Schneider Electric Quantum Safety PLC, Safety Reference manual
Reklaam
Reklaam
Modicon Quantum
33003879 10/2017
Modicon Quantum
Quantum Safety PLC
Safety Reference Manual
10/2017 www.schneider-electric.com
2
The information provided in this documentation contains general descriptions and/or technical characteristics of the performance of the products contained herein. This documentation is not intended as a substitute for and is not to be used for determining suitability or reliability of these products for specific user applications. It is the duty of any such user or integrator to perform the appropriate and complete risk analysis, evaluation and testing of the products with respect to the relevant specific application or use thereof. Neither Schneider Electric nor any of its affiliates or subsidiaries shall be responsible or liable for misuse of the information contained herein. If you have any suggestions for improvements or amendments or have found errors in this publication, please notify us.
No part of this document may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without express written permission of Schneider Electric.
All pertinent state, regional, and local safety regulations must be observed when installing and using this product. For reasons of safety and to help ensure compliance with documented system data, only the manufacturer should perform repairs to components.
When devices are used for applications with technical safety requirements, the relevant instructions must be followed.
Failure to use Schneider Electric software or approved software with our hardware products may result in injury, harm, or improper operating results.
Failure to observe this information can result in injury or equipment damage.
© 2017 Schneider Electric. All Rights Reserved.
33003879 10/2017
Table of Contents
Safety Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
About the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 1 General Information on the Quantum Safety PLC . . . . .
1.1 General Information. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IEC 61508 and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Functional Safety Certification. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Special Operating Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Difference Between Standard Quantum PLC and Quantum Safety PLC
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Safety Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Requirements for Hardware and Programming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 2 Hardware and Configuration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Safety CPU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standalone Safety CPU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hot Standby Safety CPU Specifics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Safety I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General Information on the Safety I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety I/O Modules in High Availability Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety I/O Modules Diagnostics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety Analog Input Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety Digital Input Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety Digital Output Module. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Power Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Power Supply for the Quantum Safety PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Non-Interfering Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Non-Interfering Modules for the Quantum Safety PLC . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5 Restrictions on I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the Restrictions on I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 System Behavior in Case of Detected Diagnostic Errors . . . . . . . . . .
Improper Behavior of the Safety CPU Modules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Improper Behavior of the Safety I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.7 Configuration Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration Examples for the Quantum Safety PLC . . . . . . . . . . . .
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55
55
57
62
62
45
47
50
54
38
39
40
43
31
32
33
35
25
28
29
29
15
16
23
24
13
14
7
9
3
4
Chapter 3 Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 General Information on Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Available Language Sections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exceptions and Requirements for Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Process Safety Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Software Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unity Pro XLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Application Password. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Operating Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operating Modes of the Safety PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safety Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Maintenance Mode. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Special Features and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checking the Programming Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Starting the Quantum Safety PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Version Stamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Project Backups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Detected Faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
101
Chapter 4 Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
103
4.1 Memory Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
98
99
100
Memory Area Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 PC-PLC Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PC-PLC Communication Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 PLC-PLC Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PLC-PLC Communication Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Safe Ethernet PLC-PLC Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Peer-to-peer Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solution Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration of NTP Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration of S_WR_ETH DFB in the User Program of the Sender
PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration of S_RD_ETH DFB in the User Program of the Receiver
PLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Configuration of IO Scanning Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Safe Peer-to-peer Communication Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Example of Configuration, Parameters and Performance Results. . . .
104
104
107
107
108
108
110
111
112
113
92
94
95
96
86
87
88
90
75
79
80
82
69
70
71
72
115
116
119
120
122
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4.5 PLC-HMI Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PLC-HMI Communication Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 5 Checklists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checklist for Configuring Safety-Related Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checklist for Programming SIL3 Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checklist for I/O Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Checklist for Configuring Safe Peer-to-Peer Communication . . . . . . .
Checklist for Operation, Maintenance, and Repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter 6 Special Requirements for Application Standards . . . . . .
Special Requirements for Application Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
141
Appendix A IEC 61508. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General Information on the IEC 61508 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
124
124
127
128
130
132
134
137
139
139
SIL Policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix B System Objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.1 System Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
System Bit Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Bits %S0 to %S13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Bits %S15 to %S21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Bits %S30 to %S51 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Bits %S59 to %S122 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B.2 System Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Words %SW0 to %SW21 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127 . . . . . . . . . . .
158
159
161
162
164
168
143
144
146
151
152
153
154
156
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
175
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
187
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Safety Information
Important Information
NOTICE
Read these instructions carefully, and look at the equipment to become familiar with the device before trying to install, operate, service, or maintain it. The following special messages may appear throughout this documentation or on the equipment to warn of potential hazards or to call attention to information that clarifies or simplifies a procedure.
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PLEASE NOTE
Electrical equipment should be installed, operated, serviced, and maintained only by qualified personnel. No responsibility is assumed by Schneider Electric for any consequences arising out of the use of this material.
A qualified person is one who has skills and knowledge related to the construction and operation of electrical equipment and its installation, and has received safety training to recognize and avoid the hazards involved.
8
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About the Book
At a Glance
Document Scope
This Safety Reference Manual describes the Quantum Safety PLC with special regard to how it meets the Safety requirements of the IEC 61508. It provides detailed information on how to install, run, and maintain the system correctly in order to protect human beings as well as to prevent damage to environment, equipment, and production.
This documentation is intended for qualified personnel familiar with Functional Safety and Unity
Pro. Commissioning and operating the Quantum Safety PLC may only be performed by persons who are authorized to commission and operate systems in accordance with established Functional
Safety standards.
Validity Note
This documentation is valid for Unity Pro from version 7.0.
Related Documents
You can download the Schneider Electric technical publications and other technical information from our website.
NOTE: All restrictions regarding electrical safety and external cabling and wiring must follow the documents in this table and the contents of this manual.
Title of Documentation
Modicon Quantum with Unity Ethernet Network Modules User
Manual
Grounding and Electromagnetic Compatibility of PLC Systems User
Manual
Reference Number
33002479
33002439
Modicon Quantum Hot Standby with Unity User Manual 35010533
Modicon Remote I/O Cable System Planning and Installation Guide 35014629
Premium, Atrium and Quantum using Unity Pro Communication services and architectures Reference manual
35006173
Quantum Instruction Sheets
Quantum TCPIP/IP Configuration User Manual
33002365
33002467
Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual 35010516
Quantum with Unity Pro Hardware Reference Manual 35010529
Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual 33003101
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9
Title of Documentation
Unity Pro OSLoader User Manual
Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference Manual
Unity Pro Safety Block Library
Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics
IEC 61131-2 Programmable controllers Part 2: Equipment requirements and tests, third edition 2007
IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems, edition 2.0
IEC 61511 Functional safety - safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector, edition 2016
Reference Number
35006156
35006144
33003873
33003885
–
–
–
You can download these technical publications and other technical information from our website at https://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download
Product Related Information
Schneider Electric assumes no responsibility for any errors that may appear in this documentation.
Please contact us if you have any suggestions for improvements or amendments, or if you have found any errors in this publication.
No part of this documentation may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, without written permission of Schneider Electric.
All pertinent state, regional, and local safety regulations must be observed when installing and using this product. For reasons of safety and to ensure compliance with documented system data, only the manufacturer should perform repairs to components.
When controllers are used for applications with technical safety requirements, please follow the relevant instructions.
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Use only Schneider Electric approved software.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
10
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WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Refer to IEC 61508, "Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safetyrelated systems".
Completely understand the applications and environment defined by Safety Integrity Level
(SIL) 3 within IEC 61508 Parts 1-7, edition 2.0.
SIL requirements are based on the standards current at the time of certification.
Do Not exceed SIL3 ratings in the application of this product.
The terms identified in the list below as used in this document are applied only within the SIL3 rating.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Terms used in this document:
certified
failure (except as used in Special Message Statement of Consequence) fault non-interfering
Quantum Safety PLC
Quantum Safety CPU
Safety analog inputs
Safety analog module(s)
Safety CPU
Safety digital inputs
Safety digital modules
Safety digital outputs
Safety FFB
Safety firmware
Safety I/O (module(s))
Safety library
Safety logic
Safety memory area
Safety modules
Safety mode
Safety outputs
Safety PLC
Safety power supply
Safety programming
Safety Quantum
Safety-Related application(s)
Safety remote I/O
Safety variable
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Modicon Quantum
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General Information on the Quantum Safety PLC Chapter 1
General Information on the Quantum Safety PLC
Introduction
This chapter provides general information on the Quantum Safety PLC.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following sections:
Section
1.1
1.2
General Information
Safety Requirements
Topic Page
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General Information Section 1.1
General Information
Introduction
This section provides information on the Quantum Safety PLC.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
IEC 61508 and Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Functional Safety Certification
Special Operating Modes
Diagnostics
Difference Between Standard Quantum PLC and Quantum Safety PLC
Training
Page
14
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IEC 61508 and Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Introduction
The Quantum Safety PLC is a Safety-Related System certified according to IEC 61508 by TÜV
Rheinland Group. It is based on the Quantum family of programmable logic controllers (PLCs). For programming, the Unity Pro XLS programming software of Schneider Electric must be used.
Unity Pro XLS provides all the functionality of Unity Pro XL and is additionally able to program the
Quantum Safety PLC. For further information on the differences between these software packages, see Differences between standard and Safety Quantum PLC
see page 25
IEC 61508 Description
The IEC 61508 is a technical standard concerning the Functional Safety of electrical, electronic or programmable electronic Safety-Related Systems.
A Safety-Related System is a system that is required to perform 1 or more specific functions to ensure risks are kept at an acceptable level. Such functions are defined as Safety Functions.
A system is defined functionally Safe if random, systematic, and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the system and do not result in injury or death of humans, spills to the environment, and loss of equipment and production.
Description of the Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
Safety Functions are executed to achieve and maintain the Safe state of a system. The IEC 61508 specifies 4 levels of Safety performance for a Safety Function. These are called Safety Integrity
Levels (SIL), ranging from 1 (the lowest) to 4 (the highest). The Quantum Safety PLC is certified for use in SIL3 applications in which the de-energized state is the Safe state, for example in an emergency shutdown (ESD) system.
You can also use the Schneider Electric Safety products for creating a hot standby (HSBY) solution if you require high availability for a Safety-Related System.
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Functional Safety Certification
Introduction
The Quantum Safety PLC is certified
by TÜV Rheinland Group
for use in applications up to and including SIL3 according to IEC 61508 and IEC 62061.
This certification verifies that the Quantum Safety PLC is compliant with the following standards:
IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related
systems, Part 1-7, edition 2.0
IEC 61131: Programmable controllers
Part 2: Equipment requirements and tests, third edition 2007
Boiler protection
US standards: NFPA 85 and NFPA 86
EN 54 Fire detection and fire alarm systems
EN 298 Automatic gas burner control systems for gas burners and gas burning appliances with or without fans
IEC 62061: Safety of machinery
EN ISO 13849: Safety of machinery
NOTE: Using a Quantum Safety PLC is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for the certification of a SIL3 application. A SIL3 application must also fulfill the requirements of the
IEC 61508, IEC 61511, IEC 61131-2, and other application standards, see also Requirements for
page 29
,
Exceptions and Requirements for Programming,
page 72
and
Special Requirements for Application Standards,
page 139
Classification of the Schneider Electric Products
The Quantum Safety PLC consists of Safety modules, which are allowed to perform Safety
Functions. However, it also supports so-called non-interfering modules, thereby enabling you to add non-Safety parts to your SIL3 project.
Therefore, the Schneider Electric products must be distinguished into
Safety modules and
non-interfering modules.
In contrast to the Safety modules, non-interfering modules are not used to perform Safety
Functions. They are certified as non-interfering modules for use in the Quantum Safety PLC. A fault in 1 of these modules does not influence the execution of the Safety Functions in a negative way.
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Available Safety Products
Schneider Electric offers the following Safety modules certified for use in SIL3 applications. The
Safety modules are listed with their corresponding PFD/PFH values for different proof test intervals
(PTIs), see Probabilities of Failure,
page 20
page 22
. The PFD/PFH are expressed as values that contributes to the overall PFD/PFH of the complete Safety loop (see
page 20
page 148
for SIL3 applications.
The tables below list the Safety modules and their PFD/PFH values for SIL3 applications:
Product Type Product Reference MTBF [h]
140 CPU 651 60S 600,000
PTI = 1 year
PFD
G
1.527E-05
PFH
G
3.487E-09 Standalone Safety
CPU
Hot Standby Safety
CPU
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Power Supply (PS)
Power Supply (PS)
140 CPU 671 60S
140 SDI 953 00S
140 SDO 953 00S
140 SAI 940 00S
140 CPS 124 20
140 CPS 224 00
600,000
900,000
1,000,000
700,000
750,000
1,000,000
1.527E-05
5.610E-07
7.156E-07
8.932E-07
–
–
3.487E-09
1.218E-10
5.720E-11
7.770E-11
–
–
Product Type
Standalone Safety
CPU
Hot Standby Safety
CPU
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Power Supply (PS)
Power Supply (PS)
Product Reference
140 CPU 651 60S
140 CPU 671 60S
140 SDI 953 00S
140 SDO 953 00S
140 SAI 940 00S
140 CPS 124 20
140 CPS 224 00
PTI = 5 years
PFD
G
7.662E-05
7.662E-05
2.806E-06
3.579E-06
4.467E-06
–
–
Product Type
Standalone Safety
CPU
Product Reference
140 CPU 651 60S
PTI = 10 years
PFD
G
1.540E-04
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PFH
G
3.507E-09
3.507E-09
1.218E-10
5.727E-11
7.777E-11
–
–
PFH
G
3.532E-09
17
18
Product Type
Hot Standby Safety
CPU
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Power Supply (PS)
Power Supply (PS)
Product Reference
140 CPU 671 60S
140 SDI 953 00S
140 SDO 953 00S
140 SAI 940 00S
140 CPS 124 20
140 CPS 224 00
PTI = 10 years
PFD
G
1.540E-04
–
–
5.615E-06
7.160E-06
8.937E-06
Product Type
Standalone Safety
CPU
Hot Standby Safety
CPU
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Power Supply (PS)
Power Supply (PS)
Product Reference
140 CPU 651 60S
140 CPU 671 60S
140 SDI 953 00S
140 SDO 953 00S
140 SAI 940 00S
140 CPS 124 20
140 CPS 224 00
PTI = 15 years
PFD
G
2.321E-04
2.321E-04
8.426E-06
1.074E-05
1.341E-05
–
–
PFH
G
3.532E-09
–
–
1.219E-10
5.735E-11
7.785E-11
Product Type Product Reference
Standalone Safety
CPU
Hot Standby Safety
CPU
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Power Supply (PS)
Power Supply (PS)
140 CPU 651 60S
140 CPU 671 60S
140 SDI 953 00S
140 SDO 953 00S
140 SAI 940 00S
140 CPS 124 20
140 CPS 224 00
PTI = 20 years
PFD
G
3.109E-04
3.109E-04
1.124E-05
1.433E-05
1.788E-05
–
–
The Quantum Safety PLC is programmed with Unity Pro XLS.
PFH
G
3.582E-09
3.582E-09
1.221E-10
5.753E-11
7.803E-11
–
–
PFH
G
3.557E-09
3.557E-09
1.220E-10
5.744E-11
7.794E-11
–
–
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CPU and IO detect the power supply errors, therefore the power supply does not contribute to the
PFD/PFH values.
PCMCIA Memory Cards
The values in the Safety module tables above include the use of the following PCMCIA memory cards:
TSX MCPC 002M
TSX MCPC 512K
TSX MFPP 001M
TSX MFPP 002M
TSX MFPP 004M
TSX MFPP 512K
TSX MRPC 768K
TSX MRPC 001M
TSX MRPC 01M7
TSX MRPC 002M
TSX MRPC 003M
TSX MRPC 007M
Functional Safety Parameters
The Functional Safety parameters according to EN ISO 13849 are as follows:
Performance Level for
SDI to SDO: PL d
SAI to SDO: PL d
Category: 3
Available Non-Interfering Products
Schneider Electric offers the following non-interfering products:
Module Type
Remote I/O Head Adapter
Remote I/O Drop Adapter
Ethernet Module
Backplane 16 Slots
Backplane 10 Slots
Backplane 6 Slots
Digital Input
Digital Output
Analog Input
Analog Output
Terminal Strip
Terminal Strip
Remote I/O Optical Repeater
Module Reference
140 CRP 932 00
140 CRA 932 00
140 NOE 771 11
140 XBP 016 00
140 XBP 010 00
140 XBP 006 00
140 DDI 353 00
140 DDO 353 00
140 ACI 040 00
140 ACO 020 00
140 XTS 001 00
140 XTS 002 00
140 NRP 954 00
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Module Type
Remote I/O Optical Repeater
Time Stamping
Module Reference
140 NRP 954 01C
140 ERT 854 20
WARNING
LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Choose only Schneider Electric products certified for use in Safety-Related Systems in order to create a Safety-Related System.
Use only Safety modules to perform Safety functions.
Do not use inputs or outputs of non-interfering modules for Safety-Related outputs.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Unity Pro XLS offers modularization of the logic into sections. Schneider Electric recommends creating sections which are only used for non-Safety logic of the system. The data from noninterfering modules should be processed in these sections only, which makes the certification of your project much easier.
NOTE: To operate the Quantum Safety PLCs and to program and run your SIL3 project, you need
the certified Safety version of the Quantum firmware. For details, see Certified Products,
page 22
.
Probabilities of Failure
For SIL3 applications, the IEC 61508 defines the following probabilities of failure on demand (PFD) and probabilities of failure per hour (PFH) depending on the mode of operation:
PFD ≥ 10 -4
PFH ≥ 10 -8 to < 10 to < 10
-3
-7
for low demand mode of operation
for high demand mode of operation
The Quantum Safety PLC is certified for use in low and high demand systems.
Safety Loop Description
The Safety loop to which the Quantum Safety PLC belongs consists of the following 3 parts:
Sensors
Quantum Safety PLC with Safety CPU and Safety I/O modules
Actuators
Backplanes, a remote connection with CRA/CRP and Fiber Optic repeater modules do not destroy a Safety Loop. Backplanes, CRA/CRP and Fiber Optic repeater modules are part of a “black channel”. This means that the data exchanged by I/O and PLC cannot be corrupted without detection by the receiver.
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The following figure shows a typical Safety loop:
For the calculation of the PFD/PFH values of an example system, a maximum of 15% is assumed
for the PLC. For the PFD/PFH values of the Quantum Safety modules, see Available Safety
page 17
.
NOTE: The programming tool Unity Pro XLS is not part of the Safety loop.
For detailed information on the IEC 61508 and its SIL policy, see also chapter
page 143
Example Calculation
The following table gives 2 example calculations for PFD values within a SIL3 Safety loop with an assumed proof test interval of 10 years:
If the Safety loop contains ...
1 digital input,
1 digital output, and a standalone CPU
2 sensors,
2 redundant analog inputs,
2 redundant digital outputs, and
2 Hot Standby CPUs
Then the PLC contributes to the
Safety loop with ...
5.610E-06 + 7.156E-06 +
9.979E-05 = 1.126E-04
=> It corresponds to around
11.3% of the complete safety loop.
8.932E-06 + 7.156E-06 +
9.979E-05 = 1.159E-04
=> It corresponds to around
11.6% of the complete safety loop.
Note: All doubled modules contribute only once because the redundancy is only for high availability. Thus, only 1 module is active in the Safety loop.
And sensors and actuators can use ...
88.7%
88.4%
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Safety Times Description
The Quantum Safety PLC has a minimum PLC cycle time of 20 ms, which is necessary for processing the signals from the I/O modules, executing the user logic, and setting the outputs. For calculating the maximum PLC reaction time, the maximum reaction time of the sensors and actuators you use must be known. Further, the maximum PLC reaction time depends on the process Safety time (PST) required for your process. You can find details of how to configure your
PLC reaction time in
page 75
.
Proof Test Interval
The proof test is a periodic test performed to detect failures in a Safety-Related System so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to a like new condition or as close as practical to this condition. The time period between these tests is the proof test interval.
The proof test interval depends on the targeted Safety Integrity Level, the sensors, actuators and the PLC application. The Quantum is suitable for use in a SIL3 application and a proof test interval
of 10 years. See Available Safety Products (
see page 17
see page 30
Certified Products
The Safety product versions are certified. Only certified versions are allowed for programming, commissioning, and operating the Quantum Safety PLC.
NOTE: Only Safety firmware can be loaded into the Quantum Safety PLC.
The Safety firmware is loaded with the OSLoader into the Quantum Safety PLC. Further information on how to load the firmware can be found in the Unity Pro OSLoader User Manual.
WARNING
Degrading the Safety Integrity Level
Only a CPU with Firmware Version 2.0 and above is suitable for SIL3.
A CPU with Firmware Version 1.0 is only suitable for SIL2 applications.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
You can find the most recent information on the certified product versions on the TÜV Rheinland
Group website http://www.tuvasi.com/
Programmable Electronic Systems .
under Information and further List of Type Approved
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Special Operating Modes
Introduction
With regard to Functional Safety aspects, the following 2 operating modes of the Quantum Safety
PLC are of special importance:
the Safety Mode the Maintenance Mode
Safety Mode Description
The Safety Mode is the default mode of the Quantum Safety PLC, in which the Safety Functions are performed to control the process. It is a restricted mode in which modifications and maintenance activities are prohibited. You are only allowed to stop and start the PLC.
You can find a detailed description of the Safety Mode in
page 90
.
Maintenance Mode Description
The Maintenance Mode of the Quantum Safety PLC is a temporary mode for debugging and maintaining your program. You are allowed to force values and to modify the program.
In the Maintenance Mode the (STOP or RUN), diagnostics are not available.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
In Maintenance Mode, all diagnostic functions are performed but their results are not fully evaluated. Once the Quantum Safety PLC exits Safety Mode and enters Maintenance Mode, you are fully responsible for ensuring the Safe state of your system.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
You can find a detailed description of the Maintenance Mode in
page 92
.
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Diagnostics
Introduction
The Quantum Safety PLC provides additional internal diagnostics and system testing, increasing the diagnostic coverage (DC).
Survey of the Diagnostics
The internal architecture of the Quantum Safety CPU
provides 2 shutdown paths and
allows double code generation and execution to detect
systematic faults in the code generation and execution and
random faults in the CPU and the RAM.
The double code execution is controlled by 2 different processors integrated into the CPU.
For further details, see Standalone Safety CPU,
page 33
The internal architecture of the Quantum Safety I/O modules
provides redundancy,
detects systematic faults in the code execution, and random faults in the I/O modules.
The communication between the CPU and the I/O is designed as a black channel. The protocol checks or manages detected errors such as detected transmission errors, omissions, insertions, wrong order, delays, incorrect addresses, and masquerade bits, and retransmissions. Therefore, the non-interfering modules such as backplanes, Fiber Optic repeaters (140 NRP 954 00,
140 NRP 954 01C), remote I/O adapters 140 CRP 932 00 and 140 CRA 932 00 can be used inside the safety loop without impact on the PFD and PFH evaluations.
For further details, see General Information on the Safety I/O Modules,
page 39
.
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Difference Between Standard Quantum PLC and Quantum Safety PLC
Differences Between Standard and Safety PLC
To meet the requirements of the IEC 61508 standard, the Quantum Safety PLC differs from the standard Quantum PLC.
The following table lists the main differences between a standard Quantum and a Safety Quantum
PLC:
Feature Standard Quantum PLC
CPU Program Execution executed on application processor or Intel
Configuration
backplane local rack remote I/O all power supplies backplane expanders distributed I/O fieldbus I/O
Firmware
Software
User Logic
Data Type
regular firmware
Unity Pro XLS
Unity Pro XL
Unity Pro L
FBD
LD
IL
ST
SFC
EDT
DDT
Mode –
Restart Behavior
no restart cold start warm start
Quantum Safety PLC executed on application processor and Intel backplane local rack remote I/O dedicated power supply
Safety firmware
Unity Pro XLS
FBD
LD
EDT only simple arrays
Maintenance Mode
Safety Mode no restart cold start
Differences Between Standard and Safety PLC OS
To meet the requirements of the IEC 61508 standard, the operating system (OS) of the Quantum
Safety PLC differs from that of the standard Quantum PLC.
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The following table lists the main differences between a standard Quantum PLC OS and a Safety
Quantum PLC OS:
Feature
Warm Start
Safety Mode
Minimal Time Duration for MAST Execution in Cyclic
Mode
Forcing Safety Mode by Locking the Key
Display of Mode Indicating Characters on LCD
Memory Check
Password
Safety Analog Input
Safety Digital Input
Safety Digital Output
Meaning of SW12, SW13
MSTR Blocks
Global Data Subscribing (Ethernet)
I/O Scanner Read (Ethernet)
Global Input and Specific Input (Modbus Plus)
Unrestricted Area for %M and %MW
Standard Quantum PLC OS Quantum Safety PLC OS yes no no
3 ms yes
20 ms no no no no no no no no yes everywhere everywhere everywhere no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Safety mode no only in unrestricted area only in unrestricted area only in unrestricted area yes
Notes
The Quantum Safety PLCs only perform cold start. Thus, the application is reinitialized at each start.
The Quantum Safety PLC can run in cyclic or periodic mode. Thus, there is no difference in its behavior compared to the standard Quantum PLC. For details on cyclic and periodic execution, see the chapter "Application Program Structure" in the Unity Pro Program Languages and
Structure Reference Manual .
Memory
The memories of the Quantum Safety CPUs are each divided into a Safety and an unrestricted part. The Safety memory area is write protected and used for processing Safety-Related data. The unrestricted memory area is not write protected and used if it is necessary to get access to the
Safety Functions. Its values cannot be used directly but by using specific function blocks, see
page 104
.
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In slot A, PCMCIA memory cards can be used in a Quantum Safety CPU in the same way as they can be used in a standard Quantum CPU. These cards can be standard type, application and filetype or data and file-type memory cards. For details on this topic, see the chapter "High End CPU" in the Quantum with Unity Pro Hardware Reference Manual .
In contrast, slot B for data and file-type memory cards is not allowed to be used because this data storage is not available for SIL3 projects.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Do not use slot B. Data stored on a memory card in slot B is not processed in SIL3 projects.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Hot Standby
In addition to the standard Quantum Hot Standby functions, you can also use the Quantum Safety
PLCs for Safety-Related Hot Standby systems in order to achieve high availability for the CPU in a Safety-Related System. To control the ability of the standby PLC to take over from the primary, you can use an elementary function block (EFB) to program an automatic swap between primary
and standby PLC. For further information on this topic, see also Hot Standby Safety CPU Specifics,
page 35
.
Redundant I/O
To achieve high availability for the I/O, you can also use the Safety I/Os in a redundant manner.
For further information on this topic, see also Configuration Examples for the Quantum Safety PLC,
page 62
.
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Training
Introduction
As stated in the IEC 61508, Part 1, App. B, all persons involved in a Safety Lifecycle activity should have the appropriate training, technical knowledge, experience, and qualifications relevant to the specific duties they have to perform. This should be assessed in relation to each particular application.
NOTE: Make sure you possess all information and skills required to install, run, and maintain
Safety-Related Systems correctly.
Training Contents
In addition to the usual training courses concerning the use of the company’s products, Schneider
Electric offers you training courses covering the topics of its IEC 61508 compliant Safety-Related
System.
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Safety Requirements Section 1.2
Safety Requirements
Requirements for Hardware and Programming
Introduction
You must fulfill the following Safety requirements when using the Quantum Safety PLC.
Hardware Requirements
For a SIL3 project, you must use 1 of the 2 following Quantum Safety CPUs:
140 CPU 651 60S for stand-alone systems
140 CPU 671 60S for systems requiring high availability
Only Quantum Safety modules are allowed to perform Safety Functions. Non-interfering modules can be part of the Safety PLC because they do not interfere with the Safety modules by their own means. However, they are not allowed to execute Safety Functions. They can only be used to process non-Safety signals except the backplanes and remote IO adapters, which are considered as part of a black channel.
The Safe state of the outputs is the de-energized state.
You must follow the specified operating conditions regarding EMC, mechanical, and climatic influences. For details, see the chapter "System Specifications" in the Quantum with Unity Pro
Hardware Reference Manual .
NOTE: Backplane expanders and distributed I/Os are not allowed in the Quantum Safety PLC configuration.
NOTE: All Safety and non-interfering modules fulfill the requirements of the IEC 61131-2.
Programming Requirements
For programming a SIL3 project, you must use the certified Quantum Safety firmware and the
Safety programming software Unity Pro XLS.
You must make sure that your SIL3 project is configured and programmed correctly according to the rules of the IEC 61508 as well as to the rules described in this Safety Reference Manual.
For the complete life-cycle of the project development, you must follow the requirements of the
IEC 61511 for installation, commissioning, and validation.
The logic can be tested in simulation mode but the full test of the Safety Functions must be performed with the runtime system and the complete installation.
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WARNING
RISK OF PROJECT ERRORS
Check that your project is correct according to your specification by performing tests on the runtime system.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Proof Test Procedure
The user must perform the proof test procedure periodically (see IEC61508-4, 3.8.5). The maximum time between 2 proof test is the proof test interval.
For the safety PLC itself, the proof test consists of:
A power cycle
Checks that all modules restart without a detected diagnostic error
In addition, a complete commissioning of the safety application has to be performed. The complete procedure must include the necessary tests of cabling, sensors and actuators, depending on the full application analysis.
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Modicon Quantum
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Hardware and Configuration Chapter 2
Hardware and Configuration
Introduction
This chapter provides information concerning hardware and configuration of the Schneider Electric products that can be used for SIL3 applications.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following sections:
2.4
2.5
2.6
2.7
Section
2.1
2.2
2.3
Topic
Safety CPU
Safety I/O Modules
Power Supply
Non-Interfering Modules
Restrictions on I/O Modules
System Behavior in Case of Detected Diagnostic Errors
Configuration Examples
Page
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31
Safety CPU Section 2.1
Safety CPU
Introduction
The following section introduces the internal architecture of the Quantum Safety CPUs, distinguished according to their use in standalone and Hot Standby solutions.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Standalone Safety CPU
Hot Standby Safety CPU Specifics
Page
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Standalone Safety CPU
Introduction
For use in standalone SIL3 solutions, the 140 CPU 651 60S Quantum Safety CPU is certified.
The safety CPU includes a PCMCIA memory card, but its use and presence is not mandatory.
Description of the Internal CPU Architecture
The Quantum Safety CPU contains 2 different processors, an Intel Pentium and an application processor. Each one executes the Safety logic in its own memory area and both compare the results of the execution at the end of each cycle.
Two CPUs are available:
140 CPU 651 60S (Standalone Safety CPU)
140 CPU 671 60S (Hot Standby Safety CPU)
The following figure shows the internal architecture of the Quantum Safety CPU:
Benefits of the Double Code Generation and Execution
The 2 processors inside the Quantum Safety PLC allow double code generation and execution.
This diversity provides the following advantages in error detection:
2 executable codes are generated independently. The diversity of compilers allows the
detection of systematic error in the code generation.
The 2 generated codes are executed by 2 different processors. Thus, the CPU is able to detect both systematic errors in the code execution and random errors in the PLC.
2 independent memory areas are used for the 2 processors. Thus, the CPUs are able to detect random errors in the RAM and a full RAM test is not necessary at every scan.
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Description of the Watchdog
A hardware and a firmware watchdog check the PLC activity and the time needed to execute the user logic.
NOTE: You must configure the software watchdog (maximum PLC cycle time) to be consistent with the application execution time, the filtering of the I/O communication error, and the process Safety time (PST) targeted.
Description of the Memory Check
Static memory areas, including the Flash memory, PCMCIA memory card (if any) and the RAM, are checked using the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and the double code execution. Dynamic areas are protected by the double code execution and a periodic memory test. At cold start, these tests are re-initialized and fully performed before the CPU goes into Stop or Run mode.
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Hot Standby Safety CPU Specifics
Introduction
The 140 CPU 671 60S Quantum Safety CPU module is certified for use in Hot Standby SIL3 solutions compliant with the 61508 IEC standard. For more details about to the safety certifications, refer to the Modicon Quantum Safety PLC Safety Reference Manual .
In the Standalone Safety CPU, the Ethernet port is used to communicate with other devices using a normal Ethernet cable.
In the Hot Standby Safety CPU, the connection used to exchange data between the Primary CPU and the Standby CPU controller is a fiber optic link. Because the fiber optic link is not part of the
Safety loop, the PFD and PFH values of the Hot Standby CPU are the same as those of the
Standalone CPU.
Each Safety CPU can include a PCMCIA memory card, but its use and presence is not mandatory.
NOTE: This CPU cannot be used in a Quantum Ethernet I/O Hot Standby system.
Description of a Safety Hot Standby Configuration
The Hot Standby configuration contains two identical local racks and at least one remote I/O drop because I/Os cannot be placed in the local rack of a Safety Hot Standby configuration.
Besides a power supply module (there must be at least one 140 CPS 124 20 or one
140 CPS 22 400), each local rack must contain:
140 CPU 671 60S module
140 CRP 932 00 module
Besides a power supply, I/O modules (including at least one 140 CPS 124 20 or one
140 CPS 22 400), the remote drop(s) must include a 140 CRA 932 00 module.
CAUTION
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Use only high availability RIO modules with dual cabling in a Safety-Related System.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
Description of the Operating Modes
Safety Mode: This is the default mode. It is a restricted mode in which modifications and maintenance activities are prohibited.
Maintenance Mode: This is a temporary mode for modifying the project, debugging and maintaining the application program.
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State Compatibility with Safe and Maintenance Modes
A Quantum Hot Standby system has two states:
Redundant (1 CPU is Primary, 1 is Standby)
The Standby CPU controller mode follows the Primary CPU controller mode. For example, if you switch the Primary CPU controller from Safety to Maintenance mode, the Standby CPU controller switches from Safety to Maintenance mode at the start of the next cycle.
Non-redundant (at least 1 CPU Offline)
The two controllers are independent, one can be in Safety mode and the other one in
Maintenance mode. For example, the Run Primary controller can be in Safety mode while the
Stop Offline controller is in the Maintenance mode.
Impact of the PLC Switchover on the Process Safety Time
If the Primary CPU detects an internal or external problem, it stops exchanging data with the
Standby CPU and stops processing the I/O. As soon as the Standby CPU detects that there are no longer exchanges with the Primary CPU, it takes over the role of the Primary CPU, executing the user logic and processing the I/O. Therefore, the output modules must filter the lack of exchange with the Primary CPU to avoid glitches when a Switchover occurs. This is achieved by configuring the output module time-out. As a result, the PLC reaction time is greater than the timeout configured in the output module, thereby influencing the process Safety time.
NOTE: The behavior of the Hot Standby Safety CPU is equivalent to a Standalone Safety CPU.
In case of a detected error, the Safety PLC enters:
Halt state when running in the Maintenance Mode
Error state when running in the Safety Mode
Availability of the Hot Standby Functions
In addition to the standard Hot Standby functions, you can use an EFB to program an automatic
Switchover between Primary CPU and Standby CPU to verify the ability of the Standby CPU to take over from the Primary CPU. That means that the Standby CPU periodically becomes the
Primary CPU and the Primary CPU becomes the Standby CPU.
It is recommended to avoid using the USB link during a Switchover.
The following table lists the available Hot Standby functions in Maintenance and Safety modes:
Function
Hot Standby
Switchover
EFB Swap
Keypad
Application mismatch
OS Upgrade
Application Transfer
Maintenance Mode yes yes no yes yes yes, if Standby CPU is in Stop Offline yes yes no no no
Safety Mode yes yes yes
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NOTE: Applying the power simultaneously to Primary CPU and Standby CPU is allowed, but we recommend to do it sequentially.
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Safety I/O Modules Section 2.2
Safety I/O Modules
Introduction
This section deals with the 3 Safety I/O modules developed for use in the Quantum Safety PLC.
The features that the 3 modules share are described in general, whereas their distinctions are explained separately.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
General Information on the Safety I/O Modules
Safety I/O Modules in High Availability Configurations
Safety I/O Modules Diagnostics
Safety Analog Input Module
Safety Digital Input Module
Safety Digital Output Module
Page
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General Information on the Safety I/O Modules
Introduction
The following 3 Quantum Safety I/O modules are certified for use in safety applications:
140 SAI 940 00S (Analog Input)
140 SDI 953 00S (Digital Input)
140 SDO 953 00S (Digital Output)
The 3 Safety I/O modules allow you to connect the Safety PLC to the sensors and actuators, which are part of the Safety loop. All of them are composed of 2 micro controller systems running the same program, sharing the same information and checking each other periodically. You can install these I/O modules in the local backplane or in remote I/O drops.
Description of the CPU-I/O Communication
In general, the Quantum Safety CPU masters all backplane exchanges whereas the other modules are slaves. Between Safety CPU and Safety I/Os, data are exchanged through a dual port RAM, located in the I/O module.
For the communication between CPU and remote I/Os (RIOs), you must use the following 2 noninterfering modules:
140 CRP 932 00 (RIO head adapter), located in the local rack
140 CRA 932 00 (RIO drop adapter), located in the RIO drop
Optionally, you can use Fiber Optic repeater modules (140 NRP 954 00, 140 NRP 954 01C).
Those modules enhance remote I/O network noise immunity and increase cable distance while maintaining the full dynamic range of the network and the safety integrity level.
The communication protocol between the Safety I/O and CPU secures their exchanges. It allows both to check the correctness of received data, and detect any failure of the transmitter or during the transmission. Thus, a safety loop may include any non-interfering RIO adapters and backplane.
For details on this topic, see Safety I/O Modules Diagnostics (
see page 43
.
The Safety I/O modules provide features for line monitoring, see Safety I/O Modules Diagnostics
see page 43
) and the Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual.
NOTE: Use the red labels provided with the Quantum Safety /IO modules to clearly indicate the
Safety modules.
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Safety I/O Modules in High Availability Configurations
Introduction
The Quantum Safety I/O modules can be used in a redundant way to increase the availability.
However, using redundant Safety modules does not increase Safety. Schneider Electric provides function blocks to supervise the state for a configuration with 2 redundant modules.
The health of the modules is available by system words, which you can evaluate and make available to the operator and maintenance personnel in order to inform them in case a module is inoperable and must be exchanged. Each bit in the word represents the health of one channel. For further details, see the chapter "Quantum Safety I/O Modules" in the Quantum with Unity Pro
Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual . The system is still running in a SIL3 configuration and the only time limit for the exchange of the module is the proof test interval.
The modules can be placed in the same drop. However, Schneider Electric recommends using different drops to avoid problems in a single drop (remote adapter or power supply outage), see also chapter
Configuration Examples for the Quantum Safety PLC,
page 62
.
High Availability Analog Input Modules
2 sensors must be used for high availability Safety analog inputs and each must be connected to a different input point. The 2 input points must be located on different input modules.
The following figure illustrates the redundant analog input configuration:
The function block S_AISIL2
of the inputs.
Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications,
page 82
, can be used for selecting the data from the 2 redundant analog inputs and to supervise the state
High Availability Digital Input Modules
The redundant Safety digital inputs can be connected to either 1 or 2 sensors. The 2 input points must be located on different input modules. In case you use 1 sensor, the modules share the same process power supply. Using the information on the modules (input characteristics on short circuit, open wire, zero and one level, voltage and current) specified in the Quantum with Unity Pro
Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual, you must define the wiring to fulfill these characteristics.
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The following figure illustrates the redundant digital input configurations:
The function block S_DISIL2
the inputs.
Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications,
page 82
, can be used for selecting the data from the 2 redundant digital inputs and to supervise the state of
High Availability Digital Output Modules
For high availability digital outputs, the 2 outputs must be on separate modules, wired in parallel and connected to 1 actuator.
The following figure illustrates the redundant digital output configuration:
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41
42
The following figure shows the electrical scheme for this configuration:
A function block is not necessary because the same signal from the CPU is connected to both outputs.
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Safety I/O Modules Diagnostics
Description of the I/O Diagnostics
The following table lists the field diagnostics of the Safety I/O modules:
Diagnostics
Out of Range
Broken Wire
Field Power
Overload
Analog Input yes yes
–
–
Digital Input
– yes yes
–
Digital Output
–
– yes yes
NOTE: Short circuit of the wiring is not detected for the input modules. It is your responsibility to make sure that the modules are wired correctly, see the Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and
Analog I/O Reference Manual.
In addition, the Quantum Safety PLC provides diagnostics of the communication between Safety
CPU and Safety I/O modules, for instance a CRC. Thus, it is not only checked that the data received are the data sent but also that the data are updated. To handle disturbances, for example by EMC effects, which may temporarily corrupt your data, you can configure a maximum accepted consecutive CRC error for each module (ranging from 1 to 3). For a detailed procedure, see the chapter “Configuring I/O Modules for Safety Projects” in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual
Safety PLC Specifics .
Diagnostics at Power Up
At power up, the I/O modules perform an extended self-test during about 30 seconds. If these tests are unsuccessful, the modules are not considered to be healthy and do not start. The inputs and outputs are then set to 0.
If the 24 VDC external power supply is not connected to the digital input or digital output modules, the power up self-tests do not take place and the modules does not start.
Runtime Diagnostics
During runtime, the I/O modules perform self-tests. The input modules verify that they are able to read data from the sensors over the complete range. The output modules perform pulse tests on their switches with a duration lower than 1 ms.
Description of the General Over Voltage Diagnostics
Because the electronics may not work up to the theoretical maximum output voltage of the power supplies, the I/O modules must supervise the backplane power supply voltage.
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43
44
The following table describes the supervision of the power supply:
The power supply of ...
the backplane, which has a theoretical maximum output voltage of 18.5 V, the field side, which is generated by DC-to-DC converters, the process, which is one of the PELV type with a maximum output voltage of 60 V,
Is monitored by ...
2 over voltage supervisors, that is 1 for each micro processor system. Each supervisor is able to handle a possible over voltage by opening its power switch and triggering its reset block, which manages transitions between the states of power on and power off and resets both processors when active.
2 over and under voltage supervisors, that is 1 for each micro processor system. If the 2 isolated DC-to-DC converters generating the power supply to the field side electronics experience a fault, the supervisors signal this condition to its particular processor through an isolator.
2 over and under voltage supervisors, that is 1 for each micro processor system, in the same way as they monitor the DC-to-DC converters. In case of a fault, the supervisors signal this condition to the user logic by setting a status bit in order to warn the system of possible inconsistent inputs.
DANGER
LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Use the correct process power supply, which is a PELV type with a maximum output of 60 V.
Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
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Safety Analog Input Module
Architecture
The following figure shows the architecture of the Quantum Safety Analog Input module:
Legend:
μ Proc Microprocessor
The interface on the process side consists of 8 independent, isolated, current input channels.
Each input is acquired by 2 identical circuits:
1. The measuring devices are regularly monitored for their ability to measure, without a detected error, 5 analog values between 4 and 20 mA.
The linearity of the measuring stages is verified at the same time.
3. to 5. These mechanisms are described in the digital input module
140 SDI 953 00S section.
see page 47
Wiring Information
In order to ensure appropriate shielding characteristics of the wiring, you must use grounding equipment for the analog input shielded wires.
Schneider Electric recommends using the following devices from the Advantys STB catalog
(MKTED206061EN) or similar equipment:
Grounding Kit, part number STB XSP 3000
Terminals for Grounding Kit, part number STB XSP 3010 or STB XSP 3020
Unused inputs are signaled as unhealthy because of the Safety analog input module's open circuit detection. The health bit of unused inputs should be masked in the health word of the module in your application logic.
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Usage in Fire and Gas Applications
In fire and gas applications, the Safety analog input modules must be monitored for ground faults
(leakage of current). The wires should be connected potential-free. With a shunt resistor (for instance 250 Ω) between the ground rail of the grounding kit and the earth ground, a voltage can be measured in case of a leakage of the current on 1 of the analog inputs. This voltage must be supervised to detect a leakage.
Description of the Diagnostics
The field side consists of 8 isolated independent input channels. Each input is acquired by 2 identical circuits. Each micro processor drives its ADC through isolators to acquire the input value.
Further, it drives each DAC and may set it to high impedance (non-interfering) or low impedance, forcing the input of the ADC during diagnostics.
Diagnostic Timing
The analog input module performs:
A short term (every 15 ms) self-test during normal, cyclical acquisition to detect a discrepancy
that could result from an internal fault.
An intermediate (every 18.75 s) self-test during diagnostic acquisition to verify the health of each channel.
A long term (< 8 hours) self-test of the systems
A power-on self-test which includes a full diagnostic of the process side (takes1.8 s) and of the system side (takes 25 s)
Description of the Power Supply Supervision
There is no power supply supervisor. This function is checked during ADC diagnostics as both
ADC and DAC provide values dependant on their power supply voltage value.
Description of the Health Conditions
A module is healthy if the following tests are passed successfully:
At each module cycle, the 2 systems cross check their behavior (state, data and timing
consistency)
Comparison of both Dual Port Memory data at each PLC access
Clock frequency check (long term test)
Memory check (long term test)
Controller check (long term test)
A channel is declared healthy if the module is healthy and the following tests are passed successfully:
Every 15ms, the 2 systems compare the sampled measure
Once every 250 module cycles, the measure is done by one system, while the other system checks its input (it forces 1 analog value out of 5 possible in the full input range and measures it).
The full diagnostic is finished when all 5 values have been tested.
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Safety Digital Input Module
Architecture
The following figure shows the architecture of the Quantum Safety Digital Input module:
Legend:
μ Proc Microprocessor
Each input channel uses a unique interface circuit and 2 independent inputs.
The diagram above shows that, except for the input terminal block screw and the backbone connection, the module is internally fully redundant. The input is connected to 2 different measuring devices, each controlled by a microprocessor.
The +24 V sensor supply voltage is also supplied to each of the 2 measurement channels, where its validly is tested. Each microprocessor stores data, then checks that the 2 measuring systems have worked correctly before sending the data to the PLC processor.
To do this cross-checking, each microprocessor:
1. Forces 0 and 1 on the measuring system, reads these values and then verifies that they are consistent with the 0 an 1 levels.
2. Verifies the presence of the +24 V that is needed to validate the measurement
3. Verifies that the other microprocessor has complied with the diagnostic and measurement protocols.
The microprocessors then exchange data and compare their measurement results. Each then defines its response for the CPU by preparing a secure response frame with:
Time-based date
Identification of the module and its address
32-bit CRC for reliable transmission
Note: The maximum length of a data frame is 160 bits. The CRC/frame length ratio is such that the risk of non-detection of transmission errors on the assembly is almost zero.
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4. The supply voltage from the backplane is monitored. If there is an over- or under-voltage from the backplane, the module goes into a safe fallback position.
5. For each input, both measurement channels must send the same data to the CPU. This is verified by the Vote function, which eliminates any risk of data degradation between the microprocessor stage and the backplane.
Wiring Information
NOTE: The Safety digital inputs are de-energized to trip. The Safe input state is the de-energized state, that means if the input state goes to de-energized, the Safety Function is executed.
Therefore, the wiring must be done accordingly.
Connect the unused input channels of the used input modules to 24 VDC. This is required to avoid creating open circuit faults due to the Safety digital input module's open circuit detection of these unused inputs.
Description of the Diagnostics
Each input channel uses a common input circuit and 2 independent acquisition chains. Each micro processor drives a digital input serializer (DIS), which samples the input information. It also drives a digital input deserializer (DID) on each input circuit, which in turn drives the diagnostic block to set the diagnostic cases. The acquisitions are synchronous so that they can be compared.
Diagnostic Timing
The digital input module performs:
A power on self-test which includes a full diagnostic of the process side (takes 5.1 s) and of the
system side (takes 25 s)
A short-term self-test (every 15 ms) during normal, cyclical acquisition to detect a discrepancy that could result from an internal fault.
A intermediate self-test (every 60 ms) during diagnostic acquisition to verify the health of each channel.
A long term self-test (< 8 hours) of the systems
Description of the Input Channel Error Detection
The digital input monitors the field side power supply. The external wiring is checked by sensing the leakage current. The minimum leakage current is 1mA. If there is no leakage current, this is detected as an open circuit. In case of dry contact, a pull-up resistor of 15 kΩ is needed to avoid broken wire detection. Each input circuit is equipped with switches, which are periodically forced to 1 or to open circuit state in order to check if the circuit is healthy. Each input circuit is checked independently and declared unhealthy if there is a detected fault by setting a diagnostic bit.
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Description of the Health Conditions
A healthy module successfully passes the following tests:
During each module cycle, the 2 systems cross check their behavior (state, data and timing
consistency)
Comparison of both Dual Port Memory data at each PLC access
Clock frequency check (part of the long term test)
Memory check (part of the long term test)
Controller check (part of the long term test)
During the continuous checking, the process power supply is checked by 2 independent circuits
A channel is declared healthy if the module is healthy and the following tests are passed successfully:
At each input sample (every 15ms), the 2 systems check the consistancy of the sample measurment
Once every 4000 module cycles, the mesurement is done by only one System, while the other system checks that its input circuit is OK (it forces a 0 then a 1, then it checks the feedback value)
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Safety Digital Output Module
Architecture
The following figure shows the architecture of the Quantum Safety Digital Output module:
50
Legend:
μProc Microprocessor
Diagnostic mechanisms 2 to 5 are identical to the discrete input module
140 SDI 953 00S mechanisms.
see page 47
Like all safety modules and CPUs, the140 SDI 953 00S module is internally fully redundant. The output is controlled by 2 different control devices, which are controlled by a microprocessor.
The output stages are checked using a safety function.
Each output consists of 2 switches in series between the external +24 V power supply and the ground. The mid-point value (6) is read and sent to each microprocessor.
NOTE: The power supply is designed to detect any interruption of the voltage supplied to the output stage.
NOTE: These brief changes to “0“ have no effect on industrial control of motors or valves that are insensitive to these very short control disturbances.
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WARNING
RISK OF UNINTENDED OPERATION
When the demand state of the output is energized, the monitoring of the health status of each channel output of the SDO module is mandatory to take an appropriate measure in accordance with the application.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Wiring Information
You should protect the field power supply of the Safety digital output modules by a fuse. This fuse protects the module not only against reversed field power supply, but also against field power supply overvoltage. There must not be any current limitation, and the field power supply must be able to deliver 50 A during 0.2 s in case of short circuit. The fuse must be chosen according to the driven load and must not exceed 16 * 0.5 * 1.25 = 10 A fast-blow (IEC 61131-2). Thus, you should use a fast 10 A fuse on the field power supply input of each digital output module.
WARNING
SHORT-CIRCUIT RISK
Use a 10 A, 250 V fast-blow fuse to protect the field power supply against reversed power and overvoltage.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
NOTE: The 10 A value for the fuse is an absolute maximum value. Adapt it to a lower value depending on the real consumption of the actuators and on the number of outputs used.
For example, if only 12 outputs are connected to actuators with an input current less than 0.2 A, the fuse value is 12*0.2 = 2.4 A < Fuse <= 10 A.
The ground of the field power supply must be wired to the terminal block of the output module separately from the ground of the actuators. For further details, see the Quantum with Unity Pro
Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual.
NOTE: It is recommended connecting at least 2 ground lines (common 0 V) to the terminal block.
For further details, see “Wiring Diagram” in Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O
Reference Manual
Diagnostic Timing
The digital output module performs:
A power on self-test which includes a full diagnostic of the process side (takes 3.06 s) and of
the system side (takes 25 s)
A short-term self-test (every 15 ms) during normal, cyclical acquisition to detect a discrepancy that could result from an internal fault
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An intermediate self-test (every 24 s) during diagnostic acquisition to verify the health of each channel
A long term self-test (< 8 hours) of the systems
Description of the Timeout State
Configure a timeout state for the Safety-Related output modules in the following cases:
Detection of a malfunction of the CPU
Occurrence of a communication problem
Configure the following 3 timeout states:
Hold last value
User defined 0, which is the Safe state
User defined 1
For a detailed procedure for configuring the timeout state and the module timeout of the digital output modules, refer to the Unity Pro XLS Software Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC
Specifics.
WARNING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO ENTER THE SAFE STATE
Configure a timeout state of 0 to allow the Safety digitial output modules to go into the Safe state.
If the configured state = 1, the Safety modules may not go into the Safe state.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
WARNING
RISK OF UNEXPECTED BEHAVIOR
If the module detects an internal error, the output goes into the Safe (de-energized) state whatever the value defined for the time-out state.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Description of the Module Time-out
Configure the module time-out value, which must be compliant with the PLC cycle time, the Hot
Standby configuration (if HSBY is used) and the process Safety time. For more information, refer
see page 75
.
In case of permanent bad exchanges with the CPU, the digital output module reboots after a fixed time-out of 65 seconds. This causes all outputs to go to 0, independent of the configured time-out state.
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Description of the Health Conditions
A healthy module successfully passes the following tests:
During each module cycle, the 2 systems cross check their behavior (state, data and timing
consistency)
Comparison of both Dual Port Memories data at each PLC access
Clock frequency check (part of the long term test)
Memory check (part of the long term test)
Controller check (part of the long term test)
During the continuous checking, the process power supply is checked by 2 independent circuits
During each module cycle, both systems check the consistency of CPU messages.
A channel is declared healthy if the module is healthy and the following tests are passed successfully:
During each module cycle, both systems check the consistency state of the switches
Once every 1600 module cycles, both systems cooperate to perform a test of the "switch health". The sequence depends on the actual value of the output. The duration of each state is less than 1ms.
The circuits tested when output = 0:
The circuits tested when output = 1:
Legend:
1. 24 V process
2. High side switch
3. Low side switch
4. Load
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Power Supply Section 2.3
Power Supply
Power Supply for the Quantum Safety PLC
Introduction
For use in the Quantum Safety PLC, the 140 CPS 124 20 and 140 CPS 224 00 Quantum power supply modules are certified.
These CPS are certified, even if neither PFH nor PFD values are provided. They cannot deliver a higher voltage than the one supported by all the safety modules. For this reason, these CPS modules do not contribute to the global PFH or PFD values calculation for the safety function.
WARNING
LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Do not use power supply modules other than the Quantum 140 CPS 124 20 or 140 CPS 224 00.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Description of the Module Features
These modules have an over voltage protection and detection. Further, they support redundancy.
If a fault is detected, the other one will take over and supply the rack with the necessary power.
NOTE: Schneider Electric recommends always using 2 Quantum power supply modules per rack in the Quantum Safety PLC.
NOTE: 1 power supply module (140 CPS 124 20 or 140 CPS 224 00) must be able to deliver the complete power of the drop.
For details of the configuration of modules, see
Configuration Examples for the Quantum Safety
page 62
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Non-Interfering Modules Section 2.4
Non-Interfering Modules
Non-Interfering Modules for the Quantum Safety PLC
Introduction
The Quantum Safety PLC consists of Safety modules that perform Safety functions. This PLC also supports non-interfering modules.
There are 2 groups of non-interfering modules:
Modules needed to complete a Safety PLC:
140 XBP 006 00 (Backplane 6 slots)
140 XBP 010 00 (Backplane 10 slots)
140 XBP 016 00 (Backplane 16 slots)
140 CRP 932 00 (Remote I/O Head Adapter)
140 CRA 932 00 (Remote I/O Drop Adapter)
140 CPS 124 20 (Power Supply)
140 CPS 224 00 (Power Supply)
140 NRP 954 00 (Multi-mode Fiber Optic Repeater Module)
140 NRP 954 01C (Single Mode Fiber Optic Repeater Module)
Modules for additional non-safety functions:
140 NOE 771 11 (Ethernet Module)
140 DDI 353 00 (Digital Input)
140 DDO 353 00 (Digital Output)
140 ACI 040 00 (Analog Input)
140 ACO 020 00 (Analog Output)
140 ERT 854 20 (Time Stamp Module)
Additional parts such as cables and terminal strips are also available for a Quantum Safety PLC.
Description of the RIO Adapters
The RIO head adapter 140 CRP 932 00 and the RIO Drop Adapter 140 CRA 932 00 are allowed to be used for the communication between the Safety CPU and the Safety remote I/Os. For detailed information on this topic, see
Description of the CPU-I/O Communication,
are allowed to be used in the Safety-Related System.
page 39
. All standard components of Schneider Electric for wiring remote I/Os (cables, connectors, and so on)
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Description of the Ethernet Module
The Ethernet module 140 NOE 771 11 can be used for the communication of the Safety PLC with other PLCs, HMIs or I/Os on the Ethernet network. It does not alter Safety-Related data and therefore is not part of the Safety loop. For detailed information on this topic, see rack.
page 108
. The Ethernet module can only be configured in the local
Description of the Backplanes
The backplanes 140 XBP 016 00, 140 XBP 010 00, and 140 XBP 006 00 are the equipment on which you can mount all Safety and non-interfering modules.
NOTE: Backplane expanders are not allowed in the Quantum Safety PLC.
Description of the I/O and Time Stamp Modules
You are allowed to configure non-interfering I/O and time stamp modules in your Safety PLC.
However, they must not be part of the Safety loop.
CAUTION
INCORRECT USE OF SAFETY-RELATED DATA
Make sure that neither inputs nor outputs of non-interfering I/O and time stamp modules are used for calculating Safety-Related outputs. These modules are only allowed to process non-Safety signals. The logic used to process the non-interfering I/Os must follow the same rules as for
Safety logic. The non-interfering I/Os must be mapped to the Safety memory range.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
The Unity PRO XLS cannot check this rule, so the user is responsible for the separation of safety logic and non-safety logic. It is recommended to use separate sections to facilitate the verification.
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Restrictions on I/O Modules Section 2.5
Restrictions on I/O Modules
Description of the Restrictions on I/O Modules
Introduction
With regard to the communication between the Quantum Safety CPU and I/O modules, you must observe the following restrictions on I/O modules:
Communicating to I/O via Ethernet or Modbus Plus is not allowed on a Quantum Safety PLC.
Unity Pro XLS cannot check for compliance with this rule because Ethernet and Modbus Plus communication to other PLCs (not I/Os) are allowed, see also PLC-PLC Communication
Description
see page 108
.
DANGER
UNCERTIFIED DATA TRANSFER – SIL3 VIOLATION
Do not configure Ethernet or Modbus Plus I/Os in your Safety PLC. It is your responsibility to guarantee that no communication occurs to I/O via Ethernet or Modbus Plus. Any violation of this rule makes your application non-IEC 61508 compliant.
Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
Distributed I/Os, which communicate via Modbus Plus, are not allowed in the Quantum Safety
PLC. Unity Pro XLS checks that no distributed I/Os are configured. If you do not obey this rule, the Unity Pro analyzer does not generate code.
I/Os communicating via other fieldbuses are not allowed in the Quantum Safety PLC.
Unity Pro XLS checks that no fieldbus I/Os are configured. If you do not obey this rule, the Unity
Pro analyzer creates a relevant error message and does not generate code.
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System Behavior in Case of Detected Diagnostic Errors Section 2.6
System Behavior in Case of Detected Diagnostic Errors
Introduction
The Safety CPU modules and the Safety I/O modules have internal diagnostics to check if the modules are working correctly. This chapter describes the behavior of the modules in case an error is detected. Also, your possibilities to intervene are explained.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Improper Behavior of the Safety CPU Modules
Improper Behavior of the Safety I/O Modules
Page
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Improper Behavior of the Safety CPU Modules
General
The CPU diagnostics verifies the correctness of the hardware and the running program, see
page 33
. If an error is detected during 1 of the tests, the CPU enters an error state and all Safety-related outputs go to the Safe state.
Handling Detected Errors
If a an error is detected, perform the following steps:
Step
1
2
3
4
Action
Power off the complete PLC.
Switch the power on again.
Result: A self-test is performed.
Read the content of the system words %SW125, %SW126, and %SW127 for information on the detected error state, see
Description of the System Words
Provide the contents of these system words and Unity Pro project system words to Schneider Electric support.
Some of the detected errors are temporary and disappear after a restart of the PLC. Others require replacement of the CPU.
NOTE: If an “Automatic Start in Run” option for the CPU is configured (its use is not recommended in a Safety PLC) and if the diagnostic error is persistent, the CPU again enters the error state and stops.
To read the values of the system words, prevent a restart by either:
removing the PCMCIA memory card (the application is stored on the card) by inserting an empty PCMCIA memory card (the application is stored in memory)
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Avoid using the Automatic start in Run option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Content of the System Words
%SW125 contains the cause of the detected error and have the following meaning:
Code (hex) Meaning
0x5AF1 sequence check detected error (unpredictable execution in CPU)
0x5AF2
0x5AF3 detected error in memory (incorrect address) detected comparison error (result of the execution of the Intel processor differs from that of the application processor)
0x5AF4
0x5AF5
0x5AF6
0x5AF7
0x5AF8 real-time clock detected error detected error initializing double code execution detected watchdog activation error detected error during memory check (it takes more than 8 hours) detected error in memory check (in RAM)
%SW126 and %SW127 contain information that is for Schneider Electric internal use to analyze the problem in more detail.
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Improper Behavior of the Safety I/O Modules
General
The Safety I/O modules detect an internal error in either:
a channel
the complete module
Detected Channel Error
If an error is detected in a channel, this channel is set to the Safe state while the other channels continue to operate. The information about the detected error is available in the status registers of the module (see "Quantum Safety I/O Modules" in the to be exchanged.
Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog
I/O Reference Manual ). Depending on the type of detected error, the complete module may have
Detected Module Error
If a module error is detected, the I/O module enters the Safe state. It then resets, restart sand performs the power up self-tests:
If the power up self-tests ...
are successful are unsuccessful
Then the module ...
starts and operates normally.
resets and goes through the same procedure.
NOTE: If several self-tests are unsuccessful, the module must be exchanged.
After a detected error in a Safety I/O module, it restarts automatically. If the power-up self tests are successful, the module continues normal operation, i.e., it again sets the outputs to 1. If an inoperable module has been exchanged (hot-swapped), it also automatically starts operation after the self-test. The application must be programmed and configured in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart of the Safety I/O modules.
WARNING
UNEXPECTED APPLICATION BEHAVIOR - AUTOMATIC RESTART
Program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after the Safety I/O modules restart.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Configuration Examples Section 2.7
Configuration Examples
Configuration Examples for the Quantum Safety PLC
Introduction
The Quantum Safety PLC can consist of a local rack and additional remote I/O drops. All Safety modules on the local and remote racks are in the safety loop. The Safety PLC and the Safety I/O modules can be configured as either non-redundant or redundant.
Standalone Configuration (1oo2 HotStandby system)
The following is an example of a standalone Quantum Safety PLC, consisting of a local rack and
3 remote I/O drops:
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The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:
NOTE: Only the Schneider Electric Safety products are certified for use in your Quantum Safety
PLC and therefore for processing Safety-Related data. Non-interfering modules such as the
Ethernet NOE communication module are only certified for processing non-Safety-Related data.
However, they are allowed to be part of the Quantum Safety PLC because they cannot interfere with the Safety-Related System by their own means. Still, they are not allowed to execute Safety
Functions. Further, you can connect other necessary devices such as human-machine interfaces
(HMI). These devices are not part of the Safety loop because they are not allowed to write Safety data directly, see also
PLC-HMI Communication Description,
page 124
.
Redundant CPU Configurations for High Availability (1oo2 HotStandby system)
The following figure is an example of a Hot Standby Quantum Safety PLC consisting of redundant
CPUs:
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The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:
Redundant I/O Configurations for High Availability
The following figure provides the functional overview of a redundant I/O configuration, consisting of 1 CPU and redundant I/Os:
64
It is possible to place your redundant Safety I/O modules
either in the same RIO drop (not recommended)
or in different RIO drops (recommended when redundant Safety I/O modules are used).
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The following figure shows redundant I/Os placed in the same RIO drop (left) and in different RIO drops (right):
NOTE: Schneider Electric recommends always placing redundant Safety I/O modules in different
RIO drops.
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Redundant CPU and I/O Configuration
The following figure shows an example of a Quantum Safety PLC consisting of redundant CPUs and redundant I/Os:
The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:
66
NOTE: Schneider Electric recommends always placing redundant Safety I/O modules in different
RIO drops.
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Peer-to-Peer Standalone Configuration
The following figure shows an example of peer-to-peer standalone Quantum Safety PLC,
consisting of two standalone configurations which communicate throughout a black channel
see page 120
on an Ethernet link:
The following figure provides the appropriate functional overview:
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Modicon Quantum
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Programming Chapter 3
Programming
Introduction
This chapter deals with the topics important for programming your SIL3 project. The requirements for programming a Safety-Related System are described and the SIL3 features are explained.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following sections:
Section
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
Topic
General Information on Programming
Software Description
Operating Procedures
Special Features and Procedures
Page
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General Information on Programming Section 3.1
General Information on Programming
Introduction
This section provides general information on programming a SIL3 application with regard to programming and monitoring requirements.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Available Language Sections
Exceptions and Requirements for Programming
Process Safety Time
Page
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Available Language Sections
Introduction
For programming your SIL3 project, you are only allowed to use the following 2 programming languages:
function block diagram (FBD) ladder diagram (LD)
Both are languages defined by the IEC 61131-3 for the programming of PLCs.
Description of the Restrictions on Language
If you create a SIL3 project, the following restrictions apply:
At creation time, Unity Pro XLS restricts your choice of programming language.
At import time, Unity Pro XLS ignores any section other than FBD or LD, but does not stop the import. The use of sections other than FBD or LD generates errors.
At analyze time, Unity Pro XLS checks each section for its language. If any test fails, it creates an error and does not generate your program.
You can find a detailed description of the restrictions on program structure, language elements,
and data configuration in Exceptions and Requirements for Programming,
page 72
.
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Exceptions and Requirements for Programming
Introduction
To program a SIL3 project, you must use the programming languages FBD and LD only while at the same time observing the rules listed below concerning the program structure, language elements, and data configuration.
Requirements for the Program Structure
You are only allowed to program your SIL3 project in master task (MAST task) sections.
You are not allowed:
to program FAST, TIMER, INTERRUPT, and AUX tasks. In case of an import, Unity Pro XLS
ignores the objects not allowed and informs you of their existence. If you continue the import, it is done without the objects that are not allowed, which may lead to errors or it may stop if the import is not possible to use subroutines (SR sections) to schedule segments to call remote I/Os in parallel
WARNING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Do not use conditional section execution with Unity Pro XLS.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Requirements for Language Elements
You are only allowed to use functions and function blocks (FFBs) that are certified for use in Safety logic and described in the Unity Pro Safety Block Library.
You are allowed to create your own derived function blocks (DFBs) and store them in the safety library.
You are not allowed to use ST expressions.
In LD, you are not allowed to use:
halt coils
call coils returns operate blocks compare blocks
NOTE: Though jumps to labels are allowed in FBD and LD, Schneider Electric recommends not using them for a better structuring of your Safety logic.
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Requirements for Configuring Data
You are only allowed to use:
the elementary data types (EDTs) BOOL , EBOOL , BYTE , WORD , DWORD , INT , UINT , DINT ,
UDINT , FLOAT and TIME simple arrays (the index can only be a literal), for details see the chapter "Programming" in the
Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics direct addressing, for instance, writing %MW4000 by a coil in LD located variables. All instances of variables are not only checked with regard to being located
but also as to being located in a valid memory area, see also Memory Area Description,
page 104
You are not allowed to create derived data types (DDTs).
NOTE: You are not allowed to use variables from the unrestricted memory areas in your user logic unless you may connect it to the input of S_SMOVE_BIT or S_SMOVE_WORD function blocks, see
page 104
Checks for Programming
At creation time of a SIL3 project, Unity Pro XLS offers only the features allowed for Safety logic.
Any attempt to create objects not allowed leads to an error.
However, objects not allowed can be inserted through source file import. Therefore, Unity Pro XLS checks all objects at analyze time. At any rule not obeyed or any object not allowed, Unity Pro XLS creates an error and does not generate your project.
In the project settings, Unity Pro XLS provides the following different options concerning the warnings of the language analyzer:
Variables not used
Multiple writing of variables
Parameters not assigned
Multiple use of FB instances
Overlapping of addresses
WARNING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Switch on all warning options in the project settings and check the warnings to make sure that they are not critical and that the behavior is intended.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Requirements for Monitoring
Unity Pro XLS is the only programming software allowed to load or to modify your SIL3 project.
Other programming packages or HMIs may monitor both the state and functions of the Safety-
Related System but must not alter them. Any other device is allowed to read data from the Safety
PLC but writing to a Safety PLC is restricted, see also Memory Area Description,
page 104
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Process Safety Time
Description of the Process Safety Time
The process Safety time (PST) is a critical measure of each process. It is defined as the period between the occurrence of a failure in equipment under control (EUC) and the occurrence of a hazardous event if the Safety Function is not performed.
NOTE: The process Safety time is given by the process. It must be ensured that the Safety-Related
System is able to perform the Safety Functions within the process Safety time.
Description of the System Reaction Time
The system reaction time is the sum of the PLC reaction time and the time for the used sensor device (T
S
) and the time for the used actuator device (T
A
). T
S
and T
A
are device specific.
The following equation is valid:
System reaction time = PLC reaction time + T
S
+ T
A
This equation is illustrated below:
The system reaction time must be less than the process Safety time.
Description of the PLC Reaction Time
The PLC reaction time is the sum of the related time for the used input module (T
I output module (T
O
) and the CPU reaction time (T
CPU
).
) and the used
The following equation is valid:
PLC reaction time = T
CPU
+ T
I
+ T
O
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Description of the CPU Reaction Time
The CPU reaction time is directly impacted by the CPU cycle time which is needed to execute the
Safety logic. A signal may appear just at the beginning of the execution cycle when the signals have already been processed. Therefore, 2 cycles may be necessary to react to the signal.
This leads to the following equation:
CPU reaction time = 2 x CPU cycle time
In addition, it is possible to define a maximum number of accepted CRC faults (N
CRC
) for the communication with the I/Os. This has been introduced to reduce spurious effects (for instance by an EMC disturbance). This number can be defined to take a value between 1 and 3. This must be taken into account because the number of cycles for the output module to react is increased.
Therefore, the equation above is extended as follows:
CPU reaction time = (2 + N
CRC
) x CPU cycle time
NOTE: If you are using a peer-to-peer safe communication to perform the safety function, the CPU reaction time estimation is different
see page 120
.
Description of the Time for Input Modules
The maximum times (worst case) for the Safety digital input module and for the Safety analog input module T
I
are 45 ms (3 times the module’s cycle time).
Description of the Time for Output Modules
The maximum time T
O
for the Safety digital output module is equal to the cycle time of the module:
T
O
= 15 ms
For the Safety digital output module, a timeout T
OUT be greater than the CPU cycle time, see below.
must be configured. The module timeout must
You can find a detailed procedure for configuring the module timeout of digital output modules in the chapter "Configuring I/O Modules for Safety Projects" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode
Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
Description of the Maximum CPU Cycle Time
Knowing the required PST and the maximum reaction time of the sensors and actuators, you are able to calculate the maximum PLC reaction time tolerable in your process.
To ensure that the system reaction time is smaller than the process Safety time, the maximum CPU cycle time must fulfill the following condition:
Max. CPU cycle time < (PST - T
I
- T
O
- T
S
- T
A
) / (2 + N
CRC
)
In addition, you must consider the following relation between the maximum timeout T
OUT output modules and the maximum CPU cycle time:
for the
T
OUT
> max. CPU cycle time x (1 + N
CRC
)
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NOTE: If you are using a peer-to-peer safe communication to perform the safety function, the
maximum CPU cycle time estimation is different (
see page 120
.
Example Calculation
The following values are given:
required PST = 1.1 s
T
I
= 45 ms
T
O
T
S
T
A
= 15 ms
= 100 ms
= 500 ms
N
CRC
= 1
The maximum CPU cycle time is calculated as follows:
Max. CPU cycle time < (1100 ms - 45 ms - 15 ms - 100 ms - 500 ms) / 3
Max. CPU cycle time < 146.7 ms
The requirement that the module timeout of the digital output module must be greater than the CPU cycle time is fulfilled:
T
OUT
> 300 ms
In case of a fault of the CPU, the outputs are set to Safe state after the timeout has expired.
Therefore, the system needs the following time to shut down the outputs:
T
OUT
+ T
O
In the example, this time amounts to
300 ms + 15 ms = 315 ms
CPU Cycle Time in a Hot Standby System
In a normally running Hot Standby system, the formula for the CPU cycle time is the same:
Max. CPU cycle time < (PST - T
I
- T
O
- T
S
- T
A
) / (2 + N
CRC
)
In addition, you must consider the following relation between the maximum timeout T
OUT output modules and the maximum CPU cycle time:
for the
T
OUT
> 4 x max. CPU cycle time (worst case)
Configuring the Maximum CPU Cycle Time
The Quantum Safety PLC can perform cyclic or periodic execution. There is no difference between the behavior of a standard Quantum PLC and a Quantum Safety PLC regarding cyclic and periodic execution. In both cases, you must configure the maximum acceptable CPU cycle time in
Unity Pro XLS.
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78
The maximum allowed CPU cycle time (watchdog) is configured in the properties of the MAST task. For details, see the chapter "Programming" in the the chapter "Presentation of the Master Task" in the
Reference Manual .
Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual and
Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure
NOTE: The minimum CPU cycle time is 20 ms.
NOTE: Only configure a maximum number of %M and %MW that is really needed. All configured memory ranges %M and %MW are compared as part of the double execution, which takes roughly
5.5 ms per 10,000 words. Therefore, you increase the cycle time unnecessarily if you configure more memory than needed.
You must check your CPU cycle time when commissioning your project. At this time, Unity Pro XLS provides the real time values from the PLC.
You can find this information
in the Task tab available using the menu entry Tools → PLC Screen.
in %SW30, containing the current time of the MAST task execution.
in %SW31, containing the maximum time of the MAST task execution.
in %SW32, containing the minimum time of the MAST task execution.
For details, see Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59,
"Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW47" in the
page 164
or the chapter
Unity Pro Program Languages and
Structure Reference Manual . If your maximum acceptable CPU cycle time is exceeded, you must adjust your configuration or your user logic or both to reach the required value.
WARNING
RISK OF EXCEEDING THE PROCESS SAFETY TIME
Set the maximum CPU cycle time taking into account your process Safety time.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Software Description Section 3.2
Software Description
Introduction
This section describes the special characteristics of Unity Pro XLS developed to program SIL3 applications.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Unity Pro XLS
Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications
Application Password
Page
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Unity Pro XLS
Introduction
To meet the requirements of the IEC 61508, only certified software is allowed for programming
SIL3 applications. For this purpose, Schneider Electric has developed the Safety version of the programming tool Unity Pro XLS (XL-Safety). It is able to perform both fault diagnostics and project protection to an extent necessary for programming a SIL3 project.
NOTE: When you create a new project with Unity Pro XLS, the choice of the Quantum PLC type determines if a SIL3 or non-Safety project is created.
SIL3 and Non-Safety Applications
Unity Pro XLS can be used to program both SIL3 and non-Safety applications. Thus, no other programming software is necessary. Only 1 version can be installed on your computer.
Your SIL3 project is stored in binary project files ( executable binary files (
Mode" in the
APX ) into a Safety CPU. For details, see the chapter "Services in Offline
Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual .
STU ) and in archive project files ( STA ). You cannot open these files with non-Safety versions of Unity Pro. Further, you can only download your
Non-Safety projects created by non-Safety Unity Pro versions must be exported using the appropriate Unity Pro version and imported into Unity Pro XLS.
Description of the Project Protection
Unity Pro XLS offers protection against unauthorized access concerning your SIL3 project and the
Quantum Safety PLC as well as Unity Pro XLS itself.
Your SIL3 project and the Quantum Safety PLC are protected by the following password mechanisms:
The SIL3 project is protected by a password at the application level, the application password.
When you create a SIL3 project, an empty password, which you can change, is set.
The Quantum Safety PLC is also protected by the application password. In case there is no application in the PLC, it accepts any password.
Connecting to a Safety PLC requires to enter the application password if the currently opened project in Unity Pro XLS is different or no project is opened.
Unity Pro XLS itself is protected by the following mechanisms:
You can define access rights or a list of functions a user is allowed to perform using the Security
Editor provided together with Unity Pro XLS (and having the same functionality as in
Unity Pro XL).
After a configured time of inactivity, Unity Pro XLS is locked automatically. Before being able to continue to work with it, you must enter the application password. While Unity Pro XLS is locked, the connection to the PLC is maintained and it stays in the current mode.
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Description of the Security Editor
To protect Unity Pro XLS against unauthorized access, you can use the Security Editor
to apply a policy and to create profiles and users for it.
to manage access rights to it.
For example, you can restrict the access for
creating or modifying the application password,
entering Maintenance Mode, or adapting the auto-lock timeout.
For details of using the Security Editor, see also the chapter "Access Security Managment" in the
Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual and the chapter "Security Management for Unity Pro XLS" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
NOTE: Use the features provided by the Security Editor to protect Unity Pro XLS against unauthorized access. However, using the Security Editor does not remove the necessity to protect your SIL3 project by using an application password.
Description of the Auto-Lock Feature
Unity Pro XLS offers the option to protect itself against unauthorized access after a configured time of inactivity. After this time is exceeded, Unity Pro XLS prompts you to enter the application password.
You can find a detailed procedure for activating the auto-lock in the chapter "Protection of a Safety
Project with Unity Pro XLS" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
Default Values
When you create a new SIL3 project, the following values are set by default:
The application password is empty.
The auto-lock is activated, allowing 10 minutes of inactivity before Unity Pro XLS is locked.
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Functions/Function Blocks for SIL3 Applications
Introduction
Schneider Electric offers you a number of elementary functions (EF) and function blocks (EFBs) that are certified for use in SIL3 applications. For details, see the Unity Pro Safety Block Library.
Remark
FFBs that are available for different data types are labeled with *** .
For example, the elementary function S_AND_*** is available for the data type
BOOL as S_AND_BOOL .
BYTE as S_AND_BYTE .
WORD as S_AND_WORD .
DWORD as S_AND_DWORD .
Description of the Safety FFBs for Mathematics
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of mathematic functions:
Name
S_ADD_***
S_SUB_***
S_MUL_***
S_DIV_***
S_NEG_***
S_ABS_***
S_SIGN_***
S_SMOVE_BIT
S_SMOVE_WORD
EF
EF
EF
EF
EFB
Type Used...
EF to add the input values
EF
EF to substract the input 2 from the input 1 value to multiply the input value to divide the Divident input value by the Divisor input value to negate the input values to compute the absolute value of the input value to detect negative signs to assign the input value to the output (to use data from unrestricted memory area in the Safety logic)
Description of the Safety FFBs for Comparison
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of comparison functions:
Name
S_EQ_***
S_GT_***
S_GE_***
S_LT_***
S_LE_***
S_NE_***
EF
EF
EF
Type Used to check the values of successive inputs...
EF for equality
EF
EF for a decreasing sequence for a decreasing sequence or equality for an increasing sequence for an increasing sequence or equality for inequality
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Description of the Safety FFBs for Logic
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of logic functions:
Name
S_AND_***
S_OR_***
S_XOR_***
S_NOT_***
S_SHL_***
S_SHR_***
S_ROL_***
S_ROR_***
S_RS
S_SR
S_F_TRIG
S_R_TRIG
EF
EFB
EFB
EFB
EFB
EF
EF
EF
EF
Type Used...
EF to perform a bit by bit AND link of the input bit sequence
EF
EF to perform a bit OR link of the input bit sequence to perform a bit XOR link of the input bit sequence to negate the input sequence bit by bit to shift a bit pattern to the left to shift a bit pattern to the right to rotate a bit pattern circularly to the left to rotate a bit pattern circularly to the right as RS memory with a dominant reset input as SR memory with a dominant set input to detect falling edges to detect rising edges
Description of the Safety FFBs for Statistics
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of statistical functions:
Name
S_MIN_***
S_MAX_***
S_LIMIT_***
S_MUX_***
S_SEL
Type Used...
EF to assign the smallest input value to the output
EF
EF to assign the largest input value to the output to transfer the unchanged input value to the output if it lies within the minimum and the maximum limit
EF
EF to transfer the respective input value to the output depending on the K input value for a binary selection between 2 input values
Description of the Safety FFBs for Timers and Counters
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of timer and counter functions:
Name
S_CTU_***
S_CTD_***
S_CTUD_***
S_TON
S_TOF
Type Used...
EFB for counting upwards
EFB
EFB for counting downwards for counting upwards and downwards
EFB
EFB as on delay timer as off delay timer
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Name
S_TP
Type Used...
EFB for generating a pulse with defined duration
Description of the Safety FFBs for Type Conversion
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of type conversion functions:
Name
S_BOOL_TO_***
S_BYTE_TO_***
S_WORD_TO_***
S_DWORD_TO_***
S_INT_TO_***
S_DINT_TO_***
S_UINT_TO_***
S_UDINT_TO_***
Type Used to convert an input value of the data type...
EF
EF
BOOL to a data type
BYTE , WORD , DWORD , INT , DINT , UINT , or UDINT
BYTE
to a
BOOL
,
WORD
,
DWORD
,
INT
,
DINT
,
UINT
, or
UDINT data type
EF
EF
WORD
to a
BOOL
,
BYTE
,
DWORD
,
INT
,
DINT
,
UINT
, or
UDINT data type
DWORD to a BOOL , BYTE , WORD , INT , DINT , UINT , or UDINT data type
EF
EF
EF
EF
INT
to a
BOOL
,
BYTE
,
WORD
,
DWORD
,
DINT
,
UINT
, or
UDINT data type
DINT to a BOOL , BYTE , WORD , DWORD , INT , UINT , or UDINT data type
UINT
to a
BOOL
,
BYTE
,
WORD
,
DWORD
,
INT
,
DINT
, or
UDINT data type
UDINT
to a
BOOL
,
BYTE
,
WORD
,
DWORD
,
INT
,
DINT
, or
UINT data type
Description of the Safety FFBs for High Availability
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of functions for high availability:
Name
S_DISIL2
S_AISIL2
Type Used...
EFB to select the data from the 2 digital input modules in case of a redundant input module configuration
EFB to select the data from the 2 analog input modules in case of a redundant input module configuration
Description of the Safety FFBs for Hot Standby
The following table lists the Safety FFBs belonging to the family of functions for Hot Standby:
Name
S_HSBY_SWAP
Type Used...
EFB to swap between primary and standby CPU in case of a Hot
Standby solution
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Details on how to use the Safety FFBs in your project are provided in the Unity Pro Safety Block
Library .
Description of the Safety DFBs for Safe Peer-to-Peer Communication
The following table lists the Safety DFBs belonging to the family of functions for Safe Peer-to-Peer communication:
Name
S_WR_ETH
S_RD_ETH
Type Used...
EFB to compute data to send on Safe Peer-to-Peer communication from the sender PLC
EFB to compute data received from Safe Peer-to-Peer communication in the receiver PLC
Details on how to use the Safety DFBs in your project are provided in the Unity Pro Safety Block
Library .
Description of the Non-Interfering FFBs for Quantum I/O
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Do not use output of the non-interfering function blocks to perform Safety functions.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
The following table lists the non-interfering FFBs belonging to the family of functions for
Quantum I/O:
Name
NI_QUANTUM
Type Used...
EFB to edit the configuration data of a Quantum main rack
NI_DROP EFB
NI_ERT_854_20 EFB to edit the configuration data of a remote I/O station to give access to the time stamp and status functions of the
140 ERT 854 20 module
Details on how to use the non-interfering FFBs in your project are provided in the Unity Pro Safety
Block Library .
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Application Password
Password Protection Management
In the following situations, you are requested to enter the application password:
opening an existing SIL2 or SIL3 project
modifying the application password clearing the application password connecting to the Safety PLC exceeding the configured time of inactivity and launching the auto-lock mechanism
You can find detailed procedures for managing the application password in the chapter "Project
Properties and Password for Unity Pro XLS" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety
PLC Specifics .
NOTE: Schneider Electric strongly recommends changing the default password immediately after having selected a Quantum Safety CPU in order to protect your project against unauthorized access from the beginning. Yet, if you forget to change the default password, the empty password is kept even if you save and close your project. When re-opening it, just click OK, that is leave the edit field empty, and change the password as soon as possible.
Losing the Application Password
You can find detailed procedures for what to do in case you have lost the application password in the chapter "Loss of Password" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC
Specifics .
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Operating Procedures Section 3.3
Operating Procedures
Introduction
This section deals with the operating procedures of the Quantum Safety PLC with special regard to its 2 special operating modes.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Operating Modes of the Safety PLC
Safety Mode
Maintenance Mode
Forcing
Page
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Operating Modes of the Safety PLC
Introduction
The default behavior of the Quantum Safety PLC is to perform Safety Functions to achieve and to maintain the Safe state of a process. Nevertheless, you must be able to debug and to maintain your project.
Use the Safety Mode to control your process and the Maintenance Mode for debugging and refining your project.
In Maintenance Mode, the I/O and CPU modules are still executing the diagnostics and establishing the Safe state if a fault is detected. Only the application program and the application data, which may be changed in Maintenance Mode, are not checked.
NOTE: To program a Safety PLC, Unity Pro XLS is required.
Safety and Maintenance Mode Features
The operating mode of the Quantum Safety PLC depends on events such as application exception, power on/off, and so on. The functions available in Unity Pro XLS depend on the operating mode.
Switching between the modes requires defined conditions and follows certain procedures. For details, see the chapter “Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode” in the Unity Pro XLS
Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
You can interact with the Safety PLC using:
Unity Pro XLS programming tool
Quantum Safety CPU keypad
Quantum Safety CPU key switch
Depending on the operating mode, the Safety PLC can be in different states.
After power up, it automatically enters run state of the Safety Mode if the following 2 conditions are fulfilled:
There is a valid application.
The Automatic start in Run option is activated.
In case of an invalid application, it enters the not configured (no conf) state of the Maintenance
Mode (only if the key state is unlocked), in which you are able to download your project.
If a fault is detected, the PLC enters
Halt state when running in Maintenance Mode.
Error state when running in Safety Mode.
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PLC States
The following figure shows the state diagram of the Quantum Safety PLC:
Operating Mode Identification
The LCD display on the CPU indicates the current operating mode by showing the letters
Maintenance Mode or S for Safety Mode.
M for
The status bar field on the PLC screen indicates the current operating mode as shown in the following figure:
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Safety Mode
Safety Mode Description
The Safety Mode is the default mode of the Quantum Safety PLC. It is a restricted mode in which modifications and maintenance activities are prohibited.
Safety Mode Restrictions
When the PLC is running in Safety Mode, the following restrictions are implemented by
Unity Pro XLS:
Download changes are not allowed.
Setting and forcing of Safety variables and Safety I/Os is not allowed.
Debugging with breakpoints, watch points, and single step is not allowed.
Animation tables and operator screens must not write Safety variables and Safety I/Os.
The Safety memory is write protected; that means that human-machine interfaces (HMIs) and
other PLCs cannot write to it. This is controlled by the Safety PLC, see also Memory Area
page 104
NOTE: The logic animation, animation tables, and operator screens can influence the scan time.
NOTE: It is possible to download a new version of the Ethernet processor firmware into the
Quantum Safety CPU with the OSLoader. However, it is only allowed to do that in Maintenance
Mode.
WARNING
POSSIBLE LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Do not download a new version of the Ethernet processor firmware into the Quantum Safety CPU in Safety Mode. It is possible to do so but not allowed.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Safety Mode States
Once the Safety Mode is entered, the PLC can be in run state and in error state. In run state, all restrictions are active and the results of the double user code execution are compared. If any test is unsuccessful, the PLC goes to error state because it has no means to recover from the error.
Entering Safety Mode
There are 4 ways of entering Safety Mode:
when the Safety PLC is powered up
when the Safety Mode is entered from Maintenance Mode when the key is locked when Unity Pro XLS is disconnected either by the customer or because of a broken connection
When the Safety PLC is powered up, it automatically enters Safety Mode.
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NOTE: After power up and if there is a valid application, the PLC only performs cold start.
Thus, the project is reinitialized and the system performs:
the initialization of data with the initial values defined in the project the initialization of elementary function blocks (EFBs) based on initial data
the initialization of data declared in the EFBs the initialization of system bit and words
the cancellation of any forcing, see also Forcing,
page 94
Switching from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode is only possible if the PLC is not debugging.
NOTE: Data forced before switching to Safety Mode stay forced after switching, see also Forcing,
page 94
.
Details concerning the transition from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode can be found in the chapter "Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode
Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
Automatic Start in Run Option
You have the possibility to let your project automatically enter Safety Mode’s run state after power up. To do this, activate the option Automatic start in Run, see also the chapter "Configuration of
Quantum Processors" in the project to enter run state.
Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual . However, Schneider Electric recommends using the Run command instead of the Automatic start in Run option for a SIL3
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Avoid using the Automatic start in Run option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Maintenance Mode
Maintenance Mode Description
The Maintenance Mode of the Quantum Safety PLC is a temporary mode for modifying your project and debugging and maintaining your program.
Maintenance Mode Features
This mode is available in both RUN and STOP.
The PLC allows direct transition from RUN SAFE to RUN MAINTENANCE (and RUN
MAINTENANCE to RUN SAFE.)
The Maintenance Mode (protected by a password) allow users to perform:
online modifications (programs enhancements, temporary modifications, etc.)
forcing values for sensor or actuator maintenance system installation and commissioning
When the PLC is running in Maintenance Mode, the following features are implemented by Unity
Pro XLS:
Download changes are allowed.
Setting and forcing of Safety variables and Safety I/Os is allowed. However, only variables of the type EBOOL can be forced.
Switching to Safety Mode while forcing is allowed. The forced variables stay forced, see also
page 94
Debugging with breakpoints, watch points, and single step is allowed. However, the PLC must be in run state.
Animation tables and operator screens can write Safety variables and Safety I/Os.
The Safety memory is write protected; that means that HMIs or other PLCs cannot write to it.
This is controlled by the Safety PLC, see also
page 104
.
Entering Maintenance Mode
You can only enter Maintenance Mode from Safety Mode because after power up the PLC automatically enters Safety Mode. To exit Safety Mode and enter Maintenance Mode, the key switch must be unlocked. You can find procedures for switching between the modes in the chapter
"Switching Between Safety and Maintenance Mode" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual
Safety PLC Specifics .
Maintenance Mode States
In Maintenance Mode, the PLC can be in run state or in halt state. When it is in run state, you can modify your project. Further, you can switch to Debug Mode if you want to debug and maintain your program. In run state, the double code execution is performed but the result of the comparison is ignored.
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DANGER
RISK OF LOSING THE SAFETY FUNCTION DURING COMMISSIONING AND MAINTENANCE
All modifications of the running system must follow the requirements of the IEC 61508.
Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
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Forcing
Introduction
Forcing is only possible in Maintenance Mode. However, it is possible to switch from Maintenance
Mode to Safety Mode while data are forced and the forcing stays active.
NOTE: Check the latest version of the TÜV document
Rheinland Group website http://www.tuvasi.com/ .
Maintenance Override for the procedures which must be applied when using forcing in a Safety-Related System. You can find it on the TÜV
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
Make sure that the forcing is turned on only temporarily and that the user logic is supervising the status of forcing (%SW108, see
Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127,
page 168
).
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
Handling Forced Data
Because forced data stays forced, Unity Pro XLS warns you before executing your switch command from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode and prompts you to confirm it.
NOTE: In case of a disconnection between PLC and Unity Pro XLS, the latter also warns you if there are forced data, independently of the mode the PLC is in. This is due to the fact that the PLC automatically enters Safety Mode when being disconnected from Unity Pro XLS by the user or a communication interruption.
RISK OF PROCESSING FORCED DATA
WARNING
Check the state of your data before switching from Maintenance Mode to Safety Mode. Forced data stays forced and the PLC continues processing them. Make sure that your PLC processes the correct, unforced data necessary for performing the Safety Functions.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
You can check the status of forcing by reading the system word %SW108. It contains the number of forced I/O module bits. The system word is incremented on every forcing and decremented on every unforcing.
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Special Features and Procedures Section 3.4
Special Features and Procedures
Introduction
This section explains the special features and procedures using Unity Pro XLS as a programming tool for SIL3 projects.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Checking the Programming Environment
Starting the Quantum Safety PLC
Version Stamp
Upload
Project Backups
Detected Faults
Page
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95
Checking the Programming Environment
Introduction
Unity Pro XLS provides the possibility to perform a self-test in order to verify that the components currently in use are the correct versions originally installed and are not corrupted, for instance by hard disk corruption. The self-test is done by evaluating the CRC.
Description of the Self-Test
When performing the self-test, Unity Pro XLS checks the version and CRC of
DLLs of Unity Pro XLS,
the Safety FFB-library database, and the hardware catalog database.
WARNING
RISK OF CORRUPTED PROGRAM
Use the self-test of Unity Pro XLS on a regular basis to check the integrity of your program. At least, perform the self-test after installing any software on or removing it from your computer.
before loading the final operating program into the Safety PLC.
before modifying a program in the running Safety PLC.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
You can find details of how to start the self-test in the chapter "Unity Pro XLS Self-Test" in the Unity
Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
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Starting the Quantum Safety PLC
Preconditions
Preconditions to start the Quantum Safety PLC are that you have
configured your Safety-Related System correctly,
programmed your SIL3 project correctly, tested the integrity of both your SIL3 project and Unity Pro XLS, connected Unity Pro XLS to your Safety PLC, and downloaded your SIL3 project into the Safety PLC.
Starting the Quantum Safety PLC
Once the Quantum Safety PLC contains a valid project, it only performs cold start. Therefore, you can only start your SIL3 project by performing a cold start except when you have just downloaded your project into the PLC.
Hence, you can start your project out of the following 2 initial states:
The PLC is powered up and you have downloaded your SIL3 project since power up.
The PLC is powered off.
Further, Unity Pro XLS offers the Automatic start in Run option. If it is activated, your PLC automatically enters run state in Safety Mode after power up. However, Schneider Electric recommends not using this option.
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
Avoid using the Automatic start in Run option. If you use this feature, it is your responsibility to program and configure the system in such a way that it behaves correctly after restart.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
You can find detailed procedures for starting a SIL3 project in the chapter "Starting and Stopping a Safety Project" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
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Version Stamp
Version Stamp Description
In Unity Pro XLS, each generated binary file of a SIL3 project has a version stamp, providing date and time of build. Thus, you can check both if and when your project has been subject to modifications.
You can find a detailed procedure for checking the project version in the chapter "Project
Properties for Unity Pro XLS" in the Unity Pro XLS Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
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Uploading a SIL3 Project
Uploading a project from the PLC to Unity Pro XLS is also available for SIL3 projects. If you want to use this feature, it must be selected in the project settings. In a SIL3 project, the application password must be known to be able to connect to the PLC. In addition, the PLC must be switched to Maintenance Mode to perform the upload. For further details, see the chapter "Project Settings" in the Unity Pro Operating Modes Manual .
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Project Backups
Introduction
Unity ProXLS checks the integrity of your SIL3 project by calculating a CRC when you close it and checking the CRC when you open it again. The CRC indicates by changing its value if your project has been damaged or corrupted. In this case, the comparison indicates the values are not the same and Unity Pro XLS does not open your project. As a result, you cannot connect Unity Pro
XLS to the Safety PLC and, therefore, have no possibility of modifying or repairing your corrupt project.
Project Backup Description
Besides uploading the project from the PLC (see
can copy back your project data, that is restore them.
page 99
), the only way to get access to your project is to have a copy of its original, that is a backup of your project. From this backup, you
NOTE: Create backups of your SIL3 project on a regular basis. Once your project is damaged or corrupted, you cannot open it to modify or repair it yourself.
Advice for Creating Backups
Creating backups requires careful planning including consideration of
Backup software
Automated backup cannot be affected by human error to the extent that manual backup can.
Backup procedure
Making more than 1 copy and storing them offsite increases the possibility of a successful data recovery
Backup type.
In general, a backup can be full, incremental, or differential depending on which data it backs up.
Backup interval
Regularly scheduled backups improve the reliability of data recovery.
Backup media type
Whereas hard disk based storage is very practical, remote backups imply offsite storage.
Advice for Recovering Data
A backup is only as useful as its associated recovery strategy. Therefore, it is not only important to save the backup data but also to have access to the software required to read them.
NOTE: Choose the backup policy that is the most appropriate for your Safety-Related System.
Make the adequate amounts and types of backups. Test frequently the process for restoring the original project from the backup copies.
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Detected Faults
Introduction
If a fault is detected by any of the internal diagnostic measures and system tests, the behavior of the Quantum Safety PLC varies according to the mode that it is in.
Fault Behavior in Safety Mode
Running in Safety Mode, your PLC enters error state in case of a single detected fault because it has no means to recover from it. The error state is a hardware locked state. Your project is stopped and you cannot intervene or communicate with it.
Leaving the Error State
The only way to leave the error state is to start your PLC again, whereupon the PLC performs selftests and initializes your project.
If your project ...
is valid is invalid
Then your PLC...
enters stop state, which it is forced to do because of the detected fault.
enters no conf state.
NOTE: The PLC may be in an error state if the persistent detection of an error occurs. In this case, it may be necessary to replace the PLC.
Depending on the state which your PLC is in, perform the following steps:
If your project is ...
in stop state and the autorun option activated
Then ...
either power on your PLC again or perform a Run command.
in stop state and the autorun option not activated perform a Run command.
in no conf state download a backup of your project.
Fault Behavior in Maintenance Mode
Running in Maintenance Mode, your PLC enters
halt state in case of a diagnostic error.
error state in case of a hardware watchdog occurrence.
If the PLC is in halt state, you still have the possibility to communicate with it and therefore to debug your project. With the Init command or the download of a project, the PLC goes to stop state and can now be restarted. If the PLC is in error state, the behavior is the same as described above in
Fault Behavior in Safety Mode .
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Communication
Introduction
This chapter deals with the communication of the Quantum Safety PLC with Unity Pro XLS as well as with other devices.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following sections:
Section
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Topic
Memory Area
PC-PLC Communication
PLC-PLC Communication
Safe Ethernet PLC-PLC Communication
PLC-HMI Communication
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Memory Area Section 4.1
Memory Area
Memory Area Description
Introduction
In Safety Mode, the Safety CPU rejects all write requests to the following memory areas:
%M or %Q (0x register)
%MW or %QW (4x register)
EFB data
However, because it may be necessary for you to be able to write data to the Safety PLC, the memory is divided into a Safety and an unrestricted part, allowing you to write in %M as well as in
%MW.
Safety Memory Description
The Safety memory area is write protected for any other device.
NOTE: The write access is controlled inside the CPU because some communications, for example with the HMI or with other PLCs (Safety or non-Safety), are not configured in the Safety PLC with
Unity Pro XLS and therefore cannot be checked in the Unity Pro XLS configuration.
Write Protection Description
To prevent other devices from writing to the Safety memory area, there is a blocking mechanism.
The PLC does not execute any write command and returns an error code.
Unrestricted Memory Area Description
The unrestricted memory area (UMA) is a specially dedicated memory area for bits and words which is not write protected. It has the following characteristics:
It is located at the beginning of the complete memory range.
Its size can be configured in Unity Pro XLS.
Its values cannot be used directly but by using specific function blocks.
Configuring the Unrestricted Memory Area
You can configure the size of your unrestricted memory area in Unity Pro XLS in the CPU configuration with the following limits:
In %MW, the limit is
the last word in the unrestricted area or
0 if this area is not used.
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In %M, the limit is
a multiple of 16 and the last %M in the unrestricted area or
0 if it is not used.
NOTE: Configure the unrestricted memory area first and confirm that the configured area is large enough. If this part of the memory must be modified later, all addresses must be changed.
CAUTION
RISK OF CORRUPT PROJECT
Check that the size of the unrestricted memory area is correctly stored in the Quantum Safety
CPU after the download of the PLC application. To do so, you must read the system words
%SW110 and %SW111 (for instance using the animation table) and compare them with the configured values in your application.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
Using Data from the Unrestricted Memory Area
To perform Safety Functions, you are only allowed to process data stored in the Safety memory area. If it is necessary to get access to the Safety Functions, you are allowed to use data from the unrestricted memory data. However, for Safety reasons, you cannot process them directly. Instead you must transfer data from the unrestricted memory area to the Safety memory area in order for
Safety Functions to use these data.
You can find a detailed procedure for transferring data from the unrestricted to the Safety memory area in the chapter "Using Data from the Unrestricted Memory Area" in the Unity Pro XLS
Operating Mode Manual Safety PLC Specifics .
Description of the Safety Move Function Blocks
Because you are not able to work with the values located in the unrestricted memory area directly, there are the following 2 function blocks enabling you to transfer data from the unrestricted memory area to the Safety memory:
S_SMOVE_BIT to get access to bits
S_SMOVE_WORD to get access to words
The variables from the unrestricted memory area are connected to the input of the function block, and its output is connected to a Safety variable. Direct addresses cannot be used because they are interpreted as INT . The WORD to be moved must be configured in the unrestricted memory area. If the actual value is not within the range, the output is set to 0 and the error is indicated.
Additional inputs are used to control how the function blocks transfer the data to the outputs in case some data can only be used together in the same cycle.
NOTE: It is good practice to use an appropriate naming convention for variables from the unrestricted memory area and to comment them accordingly. This eases the audit of your SIL3 project.
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The user can use data in the safety application by implementing a verification protocol (for example, send a word and its complement and then check the consistency in the application, copy the word in a new location and then reread the value, etc.).
Write Protection Description
Unity Pro XLS checks at edition time and at build time that only variables from the unrestricted memory area are used as input to the Safety MOVE function blocks. In addition, Unity Pro XLS provides a cross-reference feature to search for the variable usage, enabling you to check the rule easily.
WARNING
RISK OF PROCESSING INCORRECT DATA
Make sure that the data you move to the Safety memory area are correct data. Data transferred to the Safety memory area using the Safety MOVE function blocks are not automatically correct.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
To help ensure that data are transferred accurately, you can write the data to 2 different variables and then compare them.
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PC-PLC Communication Section 4.2
PC-PLC Communication
PC-PLC Communication Description
Introduction
Once you have programmed your SIL3 project, you must connect Unity Pro XLS to the Quantum
Safety PLC if you want to download, run, and maintain it. To enable the communication between both, you can connect Unity Pro XLS to the following:
Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
Modbus Plus
Modbus RS232 / RS485
USB
The communication between Unity Pro XLS and the Quantum Safety PLC is not part of the Safety loop but nevertheless subject to checks. For instance, a CRC is used during the download of a project in order to verify that the data are transferred correctly and that there is no communication error. However, you must additionally check the version and functionality of your project as well as the Unity Pro XLS environment.
For the Ethernet cabling, the standard Ethernet devices can be used.
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PLC-PLC Communication Section 4.3
PLC-PLC Communication
PLC-PLC Communication Description
Introduction
Concerning a Safety PLC, only writing to other PLCs is allowed. Reading from other PLCs is only allowed in the unrestricted memory area, see also
page 104
NOTE: The write access is controlled inside the CPU because some communications, for example with the HMI or with other PLCs, are not configured in the Safety PLC with Unity Pro XLS and therefore cannot be checked in the configuration.
The Quantum Safety PLC is able to communicate with other PLCs using the following:
Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
Modbus Plus
Modbus RS232 / RS485
These kinds of communication are categorized as non-interfering.
NOTE: Communication from the Quantum Safety PLC as a Modbus Master via Modbus is not allowed because the function blocks are not certified. However, as a Modbus slave, the Safety PLC may be connected to other PLCs and communicate data when requested, or even accept data in the unrestricted memory area.
Description of the Ethernet Communication
The Ethernet network can be connected to
either the Ethernet port of the CPU
or the Ethernet module 140 NOE 771 11.
NOTE: In case of a Hot Standby Safety CPU, the Ethernet port is used for the data exchange between the primary and the standby CPU and therefore not available for the communication with other PLCs or HMIs.
The Ethernet module 140 NOE 771 11 is certified as non-interfering product for use in the
Quantum Safety PLC. The communication can be either peer-to-peer or as global data.
For the Ethernet cabling, the standard Ethernet devices can be used.
Configuring the Ethernet Peer-to-Peer Communication
The peer-to-peer communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Ethernet network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.
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Configuring the Ethernet Global Data Communication
The global data communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Ethernet network configuration to publish data for writing and to subscribe to data for reading. Because reading is only allowed from the unrestricted memory area, Unity Pro XLS checks this rule and creates an error if it is not obeyed.
Description of the Modbus Plus Communication
The Modbus Plus module 140 NOM 2XX 00 is not allowed for communication. You can only use the Modbus Plus port of the CPU. On the Modbus Plus network, a peer-to-peer communication or a global data exchange is possible.
Configuring the Modbus Plus Peer-to-Peer Communication
The peer-to-peer communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Modbus Plus network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.
Configuring the Modbus Plus Global Data Communication
The global data communication is configured in Unity Pro XLS in the Modbus Plus network configuration, independently for reading and writing. Unity Pro XLS checks that reading uses only the unrestricted memory area. It creates an error and does not generate code if this rule is not obeyed.
WARNING
UNDETECTABLE LOSS OF DATA
Do not write from an external device to the Safety memory area in the Quantum Safety PLC using
Ethernet. The data are ignored because of the Safety PLC’s write protection. The data are lost without you being notified.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Safe Ethernet PLC-PLC Communication Section 4.4
Safe Ethernet PLC-PLC Communication
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Peer-to-peer Communication
Solution Architecture
Configuration of NTP Service
Configuration of
S_WR_ETH
DFB in the User Program of the Sender PLC
Configuration of S_RD_ETH DFB in the User Program of the Receiver PLC
Configuration of IO Scanning Service
Safe Peer-to-peer Communication Impacts
Example of Configuration, Parameters and Performance Results
Page
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Peer-to-peer Communication
Introduction
By implementing a specific configuration, you are able to use Ethernet based peer-to-peer communication to perform the safety function with a SIL3 level.
The following figure provides the safety peer-to-peer communication functional overview:
This specific safe peer-to-peer Ethernet communication is based on a black channel. The protocol checks detected errors such as detected transmission errors, omissions, insertions, wrong order, delays, incorrect addresses, masquerade bits and manages retransmissions.
This safe communication is possible and allowed only between Quantum Safety PLCs.
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Solution Architecture
Description of the Configuration
The solution architecture is based on:
NTP service for time base synchronization
execution of 2 DFBs ( S_WR_ETH in the sender PLC and S_RD_ETH in the receiver PLC)
IO scanning service on Ethernet for data transportation (Modbus TCP)
The following figure shows the overview of the configuration required to establish the safe peer-topeer communication:
112
On the Ethernet network, you are allowed to mix safety related data and non safety related data without impact on the integrity level of the safety related data.
There is no restriction on the Ethernet network when using the safe peer-to-peer communication.
You must conform to the Modicon Quantum with Unity Ethernet Network Modules User Manual .
To connect a 140 NOE 771 11 module to the Ethernet network, Schneider Electric recommends to use the following switches:
499NES17100
499NOS17100
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Configuration of NTP Service
Description
The safe Ethernet PLC-PLC communication needs the synchronization of both PLCs (sender and receiver) time base. You have to configure the NTP service on each receiver and sender PLC by using the 140 NOE 771 11 non interfering module in Unity Pro (see Modicon Quantum with Unity,
Ethernet Network Modules, User Manual) .
The following figure describes the sender and receiver PLCs time base synchronization principle:
The CPU operating system updates at each cycle some system words ( %SW36 to %SW38 ) that contain a time used by the safe communication as a time base. This time is internally filtered to avoid important time shifts and forbid fugitive bad values to be received from the NTP server.
The %SW39 system word allows to diagnose the health of the time taken into account by the DFBs used in the user program in order to implement the safe peer-to-peer communication.
In Unity Pro, you must configure the NTP service parameters as follows:
set the Polling period value to 20 seconds
configure the same time zone for both sender and receiver PLCs in the Time Zone box uncheck the Automatically adjust clock for daylight saving change check box
Each sender and receiver PLC is connected to the same external NTP server.
You may configure two redundant NTP servers. If the connection with the primary NTP server is not correct, the 140 NOE 771 11 module is automatically connected to the redundant NTP server.
When the connections are properly set, both servers must be synchronized and display the same time value.
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CAUTION
LOSS OF TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
Do not change the NTP server time during operation.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
NTP Server Time Consistency and System Bits
NTP server time consistency:
If the NTP server time is consistent with the internal PLC time in %SW36 to %SW38 with less than
2 seconds difference, then the time value in %SW36 to %SW38 is updated with the last NTP server time received filtered with a slope of 1ms/s.
If the NTP server time received differs from the internal PLC time in %SW36 to %SW38 by more than 2 seconds, then the last NTP server time received is ignored by the PLC, the time value in
%SW36 to %SW38 is refreshed internally and the bit %SW39.2
is set to 1 to warn the user.
In order to have the NTP server time being taken into account by the PLC you can do one of the following actions:
reinitialize the application by a cold start download the application
restart the PLC set the system bit %SW39.8
to 1. In this case, the CPU will accept the next NTP server time received without filtering (1ms/s) and without consistency check. After the next NTP server time is received, the %SW39.8
bit is automatically reset to 0 by the controller.
NOTE: If the system bit %SW39.8
is set to 1, both sender and receiver PLCs time base can be de synchronized and there is a risk that the safe peer-to-peer communication fails ( S_RD_ETH
DFB health output parameter set to 0).
CAUTION
LOSS OF TIME SYNCHRONIZATION
Do not set the system bit %SW39.8
to 1 continuously.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in injury or equipment damage.
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Configuration of S_WR_ETH DFB in the User Program of the Sender PLC
Representation
DFB representation (more details in Unity Pro Safety Block Library):
Communication
Description
This DFB calculates data (reserved data containing a CRC and a time stamp) required by the receiver to check and manage errors detected during the safe peer-to-peer communication.
The S_WR_ETH DFB function block has to be called at each cycle in the sender PLC. Within the cycle, it has to be executed in the logic after all required modifications have been performed on the data to be sent. This means that the data to be sent must not be modified by the user within the cycle after the execution of the DFB, otherwise the CRC information used in the reserved data area will not be correct and the safe peer-to-peer communication fails.
You have to assign the ID parameter a unique value that identifies the safe peer-to-peer communication between a sender and a receiver.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
The ID parameter value must be unique and fixed in the network for a sender/receiver pair.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Configuration of S_RD_ETH DFB in the User Program of the Receiver PLC
Representation
DFB representation (more details in Unity Pro Safety Block Library):
Description
This DFB copies the data from the unrestricted memory area to the Safety memory area and guarantees the validity of the received data. The data copy from the unrestricted memory area is not made if the integrity of the data is not correct.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
The S_RD_ETH DFB function block must be called at each cycle in the receiver PLC application and must be executed before the data usage in the cycle.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
The data contained in the output array OUTPUT_DATA_SAFE are considered as safe if, and only if, the output parameter HEALTH is set to 1.
Unity Pro XLS checks that the INPUT_DATA array is allocated to the unrestricted memory area and that the OUTPUT_DATA_SAFE array is allocated to the Safety memory area. If the data arrays are not properly allocated, Unity Pro XLS creates an error message and does not generate the user application code.
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HEALTH Bit Description
HEALTH bit meaning:
= 1, the integrity of the data is correct (CRC) and if the age of the data is lower than the value set in the SAFTETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT input register.
The age of the data considered is the time between:
the beginning of the cycle where the data are computed in the sender PLC,
and the beginning of the cycle where the data are checked in the receiver PLC.
=0, new valid data are not received in the required time interval (the timer expires and the
HEALTH bit is set to 0)
If the HEALTH bit is set to 0, you must consider the data in the output array OUTPUT_DATA_SAFE as unsafe and react accordingly.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
You must test the HEALTH bit value of the S_RD_ETH DFB at each cycle before using any safe data to manage the safety function.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
ID Parameter Description
You have to assign the ID parameter a unique value that identifies the safe peer-to-peer communication between a sender and a receiver.
WARNING
LOSS OF ABILITY TO PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS
The ID parameter value must be unique and fixed in the network for a sender/receiver pair.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
SYNCHRO_NTP Parameter Description
SYNCHRO_NTP is a logical AND of the following bits:
%SW39.0
%SW39.1
%SW39.2
SYNCHRO_NTP bit meaning:
=1, the synchronization between sender PLC and receiver PLC is healthy
=0, the synchronization between sender PLC and receiver PLC is not guaranteed and there is a risk that the safe peer-to-peer communication becomes unhealthy due to internal time slippage ( HEALTH bit is set to 0).
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You must identify as soon as possible the root cause of the NTP synchronization issue and fix it. The system word %SW39 helps you to diagnose and fix the issue.
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT Parameter Description
The SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter defines the maximum expectation age accepted for data received in the receiver PLC.
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter value:
Minimum value: SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT > T1
Recommended value: SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT > 2 * T1
T1 = CPU sender
cycle time + Repetitive_rate + Network transmission time + CPU receiver with:
CPU
sender
cycle time: cycle time of the sender PLC
cycle time
Repetitive_rate: time rate for the IO scanner write query from the sender PLC to the receiver
PLC
Network transmission time: time consumed on the Ethernet network for the data transmission from the sender PLC to the receiver PLC
CPU receiver
cycle time: cycle time of the receiver PLC
It is very important to note that the value defined for the SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter has a direct effect on the robustness and availability of the safe peer-to-peer communication. If the
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter value is highly greater than T1, the communication will be tolerant to various delays (for example network delays) or corruption errors during the data transmission.
You are responsible for ensuring that the Ethernet network has a load that does not lead to an abnormal delay on the network during data transmission which could lead to the expiration of the timeout. In order to prevent your safe peer-to-peer communication from any abnormal delays due to other non-safety data transmitted on the same network, you can use a dedicated Ethernet network for the safe peer-to-peer protocol.
When commissioning your project, you have to estimate the safe peer-to-peer communication performance by checking the values provided in the output parameter TIME_DIFF and evaluating the margin using the value defined in the SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter.
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter in a Hot Standby system:
If a Hot Standby system is used in the PLC-PLC safe communication (either as a sender or a receiver), the SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT parameter value has to fit the following additional condition:
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT > T1 + 1000 ms + Repetitive_rate + Max(CPU sender
cycle time;CPU receiver
cycle time)
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Configuration of IO Scanning Service
Description
The IO scanning service for safe peer-to-peer communication is used for data transportation:
from DATA_SAFE array ( S_WR_ETH output parameter) in the Safety memory of the sender PLC
to the INPUT_DATA array ( S_RD_ETH input parameter) in the unrestricted memory of the receiver PLC
The IO scanning service is configured in Unity Pro XLS (see Modicon Quantum with Unity,
Ethernet Network Modules, User Manual) , in the Ethernet network configuration of the sender PLC.
The Ethernet network used for IO scanning can be either connected to the Ethernet port of the CPU or to an Ethernet module (140 NOE 771 11).
Configuration
In Unity Pro XLS, configure the IO scanning for safe peer-to-peer communication of the sender
PLC respecting the following requirements:
Configure the data to send in 1 block with a write request.
Set the Health Timeout (ms) parameter value to 300. If the communication conditions do not
allow this value, set this parameter to the minimum value allowed by the conditions of the communication.
Set the WR length parameter to 100 (data size is fixed to 100 words).
Set a value in WR Master Object parameter that fit to the address of DATA_SAFE output
parameter ( S_WR_ETH DFB) on sender PLC program.
Set a value in WR Ref Slave parameter that fit to the address of INPUT_DATA input parameter
( S_RD_ETH DFB) on receiver PLC program.
In the receiver PLC, the memory area where the data will be written has to be located in the unrestricted memory area (see parameter WR Ref Slave)
Choose a Repetitive rate (ms) value equal to the receiver PLC cycle time.
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Safe Peer-to-peer Communication Impacts
Impact on the CPU Reaction Time
When safe peer-to-peer communication is used to perform the Safety function, the CPU reaction
time is directly impacted. The CPU reaction time (
see page 76
is extended as follows:
CPU reaction time = (1 + N
CRC
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT
) x CPU sender
cycle time + CPU receiver
cycle time +
This equation has to be used to calculate the system reaction time.
The following figure shows the safety system reaction time:
Impact on the Maximum CPU Cycle Time
When safe peer-to-peer communication is used to perform the Safety function, in order to ensure
that the system reaction time is smaller than the process Safety time, the maximum CPU cycle time
see page 76
((1 + N
CRC
) x Max. CPU sender
cycle time + Max. CPU receiver
cycle time) < (PST - T
SAFETY_CONTROL_TIMEOUT )
I
- T
O
- T
S
-T
A
-
Impact on PFD/PFH Calculation
When using a safe peer-to-peer communication in the Safety loop, you have to include the contribution of the sender PLC and the receiver PLC in the calculation of the PFD/PFH values of the system.
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On the contrary, all modules on the Ethernet network which are part of the black channel like
140 NOE 771 11 modules, switches, NTP servers do not contribute to the calculation of the
PFD/PFH values of the system.
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Example of Configuration, Parameters and Performance Results
Configuration Example
In the following Ethernet network design, 2 Hot Standby configurations (based on
140 CPU 671 60 S CPU) use a safe peer-to-peer communication to exchange data:
122
1 Sender PLC Primary local rack
2 Sender PLC Standby local rack
3 Receiver PLC Primary local rack
4 Receiver PLC Standby local rack
5 499NES17100 switch
6 499NES17100 switch
7 NTP server
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NOTE: The Ethernet RIO network is not represented in the previous example.
Parameters and Performance Results
The parameters used in the previous example are as follows:
Sender PLC:
size of words sent by IO scanning to the receiver PLC = 100 words (safe data only) no messaging configured no global data configured
Receiver PLC:
no messaging configured
no global data configured no IO scanning configured
The measurements done in the previous example are as follows:
60
100
150
200
Parameters
Sender PLC
Cycle Time
(ms)
Repetitive
Rate (ms)
100
100
150
200
100
100
150
200
Receiver PLC
Cycle Time
(ms)
Maximum
TIME_DIFF
value observed on the output parameter of S_RD_ETH DFB in normal operation (in ms after 8 hours of operation)
223
296
446
608
884
760
832
953
Maximum
TIME_DIFF
value observed on the output parameter of S_RD_ETH DFB after a Switchover between
Primary and Standby on the sender PLC (in ms after 100
Switchover performed)
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Communication
PLC-HMI Communication Section 4.5
PLC-HMI Communication
PLC-HMI Communication Description
Introduction
A HMI is allowed to read data from a Safety PLC. However, it is only allowed to write to the
unrestricted memory area of the PLC, see also
Modbus Plus
Modbus RS232 / RS485
Safety PLC is able to communicate with HMIs using the following:
Modbus TCP (either with CPU or NOE module)
page 104
. The Quantum
The communication between PLC and HMI is not configured in Unity Pro XLS. Therefore, it cannot be controlled by it and the Quantum Safety CPU protects itself against writing from a HMI.
Write Protection Description
The Safety memory area of the Safety PLC is write protected and you are not allowed to write to
it. If you do not obey this rule, the PLC does not execute your write command, see also Write
page 104
.
Writing in Maintenance Mode
Even in Maintenance Mode, there is a write protection of the Safety memory area for other PLCs and HMIs. But with Unity Pro XLS, you are able to modify and tune data.
With Unity Pro XLS, it is possible to
modify logic.
set values.
force values.
debug.
By using the Schneider Electric OPC server OFS or the web server of the PLC, it is also possible to modify data in the Safety memory area when in Maintenance Mode.
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Communication
WARNING
RISK OF PROCESSING FORCED DATA
Follow the latest version of the TÜV document Maintenance Override if you use the Maintenance
Mode to modify Safety data. You can find it on the TÜV Rheinland Group website http://www.tuvasi.com/ .
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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Communication
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Checklists Chapter 5
Checklists
Introduction
For a system to perform Safety Functions, installing and configuring, programming, commissioning, and operating must meet the Safety requirements of the IEC 61508. To ensure that Safety aspects are observed, Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklists. However, these lists are not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all
Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following topics:
Topic
Checklist for Configuring Safety-Related Systems
Checklist for Programming SIL3 Applications
Checklist for I/O Modules
Checklist for Configuring Safe Peer-to-Peer Communication
Checklist for Operation, Maintenance, and Repair
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Checklist for Configuring Safety-Related Systems
Introduction
This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
Checklist
Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for configuring your Safety-
Related System:
Remarks Checks
Check and verify the PFD/PFH values of the complete Safety loop.
Reference in this
Manual
Done
Respect all rules described in the following reference manuals:
Quantum with Unity Pro Hardware Reference Manual
Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference
Manual
Grounding and Electromagnetic Compatibility of PLC Systems
User Manual
Modicon Remote I/O Cable System Planning and Installation
Guide
Modicon Quantum Hot Standby with Unity User Manual
Premium, Atrium and Quantum using Unity Pro Communication services and architectures Reference manual
Quantum TCPIP/IP Configuration User Manual
Modicon Quantum with Unity Ethernet Network Modules User
Manual
Test and verify the complete configuration and wiring as part of the commissioning.
Use certified Safety and non-interfering modules only.
Use modules with the certified firmware versions only. It is possible to check the firmware version of the CPU, CRP/CRA and NOE modules as well as that of the CPU Ethernet and CPU Hot Standby processors, with the OSloader. The firmware of the Safety I/O modules is displayed on the label on the housing.
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Checks
Configure the maximum scan time correctly and appropriately to the process.
Use an application password to protect your SIL3 application against unauthorized access.
Use only high availability RIO modules (140 CRP 932 00 and 140
CRA 932 00), which provide dual cabling.
Protect the process power supply of the digital output modules by an appropriate fuse.
Use 2 power supply modules per rack and drop to improve the availability of your system. Mounting the 2 power supply modules on each end of the rack or drop provides better heat dissipation.
Check in each drop that 1 power supply module is able to deliver the complete power consumption.
Make sure that the addresses of all CRA modules are configured correctly.
Do not write data to the Safety memory area from other devices
(PLCs, HMI, and so on).
Do not download the Ethernet processor firmware while the PLC is running in Safety Mode.
Reference in this
Manual
Requirements for Monitoring, page 74
,
,
,
Done Remarks
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Checklist for Programming SIL3 Applications
Introduction
This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
Checklist
Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for programming your SIL3 application:
Checks Remarks
Check the consistency of Unity Pro XLS regularly.
Check the correctness of your project.
Reference in this
Manual
Done
Test and verify the complete logic as part of the commissioning.
Configure the maximum %M and %MW correctly.
Configure the maximum unrestricted areas for %M and %MW correctly.
Check that the configured maximum UMA for %M and %MW is downloaded correctly (check with %SW110 and %SW111).
Check the correct usage of non-Safety-related data from the unresticted memory area with S_SMOVE_*** function blocks.
Check the range of WORD data of non-Safety-related data from the unresticted memory area by configuring the S_SMOVE_WORD function block.
Do not use use conditional execution of Safety logic sections.
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Checks
Do not use jumps to labels inside FBD and LD logic.
Program the non-Safety logic for non-interfering I/Os in separate sections.
Indicate the non-Safety-Related variables with an appropriate naming convention and comment.
Make sure that inputs or outputs of non-interfering I/O modules are not used for calculating Safety-Related outputs.
Do not monitor concurrently a huge amount of data in
Unity Pro XLS (leads to increase of scan time).
In the project settings, switch on all options for warnings during analysis. Check all warnings and make sure that they are not critical and that the behavior is intended.
Reference in this
Manual
Description of the I/O and Time
Requirements for Monitoring, page 74
Done Remarks
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Checklist for I/O Modules
Introduction
This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
Checklist for the I/O Modules
Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for your I/O modules:
Remarks Checks
Do not use Ethernet I/Os.
Reference in this
Manual
Do not use Modbus Plus I/Os.
Do not use non-interfering I/Os for Safety-
Related functions.
The wiring of the digital inputs must be deenergized to trip (a wiring fault must be equivalent to the de-energized state).
Use appropriate grounding equipment for the analog input shielded wires.
In burner management applications, the analog inputs must be monitored for grounding faults (leakage of current).
Check that the configured timeout state of the output modules is appropriate for the connected device and the controlled process.
In a redundant I/O system, use the 2 I/O channels on separate modules which should be located in separate drops.
Use an appropriate wire type/size to connect the inputs/outputs of the I/O modules with the sensors and actuators.
For unused inputs of the Safety analog input module, the health bit of unused inputs should be masked in the health word of the module in your application logic.
Check that sensors and actuators connected to the I/O modules respect the specified values and limits of the I/O modules.
special req. for appl. standard
RIO adapter
description of the timeout state
redundant I/O configuration
Done
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Checks
Use the red labels for the terminal blocks provided with the Safety I/O modules to indicate clearly the Safety modules.
Reference in this
Manual gen. inf. on safety
Done Remarks
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Checklist for Configuring Safe Peer-to-Peer Communication
Introduction
This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
Checklist for the I/O Modules
Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for configuring your safe peerto-peer communication:
Remarks Checks
Check and verify the PFD/PFH values of the complete Safety loop by taking into account the safe peer-to-peer communication: both sender CPU and receiver CPU contribute to the calculation.
Respect all rules described in the following reference manuals:
Grounding and Electromagnetic
Compatibility of PLC Systems User
Manual
Modicon Quantum Hot Standby with Unity
User Manual
Quantum TCPIP/IP Configuration User
Manual
Modicon Quantum with Unity Ethernet
Network Modules User Manual
Verify that the NTP service is configured on each receiver PLC and sender PLC by using the non interfering 140 NOE 771 11 module in Unity Pro XLS.
Verify that each receiver PLC and sender
PLC is connected to a same external NTP server and have the same Time Zone parameter configured.
In Unity Pro XLS, for each receiver PLC and sender PLC, make sure that NTP configuration parameters are as follows:
Automatically adjust clock for daylight
saving change check box is unchecked
Polling period value is set to 20s
Reference in this
Manual
Impact on PFD/PFH
Calculation
Configuration of NTP
Configuration of NTP
Configuration of NTP
Done
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Checks
Check that the sender PLC and receiver PLC application do not set the
%SW39.8
system bit to 1 continuously.
On the sender PLC, verify that the
S_WR_ETH
DFB function block is called at each cycle and executed in the logic after all required modifications have been performed on the data to be sent.
On the receiver PLC, verify that the
S_RD_ETH
DFB function block is called at each cycle and executed before the data usage in the cycle.
Check that the ID parameter value of the
S_RD_ETH
and
S_WR_ETH
function blocks are identical in the sender PLC and the receiver PLC and that the value is unique and fixed in the complete system for a sender/receiver pair.
Check that the receiver PLC program monitors the HEALTH output parameter of the
S_RD_ETH
function block.
If the HEALTH parameter is set to 0, the data in the OUTPUT_DATA_SAFE array are considered as unsafe in the Safety loop and the receiver PLC must react accordingly.
Reference in this
Manual
NTP Server Time
Consistency and
Configuration of
S_WR_ETH
DFB in the
User Program of the
Sender PLC
Configuration of
S_RD_ETH
DFB in the
User Program of the
Configuration of
S_WR_ETH DFB in the
User Program of the
Sender PLC
Configuration of
S_RD_ETH DFB in the
User Program of the
Done Remarks
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136
Checks
On IO Scanning configuration of the sender
PLC, check that:
The data are sent in 1 block with a write
request to the receiver PLC.
The Health Timeout (ms) parameter value is equal to 300 ms or to the minimum value allowed by the conditions of the communication.
The WR length parameter is set to 100.
The value in WR Master Object parameter fits to the source address of DATA_SAFE output parameter (
S_WR_ETH
DFB) on sender PLC program.
The value in WR Ref Slave parameter fits to the address of
INPUT_DATA
input
parameter ( S_RD_ETH DFB) on receiver
PLC program.
In the receiver PLC, the memory area where the data will be written is located in the unrestricted memory area.
The Repetitive rate (ms) value is equal to the receiver PLC cycle time.
If safe peer-to-peer communication is used, monitor the status of the NTP synchronization
(
%SW39
or
SYNCHRO_NTP
output parameter of the
S_RD_ETH
and
S_WR_ETH
function blocks) and signal a detected fault to the maintenance personnel.
If safe peer-to-peer communication is used, monitor the status of the HEALTH output parameter of the
S_RD_ETH
function block.
Reference in this
Manual
Configuration of the
IO Scanning Service
NTP Server Time
Consistency and
System Bits
Configuration of
S_RD_ETH DFB in the User Program of
Done Remarks
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Checklist for Operation, Maintenance, and Repair
Introduction
This list is not exhaustive and you are fully responsible for observing all Safety requirements mentioned in the IEC 61508 as well as in this manual.
Checklist
Schneider Electric recommends that you use the following checklist for operation, maintenance, and repair of your Safety-Related System:
Remarks Checks Reference in this
Manual
Define a standard operating procedure (SOP) for operation, maintenance, and repair of the
Safety instrumented system and ensure that it is respected.
Define a maintenance plan for your Safety-
Related System according to the proof test interval.
Maintain your Safety-Related System according to your maintenance plan.
Create backups of your SIL3 project on a regular basis.
When changing the Safety-Related System, follow the rules of the IEC61508-1, chapters
7.15 and 7.16 (even if only non-Safety-Related parts are modified).
Follow the guidelines of the Maintenance
Override TÜV document when using forcing
(available on http://www.tuvasi.com/ ).
Check that forcing is switched off after the maintenance operation (either as part of the application or by an appropriate standard operating procedure).
Monitor the status of the Safety I/O modules
(health, out of range, overload, invalid channel), see also the Quantum with Unity Pro Discrete and Analog I/O Reference Manual .
Done
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138
Checks
In a redundant I/O system, signal a fault in 1 of the redundant modules to the maintenance personnel.
Signal a fault in 1 cable of the dual cable remote
I/O system to the maintenance personnel.
In a redundant power supply configuration, signal a fault of 1 of the 2 power supply modules to the maintenance personnel.
In a HSBY system, use the
S_HSBY_SWAP function block regularly (for example once a week) to check the ability of the standby controller to take over.
When replacing a CRA module, make sure that the address is configured correctly.
Reference in this
Manual
Safety I/O Modules in High Availability
Make sure that your personnel possess all information and skills required to install, run, and maintain the Safety-Related System correctly.
Make sure to follow the specified operating conditions regarding EMC, electrical, mechanical, and climatic influences.
Power Supply for the Quantum Safety
Done Remarks
DANGER
RISK OF LOSING THE SAFETY FUNCTION DURING COMMISSIONING AND MAINTENANCE
All modifications of the running system must follow the requirements of the IEC 61508.
Failure to follow these instructions will result in death or serious injury.
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Special Requirements for Application Standards Chapter 6
Special Requirements for Application Standards
Special Requirements for Application Standards
Fire and Gas Systems
Fire and gas systems should be integrated in accordance with EN 54.
Fire and gas applications must operate continuously to provide protection. As a result, the following industry guidelines apply:
If inputs and outputs are energized to mitigate a problem, the PLC system must detect open and short circuits in the wiring between the PLC and the field devices and must raise alarms.
The entire PLC system must have redundant power supplies. Further, the power supplies that are required to activate critical outputs and to read Safety-critical inputs must be redundant. All power supplies must be monitored for proper operation.
De-energized outputs may be used for normal operation. To initiate the actions to mitigate a problem, the outputs are energized. This type of system shall monitor the critical output circuits to help ensure that they are properly connected to the end devices.
In fire and gas applications, the Safety analog input modules must be monitored for ground faults
(leakage of current). The wires should be connected potential-free. With a shunt resistor (for instance 250 Ω) between the ground rail of the grounding kit and the earth ground, a voltage can be measured in case of a leakage of the current on 1 of the analog inputs. This voltage must be supervised to detect a leakage.
Emergency Shutdown Systems
In Emergency Shutdown systems, the Safe state of the plant is a de-energized or low (0) state.
Burner Management Systems
In burner management systems, the Safe state of the plant is a de-energized or low (0) state.
If a Safety-Related System is required to conform with the EN 298 standard for automatic gas burner control systems, the PLC throughput time should ensure that a Safe shutdown can be performed within 1 second after a problem in the process is detected. For the calculation, see
page 75
.
A stabilized power supply of 20 VDC to 25 VDC must be used for the field power.
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Appendices
Introduction
The appendices contain information on the IEC 61508 and its SIL policy. Further, technical data of the Safety and non-interfering modules are provided and example calculations are carried out.
What Is in This Appendix?
The appendix contains the following chapters:
Chapter Name Chapter
A
B
IEC 61508
System Objects
Page
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IEC 61508 Appendix A
IEC 61508
Introduction
This chapter provides information on the Safety concepts of the IEC 61508 in general and its SIL policy in particular.
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following topics:
Topic
General Information on the IEC 61508
SIL Policy
Page
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General Information on the IEC 61508
Introduction
Safety-Related Systems are developed for use in processes in which risks to humans, environment, equipment and production must be kept at an acceptable level. The risk depends on the severity and likelihood, thereby defining the necessary measures of protection.
Concerning the Safety of processes, there are 2 sides to be considered:
the regulations and requirements defined by official authorities in order to protect humans,
environment, equipment, and production the measures by which these regulations and requirements are fulfilled
IEC 61508 Description
The technical standard defining the requirements for Safety-Related Systems is
the IEC 61508.
It deals with the Functional Safety of electrical, electronic or programmable electronic Safety-
Related Systems. A Safety-Related System is a system that is required to perform 1 or more specific functions to ensure risks are kept at an acceptable level. Such functions are defined as
Safety Functions. A system is defined functionally Safe if random, systematic, and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the system and do not result in injury or death of humans, spills to the environment and loss of equipment and production.
The standard defines a generic approach to all lifecycle activities for systems that are used to perform Safety Functions. It constitutes procedures to be used for the design, the development, and the validation of both hardware and software applied in Safety-Related Systems. Further, it determines rules concerning both the management of Functional Safety and documentation.
IEC 61511 Description
The Functional Safety requirements defined in the IEC 61508 are refined specifically for the process industry sector in the following technical standard:
the IEC 61511: Functional safety - safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
This standard guides the user in the application of a Safety-Related System, starting from the earliest phase of a project, continuing through the start up, covering modifications and eventual decommissioning activities. In summary, it deals with the Safety Lifecycle of all components of a
Safety-Related System used in the process industry.
Risk Description
The IEC 61508 is based on the concepts of risk analysis and Safety Function. The risk depends on severity and probability. It can be reduced to a tolerable level by applying a Safety Function that consists of an electrical, electronic or programmable electronic system. Further, it should be reduced to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable.
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In summary, the IEC 61508 views risks as follows:
Zero risk can never be reached.
Safety must be considered from the beginning.
Intolerable risks must be reduced.
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SIL Policy
Introduction
The SIL value evaluates the robustness of an application against failures, thus indicating the ability of a system to perform a Safety Function within a defined probability. The IEC 61508 specifies 4 levels of Safety performance depending on the risk or impacts caused by the process for which the
Safety-Related System is used. The more dangerous the possible impacts are on community and environment, the higher the Safety requirements are to lower the risk.
SIL Value Description
Discrete level (1 out of a possible 4) for specifying the Safety Integrity requirements of the Safety
Functions to be allocated to the Safety-Related Systems, where Safety Integrity Level 4 has the
highest level of Safety Integrity and Safety Integrity Level 1 has the lowest, see SILs for Low
page 147
.
SIL Requirements Description
To achieve Functional Safety, 2 types of requirements are necessary:
Safety Function requirements, defining what Safety Functions have to be performed
Safety Integrity requirements, defining what degree of certainty is necessary that the Safety
Functions are performed
The Safety Function requirements are derived from hazard analysis and the Safety Integrity ones from risk assessment.
They consist of the following quantities:
Mean time between failures
Probabilities of failure
Failure rates
Diagnostic coverage
Safe failure fraction
Hardware fault tolerance
Depending on the level of Safety Integrity, these quantities must range between defined limits.
SIL Rating Description
As defined in the IEC 61508, the SIL value is limited by both the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of the subsystem that performs the Safety Function. A HFT of n means that n+1 faults could cause a loss of the Safety Function, the Safe state cannot be entered. The SFF depends on failure rates and diagnostic coverage.
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The following table shows the relation between SFF, HFT, and SIL for complex Safety-Related subsystems according to IEC 61508-2, in which the failure modes of all components cannot be completely defined:
SFF
SFF ≤ 60%
60% < SFF ≤ 90%
90% < SFF ≤ 99%
SFF > 99%
-
HFT=0
SIL1
SIL2
SIL3
HFT=1
SIL1
SIL2
SIL3
SIL4
HFT=2
SIL2
SIL3
SIL4
SIL4
There are 2 ways to reach a certain Safety Integrity Level:
via increasing the HFT by providing additional independent shutdown paths
via increasing the SFF by additional diagnostics
SIL-Demand Relation Description
The IEC 61508 distinguishes between low demand mode and high demand (or continuous) mode of operation.
In low demand mode, the frequency of demand for operation made on a Safety-Related System is not greater than 1 per year and not greater than twice the proof test frequency. The SIL value for a low demand Safety-Related System is related directly to its average probability of failure to perform its Safety Function on demand or, simply, probability of failure on demand (PFD).
In high demand or continuous mode, the frequency of demand for operation made on a Safety-
Related System is greater than 1 per year and greater than twice the proof test frequency. The SIL value for a high demand Safety-Related System is related directly to its probability of a dangerous failure occurring per hour or, simply, probability of failure per hour (PFH).
SILs for Low Demand
The following table lists the requirements for a system in low demand mode of operation:
2
1
Safety Integrity Level
4
3
Probability of Failure on Demand
≥ 10
-5
to < 10
-4
≥ 10
-4
to < 10
-3
≥ 10
-3
to < 10
-2
≥ 10 -2 to < 10 -1
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SILs for High Demand
The following table lists the requirements for a system in high demand mode of operation:
3
2
Safety Integrity Level
4
1
Probability of Failure per Hour
≥ 10 -9 to < 10 -8
≥ 10 -8 to < 10 -7
≥ 10 -7 to < 10 -6
≥ 10 -6 to < 10 -5
For SIL3, the required probabilities of failure for the complete Safety integrated system are:
PFD ≥ 10 -4
PFH ≥ 10 -8
to < 10 -3
to < 10 -7
for low demand
for high demand
Safety Loop Description
The Safety loop to which the Quantum Safety PLC consists of the following 3 parts:
Sensors
Quantum Safety PLC with Safety CPU and Safety I/O modules
Actuators
A backplane or a remote connection with CRA/CRP do not destroy a Safety Loop. Backplanes,
CRP and CRA modules are part of a “black channel”. This means that the data exchanged by I/O and PLC cannot be corrupted without detection by the receiver.
The following figure shows a typical Safety loop:
148
As shown in the figure above, the contribution of the PLC is only 10-20% because the probability of failure of sensors and actuators is usually quite high.
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A conservative assumption of 10% for the Safety PLC’s contribution to the overall probability leaves more margin for the user and results in the following required probabilities of failure for the
Safety PLC:
PFD ≥ 10 -5 to < 10 -4
PFH ≥ 10 -9 to < 10 -8
for low demand
for high demand
PFD Equation Description
The IEC 61508 assumes that half of the failures end in a Safe state. Therefore, the failure rate λ is divided into
λ
S
λ
D
- the safe failure and
- the dangerous failure, itself composed of
λ
DD
λ
DU
- dangerous failure detected by the internal diagnostic
- dangerous failure undetected.
The failure rate can be calculated by using the mean time between failures (MTBF), a module specific value, as follows:
λ = 1/MTBF
The equation for calculating the probability of failure on demand is:
PFD(t) = λ
DU
x t t represents the time between 2 proof tests.
The probability of failure per hour implies a time interval of 1 hour. Therefore, the PFD equation is reduced to the following one:
PFH = λ
DU
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System Objects
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System Objects Appendix B
System Objects
Introduction
This chapter describes the system bits and words of the Quantum Safety PLC.
Note: The symbols associated with each bit object or system word mentioned in the descriptive tables of these objects are not implemented as standard in the software, but can be entered using the data editor.
It is suggested that the symbol names associated with the system bits and system words that appear on the following pages be implemented to provide continuity and ease of understanding.
Example: %S0 COLDSTART (the user can select another word to replace COLDSTART).
What Is in This Chapter?
This chapter contains the following sections:
Section
B.1
B.2
System Bits
System Words
Topic Page
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System Objects
System Bits Section B.1
System Bits
Introduction
This section describes the system bits of the Quantum Safety PLC.
For your convenience, all system bits of standard Quantum PLCs are listed but only explained further if used in the Quantum Safety PLC.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
System Bit Introduction
Description of the System Bits %S0 to %S13
Topic
Description of the System Bits %S15 to %S21
Description of the System Bits %S30 to %S51
Description of the System Bits %S59 to %S122
Page
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System Objects
System Bit Introduction
General
The Quantum PLCs use %Si system bits which indicate the state of the PLC, or they can be used to control how it operates.
These bits can be tested in the user program to detect any functional development.
Some of these bits must be reset to their initial or normal state by either the program or the user.
Other bits are automatically reset by the system. Finally, there are bits which only display the status of the PLC.
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System Objects
Description of the System Bits %S0 to %S13
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system bits %S0 to %S13:
Function Bit
Symbol
%S0
COLDSTART
%S1
WARMSTART cold start warm restart
Description
Normally at 0, this bit is set to 1 by:
power restoration with loss of data (battery related),
the user program, the terminal, a change of cartridge,
This bit is set to 1 during the first complete restored cycle of the PLC either in RUN or in STOP mode. It is reset to 0 by the system before the following cycle.
%S0 is not always set in the first scan of the PLC. If a signal set for every start of the PLC is needed, %S21 should be used instead. see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual
0
Initial
State
1
(1 cycle)
Write
Access no no
Quant.
Safety yes no
%S4
TB10MS
%S5
TB100MS
%S6
TB1SEC
%S7
TB1MIN time base
10 ms time base
100 ms time base
1 s time base
1 min see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual
-
-
-
no no no no no no no no
%S10
IOERR
%S11
WDG input/output fault watchdog overflow
Normally at 1, this is set to 0 when an I/O fault on an inrack module or device on Fipio is detected (e.g. noncompliant configuration, exchange fault, hardware fault, etc.). The %S10 bit is reset to 1 by the system as soon as the fault disappears.
Normally at 0, this is set to 1 by the system as soon as the task execution time becomes greater than the maximum execution time (i.e. the watchdog) declared in the task properties.
1
0 no no yes yes
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Bit
Symbol
%S12
PLCRUNNING
%S13
1RSTSCANRUN
System Objects
Function Description
PLC in
RUN first cycle after switching to
RUN
This bit is set to 1 by the system when the PLC is in
RUN.
It is set to 0 by the system as soon as the PLC is no longer in RUN (STOP, INIT, etc.).
Normally set to 0, this is set to 1 by the system during the first cycle of the master task after the PLC is set to
RUN.
-
0
Initial
State
Write
Access no no
Quant.
Safety yes yes
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
On Quantum Safety PLCs, communication interruptions from NOE, CRA or CRP modules are not reported on bit %S10.
Make certain that these system bits are used correctly.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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System Objects
Description of the System Bits %S15 to %S21
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system bits %S15 to %S21:
Function Description Bit
Symbol
%S15
STRINGERROR character string fault see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual
Initial
State
0
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety no
%S16
IOERRTSK
%S17
CARRY
%S18
OVERFLOW
%S19
OVERRUN task input/output fault rotate or shift output overflow or arithmetic error task period overrun
(periodical scanning)
Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on an in-rack I/O module or a Fipio device configured in the task.
This bit must be reset to 1 by the user. normally at 0
During a rotate or shift operation, this bit takes the state of the outgoing bit.
Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 in the event of a capacity overflow if there is
a result greater than + 32 767 or less than - 32 768, in single length,
result greater than + 65 535, in unsigned integer, a result greater than + 2 147 483 647 or less than -
2 147 483 648, in double length, result greater than +4 294 967 296, in double length or unsigned integer, real values outside limits, division by 0, the root of a negative number, forcing to a non-existent step on a drum, stacking up of an already full register, emptying of an already empty register.
It must be tested by the user program after each operation where there is a risk of overflow, and then reset to 0 by the user if there is indeed an overflow.
When the %S18 bit switches to 1, the application stops in error state if the %S78 bit has been set to 1.
Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 by the system in the event of a time period overrun (i.e. task execution time is greater than the period defined by the user in the configuration or programmed into the %SW word associated with the task). The user must reset this bit to
0. Each task manages its own %S19 bit.
1
0
0
0 yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
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Bit
Symbol
%S20
INDEXOVF
%S21
1RSTTASKRUN
System Objects
Function
Index overflow first task cycle
Description
Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 when the address of the indexed object becomes less than 0 or exceeds the number of objects declared in the configuration.
In this case, it is as if the index were equal to 0.
It must be tested by the user program after each operation where there is a risk of overflow, and then reset to 0 if there is indeed an overflow.
When the %S20 bit switches to 1, the application stops in error state if the %S78 bit has been set to 1.
Tested in a task (Mast, Fast, Aux0, Aux1, Aux2 Aux3), the bit %S21 indicates the first cycle of this task. %S21 is set to 1 at the start of the cycle and reset to zero at the end of the cycle.
Notes: The bit %S21 does not have the same meaning in PL7 as in Unity Pro.
0
0
Initial
State
Write
Access yes no
Quant.
Safety no yes
WARNING
UNINTENDED EQUIPMENT OPERATION
On Quantum Safety PLCs, communication interruptions from NOE, CRA or CRP modules are not reported on bit %S16.
Make certain that these system bits are used correctly.
Failure to follow these instructions can result in death, serious injury, or equipment damage.
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System Objects
Description of the System Bits %S30 to %S51
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system bits %S30 to %S51:
Bit
Symbol
%S30
MASTACT
%S31
FASTACT
%S32
%S33
%S34
%S35
%S38
ACTIVEVT
%S39
EVTOVR
%S50
RTCWRITE
%S51
RTCERR
Function Description activation/deacti vation of the master task activation/deacti vation of the fast task activation/deacti vation of the auxiliary tasks 0-
3 enabling/inhibiti on of events see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual saturation in event processing updating of time and date via words %SW50 to %SW53 time loss in realtime clock see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
Normally set to 0, this bit is set to 1 by the program or the terminal:
set to 0: update of system words %SW50 to
%SW53 by the date and time supplied by the
PLC real-time clock, set to 1: system words %SW50 to %SW53 are
no longer updated, therefore making it possible to modify them.
The switch from 1 to 0 updates the real-time clock with the values entered in words %SW50 to %SW53.
This system-managed bit set to 1 indicates that the real-time clock is missing or that its system words
(%SW50 to %SW53) are meaningless. If set to 1, the clock must be reset to the correct time.
-
1
Initial
State
0
0
1
0
0
Write
Access yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Quant.
Safety no no no no no yes yes
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System Objects
Description of the System Bits %S59 to %S122
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system bits can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system bits are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system bits %S59 to %S122:
Bit
Symbol
%S59
RTCTUNING
%S67
PCMCIABAT0
%S68
PLCBAT
%S75
PCMCIABAT1
Function Description incremental update of the time and date via word
%SW59 state of the application memory card battery state of the processor battery state of the data storage memory card battery
Normally set to 0, this bit can be set to 1 or 0 by the program or the terminal:
set to 0: the system does not manage the system word %SW59,
set to 1: the system manages edges on word
%SW59 to adjust the date and current time (by increment).
This bit is used to monitor the status of the main battery when the memory card is in the upper PCMCIA slot (all the Atriums, Premiums, and on the Quantums):
set to 1: main voltage battery is low (application is
preserved but you must replace the battery following the so-called predictive maintenance procedure), set to 0: main battery voltage is sufficient
(application is preserved).
Bit %S67 is managed:
on the PV06 small and medium capacity RAM
memory cards (product version written on the card label), i.e. offering memory size under Unity =#768K:
TSX MRP P 128K, TSX MRP P 224K TSX MCP C
224K, MCP C 512K, TSX MRP P 384K, TSX MRP C
448K, TSX MRP C 768K, under Unity whose version is ≥ 2.02.
This bit is used to check the operating state of the backup battery for saving data and the program in RAM:
set to 0: battery present and operational, set to 1: battery missing or non-operational.
This bit is used to monitor the status of the main battery when the memory card is in the lower PCMCIA slot, see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual .
Note: Data stored on a memory card in slot B are not processed in SIL3 projects.
-
–
–
0
Initial
State
Write
Access yes no no no
Quant.
Safety yes yes yes no
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System Objects
Bit
Symbol
%S76
DIAGBUFFCONF
%S77
DIAGBUFFFULL
%S78
HALTIFERROR
%S80
RSTMSGCNT
%S94
SAVECURRVAL
%S118
REMIOERR
%S119
LOCIOERR
%S120
%S121
%S122
Function Description configured diagnostics buffer full diagnostics buffer stop in the event of error reset message counters saving adjustment values
General
Remote I/O fault
This bit is set to 1 by the system when the diagnostics option has been configured. Then, a diagnostics buffer for storage of errors found by diagnostics DFBs is reserved.
This bit is read-only.
This bit is set to 1 by the system when the buffer that receives errors from the diagnostics function blocks is full.
This bit is read-only.
Normally at 0, this bit can be set to 1 by the user, to program a PLC stop on application fault: %S15, %S18,
%20.
Normally set to 0, this bit can be set to 1 by the user to reset the message counters %SW80 to %SW86.
see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual
General inrack I/O fault
DIO bus faults
Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on a device connected to the RIO (Fipio for Premium or Drop S908 for Quantum) remote input/output bus.
This bit is reset to 1 by the system when the fault disappears.
This bit is not updated if an error occurs on the other buses (DIO, ProfiBus, ASI).
Normally set to 1, this bit is set to 0 by the system when a fault occurs on an I/O module placed in 1 of the racks.
This bit is reset to 1 by the system when the fault disappears.
see chapter "System Bits" in the Unity Pro Program
Languages and Structure Reference Manual
0
0
0
0
–
–
–
Initial
State
0
Write
Access no no yes yes yes no no no
Quant.
Safety yes yes yes yes no yes yes no
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System Objects
System Words Section B.2
System Words
Introduction
This section describes the system words of the Quantum Safety PLC.
For your convenience, all system words of standard Quantum PLCs are listed but only explained further if used in the Quantum Safety PLC.
What Is in This Section?
This section contains the following topics:
Topic
Description of the System Words %SW0 to %SW21
Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59
Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127
Page
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System Objects
Description of the System Words %SW0 to %SW21
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system words are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system words %SW0 to %SW21:
Word
Symbol
%SW0
MASTPERIOD
%SW1
FASTPERIOD
%SW2, %SW3,
%SW4, %SW5
%SW8
TSKINHIBIN
%SW9
TSKINHIBOUT
%SW10
TSKINIT
%SW11
WDGVALUE
%SW12
APMODE
Function master task scanning period fast task scanning period auxiliary task scanning period acquisition of task input monitoring monitoring of task output update first cycle after cold start watchdog duration mode of application processor
Description see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
Reads the duration of the watchdog. The duration is expressed in milliseconds (20...990 ms).
This word cannot be modified.
This word indicates the operating mode of the application processor. Possible values are:
16#A501: application processor is in
Maintenance Mode.
16#5AFE: application processor is in Safety
Mode.
Any other value is interpreted as an error.
This system word is not available for the standard
Quantum CPU.
-
Initial
State
0
0
0
0
0
0
Write
Access yes yes yes yes yes no no
16#A501 no
Quant.
Safety no no no no no no yes yes
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System Objects
Word
Symbol
%SW13
INTELMODE
%SW14
OSCOMMVERS
%SW15
OSCOMMPATCH
%SW16
OSINTVERS
%SW17
FLOATSTAT
%SW18
%SW19
100MSCOUNTER
%SW20
%SW21
MSCOUNTER
Function mode of Intel processor commercial version of
PLC processor
PLC processor patch version firmware version number error status on floating operation absolute time counter absolute time counter
Description
This word indicates the operating mode of the Intel
Pentium processor. Possible values are:
16#501A: application processor is in
Maintenance Mode.
16#5AFE: application processor is in Safety
Mode.
Any other value is interpreted as an error.
This system word is not available for the standard
Quantum CPU.
This word contains the commercial version of the
PLC processor.
Example: 16#0135 version: 01; issue number: 35
This word contains the commercial version of the
PLC processor patch.
It is coded onto the least significant byte of the word.
coding: 0 = no patch, 1 = A, 2 = B...
Example: 16#0003 corresponds to patch C.
This word contains the Firmware version number in hexadecimal of the PLC processor firmware.
Example: 16#0017 version: 2.1; VN: 17 see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
%SW17.1: Flag not managed by Quantum Safety.
%SW18 is the low and %SW19 the high word for calculating durations. Both are incremented every
1/10th of a second by the system (even when the
PLC is in STOP, they are no longer incremented if it is powered down). They can be read and written by the user program or by the terminal.
The low word %SW20 and the high word %SW21 are incremented every 1/1000th of a second by the system (even when the PLC is in STOP, they are no longer incremented if it is powered down). They can be read by the user program or by the terminal.
%SW20 and %SW21 are reset on a cold start, but not on a warm start.
-
-
-
Initial
State
Write
Access
16#501A no
0
0
0 no no no yes yes no
Quant.
Safety yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
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System Objects
Description of the System Words %SW30 to %SW59
Detailed Description
NOTE: Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. The unusable system words are marked in the Quant. Safety column with no.
The following table gives a description of the system words %SW30 to %SW59:
Word
Symbol
%SW30
MASTCURRTIME
Function master task execution time
Description
This word indicates the execution time of the last master task cycle (in ms).
-
Initial
State
Write
Access no
Quant.
Safety no
%SW31
MASTMAXTIME
%SW32
MASTMINTIME
%SW33 to
%SW35
%SW36
%SW37
%SW38 maximum master task execution time minimum master task execution time fast task execution times
NTP number of seconds (LSB)
NTP number of seconds
(MSB)
NTP number of milliseconds
This word indicates the longest master task execution time since the last cold start (in ms).
This word indicates the shortest master task execution time since the last cold start (in ms).
see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
This word indicates the number of seconds passed since January 1st, 1980 at 00:00 (LSB part). It reflects the NTP time coming from the
140 NOE 771 11 module. This word is refreshed internally between two NTP synchronizations.
This word indicates the number of seconds passed since January 1st, 1980 at 00:00 (MSB part). It reflects the NTP time coming from the
140 NOE 771 11 module. This word is refreshed internally between two NTP synchronizations.
This word indicates the number of milliseconds added to the NTP number of seconds (%SW36 and %SW37). It reflects the NTP time coming from the 140 NOE 771 11 module. This word is refreshed internally between two NTP synchronizations.
-
-
-
0
0
0 no no no no no no yes yes no yes yes yes
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Word
Symbol
%SW39
%SW40 to
%SW47
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System Objects
Function status of the
NTP timestamps in ms auxiliary tasks execution times
Description
Meaning of the different bits of
%SW39
word:
%SW39.0
(managed by the controller):
=0, the time value is not available or the time has not been updated within last 2 minutes
=1, the time value is available or the time has been updated within last 2 minutes
%SW39.1
(managed by the 140 NOE 771 11 status):
=0, the NTP server time value is not available
=1, the updated time value is received from the NTP server and has been sent to the module (at least once)
%SW39.2
(managed by the CPU):
=0, the time value in
%SW36
to
%SW38
words
differs from the last NTP server time received by more than 2 seconds. The last
NTP server time received has been ignored.
=1, the time value in %SW36 to %SW38 words are consistent with the last NTP server time received (less than 2 seconds difference).
The time value in
%SW36
to
%SW38
words is filtered with a slope of 1ms/s to reach the last NTP server time received.
%SW39.3
to %SW39.7
: not used
%SW39.8
(control that can be set by the application):
=0, no action
=1. When set to 1, the CPU will accept the next NTP server time received without filtering (1 ms/s) and without consistency check (difference between time value in
%SW36
to
%SW38
words and NTP server time). After the next NTP server time is received, the %SW39.8
bit is automatically reset to 0 by the controller.
%SW39.9
to
%SW39.15
: not used see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
-
Initial
State
0 no
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety yes no
165
%SW54
STOPSEC
%SW55
STOPHM
%SW56
STOPMD
%SW57
STOPYEAR
%SW58
STOPDAY
System Objects
Word
Symbol
%SW48
IOEVTNB
%SW49
DAYOFWEEK
%SW50
SEC
%SW51
HOURMIN
%SW52
MONTHDAY
%SW53
YEAR
Function number of events real-time clock function real-time clock function on last stop
Description see chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference
Manual
System words containing date and current time (in
BCD):
%SW49: day of the week:
1 = Monday,
2 = Tuesday,
3 = Wednesday,
4 = Thursday,
5 = Friday,
6 = Saturday,
7 = Sunday,
%SW50: Seconds (16#SS00),
%SW51: Hours and Minutes (16#HHMM),
%SW52: Month and Day (16#MMDD),
%SW53: Year (16#YYYY).
These words are managed by the system when the bit %S50 is set to 0.
These words can be written by the user program or by the terminal when the bit %S50 is set to 1.
System words containing date and time of the last power outage or PLC stop (in Binary Coded
Decimal):
%SW54: Seconds (00SS),
%SW55: Hours and Minutes (HHMM),
%SW56: Month and Day (MMDD),
%SW57: Year (YYYY),
%SW58: the most significant byte contains the day of the week (1 for Monday through to 7 for
Sunday), and the least significant byte contains the code for the last stop:
1 = change from RUN to STOP by the
terminal or the dedicated input,
2 = stop by watchdog (PLC task or SFC overrun),
4 = power outage or memory card lock
operation,
5 = stop on hardware fault,
6 = stop on software fault. Details on the type of software fault are stored in
%SW125.
-
-
Initial
State
0
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety no yes no yes yes
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Word
Symbol
%SW59
ADJDATETIME
System Objects
Function adjustment of current date
Description
Contains 2 8-bit series to adjust the current date.
The action is performed on the rising edge of the bit.
This word is enabled by bit %S59=1.
In the following illustration, bits in the left column increment the value, and bits in the right column decrement the value:
Initial
State
0
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety yes
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System Objects
Description of the System Words %SW60 to %SW127
Detailed Description
Not all of the system words can be used in the Quantum Safety PLC. In the following table the unusable system words are marked no in the Quant. Safety column.
This table gives a description of the system words %SW60 to %SW127:
Function Word
Symbol
%SW60
HSB_CMD
Quantum Hot
Standby command register
Description
Meaning of the different bits of the word
%SW60
:
%SW60.0
= 1 invalidates the commands
entered in the display (keypad).
%SW60.1
= 0 sets PLC A to OFFLINE mode.
= 1 sets PLC A to RUN mode.
%SW60.2
= 0 sets PLC B to OFFLINE mode.
= 1 sets PLC B to RUN mode.
%SW60.3
= 0 If an application mismatch is detected,
standby PLC is forced to OFFLINE mode.
= 1 Standby PLC operates normally even if a mismatch occurs.
%SW60.4
= 0 authorizes an update of the firmware only after the application has stopped.
= 1 authorizes an update of the firmware without the application stopping.
%SW60.5
= 1 application transfer request from the standby to the primary.
%SW60.8
= 0 address is switched on Modbus port 1 during a primary swap.
= 1 address is not switched on in Modbus port 1 during a primary swap.
Initial
State
0
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety no
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Word
Symbol
%SW61
HSB_STS
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System Objects
Function
Quantum status register
Description
Meaning of the different bits of the word
%SW61
:
%SW61.0
and
%SW61.1
PLC operating mode bits:
%SW61.1
= 0, %SW61.0
=1: OFFLINE
mode
%SW61.1
= 1,
%SW61.0
=0: primary mode
%SW61.1
= 1, %SW61.0
=1: secondary mode (Standby)
%SW61.2
and
%SW61.3
operating mode bits from the other PLC
%SW61.3
=0, %SW61.2
=1: OFFLINE mode
%SW61.3
= 1, %SW61.2
=0: primary mode
%SW61.3
= 1,
%SW61.2
=1: secondary
mode (Standby)
%SW61.3
= 0, %SW61.2
=0: the remote PLC is not accessible (switched off, no communication)
%SW61.4
= 0 the applications on both PLCs are identical
= 1 the applications on both PLCs are not identical
%SW61.5
= 0 the PLC is used as unit A
= 1 the PLC is used as unit B
%SW61.7
= 0 same PLC OS version
= 1 different PLC OS version
%SW61.8
= 0 same copro OS version
= 1 different copro OS version
%SW61.12
= 0 information given by bit 13 is not relevant
= 1 information given by bit 13 is valid
%SW61.13
= 0 NOE address set to IP.
= 1 NOE address set to IP + 1.
%SW61.15
= 0 Hot Standby not activated
= 1 Hot Standby activated
Initial
State
0
Write
Access no
Quant.
Safety yes
169
System Objects
Word
Symbol
%SW62
HSBY_REVERSE0
%SW63
HSBY_REVERSE1
%SW70
WEEKOFYEAR
Function Description
Transfer word These 2 words may be added to the first section of the master task. They are then transferred automatically from the standby processor to update the primary PLC.
They may be read on the primary PLC and be used as primary application parameters.
real-time clock function
System word containing the number of the week in the year: 1 to 52.
Initial
State
0
–
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety yes yes
%SW71
KEY_SWITCH no yes
%SW75
TIMEREVTNB
%SW76
DLASTREG
%SW77
DLASTDEREG
%SW78
DNBERRBUF position of the switches on the
Quantum front panel timer-type event counter.
diagnostics function: recording diagnostics function: nonrecording diagnostics function: number of errors
This word provides the image of the positions of the switches on the front panel of the Quantum processor. This word is updated automatically by the system.
%SW71.0
= 1 switch in the "Memory protected"
position
%SW71.1
= 1 switch in the "STOP" position
%SW71.2
= 1 switch in the "START" position
%SW71.8
= 1 switch in the "MEM" position
%SW71.9
= 1 switch in the "ASCII" position
%SW71.10
= 1 switch in the "RTU" position
%SW71.3
to 7 and 11 to 15 are not used
See chapter "System Objects" in the Unity Pro
Program Languages and Structure Reference manual .
Result of the last registration:
= 0 if the recording was successful
= 1 if the diagnostics buffer has not been configured
= 2 if the diagnostics buffer is full
Result of the last de-registration:
= 0 if the non-recording was successful
= 1 if the diagnostics buffer has not been configured
= 21 if the error identifier is invalid
= 22 if the error has not been recorded
Number of errors currently in the diagnostics buffer.
0
0
0
0
0 no yes yes yes
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Word
Symbol
%SW80
MSGCNT0
%SW81
MSCNT1
%SW87
MSTSERVCNT
%SW90
MAXREQNB
%SW108
FORCEDIOIM
%SW110
%SW111
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System Objects
Function message management
Description
These words are updated by the system, and can also be reset using
%S80
.
%SW80
: Number of Modbus messages sent by the system as client on all communication ports except USB and Ethernet copro.
NOTE: Modbus messages sent by the system as Master are not counted in this word.
%SW81
: Number of Modbus messages received by the system as client on all communication ports except USB and
Ethernet copro.
NOTE: Modbus messages received as response to the requests sent by the system, as Master, are not counted in this word.
Number of requests processed by synchronous server per master (MAST) task cycle.
Initial
State
0
0 communication flow management maximum number of requests processed per master task cycle number of forced I/O module bits number of unrestricted memories area for %M number of unrestricted memories area for %MW
This word is used to set a maximum number of requests which can be processed by the PLC per master task cycle.
When the CPU is the server: This number of requests must be between 2 (minimum) and N+4
(maximum).
N: Number differs depending on the model.
When the CPU is the client:
N: Number differs depending on the model.
The value 0 does not work.
If a value is entered that is outside of the range, the value N that is taken into account.
See also chapter "System Objects" in the
Manual .
Unity
Pro Program Languages and Structure Reference
This system word counts the number of forced I/O module bits. This word is incremented for every forcing, and decremented for every un-forcing.
This system word gives information on the size of the unrestricted memory area for %M.
This system word is not available for the standard
Quantum CPU.
This system word gives information on the size of the unrestricted memory area for %MW.
This system word is not available for the standard
Quantum CPU.
0
0
–
–
Write
Access yes
Quant.
Safety yes yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes
171
System Objects
Word
Symbol
%SW124
CPUERR
Function type of system fault
Description
This system word is updated if the PLC is set to error state.
The possible values are as follows:
0x0065: execution of HALT instruction
impossible
0x0080: system watchdog
If the PLC is set to Safety error state, the content of %SW125 is updated and can be read after the next restart of the PLC (see below).
Initial
State
–
Write
Access no
Quant.
Safety yes
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Word
Symbol
%SW125
BLKERRTYPE
Function last fault detected
System Objects
Description
The code of the last fault detected is given in this word. If
%S78
is set to 1, the following detected errors cause the PLC to stop.
%S15
,
%S18
and
%S20 are activated independently of %S78 :
16#0002: PCMCIA signature not verified
16#2258: execution of HALT instruction
16#2302: call to a not supported system
function in a user function block
16#9690: error of application CRC detected in background
16#DE87: calculation error on floating-point numbers ( %S18 , these errors are listed in the word
%SW17
)
16#DEB0: watchdog overflow (
%S11
)
16#DEF1: character string transfer error
( %S15 )
16#DEF2: arithmetic or division by 0 error
(
%S18
)
16#DEF3: index overflow ( %S20 )
Note: The codes 16#8xxx and 16#7xxx do not stop the application and indicate an error on function blocks.
In case of an SIL3 related error, the PLC stops.
After power off and restart of the PLC, %SW 125 contains the code of the cause of the error:
0x5AF1: sequence check error (unpredictable
execution in CPU)
0x5AF2: error in memory (corrupt address)
0x5AF3: comparison error (execution results of Intel and application processor differ)
0x5AF4: real-time clock error
0x5AF5: error initializing double code execution
0x5AF6: watchdog activation error
0x5AF7: error during memory check (takes more than 8 hours)
0x5AF8: error in memory check (corrupt RAM)
Note:
%SW125
is only reset after init
or complete download or restart (it always contains the last fault detected).
Initial
State
–
Write
Access no
Quant.
Safety yes
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System Objects
Word
Symbol
%SW126
ERRADDR0
%SW127
ERRADDR1
Function blocking fault instruction address
Description
Address of the instruction that generated the application blocking fault.
For 16-bit processors:
%SW126
contains the offset for this address
%SW127
contains the segment number for this address.
For 32-bit processors:
%SW126 contains the least significant word for
this address
%SW127
contains the most significant word for this address
The content of %SW126 and %SW127 is for
Schneider Electric use only.
Initial
State
0
Write
Access no
Quant.
Safety yes
For the description of the system words %SW128 to %SW339 and %SW535 to %SW640 , see the chapter "Quantum Specific System Words" in the Unity Pro Program Languages and Structure
Reference Manual . The system words %SW340 to %SW534 are not used in Quantum Safety PLCs.
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Modicon Quantum
Glossary
33003879 10/2017
Glossary
!
!
NOTE: For terms taken from the IEC 61508 standard, refer to the standard for complete definitions.
1002D diagnostic configuration
X out of Y
For example 1 out of 2. Voting and redundancy capacity of a Safety-Related System.
D in 1oo2D refers to diagnostics. Hence, D in 1oo2D means 1 out of 2 with diagnostics.
A
ALARP as low as is reasonably practicable
(Definition IEC 61508)
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Glossary
C
CCF cold start
Cold start refers to starting the computer from power off.
CPU central processing unit
CRC common cause failure failure, which is the result of 1 or more events, causing coincident failures of 2 or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to system failure
(Definition IEC 61508)
The common cause factor in a dual channel system is the crucial factor for the probability of failure on demand (PFD) for the whole system.
cyclic redundancy check
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DC
Glossary
D
diagnostic coverage fractional decrease in the probability of dangerous hardware failures resulting from the operation of the automatic diagnostic tests
(Definition IEC 61508)
The fraction of the possible dangerous failures λ
D diagnostics and failures which remain undetected.
is divided into failures which are detected by
λ
D
=λ
DD
+ λ
DU
The diagnostic coverage (DC) defines the fraction of the dangerous failures which are detected.
λ
DD
=λ
D
. DC
λDU=λ
D
(1 - DC)
The definition may also be represented in terms of the following equation, where DC is the diagnostic coverage, λ
DD
is the probability of detected dangerous failures and λ probability of total dangerous failures:
D
total is the
DDT derived data type
A derived data type is user defined.
DFB derived function block
DIO distributed input/output
DLL dynamic link library
E
E/E/PES electrical/electronic/programmable electronic system
(Definition IEC 61508)
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177
Glossary
System for control, protection or monitoring based on 1 or more electrical/electronic programmable electronic (E/E/PE) devices. This includes elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.
EDT elementary data type
An elementary data type is predefined.
EF elementary function
EFB elementary function block
EMC electromagnetic compatibility
The term refers to the origin, control, and measurement of electromagnetic effects on electronic systems.
EN
European Norm
This is the official European standard.
error discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or condition and the true, specified or theoretically correct value or condition
(Definition IEC 61508)
ESD emergency shutdown
EUC equipment under control
(Definition IEC 61508)
This term designates equipment, machinery, apparatuses or plants used for manufacturing, process, transportation, medical or other activities.
F
failure termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function
(Definition IEC 61508)
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Glossary fault abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a functional unit to perform a required function
(Definition IEC 61508)
FBD functional block diagram
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.
FFB function/function block
FMEA failure modes and effects analysis
FMECA failure modes and effects criticality analysis
Functional Safety part of the overall safety relating to the EUC and the EUC control system which depends on the correct functioning of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other technology safety-related systems and external risk reduction facilities
(Definition IEC 61508)
A system is defined functionally Safe if random, systematic and common cause failures do not lead to malfunctioning of the system and do not result in injury or death of humans, spills to the environment and loss of equipment or production:
Functional Safety deals with the part of the overall Safety that depends on the correct
functioning of the Safety-Related System.
Functional Safety applies to products as well as organizations.
H
HALT high accelerated life tests
HFT hardware fault tolerance
(Definition IEC 61508)
A hardware fault tolerance of N means that N + 1 faults could cause a loss of the Safety Function, for instance:
HFT = 0: The 1st failure could cause a loss of the Safety Function
HFT = 1: 2 faults in combination could cause a loss of the Safety Function. (There are 2 different paths to go to a Safe state. Loss of the Safety Function means that a Safe state cannot be entered.
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Glossary
HMI human-machine interface
HSBY
Hot Standby
I
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IEC 61508
The IEC 61508 standard is an international standard that addresses Functional Safety of electrical
/ electronic / programmable electronic Safety-Related Systems. It applies to any kind of Safety-
Related System in any industry wherever there are no product standards.
IL instruction list
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.
L
LCD liquid crystal display
LD ladder diagram
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.
M
MTBF mean time between failures
MTTF mean time to failure
MTTR mean time to repair
N
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
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Glossary
This is a body for establishing codes and standards for fire protection, electrical and machine
Safety in the U.S.
non-interfering module
Non-interfering modules are modules that are not directly used to control the Safety Function. They do not interfere with the Safety modules (either during normal operation or if there is a fault).
NTP
Network Time Protocol
P
PELV protected extra low voltage
PES programmable electronic system
(Definition IEC 61508)
System for control, protection or monitoring based on 1 or more programmable electronic devices, including elements of the system such as power supplies, sensors and other input devices, data highways and other communication paths, and actuators and other output devices.
PES is another term for a computer control system or PLC.
PFD probability of failure on demand
(Definition IEC 61508)
For a single channel system the average probability of a failure on demand is calculated as follows:
For a dual channel system the average probability of a failure on demand is calculated as follows:
For a dual channel system, also the Common Cause effect (CC) must be considered. The common cause effect ranges from 1% to 10% of PFD
CH1
and PFD
CH2
. (=1/RRF).
PFH probability of failure per hour
(Definition IEC 61508)
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181
Glossary
PLC programmable logic controller project
A project is a user application in Unity Pro XLS.
proof test periodic test performed to detect failures in a safety-related system so that, if necessary, the system can be restored to an "as new" condition or as close as practical to this condition
(Definition IEC 61508) proof test interval
The proof test interval is the time period between proof tests.
PRT
PLC reaction time
The PLC Reaction Time is the time which passes between a signal is detected at the input module terminal and the reaction is set at the output module terminal.
PS power supply
PST process safety time
The process safety time is defined as the period of time between a failure occurring in EUC or the
EUC control system (with the potential to give rise to a hazardous event) and the occurrence of the hazardous event if the safety function is not performed.
(Definition IEC 61508)
Q
QSE environment system qualification
R
RAM random access memory random hardware failure failure, occurring at a random time, which results from 1 or more of the possible degradation mechanisms in the hardware
(Definition IEC 61508)
RIO remote input/output
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risk combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm
(Definition IEC 61508)
Risk is calculated using the following equation: R=S*H
The letters stand for:
S
H
Letter
R
Meaning risk extent of the damage frequency of occurrence of the damage
RM requirements management
RRF risk reduction factor
(Definition IEC 61508)
The risk reduction factor equals 1/PFD.
Glossary
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183
Glossary
RTC real-time clock
S
Safety Function function to be implemented by an E/E/PE safety-related system, other technology safety-related system or external risk reduction facilities, which is intended to achieve or maintain a safe state for the EUC, in respect of a specific hazardous event
(Definition IEC 61508)
Safety Integrity probability of a safety-related system satisfactorily performing the required safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated period of time
(Definition IEC 61508)
Safety PLC
Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S or 140 CPU 671 60S)
Safety variable variable used to implement a Safety Function in a Safety-Related System
Safety-Related System
This term designates a system that both
implements the required Safety Functions necessary to achieve or maintain a Safe state for the
EUC and
is intended to achieve, on its own or using other E/E/PE Safety-Related Systems, other technology Safety-Related Systems, or external risk reduction facilities, the necessary Safety
Integrity for the required Safety Functions.
SFC sequential function chart
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.
SFF safe failure fraction
SFR
Safety Functional requirement
Safety Functional requirements are derived from the hazard analysis and define what the function does, for instance the Safety Function to be performed.
SIL
NOTE: For complete definitions and parameters related to SIL ratings refer to IEC 61508,
"Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems".
Provided here is a partial definition.
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Glossary safety integrity level discrete level (1 out of a possible 4) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the E/E/PE safety-related systems, where safety integrity level 4 has the highest level of safety integrity and safety integrity level 1 has the lowest
(Definition IEC 61508)
SIL2 project (application)
A project (application) that uses a Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S V1.00 or
140 CPU 671 60S V1.00) to implement Safety Functions in a Safety-Related System.
SIL3 project (application)
A project (application) that uses a Quantum Safety PLC (140 CPU 651 60S V2.00 or
140 CPU 671 60S V2.00) to implement Safety Functions in a Safety-Related System.
SIR
Safety Integrity requirement
Safety Integrity requirements are derived from a risk assessment and describe the likelihood of a
Safety Function to be performed satisfactorily, for instance the degree of certainty necessary for the Safety Function to be carried out.
sniffing reading the configuration out of a PLC
SRS safety requirements specification specification containing all the requirements of the safety functions that have to be performed by the safety-related systems
(Definition IEC 61508)
SSC system Safety concept
This is a detailed description of the system architecture, configuration and diagnostics required to achieve Functional Safety.
ST structured text
This is an IEC 61131-3 programming language for PLC user logic.
Statement of Consequence
This is the last line within all special messages. It begins with "Failure to follow these instructions..." systematic failure failure related in a deterministic way to a certain cause, which can only be eliminated by a modification of the design or of the manufacturing process, operational procedures, documentation or other relevant factors
(Definition IEC 61508)
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185
Glossary
T
TÜV
Technischer Überwachungsverein
(German for Association for Technical Inspection)
U
UMA unrestricted memory area
It is a specially dedicated memory area for bits and words which is not write protected.
V
VDE
Verband Deutscher Elektroingenieure
This is the German equivalent of the IEEE.
W
warm start
Warm start refers to restarting the computer without turning the power off.
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Modicon Quantum
Index
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Index
Symbols
%S0,
%S1,
%S7,
%S118,
%S119,
%S120,
%S121,
%S122,
%S4,
%S5,
%S6,
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187
Index
%SW54,
%SW55,
%SW56,
%SW57,
%SW58,
%SW59,
%SW60,
%SW61,
%SW62,
%SW63,
%SW70,
%SW71,
%SW75,
%SW76,
%SW77,
%SW78,
%SW8,
%SW80,
%SW81,
%SW87,
%SW9,
%SW90,
0-9
100MSCOUNTER,
61508
61511
A
ADJDATETIME,
APMODE,
loss of, auto-lock,
Automatic start in Run, automatic swap,
188
B
BLKERRTYPE,
C
CARRY, checklist
for configuring Safety-Related Systems,
for I/O modules,
for operation, maintenance, and repair,
for programming SIL3 applications,
for safe peer-to-peer communication,
,
CRC (cyclic redundancy check), cyclic redundancy check (CRC),
,
,
D
DAYOFWEEK,
DIAGBUFFCONF,
DIAGBUFFFULL,
DLASTDEREG,
DLL (dynamic link library),
double code execution, 33 double code generation, 33
dynamic link library (DLL),
E
F
FASTACT,
FASTPERIOD,
33003879 10/2017
FFB (Safety function/function block,
firmware,
forcing,
H
hardware catalog, hardware fault tolerance (HFT),
HFT (hardware fault tolerance),
Hot Standby (HSBY),
HOURMIN,
HSB_CMD,
HSBY (Hot Standby)
I
IEC 61508
Emergency Shutdown (ESD),
ESD (Emergency Shutdown),
Functional Safety,
IEC 61511 try,
installation
Functional Safety for the process indus -
IEC61508
Functional Safety,
INTELMODE,
33003879 10/2017
Index
K
L
LOCIOERR,
M
Maintenance Mode,
Debug Mode,
MASTACT,
MASTCURRTIME,
MASTMINTIME,
mean time between failures (MTBF),
MTBF (mean time between failures),
N
non-interfering function block (non-interfering
O
OVERRUN,
P
PFD (probability of failure on demand, 17
,
189
Index
PFD (probability of failure on demand),
PFH (probability of failure per hour),
,
PLC (programmable logic controller),
PLCBAT,
probability of failure on demand (PFD),
,
probability of failure per hour (PFH),
,
process Safety time (PST),
programmable logic controller (PLC),
proof test procedure,
PST (process Safety time),
Q
Quantum Safety CPU internal 1oo2 architecture,
,
R
REMIOERR, remote I/O (RIO),
RIO (remote I/O),
RSTMSGCNT,
RTCTUNING,
S
safe failure fraction (SFF), 146
Safety FFB (Safety function/function block,
,
Safety function/function block (Safety FFB),
Safety loop,
190
,
Safety move function block,
SAVECURRVAL,
SFF (safe failure fraction),
SIL,
STOPDAY,
T
U
UMA (unrestricted memory area),
Unity Pro XLS
self-test,
unrestricted memory area (UMA),
V
W
33003879 10/2017
watchdog,
write protection,
Y
YEAR,
Index
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191
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