Certification Report: 0501a

Certification Report: 0501a
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
for
S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Card, Revision 2
from
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.22
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2
from
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure state)
and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up
to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 1 July 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
This page is intentionally left blank.
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Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
herein after called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment ...................................................................17
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................18
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
•
BSIG2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective on 3 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL
1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom
within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the
CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2
undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
has
The evaluation of the product S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card,
Revision 2 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 20 June 2008. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0452-2007. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZCC-0452-2007 were re-used.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics Co.,
Ltd.
The product was developed by: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
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Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
Certification Report
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSIInfoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
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Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
San24, Nongseo-dong
Giheung-gu
Yongin-City
Gyeonggido
Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card,
Revision 2. The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3CC9LC Microcontroller featuring the
TORNADO™ cryptographic co-processor, is a smartcard integrated circuit which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and contact based I/O
ports, hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process and volatile
and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes any IC
Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in
the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such
software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing
process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services, including a RSA asymmetric cryptography library and an
AIS20 compliant random number generation library. All other software is called Smartcard
Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like banking and
finance applications, communication highways (Internet access and transaction
processing), Transport and ticketing applications (access control cards) and Governmental
cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses). Several security features independently
implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper
operations and the integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
Regarding the RSA crypto library the user has the possibility to tailor this IC Dedicated
Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the RSA crypto
library. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA crypto
library what’s resulting in two TOE configurations. This is considered in this Security
Target and corresponding notes (indicated by “optional”) are added where required. If the
user decides not to use the RSA crypto library the library is not delivered to the user and
the accompanying “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)” RivestShamir-Adleman (RSA) is not provided by the TOE. Deselecting the RSA crypto library
means excluding the code implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use.
Excluding the code of the deselected functionality has no impact on any other security
policy of the TOE, it is exactly equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to
use the functionality. The S3CC9LC single-chip CMOS micro-controller is designed and
packaged specifically for "Smart Card" applications.
The main security features of the S3CC9LC integrated circuit are:
●
Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High
and Low Frequency detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply
Voltage Glitch detectors, Light detector and the Passivation Removing Detector
●
A Active Shield against physical intrusive attacks
●
Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure
topology
●
Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal
Variable Clock, Random Waits Generator, Random Current Generator, RAM and
EEPROM scrambling mechanisms
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●
Secure DES Symmetric Cryptography support (part of the evaluation is the tripleDES operation only)
●
Secure Tornado™ co-processor for RSA Asymmetric Cryptographic Support
The IC Dedicated Software include a modular arithmetic library v.3.6S for RSA
Asymmetric Cryptography support (optional) and a Deterministic Random Number
Generator (DRNG) for AIS20-compliant Random Number Generation. For the detailed
information about the Hardware and Software of the S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Card, Revision 2 refer to section [9, chapter 2.1 to 2.5].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and additional SFR are defined in the used Protection Profile. Thus the TOE is CC part 2
extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 5.2].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF1
Environmental Security violation recording and reaction
SF2
Access Control
SF3
Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL mode
SF4
Hardware countermeasures for unobservability
SF5
Cryptography
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 6].
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 6] is confirmed. The rating of the Strength
of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter
3.1]. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target Lite [9 ,
chapter 3.1 to 3.4].
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
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Certification Report
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
1 HW
S3CC9LC
2 SW
Deterministic Random Number
Generator (DRNG)
3 SW
Secure Crypto Library (optional)
4
5
6
7
8
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
DOC
User's manual [16]
Security Application Note [12]
RSA Application Note [13]
DRNG Application Note [14]
S3CC91A Delivery Specification [15]
Release
Rev. 2
V2.0
V3.6S
V 5.0
V1.1
V1.12
V2.0
V1
Form of delivery
Wafer
Source code in
electronic form
Source code in
electronic form
In electronic form
In electronic form
In electronic form
In electronic form
In electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by S3CC9LC revision 2. Another characteristic of the TOE is the
product code. This information is stored in the EEPROM and can be read out by the user
of the card via the normal EEPROM read command. It contains the following information at
which among others the production line indicator is part of the serial number. Here the hex
value “06” at the beginning of the serial number indicates that the TOE is produced in
Giheung (Korea) wafer line 6:
Address
80000h – 80001h
80002h – 80003h
80004h – 80005h
80006h – 8000Fh
Contents
Chip status information
ROM code number
Device Type
Available for customer
80010h – 8001Bh
Serial number
8001Ch – 8001Dh
IC Fabricator
8001Eh – 8001Fh
IC Fabrication Date
80020h – 80021h
IC Module Fabricator
80022h– 80023h
IC Module Packaging date
80024h – 80027h
80028h – 80029h
IC Serial Number
IC Batch number
Data
Samsung’s internal management value
ROM code number
150C h
All FF h
Samsung’s
internal
management
value
beginning with 06 h
4250 h
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of the year
and DDD is the number of the day within the
year)
4252 h
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of the year
and DDD is the number of the day within the
year)
A proprietary binary number
A proprietary binary number
8002Ah
IC Version
02 h
8002Bh
Test ROM Code Version
10 h
8002Ch – 8002Dh
Crypto. Library Version
036C h
8002Eh
DRNG Library Version
02 h
80030h – 8007Fh
Available for customer
All FF h
Table 3: TOE version information
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3 Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a deterministic random number
generator. If the user decides not to use the RSA crypto library the library is not delivered
to the user. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA
crypto library what is resulting in two TOE configurations.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES and RSA cryptographic functions performed by the
TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and
against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during
TOE Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and
Personalisation. Details can be found in the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 4.2].
5 Architectural Information
The S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 is integrated circuits
(IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application
software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE
description of the Security Target Lite [9, chapter 2.1]. The complete hardware description
and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found in guidance documents
delivered to the customer, see table 2.
The TOE consists of the 18 subsystems (15 hardware / 3 software) as defined in
evaluation documentation. For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically
the components processing unit (CPU) with ROM, EEPROM, RAM, I/O, Deterministic
Random Number Generator (DRNG), TORNADO, Clock, Timer / 16-bit Timer and 20-bit
Watchdog, Detectors and Security Control, RESET, Address and Data Bus, DES, Power
Control, MPU / Memory Protection Unit, Testrom_code, RSA Crypto Library and DRNG
Library are used.
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Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole
circuitry. The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of the TOE.
The subsystem Testrom_code stored on the chip, is used for testing purposes during
production only and is completely separated from the use of the embedded software by
disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the Triple-DES operation only.
6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC
Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
•
used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
•
special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with samples of the
TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which include also layout
tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout;
6. functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
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performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer
tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment
was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures
were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the
final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2
and specific EEPROM coding as outlined above. The TOE can be delivered in two
configurations:
●
Smartcard IC S3CC9LC, Revision 2,
●
Smartcard IC S3CC9LC, Revision 2 with Secure Crypto Library V3.6S.
No further generation takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery the TOE
only features one fixed configuration (normal mode), which cannot be altered by the user.
The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification results
therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE. For all evaluation activities
performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the normal
mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
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Certification Report
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
•
All components of the class ASE
•
All components of the EAL 5 augmented package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
•
The components
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
•
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
•
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
•
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure state)
and AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
• The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
SF3 – Non-reversibility of TEST and NORMAL modes
SF5 – Deterministic Random Number Generator (part of SF5)
The cryptographic algorithm of Triple-DES can also be analysed with permutational or
probabilistic methods but that was not part of this evaluations.
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, 26 and AIS
31 (see [4]) were used. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and
production environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for: SF5.
The TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators to support the standard
cryptographic operations. This security enforcing function is introduced to include the
cryptographic operation in the scope of the evaluation as the cryptographic function itself is
not used from the TOE Security Policy. On the other hand these functions are of special
interest for the use of the hardware as platform for the software. The components are a
hardware DES encryption unit and a combination of software and hardware unit to support
RSA cryptography and RSA key generation. The key for the cryptographic Triple-DES
operations are provided from the Smartcard Embedded Software.
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The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). The validity period of each algorithm and its
bitlength is recommended in the official catalogue [17].
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The TOE is delivered to Card Manufacturer and the Smart Card Embedded Software
Developer. The actual end user obtains the TOE from the operating system producer
together with the application which runs on the TOE.
The Smart Card Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations
and hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
•
All security hints described in [16] and the delivered documents [12], [13], [14] have to
be considered.
In addition the following assumptions and requirements concerning external security
measures, explicitly documented in the singles evaluation reports, have to be fulfilled:
•
Requirement resulting from ADV_LLD:
Since the hardware cannot guarantee the storage of correct data in case of power
loss during memory write operations the software has to implement appropriate
measures to check if security relevant data are correctly written.
•
Requirement resulting from ADO_DEL:
●
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip manufacturer can only
guarantee the integrity up to the delivery procedure. It is in the responsibility of the
Smart Card Embedded Software Developer to include mechanisms in the
implemented software which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.
●
TOEs which failed the production tests are also delivered, as they are inked
(marked my black dots) and remain physically on the wafer. The Card Manufacturer
has to follow the procedure described in [15] to handle these chips in a secure
manner.
•
Requirement resulting from AVA_MSU:
During an evaluation of the Smart Card Embedded Software the following has to be
checked:
• Application of the security advices given in [12] especially the recommendations for
secure usage in [12, chapter 4].
•
Requirement resulting from AVA_VLA:
• The TOE is protected by light sensors against light injection attacks (e.g. with laser).
Nevertheless the performed penetration tests show that it is still possible to
manipulate a running program with a focussed laser. The Smart Card Embedded
Software Developer has to implement sufficient counter-measures in his software to
counter such attacks, too.
• The TOE does not implement a padding scheme for the RSA signature
creation/verification. This has to be implemented by the embedded software. To
counter known attacks against incorrect padding a complete check of padding
regarding correctness is mandatory.
• If the key parameters of the signature generation are stored in the memory, a
Bellcore attack is possible. Therefore the embedded software has to check the
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consistency of the key parameters handed over by the RSA signature generation
function after call of the function, e.g. by means of a CRC.
The Card Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints to develop his
software in form of the delivered documentation.
•
All security hints described in [15] have to be considered.
Periodically a new official catalogue [17] is published on the homepage of the German
Federal Network Agency. The current version of the catalogue holds for the strength of the
TOE`s cryptographic signature algorithms. The user is obliged to take the information of
the current version of [17, published February 5th, 2008, page 376] into account. The
periods of the recommended usage of the TOEs algorithms for encryption and decryption
listed in 9.2 are
•
Signature creation and verification using RSA encryption, decryption and key
generation with a key length from 1024 to 2048 bits. A usage of 2048 bits is
recommended. From 1976 bits key length the current recommended period of
usage is by the end of 2014 [17].
•
Signature creation and verification according to ECDSA and Elliptic Curve (EC) key
generation standard with 192 - 521 bits key sizes. From 224 bits key length the
current recommended period of usage is by the end of 2014 [17].
This data is deplaced by a new version of [17].
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
CBC
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, Act setting up the Federal Office for Information
Security
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRC
Cyclic Redundancy Check
CPU
Central Processing Unit
CMOS
Complimentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
DRNG
Deterministic Random Number Generator
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EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electrical Code Block
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro magnetic analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
I/O
Input/Output
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MPU
Memory Protection Unit
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB
Universal Serial Bus
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target of S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards – Project
Cheyenne II, Version 1.4, 2008-04-29, Samsung Electronics (confidential
document)
[7]
EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT-SUMMARY (ETR SUMMARY), 8103842493 /
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501, S3CC9LC, Version 2, TÜViT (confidential document)
[8]
Configuration Management Documentation (Class ACM_AUT/CAP/SCP) – Project
Cheyenne II, Version 1.3, 2008-05-09 Samsung Electronics (confidential document)
[9]
Security Target Lite of S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Cards,
Version 1.0,2008-06-03, Samsung Electronics
[10]
Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration
ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[11]
ETR FOR COMPOSITE EVALUATION (ETR-COMP), 8103842493 / BSI-DSZCC-0501, S3CC91A, Version 2, 2008-06-03, TÜViT (confidential document)
[12]
Security Application Note, S3CC9LC, Version 1.1, 2008-05-06, Samsung
Electronics
8
specifically
•
AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document resp. CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[13]
Application Note RSA Crypto Library with TORNADO V3.6S, Version 1.12,
2008-01-11, Samsung Electronics
[14]
Application Note DRNG Software Library v2.0, Version 2.0, 2006-12-13, Samsung
Electronics
[15]
S3CC9LC Chip
Electronics
[16]
User’s manual S3CC9GC/GW/LC 16-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card,
Version 5, 2007-06-05, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Samsung Electronics
[17]
Bundesnetzagentur: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht
über
geeignete
Algorithmen), German "Bundesanzeiger Nr. 19",
published February 5th, 2008,
page 376
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Delivery
Specification,
Revision
1,
06.2007,
Samsung
Certification Report
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the
conformance result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages
listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
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PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
Certification Report
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly
stated
(APE_SRE)
IT
security
requirements
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
by
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
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Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product S3CC9LC 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 (Target
of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 1 July 2008, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance
Requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. San24, Nongseo-dong, Giheung-gu, Yongin-City,
Gyeonggido , 449-711, Korea (Development, Production, Mask House)
b)
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. San #16, Banwol-Ri, Hwasung-Eup, Gyeonggi-Do,
445-701, Korea (Development)
c)
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., San #74, Buksoo-Ri, Baebang-Myun, Asan-City,
Choongcheongnam-Do, 336-711, Korea (Onyang plant, Delivery)
d)
PKL Co., Ltd. Plant, 493-3 Sungsung-Dong, Cheonan-City, Choongcheongnam-Do,
330-300, Korea (Mask House)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in Giheung, Korea, is
labelled by the production line indicator „06“ as hex.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [9]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0501-2008
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