Certification Report: 0316a

Certification Report: 0316a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
for
TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072
and TCOS Passport Version 1.01 /
SLE66CLX641P
from
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
TCOS Passport Version 1.01/P5CT072
and
TCOS Passport Version
1.01/SLE66CLX641P
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
from
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI
The IT products identified in this certificate have been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Functionality:
Assurance Package:
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0017-2005)
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the
evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 30. November 2005
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
Certification Report
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
•
Part 1, Version 0.6
•
Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
2
Certification Report
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF) and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
A-2
Certification Report
3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport
Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P have undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the products TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and
TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik
GmbH,
Prüfstelle
IT-Sicherheit.
The
TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor [, and vendor and distributor] is:
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI
Untere Industriestr. 20
57250 Netphen
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 30. November 2005.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
4
Certification Report
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-22 and D1 to D-4.
The products TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport
Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P have been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer
and sponsor 7 of the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded
from the above-mentioned website..
7
A-4
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI
Untere Industriestr. 20
57250 Netphen
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
2
Identification of the TOE
11
3
Security Policy
12
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
12
5
Architectural Information
13
6
Documentation
13
7
IT Product Testing
14
8
Evaluated Configuration
14
9
Results of the Evaluation
15
10 Comments/Recommendations
17
11 Annexes
17
12 Security Target
17
13 Definitions
18
14 Bibliography
20
B-2
3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is the
Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access Control
Application“ TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport
Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control [8].
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [15] and providing the Basic Access Control according to ICAO document
[14]. It will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.
The TOE comprises
•
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for
the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors
•
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software
•
the IC Embedded Software (operating system TCOS)
•
the MRTD application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system
on the chip and
•
the associated guidance documentation.
The TOE is a Smart Device with an operating system (TCOS) and a dedicated
file-system, that contains all data relevant for the ICAO application.
For details on the MRTD chip and IC Dedicated Software see certification
reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 [12] for the Philips chip P5CT072V0N and BSIDSZ-CC-0338-2005 [13] for the Infineon chip SLE66CLX641P.
Following the protection profile PP0002 [11, Fig. 15] the life cycle phases of a
TCOS Passport device can be divided into the following seven phases:
•
Phase 1: Development of operating system software by the operating
system manufacturer
•
Phase 2: Development of the smart card controller by the semiconductor
manufacturer
•
Phase 3: Fabrication of the smart card controller (integrated circuit) by the
semiconductor manufacturer
•
Phase 4: Installation of the chip in an inlay with an antenna
•
Phase 5: Completion of the smart card operating system
•
Phase 6: Initialisation and personalization of the MRTD
B-3
Certification Report
•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Phase 7: Operational phase of the MRTD
According to the MRTD BAC PP [8] the TOE life cycle is described in terms of
the four life cycle phases.
•
Life cycle phase 1 “Development”: Development of Hardware and Software.
This life cycle phase 1 covers Phase 1 and Phase 2 of PP0002 [11]. 8
•
Life cycle phase 2 “Manufacturing”: IC Production, Initialisation and PrePersonalization of the MRTD Application. This life cycle phase 2
corresponds to Phase 3 and Phase 4 of PP0002 [11] and may include for
flexibility reasons Phase 5 and some production processes from Phase 6
as well. 9
•
Life cycle phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”: This life cycle phase
corresponds to the remaining initialisation and personalization processes
not covered yet from Phase 6 of the PP0002 [11].
•
Life cycle phase 4 “Operational Use”. This life cycle phase corresponds to
the Phase 7 of the PP0002 [11].
The TOE is finished after initialisation, testing the OS and creation of the
dedicated file system with security attributes and ready made for the import of
LDS. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection Profile
MRTD BAC PP [8]. A more detailed description of the production processes in
Phases 5 and 6 of PP0002 resp. Phase 3 of the MRTD BAC PP is given in the
Administrator Guidance document [16].
The IT product TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport
Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P was evaluated by TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was completed on 31.10.2005.
The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF) 10 recognised by BSI.
The developer and sponsor is
T-Systems International GmbH
Service Line SI
Untere Industriestr. 20
57250 Netphen
8
Software development at T-Systems, Nethpen; for hardware development sites refer to
[12] resp. [13]
9
Completion and inlay module initialisation at Bundesdruckerei, Berlin.
The personalization process at the Bundesdruckerei was not part of the evaluation.
For hardware manufacturing sites refer to [12] resp. [13];
10
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
1.1
Certification Report
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
Identifier
EAL4
TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2
Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement
Identifier and addressed issue
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD
Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the TOE
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key
Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
Cryptographic operation – Encryption /
Decryption Triple-DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1 (PRIM)
Subset access control – Primary Access
Control
FDP_ACC.1 (BASIC)
Subset access control – Basic Access
control
FDP_ACF.1 (PRIM)
Security attribute based access control –
Primary Access Control
FDP_ACF.1 (Basic)
Security attribute based access control –
Basic Access Control
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
Data exchange integrity - MRTD
B-5
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Security Functional Requirement
Identifier and addressed issue
FIA
Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
Single-use authentication mechanisms Single-use authentication of the Terminal by
the TOE
FIA_UAU.5
Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of
Terminal by the TOE
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MOF.1
Management of functions in TSF
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Management of TSF data – Writing of
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data – Disabling of
Read Access to Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Management of TSF data – Key Read
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1
Non-bypassability of the TSP
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement
Identifier and addressed issue
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement
Identifier and addressed issue
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE Emanation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the ITEnvironment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement
Identifier and addressed issue
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT
Cryptographic key generation – Generation
of Document Basic Access Keys by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_CKM.4/BT
Cryptographic key destruction – BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT
Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT
Cryptographic
operation
–
Secure
Messaging Encryption / Decryption by the
Basic Terminal
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
Cryptographic
operation
–
Secure
messaging Message Authentication Code by
the Basic Terminal
FCS_RND.1/BT
Quality metric for random numbers - Basic
Terminal
FDP
User data protection
FDP_DAU.1/DS
Basic data authentication
Authentication
FDP_UCT.1/BT
Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic
Terminal
FDP_UIT.1/BT
Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
FIA
Identification and authentication
FIA_UAU.4/BT
Single-use authentication mechanisms –
Basic Terminal
FIA_UAU.6/BT
Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT
Authentication
Proof
of
Identity
Personalization Terminal Authentication with
Symmetric Key
–
Passive
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
• Identification and Authentication based on Challenge-Response
•
Data exchange under secure messaging
•
Access Control of stored data objects
•
Reliability
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-High) for the following
security functions Identification and Authentication based on ChallengeResponse and Data exchange under secure messaging.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The ST defines the following assets taken from the MRTD BAC PP [8]:
Logical MRTD Data consisting of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the
Document security object according to LDS [15].
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
Assets have to be protected in terms of confidentiality and/or integrity.
The ST considers the following subjects taken from the MRTD BAC PP [8]:
Manufacturer, MRTD Holder, Traveller, Personalization Agent, Inspection
System (split into Primary Inspection System (PIS), Basic Inspection System
(BIS), and Extended Inspection System (EIS)), the Terminal and the Attacker.
For details refer to the Security Target chapter 3.2.
The following list of considered threats for the TOE is defined in the Security
Target. They are taken from the MRTD BAC PP [8].
T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the
contactless communication interface. The attacker can not read and does not
know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
T.Skimming
Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Certification Report
read and does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data
page.
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system
uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not
know this data in advance.
T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of
it including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system
by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery.
T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate
(explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the
TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the
misuse of the functions for the initialisation and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may
be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order to
disclose TSF Data to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i)
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or
modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
For more details refer to the Security Target chapter 3.3.
The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations:
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Certification Report
P.Manufact
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the
security of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialisation Data are written by the IC
Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the
Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
Organisation only
Personalization
of
the
MRTD
by
issuing
State
or
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the
biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric
reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by
authorised agents of the issuing State or Organisation only.
P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris
image(s) (DG4) and data according to LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are
intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection
systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the
possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to these data only
for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document
Basic Access Keys as defined in [14].
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The issuing State or Organisation decides (i) to enable the Basic Access
Control for the protection of the MRTD holder personal data or (ii) to disable the
Basic Access Control to allow Primary Inspection Systems of the receiving
States and all other terminals to read the logical MRTD. This configuration is
performed during the personalization phase 3 of the TOE life cycle.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions are describe the security aspects of the environment in which
the TOE will be used or is intended to be used. The ST defines the following
assumptions taken from the MRTD BAC PP [8]:
A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the
Active Authentication Public Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
(iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip)
on the MRTD’s chip. (Note: Because the Active Authentication Public Key Info
(DG15) is not stored on the TOE, this assumption from the MRTD BAC PP [8] is
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Certification Report
not relevant.) The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to
authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary
Inspection System for global interoperability contains the Country Signing Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organisation
[14]. The Primary Inspection System performs the Passive Authentication to
verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is not protected by Basic Access
Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the Primary Inspection
System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and reads the
logical MRTD being under Basic access Control.
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and
TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1a
TCOS Passport operating
system and file-system for
the ICAO application with
Philips chip P5CT072V0N 11
Version 1.01 /
P5CT072V0N,
mask ICAO10R1
Philips
SW completely contained in
ROM and EEPROM memory,
chip mounted into an inlay
package (OM9500/1) initialised
and tested
HW /
SW
And
11
For details on the MRTD chip and IC Dedicated Software see certification report BSIDSZ-CC-0312-2005 [12] for the Philips chip P5CT072V0N.
B-11
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1b
HW /
SW
TCOS Passport operating
system and file-system for
the ICAO application with
Infineon chip
SLE66CLX641P 12
Version 1.01 /
SLE66CLX641P/
m1522a11, mask
ICAO10R1
Infineon
SW completely contained in
ROM and EEPROM memory,
chip mounted into an inlay
package initialised and tested
2
DOC
Administrator manual TCOS V1.0 24.October
Passport Version 1.0
2005
Release 1 [16]
Document in paper / electronic
form
3
DOC
User Manual TCOS
Passport Version 1.0
Release 1 [17]
Document in paper / electronic
form
V1.0 24.October
2005
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD BAC PP.
Delivery is performed from the Initialization facility to the personalisation facility
by as a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization
site. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the
personalisation commands and process requirements. To ensure that the
personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the
personalisation process as described in the administrator manual [16] have to
be followed. Within this evaluation initialisation and personalization organisation
were the same organisation and facility (Bundesdruckerei, Berlin, Germany).
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [8] by
the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It
addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the
Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions on Personalization of the MRTD’s chip and on Inspection
Systems for global interoperability as outlined above are of relevance.
The state or organisation issues the MRTD to be used by the holder for
international travel. The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to
prove his or her identity. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the
possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference
12
B-12
For details on the MRTD chip and IC Dedicated Software see certification report BSIDSZ-CC-0338-2005 [13] for the Infineon chip SLE66CLX641P.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Certification Report
data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or Organisation ensure the
authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trust a genuine
MRTD of a issuing State or Organisation.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE consists of hardware and software. Hardware is either the Infineon
Chip SLE66CX641P or the Philips Chip P5CT072V0N.
The TOE software is the chip card operation system TCOS and the specific
ICAO file-system specified by specific initialisation data. The software is
grouped as follows:
The kernel subsystem controls the communication between all other
subsystems. It checks the used memory areas, allocates resources and
controls the order of operation.
The administrative subsystem contains all administrative functionality of the
TOE. It provides functionality for generation and deletion of files and directories
and for reading and writing of files. This subsystem is also responsible for
access control.
The crypto subsystem contains the cryptographic functionality and guarantees
controlled access to keys.
The IO subsystem is responsible for all communication to the external world. It
implements the protocol T=CL and checks syntax of APDUs.
The ROM TCOS-Type Task includes the ISO specific parts of the code. It
analysis the APDUs and enforces calls to other subsystems.
The User-Type Task of TCOS including application specific code but is not used
within the TOE.
The TSF of the software uses the hardware via evaluated hardware interfaces.
External interface of the composite TOE used in the MRTD application is a
specific set of commands operating on a defined file-system of the application.
This interface is available to the inspection system via the contactless chip
interface.
6
Documentation
The administrator manual [16] is provided for the Personalization Agent of the
TOE who needs information about security procedures and how the TOE
supports the personalisation process. In addition this documents includes
information about the initialisation process which is done before TOE delivery.
In this case initialisation and personalization is performed by the same
organisation (Bundesdruckerei, Berlin, Germany).
The user manual [17] is provided for the developer of an inspection system who
needs information how the TOE interacts with the inspection system.
B-13
Certification Report
7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
IT Product Testing
Developer tests, independent evaluator tests and penetration tests were
performed using MRTD chips TCOS Passport Version 1.01/P5CT072 (Philips
Chip) and TCOS Passport Version 1.01/SLE66CLX641P (Infineon Chip)
composed of the hardware chip, its dedicated software, the operating system
TCOS and a file-system for the ICAO application. TOEs in the configuration
LDS (Logical Data Structure) and BAC (Basic Access Control) were tested.
The developer performed functional tests with a TOE in the personalization
phase and in the operational phase. All security functions were tested including
their sub-functions. The test coverage analysis and the test depth analysis gave
evidence that the TOE was systematically tested on the level of the functional
specification and on subsystem level.
The test cases defined based on the security functionality specified in the
functional specification showed the conformance to the expected behaviour of
the TOE in the personalization and operational phase. The tests were
performed using a smart card simulator and real chips with the TOE software
and the ICAO file-system.
The evaluator repeated developer tests by sampling. The sample covered all
security functions and was performed by using real chips and an emulator. The
TOE operated as specified.
Independent evaluator tests were performed in phase 5 (completion of the
smart card operating system), phase 6 (initialisation and personalization of the
MRTD) and in phase 7 (Operational phase of the MRTD) of the TOE. The tests
confirmed the expected behaviour as specified.
The evaluators penetration tests confirmed the effectiveness of all security
functions of the TOE. During these tests the different life cycle phases were
considered. The penetration tests were performed based on the developers
vulnerability analysis and based on the independent vulnerability analysis of the
evaluator. Potential vulnerabilities were assessed upon their exploitability by
analysis and tests. Analysis results and tests results showed that potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational environment of the
TOE and that the TOE is resistant against low attack potential AVA_VLA.2 as
specified.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered at the end of phase 6.1 in form of initialised and tested
inlay module. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection
Profile MRTD BAC PP [8].
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the Administrator Guidance document [16].
B-14
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
9
Certification Report
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
As the evaluation of the TOE was conducted as a composition evaluation, the
ETR [7] includes also the evaluation results of the composite evaluation activities in accordance with CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition:
Annex A Composite smart card evaluation [4, AIS 36]. The ETR [7] builds up on
the ETR-lite for Composition document of the evaluation of the underlying
Philips chip P5CT072V0N (see BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 [12]) and the Infineon
chip SLE66CLX641P (BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005 [13]).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card specific
methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4])
were used.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Problem tracking CM coverage
ACM_SCP.2
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
B-15
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Assurance classes and components
Verdict
Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_FSP.2
PASS
Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_HLD.2
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.1
PASS
Informal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.1
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1
PASS
Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.1
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: high-level design
ATE_DPT.1
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
CC Class AVA
PASS
Validation of analysis
AVA_MSU.2
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis
AVA_VLA.2
PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conformant to the PP Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, version 1.0 (BSI-PP0017-2005) [8]
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are PP
conformant and Common Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and ALC_DVS.2
(Sufficiency of security measures)
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
SOF-high:
- Identification and Authentication based on Challenge-Response and
- Data exchange under secure messaging.
B-16
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Certification Report
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the Triple-DES functionality.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TCOS Passport Version
1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P. The
validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided
the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of
the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10
Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [16] and [17] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The TOEs implemented security functions meet the claimed strength of function
SOF-high from design and construction point of view. The strength of function
available in a specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the
selection of the data used to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore
the issuing state or organisation is responsible for the strength of function that
can be achieved in a specific system context. This has to be assessed in the
specific system context. Then, the administrator (personalizer) is in
collaboration with the issuing state or organisation responsible to provide keys
with sufficient entropy, as required by the specific system context.
Only chips from the production sites (waferfabs, module and inlay production
sites) as outlined in the certification reports for the Philips chip P5CT072V0N
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 [12]) and for the Infineon chip SLE66CLX641P (BSIDSZ-CC-0338-2005 [13]) shall be used.
The Personalization Agent has to verify that they got the correct version of the
TOE.
Defect chips and invalid passports including a chip must be destroyed in a way
that the chip itself is destructed..
11
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
B-17
Certification Report
13
BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC
Document
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
OS
Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
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TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
13.2
Certification Report
Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE, specifically
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version
1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
T-Systems, Specification of the Security Target TCOS Passport Version
1.01, 27.10.2005, Version: 1.01 BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
[7]
Technischer Evaluierungsbericht (ETR), Version: 3, 31.10.2005 for
TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport Version
1.01 / SLE66CLX641P, TÜVIT
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Certification Report
[8]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, Version
1.0, 18. August 2005, BSI
[9]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[10]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
[11]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[12]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 for Philips Secure Smart
Card Controller P5CT072V0N including OM9500/1 and OM9501/2,
P5CD072V0N and P5CD036V0N with specific IC Dedicated Software, 7.
October 2005, BSI
[13]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005 for Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security
Controller)
SLE66CLX640P/m1523-a11
and
SLE66CLX641P/m1522-a11 both with RSA2048 V1.3 and specific IC
Dedicated Software, 9. November 2005, BSI
[14]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
[15]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[16]
Administratorhandbuch TCOS Passport Version 1.0 Release 1, TSystems International GmbH, Version 1.0, 24.October 2005
[17]
Benutzerhandbuch TCOS Passport V1.0 Release
International GmbH, Version 1.0 24.October 2005
1,
T-Systems
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Class ADV:
Development
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Class AGD: Guidance Administrator guidance
documents
User guidance
Class ALC: Life cycle Development security
support
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Class AVA:
Covert channel analysis
Vulnerability
assessment
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0316-2005
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT products TCOS Passport Version 1.01 / P5CT072 and TCOS Passport
Version 1.01 / SLE66CLX641P (Target of Evaluation, TOE) have been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999)
and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version
2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 30. November 2005, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a) T-Systems International GmbH, Service Line SI, Untere Industriestr. 20,
57250 Netphen, Germany (embedded software development)
(b) Bundesdruckerei, Oranienstrass 91, 10958 Berlin, Germany (TOE
Completion, Initialisation and Pass Production).
The personalization process at the Bundesdruckerei was not part of the
evaluation.
(c) For development and productions sites regarding the Philips chip
P5CT072V0N refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005
and regarding the Infineon chip SLE66CLX641P refer to the certification
report BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target (T-Systems, Specification of the Security
Target TCOS Passport Version 1.01, 27.10.2005, Version: 1.01 BSI-DSZ-CC0316-2005 [6]). The evaluators verified, that the requirements for the TOE life
cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6]) are fulfilled by
the procedures of these sites.
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