Certification Report: 0798a_pdf

Certification Report: 0798a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
for
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
from
cv cryptovision GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.64
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Electronic ID documents: IC with Applications
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
from
cv cryptovision GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10,
25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 September 2012
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
for components up
to EAL 4
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
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Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................8
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................15
Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
Documentation.............................................................................................................17
IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
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A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the component ALC_DVS.2 that is not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 23 August 2012. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by cv cryptovision GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5
Publication
The product cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 has been included in the BSI list of certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact-less integrated circuit chip containing
components for a machine readable travel document (MRTD chip).
The TOE consists of
●
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) including the contact-based
interface with hardware for the contact-less interface including contacts for the antenna,
[9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23],
●
the platform with the Java Card operation system JCOP 2.4.1R3 by NXP, in the variants
JxA081, A, B1, B4, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011, J2A080, Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011, JxA040, A, B1, B4, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011,
[15, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26],
●
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 as the only application that has access to the contact-less
interface,
●
the associated guidance documentation Administrator and User Guidance [27] as well
as JCOP documentation [28, 29, 30] (see details below).
The BAC compliant configuration (application) cv act ePasslet/BACv1 v1.8 is part of the cv
act ePasslet Suite. Some of the underlying platform variants of this composite TOE provide
MIFARE functionality; please note that this functionality is out of scope of the TOE’s
security functionality.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical
data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and
machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data
elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contact-less machine reading. The
authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized
for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii)
biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing state or organization
ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving state trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing state or organization.
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile only the security
mechanism Basic Access Control is in the focus of this certification. The security
mechanisms Extended Access Control and Chip Authentication were subject of the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0797-2012, [33].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
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The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functions
Addressed issue
TSF_Access
Access rights
TSF_Admin
Administration
TSF_Secret
Secret key management
TSF_Crypto
Cryptographic operations
TSF_ SecureMessaging
Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth
Authentication protocols
TSF_Integrity
Integrity protection
TSF_OS
Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
The cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1 is a multi-application package for eID documents based on
Java Card. It contains a fixed set of applications as stated in the Security Target [6],
Table 1. These applications are realized by configurations of one or more predefined
applets. While each application has a distinct configuration, different applications might
use the same underlying applet. For details on the relation between applets and
applications please refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2 of the Security Target [6].
While the whole applet code resides in ROM, the applets providing the different
applications are instantiated into EEPROM. Multiple applications can be present at the
same time by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations with some
restrictions detailed below. A common combination could be an EACv1 applet and an ePKI
applet providing a travel application with LDS data and EAC authentication together with a
signature application.
The complete product (not to be mistaken for the TOE) is available in two variants.
Variant 1
●
available on P5Cx081,
●
covering all applications provided in Table 1 of the Security Target [6],
●
certified products: BAC certified according to PP0055 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012, [34]),
EACv1 certified according to PP0056 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0797-2012, [33]), EACv2-SAC
certified according to SAC/PACE-PP (BSI-DSZ-CC-0799-2012, [35]), ePKI certified as
Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to PP0059 (contact interface and
contact-less interface with PACE) (BSI-DSZ-CC-0804-2012, [36]).
Variant 2
●
available on P5Cx080 and P5Cx040,
●
contains the applets and applications indicated in Figure 2 of the Security Target [6],
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
certified products: BAC certified according to PP0055 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012, [34]),
EACv1 certified according to PP0056 (BSI-DSZ-CC-0797-2012, [33]), ePKI certified as
Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to PP0059 (contact interface only)
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0804-2012, [36]).
For this TOE (BAC) it means that TOE is available in the following two variants:
●
Variant 1: Big ROM mask and
●
Variant 2: Small ROM mask.
The small ROM mask does not include all available applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite
v1.1 but all parts necessary for the TOE are available in both variants.
This means for this TOE (BAC) that two variants are available on the following platforms:
Variant 1 (big ROM mask)
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (JxA081, A, B1, B4) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011, [17]) with crypto
library v2.7 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010, [14]) and hardware P5Cx081V1A (Cert.ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009, [11]).
Variant 2 (small ROM mask)
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (J2A080) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011, [16]) with crypto library
version 2.6 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010, [13]) and hardware P5Cx080V0B (Cert.ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2010, [10]),
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (JxA040, A, B1, B4) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011, [15]) with crypto
library version 2.7 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010, [12]) and hardware P5Cx040VOB
(Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007, [9]).
Combinations of certified and non-certified applications are possible (as long as these
applications use one of the above applets instantiated from ROM). Via configuration the
instantiated applets can be tied to the contact-less and/or the contact interface,
respectively. BAC, EACv1, EACv2-SAC require exclusive access to the contact-less
interface. Hence, if one of these applications is used (in certified configuration), further
(certified or non-certified) applications have to be bound to the contact interface. The
configuration of the TOE claimed by the Security Target [6] is fixed after personalization.
Only applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite, which is part of the ROM mask, are available for
installation. Additional applets cannot be loaded or installed. This explicitly excludes
additional applet code being loaded and installed into EEPROM.
The TOE is delivered before initialization / pre-personalization. The antenna is not part of
the TOE.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2
Certification Report
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
1
2
Item
Identifier (Name
Description
and
version) Form of Delivery
HW/S Hardware-Chip
W
with Applet Suite
in ROM
cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1 on JCOP
Secure physical
2.4.1 R3 (JxA081, J2A080 or JxA040). delivery
DOC
cv act ePasslet/BAC cv act ePasslet
Secure electronic
Suite Java Card applet providing ICAO delivery
ePassport application with Basic
Access Control Guidance Manual
v2.1.6.
cv act ePasslet/
BAC Guidance
[27]
This is the integrated circuit (in the
form of module) with the embedded
operating system and the cv act
ePasslet Suite v1.1, ready for prepersonalization.
The Guidance contains necessary
information to pre-personalize and
personalize the TOE.
3
DOC
DOC
JCOP
Administrator
Manual
JCOP V2.4.1 Revision 3 Secure Smart Secure electronic
Card Controller - Administrator
delivery
manual, Rev. 3, 2011-03-08, NXP.
[28]
The Guidance contains necessary
information to pre-personalize the
TOE.
JCOP User
Manual
JCOP V2.4.1 Revision 3 Secure Smart Secure electronic
Card Controller - User Manual, Rev.
delivery
3.0, 9 March 2011, NXP.
[29]
The Guidance contains necessary
information to pre-personalize the
TOE.
DOC
NXP Application
Note
[30]
CV act ePasslet Suite V1.1, PrePersonalization of JCOP JxA081EX0
products for cv act ePasslet Suite
v1.1, Rev. 1.0, 28.11.2011, NXP.
Secure electronic
delivery
The NXP Application Note contains
necessary information to prepersonalize the TOE.
KEYS Keys
Transport key This key allows to
access most parts of the EEPROM
(including JCRE configuration area) to
preconfigure the card.
Authentication key This key allows to
verify authenticity of the IC via internal
JCOP authentication mechanism.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Delivery of the HW/SW items:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
●
The customer collects the hardware himself at the NXP site.
●
The hardware is sent by NXP to the customer and protected by special measures.
The delivery of the documents and keys is performed by the document control office of
NXP BU ID. The documents are delivered as encrypted PDF. The password required to
open the document is delivered using a separate route of transport.
The TOE is delivered before initialization / pre-personalization. The antenna is not part of
the TOE. The pre-personalizer is responsible for the delivery of the pre-personalized
hardware and the key material to the personalizer.
NXP is responsible for the delivery of all needed documentation.
The identification of the TOE during the pre-personalization phase shall be performed by
issuing the APDU command IDENTIFY. The returned ROM value has to match the
platform, which includes all hardware and software (i.e. the used cv act ePasslet Suite
v1.1). The identification procedure is described in detail in [27, chapter 2.2.2]. The
following steps are a short summary:
●
Boot the chip and send the IDENTIFY command: 00h A4h 04h 00h 09h A0h 00h 00h
01h 67h 41h 30h 00h FFh 00h
●
Check if the returned ROM value matches the platform used as given below:
Response (starting at byte offset 16): P5Cx081UA: 8F80EC; P5Cx080UA: 7C1970;
P5Cx040UA: F39353
The identification of the TOE during the personalization phase shall be performed by
issuing the APDU commands SELECT and GET DATA. This procedure is described in
detail in [27, chapter 2.2.2]. The following steps are a short summary:
●
Select ePasslet/BAC using SELECT; Command: 00A4040C 07 A0000002471001 00;
Response: 6F198201388407A0000002471001860800FFFFFFFFFF0C0C8A0103 9000
●
Read out version information using GET DATA; Command: 00CA0182 02; Response:
0108 9000
●
Read out personalization options using GET DATA; Command: 80CA0055 00;
Response: 5505 42 0108 8100 9000
In case that more than one application has been installed, each applet has to be selected
and identified according to the respective guidance.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the “Machine Readable Travel
Document with 'ICAO Application' Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009” by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less
chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security
Policy addresses the advanced security methods in this Protection Profile according the
the Security Target [6].
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
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specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
●
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
●
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
●
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
●
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
●
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
●
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
●
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
●
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is a contact-less integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing
the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO document [31].
The TOE architecture of the cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1 comprises the following
subsystems:
●
Platform (S_Platform)
●
Operating System (S_OpSys)
●
Configuration Manager (S_CfgMgr)
●
Event Manager (S_EvtMgr)
●
Command Processor (S_CmdProc)
●
Secure Messaging Manager (S_SecMsgMgr)
●
File System Manager (S_FileSysMgr)
●
State Manager (S_StateMgr)
The cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1 is a modular multi-application package for eID documents
based on Java Card. It provides the applications as stated in the Security Target [6],
Table 1. These applications are realized by configurations of one or more predefined
applets as described in Figure 1 and Figure 2 of the Security Target [6].
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions on a simulator as well as on real cards.
For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate
its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all
boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid
inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Partial
repetition of developer tests was performed during the independent evaluator tests.
The independent tests of the evaluators were performed on the real cards. The selfprotection of the TSF was tested by means of penetration tests. The tests of the evaluators
covered aspects not already covered by the platform:
●
Access Control (by means of APDU commands)
●
Identification and Authentication (by means of APDU commands),
●
Secure Messaging (by means of APDU commands),
●
Preparative procedures, i.e. applet installing and personalisation (by means of APDU
commands),
●
Self-protection of TSF (by means of LFI),
●
Resistance to Java Card related attacks (by means of source code review).
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during
their penetration testing. The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to
●
Manufacturing (applet loading, installing and selection),
●
Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
●
Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
●
Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
●
Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance,
●
LFI tests using standard LFI equipment.
The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the
following approach:
●
Augmentation of developer tests for interfaces and supplementation of developer testing
strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
●
Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer’s tests the tests are also
selected by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and
related functionality.
●
Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer testing of the
interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably tested. The
evaluator had no doubt that an interface is not properly implemented.
●
The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and were therefore in the focus of
testing.
●
Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative steps
were performed and described for nearly each test case.
18 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
●
Certification Report
The selection process was based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body.
Therefore all TOE security functionality was included within the subset. All cryptographic
functionality is provided by the platform and was sufficiently tested during platform
evaluation.
The TOE was tested on all hardware platforms. The keys and personalization data used in
the test configurations were provided by the developer. The test reports for the APDU tests
were automatically generated by the test tool used. The test logs and the test
documentation include details and comments on the test configuration, on the test
equipment used, on the used command structure and the expected results. The test
prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test the related TSFI, and they
are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification.
The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test results and the
actual test results.
The penetration testing was partially performed using the developer’s testing environment,
partially using the test environment of evaluator.
All configurations of the TOE that are covered by the evaluation were tested.
The evaluator devised penetration tests where the evaluator identified attack scenarios
that could exploit potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment. This included
●
Perturbation attacks on program flow disturbance and authentication bypass;
●
Logical attacks on bypass authentication or access control;
●
Reaching limits of resources or maximum values of parameters;
●
Traceability attacks.
The evaluator performed code review of the cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1 to verify the
implementation of the requirements of the platform's ETRs for composition and guidance
as well as of the security mechanisms of the applets in general.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was successful on the
TOE in its operational environment as defined in [6] provided that all measures required by
the developer are applied.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is available in the following two variants:
●
Variant 1: Big ROM mask and
●
Variant 2: Small ROM mask.
The small ROM mask does not include all available applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite
v1.1 but all parts necessary for the TOE are available in both variants.
The two variants are available on the following platforms:
Variant 1 (big ROM mask)
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (JxA081, A, B1, B4) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011, [17]) with crypto
library v2.7 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010, [14]) and hardware P5Cx081V1A (Cert.ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009, [11]).
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Variant 2 (small ROM mask)
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (J2A080) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011, [16]) with crypto library
version 2.6 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010, [13]) and hardware P5Cx080V0B (Cert.ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2010, [10]),
●
JCOP 2.4.1R3 (JxA040, A, B1, B4) (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011, [15]) with crypto
library version 2.7 (Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010, [12]) and hardware P5Cx040VOB
(Cert.-ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007, [9]).
Combinations of certified and non-certified applications are possible (as long as these
applications use one of the above applets instantiated from ROM). Via configuration the
instantiated applets can be tied to the contact-less and/or the contact interface,
respectively. BAC, EACv1, EACv2-SAC require exclusive access to the contact-less
interface. Hence, if one of these applications is used (in certified configuration), further
(certified or non-certified) applications have to be bound to the contact interface. The
configuration of the TOE claimed by the Security Target [6] is fixed after personalization.
Only applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite, which is part of the ROM mask, are available for
installation. Additional applets cannot be loaded or installed. This explicitly excludes
additional applet code being loaded and installed into EEPROM.
The TOE is delivered before initialization / pre-personalization. The antenna is not part of
the TOE.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
●
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators (for JCOP),
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number
generators (for the hardware platform),
●
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices. According to this
concept the relevant documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware, crypto libraries and JCOP) have been provided to the composite evaluator
and used for the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 34, AIS 35, AIS 36, AIS 38 were used).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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Certification Report
●
All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
[The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for the TOE Security
Functionalities TSF_Crypto and TSF_OS and is detailed in the following table.
The table lists the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its security
policy.
Algorithm
Bit
Length
Purpose
Security
Function
Standard of
Implementation
Standard of
Application
Triple-DES in 112 bit
CBC mode
Key derivation
TSF_Crypto
ICAO_9303
TR-03110
SHA-1
Hash for Key Derivation
TSF_OS
FIPS PUB 180-4
TR-03110
Triple-DES in 112 bit
CBC mode
encryption / decryption
TSF_OS
FIPS PUB 46-3
TR-03110
Retail MAC
secure messaging –
MAC
-
112 bit
TSF_OS
ICAO_9303
TSF_Crypto
TSF_OS
ISO 9797-1
(MAC algorithm
3)
TR-03110
Table 3: Cryptographic Algorithms used by the TOE
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110,
[32], the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and confidentiality of the stored
data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs). All cryptographic algorithms listed
in table 3 are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE
application (e.g. TR-03110 [32]). A validity period of each algorithm is not mentioned in
BSI-TR-03110 [32]. For that reason an explicit validity period is not given.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
The Cryptographic Functionalities 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), SHA1 provided by the TOE
achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
Especially, after pre-personalization the selection of the card manager has to be disabled
permanently by the pre-personalizer. This is described in the JCOP Administrator Manual
[28], chapter 2.3.1.
Please bear in mind that the TOE is delivered before pre-personalization and the antenna
is not part of the TOE. Also, the pre-personalization agent has to carefully follow the
guidance [27] and all JCOP documentation that is part of the delivery of the TOE, i.e. [28,
29, 30].
In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security
Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of
the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms has to be considered by the
user and his system risk management process.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ANSI
American National Standards Institute
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
BU ID
A Business Unit of NXP
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
DTBS
Data To Be Signed
DTBS/R
DTBS Representation
EAC
Extended Access Control
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ePKI
Electronic PKI
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
MRZ
Machine Readable Zone
OCR
Optical Character Recognition
OSP
Organisational Security Policy
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PDF
Portable Document Format
PKCS
Public-key cryptography standards
PKI
Public Key Infrastructure
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAC
Supplemental access control
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SCD
Signature Creation Data
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SSCD
Secure Signature Creation Device
ST
Security Target
SVD
Signature Verification Data
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Certification Report
13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[2]
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012, cv act ePasslet/EACv1 v1.8, Version 1.02,
Date 16.08.2012, cv cryptovision GmbH
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, cv act ePasslet/BACv1 v1.8, Version 7, Date
22.08.2012, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[9]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each
with specific IC Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification, 05.07.2007, BSI, including all Assurance Continuity
Maintenance Reports
[10]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC
Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line
Identification, 05.07.2007, BSI, including all Assurance Continuity Maintenance
Reports
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 8,Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
[11]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 10.11.2009, including all Assurance
Continuity Maintenance Reports
[12]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010 for Crypto Library V2.6 on
P5CD040V0B / P5CC040V0B / P5CD020V0B / P5CC021V0B / P5CD012V0B from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 07.01.2011, BSI
[13]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010 for Crypto Library V2.6 on
P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 03.12.2010, BSI
[14]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 for Crypto Library V2.7 on
P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A /
P5CD016V1A from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 19 November 2010, BSI,
including reassessment dated 29.02.2012, BSI
[15]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011 for NXP J3A040 & J2A040 Secure
Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH,
25.05.2011, BSI
[16]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011 for NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Secure
Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH,
31.03.2011, BSI
[17]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011 for NXP J3A081, J2A081 and J3A041
Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH, 06.04.2011, BSI
[18]
ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD040V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.4, 21.10.2011, T-Systems, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0404
[19]
ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.31, 07.09.2010, T-Systems, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0410
[20]
ETR for composition according to AIS36, NXP P5CD081V1A Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.4, 28.10.2011, T-Systems, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0555
[21]
ETR for composition Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD040V0B / P5CC040V0B /
P5CD020V0B / P5CC021V0B / P5CD012V0B according to AIS36, 24.11.2010,
Version 1.0, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0710, Brightsight
[22]
ETR for composition Crypto Library Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD080V0B /
P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B, 18.11.2010, Version 1.0, Certification
ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0709, Project name Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD080V0B /
P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B, Brightsight
[23]
ETR for composition Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A /
P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A, 27.02.2012, Version
5.0, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633, Project name NXP CC CryptoLib P5CD081,
Brightsight
[24]
Evaluation technical report for composite evaluation, NXP J3A040 and J2A040
Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3, Version 3, 18.05.2011, TÜViT, Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0730
26 / 42
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Certification Report
[25]
Evaluation technical report for composite evaluation, NXP J3A080 and J2A080
Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3, Version 2, 30.03.2011, TÜViT, Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0674
[26]
Evaluation technical report for composite evaluation, NXP J3A081, J2A081 and
J3A041 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3, Version 4, 06.04.2011-, TÜViT,
Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0675
[27]
cv act ePasslet/BAC, cv act ePasslet Suite Java Card applet providing ICAO
ePassport application with Basic Access Control (BAC), Guidance Manual, cv act
ePasslet Suite version 1.1, cv act ePasslet/BAC version 1.8, Document Version
2.1.6, 11.06.2012, cv cryptovision GmbH
[28]
JCOP V2.4.1 Revision 3 Secure Smart Card Controller - Administrator manual, Rev.
3, 08.03.2011, NXP
[29]
JCOP V2.4.1 Revision 3 Secure Smart Card Controller - User Manual, Rev. 3.0,
09.03.2011, NXP
[30]
CV act ePasslet Suite V1.1, Pre-Personalization of JCOP JxA081EX0 products for
cv act ePasslet Suite v1.1, Rev. 1.0, 28.11.2011, NXP
[31]
ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1, “Machine Readable Passports”, sixth edition, 2006, Part. 2,
"Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability", and Part 3, “Machine Readable Official Travel Documents”, third edition,
2008, ICAO
[32]
Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Password
Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI),
Version 2.02, BSI
[33]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0797-2012 for cv act ePasslet/EACv1 v1.8 from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 2012, BSI
[34]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012 for cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 2012, BSI
[35]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0799-2012 for cv act ePasslet/EACv2-SAC v1.8
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 2012, BSI
[36]
Certification Report - BSI-DSZ-CC-0804-2012 for cv act ePasslet/ePKI v3.6 from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 2012, BSv3.6 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, 2012, BSI
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
CC Part 3:
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Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
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Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0798-2012
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated
at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 September 2012, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC - Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Developer, MRTD Manufacturer: cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14,
45886 Gelsenkirchen
For development and production sites regarding the platforms please refer to the
certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 [9], BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 [10], BSI-DSZCC-0555-2009 [11], BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010 [12], BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010 [13], BSI-DSZCC-0633-2010 [14], BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011 [15], BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011 [16], BSI-DSZCC-0675-2011 [17].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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