Security Target: anssi_cible_2015_63_LITE

Security Target: anssi_cible_2015_63_LITE
MRTD full EAC v2
Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
FQR No: 110 7637
FQR Issue: 4
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
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Document Management
A. Identification
Business Unit - Department
ID R&D
Document type:
Document Title:
FQR
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
FQR No:
110 7637
FQR Issue:
4
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES
8
LIST OF TABLES 9
1
2
3
4
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
10
1.1
Purpose .............................................................................................................. 10
1.2
Objective of the security target............................................................................ 10
1.3
Security target identification ............................................................................... 11
1.4
TOE technical identification ................................................................................. 12
1.5
IC identification ................................................................................................... 13
TOE OVERVIEW
14
2.1
Product overview ................................................................................................ 14
2.2
TOE overview ...................................................................................................... 15
2.3
TOE usages .......................................................................................................... 16
2.4
TOE definition ..................................................................................................... 17
TOE ARCHITECTURE
19
3.1
Integrated Circuit - NXP P60................................................................................. 19
3.2
Low layer ............................................................................................................ 20
3.3
Tools modules ..................................................................................................... 21
3.4
Applicative modules ............................................................................................ 21
3.5
Operating System ................................................................................................ 22
3.6
Application layer ................................................................................................. 22
TOE LIFE CYCLE
24
4.1
Life cycle overview .............................................................................................. 24
4.2
Phase 1 “Development”....................................................................................... 26
4.3
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”..................................................................................... 26
4.4
Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” ................................................ 27
4.5
Phase 4 “Operational Use” .................................................................................. 28
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5
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.2
29
Common Criteria conformance ............................................................................ 29
Overview of the SFR defined in this ST .................................................................... 29
Overview of the additional protocols ...................................................................... 31
5.1.2.1 Active Authentication ...................................................................................................... 31
5.1.2.2 Prepersonalization phase ................................................................................................ 31
5.1.2.3 PACE CAM........................................................................................................................ 31
6
5.2
Protection Profile conformance ........................................................................... 32
5.3
Rationale for the additions .................................................................................. 32
5.4
Non evaluated features ....................................................................................... 32
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
6.1
6.1.1
33
Subjects .............................................................................................................. 33
PP EAC with PACE subjects....................................................................................... 33
6.1.2
PP PACE Subjects ...................................................................................................... 35
6.1.3
Additional Subjects .................................................................................................. 37
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.3
6.3.1
Assets ................................................................................................................. 37
User data .................................................................................................................. 37
TSF data .................................................................................................................... 39
Threats ............................................................................................................... 41
Threats from the PP EAC with PACE......................................................................... 41
6.3.2
Threats from the PP PACE ........................................................................................ 42
6.3.3
Threats for AA .......................................................................................................... 46
6.3.4
Threats for Note 6 .................................................................................................... 46
6.4
6.4.1
Organisational Security Policies ........................................................................... 47
47
6.4.2
OSP from PP EAC with PACE..................................................................................... 47
6.4.3
OSP from PP PACE .................................................................................................... 48
6.4.4
OSP for AA ................................................................................................................ 50
6.5
6.5.1
Assumptions ....................................................................................................... 50
Assumptions from PP EAC with PACE ...................................................................... 50
6.5.2
Assumptions from PP PACE ...................................................................................... 51
6.5.3
Assumptions for Active Authentication ................................................................... 51
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7
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
7.1
7.1.1
SO from PP PACE ...................................................................................................... 53
7.1.3
SO for AA .................................................................................................................. 55
7.1.4
SO for Note 6 ............................................................................................................ 55
Security objectives for the Operational Environment............................................ 56
OE from PP EAC with PACE....................................................................................... 56
7.2.2
OE from PP PACE ...................................................................................................... 57
7.2.3
OE for AA .................................................................................................................. 59
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
60
8.1
8.1.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage..................................................... 60
Extended components FAU_SAS.1 ........................................................................... 60
8.2
8.2.1
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ 60
Extended component FCS_RND.1 ............................................................................ 60
8.3
8.3.1
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity ................................. 60
Extended component FIA_API.1 .............................................................................. 60
8.4
8.4.1
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ........................... 61
Extended component FMT_LIM.1............................................................................ 61
8.4.2
8.5
8.5.1
9
Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................ 52
SO from PP EAC with PACE....................................................................................... 52
7.1.2
7.2
7.2.1
8
52
Extended component FMT_LIM.2............................................................................ 61
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ......................................................... 62
Extended component FPT_EMS.1 ............................................................................ 62
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
9.1
9.1.1
9.1.2
63
Security Functional Requirements........................................................................ 63
Global SFR ................................................................................................................ 63
Product configuration SFR ....................................................................................... 65
9.1.2.1 SFR for additional code ................................................................................................... 65
9.1.2.2 Manufacturing and Personalization ................................................................................ 69
9.1.3
Active Authentication SFR ........................................................................................ 76
9.1.4
Chip Authentication SFR........................................................................................... 78
9.1.5
Terminal Authentication SFR ................................................................................... 84
9.1.6
Extended Access Control SFR ................................................................................... 86
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
9.1.7
PACE SFR .................................................................................................................. 88
9.1.8
PACE CAM SFR .......................................................................................................... 95
9.2
10
Security Assurance Requirements ........................................................................ 97
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
10.1
98
TOE Summary Specification ................................................................................. 98
11
RATIONALES
102
12
REFERENCES
103
13
ACRONYMS
106
INDEX 107
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
List of Figures
Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview
Figure 3 - TOE architecture
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
Figure 5 - Advanced Inspection Procedure
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15
19
24
34
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
List of tables
Table 1 - General Identification
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
Table 3 - Chip Identification
Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview
Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
Table 10 - SFR driven from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2
Table 11 - Additional SFR
Table 12- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage
Table 13 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage
Table 14 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage
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11
12
13
15
20
25
25
29
30
31
102
102
102
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The objective of this document is to present the Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA of the
MRTD full EAC v2 product on NXP components from P60 family.
1.2 Objective of the security target
This security target describes the security needs for MRTD full EAC v2 product. The product is
conforming to PP EAC v2 and PP PACE and adds requirements for prepersonalization and
personalization.
This security target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL5 augmented as
defined in §1.3 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing
the environment in which it operates.
The objectives of this Security Target are:
- To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart
card life cycle.
- To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and
the threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the
platform active phases.
- To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE
(and its documentation) during the product active phases.
- To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the
TOE assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment.
- To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.
- To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the
TOE provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security
environment, and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
1.3 Security target identification
Title:
Editor:
CC version:
Security target EAC with PACE
Oberthur Technologies
3.1 revision 4
EAL5 augmented with:
EAL:
PP(s):
ST Reference:
ITSEF:
Certification Body:
Evaluation scheme:
-
ALC_DVS.2
-
AVA_VAN.5
BSI-CC-PP-0056 v2 [R13]
BSI-CC-PP-0068 v2 [R14]
FQR 110 7239 Issue 6
LETI
ANSSI
FR
Table 1 - General Identification
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
1.4 TOE technical identification
Product name:
ID-One ePass Full EAC v2
Commercial name of
the TOE 1:
ID-One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x080 VC/VG in EAC with PACE
configuration with AA
Commercial name of
the TOE 2:
ID-One ePass Full EAC v2 on P60x144 VA in EAC with PACE
configuration with AA
‘6C14’ (P60D080 VC)
‘6014’ (P60D080 VG)
IC type
‘6A15’ (P60D144 VA)
‘6019’ (P60C080 VG)
‘6A20’ (P60C144 VA)
Additional code 1
Mandatory generic
‘C96E449AD06093BB25395B4F2C4F63720C46F52E2D4D91BA00B84B098
6F7A738’
Identification:
Additional code 2
Optional DBI
‘B765E230D3B932A3930445DF453B50CAA3EC0077C03ABD2F327D8606
532F51C2’
Identification:
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
Nota Bene
- The additional code doesn’t depend on the IC and the memory size
- The additional code is encrypted with the LSK key
- An optional additional code (functional) can be loaded. This additional code, relative to the
Digitally Blurred Image process (DBI) is part of the product, but not in the scope of the
evaluation.
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
1.5 IC identification
IC Reference:
TOE 1:
TOE 2:
Communication
protocol:
Memory:
Chip Manufacturer:
NXP P60 chips
NXP P60x080/052/040 PVC/PVG [R19]
EAL 6 + AVA_VAN.5 + ALC_DVS.2 + ASE_TSS.2
NXP P60x144/080PVA/PVA (Y) [R18]
EAL 6 + ALC_FLR.1
Contact, Contactless and Dual
ROM
NXP Semiconductors
Table 3 - Chip Identification
Nota Bene
TOE 1 and TOE 2 possess the same source code, which is embedded on the two NXP chips. The two
NXP chips are driven from the NXP P60 chip family.
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2 TOE OVERVIEW
2.1 Product overview
The product ID-One Native eDoc is a multi-applicative native software, embeddable in contact
and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can be
configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization phases of the
product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical
Data Structure as specified in [R2]. It also provides standard authentication protocols, namely Basic
Access Control [R11], Supplementary Access Control [R17], Active Authentication [R39], Extended
Access Control ([R12] and [R13]), the Basic Access Protection [R9] and Extended Access Protection
(compliant to [R9]).
It can host four types of applications as mentioned above, namely the IDL, MRTD, eID and eSign.
Moreover, further configuration may also be done to each type of application to serve use cases
other than those behaviourally defined in the referenced normative documents.
This product is embedded on the ICs described in §1.5 IC identification.
The ID-One Native eDoc architecture can be viewed as shown in the following picture:
Application
layer
Block 1:
MRTD - IDL
Block 2:
eID
Block 3:
eSign
Block 4:
Dauth
Operating System
Applicative modules
Tools modules
Platform
layer
Low layer
NXP P60
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
Figure 1 - ID-One Native eDoc Overview
2.2 TOE overview
The TOE described in this security target is the EAC with PACE and AA TOE of the product, a subset of
the Block 1 MRTD - IDL.
The block 1 of the ID-One Native eDoc is composed of the following applications:
Applications
PP
Targeted EAL
MRTD
BAC with CA and AA
[R11]
EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAC with AA
[R12]
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAC with PACE and AA
PACE,
with
CA,
PACE_CAM and AA
IDL
[R13]
[R14]
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
BAP
X
EAC and BAP
X
EAL4 + ADV_FSP.5 + ADV_INT.2 + ADV_TDS.4 + ALC_DVS.2 +
ALC_CMS.5 + ALC_TAT.2 + ATE_DPT.3
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PACE
PACE and EAC
X
X
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
Table 4 - Block 1 Applications overview
Block 1:
MRTD & IDL
MRTD BAC
MRTD EAC
MRTD EAC with
PACE
MRTD PACE
IDL BAP
IDL BAP & EAC
IDL PACE
IDL EAC with
PACE
Figure 2 - Block 1 Overview
The EAC with PACE and AA TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the
operating system that creates the MF / DF required for the EAC configuration.
The TOE life cycle is described in §4 TOE life cycle.
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The TOE identification is described in §1.4 TOE technical identification.
Nota bene
The TOE scope encompasses the following features:
- Extended Access Control with Password Authenticated Connection Establishment, Chip
Authentication and Terminal Authentication
- Active Authentication
- Prepersonalization phase (in particular with Additional code loading)
- Personalization phase
Nevertheless, the TOE can embed other secure functionalities, but they are not in the scope of this
TOE and subject to an evaluation in other TOEs.
2.3 TOE usages
State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration,
verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
- Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
- A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
- And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
- The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and
- The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data stored
in the MRTD.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
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The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:
- A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder
o The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book
o The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies
the device
o The printed portrait
- A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO and extended in [R7], [R8], [R9] on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of
the MRTD holder
o The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1)
o The digitized portraits
o The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
o The other data according to LDS (up to DG24)
o The Document security object
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s
chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding
of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
2.4 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
the following feature:
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
-
Active Authentication
EAC
PACE
The TOE comprises at least:
- Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
- IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support
Software
- IC Embedded Software (operating system)
- MRTD application
- Associated guidance documentation
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MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is a smartcard, composed of various modules and composed of the following components:
Application
layer
Block 1: MRTD & IDL
BAC
EAC
eDoc Application
EAC w
PACE
IDL BAP
IDL PACE
PACE
IDL BAP &
IDL PACE &
EAC
EAC
Block
2
Block
3
Block
4
Resident Application
Operating System
Applicative modules
Tools modules
Platform
layer
Low layer
Figure 3 - TOE architecture
3.1 Integrated Circuit - NXP P60
The TOE is embedded on NXP chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification.
More information on the chips are given in the related security targets.
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3.2 Low layer
The low layer developed by Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip
features from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer
design which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
- EEPROM management including secure data processing,
- Other memories management,
- Transaction management,
- APDU protocol management,
- Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
- Error processing,
- Advanced securities activation.
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to
provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Cryptographic Feature
Embedded
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits
RSA CRT from 1024, to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits):
- signature/verification
- key pair generation
RSA SFM from 1024 to 4096 bits (by steps of 256 bits):
- signature/verification
- key pair generation
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits :
- signature/verification (ECDSA)
- key agreement (ECDH)
- key pair generation
3DES with 112 bits key size
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes
Random Generator compliant AIS31
Diffie Hellman from 1024 to 2048 :
- key agreement
- key generation
Integrated mapping over prime field and Elliptic curves
Table 5 - OT Cryptographic library
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More information is available in complete ST.
3.3 Tools modules
The tools modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product:
- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO
recommendations [R2].
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R20] and as described in annex E of [R41].
- PIN and BIO access rights management as presented in § 2.5 of [R40] and B.6 of [R41]
- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation.
- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and
Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard
More information is available in complete ST.
3.4 Applicative modules
The applicative modules provide MRTD full EAC v2 product:
- Chip Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in [R40], an
ephemeral-static Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that provides secure
communication and unilateral authentication of the MRTD chip.
- Terminal Authentication version 1 as described in [R39] and version 2 as described in [R40], a
two move challenge-response protocol that provides explicit unilateral authentication of the
terminal.
- PACE Protocol as specified in [R17], a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol that provides secure communication and explicit password-based authentication of
the MRTD chip and the terminal.
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data
object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…). For applications already defined by normative
documents such as eMRTD, iDL, eID and eSign, the application embeds ROMed access
condition rules.
- Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring
of a JPG or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of
patents owned by Oberthur Technologies. This module is part of the TOE and outside the
scope of this present certification.
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3.5 Operating System
This application manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to
configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK,
LSK), File management including data reading and writing or additional code loading. It can be
addressed in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands, using SCP02 or SCP03.
More information is available in complete ST.
3.6 Application layer
Two kinds of dispatcher are available on the top of the product: the resident application that is used
for Personalization Phase and for administration during Use Phase and the eDoc application that is
used during the Use Phase of MRTD Applications.
The application layer also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access Control
Extended Access Control, Password Authenticated Connection Establishment or Active
Authentication.
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2]. Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access
Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used
to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted
data.
The inspection system:
- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data.
After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO. Basic Access Control checks that the
terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is enforced by requiring the terminal to
derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access
Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R36] key establishment mechanism 6. This protocol is also used
to generate session keys that are used to protect the confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted
data.
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The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the latest security features and ensures a strong and
mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access biometric
data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG3 and DG4. In particular, the authentication steps
ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are read
and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal
comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps may be performed either with elliptic
curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.
This application uses the Chip Authentication and then after the Terminal Authentication.
The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a security feature that is supported
by the TOE.
The Inspection System:
- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for eMRTD) or the CAN (the holder may as well enter it
itself).
- Authenticates itself as Inspection System by means of keys derived from MRZ or CAN data.
After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring
PACE rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the Inspection
System.
The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that
the TOE has not been “cloned”, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the Inspection
System and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key
pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 and optionally 14 (DG14/DG15) containing the
Verification Public Key and attributes (algorithm...) is stored in the Document Security Object (SOD)
and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored
in the TOE’s secure memory.
The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.
More information is available in complete ST.
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4 TOE LIFE CYCLE
4.1 Life cycle overview
Software development
Phase 1
ALC phase
Patch development
Phase 2
IC photomask
fabrication
IC database
construction
Phase 3
IC manufacturing
IC testing
TOE delivery point
Phase 4
Card printing
Micromodule
Phase 5
Testing
Embedding
Prepersonalization
AGD PRE
AGD phase
Testing
Testing
Phase 6
Personalization
Smartcard
product
End usage
Application
End of life
Smartcard
End of life
Phase 7
AGD OPE
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
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USE phase
Application
End usage
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The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the [R10], the TOE
life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Additional codes are identified in §1.5.
The table below presents the TOE role:
Roles
Subject
IC developer
IC manufacturer
NXP Semiconductors
NXP Semiconductors
TOE developer
Oberthur Technologies
Manufacturer
NXP Semiconductors
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Oberthur Technologies or another agent
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle [R10], the Protection Profile lifecycle in phases, the TOE delivery point and the
coverage:
Steps
Phase
Covered by
Oberthur Technologies
ALC R&D sites
Sites
Step 2
Development
NXP Semiconductors
IC certification
Pessac and
Colombes
IC certification
Step 3
Manufacturing
NXP Semiconductors
TOE delivery point
IC certification
IC certification
Manufacturing
MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
AGD_PRE
Manufacturing
MRD Manufacturer
(Prepersonalizer)
AGD_PRE
Step 6
Personalization
Personalization Agent
AGD_PRE
Step 7
Operational Use
End user
AGD_OPE
Step 1
Step 4
Step 5
Development
Subject
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
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4.2 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered to the IC
manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the eMRTD
application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the Manufacturer.
4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel document’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded Software in the nonvolatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data
onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the Manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the
Manufacturer. If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer add initialization
data in EEPROM and keys (MSK, LSK).
TOE delivery point
(Step4) The Manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contact based / contactless
interface in the travel document unless the travel document consists of the card only.
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it and the additional source
code in the non-volatile programmable memories if necessary, (ii) creates the eMRTD application,
and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
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The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Additional code loading is performed in Prepersonalization phase. It is compliant to ANSSI Note 6
[R45].
The additional code loading process is performed by the Prepersonalizer in the following steps, via
the Command LOAD SECURE:
- Additional code generation
- MSK authentication
- LSK derivation
- Memory area definition
- Loading of the additional code
- Secure activation of the additional code
The additional code loading is performed before the creation of the MF file during
Prepersonalization.
Identification of the additional code loading is given in Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification.
Additional code generation
The additional code is generated by Oberthur Technologies: developped, compiled, ciphered and
signed. After generation, it is sent to the MRTD manufacturer to that it can load it in the (initial) TOE.
Loading of the additional code
The additional code is loaded in the (initial) TOE by the Prepersonalizer that shall authenticate itself
to the TOE beforehand. Upon reception, the (intial) TOE checks it has been generated by Oberthur
Technologies (by verifying the signature) before activating it.
Identification of the TOE
After successful loading and activation of the additional code, the TOE update its identification data
to reflects the presence of the additional code.
4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel document
holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data
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(i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the personalization of the
visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User
Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The
step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security
object. The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer finalizes the
personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The personalised
travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
travel document holder for operational use.
4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they
can never be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of
an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE
delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation
process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of
P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs.
after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
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5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R42],
[R43] and [R44].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC
Conformance rationale
Part 1
Strict conformance
Part 2
Part 3
Conformance to the extended1 part:
- FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
- FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
- FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
- FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 5, augmented with:
- ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
- AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
5.1.1 Overview of the SFR defined in this ST
SFR are presented in § 9.1 Security Functional Requirements:
- SFR (/global) that are global to the product (shared between the various TOE)
- SFR (/MP_Add_code) that are dedicated for the patch loading
- SFR (/MP) that are dedicated for the Manufacturing and Personalization phases
- SFR (/AA) that are dedicated for Active Authentication
- SFR (/BAC) that are dedicated for Basic Access Control
- SFR (/CA) that are dedicated for Chip Authentication
- SFR (/TA) that are dedicated for Terminal Authentication
- SFR (/EAC) that are dedicated for Extended Access Control
1
The rationale for SFR addition is described in the relative PP and in this Security Target
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-
SFR (/PACE) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
SFR (/PACE_CAM) that are dedicated for Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
with Chip Authentication Mapping
The following table presents all the SFR defined in the ST with the generic notation.
SFR from the PP
FCS_CKM.1/CA;FCS_COP.1/SHA; FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC; FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER; FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC; FIA_UID.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.1/PACE;
FIA_UAU.4/PACE; FIA_UAU.5/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/EAC; FIA_API.1; FDP_ACC.1/TRM; FDP_ACF.1/TRM; FMT_SMR.1/PACE;
FMT_LIM.1; FMT_LIM.2; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI; FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD; FMT_MTD.1/DATE; FMT_MTD.1/CAPK;
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ; FMT_MTD.3; FPT_EMS.1
Table 9 -SFR from the PP 0056 V2
SFR from the PP
FAU_SAS.1; FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE ; FCS_CKM.4; FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC ; FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC; FCS_RND.1;
FIA_AFL.1/PACE; FIA_UAU.6/PACE; FDP_RIP.1 ; FDP_UCT.1/TRM; FDP_UIT.1/TRM; FMT_SMF.1; FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA;
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS; FMT_MTD.1/PA; FPT_TST.1; FPT_FLS.1; FPT_PHP.3; FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Table 10 - SFR driven from the PP 0068 v2 (required for the compliance to PP 0056 v2
Section
Additional SFR
MP
FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ;
FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ;
FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
MP Add code
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ;
FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code
Active Authentication
PACE CAM
FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ;
FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM;
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
Section
Additional SFR
MP
FCS_CKM.1/MP ; FCS_COP.1/MP ; FDP_ACC.2/MP ; FDP_ACF.1/MP ; FDP_ITC.1/MP ;
FDP_UCT.1/MP ; FDP_UIT.1/MP ; FIA_AFL.1/MP ; FIA_UAU.1/MP ; FIA_UID.1/MP ;
FIA_UAU.4/MP ; FIA_UAU.5/MP ; FMT_MTD.1/MP ; FTP_ITC.1/MP ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE
MP Add code
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ; FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code ; FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ;
FCS_COP.1/MP_Add_code ; FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ; FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ;
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ; FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code
Active Authentication
FCS_COP.1/AA ; FDP_DAU.1/AA ; FDP_ITC.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ ;
FMT_MOF.1/AA ; FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE
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Section
PACE CAM
Additional SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM; FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM;
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM; FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE
Table 11 - Additional SFR
5.1.2 Overview of the additional protocols
5.1.2.1
Active Authentication
The additional functionality of Active Authentication (AA) is based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the
related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys.
It implies the following addition to the standard PP:
- Additional Threats: § 6.3.3 Threats for AA
- Additional Objective: § 7.1.3 SO for AA
- Additional OE: § 7.2.3 OE for AA
5.1.2.2
Prepersonalization phase
The prepersonalization phase has been reinforced in this Security Target, with the following
elements.
This functionality is usable in phase 5 and phase 6. Once the product is locked, stated as
personalized, it is no more possible to perform this operation. The following addition has been
performed:
- Additional Threats: § 6.3.4 Threats for Note 6
- Additional Objective: § 7.1.4 SO for Note 6
The TOE is compliant to the last version (draft) of ANSSI Note 6 [R45].
5.1.2.3
PACE CAM
The additional functionality of Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip
Authentication Mapping (PACE CAM) has been added to the TOE.
It possesses the same security requirements than the PACE functionality, that means that the same
SPD applies to the PACE CAM.
Additional SFR has been defined for defining the PACE CAM security functional requirements.
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5.2 Protection Profile conformance
This security target claims a strict conformance to the following protection profiles:
- BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012: “Machine Readable Travel Document with ”ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP)”
- BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011:”Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE”
5.3 Rationale for the additions
The rationales are available in the complete ST.
5.4 Non evaluated features
Some features may be part of the TOE but are not evaluated as they are not relevant for the TSFs:
- Standard and biometric PIN management
- DBI
The TOE may also contain other applications such as eID, eSign, …..The current evaluation covers any
combination of application.
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6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
6.1 Subjects
6.1.1 PP EAC with PACE subjects
Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State
or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the
MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems.
The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of
the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact interface
or through the contactless interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure and therefore
(i)contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the
terminals part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical travel document
either under PACE or BAC by optical reading the travel document providing this information. (iv)
implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocolsboth according to [5]and
(v) is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes of the EIS are defined by
means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both
PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used.
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Application note:
For definition of Basic Inspection System (BIS) resp. Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE)
see PACE PP [7].
PACE (MRZ/CAN)
(conditional)
ePassport Application
Selection
Basic Access Control
(conditional)
Chip Authentication
Passive Authentication
with SOD
Terminal
Authentication
Figure 5 - Advanced Inspection Procedure
Attacker
Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [7], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined as
followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization,
(ii) to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel
document, or (iv) to trace a travel document.
Application Note:
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An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a
genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful
attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.2 PP PACE Subjects
Travel document holder (MRTD holder)
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has personalised the travel document. This entity is
commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [R11]. Please note that a travel document holder can also be
an attacker.
Travel document presenter (Traveler)
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity of the travel
document holder. This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in [R11]. Please note that a
travel document presenter can also be an attacker (s. below).
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless/contact
interface. The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal being recognised by the TOE as not
being PACE authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document presenter). This entity is
commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [R11].
Basic Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE)
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the travel document
presenteras the travel documentholder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometric data (face) of
the travel document presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates itself to the travel
document using a shared password (PACE password) and supports Passive Authentication.
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document Security Object stored on
the travel document for passive authentication. A Document Signer is authorised by the national
CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [R2]. This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA)
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An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect to confirming
correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The CSCA represents the country
specific root of the PKI for the travel document and creates the Document Signer Certificates within
this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure
diplomatic means, see [R2].
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise the travel document
for the travel document holder by some or all of the following activities:
(i)
Establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data in the
travel document
(ii)
Enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder
(iii)
Writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical personalisation)
and storing them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in [R2]
(iv)
Writing the document details data
(v)
Writing the initial TSF data
(vi)
Signing the Document Security Object defined in [R2] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among several institutions
according to the operational policy of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in [R11].
Application Note
Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel document
Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC
Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [R11].
Attacker
A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf) trying to undermine the security policy
defined by the current PP, especially to change properties of the assets having to be maintained. The
attacker is assumed to possess an at most high attack potential.
Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.
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This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in [R11].
6.1.3 Additional Subjects
IC Developer
Developer of the IC.
TOE Developer
Developer of part of the TOE source code.
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as
described in [R11].
6.2 Assets
6.2.1 User data
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip, user data
transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data from the claimed
PACE PP [R14], chap 3.1.
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing State or Organisation for
the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine travel
document.
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includes all assets listed in [R14], chap 3.1, namely
the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user data transferred between the TOE
and the terminal connected (object 2), travel document tracing data (object 3), and the secondary
assets accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects (object 4) Genuineness
of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret
cryptographic material (object 7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation
data (object 8).
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They are refined here below for the present TOE.
User data stored on the TOE
All data (being not authentication data) stored in the context of the eMRTD application of the travel
document as defined in [R2] and being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal
acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [R2]), i.e. for the current TOE:
User Data
Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user
data as they enable to track the holder
Sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture
Chip Authentication Public Key
and attributes in EF.DG14
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to a chip authentication
Active Authentication Public Key
and attributes in EF.DG15
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to an active authentication
Table 1: User data stored on the TOE
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [4] can get access to
the user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal.
User data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected
All data (being not authentication data) being transferred in the context of the eMRTD application of
the travel document as defined in [R11] between the TOE and an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [R2]).
User data can be received and sent (exchange <--> [receive, send]).
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity.
Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [4] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is
required for all messages according to [4].
Travel document tracing data
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Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel document gathered
unnoticeable by the travel document holder recognising the TOE not knowing any PACE password.
TOE tracing data can be provided / gathered.
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Unavailability
Unavailability represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder
6.2.2 TSF data
Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property of the TOE to restrict access to TSF and TSF-data stored in the TOE to authorised subjects
only.
TSF data
Description
Personalisation Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation
agent (same as PACE ST)
Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between
the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
(same as PACE ST)
Session keys for the secure channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality and in integrity
Table 2: Accessibility to the TOE functions and data only for authorised subjects
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability.
Genuineness of the TOE
Property of the TOE is to be authentic in order to provide claimed security functionality in a proper
way. The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalised by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveller to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD. This asset also
covers "Authenticity of the MRTD's chip" in [R11].
TSF data
Description
TOE_ID
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Chip Authentication private Key
Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication
Active Authentication private key
Private key the chip uses to perform an active
authentication
Current Date
Current date of the travel document
Table 3: Genuineness of the TOE
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Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Availability.
TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic material used by the TOE in order to enforce
its security functionality.
TSF data
Description
Personalisation Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent
Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment (PACE)
Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the
Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Chip Authentication private Key
Active Authentication private key
Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication
Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality
and in integrity
Manufacturer Secret Key used to perform the authentication of the
personal agent in pre-personalisation phase
Loading Secure Key used to load Optional Code in prepersonalisation phase
MSK
LSK
Table 4: TOE internal secret cryptographic keys
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity.
TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
Permanently or temporarily stored non-secret cryptographic (public) keys and other non-secret
material (Document Security Object SOD containing digital signature) used by the TOE in order to
enforce its security functionality.
TSF data
Description
TOE_ID
Data enabling to identify the TOE and the TOE Configuration
Life Cycle State
Public Key CVCA
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory
CVCA Certificate
All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..) stored in
persistent memory
Current date of the travel document
Current Date
Table 5: TOE internal non-secret cryptographic material
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Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Integrity, Authenticity.
Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data
Restricted-revealable authorization information for a human user being used for verification of the
authorisation attempts as authorised user (PACE password). These data are stored in the TOE and are
not to be send to it.
TSF data
Description
PACE password
(MRZ or CAN)
Reference information being persistently stored in the TOE and
allowing PACE authentication
Table 6: Travel Document communication establishment authorisation data
Property to be maintained by the current security policy: Confidentiality, Integrity.
6.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
The threats are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some threats
described in the PP PACE.
6.3.1 Threats from the PP EAC with PACE
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action
An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface
of the Travel Document's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming
(cf. [R12]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data
stored on the Travel Document's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive
biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e.
knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive
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biometric reference data are stored only on the Travel Document's chip as private sensitive personal
data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical Travel Document as
well.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a legitimate Travel
Document.
Asset
Confidentiality of logical Travel Document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric reference).
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine
MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD's
chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD's chip and copy them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset
Authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
6.3.2 Threats from the PP PACE
T.Skimming
Adverse action
An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data stored on or
transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact
interface of the TOE.
Threat agent
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Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared
password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Confidentiality of logical travel document data
T.Eavesdropping
Adverse action
An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and the PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal
connected.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared
password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Confidentiality of logical travel document data
T.Tracing
Adverse action
An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the travel document)
unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent
Having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared
password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset
Privacy of the travel document holder
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action
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An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order (i) to
manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored
in the TOE or (iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE. This
threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and personalisation in the operational phase
after delivery to the travel document holder.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel
document.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action
An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between
the TOE and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker.
Threat agent
having high attack potential.
Asset
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be
interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is more closely related to measurement of
operating parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip)
and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may
try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis)..
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action
An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to disclose the TSFdata, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software. An attacker may physically modify
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the travel document in order to alter (I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as
well), (ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents.
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel
document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
the user data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE
to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s
internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts
may be used. Before that, hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data
may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g.
T.Forgery
Adverse action
An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and
exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel document holder’s related reference data (like
biographic or biometric data). The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected
perceives these modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent
having high attack potential.
Asset
integrity of the travel document.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action
An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of
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the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s
Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded Software or misusing
administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
Threat agent
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel documents, having
information about the functional operation.
Asset
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of the travel
document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the threat
T.PhysTamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals.
6.3.3 Threats for AA
T.Counterfeit
6.3.4 Threats for Note 6
T.Unauthorized_Load
Adverse action: An attacker tries to load an additional code that is not intended to be assembled
with the initial TOE, ie the evidence of authenticity or integrity is not correct.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: Logical MRTD data
T.Bad_Activation
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the additional code activation such as the final TOE is
different than the expected one (initial TOE or perturbated TOE).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the MSK, LSK and derivation data, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD, being in possession of an additional code that is authorized to be
load
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Asset: Logical MRTD data
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification and in particular the additional
code identification.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: TOE_ID
Application Note
This threat is not applicable in phase 7, as the TOE identification is not possible in phase 7.
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations.
The OSP are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some OSP described in
the PP PACE.
6.4.1
6.4.2 OSP from PP EAC with PACE
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within
the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
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with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an
agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
6.4.3 OSP from PP PACE
P.Pre-Operational
1) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the terminals
complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other of those,
concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently stored in the TOE.
3) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which enable
traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before
they are in the operational phase.
4) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the travel
document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to ensure that the
Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI
1) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel document. For this
aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA). The travel document Issuer shall
publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA)
2) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall keep the CSCA
Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be made available to the
travel document Issuer by strictly secure means, see [R17]. The CSCA shall create the Document
Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel
document Issue.
3) A Document Signer shall:
(i) Generate the Document Signer Key Pair
(ii) Hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification
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(iii) Keep the Document Signer Private Key secret
(iv) Securely use the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security
Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations (DS) and
DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be stored on the
travel document.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
P.Terminal
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as follows:
1) The related terminals shall be used by terminal operators and by travel document holders
2) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [R17], of the Passive Authentication
[R2] and use them in this order. The PACE terminal shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly
selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann)
3) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials
4) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key (in form
of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive Authentication (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [R2])
5) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity of respective
data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.),
where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE
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6.4.4 OSP for AA
P.Activ_Auth
The terminal implements the Active Authentication protocol as described in [R39].
6.5 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
The Assumptions are taken from the PP EAC with PACE, which requires to include also some
Assumptions described in the PP PACE.
6.5.1 Assumptions from PP EAC with PACE
A.Insp_Sys
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability:
(i)
Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key
(ii)
Implements the terminal part of PACE [R17] and/or BAC [R11]
BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the TOE and
the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC and
performs the Chip Authentication v.1to verify the logical travel document and establishes secure
messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocolv.1in order to ensure access control
and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities,
the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and
certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the certificates of the
Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection
Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the
public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
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6.5.2 Assumptions from PP PACE
A.Passive_Auth
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel document. The
issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and
uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity.
The Document Signer
(i)
Generates the Document Signer Key Pair
(ii)
Hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification
(iii)
Keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret
(iv)
Uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security
Objects of the travel documents.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are
distributed to the receiving States and Organisations. It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent
ensures that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data
according to [R10].
6.5.3 Assumptions for Active Authentication
A.Insp_Sys_AA
The Inspection System implements the Active Authentication Mechanism. The Inspection System
verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection using the signature returned by the
TOE during Active Authentication.
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7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
The OT are taken from the PP EAC with PACe, which requires to include also some OT described in
the PP PACE.
7.1.1 SO from PP EAC with PACE
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization
of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State
or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [R39]. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note:
The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have:
(i)
A unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number
(ii)
A secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data.
The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference
data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
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Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel document’s
chip. This certificate is provided by
(i)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [6]
(ii)
The hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
7.1.2 SO from PP PACE
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting these
data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised modifying). The
TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE
Authentication.
OT.Data_Auth
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by enabling
verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between
the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side (at receiving
by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving by the TOE).
OT.Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data33 by granting read access
only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected.The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User
Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel
document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless/contact
interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (PACE passwords)
in advance.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE operational phase,
can be abused in order:
(i)
To manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE
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(ii)
(iii)
To manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE
To manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the
TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored
and/or processed by the travel document by:
- Measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O
lines
- Forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- A physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note:
This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing due to normal
operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software by means of:
- Measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and
current) or
- Measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction between
electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
With a prior
- Reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The Initialisation Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The
storage of the PrePersonalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
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logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization.
Application note:
The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during personalisation for travel
document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed using write access after
personalisation.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation hves not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic)
fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
7.1.3 SO for AA
OT.AA_Proof
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of MRTD’s chip
as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active Authentication as
defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Data_Int_AA
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Active Authentication.
7.1.4 SO for Note 6
OT.Secure_Load_ACode
The Loader of the Initial TOE shall check an evidence of authenticity and integrity of the loaded
Additional Code. The Loader enforces that only the allowed version of the Additional Code can be
loaded on the Initial TOE. The Loader shall forbid the loading of an Additional Code not intended to
be assembled with the Initial TOE.
During the Load Phase of an Additional Code, the TOE shall remain secure.
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OT.Secure_AC_Activation
Activation of the Additional Code and update of the Identification Data shall be performed at the
same time in an Atomic way. All the operations needed for the code to be able to operate as in the
Final TOE shall be completed before activation.
If the Atomic Activation is successful, then the resulting product is the Final TOE, otherwise (in case
of interruption or incident which prevents the forming of the Final TOE), the Initial TOE shall remain
in its initial state or fail secure.
OT.TOE_Identification
The Identification Data identifies the Initial TOE and Additional Code. The TOE provides means to
store Identification Data in its non-volatile memory and guarantees the integrity of these data. After
Atomic Activation of the Additional Code, the Identification Data of the Final TOE allows
identifications of Initial TOE and Additional Code. The user must be able to uniquely identify Initial
TOE and Addtitional Code(s) which are embedded in the Final TOE. TOE must support the Inspection
Systems to verify the authenticity.
7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 OE from PP EAC with PACE
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
(i)
Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair
(ii)
Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key
data in EF.DG14
(iii)
Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity
of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication
Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving
States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document
Verifier only.
OE.Exam_MRTD
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The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability:
(i)
Includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each
issuing State or Organization
(ii)
Implements the terminal part of the PACE [R17] and/or the Basic Access Control [R2].
Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the Chip Authentication Protocol
to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity
of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol .
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems
by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the
logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
7.2.2 OE from PP PACE
OE.Legislative_Compliance
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the terminals
complying with all applicable laws and regulations
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as follows: the
CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document Issuer must (i) generate a
cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign
Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of
the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being
maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must:
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(i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification
(iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for
each data group in use according to [6].
The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash
values of genuine user data according to [6]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the
rightful organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct DocumentSecurity Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalization
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his behalf:
(i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the biographical data for
the travel document
(ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the travel document holder
(iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and store them in
the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [6]
(iv) write the document details data
(v) write the initial TSF data
(vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [6](in the role of a DS).
OE.Terminal
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal operators
and by travel document holders as defined in [6]
2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [4], of the
Passive Authentication [4] (by verification of the signature of the Document Security Object)
and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses randomly and (almost) uniformly selected
nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann)
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials
4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCAand CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication of the travel document (determination of the authenticity of data groups
stored in the travel document, [6])
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5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity of
respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords, integrity of PKI
certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE according to the
current PP
OE.MRTD_Holder
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the PACE
password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations
and are trustworthy.
7.2.3 OE for AA
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Exam_MRTD, the inspection systems perform the Active Authentication
protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Aditionally to the OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, the inspection system prevents eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Active
Authentication Protocol.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the
verification by Active Authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the
MRTD.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
(i) generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or
organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of
the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
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8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
8.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [R11].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [R11]
8.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [R11]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R11]
8.3
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity
8.3.1 Extended component FIA_API.1
Description: see [R12]
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FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R12]
8.4
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
8.4.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: see [R11]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [R11]
8.4.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [R11]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
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Rationale: See [R11]
8.5
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.5.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: see [R11]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R11]
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9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
This chapter presents the Security Functional Requirements to take into account within the TOE
configuration presented in this security target. It is composed of the following elements:
- Global SFR that are applicable to all the passports configuration
- MP SFR for covering the phase Manufacturing and Personalization described in the Passport
Protection Profile and also the coverage of Additional Code.
- Active Authentication SFR that cover the Active Authentication Protocol
- CA SFR that cover the Chip Authentication Protocol
- TA SFR that cover the Terminal Authentication Protocol (note: Terminal Authentication
Protocol is only available with the Extended Access Control)
- EAC SFR that cover the Extended Access Control (note: EAC protocol is a combination of TA
and CA, this chapter only contains SFR that can not be strictly applied to one or another)
- PACE SFR that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment protocol
- PACE CAM that cover the Password Authenticated Connection Establishment with Chip
Authentication Mapping protocol
9.1.1 Global SFR
This chapter covers the common SFR that are shared between the different applications that are
embedded on the product.
FCS_CKM.4/Global Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Global The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_RND.1/Global Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1/Global The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
1. The requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R37]
and
2. The requirement of RGS_B1 for random number generation.
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FMT_LIM.1/Global Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks
FMT_LIM.2/Global Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/Global The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks
FPT_EMS.1/Global TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/Global The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
FPT_EMS.1.2/Global The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. EF.COM, EF.SOD and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
FPT_FLS.1/Global Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1/Global The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
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FPT_TST.1/Global TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/Global The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- At reset
- Before any cryptographic operation
- When accessing a DG or any EF
- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command
FPT_TST.1.2/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/Global The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3/Global Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1/Global The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
9.1.2 Product configuration SFR
This chapter covers the Manufacturing and Personalization SFR. It also includes additional SFR for the
compliance to Note 6.
9.1.2.1
SFR for additional code
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code Guarantees of audit data availability
FAU_STG.2.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorized modifications to the
stored audit records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.2.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure that Additional code identification stored audit
records will be maintained when the following conditions occur: failure and attack.
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Application Note:
Additional code code is loaded with its integrity information. This integrity information is verified by
the TOE after the loading, and before the writing of the identification information by calculating the
signature and comparing to the expected value. The signature is protected in integrity through the
TOE life cycle, at each power on, the card verifies the integrity of this signature.
FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Calculation of LSK_LOAD, from initial LSK and derivation data
entered - AES 128 ECB
Key length (bits)
Standards
128
None
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_Add_code Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Encryption of the additional code (ciphered with
LSK_LOAD) and signature verification
AES
128
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_Add_code The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
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Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging with BAC - 3DES
3DES Retail MAC
112
[R35]
Secure Messaging with BAC - AES
AES CMAC
128, 192 or 256
[R35]
FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control SFP to
receive user data in a manner protected from modification errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification of some of the pieces of the application sent by the TOE developer
has occurred.
Application Note
Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution, unrecoverable ordering
change of data and any other integrity error that may cause the additional code to be installed on the
card to be different from the one sent by the TOE Developer.
This SFR control integrity of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection the [list of TSF data] to
[authorized identified roles]:
Activate
List of TSF data
Authorised role
Additional code
TOE developer
Application note
The Activation of the additional code modify the TOE. This additional code is ciphered with the
LSK_LOAD (LSK and Derivation Data) and activated after the authentication of the TOE developer.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to
[authorized identified roles]:
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TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
LSK
None
FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. TOE developper
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP_Add_code The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. LSK
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP_Add_code The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. LSK
FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP_Add_code The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP_Add_code [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the TOE Developer and
Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP_Add_code The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:
1. Additional code loading
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9.1.2.2
Manufacturing and Personalization
FCS_CKM.1/MP Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key
sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
MSK derivation from initial MSK loaded in phase 1 using SHA 256
256
None
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
3DES in CBC mode
112
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – encryption and
decryption
AES in CBC mode
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
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FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Secure Messaging – MAC
3DES RMAC
112
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Secure Messaging MAC
AES
Key length
(bits)
128, 192 and 256
Standard
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_3DES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)
3DES
112
[R32]
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_AUTH_AES The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
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Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Card Manufacturer Authentication (MSK)
AES
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MP_SHA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Hashing
SHA256
None
[R27]
FDP_ACC.2/MP Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on all subjects and all
objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF
and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
Application Note
This SFR enforces access control over all the operation performed in phase 5, including additional
code loading but not only.
FDP_ACF.1/MP Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control to objects based on
the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS).
FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
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FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
Application Note
This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in phase 5, including additional code loading
but not only.
FDP_ITC.1/MP Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
Application Note
This SFR control import of data in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
This SFR ensures also the MSK diviersification, which is performs once, at first command, without any
security requirements preliminary to this action.
FDP_UCT.1/MP Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to receive user data in
a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Application note
For the Additional code loading access control, the LSK_LOAD is used to cipher the data transmitted.
This SFR control confidentiality of data import in phase 5, including the additional code but not only.
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FDP_UIT.1/MP Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control SFP to receive user
data in a manner protected from modification errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP [Editorially refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification of some pieces of the application sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred
FIA_AFL.1/MP Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
authentication of
1. Prepersonalizer
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Personalizer.
FIA_UAU.1/MP Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/MP Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on 3DES
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FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_AES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Authentication Mechanisms based on AES
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key
FMT_MTD.1/MP Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall restrict the ability to switch the TOE life cycle from phase 5 to
phase 6 to the Prepersonalizer.
FTP_ITC.1/MP Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
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FTP_ITC.1.2/MP [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for:
1. Personalization Agent key storage
2. Life cycle transition from Prepersonalization to Personalization phase
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
MSK
None
Personalization Agent Keys
None
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the [data] to [authorized
identified roles]:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
MSK
IC manufacturer (created by the developer)
Personalization Agent Keys
None
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FAU_SAS.1/MP Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FMT_SMF.1/MP Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
FMT_SMR.1/MP Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/MP TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Prepersonalizer Key
2. Personalization Agent Key
3. MSK
9.1.3 Active Authentication SFR
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FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_DSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation
Algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
RSA signature (CRT or SFM) with
SHA1, 224, 256, 384, 512
1024 to 4096 with a step
of 256 bits
[R25]
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AA_ECDSA The TSF shall perform [cryptographic operation] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following [standard]:
Operation
Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
Digital Signature
Creation
ECDSA with SHA1, 224, 256, 384,
512
192 to 521 over prime
field curves
[R25] [R26]
[R27] [R28]
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Active Authentication Access Control SFP when importing
user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
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FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the AAK to none.
FPT_EMS.1/AA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/AA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/AA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Private Key (AAK)
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active
Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/AA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the AAK to Personalization
Agent.
9.1.4 Chip Authentication SFR
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FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to [R39] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to PKCS#3
Key length (bits)
Standards
112
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Algorithm based on the Key Diffie-Hellman key derivation
protocol compliant to PKCS#3
Key length (bits)
Standards
128, 192, 256
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length (bits)
Standards
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to
ISO 15946
112
[R2]
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FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Algorithm based on ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to
ISO 15946
Key length (bits)
Standards
128, 192, 256
[R2]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1
None
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1 and SHA256
None
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
Standards
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3DES CBC mode
(bits)
112
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES
128, 192 and 256
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
3DES Retail MAC
Key length
(bits)
112
Standards
[R39]
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES The TSF shall perform SM message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
AES CMAC
Key length
(bits)
128, 192 and 256
Standards
[R39]
FIA_UAU.1/EAC Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/EAC The TSF shall allow:
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1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
5. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/EAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on 3DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.5/CA_AES Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_AES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure Messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_AES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with
correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism
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FIA_UAU.6/CA Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to
the TOE after successful run of the CA shall be verified as being sent by the inspection system
FIA_UID.1/EAC Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/EAC The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disbled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out th Chip Authentication Protocol
4. To carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/EAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FPT_EMS.1/CA TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. Active Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK)
FPT_TST.1/CA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When performing the Chip Authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
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FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the CAK to Personalization
Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to none.
9.1.5 Terminal Authentication SFR
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
SHA1, SHA256 and SHA 512
Key length
(bits)
None
Standards
[R27]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_SM_ECC The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key length] that
meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512
None
[R27]
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FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
RSA coupled with SHA
From 1024 to 4096, with a step of 256
[R39]
FCS_COP.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_ECC The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [key
length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
ECC coupled with SHA
From 192 to 521
[R39]
FIA_UAU.4/TA Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
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3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
FPT_TST.1/TA TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When using the CVCA Root key
- When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ
- When performing a Terminal authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_SMR.1/TA Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
4. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_MTD.1/TA_CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
9.1.6 Extended Access Control SFR
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FMT_MTD.3/EAC Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editiorally Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access
Control.
Refinement:
The Certificate chain is valid if and only if:
1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key of the
Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date
of the TOE
2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the public key in the
Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is
not before the Current Date of the TOE
3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the
Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure
value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a
secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
FIA_UAU.5/EAC Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol
and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism
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FMT_LIM.1/EAC Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed (not available for BAC)
FMT_LIM.2/EAC Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
9.1.7 PACE SFR
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length (bits)
Standards
ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3
3DES 2 keys
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/ECDH_PACE_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ECDH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Key length (bits)
Standards
ECDH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946
128, 192 & 256
[R2]
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FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
DH key derivation protocol compliant to PKCS#3
Key length (bits)
3DES 2 keys
Standards
[R2]
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE_AES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
DH key derivation protocol compliant to ISO 15946
Key length (bits)
128, 192 & 256
Standards
[R2]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
AES in CBC mode
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_ENC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
3DES in CBC mode
112
[R32]
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FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_AES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_AES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message Authentication
Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
CMAC AES
128, 192 and 256
[R35]
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC_3DES Cryptographic key generation
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE_MAC_3DES The TSF shall perform Secure Messaging – Message Authentication
Code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes [key length] that meet the following [standard]:
Cryptographic algorithm
Key length
(bits)
Standards
Retail MAC with 3DES
112
[R32]
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Complete access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining access to the
User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the logical travel document
FDP_ACF.1/PACE_EAC Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal
b. BIS-PACE
c. Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
a. Data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical MRTD
b. Data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD
c. Data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
d. All TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel document
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3. Security attributes:
a. PACE Authentication
b. Terminal Authentication
c. Authorization of the Terminal
FDP_ACF.1.2/PACE The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects
from FDP.ACF.1.1/PACE according to [4] after a successful PACE authentication a required by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FDP_ACF.1.3/PACE The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/PACE The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to
write, to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel document
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use any
data stored on the travel document
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG.3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not
allowed to read the data objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG.4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not allowed
to read the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of FDP_ACF.1.1/PACE
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the allocation of the ressource to and deallocation of the resource from the
following objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication session)
2. The ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC- PACE (by having generated a DH shared secret)
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FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to authentication attempts using the PACE password as shared password
FIA_AFL.1.2/PACE [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal
challenge and sending of the TSF response during the PACE authentication attempts.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [4]
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [4]
2. Passive Authentication according to [6]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [4]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the following
rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed with the
terminal by means of the PACE protocol
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE after
successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent by the
Inspection System.
Application note 29: The Password Authenticated Connection Establishment and the Chip
Authentication Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after
successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC
mode each command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details). The TOE does not
execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE reauthenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from
the previously authenticated user.
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FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent
to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE
terminal
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
3. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE passwords
to none.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Terminal
2. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FPT_EMS.1/PACE TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1/PACE The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICC-PACE
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FPT_EMS.1.2/PACE The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart
card circuit contacts to gain access to
1. PACE: Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KENC), Ephemeral Private Key ephem SKPICCPACE
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another
trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE The TSF shall enforce communication via the trusted channel for any data
exchange between the TOE and the Terminal
FPT_TST.1/PACE TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1/PACE The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of self
tests at the conditions:
- When performing a PACE authentication
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF
FPT_TST.1.2/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/PACE The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security Objects (SOD) to
Personalization Agent.
9.1.8 PACE CAM SFR
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FIA_UAU.1/PACE_CAM Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow
1. Carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [4]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE_CAM Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
Aditionally to FIA_UAU.4/PACE
1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
FIA_UAU.5/PACE_CAM Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall provide
1. PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
The same rules from FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE applies, with the PACE_CAM protocol
FIA_UAU.6/PACE_CAM Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE aftter successful run of the PACE CAM protocol shall be verified as being sent by
the PACE terminal
FIA_UID.1/PACE_CAM Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/PACE_CAM The TSF shall allow additionally to FIA_UID.1/PACE:
1. Carrying out the PACE CAM Protocol according to [4]
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on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/PACE_CAM The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. PACE CAM Private Key
to none.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/PACE_CAM_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the PACE CAM
private key to Personalization Agent
9.2 Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5.
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10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval.
Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access
conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
- PACE keys
- Chip Authentication keys
- PACE CAM keys
- Active Authentication private key
- Personalization Agent keys
- MSK and LSK
- CVCA keys
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
- It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
- It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
- The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), the Document Security Object, EF.CVA,
EF.COM only after PACE authentication and through a valid secure channel
- When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4
provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel
In the personalization phase
- The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by
the TOE (using its authentication keys)
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are
fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in personalization
phase to be set to “1”.
It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and that it
is not possible to load an additional code.
Regarding the file structure
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In the operational use:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to update
any system files. However
- the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs
- The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application
according to the authentication mechanism described in [R39]
In the personalization phase
- The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data
files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in [R39]. (if it
is activated by the personnalizer).
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular:
- It handles the certificate verification
- The management of access rights to DG3 & DG4
- The management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of the
incoming certificate)
- The signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism)
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA
key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this
security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4].
This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each
successful Chip Authentication step.
The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the GIS
(the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes
more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
PACE mechanism
This security functionality ensures the PACE is correctly performed. It can only be performed once
the TOE is personalized with the PACE password. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures
the correct calculation of the PACE session keys.
PACE_CAM mechanism
This security functionality ensures the PACE_CAM is correctly performed. It can only be performed
once the TOE is personalized with :
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-
the chip authentication mapping (CAM) keys the Personnalization Agent loaded during the
personalization phase
- the PACE password.
Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the correct calculation of the PACE_CAM session
keys.
Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands
an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure
Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm. This function is in charge of preinitializing the product and loading additional code if needed. This TSF is conformant with [R45]. This
TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when
- an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the channel the TOE
and the IFD are using to communicate.
After a successful PACE authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES algorithm, and after a successful Chip Authentication , a secure
channel is (re)established based on Symetric algorithms (Triple DES, AES128, 192 or 256)
This security functionality ensures:
- No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
- The data exchanged remain confidential
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-
The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one
that was authenticated (through PACE or EAC)
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
This Secure Messaging can be combined with the Active Authentication.
This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02 or SCP03) for the Prepersonalization or
Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data:
- Before the TSF data usage
- The additional code integrity is checked at each POWER ON of the card
- The integrity of keys and sensitive data is ensured
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11 RATIONALES
Threats
Security Objectives
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OE.Auth_Key_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD, OT.AA_Proof,
T.Counterfeit
OT.Data_Int_AA, OE.Activ_Auth_Verif
T.Skimming
OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Data_Conf, OT.MRTD_Holder
T.Eavesdropping
OT.Data_Conf
T.Tracing
OT.Data_Int, OE.MRTD_Holder
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Auth, OT.Prot_PhysTamper, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Terminal, OE.Pass_Auth_Sign,
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD_AA
T.Malfunction
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Unauthorized_Load
OT.Secure _Load_ACode
T.Bad_Activation
OT.Secure _AC_Activation
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery
OT.TOE_Identification
Table 12- Threats and Security Objectives – coverage
OSP
Security Objectives
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
P.Personalization
OE.Personalization, OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification
P.Pre_operational
OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers, OE.Personalization, OE.Legislative_Compliance
P.Card_PKI
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
P.Trustworthy_PKI
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
P.Manufact
OT.Identification
P.Terminal
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Terminal
P.Activ_Auth
OT.AA_Proof
Table 13 - OSPs and Security Objectives – Coverage
Assumptions
OE
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Auth_PKI
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
A.Passive_Auth
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD
A.Insp_Sys_AA
OE.Exam_MRTD_AA, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD_AA
Table 14 - Assumptions and OE – Coverage
The other rationales are available in the complete ST.
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12 REFERENCES
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical
Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with
biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R4]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R5]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[R6]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts
from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
IDL specifications
[R7]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part
1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC 18013-1:2005
[R8]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part
2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC 18013-2:2008
[R9]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part
3: Access control, authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC 18013-3:2009
Protection Profiles
[R10]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R11]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSIPP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R12]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control –
BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R13]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control
with PACE (EAC PP) – BSI-PP-0056 V2 – 2012
[R14]
MRTD with PACE – PP-0068v2
[R15]
E-passport: adaptation and interpretation
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R16]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
of
e-passport
Protection
Profiles,
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[R17]
Technical Report, Supplemental Access Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents
– version v1.01
Chips References
[R18]
Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013-MA-02 - NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P60x144/080PVA/PVA(Y/B) with IC dedicated software FW5.0
[R19]
Certification report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0837-v2-2014 - NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
Controller P60x080/052/040PVC(Y/Z/A)/PVG with IC Dedicated Software
Standards
[R20]
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R21]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
[R22]
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[R23]
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[R24]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[R25]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[R26]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[R27]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[R28]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
[R29]
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
[R30]
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, 2002
[R31]
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
[R32]
FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[R33]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
[R34]
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
[R35]
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
[R36]
ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management –
part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
Misc
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[R37]
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[R38]
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
[R39]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R40]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R41]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012
CC
[R42]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
[R43]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R44]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R45]
ANSSI-CC note 6 – v0.91
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13 ACRONYMS
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OCR
OS
PKI
PP
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4
Card personalization life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Optical Character Recognition
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security function
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INDEX
A
A.BAC-Keys .................................................... 40
A.Insp_Sys...................................................... 39
A.Insp_Sys_AA ............................................... 40
A.Insp_Sys_CA ............................................... 40
A.MRTD_Delivery .......................................... 39
A.MRTD_Manufact ........................................ 39
A.Pers_Agent ................................................. 39
Access__Control__in__reading ..................... 71
Access__Control__in__writing ...................... 71
Active__Authentication................................. 71
Attacker ......................................................... 34
Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip ....... 35
B
BAC__mechanism.......................................... 71
F
FAU_SAS.1/MP .............................................. 59
FAU_STG.2/MP_Add_code ........................... 52
FCS_CKM.1/BAC ............................................ 61
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES ...................... 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_DH_SM_AES ........................ 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_3DES .................. 66
FCS_CKM.1/CA_ECDH_SM_AES .................... 67
FCS_CKM.1/MP ............................................. 54
FCS_CKM.1/MP_Add_code ........................... 52
FCS_CKM.4/Global ........................................ 50
FCS_COP.1/AA_DSA ...................................... 60
FCS_COP.1/AA_ECDSA .................................. 60
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH .................................. 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC .................................... 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC ................................... 62
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA .................................... 62
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES .................... 68
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC_SM_AES ...................... 68
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES ..................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SHA_SM_AES ....................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES .................... 67
FCS_COP.1/CA_SYM_SM_AES ...................... 67
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_3DES ........................ 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_AUTH_AES .......................... 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_3DES........................... 54
FCS_COP.1/MP_Enc_Add_code ................... 52
FCS_COP.1/MP_ENC_AES ............................. 54
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_3DES ......................... 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_Add_code ................. 52
FCS_COP.1/MP_MAC_AES............................ 55
FCS_COP.1/MP_SHA ..................................... 56
FCS_RND.1/Global ........................................ 50
FDP_ACC.1/BAC ............................................ 64
FDP_ACC.2/MP ............................................. 56
FDP_ACF.1/BAC ............................................ 64
FDP_ACF.2/MP.............................................. 56
FDP_DAU.1/AA ............................................. 60
FDP_ITC.1/AA................................................ 61
FDP_ITC.1/CA ................................................ 68
FDP_ITC.1/MP ............................................... 56
FDP_UCT.1/BAC ...................................... 62, 70
FDP_UCT.1/MP ............................................. 57
FDP_UIT.1/BAC ............................................. 63
FDP_UIT.1/CA ............................................... 70
FDP_UIT.1/MP .............................................. 57
FDP_UIT.1/MP_Add_code ............................ 53
FIA_AFL.1/BAC .............................................. 65
FIA_AFL.1/MP ............................................... 57
FIA_API.1/CA................................................. 66
FIA_UAU.1/BAC ............................................ 65
FIA_UAU.1/CA............................................... 68
FIA_UAU.1/MP.............................................. 57
FIA_UAU.4/BAC ............................................ 65
FIA_UAU.4/MP_3DES ................................... 58
FIA_UAU.4/MP_AES ..................................... 58
FIA_UAU.5/BAC ............................................ 65
FIA_UAU.5/CA_3DES .................................... 68
FIA_UAU.5/MP_3DES ................................... 58
FIA_UAU.5/MP_AES ............................... 58, 69
T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700
Colombes - France I [email protected]
S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
FIA_UAU.6/BAC ............................................. 65
FIA_UAU.6/CA ............................................... 69
FIA_UID.1/BAC............................................... 65
FIA_UID.1/CA ................................................. 69
FIA_UID.1/MP................................................ 57
FMT_LIM.1/BAC ............................................ 63
FMT_LIM.1/Global......................................... 50
FMT_LIM.2/BAC ............................................ 63
FMT_LIM.2/Global......................................... 50
FMT_MOF.1/AA............................................. 61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_READ .......................... 61
FMT_MTD.1/AA_KEY_WRITE ........................ 61
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_READ ........................ 63
FMT_MTD.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE ...................... 63
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_READ .......................... 70
FMT_MTD.1/CA_KEY_WRITE ........................ 70
FMT_MTD.1/MP ............................................ 58
FMT_MTD.1/MP_Add_code ......................... 53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_DIS .............................. 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_INI_ENA ............................ 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ ......................... 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_READ_Add_code ....... 53
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE ....................... 59
FMT_MTD.1/MP_KEY_WRITE_Add_code ..... 53
FMT_SMF.1/MP............................................. 59
FMT_SMR.1/BAC ........................................... 64
FMT_SMR.1/MP ............................................ 59
FMT_SMR.1/MP_Add_code .......................... 53
FPT_EMS.1/AA............................................... 61
FPT_EMS.1/CA ............................................... 69
FPT_EMS.1/Global ......................................... 51
FPT_EMS.1/MP .............................................. 60
FPT_EMS.1/MP_Add_code ........................... 53
FPT_FLS.1/Global........................................... 51
FPT_PHP.3/Global ......................................... 51
FPT_TST.1/BAC .............................................. 63
FPT_TST.1/Global .................................... 51, 69
FTP_ITC.1/MP.............................................. 58
FTP_ITC.1/MP_Add_code .......................... 54
FTP_ITC.1/PP............................................... 70
I
IC_developer................................................. 34
Inspection_System........................................ 33
L
Logical__MRTD__data .................................. 34
M
Manufacturer................................................ 33
MRTD_Holder ............................................... 34
O
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD ..................................... 45
OE.BAC-Keys ................................................. 44
OE.Exam_MRTD ...........................31, 44, 45, 46
OE.MRTD___Delivery ................................... 43
OE.MRTD_Manufact ..................................... 43
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign ....................................... 44
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif ................................. 44
OE.Personalization ........................................ 44
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD ................................. 45
OT.AA_Proof ................................................. 42
OT.AC_Pers ................................................... 41
OT.CA_Proof ................................................. 42
OT.Data_Conf ............................................... 41
OT.Data_Int................................................... 41
OT.Data_Int_AA ............................................ 42
OT.Data_Int_CA ............................................ 42
OT.Identification ........................................... 41
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func ..................................... 41
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak .......................................... 41
OT.Prot_Malfunction .................................... 42
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper .................................. 42
OT.Secure_AC_Activation ............................. 43
OT.Secure_Load_ACode ............................... 43
OT.TOE_Identification .................................. 43
P
P.Activ_Auth ................................................. 39
P.Chip_Auth .................................................. 39
T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700
Colombes - France I [email protected]
S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534
MRTD full EAC v2 – Public Security Target EAC with PACE and AA
P.Manufact .................................................... 38
P.Personal_Data ............................................ 38
P.Personalization ........................................... 38
Personalisation__Agent__Authentication .... 72
Personalization_Agent .................................. 33
Physical__protection ..................................... 72
Prepersonalizer ............................................. 34
S
Safe__state__management .......................... 72
Secure__Messaging ....................................... 72
Self__tests ..................................................... 72
Software_developer ...................................... 34
T
T.Abuse-Func ................................................. 36
T.Bad_Activation ........................................... 38
T.Chip_ID ....................................................... 36
T.Counterfeit ........................................... 37, 38
T.Eavesdropping ............................................ 36
T.Forgery........................................................ 36
T.Information_Leakage ................................. 36
T.Malfunction ................................................ 37
T.Phys-Tamper............................................... 37
T.Skimming .................................................... 36
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery ....................... 38
T.Unauthorized_load ..................................... 38
Terminal ........................................................ 33
Traveler.......................................................... 34
T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves - 92700
Colombes - France I [email protected]
S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534
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