COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET LITE

COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET LITE
IAS ECC - Secure Signature Creation Device
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COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY
TARGET LITE
IAS ECC - Secure Signature Creation Device - CC
IDeal CitizTM
Reference: SSE-0000078793-02
Date: 2010-04-06
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 5 1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE ........................................................................ 5 1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE) .................................... 5 1.3 2 4 TOE Type ..................................................................................................................... 5 1.2.2 Usage and major security features of the TOE............................................................ 6 TOE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................. 8 1.3.1 TOE boundary .............................................................................................................. 8 1.3.2 TOE architecture .......................................................................................................... 8 1.3.3 TOE life cycle ............................................................................................................... 9 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM ........................................................................................................... 12 2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA ............................................................. 12 2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE ......................................................... 12 2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE............................................................. 12 2.4 3 1.2.1 2.3.1 Protection Profile reference........................................................................................ 12 2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements................................................................................... 13 2.3.3 Protection Profile addition .......................................................................................... 13 2.3.4 Protection Profile Claims rationale ............................................................................. 14 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS.......................................... 14 2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards ............................................................ 14 2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices ........................... 15 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................................................ 16 3.1 ASSETS .................................................................................................................................. 16 3.2 SUBJECTS.............................................................................................................................. 16 3.2.1 Subjects Definition...................................................................................................... 16 3.2.2 Threat agents ............................................................................................................. 17 3.3 THREATS................................................................................................................................ 17 3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ........................................................................... 18 3.5 ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................................................................... 19 SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................ 20 4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ............................................................................. 20 4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................... 22 4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE ................................................................................. 23 4.3.1 Security Objectives Coverage.................................................................................... 23 4.3.2 Security Objectives Sufficiency .................................................................................. 24 Sagem Orga document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibited
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ...................................................................................... 28 6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... 29 6.1 6.2 6.3 7 9 6.1.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements..................................................................... 29 6.1.2 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ....................................................................................... 42 6.1.3 Security Functional Requirements for the IT Environment ........................................ 47 6.1.4 Security Functional Requirements for the Non-IT Environment ................................ 51 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................ 52 6.2.1 Rationale for Assurance Level 5 Augmented............................................................. 52 6.2.2 Rationale for TOE assurance requirements conformance to PPs [R8] & [R9] .......... 53 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE .......................................................................... 54 6.3.1 Security Requirement Coverage ................................................................................ 54 6.3.2 Security Requirements Sufficiency ............................................................................ 56 6.3.3 Dependency Rationale ............................................................................................... 60 6.3.4 Security Requirements Grounding in Objectives ....................................................... 63 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION................................................................................................... 65 7.1 8 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS........................................................................ 29 SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY DESCRIPTION....................................................................... 65 7.1.1 Chip security functionalities........................................................................................ 65 7.1.2 Low level security functionalities ................................................................................ 66 7.1.3 Operating system security functionalities................................................................... 67 7.1.4 Application manager security functionalities .............................................................. 67 7.1.5 Application security functionalities ............................................................................. 67 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS .............................................................................. 69 8.1 GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................................ 69 8.2 ACRONYMS ........................................................................................................................... 71 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ........................................................................... 73 9.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS.................................................................................................. 73 9.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .................................................................................................. 75 Sagem Orga document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibited
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List of figures
Figure 1: Structural view of the SSCD ............................................................................................................ 7 Figure 2: TOE Architecture ............................................................................................................................. 9 Figure 3: TOE life cycle................................................................................................................................. 11 Sagem Orga document - Reproduction and disclosure are prohibited
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1
SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE
ST reference:
Title : IAS ECC - SECURE SIGNATURE CREATION DEVICE - CC
IDEAL CITIZTM
Security target identifier : SSE-0000078793-02
TOE reference:
Chip identifier : SB23YR48 Version B
TOE Identifier IDEALMOC/SB23YR48/1.4.5
Administration guidance : 0000064845-01 - IDEAL - AGD - IAS ECC PERSONALIZATION
GUIDANCE
User guidance : 0000065958-01 - IDeal - AGD - IAS ECC Operational user
guidance
CC compliance:
Version : 3.1
Assurance level : EAL5+ augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Chip certificate reference : ANSSI-2010/02
Protection Profile : PP SSCD Type 2 [R8] and Type 3 [R9]
1.2
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE)
1.2.1
TOE Type
This security target specifies the functional and security assurance requirements applicable to the CC
IDeal CitizTM smart card. The CC IDeal CitizTM is comprised of embedded software masked on a
referenced IC and its cryptographic library.
The IC and the cryptographic library have been evaluated separately. The TOE evaluation is thus a
composite evaluation of an embedded software on a certified IC with its cryptographic library.
The IAS ECC application provides services responding to the new needs of the electronic
administration (e-administration). In its operating environment, the IAS ECC application especially
offers electronic signature services, responding to the characteristics of a Secure Signature Creation
Device (SSCD), in compliance with the European directive [R13] and is offering user authentication
based on PIN as well as biometric with on Card verification:
−
Generation of an electronic signature key pair;
−
Destruction of the electronic signature key pair;
−
Loading of electronic signature private key;
−
Electronic signature creation,
−
Biometric match on card
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Note: as the card is a DUAL interface card, the IAS ECC application provides its services over the
contact and the contact less interface.
CC IDeal CitizTM embeds usual user authentication mechanism, such as PIN, as well as capacity to
perform user biometric authentication, also known as Match On Card (MOC). The MOC can be used
to strongly authenticate user in order to generate qualified signature and is compliant to ISO/IEC
19794-2 [R34]. This capacity is replacing the use of the PIN.
In Addition, CC IDeal CitizTM is a Java open multi-applicative card compliant to JavaCard specification
and allow the card issuer to download new Java applet without jeopardizing the IAS ECC security.
1.2.2
Usage and major security features of the TOE
The TOE is a secure signature-creation device (SSCD Type 2 and SSCD Type 3) according to
Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures [R13]. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory
before the TOE loads or generates a new pair SCD/SVD.
The TOE provides the following functions necessary for devices involved in creating qualified
electronic signatures:
1) to generate the SCD and the correspondent signature-verification data (SVD) and
2) to create qualified electronic signatures:
a) after allowing for the data to be signed (DTBS) to be displayed correctly
where the display function may either be provided by the TOE itself or by
appropriate environment
b) using appropriate hash functions that are, according to [R14], agreed as
suitable for qualified electronic signatures
c) after appropriate authentication of the signatory by the TOE.
d) using appropriate cryptographic signature function that employs appropriate
cryptographic parameters agreed as suitable according to [R14].
Signature generation by means of a SSCD Type 2 TOE requires that the SCD/SVD pair has been
generated by and imported from a SSCD Type 1. Consequently, there is an interdependence where a
SSCD Type 1 constitutes the environment of the TOE.
The TOE implements all IT security functionalities which are necessary to ensure the secrecy of the
SCD. To prevent the unauthorised usage of the SCD the TOE provides user authentication and
access control. To this end, the TOE may implement IT measures to support a trusted path to a
trusted human interface device.
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The SSCD protects the SCD during the whole life cycle as to be solely used in the signature-creation
process by the legitimate signatory. The TOE will be initialised for the signatory's use by:
1) import of the SCD or generating a SCD/SVD pair,
2) personalisation for the signatory by means of the signatory’s verification authentication
data (VAD).
The SVD corresponding to the signatory's SCD will be included in the certificate of the signatory by
the certificate-service-provider (CSP). The TOE will destroy the SCD if the SCD is no longer used for
signature generation.
The TOE allows implementing a human interface for user authentication by a trusted human interface
device connected via a trusted channel with the TOE.
Figure 1 shows the structural perspective of the TOE and its environment. The SSCD, i.e. the TOE,
comprises the underlying hardware, the operating system (OS), the SCD/SVD generation, SCD
storage and use, and signature-creation functionality. The SCA and the CGA (and possibly other
applications) are part of the immediate environment of the TOE. They shall communicate with the
TOE over a trusted channel, a trusted path for the human interface provided by the SCA, respectively.
Figure 1: Structural view of the SSCD
Application note 1: This ST refers to qualified certificates as electronic attestation of the SVD
corresponding to the signatory's SCD that is implemented by the TOE.
While the main application scenario of a SSCD will assume a qualified certificate to be used in
combination with a SSCD, there still is a large benefit in the security when such SSCD is applied in
other areas and such application is encouraged. This ST may as well be applied to environments
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where the certificates expressed as 'qualified certificates' in this ST do not fulfil the requirements laid
down in Annex I and Annex II of the Directive [R13].
With this respect the notion of qualified certificates in this ST refers to the fact that when an instance
of a SSCD is used with a qualified certificate, such use is from the technical point of view eligible for
an electronic signature as referred to in Directive [R13], article 5, paragraph 1. As a consequence, this
standard does not prevent a device itself from being regarded as a SSCD, even when used together
with a non-qualified certificate.
1.3
TOE DESCRIPTION
1.3.1
TOE boundary
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is a DUAL (contact & contactless) integrated circuit chip.
The TOE boundary encompasses:
-
The Operating System
-
The IAS ECC application
-
The ST embedded crypto library: NesLib Version 3.0
-
The ST chip: SB23YR48 Version B
1.3.2
TOE architecture
The TOE is embedding:
−
the IAS ECC application, which meets all the needs of the electronic administration and is
compliant with [R31]. The IAS application may be instantiated several times,
The TOE allows any additional applets loading during its operational use.
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The TOE architecture is given in:
AIP Data
IAS Data 1
IAS Data n
AIP Instance
IAS
instance 1
IAS
instance n
IAS application
AIP application
Application manager
Operating System
HAL
Deactivated in user phase
Figure 2: TOE Architecture
1.3.3
TOE life cycle
The TOE is a smart card, whose life cycle may be divided into 7 phases:
Phase 1
Development of the smart card embedded software
Sagem Sécurité is in charge of the development of the smart card integrated software and of the
specification requirements for the initialisation of the integrated circuit.
Phase 2
Integrated Circuit (IC) Development
STMicroelectronics designs the IC, develops the dedicated software IC and transmits the information,
the software and the tools to the developer’s embedded software (Sagem Sécurité), by protected
verification and delivery procedures. From the integrated circuit, the dedicated software and the
embedded software, they build the integrated circuit smart card data base, indispensable for creating
the integrated circuit mask.
Phase 3
Manufacture and test of the integrated circuit
STMicroelectronics is in charge of the production of the integrated circuit which occurs in three
principal steps: manufacture, test and initialisation of the integrated circuit.
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Phase 4
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Encapsulation and test of the integrated circuit
The integrated circuit packaging manufacturer is in charge of packaging (encapsulation) and testing of
the integrated circuit.
Phase 5
Smart card product Finish
The smart card manufacturer is in charge of finishing and testing the smart card.
Phase 6
Smart card personalisation
The personaliser is in charge of personalising the smart card and performing final tests.
Phase 7
Smart card use
The smart card issuer is in charge of product delivery to the end user, as well as for the end of the life
cycle.
The TOE life cycle as a SSCD is shown below. Basically, it consists of a development phase and the
operational phase. This document refers to the operational phase which starts with personalisation
including SCD/SVD generation and SCD import if necessary. This phase represents installation,
generation, and start-up in the CC terminology. The main functionality in the usage phase is
signature-creation including all supporting functionality (e.g., SCD storage and SCD use). The life
cycle ends with the destruction of the SSCD.
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IC development
HW Design
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Embedded software development
OS Design
Application Design
IC manufacturing
HW Fabrication
OS and application implementation
Encapsulation
Product finish
Loading of general application data
Personalization
SCD Import
SCD/SVD Generation
Usage
Signature Creation
SSCD Destruction
Figure 3: TOE life cycle
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2 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
2.1
CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA
This Security Target is compliant with Common Criteria v3.1 [R5], [R6]:
-
Part 1 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 1, dated September 2006 (see [R4])
-
Part 2 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 2, dated September 2007 (see [R5]),
-
Part 3 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 2, dated September 2007 (see [R6]),
as follows
-
Part 2 extended,
-
Part 3 conformant.
2.2
CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE
The assurance level specified in the present security target and in its documentation is EAL 5
augmented by the following components defined in CC part 3 [R6]:
−
ALC_DVS.2,
−
AVA_VAN.5.
2.3
CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE
2.3.1
Protection Profile reference
This Security Target is compliant with the SSCD Type 2 and SSCD Type 3 Protection Profiles [R8] &
[R9].
However, as those PPs [R8] & [R9] are compliant with CC v2.1 [R1], [R2], [R3] and this ST is
compliant with CC v3.1 [R4], [R5], [R6], some requirements from the PPs [R8] & [R9] have been
updated to match CC v3.1 [R4], [R5], [R6]. A rationale on how the modified requirements still fulfil the
PPs [R8] & [R9] requirements is given in §2.3.4 and §6.2.2.
Therefore this Security Target claims conformance to the PPs [R8] & [R9]:
−
Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2 – Ref. PP0005, Version 1.04, 25
July 2001
−
Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3 – Ref. PP0006, Version 1.05, 25
July 2001
Those PPs [R8] & [R9] are established by CEN/ISSS for use by the European Commission in
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 9 of the Directive 1999/93/ec of the European
parliament and of the council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic
signatures [R13], as generally recognised standard for electronic-signature products in the Official
Journal of the European Community.
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The intent of those PPs [R8] & [R9] is to specify functional and assurance requirements defined in the
Directive [R13], Annex III for secure signature-creation devices (SSCD) which is the target of
evaluation (TOE). Member States shall presume that there is compliance with the requirements laid
down in Annex III of the Directive [R13] when an electronic signature product is evaluated to a
Security Target (ST) that is compliant with one or both of those PPs [R8] & [R9].
Those PPs [R8] & [R9] define the security requirements of a SSCD for the generation of signaturecreation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic signatures. The TOE may implement
additional functions and security requirements e.g. for editing and displaying the data to be signed
(DTBS), but these additional functions and security requirements are not subject of those PPs [R8] &
[R9].
2.3.2
Protection Profile Refinements
No specific refinement was performed to the Protection Profile [R8] & [R9].
2.3.3
Protection Profile addition
The following threats are considered in addition to the threats listed in the PP ([R8] & [R9]):
−
T.Tracking
−
T.Skimming
−
T.Listening
These additional threats are marked in italics in this ST.
The following objective is considered in addition to the objectives listed in the PPs ([R8] & [R9]):
−
O.Privacy
This additional objective is marked in italics in this ST.
The following requirements are considered in addition to the requirements listed in the PPs ([R8] &
[R9]):
−
FCS_COP.1/TDES (to cover the secure messaging)
−
FCS_COP.1/MAC (to cover the secure messaging)
Additional requirements are marked in italics in this ST.
The assignments of the following requirements have been augmented compared to those of the PPs
[R8] & [R9], in order to cover the protection for communication in contactless mode:
−
FIA_UID.1
−
FIA_UAU.1
Augmentations are marked in italics inside the SFRs.
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Protection Profile Claims rationale
As the PPs SSCD [R8] & [R9] are compliant with CC v2.1, there is no specification about the type of
conformance required (strict or demonstrable). Therefore, the goal of this Security Target is to be
conformant to the PPs [R8] & [R9] in the sense of CC v2.
The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and those of the
PPs SSCD [R8] & [R9], to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified in each
impacted chapter. They have been recalled in the previous section.
The TOE type defined in this security target is exactly the same than the one defined in the PPs [R8]
& [R9]: an IC with embedded software, and the SSCD application conformant to the European
directive [R13].
In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the
security requirements are consistent with those of the PPs SSCD [R8] & [R9].
The security problem definition presented in chapter 3 clearly shows the additions to the security
problem statement of the PPs.
The security objectives rationale presented in chapter 4.3 clearly identifies modifications and additions
made to the rationale presented in the PPs SSCD [R8] & [R9].
Similarly, the security requirements rationale presented in chapter 6.3 has been updated with respect
to the protection profile.
All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements whose
completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale sections of the present
document.
Some assignments operations in the SFRs are determined in the PPs [R8] & [R9], some are left with
unspecified values. Assignments made by the PPs [R8] & [R9] authors are marked as bold text, while
assignments made by the ST author are marked as bold text and in italics.
2.4
CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
This security target address a smartcard TOE and therefore, the associated evaluation shall be
performed in compliance with all CC mandatory supporting documents related to smartcard
evaluations:
2.4.1
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
This document [R20] shall be used instead of the CEM [R7] when calculating the attack potential of
the successful attack performed during AVA_VAN analysis. This document impacts only the
vulnerability analysis performed by the ITSEF, and is not detailed here.
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Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices
This document [R21] shall be used in addition to the CC part 3 [R6] and to the CEM [R7]. This
document specifies the additional information to be provided by a developer, and the additional
checks to be performed by the ITSEF when performing a “composite evaluation”. This is the case for
the current TOE as the underlying IC SB23YR48 Version B is already evaluated and certified under
the reference: ANSSI-2010/02. Therefore, the following additional assurance requirements apply for
this TOE:
−
ASE_COMP.1 for the security target ;
−
ALC_COMP.1 for the life cycle support ;
−
ADV_COMP.1 for the development activity ;
−
ATE_COMP.1 for the tests activity ;
−
AVA_COMP.1 for the vulnerability assessment.
The "Statement of compatibility” required by ASE_COMP additional requirements can be found in
this security target, chapter 8.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1
ASSETS
SCD
Private key used to perform an electronic signature operation (confidentiality of the SCD must be
maintained).
SVD
Public key linked to the SCD and used to perform an electronic signature verification (integrity of the
SVD when it is exported must be maintained).
DTBS and DTBS-representation
Set of data, or its representation which is intended to be signed (Their integrity must be maintained).
VAD
PIN code or biometrics data entered by the End User to perform a signature operation (confidentiality
and authenticity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed)
RAD
Reference PIN code or biometrics authentication reference used to identify and authenticate the End
User (integrity and confidentiality of RAD must be maintained).
Signature-creation function of the SSCD using the SCD
The quality of the function must be maintained so that it can participate to the legal validity of
electronic signatures.
Electronic signature
Unforgeability of electronic signatures must be assured.
3.2
3.2.1
SUBJECTS
Subjects Definition
S.User
End user of the TOE which can be identified as S.Admin or S.Signatory
S.Admin
User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or other TOE
administrative functions.
S.Signatory
User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or
entity he represents.
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Threat agents
S.OFFCARD
Attacker. A human or a process acting on his behalf being located outside the TOE. The main goal of
the S.OFFCARD attacker is to access Application sensitive information. The attacker has a high level
potential attack and knows no secret.
3.3
THREATS
TOE threats
T.Hack_Phys
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Sig_Forgery
T.Sig_Repud
T.SVD_Forgery
T.DTBS_Forgery
T.SigF_Misuse
T.Tracking
T.Skimming
T.Listening
T.Hack_Phys
PP SSCD Type 2 threats
T.Hack_Phys
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Sig_Forgery
T.Sig_Repud
T.SVD_Forgery
T.DTBS_Forgery
T.SigF_Misuse
PP SSCD Type 3 threats Additional threats
T.Hack_Phys
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.Sig_Forgery
T.Sig_Repud
T.SVD_Forgery
T.DTBS_Forgery
T.SigF_Misuse
T.Tracking
T.Skimming
T.Listening
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security
compromises. This threat addresses all the assets.
T.SCD_Divulg
Storing, copying, and releasing of the signature-creation data
An attacker can store, copy the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can release the SCD during
generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive
Derive the signature-creation data
An attacker derives the SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or
signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a
threat against the secrecy of the SCD.
T.Sig_Forgery
Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature created by the
TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by
third parties. The signature generated by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts
possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts
employed by the TOE.
T.Sig_Repud
Repudiation of signatures
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If an attacker can successfully threaten any of the assets, then the non repudiation of the electronic
signature is compromised. The signatory is able to deny having signed data using the SCD in the
TOE under his control even if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his unrevoked certificate.
T.SVD_Forgery
Forgery of the signature-verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the TOE. This result in loss of SVD integrity in the certificate
of the signatory.
T.DTBS_Forgery
Forgery of the DTBS-representation
An attacker modifies the DTBS-representation sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS-representation used
by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intends to sign.
T.SigF_Misuse
Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory
has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack
potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
T.Tracking
Remote tracking of the TOE
An attacker tries to trace the movement of the TOE by identifying remotely the TOE by establishing or
listening a communication through the contactless communication interface.
T.Skimming
Remote unauthorized disclosure of TOE data
An attacker tries to read parts of data stored in the TOE via the contactless interface.
T.Listening
Listening of contactless communications
An attacker listens exchanges between the TOE and an authorized terminal communicating using the
contactless interface in order to get the exchanged data.
3.4
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
TOE OSP
P.CSP_QCERT
P.QSign
P.Sigy_SSCD
P.CSP_Qcert
PP SSCD Type 2 OSP
P.CSP_QCERT
P.QSign
P.Sigy_SSCD
PP SSCD Type 3 OSP
P.CSP_Qcert
P.QSign
P.Sigy_SSCD
Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the
SSCD. The qualified certificates contains at least the elements defined in Annex I of the Directive, i.e.,
inter alia the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under
sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE is evident with signatures
through the certificate or other publicly available information.
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Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with qualified electronic signatures. The
DTBS are presented to the signatory by the SCA. The qualified electronic signature is based on a
qualified certificate and is created by a SSCD.
P.Sigy_SSCD
TOE as secure signature-creation device
The TOE implements and stores the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the
signatory. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once.
3.5
ASSUMPTIONS
TOE assumptions
A.CGA
A.SCA
A.SCD_Generate
A.CGA
PP SSCD Type 2
assumptions
A.CGA
A.SCA
A.SCD_Generate
PP SSCD Type 3
assumptions
A.CGA
A.SCA
Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by
an advanced signature of the CSP.
A.SCA
Trustworthy signature-creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS-representation
of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
A.SCD_Generate
Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation
If a party other than the signatory generates the SCD/SVD-pair of a signatory, then
−
this party will use a SSCD for SCD/SVD-generation,
−
confidentiality of the SCD will be guaranteed until the SCD is under the sole control of the
signatory and
−
the SCD will not be used for signature-creation until the SCD is under the sole control of the
signatory.
−
The generation of the SCD/SVD is invoked by authorised users only
−
The SSCD Type1 ensures the authenticity of the SVD it has created an exported
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section identifies and defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment. Security
objectives reflect the stated intent and counter the identified threats, as well as comply with the
identified organisational security policies and assumptions.
4.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
TOE objectives
PP SSCD Type 2
objectives
OT.EMSEC_DESIGN
OT.EMSEC_DESIGN
OT.LIFECYCLE_SECURIT OT.LIFECYCLE_SECURI
Y
TY
OT.SCD_SECRECY
OT.SCD_SECRECY
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.Init
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sig_Secure
O.Privacy
OT.EMSEC_Design
PP SSCD Type 3
objectives
OT.EMSEC_DESIGN
OT.LIFECYCLE_SECURI
TY
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.Tamper_Resistance
Additional objectives
OT.Init
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
O.Privacy
Provide physical emanations security
Design and build the TOE in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations within
specified limits.
OT.Lifecycle_Security
Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The
TOE shall provide safe destruction techniques for the SCD in case of re-import and in case of regeneration.
OT.SCD_Secrecy
Secrecy of the signature-creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) is reasonably assured against attacks with a
high attack potential.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The TOE shall verify on
demand the correspondence between the SCD stored in the TOE and the SVD if it has been sent to
the TOE.
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD
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The TOE provides means to enable the CGA to verify the authenticity SVD that has been exported by
that TOE.
OT.Tamper_ID
Tamper detection
The TOE provides system features that detect physical tampering of a system component, and use
those features to limit security breaches.
OT.Tamper_Resistance
Tamper resistance
The TOE prevents or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
OT.SCD_Transfer
Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD
The TOE shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred between SSCDs.
OT.Init
SCD/SVD generation
The TOE provides security features to ensure that the generation of the SCD and the SVD is invoked
by authorised users only.
OT.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic
signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and cannot be
reconstructed from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the probability of equal
SCDs is negligible low.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity
The TOE shall verify that the DTBS-representation received from the SCA has not been altered in
transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE itself shall ensure that the DTBS-representation is
not altered by the TOE as well. Note, that this does not conflict with the signature-creation process
where the DTBS itself could be hashed by the TOE.
OT.Sigy_SigF
Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE provides the signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the
SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Sig_Secure
Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE generates electronic signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD
through robust encryption techniques. The SCD cannot be reconstructed using the electronic
signatures. The electronic signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed
with a high attack potential.
O.Privacy
Protection of TOE identification and of stored data
During the TOE operational use phase, when communicating using the contactless interface, the TOE
shall disclose identification data or data stored on the card only to a successfully authenticated
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terminal through a communication channel that protects data from disclosure to an unauthorized third
party.
4.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
TOE objectives for the PP
SSCD
Type
2
environment
objectives
for
the
environment
OE.SCD_SVD_CORRESP OE.SCD_SVD_CORRESP
OE.SCD_TRANSFER
OE.SCD_TRANSFER
OE.SCD_UNIQUE
OE.SCD_UNIQUE
OE.CGA_QCERT
OE.CGA_QCERT
OE.SVD_AUTH_CGA
OE.SVD_AUTH_CGA
OE.HI_VAD
OE.HI_VAD
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
PP
SSCD
objectives
environment
Type
3
for
the
OE.CGA_QCERT
OE.SVD_AUTH_CGA
OE.HI_VAD
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD. The SSCD Type1
shall verify the correspondence between the SCD sent to the TOE and the SVD sent to the CGA or
TOE.
OE.SCD_Transfer
Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred to the TOE. The SSCD
Type1 shall prevent the export of a SCD that already has been used for signature generation by the
SSCD Type2. The SCD shall be deleted from the SSCD Type1 whenever it is exported into the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The SSCD Type1 shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified
electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once and
cannot be reconstructed from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the
probability of equal SCDs is negligible low.
OE.CGA_Qcert
Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA generates qualified certificates which include inter alia
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD
The CGA verifies that the SSCD is the sender of the received SVD and the integrity of the received
SVD. The CGA verifies the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the
SVD in the qualified certificate.
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Protection of the VAD
If an external device provides the human interface for user authentication, this device will ensure
confidentiality and integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
Data intended to be signed
The SCA
4.3
4.3.1
−
generates the DTBS-representation of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the
signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
−
sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBSrepresentation by the TOE
−
attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE
Security Objectives Coverage
P.CSP_Qcert
P.QSign
OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
OE.CGA_Qcert
OE.SCD_Unique
OE.SCD_Transfer
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.Privacy
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.Init
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
X
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
X
X
OE.HI_VAD
X
X
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_Transfer
X
OT.Tamper_ID
T.Hack_Phys
T.SCD_Divulg
T.SCD_Derive
T.SVD_Forgery
T.DTBS_Forgery
T.SigF_Misuse
T.Sig_Forgery
T.Sig_Repud
T.Tracking
T.Skimming
T.Listening
A.SCD_Generat
e
A.CGA
A.SCA
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.EMSEC_Design
Table 4-1 provides the mapping of the security objectives for the TOE.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
X
X
X
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OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.HI_VAD
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
OE.CGA_Qcert
OE.SCD_Unique
OE.SCD_Transfer
X
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
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OT.Privacy
OT.SCD_Unique
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
X
OT.Init
P.Sigy_SSCD
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.EMSEC_Design
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Table 4-1: Security Environment to Security Objectives Mapping
4.3.2
Security Objectives Sufficiency
4.3.2.1
POLICIES AND SECURITY OBJECTIVE SUFFICIENCY
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates) establishes the qualified certificate for the
signatory and provides that the SVD matches the SCD that is implemented in the SSCD under sole
control of this signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by the TOE by OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp and
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp concerning the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD, in the TOE
IT environment, by OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates by the CGA, respectively.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to
sign data with qualified electronic signatures, as defined by the Directive [R13], article 5, paragraph 1.
Directive [R13], recital (15) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced signatures. The
requirement of qualified electronic signatures being based on qualified certificates is addressed by
OE.CGA_QCert. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the SCA presents the DTBS to the signatory
and sends the DTBS-representation to the TOE. OT.Sig_Secure and OT.Sigy_SigF address the
generation of advanced signatures by the TOE.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature-creation device) establishes the TOE as secure
signature-creation device of the signatory with practically unique SCD. This is addressed by
OT.Sigy_SigF ensuring that the SCD is under sole control of the signatory and OE.SCD_Unique (if
SCD is imported) or OT.SCD_Unique (if SCD/SVD pair is generated) ensuring the cryptographic
quality of the SCD/SVD pair for the qualified electronic signature. OT.Init provides that generation of
the SCD/SVD pair is restricted to authorised users.
4.3.2.2
THREATS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVE SUFFICIENCY
T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting
physical vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. Physical
attacks through the TOE interfaces or observation of TOE emanations are countered by
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OT.EMSEC_Design. OT.Tamper_ID and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by
detecting and by resisting tamper attacks.
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing and copying and releasing of the signature-creation data) addresses the
threat against the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the
TOE, as expressed in the Directive [R13], recital (18). This threat is countered by OT.SCD_Secrecy
which assures the secrecy of the SCD used for signature generation. OT.SCD_Transfer and
OE.SCD_Transfer ensure the confidentiality of the SCD transferred between SSCDs.
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature-creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known
data produced by the TOE. This threat is countered by OE.SCD_Unique (if SCD is imported) or by
OT.SCD_Unique (if SCD/SVD pair is generated) that provides cryptographic secure generation of the
SCD/SVD-pair. OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographic secure electronic signatures.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS-representation) addresses the threat arising from
modifications of the DTBS-representation sent to the TOE for signing which then does not correspond
to the DTBS-representation corresponding to the DTBS the signatory intends to sign. The TOE
counters this threat by the means of OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE by verifying the integrity of the DTBSrepresentation. The TOE IT environment addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of
OE.SCA_Data_Indent.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature-creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of
misuse of the TOE signature-creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create
SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign, as required by the Directive [R13], Annex III,
paragraph 1, literal (c). This threat is addressed by the OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function
for the legitimate signatory only), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed),
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of the DTBS-representation integrity), and OE.HI_VAD
(Protection of the VAD) as follows: OT.Sigy_SigF ensures that the TOE provides the signaturegeneration function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.SCA_Data_Intend ensures that the SCA
sends the DTBS-representation only for data the signatory intends to sign. The combination of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE and OE.SCA_Data_Intend counters the misuse of the signature generation
function by means of manipulation of the channel between the SCA and the TOE. If the SCA provides
the human interface for the user authentication, OE.HI_VAD provides confidentiality and integrity of
the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed.
T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the
electronic signature. This threat is in general addressed by OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of
the electronic signature), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (SCA sends representation of data intended to be
signed), OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
(Correspondence between SVD and SCD), OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the
SVD), OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of
the signature-creation data), OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD),
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection),
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) and OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), as
follows: OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust encryption techniques that the signed data and
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the electronic signature are securely linked together. OE.SCA_Data_Intend provides that the methods
used by the SCA (and therefore by the verifier) for the generation of the DTBS-representation is
appropriate for the cryptographic methods employed to generate the electronic signature. The
combination
of
OE.CGA_QCert,
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE,
and
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA provides the integrity and authenticity of the SVD that is used by the signature
verification process. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.SCD_Transfer, OT.EMSEC_Design,
OT.Tamper_ID, OT.Tamper_Resistance, and OT.Lifecycle_Security ensure the confidentiality of the
SCD implemented in the signatory's SSCD and thus prevent forgery of the electronic signature by
means of knowledge of the SCD.
T.Sig_Repud (Repudiation of electronic signatures) deals with the repudiation of signed data by
the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his
un-revoked certificate. This threat is in general addressed by OE.CGA_Qcert (Generation of qualified
certificates), OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD), OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA
proves the authenticity of the SVD), OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and
SCD), OE_SCD_Unique or OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data),
OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD), OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of the
signature-creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security), OT.Tamper_ID
(Tamper detection), OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance), OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle
security), OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only),
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature), OE.SCA_Data_Intend (SCA
sends representation of data intended to be signed) and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of the
DTBS-representation integrity). OE.CGA_QCert ensures qualified certificates which allow to identify
the signatory and thus to extract the SVD of the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert, OT.SVD_Auth_TOE and
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA ensure the integrity of the SVD. OE.CGA_QCert and OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
ensure that the SVD in the certificate correspond to the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the
signatory. OE_SCD_Unique or OT.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically
occur just once. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Transfer, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Tamper_ID,
OT.Tamper_Resistance, OT.EMSEC_Design, and OT.Lifecycle_Security ensure the confidentiality of
the SCD implemented in the signatory's SSCD. OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may
use the TOE for signature generation. OT.Sig_Secure ensures by means of robust cryptographic
techniques that valid electronic signatures may only be generated by employing the SCD
corresponding to the SVD that is used for signature verification and only for the signed data.
OE.SCA_Data_Intend and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the TOE generates electronic
signatures only for DTBS-representations which the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature-verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD
exported by the TOE to the CGA for the generation of the certificate. T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form to the CGA, as
well as by OE.SVD_Auth_CGA which provides verification of SVD authenticity by the CGA.
T.Tracking (Remote tracking of the TOE) is met by O.Privacy, as O.Privacy does not allow the TOE
to identify itself to an unknown terminal, therefore an attacker will not be able to identify and track a
dedicated TOE.
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T.Skimming (Remote unauthorized disclosure of TOE data) is met by O.Privacy because
O.Privacy forbids to disclose data stored on the TOE to an unauthorized terminal, therefore an
attacker will not be able to access to data stored on the TOE.
T.Listening (Listening of contactless communications) is met by O. Privacy because O.Privacy
protects data exchanged between the TOE and an authorized terminal from disclosure to an
unauthorized third party.
4.3.2.3
ASSUMPTIONS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVE SUFFICIENCY
A.SCD_Generate (Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation) establishes a trustworthy SCD/SVD pair.
This requires that the SCD must be unique, objective met by OE.SCD_Unique, that the SCD and the
SVD must correspond, objective met by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp. The secrecy of the SCD must be
maintained while it is transferred to the TOE before being deleted, OE.SCD_Transfer.
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature-creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA
according to the generation of DTBS-representation. This is addressed by OE.SCA_Data_Intend
(Data intended to be signed) which ensures that the SCA generates the DTBS-representation of the
data that has been presented to the signatory as DTBS and which the signatory intends to sign in a
form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.
A.CGA (Trustworthy certification-generation application) establishes the protection of the
authenticity of the signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced signature
of the CSP by means of the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified
certificates) which ensures the generation of qualified certificates and by OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA
proves the authenticity of the SVD) which ensures the verification of the integrity of the received SVD
and the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the
signatory.
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
The additional family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent
attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable
physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic
radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This
family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE Emanation ------------- 1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation has two constituents:
−
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
−
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no action defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE Emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types
of user data].
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No other components.
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6 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
This chapter gives the security functional requirements and the security assurance requirements for
the TOE and the environment.
Security functional requirements components given in section 6.1.1, excepting FPT_EMSEC.1 which
is explicitly stated, are drawn from Common Criteria part 2 [R5]. Some security functional
requirements represent extensions to [R5].
Operations for assignment, selection and refinement have been made. Some operations in the SFRs
are determined in the PPs [R8] & [R9], some are let with unspecified values. Assignments made by
the PPs [R8] & [R9] authors are marked as bold text, while assignments made by the ST author are
marked as bold text and in italics.
The TOE security assurance requirements statement given in section 6.2 is drawn from the security
assurance components from Common Criteria part 3 [R6].
Section 6.1.3 identifies the IT security requirements that are to be met by the IT environment of the
TOE.
The non-IT environment is described in section 6.1.4.
6.1
6.1.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
TOE Security Functional Requirements
TOE SFR
PP SSCD type 2 SFR
PP SSCD type 3 SFR
Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1
Additional SFR
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
USER DATA PROTECTION
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ETC.1
FDP_ETC.1
FDP_ETC.1
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_ITC.1
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2
FDP_SDI.2
FDP_SDI.2
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_AFL.1
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TOE SFR
PP SSCD type 2 SFR
PP SSCD type 3 SFR
FIA_ATD.1
Additional SFR
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
SECURITY MANAGEMENT
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
Protection of the TSF
FPT_AMT.1
FPT_AMT.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1
TRUSTED PATHS/CHANNELS
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1
FTP_TRP.1
FTP_TRP.1
FTP_TRP.1
FPT_AMT.1 is removed according to Common Criteria 3.1 R2 [R4].
6.1.1.1
6.1.1.1.1
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
Assignment
Cryptographic key generation algorithm: [R15], [R16], [R19]
Cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584
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and 4096 bits for RSA, and 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 for Elliptic
curves
6.1.1.1.2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DESTRUCTION (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in case of re-importation of the
SCD in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method] that meets the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
Assignment
Cryptographic key destruction method: Key overwriting
List of standards: None
Application note 2: The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed on demand of the Signatory or
Administrator. The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD is re-imported into the TOE.
The destruction of the SCD is mandatory before the SCD/SVD pair is re-generated by the TOE.
6.1.1.1.3
CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 /
CORRESP
The TSF shall perform SCD / SVD correspondence verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
Assignments
Cryptographic algorithms:
‰
‰
‰
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-1 [R22]
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 [R22]
ISO15946 ECDSA
Cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560 or 3072 bits
for RSA, and 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 for Elliptic curves
FCS_COP.1/SIGNING
FCS_COP.1.1 /
SIGNING
Cryptographic operation
The TSF shall perform digital signature-generation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that
meet the following: List of approved algorithms and parameters.
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Cryptographic algorithms:
‰
‰
‰
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-1 [R22]
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 [R22]
ISO15946 ECDSA
Cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792 or 2048, 2560 or 3072
bits for RSA, and 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 for Elliptic curves
FCS_COP.1/TDES
Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
FCS_COP.1.1 / TDES
The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment
List of cryptographic operations: secure messaging – encryption and
decryption
Cryptographic algorithm: Triple-DES in CBC mode
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits
List of standards: ANSI X9.52
FCS_COP.1/MAC
Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FCS_COP.1.1 / MAC
The TSF shall perform [assignment: list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment
List
of cryptographic operations: secure
messaging – message
authentication code
Cryptographic algorithm: Retail MAC
Cryptographic key sizes: 112 bits
List of standards: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2)
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USER DATA PROTECTION (FDP)
6.1.1.2.1
SUBSET ACCESS CONTROL (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 / SVD
Transfer SFP
Subset access control
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP on import and on export of
SVD by User.
Application note 3: FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE is to import the
SVD from a SSCD Type1 so it will be exported to the CGA for certification.
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 / SCD
Import SFP
Subset access control
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP on import of SCD by User.
FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 /
Personalisation SFP
Subset access control
The TSF shall enforce the Personalisation SFP on creation of RAD by
Administrator.
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 /
Signature-creation
SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP on
1.
sending of DTBS-representation by SCA,
2.
signing of DTBS-representation by Signatory.
FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 /
Initialisation SFP
6.1.1.2.2
Subset access control
Subset access control
The TSF shall enforce the Initialisation SFP on generation of SCD/SVD
pair by User.
SECURITY ATTRIBUTE BASED ACCESS CONTROL (FDP_ACF.1)
The security attributes for the user, TOE components and related status are:
User, subject or object the
Attribute
attribute is associated with
General attribute
User
Role
Initialisation attribute group
User
SCD / SVD management
SCD
secure SCD import allowed
Signature-creation attribute group
SCD
SCD operational
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Status
Administrator, Signatory
authorised, not authorised
no, yes
no, yes
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DTBS
sent by an authorised SCA
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no, yes
Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 / SVD
Transfer SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on General
attribute.
FDP_ACF.1.2 / SVD
Transfer SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or to
“Signatory” is allowed to export SVD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 / SVD
Transfer SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 / SVD
Transfer SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule: none.
Application note 4: FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE holds the SVD
and the SVD is exported to the CGA for certification.
FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP
Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 / SCD
Import SFP
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on General
attribute and Initialisation attribute group.
FDP_ACF.1.2 / SCD
Import SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or to
“Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD management”
set to “authorised” is allowed to import SCD if the security attribute
“secure SCD import allowed” is set to “yes”.
FDP_ACF.1.3 / SCD
Import SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
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Import SFP
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The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
(a) The user with the security attribute “role” set to
“Administrator” or to “Signatory” and with the security
attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “not authorised” is
not allowed to import SCD if the security attribute “secure SCD
import allowed” is set to “yes”.
(b) The user with the security attribute “role” set to
“Administrator” or to “Signatory” and with the security
attribute “SCD / SVD management” set to “authorised” is not
allowed to import SCD if the security attribute “secure SCD
import allowed” is set to “no”.
FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP
Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 /
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Personalisation SFP to objects based on
General attribute.
FDP_ACF.1.2 /
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” is allowed
to create the RAD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 /
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 /
Personalisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule: none.
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation SFP
Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 /
Signature-creation
SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to objects based on
General attribute and Signature-creation attribute group.
FDP_ACF.1.2 /
Signature-creation
SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is allowed to
create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by an authorised SCA with
SCD by the Signatory which security attribute “SCD operational” is set
to “yes”.
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FDP_ACF.1.3 /
Signature-creation
SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 /
Signature-creation
SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
(a) User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is
not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS which is
not sent by an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory
which security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”.
(b) User with the security attribute “role” set to “Signatory” is
not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS sent by
an authorised SCA with SCD by the Signatory which security
attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”.
FDP_ACF.1/Initialisation SFP
Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 /
Initialisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the Initialisation SFP to objects based on General
attribute and Initialisation attribute.
FDP_ACF.1.2 /
Initialisation SFP
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or set
to “Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
management” set to “authorised” is allowed to generate SCD/SVD
pair.
FDP_ACF.1.3 /
Initialisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 /
Initialisation SFP
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
The user with the security attribute “role” set to “Administrator” or set
to “Signatory” and with the security attribute “SCD / SVD
management” set to “not authorised” is not allowed to generate
SCD/SVD pair.
6.1.1.2.3
EXPORT OF USER DATA WITHOUT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES (FDP_ETC.1)
FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer
Export of user data without security attributes
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FDP_ETC.1.1 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer when exporting user data,
controlled under the SFP(s), outside of the TOE.
FDP_ETC.1.2 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall export the user data without the user data's associated
security attributes.
Application note 5: FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer SFP will be required only, if the TOE holds the SVD
and the SVD is exported to the CGA for certification.
6.1.1.2.4
IMPORT OF USER DATA WITHOUT SECURITY ATTRIBUTES (FDP_ITC.1)
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1 / SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2 / SCD
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3 / SCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: SCD shall be sent by an
authorised SSCD.
Application note 6: A SSCD of Type 1 is authorised to send SCD to a SSCD of Type 2, if it is
designated to generate the SCD for this SSCD of Type 2 and to export the SCD for import into this
SSCD of Type 2. Authorised SSCD of Type 1 are able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD of
Type 2 for SCD transfer as required by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCD export.
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS
Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1 / DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2 / DTBS
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3 / DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: DTBS-representation
shall be sent by an authorised SCA.
Application note 7: A SCA is authorised to send the DTBS-representation if it is actually used by the
Signatory to create an electronic signature and able to establish a trusted channel to the SSCD as
required by FTP_ITC.1.3/SCA DTBS.
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6.1.1.2.5
SUBSET RESIDUAL INFORMATION PROTECTION (FDP_RIP.1)
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1.1
6.1.1.2.6
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The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the
following objects: SCD, VAD, RAD.
STORED DATA INTEGRITY MONITORING AND ACTION (FDP_SDI.2)
The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity checked
persistent stored data":
1. SCD
2. RAD
3. SVD (if persistent stored by TOE).
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1 /
Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF
for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity
checked persistent stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2 /
Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
1.
prohibit the use of the altered data
2.
inform the Signatory about integrity error.
The DTBS-representation temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked
stored data":
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FDP_SDI.2.1 / DTBS
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF
for integrity error on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity
checked stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2 / DTBS
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall
6.1.1.2.7
1.
prohibit the use of the altered data
2.
inform the Signatory about integrity error.
BASIC DATA EXCHANGE CONFIDENTIALITY (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1/Receiver
FDP_UCT.1.1 /
Basic data exchange confidentiality
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to be able to receive objects in
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6.1.1.2.8
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a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
DATA EXCHANGE INTEGRITY (FDP_UIT.1)
SVD Transfer SFP will be required only if the TOE holds the SVD and the SVD is exported to the CGA
for certification.
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer
Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to be able to transmit user
data in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification and insertion has occurred.
FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS
Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 / TOE
DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to be able to receive
the DTBS-representation in a manner protected from modification,
deletion and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 / TOE
DTBS
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion and insertion has occurred.
6.1.1.3
IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA)
6.1.1.3.1
AUTHENTICATION FAILURE HANDLING (FIA_AFL.1)
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [assignment: number] unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to consecutive failed authentication
attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met or surpassed, the TSF shall block RAD.
Assignment
Number: 3
6.1.1.3.2
FIA_ATD.1
USER ATTRIBUTE DEFINITION (FIA_ATD.1)
User attribute definition
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6.1.1.3.3
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The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users: RAD.
TIMING OF AUTHENTICATION (FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
1.
Identification of the user by means of TSF required by
FIA_UID.1.
2.
Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD of
Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD import.
3.
Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
4.
Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE
by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import.
5.
Establishing a trusted channel with an authorized terminal
through the contactless interface
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 8: “Local user” mentioned in component FIA_UAU.1.1 is the user using the trusted
path provided between the SGA in the TOE environment and the TOE as indicated by
FTP_TRP.1/SCA and FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
6.1.1.3.4
TIMING OF IDENTIFICATION (FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1.1
Timing of identification
The TSF shall allow
1. Establishing a trusted channel between the TOE and a SSCD of
Type 1 by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/SCD import.
2. Establishing a trusted path between local user and the TOE by
means of TSF required by FTP_TRP.1/TOE.
3. Establishing a trusted channel between the SCA and the TOE
by means of TSF required by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS import
4. Establishing a trusted channel with an authorized terminal
through the contactless interface
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
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FIA_UID.1.2
6.1.1.4
6.1.1.4.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)
MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS BEHAVIOUR (FMT_MOF.1)
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MOF.1.1
6.1.1.4.2
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Management of security functions behaviour
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the signature-creation function
to Signatory.
MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY ATTRIBUTES (FMT_MSA.1)
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.1.1 /
Administrator
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP and the Initialisation SFP to
restrict the ability to modify [assignment: other operations] the security
attributes SCD / SVD management and secure SCD import allowed to
Administrator.
Assignment
Other operations: none
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.1.1 /
Signatory
6.1.1.4.3
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the ability to
modify the security attributes SCD operational to Signatory.
SECURE SECURITY ATTRIBUTES (FMT_MSA.2)
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.2.1
6.1.1.4.4
Management of security attributes
Secure security attributes
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for security
attributes.
STATIC ATTRIBUTE INITIALISATION (FMT_MSA.3)
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3.1
Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP, Initialisation SFP and
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Signature-creation SFP to provide restrictive default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
Refinement
The security attribute of the SCD “SCD operational” is set to “no” after
import of the SCD.
The security attribute of the SCD “SCD operational” is set to “no” after
generation of the SCD.
FMT_MSA.3.2
6.1.1.4.5
The TSF shall allow the Administrator to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify [assignment: other
operations] the RAD to Signatory.
Assignment
Other operations: none
6.1.1.4.6
SECURITY ROLES (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles Administrator and Signatory.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.2
Protection of the TSF (FPT)
6.1.2.1
ABSTRACT MACHINE TESTING (FPT_AMT.1)
FPT_AMT.1
FPT_AMT.1.1
Abstract machine testing
The TSF shall run a suite of tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of an authorised
user, other conditions] to demonstrate the correct operation of the
security assumptions provided by the abstract machine that underlies the
TSF.
Selection
during initial start-up
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TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC.1)
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE Emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to RAD and SCD.
Assignment
Types of emissions: side channel
Specified limits: state of the art
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
RAD and SCD.
Assignment
Type of users: any user
Type of connection: external interface
Application note 9: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be
observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may origin from internal operation of the TOE or may origin
by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of
measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the TOE.
Examples of measurable phenomena are variations in the power consumption, the timing of
transitions of internal states, electromagnetic radiation due to internal operation, radio emission.
Due to the heterogeneous nature of the technologies that may cause such emanations, evaluation
against state-of-the-art attacks applicable to the technologies employed by the TOE is assumed.
Examples of such attacks are, but are not limited to, evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc.
6.1.2.3
FAILURE WITH PRESERVATION OF SECURE STATE (FPT_FLS.1)
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur: [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].
Assignment
List of types of failures in the TSF:
(1) Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore
a malfunction could occur,
(2) Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1
‰
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PASSIVE DETECTION OF PHYSICAL ATTACK (FPT_PHP.1)
FPT_PHP.1
Passive detection of physical attack
FPT_PHP.1.1
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that
might compromise the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical
tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
6.1.2.5
RESISTANCE TO PHYSICAL ATTACK (FPT_PHP.3)
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_PHP.3.1
Resistance to physical attack
The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically
such that the SFR are always enforced.
‰
Assignment
Physical tampering scenarios: physical manipulation and physical
probing
List of TSF devices/elements: TSF
Application note 10: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the
TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here
− assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
− countermeasures are provided at any time.
6.1.2.6
TSF TESTING (FPT_TST.1)
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1.1
TSF testing
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Selection
during initial start-up
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FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
6.1.2.7
TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS (FTP)
6.1.2.7.1
INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / SCD
Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / SCD
Import
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product]
to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
Selection
the remote trusted IT product
FTP_ITC.1.3 / SCD
Import
The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for SCD import.
Refinement
The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD of type 1.
FTP_ITC.1/ SVD Transfer
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product]
to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
Selection
the remote trusted IT product
FTP_ITC.1.3 / SVD
Transfer
The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for transfer of SVD.
Refinement
The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD of type 1 for SVD
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import and the CGA for the SVD export.
Application note 11: FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer will be required only, if the TOE is to import the SVD
from a SSCD Type1 so it will be exported to the CGA for certification.
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / DTBS
Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / DTBS
Import
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product]
to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
Selection
SCA
FTP_ITC.1.3 / DTBS
Import
The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for signing DTBS-representation.
Refinement
The mentioned remote trusted IT product is the SCA.
6.1.2.7.2
TRUSTED PATH (FTP_TRP.1)
The trusted path between the TOE and the SCA will be required only if the human interface for user
authentication is not provided by the TOE itself but by the SCA.
FTP_TRP.1/TOE
Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 / TOE
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and local users
that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 / TOE
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
Selection
local users
FTP_TRP.1.3 / TOE
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user
authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is
required]].
Selection
initial user authentication
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Security Functional Requirements for the IT Environment
6.1.3.1
6.1.3.1.1
SIGNATURE KEY GENERATION (SSCD TYPE1)
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
Assignment
Cryptographic key generation algorithm: [R15], [R16], [R19]
Cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560, 3072, 3584
and 4096 bits for RSA, and 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 for Elliptic
curves
6.1.3.1.2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DESTRUCTION (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1/Type1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Assignment
Cryptographic key generation algorithm: Key overwriting
List of standards: None
Application note 12: The cryptographic key SCD will be destroyed automatically after export.
6.1.3.1.3
CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FCS_COP.1.1 /
CORRESP
Cryptographic operation
The TSF shall perform SCD / SVD correspondence verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
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Assignment
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Cryptographic algorithm: one of the following:
‰
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-1 [R22]
‰
RSASSA PKCS1-v1_5 SHA-256 [R22]
‰
ISO15946 ECDSA
Cryptographic key sizes: 1024, 1280, 1536, 1792, 2048, 2560 or 3072 bits
for RSA, and 192, 224, 256, 384 and 521 for Elliptic curves
6.1.3.1.4
SUBSET ACCESS CONTROL (FDP_ACC.1)
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Export SFP
FDP_ACC.1.1 / SCD
Export SFP
6.1.3.1.5
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Export SFP on export of SCD by
Administrator.
BASIC DATA EXCHANGE CONFIDENTIALITY (FDP_UCT.1)
FDP_UCT.1/Sender
FDP_UCT.1.1 /
Sender
6.1.3.1.6
Subset access control
Basic data exchange confidentiality
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Export SFP to be able to transmit objects
in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Export
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / SCD
Export
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / SCD
Export
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product]
to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
Selection
The TSF (the SSCD type 1)
FTP_ITC.1.3 / SCD
Export
The TSF or the SSCD type2 shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for SCD Export.
Refinement
The mentioned remote trusted IT product is a SSCD of type 2.
Application note 13: If the TOE exports the SVD to a SSCD Type 2 and the SSCD Type 2 holds the
SVD then the trusted channel between the TOE and the SSCD type 2 will be required .
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CERTIFICATION GENERATION APPLICATION (CGA)
6.1.3.2.1
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY DISTRIBUTION (FCS_CKM.2)
FCS_CKM.2/CGA Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.2.1 / CGA
6.1.3.2.2
The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method qualified certificate that meets the
following: List of approved algorithms and parameters.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ACCESS (FCS_CKM.3)
FCS_CKM.3/CGA Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.3.1 / CGA
The TSF shall perform import the SVD in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key access method import through a secure channel that
meets the following: [assignment: list of standards].
Assignment
List of standards: [R15], [R16]
6.1.3.2.3
DATA EXCHANGE INTEGRITY (FDP_UIT.1)
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Import
Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 / SVD
Import
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Import SFP to be able to receive user data
in a manner protected from modification and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 / SVD
Import
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification and insertion has occurred.
6.1.3.2.4
INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/ SVD Import
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / SVD
Import
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / SVD
Import
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, the remote trusted IT product]
to initiate communication via the trusted channel.
Selection
The TSF (the CGA)
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Import
6.1.3.3
6.1.3.3.1
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The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted
channel for import of SVD.
SIGNATURE CREATION APPLICATION (SCA)
CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP.1)
FCS_COP.1/SCA Hash
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 / SCA
Hash
The TSF shall perform hashing the DTBS in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: List of approved
algorithms and parameters.
Assignment
Cryptographic algorithm: One of the following:
6.1.3.3.2
‰
SHA-1
‰
SHA-256
DATA EXCHANGE INTEGRITY (FDP_UIT.1)
FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS
Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 / SCA
DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to be able to transmit
user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion and insertion
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 / SSC
DTBS
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion and insertion has occurred.
6.1.3.3.3
INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (FTP_ITC.1)
FTP_ITC.1/ SCA DTBS
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1 / SCA
DTBS
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and a
remote trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection
of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 / SCA
DTBS
The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 / SCA
The TSF or the remote trusted IT shall initiate communication via the trusted
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6.1.3.3.4
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channel for signing DTBS-representation by means of the SSCD.
TRUSTED PATH (FTP_TRP.1)
The trusted path between the TOE and the SCA will be required only if the human interface for user
authentication is not provided by the TOE itself but by the SCA.
FTP_TRP.1/SCA
Trusted path
FTP_TRP.1.1 / SCA
The TSF shall provide a communication path between itself and local users
that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_TRP.1.2 / SCA
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, local users] to initiate
communication via the trusted path.
Selection
The TSF (the SCA)
FTP_TRP.1.3 / SCA
The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for [selection: initial user
authentication, [assignment: other services for which trusted path is
required]].
Selection
6.1.4
initial user authentication
Security Functional Requirements for the Non-IT Environment
R.Administrator_Guide
Application of Administrator Guidance
The implementation of the requirements of the Directive, ANNEX II “Requirements for certificationservice-providers issuing qualified certificates”, literal (e), stipulates employees of the CSP or other
relevant entities to follow the administrator guidance provided for the TOE. Appropriate supervision of
the CSP or other relevant entities shall ensures the ongoing compliance.
R.Sigy_Guide
Application of User Guidance
The SCP implementation of the requirements of the Directive, ANNEX II “Requirements for
certification-service-providers issuing qualified certificates”, literal (k), stipulates the signatory to follow
the user guidance provided for the TOE.
R.Sigy_Name
Signatory’s name in the Qualified Certificate
The CSP shall verify the identity of the person to which a qualified certificate is issued according to
the Directive [R13], ANNEX II “Requirements for certification-service-providers issuing qualified
certificates”, literal (d). The CSP shall verify that this person holds the SSCD which implements and
stores the SCD corresponding to the SVD to be included in the qualified certificate.
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SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS
The assurance level specified in the present security target and in its documentation is EAL 5
augmented by the following components defined in CC part 3 [R6]:
−
ALC_DVS.2,
−
AVA_VAN.5.
Table 6-1 list all the Assurance Requirements applicable.
Assurance
Class
ADV
AGD
ALC
ATE
AVA
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_IMP.1, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1 ALC_TAT.2
ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.1, ATE_IND.2
AVA_ VAN.5
Table 6-1
As there is no specific operation or refinement on the security assurance requirements, they are not
detailed in this security target.
6.2.1
Rationale for Assurance Level 5 Augmented
The assurance level for this ST is EAL5+ augmented. The TOE is semiformally designed and tested.
EAL5+ allows a developer to attain a reasonably high assurance level without the need for highly
specialized processes and practices. The TOE is intended to operate in open environments, where
attackers can easily exploit vulnerabilities. According to the usage of the TOE, it represents a
significant value to perform attacks. In some malicious usages, of the TOE the statistical or
probabilistic mechanisms in the TOE, for instance, may be subjected to analysis and attack in the
normal course of operation. This level seems to be the reasonable minimum level for card hosting
sensitive operations.
Augmentation results from the selection of:
ALC_DVS.2
Life-cycle support - Development security – Sufficiency of security measures
The TOE shall be protected in confidentiality and integrity during its development to meet the security
objective OT.Lifecycle_Security. ALC_DVS.2 has no dependency.
AVA_VAN.5
Vulnerability Assessment - Vulnerability Analysis – Advanced Methodical
Vulnerability Analysis
The TOE shall be shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF and OT.Sig_Secure. AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
ADV_ARC.1
Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2
Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_IMP.1
Implementation representation of the TSF
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ADV_TDS.3
Basic modular design
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
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All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5+ assurance package.
6.2.2
Rationale for TOE assurance requirements conformance to PPs [R8] & [R9]
The set of assurance requirements has been chosen among component defined in CC v3.1 part 3, in
a manner that ensures that all assurance requirements listed in PPs [R8] & [R9] and defined in CC
v2.3 part 3 are fulfilled or exceeded.
[R8] & [R9] CC v2
assurance
requirements
ADV_FSP.2
TOE CC v3
assurance
requirements
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_HLD.2
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_LLD.1
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_RCR.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_SPM.1
ASE
AGD_ADM.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_USR.1
AGD_OPE.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.2
ADO_DEL.2
ALC_DEL.1
Rationale
Both SARs require to provide functional specifications of
the TOE. CC v3 ADV_FSP.5 additionally requires those
specifications to be written using a semi formal style.
This SAR is an augmentation to the PPs SARs.
The CC v3 ADV_TDS.4 requires the developer to provide
a description of the sub-systems, which corresponds to the
HLD description required by CC v2 ADV_HLD.2. CC v3
ADV_TDS.4 additionally requires this description to be
written using a semi formal style.
Both SARs require to provide the implementation
representation of the TSF to the evaluator for analysis.
The CC v3 ADV_TDS.4 requires the developer to provide
a description of the modules, which corresponds to the
LLD description required by CC v2 ADV_LLD.1. CC v3
ADV_TDS.4 additionally requires this description to be
written using a semi formal style.
In CC v2, a specific SAR requires the developer to provide
evidence at each description level of the TSF
representation that the TSF is correctly and completely
implemented, whereas in CC v3 the requirement for this
rationale is done in each corresponding SAR.
The informal SPM is given by the collection of Security
Objectives in the ST.
All available functions and interfaces with their use
conditions, including the administration ones, are required
by CC v3 AGD_OPE.1 to be described.
All available functions and interfaces with their use
conditions, including the user non-administration ones, are
required by CC v3 AGD_OPE.1 to be described.
CC v3 ALC_DVS.1 is equivalent to CC v2 ALC_DVS.1. So
CC v3 ALC_DVS.2 exceeds CC v2 ALC_DVS.1.
CC v3 ALC_ LCD.1 is equal to CC v2 ALC_ LCD.1.
CC v3 ALC_ TAT.2 is equivalent to CC v2 ALC_TAT.2,
therefore the CC v2 ALC_TAT.1 is met.
CC v3 ALC_ DEL.1 is equivalent to CC v2 ADO_DEL.1.
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[R8] & [R9] CC v2
assurance
requirements
6.3
6.3.1
TOE CC v3
assurance
requirements
AGD_PRE.1
ADO_IGS.1
AGD_PRE.1
ACM_AUT.1
ALC_CMC.4
ACM_CAP.4
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.5
ACM_SCP.2
ALC_CMS.5
ATE_COV.2
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA_MSU.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
AVA_SOF.1
AVA_ VAN.5
AVA_VLA.4
AVA_ VAN.5
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Rationale
AGD_PRE.1 by requiring secure acceptance procedures
allows to detect any modification during delivery if any.
CC v3 AGD_PRE.1 requires secure procedures for
installation as well as CC v2 ADO_IGS.1
As the TOE is a smart card, the whole installation,
generation and start-up of the TOE consist in powering the
TOE and in verifying the value of the ATR.
CC v3 ALC_CMC requires at least as much as CC v2
ACM_AUT.1: use of a CM system, CM plan and
documentation, automated measures for authorizing
changes, automated means for TOE generation.
CC v3 ALC_CMC requires: unique TOE reference, use of a
CM system, CM documentation, measures for authorizing
changes, TOE generation, new item creation as well as CC
v2 ACM_CAP.4.
Other requirements of CC v2 ACM_CAP.4 are enforced by
ALC_CMS.5: configuration list, unique identification for
each item.
CC v3 ALC_CMS.5 requires to provide a configuration list,
including implementation representation, security flaws and
evaluation evidence required by the SARs, as it is
demanded by CC v2 ACM_SCP.2.
CC v3 ATE_COV.2 is equivalent to CC v2 ATE_COV.2 at
the exception that the coverage is demonstrated using
TSFI instead of TSF.
Both SARs define the depth at which the analysis of the
testing coverage must be done. CC v3 ATE_DPT.3
requires the coverage to be demonstrated at the subsystem and module level, while CC v2 ATE_DPT.1 require
the demonstration to be at the sub-system level (HLD)
only.
CC v3 ATE_FUN.1 is equivalent to CC v2 ATE_FUN.1.
CC v3 ATE_IND.2 is equivalent to CC v2 ATE_IND.2.
The analysis of misuse of the guidances required by CC v2
AVA_MSU.3 is done through CC v3 AGD_OPE.1 and
AGD_PRE.1.
The analysis if the strength of the security functionality is
done trough the TOE vulnerability analysis required by
AVA_VAN.5.
Both SARs require that the vulnerability testing shall be
performed with a high level attack potential.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
Security Requirement Coverage
The following tables in sub-section “Security Requirement Coverage” provide the mapping of the
security requirements for the TOE and for the environment.
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FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FCS_COP.1/SIGNING
FCS_COP.1/TDES
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-Creation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-Creation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP
FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer
FDP_ITC.1.DTBS
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_UCT.1/Receiver
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer
FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_TST.1
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import
FTP_TRP.1/TOE
X
X
X
X
O.Privacy
OT.SCD_Transfer
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.SCD_Unique
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OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Init
OT.lifecycle_Security
TOE SFR / TOE Security Objectives
OT.EMSEC_Design
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 6.2: Functional Requirements to TOE Security Objective Mapping
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FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Export SFP
FDP_UCT.1/Sender
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Export
FCS_CKM.2/CGA
FCS_CKM.3/CGA
FCS_COP.1/SCA Hash
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Import
FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS
FTP_TRP.1/SCA
R.Sigy_Name
X
OE.SCD_Unique
OE.SCD_Transfer
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OE.SVD_Auth_CGA
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OE.SCA_Data_Intend
OE.HI_VAD
Environment Security Requirements / Environment Security Objectives
OE.CGA_Qcert
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 6.3: IT Environment Functional requirement to Environment Security Objective Mapping
Objectives
Requirements
OT.Lifecycle_Security
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2, ALC_DEL.1, AGD_PRE.1
ADV_IMP.1, AVA_VAN.5
AGD_PRE.1, AGD_OPE.1, AVA_VAN.5
AVA_VAN.5
ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1, ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5, ADV_IMP.1,
ADV_TDS.4, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2, ATE_DPT.3, ATE_FUN.1,
ATE_IND.2
Security objectives
Table 6.4: Assurance Requirement to Security Objective Mapping
6.3.2
Security Requirements Sufficiency
6.3.2.1
TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SUFFICIENCY
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information
is emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMSEC.1.
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the security assurance requirements
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2, ALC_DEL.1, and AGD_PRE.1 that ensure the lifecycle
security during the development, configuration and delivery phases of the TOE. The test functions
FPT_TST.1 and FPT_AMT.1 provide failure detection throughout the lifecycle. FCS_CKM.4 provides
secure destruction of the SCD to conclude the operational usage of the TOE as SSCD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature-creation data) counters that, with reference to recital (18)
of the Directive, storage or copying of SCD causes a threat to the legal validity of electronic
signatures. When SCD/SVD pair is generated, OT.SCD_Secrecy is provided by the security
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functionalities specified by FDP_ACC.1/INITIALISATION SFP and FDP_ACF.1/INITIALISATION SFP
that ensure that only authorised user can initialise the TOE and create or load the SCD. The
authentication
and
access
management
functions
specified
by
FMT_MOF.1,
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.3 and FMT_SMR.1 ensure that only the signatory can use the
SCD and thus avoid that an attacker may gain information on it.
The security functionalities specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual information
on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that destruction of SCD
leaves no residual information. Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of
SCD by cryptographic attacks using the publicly known SVD.
The security functionalities specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that no critical data is modified
which could alter the efficiency of the security functionalities or leak information of the SCD.
FPT_AMT.1 and FPT_FLS.1 test the working conditions of the TOE and guarantee a secure state
when integrity is violated and thus assure that the specified security functionalities are operational. An
example where compromising error conditions are countered by FPT_FLS is differential fault analysis
(DFA).
The assurance requirements ADV_IMP.1 by requesting evaluation of the TOE implementation and
AVA_VAN.5 by requesting that the TOE resists attacks with a high attack potential assure that the
security functionalities are efficient.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. When SCD/SVD pair is generated, this is provided
by the algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security
functionalities specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the keys are not modified, so to retain
the correspondence. Cryptographic correspondence is provided by FCS_COP.1/CORRESP.
OT.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD) is provided by FDP_ITC.1/SCD Import
and FDP_UCT.1/Receiver that ensure that a trusted channel is provided and that confidentiality is
maintained. Security functionalities specified by FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMR.1, and FDP_ACF.1/SCD Import SFP ensure that transfer of SCDs is
restricted to administrators. This supports the confidentiality-oriented functions. Security functionality
FCS_CKM.4 destroys the SCD before a SCD is re-imported into the TOE.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (Verification of DTBS-representation integrity) covers that integrity of
the DTBS-representation to be signed is to be verified, as well as the DTBS-representation is not
altered by the TOE. This is provided by the trusted channel integrity verification mechanisms of
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import, and by FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS. The verification that the
DTBS-representation has not been altered by the TOE is done by integrity functions specified by
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS. The access control requirements of FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation SFP and
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation SFP keeps unauthorised parties off from altering the DTBSrepresentation.
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OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by
FIA_UAU.1 and FIA_UID.1 that ensure that no signature generation function can be invoked before
the signatory is identified and authenticated.
The security functionalities specified by FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP, FDP_ACC.1/SignatureCreation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP, FDP_ACF.1/Signature-Creation SFP, FMT_MTD.1
and FMT_SMR.1 ensure that the signature process is restricted to the signatory.
The security functionalitiess specified by FIA_ATD.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.2, and MSA.3 ensure
that the access to the signature generation functions remain under the sole control of the signatory, as
well as FMT_MSA.1/Signatory provides that the control of corresponding security attributes is under
signatory’s control.
The security functionalities specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent and FPT_TRP.1/TOE ensure the
integrity of stored data both during communication and while stored.
The security functionalities specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FIA_AFL.1 provide protection against a
number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of residual information, or brute force attacks
against authentication.
The assurance measures specified by AGC_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1 provide the misuse of the TOE
implementation.
The assurance measures specified by AVA_VAN.5 by requesting that the TOE resists attacks with a
high attack potential assure that the security functionalities are efficient.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the
cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1/SIGNING which ensures the cryptographic
robustness of the signature algorithms. The security functionalities specified by FPT_AMT.1 and
FPT_TST.1 ensure that the security functionalities are performing correctly. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE.
OT.SVD_Auth_TOE (TOE ensures authenticity of the SVD) is provided by a trusted channel
guaranteeing SVD origin and integrity by means of FTP_ITC.1/SVD Transfer and FDP_UIT.1/SVD
Transfer. The cryptographic algorithms specified by FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP,
FDP_ACF.1/SVD Transfer SFP and FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer ensure that only authorised user can
Import the SVD from a SSCD Type1 (if SCD is imported) and Export the SVD to the CGA.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of
physical attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.
OT.Init (SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair requires proper user
authentication. FIA_ATD.1 define RAD as the corresponding user attribute. The TSF specified by
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 provide user identification and user authentication prior to enabling access
to authorised functions. The attributes of the authenticated user are provided by
FMT_MSA.1/ADMINISTRATOR, FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. Access control is
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provided by FDP_ACC.1/INITIALISATION SFP and FDP_ACF.1/INITIALISATION SFP. Effort to
bypass the access control by a frontal exhaustive attack is blocked by FIA_AFL.1.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) implements the requirement of
practically unique SCD as laid down in the Directive [R13], Annex III, article 1(a), which is provided by
the cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
O.Privacy (Protection of TOE identification and of stored data) requires that the contactless
interface does not allow an attacker to track the TOE or to get access to data stored on the TOE or
exchanged with an authorized terminal. This is met by FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 which requires that
a terminal can only set up a trusted channel before it is identified and authenticated by the TOE,
therefore an attacker will not be able to identify the TOE or interact with the TOE to get information.
Setting up a trusted channel will also protect the exchanged data from disclosure. O.Privacy is also
met by FCS.COP/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC, which allow to set up a secure messaging in integrity
and confidentiality.
6.3.2.2
TOE ENVIRONMENT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS SUFFICIENCY
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD
corresponds to the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by
FCS_CKM.1 to generate corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. Cryptographic correspondence is provided
by FCS_COP.1/CORRESP.
OE.SCD_Transfer (Secure transfer of SCD between SSCD) is provided by FDP_UCT.1/Sender,
that ensure that a trusted channel is provided and that confidentiality is maintained. Security
functionalities complying with FDP_ACC.1/Export SFP and FTP_ITC.1/ SCD Export ensure that only
TOE may export the SCD. Security functionality specified by FCS_CKM.4/Type1 destroy the SCD,
once exported from the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature-creation data) stores the requirement of practically
unique SCD as laid down in the Directive [R13], Annex III, article 1(a), which is provided by the
cryptographic algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates) addresses the requirement of qualified
certificates. The functions specified by FCS_CKM.2/CGA provide the cryptographic key distribution
method. The functions specified by FCS_CKM.3/CGA ensure that the CGA imports the SVD using a
secure channel and a secure key access method.
OE.HI_VAD (Protection of the VAD) covers confidentiality and integrity of the VAD which is provided
by the trusted path FTP_TRP.1/SCA.
OE.SCA_Data_Intend (Data intended to be signed) is provided by the functions specified by
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS and FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS that ensure that the DTBS can be checked by the
TOE, and FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH that provides that the hashing function corresponds to the
approved algorithms.
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OE.SVD_Auth_CGA (CGA proves the authenticity of the SVD) is provided by
FTP_ITC.1/SVD.Import which assures identification of the sender and by FDP_UIT.1/ SVD Import,
which guarantees its integrity.
6.3.3
Dependency Rationale
6.3.3.1
FUNCTIONAL AND ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS DEPENDENCIES
The functional and assurance requirements dependencies for the TOE are completely fulfilled. The
functional requirements dependencies for the TOE environment are not completely fulfilled (see
section 6.3.3.2 for justification).
Requirements
Dependencies
Functional Requirements
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FCS_COP.1/SIGNING
FCS_COP.1/TDES
FCS_COP.1.MAC
FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-Creation SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ Signature-Creation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD Import SFP
FDP_ETC.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS
FDP_UCT.1/Receiver
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer
FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_TST.1
FCS_COP.1/SIGNING, FCS_CKM.4, FMT_MSA.2
FCS_CKM.1, FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACF.1/Initialisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/Personalisation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ Signature-Creation SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/ SCD Import SFP
FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-Creation SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD Transfer SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-Creation SFP, FMT_MSA.3
FTP_ITC.1/ SCD Import SFP, FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP
FTP_ITC.1/ SVD Transfer, FDP_ACC.1/ SVD Transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-Creation SFP, FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/Initialisation SFP, FDP_ACC.1/ SCD Import SFP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/ Signature-Creation SFP, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
ADV_SPM.1, FDP_ACC.1/Personalisation SFP, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.1/Administrator, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
ADV_SPM.1
FMT_MOF.1
None
Assurance Requirements
PPs SARs
ACM_AUT.1
ACM_CAP.4
ACM_SCP.2
ST SARs
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
ALC_CMS.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1
/
/
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Requirements
ADO_DEL.2
ADO_IGS.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_HLD.2
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_LLD.1
ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1
AGD_ADM.1
AGD_USR.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA_MSU.3
AVA_SOF.1
AVA_VLA.4
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Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ASE
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.2
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
AVA_VAN.5
AVA_VAN.5
/
/
/
ADV_FSP.1, ADV_TDS.1
ADV_TDS.1, ADV_IMP.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.3, ALC_TAT.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.1, ADV_IMP.1
ADV_FSP.5
ASE
ADV_FSP.1
ADV_FSP.1
/
/
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_FSP.2, ATE_FUN.1
ADV_ARC.3, ADV_TDS.4, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_COV.1
ADV_FSP.2, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.1, ATE_FUN.1
ADV_FSP.1
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.2, ADV_TDS.3, ADV_IMP.1, AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1
Functional Requirements for Certification generation application (CGA)
FCS_CKM.2/CGA
FCS_CKM.3/CGA
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
FDP_UIT.1/SVD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Import, unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
None
Functional Requirements for Signature creation application (SCA)
FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH
FDP_UIT.1/SCA DTBS
FTP_ITC.1/SCA DTBS
FTP_TRP.1/SCA
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
FTP_ITC.1/ SCA DTBS, unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
None
None
Functional Requirement for SSCD Type1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
FCS_COP.1/CORRESP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Export SFP
FDP_UCT.1/Sender
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Export
FCS_CKM.4/Type1, FCS_COP.1/CORRESP, unsupported dependencies, see sub-section
6.3.3.2 for justification
FCS_CKM.1, unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
unsupported dependencies, see sub-section 6.3.3.2 for justification
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Export, FTP_ITC/SCD Export
None
Table 6.5: Functional and Assurance Requirements Dependencies
6.3.3.2
JUSTIFICATION OF UNSUPPORTED DEPENDENCIES
The security functional dependencies for the TOE environment SSCD Type1, CGA and SCA are not
completely supported by security functional requirements in section 6.1.3.
FCS_CKM.1
The SSCD Type1 generates the SCD/SVD pair. The dependency for cryptographic secure key
generation is supported by FCS_COP.1/CORRESP, proof of SCD/SVD correspondence, and the key
destruction by FCS_CKM.4/Type1.
FCS_CKM.4/Type1
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The SSCD Type1 destroys the SCD once it has been exported. The dependency for key generation is
supported by FCS_CKM.1.
FCS_COP.1/ CORRESP
The SSCD Type1 does a cryptographic operation when creating the SCD/SVD pair, FCS_CKM.1 and
when destroying it, FCS_CKM.4/Type1.
FDP/ACC.1/ SCD Export SFP
The SSCD Type1 will follow the SCD export SFP when exporting the SCD. The access control
required by this SFP, FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control, is outside the scope of this
ST.
FCS_CKM.2/ CGA
The CGA generates qualified electronic signatures including the SVD imported from the TOE. The
FCS_CKM.1 is not necessary because the CGA does not generate the SVD. There is no need to
destroy the public SVD and therefore FCS_CKM.4 is not required for the CGA.
FCS_CKM.3/ CGA
The CGA imports SVD via trusted cannel implemented by FTP_ITC.1/ SVD import. The FCS_CKM.1
is not necessary because the CGA does not generate the SVD. There is no need to destroy the public
SVD and therefore FCS_CKM.4 is not required for the CGA.
FDP_UIT.1/ SVD Import (CGA)
The access control (FDP_ACC.1) for the CGA is outside the scope of this Security Target.
FCS_COP.1/ SCA HASH
The hash algorithm implemented by FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH does not require any key or security
management. Therefore FDP_ITC.1, FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.4 are not required for
FCS_COP.1/SCA HASH in the SCA.
FDP_UIT.1/ SCA DTBS
Access control (FDP_ACC.1.1) for the SCA is outside of the scope of this Security Target.
FMT_MOF.1
The TOE manage management function only during personalization phases, therefore FMT_SMF.1 is
not required.
FMT_MOF.1/administrator
The TOE manage management function only during personalization phases, therefore FMT_SMF.1 is
not required.
FMT_MOF.1/Signatory
The TOE manage management function only during personalization phases, therefore FMT_SMF.1 is
not required.
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FMT_MTD.1
The TOE manage management function only during personalization phases, therefore FMT_SMF.1 is
not required.
6.3.4
Security Requirements Grounding in Objectives
This chapter covers the grounding that has not been done in the precedent chapter.
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Requirements
Security Objectives
PPs Security assurance
requirements
ST Security assurance
requirements
ACM_AUT.1
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_DEL.1
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_INT.2
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_TDS.4
ASE
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.2
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
AVA_VAN.5
AVA_VAN.5
ACM_CAP.4
ACM_SCP.2
ADO_DEL.2
ADO_IGS.1
ADV_FSP.2
ADV_HLD.2
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_LLD.1
ADV_RCR.1
ADV_SPM.1
AGD_ADM.1
AGD_USR.1
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
AVA_MSU.3
AVA_SOF.1
AVA_VLA.4
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Security requirements for
the non IT environment
R.Administrator_Guide
R.Sigy_Guide
R.Sigy_Name
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5, OT.Lifecycle_Security
EAL 5, OT.Lifecycle_Security
EAL 5, OT.Lifecycle_Security
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
EAL 5
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.Sig_Secure,
AGD_ADM.1
AGD_USR.1
OE.CGA_QCert
Table 6.6: Assurance and Functional Requirement to Security Objective Mapping
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7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONALITY DESCRIPTION
7.1.1
Chip security functionalities
The following functionalities of the product are directly addressed by the chip. The complete list the
chip security functionality can be check in the chip Security Target [R11].
TSF_INTEGRITY
This security functionality is responsible for :
−
correcting single bit fails upon a read operation on each NVM byte,
−
verifying valid CPU usage,
−
checking integrity loss when accessing NVM, ROM or RAM,
−
providing a sign engine to check code and/or data integrity loss,
−
monitoring various manifestations of fault injection attempts,
−
providing a security timeout feature (watchdog timer),
−
providing the embedded software developer with the traceability information of the TOE.
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING
This security functionality ensures that:
−
The TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
−
The TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity, and glitch attacks,
−
The TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating conditions.
TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN
This security functionality ensures the management of the following security violation attempts:
−
Incorrect CPU usage,
−
Integrity loss in NVM, ROM or RAM
−
Code signature alarm,
−
Fault injection attempt,
−
access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
−
MPU errors,
−
Clock and voltage supply operating changes,
−
TOE physical integrity abuse.
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TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY
This security functionality prevents the disclosure of user data and of TSF data when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE (the different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the
TOE such as a cryptographic co-processor are seen as separated parts of the TOE) :
This functionality provides additional support mechanisms to the embedded software developer
contributing to avoid information leakage.
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides DES and TDES data encryption / decryption capability, in order to
compute Message Authentication code (MAC) or the encrypted data.
TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides:
−
RSA verification (encryption) with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
RSA signature (decryption) using or not using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), with an
RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
RSA private and public keys computation with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
Prime number generation up to 3200 bits, with Rabin-Miller primality tests.
This functionality implements also the following standard hash function:
−
SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160 bits result,
−
SHA-224 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 224-bit result,
−
SHA-256 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 256-bit result.
This security function provides also the following basic functions for Elliptic Curves Cryptography over
prime fields:
−
general point addition,
−
point expansion and compression,
−
public scalar multiplication,
−
private scalar multiplication.
TSF_ALEAS
This security functionality provides a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) to support security
operations performed by cryptographic applications. The RNG complies with the AIS31 Class P2
quality metric.
7.1.2
Low level security functionalities
TSF_PHYS
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This security functionality provides protection mechanism of the TOE towards observation and
physical tampering, such as random delay and desynchronization capability. This security functionality
may call TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY.
7.1.3
Operating system security functionalities
TSF_ACCESS
This security function manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in
E²PROM.
TSF_INIT
This security function performs TOE testing and initialization after each reset of the TOE.
TSF_MEMORY
This security function manages E²PROM and RAM erasure.
TSF_CHECK
This security function performs data integrity checks.
TSF_TEST
This security function performs self-tests at start-up and monitors code integrity during execution.
TSF_AUDIT
This security function reacts when a fault or an anomaly is detected.
7.1.4
Application manager security functionalities
TSF_GESTION
This security function manages:
7.1.5
−
Management of the secure state of the TOE.
−
Application selection.
−
Application separation.
Application security functionalities
TSF_SECRET
This security function ensures secure management of secret such as cryptographic keys.
TSF_CRYPTO
This security function performs high level cryptographic operations.
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TSF_AUTH
This security functionalities manages the authentication of the user, whether the signatory or the
administrator.
TSF_RATIF
A counter may be associated to an authentication secret, which is used to count the number of
successive unsuccessful authentication attempts.
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8 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
8.1
GLOSSARY
Administrator means a user that performs TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation, or other TOE
administrative functions.
Advanced electronic signature (defined in the Directive [R13], article 2.2) means an electronic
signature which meets the following requirements:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
it is capable of identifying the signatory;
it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control, and
it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the
data is detectable.
Authentication data is information used to verify the claimed identity of a user.
CEN workshop agreement (CWA) is a consensus-based specification, drawn up in an open
workshop environment of the European Committee for Standardization (CEN). The SSCD Protection
Profile (PP) [R8] & [R9] represent Annex A to the CWA that has been developed by the European
Electronic Signature Standardisation Initiative (EESSI) CEN/ISSS electronic signature (E-SIGN)
workshop, Area F on secure signature-creation devices (SSCD).
Certificate means an electronic attestation which links the SVD to a person and confirms the identity
of that person. (defined in the Directive [R13], article 2.9)
Certification generation application (CGA) means a collection of application elements which
requests the SVD from the SSCD for generation of the qualified certificate. The CGA stipulates the
generation of a correspondent SCD / SVD pair by the SSCD, if the requested SVD has not been
generated by the SSCD yet. The CGA verifies the authenticity of the SVD by means of
(a) the SSCD proof of correspondence between SCD and SVD and
(b) checking the sender and integrity of the received SVD.
Certification-service-provider (CSP) means an entity or a legal or natural person who issues
certificates or provides other services related to electronic signatures. (defined in the Directive [R13],
article 2.11)
Data to be signed (DTBS) means the complete electronic data to be signed (including both user
message and signature attributes).
Data to be signed representation (DTBS-representation) means the data sent by the SCA to the
TOE for signing and is
(a) a hash-value of the DTBS or
(b) an intermediate hash-value of a first part of the DTBS and a remaining part of the DTBS or
(c) the DTBS.
The SCA indicates to the TOE the case of DTBS-representation, unless implicitly indicated. The hashvalue in case
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(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
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or the intermediate hash-value in case
is calculated by the SCA. The final hash-value in case
or the hash-value in case
is calculated by the TOE.
Directive The Directive 1999/93/ec of the European parliament and of the council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [R13] is also referred to as the ‘Directive’ in
the remainder of the PP.
Qualified certificate means a certificate which meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the
Directive [R13] and is provided by a CSP who fulfils the requirements laid down in Annex II of the
Directive [R13]. (defined in the Directive [R13], article 2.10)
Qualified electronic signature means an advanced signature which is based on a qualified
certificate and which is created by a SSCD according to the Directive [R13], article 5, paragraph 1.
Reference authentication data (RAD) means data persistently stored by the TOE for verification of
the authentication attempt as authorised user.
Secure signature-creation device (SSCD) means configured software or hardware which is used to
implement the SCD and which meets the requirements laid down in Annex III of the Directive [R13].
(SSCD is defined in the Directive [R13], article 2.5 and 2.6).
Signatory means a person who holds a SSCD and acts either on his own behalf or on behalf of the
natural or legal person or entity he represents. (defined in the Directive [R13], article 2.3).
Signature attributes means additional information that is signed together with the user message.
Signature-creation application (SCA) means the application used to create an electronic signature,
excluding the SSCD. I.e., the SCA is a collection of application elements
−
to perform the presentation of the DTBS to the signatory prior to the signature process according
to the signatory's decision,
−
to send a DTBS-representation to the TOE, if the signatory indicates by specific nonmisinterpretable input or action the intend to sign,
−
to attach the qualified electronic signature generated by the TOE to the data or provides the
qualified electronic signature as separate data.
Signature-creation data (SCD) means unique data, such as codes or private cryptographic keys,
which are used by the signatory to create an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive [R13],
article 2.4).
Signature-creation system (SCS) means the overall system that creates an electronic signature.
The signature-creation system consists of the SCA and the SSCD.
Signature-verification data (SVD) means data, such as codes or public cryptographic keys, which
are used for the purpose of verifying an electronic signature. (defined in the Directive [R13], article
2.7)
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Signed data object (SDO) means the electronic data to which the electronic signature has been
attached to or logically associated with as a method of authentication.
SSCD provision service means a service that prepares and provides a SSCD to subscribers.
User means any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with the TOE.
Verification authentication data (VAD) means authentication data provided as input by knowledge
or authentication data derived from user’s biometric characteristics.
8.2
ACRONYMS
CC
Common Criteria
CGA
Certification Generation Application
CM
Configuration Management
DTBS
Data To Be Signed
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
IAS
Identité Authentification Signature
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
JCRE
Java Card Runtime Environment
JVM
Java Virtual Machine
OS
Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
RAD
Reference Authentication Data
RNG
Random Number Generator
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SCA
Signature-Creation Application
SCD
Signature-Creation Data
SCS
Signature-Creation System
SDO
Signed Data Object
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
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SSCD
Secure Signature-Creation Device
ST
Security Target
SVD
Signature-Verification Data
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSFI
TSF Interface
TSP
TOE Security Policy
VAD
Verification Authentication Data
VGP
Visa Global Platform
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9
9.1
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REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Designation
Reference
Title
Revision
Date
Common Criteria v2.3
[R1]
CCMB-2005-08-001
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model
Version
2.3
August 2005
[R2]
CCMB-2005-08-002
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components
Version
2.3
August 2005
[R3]
CCMB-2005-08-003
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components
Version
2.3
August 2005
Common Criteria v3.1
[R4]
CCMB-2006-09-001
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model
Version
3.1,
Revision
1
September
2006
[R5]
CCMB-2007-09-002
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
[R6]
CCMB-2007-09-003
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
[R7]
CCMB-2007-09-004
Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
Protection Profiles and Security Target
[R8]
PP0005
Protection Profile - Secure SignatureCreation Device Type 2
Version
1.04
25 July 2001
[R9]
PP0006
Protection Profile - Secure SignatureCreation Device Type 3
version
1.05
25 July 2001
[R10]
BSI-PP-0002-2001
Protection Profile, Security IC Platform
Protection Profile. Certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik).
Version
1.0
July 2001
[R11]
SMD_SB23YR80_ST_09_00
1
SB23YR80B Security Target - Public
Version
Rev
01.00
March 2009
[R11]
ANSSI-2010/02
SB23YR80 Version B with
NesLib Version 3 – Chip Certificate
Version
1.0
January 2010
Technical or legal specifications
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Designation
Reference
Title
[R13]
199/93/EC
DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic
signatures Passports with Biometric
Identification Capability.
[R14]
Revision
Date
13 December
1999
Algorithms and parameters for algorithms,
list of algorithms and parameters eligible
for electronic signatures, procedures as
defined in the directive 1999/93/EC,
article 9 on the ‘Electronic Signature
Committee’ in the Directive.
[R15]
CWA 14890-1
CWA 14890-1: Application Interface for
smart cards used as Secure Signature
Creation Devices – Part 1: Basic
requirements – (AREA-K-1)
April 2004
[R16]
CWA 14890-2
CWA 14890-2: Application Interface for
smart cards used as Secure Signature
Creation Devices – Part 2: Additional
Services – (AREA-K-2)
May 2004
[R17]
[R18]
ICAO Doc 9303
Plate-forme commune pour
l’eAdministration – Spécification
technique
Version
1.01
part 1 volume 1, Sixth edition, 2006,
Passports with Machine Readable Data
Stored in Optical Character Recognition
Format;
Sixth
edition
2006
part 1 volume 2, Sixth edition, 2006,
Specifications for Electronically Enabled
Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability.
[R19]
The Elliptic Curve Digitale Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA)
CC supporting document
[R20]
CCDB-2008-04-001
Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Application of
Attack Potential to Smartcards
V2.5, R1
April 2008
[R21]
CCDB-2007-09-001
Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Composite product
evaluation for Smartcards and similar
devices
V1.0, R1
September
2007
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9.2
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APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
Designation
Reference
Title
Revision
Date
Version
2.1
June 14, 2002
Cryptography
[R22]
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
RSA Laboratories, PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA
Cryptography Standard
[R23]
ISO/IEC 15946
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology –
Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part
3: Key establishment.
2002
[R24]
FIPS PUB 46-3
Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data
Encryption Standards (DES), U.S.
Department Of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Reaffirmed
1999 October
25
[R25]
ANSI X9.31
American Bankers Association, Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998 Appendix A.2.4
1998
Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include
SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of
Standards and Technology
2002 August
1
[R26]
OTHER
[R27]
VISA global platform requirements
configuration 3 – compact
v2.1.1
May 2003
[R28]
Java Card 2.2.2 - Application Programming
Interfaces, Sun Microsystems
V2.2.2
March 2006
[R29]
Java Card 2.2.2 - JCRE, Sun Microsystems
V2.2.2
March 2006
[R30]
Java Card 2.2.2 - Virtual Machine
Specifications, Sun Microsystems
V2.2.2
March 2006
[R31]
Plate-forme commune pour
l’eAdministration – Spécification technique
Version
1.01
[R32]
EMV CPS
1.0 Final
[R33]
ANSI X9.31
American Bankers Association, Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA) - Appendix A.2.4
16 June 2003
1998
BIOMETRY
[R34]
ISO/IEC19794-2
Biometric data
interchange formats - Finger minutiae data
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Reference: SSE-0000078793-02
15 September
2005
Page: 75/75
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