Certification Report: 0873a_pdf

Certification Report: 0873a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
for
Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128
Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type
Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on
RS4FC128E Version 01 integrated circuit Product
Type Code 01
from
Renesas Electronics Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.75
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Smartcard Controller
Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated
circuit Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on
RS4FC128E Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 01
from
Renesas Electronics Corporation
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 5 March 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
SOGIS Recognition
Agreement
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn -
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1
2
3
4
5
Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
CC Part 1:.......................................................................................................................25
CC Part 3:.......................................................................................................................26
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated circuit
Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128E Version 01
integrated circuit Product Type Code 01 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01
integrated circuit Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on
RS4FC128E Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 01 was conducted by
T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 6 February 2014. T-Systems
GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Renesas Electronics
Corporation.
The product was developed by: Renesas Electronics Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4
Certification Report
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated circuit
Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128E Version 01
integrated circuit Product Type Code 01 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Renesas Electronics Corporation
5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588
Japan
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version
01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on
RS4FC128E Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 01.
The composite TOE is a cryptographic library running on the Renesas’ certified hardware
platform RS4FC128(E) security integrated circuit Version 01. As software library, the
RCL3.0 has to be integrated in an application software (Security IC Embedded Software)
running on the hardware platform.
The TOE complies with the Security IC Platform Protection Profile, where the
cryptographic library serves as IC Dedicated Support Software as defined in [7]. It provides
cryptographic services using the certified hardware platform RS4FC128(E).
The TOE consists of the certified hardware platform and the cryptographic library software.
The hardware platform is intended for use in a variety of security applications requiring
large memory, high security and high speed secure authentication, data encryption, or
electronic signature generation. The hardware platform is described in the related
certification report.
The cryptographic library software is intended for use by the Security IC Embedded
Software. It comprises the following major blocks: Public Key Algorithm Library (PKLIB),
Secret Key Algorithm Library (SKLIB), and Common Code Platform Library (CCPLIB).
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
SF.RCL-LeakProtect
Leak Protection
SF.RNG
Random Number Generator
SF.DES
Triple-DES function
SF.AES
AES function
SF.PKCC
RSA functions
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
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Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated circuit Product
Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128E Version 01
integrated circuit Product Type Code 01
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW
Renesas RS4FC128(E) integrated circuit Version
01
Version 01
wafer, Chip On
Tape (COT), SON8
2
SW
IC Dedicated Test Software, Test ROM software
Version 50282
included in the
TOEs ROM
3
SW
Secure Boot Loader software
Version 5560
included in the
TOEs ROM
4
DOC RNG on-line test software printed on the guidance
document (cf. [17])
Version 1.1
source code printed
in the guidance
document
5
SW
Version 5897
as electronic copy
6
DOC RS4FC128, RS4FC128E User's Manual: Hardware, Revision 1.00
Renesas Secure Microcomputer RS-4E Series,
July 2013 [16]
7
DOC Secure Boot Loader Version 5560 User's Manual:
Hardware, Renesas Secure Microcomputer RS-4E
Series, August 2013 [18]
Revision 1.10
as hardcopy or
Document Number electronic copy
R01US0044EJ0110
8
DOC RS-4E Series User Guidance Manual, September
2013 [17]
Revision 1.1
as hardcopy or
electronic copy
9
DOC Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for
RS4FC128), 16 November 2012 [14]
Version 0.2
Revision 22272
as hardcopy or
electronic copy
10
DOC Renesas Cryptographic Library 3, User's Manual:
Software, Renesas Secure Microcomputer RS-4E
Series, 25 September 2013 [15]
Version 5897
as hardcopy or
Revision 1.10
electronic copy
Document Number
R01US0043EJ0110
Renesas Cryptographic Library 3.0
as hardcopy or
electronic copy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
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Only 7 items (the hardware platform, five documents, and the electronic RCL3.0 software)
are delivered since the IC Dedicated Software and the Secure Boot Loader software
included in the ROM is delivered on the chip and the RNG on-line test software is printed
in the guidance document [17].
The TOE hardware platform RS4FC128 is available as wafers or as packaged module.
The security functionality of the TOE is not influenced by the delivery forms.
Product Name
Product Type Code
Application
Package at shipment
RS4FC128
00
Smart cards
Wafer, COT
RS4FC128E
01
Embedded in devices
Wafer, SON8
Table 3: Configurations of the TOE
The commercial type name of the underlying hardware is the name of the RS4FC128(E)
along with the selected product type code, which is described in [14]. The package at
shipment is selected by the customers in [14]. The commercial type name of the RCL
library is Renesas Cryptographic Library 3.0 (RCL3.0) Version 5897.
The underlying hardware platform is identified as described in [14]. The user is required to
verify the integrity of the RCL using SHA-256 hash calculation. The RCL is delivered as
three libraries and one header file (refer to section 1.2 of [15]). The identification occurs by
comparison of their calculated SHA-256 values with the hash values depicted in section
2.3.8 of [15].
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy of the TOE is
to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the
smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE will implement algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption
and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number
generator.
The security policy of the TOE is also to provide protection against leakage of information
(e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions
performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
4
•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the
TOE and
•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Features provided by the TOE.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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Name
Assumption Title
OE.Plat-Appl
Usage of Hardware Platform
OE.Resp-Appl
Treatment of User Data
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
OE.InjDatSupp
Injected Data Support
Table 4: Objectives for the TOE-Environment
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2.
5
Architectural Information
The composite TOE comprises Renesas Cryptographic Library RCL3.0 running on
Renesas' security IC RS4FC128 and packaged version RS4FC128E. The TOE complies
with the Security IC Platform Protection Profile [7]. The RCL3.0 as cryptographic library
provides cryptographic services using the certified hardware platform RS4FC128 with
countermeasures against attacks described in RCL3.0 on RS4FC128 Version 01 Security
Target [6]. These may be incorporated into the user's security IC embedded software.
The hardware platform is Renesas' Security IC RS4FC128 and packaged version
RS4FC128E, which has already been certified according the requirements of CC EAL5+
(refer to [12]). It implements different security measures and requires the software to
implement further countermeasures. The requirements are described in RS-4E Series
User Guidance Manual [12] and Secure Boot Loader Version 5560, User's Manual:
Hardware [15].
The RCL3.0 is provided as three different libraries (PKLIB, SKLIB, CCPLIB), which provide
the following functions in a secured implementation to protect against inherent leakage:
Public Key Algorithm library (PKLIB):
•
RSA CRT algorithm,
•
RSA public algorithm,
•
Multiplication of data blocks containing secret integers, based on the hardware
PKCC and using data blinding,
•
Comparison: To compare data blocks containing secret integers, the RCL3.0
provides a function to perform the operation, based on the hardware PKCC and
using data blinding. In contrast to the equality test function from the CCPLIB, the
supported data block length is different and the function checks whether the first
input integer is equal to, smaller or larger than the second input integer.
Secret Key Algorithm library (SKLIB):
•
DES keys loading process,
•
3DES algorithm in ECB, CBC and OFB modes using the hardware DES
coprocessor,
•
AES keys loading process,
•
AES algorithm in ECB, CBC and OFB modes using the hardware AES coprocessor.
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Common Code Platform library (CCPLIB):
•
Online test of the underlying platform's hardware random number generator
(without security claim),
•
Random data string generation based on the underlying 16-bit hardware random
number generator,
•
Scrambled copy / equal / XOR: To copy, test for equality or compute the XOR sum
of data blocks containing secret information, the RCL3.0 provides functions to
perform the operation in a varying order. In contrast to the compare function from
the PKLIB, the scrambled equality test function only tests for equality and the
supported data block length is different,
•
Scrambled 32-bit check sum: To compute a 32-bit check sum over a given data
block containing secret information, the RCL3.0 provides a function to perform the
operation in a varying order.
The RCL3.0 does not include any key management functionality, since this depends on
the application context. It also does not contain functionality for formatting the input data
(e.g. padding for the RSA algorithm). This has to be provided by the user of the RCL3.0
(i.e. usually the operating system).
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the composite developer can be divided into the following
categories:
1. Unit Tests - individual functions are tested with specific inputs. The unit tests are
performed on emulator as well as on chip, except for tests cases involving a chip
reset, which are performed on emulator only,
2. Integration Tests - the user functions are tested, individually and when they are
working together, for example in a user program. Integration tests include interface
tests (API tests), random input tests (random tests), and functionality tests in
different clock settings (HeatRun Tests),
3. System Tests - speed and memory consumption tests (including stack- and
section-size testing), and
4. Countermeasure Correctness Testing - verification of the security countermeasures.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by sampling. Some test
protocols of the tests provided by the developer were verified. In addition the evaluators
performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by
the developer. The tests of the evaluators comprise special tests and examination of the
RCL software using open samples.
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The evaluation provides evidence that the TOE provides the TOE Security Functionality as
specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE
Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The tests for
the composite TOE considered the requirements to the software. Although the final ETR
for Composition of the hardware platform was not available when the tests were carried
out, the information was available to the evaluators, because the hardware platform has
also been evaluated at T-Systems. The penetration tests considered both the side channel
analysis and fault injection attacks. The test of the composite TOE comprises attacks that
must be averted by the combination of the hardware platform and the IC Embedded
Software as well as attacks against the software hardware platform (stack overflow).
The penetration testing was performed using the evaluators' testing environment. All
configurations of the TOE being intended to be covered by the current evaluation were
tested.
The penetration tests tested all SFRs.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was actually
successful in the TOE's operational environment as defined in the RCL3.0 on RS4FC128
Version 01 Security Target ([6], [8]) provided that all measures required by the guidance
are applied.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The TOE is Renesas' Cryptographic Library running on Renesas' certified product
hardware platform (RS4FC128) without any Security IC Embedded Software. The TOE is
intended to be used by the secure application software (Security IC Embedded Software),
which is not in scope of the evaluation, however the Security IC Embedded Software
programmer is responsible for the proper use of the TOE. The hardware platform requires
the implementation of the RNG on-line test software (described in [17]), which is
implemented as a security functionality of the TOE. The RCL3.0 on RS4FC128 supports
the development of Security IC Embedded Software.
The underlying hardware (RS4FC128) can also be delivered as embedded device
(RS4FC128E). Therefore there are two names and configurations for the hardware of the
TOE. However the secure boot loader software of the hardware platform can be delivered
in different configurations, as described in [17].
The TOE type in question is a Security IC. The hardware platform uses state-of-the-art
smart card security technologies like glue logic, shielding, anti-DPA/DFA measures, and
requests further secure measures to be implemented in the software. The Renesas
RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 00
and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128E Version 01 integrated circuit Product
Type Code 01 implements security functions equipped with the secure measures. The
security functionalities implemented in RCL3.0 on RS4FC128(E) fulfil the requirements of
the hardware platform or fulfil a part of them and require further secure measures to the
secure application software as stated in [15].
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9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, The Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits
●
Supporting Document – Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack
Potential to Smartcards
●
Supporting Document – Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
9.2
Certification Report
Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
Any Cryptographic Functionality that is marked in column 'Security Level above 100 Bits'
of the following table with 'no' achieves a security level of lower than 100 Bits (in general
context).
No. Purpose
Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in
Bits
Security Level
above 100 Bits
NIST SP 800-67, NIST
SP 800-38A
112
No
1
Cryptographic Triple-DES in ECB,
Primitive
CBC, OFB
2
Triple-DES in ECB
168
No
3
Triple-DES in CBC, OFB NIST 800-67, NIST SP
800-38A
168
Yes
4
AES in ECB
128, 192, 256 No
5
AES in CBC, OFB
6
RSA encryption and
decryption (RSAEP,
RSADP)
PKCS#1 v2.1
RSA signature
generation and
verification (RSASP1,
RSAVP1)
PKCS#1 v2.1
7
8
9
FIPS 197, NIST
SP800-38A
128, 192, 256 Yes
1024 to 1975
No
1976 to 2048
Yes
1024 to 1975
No
1976 to 2048
Yes
Table 5: TOE cryptographic functionality
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
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Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining, mode of operation for block ciphers
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electronic Codebook Mode, mode of operation for block ciphers
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technologies
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OFB
Output Feedback Mode, mode of operation for block ciphers
PP
Protection Profile
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
An algorithm for public-key encryption developed by Rivest, Shamir and
Adleman
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014, Revision 7290, 27 September 2013,
RCL3.0 on RS4FC128 Version 01 Security Target, Renesas Electronics Corporation
(confidential document)
[7]
Security IC Platform
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
[8]
Security Target for BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014, Revision 7716, 17 January 2014,
RCL3.0 on RS4FC128 Version 01 Security Target Public Version, Renesas
Electronics Corporation (sanitised public document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.00, 5 February 2014, Evaluation Technical
Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0873, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[10]
0873-ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for Renesas Cryptographic
Library 3.0 running on the RS4FC128, Version 1.00, 5 February 2014, 0873-ETR for
composition, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
8
Protection
Profile,
Version
1.0,
15
June
2007,
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 2, 15 May 2013, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 8, 12 February 2013, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 9, 21 March 2013, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 3, 15 May 2013, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 7, 8 June 2011, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 4, 15 May 2013, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 37, Version 3, 17 May 2010, Terminologie und Vorbereitung von Smartcard-Evaluierungen
•
AIS 38, Version 2.9, 8 June 2011, Reuse of evaluation results
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Certification Report
[11]
Generic Configuration List, Version 7420, 02 October 2013, RCL3.0 on RS4FC128
Generic
Configuration
List,
Document
Number
RCL3.0
on
RS4FC128-CC-ALC-0002,
Renesas Electronics
Corporation
(confidential
document)
[12]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0872-2013, 06 December 2013, Renesas
RS4FC128 and RS4FC128E integrated circuits version 01, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[13]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0872-2013 ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, Version
1.00, 30 October 2013, 0872-ETR for composition, T-Systems GEI GmbH
(confidential document)
[14]
Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for RS4FC128), Version 0.2, Revision
22272, 16 November 2012, Renesas Electronics Corporation
[15]
Renesas Cryptographic Library 3 (RCL3), User's Manual: Software, Renesas
Secure Microcomputer RS-4E Series, Version 5897 (RCL3.0), Rev. 1.10, 25
September 2013, Renesas Electronics Corporation
[16]
RS4FC128, RS4FC128E User's Manual: Hardware, Renesas Secure
Microcomputer, RS-4E Series, Rev. 1.00, July 2013, Renesas Electronics
Corporation
[17]
RS-4E Series User Guidance Manual, Revision 1.1, September 2013, Renesas
Electronics Corporation
[18]
Secure Boot Loader Version 5560, User's Manual: Hardware, Renesas Secure
Microcomputer RS-4E Series, Rev. 1.10, August 2013, Document Number
R01US0044EJ0110, Renesas Electronics Corporation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (Release 4 = chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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Certification Report
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128 Version 01 integrated
circuit Product Type Code 00 and Renesas RCL3.0 (version 5897) on RS4FC128E
Version 01 integrated circuit Product Type Code 01 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 5 March 2014, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
No.
a)
Site
Task within the evaluation
Renesas Electronics Corporation
Development and customer
support
5-20-1, Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi,
Tokyo 187-8588, Japan
b)
Renesas Electronics Europe Ltd.
Dukes Meadow, Millboard Road,
Provides evaluation deliverables
and customer support
Bourne End, Buckinghamshire, SL8 5FH, U.K.
c)
Renesas Musashi Engineering Services Co., Ltd.
5-22-1, Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi,
Provides customer support for
built-in software and write data
Tokyo 187-8522, Japan
d)
Renesas Electronics Corporation Naka Factory
Wafer manufacturing and test site
751 Horiguchi, Hitachinaka-shi,
Ibaraki-ken 312-8504, Japan
e)
Toppan Printing Co., Ltd.
Preparation of masks
7-21-33 Nobidome, Niiza-shi,
Saitama 352-0011, Japan
f)
Renesas Electronics Corporation Naka Factory
Test center
730 Horiguchi, Hitachinaka-shi,
Ibaraki 312-0034, Japan
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Certification Report
No.
g)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0873-2014
Site
Task within the evaluation
MTEX Matsumura Corp.
Module Assembly
2-2-2 Kitamachi, Obanazawa-shi
Yamagata 999-4231, Japan
h)
Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH
Karl-Hammerschmidt-Str. 42,
Test and development for Secure
Boot Loader
85609 Aschheim-Dornach, Germany
d) to h) Sites from the basis security IC certification
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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