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The Theory of Interhybridity:
Socio-political Dimensions and Migration
Experiences of Post-communist Western
Balkan States
Aliu, Armando
University of Heidelberg
25. January 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44056/
MPRA Paper No. 44056, posted 29. January 2013 / 12:44
The Theory of Interhybridity:
Socio-political Dimensions and Migration
Experiences of Post-communist
Western Balkan States
Armando ALIU
Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany
The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former
communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU
agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting
power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact
that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the
Soviet Socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western
Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and
migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration
policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this
standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors
such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society
score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the
hybridization state and non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related
problems. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of
balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a
combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is
precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of
communication.
Keywords: Interhybridity, Migration, Politics, Western Balkans
«Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the
resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now
shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its
unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the
migrant,1 and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the
political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between
languages»
--- Edward W. Said – Culture and Imperialism, 1993: 332 ---
T
he EU started to shape a common migration policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to
structure intergovernmental cooperation. Afterwards, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and
included migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement
into acquis communitaire. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental
cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries.
Likewise, the TFEU has centralized the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the
centralization to Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues.2 At national
level, the EU respects all member states’ own constitutions and regulations because all member states have their
sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to
their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and
multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and
back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional
cooperation and enlargement policy.
Thus the Western Balkans appears as a strategic region which have high priorities for regional cooperation
and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming more closer to these
countries. Latterly, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalizations, social and cultural funds, financial aid
and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member
state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalization talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve
interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to
be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts.
From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are guaranteed
by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. The judicial
complaints, debates and skeptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration policies and
Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly. In 2009, only these four countries have received
approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in Schengen zone.
With these facts in mind, for the Western Balkan countries visa liberalizations have provided overstay of
migrants and asylum applications. All Western Balkan countries’ (currently except Kosovo) citizens are
allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they
move to any member state within this process. Chronically, some matters of free movement lay on the
circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with
their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international
protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from where
they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental reasons
through using empirical data and attempts to connect the main migration factors (e.g. visa, remittance, asylum
and migration) are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the
economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western
Balkans. In general, the research questions are as follows:
General Questions
Form of Questioning
1. Have the EU integration process and enlargement agenda significant effect on
transformation of Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions within Western
Balkans?
2. Have the characteristics of transformation process been shaped in between the Soviet
Socialism and the European democracy?
3. Is the role of Constitutional Courts in Western Balkan states significant at
enhancement of judicial independence and judicial review, level of
democracy/democratization and rule of law?
4. Can voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – effectiveness on the
other be clarified in the context of industrial relations and democracy?3
If yes Why? How?
How? To what extend?
Why? To what extend?
How? At which level: national, international
and/or supranational?
The research contributes at both the theoretical and empirical levels to the insights of employment
relationship and comparative political analyses of Western Balkan countries. Specifically, it is important to ask;
on the one hand how the Western Balkan countries ought to preserve characteristics of Soviet Socialism, and on
the other, how these sovereign states will keep up doing reforms in political and judiciary area for meeting
European standards and norms during the Europeanization and EU integration process without causing any
damage towards the characteristics of Soviet Socialism. The research has focused on the Codebook of the
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006 (Klaus Armingeon,
University of Berne), the Comparative Constitutional Project (University of Illinois) and the Judinst Project –
Assessing Judicial Institutions and Judicial Performances in which I was an intern at Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. According to the scope of these codebooks,
research hypotheses and empirical techniques have been generated as below.4
1. Elections
H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
The date of election of national Parliament affects the percentage of votes.
The president’s term in office has significant effect on mode of electing the president.
The voter turnout in the parliamentary election influences percentage of votes.
The number of seats contested in each election affects the percentage of seats.
The percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election influences the turnout for presidential
election.
2. Post-Communist Institutions
H6
H7
H8
The political system significantly influences the mode of election of upper chamber.
The index of rigidity of constitution affects electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament.
The presidential power index has an effect on popular veto and veto point referendum.
3. Women in Parliament
H9
The number of women in Parliament affects the type of cabinet.
4. Party System
H10
The effective number of parties in Parliament has an influence on the type of cabinet.
5. Complexion of Government
H11
2
The complexion of government affects the percentage of seats.
6. Democracy
H12
H13
H14
The democratization score significantly influences the electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance
scores.
Rule of Law score has an effect on judicial framework and independence, and corruption scores.
The democracy score affects the national and local democratic governance scores.
7. Industrial Relations
H15
The number of workers involved in labour conflicts has an effect on the unemployment as a percentage of the labour force.
H16
The constitution has a significant effect on industrial relations.
[PROVWORK] - Does the constitution mention a state duty to provide work/employment?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
[REMUNER] - Does the constitution provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
[JOINTRDE] - Does the constitution provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
[STRIKE] - Does the constitution provide for a right to strike?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
[LEISURE] - Does the constitution provide for a right of rest and leisure?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
[SAFEWORK] - Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?
1. Yes; 2. No
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable
8. Judiciary
H17
Verdicts of constitutional courts have significant influence on judicial review and index of rigidity of constitution.
G 
1
2
m
 v
i 1
i
 si
Gallagher index of disproportionality (Lijphart 1999: 158)
v
seats for party i, i is the share of votes for party i, and m is the number of parties.
Index of electoral fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula [F]

2
, where
si
is the share of
m
rae _ ele  1 
v
2
i
v
, where i is the share of votes for party i and m the number of parties.
Index of legislative fractionalization of the party-system according to the formula [F]
i 1
m
rae _ leg  1 
s
2
i
s
, where i is the share of seats for party i and m the number of parties.
The objectives of the research are listed as follows: comparing i) Elections, ii) Post-communist Institutions, iii)
Women in Parliament, iv) Party System, v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy, vii) Industrial Relations
and viii) Judiciary criteria in Western Balkan countries. The scope of the research in terms of criteria and factors
are as such: i)Elections (e.g. date of election of national Parliament, voter turnout in the parliamentary election,
number of seats contested in each election, electoral threshold, percentage of votes, percentage of seats, mode of
electing the president, president’s term in office, date of election of president, turnout for presidential election,
percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election), ii)Post-communist Institutions
(e.g. bicameral or unicameral parliament, subordinated upper chamber, mode of election of upper chamber, form
of state organization as defined by constitution, judicial review, electoral system for the Parliament, type of
cabinet, index of rigidity of constitution, required referendum, veto point referendum, popular veto, popular
initiative and political system), iii)Women in Parliament (e.g. percentage of women in Parliament, number of
women in Parliament), iv)Party System (e.g. effective number of parties in Parliament, index of
fractionalization of the party –system), v)Complexion of Government, vi)Democracy (e.g. year of acquisition
of independence or official end of communist rule, overall status of a country, rating of Political Rights, rating
of Civil Liberties, Democratization score, Rule of Law score, Economic Liberalization score, rating of press
freedom scores, Corruption Perception Index, violent conflict inside the country or at the borders),
vii)Industrial Relations (e.g. number of workers involved in labor conflicts, number of days not worked,
unemployment as a percentage of the labor force) and viii)Judiciary (e.g. Constitutional Comparisons,
Constitutional Court and Judicial Review). In this study, the hypotheses of Post-Communist Institutions and
Democracy were merely taken into account because of the scope of the research. Thus the hypotheses of
Elections, Women in Parliament, Party System, Complexion of Government, Industrial Relations and Judicial
framework were excluded.
i 1
3
Methodology and Background
Why the Western Balkan countries were chosen for a comparison analysis? Geographically, the Western
Balkans, consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and
Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth
member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate
achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in
these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with
merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will
enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans.
From international migration point of view, the Western Balkan case is sui generis. The European
Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly Western Balkan
countries. Above all, from the European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for
pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and externally in
Western Balkans. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and Western Balkans is a factor that distinguishes the
region from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with the region as both strategy and
security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of this region and that’s why the
hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the EU enlargement,
integration, stability, and development processes.
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European
Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit:
Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled ‘The EU’s Enlargement Policy’ and the
conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s
Asylum Policy’. The author has also participated in a conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der
Historische Materialismus.’ The conference was organized on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto
Apel (Universität Frankfurt am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main)
and many other social scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal
in Germany. Altogether, the author has applied two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg
Interkulturelles Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në
Botë) to the research. The first case is testing the perception of a migrant receiver country (Germany) and the
second case is testing the perception of migrant sender country (Albania). The author has carried out an in-depth
interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in
Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview were very significant in
terms of the EU integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the
Heidelberg Intercultural Center as a hybrid case are likely to spread and networked in the future.
Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases and the European
Commission published reports in order to analyze each state and region separately and then compare the
illustrations for finding out similarities and differences among each other.
Systematically, the study presents the interrelationship among concepts and categories of comparison
analyses of the case of Western Balkan countries’ data. The first step of migration process is visa applications.
Many embassies of EU member states in Western Balkan countries have set up new regulations and procedures
so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa because of not meeting the
eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards
migrants and gives a clue regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and
procedures. If migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even though
the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa application process, many
inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or different problems may emerge in home
countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the inflexible dynamic factors which directly influence both
migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts
points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even public
institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host countries because of several
reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in between home and host countries.
For instance, migrants who face financial problems are problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host
country. Therefore, hybridity which will be argued in the fourth section proposes a solution which links home
and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society. The third step is asylum that
covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries
temporarily find solutions for working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home
countries, the high level of competitiveness, restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are the
4
essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions
sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of home country and make the host country change
the positive attitude towards asylum seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is
the lack of information sources. Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online
platforms for asylum seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home
and host countries. The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category
frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide
strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of migration dynamics and creation of
collaborations among state, private and civil society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host
countries and migrants) via indirect centralization within public sphere and state’s authority to attain the
ultimate goal. This will be a reflection of global trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for
legal migration of high skilled workers and well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type
which is shaped by migrants of Western Balkan countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving
unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will strengthen the partnership level among home and host
countries and will provide some definite solutions for issues such as pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social
protection and inclusion, healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on.
Figure 1: A Range of Methodologies and Their Related Paradigms
Source: Healy and Perry, 2000:121
Positivism, Constructivism and Case Study Research were followed as paradigmatic research methods. The
research has a mainstream methodology understanding that means specified three methods were partly engaged
to the research. Positivism supports a quantitative methodology and generally utilizes a hypothesis approach,
which is then tested empirically, as the ontological perspective dictates that objective enquiry provides a true
and predictive knowledge of external reality. The goal of positivism is scientific explanation whereas the
purpose of social science is the “understanding of the meaning of social phenomena”. Constructivism, broadly
conceived, is the thesis that knowledge cannot be a passive reflection of reality, but has to be more of an active
construction by an agent. Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the term was first coined by
Piaget to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. Case Study is an empirical
inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the boundaries between
the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.5
Data Overview: Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans
The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkan countries are as follows: Serbia has the highest
international migration stock and percentage of population. Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and
Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of population of
international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that
these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia. Symptomatically, the results of the
comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and
percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkan countries are as such: Montenegro has
5
the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants.
Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. Albania has the highest
number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock
at host country. Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkan countries, the graphs
illustrate dynamic trends. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of inward and
outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows. The World Bank data
comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum of Western Balkan countries indicates
interesting results. Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has the lowest
refugee population by country or territory of asylum. The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by
country or territory of origin of Western Balkan countries emphasizes the fact that the Western Balkan region
has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest
refugee population by country or territory of origin.
With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may recognize many similarities among Western Balkan
countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, refugee
population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries
and so forth. The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the generalization of
concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and differences.
Numerical results of Western Balkans are as such7: During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data,
Albanian net migration (total migration) numbers are as follows: -270245 (2000) -72243 (2005) and -47889
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76
refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees
in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 (2000)
2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of population.
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as such: -9000
(2000) -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from
9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has
increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international
migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population, and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent of population.
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as follows: -32450
(2000),
-20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased
from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of
origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the
international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of
population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net migration
numbers are as such: 281795 (2000) 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by country or
territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and refugee population
by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well.
There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 35141
(2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to
the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as follows: -147889 (2000) -338544 (2005) and 0
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to
73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748
refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 856763
(2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population, and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of
population. Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkan to the EU have also economic consequences
and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both inward remittance flows and outward
remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows
reached $1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward
remittance flows reached $10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is
$1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.2 billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward
remittance flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $61 million. In Macedonia,
in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $401
million. Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance
flows reached $26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the
inward remittance flows reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from
$138 million in 2008 to $91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is workers’
remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4
billion, FYR Macedonia $260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion.
6
Empirical results also illustrate another aspect of immigration from Western Balkan to the EU. Feminization
of migration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of
immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in
Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females.
Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific
immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and anti-discriminative solutions.
At supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of
full protection of female migrants’ rights. No doubt, feminization of migration is an important factor for
demographic change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminization of
migration has also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and
hybrid model.
Table 1: The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkan Countries
Western Balkan Countries
Albania (2011-2013)
BiH (2011-2013)
Kosovo (2011-2013)
Macedonia (2011-2013)
Montenegro (2011-2013)
Serbia (2011-2013)
Total Amount
Multiannual Indicative
Financial Framework
€228.82
€328.7
€212.4
€320.3
€104.9
€622.3
€1.81 billion
Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher when the
allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million). To be sure, this
evidence illustrates at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans.7
The Genesis of Hybridity Notion in Social Sciences
Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state,
private actors and non-profit organizations. Anheier examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the
relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is
institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralized public sector and the
centralizing tendencies in civic society.8 In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of
heterogeneity and pluralism rather than homogeneity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in between
public and private dichotomy. Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market covers an
ambivalent political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation and organizational sociology. Thus,
hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations with difficulties that
occur among Government Organizations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) and Private Market
Organizations (PMOs).
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was argued by many
remarkable scientists, politicians and authors.9 The third way has various meanings such as ‘new progressivism’
for the American Democrats, ‘new labor’ for the Labor Party in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a leftright rationalization, political environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernizing left or modernizing social
democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of Giddens.
What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model seeks for approaching
governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society from a broader perspective.
Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political
actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains
how the ideal policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it provides solutions in
real terms. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through looking to international financial
crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as failure because of being
unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations. Jordan included the big ‘conservative’
society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the third way approach, big
society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position and active participation of
churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralization process from central government to
local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid model that this study argues
is something more than this picture. Ideally, hybridity looks into various communities, associations, unions and
7
organizations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big
society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, the role and influence of churches at
increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are indispensable however not at adequate level for
dealing with social issues.
Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance,
manufacture and knowledge. He emphasized the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of productivity
and expanding financial markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening foundations of
knowledge base society.
Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership and
central authority of state. He stated that the fundamental rights are effective for offering for participation with
equal opportunity in the process of production and the interplay of a commercial society or a triple function of
the fundamental rights is legitimized by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be
maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization.10 Naively, Habermas preferred to
construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view and put forward
argumentations that take into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process.
With respect to this great transformation, multilateralism, regionalization and multipolarity caused emerging
of new regional powers in the world. Monopoly powers are by inches oligopolized and this situation has
balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational level,
and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. Moreover, the economic power shift from the
western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries
has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises
(SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridization via national private actors in modern
nation states.11 Hybridity has various dimensions; such as political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance
model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities),
judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO
26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach) and so forth. 12
In the light of these considerations, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at
national level or within the EU structure at supranational level interhybridity as the main effect of controlling
migration approach is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and nonstate parts with taking into account ‘migration driving forces’ such as remittances, labor policy (wages,
employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. The European
Commission has created at implementing decision which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a
partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor
reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Commission has established a ‘Civil
Society Facility’ to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and
promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation
in the fulfillment of Neighborhood Policy objectives.
Considering clarifications above, interhybridity is not possible with using only hard law of states towards
migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal
migration flows. It ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in
favor of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase
in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. Interhybridity is an open
debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable.
Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more general
understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of
social scientific disciplines.13
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He
proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the theory’s own origins and
application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological,
and methodological aspects. Excellently, Habermas stated that: ‘Political theory cannot aim at instructing the
state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known.’
Therefore, a convergence of the two systems on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the
welfare state is not to be excluded.
In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may
work in EU, Western Balkan countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The
author of this article has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of
the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural
8
Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common
platform for state, private and civil society. It has been established in April (2012) and the main purpose is to
include other non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs
and many other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly
enlightened me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and volunteers
who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a
transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the
project’s motto that is ‘problems are potentials.’ This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and nonstate actors and each actor has its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will
be transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralization and social
transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three
principles of this harmony. Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that ‘if you open your door to others, then you
begin to live in a huge house (He referred to an African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently
preparing a similar hybrid project for Western Balkan countries’ institutions for benchmarking, embedding and
proliferating hybridity. The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i
Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of
Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of
young people at home country and host country. ASAN project participants have created an online database
(www.asan.al) and rapidly increased capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center,
ASAN project will deal with internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a
general/real hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and
incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, objectives of the
project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the
future of Albania under control; creation and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of
national Albanian identity; establish a national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities
for Albanian migrants; increase Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a
common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth
with their diversities.
Socio-political Analyses of Western Balkan Countries
Hans Kelsen (1955) investigated Socialist Law Legal System, Soviet Political Structures and various
interpretations and approaches to the Socialist Law of State. These interpretations influenced the Western
Balkan countries that were a part of Soviet Union. 14 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the legal
superstructure and sovereignty of these states were overwhelmingly damaged. In this context, the research has
examined how European Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions in Western Balkans have been
transformed in frame of EU integration process and enlargement agenda. Undoubtedly, industrial relations and
employment relationship (i.e. the relationship between employees, employee representatives, employers and
nation-states) are very important factors. Especially, the Western Balkans will be investigated in order to find
out whether the EU integration process and EU Legal Structure (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty “TFEU” the Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the acquis communautaire) for Western Balkans have significant effects on Balkan
states’ transition to the European Social Model; such as, social dialogue, tripartite and bipartite information
exchange and consultation, collective bargaining and legal provisions regarding employment conditions and
social protection. In general, the research is in a tight manner bound on the criteria and factors of the
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006, is a collection of
political and institutional data which has been assembled in the context of the research project “Forms of
Government. A Comparative Data Set for 28 Eastern Countries” directed by Klaus Armingeon (University of
Berne) and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.15
Table 2: Constitutional Courts of Western Balkans
Country
Website
The Constitutional Court of Albania (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Shqipërisë)
http://www.gjk.gov.al/
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine)
http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës)
http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia (УСТАВЕН СУД НА
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА)
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro (Ustavni sud Crne Gore)
http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia (Уставни суд Републике Србије)
http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktuelnostie.htm
http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB
Source: Author’s compilation.
9
In essence, the role of the constitutional courts in Western Balkan states will be examined at the end of the
research with taking into account judicial independence of states and judicial review process in order to better
reflect the impact of the Europeanization and harmonization process on legal structures, jurisdictions,
democratization, rule of law and legalization.
Approaching a Multidimensional Empirical Framework of Interhybridity
Many mathematical, economical, advanced empirical studies have influenced significantly the insights of
migration.16 An economical and sociopolitical migration model is overlapping with the multidimensional
empirical framework of interhybridity. The economy starts with L native individuals, M migrants and a special
resource, K = ∑ i which is the sum of individual holdings of resources. This resource is used for training a
part of the native population (L) that is willing to join the skilled labor market (L1). The rest of the native
population (L2) and M comprise the unskilled labor force or
L2' = L2 + M
The country produces a good Q using both skilled and unskilled labor L1 and L2'.
The skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements in the sense that the marginal productivity of the skilled
workers rises with the amount of the unskilled workers. In the skilled workers' market there is full employment
(L1=E1), but in the unskilled workers' market there is unemployment, i.e.,
L1 = E1
L2' = E2' + U2'
where L2' is the total number of unskilled workers, and E2'(U2') is the number of employed/unemployed
workers in the unskilled labor market.
Q = Q(E1, E2')
Each individual likes to consume goods and each native individual, i, in the economy has
share of this special input where PK is the given price at which K can be marketed.
The utility function is given by
V = V(Q)
The unemployment in the unskilled workers' market results from a wage higher than the market clearing wage
in the unskilled labor market. This above-equilibrium wage is the result of bargaining between the unions and
the employers. In their effort to maximize income from the labor market, unions propose a nominal wage W2 in
the unskilled workers' market. In addition to the nominal wage for the unskilled workers, the unions also bargain
for some additional nonwage benefits, the money value of which equals θ. This is a payment for training to
acquire more skill. This is bargained because unions are aware that for the majority of the native unskilled
workers, PKKi is too small to accommodate training cost. The employed unskilled native workers would now
have
PKKi + θ = ϕi
to finance the training if they want to join the skilled workers' market (unskilled migrant workers don't have
PKKi). For the employed native unskilled workers the cost of acquiring skill, Cs, (for a given PKKi) is dependent
on ϕi and thus on θ; then
The employed unskilled native workers would decide to join the skilled workers' market if the net discounted
expected utility stream with a discount rate r(>0) is higher for that market. The discounted expected utility
stream for an employed native unskilled worker is given by rV2=(W2+ PKKi)/P where P is the price level and
rV2 shows the return on assets in the unskilled native labormarket,which is just equal to current utility. The
discounted expected utility fromthe skilled labor market is given as rV1={(W1+ PKKi)/P−c(ϕ)} where c(ϕ) is the
cost per period when C(ϕ) is distributed over the entire working period. A native worker would be indifferent
between these two markets when V1=V2. So given the distribution of the capital resource, given W1 and the
choices for W2 and θ, therewill be an equilibriumlevel of ϕ i.e. ϕ~ for which V1=V2. The total number of
participants/employed workers in the skilled workers' market is given by
where
10
is the proportion of native unskilled workers at a
given θ and would give the proportion of the native population willing to be in the skilled
workers' market. If the union opts for a bigger θ, ϕi goes up and f(ϕ) moves downward or to the right and L2
becomes smaller. Thus, the total number of workers in the unskilled native labor market given by
L – E 1 = L2
goes down and
L2 – E2 = U2 also goes down
where E2(U2) is the employed (unemployed) native unskilled worker. The money value of the total amount
negotiated by the unions for unskilled workers is written as
Employers choose the level of employment, E2, once unions choose W2 and θ. The total amount bargained could
have been just the nominal wage if the unions did not want to go for the benefits for acquiring more skill. For a
chosen level of θ, W2 and a settled wage, W1, in the skilled workers' market, E2′ is determined such that
W2=PQG2(E2′;E1,θ) and W1=PQG1(E2′(E1,W2,θ),E1) where PQ is the given price of the good. This follows from
the assumption that the country is small enough to have any effect on prices. For the sake of simplicity it is also
assumed that the immigrants have no effects on demand. Note that Gi,i=1,2 is the marginal product of the
respective workers. Unions' bargaining usually involves both skilled and unskilled workers. They are concerned
about the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy, wages of both types of workers, the
unemployment level in the unskilled labor market and the effects of migration on the labor market in general,
especially on the unemployment rate. The unions are also aware of the distortion created by bargaining. For the
purpose of this model, however, it is assumed that unions do not directly bargain for skilled workers' wages. It is
generally believed that European unemployment is mainly a problem of the unskilled labor. In other words,
since there is no threat of a huge supply of unemployed skilled workers to push the wage down in the skilled
labor market, unions' bargaining about wages is focused on the unskilled workers' market. This argument stands
in line with the fact that unions are less able to influence the skilled labor market outcome in Europe, although
they take skilled labor's interest into consideration while bargaining for the unskilled workers. Thus with
existing migrants, the labor market in the economy can be described as follows. The total population
where L is the total supply of native workers, M is the number of migrants in the total population, E1 is the
number of skilled workers L2′ is the total (native and migrant) number of unskilled workers E2′ is the total
(native and migrant) number of employed unskilled workers U2′ is the total number (native and migrant) of
unemployed, E2 is the number of employed unskilled native workers, where EM is the number of employed
unskilled migrants, U2 is the unemployed native workers and UM is the unemployed migrant workers. The
employment share of each type of unskilled workers is assumed to be determined by their respective sizes in the
total unskilled labor force;
i.e.
is the employment share of native unskilled workers and γE2′ is the number of employed native
unskilled workers.
M = EM + UM
With information about how the unskilled workers decide to join a particular labor market, the union will
choose a particular combination of W2 and θ to maximize the total earned income (wage and nonwage). The
effect of the choice of W2 and θ can be derived from the first order condition of unions' income maximization
behavior. Unions, interested in the maximization of total labor market income for native workers, will maximize
with respect to W2 and θ subject to the constraints
11
where λ the weight attached to skilled workers' market in union decision making; τ1 tax on skilled workers'
income; τ2 tax on unskilled workers' income; γ proportion of native workers in total unskilled workers and also
this proportion of total employed unskilled workers is native; b unemployment benefit and α weight for the
unemployment of natives in union decision making.
The first term presents the wage bill from the skilled workers' market. The wage bill of the unskilled resident
workers' market is presented by the second term. And the third term shows that the national union is likely to
internalize the effects of union's action on the level of unemployment of the native unskilled workers. Note that
although unions are not bargaining for the skilled workers, they may take skilled workers' economic condition
into consideration.
First order conditions are presented by
Thus, to summarize, equations above solve for unknownsW2, θ, ϕ, W2¯, Cs, E1, L1, L2, E2, E2′, V, EM, L2′, U2′, U2,
UM, Q, γ and YL given L, M, L–, K, PQ, PK, W1, λ, τ1, τ2, b, and α. It is assumed that i) this is a small country with
given prices, ii) immigrants have no impact on demand, iii) skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements
(the latter raises the productivity of the skilled workers), iv) unions don't bargain for skilled workers' wage but
they take into consideration skilled/unskilled labor ratio, unemployment and non-wage benefit, v) skilled market
has full employment and unskilled market has unemployment because the bargained wage is greater than the
market equilibrium wage., vi) all skilled workers are natives. Migrants don't bring any capital with them to be
trained and vii) migration is caused by expected wage difference. The optimal combination of W2 and θ will be
the one where the marginal gain from W2 equals the marginal gain from θ. For an interior solution, skilled
workers will earn more than unskilled workers and unskilled workers will feel better being employed than
unemployed; b≤(1−τ2)W2≤(1−τ1)W1. The weights, λ, α, taxes, τ1, τ2, and technology will decide whether the
wage should be chosen on the elastic or the inelastic part (the second order condition is verified. After unions fix
W2– (=W2+θ), employers decide on the employment level. Thus W2 and θ enter as arguments in the E2′ function.
Since the productivity of E1 increases with the size of E2′, the size of E1 becomes a deciding factor in the
demand for unskilled workers. Thus θ affects E2′ both directly and indirectly.
Keeping W2 constant
The first term is the usual effect of an increase in the cost of hiring workers. This will have a negative impact,
reducing the demand for unskilled workers. The non-wage benefit θ (skill training cost) actually helps workers
move to the skilled workers' market. The second term shows the increase in demand for E2′ because vacancies
will be created when a number of unskilled workers move to the skilled labor market. When the number of
skilled workers increases, to maintain the productivity of the skilled workers at the previous level (i.e., dW1=0)
there will be an additional demand for unskilled workers (because E1 and E2′ are q-complements). This positive
effect is shown by the third term. The last two terms thus generate favorable effects for employment of unskilled
workers. If the elasticity of the marginal product of the unskilled labor curve is not very high, as a result of an
upward change in θ the employment of unskilled workers will go up i.e., ∂ E2′ / ∂ θ > 0.
Eq. (18) suggests that if unions are interested only in the employed unskilled native workers' market (i.e.,
λ=α=0) and want to raise wage, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for labor will have to be bigger
than one to support a positive unemployment benefit (i.e., since b has to be positive to be meaningful, it can
only be supported by e>1). The existence of high unemployment benefit encourages unions to choose a wage on
12
the elastic part of labor demand curve and thus wages and unemployment will be higher, higher is the
unemployment benefit. Any increase in non-wage benefits will on the other hand have a positive effect on the
wage bill as shown by Eq. (19) (because of the favorable effects on dE2′), provided the elasticity of demand for
unskilled labor is not very high. It is important to note that the negative effect on employment from higher wage
demand may be offset by the positive employment effect from higher non-wage benefits. This stands in contrast
to other analyses in the literature. where any higher wage demand increases unemployment. In those analyses, if
unions are concerned about unemployment, the negotiated wage will be driven to a relatively inelastic part of
the labor demand curve compared to the situation when unions are not concerned about unemployment (i.e.,
α=0). In this paper's analysis even when unions are concerned about unemployment they can bargain for an
increase in wages and still can generate a favorable employment effect for native unskilled workers through
their choice of θ. However, practicing restraints on increased money wage demands will be an additional tool to
deal with unemployment. in the case when unions deal only with wage compensation, i.e., W2, they will be
eager to lower wage benefits if they are interested in all three parts (skilled workers' market, unskilled workers'
market, and unemployment pool) of the labor market but the labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled
workers are complements. In this paper's model under the same scenario (i.e., labor demand is elastic and skilled
and unskilled workers are complement and unions pays attention to the skilled wage bill, unskilled wage bill and
unemployment) unions can afford not to change the wage demand at all or to change the money wage by a small
amount and go for a higher non-wage benefit to maximize the total labor market income. However, to take
better care of unemployment pool and/or skilled labor market, unions will prefer to be on the relatively inelastic
part of the labor demand curve or to reduce the money wage.
Migration in this paper is caused by the expected wage (actual wage times the probability of employment)
difference. A vast majority of the immigrants to western European countries are unskilled workers. Thus they
affect the unskilled native workers' market directly. The quantity of immigrants is decided by the government
control or quota of immigration. In this section we will find out how immigration affects the equilibrium
solution. Following immigration γ goes down. As a result, the marginal gain from both W2 and θ decline. The
relative gain or loss will depend on the existing elasticity of labor demand. This suggests that in their
negotiation, the labor union may choose a different combination of W2 and θ following migration. They may not
change the nominal wage at all; instead unions may try for a reasonable increase in the training cost benefits. It
was shown in the previous section that when more unskilled employed workers opt for training, the total number
of skilled workers goes up. This has two-fold effects on the unskilled labor market: i) it directly creates
vacancies in the unskilled labor market; and ii) the newly trained skilled workers need unskilled workers to
boost up the productivity in the skilled workers' market (indirect effect). Also there will be direct negative
effects from raising θ. However, the direct and indirect effects together raise the employment of unskilled
workers by offsetting the negative effect. Consequently, unemployment goes own. By totally differentiating the
first order conditions we see that dθ / dM will be positive and dW2 / dM may take either positive or negative
depending on the values of the second derivatives or the rates at which the change in employment is affected by
changes in θ and W2 However, dW2 / dM<dθ / dM. The effects of a reduced γ following immigration will lead to
a new combination of W2 and θ where favorable effect of increasing θ offsets other unfavorable effects.
These effects are shown in Propositions 1–4 where immigrants do not bring capital with them.
Proposition 1: An increase in immigration increases the size of the skilled labor market.
Proof: To start with E1 has already been determined by W1 and only θ can affect E1. Note that only native
unskilled workers can move to the skilled workers' market because they enjoy the privilege of having different
values of initial asset, PKKi. The non-wage benefit, θ, together with PKKi will give the native workers an edge in
getting training compared to immigrant unskilled workers.
f(ϕ)=f(ϕ0)=f(PKKi) = proportion of people having different values of PKKi or ϕ0 when θ=0 (initially).
f(ϕ)=f(ϕ0)−aθ = proportion of people having different values of ϕ when θ>0 and a>0 (note that an increase in θ
helps to reduce the size of the unskilled labor market or f(ϕ) curve moves rightward or downward or f(ϕ) for
θ=0>f(ϕ) for θ>0). In that case, dϕ~ =dθ. Thus
13
Proposition 2: An increase in immigration reduces unemployment of native workers.
Proof:
Note:
The union would opt for a different combination of W and θ when this new combination would have a favorable
effect. Total supply of native unskilled workers is written as L2=L−L.
Proposition 3: An increase in immigration increases the skill composition of the labor market for the native
workers.
Proof:
Thus, following immigration not only does the level of unemployment goes down, but the number of skilled
workers and the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers go up.
Proposition 4: An increase in immigration increases national income and native workers' share in the national
income.
Proof: The share of native workers income in the national income is given by W1E1+W2E2. It will go up as
W1dE1+W2dE2+E2dW2 is positive when E2=γE2′. Following immigration E2′ rises and γ goes down when
E2′=E2+EM and dE2′ =dE2, because dEM=0. The rise in E2 offsets the effect of a fall in γ. This increase in native
workers' share in national income will be observed even when union opts for no changes in W2 i.e., dW2=0.
Thus,
The above analysis is done while focusing just on the resident workers' market.
14
Let's now assume that both native and migrant employed unskilled workers have equal chances of being trained
and employed. It implies that the migrants may move with some amount of special resource, K and it replaces
the assumption that immigrants could not bring any capital with them. Under the scenario immigration will
again result in a different combination of W2 and θ; however, this reshuffling will affect the labor market
through L–(not just L). Propositions 1′–3′ describe the effects when immigrants arrive with some amount of
capital.
Proposition 1′: An increase in immigration will increase the size of the skilled workers' market.
Proof: The size of skilled workers' market here is given by
Since,
Proposition 2′: An increase in immigration will decrease the size of the unskilled workers' market.
Proof:
Proposition 3′: An increase in immigration will increase the skill composition of the labor force.
Proof:
It is, however, interesting to note that unions' reaction to an increase in L– following an increase in domestic
unskilled labor supply may not increase the skill composition of the work force, i.e., dE1′ = dL2 and d(E1′ / L2′) /
dL2 may decrease. The intuition behind this result says that as share of native unskilled workers in the total
unskilled workers increases, native workers' income goes up via γ. Consequently, unions may not want to
increase θ. Does this provision of non-wage benefit give any new insights in dealing with the problems of
unemployment that is exacerbated by immigration influx? In analyzing unions' response to immigration, many
Scholars have shown that unions' reaction depends on whether unions are interested in only native unskilled
workers' market (pure wage bill maximization for native unskilled workers) or in unskilled workers' market as a
15
whole (including unemployment of unskilled migrant workers) or in both skilled and unskilled workers' market.
In their analysis for pure wage bill maximization (i.e., only in employed unskilled native workers' market),
unions will have to be on that part of the demand curve where the value of the elasticity of the labor demand
curve is greater than one. In other two cases (i.e. when unions pay attention to unemployment or to the skilled
workers' market), unions might prefer to be on relatively inelastic part. Since bargaining over money wages is
not the only choice in this paper, unions may accomplish their objective on any part of the labor demand curve
by negotiating only for non-money wage benefits and keeping the money wage fixed. Of course, employment
will increase more if labor demand is relatively inelastic. Thus, the introduction of the non-wage benefit brings
in an element of flexibility that may benefit unions, employers and the government. The analysis in this paper
suggests that as a result of migration when the marginal gain from bargaining for money wage goes down,
unions have the option of switching their effort to change the non-wage benefit. In fact, in this paper irrespective
of (assumptions about)whether unions want to focus on only unskilled labor market or on both skilled and
unskilled labor market, the negotiation about non-wage benefit will have a positive effect. For the purpose of
maximizing the total wage bill, it is better if we allow the unions to include all three parts of the labor market
(skilled labor market, unskilled labor market unskilled unemployed labor pool).
As it is mentioned before, in European Union countries, the governments cannot affect the wages or
employment levels directly because of the institutional factors. Unions and the employers decide on the wages
and employment levels through bargaining. The governments are engaged in transfer payment through taxation
and unemployment benefits. Thus, the government can only control the factors that indirectly affect unions' and
employers' decisions. In a situation when migration act as a ‘competitive fringe’ in the sense that as a result of
migration, unions follows a wage restraints policy, the governments (especially the left-wing governments who
don't want to use anti-union policy openly) can use migration as a hidden ‘anti-union’ policy. However, in this
paper's model where unions can use non-wage benefits, migration does not need to be used as an anti-union
policy. The government can change the anti-migration or anti-union environment by encouraging bargaining
about non-wage benefits. Noticing that unions' policy has a favorable impact on unemployment, the government
might come up with some incentives for the employers to settle for a higher θ than what the employers would
have agreed to otherwise. Employers also might feel encouraged if they don't need to provide for additional
wage compensation. The government can afford to do this because the total government expenditure on transfer
payment goes down and tax revenue increases as employment increases following a successful bargaining for a
higher θ. In that case, the bargaining power of the unions is not weakened in the presence of immigration influx.
The government's budget is given by
when B = total budget and immigrants can't join the skilled workers' market. Immigration of unskilled workers
can affect B if immigration has any effects on
or wages.
where M = total number of migrants. If unions decide not to change wage benefit at all i.e., (dW2 / dM) = 0, as
long as the effect of the first and the second terms exceeds that of the last term in this equation, the government
will not resort to any antiunion policy. If both wages and non-wage benefits are changed, the first three terms
need to exceed the last term for the government not to use any anti-union policy. However, if
(on the highly elastic part of the labor demand curve where migration would act as a competitive fringe) the
government's migration policy may reflect an anti-union agenda. Immigration, unemployment and their
interrelation not only challenge the labor market of European Union, but they also demand attention for a better
performance of the Union economy as a whole. The common perception is that the immigration makes the
unemployment situation worse for the native workers. Scholars have argued that the presence of dominant labor
unions together with immigration makes European unemployment problem worse than that in the US. Since
migration can only be controlled by the government, it (especially the left-wing government) can use
immigration as a covert anti-union policy when immigration acts as a competitive fringe. The analysis in this
paper offers an alternative to that covert antiunion policy. It shows that it is possible to empower unions with an
effective alternative by allowing them to bargain for non-wage benefits together with wage benefits. These nonwage benefits are expected to have favorable effects on unemployment, the skill level of the labor force, and the
national income. Instead of using politically unfavorable tax or welfare program, the government actually can
16
use these redistribution tools to encourage both the employers and the unions to use ‘non-wage benefits’
effectively in their bargaining strategy. That will help in avoiding an anti-union or anti-immigration
environment. The first order condition can be written as F1(W2, θ; L, M) and F2(W2, θ; L, M). Totally
differentiating the first order condition;
may take either sign.
This is negative because
This is positive because
This is positive because
This is negative because
17
This is negative because
This is negative because
This is negative because
This is positive because
may take either sign.
may take either sign.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns.
Hegel’s dialectic method might be applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better
outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.’17 As a
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and
transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Interhybridity and indirect centralization will create
more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, hybrid
structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With indirect centralization
within the confine of state’s control mechanism, authority and public sphere, these structures will have same
legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common migration and
asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral
consciousness in migration turbulence through interhybridity mechanisms and good migration governance
within the framework of hybrid model. The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for
researchers to improve migrant-based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not
just simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses.
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for all migrants in the
world. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity is
likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events
and ethnic enclaves, maximize benefits and minimize negative effects, and enhance the humane of migration
from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit and host
countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, create ground
for networking and ensure a communication platform.
18
The role of the EU is to help Western Balkan countries to keep up realizing reforms in various areas. The
Western Balkan counties’ migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilization
and integration reforms, enlargement and neighborhood policy and the Stabilization Association Process. These
reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with BRICs and eastern countries which
have multi-dimensional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with Western Balkan countries. Obviously, it
can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkan countries have significant influences for
attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration and stabilization of Western Balkan countries within
the EU will be a driving force for the EU. With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these
countries are seen as potentials or opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or
potential problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labor
migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled workers over next years. Both two hybrid case –
i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support
such projects in order to attract high skilled labor migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence
of the EU member states’ national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU
migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues
in different alternatives. The involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and
active networking.
Moralization of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide
definite solutions in various aspects and interhybridity can transform socially the migration process in favor of
migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of
migration is an utopia (or absolute spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies
with minimum problems is not only rational but also real.
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc
Western Balkan countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role
of states and the existence of centralized power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. Second,
people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in communicative
action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values towards
inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial era.
Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of interhybridity.
According to the mode of institutionalization, there are three types of governance; ‘governance by
governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without governments’.18
Table 3: Governance by/with/without Government(s)
Type of
Mode of
Norm Building
Governance
Institutionalization
Governance by
government(s)
Governance with
government(s)
Governance without
government(s)
Norm
Implementing
International/government
al cooperation
Without selforganization
Via nation-states
Global policy networks
With self-organization
With nation-states
Transnational network
organizations
Via self-organization
Without nation-states
HYBRID
MODEL
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27
Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalization and how norms are
built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states are presented by their own
governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states or
international organizations. This type of governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only
at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organization.
Governance with governments means among others also governments take place, however there are also nonstate actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which these
actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically related
to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share common
interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors hybrid
model means centralized authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For private
actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid model means
having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favor of the goodness of society.
19
The challenge is that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system’s
monopoly of authority. Some commentators assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as
sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks. We can
assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central authority,
sovereignty, decentralization and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency towards theoretical
complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the multidimensional and multicausal nature of
current world politics.
In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for social
transformation and indirect centralization. As an illustration, migration and asylum issues acquire elements of
multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the assigning
policy-making capacity to Brussels. On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other
hand, this shift of power causes decentralization in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels’ governance
ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum seekers under
the control of the EU institutions. Collaboration with post-communist institutions in Western Balkan states will
enhance democracy level, rule of law and the prosperity for civil society.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
20
Said, E. W. (1979) Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books; Said, E. W. (1993) Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books.
It is apparent that Western Balkans has been put to a pro-European position from cultural and economic aspects rather categorizing as
‘pure orientalist states’ (Said 1978). The EU has stressed at the progress reports, media channels, and even at academic level that the
Western Balkans belongs to European culture, history and tradition. Obviously, as Said (1993) pointed out these returns accompany
rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behaviour that are opposed to the permissiveness associated with multiculturalism and
hybridity. In a world where the number of migrants are reaching a greater amount, it is not possible to consider a culture as single,
pure, homogenous, autonomous or monolithic because hybridity is an indispensable and revolutionary transformation process.
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Armando Aliu, MA, is a Postgraduate Scholar at Heidelberg University – Institute for Political Sciences and
researcher at Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg
(Germany).The author holds an M.A. degree (Hamburg University) and he was supported by DAAD. Contact
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Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi (Head of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’
Council in Heidelberg) for accepting to realize an in-depth interview.
21
Appendix I: Total Visa statistics 2009
Schengen States
AT
BE
CH
CZ
DE
DK
EE
EL
ES
FI
FR
HU
IS
IT
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL
NO
PL
PT
SE
SI
SK
UE Member States
not
applying yet fully the
Schengen acquis
BG
CY
RO
Totals
Schengen visas
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay
visas)
Number of visas
Non issuance rate
issued
285.196
5,23%
165.474
17,38%
351.578
8,70%
440.360
3,74%
1.491.784
9,06%
77.142
5,40%
93.464
2,49%
598.883
4,68%
748.466
9,97%
783.340
1,58%
1.415.886
12,35%
272.972
4,14%
779
4,18%
1.053.354
5,02%
236.299
1,77%
5.364
2,38%
118.436
3,48%
28.915
9,31%
313.534
7,37%
105.430
0,75%
579.424
3,29%
107.224
6,87%
172.595
7,62%
97.690
4,19%
62.287
3,78%
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay
visas
Number of visas
Non issuance rate
issued
595.914
1,05%
113.205
2,63%
175.956
3,24%
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay
visas
Number of visas
Non issuance rate
issued
9.605.876
7,11%
885.075
1,70%
Sub-total Schengen
Sub-total non
Schengen
Total
10.490.951
Source: European Commission 2011: 21
22
6,68%
Number of national
long-stay visas
issued
27.169
24.588
37.975
17.109
139.640
1.037
399
40.686
135.568
167.108
8.530
88
155.286
2.824
27
1.450
4.168
9.032
16.502
210.292
15.800
527
391
1.982
Number of national
long-stay visas
issued
8.575
12.831
Number of national
long-stay visas
issued
1.018.178
21.406
1.039.584
Appendix II: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data
and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data
Albania
Indicator Name
2000
Emigration rate of tertiary
educated (% of total tertiary
educated population)
17.45868
Net migration
Refugee population by
country or territory of asylum
Refugee population by
country or territory of origin
International migrant stock,
total
International migrant stock
(% of population)
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant
Stocks in 2010*
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
-270245
523
292
17
26
51
-72243
56
56
77
65
70
-47889
76
6802
7626
10761
10385
10478
12722
14079
15340
15006
15711
14772
76695
82668
89106
2.496699
2.631231
2.780839651
Stock of emigrants in 2010
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of
individual countries) to the UN
Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France
Stock of immigrants in 2010
Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1%
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2000
Emigration rate of tertiary
educated (% of total tertiary
educated population)
Net migration
Refugee population by
country or territory of asylum
Refugee population by
country or territory of origin
International migrant stock,
total
International migrant stock
(% of population)
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant
Stocks in 2010*
20.30026
Home Country: 89106
Host Country: 1438451
1438.3 thousands, 45.4%
of total population (2.83
million, Instat 2011)
89.1 thousands, 2.8% of
total population
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
281795
38152
32745
28022
22517
22215
61825
10568
10318
7367
7257
7132
-10000
7016
474981
447321
406326
300006
228815
109930
199946
78273
74366
70018
63004
96001
35141
2.599048
0.92941
27780
0.73880051
Home Country: 27780
Host Country: 1460639
Stock of emigrants in 2010
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of
individual countries) to the UN
Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy
Stock of immigrants in 2010
Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3%
Kosovo**
**World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral
migrant stocks for host country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK.
According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7
million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 2009.
Macedonia
2000
Emigration rate of tertiary
educated (% of total tertiary
educated population)
29.38359
Net migration
Refugee population by
country or territory of asylum
Refugee population by
country or territory of origin
International migrant stock,
total
International migrant stock
(% of population)
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant
Stocks in 2010*
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
-9000
9050
4363
2816
193
1004
-4000
1274
1240
1235
1672
1542
2000
1398
2176
12197
8072
5982
5104
8600
7940
8077
7521
7926
7889
125665
120288
129701
6.254819
5.901941
6.294444771
Stock of emigrants in 2010
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of
individual countries) to the UN
Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France
Stock of immigrants in 2010
Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3%
Montenegro
1461.0 thousands,
38.9% of total population
(3.8 million, 2011)
27.8 thousands, 0.7% of
total population
2000 2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Home Country: 129701
Host Country: 447137
447.1 thousand, 21.9% of
total population (2 million,
2010)
129.7 thousands, 6.3% of
total population
2009
2010
Emigration rate of tertiary
educated (% of total tertiary
educated population)
Net migration
Refugee population by
country or territory of asylum
Refugee population by
country or territory of origin
International migrant stock,
total
International migrant stock
(% of population)
-32450
-20632
6926
8528
24741
24019
-2508
16364
135
557
1283
2582
3246
54583
42509
8.709048
6.731539692
23
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant
Stocks in 2010*
Stock of emigrants in 2010
Stock of immigrants in 2010
Serbia
Home Country: 42509
Host Country: 36
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of
individual countries) to the UN
Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary
Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5%
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
0.0 thousands
42.5 thousands, 6.8% of
total population (0.63
million, 2010)
2009
2010
Emigration rate of tertiary
educated (% of total tertiary
educated population)
Net migration
Refugee population by
country or territory of asylum
Refugee population by
country or territory of origin
International migrant stock,
total
International migrant stock
(% of population)
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant
Stocks in 2010*
-147889
484391
400304
354402
291403
276683
-338544
148264
98997
97995
96739
86351
0
73608
146748
144231
323335
296632
237032
189989
174027
165643
185935
195626
183289
856763
674612
525388
11.39866
9.066428
7.204424665
Stock of emigrants in 2010
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of
individual countries) to the UN
Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark
Stock of immigrants in 2010
Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7%
Home Country: 525388
Host Country: 130844
196.0 thousands, 2.0% of
total population (7.3
million, 2009)
525.4 thousands, 5.3% of
total population
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$)
Albania
Inward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
(estimate)
598
531
67
699
615
84
734
643
90
889
778
111
1161
1028
132
1290
1161
129
1359
1176
184
1468
1305
163
1495
1226
270
1317
1090
227
1285
4
0
4
5
0
5
7
27
0
27
10
16
10
10
16
9
7
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and
services US$3.8 bn in 2008.
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
(estimate)
Inward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
1595
950
631
26
2
1521
919
581
25
11
5
6
1526
956
540
30
14
7
7
1749
1143
595
11
20
10
11
2072
1474
579
19
62
49
13
2043
1467
570
5
40
28
12
2157
1589
560
8
55
41
14
2700
1947
739
13
65
50
15
2735
1899
828
8
70
53
17
2167
1432
643
6
61
46
15
2228
2
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and
services US$6.8 bn in 2008.
Kosovo**
Macedonia
Inward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
(estimate)
414
81
80
0
73
68
5
106
92
14
174
146
28
213
161
52
227
169
57
267
198
69
345
239
106
407
266
140
401
260
121
14
14
21
21
23
23
1
16
15
1
16
15
1
16
14
2
18
16
2
25
22
3
33
28
5
26
22
4
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and
services US$5.0 bn in 2008.
Montenegro
Serbia
Inward remittance flows
24
Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
1132*
1698*
2089*
2661
4129
4650
4703
5377
2008
2009
2010
(estimate)
5538
5406
558
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
Outward remittance flows
Workers' remittances
Compensation of employees
Migrants' transfer
2948
2913
3755
148
191
184
2
2
3
114
138
91
95
114
70
17
23
20
2
1
1
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and
services US$14.8 bn in 2008.
*Serbia and Montenegro
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011
Appendix III: Comparison of the European Union Pre-accession Assistance for the
Western Balkan Countries
Albania
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Justice and Home Affairs
Public Administration Reform
Transport
Environment and Climate Change
Social Development
Rural Development/Agriculture
TOTAL
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
TOTAL
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Justice and Home Affairs
Public Administration Reform
Private Sector Development
Transport
Environment and Climate Change
Social Development
Acquis related and other Actions
TOTAL
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
TOTAL
Kosovo
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Justice and Home Affairs
Private Sector Development
Public Administration Reform
Other
TOTAL
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
TOTAL
Macedonia
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Public Administration Reform
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights
Private Sector Development
Agriculture and Rural Development
Transport
Environment and Climate Change
Social Development
TOTAL
Period 2007 - 2010
56.52
43.15
49.06
80.12
13.40
17.20
259.45
2011
84.30
10.13
94.43
Period 2011 - 2013
38.66
15%
38.66
15%
51.55
20%
51.55
20%
25.77
10%
51.55
20%
257.74
100%
2012
2013
85.99
87.45
10.28
10.67
96.27
98.12
Period 2007 - 2010
38.64
51.55
28.10
22.30
72.70
46.75
52.54
312.58
2011
102.68
4.75
107.43
Period 2011 - 2013
55.00
17.5 %
40.00
12.7 %
50.00
15.9 %
35.00
11.1 %
54.22
17.3 %
40.00
12.7 %
40.00
12.7 %
314.22
100%
2012
2013
104.67
106.87
4.80
4.94
109.47
111.81
Period 2007 - 2010
78.50 (18.46%)
192.93 (45.38 %)
106.22 (24.98%)
47.55 (11.18%)
425.20
2011
65.83
2.87
68.70
Period 2011 - 2013
61.09
30 %
97.75
48 %
20.35
10 %
24.42
12 %
203.61
100%
2012
2013
67.07
70.71
2.93
2.99
70.00
73.70
Period 2007 - 2010
28.00
44.00
45.50
46.40
52.50
28.30
37.30
282.00
Period 2011 - 2013
21.33
7%
24.38
8%
45.71
15%
67.04
22 %
60.95
20%
54.85
18%
30.47
10%
304.76
100%
25
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
Regional Development
Human Resources Development
Rural Development
TOTAL
Montenegro
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Justice and Home Affairs
Public Administration
Environment and Climate Change
Transport
Social development
Agriculture and Rural Development
Ad hoc measures
TOTAL
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
Regional Development
Social Development
Agriculture and Rural Development
TOTAL
Serbia
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million)
2011-2013
Justice and Home Affairs
Public Administration Reform
Social Development
Private Sector Development
Transport
Environment, Climate Change and Energy
Agriculture and Rural Development
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities
TOTAL
IPA Component
Transition Assistance and Institution Building
Cross-border Cooperation
TOTAL
26
2011
28.80
5.12
39.30
8.80
16.00
98.02
2012
28.20
5.18
42.30
10.38
19.00
105.07
2013
27.94
5.24
51.80
11.20
21.03
117.21
Period 2007 - 2010
17.85
21.65
14.80
16.20
8.63
8.10
8.11
106.54
2011
29843599
4310344
0
0
0
34153943
Period 2011 - 2013
7.30
8%
10.04
11%
22.82
25%
18.26
20%
9.13
10%
14.60
16%
9.13
10%
91.28
100%
2012
2013
21585429
49.05%
9257238
12.94%
23200000
22.13%
5757077
5.49%
10900000
10.40%
70699744
100.00%
Period 2007 - 2010
42.00
89.00
96.00
34.00
71.00
93.00
34.00
120.00
579.00
2011
190.00
12.00
202.00
Period 2011 - 2013
75.00
12%
75.00
12%
75.00
12%
75.00
12%
75.00
12%
99.00
16%
75.00
12%
75.00
12%
624.00
100%
2012
2013
194.00
203.00
12.00
12.00
206.00
215.00
Appendix IV: Output of SPSS Data Analyses (Democracy and Institutions)
1.
General variables
Country: country name
Countryn: country code: Albania 1; Bosnia and Herzegovina 2; Kosovo 3; Macedonia (FYR) 4; Montenegro 5; Serbia 6.
Case Processing Summary
N
Cases
%
Valid
Excluded(a)
52
86,7
8
13,3
Total
60
100,0
a Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
Reliability Statistics
Cronbach's Alpha Based on
Standardized Items
,947
Cronbach's Alpha
,922
N of Items
4
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity
,819
Approx. Chi-Square
315,262
df
10
,000
Sig.
Item Statistics
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two
dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
Mean
Std.
Deviation
N
3,5769
1,07277
52
3,9660
,56013
52
4,6996
,56573
52
3,1923
,88647
52
Summary Item Statistics
Mean
3,859
Minimum
3,192
Maximum
4,700
Range
1,507
Maximum /
Minimum
1,472
Variance
,414
Item Variances
,643
,314
1,151
,837
3,668
,164
4
Inter-Item Covariances
,480
,246
,848
,601
3,440
,038
4
Inter-Item Correlations
,816
,749
,896
,147
1,196
,004
4
Item Means
N of Items
4
Scale Statistics
Mean
15,4348
Variance
8,327
Std. Deviation
2,88567
N of Items
4
ANOVA with Friedman's Test
Between People
Within People
Sum of
Squares
106,171
64,590(a)
24,922
89,512
195,683
Between Items
Residual
Total
Total
Grand Mean = 3,8587
a Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = ,330.
df
51
3
153
156
207
Mean Square
2,082
21,530
,163
,574
,945
Friedman's ChiSquare
112,567
Sig
,000
Hotelling's T-Squared Test
Hotelling's TSquared
415,862
F
133,185
df1
df2
3
Sig
49
,000
27
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
Intraclass
Correlation(a)
Single Measures
Lower Bound
,747(b)
95% Confidence Interval
Upper Bound
,647
F Test with True Value 0
Value
df1
,831
df2
12,780
Sig
51,0
153
Lower Bound
,000
Average Measures
,922(c)
,880
,951
12,780
51,0
153
Two-way mixed effects model where people effects are random and measures effects are fixed.
a Type C intraclass correlation coefficients using a consistency definition-the between-measure variance is excluded from the denominator
variance.
b The estimator is the same, whether the interaction effect is present or not.
c This estimate is computed assuming the interaction effect is absent, because it is not estimable otherwise.
,000
Correlations
rating of Political Rights as
calculated by Freedom House and
reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the
World"
rating of Civil Liberties as
calculated by Freedom House and
reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the
World"
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law
score is calculated as the average
of ratings obtained on two
dimensions: Constitutional,
Legislative and Judicial
Framework and Corruption
rating of Civil
Liberties as
calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Nations in Transit Democratization
score is calculated as
the average of scores
obtained on 4
dimensions:
Electoral Process,
Civil Society,
Independent Media
and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule
of Law score is
calculated as the average
of ratings obtained on
two dimensions:
Constitutional,
Legislative and Judicial
Framework and
Corruption
1
,927(**)
,911(**)
,830(**)
112
,000
112
,000
70
,000
70
,927(**)
1
,848(**)
,788(**)
,000
112
112
,000
70
,000
70
,911(**)
,848(**)
1
,913(**)
,000
70
,000
70
78
,000
78
,830(**)
,788(**)
,913(**)
1
,000
,000
,000
70
70
78
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
Nations in Transit Democratization score is
calculated as the average of scores
obtained on 4 dimensions:
Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and
Governance
rating of
Political Rights
as calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Each country and territory is awarded from 0 to 4 raw points for each of 10 questions grouped into three
subcategories in a political rights checklist (A. Electoral Process, B. Political Pluralism and Participation and C. Functioning
of Government) and for each of 15 questions grouped into four subcategories in a civil liberties checklist (A. Freedom of
Expression and Belief, B. Associational and Organizational Rights, C. Rule of Law and D. Personal Autonomy and
Individual Rights). A country or territory is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw
points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both checklists, 1 represents the most free
and 7 the least free; each 1 to 7 rating corresponds to a range of total raw scores. Each pair of political rights and civil
liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings
average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 5.5-7 Not Free. The dividing line between Partly Free and Not Free
falls at 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political
rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either Partly Free or Not Free. The total number of raw points is the definitive
factor that determines the final status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-33 points are Not Free, 34-67
points are Partly Free, and 68-100 are Free.
28
78
Item Statistics
Mean
bicameral or unicameral
parliament, as defined in the
country's constitution.
Std. Deviation
N
,69
1,423
484
form of state organization as
defined by constitution
-,36
,823
484
electoral system for the (lower
chamber of the) Parliament (see
Annex Electoral Systems)
1,00
1,859
484
index of rigidity of constitution
(Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see
Annex Flexibility of
Constitutions)
1,86
2,016
484
ANOVA
Sum of
Squares
3772,988
Between People
Within People
df
483
Mean Square
7,812
Between Items
1222,228
3
407,409
Residual
1164,460
1449
,804
Total
2386,687
1452
1,644
6159,675
1935
3,183
Total
F
Sig
506,961
,000
form of state
organization as
defined by
constitution
,925(**)
electoral system
for the (lower
chamber of the)
Parliament (see
Annex Electoral
Systems)
,657(**)
index of rigidity of
constitution
(Lijphart 1999:
216-223) (see
Annex Flexibility
of Constitutions)
,844(**)
,000
,000
,000
Grand Mean = ,80
Correlations
bicameral or
unicameral
parliament, as
defined in the
country's
constitution.
bicameral or unicameral
parliament, as defined in the
country's constitution.
Pearson Correlation
N
form of state organization as
defined by constitution
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
electoral system for the (lower
chamber of the) Parliament (see
Annex Electoral Systems)
1
Sig. (2-tailed)
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
486
486
484
486
,925(**)
1
,703(**)
,891(**)
,000
,000
,000
486
502
484
486
,657(**)
,703(**)
1
,724(**)
,000
,000
484
484
484
484
1
,000
N
index of rigidity of constitution
(Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see
Annex Flexibility of
Constitutions)
Pearson Correlation
,844(**)
,891(**)
,724(**)
Sig. (2-tailed)
,000
,000
,000
N
486
486
484
486
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
29
Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
rating of
Political Rights
as calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Nations in Transit Democratization
score is calculated as
the average of scores
obtained on 4
dimensions:
Electoral Process,
Civil Society,
Independent Media
and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule
of Law score is
calculated as the average
of ratings obtained on
two dimensions:
Constitutional,
Legislative and Judicial
Framework and
Corruption
1,000
,896
,770
,891
,896
1,000
,778
,811
,770
,778
1,000
,749
,891
,811
,749
1,000
rating of
Political Rights
as calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Nations in Transit Democratization
score is calculated as
the average of scores
obtained on 4
dimensions:
Electoral Process,
Civil Society,
Independent Media
and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule
of Law score is
calculated as the average
of ratings obtained on
two dimensions:
Constitutional,
Legislative and Judicial
Framework and
Corruption
1,151
,538
,467
,848
,538
,314
,246
,403
,467
,246
,320
,376
,848
,403
,376
,786
rating of Political Rights as calculated by
Freedom House and reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is
calculated as the average of scores obtained on
4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is
calculated as the average of ratings obtained on
two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and
Judicial Framework and Corruption
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by
Freedom House and reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the World"
rating of Civil
Liberties as
calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Inter-Item Covariance Matrix
rating of Political Rights as calculated by
Freedom House and reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is
calculated as the average of scores obtained on
4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and Governance
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is
calculated as the average of ratings obtained on
two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and
Judicial Framework and Corruption
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by
Freedom House and reported annually in the
publication "Freedom in the World"
rating of Civil
Liberties as
calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Communalities
Initial
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom
in the World"
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom
in the World"
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions:
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions:
Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Extraction
1,000
,925
1,000
,871
1,000
,870
1,000
,942
Total Variance Explained
Initial Eigenvalues
Component
Total
% of Variance
1
3,609
90,215
2
,251
6,279
3
,093
2,313
4
,048
1,193
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
30
Cumulative %
90,215
96,494
98,807
100,000
Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total
% of Variance
Cumulative %
3,609
90,215
90,215
Component Matrix(a)
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and
Judicial Framework and Corruption
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and Governance
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a 1 components extracted.
Component
1
,962
,933
,933
,971
Reproduced Correlations
rating of Political
Rights as
calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Reproduced
Correlation
Residual(a)
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom
House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom
House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as
the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions:
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework
and Corruption
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and Governance
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom
House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom
House and reported annually in the publication
"Freedom in the World"
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as
the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions:
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework
and Corruption
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media and Governance
rating of Civil
Liberties as
calculated by
Freedom House
and reported
annually in the
publication
"Freedom in the
World"
Nations in Transit Rule of Law score
is calculated as the
average of ratings
obtained on two
dimensions:
Constitutional,
Legislative and
Judicial
Framework and
Corruption
Nations in Transit Democratization
score is calculated
as the average of
scores obtained on
4 dimensions:
Electoral Process,
Civil Society,
Independent Media
and Governance
,925(b)
,898
,897
,934
,898
,871(b)
,871
,906
,897
,871
,870(b)
,905
,934
,906
,905
,942(b)
,013
-,067
-,023
-,083
-,058
,013
-,067
-,083
-,023
-,058
,021
,021
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
a Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 3 (50,0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values
greater than 0.05.
b Reproduced communalities
Rotated Component Matrix(a)
a Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated.
1.
bicam
subordup
electup
federal
judrev
electsys
Institutions
bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country’s constitution.
codes: 1 - unicameral parliament; 2 - bicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution
subordinated upper chamber: relationship between the lower and upper chamber, as framed by the post-communist constitutions.
codes: 1 – upper chamber is subordinated; 0 - upper chamber is not subordinated; -1 – unicameral parliament; -2 – communist
constitution or undemocratic rule
mode of election of upper chamber
codes: 1 – appointment/delegation; 2 – indirect by regional/state legislature; 3 – directly by the people; 4 – other; -1 – unicameral
Parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule
form of state organization as defined by constitution
codes: 1 – federal state; 0 – other; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule
judicial review – existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are in conformity with the constitution
codes: 1 – yes ; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule
electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament
31
codes: 0 – proportional representation; 1 – proportional representation modified; 2 – majoritarian; 3 – parallel (the chamber is elected
using both majoritarian and proportional representation systems, and each is allocated a fixed number of seats); -2 – communist
election rule
type of cabinet
codes: 1 - single party majority; 2 - minimal winning; 3 - surplus coalition; 4 - single party minority; 5 - minority coalition; 6 caretaker; 7 - grand coalition
n/p – non-party ministers or experts; na – presidential cabinets (cabinets at the formation of which the Parliament composition is not
taken into account)
index of rigidity of constitution
codes: 1- ordinary majorities; 2 – more than ordinary but less than two-thirds majorities plus referendum; 3 - two-thirds majorities and
equivalent; 4 - supermajorities (greater than two-thirds). If particularly difficult conditions for amending the constitution existed, an
intermediary category was created by adding .5 to the code describing the basic conditions.
required referendum
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
veto point referendum
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
popular veto
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
popular initiative
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other
cab_type
Irid
Req_rev
Vp_ref
Pop_veto
Pop_init
Topics of referenda:
Topic 1
Topic2
Topic3
Topic4
polsys
ppi
2.
independ
refers to the issues on which referenda are required or can be organized
based on post-communist constitutions
border issues and association/secession issues; delegation of state powers to international organizations
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
adoption of and amendments to constitution; adoption of and change in other laws
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
dissolution of Parliament; impeachment
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
other issues "of national importance"
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution
political system
codes: 0 – parliamentary; 1 – presidential; 2 – semi-presidential, dominated by president; 3 – semi-presidential, dominated by
parliament; 4 – other
presidential power index
-2 - communist constitutions
Democracy
year of acquisition of independence (for NIS) or official end of communist rule (for CEE)
codes: 0 – communist rule; 1 - independent or non-communist
FH
overall status of a country
codes: 0 – not free; 1 - partly free; 2 – free;
“.” missing value – data does not exist
FH_PR
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”
FH_CL
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”
NiT_DEM
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil
Society, Independent Media and Governance (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_ROL
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative
and Judicial Framework and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_EC
Nations in Transit - Economic Liberalization score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on three dimensions: Privatization,
Macroeconomic Policy and Microeconomic Policy (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_DEM2
Nations in Transit - Democracy score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 7 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society,
Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence and
Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_EP
Nations in Transit – Electoral process score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_CS
Nations in Transit – Civil society score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_Media
Nations in Transit – Independent media score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_GOV
Nations in Transit – Governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_NGov
Nations in Transit – National democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004)
NiT_LGov
Nations in Transit – Local democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004)
NiT_JUD
Nations in Transit – Judicial Framework and Independence score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
NiT_COR
Nations in Transit – Corruption score (1 highest, 7 lowest)
freedom1
rating of press freedom
codes: 0 - not free; 1 - partly free; 2 - free;
“.” missing value – data does not exist
freedom2 rating of press freedom scores. Data is available only from 1994 onward.
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist
CPI
Corruption Perception Index. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
codes: table entries are CPI values.
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist
source: Transparency International.
war
violent conflict inside the country or at the borders.
codes: 0 – no violent conflict; 1 – war, civil war or turmoil; 2 – ceasefire
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist
32

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