Certification Report: 0608a_pdf

Certification Report: 0608a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
for
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B /
P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.35
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B /
P5CC073V0B
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
11 July 2001, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 June 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................9
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication....................................................................................................................10
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
7.1 Hardware platform testing......................................................................................17
7.2 Crypto Library testing.............................................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report
2.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom.
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_HLD.3,
ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2,
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3, AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually
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recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B /
P5CC073V0B has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification
based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZCC-0417-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B /
P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B was conducted by Brightsight BV. The evaluation was
completed on 27 April 2010. The Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Publication
The product Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B /
P5CC073V0B has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PO Box 540240
22502 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B /
P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) consists of a hardware part and a software part:
●
●
The hardware part consists of the NXP SmartMX P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B & P5CC073V0B Secure Smart Card Controller with IC Dedicated
Software stored in the Test-ROM that is not accessible in the System Mode or the User
Mode after Phase 3. The hardware part of the TOE includes dedicated guidance
documentation. All configurations as defined in [23] and quoted in [11] are covered by
this evaluation. These configurations are:
●
P5CD080V0B
●
P5CN080V0B
●
P5CC080V0B
●
P5CC073V0B
The software part consists of the IC Dedicated Support Software “Crypto Library V2.2
on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B” which consists of a
software library and associated documentation. The Crypto Library on SmartMX is an
additional part that provides cryptographic functions that can be operated on the
hardware platform as described in this Security Target.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 11 July 2001, BSIPP-0002-2001 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Functions
Addressed issue
F.LOG
Extended Logical Protection
F.AES
AES encryption and decryption
F.DES
DES encryption and decryption
F.RSA_encrypt
RSA encryption
F.RSA_sign
RSA signature generation and verification
F.RSA_public
computation of an RSA public key
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TOE Security Functions
Addressed issue
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA
ECC Signature Generation and Verification
F.ECC_GF_p_DH_KeyExch
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
F.SHA
compute Secure Hash Algorithms
F.RSA_KeyGen
generate RSA key pairs
F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen
ECC Key Generation
F.RNG_Access
software RNG
F.Object_Reuse
clearing memory areas
F.COPY
copy memory contents
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.3 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1 . Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B, P5CC080V0B and P5CC073V0B.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW
NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller
V0B
Wafer, modules and package
(dice include reference T035B)
2
SW
Test ROM Software (the IC Dedicated
Test Software)
63, dated 29-112006
test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_63.lst)
3
SW
Boot ROM Software (part of the IC
Dedicated Support Software)
63, dated 29-112006
test ROM on the chip
(tmfos_63.lst)
4
SW
MIFARE Operating System (part of
theIC Dedicated Support Software)
2.0, dated 24-08- test ROM on the chip
2006
(tmfos_63.lst)
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No
Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
5
SW
Crypto Library
2.2, 25-11-2008
Binary files
6
DOC
NXP Semiconductors Data Sheet
P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family;
Secure dual interface and contact PKI
smart card controller
Rev. 3.6, 07-042009
electronic document
7
DOC
NXP Semiconductors Documentation:
Rev. 1.1, 04-07Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure 2006
Smart Card Controller, Objective
Specification
electronic document
8
DOC
NXP Semiconductors Guidance,
Delivery and Operation Manual for the
P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family of
Secure Smart Card Controller
Rev. 1.8, 15-022010
electronic document
9
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User
Guidance: Secured Crypto Library
on the P5Cx02x/040/080/144
Family
Rev. 3.8, 30-032010
electronic document
10
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 5.0, 24-08Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2007
– Pseudo Random Number Generator
& Chi-Squared Test Library
electronic document
11
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 1.1, 07-11Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2007
– Secured AES Library
electronic document
12
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User
Guidance: Secured Crypto Library
on the SmartMX – Secured DES
Library
Rev. 3.0, 24-082007
electronic document
13
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User
Guidance: Secured Crypto Library
on the SmartMX – SHA Library
Rev. 4.1, 12-062008
electronic document
14
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 4.4, 30-03Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2010
– Secured RSA Library
electronic document
15
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 4.3, 30-03Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2010
– Secured RSA Key Generation Library
electronic document
16
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 1.4, 30-03Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2010
– Secured ECC Library
electronic document
17
DOC
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance:
Rev. 1.0, 24-08Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX 2007
– Utility Library
electronic document
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B, P5CC080V0B
and P5CC073V0B. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask
onto the chip during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate
T035B is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the guidance
documentation [25]. This nameplate identifies Version V0B of the hardware, but does not
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identify specifically the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration, the
Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [27], chapter 11.7):
The value 28 hex as Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD080V0B.
The value 27 hex as Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CN080V0B.
The value 26 hex as Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC080V0B.
The value 16 hex as Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC073V0B.
Items 2 and 3 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle
of the PP) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different
parts of the TOE as outlined above. Further information on secure delivery procedures of
the hardware platform are given in [22] and [25].
The Crypto Library is intended to be supplied to “users”, who are developers of operating
systems or other software to be embedded into the SmartMX chips. The library will be
supplied to the users as a set of binary library files, to enable the “users” to incorporate the
crypto library into their operating systems.
It has to be made sure the user of the Crypto Library receives a correct version of the
Crypto Library. The customer has to fill in a so-called Order Entry Form for Crypto
Libraries. There he has to make sure to select the correct device and to mark the Common
Criteria evaluated check-box to make sure to get the library CC certified for this device.
More details are given in [12].
The reference of the hardware part of the TOE is checked by visual inspection. The
surface of the TOE consists of the label “T035B”. The reference of the software part of the
TOE is checked by using the SHA-256 hash values. The values are provided in the in user
guidance manual [12].
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
Since this Security Target claims conformance to a PP the Policy P.Process-TOE
“Protection during TOE Development and Production” of the Protection Profile is applied
here also. The hardware security target defines the following additional security
components:
P.Add-Components: Additional Specific Security Components
The SmartMX processor part of the TOE provides the following additional security
functionality to the Smartcard Embedded Software:
●
Triple-DES encryption and decryption
●
AES encryption and decryption
●
Area based Memory Access Control
●
Special Function Register Access Control
●
Memory separation for different software parts
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The Crypto Library part of the TOE uses the Triple-DES co-processor hardware to provide
DES security functionality, as listed below in P.Add-Func: Additional Specific Security
Functionality. The Crypto Library makes no use of either the Area based Memory Access
Control or the Special Function Register Access Control. These features are for the use
and control of the Smartcard Embedded Software that includes the Crypto Library. In
addition to the security functionality provided by the hardware mentioned above and
defined in the Security Target of the SmartMX, the following additional security functionality
is provided by the Crypto Library for use by the Smart Card Embedded Software:
P.Add-Func: Additional Specific Security Functionality
The TOE shall provide the following additional security functionality to the Smartcard
Embedded Software:
●
AES encryption and decryption
●
Triple-DES encryption and decryption,
●
RSA encryption, decryption, signature generation and verification,
●
RSA public key computation
●
RSA key generation,
●
ECC over GF(p) signature generation and verification,
●
ECC over GF(p) key generation,
●
ECC Diffie-Hellman key exchange
●
ECC Secure Point Addition
●
SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 Hash Algorithms,
●
access to the RNG (implementation of a software RNG and tests for the hardware
RNG),
●
secure copy routine.
In addition, the TOE shall
●
provide protection of residual information, and
●
provide resistance against side channel attacks as described in Table 7 and in section
6.1.13 F.COPY.
Regarding the Application Note 12 of the Protection Profile [10] there are no other
additional policies defined in this Security Target.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform,
Treatment of User Data, Check of initialisation data by the Smartcard Embedded Software,
Usage of Key-dependent Functions. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp.
[9], chapter 3 and the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001.
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5
Certification Report
Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components
based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family
entitled “High-level design”. The Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile [10] describes
general requirements for smart card controllers and their support software. The Hardware
Security Target [23] defines the functionality of the platform provided by the P5CD080V0B/
P5CN080V0B/ P5CC080V0B and P5CC073V0B Smart Card Controllers (abbreviated
SmartMX). The Crypto Library V2.2 on SmartMX provides additional functionality to the
developer of Smartcard Embedded Software. It is a supplement of the basic cryptographic
features provided by the hardware platform.
In addition, the Crypto Library implements a software (pseudo) random number generator
which is initialised (seeded) by the hardware random number generator of the SmartMX.
Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy routine and includes internal security measures
for residual information protection.
The TOE contains a cryptographic library, which provides a set of cryptographic functions
that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software. The cryptographic library consists
of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to the Smartcard Embedded
Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links the binary packages that he
needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software and the whole is subsequently implemented
in the User ROM.
The Crypto Library is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is
chosen according to the cryptographic algorithms provided. The Crypto Library
subsystems are: AES, DES, RSA, ECC over GF(p), SHA, Random Numbers and Utility.
The TOE includes internal security measures for residual information protection and
provides a secure copy routine.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
7.1
Hardware platform testing
The hardware platform tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
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4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the
IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production.
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
Further information on the hardware testing are given in the
BSI-DSZ-CC-410-2007 [22].
7.2
Certification Report
Crypto Library testing
For the Crypto Library, the developer has defined an extensive test set. The test set covers
all TOE interfaces, and all modes of operation of the implemented algorithms, as well as all
available parameters. The evaluator was provided with a copy of the required software and
hardware, together with the means required to generate the TOE. This allowed the
evaluator to perform the complete test set as defined by the developer, in addition to the
tests defined by the evaluator.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE,
provided that TOE is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
The following tests are performed – DES/AES/RNG/SHA functionality, functionality and
leakage protection of RSA and ECDSA/ECDH/EC Key Generation, sensitivity to fault
injection and ECC Penetration testing. All test results were as expected.
All security functions have been tested at least once, by repeating the extensive set of fullautomated tests of the developer. Furthermore, the evaluator performeded an additional
RSA key generation test case.
The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the functions.
Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
Side channel protection has been assessed as part of the vulnerability analysis.
The overall conclusion is that the Crypto Library is protected against attackers possessing
a high attack potential for all scenarios considered.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B (Singapore, SSMC),
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CN080V0B (Singapore, SSMC),
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CC080V0B (Singapore, SSMC),
Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CC073V0B (Singapore, SSMC).
The Crypto Library provides AES, DES, Triple-DES (3DES), RSA, RSA key generation,
RSA public key computation, ECC over GF(p), ECC over GF(p) key generation, ECC
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange, SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 algorithms.
The TOE supports various key sizes for RSA up to a limit of 5024 bits. Conformance with
the evaluation requirement Strength of Function: High requires a minimum key size of
1535 bits. The TOE supports various key sizes for ECC over GF(p) up to a limit of 544 bits.
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Conformance with the evaluation requirement Strength of Function: High requires a
minimum key size of 192 bits.
All with the specific IC Dedicated Software and with production line indicator T035B for
Singapore. All the evaluation and certification results therefore are only effective for these
versions of the TOE.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up to EAL 4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of deterministic random number
generators
(ii)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(iii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(iv)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [9], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31.)
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [11] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 11 July
2001, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
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●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conform
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
F.RNG_Access – implementation of a software RNG and tests for the hardware RNG.
F.LOG – implements measures to limit or eliminate the information that might be
contained in the shape and amplitude of signals or in the time between
events found by measuring such signals. It includes software
countermeasures against side channel attacks.
F.COPY – implements a secure copy routine which includes randomization as a
countermeasure.
F.SHA – implements SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 according to the standard FIPS
180-1. The algorithms SHA-224 and SHA-256 do fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
high, the SHA-1 does not. For appropriate usage of the TOE, chapter 10 and [24]
should be considered.
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretations AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS
26, AIS 31(see [4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities
with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against
attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for
these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate
for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), RSA 1024, ECC 160, MillerRabin primality test with error bound of 2^{-80}, seed for the deterministic random number
generator, SHA1 used as collision-resistent hash function provided by the TOE achieves a
security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general contexts).
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security
Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of
the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
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The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [11].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
●
Periodically a new official catalogue is published on the homepage of the German
Federal Network Agency. The actual version of the catalogue holds for the strength of
the TOE`s Security Functions F.RSA_encrypt, F.RSA_sign, F.RSA_public,
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA, F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen, F.RSA_KeyGen and
F.ECC_GF_p_DH_keyExch. The user is obliged to take the information of the actual
version of [24] into account.
11
●
Signature creation and verification using RSA encryption, decryption and key
generation with a keylength from 1728 to 5024 bits. A usage of 2048 bits is
recommended. From 1976 bits keylength the current recommended period of
usage is by the end of 2016 [24].
●
Signature creation and verification according to ECDSA and Elliptic Curve (EC)
key generation standard with 224 - 544 bits key sizes. From 224 bits keylenght
the current recommended period of usage is by the end of 2015 [24].
●
A usage of SHA-224 and SHA-254 is currently recommended by the end of
2015.
●
A usage of the SHA-1 algorithm cannot be recommended for a high security
environment [24].
●
The operational documentation [12 - 20], [25] contains necessary information
about the usage of the TOE. For secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the
assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6, 22] has to be taken
into account. Especially the advice by the hardware user guidance [25] given in
section 5.1 and 4.3.2 must be implemented by the user.
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
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12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (symmetric crypto-algorithms)
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. cryptosystems based on elliptic curves)
GF(p)
Finite field or Galois field that contains p elements and p is a prime number
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm. SHA-1 returns hash-values with 160 bits length,
SHA-224 (sometimes called SHA-2) returns hash-values with 224 bits length
and SHA-256 (sometimes called SHA-3) returns hash-values with 256 bits
length.
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
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Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-0608-2010, Version 1.7, 30-03-2010, Crypto Library V2.2
on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B,
NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH (confidential document)
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report, V6.0, 20-04-2010, Crypto Library V2.2 on
P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B, Brightsight BV
(confidential document)
[8]
List of Configuration Items, 1.10, 30-03-2010, List of Configuration Items
(confidential document)
[9]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0608-2010, Rev. 1.5, 30-03-2010, Crypto Library V2.2
on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B, NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH (sanitised public document)
[10]
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002.2001, Version 1.0, July 2001, by Atmel Smart Card
ICs, Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
8
specifically
24 / 38
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Certification Report
[11]
ETR for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product Crypto Library V2.2 on
P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B, v5.0, 10-05-2010,
Brightsight BV (confidential document)
[12]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Crypto Library on the P5Cx02x/040/080/144
Family, Revision 3.8, 30-03-2010
[13]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Pseudo Random Number Generator & Chi-Squared Test Library, Revision 5.0, 2408-2007
[14]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured AES Library, Revision 1.1, 07-11-2007
[15]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured DES Library, Revision 3.0, 24-08-2007
[16]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
SHA Library, Revision 4.1, 12-06-2008
[17]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured RSA Library, Revision 4.4, 30-03-2010
[18]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured RSA Key Generation Library, Revision 4.3, 30-03-2010
[19]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Secured ECC Library, Revision 1.4, 30-03-2010
[20]
NXP Semiconductors User Guidance: Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX –
Utility Library, Revision 1.0, 24-08-2007
[21]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0417-2007, Secured Crypto Library on the
P5CD080V0B, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Rev. 1.1, 07-11-2007
(sanitised public document)
[22]
Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, BSIDSZ-CC-410-2007, 05-07-2007
[23]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0410, Version 1.7, P5CD080/P5CN080/
P5CC080V0B/P5CC073V0B, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 28-09-2009,
(sanitised public document)
[24]
Bundesnetzagentur: Bekanntmachung zur elektronischen Signatur nach dem
Signaturgesetz und der Signaturverordnung (Übersicht über geeignete
Algorithmen), German "Bundesanzeiger Nr. 19", page 426, 04-02-2010
[25]
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144V0B
Family of Secure Smart Card Controllers, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line
Identification, Version 1.8, 15-02-2010
[26]
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008-MA-01, NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller P5CC073V0B with IC Dedicated Software: Secured
Crypto Library Release 2.1, 18-09-2008
[27]
Data Sheet P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family, Secure dual interface and contact
PKI smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Rev. 3.6, 07-042009
25 / 38
Certification Report
[28]
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure Smart Card Controller, Objective
Specification, NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Rev. 1.1, 04-07-2006
BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
ADV: Development
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
Tests
ALC_FLR
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Certification Report
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0608-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Crypto Library V2.2 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B /
P5CC073V0B (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended
by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for
the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)..
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 June 2010, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security Assurance
Requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
1. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Georg-HeykenStr. 1, D-21147 Hamburg (Development Center)
2. NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303
Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand (Assembly, Test and
Delivery)
3. Document Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Documentation)
4. Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (Semiconductor Factory)
5. Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park, Singapore
507099, Singapore (mask shop)
6. Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd., ScienceBased Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (Mask Shop)
7. Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial
Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Wafer Bumping)
8. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center
Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Delivery, Test and
Assembly)
9. NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module
Assembly)
10. HID Global Galway, Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann, Co. Galway,
Ireland (Inlay Assembly)
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Certification Report
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11. Smartrac Technology GmbH, Wernerwerkstr. 2, 93049 Regensburg, Germany (Inlay
assembly)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by the
nameplate (on-chip identifier) T035B. For development and productions sites regarding the
NXP chip P5CD080V0B refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 [22].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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