Security Target: 0798b_pdf

Security Target: 0798b_pdf
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
Security Target
BSI-DSZ-CC-0798
Common Criteria / ISO 15408
EAL 4+
Document Version 1.02 • 2012-08-16
cv cryptovision GmbH • Munscheidstr. 14 • 45886 Gelsenkirchen • Germany
www.cryptovision.com • [email protected] • +49-209-167-2450
v
cv act ePasslet/BAC Security Target
Content
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1
ST/TOE Identification ..................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2
ST overview ................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3
TOE overview ................................................................................................................................................. 6
Conformance claims ............................................................................................................................. 13
2.1
CC conformance .......................................................................................................................................... 13
2.2
Statement of Compatibility concerning Composite Security Target ........................................................... 13
Security problem definition .................................................................................................................. 22
3.1
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 22
3.2
Assumptions ................................................................................................................................................ 23
3.3
Threats ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
3.4
Organizational security policies ................................................................................................................... 27
Security objectives ................................................................................................................................ 29
4.1
Security Objectives for the TOE ................................................................................................................... 29
4.2
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment ................................................................................ 31
4.3
Security Objective Rationale ....................................................................................................................... 33
Extended Components Definition......................................................................................................... 36
5.1
Definition of the Family FAU_SAS................................................................................................................ 36
5.2
Definition of the Family FCS_RND ............................................................................................................... 36
5.3
Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ............................................................................................................... 37
5.4
Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC ........................................................................................................... 38
Security Requirements.......................................................................................................................... 40
6.1
Security Definitions ..................................................................................................................................... 40
6.2
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE ........................................................................................... 40
6.3
Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ............................................................................................ 53
6.4
Security Requirements Rationale ................................................................................................................ 53
TOE Summary Specification .................................................................................................................. 60
7.1
Security Functionality .................................................................................................................................. 60
7.2
Mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities ................................................. 66
References ..................................................................................................................................................... 68
Common Criteria ........................................................................................................................................................ 68
Protection Profiles ..................................................................................................................................................... 68
TOE and Platform References .................................................................................................................................... 68
ICAO specifications .................................................................................................................................................... 70
Cryptographic Standards ........................................................................................................................................... 70
Other
70
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Glossary ......................................................................................................................................................... 71
Version Control
Version
Date
Author
Changes to Previous Version
0.1
2010-10-27
Benjamin Drisch
Initial version based on PP0055
0.2
2010-11-02
Benjamin Drisch
First assignments performed
0.3
2010-11-12
Benjamin Drisch
Minor corrections
0.35
2010-11-23
Benjamin Drisch
Chapter 5 added
0.4
2010-11-29
Benjamin Drisch
Chapters 1 and 2 restructured, chapter 7 revised
0.45
2010-12-16
Benjamin Drisch
Remarks by NXP included, multi-application approach added to chapter 1 and 2
0.5
2011-01-06
Thomas Zeggel
Minor corrections and additions in chapter 1, chapter 7
extended
0.6
2011-01-07
Benjamin Drisch,
Thomas Zeggel
Internal revision with small corrections.
0.7
2011-01-21
Benjamin Drisch
Remarks by NXP included
0.8
2011-06-17
Benjamin Drisch,
Thomas Zeggel
Changes according to TüvIT observation report
0.9
2011-08-12
Thomas Zeggel
Changes according to TüvIT observation report
0.91
2011-08-24
Benjamin Drisch
Feedback by TüvIT included – only minor changes
0.92
2011-08-30
Thomas Zeggel
Small corrections after internal review.
0.93
2011-09-27
Thomas Zeggel
Small corrections after internal review.
0.94
2011-11-10
Benjamin Drisch,
Thomas Zeggel
Small changes and additions based on the results of the BSI
kick-off meeting and issues in the observation reports to
the SSCD ST by TüvIT.
0.95
2012-01-26
Thomas Zeggel
Changes according to internal review.
Other changes according to comments from TÜVit:
Changed product name in ePasslet/EACv1 v1.8.
Comments in SFR mappings of chapter 2.2 added.
Change of name of chapter 1.1.
Reference [ZertIC080] corrected.
Certificates of Crypto Libs referenced.
Additional references in chapters 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3.2.
Names of hardware platforms corrected.
0.96
2012-01-31
Thomas Zeggel
Minor corrections in section 1.1 and 1.3.2.
0.97
2012-02-01
Thomas Zeggel
Minor corrections (version control and section 1.3.4)
0.98
2012-02-27
Thomas Zeggel
Changes and corrections, based on comments by the BSI:

Added certification ID of platform, crypto lib and hardware in section 1.3.2

Included remark on PP conformance claim in section
2.1
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
Minor corrections in section 2.1
0.99
2012-03-01
Benjamin Drisch

Corrected Certification ID of underlying hardware platform for P5CD080
1.00
2012-03-15
Benjamin Drisch

Clarified life cycle of the TOE according to ALC

Added clarification of MIFARE functionality in section
1.3.2
Clarified TOE definition and life-cycle description
1.01
2012-04-16
Benjamin Drisch

1.02
2012-08-16
Benjamin Drisch
Revised TOE definition

corrected references to underlying certificates for
Crypto Library and HW platform in 1.3.2

explicitely stated contact-based interface
Corrected reference to Guidance Manual
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1 Introduction
1.1 ST/TOE Identification
Title:
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 Security Target
Version:
v1.02
Origin:
cv cryptovision GmbH
Compliant to:
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control (BSI-CC-PP0055) [PP0055]
Product identification:
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
ROM identification value:
P5Cx081UA: 8F80EC
P5Cx080UA: 7C1970
P5Cx040UA: F39353
Javacard OS platform:
NXP JCOP 2.4.1 R3 [ZertJCOP080], [ZertJCOP081], [ZertJCOP040]
Cryptographic library:
[ZertCL080], [ZertCL081], [ZertCL040]
Security controller:
[ZertIC080], [ZertIC081], [ZertIC040]
TOE identification:
cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8
TOE documentation:
Administration and user guide [Guidance]
1.2 ST overview
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for MRTD chips based on the BAC application
of the cv act ePassslet Suite. The cv act ePasslet Suite is a set of Javacard applications intended to be used
exclusively on the NXP JCOP Javacard OS platforms, which are certified according to CC EAL 5+
[ZertJCOP080], [ZertJCOP081], [ZertJCOP040]. The cv act ePasslet Suite as well as the NXP JCOP operating
system are provided within the ROM mask of a smart card chip based on the NXP P5CD security controller,
which is itself certified according to CC EAL 5+ [ZertIC080], [ZertIC081], [ZertIC040], and certified cryptographic library [ZertCL080], [ZertCL081], [ZertCL040].
This ST claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control (BSI-CC-PP0055) [PP0055].
The main objectives of this ST are:

to introduce TOE and the MRTD application,

to define the scope of the TOE and its security features,

to describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development, production and usage.

to describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of integrity
and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.

to specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional requirements, the
TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functionalities.
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4+.
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1.3 TOE overview
1.3.1 Overview of cv act ePasslet Suite
The cv act ePasslet Suite is a modular multi-application solution for eID documents based on Java Card.
It provides the following applications:
Application name
Function
Standard
cv act ePasslet/BAC
Basic Access Control
ICAO Doc 9303
cv act ePasslet/EACv1.11
Extended Access Control, V1.11
BSI TR03110, V1.11
cv act ePasslet/EACv2-SAC
Extended Access Control, V2.05
BSI TR03110, V2.05
cv act ePasslet/GeID
German eID card
BSI TR03127, BSI TR03110
cv act ePasslet/ePKI
IAS with own PKCS#15 profile
PKCS#15
cv act ePasslet/IDL
International Driving License
ISO 18013
cv act ePasslet/eHIC
European Health Insurance
CWA 15974
cv act ePasslet/EuCCB
European Citizen Card - Base Profile
CEN/TS 15480
cv act ePasslet/EuCCF
European Citizen Card - French Profile
GIXEL IAS-ECC V1.01
cv act ePasslet/eVR
Electronic Vehicle Registration
EU Council Directive 1999/37/EC
cv act ePasslet/NIDS
Combination of EAC V1.11 and ePKI
BSI TR03110, V1.11, PKCS#15
Table 1: Customer view of the available applications in the cv act ePasslet Suite.
These applications are realized by configurations of one or more predefined applets; while each application has a distinct configuration, different applications might use the same underlying applet. For details
on the relation between applets and applications please refer to Figures 1 and 2 below.
While the whole applet code resides in ROM, the applets providing the different applications are instantiated into EEPROM. Multiple applications can be present at the same time by instantiating multiple applets
with their distinct configurations with some restrictions detailed below. A common combination could be
an EACv1 applet and an ePKI applet providing a travel application with LDS data and EAC authentication
together with a signature application (offered as own standard product configuration “NIDS” as listed in
Table 1, Figure 1 and Figure 2).
The product is available in two variants:
Variant 1



available on P5Cx081 and P5Cx041
covering all applications provided in Table 1
certified products (on P5Cx081 only):
 BAC
certified according to PP0055
 EACv1
certified according to PP0056
 EACv2-SAC
certified according to SAC/PACE-PP
 ePKI
certified as Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to PP0059
(contact and contactless with PACE)
The following Figure 1 gives an overview of the available applications and actual applets in variant 1.
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cv act ePasslet/BAC Security Target
Variant 1 - available applications
NIDS
IDL
BAC
eVR
EACv2SAC
EACv1
GeID
ePKI*
eHIC
EuCC
Base
EuCC
French
EAC
eID
ePA
ePKI
MF
IAS-ECC
com.cryptovision
.ePassletEAC
com.cryptovision.eid
com.cryptovision.EPA
com.cryptovision.applet
com.cryptovision.MF
com.cryptovision.IAS
Bold: Configurations to
be certified
Actual applets
* The ePKI application uses the ePA MF
applet for contactless operation. This is
available in variant 1 only.
class names
Figure 1: Available applications and actual applets in variant 1.
The other version (variant 2) contains a subset of these applications:
Variant 2



available on P5Cx080 and P5Cx040
Contains the applets and applications indicated in Figure 2
certified products:
 BAC
certified according to PP0055
 EACv1
certified according to PP0056
 ePKI
certified as Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) according to PP0059
(contact interface only)
The following Figure 2 gives an overview of the available applications and actual applets in variant 2.
Variant 2 - available applications
NIDS
IDL
BAC
eVR
EACv1
ePKI
EAC
ePKI
com.cryptovision
.ePassletEAC
com.cryptovision.applet
Bold: Configurations to
be certified
eHIC
Actual applets
class names
Figure 2: Available applications and actual applets in variant 2.
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Combinations of certified and non-certified applications are possible (as long as these applications use one
of the above applets instantiated from ROM).
Via configuration the instanciated applets can be tied to the contactless and/or the contact interface, respectively. BAC, EACv1, EACv2-SAC require exclusive access to the contactless interface only. Hence, if one
of these applications is used (in certified configuration), further (certified or non-certified) applications
have to be bound to the contact interface.
These additional applications have to be instanciated from ROM. That especially excludes additional applet code being loaded and installed into EEPROM.
1.3.2 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip containing components for a
machine readable travel document (MRTD chip). After instantiation and configuration of the cv act
ePasslet/BAC application it can be programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [ICAODoc]
and provides the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO document [MRTD-PKI].
The TOE consists of

the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) including the contact-based interface
with hardware for the contactless interface including contacts for the antenna,

the platform with the Java Card operation system JCOP 2.4.1R3 by NXP, in the variants
o JxA081, A, B1, B4, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011 ([ST_JCOP081], [ZertJCOP81])
with crypto library version 2.7, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 ([ST_CL081],
[ZertCL081]) and hardware P5Cx081V1A, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
([ST_IC081], [ZertIC081]),
o J2A080, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011 ([ST_JCOP080], [ZertJCOP80]) with crypto
library version 2.6, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010 ([ST_CL080], [ZertCL080]) and
hardware P5Cx080V0B , Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2010 ([ST_IC080], [ZertIC080]),
o JxA040, A, B1, B4, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011 ([ST_JCOP040], [ZertJCOP40])
with crypto library version 2.6, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010 ([ST_CL040],
[ZertCL040]) and hardware P5Cx040VOB, Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007
([ST_IC040], [ZertIC040]).

cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 as the only application that has access to the contactless interface,

the associated guidance documentation Administrator and User Guidance [Guidance].
The TOE’s functionality claimed by this Security Target is realized by the cv act ePasslet/BAC v1.8 application only.
Some of the underlying platform variants of this composite TOE provide MIFARE functionality; please note
that this functionality is out of scope of the TOE’s security functionality claimed by this Security Target.
1.3.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
This paragraph is directly based on the corresponding paragraph in the protection profile [PP0055].
A state or organisation issues a MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods
in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for con8 of 75
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tactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing state or organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
state trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing state or organization.
Within this security target the MRTD is viewed as a unit of

the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder:
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.

the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAODoc] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. Via the contactless interface
of the integrated circuit, the following data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder are accessible:
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both1
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely
identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security printing),
logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures (e.g. control of
materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to
the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended
Access Control to and the Data Encryption of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the
ICAO Technical Report [MRTD-PKI]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are
performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-only-once access
control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism. This security target does not address the Extended Access Control as optional security mechanism.
The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by the TOE. The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system by means of
Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection system the MRTD’s chip
provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private communication (secure messaging) with this
inspection system [ICAODoc], normative appendix 5.
1
These additional biometric reference data are optional
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1.3.4 Major security features of the TOE
The TOE provides the following TOE security functionalities:

TSF_Access manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in the applet’s file system. It also controls write access of initialization, pre-personalization and personalization data.

TSF_Admin manages the storage of manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data.

TSF_Secret ensures secure management of secrets such as cryptographic keys. This covers secure
key storage, access to keys as well as secure key deletion. These mechanisms are mainly provided
by TSF_OS.

TSF_Crypto performs high level cryptographic operations. The implementation is mainly based on
the Security Functionalities provided by TSF_OS. The supported crypto mechanisms are:
o Triple-DES for encryption/decryption and MAC calculation
o SHA-1 for key derivation

TSF_SecureMessaging realizes a secure communication channel with MACs and encryption based
on Triple-DES (112 bit key length).

TSF_Auth_3DES performs an authentication mechanism based on Triple-DES (112 bit key length)
used for BAC and symmetric authentication based on pre-shared keys for personalization.

TSF_Integrity protects the integrity of internal applet data like the Access control lists.

TSF_OS contains all security functionalities provided by the certified platform (IC, crypto library,
Javacard operation system). Besides some minor additions, the cryptographic operations are provided by this platform.
1.3.5
TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases (subdivided into 7 steps). This paragraph is directly based on the corresponding paragraph in the protection profile [PP0055].
1.3.5.1 Phase 1: Development
(Step 1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer2 uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation associated with these
TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer.
The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
2
Please note that in this ST the role software developer of the protection profile is subdivided into two
separate roles: the operating system is developed by the OS software developer, and the MRTD application by the (MRTD) software developer.
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1.3.5.2 Phase 2: Manufacturing
(Step 3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD
material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
The TOE delivery according to CC is the delivery of the IC (with the application code in ROM) from the IC
manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step 4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
(Step 5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with prepersonalization Data.
Application Note 1: Creation of the application implies Applet instantiation.
In this step the final (but not yet personalized) MRTD is generated from the certified components
according to the binding initialization and pre-personalization guidelines provided in [Guidance].
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
1.3.5.3 Phase 3: Personalisation of the MRTD
(Step 6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder biographical data, (ii)
the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional
biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD and their
secure transfer to the Personalisation Agent, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the
logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalisation Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation
of (i) the digital MRZ data (DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [MRTD-PKI] finalizes the personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Application note 2: The TSF data (data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE; cf. application note 15) comprise (but are not limited to) the Personalization Agent Authentication
Key(s) and the Basic Authentication Control Key.
Application note 3: This Security Target and the underlying protection profile [PP0055] distinguish between the Personalization Agent as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE
IT environment signing the Document security object as described in [PP0055], [MRTD-PKI]. This approach
allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles. The TOE uses symmetric authentication keys for
the personalization process. Authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives allows fast authentication protocols appropriate for centralized personalization schemes but relies on stronger security protection in the personalization environment, e.g. by using hardware security module (HSM) for the storage
of the authentication keys.
1.3.5.4 Phase 4: Operational use
(Step 7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational
Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or Organization
and used according to the security policy of the Issuing State but they can never be modified.
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Application note 4: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to modify) data in
the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. This will imply an update of the Document Security Object including the re-signing by the
Document Signer.
Application note 5: The intention of the underlying PP [PP0055] is to consider at least the phases 1 and
parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step 1 to Step 3) as part of the evaluation and therefore to define the TOE delivery
according to CC after this phase 2 or later. Since specific production steps of phase 2 are of minor security
relevance (e. g. booklet manufacturing and antenna integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation
under ALC. Nevertheless the decision about this has to be taken by the certification body resp. the national body of the issuing State or Organization. In this case the national body of the issuing State or Organization is responsible for these specific production steps.
Note, that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an
issuing State or Organization. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up
to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD
assurance class.
Remark: This ST considers only phase 1 and parts of phase 2 (Steps 1 - 3) as part of CC evaluation under
ALC.
1.3.6 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its claimed
security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are
needed to represent a complete MRTD, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of the TOE.
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2 Conformance claims
2.1 CC conformance
This security target claims conformance to:
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and general
model, July 2009, version 3.1 revision 3, [CC_1],
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional requirements, July 2009, version 3.1 revision 3, [CC_2],
 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements, July 2009, version 3.1 revision 3, [CC_3],
as follows:
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant,
 Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2.
The
 Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009, [CC_4]
has to be taken into account.
This security target claims strict conformance also to the Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control (BSI-CC-PP0055) [PP0055]. No extensions have been
made.
The evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the chip platform claiming conformance
to the PP [PP0035]. The hardware part of the composite evaluation is covered by the certification report
[ZertIC080], [ZertIC081], [ZertIC040]. In addition, the evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the crypto library and the JCOP 2.4.1R3 Javacard OS. The Javacard OS part of the composite
evaluation is covered by the certification reports [ZertJCOP080], [ZertJCOP081], [ZertJCOP040], the crypto
library by the certification reports [ZertCL080], [ZertCL081], [ZertCL040].
2.2 Statement of Compatibility concerning Composite Security Target
2.2.1 Assessment of the Platform TSFs
The following Table 2 lists all Security Functionalities of the underlying Platform ST and shows, which Security Functionalities of the Platform ST are relevant for this Composite ST and which are irrelevant. The
first column addresses specific Security Functionality of the underlying platform, which is assigned to Security Functionalities of the Composite ST in the second column. The last column provides additional information on the correspondence if necessary.
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Relevant Platform TSF-group
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
SF.AccessControl
TSF_Access
SF.Audit
TSF_Admin
SF.CryptoKey
TSF_Secret
SF.CryptoOperation
TSF_Crypto
SF.I&A
TSF_Access
SF.SecureManagement
TSF_Admin, TSF_Integrity
SF.Transaction
TSF_Integrity
SF.Hardware
TSF_OS
Implicitly used via JCOP (TSF_OS)*
SF.CryptoLib
TSF_OS
Implicitly used via JCOP (TSF_OS)*
Table 2: Relevant platform TSF-groups and their correspondence
* Remark: The Platform TSF-groups “SF.Hardware” and “SF.CryptoLib” are not directly used by Security
functionalities of the TOE, they are (implicitly) invoked by calls to the JCOP operating system, though. These OS calls are grouped in the TSF_OS.
2.2.2 Assessment of the Platform SFRs
The following Table 3 provides an assessment of all relevant Platform SFRs.
Relevant Platform SFR
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
FAU_ARP.1/JCS
FPT_PHP.3
Internal counter for security violations
complement JCOP mechanisms
FAU_SAA.1
FPT_PHP.3
Internal counter for security violations
complement JCOP mechanisms
FAU_SAS.1
FAU_SAS.1
Fulfillment of the platform SFR leads
directly to the SFR of this ST.
FAU: Security Audit
FCS: CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
The requirement in this ST is equivalent to parts of the platform ST.
FCS_CKM.2
No correspondence
Out of scope (managed within JCOP)
No contradiction to this ST
FCS_CKM.3
No correspondence
Out of scope (managed within JCOP)
No contradiction to this ST
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
The requirements are equivalent
(physically overwriting the keys with
zeros).
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/MAC
The requirements are equivalent:
FCS_COP.1/SHA of this ST corresponds
to the platform SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA-1;
FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/AUTH
correspond to the platform SFR
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD;
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Relevant Platform SFR
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
FCS_COP.1/MAC corresponds to the
platform SFR FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD.
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_RND.1
Fulfillment of the platform SFR leads
directly to the SFR of this ST.
No correspondence
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
FDP: User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1/CMGR
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACC.1/SCP
Out of scope (JCOP memory management)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL
Out of scope (JCOP access control
mechanisms)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACF.1/CMGR
Out of scope (JCOP access control
mechanisms)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ACF.1/SCP
Out of scope (JCOP access control
mechanisms)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ETC.1
Out of scope (JCOP data control mechanisms)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_IFC.1/JCVM
Out of scope (refers to Virtual Machine)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_IFC.1/SCP
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_IFF.1/JCVM
No correspondence
Out of scope (refers to Virtual Machine)
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ITC.1
Out of scope (JCOP data control mechanisms)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_ITT.1/SCP
Out of scope (platform internal data
transfer)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_RIP.1
FCS_CKM.4
Relied on for key deletion
No contradiction to this ST
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Relevant Platform SFR
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL
No correspondence
Out of scope (refers to Virtual Machine)
No contradiction to this ST
FDP_SDI.2
Out of scope (JCOP internal data integrity protection)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA: Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
Out of scope (no PINs used within applet)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_AFL.1/CMGR
No correspondence
Out of scope (refers to card manager)
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_ATD.1/AID
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP AID management)
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_UAU.1
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_UAU.3/CMGR
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_UAU.4/CMGR
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_UID.1/CMGR
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_UID.2/AID
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP AID management)
No contradiction to this ST
FIA_USB.1
Out of scope (JCOP applet management)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FMT: Security Management
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.1
The SFR of this St is refinement of the
platform SFR. No contradictions to this
ST.
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
The SFR of this St is refinement of the
platform SFR. No contradictions to this
ST.
FMT_MSA.1/JCRE
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No contradiction to this ST
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Relevant Platform SFR
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
FMT_MSA.1/CMGR
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.2/JCRE
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP object handling)
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.3/CMGR
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MSA.3/SCP
Out of scope (JCOP firewall mechanism)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_MTD.1/JCRE
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
The platform SFR leads to the fulfillment of these SFR of this ST.
FMT_MTD.3
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP LF state handling)
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_SMF.1
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP applet handling)
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_SMR.1/JCRE
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP specific roles)
No contradiction to this ST
FMT_SMR.1/CMGR
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP specific roles)
No contradiction to this ST
FPR: Privacy
FPR_UNO.1
Out of scope (JCOP package separation)
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_FLS.1/JCS
FPT_FLS.1
Internal countermeasures for detecting
security violations complement JCOP
mechanisms
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_FLS.1/SCP
FPT_FLS.1
Internal countermeasures for detecting
security violations complement JCOP
mechanisms
FPT_ITT.1/SCP
No correspondence
Out of scope (platform internal data
transfer)
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Relevant Platform SFR
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_PHP.1
No correspondence
Out of scope (hardware mechanism)
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_PHP.3/SCP
FPT_PHP.3
The SFRs are identical.
FPT_RCV.3/SCP
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_RCV.4/SCP
No correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_TDC.1
No correspondence
Refers to LC state before Applet instantiation
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1
The SFR is equivalent. No contradiction
to the ST.
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP internal)
FRU: Resource Utilisation
FRU_FLT.2/SCP
No contradiction to this ST
FTP: Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/CMGR
No correspondence
Out of scope (JCOP internal)
No contradiction to this ST
Table 3: Relevant platform SFRs and their correspondence
2.2.3 Assessment of the Platform Objectives
The following Table 3 provides an assessment of all relevant Platform objectives.
Relevant Platform Objective
Correspondence in this ST
O.PROTECT_DATA
OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
O.SIDE_CHANNEL
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.OS_DECEIVE
No correspondence
O.FAULT_PROTECT
OT.Prot_Malfunction
O.PHYSICAL
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
O.IDENTIFICATION
OT.Identification
O.RND
No correspondence
References/Remarks
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SID
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.MF_FW
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.OPERATE
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.RESOURCES
No correspondence
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Relevant Platform Objective
Correspondence in this ST
References/Remarks
No contradiction to this ST
O.FIREWALL
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.REALLOCATION
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SHRD_VAR_CONFID
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SHRD_VAR_INTEG
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.ALARM
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.TRANSACTION
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.CIPHER
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.PIN-MNGT
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.KEY-MNGT
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.CARD-MANAGEMENT
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SCP.RECOVERY
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SCP.SUPPORT
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
O.SCP.IC
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
Table 4: Relevant platform objectives and their correspondence
2.2.4 Assessment of Platform Threats
The following Table 5 provides an assessment of all relevant Platform objectives.
Relevant Platform Oberctive
Correspondence in this ST
T.ACCESS_DATA
T.Eavesdropping
T.OS_OPERATE
No correspondence
References/Remarks
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.OS_DECEIVE
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
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Relevant Platform Oberctive
Correspondence in this ST
T.LEAKAGE
T.Information_Leakage
T.FAULT
T.Malfunction
T.RND
No correspondence
References/Remarks
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.PHYSICAL
T.Phys-Tamper
T.CONFID-JCSCODE
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.CONFIDAPPLI-DATA
T.Information_Leakage
T.CONFID-JCSDATA
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.INTEG-APPLICODE
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.INTEG-JCSCODE
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.INTEG-APPLIDATA
T.Forgery
T.INTEG-JCSDATA
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.SID.1
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.SID.2
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.EXE-CODE.1
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.EXE-CODE.2
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
T.RESOURCES
No correspondence
Out of scope
No contradiction to this ST
Table 5: Relevant platform threats and their correspondence
2.2.5 Assessment of Platform Organisational Security Policies
The platform ST contains only the Organisational Security Policy “OSP.PROCESS-TOE” referring to accurate
identification of each TOE instance. This policy will be fulfilled by a distinct product code for the platform
and for the composite TOE each. This policy does not contradict to the policies of this ST.
2.2.6 Assessment of Platform Operational Environment
2.2.6.1 Assessment of Platform Assumptions
In the first column, the following table lists all significant assumptions of the Platform ST. The last column
provides an explanation of relevance for the Composite TOE.
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Significant Platform Assumption
Relevance for Composite ST
A.USE_DIAG
A.USE_DIAG is required in the Platform ST to cover secure
communication.
There is no corresponding assumption in the Composite ST.
Secure communication is enforced by TSF_Access and hence
supports this assumption directly.
Table 6: Significant assumptions of the Platform ST.
2.2.6.2 Assessment of Platform Security Objectives and SFRs for the Operational Environment
There are no significant Platform Security Objectives and no Platform SFRs for the Operational Environment to be considered.
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3 Security problem definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
3.1.1.1 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and the
Document Security Object EF.SOD according to [ICAODoc]. These data are user data of the TOE. The
EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16
contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the
inspection system for the Chip Authentication within the EAC protocol (which is not in the scope of the
TOE). The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
Due to interoperability reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAODoc] the TOE described in the according protection profile [PP0055] specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against enhanced basic attack
potential granting access to

Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),

Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,

Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,

Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,

Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data

Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
3.1.1.2 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder
is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
3.1.2.1 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer
using this role Manufacturer.
3.1.2.2 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the holder
by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data
in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
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finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD
for the holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF
data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in [ICAODoc].
3.1.2.3 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
3.1.2.4 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s
chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts
of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection
System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection
System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
Application note 6: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the
Extended Access Control is outside the scope.
3.1.2.5 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
3.1.2.6 Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
3.1.2.7 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without
authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note 7: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on
using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks
against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is intended to be used.
3.2.1 A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and integrity of
the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention,
theft or unauthorized use).
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3.2.2 A.MRTD_Delivery
MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:

Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery process and storage.

Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required
skill.
3.2.3 A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the
MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
3.2.4 A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The
Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control [ICAODoc]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access
Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
Application note 8: According to [ICAODoc] the support of the Passive Authentication mechanism is mandatory whereas the Basic Access Control is optional. This Security Target and the underlying PP [PP0055]
does not address Primary Inspection Systems, therefore the BAC is mandatory within this ST.
3.2.5 A.BAC-Keys
Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAODoc], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual
printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack
based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Application note 9: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy potential dependencies
between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have to be considered and taken into account.
E.g. there might be a direct dependency between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and
the issuing date.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT
environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the
assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
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3.3.1 T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action:
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely
the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication interface.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset:
Anonymity of user
3.3.2 T.Skimming
Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action:
An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to
read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of
the TOE.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset:
confidentiality of logical MRTD data
3.3.3 T.Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
Adverse action:
An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip
and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection
system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does
not know these data in advance.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ
data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset:
confidentiality of logical MRTD data
3.3.4 T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action:
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This
threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passportbook, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The
attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the
visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical
MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait
and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the
identity of the holder of this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRTD data
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The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
3.3.5 T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action:
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
“Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to
disclose or to manipulate TSF Data. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
3.3.6 T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action:
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage
in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through
emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency,
or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted
as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of
operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip
still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may
try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
3.3.7 T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action:
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security
features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functionalties of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation
of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or
TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation
of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g.
to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly
employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and
TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security functionality. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
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Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
3.3.8 T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action:
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify Security Functionalities of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be
achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
Threat agent:
having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
3.4 Organizational security policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1 [CC_1], section 3.2).
3.4.1 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
3.4.2 P.Personalization
Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed portrait
and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by
the issuing State or Organization only.
3.4.3 P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the
biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13,
EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control to allow read access to
these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [ICAODoc].
3
Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not being covered by this Security Target.
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Application note 10: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [ICAODoc]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE environment and loaded
to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
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4 Security objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for the
development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be
countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
4.1.1 OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [ICAODoc] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only.
The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note 11: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and (ii)
update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in the
“Operational Use” phase is optional.
4.1.2 OT.Data_Int
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any
modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
4.1.3 OT.Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read access
to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read
access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as
Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access
Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality
of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
Application note 12: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip shall provide
read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the
TOE to ensure the strength of the Security Functionality Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded
into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these keys has to result from
the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAODoc] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for
reading the biometric data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Extended Access Control
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not covered by this security target. Thus the read access must be prevented even in case of a successful
BAC Authentication.
4.1.4 OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify
itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
Application note 13: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE
to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The IC Identification
Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure
shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE manufacturing. In the
Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number
ICCSN) or MRTD identifier through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent of
the TOE environment.
4.1.5 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User Data of the
IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate,
change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
4.1.6 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in
the MRTD’s chip

by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and

by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or

by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note 14: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal processing
due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
4.1.7 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data, and
the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack potential
by means of
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
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except
on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or

measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)

manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as

controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior

reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
4.1.8 OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to prevent
errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage
(on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note 15: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
4.2.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
4.2.1.1 OE.MRTD_Manufact
Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5 and 6
to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
4.2.1.2 OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:

non-disclosure of any security relevant information,

identification of the element under delivery,

meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),

physical protection to prevent external damage,

secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),

traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o origin and shipment details,
o reception, reception acknowledgement,
o location material/information.
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Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with
the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
4.2.1.3 OE.Personalization
Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for
the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the
defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
4.2.1.4 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair, (ii)
ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure
operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization
must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States
and Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [ICAODoc].
4.2.1.5 OE.BAC-Keys
Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’
[ICAODoc] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the individual
printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack
based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the
printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
4.2.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE environment.
4.2.2.1 OE.Exam_MRTD
Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by the
traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAODoc].
4.2.2.2 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as MRTD
holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects
and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organ-
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izations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining
their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
4.2.2.3 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under Basic
Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control
and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e.
Basic Inspection Systems).
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
X
T.Eavesdropping
X
X
X
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.BAC-Keys
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
OE.MRTD_Delivery
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
X
X
X
X
T.Information_Lea
kage
X
X
T.Phys-Tamper
X
T.Malfunction
X
P.Manufact
P.Personal_Data
X
X
X
T.Abuse-Func
P.Personalization
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
T.Skimming
T.Forgery
OT.Prot_Absue-Func
X
OE.Exam_MRTD
T.Chip-ID
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
X
X
X
X
X
X
A.MRTD_Manufact
X
A.MRTD_Delivery
X
A.Pers_Agent
X
A.Insp_Sys
X
A.BAC-Keys
X
X
Table 7: Security Objective Rationale
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by
means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only” addresses
the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security objec-
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tive for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access
control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization
Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security
objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization
Agent.
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to support the protection
of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access
control for reading as decided by the issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional protection of the
integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality
of personal data” describes the protection of the confidentiality.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently
strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection system” address the reading of the logical
MRTD trough the contactless interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a
terminal. This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal
data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical
MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_PhysTamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book
according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD.
The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will
be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by
the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s chip as production
material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported
by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
ensuring that the TOE Security Functionalities for the initialization and the personalization are disabled
and the Security Functionalities for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper “Physical
Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against
these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against
Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and
OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
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The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment,
the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data. The examination
of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission
and the internal handling.
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
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5 Extended Components Definition
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are
defined in [PP0002], other components are defined in the underlying protection profile and cited here for
completeness.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU
(Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit
data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to
be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
5.1.1 FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
1
FAU_SAS.1 Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: a list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of the Class FCS
(cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random
number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
5.2.1 FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
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This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be
used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
1
FCS_RND.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of
functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities
of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
5.3.1 FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family
requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
1
FCS_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or
by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
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Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT
(Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test
Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the
TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 16: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are two
types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide protection
in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i)
the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities
are so limited that the policy is enforced or conversely
(ii)
the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the
product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here
to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the
TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the
TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis
(SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].a
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FCS_EMSEC TOE emanation
1
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FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of the [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6 Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [CC_1] of the CC. Each of these operations is
used in this ST and the underlying PP.
Operations already performed in the underlying PP [PP0055] are uniformly marked by bold italic font
style; for further information on details of the operation, please refer to [PP0055].
Operations performed within this Security Target are marked by bold underlined font style; further information on details of the operation is provided in foot notes.
6.1 Security Definitions
Security Attribute
Values
Meaning
Terminal authentication None (any terminal)
status
Default role (i.e. without authorization after startup)
Basic Inspection System
Terminal is authenticated as Basic Inspection System after successful Authentication in accordance
with the definition in rule 2 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
Personalisation Agent
Terminal is authenticated as Personalisation Agent
after successful Authentication in accordance with
the definition in rule 1 of FIA_UAU.5.2.
Table 8: Security Definitions for the TOE
6.2 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main
security functionality.
6.2.1 Class Security Audit (FAU)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2 extended).
6.2.1.1 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Application note 17: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-onlyonce data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
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6.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation algorithms
to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic Access Keys by the
TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[ICAODoc], normative appendix 5.
Application note 18: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol described in [ICAODoc],
normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the RetailMAC message authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [ICAODoc], Normative appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physically overwriting the keys with zeros4 that
meets the following: none5.
Application note 19: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the Retail-MAC message
authentication keys for secure messaging.
6.2.2.3 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the
TOE.
6.2.2.3.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
4
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
5
[assignment: list of standards]
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FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-16 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 18027.
Application note 20: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4) according to
[ICAODoc].
6.2.2.3.2
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [FIPS46-3] and
[ICAODoc]; normative appendix 5, A5.3.
Application note 21: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as
part of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.2.3.3
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH
The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES8 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit9 that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [FIPS46-3]10.
Application note 22: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism
(cf. FIA_UAU.4).
6.2.2.3.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
6
[selection: SHA-1 or other approved algorithms]
7
[selection: FIPS 180-2 or other approved standards]
8
[selection: Triple-DES, DES, AES]
9
[selection: 112, 128, 168, 192, 256]
10
[selection: FIPS 46-3, FIPS 197]
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Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic
key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Application note 23: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is agreed
between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and
FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.2.4 FCS_RND.1 Random Number Generation
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
6.2.2.4.1
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the
AIS 20 Class K3 quality metric11.
Application note 24: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the authentication
protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.3 Class Identification and Authentication (FIA)
Application note 25: The following Table 9 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name
SFR for the TOE
Algorithms and key sizes according to
[ICAODoc], normative appendix 5, and
[TR03110]
Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4 and
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/ENC)
and Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys (cf.
FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agent
FIA_UAU.4
Either Triple-DES with 112 bit keys or AES with
128 up to 256 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
Table 9: Overview of the authentication mechanisms used
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.1 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
11
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
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1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 26: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the Initialization Data and/or
Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the
only user role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization
Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the
Phase 3 (i.e. writing the digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection
System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as
default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System.
Application note 27: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read the ICCSN,
the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection
System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a (randomly chosen) identifier for
the communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more than one RFID. If this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification. If this identifier is fixed the ST writer
should consider the possibility to misuse this identifier to perform attacks addressed by T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.2 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 28: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent authenticate themselves.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.3 FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by
the TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
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1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES12.
Application note 29: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated by
the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt.
However, the authentication of the Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a diversifier.
Application note 30: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication mechanism
defined in [ICAODoc]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s
chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the
terminal with a challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with
some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE stops
further communications if the terminal is not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to
fulfill the security objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.4 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES13 to support user
authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following
rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one
of the following mechanism(s) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism
with the Personalization Agent Key14,
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only
by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys.
Application note 31: In case the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control’ [19] should also be fulfilled the Personalization Agent
should not be authenticated by using the BAC or the symmetric authentication mechanism as they base
on the two-key Triple-DES. The Personalization Agent could be authenticated by using the symmetric AESbased authentication mechanism or other (e.g. the Terminal Authentication Protocol using the Personalization Key, cf. [PP0056] FIA_UAU.5.2).
Application note 32: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may
use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personali12
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
13
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
14
[selection: the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Keys, the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key, [assignment other]]
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zation environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and personalization
terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Document Basic Access Keys.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.5 FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to
the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Application note 33: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [ICAODoc] includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE
checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent
by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not
execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates
the user for each received command and accepts only those commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
Application note 34: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [PP0056] the BAC communication might
be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing a new secure messaging that is distinct from
the BAC based communication. In this case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the
option that commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication but are
protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more advanced authentication
process.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.3.6 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
the range of 1 – 3276715 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
BAC authentication16.
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met17, the TSF shall block access to the card permanently18.
Application note 35 (examples) omitted.
15
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
16
[assignment: list of authentication events]
17
[assignment: met or surpassed]
18
[assignment: list of actions]
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6.2.4 Class User Data Protection (FDP)
6.2.4.1 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
6.2.4.1.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
6.2.4.2 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.4.2.1
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and
to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read
the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
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1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4.
Application note 36: The inspection system needs special authentication and authorization for read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 not defined in this security target (cf. [PP0056] for details).
6.2.4.3 FDP_UCT.1 Inter-TSF-Transfer
Application note 37: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data transmitted from
the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes after
successful authentication of the terminal. The authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control
Mechanism include the key agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be used
for secure messaging.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.4.3.1
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
6.2.4.4 FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note 38: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the management of the TSF data.
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.5.1.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
6.2.5.1.2
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note 39: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF
data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended)
6.2.5.1.3
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
6.2.5.1.4
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
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Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.
Application note 40: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit
misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide
an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated and
IC Embedded Software.
Application note 41: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.
6.2.5.1.5
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note 42: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
6.2.5.1.6
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Application note 43: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are the
default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the
TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by (i) allowing to write
these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by
FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in
the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4 “Operational
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Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer will write the Prepersonalization Data.
6.2.5.1.7
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE
6.2.5.1.8
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic Access Keys
and Personalization Agent Keys to none.
Application note 44: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.
6.2.6 Class Protection of the Security Functions (FPT)
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the forced
leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with
preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance
to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the security
features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
6.2.6.1.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit variations in power consumption or timing during command execution19 in excess of non-useful information20 enabling access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and confidential user data21.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s)
and confidential user data22.
19
[assignment: types of emissions]
20
[assignment: specified limits]
21
[assignment: list of types of user data]
22
[assignment: list of types of user data]
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Application note 45: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is based
on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the interfaces
of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an attacker that
varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.6.1.2
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part
2).
6.2.6.1.3
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up23 to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of
stored TSF executable code.
Application note 46: Further explanation of the protection profile [PP0055] applied, examples omitted.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
6.2.6.1.4
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
23
[selection: during initial start-up,periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised
user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
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FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application note 47: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can
by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks
is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means
here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any
time.
Application note 48: The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and “TSF domain separation
FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [CC_2]. These requirements are now an implicit part of the assurance
requirement ADV_ARC.1.
6.3 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The Security Assurance Requirements for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating
environment are those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following component:
ALC_DVS.2.
6.4 Security Requirements Rationale
6.4.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
FAU_SAS.1
X
FCS_CKM.1
X
FCS_CKM.4
X
FCS_COP.1/SHA
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1/ENC
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
X
X
FCS_COP.1/MAC
X
X
X
FCS_RND.1
X
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_UID.1
X
X
FIA_AFL.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.4
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.5
X
X
X
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OT.Prot_AbuseFunc
OT.Prot_Malfunc
tion
OT.Prot_PhysTamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
The following Table 10 provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
FDP_ACC.1
X
X
X
FDP_ACF.1
X
X
X
FDP_UCT.1
X
X
X
FDP_UIT.1
X
X
X
FMT_SMF.1
X
X
X
FMT_SMR.1
X
X
X
OT.Prot_AbuseFunc
X
OT.Prot_Malfunc
tion
X
OT.Prot_PhysTamper
OT.Data_Conf
X
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Data_Int
FIA_UAU.6
OT.Identification
OT.AC_Pers
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FMT_LIM.1
X
FMT_LIM.2
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
X
X
X
FPT_EMSEC.1
X
X
FPT_TST.1
X
X
X
FPT_FLS.1
X
X
FPT_PHP.3
X
X
X
Table 10: Coverage of the Security Objectives for the TOE by SFR.
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD” addresses the
access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by
the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be authenticated either by using the BAC
mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/MAC) with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [PP0055] by using the symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the
cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF
management functions (including Personalization) setting the Document Basic Access Keys according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
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The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the integrity of
the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The
write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way:
only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The
authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SFR
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or
FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the
BAC mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC
for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish
the Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in accordance to
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1
allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do not violate
OT.Data_Conf. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces blocking for facilitating a
brute force attack. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical
MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the
data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles
(including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access
Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the user.
The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System
only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and
FCS_RND.1 establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of
the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the Personalization
Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure Messaging.
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will
be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the
phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and
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FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication attempt (cf. Application note 30). In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces blocking for facilitating a brute force attack.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is ensured by the
SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features
which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the TOE to
protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against disclosure

by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines,
which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,

by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1,
and/or

by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is covered by the
SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i) the SFR
FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to
verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in
case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.4.2 Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support
and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained.
The following Table 11 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction,
Fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation]
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_CKM.4
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
justification 1 for non-satisfied
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic
key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_RND.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.5
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6
No dependencies
n.a.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1, justification 3 for non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/ENC
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
FCS_COP.1/MAC
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dependencies,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel,
or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control or FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
justification 4 for non-satisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_FLS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_PHP.3
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_TST.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Table 11: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need any key material. Therefore
neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key permanently stored during the
Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or
FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during
the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of these security
attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging between the MRTD and the
BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically distinct
from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not provide a
direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
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6.4.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial
specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those circumstances where
developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional
commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the MRTD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s material.
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other security requirements
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2:
no dependencies.
6.4.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security requirements for
the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the security assurance requirements
(SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole.
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.4.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional requirements
shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and nonsatisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent assurance
requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in section 6.4.3 Security
Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and
internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are functionalassurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to arise in sections
6.4.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.4.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also
discussed in section 6.4.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance components
are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of
security requirements.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 Security Functionality
7.1.1 TSF_Access: Access rights
This security functionality manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in the
applet’s file system. It also controls write access of initialization, pre-personalization and personalization
data. Access control for initialization and pre-personalization in Phase 2 – while the actual applet is not yet
present – is based on the card manager of the underlying JCOP Java Card platform (SF.AccessControl,
SF.I&A).
Access is granted (or denied) in accordance to access rights that depend on appropriate identification and
authentication mechanisms.
TSF_Access covers the following SFRs:

FIA_UID.1 requires that the TSF shall allow reading specific data on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified, but shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FIA_UAU.1 requires that the TSF shall allow reading of specific data on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated, but shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user. TSF_Access realizes
the appropriate control of the access rights.

FIA_UAU.4 requires that the TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data. TSF_Access realizes
the appropriate control of the access rights.

FIA_UAU.5: FIA_UAU.5.1 requires that the TSF shall provide a (1) Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and a (2) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES to support
user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2 requires that the TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to specified rules. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FIA_UAU.6 requires that the TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism. TSF_Access realizes the
appropriate control of the access rights.

FIA_AFL.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when a defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts related to BAC authentication has occurred, and that if this number has been met,
the TSF shall block the card permanently. This is realized within TSF_Auth and TSF_Access.

FDP_ACC.1: FDP_ACC.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FDP_ACF.1: FDP_ACF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the following: (1) Subjects: (a) Personalization Agent, (b) Basic Inspection System,
(c) Terminal; (2) Objects: (a) data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, (b) data in EF.COM, (c)
data in EF.SOD; (3) Security attributes: (a) authentication status of terminals. FDP_ACF.1.2 requires that the TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: (1) the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD, and (2) the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
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FDP_ACF.1.3 requires that the TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none. This means that no other access possibilities exist.
FDP_ACF.1.4 requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule: (1) any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD;
(2) any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD; (3) the
Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4. TSF_Access realizes
the appropriate control of the access rights.

FDP_UCT.1: FDP_UCT.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be
able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FDP_UIT.1: FDP_UIT.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FMT_SMR.1: FMT_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles (1) manufacturer, (2)
personalization agent, and (3) basic inspection system. FMT_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall
be able to associate users with roles. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access
rights.

FMT_LIM.1: FMT_LIM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow (1) User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, (2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, (3) software to be reconstructed and (4)
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FMT_LIM.2: FMT_LIM.2.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow (1) User Data to be disclosed
or manipulated, (2) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, (3) software to be reconstructed and
(4) substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks. TSF_Access realizes the appropriate control of the access rights.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE: FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability
to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent. TSF_Access realizes the
appropriate control of the access rights.

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ: FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to
read the Document Basic Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none. TSF_Access realizes
the appropriate control of the access rights.
7.1.2 TSF_Admin: Administration
This Security Functionality manages the storage of manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data. This storage area is a write-only-once area and write access is subject to Manufacturer
or Personalization Agent authentication. Management of manufacturing and pre-personalization data in
Phase 2 – while the actual applet is not yet present – is based on the card manager of the underlying JCOP
Java Card platform (SF.SecureManagement); also Audit functionality is based on JCOP functionality
(SF.Audit). During Operational Use phase, read access is only possible after successful authentication.
TSF_Admin covers the following SFRs:

FAU_SAS.1: FAU_SAS.1 requires that the TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records. This is realized by TSF.Admin.
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
FMT_SMF.1: FMT_SMF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be capable of performing the following
management functions: (1) initialization, (2) pre-personalization, and (3) personalization. This is
realized within TSF_Admin.

FMT_SMR.1: FMT_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles (1) manufacturer, (2)
personalization agent, and (3) basic inspection system. FMT_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall
be able to associate users with roles. TSF_Admin provides the according storage area for manufacturing data, pre-personalization data and personalization data.
7.1.3 TSF_Secret: Secret key management
This Security Functionality ensures secure management of secrets such as cryptographic keys. This covers
secure key storage, access to keys as well as secure key deletion. These functions make use of
SF.CryptoKey of the underlying JCOP Java Card OS.
TSF_Secret covers the following SFRs:

FCS_CKM.4: FCS_CKM.4.1 requires that the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physically overwriting the keys with zeros
by method (e.g. clearKey of [JCRE]) or automatically on applet deselection. This is mainly realized
in the security functionalities provided by TSF_Secret (and TSF_OS).

FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ: FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to
read the Document Basic Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none. This is realized
within TSF_Secret.
7.1.4 TSF_Crypto: Cryptographic operations
This Security Functionality performs high level cryptographic operations. The implementation is based on
the Security Functionalities provided by TSF_OS.
TSF_Crypto covers the following SFRs:

FCS_CKM.4: FCS_CKM.4.1 requires that the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physically overwriting the keys with zeros
by method (e.g. clearKey of [JCRE]) or automatically on applet deselection. This is realized in the
security functionalities provided by TSF_OS and TSF_Secret. The only exceptions are the CMAC
Sub-Keys (for Secure Messaging), where the security functionality is provided by TSF_Crypto.

FCS_COP.1/MAC: FCS_COP.1.1/MAC requires that the TSF shall perform secure messaging with a
message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (Retail MAC)
and a cryptographic key size of 112 bit that meets ISO 9797. The algorithm is realized within
TSF_Crypto, while TSF_OS provides the basic Triple-DES implementation and
TSF_SecureMessaging provides the secure messaging protocol.

FIA_UAU.5: FIA_UAU.5.1 requires that the TSF shall provide a Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism and a Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES to support user authentication. The according cryptographic functions are realized within TSF_Crypto (based on
functions provided by TSF_OS).
7.1.5 TSF_SecureMessaging: Secure Messaging
This Security Functionality realizes a secure communication channel after successful authentication for
personalization and BAC during operational use.
TSF_SecureMessaging covers the following SFRs:

FCS_COP.1/MAC: FCS_COP.1.1/MAC requires that the TSF shall perform secure messaging with a
message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (Retail MAC)
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and a cryptographic key size of 112 bit that meets ISO 9797. The implementation of trhe secure
messaging protocol is realized within TSF_SecureMessaging.

FDP_UIT.1: FDP_UIT.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred. This is realized within
TSF_SecureMessaging.
7.1.6 TSF_Auth: Authentication protocols
This Security Functionality realizes different authentication mechanisms.
7.1.6.1 TSF_Auth_3DES
TSF_Auth_3DES performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES used for BAC and symmetric authentication based on pre-shared keys used for personalization.
TSF_Auth_3DES covers the following SFRs:

FIA_UID.1: FIA_UID.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2
“Manufacturing”, to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, and to
read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified. The authentication mechanism leads to the identification and is provided by TSF_Auth.

FIA_UAU.1: FIA_UAU.1.1 requires that the TSF shall allow to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2
“Manufacturing”, to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”, and to
read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use” on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated. FIA_UAU.1.2 requires that the TSF shall require each user to be
successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.

FIA_UAU.4: FIA_UAU.4.1 requires that the TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related
to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism, and Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES. The authentication mechanisms are provided by TSF_Auth.

FIA_UAU.5: FIA_UAU.5.1 requires that the TSF shall provide a Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism and a Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES to support user authentication. FIA_UAU.5.2 requires that the TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to specified rules. The authentication mechanisms are provided by TSF_Auth.

FIA_UAU.6: FIA_UAU.6.1 requires that the TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism. The authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.

FIA_AFL.1: FIA_AFL.1.1 requires that the TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within 1 – 32767 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication. FIA_AFL.1.2 requires that when the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall block the card permanently. The authentication mechanism is
provided by TSF_Auth.

FDP_ACC.1: FDP_ACC.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. The authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.

FDP_ACF.1: FDP_ACF.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on defined subjects, objects, security attributes. FDP_ACF.1.2 requires that the TSF
shall enforce the defined rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed. FDP_ACF.1.3 requires that no other access possibilities exist.
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FDP_ACF.1.4 requires that the TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on defined rules. The authentication mechanism for the Basic Access Control SFP is provided by
TSF_Auth.

FDP_UCT.1: FDP_UCT.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be
able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure. The
authentication mechanism for the Basic Access Control SFP is provided by TSF_Auth.

FDP_UIT.1: FDP_UIT.1.1 requires that the TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able
to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion
and replay errors. The authentication mechanism for the Basic Access Control SFP is provided by
TSF_Auth.

FMT_SMR.1: FMT_SMR.1.1 requires that the TSF shall maintain the roles manufacturer, personalization agent, and basic inspection system. FMT_SMR.1.2 requires that the TSF shall be able to associate users with roles. The according authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.

FMT_LIM.1: FMT_LIM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks. The according authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.

FMT_LIM.2: FMT_LIM.2.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks. The according authentication mechanism is provided by TSF_Auth.
7.1.7 TSF_Integrity: Integrity protection
This Security Functionality protects the integrity of internal applet data like the Access control lists. This
function makes use of SF.SecureManagement and SF.Transaction of the underlying JCOP Java Card OS (cf.
the according security targets [ST_JCOP080], [ST_JCOP081], [ST_JCOP_040]).
TSF_Integrity covers the following SFRs:

FPT_FLS.1: FPT_FLS.1.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur: (1) exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur, and (2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1. This is realized within TSF_Integrity.
7.1.8 TSF_OS: Javacard OS Security Functionalities
The Javacard operation system (part of the TOE) features the following Security Functionalities. The exact
description can be found in the Javacard OS security targets [ST_JCOP080], [ST_JCOP081], [ST_JCOP040];
the realization is partly based on the security functionalities of the certified cryptographic library and the
certified IC platform:

Enforcement of access control (SF.AccessControl)

Audit functionality (SF.Audit)

Cryptographic key management (SF.CryptoKey)

Cryptographic operations (SF.CryptoOperation)

Identification and authentication (SF.I&A)
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
Secure management of TOE resources (SF.SecureManagement)

Transaction management (SF.Transaction)
Since the applet layer of the TOE is based on the Javacard OS, the realization of all TOE security functionalities and thus the fulfillment of all SFRs has dependencies to TSF_OS. The following items list all SFRs
where TSF_OS has an impact above this level:

FCS_CKM.1: FCS_CKM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm (Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm) and specified cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit. This is realized within TSF_OS.

FCS_CKM.4.1 requires that the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method. This is realized in the security functionalities provided by
TSF_OS (and TSF_Secret). The only exceptions are the CMAC Sub-Keys (for Secure Messaging),
where the security functionality is provided by TSF_Crypto.

FCS_COP.1.1/SHA: FCS_COP.1.1/SHA requires that the TSF shall perform hashing in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm (SHA-1, SHA-224 or SHA-256) that meets: FIPS 180-2. This
is realized within TSF_OS.

FCS_COP.1.1/ENC : FCS_COP.1.1/ENC requires that the TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC)
– encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (Triple-DES in
CBC mode) and cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit that meet FIPS 46-3. This is realized within
TSF_OS.

FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH: FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH requires that the TSF shall perform symmetric authentication (encryption and decryption) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (TripleDES) and cryptographic key sizes of 112 bit that meet FIPS 46-3. This is realized within TSF_OS.

FCS_COP.1.1/MAC: FCS_COP.1.1/MAC requires that the TSF shall perform secure messaging with a
message authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm (Retail MAC)
and a cryptographic key size of 112 bit that meets ISO 9797. TSF_OS provides the basic cryptographic mechanisms.

FCS_RND.1.1: FCS_RND.1.1 requires that the TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet the AIS 20 Class K3 quality metric. This is realized within TSF_OS.

FMT_LIM.1: FMT_LIM.1.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks. The
implementation is based on TSF_OS.

FMT_LIM.2: FMT_LIM.2.1 requires that the TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow User Data to be disclosed or
manipulated, TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks. The
implementation is based on TSF_OS.

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer. The basic mechanisms are provided by
TSF_OS.

FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent. The basic mechanisms for this are provided by TSF_OS.
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
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
Basic Access Keys to the Personalization Agent. The basic mechanisms are provided by TSF_OS.

FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ requires that the TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document
Basic Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none. The basic mechanisms are provided by
TSF_OS.

FPT_EMSEC.1.1 requires that the TOE shall not emit variations in power consumption or timing
during command execution in excess of non-useful information enabling access to Personalization
Agent Key(s) and confidential user data. FPT_EMSEC.1.2 requires that the TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and confidential user data. This is mainly realized by appropriate measures in TSF_OS together with the strict following of the security implementation
guidelines of the Javacard platform.

FPT_FLS.1.1 requires that the TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur: (1) exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur, and (2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1. This is realized within TSF_OS (together with and TSF_Integrity).

FPT_TST.1.1 requires that the TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF. FPT_TST.1.2 requires that the TSF shall provide authorised
users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data. FPT_TST.1.3 requires that the TSF shall
provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
This all is realized by TSF_OS, in parts due to the characteristics of the hardware platform.

FPT_PHP.3.1 requires that the TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced. This all is realized by
TSF_OS, in parts due to the characteristics of the hardware platform.
7.2 Mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities
FAU_SAS.1
TSF_OS
TSF_Integrity
TSF_Auth
TSF_SecureMessaging
TSF_Crypto
TSF_Secret
TSF_Admin
TSF_Access
Each TOE security functional requirement is implemented by at least one security functionality. The mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities is given in the following table. If iterations of a TOE security requirement are covered by the same TOE security functionality the mapping will
appear only once. The description of the TSF is given in section 7.1.
X
FCS_CKM.1
X
FCS_CKM.4
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1/SHA
X
FCS_COP.1/ENC
X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
X
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TSF_OS
X
TSF_Integrity
X
TSF_Auth
TSF_SecureMessaging
FCS_COP.1/MAC
TSF_Crypto
TSF_Secret
TSF_Admin
TSF_Access
cv act ePasslet/BAC Security Target
X
FCS_RND.1
X
FIA_UID.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.4
X
X
FIA_UAU.5
X
FIA_UAU.6
X
X
FIA_AFL.1
X
X
FDP_ACC.1
X
X
FDP_ACF.1
X
X
FDP_UCT.1
X
X
FDP_UIT.1
X
FMT_SMF.1
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_SMR.1
X
X
X
FMT_LIM.1
X
X
X
FMT_LIM.2
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
X
X
X
X
FPT_EMSEC.1
X
FPT_FLS.1
X
X
FPT_TST.1
X
FPT_PHP.3
X
Table 12: Mapping of TOE Security Requirements and TOE Security Functionalities.
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References
In the following tables, the references used in this document are summarized. The first column lists the
internal reference names, the third (last) column – if applicable – the reference numbers to these documents or older versions of these documents in the protection profile PP-0055 [PP0055].
Common Criteria
[CC_1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: [1]
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2009-07-001, Version 3.1, Revision
3, July 2009
[CC_2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: [2]
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2009-07-002, Version 3.1, Revision
3, July 2009
[CC_3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: [3]
Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2009-07-003, Version 3.1, Revision
3, July 2009
[CC_4]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, [4]
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2009-07-004, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July
2009
Protection Profiles
[PP0002]
PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July [16]
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[PP0035]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007; registered [18]
and certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
under the reference BSI-PP-0035-2007
[PP0055]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document [19]
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10,
25th March 2009
[PP0056]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0056, Version
1.10, 25th March 2009
[PP_Javacard]
Java Card System - Minimal Configuration Protection Profile, Version 1.1, May 2006, part of: Java Card Protection Profile Collection, Version 1.1, May
2006
TOE and Platform References
[Guidance]
cv act ePasslet/BAC - cv act ePasslet Suite Java Card applet providing ICAO ePassport application with Basic Access Control (BAC), Guidance Manual,
Version 2.1.6; cryptovision, June 2012
[ZertIC040]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0404-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Con- troller P5CD040V0B, P5CC040V0B, P5CD020V0B and P5CC021V0B each with
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specific IC Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification; BSI, July 2007.
[ZertIC080]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Con- troller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B, each with specific IC
Dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH; BSI, July
2007.
[ZertIC081]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 for NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A, each with IC dedicated Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification;
BSI, November 2009.
[ZertJCOP040]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0730-2011 for NXP J3A040 & J2A040 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH;
BSI, May 2011.
[ZertJCOP080]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0674-2011 for NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Se- cure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH; BSI, March 2011.
[ZertJCOP081]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0675-2011 for NXP J3A081, J2A081 and J3A041 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 from NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH; BSI, April 2011.
[ZertCL040]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0710-2010 for Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD040V0B /P5CC040V0B / P5CD020V0B / P5CC021V0B /P5CD012V0B
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH; BSI, January 2011.
[ZertCL080]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0709-2010 for Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD080V0B /P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH; BSI, December 2010.
[ZertCL081]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 for Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A /P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A /P5CD021V1A /
P5CD016V1A from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH; BSI, November
2010.
[ST_JCOP040]
Security Target Lite „NXP J3A040 and J2A040 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3“, Rev. 01.03; NXP, 13 May 2011.
[ST_JCOP080]
Security Target Lite „NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3“, Rev. 01.02; NXP, December 2010.
[ST_JCOP081]
Security Target Lite „NXP J3A081, J2A081 and J3A041 Secure Smart Card Controller Rev. 3“, Rev. 01.02; NXP, December 2010.
[ST_CL040]
Security Target Lite “Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD040V0B / P5CC040V0B / P5CD020V0B / P5CC021V0B / P5CD012V0B”, Rev. 2.4; NXP, 14 December
2010.
[ST_CL080]
Security Target Lite “Crypto Library V2.6 on P5CD080V0B / P5CN080V0B / P5CC080V0B / P5CC073V0B”, NXP, Rev. 2.3; NXP, 12 November 2010.
[ST_CL081]
Security Target Lite “Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A”, NXP, Rev. 1.2; 9
November 2010.
[ST_IC040]
Security Target Lite “P5CD040/P5CC040/P5CD020/P5CC021 V0B”, Rev. 1.0, NXP, 21 March 2007.
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[ST_IC080]
Security Target Lite “P5CD080/P5CN080/P5CC080 V0B”, Rev. 1.0, NXP, 21 March 2007.
[ST_IC081]
Security Target Lite “NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A”, Rev. 1.3, NXP, 21 September 2009.
ICAO specifications
[ICAODoc]
International Civil Aviation Organization: ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable
Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006.
[6]
[ICAOFal]
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[7]
Cryptographic Standards
[FIPS46-3]
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and [9]
Technology:
FEDERAL
INFORMATION
PROCESSING
STANDARDS
PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed October 25, 1999.
[FIPS180-2]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[FIPS197]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED [12]
ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, November 26, 2001.
[ISO9797]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 Information technology -- Security techniques -- Mes- sage Authentication Codes (MACs) -- Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher (2011).
Other
[ISO7816-4]
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part [22]
4: Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[TR03110]
Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
[20]
Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Runtime Environment Specification, Java Card(tm) Platform, Version 2.2.2, [23]
March 2006, Sun Microsystems
[JCRE]
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Glossary
Active authentication
Security mechanism defined in [MRTD-PKI] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
AES
The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) has been defined as a standard for
symmetric data encryption. It is a block cipher with a block length of 128 bit and
key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bit.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing additional supporting information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or
use of the TOE.
Asymmetric cipher
Encryption procedures employing two different keys (in contrast to a symmetric
cipher): one publicly known (public key) for data encryption and one key only
known to the message receiver (private key) for decryption.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authentication
Authentication defines a procedure that verifies the identity of the communication partner. The most elegant method is based on the use of so called digital signatures.
BAC
Basic access control. Security mechanism defined in [MRTD-PKI] by which
means the MTRD’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure messaging.
Basic access keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [MRTD-PKI]. It is drawn
from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Block cipher
An algorithm processing the plaintext in bit groups (blocks). Its alternative is
called stream cipher.
CA
Certification authority
Certificate
see digital certificate
Certificate revocation
list
A list of revoked certificates issued by a certificate authority
Certification
authority
An entity responsible for registering and issuing, revoking and generally managing digital certificates
Country signing CA
certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority. The CCSCA is stored in the inspection system.
Country verifying CA
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems. It creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of
the issuing country or organization in respect to the protection of sensitive biometric data stored in the MRTD.
CRL
see Certificate Revocation List
Cryptography
In the classical sense, the science of encrypting messages. Today, this notion
comprises a larger field and also includes problems like authentication or digital
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signatures.
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card
verifiable certificates.
CVCA link certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is
before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
DES
(Data Encryption Standard) symmetric 64 bit block cipher, which was developed
(first under the name Lucifer) by IBM. The key length is 64 bit of which 8 bit
serve for a parity check. DES is the classic among the encryption algorithms,
which nevertheless is no longer secure due to its insufficient key length. Alternatives are Triple-DES or the successor AES.
Digital certificate
A data set that identifies the certification authority issuing it, identifies its owner, contains the ower's public key, identifies its operational period, and is digitally signed by the certification authority issuing it.
Digital signature
The counterpart of a handwritten signature for documents in digital format. A
digital signature grants authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. These
features are achieved by using asymmetric procedures.
Document verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and
managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or
Organizations
EAC
Extended access control. Security mechanism identified in [MRTD-PKI] by
which means the MTRD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls
the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their
transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging.
ECC
(Elliptic Curve Cryptography) class of procedures providing an attractive alternative for the probably most popular asymmetric procedure, the RSA algorithm.
Elliptic curves
A mathematical construction, in which a part of the usual operations applies,
and which has been employed successfully in cryptography since 1985.
Fingerprint (digital)
Checksum that can be used to easily determine the correctness of a key without
having to compare the entire key. This is often done by comparing the hash
values after application of a hash function.
Hash function
A function which forms the fixed-size result (the hash value) from an arbitrary
amount of data (which is the input). These functions are used to generate the
electronic equivalent of a fingerprint. The significant factor is that it must be
impossible to generate two entries which lead to the same hash value (so called
collisions) or even to generate a matching message for a defined hash value.
Common hash functions are RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1, each having hash values
with a length of 160 bit as well as the MD5, which is still often used today having a hash value length of 128 bit.
Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and
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(ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrity
The test on the integrity of data is carried out by checking messages for changes
during the transmission by the receiver. Common test procedures employ
Hashfunctions, MACs (Message Authentication Codes) or – with additional functionality – digital signatures.
Javacard
A smart card with a Javacard operation system.
Key exchange
The use of symmetric cipher procedures requires that two communication partners decide on one joint key only known to themselves. The difficulty is that for
the exchange of such information usually only partially secure channels exist.
Additionally, protocols for key exchange must be prepared in such a way that
only those pieces of information are exchanged which do not lead to knowledge
of the real secret (the key). The most popular protocol of that type is diffieHellman, whose presentation in 1976 can be regarded as the birth of public key
cryptography.
LDS
Logical data structure. The collection of groupings of data elements stored in
the optional capacity expansion technology, defined in [MRTD-LDS].
MAC
Algorithm that expands the message by means of a secret key by special redundant pieces of information, which are stored or transmitted together with the
message. To prevent an attacker from targeted modification of the attached
redundancy, requires its protection in a suitable way.
MRTD
Machnine-readable travel document. Official document issued by a State or
Organization which is used by the holder for international travel (e.g. passport,
visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global
use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read.
MRZ
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or,
in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
Non-repudiation
One of the objectives in the employment of digital signatures. It describes the
fact that the sender of a message is prevented from denying the preparation of
the message. The problem cannot be simply solved with cryptographic routines,
but the entire environment needs to be considered and respective framework
conditions need to be provided by pertinent laws.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Passphrase
A long, but memorable character sequence (e.g. short sentences with punctuation) which should replace passwords as they offer more security.
Password
A secret character sequence whose knowledge is to serve as a replacement for
the authentication of a participant. A password is usually short to really ensure
that an attacker cannot guess the password by trial and error.
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document.
Personalization agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to personalize
the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded
iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
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holder.
PKI
Cf. Public Key Infrastructure.
PP
Protection Profile.
Private key
Secret key only known to the receiver of a message, which is used in asymmetric
ciphers for encryption or generation of digital signatures.
Pseudo random number
Many cryptographic mechanisms require random numbers (e.g. in key generation). The problem, however, is that it is difficult to implement true random
numbers in software. Therefore, so called pseudo-random number generators
are used, which then should be initialized with a real random element (the so
called seed).
Public key
Publicly known key in an asymmetric cipher which is used for encryption and
verification of digital signatures.
Public key infrastructure (PKI)
Combination of hardware and software components, policies, and different
procedures used to manage digital certificates.
Random numbers
Many cryptographic algorithms or protocols require a random element, mostly
in form of a random number, which is newly generated in each case. In these
cases, the security of the procedure depends in part on the suitability of these
random numbers. As the generation of real random numbers within computers
still imposes a problem (a source for real random events can in fact only be
gained by exact observation of physical events, which is not easy to realize for a
software), so called pseudo random numbers are used instead.
Secure messaging
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according
to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
SFR
Security functional requirement.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Smart card
A smart card is a chip card which contains an internal micro controller with CPU,
volatile (RAM) and non-volatile (ROM, EEPROM) memory, i.e. which can carry
out its own calculations in contrast to a simple storage card. Sometimes a smart
card has a numerical coprocessor (NPU) to execute public key algorithms efficiently. Smart cards have all of their functionality comprised on a single chip (in
contrast to chip cards, which contain several chips wired to each other). Therefore, such a smart card is ideal for use in cryptography as it is almost impossible
to manipulate its internal processes.
SOD
Document Security Object (stored in EF.SOD). A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data
Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the
LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS).
ST
Security Target.
Stream cipher
Symmetric encryption algorithm which processes the plaintext bit-by-bit or
byte-by-byte. The other usually employed class of procedures comprises so
called block cipher.
Symmetric cipher
Encryption procedure using the same key for enciphering and deciphering (or, in
which these two keys can simply be derived from each other). One distinguishes
between block ciphers processing plaintext in blocks of fixed length (mostly 64
or 128 bit) and stream ciphers working on the basis of single characters.
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TOE
Target of evaluation.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
TSF
TOE security function.
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template.
X.509
Standard for certificates, CRLs and authentication services. It is part of the X.500
standard of the ITU-T for realization of a worldwide distributed directory service
realized with open system.
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