4, CCMB-2012-09-004, September 2012
[3]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Guidelines for IT Security (August 8, 2013)
[4]
Korea Evaluation and Certification Scheme for IT Security (November 1, 2012)
[5]
Smart Card Open Platform Protection Profile V2.2, December 20, 2010, KECSPP-0097a-2008
[6]
Runtime Environment Specification, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March
2006
[7]
Virtual Machine Specification, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March 2006
[8]
Application Programming Interface, Java Card Platform, Version 2.2.2, March
2006
[9]
GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.1.1, March 2003
[10]
Visa GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Implementation Requirements, Version 2.0, July
2007
[11]
TTA-CCE-13-012
XSmart
OpenPlatform
V1.1
on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/
S3CT9K9 Evaluation Technical Report V1.3, September 16, 2014
[12]
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Security Target
V1.8, September 16, 2014 (Confidential Version)
[13]
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Security Target
Public Version V1.1, September 16, 2014 (Sanitized Version)
[14]
Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2012/70 – Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/
S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 with optional
secure RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including specific IC Dedicated Software,
October 10, 2012, ANSSI
[15]
Security Target Lite of Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional secure RSA and ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated Software Version 2.6, October 24, 2013
[16]
Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices Version 1.2,
CCDB-2012-04-01, April 2012
[17]
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards Version 2.9, CCDB-2013-05-002,
May 2013
[18]
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits Version 3.0 Revision 1, CCDB2009-03-002, March 2009
Certification Report
Page 24
[19]
Requirements to perform Integrated Circuit Evaluations, Version 1.1, CCDB2013-05-001, May 2013
[20]
Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.1, CCDB-2014-04-001, April 2014
[21]
Security Architecture requirements (ADV_ARC) for smart cards and similar
devices Version 2.0 – Appendix 1, CCDB-2012-04-004, April 2012
[22]
ST sanitising for publication, CCDB-2006-04-004, April 2006
[23]
ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts
[24]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards – Contactless ICCs - Proximity cards
Certification Report
Page 25
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