Security Target: 0866b_pdf

Security Target: 0866b_pdf
Security Target Lite
for the
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
SAC/EAC configuration
a Product of Morpho B.V.
Filename
7301-9301-112 ASE-Lite IDeal Pass v2 - SAC-EAC JC
ePassport 4.0.0 (SAC-EAC configuration) v1.0.3.doc
Document version
1.0.3 approved
Date
2013-11-28
Author
Morpho B.V
Certification ID
BSI-DSZ-CC-0866
Classification
Public release
Public release
© Morpho B.V.
Security Target Lite
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (SAC/EAC configuration)
2013-11-28
Table of Contents
1
ST Introduction..............................................................................................................5
1.1
ST Reference ...........................................................................................................5
1.2
TOE Reference ........................................................................................................5
1.3
TOE Overview..........................................................................................................6
1.4
TOE Description.......................................................................................................6
1.4.1 TOE Definition.....................................................................................................6
1.4.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use.........................................8
1.4.3 TOE life cycle....................................................................................................10
1.4.3.1
Phase 1 “Development” ............................................................................12
1.4.3.2
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”...........................................................................12
1.4.3.3
Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document” ....................................14
1.4.3.4
Phase 4 “Operational Use” .......................................................................14
1.4.3.5
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE ....................15
2
Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................16
2.1
CC Conformance Claim .........................................................................................16
2.2
PP Claim ................................................................................................................16
2.3
Package Claim .......................................................................................................16
2.4
PP Conformance Rationale....................................................................................17
3
Security Problem Definition .......................................................................................18
3.1
Introduction ............................................................................................................18
3.1.1 Assets ...............................................................................................................18
3.1.2 Subjects and External Entities ..........................................................................20
3.2
Assumptions...........................................................................................................25
3.3
Threats ...................................................................................................................26
3.4
Organizational Security Policies.............................................................................31
4
Security Objectives.....................................................................................................34
4.1
Security Objectives for the TOE.............................................................................34
4.1.1 TOE security objectives independent of TOE environment ..............................34
4.1.2 TOE security objectives involving TOE’s environment .....................................36
4.2
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ............................................38
4.2.1 Issuing State or Organization............................................................................38
4.2.2 Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch...39
4.2.3 Terminal operator: Terminal’s receiving branch................................................40
4.2.4 Travel document holder Obligations .................................................................40
4.2.5 Receiving State or Organisation .......................................................................40
4.3
Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................................42
5
Extended Components Definition .............................................................................45
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5.1
Definition of the Family FAU_SAS .........................................................................46
5.2
Definition of the Family FCS_RND.........................................................................47
5.3
Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ..........................................................................48
5.4
Definition of the Family FPT_EMS .........................................................................50
5.5
Definition of the Family FIA_API ............................................................................52
6
Security Requirements ...............................................................................................53
6.1
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE......................................................57
6.1.1 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) .................................................................58
6.1.1.1
Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)............................................58
6.1.1.2
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1) ....................................................61
6.1.1.3
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1).............................................68
6.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ......................................................70
6.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection ......................................................................84
6.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels ...................................................................89
6.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit..................................................................................90
6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management.....................................................................90
6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions .............................................101
6.2
Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ...................................................105
6.3
Security Requirements Rationale.........................................................................108
6.3.1 Functional Security Requirements Rationale..................................................108
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale....................................................................................115
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .................................................118
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency...............119
7
TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS) ................................................................121
7.1
SF.I&A Identification and Authentication..............................................................121
7.2
SF.CF Cryptographic functions support ...............................................................125
7.3
SF.ILTB Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass..............133
7.4
SF.AC Access control / Storage and protection of logical travel document data .133
7.5
SF.SM Secure Messaging ...................................................................................134
7.6
SF.LCM Security and life cycle management ......................................................135
8
Annex .........................................................................................................................139
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Document Revision History
Version
Date
Author
Description
1.0.0
2013-11-11
Morpho
Public release based on ASE v1.2.2
1.0.1
2013-11-12
Morpho
Synchronised with ASE v1.2.3
1.0.2
2013-11-18
Morpho
Synchronised with ASE v1.2.4
1.0.3
2013-11-28
Morpho
Synchronised with ASE v1.2.5
Distribution List
Name
v1.0.0
v1.0.1
v1.0.2
v1.0.3
TÜVIT
X
X
X
X
Morpho
X
X
X
X
BSI
X
X
X
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1 ST Introduction
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target Lite for the Machine
Readable Travel Document (MRTD) with the ICAO application, Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment and Extended Access Control on the NXP J3E120_MP65
(JCOP 2.4.2R3) Java Card Platform.
1.1 ST Reference
Title:
ASE-Lite IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
(SAC/EAC configuration)
Version Number:
1.0.3
Document Reference:
7301-9301-112 ASE Lite IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport 4.0.0 (SAC/EAC configuration)
Document type:
ASE Lite
CC version:
3.1 Revision 4
Provided by:
Morpho B.V
Evaluation body:
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (TÜViT)
Certification body:
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI)
Evaluation assurance level:
EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Name:
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport
TOE Version:
4.0.0
Developer:
Morpho B.V
TOE identification:
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0
Certification ID:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0866
Product type / platform
Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD) with the
ICAO application, PACE and Extended Access Control
on the NXP J3E120_MP65 (JCOP 2.4.2R3) Secure
Smart Card Controller (NSCIB-CC-13-37760)
TOE hardware
NXP P5CD145V0B (certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-08582013) and the crypto libraries in the hardware have
been certified by BSI (certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0750)
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1.3 TOE Overview
The Security Target Lite (ST-Lite) defines the security objectives and requirements for a
contact or contactless based chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on
the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and EU requirements for Extended Access Control v1 with PACE.
The main features and their origin are the following:
• Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [ICAO-SAC] and
strictly conform to BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [PACE-PP] for protection of the communication
between terminal and chip.
• Chip Authentication v1
according to BSI TR-03110 parts 1 and 3 [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-3] and strictly
conform to BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [EAC-PP-V2], authenticates the travel
document’s chip to the inspection system.
• Terminal Authentication v1
according to BSI TR-03110 parts 1 and 3 [TR-03110-1], [TR-03110-3] and strictly
conform to BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 [EAC-PP-V2], authenticates the inspection
system to travel document’s chip and protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the
inspection system.
As a feature that can be optionally configured the TOE supports:
• Active Authentication
which according to [ICAO-9303] prevents copying the SOD and proves that it has been
read from the authentic chip. It proves that the chip has not been substituted.
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) addressed by the current security target is an electronic
travel document representing a contactless / contact smart card programmed according to
ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control” [ICAO-SAC] (which means amongst
others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) defined in [ICAO-9303]) and
additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAO-9303], BSI TR-03110 part 1 [TR-03110-1] and part 3 [TR-03110-3] and Active
Authentication according to [ICAO-9303]. The communication between terminal and chip
shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) according
to Electronic Passport using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSICC-PP-0068-V2 [PACE-PP].
The TOE (IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport) comprises of
• the NXP J3E120_MP65 (JCOP 2.4.2R3) Secure Smartcard Controller, comprising of
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the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the NXP P5CD145V0B integrated circuit, IC)
with hardware for the contact and contactless interface;
o the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software;
o the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP2.4.2R3;
the MRTD application IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet version
1.0.59.300 loaded in ROM or in EEPROM;
the associated guidance documentation.
o
•
•
For this TOE, only one application will be present on the IC, namely the ICAO MRTD
Application. The TOE utilizes the evaluation of the underlying platform, which includes the
NXP chip, the IC Dedicated Software and the JCOP2.4.2R3 operating system certified by
the Dutch NSCIB Certification Body (NSCIB-CC-13-37760). The hardware platform NXP
P5CD145V0B has been certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013) and the crypto libraries
in the hardware have been certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0750).
A schematic overview of the TOE is shown in Figure 1:
• The MRTD’s chip circuitry and the IC dedicated software forming the Smart Card
Platform (Hardware Platform and Hardware Abstraction Layer);
• The IC embedded software running on the Smart Card Platform consisting of
o Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
o Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java
card technology enabled devices;
o Java card API, providing access to card’s resources for the Applet;
o Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the
card. For this TOE post issuance loading or deletion of Applets is not allowed;
o Native Mifare application, for this TOE the Mifare application is disabled.
• The Applet Layer is the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet.
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Figure 1: TOE
1.4.2 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for international
travel. The traveler presents a travel document to the inspection system to prove his or her
identity. The travel document in context of this Security Target contains (i) visual (eye
readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ
data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone
(MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip according to LDS in case of
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the
possession of a valid travel document personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as
given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in
the travel document. The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data
of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a genuine travel document of an
issuing State or Organization.
For this Security Target the travel document is viewed as unit of
(i) the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel
document holder
(a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document
surface,
(b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(c) the printed portrait.
(ii) the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored according to
the Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the
contact based or contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based or contactless
readable data including(but not limited to) personal data of the travel document holder
(a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
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the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both1,
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel document to
maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical
part of the travel document and the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document
Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g.
watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s
chip)and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation
procedures) [ICAO-9303].These security measures can include the binding of the travel
document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature
created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organisation and the security
features of the travel document’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active
Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303
[ICAO-9303] and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [ICAO-SAC]. The
Passive Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE
by the TOE environment.
This Security Target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity
by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the
Extended Access Control Mechanism. This Security Target addresses the Chip
Authentication Version 1 described in [TR-03110-1] as an alternative to the Active
Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303] as well Active Authentication itself.
For Basic Access Control (BAC) supported by the TOE, a separate evaluation and
certification is performed with ST [ST-BAC] under Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0867.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a
mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the
‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP)’ [PACE-PP]. Note that [PACE-PP]considers
high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [ICAO-SAC], the following steps shall be performed:
1
These biometric reference data are optional according to [ICAO-9303]. This ST assumes that the issuing State
or Organisation uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
2013-11-28
the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived from
the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with the
domain parameters to the terminal.
The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically) reading
the MRZ resp. CAN data.
The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann key
agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a shared
secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the shared
secret.
Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and verifies
the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide private
communication (secure messaging) [TR-03110-1], [ICAO-SAC].
This Security Target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as
defined in [TR-03110-1]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts
(i) the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1).
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
(i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection system and
(ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1 to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data
during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal
Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1has been
successfully executed.
The Terminal Authentication Protocolv.1 consists of
(i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving
State or Organisation through the issuing State, and
(ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data
only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems.
Active Authentication may be optionally configured.
The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification
the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
1.4.3 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of its four life cycle phases. (With respect to the
[SIC-PP], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps in the ST. These steps
are denoted too in the following although the sequence of the steps differs for the TOE life
cycle)
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Figure 2: TOE life-cycle
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1.4.3.1 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit,
the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components. The IC developer also acts as the developer of the IC Embedded Software
(operating system) which is the JCOP v.2.4.2 Revision 3 platform.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit
and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Embedded Software (JCOP
v.2.4.2 Revision 3 operating system) and develops the ePassport application and the
guidance documentation associated with this TOE component.
The ePassport application (i.e. the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet run
time code) may be integrated either in ROM or in EEPROM of the chip. Depending on the
intention
(a) the ePassport application is securely delivered directly from the software developer
(Morpho development dept.) to the IC manufacturer (NXP). The applet code will be
integrated into the ROM mask code by the IC manufacturer, or
(b) either the ePassport application and the guidance documentation is securely
delivered directly from the software developer (Morpho development dept.) to the
travel document manufacturer (Morpho production dept.).
1.4.3.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel
document’s chip Dedicated Software, the parts of the travel document’s chip Embedded
Software, and in case of alternative a) the ePassport application in the non-volatile nonprogrammable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto
the chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the
delivery process to the travel document manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the
IC manufacturer to the travel document manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the nonvolatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step4 optional) The travel document manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for
the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel
document consists of the chip only.
(Step5) The travel document manufacturer
(i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it in the non-volatile programmable
memories (for instance EEPROM or FLASH) if necessary and in case of
alternative (b), loads the ePassport application into the non-volatile programmable
memories (for instance EEPROM or FLASH) if necessary,
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(ii) creates the ePassport application,
(iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
EAC PP Application Note 1: Creation of the application for this TOE implies Applet
instantiation.
For this Security Target the following name mappings to the protection profile [EAC-PP-V2]
apply:
• IC Dedicated SW = Low level IC libraries
• travel document’s chip Embedded Software = JCOP 2.4.2 Revision 3 operating
system.
• ePassport application = the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet run
time code or an instantiation of it.
• Pre-personalization Data = Personalization Agent Key Set and Card Production Life
Cycle (CPLC) data.
Both the underlying platform and the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet
provide configuration and life-cycle management functions required for TOE preparation.
TOE preparation steps are performed in manufacturing phase and consists of the following
2 activities:
1. Platform initialisation
2. Pre-personalisation
Platform initialisation
Platform initialisation consists of the configuration of the JCOP platform in accordance with
requirements specified in the JCOP platform administrator guidance [JCOP-ADM] by using
the dedicated platform commands. Furthermore the Pre-Personalisation Agent key set is
installed and (a part of) the CPLC data is updated.
Pre-personalisation
The pre-personalisation consists of the following steps:
a. IC (chip) Authentication and getting chip access with the pre-personalisation key set.
b. [optional] In case the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet runtime
code does not reside in ROM, it is loaded into EEPROM.
c. Create applet instance for IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet (i.e.
installation of the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 Applet);
d. Disabling further pre-personalisation functionality;
e. Set the MRTD irreversibly in its PERSONALISATION life-cycle state by installation
of the Personalisation Agent specific personalisation key set;
During step c the CPLC data with the IC Identifier is configured in the ePassport application
instance. The last step (e) finalizes the TOE. This is the moment the TOE starts to exist and
is ready for delivery to the Personalisation Agent. The guidance documentation for the
Personalisation Agent is [AGD_PRE].
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The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered
from the travel document manufacturer to the Personalisation Agent. The travel document
manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the
Personalisation Agent.
1.4.3.3 Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalisation of the travel document includes
(i) the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the
digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
(iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel
document,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
(v) configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalisation Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and
(iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [ICAO-9303] finalizes
the personalisation of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The
personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance (AGD_OPE) for TOE use
if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
EAC PP Application note 2: The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might
affect the operation of the TOE; cf. [CC-1] §92) comprise (but are not limited to) the
Personalisation Agent Authentication Key(s), the Terminal Authentication trust anchor, the
effective date and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
EAC PP Application note 3: This ST distinguishes between the Personalisation Agent
as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT
environment signing the Document security object as described in [ICAO-9303]. This
approach allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles.
.
1.4.3.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveler and the inspection
systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the
security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the
security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
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EAC PP Application note 4 2: The intention of the ST is to consider at least the phases 1
and parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and therefore to define
the TOE delivery according to CC after this phase. Since specific production steps of phase
2 are of minor security relevance (e.g. booklet manufacturing and antenna integration)
these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC. Nevertheless the decision about this
has to be taken by the certification body resp. the national body of the issuing State or
Organisation. In this case the national body of the issuing State or Organisation is
responsible for these specific production steps.
Note that the personalisation process and its environment may depend on specific security
needs of an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation
procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered
in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security
Target outlines the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalisation and the related security
objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery.
1.4.3.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the
complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the
antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete
travel document. Nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the
TOE.
2
For this ST all steps of both phase 1 and phase 2 are part of the evaluation and therefore define the TOE
delivery according to the CC evaluation after this phase.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1,which
comprises
•
•
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:Introduction
and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CC-1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:Security
Functional Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September
2012 [CC-2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September
2012 [CC-3]
as follows:
• Part 2 extended
• Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
[CEM] has been taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
This security target (ST) claims strict conformance to Protection Profile Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, 5th
December 2012) [EAC-PP-V2].
The [EAC-PP-V2] claims strict conformance to the PACE Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, BSI-CC-PP0068-V2-2011, Version 1.0, 2nd November 2011, BSI [PACE-PP].
2.3 Package Claim
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5 defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
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2.4 PP Conformance Rationale
This ST claims strict conformance to [EAC-PP-V2]. According to hints in [EAC-PP-V2] parts
of the [PACE-PP] have been included into this ST. A detailed justification is given in the
following.
Main aspects:
- The TOE description (chapter 1.3) is based on the TOE definition and TOE usage of
[EAC-PP, 1.1]. It was enhanced by product specific details.
-
All definitions of the security problem definition in [EAC-PP, 3] have been taken exactly
from this protection profile in the same wording.
-
All security objectives have been taken exactly from [EAC-PP, 4] in the same wording.
-
The part of extended components definition has been taken originally from [EAC-PP, 5].
-
All SFRs for the TOE have been taken originally from the [EAC-PP, 6.1] added by
according iterations, selections and assignments.
-
The security assurance requirements (SARs) have been taken originally from the EACPP. The requirements are shifted to those of EAL 5 if necessary.
-
The application notes from [EAC-PP-V2] and [PACE-PP] are either reproduced or
modified to described their realisation.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the travel document’s chip,
user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal, and travel document tracing data
from PACE PP [PACE-PP], chapter 3.1, claimed by [EAC-PP-V2]:
Object
No.
Asset
Primary Assets travel document
1
user data stored on
the TOE
2
user data transferred
between the TOE and
the terminal connected
(i.e. an authority
represented by Basic
Inspection System with
PACE)
3
travel document
tracing data
Definition
Generic security
property to be
maintained by the
current security policy
All data (being not authentication data)
stored in the context of the ePassport
application of the travel document as
defined in [ICAO-SAC] and being
allowed to be read out solely by an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the
sense of [ICAO-SAC]).This asset
covers ‘User Data on the MRTD’s
chip’, ‘Logical MRTD Data’ and
‘Sensitive User Data’ in [BAC-PP].
All data (being not authentication data)
being transferred in the context of the
ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [ICAO-SAC]
between the TOE and an
authenticated terminal acting as Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in the
sense of [ICAO-SAC]).
User data can be received and sent
(exchange {receive, send}).
Technical information about the current
and previous locations of the travel
document gathered unnoticeable by
the travel document holder recognizing
the TOE not knowing any PACE
password. TOE tracing data can be
provided / gathered.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Authenticity
Secondary Assets travel document
4
Accessibility to the
Property of the TOE to restrict access
TOE functions and
to TSF and TSF-data stored in the
data only to authorized TOE to authorized subjects only.
subjects
Confidentiality
Integrity
Authenticity
unavailability
Availability
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5
Genuineness of the
TOE
6
TOE internal secret
Cryptographic keys
7
TOE internal nonsecret cryptographic
material
8
travel document
communication
establishment
authorisation data
Property of the TOE to be authentic in
order to provide claimed security
functionality in a proper way.
This asset also covers ‘Authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip’ in [BAC-PP]
Permanently or temporarily stored
secret cryptographic material used by
the TOE in order to enforce its security
functionality.
Permanently or temporarily stored
non-secret cryptographic (public) keys
and other non-secret material
(Document Security Object SOD
containing digital signature) used by
the TOE in order to enforce its security
functionality.
Restricted-reveal able authorization
information for a human user being
used for verification of the
authorisation attempts as authorized
user (PACE password). These data
are stored in the TOE and are not to
be send to it.
Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity
Integrity
Authenticity
Confidentiality
Integrity
Table 1: Primary and secondary Assets (see [PACE-PP, 3.1])
PACE PP Application note 6: Please note that user data being referred to in the table
above include, amongst other, individual-related (personal) data of the travel document
holder which also include his sensitive (i.e. biometric) data. Hence, the general security
policy defined by the current ST also secures these specific travel document holder’s data
as stated in the table above.
PACE PP Application note 7: Since the travel document does not support any secret
travel document holder authentication data and the latter may reveal, if necessary, his or
her verification values of the PACE password to an authorised person or device, a
successful PACE authentication of a terminal does not unambiguously mean that the travel
document holder is using TOE.
PACE PP Application note 8: Travel document communication establishment
authorisation data are represented by two different entities: (i) reference information being
persistently stored in the TOE and (ii) verification information being provided as input for
the TOE by a human user as an authorisation attempt.
The TOE secures the reference information as well as – together with the terminal
connected – the verification information in the ‘TOE ↔ terminal’ channel, if it has to be
transferred to the TOE. Please note that PACE passwords are not to be send to the TOE.
All primary assets represent User Data in the sense of the CC. The secondary assets
represent TSF and TSF-data in the sense of the CC, see [PACE-PP, 3.1]. The secondary
assets also have to be protected by the TOE in order to achieve a sufficient protection of
the primary assets.
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Logical travel document sensitive User Data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
EAC PP Application note 5: Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO9303] requires that Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document
data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using
BAC [ICAO-9303]. Note that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack
potential (cf. [BAC-PP]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to used PACE instead of
BAC. If nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip
Authentication v.1 before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is
resistant to high potential attacks.
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing State or
Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession
of a genuine travel document.
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this Security Target also includes all assets listed in
[PACE-PP], 3.1, namely the primary assets user data stored on the TOE (object 1), user
data transferred between the TOE and the terminal connected (object 2), travel document
tracing data (object 3), and the secondary assets accessibility to the TOE functions and
data only for authorised subjects(object 4) Genuineness of the TOE (object 5), TOE intrinsic
secret cryptographic keys (object 6), TOE intrinsic non secret cryptographic material (object
7), and travel document communication establishment authorisation data (object 8).
3.1.2 Subjects and External Entities
This ST considers the following external entities and subjects from [PACE-PP] chapter 3.1:
External
Entity No.
1
Subject
No.
1
Role
Definition
Travel
document
holder
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has
personalized the travel document.
This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in [BACPP].
Please note that a travel document holder can also be an
attacker (s. below).
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveler’ in
[BAC-PP].
Please note that a travel document presenter can also be
an attacker (s. below)
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the
TOE through the contactless/contact interface.
The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal
being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE
authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel document
2
-
Travel
document
presenter
(traveler)
3
2
Terminal
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4
3
Basic
Inspection
System with
PACE (BISPACE)
5
-
Document
Signer (DS)
6
-
Country
Signing
Certification
Authority
(CSCA)
7
4
Personalisati
on Agent
8
5
Manufacturer
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presenter).
This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [BAC-PP].
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority
and verifying the travel document presenter as the travel
Document holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real
biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with
the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document
holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE
protocol and authenticates itself to the travel document
using a shared password (PACE password) and supports
Passive Authentication.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and
signing the Document Security Object stored on the travel
document for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see
[ICAO-9303]. This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel
document Issuer with respect to confirming correctness of
user and TSF data stored in the travel document. The
CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for
the travel document and creates the Document Signer
Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure
diplomatic means, see [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.
An organization acting on behalf of the travel document
Issuer to personalise the travel document for the travel
document holder by some or all of the following activities:
(i) establishing the identity of the travel document holder
for the biographic data in the travel document,
(ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel
document holder,
(iii) writing a subset of these data on the physical travel
document (optical personalisation) and storing them in the
travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in [ICAO-9303],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data, (vi) signing the Document
Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303](in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be
distributed among several institutions according to the
operational policy of the travel document Issuer. This
entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation agent’ in
[BAC-PP].
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated
circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing
the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life cycle
phase.
The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC
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-
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Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this
role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in [BACPP].
A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his behalf)
trying to undermine the security policy defined by the
current PP, especially to change properties of the assets
having to be maintained.
The attacker is assumed to possess an at most high
attack potential. Please note that the attacker might
‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in
BAC-PP].
Table 2: Subjects and external entities (from [PACE-PP, 3.1])
Furthermore this ST considers the following additional subjects from [EAC-PP-V2]:
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the
issuing State or Organisation with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference
data stored in the travel document. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the
PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI.
The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying
CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect
to, the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended
Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended
Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the travel document in the limits provided by
the issuing States or Organisations in the form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through the contact
interface or through the contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
travel document presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveler as travel document holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the Advanced Inspection Procedure (see
Figure 3 below) and therefore
(i)
contains a terminal for the communication with the travel document’s chip,
(ii)
implements the terminals part of PACE and/or BAC;
(iii)
gets the authorization to read the logical travel document either under PACE or BAC
by optical reading the travel document providing this information.
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(v)
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implements the Terminal Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both
Version 1 according to [TR-03110-1] and
is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation through the Document Verifier of
the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes
of the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection System Certificates. BAC may
only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by the
TOE and the BIS, PACE must be used.
Figure 3: Advanced Inspection Procedure (Source: [EAC-PP-V2], figure 1)
EAC PP Application note 6: For definition of Basic Inspection System (BIS) resp. Basic
Inspection System with PACE (BIS-PACE) see Table 2 above.
Attacker
Additionally to the definition in Table 2 above the definition of an attacker is refined as
follows: A threat agent trying
(i)
to manipulate the logical travel document without authorization,
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(iii)
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to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4),
to forge a genuine travel document, or
to trace a travel document.
EAC PP Application note 7: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged travel document.
Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack
itself is not relevant for the TOE.
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3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.Passive_Auth
PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel
document. The issuing State or Organisation runs a Certification Authority (CA) which
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document
Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair,(ii) hands over the Document Signer
Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret
and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security
Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organisations.
It is assumed that the Personalisation Agent ensures that the Document Security Object
contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to [ICAO-9303].
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability
includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and implements the terminal part of PACE
[ICAO-SAC] and/or BAC [BAC-PP].
BAC may only be used if supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are supported by
the TOE and the IS, PACE must be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under
PACE or BAC and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document
and establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in
order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation
through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
Justification:
The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [PACE-PP] as it
repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection
Systems for handling the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations
are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing
the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or
Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of their
Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
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Justification:
This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part
of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PACE-PP] be restricted by this
assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary because it
covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.
This ST includes the assumption from [PACE-PP], chapter 3.4, namely A.Passive_Auth.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in
the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
Threats to be averted by the TOE and its environment
This ST includes
1. all threats from the [PACE-PP], chap 3.2, namely T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping,
T.Tracing, T.Abuse-Func, T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper, T.Forgery
and T.Malfunction,
2. all additional threats, refinements and extensions from the [EAC-PP-V2], namely
T.Read_Sensitive_Data and T.Counterfeit.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Skimming Skimming travel document / Capturing Card-Terminal Communication
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to
the user data stored on or transferred between the TOE and the
inspecting authority connected via the contactless/contact interface
of the TOE.
having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
confidentiality of logical travel document data.
PACE PP Application Note 10: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the
context of the security policy defined in this ST.
PACE PP Application Note 11: MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel
document. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are
restricted-revealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping
PACE terminal
Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and the
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Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
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An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel
document and the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain
the user data transferred between the TOE and the terminal
connected.
having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
confidentiality of logical travel document data.
PACE PP Application Note 12: A product using BIS-BAC cannot avert this threat in the
context of the security policy defined in this ST.
T.Tracing
Tracing travel document
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the
movement of the travel document) unambiguously identifying it
remotely by establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the
correct value of the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
privacy of the travel document holder
PACE PP Application Note 13: This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-ID”
from the BAC PP [BAC-PP].
PACE PP Application Note 14: A product using BAC (whatever the type of the inspection
system is: BIS-BAC) cannot avert this threat in the context of the security policy defined in
this ST.
PACE PP Application Note 15: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not
support any unique-secret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip
Authentication or Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel
document) cannot be averted by the current TOE.
T.Forgery
Forgery of Data
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored
on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the
terminal connected in order to outsmart the PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE or EIS-PACE by means of changed travel document
holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data).
The attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected
perceives these modified data as authentic one.
having high attack potential
integrity of the travel document
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EAC PP Application note 8: T.Forgery from the PACE PP [PACE-PP] has been extended
in this ST by the Extended Inspection System (EIS) additionally to the PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE being outsmarted by the attacker.
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
TOE operational phase in order
(i)
to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in the TOE,
(ii)
to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or
(iii) to manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded
security functionality of the TOE.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation
and personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the
travel document holder.
Having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents.
Integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document.
PACE PP Application Note 16: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for
instance, on the capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software
being not specified here.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
Information Leakage from travel document
An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data
stored on the travel document or/and exchanged between the TOE
and the terminal connected. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
having high attack potential
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
PACE PP Application Note 17: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in
power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is
more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either
from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the
specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to
enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
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T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
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Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in
order
(i) to disclose the TSF-data, or
(ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to
alter
(i) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well),
(ii) the User Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and
TSF-data of the travel document
PACE PP Application note 18: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the
disclosure or manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
inspection system) or the TSF data (e.g. authentication key of the travel document) or
indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security
features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly
employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that,
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TS data may
also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s
hardware and Embedded Software by applying environmental stress
in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functionality of
the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This may be achieved
e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded
Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents, having information about the functional
operation
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the
functionality of the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and
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TSF-data of the travel document
PACE PP Application note 19: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a
direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about
TOE’s internals.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action:
Threat agent:
Asset:
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data
through the communication interface of the travel document’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat
T.Skimming (cf. [PP_BAC]) in respect of the attack path
(communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on
the travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under
the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ,
digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the
PACE Password) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note,
that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the
travel document’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas
the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical
part of the travel document as well.
having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in
possession of a legitimate travel document
confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data(i.e.
biometric reference)
Counterfeit of travel document chip data
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized
copy or reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used
as part of a counterfeit travel document. This violates the
authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for authentication of
a traveler by possession of a travel document.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or
partially the data from a genuine travel document’s chip and copy
them to another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel
document’s chip.
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more
legitimate travel documents
authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
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3.4 Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply to the following organization security policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see
CC part 1 [CC-1], sec. 3.2).
This ST includes
1. all OSPs from the PACE PP [PACE-PP], chapter 3.3, namely P.Pre-Operational,
P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal and
2. OSPs and security rules from EAC PP [EAC PP], namely P.Sensitive_Data and
P.Personalisation.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialisation Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least
the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational Pre-operational handling of the travel document
1. The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2. The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst
other of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data
permanently stored in the TOE
3. The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC)
which enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and
issuing life cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase, cf. section
1.4.3.4 above.
4. If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to
ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document
Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch)
PACE PP Application note 20: The description below states the responsibilities of
involved parties and represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI.
Physical distribution ways shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way
that all certificates belonging to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their
final destination, e.g. by using directory services.
1. The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel
document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA).
The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA).
2. The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA
shall keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate
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(CCSCA) having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure
means, see [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to
the travel document Issuer, see [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.
3. A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI Trustworthiness of PKI
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to
be stored on the travel document.
P.Terminal Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1. The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO-9303].
2. They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAO-SAC], of the
Passive Authentication [ICAO-9303] and use them in this order. The PACE terminal
shall use randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the
protocols (for generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3. The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4. They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication(determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel
document, [ICAO-9303]).
5. The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity
of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords, integrity
of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the TOE
according to the PP [PACE-PP].
P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive
private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric reference data
can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the
travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The
issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to
manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document
Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity
of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip Authentication Version 13.
3
Should read: Terminal Authentication Version 1
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P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The personalisation of
the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State
or Organisation only.
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4 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into
security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives
for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met
by the TOE.
This ST includes
1. all Security Objectives for the TOE from the PACE PP [PACE-PP], chapter 4.1,
namely OT.Data_Integrity, OT.Data_Authenticity, OT.Data_Confidentiality,
OT.Tracing, OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OT.Prof_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OT.Identification, OT.AC_Pers and OT.Prot_Malfunction and
2. all Security Objectives for the TOE from the EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2], chapter 4.1,
namely OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
4.1.1 TOE security objectives independent of TOE environment
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the TOE
independent of TOE environment.
OT.Data_Integrity
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by protecting
these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and unauthorised
modifying).
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Authenticity
Authenticity of Data
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side.
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange
between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE)after the PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at
the terminal-side (at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself
(at receiving by the TOE).
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OT.Data_Confidentiality
Confidentiality of Data
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected.
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their
exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing
Tracing travel document
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of shared
passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSFdata stored and/or processed by the travel document
- by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
- by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
PACE PP Application note 22: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an
attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks
with high attack potential by means of
- measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and
current) or
- measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
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OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been proven or
tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental conditions may
include external energy (especially electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock
frequency or temperature.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The
authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used
for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization
defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier
Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to the Extended
Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by means of
the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [TR-03110-1]. The authenticity proof
provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack
potential.
EAC PP Application note 9: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip
to have (i) a unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a
secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The
TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the
reference data to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate
for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of
the travel document’s chip.
This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS
defined in [ICAO-9303] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document Security Object
signed by the Document Signer.
4.1.2 TOE security objectives involving TOE’s environment
The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be
countered involving TOE’s environment.
OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its nonvolatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during
the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document. The
storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent Key(s).
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OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written
by authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after
personalisation of the document.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
This ST includes
1. all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the PACE PP [PACE-PP],
chapter 4.2, namely OE.Legislative_Compliance, OE.Passive_Auth_Sign,
OE.Personalisation, OE.Terminal, and OE.Travel_Document_Holder and
2. all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2],
chapter 4.2, namely OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Exam_Travel_Document, OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
4.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Legislative_Compliance
Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store
the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14
and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify the
authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by certification
of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally
to those from [PACE-PP] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the prerequisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 which is one of the additional
features of the TOE described only in [EAC-PP-V2] and not in [PACE-PP].
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in
order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document holders to
authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates
for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally
to those from [PACE-PP]in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the
Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the
need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in
[EAC-PP-V2] and not in [PACE-PP].
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4.2.2 Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security
objectives for the TOE environment (see also the PACE PP Application Note 20):
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
Authentication of travel document by Signature
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document
Issuer must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates
in a secure operational environment, and
(iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby authenticity and
integrity of these certificates are being maintained.
A Document Signer acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must
(i) generate a cryptographically secure Document Signing Key Pair,
(ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key,
(iii) hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification,
(iv) sign Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash values for each
data group in use according to [ICAO-9303].The Personalisation Agent has to ensure that
the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according
to [ICAO-9303]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation
Personalisation of travel document
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his
behalf
(i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the
biographical data for the travel document,
(ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical personalisation) and
store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in [ICAO-9303],
(iv) write the document details data,
(v) write the initial TSF data,
(vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [ICAO-9303] (in the role of a DS).
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4.2.3 Terminal operator: Terminal’s receiving branch
OE.Terminal
Terminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [ICAO-9303].
2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [ICAOSAC], of the Passive Authentication [ICAO-SAC](by verification of the signature of
the Document Security Object) and use them in this order. The PACE terminal uses
randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for
generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to
perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [ICAO-9303]).
5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and integrity
of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE passwords,
integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of the
TOE according to the current PP.
PACE PP Application note 24: OE.Terminal completely covers and extends
“OE.Exam_MRTD”, “OE.Passive_Auth_Verif“ and “OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD” from BAC PP
[BAC-PP].
4.2.4 Travel document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
Travel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
4.2.5 Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
Examination of the physical part of the travel
document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel
document presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [ICAO-SAC]and/or the Basic
Access Control [ICAO-9303].Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these
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points the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1toverify the Authenticity of the presented
travel document’s chip.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally
to those from [PACE-PP]in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption
A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication
protocolv.1.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the requirements from OE.Terminal in
[PACE-PP] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A. Passive_Auth from [PACE-PP].
This is done because a new type of Inspection System is introduced in this PP as the
Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features of a travel
document with Extended Access Control.
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
Protection of data from the logical travel
document
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally
to those from [PACE-PP]in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the
Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric
reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric
reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
Justification: This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally
to those from [PACE-PP]in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the
Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A. Auth_PKI as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the
responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
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4.3 Security Objectives Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Counterfeit
T.Skimming5
T.Eavesdropping
T.Tracing
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_Leakage
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
T.Forgery
P.Sensitive_Data
P.Personalisation
P.Manufact
P.Pre-Operational
P.Terminal
P.Card_PKI
P.Trustworthy_PKI
A.Insp_Sys
A.Auth_PKI
A.Passive_Auth
x
x
x
x
OE.Legislative_Compliance
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Terminal
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalisation
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Dat
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Tracing
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.AC_Pers4
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. The objectives,
threats and assumptions marked in italic letters are originally included from the PACE-PP
[PACE-PP] which is claimed by the EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2].
x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
x
Table 3: Security Objective Rationale
4
The Objectives marked in italic letters are included from the claimed PACE-PP [PACE-PP]. They are listed
for the complete overview of the security objectives.
5
Threats, policies and assumptions included from the claimed PACE-PP [PACE-PP] are marked in italic
letters. They are listed for the complete overview of threats and assumptions.
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The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the
Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of logical travel document”, and (ii) the access control
for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalisation of logical travel document”. Note the manufacturer equips the
TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification
and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management
of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is
countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the
sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has
to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives from
PACE PP [PACE-PP]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to perform the
terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack of
unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is
thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
“Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to
be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as
demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel document Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel
document” the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel document’s chip.
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The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial
alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between
the TOE and the terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [PACE-PP]
which counter this threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book
according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel
document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document.
The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the
TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
travel document” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the travel
document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and the
Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document “Protection of
data from the logical travel document” require the Inspection System to protect the logical
travel document data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication of
travel document by Signature” from PACE PP [PACE-PP] covering the necessary
procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The
implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of
sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive
biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or
Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
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5 Extended Components Definition
This ST uses components defined in the PACE PP [PACE-PP] and EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2],
which have been defined as extensions to CC part 2 [CC-2]. In more detail this ST uses
1. all Extended Component Definitions from the PACE PP [PACE-PP], chapter 5,
namely FAU_SAS, FCS_RND, FMT_LIM, FPT_EMS and
2. all Extended Component Definitions from the EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2], chapter 5,
namely FIA_API.
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5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of the
class FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it
does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does
not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
1
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit
records.
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5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND)
of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes.
The component FCS_RND.1 is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the
component FCS_CKM.1 is. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for noncryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which
are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
1
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers
meet a defined quality metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
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5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific
issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and
by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of
functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to
functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities require that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of
functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be
achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a
specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
PP_PACE Application note 25: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2
assume existence of two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability)
which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the related policy. This also
allows that
1. the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment, but
its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced or conversely or conversely
2. the TSF is designed with high functionality, but is removed or disabled in the
product in its user environment.
The combination of both the requirements shall enforce the related policy.
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5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined
here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent
attacks against secret data stored in and used by the TOE where the attack is based on
external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are
evaluation of TOE’s electro magnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations being not directly addressed by any other
component of CC part 2 [CC-2].
The family ‘TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)’ is specified as follows
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behavior:
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMS.1
TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1
Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2
Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain
access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment:
list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2
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5.5 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification
by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the
identity of an external entity.
EAC PP Application note 10: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the
authentication verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the
functionality of the user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family
FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT
security requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behavior
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component leveling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management:
FIA_API.1
1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit:
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
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6 Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements;
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1
of the CC [CC-1]. Each of these operations is used in this security target and the
underlying PP.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements that add or change words
are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a
separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted
as underlined text. Selections filled in by the ST author appear as italic and underlined
text and the original text is given by a footnote.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by
the PP authors are denoted by showing as underlined text. Assignments to be filled in
by the ST author appear as italic and underlined text and the original text of the
component is given by a footnote.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying
operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after
the component identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Extended
Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier”
and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all
these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are
defined either in section 7 or in the following table. The operations “write”, “modify”,
“read” and “disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic
usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish
communication channel”, “authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from
[CC-2]. The operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [CC-2]
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Definition of security attributes:
Security attribute
Values
terminal
authentication status
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorization after
start-up)
Terminal
Authorization
Meaning
CVCA
roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as Country Verifying
Certification Authority after successful CA v.1
and TA v.1
DV (domestic)
roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as domestic Document Verifier
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign)
roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as foreign Document Verifier
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
IS
roles defined in the certificate used for
authentication (cf. [TR-03110-1]); Terminal is
authenticated as Extended Inspection System
after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
none
-
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG4: (cf. [TR-03110-1])
DG3 (Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3: (cf. [TR-03110-1])
DG3 (Fingerprint) /
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [TR03110-1])
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Data
TOE intrinsic secret
cryptographic keys
Permanently or temporarily stored secret cryptographic
material used by the TOE in order to enforce its security
functionality.
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a
private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SKCVCA)
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Name
Data
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the
Document Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security
attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date
of the Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of
a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may
be a self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TR-031101] and Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication
reference data, (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security
attributes.
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document
Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii)
identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the
coded access control rights of the Document Verifier, the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date
as security
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the
Document Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference
data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date
as security attributes.
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are
used for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH)
according to RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
according to ISO 15946.
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
travel document and used by the inspection system for Chip
Authentication v.1 of the travel document’s chip. It is part of
the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the
TOE to authenticate itself as authentic travel document’s chip.
It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate(CDS) with the Country Signing Certification Authority
Private Key (SKCSCA)and the signature will be verified by
Receiving State or Organization (e.g. an Extended Inspection
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
Chip Authentication
Public Key (PKICC)
Chip Authentication
Private Key (SKICC)
Country Signing
Certification Authority
Key Pair and Certificate
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Data
System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCSCA). The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA
Certificate (CCSCA) to be distributed by strictly secure
diplomatic means, see [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.
Document Signer Key
Pairs and Certificates
Chip Authentication
Session Key
PACE Session Keys
(PACE-KMAC, PACEKEnc)
PACE authentication
ephemeral key pair
(ephem-SKPICCPACE,ephem-PKPICCPACE)
The Document Signer Certificate CDS is issued by the Country
Signing Certification Authority. It contains the Document
Signer Public Key (PKDS) as authentication reference data.
The Document Signer acting under the policy of the CSCA
signs the Document Security Object (SOD) of the travel
document with the Document Signer Private Key (SKDS) and
the signature will be verified by a terminal as the Passive
Authentication with the Document Signer Public Key (PKDS)
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System in result
of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Secure messaging AES keys for message authentication
(CMAC-mode) and for message encryption (CBC-mode) or
3DES Keys for message authentication and message
encryption (both CBC) agreed between the TOE and a
terminal as result of the PACE Protocol, see [ICAO_SAC].
The ephemeral PACE Authentication Key Pair
{ephem-SKPICC-PACE, ephem-PKPICC-PACE } is used for Key
Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to
PKCS#3 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH; ECKA key
agreement algorithm) according to TR-03111 [TR-03111], cf.
[ICAO_SAC].
Table 4: Keys and Certificates
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsection following the main security functionality. Several SFRs of the PACE PP
[PACE-PP] are only listed in the EAC PP [EAC-PP-V2]. Therefore the descriptions of
these SFRs are taken directly from PACE PP into the Security target on hand. These
SFRs are indicated by footnotes.
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6.1.1 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated
by the TOE.
6.1.1.1 Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
PACE session keys6
Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH
Justification: A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to
have no key distribution, therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense
in this case.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_PACE
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with
the cryptographic key generation algorithms
ECDH compliant to [TR-03111] 7 and specified cryptographic
key sizes 192, 224,256 and 320 bits in combination with 112 bits
3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES 8 that meet [ICAO-SAC] 9
.
PACE PP Application note 26: The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the
terminal during the PACE protocol, see [ICAO-SAC]. This protocol may be based on
the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based
cryptographic algorithm, cf. [RSA-PKCS#3]) or on the ECDH compliant to TR-03111
[TR-03111] (i.e. the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA, cf. [ICAO-SAC] and
[TR-03111] for details). The shared secret value K used for deriving the AES or DES
session keys for message encryption and message authentication (PACE-KMAC,
6
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[selection: Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3, ECDH compliant to [TR-03111]]
8
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
9
[assignment: list of standards]
7
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PACE-KEnc) according to [ICAO-SAC] for the TSF required by
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
PACE PP Application note 27: FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE implicitly contains the
requirements for the hashing functions used for key derivation by demanding
compliance to [ICAO-SAC].
FCS_CKM.1/CA
Cryptographic key generation – Diffie- Hellman for Chip
Authentication session keys
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with the
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1[TR-03110-1] 10
based on the ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-03111] 11
with specified cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256, 320 bits in
combination with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES 12
FCS_CKM.1.1/
CA
and
based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol compliant to [RSA-PKCS#3]
and [TR-03110-1] 11 with specified cryptographic key size of 2048
bits in combination with 112 bits 3DES or 128, 192 or 256 bits AES
12
EAC PP Application note 12: FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements
for the hashing functions used for key derivation by demanding compliance to [ICAOSAC].
EAC PP Application note13: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the
terminal during the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1, see [TR-03110-1]. This
protocol may be based on the Diffie Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e.
10
[selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to [RSA-PKCS#3] and [TR-03110-1]
, based on an ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-03111] ]
11
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
12
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [RSA-PKCS#3]) or on the ECDH
compliant to TR-03111 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [TR03111] for
details). The shared secret value is used to derive the Chip Authentication Session
Keys used for encryption and MAC computation for secure messaging (defined in Key
Derivation Function [TR-03110-1]).
EAC PP Application note 14: The TOE implements keys for secure messaging from
any shared secrets of the Authentication Mechanisms. The Chip Authentication
Protocolv.1 uses SHA1 (cf. [TR-03110-1]). The TOE implements additional hash
functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1.
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Cryptographic key destruction – Session keys13
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physically overwriting
the keys14 that meets the following: none15.
FCS_CKM.4.1
PACE PP Application note 28: The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after
detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE
shall clear the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication
with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1.
EAC PP Application note 15: The TOE destroys any session keys in accordance
with FCS_CKM.4 after
(i)
detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and
(ii)
after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
(iii) The TOE destroys the PACE Session Keys after generation of a Chip
Authentication Session Keys and changing the secure messaging to the Chip
Authentication Session Keys.
(iv) The TOE clears the memory area of any session keys before starting the
communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by
FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip Authentication keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled
by FCS_CKM.1/CA. The TOE uses Java Card functionality for key destruction.
6.1.1.2 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
13
directly from [PACE-PP] except application note
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
15
[assignment: list of standards]
14
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FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES
/ 3DES
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled
byFCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled
byFCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm 3DES and AES in CBC mode
and cryptographic key sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and
256 bits that meet the following: compliant to [ICAO-SAC].
PACE PP Application note 29: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the
cryptographic primitive AES or 3DES for secure messaging with encryption of
transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step of PACE. The related
session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the PACE
protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc).
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Cryptographic operation MAC16
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail-MAC and CMAC and cryptographic key sizes:
respectively 112 and 128, 192, 256 bit that meet the following:
compliant to [ICAO-SAC].
PACE PP Application note 30: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the
cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with message authentication code over
transmitted data. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the
terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to theFCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
(PACE-KMAC).Note that in accordance with [ICAO-SAC] the (two-key) Triple-DES
could be used in Retail mode for secure messaging.
16
Taken from [PACE-PP]
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FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption /
Decryption17
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm 3DES and AES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes respectively 112 and 128, 192 and 256 bits that meet the
following [TR-03110-1].
EAC PP Application note 16: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the
cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-DES and/or AES) for secure messaging with
encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the
terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the
FCS_CKM.1/CA.
17
Taken from [PACE-PP]
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FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by travel
document
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification18 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA19
with cryptographic key sizes 192, 224 and 256 bits that meet the
following: ISO15946-2 specified in [ISO15946-2],in combination
SHA1, SHA224, SHA256 digest algorithms 20.
EAC PP Application note 17: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of
the assignments for the signature algorithms key lengths and standards implemented
by the TOE for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (cf. [TR-03110-1]). The
signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable certificates and the
authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE
challenge.
18
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
20
[assignment: list of standards]
19
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FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
travel document
2013-11-28
Cryptographic operation – Signature generation by
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_GEN
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation21 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and RSA22 with
cryptographic key sizes 192, 224, 256 and 320 bits for ECDSA and
1536, 1792 and 2048 bits for RSA23 that meet the following:
ISO15946-2 specified in [ISO15946-2] for ECDSA and ISO9796-2
specified in [ISO9796-2] for RSA, in combination with SHA1, SHA224,
and SHA256 digest algorithms specified in [NIST-180-4] for both
ECDSA and RSA signatures 24.
Guidance: This SFR has been added to this ST in order to support the signing of
challenges generated by the Inspection System as part of the optional Active
Authentication protocol specified in [ICAO-9303].
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/
CA_MAC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code25 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm 3DES Retail-MAC and AES CMAC 26
and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits 3DES and 128, 192 and
256 bits AES 27 that meet the following: [ICAO-9303] for 3DES
Retail-MAC and [NIST-800-38B] for AES CMAC 28.
21
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
23
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
24
[assignment: list of standards]
25
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
22
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EAC PP Application note18: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the
cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message
authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA. Furthermore
the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as Personalisation Agent by
means of the authentication mechanism.
26
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
28
[assignment: list of standards]
27
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6.1.1.3 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers29
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet Class DRG.3 of [KS2011]30.
PACE PP Application note 31: The TOE uses the provided platform functionality to
generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the authentication protocol
(PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
ST Application note 1: The class DRG.3 defines requirements for deterministic
RNGs. It shall not be possible to distinguish the generated random numbers from
output sequences from an ideal RNG by statistical tests, and the generated random
numbers sequence shall have at least some minimum amount of Min-entropy
(contained in the seed), and enhanced backward secrecy is ensured. The class
DRG.3 includes the requirements of class DRG.2.
While (DRG.2.2) and (DRG.2.3) require forward and backward secrecy (i.e., unknown
output value cannot be determined from known output values), the security
capabilities (DRG.3.2) and (DRG.3.3) additionally require enhanced backward
secrecy. This means that previous output values cannot even be determined with
knowledge of the current internal state and current and future output values.
Enhanced backward secrecy might be relevant, for instance, for software
implementations of a DRNG when the internal state has been compromised while all
random numbers generated in the past shall remain secret (e.g., cryptographic keys).
The requirements to a deterministic random generator of class DRG.3 are (see
[KS2011], ch. 4.8):
(DRG.3.1)If initialized with a random seed [selection: using a PTRNG of class PTG.2
as random source, using a PTRNG of class PTG.3 as random source, using an
NPTRNG of class NTG.1 [assignment: other requirements for seeding]], the internal
29
30
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
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state of the RNG shall [selection: have [assignment: amount of entropy], have
[assignment: work factor], require [assignment: guess work]].
(DRG.3.2) The RNG provides forward secrecy.
(DRG.3.3) The RNG provides backward secrecy even if the current internal state is
known.
(DRG.3.4) The RNG, initialized with a random seed [assignment: requirements for
seeding], generates output for which [assignment: number of strings] strings of bit
length 128 are mutually different with probability [assignment: probability].
(DRG.3.5) Statistical test suites cannot practically distinguish the random numbers
from output sequences of an ideal RNG. The random numbers must pass test
procedure A [assignment: additional test suites].
The platform provides a deterministic random number generator which provides
random numbers which meet class DRG.3 of [KS2011]. It is initialised with a random
seed using the certified TRNG of the underlying Hardware platform to Seed. The
internal state of the RNG has at least 100 bit MIN entropy. The RNG provides forward
secrecy. Enhanced backward secrecy is ensured. The random numbers have passed
test procedure A. The RNG provides forward secrecy and enhanced backward
secrecy. Initialized with a random seed - initialization is initiated at start-up when the
first APDU is received using the PTRNG of the HW platform conform to class P2 in
[AIS31] - generates output for which 235 strings of bit length 128 are mutually different
with probability above 1-2-37.
The predefined class DRG.3 of [KS2011] complies with class K4 of the former
definitions of [AIS20V1] (see [KS2011, 4.1 / 4.8]).
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6.1.2 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
EAC PP Application note 19: The following table provides an overview on the
authentication mechanisms used.
Name
Authentication Mechanism for
Personalisation Agents
SFR for the TOE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1
FIA_API.1/CA
FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol31
Passive Authentication
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Active Authentication
FIA_API.1/AA
Algorithms and key sizes
3DES with 112 bit keys
AES-128 bits
AES-192 bits
AES-256 bits
ECDH and DH PKCS#3 with
- 3DES Retail-MAC, 112
bit keys and
- AES-CMAC with 128,
192 and 256 bits
ECDSA with SHA1
ECDSA with SHA224
ECDSA with SHA256
as required by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
no related cryptographic
operations by the TOE
RSA: 1536, 1792 and 2048
bits in combination with
SHA1, SHA224 and SHA256
ECDSA: 192, 224, 256 and
320 bits in combination with
SHA1, SHA224 and SHA256
Table 5: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version1 as defined in this Security Target
includes
-
the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys
between the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key
and the Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
-
the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication
code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the
31
Only listed for information purposes.
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terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication
using non-blocking authorisation data32
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled
byFIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_AFL.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall detect when three33unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to authentication attempts using the
PACE password as shared password.34
FIA_AFL.1.2/
PACE
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall wait an administrator
configurable time, with a minimum of 1 second, before the next
authentication attempt can be performed35.
PACE PP Application note 32: The open assignment operation shall be performed
according to a concrete implementation of the TOE, whereby actions to be executed
by the TOE may either be common for all data concerned (PACE passwords, see
[ICAO-SAC]) or for an arbitrary subset of them or may also separately be defined for
each datum in question.
Since all non-blocking authorisation data (PACE passwords) being used as a shared
secret within the PACE protocol do not possess a sufficient entropy, the TOE shall not
allow a quick monitoring of its behaviour (e.g. due to a long reaction time) in order to
make the first step of the skimming attack requiring an attack potential beyond high,
so that the threat T.Tracing can be averted in the frame of the security policy of the
current PP.
One of some opportunities for performing this operation might be ‘consecutively
increase the reaction time of the TOE to the next authentication attempt using PACE
passwords’.
32
Taken from [PAC-PP]
[assignment: positive integer number]
34
[assignment: list of authentication events]
35
[assignment: list of actions]
33
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-SAC],
3. to read the Initialisation Data if it is not disabled by TSF,
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[TR-03110-1],
5. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1] according
to [TR-03110-1],
6. None 36
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
EAC PP Application note 20: The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE in the current PP
covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by EAC aspect 4. This
extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP. mediate
EAC PP Application note 21: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the
Manufacturer is the only user role known to the TOE which writes the Initialisation
Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in the audit records of the IC. The travel
document manufacturer may create the user role Personalisation Agent for transition
from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document”. The users in role
Personalisation Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication
key. After personalisation in the Phase 3 the PACE domain parameters, the Chip
Authentication data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data are written into the
TOE. The Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the
TOE i.e. the TOE will run the PACE protocol, to gain access to the Chip
Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i)
36
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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Extended Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol Version 1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication
as Personalisation Agent (using the Personalisation Agent Key).
EAC PP Application note 23: In the life-cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’ the
Manufacturer is the only user role known to the TOE. The Manufacturer writes the
Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in the audit records of the IC.
Please note that a Personalisation Agent acts on behalf of the travel document Issuer
under his and CSCA and DS policies. Hence, they define authentication procedure(s)
for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must functionally support these authentication
procedures being subject to evaluation within the assurance components ALC_DEL.1
and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role ‘Personalisation Agent’, when a
terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation Level as defined by the related
policy (policies).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FIA_UAU.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [ICAOSAC],
3. to read the Initialisation Data if it is not disabled by
TSF, according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the
authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
according to [TR-03110-1],
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1]
according to [TR-03110-1],
7. to carry out Personalisation Agent Authentication
based on a symmetric mechanism according to
[ICA0-9303] for 3DES and [ISO18013-3] for AES-128,
-192 and 256
8. None37
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UAU.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
EAC PP Application note 24: The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE. in the current PP covers
the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by EAC aspect 5. This extension
does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
EAC PP Application note 25: The user authenticated after a successfully performed
PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively
represent secrets, but are restricted revealable; i.e. it is either the travel document
holder itself or an authorised other person or device (BIS-PACE).If PACE was
successfully performed, secure messaging is started using the derived session keys
(PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc), cf. FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
37
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.4.1/
PACE
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-SAC],
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and
AES38
3. Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to
[TR-03110-1]
Application note 26: The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 in the current ST covers the definition in
PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by the EAC aspect 3. This extension does not
conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP. The generation of random numbers
(random nonce) used for the authentication protocol (PACE) and Terminal
Authentication as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE is required by FCS_RND.1 from
[PACE-PP].
Application note 27: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge
freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated
by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of
Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against
replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
38
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
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FIA_UAU.5/PACE
2013-11-28
Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5.1/
PACE
The TSF shall provide
1. PACE Protocol according to [ICAO-SAC]
2. Passive Authentication according to [ICAO-9303]
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to
[ICAO-SAC]
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on
Triple-DES and AES 39
5. Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to
[TR-03110-1]
to support user authentication.
39
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
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FIA_UAU.5.2/
PACE
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The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity
according to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging
with the key agreed with the terminal by means of the
PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt from the
Personalisation Agent by means of either
the ICAO BAC authentication mechanism and secure
messaging protocol defined in [ICAO-9303] for 112 bits
3DES
or
ISO18013 BAP authentication mechanism defined in
[ISO18013-3] for AES-128, 192 or 256 bits using AES
secure messaging (CMAC, IV value, tags) as specified in
EAC TR-03110 [TR-03110-1] 40
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
the TOE accepts only received commands with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the
terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism v.1
5. None41
EAC PP Application note28: The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE in the current PP covers
the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by EAC aspect 5). The SFR
FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP]
and extends it by EAC aspects 2), 3), 4)and 5). These extensions do not conflict with
the strict conformance to PACE PP.
40
41
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below(Common Criteria Part 2).
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FIA_UAU.6/EAC
TOE
2013-11-28
Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6.1/
EAC
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being
sent by the Inspection System.42
EAC PP Application note 29: The Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment and the Chip Authentication Protocol specified in [ICAO-9303] include
secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each
command based on a corresponding MAC algorithm whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for further details).
The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication
code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and
accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated user.
42
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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FIA_UAU.6/PACE
TOE
2013-11-28
Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6.1/
PACE
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the
PACE protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE
Terminal.43
PACE PP Application note 37: The PACE protocol specified in [ICAO-SAC] starts
secure messaging used for all commands exchanged after successful PACE
authentication. The TOE checks each command by secure messaging in encryptthen-authenticate mode based on CMAC or Retail-MAC, whether it was sent by the
successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details).
The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication
code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the terminal connected, if a secure
messaging error occurred, and accepts only those commands received from the
initially authenticated terminal.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
43
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/CA
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [TR-03110-1]44 to prove the identity of the TOE.45
EAC PP Application note 30: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip
Authentication Mechanism v.1 specified in [TR-03110-1]. The TOE and the terminal
generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two
session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to [ICAO-9303].
The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the travel document’s
chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private
Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/AA
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol
according to [ICAO-9303]46 to prove the identity of the TOE.47
44
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
[assignment: authorized user or role]
46
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
47
[assignment: authorized user or role]
45
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6.1.3 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP48 on terminals
gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of
the logical travel document 49
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
48
49
[assignment: access control SFP]
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM
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Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 50 to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Terminal,
b. BIS-PACE
c. Extended Inspection System
2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16, EF.SOD and EF.COM of the logical
travel document51,
b. data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document,
c. data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document,
d. all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored
in the travel document
3. Security attributes:
a. PACE Authentication
b. Terminal Authentication v.1
c. Authorisation of the Terminal52
FDP_ACF.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [ICAO-SAC] after a successful
PACE authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.53
FDP_ACF.1.3/
TRM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none54
50
[assignment: access control SFP]
e.g. Chip Authentication Version 1 and ephemeral keys
52
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
53
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
54
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
51
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FDP_ACF.1.4/
TRM
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The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:
1. Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE
authenticated BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write,
to modify, to use any User Data stored on the travel
document.
2. Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to
read, to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the
travel document.
3. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG
3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2b) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
4. Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as
Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG
4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is not allowed to read the data
objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5. Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6. Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.55
EAC PP Application note 32: The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in the current ST covers
the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by additional subjects and
objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in the current ST
cover the definition in PACE PP. The SFR FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in the current ST
covers the definition in PACE PP and extends it by 3) to 6).These extensions do not
conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
EAC PP Application note 33: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in
the CVC of the inspection system is defined in [TR-03110-1]. The TOE verifies the
certificate chain established by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the
Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3).
The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorization in
the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier
Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
55
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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EAC PP Application note 34: Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD)
stored in EF.SOD (see [ICAO-9303]) does not belong to the user data, but to the TSF
data. The document Security Object can be read out by Inspection Systems using
PACE, see [ICAO-SAC].
EAC PP Application note 35: FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the
protection of the User Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication codes after successful Chip
Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection System. The Password Authenticated
Connection Establishment and the Chip AuthenticationProtocolv.1establish different
key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption and the
message authentication key).
PACE PP Application note 41: Please note that the control on the user data
transmitted between the TOE and the PACE terminal is addressed by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection56
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content
of a resource is made unavailable upon the de-allocation of the
resource from the following objects:
1. Session Keys (immediately after closing related
communication session)
2. the ephemeral private key ephem-SKPICC-PACE (by
having generated a DH shared secret K)57
3. None58
PP PACE Application note 42: The functional family FDP_RIP possesses such a
general character, so that it is applicable not only to user data (as assumed by the
class FDP), but also to TSF-data; in this respect it is similar to the functional family
FPT_EMS. Applied to cryptographic keys, FDP_RIP.1 requires a certain quality metric
(‘any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable’) for key’s
56
Taken from [PACE-PP]
according to [ICAO-SAC]
58
[assignment: list of objects]
57
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destruction in addition to FCS_CKM.4 that merely requires a fact of key destruction
according to a method/standard.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD59
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled
byFDP_ACC.1/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP60
to be able to transmit and receive61 user data in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
Data exchange integrity62
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP63 to be able to
transmit and receive64 user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
FDP_UIT.1.1/
TRM
FDP_UIT.1.2/
TRM
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay65 has
occurred.
59
taken from [PACE-PP]
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
61
[selection: transmit, receive]
62
taken from [PACE-PP]
63
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
64
[selection: transmit, receive]
65
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
60
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6.1.4 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE66
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between it
self and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct
from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/
PACE
The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the
Terminal.67
PACE PP Application note 43: The trusted IT product is the terminal. In
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE, the word “initiate” is changed to ‘enforce”, as the TOE is a
passive device that can not initiate the communication. All the communication are
initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted channel.
PACE PP Application note 44: The trusted channel is established after successful
performing the PACE protocol (FIA_UAU.1/PACE). If the PACE was successfully
performed, secure messaging is immediately started using the derived session keys
(PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc): this secure messaging enforces preventing tracing while
Passive Authentication and the required properties of operational trusted channel; the
cryptographic primitives being used for the secure messaging are as required by
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENCand FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
The establishing phase of the PACE trusted channel does not enable tracing due to
the requirementsFIA_AFL.1/PACE.
PACE PP Application note 45: Please note that the control on the user data stored
in the TOE is addressed by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
66
67
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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6.1.5 Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage68
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer69 with the capability to
store the Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data70 in the audit
records.
PP PACE Application note 46: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity
assumed by the TOE in the life cycle phase ‘manufacturing’. The IC manufacturer and
the travel document manufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialisation
and/or Pre-personalisation Data as TSF-data into the TOE.
The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document
(seeFMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also
be such audit records which cannot be read out, but directly used by the TOE.
6.1.6 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions71
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalisation
3. Personalisation
4. Configuration72
68
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[assignment: authorised users]
70
[assignment: list of audit information]
71
Taken from [PACE-PP]
72
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
69
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EAC PP Application note 36: The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE provides basic
requirements to the management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified
below.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Security roles
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1/
PACE
The TSF shall maintain the roles:
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalisation Agent,
3. Terminal,
4. PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6. Document Verifier,
7. Domestic Extended Inspection System
8. Foreign Extended Inspection System 73
FMT_SMR.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
EAC PP Application note 37: The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in the current ST
covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by 5) to 8). This extension
does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
EAC PP Application note 38: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the
management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE
over the life-cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
73
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_LIM.1
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Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited
availability(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be
disclosed.74
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2
74
75
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capability
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be
disclosed. 75
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
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EAC PP Application note 39: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in
FMT_LIM.2.1might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no
longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality).
Nevertheless the combination ofFMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide
an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to
both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
EAC PP Application note 40: The following SFR are iterations of the component
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to
those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different
management functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing Initialisation and Prepersonalisation Data76
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled
byFMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 77the Initialisation
Data and Pre-personalisation Data78 to the Manufacturer.79
76
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
78
[assignment: list of TSF data]
79
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
77
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FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Reading and Using Initialisation
and Pre-personalisation Data80
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled
by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation
Data and Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation
Agent.
PACE PP Application note 49: The TOE may restrict the ability to write the
Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation Data by (i) allowing writing these data
only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the manufacturing
phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisation Data (as required by
FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique identification of the IC being
used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases ‘manufacturing’ and ‘issuing’, but being
not needed and may be misused in the ‘operational use’. Therefore, read and use
access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the ‘operational use’ by the
Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life cycle phase ‘issuing’
to the life cycle phase ‘operational use’.
FMT_MTD.1/PA
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
Personalisation Agent81
No other components.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled
by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PA
80
81
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Security Object (SOD)to the Personalisation Agent.
Taken from [PACE-PP]
Taken from [PACE-PP]
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PACE PP Application note 50: By writing SOD into the TOE, the Personalisation
Agent confirms (on behalf of DS) the correctness and genuineness of all the
personalisation data related. This consists of user-and TSF- data.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA
Certificate and Current Date
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write82 the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate,
3. initial Current Date,
4. none83
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
to the Personalization Agent84
EAC PP Application note 41: The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key may be written by the Manufacturer in the production or prepersonalisation phase or by the Personalisation Agent (cf. [TR-03110-1]). The initial
Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Keys (and their updates later on) are
used to verify the Country Verifying Certification Authority Link-Certificates. The initial
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate and the initial Current Date is
needed for verification of the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal
Authorization.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
Certification Authority
Hierarchical to:
Management of TSF data – Country Verifying
No other components.
82
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
[assignment: list of TSF data]
84
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
83
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Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update85 the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate.86
to Country Verifying Certification Authority 87
EAC PP Application note 42: The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates
its asymmetric key pair and distributes the public key be means of the Country
Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf. [TR-03110-1]). The TOE updates its internal trustpoint if a valid Country Verifying CA Link-Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by
the terminal (cf. [TR-03110-1]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify88 the Current date89
to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System90.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
EAC PP Application note 43: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate
(cf. [TR-03110-1]) and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf.
FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder
Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for the
identification and the Terminal authentication v.1 (cf. to [TR-03110-1]).
85
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
[assignment: list of TSF data]
87
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
88
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
89
[assignment: list of TSF data]
90
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
86
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
2013-11-28
Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load 91 the Chip
Authentication Private Key92 to the Personalization Agent93.
EAC PP Application note 44: The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by (i)
selecting other operations and (ii) defining a selection for the operations “create” and
“load” to be performed by the ST writer. The verb “load” means here that the Chip
Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside the TOE and written into the
TOE memory. The verb “create” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key
is generated by the TOE itself. In the latter case the ST writer shall include an
appropriate instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1/CA as SFR for this key
generation. The ST writer shall perform the assignment for the authorized identified
roles in the SFR component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK.
REMARK: The TOE supports only secure loading of the Chip Authentication Private
Key. Secure loading of the Chip Authentication Private Key is restricted by the TOE to
the Personalisation Agent only.
91
selection: create, load]
[assignment: list of TSF data]
93
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
92
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FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
2013-11-28
Active Authentication Private Key (AA)
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load 94 the Active
Authentication Private Key95 to the Personalization Agent96.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read97 the
1. PACE passwords,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalisation Agent Keys
4. Active Authentication Private Key 98
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
to none.99
EAC PP Application note 45: The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ in the current ST
covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP] and extends it by additional TSF data.
This extension does not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified
below(Common Criteria Part 2)
94
selection: create, load]
[assignment: list of TSF data]
96
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
97
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
98
[assignment: list of TSF data]
99
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
95
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FMT_MTD.3
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Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 and the Access Control 100.
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1. the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the
expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
2. the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE and
the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
3. the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
EAC PP Application note 46: The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for
Extended Inspection System as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and
100
[assignment: list of TSF data]
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FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access control
required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM.
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6.1.7 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data
and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the
inherent leakage. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1)
prevent by passing, deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse
of TOE functions.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1
TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit variations in power consumption or
variations in timing during command execution101 in excess of
non-useful information102 enabling access to
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SKPICC-PACE,
4. Active Authentication Private Key103,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and
7. none.104
101
[assignment: types of emissions]
[assignment: specified limits]
103
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
104
[assignment: list of types of user data]
102
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FPT_EMS.1.2
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The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access
to:
1. Chip Authentication Session Keys
2. PACE session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3. the ephemeral private key ephem SKPICC-PACE,
4. Active Authentication Private Key 105,
5. Personalisation Agent Key(s),
6. Chip Authentication Private Key and
7. none.106
EAC PP Application note 48: The ST writer shall perform the operation in
FPT_EMS.1.1 andFPT_EMS.1.2. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed
secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of
the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces of the TOE or may be
originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that
varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of
measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to
implement the smart card. The travel document’s chip can provide a smart card
contactless interface and contact based interface according to ISO/IEC 7816-2
[ISO7816] as well (in case the package only provides a contactless interface the
attacker might gain access to the contacts anyway). Examples of measurable
phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the
timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data
transmissions.
105
106
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
[assignment: list of types of user data]
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FPT_FLS.1
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Failure with preservation of secure state107
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when
the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to operating conditions
causing a TOE malfunction,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to
FPT_TST.1,
3. None
FPT_TST.1
TSF Testing108
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial
start-up109 to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of the TSF data.110
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.111
PACE PP Application note 52: If the travel document’s chip uses state of the art
smart card technology, it will run some self tests at the request of an authorised user
and some self tests automatically. E.g. a self test for the verification of the integrity of
stored TSF executable code required by FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial
start-up by the ‘authorised user’ Manufacturer in the life cycle phase‘ Manufacturing’.
Other self tests may automatically run to detect failures and to preserve the secure
state according to FPT_FLS.1 in the phase ‘operational use’, e.g. to check a
107
Taken from [PACE-PP]
Taken from [PACE-PP]
109
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at
the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
110
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data ]
111
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF ]
108
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calculation with a private key by the reverse calculation with the corresponding public
key as a counter measure against Differential Failure Analysis.
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack112
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical
probing113 to the TSF114 by responding automatically such that
the SFRs are always enforced.
PACE PP Application note 53: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to
continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of
these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on
all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is required
ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, ‘automatic response’
means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
(ii)countermeasures are provided at any time.
112
113
114
Taken from [PACE-PP]
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The security assurance requirements (SAR) for the evaluation of the TOE and its
development and operating environment are those taken from the Evaluation
Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) augmented by the following components:
-
ALC_DVS.2,
-
ATE_DPT.3 and
-
AVA_VAN.5.
EAC PP Application note 49: The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack
potential. This includes intermediate storage in the chip as well as secure channel
communications established using the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
(OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document). If the TOE is operated in non-certified mode
using the BAC-established communication channel, the confidentiality of the standard
data shall be protected against attackers with at least Enhanced-Basic attack potential
(AVA_VAN.3).
The following table lists all SARs for the evaluation of the TOE:
Assurance class
Assurance component
Denotation
Development
ADV_ARC.1
Security architecture description
ADV_COMP.1
Design compliance with the
platform certification report,
guidance and ETR_COMP
ADV_FSP.5
Complete semi-formal functional
specification with additional error
information
ADV_IMP.1
Implementation representation of
the TSF
ADV_INT.2
Well-structured internals
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Assurance class
Guidance
documents
Life-cycle support
Security Target
evaluation
Assurance component
Denotation
ADV_TDS.4
Semiformal modular design
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance
procedures and automation
ALC_CMS.5
Development tools CM coverage
ALC_COMP.1
Integration of the application into
the underlying platform and
Consistency check for delivery and
acceptance procedures
ALC_DEL.1
Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle statel
ALC_TAT.2
Tools and techniques –
Compliance with implementation
standards
ASE_CCL.1
Conformance claims
ASE_COMP.1
Consistency of Security Target
ASE_ ECD.1
Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2
PP claims
ASE_REQ.2
IT security requirements
ASE_SPD.1
Security problem definition
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Assurance class
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
2013-11-28
Assurance component
Denotation
ASE_TSS.1
TOE summary specification
ATE_COMP.1
Composite product functional
testing
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.3
Depth – Testing: modular design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing – sample
AVA_COMP.1
Composite product vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Table 1: Security Assurance Requirements
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling
of the MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides the assurance that the TOE is
shown to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Malfunction.
The Assurance Requirements for the selected level EAL 5 augmented are described
in the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation documents. They are not listed in
detail here.
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6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Functional Security Requirements Rationale
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
115
SFRs and security objectives from [PACE PP] are marked in italic letters.
SFRs and security objectives from [EAC PP] are marked in normal letters.
117
SFRs and security objectives introduced additionally by the ST are marked in italic and bold letters.
118
SFRs from [PACE PP] which are extended in EAC PP are marked in bold letters.
116
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OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Tracing
x
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
x
x
x
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
x
x
x
x
OT.Identification
x
x
x
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Integrity
FAU_SAS.1115
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA116
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1//CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN 117
FCS_RND.1
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE118
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
FIA_API.1/CA
FIA_API.1/AA
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_RIP.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements
coverage.
Security Target Lite
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
x
x
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Identification
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Data_Confidentiality
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Data_Authenticity
x
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
FMT_MTD.1/PA
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
OT.Tracing
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 6: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the
storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory,
whereby they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s
chip. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Prepersonalisation Data (including the Personalisation Agent key set). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation Agent to disable access to
Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle phase ‘operational use’. The
SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
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The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical
travel document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel
document. The justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with
respect to the Pre-personalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel
document data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the same way: only the successfully
authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once. FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the
related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally, personalization data).
The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation Agent) and the
SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalisation).
The SFRs FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to the
Personalisation Agent Keys, the Chip Authentication Private Key and the Active
Authentication Private key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by
TSF according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE.
If the Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the
Personalisation Agent Keys, the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for
the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation of the new
session keys after Chip Authentication v.1), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication).
If the Personalisation Terminal wants to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalisation Agent Key, the TOE will use TSF
according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE
to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s
chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is
addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by
(FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to
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write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document
(FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (cf.FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM).
FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on
the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the
Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy. The
Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according to
FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required
specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data
exchange, a prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE
Authentication (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
and possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication
v.1 and Terminal Authentication v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of
session keys (here: for KMAC).The TOE supports the inspection system detect any
modification of the transmitted logical travel document data after Chip Authentication
v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection
of the transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENCand FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Active
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations
needed.
The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the Userand TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the
terminal-side and by an active verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly
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achieved by FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for
establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal
Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. and possessing the special properties
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires
erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required
specific properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts
the access to the PACE passwords, the Chip Authentication Private Key and the
Active Authentication Private Key.
FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on
the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the
Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as trustworthy.
The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations
needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and
roles related.
The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures
confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication
resp. Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged.
This objective for the data stored is mainly achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent
some required specific properties of the protocols used.
This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM and FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC resp.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a
successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and
possessing the special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for
Kenc). The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE
passwords , the Chip Authentication Private Key and the Active Authentication Private
Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data
stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by
the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered trustworthy .
The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general support for cryptographic operations
needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and
roles related.
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The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf“ Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM
and FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by
successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid
certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFRs FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE require the identification and
authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the
successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as
Extended Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA
v.1 the reuse of authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6/EAC and FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the
transmitted data after Chip Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the
generation of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the
generation of shared secret and for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The
SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Active
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized
identified role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and
FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof“ Proof of travel document’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocolv.1 provided by
FIA_API.1/CA and by Active Authentication provided by FIA_API.1/AA proving the
identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocolv.1 defined by FCS_CKM.1/CA
is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication
Protocolv.1 [TR-03110-1] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for
the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
(for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging). The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions and roles related.
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The Active Authentication defined by FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN for the generation of the
RSA Signature is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as
required by FMT_MTD.1/AAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. According to
FDP_ACF.1, only the successfully authenticated Inspection Systems are allowed to
request active authentication (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 2).
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after
TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
travel document’s chip against disclosure
-
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
-
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
-
by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing
data by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through
establishing or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE
without a priori knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).
This objective is achieved as follows:
(i)
while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (non-blocking
authorization data) – by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;
(ii)
for listening to PACE communication (is of importance for the current PP,
since SOD is card-individual) – FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
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The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by
(i)
the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and
TSF code, and
(ii)
the SFRFPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure
or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the
basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional
requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional
components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately
explained.
The table 8 shows the dependencies between the SFR and of the SFR to the SAR of
the TOE.
SFR
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
from [PACE-PP]
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
Dependencies
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic
key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation]
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
Support of the
Dependencies
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
from [PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
from [PACE-PP] and
FCS_CKM.1/CA
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
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SFR
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
Dependencies
data with security attributes,
or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user
data with security attributes,
or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user
data without security
attributes, or FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic
key destruction
No dependencies
Support of the
Dependencies
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
and
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
from
[PACE-PP]
n.a.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
No dependencies
Fulfilled by
FIA_UID.1/PACE
n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_API.1/CA
No dependencies
n.a.
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the
Dependencies
FIA_API.1/AA
No dependencies
n.a.
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
Fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
justification 1 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/ PA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
from
[PACE-PP]
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SFR
Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.3
FPT_EMS.1
Support of the
Dependencies
Fulfilled by
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1
Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
No dependencies
n.a.
Table 7: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes
which are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of
the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL5 was chosen to permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices
supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such
a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements,
relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will
not be large.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling
of the MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the
security by vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks
performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability
analysis is necessary to fulfill the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
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The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:
-
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Security architecture description
Complete functional specification
Basic modular design
Implementation representation of the TSF
Operational user guidance
Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs)
and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive
and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support
and internal consistency demonstrates:
-
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and nonsatisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
-
All subjects and objects addressed by more than one SFR in sec. 6.1 are also
treated in a consistent way: the SFRs impacting them do not require any
contradictory property and behaviour of these ‘shared’ items.
-
The assurance class EAL5 is an established set of mutually supportive and
internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the
sensitive assurance components in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance
Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually
supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied
and no inconsistency appears.
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Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if
there are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility
which has been shown not to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also
discussed in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the
chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So
the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each
other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of
security requirements.
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7 TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS)
This section provides a description of the security functions and assurance measures of
the TOE that meet the TOE security requirements.
The TOE provides security features (SF) which can be associated to following groups:
• Identification and Authentication mechanisms
•
Cryptographic functions support
•
Access control /Storage and protection of logical travel document data
•
Secure messaging
•
Security and Life-cycle management
Moreover the TOE will protect itself against interference, logical tampering and bypass.
The security functionality of the TOE respectively the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport applet will be externally available to the user by APDU commands according to
the access conditions specified by the according policies considering the life cycle state,
user role and security state.
The following sub paragraphs shows how these security features satisfy the security
functional requirements (SFRs) specified in chapter 6.1.
7.1 SF.I&A Identification and Authentication
The different authentication mechanisms are supported by APDU commands and
parameters using the cryptographic functions provided by the platform. The authentication
mechanisms are enforced by protocols and APDU methods as specified in the functional
specification.
Note that Symmetric Basic Access Control (BAC) Authentication Mechanism is supported
by the TOE but not covered by this Security Target.
The TOE supports the following authentication mechanisms:
1. Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
2. EAC Chip Authentication v. 1
3. EAC Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
4. Authentication of the Personalization Agent with a personalisation key set based on a
symmetric authentication mechanism.
5. ICAO Active Authentication
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SF.I&A.1
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE)
This security functionality realizes the PACE authentication mechanism as described in [ICAO-SAC]
and [TR-03110-1]. In OPERATIONAL life-cycle state the TOE supports both CAN and MRZ as input
parameters.
The implementation of PACE contributes to:
• FIA_AFL.1/ PACE, Authentication failure handling – PACE authentication using nonblocking authorisation data. The TOE increases the reaction time of the TOE after an
unsuccessful authentication attempt with a wrong PACE passwords.
• FIA_UID.1/ PACE, Timing of identification
The TOE allows to carry out the PACE Protocol after successful user identification
• FIA_UAU.1/ PACE, Timing of identification
The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data related to the PACE protocol, i.e. according
authentication mechanisms.
• FIA_UAU.4/PACE, Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
• FIA_UAU.5/ PACE, Multiple authentication mechanisms to support user authentication.
The TOE provides multiple authentication mechanisms, PACE, symmetric key based
authentication mechanism, etc.
• FIA_UAU.6/PACE, Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
The TOE re-authenticates the connected terminal, if a secure messaging error occurred.
• FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE, Diffie-Hellman key generation for PACE session keys
provided by SF.CF.6
• FCS_CKM.4, Cryptographic key destruction – Session keys
provided by SF.CF.7
• FCS_COP.1/ PACE_ENC, Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES / 3DES
provided by SF.CF.1
• FCS_COP.1/ PACE_MAC, Cryptographic operation MAC/CMAC
provided by SF.CF.1
• FDP_ACF.1/TRM, Security attribute based access control,
provided by SF.AC
• FDP_UCT.1/TRM,Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
provided by SF.AC
• FDP_UIT.1/TRM,Data exchange integrity
provided by SF.AC
• FDP_RIP.1, Subset residual information protection
provided by SF.AC
• FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, Management of TSF data – Key Read
protection of PACE Passwords
provided by SF.LCM.6
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SF.I&A.2
Chip Authentication v.1 of the travel document’s chip
The Chip Authentication v.1 protocol establishes Secure Messaging between an MRTD chip and a
terminal based on a static private key stored on the MRTD chip and enables the terminal to verify that
the MRTD chip is genuine. The protocol in version 1 provides implicit authentication of both the
MRTD chip itself and the stored data by performing Secure Messaging using the new session keys.
The implementation Chip Authentication v1. contributes to
• FIA_API.1/CA, Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
Requires to implement Chip Authentication.
• FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message authentication code.
Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only
those commands received from the previously authenticated user.
• FMT_SMR.1, Security Roles
provided by SF.LCM.2
• FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, Chip Authentication Private Key
provided by SF.LCM.2
• FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, Management of TSF data – Key Read
provided by SF.LCM.6
SF.I&A.3
Terminal Authentication v.1 for Extended Access Control
Terminal Authentication v.1 protocol for Extended Access Control uses the secure messaging
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Domestic and foreign Extended Inspection Systems have the certificates (provided by the Country
Verifier Certification Authority and Document Verifier) to use Terminal Authentication.
The implementation of Terminal Authentication v.1 contributes to
• FIA_UAU.5/ PACE, Multiple authentication mechanisms required to provide Terminal
Authentication v1
• FIA_UID.1/ PACE, Timing of identification
• FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (ECDSA signatures only)
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SF.I&A.4
Authentication of the Personalization Agent based on a symmetric
authentication mechanism
In PERSONALISATION life-cycle state the TOE enforces mutual authentication between
Personalisation Agent and TOE based on either of the following symmetric key authentication
mechanisms.
• ICAO BAC authentication mechanism and secure messaging protocol defined in [ICAO-9303]
for 112 bits 3DES with pre-installed MAC, ENC (and KEK) keys as Personalisation Agent Key
set.
• ISO18013 BAP authentication mechanism defined in [ISO18013-3] for AES-128, 192 or 256
bits using AES secure messaging (CMAC, IV value, tags etc.) as specified in EAC TR-03110
[TR-03110-1] with pre-installed MAC, ENC (and KEK) keys as Personalisation Agent Key set.
The Personalization Agent authenticates by two symmetric keys (MAC and ENC). The KEK key may
be used for secure replacement of an existing key set.
The Personalisation Key values and as well as the secure messaging protocol are installed and
configured into the TOE by the Manufacturer during pre-personalisation. In both PREPERSONALISATION and PERSONALISATION life-cycle state the TOE supports the reading of IC
Identification data for supporting key diversification of the Personalisation Agent Key set.
The implementation contributes to
• FIA_UAU.5/PACE, Multiple authentication mechanisms,
requires to authenticate the Personalization Agent by symmetric authentication
mechanisms Triple-DES or AES which is provided by the TOE.
• FIA_UAU.4/PACE Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
• FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of authentication
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
SF.I&A.5
Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip
This protocol provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity as described in [ICAO-9303]. The
TOE support Active Authentication for both RSA and ECDSA mechanisms. Active Authentication may
be used by Generic, Basic and Extended Inspection Systems.
The implementation of Active Authentication contributes to
• FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
provided by SF.LCM.2
• FMT_MTD.1/AAPK, Active Authentication Private Key
provided by SF.LCM.2
• FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, Management of TSF data – Key Read
provided by SF.LCM.6
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN, Cryptographic operation – Signature generation by travel document
(RSA and ECDSA)
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7.2 SF.CF Cryptographic functions support
Cryptographic function support is provided by the underlying JCOP platform, i.e. the TOE
relies on the underlying platform for performing its required cryptographic operations.
SF.CF Cryptographic functions include:
1. 3DES and AES cipher operations for secure messaging
2. Digest calculations (SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256)
3. Signature generation (ECDSA, RSA)
4. Signature verification (ECDSA, RSA)
5. Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement (ECDH and DH)
6. Key Generation (PACE ECDH/DH ephemeral keys and secure messaging MAC and
ENC session keys)
7. Key Destruction
8. True Random Number generation
With respect to the ECC domain parameters for the elliptic curve cryptographic functions
supported by the TOE in this section, the following application note is applicable.
ST Application note 2
The ECC Brainpool and NIST domain parameters are regarded cryptographically strong by
the German Certification body, the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI) see [TR-02102]. The FRP256v1 have been defined by French Certification Body,
Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (ANSSI) and are also
regarded as cryptographically strong, see [ANSSI-FRP256V1].
SF.CF.1 3DES and AES cipher operations for secure messaging
3DES (112 bit keys) and AES (128, 192 and 256 bit keys) are provided by the platform. The TOE
uses 3DES and AES for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and Message Authentication Code (MAC for
DES, CMAC for AES) generation and verification.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_COP.1/ PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption
• FCS_COP.1/ PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation MAC
• FCS_COP.1/ CA_ENC Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
• FCS_COP.1/ CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – Cryptographic operation MAC
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SF.CF.2 Digest calculations (SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256)
The platform digest functions are used by the ePassport implementations of:
• PACE:
o
SHA-1 is used for deriving Kπ from MRZ data according to [ICAO-SAC] and [TR03110-1]
o
SHA-1 is used for deriving 3DES and AES-128 MAC and ENC sessions keys
according to [TR-03110-3] section A.2.3.1
o
SHA-256 is used for deriving AES-192 and AES-256 MAC and ENC sessions keys
according to [TR-03110-3] section A.2.3.2
• Chip Authentication v1:
o
SHA-1 is used for compression of DH public key according to [TR-03110-3], section
A.2.2.3.
o
SHA-1 is used for deriving 3DES and AES-128 MAC and ENC sessions keys
according to [TR-03110-3] section A.2.3.1
o
SHA-256 is used for deriving AES-192 and AES-256 MAC and ENC sessions keys
according to [TR-03110-3] section A.2.3.2
• Active Authentication
SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 are used by the TOE for the hash calculation and the
creation of the ISO9796 signature format with explicit hash identifier prior to calling the
platform RSA signature generation function.
• [Basic Access Control] (not part of this ST)119
The TOE implements the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to derive the
keys for secure messaging from the shared secrets of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism (cf. [ICAO-9303], Volume 2, Appendix 5 to Section IV. par. A5.1).
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
• FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
• FCS_CKM.1/CA (implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for key
derivation)
• FIA_API.1/AA
119
BAC support in the OPERATIONAL life-cycle state is not applicable within the scope of this document. This
document addresses the TOE in SAC/EAC configuration only. BAC may be configured next to PACE, however
Inspection systems MUST use PACE instead of BAC in order not to break the Common Criteria certification.
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SF.CF.3 Signature generation (ECDSA, RSA)
Signature generation functions performed by the ePassport implementation for:
• Active Authentication - ECDSA cf. [ISO15946-2]:
o
Supported key sizes within the scope of this ST are 192, 224, 256 and 320 bits
o
Supported domain parameters for ECDSA in accordance with [RFC-5639], [NIST186-3] and [ANSSI-FRP256V1]:
o
Brainpool192r1
Brainpool224r1
Brainpool256r1
Brainpool320r1
NIST P-192 (secp192r1)
NIST P-224 (secp224r1)
NIST P-256 (secp256r1)
ANSSI FRP256v1
Supported signature formats:
ECDSA_SHA-1
ECDSA_SHA-224
ECDSA_SHA-256
• Active Authentication - RSA cf. [ISO9796-2]:
o
Supported key sizes within the scope of this ST are 1536, 1792 and 2048 bits
o
Supported signature formats:
ISO9796 with SHA-1 (with implicit hash identifier)
ISO9796 with SHA-224 (with explicit hash identifier)
ISO9796 with SHA-256 (with explicit hash identifier)
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN (Supports ECDSA and RSA signature generation)
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SF.CF.4 Signature verification (ECDSA)
All signature verifications are performed by the platform. SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 hash values
are calculated by platform as part of the signature verification calls made by the ePassport
implementation. The TOE performs signature verification of CV certificates during Terminal
Authentication v1. cf. [TR-03110-3] section A.6.4.
Signature verification functions performed by the ePassport implementation:
• Terminal Authentication v.1 - ECDSA cf. [TR-03110-1] and [ISO 15946-2]
o
Supported key sizes within the scope of this ST are 192, 224 and 256 bits
o
TOE supports the Brainpool [RFC-5639], NIST [NIST-186-3] and ANSSI
[ANSSI-FRP256V1] defined ECC curves with cofactor =1. For a Common Criteria
EAL5+ certified product only the following ECC domain parameters may be
configured for ECDH during personalisation:
o
Brainpool192r1
Brainpool224r1
Brainpool256r1
Brainpool320r1
NIST P-192 (secp192r1)
NIST P-224 (secp224r1)
NIST P-256 (secp256r1)
ANSSI FRP256v1
Supported signature formats:
ECDSA_SHA-1
ECDSA_SHA-224
ECDSA_SHA-256
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (ECDSA signature verification)
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SF.CF.5
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Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement (ECDH and DH)
Diffie-Hellman key agreement function performed by the ePassport implementation during PACE:
• ECDH: Diffie-Hellman key agreement with EC over GF(p) [DH],[ISO15946-3] and
[TR-03111]:
o
Supported key sizes within the scope of this ST are 192, 224, 256 and 320 bits
o
TOE supports the Brainpool [RFC-5639], NIST [NIST-186-3] and ANSSI
[ANSSI-FRP256V1] defined ECC curves with cofactor =1. For a Common Criteria
EAL5+ certified product only the following ECC domain parameters may be
configured for ECDH during personalisation:
Brainpool192r1
Brainpool224r1
Brainpool256r1
Brainpool320r1
NIST P-192 (secp192r1)
NIST P-224 (secp224r1)
NIST P-256 (secp256r1)
ANSSI FRP256v1
Diffie-Hellman key agreement function performed by the ePassport implementation during Chip
Authentication (CA):
• ECDH: Diffie-Hellman key agreement with EC over GF(p) [DH],[ISO15946-3] and
[TR-03111]:
o
Supported key sizes within the scope of this ST are 192, 224, 256 and 320 bits
o
TOE supports the Brainpool [RFC-5639], NIST [NIST-186-3] and ANSSI
[ANSSI-FRP256V1] defined ECC curves with cofactor =1. For a Common Criteria
EAL5+ certified product only the following ECC domain parameters may be
configured for ECDH during personalisation:
Brainpool192r1
Brainpool224r1
Brainpool256r1
Brainpool320r1
NIST P-192 (secp192r1)
NIST P-224 (secp224r1)
NIST P-256 (secp256r1)
ANSSI FRP256v1
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• DH: PKCS#3 Diffie-Hellman key agreement according to [DH], [RSA-PKCS#3]
o
Supported key size within the scope of this ST are:
2048 bits
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FIA_API.1/CA
• FCS_CKM.1/CA
• FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
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SF.CF.6
Cryptographic key generation
The TOE uses Java Card platform functionality for key generation. The TOE supports (on board)
session key generation for the following cryptographic keys:
• PACE protocol
(available in TOE’s OPERATIONAL and PERSONALISATION Life-cycle state)
o
Ephemeral ECDH during PACE protocol
o
MAC and ENC 3DES, AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 bits session keys for secure
messaging in MAC_ENC mode derived from the Diffie-Hellman agreed shared
secret.
• Chip Authentication v1 protocol
o
MAC and ENC 3DES, AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 bits session keys for secure
messaging in MAC_ENC mode derived from the Diffie-Hellman agreed shared
secret. (available in PERSONALISATION and OPERATIONAL life-cycle state)
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for PACE session
keys
• FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication
session keys
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Destruction of cryptographic keys
• The TOE uses Java Card platform functionality for key destruction. A special
javacard.security method of the JCOP platform is used. The transient keys will be
reset by the JCOP platform if a deselect of the ePassport application or a reset occurs in an
authenticated phase of the TOE.
• The TOE destroys all session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 after
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and
after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1.
The TOE destroys the MAC and ENC secure messaging session keys derived by
PACE after generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and changing the
secure messaging to the Chip Authentication Session Keys.
(iv) The TOE clears the memory area of any session keys before starting the
communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by
FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip Authentication keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_CKM.4/ Cryptographic key destruction – Session keys
• FDP_RIP.1.
SF.CF.8
Random number generation
The TOE uses platform for true random number generation.
• Platform function used by the ePassport implementation provides random number
generation in accordance with class DRG.3 of [KS2011]
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FCS_RND.1/ Quality metric for random numbers
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7.3 SF.ILTB Protection against interference, logical tampering and
bypass
SF.ILTB.1
Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass
Security domains are supported by the Java Card platform used by the TOE underlying platform
JCOP v. 2.4.2 R3. The JCOP platform provides protection against physical attack and performs self
tests as described in [JCOP-ST].
The JCOP platform protects the TOE against malfunctions that are caused by exposure to operating
conditions that may cause a malfunction. This includes hardware resets and operation outside the
specified norms.
The IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet uses transient memory where a hardware reset
always reverts the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet into an unauthenticated state.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
• FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
• FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
7.4 SF.AC Access control / Storage and protection of logical travel
document data
SF.AC.1
Access control / Storage and protection of logical travel document data
The TOE provided access control, storage and protection of logical travel document data including
access control to MRTD data. The TOE implements the subjects, objects, security attributes and rules
according to the security attribute based access control. Access control is enforced by the APDU
methods as specified in the interface defined in the functional specification.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
• FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
• FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
• FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control,
• FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD
• FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
• FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
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7.5 SF.SM Secure Messaging
SF.SM.1
Secure Messaging
Secure messaging MAC and ENC operations are performed by the TOE’s platform.
Secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode is established during PACE or re-established during Chip
Authentication v1 and is based on SF.CF.1, 5, 6 and 8.
The implementation of this security function contributes to::
• FTP_ITC.1/PACE: trusted channel after PACE
• FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC: Encryption/Decryption after PACE
• FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC: MAC generation/verification after PACE
• FIA_UAU.1/PACE: PACE Authentication (PACE authenticated BIS-PACE)
• FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC Encryption/Decryption after Chip Authentication v1
• FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC MAC generation/verification after Chip Authentication v1
• FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality – MRTD (ENC), after Chip
Authentication v1
• FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity – MRTD (MAC), after Chip Authentication v1
SF.SM.2
Secure Messaging – Re-authentication
The Retail MAC for 3DES and CMAC for AES are part of every APDU command/response when
secure messaging is active after a successful PACE or Chip Authentication has been accomplished.
Re-authentication after reset of the SM protocol is assured by accepting only valid (mandatory) MAC
or CMAC cryptograms.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
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7.6 SF.LCM Security and life cycle management
SF.LCM.1
Management of phases and roles
For the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 TOE the following life-cycle phases have been
identified:
1.
Manufacturing phase
2.
Personalisation phase
3.
Operational phase
4.
Termination phase
Each life-cycle phase (or state) has its typical user acting as role holder.
Life-cycle phase
Manufacturing phase
Role
IC Manufacturer
MRTD Manufacturer
(Platform initialisation)
MRTD Manufacturer
(Pre-personalisation)
Personalisation phase
Personalisation Agent
Operational phase
Basic or Extended Inspection system
Terminated phase
None
All role holders in Manufacturing, Pre-Personalisation and Personalisation phases are Identified by
cryptographic authentication keys. In Operational phase the PACE password is required to
authenticate the Basic or Extended Inspection System in order to get access to the non-sensitive
ICAO LDS datagroups.
The IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet maintains the internal life-cycle state the moment
that the applet is installed. This state, together with the access control mechanisms force the Terminal
into a specific role, for the pre-personalisation and subsequent, personalisation and operational
phases. The phases (and corresponding life-cycle states) are controlled by APDU commands.
In case the TOE has detected an integrity error or perturbation attack, all MRTD functionality is
permanently blocked.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
• FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Initialisation part)
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•
FMT_SMR.1.1 Security roles (Manufacturer)
•
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialisation Data and
Pre-personalization Data
•
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data
•
FMT_MTD.1/PA
SF.LCM.2
Life Cycle states of the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet
The TOE supports the following life-cycle states:
1. Not instantiated (applet resides in EEPROM or ROM)
2. PRE-PERSONALISATION state
3. PERSONALISATION state
4. OPERATIONAL state
5. TERMINATED state (irreversibly)
Each life-cycle phase (or state) has its typical user acting as role holder.
Life-cycle phase
Life-cycle state
Role
(maintained by applet)
Manufacturing phase
-
IC Manufacturer
(Applet not instantiated)
(Applet not instantiated)
MRTD Manufacturer
(Platform initialisation)
PRE-PERSONALISATION
MRTD Manufacturer
(Pre-personalisation)
Personalisation phase
PERSONALISATION
Personalisation Agent
Operational phase
OPERATIONAL
Basic or Extended Inspection
system
Termination phase
TERMINATED
None
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
•
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
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(Personalization and Configuration)
•
FMT_SMR.1.1 Security roles
(Personalization Agent)
•
FMT_MTD.1/PA, Personalization Agent
Ability to write the Document Security Object (SOD)
•
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialisation of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
•
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Restriction of the ability to load the Chip Authentication Private Key to the
Personalization Agent.
•
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Restriction of the ability to load the Active Authentication Private Key to the
Personalization Agent.
SF.LCM.3
Management of TSF-Data
The TOE allows only in its PERSONALISATION life-cycle state TSF data to be written onto the TOE.
In OPERATIONAL life-cycle state the management of TSF-Data can only be performed after
successful Terminal Authentication.
Updating the Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key and Certificate is restricted to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority. Modifying the Current Date is restricted to the Country Verifier
Certification Authority, the Document Verifier and the domestic Extended Inspection System
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
•
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
•
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles (Personalization Agent)
•
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification
Authority
•
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
•
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Current date
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Protection of test features
The IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet does not have any dedicated test features
implemented.
The test features of the JCOP platform are protected by ways described in JCOP ST and guidance
documentation.
The platform implementation provides this security function and contributes to:
• FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
•
SF.LCM.5
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Protection of keys and PACE passwords
In PRE-PERSONALISATION life-cycle state personalisation Agent Key Set is installed on the TOE’s
platform and protected by the platform.
In all TOE life-cycle states the Personalization Agent Key set (MAC, ENC, KEK), the PACE
passwords (derived from MRZ and/or CAN), the Chip Authentication Private Key, the Active
Authentication Private Key are protected from disclosure. The IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC
ePassport Applet only stores keys in Java Card specified Key structures, which are protected by
JCOP platform.
The implementation of this security function contributes to:
•
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
•
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
SF.LCM.6
IC Identification data
During initialisation the IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport Applet is installed and initiated with
the Pre-Personalisation Agent key and the IC Identification data.
The INSTALL for INSTALL method of the JCOP platform will be used to store the IC Identification
data.
•
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
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8 Annex
Glossary
Term
Definition
Accurate Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is trusted by
the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal Certificates with the correct
certificate effective date, see [TR-03110-1].
Advanced Inspection A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO-SAC], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip Authentication
Procedure (with
v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv) Terminal Authentication v.1.
PACE)
AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIP-PACE.
Agreement
This term is used in the current ST in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303]. Option by which means the
MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known
State of organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of
the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access
Control
Security mechanism defined in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protect their communication by means of
secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using
the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading
the logical MRTD.
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in
the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa.
Biographical data
(bio data).
Biometric reference
data
Card Access
Number (CAN)
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of the datapage.
Certificate chain
A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System Certificate
is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in between, and Country
Verifying Certification Authority Certificates are on the highest level. A
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Definition
certificate of a lower level is signed with the private key corresponding to the
public key in the certificate of the next higher level.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
by whatever means.
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Country Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key
(KPu CSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer with respect
to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel document.
The CSCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the travel
documents and creates the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be
distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [ICAO-9303], 5.5.1.
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority (CVCA)
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for Document
Signers (cf. [6]) and the domestic CVCA may be integrated into a single entity,
e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key
pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR-03110-1].
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document Issuer with
respect to protection of user data stored in the travel document (at a trial of a
terminal to get an access to these data). The CVCA represents the country
specific root of the PKI for the terminals using it and creates the Document
Verifier Certificates within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in form of CVCA Link-Certificates, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based
terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a CVCS as a
subject; hence, it merely represents an organizational entity within this ST.
Current date
CV Certificate
The Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA) issuing certificates for
Document Signers (cf. [ICAO-9303]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority. However,
even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for different roles, see [TR03110-1].
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card
verifiable certificates.
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate
expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
CVCA link Certificate Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
where the certificate effective date for the new key is before the certificate
expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
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Definition
The [ICAO-9303] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Document Basic
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from
Access Key
Derivation Algorithm the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document Details
Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing
the document details like document type, issuing state, document number,
date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are
less-sensitive data.
Document Basic
Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [ICAO-9303]. It is drawn
from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [ICAO9303]
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document
Security Object stored on the travel document for passive authentication.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
Document Signer
(DS)
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS), see [TR-03110-1] and [ICAO-9303].
Document Verifier
(DV)
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service Provider
(here: of a governmental organisation / inspection authority) and managing
terminals belonging together (e.g. terminals operated by a State’s border
police), by – inter alia – issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is
therefore a Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to
issue certificates for national terminals, see [TR-03110-1].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any certificate-based
terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot recognise a DV as a subject;
hence, it merely represents an organisational entity within this ST.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting under the
policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel document Issuer; a
foreign DV is acting under a policy of the respective foreign CVCA (in this case
there shall be an appropriate agreement between the travel document Issuer
und a foreign CVCA ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer’s privacy
policy) 120 121
120
The form of such an agreement may be of formal and informal nature; the term ‘agreement’ is used in the
current ST in order to reflect an appropriate relationship between the parties involved.
121
Existing of such an agreement may be technically reflected by means of issuing a CCVCA-F for the Public
Key of the foreign CVCA signed by the domestic CVCA.
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Term
Definition
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s
chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [ICAO-9303]
ePassport
application
[PP-SAC] definition
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine
readable travel document (MRTD).
See [TR-03110-1].
[PP-EAC] definition
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
• the file structure implementing the LDS [ICAO-9303],
• the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
• the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
Security mechanism identified in [ICAO-9303] by which means the MTRD’s
Extended Access
chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read
Control
the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection
system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same
mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical
MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
System (EIS)
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of
the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait.
Global
Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all MRTDs. [ICAO-9303]
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC
hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures
between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC Dedicated
Software
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Term
Definition
IC Dedicated
Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
IC Embedded
Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The
IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life phase and embedded
into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of the TOE.
IC Identification Data The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to control the IC
as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery
process to the travel document manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document.
Improperly
documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel
document or visa, if required. [ICAO-9303]
Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. paragraph
1.4.3.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2 Manufacturing, Step 3).
Initialisation
Initialisation Data
Inspection
Inspection system
(IS)
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD
holder) and verifying its authenticity. [ICAO-9303]
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity
and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [ICAO-9303]]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the MRTD. [ICAO-9303]
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [ICAO-9303]. The capacity expansion technology used
is the MRTD’s chip.
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Term
Definition
Logical travel
document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contact based/contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contact based/contactless readable data
including (but not limited to)
1. personal data of the travel document holder
2. the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
3. the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4. the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
5. the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
6. EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity)
and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [ICAO-9303]
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [ICAO-9303]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
Manufacturer
Metadata of a CV
Certificate
Optional biometric
reference data
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the
machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine. [ICAO-9303]
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the
travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described in [TR03110-1].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4)
or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger
print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
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Term
Definition
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment
(PACE)
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-SAC]. The PACE
Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
providing implicit password-based authentication of the communication
partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e. PACE provides a
verification, whether the communication partners share the same value of a
password π). Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data transferred
within this communication channel are maintained.
Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or the SHA-1value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth and Date of Expiry
as read from the MRZ, see [ICAO-SAC],
PACE passwords
Passive
authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalisation
The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document. This may
also include the optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment” (cf.
paragraph 1.4.3.3, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
(i)
establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the
biographic data in the travel document,
(ii)
enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document
holder,
(iii)
writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document
(optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document
(electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as
defined in [TR-03110-1],
(iv)
writing the document details data,
(v)
writing the initial TSF data,
(vi)
signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO-9303] (in the role of DS).
Personalisation
Agent
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
Personalisation Data A set of data incl.
(i)
individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the
travel document holder,
(ii)
dedicated document details data and
(iii)
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-volatile
memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the life-cycle phase card
issuing.
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Definition
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalisation
Personalization
Agent Authentication Agent.
Information
Personalisation
Agent Key
Symmetric cryptographic key or key set (MAC, ENC) used
(i)
by the Personalisation Agent to prove his identity and get
access to the logical travel document and
(ii)
by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE.
Physical part of the
travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
1. biographical data,
2. data of the machine-readable zone,
3. photographic image and
4. other data.
Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE including
the creation of the travel document Application (cf. paragraph 1.4.3.2, TOE
life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalization
Pre-personalization
Data
Pre-personalised
travel document’s
chip
Receiving State
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is
not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair and Chip Life-Cycle
Production data (CPLC data).
Travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [ICAO-9303]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
RF-terminal
A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means [ICAO-9303].
Secure messaging in Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
encrypted /combined according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
mode
An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection service
Service Provider
which can be used by the travel document holder. Service Provider uses
terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
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Term
Definition
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the
printed MRZ data.
Standard Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO-SAC], namely
(i)
PACE or BAC and
(ii)
Passive Authentication with SOD.
Terminal
SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BIS-BAC.
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE either through
the contact based or contactless interface. A technical system verifying
correspondence between the password stored in the travel document and the
related value presented to the terminal by the travel document presenter.
In this ST the role ‘Terminal’ corresponds to any terminal being authenticated
by the TOE.
Terminal
Authorization
Terminal
Authorisation Level
TOE tracing data
Travel document
Travel document
(electronic)
Travel Document
Holder
Travel document’s
Chip
Traveler
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and thus
authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared password (CAN or
MRZ).
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection System
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier Certification
Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the Terminal
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder)
recognising the travel document.
Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read; see [ICAO-9303] (there “Machine
readable travel document”).
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the plastic or
paper, optical readable cover and providing the following application:
ePassport.
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing State or
Organisation personalised the travel document.
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC
14443 [15] and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO, [ICAO-9303], sec III.
Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and claiming
the identity of the travel document holder.
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Term
Definition
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [CC-1]).
Unpersonalised
travel document
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding only
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to the
Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
All data (being not authentication data)
(i)
stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [5] and
(ii)
being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal
acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE.
User data
Verification
Verification data
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places
no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to
determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template. [ICAO-9303]
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.
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Abbreviations
CC
EAL
PP
ST
SEF
SOF
TOE
TSF
Common Criteria, see [CC]
Evaluation Assurance Level
Protection Profile
Security Target
Security Enforcing Functions
Strength Of Function
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security Functions
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References
Reference
Description
[AIS20V1]
Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 2.0, 02.12.1999
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS 20:
Funktionalitaetsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie fuer deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 2.1, 02.12.2011, Bundesamt fuer
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik.
Avis relatif aux paramètres de courbes elliptiques définis par l'Etat français
NOR: PRMD1123151V (Le 18 avril 2012)- ANSSI (http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/).
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, Version
1.10, 25th March 2009
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
1:Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
2:Security Functional Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part
3:Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision
4, September 2012
Rescorla, Eric, RFC 2631: Diffie-Hellman key agreement method, 1999
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP) BSI-CCPP-0056-V2-2012, Version 1.3.2, December 5th 2012, BSI
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Machine Readable Passports, Version Sixth Edition,
2006 (this includes the latest supplemental for ICAO Doc 9303 which also
should be considered)
International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access
Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.01, November
2010
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards -Proximity cards, 2008-11
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[AIS20V2]
[ANSSI-FRP256V1]
[BAC-PP]
[CC-1]
[CC-2]
[CC-3]
[CEM]
[DH]
[EAC-PP-V2]
[ICAO-9303]
[ICAO-SAC]
[ISO14443]
[ISO15946-1]
[ISO15946-2]
[ISO15946-3]
ISO/IEC15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques –
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital
signatures, 2002.
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques —
Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key
Public release
© Morpho B.V.
Page 150 of 152
Security Target Lite
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (SAC/EAC configuration)
Reference
[ISO18013-3]
[ISO7816]
[ISO9796-2]
[ISO9797]
[JAVA-3.0.1]
[JCOP-ADM]
[JCOP-ST]
[JCOP-UM]
[KS2011]
[NIST-180-4]
[NIST-186-3]
[NIST-197]
[NIST-800-38B]
[PACE-PP]
[RFC-5639]
[RSA-PKCS#3]
2013-11-28
Description
establishment, 2002
ISO/IEC 18013-3: Information technology — Personal identification — ISOcompliant driving licence. Part 3: Access control, authentication and integrity
validation, 2009-03-01
Including ISO/CEI 18013-3/AC1:2011, TECHNICAL CORRIGENDUM 1,
Published 2011-12-01
ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards — Integrated circuit cards, Version
Second Edition, 2008
ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2002, Information Technology - Security Techniques Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer
factorization based mechanisms
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999, Information technology —Security techniques —
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) — Part 1: Mechanisms using a block
cipher.
Application Programming Interface Java Card(tm) Platform, Version 3.0.1,
Classic Edition, May 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 3 Secure Smart Card Controller Administrator Manual for NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65,
J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, J2E082_M65, J3E081_M64, J3E081_M66,
J2E081_M64, J3E081_M64_DF, J3E081_M66_DF, J3E016_M64,
J3E041_M64, J3E016_M66, J3E041_M66, J3E016_M64_DF,
J3E041_M64_DF, J3E016_M66_DF and J3E041_M66_DF Secure Smart
Card Controller Revision 3
Rev.0.5, 16 July 2013, NXP (NSCIB-CC-13-37760)
Security Target JCOP2.4.2R3
NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65,J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65
and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3
Rev. 01.01 — 25th July 2013, NXP (NSCIB-CC-13-37760)
JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 3 Secure Smart Card Controller User manual for NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65,
J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, J2E082_M65, J3E081_M64, J3E081_M66,
J2E081_M564, J3E081_M64_DF, J3E081_M66_DF, J3E016_M64,
J3E041_M64, J3E016_M66, J3E041_M66, J3E016_M64_DF,
J3E041_M64_DF, J3E016_M66_DF and J3E041_M66_DF Secure Smart
Card Controller Revision 3
Rev.0.6, 16 July 2013, NXP (NSCIB-CC-13-37760)
A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number generators, Version
2.0, September 18, 2011 - W. Killmann, W. Schindler
NIST. FIPS 180-4, Secure Hash Standard, February 2011.
NIST. Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS 186-3, 2009
NIST. Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), FIPS PUB
197, 2001
NIST. Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC
Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, 2005
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure
with PACE, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011, Version 1.0, 2nd November 2011, BSI
Lochter, Manfred; Merkle, Johannes. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC 5639, 2010
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
Public release
© Morpho B.V.
Page 151 of 152
Security Target Lite
IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (SAC/EAC configuration)
2013-11-28
Reference
Description
[SIC-PP]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile; registered and certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference
BSI-PP-0035-2007, Version 1.0, June 2007 – BSI
7301-9302-107 ASE IDeal Pass v2 - SAC/EAC JC ePassport 4.0.0 (BAC)
TR-02102 Technische Richtlinie Kryptographische Algorithmen und
Schlüssellängen, Version 2013.02, January 9th 2013 by BSI
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents –Part 1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2
and EACv1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012 by BSI
TR-03110-3 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Part 3: Common Specifications, version 2.10, 2012-03-07 by
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical
Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, Version 1.11,
17.04.2009
[ST-BAC]
[TR-02102]
[TR-03110-1]
[TR-03110-3]
[TR-03111]
Public release
© Morpho B.V.
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