Certification Report: 0719a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
for
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit
RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 0
with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0
including specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Samsung Electronics
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure
RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including specific IC Dedicated
Software
from
Samsung Electronics
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 19 May 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Irmela Ruhrmann
Head of Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
●
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
●
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement. This evaluation
contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_TAT.2 and ATE_DPT.3 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these
assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010. Specific results from the evaluation
process BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Certification Report
1.0 including specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 10 May 2011. The TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Samsung Electronics.
The product was developed by: Samsung Electronics.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Samsung Electronics
San24
Nongseo-dong Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggido
Korea
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit
RISC Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC
Library Version 1.0 including specific IC Dedicated Software.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE), the S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 revision 0
microcontroller with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library version 1.0, featuring the
TORNADOTM 2MX2 cryptographic coprocessor, is a smartcard integrated circuit which is
composed of a processing unit, security components, contactless and contact based I/O
ports, hardware circuit for testing purpose during the manufacturing process and volatile
and non-volatile memories (hardware). The TOE also includes the IC
Designer/Manufacturer proprietary IC Dedicated Software as long as it physically exists in
the smartcard integrated circuit after being delivered by the IC Manufacturer. Such
software (also known as IC firmware) is used for testing purpose during the manufacturing
process but also provides additional services to facilitate the usage of the hardware and/or
to provide additional services, including optional RSA/ECC asymmetric cryptography
library, an AIS20 [4] compliant random number generation library and an AIS31 [4]
compliant random number generator. The RSA/ECC library further includes the
functionality of hash computation. The use for keyed hash operations like HMAC or similar
security critical operations involving keys and other secrets, is not subject of this TOE and
requires specific security improvements and DPA analysis including the operating system,
which is not part of this TOE. However, this functionality is intended to be used for
signature generation and verification only ( see [9], chapter 1.2.2). All other software is
called Smartcard Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE is intended to be used in a range of high security applications like banking and
finance applications, communication highways Internet access and transaction
processing), transport and ticketing applications (access control cards) and Governmental
cards (ID cards, health cards, driving licenses). Several security features independently
implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper
operations and the integrity and confidentiality of stored data. This includes measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
Regarding the RSA/ECC library the user has the possibility to tailor this IC Dedicated
Software part of the TOE during the manufacturing process by deselecting the RSA/ECC
library. Hence the TOE can be delivered with or without the functionality of the RSA/ECC
library what’s resulting in two TOE configurations. This is considered in this Security Target
and corresponding notes (indicated by “optional”) are added where required. If the user
decides not to use the RSA/ECC cryptographic library, the library is not delivered to the
user and the accompanying “Additional Specific Security Functionality (O.Add-Functions)”
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is not provided by
the TOE. Deselecting RSA/ECC library means excluding the code implementing
functionality, which the user decided not to use. Excluding the code of the deselected
functionality has no impact on any other security policy of the TOE, it is exactly equivalent
to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality. The S3CT9KA /
S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 single-chip CMOS microcontroller is designed and packaged
specifically for "Smart Card" applications.
The main security features of the S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 integrated circuit are:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Certification Report
●
Security sensors or detectors including High and Low Temperature detectors, High and
Low Frequency detectors, High and Low Supply Voltage detectors, Supply Voltage
Glitch detectors, Light detector and the Passivation Removing Detector,
●
Active Shields against physical intrusive attacks,
●
Dedicated tamper-resistant design based on synthesizable glue logic and secure
topology,
●
Dedicated hardware mechanisms against side-channel attacks such as Internal Variable
Clock, Random Current Generator, Random Waits Generator, RAM and EEPROM
encryption mechanisms,
●
Secure DES and AES Symmetric Cryptography support,
●
Secure TORNADO™2MX2 coprocessor for RSA/ECC Asymmetric Cryptographic
Support,
●
A Deterministic Random Number Generator (DRNG) for AIS20-compliant Random
Number Generation and a True Random Number Generator (TRNG) for AIS31compliant Random Number Generation.
For more details please refer to the Security Target Lite [9], chapter 1.2.2.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSICC-PP-0035-2007 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
SFR1
Failure with preservation of secure state
SFR2
Limited fault tolerance
SFR3
Resistance to physical attacks
SFR4
Subset access control
SFR5
Security atribute based access control
SFR6
Static attribute initialization
SFR7
Management of security attributes
SFR8
Specification of management functions
SFR9
Audit Storage
SFR10
Limited capabilities
SFR11
Limited availabilities
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
SFR12
Subset information flow control
SFR13
Basic internal transfer protection
SFR14
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
SFR15
Random number generation
SFR16
Cryptographic operation
SFR17
Cryptographic key generation
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 3.1 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
●
Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 0,
●
Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 0 with Secure Crypto Library
V1.0.
For more details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
1
HW
2
SW
S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 incl. ROM code Revision 0
V1.0
DRNG
3
SW
TRNG
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Identifier
Release
V1.0
Form of delivery
Wafer or Module
Object file in
electronic form
Object file in
electronic form
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
No
Certification Report
Type
Release
Form of delivery
Test ROM Code
V1.0
Secure RSA/ECC Crypto Library (optional)
V1.0
Included in
S3CT9KA /
S3CT9K7 /
S3CT9K3 Test ROM
Object file in
electronic form
6
DOC S3CT9KA/K7/K3 Chip Delivery Specification [18]
V0.1
7
DOC S3CT9XX User's manual [17]
V1.10
8
V1.1
9
DOC S3CT9KA_K7_K3_PC_PA Security Application
Note [12]
DOC DRNG Library Application Note [13]
10
DOC TRNG Library Application Note [14]
V1.0
11
DOC RSA/ECC Library Application Note [15]
12
DOC Architecture Reference: SecuCalm16 CPU Core
[16]
4
SW
5
SW
Identifier
Softcopy
Softcopy
Softcopy
V1.0
Softcopy
Softcopy
V1.091
Softcopy
AR14
Softcopy
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 0. Another
characteristic of the TOE is the product code. This information is stored in the EEPROM
and can be read out by the user of the card via the normal EEPROM read command. It
contains the following information at which among others the production line indicator is
part of the serial number. Here the hex value “06” at the beginning of the serial number
indicates that the TOE is produced in Giheung (Korea) wafer line 6:
Address
Contents
Data
500000h – 500001h
Chip status information
Samsung’s internal management value
500002h – 500003h
ROM code number
ROM code number
140A h (S3CT9KA)
500004h – 500005h
Device Type
1407 h (S3CT9K7)
1403 h (S3CT9K3)
500006h – 50000Fh
Available for customer
All FF h
500010h – 50001Bh
Serial number
Samsung’s internal management value
beginning with 06 h
50001Ch – 50001Dh
IC Fabricator
4250 h
50001Eh – 50001Fh
IC Fabrication Date
YDDD h (where Y is the last digit of the
year and DDD is the number of the day
within the year)
500020h – 500021h
IC Module Fabricator
4252 h
YDDD h + 9 Format (If Samsung does not
ship the IC module, customer should use
Packaging
other area for this purpose. “YDDD + 9 “
means 9 days will be need for finishing
module making)
500022h – 500023h
IC Module
date
500024h – 500027h
IC Serial Number
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A proprietary binary number
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Address
Contents
Data
500028h – 500029h
IC Batch number
A proprietary binary number
50002Ah
IC Version
00 h
50002Bh
Test ROM Code Version
10 h
50002Ch – 50002Dh
Crypto. Library Version
010C h
50002Eh
DRNG Library Version
01 h
50002Fh
TRNG Library Version
01 h
500030h – 5000FFh
Available for customer
All FF h
Table 3: TOE Version Information
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The Security Policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functionalities to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to
support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a True Random Number
Generator (TRNG).
The RSA/ECC library is used to provide a high level interface to RSA/ECC cryptography
implemented on the hardware component TORNADO™2MX2 and includes
countermeasures against SPA, DPA and DFA attacks. The SHA library provides the
calculation of a hash value of freely chosen data input in the CPU.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during AES, Triple-DES, RSA/ECC cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall
●
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
●
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functionalities (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
5
Certification Report
Architectural Information
The Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for Smart
Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including specific IC
Dedicated Software are a integrated circuit (IC) providing a platform to a smart card
operating system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list
of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target Lite [9],
chapter 1.2.2. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the
TOE is to be found in guidance documents delivered to the customer, see table 2.
The TOE consists of the 20 subsystems (16 hardware / 4 software). For the
implementation of the TOE security functionalities basically the components processing
unit (CPU) with ROM, EEPROM, RAM, I/O, Deterministic (DRNG) and True Random
Number Generator (TRNG), TORNADO™, Clock, Timer / 16-bit Timer and 20-bit
Watchdog, Detectors and Security Control, RESET, Address and Data Bus, DES, Power
Control, MPU / Memory Protection Unit, Testrom_code, DRNG Library, TRNG Library and
RSA/ECC Library are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised within
the layout of the whole circuitry. The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and
the various on-chip memories provide the interface to the software using the security
functionalities of the TOE.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1. Technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2. Tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. Regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. Regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for
the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. Characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
a) used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as characterisation
tests)
b) special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
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include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to verify
statements concerning the layout;
6. Functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the Functional specification.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer were repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with an evaluation operating system. For the
developer tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters were used and the test
equipment was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data
and on the final product.
The evaluation has shown that the actual version of the TOE provides the security
functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE security functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of security functionalities using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically. The penetration tests results confirm that
the TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment for
the TOE.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE can be delivered in two configurations:
●
Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 0,
●
Smartcard IC S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 Revision 0 with Secure Crypto Library
Version 1.0.
No further generation of the TOE takes place after delivery to the customer. After delivery
the TOE only features one fixed configuration (normal mode), which cannot be altered by
the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification
results therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE. For all evaluation activities
performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the normal
mode, too.
Every information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
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9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [11] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0639-2010, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on improved Hardware and
specific Library parts.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]
●
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for: SFR16.
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
●
hash functions: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512
●
algorithms for the encryption and decryption: 3DES, AES, RSA and ECC
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities
with a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against
attacks with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for
these functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate
for the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES (3DES) provided by the TOE achieves a
security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context). SHA1 is not within the scope of this
evaluation.
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algortithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [11].
The TOE is delivered to the Composite Product Manufacturer and to the Security IC
Embedded Software Developer. The actual end-consumer obtains the TOE from the
Composite Product Issuer together with the application which runs on the TOE. The
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Security IC Embedded Software Developer receives all necessary recommendations and
hints to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
All security hints described in [17] and the delivered documents [12] to [16] have to be
considered.
●
The Composite Product Manufacturer receives all necessary recommendations and hints
to develop his software in form of the delivered documentation.
●
All security hints described in [18] have to be considered.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CRC
Cyclic Redundancy Check
CPU
Central Processing Unit
CMOS
Complimentary Metal Oxide Semiconductor
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
DRNG
Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electronic Code Book
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
HMAC
Hash-based Message Authentication Code
IC
Integrated Circuit
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I/O
Input/Output
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MPU
Memory Protection Unit
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TRNG
True Random Number Generator
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB
Universal Serial Bus
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
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Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target of S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Cards with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library – Project Crow II, Version
1.3, 2011-04-20, Samsung Electronics (confidential document)
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report Summary (ETR SUMMARY), BSI-DSZ-CC-0719,
S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3, Version 1, 2011-04-29, TÜViT (confidential
document)
[8]
Life Cycle Definition (Class ALC_CMC.4/CMS.5) – Project Crow II, Version 1.0,
2011-03-21, Samsung Electronics (confidential document)
[9]
Security Target Lite of S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Cards – Project Crow II, Version 1.0, 2011-03-16, Samsung Electronics
[10]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP0035-2007
[11]
ETR for Composite Evaluation (ETR-COMP), BSI-DSZ-CC-0719, S3CT9KA /
S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3, Version 1, 2011-04-29, TÜViT (confidential document)
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[12]
Security Application Note, S3CT9KA_K7_K3_PC_PA, Version 1.1, 2011-03-23,
Samsung Electronics
[13]
S3CT9KA/PC family AIS20 DRNG library application note, Version 1.0, 2010-08-29,
Samsung Electronics
[14]
S3CT9KA/PC family AIS31 TRNG library application note, Version 1.0, 2010-08-29,
Samsung Electronics
[15]
TORNADO-2Mx2 RSA/ECC Library API Manual, Version 1.0, 2010-08-29, Samsung
Electronics
[16]
Architecture Reference: SecuCalm16 CPU Core, Version AR14, 2011-03-03,
Samsung Electronics
[17]
User’s manual S3CT9xx 16-Bit CMOS Microcontroller for Smart Card, Supported
Device: S3CT9KW/KC/KA/K9/K7/K3/PC/PA/P3/P2, Version 1.10, November 2010,
Samsung Electronics
[18]
S3CT9KA/K7/K3 Chip Delivery Specification, Version 0.1, 08.2010, Samsung
Electronics
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0719-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Samsung S3CT9KA / S3CT9K7 / S3CT9K3 16-bit RISC Microcontroller for
Smart Card, Revision 0 with optional Secure RSA/ECC Library Version 1.0 including
specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 19 May 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC–Life cycle support ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 and ALC_TAT.2
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site
Address
Function
Giheung Plant
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. San24, Nongseo-dong,
Giheung-gu, Yongin-City, Gyeonggido , 449-711, Korea
Development, Production
(Wafer Fab, Initialisation and
Pre-personalisation)
Hwasung Plant
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd. San #16, Banwol-Ri,
Hwasung-Eup, Gyeonggi-Do, 445-701, Korea
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd., San #74, Buksoo-Ri,
Baebang-Myun, Asan-City, Chungcheongnam-Do, 449711, Korea
Development (Server room,
Mask data preparation)
Cheonan Plant
(PKL)
PKL Co., Ltd. Plant, 493-3 Sungsung-Dong, CheonanCity, Choongcheongnam-Do, 330-300, Korea
Production (Mask House)
Asan Plant
(Hanamicron)
Hanamicron Co., Ltd., #95-1, Wonnam-Li, UmbongMyeon, Asan-City, Choongcheongnam-Do, 449-711,
Korea
Production (Grinding, Sawing)
Onyang Plant II
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd., San #74, Buksoo-Ri,
Baebang-Myun, Asan-City, Chungcheongnam-Do, 449711, Korea
Production (Grinding, Sawing)
Onyang Plant I
Production
(Warehouse/Delivery)
Shanghai Plant I Changfeng Co., Ltd., No. 818 Jin Yu Road, Jin Qiao
(ChangFeng)
Export Processing Zone Pudong, Shanghai, China
Production (Sawing, COB
Assembly)
Shanghai Plant II Statschippac Co., Ltd., 188 Huaxu Road, Qingpu
(StatsChippac) District, 201702 Shanghai, China
Production (Grinding)
Suzhou Plant I
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd., SESS Bonded
Warehouse, No. 88, Morden Road, Suzhou Industrial
Park, Suzhou, China
Production
(Warehouse/Delivery)
Suzhou Plant II
Samsung Electronics. Co., Ltd., SESS Plant, No. 15, Jin Production (Grinding, Sawing,
Ji Hu Road, Suzhou Industrial Park, Suzhou, China
COB Assembly)
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For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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