Certification Report: 0532a

Certification Report: 0532a
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
for
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition
Version 1.0.1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.24
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
Security IC with MRTD EAC Application
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition
Version 1.0.1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Extended Access Control,
BSI-PP-0026
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and smart card specific guidance for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 27 June 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
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Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
5
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Contents
A
Certification
7
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
7
2
Recognition Agreements
7
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates
7
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
8
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
8
4
Validity of the certification result
9
5
Publication
9
B
Certification Results
11
1
Executive Summary
12
2
Identification of the TOE
14
3
Security Policy
15
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
15
5
Architectural Information
15
6
Documentation
16
7
IT Product Testing
16
7.1
Description of the Test Configuration
16
7.2
Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN
17
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND
17
7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
18
8
Evaluated Configuration
19
9
Results of the Evaluation
20
9.1
CC specific results
20
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
21
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
21
11 Security Target
21
12 Definitions
21
12.1
Acronyms
21
12.2
Glossary
23
13 Bibliography
24
C
Excerpts from the Criteria
27
D
Annexes
35
6
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Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005) 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
7
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This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal
Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the
national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms
of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual
recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to
and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the
recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate
indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF), ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of Security Measures), AVA_VLA.4 (Highly
Resistant) and AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and Testing for insecure States) that are
not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For
mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are
relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC0463-2008. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-04632008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1
was conducted by SRC Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was
8
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completed on 23 June 2008. The SRC Research & Consulting GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed Strength of
Functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1 has been included
in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
9
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
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Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstrasse 159
81607 München
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Certification Report
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is the
Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Extended Access
Control Application STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control [9].
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [10]. It provides the Basic Access Control and the Extended Access
Control according to the ICAO document [9] and an authentication mechanism
according to the technical report [11], including the Chip Authentication
mechanism described in [9]. It will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a
passport booklet.
The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) of the TOE are based entirely on
the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C
or [1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ADV_DVS.2,
AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.1. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is
CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of
the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.ACCESS
Access Control
Before the TSF performs an operation
requested by a user, this Security
Function checks if the operation specific
requirements on user authorisation and
protection of communication data are
fulfilled.
SF.ADMIN
Administration of the TOE
The administration of the TOE is
managed by this Security Function. The
TOE administration is mainly done in the
initialisation and personalisation phase.
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TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.AUTH
Authentication of the authorized TOE
user
The authentication of the authorized user
is managed by this Security Function.
SF.CRYPTO
Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the
cryptographic support for the other
Security Functions.
SF.PROTECTION
Protection of TSC
This Security Function protects the TSF
functionality, TSF data and user data.
After a successfully performed Chip
Authentication no unencrypted data
transmission between TOE and the
outside of the TOE is allowed.
SF.IC
Security Functions of the IC
This Security Function covers the
Security Functions of the IC
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high ) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1 is
confirmed. The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the
cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4,
Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6]
resp. [7], chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the security environment is
defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies.
This is outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2 to chapter 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
•
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for
the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
•
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
•
the associated guidance documentation,
•
the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool, Version 1.1 (GMA-Verifier Tool)
and
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•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
the Reference Initialisation Table for the GMA-Verifier Tool 8 containing the
IC Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS 3.3) and the MRTD
application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system on the
chip).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
1
Chip modules with NXP
P5CD080V0B including
STARCOS 3.3 PE V1.0.1
HW /
SW
Release
Form of Delivery
SW completely contained in
ROM and EEPROM memory,
chip mounted into an inlay
package (MOB4 module),
initialised and tested
- ROM mask of the TOE
already Implemented
STARCOS_CPDI0S
CSR33-1AV100
- EEPROM part of the TOE
loaded before TOE delivery:
Initialisation Table compliant
to STARCOS33PEV10_
Referenz.hex
Possible values:
CPDI0SCSI33-A1100V001 to
CPDI0SCSI33-A1100V0FF
2
DOC
Administrator Guidance
STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition [14]
Version 1.6,
21 November 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
3
DOC
User guidance STARCOS
3.3 Passport Edition [15]
Version 0.8,
13 September 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
4
DOC
STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition TABLES [16]
(STARCOS33PETABLES)
Version 0.6
04 June 2008
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
8
The GMA-Verifier Tool and the Reference Initialisation Table are part of the TOE but not
part of the deliverables. Since the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables
that have to be compliant to the Reference Initialisation Table without exceeding the CC
certificate, the developer has to ensure this compliance by checking the initialisation table
with the GMA-Verifier Tool.
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The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the Protection Profile
MRTD EAC PP [9].
Delivery is performed from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH in Munich to the
personalisation facility. Any delivery of the initialised inlays is done via a security
transport of the MRTD Manufacturer (G&D) or a security transport maintained
by the Personalization Agent. This delivery process has therefore to be
regarded as 'personal pickup'. In addition, the correct inlay modules for the TOE
are secured by cryptographic means. Furthermore, the personalizer receives
information about the personalisation commands and process requirements. To
ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to
start the personalisation process as described in the administrator manual for
personalisation [14] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [9]
by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It
addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the
Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats
and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOEEnvironment. The following topics are of relevance:
•
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip,
•
Inspection Systems for global interoperability,
•
PKI for Passive Authentication and
•
PKI for Inspection Systems.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC),
IC Embedded Software, IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software
(containing the ICAO Application) and the Generic MRTD Application Verifier
Tool (GMA-Verifier). While the IC Embedded Software contains the operating
system STARCOS 3.3 PE v1.0.1 and key, the part Application Software
contains the ICAO application (also referred as MRTD application). As all these
parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to
its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the EAL 5+
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certified NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller (for details
concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC see the evaluation documentation
under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007).
The GMA-Verifier is not running inside the IC, but on a standard PC. It checks
the MRTD application (in form of a hex file) that is designed to be loaded onto
the IC whether it contains only allowed modifications in comparison with the
reference application hexfile "STARCOS33PEV10_Referenz.hex".
The following table gives an mapping of the subsystems of the TOE´s
Embedded Software and the corresponding TSF which were objects of the
evaluation:
Subsystem
Enforced TOE Security Function
Access control
SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION
Setup
SF.ADMIN, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC.
Commands
SF.ACESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION
Application Data and Basic
Functions
SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Crypto Functions
SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,
SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Secure Messaging
SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,
SF.PROTECTION
Hardware
SF.AUTH, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Table 3: Subsystems and corresponding TSF
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information
for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
7.1
Description of the Test Configuration
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product STARCOS 3.3
Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1 consisting of the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controller P5CD080V0B, operating system STARCOS 3.3 PE v1.0.1 and a file
system (called MRTD application) in the context of the ICAO application.
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7.2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN
In the following the developer’s testing effort is summarised:
TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Developer’s testing approach
•
The developer performed functional tests in the Initialisation-,
Personalisation- and Usage phase of the TOE and covered all the TSF and
related subfunctions.
•
Test suites were implemented in accordance with the functional specification
of the TOE in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected
behaviour.
•
The tests were performed on a smartcard emulator and on the test samples
with the MRTD Application.
Amount of developer testing performed
The developer has tested the 6 TSF of the TOE with a total of 800 test cases.
As demonstrated by the documentation of the test coverage the developer has
tested the TOE systematically at the level of TSF functionalities as given in the
functional specification. As demonstrated by the documentation of the test
depth the developer has tested the TOE systematically at the level of the
subsystems as given in the high level design of the TOE.
GMA-Verifier
For the GMA-Verifier, the developer provided a test case set consisting of 4 test
cases which includes two good case tests and two bad case tests. For the good
case tests, several allowed modifications were applied to the MRTD application,
while for the bad case tests several unallowed modifications were applied.
Overall developer testing results
All test of the TSF in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phases of
the TOE passed all test cases so that all TSF have been successfully tested
against the functional specification and the high level design of the TOE.
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND
In the following the evaluator’s independent testing effort is summarised:
TOE test configurations
The tests were performed in the phases Initialisation, Personalisation and
Usage. For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this
report.
Evaluator’s testing approach
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The evaluator’s independent tests covered the security functionality of the TOE
in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phase.
Subset size chosen
The evaluators have tested all 6 TSF.
TSF subset selection criteria
The evaluators have chosen a subset of developer tests so that all TSF could
be covered by at least one test case in order to confirm that the TOE operates
as specified. The valid cases as well as invalid cases were considered. For the
simulator tests as well as for the GMA-Verifier tests, all tests were reproduced
by the evaluators.
Security functions tested
The evaluators have covered all 6 TSF within the independent testing.
Developer tests performed
The evaluators have selected and tested a sample of 298 test cases from the
developer TSF tests. The evaluator’s sample of developer tests covers all TSF
and was performed on a smartcard emulator as well as on the test samples with
the MRTD Application.
GMA-Verifier
All developer tests for the GMA-Verifier were reproduced by the evaluators. For
the independent tests, two testcases (one good-case test and one bad-case
test) were performed by the evaluators. The new functionality of the GMAVerifier version 1.1 regarding the file EF_CP_ECC_TP2 has explicitly been
addressed by the independent tests.
Verdict for the activity
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. The
evaluators have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of
tests in the developer’s test documentation.
7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
7.4.1 Developer Vulnerability Analysis
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on developer
vulnerability analysis is summarised:
Testing approach
Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of
the TOE.
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TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Security functions penetration tested
The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the developer
vulnerability analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE
operated as specified. The vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended
environment for the TOE. The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential.
7.4.2 Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on his
independent vulnerability analysis is summarised:
Testing approach
Examination of evaluator’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of
the TOE.
TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Security functions penetration tested
The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on his independent
vulnerability analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE
operated as specified. The vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended
environment for the TOE. The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack
potential.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1 consisting of
•
the NXP Chip P5CD080V0B,
•
the embedded software operation system STARCOS 3.3 PE v1.0.1,
•
a file system (called MRTD application) in the context of the ICAO
application,
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•
the GMA-Verifier Version 1.1 (Build 1.0, 23 April 2008) and
•
the Reference Initialisation Table "STARCOS33PEV10_Referenz.hex".
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
For components beyond EAL 4 the Evaluation Methodology applied was
defined in co-ordination with the Certification Body [4] (AIS 34).
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up
to EAL 4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 and smart card specific guidance.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
•
All components of the class ASE
•
All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
•
The components
ADV_IMP.2 – Implementation of the TSF
ALC_DVS.2 – Sufficiency of security measures
AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out
as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0463-2008, re-use of
specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on
the upgrade of the implemented communication protokoll to reach conformance
to the ISO/IEC 1444 standard and on the upgrade of the GMA-Verifier to
version 1.1 that allows the personalisation of the file EF_CP_ECC_TP2
(compared to version 1.0, where a personalisation of this file was prohibited).
The evaluation has confirmed:
•
PP Conformance
Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Extended Access Control,
BSI-PP-0026 [8]
•
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
•
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
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ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4
The TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function 'high'.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
•
SF.ADMIN
Administration of the TOE,
•
SF.AUTH
Authentication of the authorized TOE user,
•
SF.CRYPTO
Cryptographic Support and
•
SF.IC
Security Functions of the IC.
10
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target Of
Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this
report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the
evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as
outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
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DOC
Document
EAC
Extended Access Control
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE 9
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 1.0.1, BSI-DSZCC-0532-2008, Version 1.0, 23 April 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
(confidential document)
9
specifically
•
AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CCInterpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes
for EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (STLite) including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL
Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[7]
Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 1.0.1, BSIDSZ-CC-0532-2008, Version 1, 23 June 2008, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH (sanitized public document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.0, 23 June 2008, STARCOS 3.3
Passport Edition Version 1.0.1, SRC Security Research & Consulting
GmbH (confidential document)
[9]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026,
Version 1.2, 19 November 2007, BSI
[10]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004
[11]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version
1.1, Date 01 October 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
[12]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[13]
Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC
Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-410-2007, 05 July 2007, BSI
[14]
Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH, Version 1.6, 21 November 2007
[15]
User guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH, Version 0.8, 13 September 2007
[16]
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition TABLES, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Version 0.6, 04 June 2008
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C
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Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly
stated
(APE_SRE)
IT
security
requirements
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
by
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 1.0.1 (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL 4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 27 June 2008, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria Security Assurance Requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich,
Germany (Development Center)
b) Giesecke
&
Devrient
GmbH,
Dienstleistungscenter
Prinzregentenstr. 159, 81677 Munich, Germany (Initialisation)
DLC,
c) Smartrac Technology, 142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech industrial Estate, Ban
Laean,Bang, Pa-In Phra nakorn Si Ayatthaya, 13160 Thailand (TOE
Completion)
For development and production sites regarding the NXP chip P5CD080V0B
refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version
1.0.1, BSI-DSZ-CC-0532-2008, Version 1.0, 23 April 2008, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH [6] resp. [7]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security
Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as
stated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these
sites.
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