Certification Report: 0353a

Certification Report: 0353a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
for
Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1)
smartcard integrated circuit version 01
from
Renesas Technology Corp.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1)
smartcard integrated circuit version 01
from
Renesas Technology Corp.
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Functionality:
Assurance Package:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by:
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficieny of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and testing for insecure states) and
AVA_VLA.4 (Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 13. September 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit
Version 01 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a recertification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006. For this evaluation specific
results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0329-2006 were reused.
The evaluation of the product Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard
integrated circuit Version 01 was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The TSystems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The vendor and distributor is Renesas Technology Corp.. The sponsor is
Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.
Dukes Meadow Millboard Road
Bourne End
Buckinghamshire
SL8 5FH
UK
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 13. September 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-18 and D1 to D-4.
The product Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit
Version 01 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
A-4
Renesas Technology Corp.
Secure MCU Design Dept. 1
5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho, Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588
Japan
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
3
2
Identification of the TOE
8
3
Security Policy
9
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
10
5
Architectural Information
10
6
Documentation
11
7
IT Product Testing
11
8
Evaluated Configuration
12
9
Results of the Evaluation
12
10 Comments/Recommendations
14
11 Annexes
15
12 Security Target
15
13 Definitions
15
14 Bibliography
17
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the "Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1)
smartcard integrated circuit Version 01“ with IC manufacturer’s ID number 4870
for Naka (Japan). The AE57C1 is an integrated circuit (IC) and an AES Library
providing a hardware platform and cryptographic functions implemented in
software to a smart card operating system and smart card application software.
The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications, including
high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic signature.
Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operation and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory
protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only under
specified conditions.
The TOE is composed of a processing unit, system control logic, security logic,
watchdog timer, firewall management unit, UART, two I/O lines, volatile or nonvolatile memories (480 kbytes + 16 kbytes ROM, 12 kbytes RAM + 2 kbytes of
coprocessor RAM, 128 kbytes + 16 kbytes EEPROM), a AES co-processor, a
DES co-processor, a random number generator (RNG), modular multiplication
coprocessor and two interval timer. The TOE also includes Renesas proprietary
IC Dedicated Software stored on the chip and used for testing purposes during
production only. It does not provide additional services in the operational phase
of the TOE. The listing of a RNG Online Test Software is delivered as part of
the TOE and should be included in the users embedded software as outlined in
the guidance [11]. Additionally an AES library is integrated into the TOE
hardware. The smart card operating system and the application stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The IT product Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit
Version 01 was evaluated by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 11. August 2006. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF) 8 recognised by BSI.
The vendor and distributor is
Renesas Technology Corp.
5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho
Kodaira-shi
Tokyo 187-8588
Japan
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-3
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
The sponsor is
Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.
Dukes Meadow Millboard Road
Bourne End
Buckinghamshire
SL8 5FH
UK
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components:
Requirement
Identifier
EAL4
TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+ ADV_IMP.2
Development – Implementation of the TSF
+ ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+ AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+ AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [DES]
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1 [AES]
Cryptographic operation
FDP
User data protection
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information overflow control
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
FDP_ACC.1 [CRP]
Subset access control [Controlled-Register Policy]
FDP_ACC.1 [WPP]
Subset access control [Write-Protect Policy]
FDP_ACF.1 [CRP]
Security attribute based access control [Controlled-Register
Policy]
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Certification Report
Security
Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FDP_ACF.1 [WPP]
Security attribute based access control [Write-Protect Policy]
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Addressed issue
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.HWProtect
Protection from attacks on the operation of the hardware
SF.LeakProtect
Protection against leakage of information from the IC
SF.RNG
Random Number Generator
SF.AES
AES Coprocessor
SF.DES
DES Coprocessor
SF.FMU
Firewall Management Unit
SF.ESFunction
Embedded Software Functions
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.TestModeControl
Test Mode Control
SF.EEPAccess
Erase/write protection of EEPROM
SF.Inject
Data injection
Table 4: Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [7] and can be summarized as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
With reference to the Protection Profile [9], the Security Target [7] defines so
called standard high-level security concerns derived from considering the endusage phase (Phase 7 of the life cycle as described in the Security Target) as
follows:
•
manipulation of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
•
disclosure of User Data and of the Smartcard Embedded Soft-ware (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
•
deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined by defining threats on a more
technical level for
•
Inherent Information Leakage,
•
Physical Probing,
•
Physical Manipulation,
•
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
•
Forced Information Leakage,
B-6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
•
Abuse of Functionality and
•
Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Certification Report
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Additionally, the Security Target defines a security concern about specific
attacks on the Smartcard Embedded Software the TOE is not being able to
detect or to respond to. This concern is detailled in terms of the threats
•
Inability of the TOE to detect an attack,
•
Inability of the Smartcard Embedded Software to respond to an attack.
A specific additional security functionality for DES encryption and decryption
must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security policy defined
in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional threats and policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes from security aspect, user mode
and test mode. The application software being executed on the TOE can not
use the test mode. The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC
manufacturing process (Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At
this point in time the operating system software is already stored in the nonvolatile memories of the chip and the test mode is disabled. Thus, there are no
special procedures for generation or installation that are important for a secure
use of the TOE. The further production and delivery processes, like the Smart
Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the delivery of the smart card to an
end user, have to be organized in a way that excludes all possibilities of
physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no special security measures for
the startup of the TOE besides the requirement that the controller has to be
used under the well-defined operating conditions and that the requirements on
the software have to be applied as described in the user documentation.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security Target, Phase 1 and the
Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are covered by these
assumptions:
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
The developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
•
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
•
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that
the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
Following additional assumptions are assumed in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the Smartcard
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
•
Data for injection/pre-personalisation will be supplied from the various
bodies controlling the operations of the system in which the TOE is
functioning. It is assumed that the generation, distribution, maintenance,
and destruction of these data is adequately secure (A.InjDatSupp).
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit Version 01
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
B-8
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Certification Report
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW
AE57C1 (HD65257C1) singlechip microcomputer
version 01 with IC
manufacturer’s ID
number 4870 for
Naka
Wafer or packaged
module
2
SW
AES Library
version 1.30
Stored in AE57C1
ROM on the chip
3
SW
Self-Test ROM Software (the IC
dedicated software)
Rev. 1.2
Stored in AE57C1
ae57c1_selfrom_a Test ROM on the
01_1st_keyX"_NP chip
_merge.src
3
SW
RNG online test software
Defined by the
version of [11]
Hardcopy
4
DOC
AE57C1 Hardware Manual
Rev. 1.00
Hardcopy
6
DOC
AE-5 series User Guidance
Manual
Rev. 5.3
Hardcopy
7
DOC
Option List for Smart Card
Microcomputer (for HD65257C1
[AE57C1])
V. 1.3
Hardcopy
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is identified by HD65257C1 (short form AE57C1) Version 01 (stored
as version number in the EEPROM), produced in Naka (indicated by IC
manufacturer’s ID number 4870 for Naka). The pre-personalisation data are
injected into the EEPROM as specified by the customer using the option list
[12].
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery procedures described in [11] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
ƒ
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
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Certification Report
ƒ
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of security
functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the TOE manufacturer to
check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was considered as part of the
evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and
under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Renesas Technology Corp. is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to chapter 9 of this report.
5
Architectural Information
The Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit version 01 is
an integrated circuit (IC) providing a hardware platform and an AES library to a
smart card operating system and smart card application software. The top level
block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description
of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the complete
instruction set of the Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated
circuit version 01 is to be found in the Hardware Manual [10].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
AE-5 Series CPU, EEPROM, Watchdog Timer, System Control Registers, AES
coprocessor, DES coprocessor, Firewall Management Unit, a Random Number
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Certification Report
Generator, the analog block with security sensors and the random logic module
for security logic are used. Security measures for physical protection are
realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The TOE IC Dedicated Software, stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of
the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
6
Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
ƒ
The Hardware Manual [10],
ƒ
Guidelines for using the TOE [11],
ƒ
The Option List [12].
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform. The documents [10] - [12] will be used by the
customer to implement the software (operating system / application software)
which will use the TOE.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories:
ƒ
tests which are performed in a simulation environment,
ƒ
functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the production
process (phase 3) and, in case TOE delivery is at the end of phase 4,
additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests are done for
every chip to check its correct functionality,
ƒ
characterization tests, which were used to determine the behaviour of the
chip with respect to different operating conditions and
ƒ
special verification tests for security functions which were done with samples
of the TOE.
The developer tests cover all security functions and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification and the high level design. Chips from
the production site in Naka (see annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators repeated the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They
performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was
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done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
The evaluators gave evidence that the actual version of the TOE (Version 01
with IC manufacturer’s ID number 4870 for Naka) provides the security
functions as specified. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the
TOE security functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all security functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expert know
how.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by AE57C1 (HD65257C1) version 01 IC manufacturer’s
ID number 4870 for Naka. There is only one evaluated configuration of the
TOE. This configuration (all TSF are active and usable) has to be selected by
the customer in the option list at order. All information of how to use the TOE
and its security functions by the software is provided within the user
documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4.
For smart card IC specific methodology the guidance documents (i) Joint
Interpretation Library - The application of CC to Integrated Circuits, (ii) Joint
Interpretation Library - Integrated Circuit Hardware Evaluation Methodology and
(iii) Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random
number generators (see [4]: AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 31) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 and
the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the
following table:
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Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage
ACM_SCP.2
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_FSP.2
PASS
Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_HLD.2
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.1
PASS
Informal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.1
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1
PASS
Well-defined developement tools
ALC_TAT.1
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: high-level design
ATE_DPT.1
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Vulnerability assessment
Verdict
CC Class AVA
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 1: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
ƒ
the TOE ist conformant to the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001,
ƒ
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common are
Criteria Part 2 extended,
ƒ
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4,
ƒ
the following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF.LeakProtect
SF.RNG
SF.TestModeControl
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
ƒ
the TOE Security Function SF.DES used for encryption and decryption.
ƒ
the TOE Security Function SF.AES used for encryption and decryption.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
10
Comments/Recommendations
ƒ
The operational documentation [10] - [12] contains necessary information
about the usage of the TOE. For secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of
the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target has to be
taken into account. These requirements are stated in the guidance
document [11].
ƒ
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or using
the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems or
complete smart cards), specific information resulting from this evaluation is
of importance and shall be given to the succeeding evaluation.
ƒ
The TOE software for random number postprocessing shall be implemented
by the embedded software developer as outlined in the guidance [11].
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11
Certification Report
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Evaluation Methodology
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
IT
Information Technology
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
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13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
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TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
2.3, August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0353, Version 5.2, 26 June 2006, AE57C1
(HD65257C1) Version 01, Renesas Technology Corp. (confidential
document)
[7]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0353, Version 3.0, 18 July, 2006, AE57C1
(HD65257C1) Version 01, Renesas Technology Corp. (sanitized public
document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, 1.0, 10 August, 2006, AE57C1 (HD65257C1)
Version 01 (confidential document)
[9]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July, 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10] AE57C1 Hardware Manual Rev. 1.0, Renesas 32-bit Smart Card
Microcomputer AE-5 Series AE57C1 (HD65257C1, Renesas Technology
Corp., 21 April, 2006, (confidential document)
[11] AE-5 Series User Guidance Manual Rev. 5.30, Renesas Technology
Corp., 13 July, 2006, (confidential document)
[12] Option List for Smart Card Microcomputer (for HD65257C1 [AE57C1]),
Version 1.3, Renesas Technology Corp, 31 January, 2006, (confidential
document)
[13] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, FIPS PUB 140-2, 25th May
2001
[14] U.S. Department of Commerce/ National Bureau of Standards Data
Encryption Standard, FIPS PUB 46-3, 25th October 1999
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a)
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b)
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a)
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b)
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a)
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b)
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a)
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery and
operation
Development
EAL3
ADO_DEL
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Renesas AE57C1 (HD65257C1) smartcard integrated circuit
Version 01 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited
and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005), for conformance to
the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC15408:
2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 13. September 2006, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) Renesas Technology Corp. – Musashi site, 5-20-1 Jousuihon-cho, Kodairashi, Tokyo 187-8588, Japan
(b) Renesas Technology Corp. – Naka site, 571 Horiguchi, Hitachinaka-shi,
Ibaraki 312-0034, Japan (production site “Naka“)
(c) Subcontractors supporting the production of the AE57C1 (HD65257C1) with
i.e. photomask fabrication and IC packaging into modules
The hardware part of the TOE produced at site (b) “Naka“ indicated by IC
manufacturer’s ID number 4870 for Naka .
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0353, Version 5.2, 26 June
2006, AE57C1 (HD65257C1) Version 01, Renesas Technology Corp.).
The evaluators verified, that the threats and the security objective for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phases 3 or 4 as stated in
the TOE Security Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0353-2006
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