Certification Report: 0664a_pdf

Certification Report: 0664a_pdf

BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

for

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80

from

MaskTech International GmbH

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111

Certification Report V1.0

CC-Zert-327 V4.5

BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

Security IC with MRTD EAC Application

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80

from MaskTech International GmbH

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO

Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10,

25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009

Functionality: PP conformant

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL 4 augmented by

ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5

Common Criteria

Recognition

Arrangement for components up to

EAL 4

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification

Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the

German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the

Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 15 February 2011

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski

Head of Department

L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security

(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by

BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed

Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

1 Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,

Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

Contents

A Certification........................................................................................................................7

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7

2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7

2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8

4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9

5 Publication......................................................................................................................9

B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11

1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12

2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13

3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14

5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14

6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15

7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15

8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16

9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17

9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18

10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19

11 Security Target............................................................................................................19

12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19

12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19

12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20

13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22

C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25

D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

BSIG

2

BSI Certification Ordinance

3

BSI Schedule of Costs

4

Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the

Interior)

DIN EN 45011 standard

BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1

5

[1]

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]

BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or

CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1

European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in

April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels

EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.

It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).

The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,

Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

2

3

4

5

Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,

Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security

(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated

23 February 2007, p. 3730

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security

(BSI) recognises

● for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.

● for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The

Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only) became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being continued.

2.2

International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,

Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,

Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United

States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80 was conducted by SRC

Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 11 February

2011. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)

6

recognised by the certification body of BSI.

6

Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:

MaskTech International GmbH.

The product was developed by:

MaskTech International GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this

Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,

● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.

Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).

Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https:// www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the

product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

7 MaskTech International GmbH

Nordostpark 16

90411 Nürnberg

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,

● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and

● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

Certification Report

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

1 Executive Summary

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data

Structure (LDS) [20] and providing Basic Access Control, Active Authentication and

Extended Access Control according to the ICAO documents [21] [22] [23] and Chip

Authentication according to the technical report TR-03110 [24].

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified

Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended

Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [7].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).

The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the

Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE

Security Functionalities:

TOE Security Functionality

F.IC_CL

F.Access_Control

F.Identification_Authentication

F.Management

F.Crypto

F.Verification

Addressed issue

Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and

Crypto Library

Regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only executed after this TSF allowed access

Provides identification/authentication of the user roles

Provides management and administrative functionalities

Provides a high level interface to the used algorithms and implements the used hash algorithms

TOE internal functions to ensure correct operation

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of

Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security

Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.

This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE (for details refer to chapter

8 of this report):

● the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

8

● the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated

Support Software,

● the IC Embedded Software (operating system),

● the MRTD application, and

● the associated guidance documentation.

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification

Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for

Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No Type Identifier

1 HW/

SW

MTCOS Passport operating system and a file-system in the context of the ICAO application with the contactless

STMicroelectronics chip

SB23YR80B

8

2 DOC User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.1

EAC/ST23YR80

3 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS

Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 1 -

Filesystem and Security

Architecture

4 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS

Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 2 -

Basic Access Control and Secure

Messaging

5 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Pro

V2.1: Part 3 - Digital Signature

6 DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS

Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 5 -

Advanced Security Mechanisms

Extended Access Control

Release

MTCOS Pro 2.1,

ROM Mask:

K2M0BFB

Version 1.3,

22.07.2010 [11]

Version 1.02,

18.05.2009 [12]

Version 1.0,

08.04.2008 [13]

Version 1.0,

02.04.2008 [14]

Version 1.01,

20.06.2008 [15]

Form of Delivery

SW completely contained in

ROM and EEPROM memory, chip initialised and tested, but without hardware for the contactless interface

Document in electronic form

Document in electronic form

Document in electronic form

Document in electronic form

Document in electronic form

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

For details on the MRTD chip and the IC Dedicated Software see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID ANSSI-CC-2010/02 [16].

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by STMicroelectronics as K2M0BFB. The name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech to STMicroelectronics is

mtcos21b_st23yr80.dlv.

The commercial numbering of the IC embedded software by STMicroelectronics is as follows:

Commercial Product Type: SB23YR80BCB4MHBA

Finished Good Type: 23YR80FCB4MHBASN

The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD EAC PP [7]. Delivery is performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility as a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. The TOE itself will be delivered as an initialized module but without hardware for contactless interface. The inlay production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE and takes part after the delivery to the personalization site. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the User's Guide [11] have to be followed.

3 Security Policy

The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [7] by the

Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International

Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy address the advanced security methods Basic and Extended Access Control as well as Chip Authentication and Active

Authentication.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Personalization of the MRTD’s chip, Inspection Systems for global interoperability, PKI for Passive Authentication and PKI for Inspection Systems. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [8], chapter 3.2.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded

Software and Part Application Software. While the IC Embedded software contains the operating system MTCOS Pro 2.1, the Part Application Software contains the MRTD

Application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of the IC, the

STMicroelectronics SB23YR80B. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the

STMicroelectronics IC see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID ANSSI-

CC-2010/02 [16]. Please note that the hardware for the contactless interface (i.e. antenna) is not part of the TOE. The inlay production including the application of the antenna takes part after delivery.

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

The Security Functions of the TOE are:

F.Access_Control

F.Identification_Authentication

F.Management

F.Crypto

F.Verification

F.IC_CL

According to the TOE design these Security Functions are enforced by the following subsystems:

Application data (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication)

Kernel (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication,

F.Management, F.Crypto, F.Verification)

HAL (supports the TSF F.Crypto, F.Identification_Authentication, F.Verification)

Hardware (supports the TSF F.IC_CL)

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.

Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.

Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.

Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.

During their independent testing, the evaluators covered

● testing APDU commands related to Access Control,

● testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,

● testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,

● testing APDU commands related to the Creation of Digital Signatures,

● penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

● source code analysis performed by the evaluators,

● side channel analysis for SHA, ECC and RSA,

● fault injection attacks (laser attacks),

● testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase, and

● testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.

The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against high attack potential during their penetration testing.

The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.

8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80 consisting of

● the STMicroelectronics chip SB23YR80B,

● the embedded software, and

● a file system in the context of the ICAO application.

The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS 2.1 Pro EAC, including a cryptographic library which supports T-DES, RSA and ECDH (Elliptic Curve

Diffie-Hellman) and an application layer, consisting of the ICAO application.

The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by STMicroelectronics as K2M0BFB. The name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech International GmbH to

STMicroelectronics is mtcos21b_st23yr80.dlv.

Since an MRTD may have different file structures here the certified configuration of the

TOE is addressed. The certified configuration of the TOE has 18 different variations due to three different file system layouts and six different elliptic curve parameter sets (BP224r1,

BP256r1, BP320r1, NISTP224, NISTP256, NISTP384). Thus the TOE consists of the hardware applied with the 18 different initialisation / pre-personalisation files:

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP224r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP256r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP320r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP224.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP256.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP384.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP224r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP256r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP320r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP224.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP256.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP384.txt

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP224r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP256r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP320r1.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP224.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP256.txt

Dummy-patch8v2-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP384.txt

All files are maintained using the configuration management system Subversion. The certified version number of the above mentioned scripts is 5380.

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1

CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the

Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits

Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards

Public Version of Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting

Document and CCRA policies

(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 35).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)

The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

The evaluation has confirmed:

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"

Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,

BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [10]

● for the Functionality: PP conformant

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2

Results of cryptographic assessment

The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for the following TOE Security Functions:

F.Identification_Authentication

Identification / authentication of the user roles

F.Crypto

F.IC_CL

Interface to the DES functionality and implementation of the used hash algorithms

Security Functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the cryptolibrary

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

Algorithm Bit

Length

SHA-1 -

SHA-224

SHA-256

ECDH

-

-

Triple-DES 112 bit

Retail-MAC 112 bit

224 bit,

256 bit,

320 bit or

384 bit

Purpose

Computing hash value for key derivation (Basic

Access Control);

Signature verification of

ECDSA (Extended

Access Control –

Terminal Authentication)

Signature verification of

ECDSA (Extended

Access Control –

Terminal Authentication)

Signature verification of

ECDSA (Extended

Access Control –

Terminal Authentication)

Secure Messaging

Secure Messaging

ECC Key Agreement

Extended Access

Control – Chip

Authentication

Security

Function

F.Crypto

F.Crypto

F.Crypto

F.Crypto

F.IC_CL

F.Identification

_Authentication

F.Crypto

F.IC_CL

F.Identification

_Authentication

F.IC_CL

F.Identification

_Authentication

Standard of

Implementation

FIPS 180-2

FIPS 180-2

FIPS 180-2

FIPS 46-3

Standard of Usage

TR-03110

[24]

TR-03110

[24]

TR-03110

[24]

TR-03110

[24]

ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,

Sequence

Message Counter, padding mode 2)

TR-03110,

Annex A.1

TR-03110

[24]

TR-03110

[24]

-

-

-

-

-

Validity

Period

-

9

9

The SHA-1 algorithm as well as the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [24]). For that reason an explicit validity period is not given for the SHA-1 and also not for the following cryptographic algorithms.

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Algorithm Bit

Length

ECDSA

RSA

Purpose

224 bit,

256 bit,

320 bit or

384 bit

Signature verification

(Extended Access

Control – Terminal

Authentication)

1536 bit Active Authentication

Security

Function

F.IC_CL

F.Identification

_Authentication

Standard of

Implementation

FIPS 186-2

F.IC_CL

ISO/IEC 9796-

2:2002

Table 3: Cryptografic Algorithms used by the TOE

Standard of Usage

TR-03110

[24]

MRTD-PKI

[21]

-

-

Validity

Period

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation

(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110,

Version 1.11 [24], the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and confidentiality of the stored data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs).

10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the

TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the

TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the

TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

AIS

Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme

APDU

BAC

BSI

BSIG

CCRA

CC

CEM

Application Protocol Data Unit

Basic Access Control

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for

Information Security, Bonn, Germany

BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security

Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation

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EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level

EEPROM

Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory

ES

ETR

IC

ICAO

Embedded Software

Evaluation Technical Report

Integrated Circuit

International Civil Aviation Organisation

IT

ITSEC

ITSEF

LDS

MRTD

PP

RAM

Information Technology

Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria

Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

Logical Data Structure

Machine Readable Travel Document

Protection Profile

Random Access Memory

RNG

ROM

SAR

SFP

SFR

ST

Random Number Generator

Read Only Memory

Security Assurance Requirement

Security Function Policy

Security Functional Requirement

Security Target

TOE

TSF

Target of Evaluation

TOE Security Functionalities

Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2

and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-

established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon

which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a

TOE type.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific

identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

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Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied

by guidance.

TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and

firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

13 Bibliography

[1]

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,

Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009

Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009

Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),

Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009

[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

[4]

Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 10 .

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website

[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011, Version 2.0, 10.02.2011, Security Target –

Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Extended Access

Control MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC/ST23YR80, MaskTech International GmbH

(confidential document)

[7] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access

Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009, BSI

[8] Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011, Version 1.4, 10.02.2011, Security

Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Extended

Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC/ST23YR80, MaskTech International GmbH

(sanitised public document)

[9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.4, 10.02.2011, MaskTech MTCOS Pro 2.1

EAC / ST23YR80, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)

10 specifically

• AIS 20, Version 1, 02. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren

AIS 25, Version 6, 07 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL

Document and CC Supporting Document

AIS 26, Version 7, 03 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte

Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document

AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren

AIS 32, Version 6, 03 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema

AIS 34, Version 3, 03 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for

EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)

AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies

AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC

Supporting Document

AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results

AIS 47, Version 1.0, 19 October 2010, Regelungen zu Site Certification

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[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.6, 10.02.2011, Configuration List of

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC/ST23YR80, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential document)

[11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.3, 22.07.2010, User Guidance

MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC/ST23YR80, MaskTech International GmbH

[12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.02, 18.05.2009, MTCOS Standard

& Pro V2.1: Part 1 - Filesystem and Security Architecture, MaskTech International

GmbH

[13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0, 08.04.2008, MTCOS Standard &

Pro V2.1: Part 2 - Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging, MaskTech

International GmbH

[14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0, 02.04.2008, MTCOS Pro V2.1:

Part 3 - Digital Signature, MaskTech International GmbH

[15] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.01, 20.06.2008, MTCOS Standard

& Pro V2.1: Part 5 - Advanced Security Mechanisms Extended Access Control,

MaskTech International GmbH

[16] Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2010/02 - SA23YR48/80B and SB23YR48/80B

Secure Microcontrollers, including the cryptographic library Neslib v2.0 or v3.0, in

SA or SB configuration, French Network and Information Security Agency,

01 February 2010

[17] Evaluation Technical Report LAFITE project, Reference/Version: LAFITE_

SB23YR80B_ETRLiteComp_v1.0 / 1.0, 13.01.2010

[18] SA23YR48B / SB23YR80B / SA23YR80B / SB23YR80B Security Target – Public

Version, Common Criteria for IT security evaluation, Version number: Rev 02.01,

November 2009, Registration: SMD_Sx23YRxx_ST_09_002.

[19] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-2009 for Inlay Production and Initialisation of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd. Thailand, BSI,

2009

[20] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical

Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –

1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation

Organization, LDS 1.7, 18.05.2004

[21] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable

Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October

01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation

Organization

[22] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports.

International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006

[23] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official

Travel Documents. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006

[24] Technical Guideline TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine

Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI,

2008

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

● describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.

● describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:

CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that

PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or

CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in

that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.

describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:

CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that

PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or

CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package

(e.g. EAL) if:

– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or

– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.

Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:

– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.

– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection

Profiles:

PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.

Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

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CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.”

Assurance Class Assurance Components

APE_INT.1 PP introduction

Class APE: Protection

Profile evaluation

APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims

APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition

APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment

APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives

APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition

APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the

ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

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Assurance Class Assurance Components

ASE_INT.1 ST introduction

ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims

Class ASE: Security

Target evaluation

ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition

ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment

ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives

ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition

ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements

ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification

ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.“

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class

ADV: Development

Assurance Components

ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description

ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification

ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary

ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification

ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information

ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification

ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF

ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF

ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals

ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals

ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals

ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model

ADV_TDS.1 Basic design

ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design

ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design

ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design

ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design

ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation

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Assurance Class

AGD:

Guidance documents

ALC: Life cycle support

ATE: Tests

AVA: Vulnerability assessment

Assurance Components

AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures

ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE

ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system

ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls

ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation

ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support

ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage

ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage

ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage

ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage

ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures

ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures

ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures

ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation

ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures

ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation

ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model

ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model

ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools

ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards

ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts

ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage

ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage

ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage

ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design

ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules

ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design

ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation

ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing

ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing

ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance

ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample

ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete

AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis

AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis

AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis

AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis

Assurance class decomposition

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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only

EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

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Assurance

Class

Development

Guidance

Documents

Life cycle

Support

Security Target

Evaluation

ADV_ARC

ADV_FSP

ADV_IMP

ADV_INT

ADV_SPM

ADV_TDS

AGD_OPE

AGD_PRE

ALC_CMC

ALC_CMS

ALC_DEL

ALC_DVS

ALC_FLR

ALC_LCD

ALC_TAT

ASE_CCL

Assurance

Family

1

1

1

1

Assurance Components by

Evaluation Assurance Level

EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7

1 1 1 1 1 1

1 2 3 4

1

5

1

5

2

6

2

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

3

3

1

1

3

1

1

4

4

1

1

4

1

1

4

5

1

1

5

1

3

1

1

5

5

1

2

6

1

3

1

1

5

5

1

2

1 1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

3

1

2

3

1

ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

ASE_INT

ASE_OBJ

ASR_REQ

ASE_SPD

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

Tests

Vulnerability assessment

ASE_TSS

ATE_COV

ATE_DPT

ATE_FUN

ATE_IND

AVA_VAN

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

1

2

3

1

2

3

1

2

4

1

2

3

2

2

5

1

3

4

2

3

5

1

3

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the

TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed

(chapter 8.6)

“Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)

“Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested

(chapter 8.8)

“Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested

(chapter 8.9)

“Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 37

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011 Certification Report

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0664-2011

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / ST23YR80 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT

Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 15 February 2011, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,

ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below: a) b)

MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany

(Development and Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation)

Smartrac Ltd., 142 Moo1, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean,

Amphor Bang-pa-in, Phra Nakorn Si Ayutthaya, 13160 Thailand, Site

Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-2009 [19] (Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation)

For development and production sites regarding the STMicroelectronics chip SB23YR80B refer to the certification report ANSSI-CC-2010/02 [16].

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6] and [8]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the

Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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